Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 17966

 1                          Friday, 9 November 2007

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          --- Upon commencing at 11.00 a.m.

 5            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac, please continue with your examination

 6    of Mr. Lazarevic.

 7            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  Good

 8    morning to everyone.

 9                          WITNESS:  VLADIMIR LAZAREVIC [Resumed]

10                          [Witness answered through interpreter]

11                          Examination by Mr. Bakrac: [Continued]

12       Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Lazarevic.

13       A.   Good morning.

14       Q.   We will continue where we left off yesterday, and I have a

15    question and then we can move on to another topic regarding the civil

16    defence.  First of all, were members of the civil defence armed?

17       A.   In accordance with the Law on Defence, they had side-arms for the

18    purpose of their self-defense and self protection.

19            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please have Exhibit 5D300 up

20    in e-court.

21       Q.   Let me ask you and then we will comment.  Who was in charge of

22    arming the members of the civil defence, and you may comment on paragraph

23    1 in this document.

24       A.   Yesterday I said that in accordance with the Law on Defence, the

25    organ in charge of organizing, equipping, arming, engaging, and commanding

Page 17967

 1    the forces of the civil defence and the civilian protection was the

 2    Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  We

 3    have in front of us a document, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the

 4    federal defence ministry, the district organ in the Republic of Serbia,

 5    the Pristina defence administration, as far as I can see that would be the

 6    21st of May, 1998, a task was issued, an order was issued, to the

 7    departments and sections for defence.  It was addressed personally to

 8    chiefs of departments of those regional organs on the implementation of

 9    measures for the security and protection of the population, and now I

10    would like to ask the Trial Chamber whether I should just read what it

11    says here or explain.

12            JUDGE BONOMY:  I think, Mr. Lazarevic, you should listen carefully

13    to the questions and just deal with the point raised.  You could have

14    answered that much more briefly, and we can follow the point that's being

15    made by reading the document for ourselves.

16            Mr. Bakrac.

17            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

18       Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, I just wanted to note that we don't have to read

19    everything.  Could you just explain here, in the middle it says that care

20    should be taken that the military conscripts in -- with wartime

21    assignments in units of the VJ, VTO, MUP, units of the SMO should not be

22    on the lists of the population that is to be issued with weapons?

23       A.   Yes, naturally.  This is because the organ in charge of arming and

24    equipping military conscripts and members of the units of the Army of

25    Yugoslavia and MUP were -- that was another organ, and here we're talking

Page 17968

 1    about the Federal Ministry of Defence.

 2       Q.   Thank you, Mr. Lazarevic.  Let us move on.  What were the

 3    relations of the Pristina Corps, or rather, at the beginning of 1999 in

 4    Kosovo and Metohija and during the state of war, did the state organs

 5    function; and if yes, which ones?

 6       A.   From what I personally know, even in this terrible chaos of war,

 7    all the state organs and all the local self government organs in Kosovo

 8    and Metohija functioned in accordance, as far as it was possible, and

 9    these local self government organs existed in the 29 municipalities, the

10    organs of the Republic of Serbia operated in five districts, the Temporary

11    Executive Council of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija.  I

12    know that in the whole territory the public services functioned, health

13    service, education, financial organs, judicial organs, everything that the

14    civilian government comprises.

15       Q.   What were relations between the Pristina Corps and other agencies

16    involved in defence, or rather, with the organs that you just enumerated?

17       A.   This was cooperation whenever it was objectively possible to have

18    this kind of cooperation, and primarily the purpose was to maintain the

19    overall security system in the province, and in particular to provide

20    assistance to those organs in taking care of all of the civilians in the

21    chaos of war.

22       Q.   General, what was the situation with the manning levels in the

23    Pristina Corps at the beginning of the war in late March and early April

24    when NATO air-strikes continued for two weeks already?  So what were the

25    manning levels in Pristina Corps at that time?

Page 17969

 1       A.   When the state of war was declared on the 24th of March, 1999, the

 2    Pristina Corps, in accordance with the plans, the mobilisation plan, was

 3    supposed to reach the wartime organization and strength of about 35.000

 4    people within 72 hours.  On the 24th of March, the corps had about 14.000

 5    personnel, including the March intake of soldiers who had been retained in

 6    the ranks from the 15th of March onwards.

 7       Q.   General, let us now look at a Prosecution exhibit, that's P1929,

 8    it's a report on the manning levels to the 3rd Army command.  The date is

 9    the 31st of March.  You told us what the situation was like on the 24th of

10    March when the aggression started, but let us look at page 2 of this

11    document.  Could you please look -- well, we can't really tell the

12    paragraphs apart.  It's in the upper half of the page, it begins with the

13    words "the Pristina Corps."  Do you see that?

14       A.   Yes.

15       Q.   Could you please read it and just comment on it in a couple of

16    sentences because we have some figures here just so we know what this is

17    all about.

18       A.   "At day plus seven," that's the eighth day of the war, "the

19    Pristina Corps had 933 officers, that was 37 per cent; non-commissioned

20    officers, 919, that was 48 per cent; soldiers 16.120, which was 54 per

21    cent; a total number of 17.971, which was 52 per cent of the wartime

22    establishment of the Pristina Corps."

23       Q.   General.  Thank you very much.  Please tell us, by the 8th of

24    April, 1999, that was the 14th day of the war, did all the units in the

25    3rd Army in Kosovo and Metohija, were they all resubordinated?

Page 17970

 1       A.   On the 7th of April, 1999, in Kosovo and Metohija there were the

 2    following units of the 3rd Army:  The Pristina Corps, the Pristina

 3    Military District, and 202nd Logistics Base.  On that day, the 3rd Army

 4    commander decided that the military district, the Pristina Military

 5    District and the 202nd would be resubordinated to the Pristina Corps until

 6    the end of the war.

 7            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please look at Exhibit

 8    5D180.

 9       Q.   You said the order of the 3rd Army commander.  It appears that you

10    implemented this order, and it appears that it says so in this document.

11    Could you please confirm that.

12       A.   This is my order, order from the Pristina Corps command, on the

13    resubordination of these two units and the 3rd Army pursuant to the order

14    of the 3rd Army commander dated the -- the date is the 8th of April, 1999,

15    so that's the next day.  This also regulates the procedure for the

16    reporting, getting acquainted with the documents and tasks.

17            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Lazarevic, you gave us a figure of just under

18    18.000 as the number of troops in the Pristina Corps eight days into the

19    war.  Did that number increase?

20            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, let me briefly reply to

21    your question by giving you some information.  Yes, it increased at a pace

22    as much as it was possible through a selective and partial mobilisation in

23    such a way that on D plus 15, that was the 15th day of the war, the

24    strength was up to 21.000 troops, and on the 52nd day of the war, that was

25    around the 15th of May, the corps reached its wartime manning level

Page 17971

 1    envisaged by the wartime organization and establishment, that figure was

 2    about 35.000 people.

 3            JUDGE BONOMY:  What went wrong to prevent you doing it in the 72

 4    hours you were supposed to do it in?

 5            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, what had been achieved

 6    by that time was, in fact, mission impossible, I say that as a soldier,

 7    because there were intensive air-strikes and intensive rebel activity

 8    throughout Kosovo and Metohija.  So it was impossible to bring in troops

 9    in larger groups or unit per unit.  We had to do it in smaller groups,

10    selectively, and assessments had to be made to avoid casualties that could

11    be inflicted both by the rebel forces and by NATO air-strikes.

12            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

13            Mr. Bakrac.

14            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15       Q.   General, you replied to His Honour Judge Bonomy's question, and

16    thereby you pre-empted some of my questions.  I would just like to ask you

17    something more.  The defence plans, the previous defence plans, did they

18    envisage, apart from the manning levels bringing them up to strength, that

19    there should be some additional vehicles brought in to bring them up to

20    strength?

21       A.   The mobilisation plans regulated the recruitment and replenishment

22    with materiel and equipment.  You're now asking me about vehicles.  When

23    we're talking about the replenishment for the corps from the territory of

24    Kosovo and Metohija the plans envisaged that around 530 motor vehicles

25    should be mobilised in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija for the needs

Page 17972

 1    of the Pristina Corps.  The replenishment was carried out up to the level

 2    of maybe 50 to 52 per cent, about 260 vehicles, and the overall

 3    replenishment of the vehicles from outside of the territory of Kosovo and

 4    Metohija was around 5.000 vehicles.

 5       Q.   General, we will have a witness who will describe this in greater

 6    detail --

 7            JUDGE BONOMY:  Is that an accurate figure in line 4 of page 7,

 8    5.000?

