1 Thursday, 25 October 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic, your next witness is?

6 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. Our

7 next witness is Miodrag Jankovic.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

9 [The witness entered court]

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Good afternoon, Mr. Jankovic.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to

13 speak the truth by reading aloud the document which will now be shown to

14 you.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I say something?

16 I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth,

17 and nothing but the truth.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Please be seated.

19 What was it you wanted to say?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was in the witness

21 room before I entered the courtroom, and I left my glasses behind.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Someone is already bringing your --

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: -- spectacles, and so far you've done extremely

25 well without them, so let's hope that continues.

1 You'll now be examined by Mr. Aleksic on behalf of Mr. Pavkovic.

2 Mr. Aleksic.

3 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

4 WITNESS: MIODRAG JANKOVIC

5 [Witness answered through interpreter]

6 Examination by Mr. Aleksic:

7 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Colonel.

8 A. Good afternoon to all.

9 Q. Please state your name for the record.

10 A. Miodrag Jankovic.

11 Q. Colonel, on the 1st of October this year, did you make a statement

12 to the Pavkovic Defence team?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did you read that statement before you signed it?

15 A. I did read it before I signed it.

16 Q. If you were asked all the same questions as in that statement

17 today, would you provide the same answers?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Thank you very much, Colonel.

20 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is 4D504.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Aleksic.

22 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

23 statement into evidence.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

25 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. In your statement you describe in detail your duties and your

2 activities. Will you please tell the Chamber briefly about 1998, what was

3 the post you held back in 1998?

4 A. Back in 1998 I was commander of the 319th Signals Regiment of the

5 3rd Army.

6 Q. Where was it based?

7 A. The command of the 319th Signals Regiment was at the Nis garrison.

8 Q. Throughout 1998, did you as part of your work at any point stay in

9 Kosovo and Metohija?

10 A. Back in 1998, in my capacity as commander of the signals regiment

11 and while I was training the members of the regiment, I was travelling

12 around as commander for the purposes of this training and various drills.

13 I spent some time in Kosovo and Metohija in March and in October.

14 Q. How long were those two visits?

15 A. One or two days each. In addition to that, from July 1998 as

16 units from the 319th Signals Regiment were actually active in the area, I

17 in my capacity as commander would go to the area to see how the unit was

18 doing and how they were going about their assignments. There were a total

19 of three or four visits, and I stayed about one or two days each time.

20 Q. Thank you very much, Colonel. What about 1999, what were your

21 duties in 1999?

22 JUDGE BONOMY: It --

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In 1999, in February 1999, I became

24 chief of the communications organ, which was attached to the 3rd Army

25 command.

1 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Thank you. In your statement you explain in detail about the

3 scope of its work. Will you just tell the Chamber whether it was part of

4 your duties in a purely technical sense to send reports to your superior

5 command.

6 A. As chief of the communications organ of the 3rd Army command and

7 based on a written request by the chief before the war broke out or the

8 head of the communications administration, electronic communications and

9 activities sector, I submitted daily reports in writing at the end of our

10 daily activities. In these reports I provided information on the

11 functioning of the communications system in the area of responsibility of

12 the 3rd Army.

13 Q. Thank you very much, Colonel. Again, in your statement you

14 provided some technical and detailed explanations about all of this. Will

15 you briefly explain to the Trial Chamber what the situation was after the

16 start of the NATO air-strikes in terms of the situation regarding the

17 communications system in the area of responsibility of the 3rd Army.

18 A. I would like to draw an analogy here about the communications

19 system. I will tell you briefly how the communications system was set up

20 to function in the time prior to the air-strikes. The organs and units,

21 the communications organs and units of the 3rd Army, were fully

22 operational and they were with the Pristina Corps. We also checked the

23 communications systems and the command system. This check was conducted

24 just before the start of the NATO air-strikes. The result was that this

25 highly evolved communications system in the area of responsibility of the

1 3rd Army, the focus being on the Pristina Corps, was providing no more

2 than the bare minimum of conditions in terms of the command system. When

3 the air-strikes began on the 24th of March, 1999, and when the Gora

4 facility was targeted, which was the command post of the 3rd Army, when

5 the Jastrebac facility was targeted, as well as the stationary

6 communications centres, such as Kursumlija and Prokuplje, and regrettably

7 these operations left 11 officers dead, one of them was a professional

8 communications officer at Kursumlija and one was a professional soldier

9 from Prokuplje. The communications system that was operating at the Gora

10 facility was disrupted. This meant that the line of communication between

11 the forward command post of the 3rd Army in Pristina and the command post

12 of the 3rd Army at the command building in Nis was disrupted.

13 From this very first day and on each of the following days,

14 specifically on the 25th, the NATO air-strikes continued on the stationary

15 communications node at Mokra Gora as well as on the Prizren, Djakovica,

16 Pec, Kosovska Mitrovica stationary communications centres and relay and

17 wire communications and links were disrupted, which meant that it now

18 became impossible for the Pristina Corps command and its subordinate

19 units, that is, brigade commands, battalion commands, platoon commanders

20 and the company commanders to submit information in the regular way. And

21 it also became impossible for them to receive proper orders.

22 This example that I mentioned, there were daily strikes by the

23 aggressor on the facilities that were used for our stationary

24 communications centres and stationary communication nodes as well as the

25 external roads connecting these. As a result, the system gradually

1 collapsed bit by bit.

2 Q. You provide a very detailed account of all of this in your

3 statement, Colonel. I'm sorry, I have to interrupt you. What about this

4 situation that was ongoing during the war itself. Was this something that

5 was reoccurring at various points in time? Were there any further

6 disruptions; and if so, for how long?

7 A. Each strike on any of the stationary communications centres and

8 nodes would cause a breakdown in our communications system. They would

9 normally last 24, 48, 72, or more hours. Specifically I'm referring to

10 disruptions to the following levels: Corps commands, brigade commands,

11 battalion commands, and their links to company commands, as well as the

12 links between company commands and platoon commanders.

13 Again, I must go back to the situation that this brought about, as

14 well as attempts that were made to enlist the assistance of forces

15 belonging to the mobile communications system. They were securing some of

16 the elements that were destroyed during these strikes against stationary

17 communication facilities, and they helped to get the communications system

18 up and running, back up and running, to some degree. So after this

19 period, this was restored, but the capacity was greatly diminished. What

20 I'm referring to is the number of channels that were available to all

21 these command levels that I have mentioned.

22 Q. Thank you very much, Colonel.

23 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I've no further

24 questions for this witness. Thank you.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Aleksic.

1 Any Defence counsel have any questions?

2 You'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Hannis on behalf of the

3 Prosecution.

4 Mr. Hannis.

5 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:

7 Q. Good afternoon, Colonel.

8 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Prosecutor.

9 Q. I have some questions for you based on your statement, which is

10 Exhibit 4D504.

11 A. I'm sorry to interrupt, but can I please have a copy of my

12 statement.

13 Q. I have a hard copy for you here, Colonel.

14 A. Thank you very much.

15 Q. Your statement was quite detailed, but I have to confess that some

16 of the terminology was difficult for me to follow. So I'll ask you to

17 explain a few things for me. In paragraph 20 you mentioned that from the

18 2nd of February you and some of the officers from the 3rd Army moved into

19 the 3rd Army war command post in the Gora facility. And what is the Gora

20 facility or what was it at that time?

21 A. You probably remember what I said at the start of my evidence

22 today. I made a reference to the Gora facility. This is a facility that

23 in terms of engineering and how it was built and set up was meant to be

24 protected from cruise missiles, from air-strikes, generally speaking, or

25 attacks by artillery weapons. This Gora facility was prepared - and I'm

1 saying this as a signals officer - to secure that the capacity of our

2 communications system would be such that officers and COs and all the

3 other staff of that particular command post could use it to its full

4 capacity to maintain links with the subordinate units under the command of

5 the 3rd Army. It made sure that they could have a line of communication

6 with the staff of the -- command staff of the 3rd Army, and thus to ensure

7 that there was a smooth command system.

8 Q. Okay. And in what town, what municipality was this located?

9 A. This facility was in Toplicki Ustanak barracks in Kursumlija,

10 Kursumlija municipality.

11 Q. Okay. I saw that in your statement, but I wasn't sure if that was

12 all one location or we were talking about more than one. You mention in

13 paragraph 27 a meeting of officers of the -- at the forward command post,

14 I guess, on the 23rd of March, 1999. The 3rd Army commander,

15 General Pavkovic, I take it, appointed a commanding group from among the

16 officers, which included you and General Djakovic, Colonel Vranic and

17 others. What was this commanding group that was appointed on the 23rd of

18 March?

19 A. There were all these officers and COs and civilians who were

20 involved that I mentioned, and they were manning the forward command post

21 of the 3rd Army. The army commander, General Pavkovic, had the following

22 objective in mind. He wanted to use some of these officers that I

23 mentioned to make sure that information could be obtained as quickly as

24 possible, or rather, that orders could be issued to the subordinate units,

25 those under the Pristina Corps command. It was for this reason that he

1 was spending time at the Pristina Corps command post.

2 Q. I guess I'm not clear, though, on what this commanding group is.

3 Is this some sort of contingency in case the regular chain of command

4 breaks down or certain individuals got hurt because of the war? What is

5 this commanding group and how is it different from the normal positions

6 everyone held?

7 A. It is no different from any other officer group that were part of

8 the -- part of the 3rd Army command at the forward command post of the 3rd

9 Army. However, the army commander wanted to have an operative officer, a

10 signals officer, an assistant for political work, an artillery officer,

11 and whatever was required at hand. He would get people involved who were

12 among the officers present at the forward command post.

13 Q. Okay. In paragraph 29 you mentioned a link to the 29th command.

14 Can you tell me what the 29th command was. That's not something ...

15 A. Mr. Prosecutor, this is what I'm talking about in this paragraph:

16 The consequences of the NATO aggression as they related to the stationary

17 communications system, and specifically the fact that the links were

18 disrupted to a total of 29 different commands.

19 Q. Okay. The way it's translated in English, it says: "In order to

20 link the 29th command with all levels of deployment in the 3rd Army's zone

21 of responsibility." It looks like that's referring to some specific unit

22 or command, and from your answer I take it that's not correct, because I'd

23 never heard of anything in the VJ called the 29th command and I just

24 wanted to be sure I was right about that.

25 A. The only thing I can tell you is that I have never before heard of

1 what you term the 29th command.

2 Q. Could you read the first sentence out for me in the original and

3 we'll see how it gets translated here in the courtroom.

4 A. "This was about a large quantity of radio sets, radio relay sets,

5 multiplex sets, with a total capacity of 616 channels that were no longer

6 operational. These formed a total of 44 radio relay axes, and the purpose

7 they served was to link all of the 29 different commands at all levels

8 around the area of responsibility of the 3rd Army."

9 Is that sufficient for your purposes, sir?

10 Q. Yes, thank you. That sounds a little different than how it

11 appears on my written translation. In paragraph 33, the second sentence

12 in English is translated as: "The impossibility of monitoring the

13 movements of units presented a problem, as a result of which a large part

14 of the PTK-2 remained in the unit utilisation sectors."

15 Can you tell us what PTK-2 is?

16 A. Mr. Prosecutor, this is what I'm trying to say, these were field

17 telephone cables or PTK-2, and this is the type of equipment that the

18 signals units of the VJ were using. However, because the quantity was

19 insufficient and because it wasn't possible to move it around quickly

20 enough on account of the NATO air-strikes, no moves or potential

21 manoeuvres could be covered and no communication could be maintained to --

22 Q. You answered my question. Now I understand what PTK-2 is. I need

23 to back up one little bit to paragraph 28. I forgot to ask you a question

24 I had. In that paragraph you mention: "The average time for eliminating

25 disruptions was 497.4 hours or 20.7 days."

1 In that context can you explain to me what you mean by a

2 disruption. Is that when a communications link is broken for whatever

3 reason, is that a disruption?

4 A. Mr. President, I provide certain figures in this paragraph. These

5 figures are in relation to the functioning of the radio relay link --

6 Q. I'm sorry, I don't think you're answering my question yet. Can

7 you tell me what your definition of a "disruption" is and then I'll have

8 another question.

9 A. All right. A disruption means that a radio relay line of

10 communication that is established with a certain unit, for example, a line

11 between the Pristina Corps command post and one of the brigades or between

12 a brigade command and a battalion command is no longer functioning. This

13 means that a stationary node has sustained damage, and therefore the

14 devices being used there can no longer perform to their full capacity or

15 function at all.

16 Q. Okay. And then you say: "The average time for eliminating such

17 things was 497.4 hours or 20.7 days."

18 I have a hard time grasping that since the war only lasted 79

19 days. Three disruptions and there would be almost no communications for

20 the entire time-period. Can you clarify for us?

21 A. Yes, precisely. Part of the facilities after the NATO aggression

22 could not operate at all; these radio relay communications did not

23 function.

24 Q. But this certainly must have been a contingency that you all in

25 the VJ planned for before the bombing started. You've certainly

1 anticipated that communications systems were something that would be

2 targeted by NATO, and you must have had contingency plans and alternative

3 means of communication, correct?

4 A. Mr. President, the commander of the Pristina Corps in 1997 and

5 1998 asked the command of the 3rd Army to have preparations carried out of

6 the units from the mobile communications system that would establish

7 mobile communications centres and that would be an alternative for the

8 stationary centres or nodes of communication. Since the communications

9 unit of the Pristina Corps, the 52nd Battalion of communications,

10 according to its organizational structure, could not meet these needs,

11 there was no possibility for it to carry it out on its own, with its own

12 signals units. It is from that point of view that the army commander

13 looked at the 319th Signals Regiment, and on the basis of this request he

14 ordered that a mixed unit, a mixed signals unit come to the area of the

15 forward command post with the intention of it providing some kind of a

16 replacement, even to a minimal degree, for a stationary system of

17 communications, the one that was disappearing, going down the drain, as

18 the NATO aggression went on.

19 Q. Colonel, we heard earlier in the case from General Andjelkovic

20 from the Supreme Command Staff, who talked at some length about the

21 communications problems; we also saw a number of exhibits from the daily

22 evening briefings held at the Supreme Command Staff, in which he or

23 someone else from his section talked about attacks on communication

24 facilities. It's clear that there were numerous problems and disruptions,

25 but the overall picture seemed to be that communications were working,

1 reports were going from the lowest level up to the highest, orders were

2 being sent down from the highest to the lowest. Wouldn't you agree that

3 in spite of all these difficulties and the bombings, that you did manage

4 to maintain a working communications system throughout the course of the

5 war?