 9            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No.  I wasn't following the

10    transcript, but this figure is not correct.

11            JUDGE BONOMY:  Should it be 500?

12            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Ah, yes, from outside of Kosovo, Your

13    Honours.  For the replenishment from Kosovo, that's the lower figure, 530;

14    and the overall replenishment from the overall territory of the FRY was

15    5.000 vehicles.

16            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

17            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

18       Q.   General, did I paraphrase you correctly?

19       A.   Yes.

20            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

21            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

22       Q.   General, you told us that it was not until the 15th of May that

23    the strength envisaged in the wartime formation was achieved.  Were there

24    any attempts to lessen the strength of PRK, to reduce the numbers?

25       A.   On the 9th of April, 1999, the Pristina Corps command received an

Page 17973

 1    order from the 3rd Army command that in the following days selective

 2    disengagement of elements of the Pristina Corps should begin as part of

 3    the overall efforts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to reduce the

 4    intensity of combat operations in Kosovo and Metohija and to contribute to

 5    the end of the war.  And if the Trial Chamber allows me, just one more

 6    sentence.  As far as I can remember, on the 13th of May I personally, as

 7    the corps commander in the sector of the village of Livadice in Podujevo,

 8    I saw off the first contingent, several buses full of military conscripts,

 9    who left the area of Kosovo and Metohija.

10       Q.   General, the transcript states that on the 9th of April, 1999, you

11    received a 3rd Army order.

12       A.   It's the 9th of May, but I might have misspoken.  I apologise.

13       Q.   General, what happened immediately after your having brought the

14    decision on the disengagement of part of the forces?

15       A.   Well, this decision was taken by the state leadership, and the

16    corps command was executing the tasks of the 3rd Army command and the

17    General Staff.  I remember that there were quite a few journalists present

18    who were following the corps' units, and that this also elicited

19    diplomatic attention.  Regrettably, I don't know about the further course

20    of events in the diplomatic and political plain, but on the ground

21    air-strikes and long-range NATO forces strikes escalated, as did the

22    activities of the rebels, the strongest up to that point, and that

23    happened as of the 12th and 13th of May, and on.

24            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we look at Exhibit 5D410, please.

25       Q.   General, this appears to be a document that is yours that you

Page 17974

 1    signed on the 12th of May, 1999.  It states that it's very urgent and it

 2    is addressed to the commander personally.  Can we have a brief comment

 3    from you.

 4       A.   I personally drafted this order and I signed it, and that can be

 5    seen from the initials on it.  And I sent an urgent order to the

 6    subordinated commanders personally because we had received information

 7    that NATO was preparing a second ground attack along a different axis,

 8    apart from the one that had been in course which was along the Kosare and

 9    Morina axis.  And I ordered that every measure be taken to defend the

10    routes and the -- persistently defend the state border and the integrity

11    of the country throughout the defence area.

12       Q.   General, in the second paragraph, please tell me whether I rightly

13    take it that in addition to the part between the Kosare and Morina border

14    posts where there was an attempt lasting several weeks to penetrate deep

15    into the corps' zone, does that mean that there had been a successful

16    attempt to penetrate before that or was this just -- am I concluding this

17    rightly?

18       A.   Your interpretation is correct because the aggressor's forces from

19    the area of Albania were in the territory of the Federal Republic of

20    Yugoslavia at a depth between 500 and 1500 metres, holding salient

21    features and endangering the complete axis towards Djakovica and Junik and

22    threatening to compromise the entire defence of the country.

23       Q.   General, can we now take a look at Exhibit 5D411.  This appears to

24    be a corps command report on the very next day, the 13th of May, 1999, to

25    the Supreme Command Staff.  So please comment on the first and third

Page 17975

 1    paragraphs.

 2       A.   This is what I would call a special and alarming report.  It is

 3    not a regular report.  It was addressed to the Supreme Command Staff.  The

 4    heading reads:  "Pristina Corps command."  This document was signed by the

 5    commander of the 3rd Army, who was at the corps command post because of

 6    the address and used its log informing the Chief of the General Staff of

 7    massive air-strikes on the 12th and 13th in the corps' area, over 230

 8    missiles.  And all the other paragraphs also inform on the fact that we do

 9    not have adequate forces to respond to counter such massive air-strikes

10    and that the VJ -- the Pristina Corps units were threatened with massive

11    casualties.  And he requests and asks the General Staff for reinforcements

12    in the system of anti-aircraft defence which I remember very well was soon

13    forthcoming.

14       Q.   And at page 2 you said amid this case of war, they used the

15    Pristina Corps May log, and this was signed by the army commander who then

16    sent his report to the Supreme Command Staff?

17       A.   Yes, the commander, General -- Colonel-General Pavkovic, it is the

18    seal and the memorandum of the corps because we were at one place.

19    Someone could see this is a technical error amid the case of war, but the

20    essence is as I have described.

21       Q.   General, take a look at Exhibit P1495.  This is a document of the

22    Supreme Command Staff to the command of the 3rd Army.  Can we have your

23    comment on just item 1 and then we can move on.

24       A.   Following these reports from the corps command and from the

25    command of the 3rd Army, the General Staff dispatched a document in

Page 17976

 1    which -- in the first item of which it is stated that a statement had been

 2    prepared on the temporary postponement of the further implementation of

 3    the supreme commander's decision on the disengagement of the Yugoslav Army

 4    and MUP from Kosovo and Metohija because air-strikes as well as ground

 5    attacks had escalated.

 6       Q.   Thank you, General.  Let us now move on to the admission of

 7    volunteers.  How was the admission of volunteers to Pristina Corps units

 8    organized and regulated and how were they assigned to the units?

 9       A.   In order to man the Pristina Corps units with volunteers, two

10    reception centres had been organized, had been set up, one within the 1st

11    Army which was in Bubanj Potok, i.e., in Grocka, and the other one at the

12    major military proving ground of the 2nd Army.  The volunteers would pass

13    through these two reception centres, and following the prescribed

14    procedure, psychological, mental -- medical check-ups, et cetera, as well

15    as additional combat training; and having completed all that, they would

16    be assigned to the Pristina Corps units.

17       Q.   General, there is a mistake in the transcript.  The 1st, 2nd, and

18    3rd Army, but we shall address that in a minute.  Let us look at document

19    5D284, and please just explain a sentence -- one sentence in that document

20    for me.  You mentioned the centre in Medja where is this for the benefit

21    of the Trial Chamber?

22       A.   The proving grounds, the automated proving grounds of major is

23    military proving ground, which is some 30 kilometres away from Nis.

24       Q.   It is not in the area of Kosovo and Metohija?

25       A.   It is much farther from Kosovo and Metohija.  It is farther than

Page 17977

 1    these 30 kilometres.

 2       Q.   We have the document before us now, General.  We can read the rest

 3    of it for ourselves, but just tell me about item 1 which states:

 4            "Organize the admission, reception, and assignment of volunteers

 5    which are to be done in the reception or admissions centre of the 3rd

 6    Army ..."

 7            What does "organize the admission, reception, and assignment of

 8    volunteers ..." Actually stand for?  What does it mean?

 9       A.   The corps command submitted to the command of the 3rd Army

10    proposals, requirements, requests for the manning of certain specific

11    units with volunteers.  Following completed training and procedure in the

12    3rd Army admission centre, volunteers would be taken to the different war

13    units along the corresponding routes.

14       Q.   Can we take a look, General, at Exhibit 5D338 at this point.  This

15    also is, it seems, one of your orders, and I should like to ask you to

16    comment for us item 3.4 and explain for us the acronym, the abbreviation

17    which features in it.

18       A.   This is my order of the 27th of March, regarding the admission,

19    reception, and assignment of volunteers to war units.  And in item 3 it is

20    stated that volunteers should be assigned to lower-level units,

21    lower-level units means lower-level units within brigades to battalions,

22    that is according to their military occupational specialities, skill

23    digits that they have been trained for.

24            THE INTERPRETER:  Will counsel please not overlap with the answer.

25            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

Page 17978

 1       Q.   In item 4 when -- you explained lower-level units are units which

 2    are lower than battalion or brigade or did I understand you correctly?

 3       A.   The designation, the name, for brigades in these conditions when

 4    we talk about manning war units and lower units are battalions.

 5       Q.   Fine.  And who does the assigning --

 6            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac, you will need to leave a pause between

 7    answer and question, please.

 8            Please continue, Mr. Lazarevic.

 9            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours.

10       Q.   Mr. Lazarevic, you have explained.  Who does the assigning of the

11    volunteers to the brigades?

12       A.   The volunteers for the brigade come from the admission or

13    reception centre, and within the brigades, the brigade then assigns them

14    within -- across its lower units.

15       Q.   In item 4.

16       A.   Item 4 states that at the level of the basic units which are

17    companies, there are set up commissions that shall admit these people and

18    provide additional equipment for them if this equipment is inadequate,

19    acquaint them with the composition and their role of assignment within

20    this basic unit.

21       Q.   General, did you issue an additional order to the effect that

22    volunteers could not be admitted to Kosovo and Metohija without

23    verification, without checking at the admission centres?  What measures

24    did you take along those lines?

25       A.   I could not order to the admission centres at the level of the

Page 17979

 1    army what they were to do, but irrespective of that procedure, which we of

 2    course were familiar with and which was observed, at the level of the

 3    corps additional measures were taken so that volunteers having been

 4    admitted, we would take additional security, psychological, medical

 5    processing, so to speak, as well as check their training level and their

 6    ability to use the resources, the weaponry, that we were armed with and

 7    equipped with.

 8            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we take a look at 5D197.

 9       Q.   General, do you recognise this document, which again appears to be

10    your own?  This is an order of the 16th of April, 1999.  Could you please

11    comment on item 1.

12       A.   Yes, I do see it.  There had been several orders in connection

13    with this particular subject matter issued by the army command and the

14    General Staff, the objective being to eliminate any observed shortcomings.

15    And item 1 shows that it was ordered that at the level of the Pristina

16    Military District there should be set up an admission subcentre as yet

17    another institution that would help vet and assign volunteers to the corps

18    war units on the one hand, and on the other hand if there should appear

19    volunteers from the area of Kosovo and Metohija, they could not be

20    received into the corps war units, but the subcentre of the Pristina

21    Military District would send them every three days to the 3rd Army

22    admission centre in the Medja area for them to go through the complete

23    prescribed procedure.

24       Q.   We'd like to draw the attention of the Trial Chamber to what you

25    have been saying now, it is paragraph 6 but on the second page, the

Page 17980

 1    one-but-last sentence before paragraph 7 starts.  Could you please just

 2    read that sentence out for us, and is that what you were telling us about?

 3       A.   Taking volunteers --

 4       Q.   No, General, page 2.  We can read that.  Could you just read about

 5    checking volunteers.  Is that what you told us?

 6       A.   Every volunteer should be checked by a way of a question as to

 7    whether he wants to be trained at the Nis reception centre; if not, this

 8    person should not be taken in as a volunteer.

 9       Q.   Thank you, General.  Tell us, do you know how many volunteers were

10    taken in within the Pristina Corps; and if there were volunteers that were

11    dismissed, how many of them were there and why?

12       A.   As for the wartime units of the Pristina Corps, throughout the war

13    a little over 1.400 volunteers were taken in.  Through vetting and through

14    decisions of wartime units in the corps command, almost one-third of these

15    volunteers were dismissed on the following grounds.  First of all, there

16    were volunteers who could not take the war effort.  They asked to be

17    dismissed from wartime units, and it is on that basis, on those grounds,

18    that some of them were dismissed.  Secondly, there were volunteers who

19    fell ill.  They were sent to a military medical commission and were

20    dismissed from wartime units.  Thirdly, there were volunteers who did not

21    observe the regimen of military discipline and the Rules of Conduct in

22    Wartime, who were then dismissed from wartime units in handcuffs,

23    arrested, and they were handed over to investigative military organs.

24       Q.   General, let us try to illustrate this quickly what you've been

25    telling us about.  P -- 5D1938 -- P, P is what I'm asking for.  P1938.

Page 17981

 1    I'd like to see page 2, please.  Page 2, please.  I have a version that's

 2    a bit better than this one.

 3            Could you please have a look at this where it says "pozitivno" --

 4    no, rather, "negativno," which is at the very top of the page, it says:

 5     "On the 1st of April.  Could you just give us your comment on that first

 6    statement, "on the 1st of April ..."

 7       A.   My command is as follows:  The command of the 3rd Army informed

 8    the General Staff that on the 1st of April only a few days later, 25

 9    volunteers were returned from the corps and seven were detained because of

10    renegade behaviour, killings, robbery, rapes, et cetera, insubordination,

11    and desertion also, among them there were two deaths.

12       Q.   General, can we please have a look at Exhibit 5D215.  Please take

13    a look at 2.1, the last sentence just before 2.2.  Could you read it out

14    for us, it's short, and could you give us your comments.

15       A.   During the course of the morning, a group of volunteers, about 150

16    of them, were sent partly by -- on buses and partly by rail in an

17    organized manner to Nis after their engagement in Metohija.  This is my

18    comment.  The date is the 18th of April.  This group of volunteers had

19    taken part in heavy fighting in defending the state border at the

20    Kosare-Morina section.  They were under great stress.  They requested to

21    be disengaged, and we did that.  I do apologise to the Trial Chamber not

22    to be able to tell them more about this because our time is short.  It's

23    quite a story.  It's a story that's quite long, because poisons were also

24    used that destabilized many of the men.

25       Q.   Among that group of volunteers I see in one day there were 150 of

Page 17982

 1    them.  Did this involve those who did not behave in accordance with

 2    military discipline?

 3       A.   No, no, no.  These were people who were at the border itself.

 4    Those who did not observe discipline had to be held accountable and could

 5    be disengaged only after that.

 6       Q.   General, the transcript does not correctly reflect what you said.

 7    The word used there is "poison," but I understood that you

 8    said "bojni otroui" chemical agents?

 9       A.   Yes, yes, but I don't think we have time to discuss that.  I know

10    what this is about, specifically.  Well, the number of 150 pertains to

11    that.

12       Q.   General, let us bring this story about the volunteers to an end.

13    Could you please look at 5D392 and give us your comments briefly as to

14    what this is about.  It seems that there were attempts here to take a

15    volunteer in without having been vetted first, and I think that you

16    opposed that.  I'm just trying to be of assistance so that we deal with

17    the document quicker.  Could you just read this sentence to us so that we

18    could move on faster.  So without reading it, could you just give us your

19    comments and tell us what this is about, just one sentence.

20       A.   I know what this is about.  From the command of the 3rd Army, or

21    rather, from the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army, a document came that had

22    to do with something that was sent by the parents of a volunteer who came

23    from the area around Belgrade.  This was a complaint lodged by the

24    parents.  The mother complained to the command of the 3rd Army as to why

25    we did not allow her son to go on being a volunteer.  This is a volunteer

Page 17983

 1    who is the son of a military man, a lieutenant-colonel in the command of

 2    the Pristina Military District.  I checked this through the commander of

 3    the Pristina Military District, whether he acted properly.  He dismissed

 4    him because he did not go through the prescribed procedure, through army

 5    reception centres.  And in this document I provide my reply, that the

 6    command of the military district noted this omission and that they acted

 7    properly.

 8       Q.   Was the Pristina Corps manned with non-Serbs from Kosovo and

 9    Metohija as well?

10       A.   Yes.  I shall try to be as accurate as possible now.  There were

11    over 1.000 military conscripts, non-Albanian in terms of their ethnic

12    background, within the corps, Turks, Gorani, Romani.

13       Q.   Were there attempts made to engage Albanians as well, to involve

14    Albanians, ethnic Albanians, as they are called?

15       A.   We had occasion to familiarise ourselves with the order of the

16    Chief of General Staff on the establishment of the 9th Detachment in

17    Pristina that would consist of Albanians, including officers, officers and

18    soldiers.  Work was done in that direction.  The military district

19    commander testified to that.  I issued a command but we did not succeed

20    because they did not dare respond to the call-up.

21       Q.   Let us look at this order; 5D183 is the number.  3.1 and 3.2 are

22    the paragraphs I would like you to have a look at.  Is that what you

23    testified about?  Is this your order?  So far we've had a problem without

24    having the English translation, and now we have for the first time the

25    problem of not having the Serbian translation.  It's a good thing that we

Page 17984

 1    have that problem for once as well.

 2       A.   Well, yes, this is my order that is in line with the order issued

 3    by the army commander and the Chief of General Staff on the establishment

 4    of the 9th Military Territorial Detachment in Pristina.

 5       Q.   Thank you, General.  Let's move on faster.  We can all read it.

 6    We can all read and realise that what you said is there.  Were there any

 7    requests by citizens who were ethnic Muslims who were not military

 8    conscripts to get involved in the Army of Yugoslavia, to join the ranks of

 9    the Army of Yugoslavia?  I would like to see 5D370.  In the meantime you

10    can give me an answer.