6 A. Mr. President, as for communications with the Supreme Command

7 Staff, the existing communications system did provide for reports to be

8 submitted to the Supreme Command Staff, or rather, to have orders received

9 from the Supreme Command Staff. In this way it satisfied those needs.

10 The focus of my analysis was the realisation of communications from the

11 corps command to brigade commands, from brigade commands to battalion

12 commands, and from battalion commands towards the commands of companies,

13 and from company commands to squad leaders.

14 Q. And, Colonel, the farther you go down in the communications net,

15 isn't it true, generally speaking, that the distances between the

16 communicators grows smaller, shorter, they're closer to one another, and

17 that alternative means, such as couriers, hand-held radios, other small

18 radios can be used for those kinds of communication and don't necessarily

19 rely on the stationary communication nodes you were talking about before?

20 A. Mr. President, when we talk about zones of defence that the

21 brigades had, they were about 100 kilometres, or in some cases about 60

22 kilometres. Communications devices, I'm talking about small radios, that

23 according to establishment brigades had as part of their equipment as well

24 as battalions, companies, squads, did not make that possible in terms of

25 their technological structure.

1 When we're talking about couriers, that type of communications,

2 where the communications organ or the chief of communications has the task

3 of planning it and it is being carried out by couriers from appropriate

4 commands, this is, indeed, carried through but at a huge risk because of

5 the incessant activity of Siptar terrorist forces. I can give you an

6 example. Signalsmen from the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade, when a wired

7 communications line was being laid, were killed mercilessly, and a few of

8 them were wounded by the Siptar terrorist forces in the period that I'm

9 talking about.

10 Q. Colonel, I'd like to show you a document that maybe you can help

11 us with because of your particular expertise, and this is Exhibit P1052.

12 We're going to try and put it up on the computer screen for you. There

13 are three pages, and we'll go through them one by one. Can you see that?

14 And you'll have to help me out because I only have it in Serbian and I

15 don't speak or understand much Serbian. "Plan rada stanice veze," what

16 does that mean?

17 A. If I could kindly ask you if this could be enlarged, zoomed in.

18 Now I can see. Thank you. In front of me -- Mr. President, may I -- may

19 I speak once again? Before me on the screen I see the DV-6 form which

20 represents a form, a communications document, as prescribed in the Army of

21 Yugoslavia. It is called the work-plan of the communications station. In

22 the right-hand corner there is a designation of the level of

23 confidentiality. It says "military secret." This document is not filled

24 out, and we do not see what the level of confidentiality or secrecy is.

25 That was not filled out.

1 In the line below what is entered is the type of route. In this

2 particular case it is the radio telephone network. There is a section

3 where it says "number." What is entered there is the number of the route.

4 In this particular case it's the number of this network, which is 01.

5 Further on it says: "For the period from" and the obligation there was to

6 enter the exact date, month, year, and then it says "up to" or "until,"

7 and that should contain the same type of information.

8 As for the next part, in this form what we see is the number where

9 the successive numbers are placed in the mentioned radio network. Over

10 here where it says "participants," "ucesnici," this was filled out in an

11 inappropriate way because according to the rules on communication and the

12 instructions on communications, there was the duty of entering the secret

13 names of these five participants.

14 Further on is the rubric that denotes the number for

15 identification. That is established in a particular way, which is defined

16 in special instructions. In this particular plan that we see here, that

17 was not done. Further on there is a distinction between day-time figures

18 and night-time figures. This pertains to information that has to do

19 either with day-time or night-time. It has to do with atmospheric

20 conditions affecting radio communications.

21 Further on, frequencies, transmission frequencies and reception

22 frequencies. Radio information is entered, or rather, relay information

23 is entered for devices that have such capacities. In this particular case

24 it says "K," which is probably for channel, 40, or rather, "R," which is

25 reserve, equals 30. In the rubric that says: "Call-signs," "pozivni

1 znaci," there is telegraph for the plan that is used for radio and

2 teleprinter devices. There are numbers and there are letters that are

3 used as call-signs.

4 As for TLF, that means telephones, there are the following names:

5 "Pastrik, Ibar-40, Osa-1, Osa-1, Kosa-1," and in night-time information,

6 the information provided is identical to the ones that I explained as

7 day-time information.

8 Q. Let me ask you a couple of specific questions. The order in which

9 the names are listed, is there any significance to that in terms of this

10 communication net?

11 A. Mr. President, I did not understand the Prosecutor's question.

12 Q. My question is: Is there any significance to being number 1 on

13 the list?

14 A. As for number 1 -- may I just have a look, with your permission,

15 at the rest of the work-plan of this station. Can I please see the lower

16 part as well. It says here: "Type of radio/network," and what is entered

17 here is something. It says "Veza," "communication," he probably meant a

18 linked radio network. That is what he should have written down here. So

19 somebody is number 1, participant number 1, and that is the main station,

20 namely, that this person calls the other participants and gives them

21 approval to establish communications among themselves, if need be.

22 However, since I've now seen this part of the work-plan, it was not filled

23 out either in accordance with the regulations governing communications.

24 We do not see where the station is placed, the type of work, the type of

25 antenna, the power of the antenna, the frequency, the azimuth of the

1 antenna.

2 Q. Colonel, I understand that. I think you're getting beyond my

3 question, though. You wanted to look at the bottom to see if that might

4 help you answer my question about: Is there any significance to the fact

5 that the number one party identified on the list is the Joint Command?

6 A. Mr. President, precisely as I observed this second part of the

7 work-plan, I could conclude that it is not official, it is not authentic,

8 and it does not have a stamp, which is compulsory for the verification

9 of --

10 Q. Colonel, that's not my question. This document is in evidence.

11 My question was: Is there any significance to the fact that the number

12 one party listed is the Supreme Command? Typically on this kind of form

13 if you were filling it out, wouldn't you put the highest-echelon entity at

14 the top, if you were doing it?

15 A. This is the first time I see this document. I did not --

16 Q. You don't need to see this document to answer my question. If you

17 were filling out this form for a communications net, wouldn't you put the

18 highest-echelon entity at the top, whether that was the Supreme Command

19 Staff, the 3rd Army command, the Pristina Corps command, whoever it was in

20 that link, that was the one that would go at the top, right?

21 A. It depends on the task defined, as set by the commander.

22 Q. Thank you, Colonel.

23 MR. HANNIS: I don't have any more questions, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

25 Mr. Aleksic -- sorry, Mr. Fila.

1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I just thought that we should allow the

2 witness to explain this document to the end. If I understood him

3 correctly, he was saying that it did not have a stamp and that it was not

4 filled out properly.

5 Further cross-examination by Mr. Fila:

6 Q. [Interpretation] Tell me, this document that is before you, was it

7 filled out according to military doctrine? Have you ever written this

8 kind of document? Would it have been done properly had you written it?

9 And what is Pastrik anyway?

10 A. Mr. President, the document that is before me is one that I

11 certainly would not have filled out in this way, or rather, it would have

12 to be filled out in accordance with the instructions on communications.

13 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I object. There are four questions

14 asked by Mr. Fila.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Hold on. Hold on. I can't hear two people at

16 once.

17 Right, Mr. Hannis.

18 MR. HANNIS: I read the transcript, there are four questions asked

19 by Mr. Fila. Could we have them one at a time for the witness, please.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: That seems a reasonable request, Mr. Fila.

21 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] This is the way we're going to do it,

22 Mr. President. One question is: Can he tell us whatever he can about

23 this document; and then the second --

24 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not an appropriate question at this stage in

25 the examination. If you have a particular issue that you want to put to

1 the witness, then please do that, but a general question of that nature is

2 not appropriate.

3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Very well. Your Honour, it's just for

4 the sake of time. I do apologise.

5 Q. Sir, could you tell us, if you had filled out this document, would

6 you have filled it out this way?

7 A. Mr. President, I would not have filled it out this way because it

8 is not filled out in accordance with instructions on communications

9 documents. And as I've already said, there would have to be a stamp on it

10 of the unit that, or rather, the command that had filled out this

11 communications document.

12 Q. The document that you see in front of you, could -- would that

13 enable the establishment of proper communication, as stated in the

14 regulations for communication, if this kind of a paper were to be

15 received?

16 A. When speaking about the deficiencies involved, I wished to say

17 that this document could not enable, ensure proper communications with

18 these five participants.

19 Q. Sir, in your view, is this a document at all then?

20 A. I said in the beginning that this paper that is in front of me is

21 a form that is used in communications documents, but as for being a

22 document that creates conditions for ensuring proper, secure

23 communications, that it is not.

24 Q. Finally, my last question. You see here it says "Pastrik." As a

25 signalsman, do you know what this could mean?

1 A. I am sorry, could you please have this zoomed in. These are

2 call-signs, call-signs. In accordance with the communications

3 instructions, call-signs are established in a prescribed way through

4 additional documents. Pastrik I hear for the very first time.

5 Q. Thank you. Another question that I forgot a few moments ago.

6 When you described the document as you see it here, you said that there is

7 this number, 01, and then it said from the period from/until, and that is

8 not filled out. Can you establish -- say the century in which this

9 document was written?

10 A. I am sorry, Mr. President, that I chuckled, but since there is no

11 such information contained, that is, to say the period from/to, all of

12 this is guess-work, and I don't think it would be serious and proper for

13 me to engage in that here.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No further questions.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic.

17 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours, no

18 questions. Thank you.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jankovic, that completes your evidence. Thank

21 you for coming here to give evidence. You're now free to leave the

22 courtroom.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 [The witness withdrew]

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic.

1 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, our next witness is

2 Tomislav Mladenovic.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

4 [The witness entered court]

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Good afternoon, Mr. Mladenovic.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to

8 speak the truth by reading aloud the document which will now be shown to

9 you.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

11 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: You'll now be examined by Mr. Aleksic on behalf of

15 Mr. Pavkovic.

16 Mr. Aleksic.

17 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

18 WITNESS: TOMISLAV MLADENOVIC

19 [Witness answered through interpreter]

20 Examination by Mr. Aleksic:

21 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General. Will you state your

22 name for the record, please.

23 A. Good afternoon. Tomislav Mladenovic, son of Rajko.

24 Q. General, on the 27th of September this year did you not make a

25 statement to the General Pavkovic Defence team?

1 A. Indeed I did.

2 Q. Did you read that statement before you signed it?

3 A. I did.

4 Q. Were you to be asked the same questions today, would you provide

5 all the same answers?

6 A. By all means.

7 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is 4D505. May it

8 please be admitted.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

10 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, please, briefly tell the Court about your military

12 career, your duties, and the posts that you filled.

13 A. I filled a number of different command posts over a six-year

14 period at a technical, operative, and strategic level. For 26 years I was

15 involved in operations and staff work.

16 Q. Will you please tell the Trial Chamber which post you were holding

17 back in 1998.

18 A. In 1998 I was chief of the operations and training organ. This

19 body was attached to the 3rd Army command. I continued in that post in

20 1999 until sometime around mid-February. As of the 1st of March, 1999, I

21 was appointed to my new position as assistant commander for logistics in

22 the 3rd Army. I remained in that post throughout 1999 and later.

23 Q. Thank you, General. Will you please tell the Chamber whether

24 throughout the summer of 1998 --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Just before you move on. The statement you've

1 produced said: "From 15 February to 1st March I worked as assistant

2 commander for logistics."

3 Now, should that be from 15th February for the rest of 1999?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should I answer?

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Until the 15th of February, I had

7 been in that previous post. Between the 15th of February and the 1st of

8 March, I was involved in the handover regarding my new post as assistant

9 commander for logistics. I was familiarising myself with my new duties,

10 and there had been an order appointing me assistant commander for

11 logistics and the date on that order was the 1st of March, 1999.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. That clarifies it.

13 Mr. Aleksic.

14 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 Q. General, throughout the summer of 1998, did you spend any time at

16 the forward command post of the 3rd Army?

17 A. Indeed. In 1998 I was part of the forward command post of the 3rd

18 Army command. This began on the 27th of July and continued throughout the

19 rest of 1998 until the end of the month of October, actually, which is

20 when it was abolished.

21 Q. General, do you know that General Perisic, the Chief of Staff of

22 the VJ at the time, throughout August 1998 was spending time in Kosovo and

23 Metohija because he was touring units of the 3rd Army?

24 A. Yes, I know that Chief of the General Staff, Perisic, with his

25 team were touring the 3rd Army and its units in Kosovo and Metohija, and

1 specifically in Pristina. I was a member of the forward command post and

2 I was involved in the briefing as a member of the command of the 3rd Army.

3 I was also involved in other activities, later on when an analysis was

4 conducted, and so on and so forth.

5 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have Exhibit 4D143

6 brought up.

7 Q. General, do you recognise this document just by looking at the

8 first page?

9 A. Yes, I most certainly do. It's dated the 14th of August, 1998,

10 isn't it. The name of the document is: "Minutes from the previous

11 analysis session following assessment and inspection of units in Kosovo

12 and Metohija by a team of the General Staff of the VJ on the 14th of

13 August, 1998."

14 Q. Thank you, General.

15 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Now can we please switch to the last

16 page of the B/C/S. In the English version this is the second-but-last

17 page.

18 Q. General, please have a close look, items 3, 4, and 12

19 specifically. For the sake of precision, item 12 in the English happens

20 to be on the last page.

21 A. Item 3 reads: "Create conditions for enlargement of the Pristina

22 Corps and its engagement according to both peacetime establishment and, if

23 needed, wartime establishment."

24 If you would like me to comment, this is what I can say and this

25 is what it means in practical terms. Conditions must be secured for the

1 Pristina Corps under its peacetime establishment to get involved in

2 certain missions, assignments; in other words, for it to grow, for

3 manpower levels to be filled up to the level of its peacetime

4 establishment because the rate was not 100 per cent. Also conditions were

5 to be created and measures were to be taken should any orders to that

6 effect be issued to switch to its wartime establishment, which means to

7 have wartime manpower levels that were quite different from the peacetime

8 ones and the scale was different because there were more men involved.