11       A.   As far as I can remember, about ten days after this unsuccessful

12    attempt in Pristina, I got a request and a proposal from the commander of

13    the 549th Motorised Brigade to have a large number of citizens of Muslim

14    and Gorani ethnicity who were asking to be involved in the defence of the

15    integrity of the country.  We can see the document here right in front of

16    us, of the command of the Pristina Corps.  I am making a proposal to the

17    command of the 3rd Army on the basis of the request made by the brigade to

18    establish a detachment consisting of 200 men in Sredacka Zupa, according

19    to a particular establishment, and in order to have specific tasks carried

20    out.

21       Q.   Thank you, General.  We are going to move on.  I would just like

22    to direct the Trial Chamber to the following.  Yesterday we talked about

23    uniforms that military conscripts had kept and that were used.  Let us not

24    go back to that now.  The references are 5D -- Exhibit 5D188 and 184.

25    From the documents we can see what it was that you testified about, so let

Page 17985

 1    us move on.

 2            General, did you insist --

 3            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we have a mistake in

 4    the -- mistake.  5D187 and 5D184 are the numbers.

 5            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

 6            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

 7       Q.   General, did you take any measures in terms of the personal

 8    appearance of the members of the corps?

 9       A.   Well, I wouldn't take -- I wouldn't say any measures or some

10    measures.  With the permission of the Trial Chamber, in this war chaos the

11    corps command and the subordinate units really and truly took many

12    measures in terms of disciplined conduct on the part of unit members,

13    including personal appearance, behaviour, wearing uniforms, using weapons.

14       Q.   General, we are going to get to that specifically.  Could you

15    please look at 5D898, it's a Defence exhibit.  This is an order of the

16    commander of the 549th Motorised Brigade dated the 30th of April, 1999,

17    that is based on your order of the 29th of April, 1999.  In paragraph 3 --

18    well, actually, can you read it out to us and can you give us your


20       A.   "Insist relentlessly on the proper personal appearance of all

21    members of the brigade and on the protection of the reputation of the Army

22    of Yugoslavia at any cost."

23            This has been copied from the order issued by my corps command.

24       Q.   General, let us look at your order of the 7th of May, that's

25    5D398.  It seems that here, too, the measure about the conduct of the

Page 17986

 1    members of the corps outside of the zone -- could you comment on item 1.

 2       A.   In this order I demand at all levels of command that information

 3    should be obtained about the movements of the members of the units in

 4    uniform and with weapons outside of the combat zone, and once again, I

 5    prohibit any movement of military personnel with weapons outside of the

 6    sector of their own unit, except if they are there to carry out some kind

 7    of an official task.  And I make responsible for the consistent

 8    implementation of this order the commanders, and they are to provide me

 9    with regular reports about that.  They are to report on that in combat

10    reports.

11       Q.   Thank you, General.  Let us go back to -- we've seen what the

12    basic tasks of the Pristina Corps were in combat operations and in the

13    tasks in the organization of the defence, that's 5D366, that's the exhibit

14    number.  I would like to ask for it.  This is about issuing tasks in the

15    organization of the defence, and I am -- would be interested to hear your

16    comments on item 7.  Could you please read it and comment on it.

17       A.   "Ensure full compliance with the security regime in the territory,

18    with focus on protecting the units, the public order, preventing crime,

19    and protecting civilians.  Complete the full clear-up of the terrain."

20            This order followed on the same day, the 5th of April, when the

21    commanders subordinate to the 3rd Army commander submitted their reports

22    on the preparations for the drafting of a new defence plan in the area of

23    the 3rd Army and the Pristina Corps in accordance with the Grom 4 plan.  I

24    didn't wait for the order from the army commander to come, but as soon as

25    this meeting was completed I issued an order, I issued relevant orders,

Page 17987

 1    and among them was this task.

 2       Q.   General, we spoke about -- we saw evidence from May indicating

 3    that the -- the penetration of the ground forces between Morina-Kosare,

 4    those border posts continued.  When did this incursion actually begin, on

 5    what date?

 6       A.   I would like to say that the federal government declared a

 7    unilateral cessation of hostilities on the 6th of April, and on one of the

 8    greatest religious feasts in the Orthodox religion, the 9th of April,

 9    that's Easter, the Orthodox Easter, there was a ground aggression launched

10    by a very strong force from Albania along the Kosare and Morina axis and

11    on to Pristina -- on to Djakovica.

12            THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.

13            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

14       Q.   To confirm what you just said, could you please look at item 2 in

15    this document, and did you, in fact, order the cease-fire pursuant to the

16    decision of the federal government?

17       A.   Yes, I can see that.  "On the 6th of April, at 2000 hours, stop

18    all active operations of the corps apart from a direct attack on our

19    units," but this was the decision of the federal government.

20            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 5D185.

21       Q.   General, it appears to be a report from the 3rd Army commander to

22    the chief of Supreme Command Staff and the date is the 11th of April.

23    Could you please briefly comment on this.  Is this what you were telling

24    us about, and we can see that there is an estimate of the enemy strength.

25       A.   This is a document from the 3rd Army command dated on the 11th,

Page 17988

 1    but on the 10th he sent another telegram with a similar content.  And as

 2    you can see, I initialled this telegram, approving that it may be sent

 3    because the army commander had already left in accordance with his own

 4    plans.  And we informed the chief of the Supreme Command Staff that ground

 5    attacks from Albania continue, and a proposal is made to the Ministry of

 6    Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take diplomatic

 7    measures to inform the United Nations and the world public through

 8    diplomatic channels about this ground aggression that is launched against

 9    the territory of Yugoslavia from Albania.

10            MR. ACKERMAN:  Excuse me just a minute.  Your Honour, there's a

11    very serious problem with this translation.  It doesn't tell us what this

12    document really is.  It says it's to the 3rd Army command and actually

13    it's from the 3rd Army command, that language doesn't appear in the B/C/S.

14    It goes to the Supreme Command Staff and the translation says it's going

15    to the Pristina Military District command.  That language doesn't appear

16    in the B/C/S.  So it's a completely wrong translation at least of the

17    heading part of that document and very misleading in that regard.  It

18    needs to be replaced with a proper translation.

19            JUDGE BONOMY:  The direction of the document is clarified in the

20    transcript I think.  Is that correct, it's from the 3rd Army command and

21    it's to the Supreme Command Staff.  And therefore, to that extent, the

22    position is accurately reflected in the transcript and what you're

23    suggesting is the document itself should be submitted for retranslation.

24            MR. ACKERMAN:  It has to be, Your Honour, because I have visions

25    of a Prosecutor standing up and arguing on appeal that the English

Page 17989

 1    translation is correct, that's happened to me before.

 2            JUDGE BONOMY:  You must have difficulties sleeping, Mr. Ackerman.

 3            MR. ACKERMAN:  So I really think it has to be -- I think that the

 4    transcript doesn't solve the problem.  I think the document has to be

 5    fixed.

 6            JUDGE BONOMY:  Remind me of the number of this document, sorry.

 7            MR. ACKERMAN:  5D185.

 8            JUDGE BONOMY:  Well, Mr. Bakrac, it's for you to resubmit this to

 9    be -- for the translation to be revised and then to make a filing to

10    substitute the revised version.

11            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12       Q.   General, let us look at 5D195.  I hope we'll have more luck with

13    the translation.  Could you please look at this document carefully.  Later

14    on we will -- and there has been quite some evidence from the Prosecution

15    witnesses regarding an action that took place a few days after this order

16    of yours, but of course this order does not refer to that.  But in order

17    to be able to understand that later on, could you please comment on this

18    document.  It's dated the 15th of April, 1999, the Pristina Corps command.

19       A.   I personally drafted this document.  Having assessed the dramatic

20    situation that was the result of the penetration of the state border and

21    the violation of the sovereignty of the country, I made the decision that

22    in a non-military parlance the most special elements within the corps for

23    the struggle against the terrorist foreign mercenaries and specials should

24    take part in protecting the integrity of the state by forming a special

25    detachment from the Pristina Corps command containing elements from the

Page 17990

 1    72nd Special Brigade that had been resubordinated to us from the military

 2    police battalion, the corps military police; and to dispatch them as soon

 3    as possible to Djakovica sector, where they would be received by the Chief

 4    of Staff of the corps.  They would place themselves under his control and

 5    they would be engaged in defending the integrity of the country.