9 Q. Thank you very much, General.

10 A. Do you want me to move on to item 4? This is what it says:

11 "Prevent DTS forces, sabotage and terrorist forces, from spilling over

12 from one territory into another, crush them within the blockade sector."

13 This is what's being ordered here. One is to foil any movement by

14 the sabotage and terrorist forces from one sector to another. Also, while

15 doing this, these forces are to be crushed in whichever sectors they

16 happen to be in in order to forestall this spillover and to keep them from

17 re-emerging and continuing their terrorist activity.

18 Q. Okay. Item 12, please, General, if you can.

19 A. Sure. Item 12 reads: "Recruitment must be carried out at all

20 levels in order to at least maintain current levels. The order of the NGS

21 for recruitment to PRK units must be ready by the 20th of August, 1998, at

22 the latest, in exact accordance to the VES based on requests by the army

23 command."

24 Yes. This item is related to the previous item, which I believe

25 was item 4 or even 3; it's about the expansion, about the growth, of the

1 Pristina Corps to the very maximum of its peacetime establishment.

2 Because this was not the case, not in terms of soldiers, not in terms of

3 officers, the Chief of the General Staff is hereby issuing an assignment

4 to the -- those in charge of this in the General Staff and the command of

5 the 3rd Army, to do whatever necessary to bring up the manpower levels in

6 the Pristina Corps.

7 Q. Thank you. Thank you, General.

8 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 4D416.

9 Q. General, do you recognise this document?

10 A. Not yet. Can we zoom in a little? Yes, I do. This was issued by

11 the General Staff of the VJ, the date is the 17th of August, 1998. It

12 bears the following title: "Measures to further strengthen

13 combat-readiness." This is an order issued by the Chief of the General

14 Staff following his tour of the units of the 3rd Army and the inspection

15 in Kosovo and Metohija.

16 Q. Thank you very much, General. Please briefly comment on items 3

17 and 4. In the English these are page 2; in the B/C/S item 3 is on page 1,

18 item 4 on page 2. Please briefly comment on item 3 first, if you can.

19 A. Could we please zoom in slightly. It's not particularly legible

20 as it is. All right. It's fine now. Thank you. This item talks about

21 the following: "Units of the 3rd Army, especially the Pristina Corps,

22 with reinforcements must prepare as a priority to engage along and secure

23 the state border." This is fine and this is how it should be shown in the

24 future because now I can read.

25 "Units of the 3rd Army, with the focus on the Pristina Corps,

1 with reinforcements ought to be prepared as a priority to engage along and

2 secure the state border," yes, yes, "facing the Republic of Albania and

3 Macedonia in the border belt, if necessary even further afield, whereby

4 they will be securing all along the border and down the depth of the

5 territory the state border. The involvement of some of the forces should

6 be planned to secure and defend all military facilities, commands, and

7 units throughout Kosovo and Metohija."

8 Q. Thank you very much, General.

9 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may.

11 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Yes, by all means, General.

13 A. I will tell you something about the essence of this because I have

14 just read it back, haven't I? This is how we would have understood this

15 at the army command and what sort of orders we would have issued to the

16 Pristina Corps to deal with this. There is one thing I wish to point out.

17 The task of defending the state border, it's not as in the previous case,

18 just about securing the state border, which is something that is done by

19 the border units, because they're not actually defending, that's not what

20 they do. The order here is in relation to the border belt, which was

21 extended to 5 kilometres, and that is where this defence of the state

22 border was to be carried out. But there's this particular bit of wording

23 added even further afield. What this calls for is the involvement of

24 additional forces from the Pristina Corps in keeping with the assessment

25 along the axes where the dangers -- where the danger came to forestall any

1 movement, any entry by sabotage and terrorist groups from Albania and

2 Macedonia into Yugoslav territory, and vice versa, to prevent these groups

3 from going to Albania to get their weapons there, and such-like.

4 Further, facilities are to be defended behind the army lines as

5 well as manpower and equipment. This is normally something that guard

6 security does and guard security had already been stepped-up for a

7 considerable period of time. But the order here is to defend. What does

8 that mean? That means that units belonging to the Pristina Corps must be

9 used across this area, because if you defend a certain facility, a

10 barracks, for example, or a building, the Pristina Corps command, any

11 storage facilities, military depots, that sort of thing, this is not

12 something that you can do effectively from inside, from the building or

13 facility itself. Then you're certain to meet a bad end. You have to do

14 this from outside to really defend these facilities, to make sure that you

15 do. So that's the meaning of this.

16 Q. General, can we now go to page 2 of the B/C/S, item 4, comment

17 briefly.

18 A. In this item, the spillover of sabotage and terrorist forces from

19 Kosovo and Metohija must be prevented into the Rasko-Polimska territory --

20 Q. Slow down, if you can, please.

21 A. "As well as the Jablanica and south Morava areas -- sectors.

22 Continue coordination and concerted action, joint action, with forces of

23 the MUP and in keeping with assessments, provide support to the MUP forces

24 in their effort to crush sabotage and terrorist forces to a degree that

25 will not significantly affect the implementation of the fundamental tasks

1 of the VJ units."

2 Q. General, be so kind and tell the Trial Chamber, what is the

3 Rasko-Polimska sector. Where is the Jablanica sector? Where is the south

4 Morava sector in the Republic of Serbia. Explain the location of all

5 these places.

6 A. The order here is to foil any spillover from Kosovo and Metohija

7 into the Rasko-Polimska sector. This is north-west of Kosovo and

8 Metohija. It's not part of Kosovo and Metohija. If I had a map, I could

9 show you. Likewise, this spillover should be prevented. The Siptar

10 terrorist forces must be stopped from actually crossing into that area.

11 That's what spillover means. It's a term much used in the military.

12 Spillover into the Jablanica sector or south Morava sector. That's what

13 it says at least. We don't know specifically what they mean. So this is

14 to the south, speaking from a purely administrative point of view, in

15 relation to the area covered by Kosovo and Metohija.

16 So what is this about in purely practical terms? One must prevent

17 any movement by the sabotage terrorist forces, first and foremost to the

18 south, facing the Republic of Albania and the Republic of Macedonia, as

19 defined by the previous item that we looked at. And on top of that, both

20 the east and the west must be secured in relation to Kosovo and Metohija,

21 the area east of Kosovo and Metohija and west of Kosovo and Metohija.

22 This order does not say that forces should start action only along the

23 area north of Kosovo and Metohija, which in administrative terms borders

24 on central Serbia.

25 In order for this to be implemented, as envisaged by this

1 document, this effort would have required a significant involvement on the

2 part of the Pristina Corps for this assignment to be completed. The army

3 command must certainly understood well what this order by the Chief of the

4 General Staff meant and implied. They produced an order for the army

5 command. It was probably a more detailed order, but I can't remember

6 right now, on how to operationalise these assignments. I am certain that

7 the order faithfully reflected these assignments. They may have been

8 presented in a more specific form and also in a more operational form.

9 Q. Thank you very much, General.

10 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please have Exhibit

11 4D418.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I still haven't managed to comment

13 on the latter portion of the item. I'm not sure if you want me to or not.

14 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Yes, my mistake. I'm really sorry. Will you, please.

16 A. Because it is much broader than that, isn't it. So the latter

17 part of this item says that: "Support should be lent to the MUP forces in

18 their effort to crush the sabotage and terrorist groups to such a degree

19 that would not significantly affect the implementation of their

20 fundamental tasks."

21 This position that support should be lent to the MUP forces is

22 self-explanatory. The only thing I have to add is about the degree that

23 is specified, such a degree that will not significantly affect the

24 implementation of the fundamental tasks. Based on what I said before, the

25 fundamental tasks of the units of the 3rd Army, and the Pristina Corps

1 above all, was to secure the state border. There is now this order by the

2 Chief of the General Staff. It says: "To defend," defend, "the state

3 border." Now, this was the case in all previous orders.

4 Furthermore, the next vital task is to defend military facilities,

5 materiel, and manpower, defend manpower and secure facilities would be the

6 exact wording, but that is something that we have in our rules, and one

7 must make sure that the life and work of the Pristina Corps could unfold

8 smoothly, which involves the Pristina garrison, and in particular the

9 units along the state border. Their vital interest would be at risk if

10 this assignment was not carried out.

11 Q. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, General.

12 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this may be a good

13 time for a break because I'm about to move on to my next exhibit.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Mladenovic, we have to have a break at this

15 stage; that will be for 20 minutes. Could you please leave the courtroom

16 with the usher and we will see you again at five minutes past 4.00.

17 [The witness stands down]

18 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 4.06 p.m.

20 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, while we're waiting for the witness to

21 come in, I just wanted to apologise for my disruption. Apparently, my

22 personal communications were working too well.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: It's bound to happen occasionally, Mr. Hannis.

24 Thank you for that.

25 [The witness takes the stand]

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic.

2 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Could we please call up in e-court 4D418.

4 Q. General, do you recognise this document?

5 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Could it please be zoomed in.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was better a few moments ago.

7 Maybe it should have stayed the way it was, but I'll do my best. Yes, I

8 can see it now. This is a document of the General Staff of the Army of

9 Yugoslavia, the sector for operations and staff affairs, the 24th of

10 August, 1998. I see that it is in the form of a telegram. The document

11 was sent to the commander personally or the Chief of Staff, to the command

12 of the 3rd Army.

13 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Can you give us your comments regarding paragraph 3 of this order.

15 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see paragraph 3,

16 could you scroll down. Thank you.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly. This paragraph

18 regulates, I'm reading it out: "In keeping with the needs and

19 possibilities, support the MUP forces in crushing and destroying sabotage

20 terrorist forces, bearing in mind that the level of combat-readiness not

21 be impeded of commands and units in carrying out their basic tasks."

22 The content of this paragraph actually relies on the previous

23 order of the Chief of General Staff that I spoke of; however, what is

24 highlighted here is the support of the forces of the Ministry of the

25 Interior. Of course what is borne in mind are the basic tasks that the

1 army, or rather, the Pristina Corps had in the area of Kosovo and

2 Metohija.

3 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Thank you, General. Now we are going to move on to another topic.

5 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Could we please call up in e-court

6 4D495.

7 Q. General, can you recognise this document?

8 A. Yes, of course. This is a typographic map on which a decision is

9 depicted of the commander for crushing the sabotage terrorist forces in

10 the area of the village of Ratis. The map shows a graphic representation

11 of the action that was planned to be carried out in this region.

12 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what is written in the upper

13 left-hand corner of this document, this map?

14 A. Yes, certainly. This is customary -- or not customary, this is

15 the way it's regulated in the rules on combat documents, that the

16 commander should give his approval. Here it is specifically the

17 approval -- it says: "I approve," and then the name and surname of the --

18 that is to say, the commander's decision is approved by the commander

19 Lieutenant, or rather, Colonel-General Dusan Samardzic.

20 Q. Can you recognise the signature in the upper left-hand corner?

21 A. Yes, certainly. Because I brought many documents to the commander

22 to sign, I know what his signature is. As far as I can see, it is the

23 commander's signature.

24 Q. Thank you, General.

25 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please call up on

1 e-court 4D504.

2 Your Honours, because time is short, we did not manage to have the

3 entire document translated, but the part that we do have translated is an

4 official translation by CLSS. So we're looking at the heading and we're

5 looking at a particular paragraph that I'd like to hear the witness's

6 comments on, but we have the entire text in the system.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the rest of it to be translated?

8 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] It will be translated.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

10 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please, Your Honours.

11 Just a moment.

12 Your Honour, I do apologise for this pause. The right number

13 would be 4D508, so could we please have that document called up on

14 e-court. Could the B/C/S version please be displayed on the other page,

15 the page -- the second page, paragraph 5, and in English we just have this

16 one page so could we keep that. And I would like to look at 5.1 in the

17 Serbian version. Yet another page to go in the B/C/S version. I do

18 apologise.

19 Q. General, could you please be so kind as to have a look at this and

20 could you look at the second paragraph, the following words: "I have

21 decided ..." and so on.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Why have we lost the English? Sorry. Thank you.

23 Please continue, Mr. Aleksic.

24 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, could you please read the second paragraph within

1 paragraph 5, the one that says: "I have decided..." et cetera.

2 General, this is just a partial translation that is there. Could

3 you please make an effort and read it even though it's this way so that

4 the Trial Chamber could see the English version as well.

5 A. Yes, that's fine. It says here: "Continue to intensify (combat

6 groups of the army) to support MUP forces in surrounding and routing the

7 DTS in the general sector of Kramovik. Engage some of the forces in

8 preparations to block the villages of Donji Ratis and Gornji Ratis."

9 I see down here the signature of the commander of the 3rd Army. I

10 didn't see the beginning, it's probably a combat report, where paragraph 5

11 was part of the content of this report. This is certainly the way reports

12 are done. Because of course, as authorised by the commander, I signed

13 this document and submitted it to the superior command, or rather, the

14 operations staff of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia. So that

15 is the document involved. And what is done here is an order is issued for

16 the further engagement of forces. I want to say for all of paragraph 5

17 that it is an integral part of combat reports and it means that the

18 commander of the subordinate unit - in this case the commander of the

19 army - sends to the superior command - in this case the General Staff of

20 the Army of Yugoslavia - their decision on the engagement of army forces,

21 specifically this mostly has to do with the forces of the Pristina Corps

22 but then there were the other army forces there as well, for the following

23 day.

24 Q. Thank you, General.

25 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Could we now call up in e-court

1 4D496.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: I take it that means that this document is a combat

3 report being addressed to the General Staff by the 3rd Army?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 Mr. Aleksic.

7 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

8 So could we please have 4D496 now.

9 Q. General, do you recognise this document, or rather, this map?

10 A. I cannot see anything here.

11 Q. Sorry. We were a bit faster.

12 A. Yes, I recognise the document. It is entitled as: "A survey of

13 the deployment of forces at the end of the fourth stage," that is the

14 disposition of forces in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, it has to

15 do with the forces of the 3rd Army, notably the Pristina Corps. And this

16 disposition of forces, as represented graphically on this map, was

17 approved by the army commander.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't think I have

20 the right map.

21 Q. Thank you, General. Just a second, please.

22 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we're going to move on

23 to the next document that has to do with this particular topic until we

24 resolve our problems here.

25 Could we please call up in e-court 4D451.

1 Q. General, this is the English version. Do you recognise this

2 document?

3 A. It would be right if this could be zoomed in, the command of the

4 3rd Army -- yes, now I can see it, yes. It's a document of the command of

5 the 3rd Army, dated the 18th of October, 1998. This is a regular combat

6 report which was submitted to the operations centre of the General Staff

7 of the Army of Yugoslavia from the command of the 3rd Army.

8 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Could we please see paragraph 5,

9 subparagraph 2; in B/C/S it is page 2 and in English, I believe.

10 Q. General, can you give us your comments on paragraph 5.2?

11 A. Yes, certainly. 5.2 is entitled: "Situation," meaning the

12 situation in army units, and what is reported here is that combat groups

13 from the Pristina Corps took over sections. It is stated here which

14 combat group took over what section. It also includes the actual figures

15 pertaining to every one of the units in combat groups and what the

16 equipment they have is. This was, generally speaking, the content of

17 combat reports. Daily information was provided in this way, depending on

18 what was relevant and important for that particular day. This was an

19 obligation in terms of carrying out a specific order, in this case of the

20 General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, and a deadline would usually be

21 provided, but if a deadline was not specifically stated then it -- it

22 meant that a report would be included in the regular combat reports.

23 Q. Thank you, General. After the agreement was signed with the

24 Kosovo Verification Mission, or rather, with the OSCE, what post did you

25 have?

1 A. The head of the organ for operations and training and staff

2 affairs, however, with a special -- by a special order by the army

3 commander, after the forward command post of the command of the 3rd Army

4 was abolished on the 30th of October, 1998, that is the date when it was

5 abolished, by an order of the commander - I don't know when exactly it was

6 issued, perhaps a bit before that day - I was appointed head of the team

7 for liaising with the organization for security and cooperation in Europe

8 in Kosovo and Metohija. It was called KVM in its English version.

9 Q. Thank you, General.

10 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Could we please call up in e-court

11 3D785.

12 Q. General, do you recognise this document?

13 A. Yes, certainly. This is a document that was drafted by the

14 liaison team of the command of the 3rd Army, liaising with the OSCE, that

15 is; specifically this has to do with a regular, weekly, report for the

16 period from the 18th until the 24th of December. The document was sent

17 and registered on the 24th of December, 1998. You will probably see the

18 signature there. You will see that I signed this document, this report,

19 as head of that team.

20 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] We need paragraph 3, please.

21 Q. Just one question before that. Throughout your tour of duty, did

22 you send such reports from the liaison team to the General Staff, you or

23 your deputies, that is?

24 A. Yes. By the order of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia,

25 and in keeping with the order of the command of the 3rd Army, it was

1 regulated that daily reports should be provided by the liaison team to the

2 command of the 3rd Army and weekly reports on the realisation of tasks.

3 This submission of weekly reports was directly and specifically derived

4 from the agreement where it says in a particular paragraph that state

5 organs of the Republic of Serbia shall submit to the mission weekly

6 reports on movements, situation in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija,

7 that is to say, of their own forces. So daily reports were written,

8 whereas these were summary reports. They certainly contained the

9 activities that were reported on in daily reports. It's the same

10 structure that was used for these reports, but it was in one place, and it

11 was the duty of the liaison team of the General Staff of the Army of

12 Yugoslavia to submit this report to the appropriate organs of the OSCE

13 team.

14 Q. Thank you, General.

15 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] My mistake, we need the first page

16 of this document, paragraph 1 on the first page, and then paragraph 3

17 further down there.

18 Q. And if you can read that and give us your comments.

19 A. This paragraph reads that: "On the 21st of December, 1998, between

20 8.00 and 2.00 in the afternoon, a movement was carried out of a military

21 column consisting of 23 combat vehicles; three 30/2, two-barrelled

22 30-millimetre, tanks, mortars there; 120 mm BRDM, armoured reconnaissance

23 vehicles, three; and one TZI, recovery vehicle, along the following axis:

24 Batlava - Bajcina trig point 716 (the Jablan feature) and vice versa."

25 This paragraph and all the other paragraphs that pertain to the

1 forces of the 3rd Army moving about in Kosovo and Metohija is something

2 that the liaison team of the General Staff of the VJ got regular reports

3 on.

4 Q. Could you please comment on paragraph 1.

5 A. Paragraph 1 says that: "At 0800 hours on the 19th of December a

6 reinforced 15th Armoured Brigade, tank company, consisting of 20 combat

7 vehicles, 15 non-combat motor vehicles, and 165 soldiers and officers,

8 went to the Batlava airfield sector to carry out planned exercises

9 pursuant to the unit Combat Training Plan and Programme."

10 Should I comment on this? I would be happy to. The Pristina

11 Corps was reinforced indirectly with soldiers that were trained already.

12 It wasn't the case that individual training was done anywhere in Kosovo

13 and Metohija or in the Pristina Corps. It was said that no untrained

14 soldiers should be sent to the area because the area was dangerous. They

15 would receive individual training across the units and behind the lines in

16 central Serbia.

17 Once a soldier arrived at the Pristina Corps there would be

18 individual training, but that was all that was done. It certainly was

19 desirable for every soldier to be trained to perform tasks required as

20 part of the establishment from the lowest possible level, squad level, up

21 to the tactical levels or company and even battalion, so that to all

22 practical intents this particular activity, the training itself, in a

23 particular area, this was done by the 15th Brigade of the Pristina Corps.

24 As far as I'm familiar with the agreement with the OSCE, the

25 activity was not limited to that, and I'm pretty certain that I'm quite

1 familiar with it. The corps command was responsible for training their

2 own troops, especially bearing in mind its surroundings and the situation

3 that it had been facing for quite some time.

4 Q. Thank you, General. At the outset of your evidence you said that

5 on the 1st of March, 1999, you became assistant commander for logistics at

6 the 3rd Army command. Can you tell us this: Was the medical service,

7 too, part of the logistics organ?

8 A. Yes, certainly. The organization of the logistics organ of the

9 3rd Army command comprised the medical service. This was one of the seven

10 services that were part of the organ, and not going into all the rest of

11 them, but the answer to your question is yes.

12 Q. Thank you very much, General.

13 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Could we please have Exhibit 4D354

14 brought up. Thank you.

15 Q. General, do you recognise this document?

16 A. Yes, certainly, I can see it. This is a document produced by the

17 command of the 3rd Army dated the 20th of April, 1999. The heading is:

18 "Battle-field clearance, supplement to order."

19 Q. All right. Paragraph 1, what does it say?

20 A. "Send Captain First Class Milos Kostov, a pathologist from Nis

21 military hospital to join the PrK team for battle-field clearance on the

22 21st of April, 1999."

23 Q. General, do you know that this particular pathologist, Kostov, was

24 there on a particular mission or was he simply sent out as a permanent

25 reinforcement? Did he remain there until the end of all combat

1 operations? Do you know anything about that, sir?

2 A. This document was produced at the command post itself. It was

3 authorised by the commander and was first forwarded to the military

4 hospital so that it could carry out this particular assignment. It was

5 also forwarded to the logistics organ at the rear command post. I was

6 assistant commander for logistics, and the medical service under me, and

7 we were in charge of monitoring the activities of the Nis military

8 hospital, and we were to see to it that this order was carried out.

9 Captain Kostov was dispatched in keeping with this order, and the duration

10 of his stay was not limited. He was to carry out his tasks as soon as he

11 reported to the Pristina Corps command, until further notice, that's what

12 it says.

13 This is a supplement to an already-existing order on battle-field

14 clearance, as it reads, and the request is probably for him to join the

15 teams already involved in clearing the battle-field or perhaps one of the

16 investigation teams, but there should be more specific order by whichever

17 commander was in charge at ground level. But I know that he was

18 dispatched there and he was to remain until further notice and for as long

19 as his presence was required.

20 Q. Thank you very much, General.

21 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no further

22 questions for this witness.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Sepenuk.

24 MR. SEPENUK: No questions, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Anyone else have questions?

1 Mr. Lukic.

2 MR. LUKIC: Give me just one minute to organize myself, Your

3 Honour.

4 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General. I am Branko Lukic; I

6 represent General Sreten Lukic. I only have a couple of questions and I

7 want to pick your brain. I want to use your experience and see if you can

8 help us explain a couple of things. This will not be a cross-examination

9 true and proper as we know it.

10 You do have a copy of your statement in front of you, don't you?

11 A. No, in fact I don't.

12 Q. I want to talk about paragraphs 21 and 22 of your statement. The

13 kindness of our technicians is helping me along in this and we'll soon

14 have these paragraphs on our screens, this is page 4 in the B/C/S that I'm

15 talking about.

16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please zoom in on paragraphs 21

17 and 22.

18 Q. General, if perhaps you find that easier, do you want a hard copy

19 in front of you? I could provide one.

20 A. If you need your own copy, I'll do my best to follow it on -- to

21 follow on the monitor in front of me.

22 Q. Fine then.

23 A. Should I address the issues?

24 Q. Have you read paragraph 21, sir?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. In this paragraph you talk about Defence Exhibit 4D495.

2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we please bring this exhibit up

3 in e-court. Could we please have 4D495 brought up. Thank you.

4 Q. General, can we agree that what we can see on this map, a decision

5 by the commander to crush the sabotage and terrorist forces in the Ratis

6 sector, is a representation of the respective positions of the VJ forces

7 as well as the MUP forces?

8 A. Yes, I can agree to that.

9 Q. Is this decision in actual fact a component of an order?

10 A. This decision, this map, is a visualisation of a combat order. It

11 visualises, it represents, what is envisaged in the actual combat order.

12 Q. Thank you very much.

13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we just scroll down slightly,

14 please.

15 Q. General, there is something there that is circled in red towards

16 the bottom of the map, the 52nd Combat Group?

17 A. Combat group number 52.

18 Q. Indeed. I think it's actually the 52nd Military Police Battalion,

19 maybe it's not clear in your copy.

20 A. Yes, there is the 52nd Military Police Battalion just above, but

21 the last thing I see down towards the bottom is the combat group -- 52nd

22 combat group.

23 Q. You're quite right there. My mistake. I apologise.

24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please now have 6D698 brought

25 up in e-court. Thank you.

1 Q. General, can you tell us what this is about. What sort of a

2 document is this?

3 A. This is a combat document, an order, produced by the Pristina

4 Corps command. On the last page you can see who actually issued the

5 order, and we can have a look if you like.

6 Q. This is an order to support the MUP forces in crushing the

7 sabotage and terrorist forces in the general area of Ratis village, right?

8 A. Right.

9 Q. All right. Let us first bring something up in e-court.

10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Page 3, please, both in the English

11 and the B/C/S. We need 5.3.

12 Q. Item 5.3, General, reads: "The 52nd Military Police Battalion

13 shall attack along this axis: Suka Vogelj-Porobica-Donji Ratis village

14 with the following task: In cooperation with a part of the forces of the

15 8th MUP Detachment and the Djakovica PJP company ..."

16 Is that consistent with what we saw in that decision on the map?

17 A. The axis of operations of the military police that was marked

18 there is probably reflected in this document. These should be compared.

19 The axes -- their respective axes should be compared with the ones that we

20 see on the map, and then we can base our conclusion on that.

21 Q. Just another question about this document, sir. Something about

22 item 8.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] This is page 6 in the B/C/S and page 7

24 in the English, please.

25 Q. This is a part of an order to do with command and communication.

1 There is a mention there of coded maps, maps in code. We are mere laymen

2 here. Could you please be so kind as to explain in layman's terms what

3 that means. Why are these important and what is their purpose, why

4 they're made.

5 A. Sure. Maps in code are produced for tactical units, companies,

6 and so on. Certain locations are defined in code and reports are based on

7 this. Whoever is listening to this reporting process has no idea what

8 they're talking about. That is the simplest possible explanation. This

9 is normal at lower tactical levels normally using encrypted communications

10 secure lines, but these are smaller units so a map in code was quite

11 acceptable. A commander would use this to base his reports to his

12 superior commander on.

13 Q. Thank you. Is it true that axes of operations are marked on these

14 maps for any assignments?

15 A. It depends. If it is an attack, if it concerns an attack, then

16 this is represented in graphic terms, where a particular unit acts. That

17 is the way it is done. That is how maps are made.

18 Q. Thank you. Every commander sees his role on this map and also the

19 tasks of his unit and those of his neighbours. Is that customary?

20 A. Yes. The axis of his engagement. I didn't give you a full

21 answer. It is customary when an order is given to a particular unit, then

22 it says in narrower terms, This is the task, and then through a manoeuvre

23 or in concert with another unit get to such and such a line. This is

24 practically a representation of what was written in the order.

25 Q. We just want to have a complete transcript. Thank you. As you've

1 already said, these maps are handed over to commanders of units that

2 participate in the action concerned. Can we, therefore, conclude that

3 maps were given to commanders of the units of the Army of Yugoslavia as

4 well as the commanders of the units of the MUP that are marked on these

5 maps that are decisions?

6 A. That's what you said, not me. The commander of the unit concerned

7 makes the map, his superior commander approves, it is his map and it

8 reflects his decision. The superior commander approves the map. The

9 superior commander does not draw the decision of the subordinate commander

10 on a map and then hand it over to him. However, as for a map that was

11 done by a higher level and that pertains to several units, he sees his

12 place and his role, and then that part that he is supposed to carry

13 through, he elaborates. He makes a combat document, an order, he

14 represents it graphically on a map. The commander hears his idea as to

15 how the decision should be carried through, and if it is in line with the

16 order of the superior commander, then he approves it. He says, I accept

17 your decision, please go ahead, and then he works out the combat order as

18 a combat document, and the content of that order is graphically

19 represented on a map. Once this is done, then he brings this map to his

20 superior commander for him to see, and then he approves it with placing

21 his signature in the upper left-hand corner. That's the procedure

22 involved.

23 Q. Obviously I as a layman made a mistake, because in our vocabulary

24 there is a difference between commander, in the sense of komandant and

25 komandir in the sense of commander?

1 A. Up to battery level and then there are commanders in the sense of

2 komandant at the higher levels.

3 Q. Commanders of -- commanding officers and leaders of lower-ranking

4 units that are marked on these maps, do they get the part of the map

5 showing their unit and its axis of action? That's what I wanted to ask.

6 A. It's possible that a company leader can get it. He doesn't work

7 out these combat documents. He does not write an order. He does not work

8 on a written document, and he does not draw a map. He gets his order from

9 the superior commander orally. He makes an assessment. He conveys his

10 decision. He is not duty-bound to draw a map or to write a decision.