 6       Q.   On the Karaula  --

 7       A.   Kosare-Morina axis.

 8       Q.   Which is adjacent to which river valley?

 9       A.   This axis leads directly to the Caragoj valley, to Junik and

10    Djakovica.

11       Q.   Thank you.  And could you please tell us, and we will be able to

12    proceed more quickly, how long did this ground operation last, the

13    invasion along this axis?

14       A.   This operation which quite well-known to military analysts, both

15    domestic, Serbian, and Yugoslav, and foreign military analysts, is known

16    as Strela 1.  It lasted until the end of the war, but they were not able

17    to penetrate any deeper than they had right at the beginning of the

18    aggression.

19       Q.   General, if I'm not mistaken, you issued a special order for the

20    routing and destruction in the border belt in the broader area of -- in

21    the broader sector of Kosare; is that correct?

22       A.   Yes.

23       Q.   And could you please tell me, this order has four pages, we'll be

24    analysing it later on, there's no need to open it or analyse it now.

25    Could you tell us how you designate the command structures, who was to be

Page 17991

 1    in command of this operation?

 2       A.   Since this was a special task of operational significance,

 3    although the forces engaged were quite small, I ordered that the Chief of

 4    Staff of the corps should be in direct command of this task force.

 5       Q.   From where?

 6       A.   From the Djakovica sector, and further on towards the border

 7    itself.

 8       Q.   From the Djakovica forward command post?

 9       A.   Yes, from the forward command post in the wider Djakovica sector.

10       Q.   General, we have to make pauses.  I am more to blame than you are

11    here, but we both have to try and make the interpreters' job easier.

12            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there is a mistake in

13    the transcript.  The date was not recorded, that's the order of the 8th of

14    May, 1999, and that's 5D401.

15       Q.   General, was there a ground operation or a ground incursion in any

16    other part of the state border?

17       A.   By Your Honours' leave I would like to say just one sentence.

18    Throughout this time NATO applied its doctrine of air-ground battle.  This

19    is one specific operation, it's a ground operation, along a single axis,

20    and then after 45 days there was another ground operation in the Vrbnik

21    axis, that's the Gorozub border post, the Pastrik mountains, in the

22    direction of Prizren.

23            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please look at 5D231.

24            JUDGE BONOMY:  Again this may be a translation issue.  I have to

25    say I don't understand what's just been said by the witness.  He said:  "I

Page 17992

 1    would like to say just one sentence.  Throughout this time NATO applied

 2    its doctrine of air-ground battle.  This is one specific operation, it's a

 3    ground operation, along a single axis ..."

 4            Now, what does that refer to?

 5            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

 6       Q.   General, could you please clarify.  You heard what His Honour

 7    said.  Could you just briefly clarify this misunderstanding.

 8       A.   Your Honour, I wanted to say that throughout the war there was

 9    this operation underway, aggression against the Federal Republic of

10    Yugoslavia, from air and on the ground.  In NATO doctrine, this is called

11    air-ground battle, and we are talking specifically about two ground

12    operations.  The first started on the 9th of April and extended until the

13    end of the war on an axis leading towards Djakovica; and the other one

14    happened on the 26th of May and lasted until the 13th of June, when the

15    agreement had already been signed, that was in the direction of Prizren.

16            JUDGE BONOMY:  Your answer earlier gave the impression that the

17    ground operation started at the beginning of the war.

18            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the 9th of April was the

19    penetration; that is what I call the ground aggression, not counting the

20    lesser-scale attacks at the very outset of the war and the incursions in

21    that period into the Kosovo and Metohija territory.

22            JUDGE BONOMY:  Just one moment until I go back a little.

23            Please continue, Mr. Bakrac.  Thank you.

24            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

25       Q.   General, the combat report describes this.

Page 17993

 1            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we now call 5D231.

 2       Q.   This is a combat report of the corps command to the 3rd Army.

 3    This is perhaps not in constance with our current topic, but look at this.

 4      On the 26th and the 27th, NATO aviation continued to shell the region of

 5    Djakovica with over 10 missiles.  Are you aware of this bombing of

 6    Djakovica?

 7       A.   Yesterday when I was explaining the isolation of the battle-field

 8    by NATO aerial bombing, it can be seen in this report.  When there are

 9    land operations across the border, there is aerial bombing by NATO forces

10    in depth of the territory in order to prevent the bringing in of forces to

11    actually stabilize the defence on the axis of the attack.

12       Q.   Can you look at item 2 and then we will continue.  Is that the

13    second land operation that you were referring to, item 1.2? Immediately on

14    the next page it is item 1.2 and it begins with the words "with

15    strong ..."

16       A.   This was already the second day of the land operation called

17    Strela 2 on this axis in which participated also the artillery units of

18    the armed forces of Albania, not only the terrorist forces gathered from

19    the wide areas of Europe and all over the place, and with exceptionally

20    intensive bombing by NATO air force with over 211 impact -- high-impact

21    missiles.  This will remain remembered in the analysis of warfare.  B-52s

22    actually shelled targets of company rank on this axis.

23       Q.   Let us look at another combat report.

24            THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the date.

25            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] This is Exhibit 5D234 -- actually, it

Page 17994

 1    is dated the 1st of June, the 1st of June, 1999, 5D234.

 2       Q.   This is also a combat report to the command of the 3rd Army by the

 3    corps command, and under item 1.1, last paragraph; and under item 1.2,

 4    first paragraph, that is what I would like you to comment on.

 5       A.   Item 1.1, activities of the NATO armed forces.  The NATO air

 6    forces continued conducting intensive reconnaissance over flights and

 7    attacks in the corps zone, and specifically in item 1.2, "in the course of

 8    31st of May, enemy aviation shelled, bombed incessantly for 12 hours,

 9    including B-52 bomber aircraft, the positions of the 1st Battalion of the

10    549th Motorised Brigade, firing over 200 missiles, with a simultaneous

11    land assault, land attack, from the Republic of Albania along the Gorozup

12    axis with several hundred enemy soldiers."

13            Let me add, I was personally on that particular axis with the army

14    commander on that day.

15       Q.   Thank you, General.  We shall now move on.  Before we proceed, how

16    many defensive battles were there and what were the casualties the

17    Pristina Corps sustained during that period and how was this reflected on

18    the security status on the zone of the border?

19       A.   As part of the defensive operation of the corps, on 250-kilometre

20    front and 100- to 120-kilometres in-depth, there were several hundred

21    battles and clashes, but the focus of the defensive operation was in the

22    front area facing Albania and in the first defensive echelon.  There were

23    casualties, 280 soldiers were killed, 760 were wounded -- actually,

24    counting for 52 per cent of all the war losses, war casualties at the

25    Pristina Corps level.

Page 17995

 1       Q.   General, how many battles and combat engagements were there,

 2    approximately, for us -- in order for us to paint a picture, because you

 3    did say that but it is not recorded in the transcript.

 4       A.   I said several hundred.  In the combat reports of the corps, 552

 5    battles and combat engagements are registered, but I'm quite sure that not

 6    all of them were registered because there were daily attacks by the armed

 7    rebels in various locations.

 8       Q.   We saw that the Ministry of the Interior was supported in

 9    executing the counter-terrorist activities on the basis of previous plans

10    and special orders of the kind of Grom 3.  What was the objective of

11    taking such counter-terrorist activities, i.e., supporting them?

12       A.   All these combat activities were component part of the defensive

13    operation of the corps.  As regards specific counter-insurgency actions of

14    the army forces and of the MUP forces, their general objective was to lift

15    the blockade on the main roads and important facilities, important

16    features, to lift the blockade on them by the armed rebels, also to

17    prevent own units -- to protect own units, to protect the general

18    population, and to establish as secure a regime of life and work as

19    possible a war security regime in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

20    That was the overall objective.

21            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we now see Prosecution Exhibit

22    P2447.

23       Q.   This is a Prosecution exhibit and deployment chart of the KLA in

24    the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.  Could you comment on these zones in

25    conjunction with this previous question, please.

Page 17996

 1       A.   This is a layout, the overview map that we had seen when the

 2    witness Zyrapi was testifying, and it originates in the leadership or the

 3    headquarters, the Main Staff, of the KLA, as was explained to us at that

 4    time.  And then these shaded areas, I recognise the most important

 5    concentrations of the armed rebel's forces throughout Kosovo and Metohija

 6    and in the border area facing Albania and Macedonia as well as in central

 7    Kosovo and Metohija and in the north of the province.

 8       Q.   When did the command of the 3rd Army issue its executive order for

 9    taking possession of the defensive sector and anti-terrorist struggle?