11 Q. Thank you for your explanations.

12 A. He can get an excerpt, that's all right, but it's not obligatory.

13 Q. Now I would like to move on to paragraph 22 of your statement.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Before we move on, the questions are being asked of

15 you to establish whether or not the commander of a MUP unit acting along

16 with VJ would ever have issued to him the map or a part of a map that had

17 been prepared for the operation. Now, you've indicated that orders are

18 given down the chain orally, and while a map may be in somebody's hands,

19 some inferior officer's hands, that is not obligatory. Are there any

20 circumstances in which a MUP officer in charge of a MUP unit involved in

21 such an operation would be given a diagram or map setting out the task?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand your question. I don't

23 know how this is regulated in the Ministry of the Interior and with the

24 MUP forces. What I was saying pertains to --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't think you do understand. The question

1 relates to the VJ map. Are there any circumstances in which the MUP would

2 be in possession of a map prepared by a VJ commander?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think so. I see no reason

4 for that, because the army command made maps for their own units. And if

5 the MUP units are of interest, then they're on the map. However, giving a

6 MUP officer the map, I don't see that would be necessary, and after all

7 it's not regulated that way either.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

9 Mr. Lukic.

10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 Q. [Interpretation] You said that you don't know how this is

12 regulated in the MUP. Have you ever seen a map for carrying out combat

13 activities made by the MUP?

14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other microphones

15 please be switched off except for the speaker's.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was never in a position to see

17 one.

18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Thank you. Could we please now move on to paragraph 22. You say:

20 "I participated in creating the document 3D697. This document is an

21 analysis from the 2nd of October, 1998, and was written by all the organs

22 of the command of the 3rd Army at the IKM in Pristina."

23 I'm just going to ask you about the methodology involved, how it

24 is that we got certain figures.

25 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] For our purposes could we see on

1 e-court page 9 in B/C/S and 10 in English. Could we zoom in on column 5,

2 please, Ratis, since that is what we were discussing.

3 Q. This breakdown is attachment 3, attached to your document. In

4 column 5 we see Ratis --

5 A. In the fifth line you mean.

6 Q. All right. Can we see from there the number of personnel involved

7 in this action?

8 A. Yes, certainly. It's portrayed here.

9 Q. Is it correct that the final outcome of these columns, save for

10 the Army of Yugoslavia, was obtained in the following way. All the

11 personnel taking part in all actions were added up?

12 A. That's correct. All the individual numbers were added up of

13 persons taking part in individual actions, and then this was sublimated.

14 If we look at the numbers involved in each and every action we see what

15 the grand total is, how many people were involved in all actions.

16 Q. Here it seems that in these nine actions, 56 combat groups took

17 part. Is it correct that there weren't that many combat groups in Kosovo,

18 but that it is this methodology that added up all people in all actions

19 led to this number?

20 A. You're right. You're quite right, certainly. Of course I know

21 that there weren't that many. There's an exact order of the army

22 commander and the General Staff, where groups were defined at this level.

23 So it's 10 or 15 groups as far as the army is concerned. It was either 10

24 at one point in time, and then another five were established on the basis

25 of a decision by the army command. I don't want to speculate now, but I

1 think it was 15 or 16 groups, that's it. No -- oh, I wish there were this

2 many.

3 Q. This pertains to the number of personnel, right, so this count led

4 to this number of people as well?

5 A. Yes, we've dealt with that already, haven't we?

6 Q. We lawyers are sometimes boring and we have to ask questions that

7 seem unnecessary to other people. The same pertains to the police as

8 well, right?

9 A. Well, that is the charm of you legal people. Yes, of course, it

10 pertains to the police as well.

11 Q. We can also see the JSO here. It says that there were three

12 units, and we all know that there was just this one unit, the JSO, if you

13 know?

14 A. As far as I know, there was just one; however, I do allow that the

15 Ministry of the Interior knows better than I do.

16 Q. Thank you, General. No further questions for you. Thank you for

17 having answered my questions.

18 A. Thank you, too.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Mladenovic, you'll now be cross-examined by

20 Mr. Hannis for the Prosecutor.

21 Mr. Hannis.

22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:

24 Q. Good afternoon. Could you tell us what rank you held when you

25 retired.

1 A. Yes, certainly. I retired on the 1st of July, 2002, as

2 lieutenant-general.

3 Q. And, General, you told us that, I think, from 1st of March, 1999,

4 you worked as assistant commander for logistics in the 3rd Army command;

5 is that correct?

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. And where physically were you located during that time, from the

8 1st of March through the end of the war, in June 1999?

9 A. In that period of the war I was at the logistics command post that

10 was located in Nis. According to a certain plan, I also toured army units

11 in the area of Kosovo. As far as I can remember, I was on tour twice and

12 both tours lasted from one to two days.

13 Q. Do you recall approximately when you made those tours and where

14 you went specifically in Kosovo?

15 A. I cannot remember exactly when I went. There was some time in

16 between, but I know exactly where I went. I toured the 202nd logistics

17 base that had its command post in the village of Banjska. I also visited

18 a part of the 202nd base, which was located in Klina. I was at the

19 command post of the 3rd Army -- the forward command post, rather, of the

20 3rd Army that then coincided, rather, it was located at the command post

21 of the Pristina Corps. That's where I met the army commander and the

22 corps commander. That is basically where I was engaged. I did not go out

23 to control the joint forces because from a professional point of view I

24 was in charge of the logistics bases, and the logistic base was

25 resubordinated to the command of the Pristina Corps; and that is why I

1 went there to see them.

2 Q. Thank you. You told us that in 1998 you were part of the forward

3 command post of the 3rd Army command, beginning on the 27th of July until

4 the end of October 1998, when it was abolished. Where was that forward

5 command post located?

6 A. The forward command post was taken -- was located in the barracks

7 of Kosovski Junaci in Pristina.

8 Q. Why was that forward command post abolished in October 1998?

9 A. The forward command post of the command of the 3rd Army in 1998 at

10 this location was abolished by an order of the superior command. However,

11 if one were to ask what the reason was - now this is my opinion - it was

12 due to the fact that the basic tasks that the army had until then had been

13 carried through, and there was no need for it to remain there any further.

14 And that is why it was abolished. A forward command post, and forward

15 command posts in general, of subordinate units are established by the

16 superior commander.

17 Q. Did its abolishment have anything to do with the

18 Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement and the creation of the OSCE and the KVM?

19 A. I don't know about that exactly, because -- well, first of all, on

20 the basis of this agreement forces were withdrawn that were outside the

21 establishment of the Pristina Corps. Then forces from the area of the

22 Pristina Corps were withdrawn into military complexes or barracks. So the

23 composition of forces that were engaged in Kosovo and Metohija was far

24 less extensive than before, and therefore it was probably not necessary to

25 have a command post there any further. I am not ruling out the

1 possibility of this agreement having affected the situation, but I'm not

2 sure.

3 Q. Fair enough. Thank you.

4 MR. HANNIS: I'd like to look at Exhibit 4D416.

5 Q. This is one you talked about earlier, General, it's the 17 August

6 1998 document about measures to further strengthen combat-readiness. And

7 I think if we could go to -- do you recall looking at that before?

8 A. Yes, I said that, didn't I?

9 MR. HANNIS: If we could go to the second page, I think it's item

10 number 4 in the B/C/S.

11 Q. And the second sentence in there it's translated in English as:

12 "Continue coordination and joint action with MUP forces and in keeping

13 with assessments, support the MUP forces in destroying the sabotage and

14 terrorist groups ..."

15 From that is it fair of me to conclude there must have been prior

16 joint action and support of the forces of the MUP, since it says

17 "continue." So I gather that was going on before this point in time?

18 A. Yes, by all means. If it says "continue," then that's what it

19 means.

20 Q. And based on your position and being stationed at the forward

21 command post in July to October 1998, you do know there was a body called

22 the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija in Pristina at that time, don't

23 you?

24 A. I didn't know about any Joint Command or any body called that.

25 Q. You never heard of it before?

1 A. I had previously heard of the expression "Joint Command." I had

2 heard this expression at the forward command post, but what this

3 expression meant to me and everybody else at the forward command post --

4 well, I don't know about everybody else, do I, but I do know about myself.

5 This to me meant activity by the Pristina Corps command with the MUP

6 command staff in Kosovo and Metohija, and this was about coordinating

7 actions. This was about having cooperation between the army and the MUP,

8 maybe coordination at the level of cooperation where the Pristina Corps

9 command was involved and the MUP staff for Kosovo and Metohija, that was

10 my information at least. But this was about cooperation. That was the

11 level.

12 The Pristina Corps command was not superior or subordinated to the

13 MUP staff or, indeed, the other way around. So that's what it meant.

14 Yes, the expression was bandied about, so when the Pristina Corps

15 commander made a decision, it would be approved by the army commander to

16 lend support to the MUP forces, and then the Pristina Corps commander

17 would take an operative officer, go to the MUP staff, or they would go to

18 the corps command, I'm not really sure how this worked because I wasn't

19 there myself, and this is one thing that I do know and that is what the

20 expression meant to me, Joint Command, but I'm not aware of any body

21 actually existing.

22 MR. HANNIS: I see Mr. Ackerman on his feet.

23 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, there may be a translation problem,

24 I'm not sure. I'm told that in 55, line 8, when he was first asked about

25 it this, he said: I didn't know about any Joint Command or any organ that

1 was called the Joint Command, I don't know if that's different, but I

2 think it is.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The question was about a body, and I

4 said I didn't know about any body. That's what I said.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 Please continue, Mr. Hannis.

7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

8 Q. General, I need to follow-up on that, I guess, because in English

9 when I say "a body," it can mean either an individual human being or it

10 can mean an organ, I guess, is the term that is translated for a group of

11 people. Either way, were you aware of any human being or group of human

12 beings that were known as the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija

13 meeting in Pristina in 1998?

14 A. Body organ command, body and organ, it's about body parts, right,

15 but for something to be a command it needs a structure, an organizational

16 structure, and this must be defined by appropriate documents. An

17 organizational structure must have organs, and I believe that now we can

18 use the word organs that are in charge of certain functions.

19 At the head of that body there is, for example, a command, and

20 then you have a commander. These are rules governing work in the VJ. I

21 did not know of any such body. A command of sorts, well, I probably would

22 have known about that and that command would have been part of a command

23 system having to do with the army, the MUP, or a third party. I probably

24 would have known, but I didn't and I do not, not the way you defined it.

25 Q. Okay. Well, let me try it this way because we've had this problem

1 with other witnesses. Now, whether you call this body the Joint Command

2 or whether you say it's a coordinating body or whether you call it the

3 Pristina branch of Hell's Angels, are you aware of a group of people,

4 including General Pavkovic, General Lukic from the MUP, Mr. Sainovic,

5 Mr. Minic, Mr. Andjelkovic, Mr. Matkovic who met in Pristina in the summer

6 and early fall of 1998?

7 A. I never said "body" nor did I give the possibility to say that

8 somebody was somebody's branch and so on and so forth. As for this

9 structure you're telling me about now, what you're enumerating, I don't

10 know. I'm not competent to talk about that. I was at the forward command

11 post of the army command. What I said to you, I know that, I was there, I

12 confirmed that. I know that the expression at the forward command post

13 figured in that way.

14 I do know that as far as coordination with MUP staff was

15 concerned, General Pavkovic went there and Colonel Jankovic went there.

16 They said, We're off there to coordinate this, to agree on this, with the

17 MUP. Who else was there is not something that I know. What I don't know,

18 I can't say, can I? I was there -- had I been there, had I seen this, I

19 would say so or maybe it was, but I don't know.

20 Q. So you did know that General Pavkovic and Jankovic, was he a

21 colonel or a general at that time? Let me ask you that first.

22 A. I said already that General Pavkovic went with Colonel Jankovic to

23 this coordination meeting.

24 Q. And you don't know who any of the other people were that went to

25 these meetings; is that correct?

1 A. I don't. I never needed to know. What mattered to me was that

2 there was a representative of the army who was involved in a joint task

3 with the MUP, and that had to be agreed there. Anything else was not my

4 business. I had my other tasks, to which I devoted all my time.

5 This was a command at an operative level, it had it own purview,

6 this was within its purview pursuant to the rules governing the work of

7 corps commands, they had to have coordination with commands of that level,

8 from the MUP specifically, to exchange information, and it was on this

9 task where we were supposed to lend support to the MUP, and that needed

10 coordinating. They did that on their own. There was no need for anyone

11 to mentor this process or supervise this process and that there was no

12 such thing for lower command levels when they have something like that and

13 when somebody to monitor or supervise them, no, there was no such thing.

14 Q. And I take it from that and your earlier answer, that you

15 personally never saw any documents purporting to come from the Joint

16 Command or any VJ documents referring to the Joint Command; is that right?

17 A. I never saw any documents with that type of heading or origin

18 arrive at the forward command post of the army, but I can't rule out the

19 possibility that there are certain documents that refer to the Joint

20 Command. There are references to that in certain minutes that were taken

21 at the forward command post, certain records at the forward command post.

22 Those are documents that say that the commander of the Pristina Corps,

23 after his decision was authorised, was going to the Joint Command to agree

24 coordination with the MUP organs. I did see those references in

25 documents, but a document from a Joint Command and me seeing such a

1 document, no.

2 Q. But you did see a document referring to the Joint Command; is that

3 right?

4 A. Yes -- probably. I can't rule that out. There may have been a

5 reference somewhere that it was supposed to go somewhere to the Joint

6 Command, the expression being used, but maybe not. If I saw a specific

7 document, maybe I could tell you. There were all sorts of documents

8 produced by various organs. I don't know if there was a reference to that

9 or not. I don't know for sure. Somebody may have written things like

10 these. The commander went to a coordinating session with the Joint

11 Command, somebody may actually have used the expression. I can't rule out

12 the possibility.

13 Q. It seems to me, though, General, we've asked similar questions of

14 some of the other military witnesses, that you as a professional soldier,

15 if you had seen a document come across your desk making reference to a

16 Joint Command, wouldn't that have aroused your curiosity, because command

17 is a very specialised and important concept for professional soldiers. So

18 wouldn't you want to know, What's this Joint Command? I never heard of

19 it. I know the 3rd Army command, I know the General Staff, what's this

20 Joint Command? Wouldn't that have made you curious and caused you to

21 investigate if you had seen such a document?

22 A. Investigate, no, that wasn't my job. That was other people's job,

23 other organ's job. But I did have an idea about the expression Joint

24 Command, and it was no surprise to me, but I never pictured a command, an

25 actual command when I said that and there was nothing that really piqued

1 my curiosity and there was no need for that on top of everything else.

2 Q. Well, I can understand why you might have less curiosity if the

3 document that came across your desk said "coordinating body," but Joint

4 Command, as I say, seem to have a special military significance. But you

5 say it wouldn't be your job to investigate something like that; is that

6 what you're telling us?

7 A. That was about what you said earlier on, about me investigating

8 that, other than that a Joint Command is not a term that has any

9 particular technical significance anywhere in the VJ. If you look at all

10 the rules, you won't find a single reference to that type of command, nor

11 indeed can it exist. Therefore, for me, the issue has no relevance

12 whatsoever.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: The oddity for -- speaking for myself, is that

14 that's exactly the situation where you would expect a man used to dealing

15 with the concept of command to be concerned. If the regulations rule out

16 such a body, when you see a document emanating from such a body or

17 referring officially to it, should it not ring bells and require you to

18 check up what it is?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the documents that

20 I produced, that I was responsible for. I never used that expression

21 myself in any of those documents. I never saw a document marked as the

22 Joint Command. If another organ used that expression, well, I must say I

23 wasn't really receiving many of those documents, not that kind. I

24 wouldn't look into that because those documents were not my

25 responsibility. I never used the expression myself. I consider it to be

1 a mere expression.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: I have one other question in regard to this.

3 When was it that General Pavkovic and Colonel Jankovic were

4 attending these coordinating meetings?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to the work-plan of the

6 forward command post, when the Pristina Corps on the next day was supposed

7 to, for example, carry out a certain action and then the corps commander

8 would --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, you misunderstand me. What time of year was

10 this? First of all, which year was it?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This occurred in 1998. It was part

12 of the orders that we looked at previously.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: And bearing in mind the position you held then,

14 what were the circumstances in which Pavkovic would tell you where he was

15 going?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Pavkovic had no need to tell me in

17 person. He would say that and everybody from the forward command post was

18 there. There were about ten officers there, including the army commander

19 or the Chief of Staff. He would receive approval for the decision to lend

20 support to the MUP forces and he would say, I'm off to the MUP or Jankovic

21 would say something. This was an expression that was used, We're on our

22 way there to agree on a decision, so this was some sort of a Joint

23 Command, and this was in the summer of 1998.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: And can you tell me who gave General Pavkovic

25 approval for the decision to lend support to the MUP forces?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The army commander.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: That was General Samardzic?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Samardzic or the Chief of

4 Staff, if he happened to be at the forward command post and the army

5 commander was away, General Simic.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

7 Can we break now, Mr. Hannis?

8 MR. HANNIS: That was my next request.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Mladenovic, we have to have a break at

10 this point; that will be for half an hour. Could you leave the courtroom

11 with the usher, and we'll see you again at 6.00.

12 [The witness stands down]

13 --- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.

14 --- On resuming at 5.59 p.m.

15 [The witness takes the stand]

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.

17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Could we bring up Exhibit 4D495.

19 Q. General, this is a map you looked at earlier. I think this is one

20 involving a proposed operation in the area of Ratis village. Hopefully,

21 it will be on your screen in a second. Maps take a little longer because

22 they're such big files. Do you have it on your screen now, General?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. I can't tell, is there a proposed date for this operation on the

25 map?

1 A. As far as I can see, no.

2 Q. Okay. Would there normally be on a map like this or not?

3 A. It should be marked according to the instruction on keeping combat

4 documents, that is to say instructions for the work of commands and

5 staffs. So the date should be marked.

6 MR. HANNIS: Now, if we could scroll to the bottom of the map. I

7 want to be sure before I ask.

8 Q. I don't see anything at the bottom of the map. We've had some

9 other maps where in the lower right-hand corner there would also be a name

10 and a signature. Is that a standard procedure?

11 A. It is standard procedure to have in the upper right-hand -- lower

12 right-hand corner to have the author of the map, the name, and the rank,

13 and also the signature of the appropriate commander of the relevant

14 command, who is in subordination to the officer whose name is in the upper

15 left-hand corner and that he got the map from. I don't see that here.

16 Q. And what does the absence of that information on this map signify

17 to you, if anything?

18 A. That fact indicates to me that this job had not been completed,

19 that staff work was not present to a sufficient degree. The staff officer

20 taking care of this was duty-bound to take care of it. The name was

21 supposed to be there and it was supposed to be signed. Maps are usually

22 done by staff officers. Commanders, or rather, these officers take it to

23 their commander so that they would see it, so it is really the fault of or

24 omission on the part of the staff officer and the commander probably did

25 not have the time to see this.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't know if this is important, Mr. Hannis, but

2 I don't think I understand -- I'm just trying to move it. I don't think I

3 understand who is supposed to sign where.

4 MR. HANNIS: I'll follow-up, Your Honour, if I can assist.

5 Q. It was my understanding from some of our earlier maps and earlier

6 witnesses that in the upper left-hand corner was usually the name and

7 signature of the superior officer or commander who was approving the

8 proposed map, and the signature in the lower right-hand corner was by the

9 subordinate officer who had created the map or was proposing the operation

10 depicted on the map. Is that correct?

11 A. Yes, that is correct. As I said, this was -- well, what is

12 important for this map is the substance --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Just answer what you're asked, because that leaves

14 outstanding who the reference is to in the upper left-hand corner, line 24

15 of page 63, which is where I become confused.

16 MR. HANNIS: You mean the phrase about: "And that he got the map

17 from"?

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

19 MR. HANNIS: Yeah, that part confuses me.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: I'll deal with it if you like.

21 MR. HANNIS: Please.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: General, you've also referred in your answer to

23 something being in the upper left-hand corner. What should that be?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the upper left-hand corner what

25 is written is that the map is being approved and who it is that approves

1 it, the rank, the name, the surname. And then the map is verified by a

2 signature, and thereby considered to have been approved, the map.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, and in fact I've been unfair to you,

4 Mr. Hannis, because I see you've actually asked the question that way

5 according to line 15, but I heard "right-hand" I think, although it says

6 "left-hand" in the -- so I've caused utter confusion.

7 MR. HANNIS: Okay. Well I thought I was clear about that, that

8 signature in the upper left-hand corner is the superior officer who

9 approves --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: This is all my mistake, Mr. Hannis.

11 MR. HANNIS: Okay.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: I think. But my problem is there is reference to

13 three people in the answer that was originally given. There was the lower

14 right-hand and the upper right and the upper left.

15 MR. HANNIS: Well, let me --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Maybe the upper right was a mistake, I don't know.

17 If you look at line 20 of page 63: "It's standard procedure to have in

18 the upper right-hand" and then it changes to lower right-hand. So, maybe

19 if that can be clarified we'll have the answer.

20 MR. HANNIS:

21 Q. General, if you can be patient with me for another minute. Then,

22 in the upper left we have the superior officer, the commander, who signs

23 signifying his approval of the operation proposed on the map, correct?

24 A. Yes, precisely, just as you put it.

25 Q. And --

1 A. However, this is not an operation, this is an action. Operations

2 are much bigger. They have to do with the use of corps as a whole. So

3 these are combat actions. There is a difference involved. That is a far

4 lower level.

5 Q. Well, I appreciate that. Can you tell me where the dividing line

6 is between an operation and an action, how many units are involved before

7 an action turns into an operation?

8 A. In order to call something an operation, it has to be carried out

9 at least at corps rank; that is to say, that this corps can have 15 or 17

10 brigades, and that is between 3500 and 5.000 people. That is to say, up

11 to 10.000 people. Action is combat action, a combat activity, if you

12 wish.

13 Q. And would not have more than how many men, more than a thousand?

14 A. It cannot be more than 5.000.

15 Q. Okay. Now let me get back to the map. In the upper right-hand

16 corner of this map, what information do we see there in the upper

17 right-hand corner?

18 A. Up there we see the degree of secrecy where it says "defence state

19 secret," that is the highest level of secrecy or confidentiality. Also

20 there are other levels, strictly confidential and confidential,

21 respectively; however, this is the highest level: Defence state secret.

22 It is decided upon by the officer in charge.

23 Q. Okay. And that's a standard procedure on all maps and that's

24 where it always goes is in the upper right-hand corner; is that correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And in the lower right-hand corner is where you would normally

2 expect to see the name and signature of the author of the map or the

3 proposer of the action or the operation?

4 A. Yes, that's where the rank, or rather, where the post is, as in

5 commander, and then the rank and then the name and surname. That is

6 written by the draftsman, and then the commander has to sign it, the one

7 who created the map.

8 Q. And in the left-hand corner does any information typically go

9 there or is that normally blank, the lower left-hand corner?

10 A. If necessary, there is a key there, and that is usually done when

11 the composition involved is very complex. For small maps like this, it is

12 quite clear, green is MUP, red is army units, and blue are the terrorist

13 forces. There is no need to have a key for this because this -- these are

14 standard markings. It would be superfluous here. It's not necessary to

15 do it at all on maps like this.

16 Q. Okay.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you now explain to me whether the person who

18 signs the bottom left signs first or -- the bottom right, rather, or

19 whether the person who signs the top left signs it first?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First the lower right, the commander

21 who brought the map for approval and for the map to be seen.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: So how can this map contain the approval, as it

23 does, without having the name and signature of the person who sought

24 approval?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is possible when the officer who

1 goes with the commander did not finish this, the commander did not notice

2 this, the superior commander does not check this, previously the map was

3 not given to the professional organ of the command from where it is

4 brought to double-check it and see if everything was done right, and then

5 the officer who accompanies the commander, he submits it, the commander

6 signs it, and that's the end of that. So certain omissions were made

7 here.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one moment.

9 Mr. Hannis.

10 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

11 Q. And, General, then, while we're looking at this map, it proposes a

12 joint action involving both MUP and VJ forces, correct?

13 A. This is a graphic representation of action by MUP and VJ forces.

14 The proposal contains the engagement of army forces to support the MUP

15 forces. The commander gives approval for the engagement of army forces,

16 the superior commander, that is.

17 Q. Okay. And I want to follow-up on a question I think that Judge

18 Bonomy asked you when Mr. Lukic showed you another map, and that is: How,

19 if you know, how would the commanders of the MUP forces - I don't know if

20 these are detachments or what size they are - but of these MUP forces, how

21 would they know where they were supposed to go and where their positions

22 and axes of movement were vis-a-vis what the VJ forces were doing unless

23 they had a copy of this map?

24 A. MUP forces that are depicted here in order to be able to carry out

25 this task have to have the same map, because this content of the MUP here

1 is based on decisions made by the staff of the MUP or the organ in charge

2 in the MUP. I wouldn't like to define that, probably a MUP staff or some

3 command, for the engagement of MUP forces. In relation to that, what was

4 planned was support to the MUP by the army. According to this logic, the

5 MUP would have to have an identical map, except that it would have to be

6 approved by the competent authorities of the MUP in this way. After all,

7 this is prescribed through their own rules and regulations, and I really

8 would not be competent to interpret that. That would be logical. But

9 really, I do not have any insight into that combat rules, the way they are

10 used, and also how their combat documents are regulated. I simply do not

11 have such information available, and this is not a subject I dealt with

12 during my professional career. How the MUP professionally plans the use

13 of its forces and what documents are a basis for the use of their forces.

14 However, in order to carry this out correctly and in a coordinated manner,

15 it has to be identical. However, there is an appropriate MUP command

16 standing behind the use of the MUP, and as for the army it is depicted

17 here who is behind that.

18 Q. Bear with me for a moment. Just getting down to the basic,

19 simplest level, then somebody draws up this map initially. Would that be

20 somebody in the VJ or somebody in the MUP, if you know?

21 A. If a military operations officer is preparing the map for the

22 commander, then it is going to be drawn by an operations officer of the

23 army; however, he has to know before that what forces are going to be

24 engaged by the MUP and what kind of support he needs. When the MUP forces

25 are depicted to him, how they're going to be engaged as well, and that he

1 is asking for such and such support, then he depicts the deployment of the

2 military; and that is the end of the job as far as the operations command

3 of the army -- operations organ of the command of the Army of Yugoslavia

4 is concerned.

5 Q. And as a practical matter, how does a copy of this map get into

6 the hands of the MUP? Does somebody in the VJ make an exact copy and

7 deliver it to the MUP so it can be distributed to those commanders in the

8 field who are going to need it? Physically, how does that get done?

9 A. That I don't know. I did not participate in that process, how the

10 MUP submitted combat documents to their subordinates. I really don't

11 know. I simply don't know. There was no need for me to know that or did

12 I see that in the case of any MUP organ, that a copied map have been given

13 to them with the signature of the commander of the army. There were some

14 maps that were signed by General Pavkovic. Perhaps this had to do with

15 speed. I assume that it had to do with speed rather than insufficient

16 professionalism, although the two are related.

17 However, this kind of map, for it to be used as a base for a MUP

18 understanding -- MUP use, I don't understand this and I did not see the

19 MUP using a map like this because I was not directly engaged with them. I

20 was mostly engaged in tasks that were being carried out by army units and

21 the focus on the border, et cetera, so I did not take part in this

22 technical work to see how this was done in their situation.

23 Q. Okay. General, I don't know if there's an equivalent Serbian

24 expression for something we say in English about the devil is in the

25 details, meaning, for example, it may be easy to make a big plan, but

1 working it out, the logistics and all the little things you have to do to

2 accomplish it is what we refer to. Do you understand the concept I'm

3 proposing when I say "the devil is in the details"?

4 A. We say "djavo" for devil, that's the word that's to be used. But

5 if the latter is not there, then the operations level, the strategic

6 level, cannot do a thing, the higher level. So yes, this is

7 concretization. This is where, ultimately, tasks are being carried out,

8 so it's got to be there.

9 Q. And wouldn't you agree with me then, in the case of trying to

10 effectively implement joint operations between the MUP and the VJ, it

11 would be useful, if not necessary, to have some sort of body to coordinate

12 that or, perhaps, command it, and that's the very kind of thing a Joint

13 Command could do and did do in Kosovo, correct?

14 A. If the security forces - because that's what they're called too,

15 according to the law - the army and the MUP are referred to in that sense,

16 if they were to be structured by having, that is to say the MUP and the

17 army, to have units for carrying out such tasks, that would be excellent.