10       A.   As far as I can remember at this point, on the day when the

11    imminent threat of war was declared on the 23rd of March, 1999, the

12    command of the army issued an executive order for taking possession of

13    positions to defend the country and begin the defence of the country's

14    integrity and sovereignty.

15       Q.   This is Defence Exhibit 5D1294.  There is no need for us to call

16    it up to appear on the screen.

17            General, in keeping with these orders and plans, when did the

18    counter-terrorist activities of a part of the corps units begin?  You

19    talked about this yesterday.  Just tell us when and did the command of the

20    corps request a report from the units after the execution of such actions?

21       A.   In this order which we did not have occasion to see, I remember

22    that in one item the army commander ordered that with the start of the

23    NATO aggression there should be -- the defensive positions should be

24    manned, should be possessed, and counter-insurgency activities initiated

25    with the objective of protecting the units and enabling the operational

Page 17997

 1    deployment of the corps' units.  So the answer is the first

 2    counter-insurgency activities were on the 24th of March and continued from

 3    then on.

 4            And to respond to your second question, unless I have omitted

 5    something, is that the corps command regularly, periodically, required of

 6    the subordinated commands interim, special, reports besides the daily,

 7    regular, ones, in which the brigades were to provide a brief analysis of

 8    the implementation of their previous tasks in defending the country.

 9       Q.   General, can we take a look at Exhibit 5D343 and can we have your

10    comment on it.  This appears to be your document.

11       A.   Yes, this is a document of the corps command which I, myself,

12    drafted on the 29th of March, following the successfully executed action

13    of routing terrorist forces in the area of Drenica.  It required the corps

14    command be submitted data on the realisation of that task, in particular

15    requiring an analysis of the training levels of the units for such tasks

16    of their combat skills of the units, that is in item 4.  In item 5, the

17    implementation of coordinated action with units of army and MUP.  And in

18    item 6, I require their information about treatment of civilians during

19    combat activities and observance of the international law of war, and

20    naturally, to inform me of any observed terrorist activities by the

21    terrorist forces.  And I'm asking them to send me written reports by the

22    3rd of April.

23       Q.   Thank you, General.  Take a look at 5D339 of the 28th of March

24    now.  Tell me what this document is and do you recognise it?

25       A.   I would like to ask the Trial Chamber for its indulgence.  I would

Page 17998

 1    like to remind you of my previous answer when we were discussing some

 2    orders that bore that strange title, the Joint Command, where I testified

 3    that the units were directed in a number of documents to those tasks.  And

 4    this is now a preparatory order that I issued to the units after the

 5    counter-insurgency action in Drenica and the preparation for a new action

 6    to take place in the Malisevo area, where each unit is given a specific

 7    task within this order for preparations.

 8       Q.   Did the 3rd Army command report to the Supreme Command Staff about

 9    those actions?

10       A.   Yes, certainly.  The 3rd Army command monitored the implementation

11    of these tasks, it approved, and definitely it reported to its superior

12    command, which would be the Supreme Command Staff.

13       Q.   Could you now look at P1446 --

14            JUDGE BONOMY:  Before you do that, why do you relate this to the

15    Joint Command issue, Mr. Lazarevic?

16            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, two actions are

17    mentioned here, one is Drenica, the other one is Malisevo.  For both these

18    actions orders that bear no signature were issued, ones that are

19    headed "Joint Command for KiM."  And yesterday, I tried to explain what it

20    meant, the fact that this was sent to the units, but there were other

21    documents that made it clear to them who was actually

22    ordering this and what was actually being ordered.

23            JUDGE BONOMY:  Yeah, I remember that.  And what's this got to do

24    with the format of these documents?

25            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, because after the

Page 17999

 1    28th of March, the commanders would again receive the order for Malisevo

 2    where there would be the heading of "the Joint Command for KiM," which

 3    means what I actually tried to explain yesterday.  But before that, they

 4    had already been given a specific task from the corps commander with the

 5    signature, and they know what they are to do.  They will face no dilemma

 6    once they receive the order that we are talking about.

 7            JUDGE BONOMY:  Are you saying that there would be a preparatory

 8    order which says nothing about Joint Command and then an executive order

 9    which mentions the Joint Command?

10            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a good example of a

11    preparatory order where there's no mention at all of the Joint Command.

12    This is the Pristina Corps, and there will be a group of documents that

13    would follow this one, including the order that is unsigned with the

14    heading of the Joint Command in order to indicate that this task was to be

15    carried out with the police.

16            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you have no further

17    questions on this topic, I have a couple of questions on this topic, but

18    we are now approaching --

19            JUDGE BONOMY:  No, continue with other couple of questions, yeah.

20            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

21       Q.   General, on, or rather, my previous question was:  Did the 3rd

22    Army command report to the Supreme Command Staff on these actions?  And

23    could you please look at Prosecution Exhibit P1446.  Could you please

24    comment on it.  This is a very brief document.

25       A.   The commander of the 3rd Army from the forward command post, which

Page 18000

 1    is at the corps command post, on the 30th of March informs the Supreme

 2    Command Staff that on the 30th of March an operation will commence to

 3    destroy the remaining terrorist forces in the Malisevo area.  And in

 4    accordance with his estimate, the action would be completed within the

 5    next two or three days.  This is the action that is mentioned in the

 6    previous preparatory order, and this is the action to which one of those

 7    documents with the heading of the Joint Command would pertain to.

 8       Q.   Could you please look at Exhibit P2029 and could you please

 9    comment on this document, in particular regarding items 2 and 4.

10       A.   This is an order of the corps command from the beginning of the

11    war.  It is a preparatory order for the next action, as was the previous

12    order, where I order that the Malisevo operation - although it was not

13    really an operation - should be completed by the 1st of April, in

14    accordance with the previous plan.  And then that the forces should be

15    regrouped for further tasks; in other words, what I'm trying to say is

16    that the corps command is monitoring the situation, controlling the

17    situation, commanding the units, taking appropriate measures.  It is in

18    command of its own units.

19       Q.   Could you please comment on item 4, it's on the next page,

20    together with this order to control and block the Jablanica area, could

21    you please look at paragraph -- item 4 and tell us what you meant by it?

22            MR. HANNIS:  I'm sorry to interrupt, Your Honour.  Could I inquire

23    when we're breaking today.

24            JUDGE BONOMY:  As soon as we finish this document, Mr. -- I don't

25    believe in interrupting at an unnatural moment if it's possible to avoid

Page 18001

 1    it.

 2            MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, I just wasn't clear because of the

 3    unusual sitting hours today starting at 11.00 and we typically don't go

 4    more than an hour and 45 minutes.

 5            JUDGE BONOMY:  Sorry.  We're almost finished this, I think.

 6            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do apologise, I didn't

 7    want to interrupt --

 8            JUDGE BONOMY:  Just deal with this and complete the document

 9    rather than go back to it later, which is a real waste of time.

10            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

11       Q.   Paragraph 4, item 4.

12       A.   Although this is a classical example of a combat order, in this

13    order too, in item 4, I insist that in all the garrisons, in all the

14    deployment areas in coordinated action with forces of the MUP, the

15    military territorial organs, the military prosecutor's offices, and

16    military investigating and judicial organs, I know what this is all about,

17    despite the fact that now the text is no longer on the screen.  Do I have

18    to talk about it?

19       Q.   No, please, just tell us about it.  Don't read it.

20       A.   I demand that a stable security regime be established, that the

21    civilian population be protected in direct coordination with all these

22    structures, that crimes of all sorts are to be prevented.  And I also

23    demand that special forces and people should be set aside for this task,

24    primarily from the military police units.

25       Q.   Thank you, General.  I have two more questions and two brief

Page 18002

 1    documents --

 2            JUDGE BONOMY:  No, not any more documents at this stage,

 3    Mr. Bakrac.  Let's be reasonable about it, and indeed this is just a

 4    demonstration of something that is quite unnecessary, because all the

 5    witness has done is tell us what we can read for ourselves on the screen.

 6    I thought I was assisting in allowing you to complete this, but it really

 7    hasn't assisted very much.  We'll break now and resume at ten minutes to

 8    2.00.

 9                          --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.51 p.m.

10                          --- On resuming at 1.52 p.m.

11            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac.

12            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

13       Q.   General, prior to the break we were looking at this document.  To

14    clarify matters can we have Exhibit P2003 of the Prosecution shown on the

15    screen, please.