18 However, this painstaking job of coordination was indispensable in order

19 to have this carried out, or if somebody had authorised the army to

20 command the MUP or authorised the MUP to command the army, it would be far

21 simpler, whereas this way, this coordination on a footing of equality is

22 what happened. I'm not going into whether -- to what extent it was

23 successful, but it does require quite a bit of effort.

24 Q. Thank you, General.

25 MR. HANNIS: I don't have any more questions, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Mladenovic, could you have a look again at

2 4D416.

3 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I think you addressed him by

4 the wrong name.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, sorry.

6 MR. HANNIS: I heard Radinovic, Your Honour, but I see it's

7 correct on the transcript.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I hope I said Mladenovic.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard Mladenovic. I heard

10 Mladenovic.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: That's good enough for me, Mr. Mladenovic.

12 4D416.

13 Questioned by the Court:

14 JUDGE BONOMY: There are a number of things in this document, and

15 at one stage you told us that when you're referring to spillover from

16 Kosovo being prevented, that the reference there was to the north-west of

17 Kosovo and Metohija. And then you went on to say: "The Siptar terrorist

18 forces must be stopped from actually crossing into that area. That's what

19 spillover means. It's a term used in the military. Spillover into the

20 Jablanica sector or south Morava sector. That's what it says at least.

21 We don't know specifically what they mean. So this is to the south,

22 speaking from a purely administrative point of view, in relation to the

23 area covered by Kosovo ..."

24 And then a little further on you say: "And on top of that, both

25 the east and the west must be secured in relation to Kosovo. The area

1 east of Kosovo and Metohija and the area west of Kosovo and Metohija."

2 Now, I'm trying to understand these references to south, east, and

3 west. I understand what you were saying about north-west, but west of

4 Kosovo is Albania, is it not, and south of Kosovo is Albania and

5 Macedonia? So what were you saying in that section of your evidence about

6 the nature of the task being assigned to the VJ?

7 A. May I? I will explain it slowly. The Rasko-Polimska region is

8 outside the area of Kosovo and Metohija geographically speaking to the

9 north-west, in the Republic of Serbia, and it has an administrative line

10 dividing it from the central part of Serbia. The Jablanica district is to

11 the east of the area of Kosovo and Metohija, just like the southern Morava

12 district, as is written here, but I think it's called the Pcinja

13 district. To the south is Macedonia and Albania. Practically, from that

14 task there, from the Chief of General Staff, what was ordered was to make

15 sure that from the area of Kosovo and Metohija there is no spillover or

16 not to allow a transfer of terrorist forces or for them to cross over to

17 Albania, Macedonia, the eastern part, that is to southern Morava district,

18 as stated in the order of the Chief of Staff, the Jablanica, and also

19 Rasko-Polimska region, so it is only not towards the north.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: I now understand that clearly. And does that

21 amount to deploying the VJ along - and I use this word in the broadest

22 sense - along the border between Kosovo and Montenegro and Serbia?

23 A. That means that the army has to prevent the spread of terrorism --

24 terrorist forces from here, but not Serbia but exactly regions as stated

25 here, Rasko-Polimska, then the central part, towards the central part of

1 the Republic of Serbia, Pcinja, Jablanica, Rasko-Polimska region, all of

2 that is central Serbia. That is to say, to prevent a spillover of

3 sabotage and terrorist forces from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija to

4 the areas mentioned now.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 Mr. Fila, is it necessary?

7 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Yes.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.

9 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, yes. I'll tell you why

10 straight away. Yesterday we received notification --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Ask your question.

12 Further cross-examination by Mr. Fila:

13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Mladenovic, you spoke about the fact that the

14 3rd Army at one point -- and I'll ask you about 1998. I don't want to

15 know about anything else. You said in response to a question by the

16 Chamber that it was sometime in the summer of 1998. All right. So

17 that -- in the summer of 1998, that General Pavkovic went to that, to

18 those meetings, to reach agreements with the MUP. The first question I

19 wish to ask you is this, can you answer this one for us: How long did

20 that go on for?

21 A. Until September, I think, when the actions were completed. If you

22 look at when the last action was completed, so that is the time we're

23 looking at. I don't think it went any further than October. I don't know

24 for sure, but if you look at the last operations and the dates coincide,

25 but it didn't spillover into October, or rather, it didn't exceed October.

1 Q. Second question: The forward command post, you said when

2 General Pavkovic came there, about actions that were to be taken the next

3 day and sometimes General Samardzic was there and sometimes there was the

4 Chief of Staff, and we know that was General Simic, don't we, do you know

5 what time of day the general came, General Pavkovic?

6 A. This was regulated by the work of the forward command post that

7 subordinate commanders should be there at about 1800 hours or 1830, and

8 that's when it happened.

9 Q. All right. Did General Pavkovic after that go to these meetings

10 for those agreements or whatever we choose to call that with the MUP

11 organs?

12 A. Yes, after that, later.

13 Q. If there was a desire to change something, to amend an order

14 received by General Pavkovic from General Samardzic or Simic, would

15 General Pavkovic go back to see Simic about that, about the possible

16 amendments or not?

17 A. Yes, if there was a need felt by the MUP for further support for

18 more forces to support them in relation to what the army commander or the

19 Chief of Staff had authorised at the forward command post,

20 General Pavkovic would go back and then he would present this, he would

21 say that they had additional requests, additional needs, and the army

22 commander would approve that or not approve that, depending on what

23 decision he took in each specific case.

24 Q. General Simic was heard before this Trial Chamber, and he said

25 this -- his decision was law to Pavkovic, and Pavkovic had to live by

1 that. Do you agree with that?

2 A. That is perfectly in keeping with the rules governing the

3 functioning of the army. There is a popular saying: An order issued by a

4 superior officer is law to his subordinate officer. This is a popular

5 saying in the -- in command theory.

6 Q. All right let's not waste any more time. You explained about this

7 command system, right. Yes, you have. In the last sentence that the

8 Prosecutor asked you he said that it was their claim, and that maybe

9 somebody else's claim, too, that the Joint Command, the body called the

10 Joint Command, exercised command over units of both the army and the MUP

11 in Kosovo, right. Throughout your time there in 1998 and everything else

12 that you told us about, everything else you did there, have you ever come

13 across a suggestion that somebody exercised command over both you and the

14 MUP and that the name of this someone was the Joint Command? What do you

15 think about this position, about this belief?

16 A. I've never heard this belief expressed, really, this position

17 presented. As far as the army is concerned, I know that, I can say that,

18 nobody else could possibly have exercised command over us outside the army

19 itself. So if you have the Pristina Corps in addition to the army

20 commander, who was there at the forward command post? Nobody else could

21 possibly have exercised command over it and there would have been no need

22 for anybody else to exercise command over it.

23 If we leave that aside for a moment, Commander Pavkovic really

24 cared very much about subordination. Whenever there was something that

25 was ambiguous he would always go back to the army commander and he never

1 allowed any interference in his own command structure. Even when I tried

2 to bring up some things with my subordinates without his knowledge he

3 would always be furious about this, Who is this Mladenovic, what has he

4 got to say about this --

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Please stop.

6 That question was inappropriate, no one objected to it, but again

7 you're going way beyond what is necessary when you're allowed the

8 privilege of re-cross-examination, Mr. Fila. And you must appreciate that

9 the type of answer that's just been given is one that might well led to a

10 request by Mr. Hannis to ask more questions and you've all had your turn

11 already. This is not the proper way to conduct this additional form of

12 cross-examination. We allow you to avoid prejudice. This was not a

13 question necessary to avoid prejudice. Now, if you have any more that

14 need to be asked, please ask them.

15 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Let me just have a look.

16 Q. My last question: We spoke - and you referred several times in

17 answer to many different questions - that there had to be some form of

18 coordination between the MUP forces and the army forces on the ground.

19 You said about the fact that back in 1998 the army was coordinating with

20 the MUP, they were lending the MUP their support, and so on and so forth.

21 My question: Is it necessary for a third party to do this or is it

22 possible for the army itself to coordinate its actions with the MUP

23 without anyone's intercession? How exactly did that happen?

24 A. That would not have been necessary. If there had been a third

25 party, they merely would have hampered the process.

1 Q. Thank you very much.

2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] That completes my questions.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, does anything arise from that?

4 MR. HANNIS: Well, from the answer the witness gave, I did have

5 one question.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please.

7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

8 Further cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:

9 Q. General, you said at page 77, line 5: "Commander Pavkovic really

10 cared very much about subordination. Whenever there was something that

11 was ambiguous, he would always go back to the army commander and he never

12 allowed any interference in his own command structure ..."

13 Sir, are you aware that General Pavkovic was noted on more than

14 one occasion going over his direct commander, going directly to

15 Mr. Milosevic; that is, he went over General Samardzic when Pavkovic was

16 in the Pristina Corps and he went over General Ojdanic when Ojdanic was

17 the head of the General Staff, do you know about any of those --

18 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.

20 MR. ACKERMAN: I object to that question because there's no

21 evidence of that. There are -- there's that letter from Perisic that

22 contends that, but there's not any evidence that he ever went over

23 anybody's head in terms of the Joint Command. Just cause he has a meeting

24 with Milosevic doesn't mean he was going over somebody's head in the Joint

25 Command. This is an inappropriate question because he suggests to the

1 witness there's evidence to support this. There are allegations that

2 might support this, but no evidence.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: The question's not confined, of course, to the

4 Joint Command, but to the circumstances that we've heard about in the

5 course of the evidence.

6 Mr. Hannis, what do you say to the objection --

7 MR. HANNIS: That's correct, Your Honour, it was not limited to

8 the Joint Command, and I'm thinking of General Vasiljevic's testimony

9 about when he was sitting outside with General Ojdanic waiting to see

10 Mr. Milosevic on one occasion.

11 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, that testimony wasn't that he was going there

12 to get instructions of any kind; he just saw him come out of a meeting

13 with Milosevic. There's testimony that they were -- that they had some

14 kinship relationship. We don't know what that meeting was about.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, we are satisfied that there is

17 evidence from which the inference could be drawn that there was a failure

18 to observe the strict command structure and that there is foundation for

19 the question, and therefore we repel the objection.

20 It might be best if you put the question again, Mr. Hannis.

21 MR. HANNIS:

22 Q. General, do you need me to repeat the question?

23 A. As far as I understand - and I believe I understand the question -

24 my answer is this: I am not aware of the fact that General Pavkovic ever

25 went to see Milosevic. I simply don't know about that, and I can't base

1 my conclusion on that, whether he complied with it or not. I'm talking

2 based on my own personal experience. This is my personal view. Other

3 than that, it is not my place to assess a corps commander in those terms.

4 I know from personal experience, and I told you what it was like as far as

5 I was concerned, in certain situations where because of haste I simply

6 skipped his level of authority in that sort of thing.

7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour, I have no further questions.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic.

9 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. It is late

10 in the day, that's true, but I will further strain the Chamber's patience

11 simply because there is a map that I must show the witness.

12 Can we please have 4D381 briefly.

13 [Defence counsel confer]

14 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just wish to

15 supplement what I said earlier on. This is a map that I meant to show the

16 witness during my chief, but it's only now that we have actually found it.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, I recollect the difficulty. Thank you.

18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer].

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Is this what you initially referred to as 4D496 and

20 said you would clarify the position and come back?

21 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Precisely, Your Honour. Precisely.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. Ask your question.

23 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I don't think this map was on

24 the original notification.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: I think that may be the problem, Mr. Hannis, and

1 therefore I understand your difficulty as well, but if Defence counsel

2 were confused about the number then it's going to be omitted from the

3 notification. We have to find a way of accommodating everyone's

4 interests, and if it does raise a problem then, untidy though it may be,

5 you will have another opportunity to cross-examine.

6 Mr. Aleksic.

7 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just one thing before

8 I broach that. This same map without the signature is P1578, it's an OTP

9 exhibit. It was included in the notification. It is precisely because of

10 this -- well, actually --

11 Re-examination by Mr. Aleksic:

12 Q. [Interpretation] General, can you tell us what you see on this

13 map?

14 A. Sure. I see that this is about the decision to engage the forces

15 of the Pristina Corps, to get them involved in Kosovo and Metohija. The

16 decision was approved by the 3rd Army commander, General Samardzic.

17 Probably we have the Pristina Corps commander's signature down there in

18 the lower corner.

19 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Can we please scroll down.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We have to pull it up a little bit

21 for me to see the disposition and if all the formal aspects are met,

22 because we did have a situation a while ago where the formal requirements

23 were not met. Yes, this is precisely what we said a while ago in relation

24 to that previous map because it was missing. This map was signed by the

25 Pristina Corps commander, General Pavkovic. Given the fact that there was

1 a need to depict the border belt and so on and so forth, there is a key

2 for this map for it to be clearer. This is the disposition of the

3 Pristina Corps forces following the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement, I

4 believe. After certain units were pulled out of Kosovo and Metohija,

5 certain establishment units, the agreement was for three combat groups to

6 remain in Dulje, Olujak [phoen], and Lapusnik.

7 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Thank you, General.

9 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. No further

10 questions.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there anything arising?

12 Further cross-examination by Mr. Hannis:

13 MR. HANNIS:

14 Q. Just a question: Is there a date on this map, General, indicating

15 when it refers to?

16 A. Yes, I didn't see it up there -- well, it's not really necessary

17 for there to be the exact date and time on maps such as these because it

18 has nothing to do with this position shown here. I didn't actually notice

19 when it should actually be there, but it's not decisive. It's not about

20 the day or the time of day. This is a fixed, permanent disposition. It

21 stays like that for quite some time, especially in the border belt. It's

22 possible. The instructions do say that we need a date there, but it's not

23 really material.

24 Q. Well, is there a month or a year?

25 A. I can't see it. If we pull it up, perhaps I could see, but right

1 now I can't. I didn't notice the first time around. No, no date.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Is this then, Mr. Mladenovic, a different form of

3 map from the one we looked at earlier which had the name of the proposer

4 omitted completely?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, by all means. This is an

6 excellent observation. In purely formal terms, this is done properly.

7 The relevant commander signed this --

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand it's done properly, but is it not a

9 map of a completely different nature from the one that had not been done

10 properly? Or are they similar maps are you saying?

11 MR. HANNIS: I guess my question, Your Honour, would be: This

12 appears to be a map showing deployments as opposed to a map depicting an

13 operation or an action.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, that's a better way of putting the question.

15 Are we not talking about in this case a map that simply sets out the

16 disposition of forces, and in the other case with the proposer omitted a

17 map which proposed an action for approval by the commander?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is the essential

19 distinction. This is a disposition, it's stable, and the other map shows

20 how a combat action is conducted or carried out.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic, anything further arising from that?

22 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] No. No more maps for this evening,

23 Your Honours. Thank you.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Mladenovic, that completes your evidence.

25 Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give evidence. You're now free to

1 leave the courtroom.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, too, Your Honours.

3 [The witness withdrew]

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic, am I right in understanding that you

5 have only one more witness?

6 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Indeed you are, Your Honour, you're

7 quite right. We believed -- we believe that we only have General

8 Ljubisa Stojimirovic left. We were thinking about Dr. Petkovic, too, but

9 we might start Stojimirovic tomorrow.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: And if we do, have we time to deal with both of

11 them should you decide to call both of them?

12 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] No, no, just one witness left.

13 We're certain about that. We made efforts for the doctor to be here.

14 Maybe I wasn't quite accurate in the way I put it. I apologise in that

15 case.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

17 Now, Mr. Bakrac, do you wish to raise something?

18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I think it's quite

19 self-evident and I don't want to come across as criticising my colleagues,

20 but over the last several days the situation has taken a dramatic turn.

21 The previous Defence team, wrapping up tomorrow as we see in their 65 ter

22 notice, had a total of 72 hours for their examination-in-chief. In the

23 notice that we received, there were a total of 14 witnesses, including the

24 accused, General Pavkovic. For this week we have a list containing seven

25 witnesses. By last night or by today, today is the first working day, we

1 didn't even know that these seven witnesses would not be appearing next

2 week, including General Pavkovic.

3 Last Monday we sent word to both the parties and the Chamber that

4 our client, General Lazarevic, after certain consultations decided to be

5 the first witness to appear in his case, decided to appear and decided to

6 appear before any other witnesses. Bearing in mind the fact that the

7 evidence he is about to give will not be short, I'm not saying that it

8 will be particularly lengthy, I'm not trying to scare you, we weren't

9 really planning for any other witnesses to appear. Also since the VWS

10 unit told us and instructed us that we shouldn't keep witnesses sitting

11 here for more than seven days -- it's ten to 7.00 now.

12 The gist of what I'm trying to say is this. We have a sudden

13 change in the situation, and I must frankly tell the Chamber that we are

14 not ready to get going with our evidence this coming Monday. Some of the

15 things that we believed would be covered, and also bearing in mind the 65

16 ter notice, I must consider this together with my client, and there is

17 also a technical problem that we discussed today. After consultations, we

18 bridged our priority exhibit list, exhibits to be tendered through the

19 accused himself. These will not be ready either because we have a

20 deadline with the CLSS and we were supposed to start Monday, the 6th of

21 November, which is the first Monday in the month of November. I'm not

22 sure if I have provided sufficient reasons for you to understand the

23 situation or if I should go on. I would appreciate any guidance from the

24 Chamber.

25 Should I go on?

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you haven't told us what you want.

2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that the notice

3 that was served on Monday clearly stated that. I would like to ask the

4 Chamber this, it's not just about what I desire, it's about you being

5 prepared to grant this request. I would like General Lazarevic's defence

6 to start according to plan, no matter how informal, to our original plan,

7 which is Sunday, the 5th of November, or rather, Monday, the 6th of

8 November -- or Tuesday, rather. I think the first day of the week is the

9 5th, but we don't sit on Monday, therefore that Tuesday.

10 Your Honours, also, could I have just another two minutes. Today,

11 to my fortune or misfortune, but I think fortune, we got the calculation

12 of our time so far, the final date being the 13th of September, but I took

13 into account the time we spent today. We have not crossed the 100-hour

14 limit. And what I have in mind here is the pre-Defence Conference. I

15 believe Your Honour said that we could divide this up among the Defence

16 teams. Therefore, we have more than half the time left for a mere two

17 Defence teams, and if we start the way I have just proposed, we're still

18 ahead of the schedule, we are not behind it.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: I speak for myself when I make this comment just to

20 ensure that you know what you have to address. The one thing that you've

21 said that has any residence with me is that the change in circumstances

22 requires you to consult with your client about the way in which his

23 defence is presented. But that's not something that will take a

24 particularly long time, bearing in mind the gaps we've had in this case to

25 enable preparations to be made.

1 So I don't at the moment see any reason why your case ought not

2 to -- if you're making an opening, for example, and there's time tomorrow,

3 I see no reason why your opening statement should not be tomorrow. If you

4 need a day to consult with your client because you want to consider the

5 approach, then that's different. It may be that you would then have the

6 rest of tomorrow and perhaps Monday to deal with that because of the

7 change in circumstances. But if you're looking for more -- and, of

8 course, you're not going to require any witnesses until a week on Tuesday

9 at least, by which time arrangements can be made to have your other

10 witnesses here.

11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm afraid you did not

12 understand me correctly, and I'm sure that only I am to blame because I

13 failed to explain properly. It's not about consulting, it's not about the

14 approach only, it's about the enormous number of topics that I have to go

15 through with my client. We were supposed to have sufficient time to

16 pursue that throughout the whole of the next week.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: This case has been running for 18 months more or

18 less. You must be constantly updating your preparations to give

19 evidence -- for your client to give evidence.

20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as you know, we had the

21 military defences before we came along, and that brought about this change

22 in circumstances, which affected our decision to have the accused appear

23 first. And this very much hinged on the other Defences, too.

24 Another result is that we are now cutting down our witness list.

25 It wasn't certain at that time whether the accused would testify to begin

1 with or whether he would be the first to appear. We covered part of the

2 material, but we believed that other Defences would be covering some of

3 the other material, and that is something that we have perhaps failed to

4 cover. This is an enormous problem. We did have a meeting today and we

5 won't have those documents before the week that I specified. And --

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, we can cope with the documents, as you

7 know, and have done so with others as the case has progressed knowing that

8 the translations will be available. And so far as the time is concerned,

9 your notice that you intimated on Monday says clearly that you still need

10 the 122 hours you originally estimated. It says in terms that there's no

11 alteration to the timing of your case.

12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, I don't think that we understood

13 each other well. There will be a change to the amount of time that we

14 need. That is merely an estimate, 120 hours, but we've cut back on that.

15 We certainly will be sticking to that sort of estimate, and one thing I

16 can say that even with the deadline extension that we are now applying

17 for, we shall be ready. I can't say 100 per cent certain, but I am quite

18 certain that we shall be prepared to complete our case by the December

19 break. And if we add that up, that doesn't add up to that sort of amount

20 of hours. And we shall also be carving up our own time with the time

21 allocated to the last Defence team. Even if we exceed that deadline,

22 maybe next week we can deduce the -- we can deduct the ten-hour limit for

23 the examination so that we might be ready to finally start our case.

24 As for the opening statement, I did announce during the

25 pre-Defence Conference that our opening statement would not take more than

1 five or ten minutes, it will be a brief one. We did not wish to repeat

2 any of the arguments put forward in the 98 bis. We shall be providing a

3 very general idea about the course of our Defence case; therefore, it will

4 not really take up that much time.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 [Trial Chamber confers].

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Hannis.

8 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, if you're willing to hear from me

9 briefly I have some sympathy for Mr. Bakrac because less than two weeks

10 ago we had reason to think that there were going to be two other witnesses

11 who well would have taken up probably five days at least between the two

12 of them in cross-examination. In addition, those two witnesses probably

13 were going to address a number of exhibits that Mr. Bakrac now has to

14 consult with his client and decide whether they need to address those.

15 At the same time I understand the Court's concern about losing a

16 whole week, and I share that. I might propose an alternative that,

17 originally, there were three other witnesses that were scheduled to

18 testify and General Lazarevic was going to be fourth, those appear to be

19 smaller or less-complicated witnesses, maybe there's a chance they could

20 be brought here Wednesday or Thursday next week and we could do two or

21 three witnesses toward the end of the week. General Lazarevic could

22 testify, then, on Tuesday, the 6th, and I think his evidence would then

23 still get nearly or identically the same weight you would give him for

24 testifying first as opposed to testifying fourth.

25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I clutch at this

1 straw because I don't know if I'm reading your faces right and whether I

2 can read what it is that you've decided. And now I'm not in an easy

3 position because I was ready to criticise my colleague Mr. Hannis and now

4 I see him jumping up to help me. Now I'm going to say what I had to say:

5 Could we please be treated the same way the Prosecution was. I hope Mr.

6 Hannis will not hold this against me, I am not criticising, I understand

7 that, but on the week of the 12th of February, this week, they simply

8 said, We don't have any witnesses this week, take our time, and we will

9 continue next week.

10 I believe that in the interests of justice we could allow for that

11 possibility, and when we have this kind of argumentation it's not

12 technical reasons. It was a difficult decision to have the accused person

13 testify first, following the instructions of this Chamber that it would be

14 useful for the Chamber. Now after all and after my promise that this

15 would not in any way interfere with our deadline, I wouldn't really want

16 to lose this very last straw that I've been clutching at.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: You'll appreciate that we've always been concerned

18 that having time in the bank is a great benefit for later in the case, and

19 the circumstances you've just identified were the type of circumstances we

20 would envisage arising in the Defence case as well. Mr. Hannis got a hard

21 time from the Bench earlier in the case, and it was only latterly in

22 desperate straits that he got some sympathy. So you may not necessarily

23 wish to be treated the same way as he was in truth. We might be assisted

24 a little if we knew what the timing of the sixth accused case was likely

25 to be, but if you sit down we may hear something from Mr. Lukic, who's

1 meanwhile hiding behind you.

2 Can you help at all, Mr. Lukic?

3 MR. LUKIC: I'm afraid that I'm not ready to take any heat at this

4 moment. I would rather have it dumped on Mr. Bakrac.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, if he were to finish by the recess and you

6 were to take up the sort of hinted three months or so --

7 MR. LUKIC: After the break.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: -- you would be --

9 MR. LUKIC: In three months we would be --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: You would be --

11 MR. LUKIC: -- done.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: -- using more time than any other accused. And you

13 may feel that you can reassure us that your evidence is not likely to

14 exceed that.

15 MR. LUKIC: I don't like to make promises if I'm not hundred per

16 cent sure that I can keep them, but as you know we'll do our best to

17 concentrate our evidence. I know that it might not be good enough if it's

18 our best.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: But you -- well, that's being unfair to yourselves.

20 But you know that it's not been our practice to compel parties to behave

21 in a particular way, but we have encouraged all of you to give careful

22 consideration to what you're doing and always to bear time in mind. Now,

23 you know better than anyone else how long your case is going to take.

24 It's impossible for anyone other than you at the moment to give a

25 realistic estimate of that. So what I'm looking for is an indication now

1 if you genuinely think it's going to exceed that sort of length, then we

2 would like to know that.

3 MR. LUKIC: Three months would be sufficient enough for us, Your

4 Honour, maybe less but I cannot promise.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Hopefully less, because the end of March, as you

6 know, seem to be a realistic time for us to finish. The starting date in

7 January is a bit later than the beginning of the month and you have to

8 bear all these things in mind.

9 MR. LUKIC: However, I would be thankful if I know that I have

10 three months and try to cut it down by myself rather than being pushed.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac might even work a miracle and you might

12 be on stage before the recess. You should take account of that

13 possibility, bearing in mind what's happened today. Anything's possible.

14 MR. LUKIC: I doubt.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well ...

16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 JUDGE BONOMY: What you didn't know -- what you probably didn't

18 know, Mr. Bakrac, is that we thought we had a realistic prospect of

19 sitting for five hours a day next week, so your penalty is going to be 25

20 hours potentially. However, relying on your assurance about how your case

21 will progress if this time is given to you, then we are prepared to grant

22 your motion. We think it would be untidy to insist on you introducing

23 witnesses early, although we appreciate the spirit in which Mr. Hannis

24 made the suggestion, but we think it would be untidy in this case where

25 you've made a specific decision to lead Mr. Lazarevic as the first witness

1 in the case. So we will at the end of the evidence for the fourth accused

2 adjourn the trial, so that effectively means we are granting your

3 application not to have to start your case until the Tuesday, which is the

4 6th of November. We may, however, try to arrange extended hours for that

5 week and we will certainly be trying to do it for subsequent weeks.

6 We've been conscious of the problem that faces Mr. Pavkovic

7 personally and have avoided these extended hours more recently with that

8 in mind. We think the pressure on him will be less now and we will rely

9 on Mr. Ackerman drawing it to our attention if he feels any prejudice is

10 being caused because of the hours we sit. But with a view to giving you

11 the maximum available time and Mr. Lukic, we will endeavour to arrange

12 these longer sittings.

13 So we'll formally make this disposition once the Pavkovic case is

14 closed.

15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do thank the Trial

16 Chamber on behalf of the accused and in my own name. Thank you for having

17 decided this. On the other hand, I may be criticised now or attacked by

18 some of my colleagues for having caused a longer working week. I just

19 need some instruction from the Trial Chamber. I have some information

20 that in a particular case after the oath was taken the Defence counsel had

21 the right to speak to his client nevertheless. I'm asking this simply

22 because I want to know whether this Chamber is going to allow me contact

23 with my client once he takes the oath up until the end of his testimony.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: I would be very surprised if there was such

25 authority, other than for administrative or personal reasons. I don't

1 think there is any authority to support the view that you would have

2 access to your client to discuss any aspect of the case. We would take

3 the view -- we've looked at this because we anticipated evidence of

4 accused earlier, we would take the view that it would be safest for you to

5 have absolutely no contact with him and that therefore any contact that is

6 required should be after you apply to us and have our authority for a

7 particular purpose. And we hope that will not be necessary.

8 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you

9 for this explanation as well. Thank you very much.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: We shall adjourn now until 9.00 tomorrow, and if

11 necessary we'll sit until 3.30.

12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.14 p.m.,

13 to be reconvened on Friday, the 26th day of

14 October, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.

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