16            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is one of the

17    orders tendered by the Prosecution.  The date is the 2nd of April, 1999,

18    and it is an order to smash and destroy the STS in the Jablanica sector.

19    The heading states "Joint Command."

20            Can we now have Exhibit 5D84 shown on the screen, please.

21       Q.   This is a combat report of the Pristina Corps dated the 3rd of

22    April.  The previous command was of the 2nd of April, this is of the 3rd

23    of April.  General, please comment on item 2.1, activities, results,

24    consequences, and other, and focus on the first sentence, please.

25       A.   This combat report, it's item 2.1, the first sentence thereof

Page 18003

 1    states -- in it I actually inform the commander of the army that on the

 2    basis of my own decision, the decision of the Pristina Corps commander,

 3    the re-grouping of forces has been completed and that actions are in

 4    course to rout terrorist forces according to the Jablanica plan in the

 5    Jablanica sector.

 6       Q.   Just a minute and then we shall wrap it up.  Let us -- we shall

 7    revert to this report later, but let us just take a look at Exhibit 5D85

 8    one minute, which I believe is a combat report in the form of a telegram

 9    dated the next day, the 4th of April, 1999.  Please read first sentence of

10    item 2.1, activities, effects, consequences, and other data the next day,

11    i.e., April 4th, 1999.

12       A.   The operation, the action, aimed at crushing the terrorist forces

13    in the wider Jablanica region is underway, and following the decision of

14    the commander of the Pristina Corps shall be completed by nightfall of the

15    4th of April, 1999.

16       Q.   Tell us now, General, did you on the 3rd of April, 1999, and on

17    the 4th of April, 1999, when this indictment was not yet in existence, did

18    you write in your report to the superior command what you explained to us

19    today and yesterday?

20       A.   Well, that is the substance and that reflects the factual state of

21    affairs, the goings on in the zone of responsibility of the corps in the

22    relevant period; namely, the corps command was planning to use -- was

23    planning the use of units in the -- to defend the country and informed the

24    superior command on that particular -- on the implementation of that

25    particular task.

Page 18004

 1       Q.   General, let us go back to 5D84 for a minute.  I apologise, I

 2    omitted something, item 8.  In order to establish a link with this

 3    document, I proceeded too quickly.

 4            So please tell us what is the focus of activities for the coming

 5    day, according to item 8.  Yes, we have it on the screen now, item 8, that

 6    is.

 7       A.   I informed the army commander that the focus for the next day

 8    would be to continue the initiated action to rout terrorist forces in the

 9    Jablanica area.  If I need to amplify --

10       Q.   No, thank you, that will suffice.

11            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we have seen this

12    document many times in regard to the explanation of when the 37th

13    Motorised Brigade was resubordinated, and the number of criminal charges

14    filed for criminal offences; all this has been dealt with and addressed in

15    dealing with other witnesses.  We shall now --

16            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac, what is the particular point you're

17    making by reference to 5D84 and 85 and P2003?

18            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is evident here that

19    then, on the 3rd April 1999, the corps commander at the time when there

20    was no indictment, it does not refer to the -- to an order of the Joint

21    Command but refers to an order of the Pristina Corps, as he told us

22    yesterday.  In the combat report, you first saw the Jablanica order which

23    has in its heading "Joint Command."  And the next day in the combat

24    report, the corps commander says:  "On the basis of the decision of the

25    commander of the Pristina Corps ..." And does not say on the basis of the

Page 18005

 1    decision of the Joint Command.  So on the 3rd and 4th of April, he refers

 2    to it as the decision of the commander of the Pristina Corps.

 3            JUDGE BONOMY:  I thought that was the case, it's just the

 4    reference to the indictment has defeated me, but let's continue.

 5            MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, I just wanted to indicate for the record

 6    that 5D85 does not appear to have been on the notification list.

 7            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

 8            Please continue, Mr. Bakrac.

 9            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that I've

10    seen it with some of the colleagues but perhaps colleague Visnjic --

11            MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is probably with me

12    and I do not object to its being used.

13            JUDGE BONOMY:  [Previous translation continues]...

14            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

15       Q.   General, we shall now move on.  Did the staff of the Supreme

16    Command issue orders and warnings for the protection of its own forces

17    against KLA attacks?

18       A.   As far as I can recall there were such orders which were invoked

19    by the army command, and certainly when it was so assessed by the Supreme

20    Command Staff it did issue such orders as well.

21            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we take a look at 5D -- Exhibit

22    5D174.  5D174.

23       Q.   Please give us a brief comment on items 2 and 3 so that we can

24    proceed.

25       A.   I remember that an order of the 3rd Army had a similar content, on

Page 18006

 1    the basis of which I issued my own order, and the essence is purely of a

 2    military doctrinal nature, namely, that prior to bringing to specific

 3    areas and facilities of units, such has to be carried out, combat control,

 4    and the insight must be gained into the area, whether it is secure to

 5    deploy the units there and protect them from any possible actions by

 6    terrorist forces.

 7            And in the third item, the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command

 8    orders the same to the army commander, namely, to act in compliance with

 9    the order.  And I also received such an order and instructions to act upon

10    it.

11       Q.   General, did the forces of the Ministry of the Interior in

12    conditions when the KLA insurgency and the NATO aggression began, were

13    they able to execute such complete combat control and protect the men and

14    the facilities?

15       A.   Even had there been many times their number, they would not have

16    been able to complete that task on their own against the sitting of the

17    armed rebellion.

18       Q.   General, we shall now take a look at another document, which I

19    should like you to comment on in more detail.  I believe that that is your

20    document dated the 9th of April, 1999, which is exhibit -- Defence Exhibit

21    5D476.  You see the document, General, can you explain to us your

22    sentence "to the commanders," what is this about?

23       A.   I recall this document because it was created at the time when the

24    land aggression began from Albania on the Kosare-Djakovica axis.  The

25    operations organ of the Pristina Corps informed me that they had received

Page 18007

 1    information from organs of the MUP staff which were engaged in planning to

 2    the effect that secretariats of the interior in the territory of Kosovo

 3    and Metohija were planning or had planned specific counter-terrorist

 4    actions.  And in that sense, I ordered the commanders to establish contact

 5    with the secretariats of the interior, to identify their place and role in

 6    terms of their potential to engage in coordinated action with the MUP

 7    forces, to implement the tasks of combat control of the territory.  And in

 8    the heading I also warned the commanders that one of the priority tasks of

 9    the corps was incessant and complete control and securing of the

10    territory.  I stated that they should identify the concrete activities by

11    secretariat, that they should identify their own potentials for

12    coordinated activity, and then that they were to draft proposals.

13       Q.   General, yes, let us not go into detail.  You did indicate what

14    factors were to be established, contact with for consultation and

15    coordination.  Let us look at page 2, item 4, the last two sentences, I

16    should like to hear your comment on those, then we shall move on.

17       A.   I ordered that once contacts, coordination, have been established in

18    accordance with the possibilities of the units, specific actions should be

19    planned and that such plans should be submitted to the Pristina Corps

20    command for its approval.  Thus, what was planned by the MUP forces, the

21    army units, the Pristina Corps as their actions, they were to act in

22    coordination in carrying out their tasks wherever they

23    could, and the plans would be approved by the corps commander.

24       Q.   And did you ask that analyses be submitted to you of those

25    actions?  Please look at 5D373.

Page 18008

 1       A.   This is a document issued by the corps command, although in the

 2    letterhead the title of the corps command is missing and the date is the

 3    23rd of April.  And in this document I ask of the subordinate commanders

 4    that they send information on the action against the rebel forces in

 5    places where those participated in the action, and the names of the

 6    actions are listed if the forces participated in them.

 7       Q.   Thank you, General.  Let's move on.  We have seen a number of

 8    documents of yours mentioning combat control of the territory.  Can you

 9    explain to us the essence or the gist of the significance of this and the

10    manner in which combat control of the territory was exercised.

11       A.   With Their Honours' leave, I ask you to bear with me and allow me

12    to respond in a few sentences, because this activity differed from the

13    usual combat activities which we call combat actions, attack, or defence.

14    Combat control of the territory is a set of different tactical combat

15    activities with the aim of primarily through passive, defensive,

16    intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other measures protecting the

17    units and major facilities.  The set of measures and activities varies.

18    It ranges from taking up positions or taking facilities to setting up

19    observation posts, setting up check-points, and by all these means combat

20    control of the territories achieved.

21       Q.   Let's look at Exhibit 5D374.  General, we will come to your

22    special orders relating to taking care of the civilian population, but we

23    have seen that in your combat orders you also demanded that your units

24    adhere by the law of war, international laws of war and humanitarian law.

25    In these orders for the control of the territory, we also see that there

Page 18009

 1    is a special item dealing with that.  Could you explain, first of all, in

 2    item 1 why did you require that all military territorial units be removed

 3    from inhabited places, and then please go on and comment on items 2 and 3.

 4    The date here is the 23rd of April.

 5       A.   From the military and doctrinal standpoint, this order of mine -

 6    and there was also a previous order issued by the army commander - is not

 7    fully justified because military doctrine implies organizing defence by

 8    relying on inhabited places and fortified facilities and buildings.

 9    However, I ordered that military territorial units which by virtue of

10    their purpose carry out their tasks in inhabited places, protecting

11    crucial facilities be removed from inhabited places, and I did this for

12    two reasons.  Firstly, with Their Honours' leave I will simplify things by

13    saying that we wanted to create a safe place where the civilian population

14    would have room to live without hindrance, as far as is possible in

15    wartime conditions.  And on the other hand, we wanted them to take certain

16    facilities outside inhabited places, that is, the units, we wanted the

17    units to take up facilities outside inhabited places in order to achieve

18    combat control.

19       Q.   Well, let's look at item 3 first, and then we'll go back to item

20    2, and especially the third sentence.  Could you please explain the whole

21    of item 3, in fact.

22       A.   Item 3 explains in greater detail the idea that guided me when I

23    issued this task.  To accommodate and protect the civilian population in

24    inhabited places in line with my previous orders.  That's why particular

25    units were evacuated or moved out.  I am requiring from the subordinate

Page 18010

 1    commanders that the civilian population not be out in the open, but that

 2    it be accommodated in buildings, inside inhabited places, and that any

 3    criminal activity against the civilian population be prevented.

 4       Q.   We see that you said something in brackets, to prevent what?

 5       A.   Well, if someone should perhaps prohibit the civilian population

 6    from returning to their homes --

 7       Q.   Thank you, General.  Could you comment on item 2 and then on item

 8    5 after that.

 9            JUDGE BONOMY:  Before moving on to that, if you would go back,

10    please, to paragraph -- section number 1 which talks of removing all

11    military territorial units from inhabited places.  It goes on to say: "And

12    occupy facilities for the purpose of the blockade."

13            What does that mean?

14            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the military

15    territorial units had to take dominant facilities to block them from

16    attacks by terrorist forces; that's combat control of the territory.  So

17    from those facilities they should protect their own forces and all the

18    other forces in the general area.

19            JUDGE BONOMY:  What is the blockade you're talking about there?

20            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is a blockade of approach of

21    possibilities for terrorist forces to approach and to suddenly attack

22    these significant features and facilities.  As I said, by setting up

23    sentinels and employing the entire system of combat control of the

24    territory.

25            JUDGE BONOMY:  Can you give me an example of such facilities?

Page 18011

 1            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with all due respect,

 2    allow me to say that the most serious form, the most difficult form, of

 3    anti-terrorist combat anywhere in the world is combat control of the

 4    territory, protection of the general area of various features and

 5    facilities.  There are experiences all over the world where suicide

 6    bombers penetrate to such facilities or features.  So approach should be

 7    blocked.

 8            JUDGE BONOMY:  I just want you to tell me the nature of the

 9    facilities you had in mind.  Can you give me an example of such a

10    facility?

11            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, a very specific example, Your

12    Honour, would be the following:  The military territorial Podujevo

13    Detachment, which according to its purpose would be deployed in an

14    inhabited place, in a town, securing important buildings, I ordered that

15    it be removed several kilometres further away where there is a major

16    waterworks important for water-supply to the entire area and to block and

17    protect that waterworks from terrorist attacks.  They succeeded in this,

18    but the waterworks were hit by NATO's air-strikes and the population was

19    left without water.

20            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac.

21            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

22       Q.   General, you have explained item 3.  Please look at items 2 and 5.

23       A.   This is a document of the 23rd of April, and here I order the

24    commanders on -- after having carried out the resubordination of the MUP

25    units, the main forces of the police should be engaged primarily as a

Page 18012

 1    priority task on the combat control of the territory and an assessment for

 2    such engagement should be carried out at the brigade level.

 3       Q.   Well, let's pause here.  We'll come to some documents, but to

 4    clarify things here you stress the date here.  This was after the order by

 5    the supreme commander, the Chief of the General Staff, and then the

 6    commander of the 3rd Army were issued.  And you set a deadline by the

 7    25th, just so that Their Honours can have a clear reference and then we'll

 8    come to those documents.  Is this correct?

 9       A.   Yes.

10       Q.   General, please look at item 5 on page 2, so it's also on page 2

11    in the English version, item 5.  Can you explain what it means?

12       A.   In item 5, I prohibited my subordinate commanders from issuing any

13    kind of order having to do with the functioning of civilian organs of

14    authority or the so-called Crisis Staffs, and the unification or

15    coordination and combination of means of defence should be regulated by

16    special orders.

17       Q.   Please look at item 9.

18       A.   Item 9, first of all, points to the continuation of previous

19    orders, numerous previous orders, and says:  "Continue using all measures

20    to prevent any attempted crime in the areas of responsibility, and should

21    there be any perpetrators of crimes, employ the most serious measures of

22    responsibility."  Also, "strengthen measures to ensure order in the units,

23    overall order, in order to preserve the reputation of the members of the

24    Army of Yugoslavia."

25       Q.   The last page, item 13, it seems that you stressed here that this

Page 18013

 1    order of an ongoing, permanent, character and that the entire corps must

 2    be familiarised with it.  Is that correct?

 3       A.   Yes, what you said is correct.  It's a permanent order, not just

 4    because I myself composed it in the midst of wartime chaos, but also

 5    because I was convinced at the time that this order provided for important

 6    measures.  And that's why I required that I be informed regularly through

 7    daily combat reports, and this happened throughout the war and this order

 8    was always referred to.

 9            MR. HANNIS:  I'm sorry to interrupt, Your Honour.  The English

10    translation says item 12 is one sentence illegible.  I don't know if since

11    the General's here he might be able to tell us what it says.

12            JUDGE BONOMY:  Could you read item 12, if you can, Mr. Lazarevic.

13            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If the usher could zoom in because I

14    see what you all see.  I will try.  I might be able to recognise

15    something.  Oh, yes, yes.

16             "By all means, to the maximum extent, intensify measures of

17    engineer protection, engineer support."  So it says:  "To the maximum

18    extent, with all available means, take measures of engineering support."

19            I can explain what this means.  It means securing manoeuvres,

20    removing land-mines from roads, and especially creating obstacles at the

21    state border to prevent attacks from Albania and Macedonia.  So that is to

22    protect the manpower.

23            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

24            Mr. Bakrac --

25            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- From attacks, from attacks from

Page 18014

 1    the air-space.

 2            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

 3       Q.   General, you read an order here concerning your prohibition, or

 4    rather, where you prohibited your commanders from interfering in the work

 5    of civilian authorities.  Can you explain what this means and what this

 6    refers to?

 7       A.   This was a preventive measure.  I must confess that at the time I

 8    didn't know that anyone on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija issued any

 9    erroneous orders to this effect, but I clearly ordered the commanders,

10    saying them -- telling them that they had absolutely no authority over the

11    civilian government and the civilian authorities in the areas where the

12    army units were deployed.

13       Q.   General, let us look at 3D592, Exhibit 3D592, and the briefing of

14    the chief of the Supreme Command of the 22nd of April, 1999.  That's page

15    4 in B/C/S and page 4 in the English version.  And in item 4, to speed

16    things up, I'll read it while we wait for it.  It says, item 4:  "The

17    state of war" and "military administration," it's not one and the same

18    thing, military rule, it's not one and the same thing.  Could you please

19    explain to us, what does that mean?

20       A.   I assume, because I don't see it in front of me, that this is what

21    the chief of Supreme Command Staff said.

22       Q.   Colonel-General Ojdanic, item 4.

23       A.   Yes, I can see it now.  And -- despite the fact that this is just

24    a few words, they unequivocally and clearly show the military doctrine of

25    the Army of Yugoslavia, which does not recognise the occupation -- the

Page 18015

 1    system of occupation and military rule, which is something that exists

 2    under the military doctrine of some other states, including some NATO

 3    member states.  In the doctrine of the Army of Yugoslavia there is no

 4    military rule where the military would suspend the civilian government,

 5    would impose some kind of military rule, and would be held responsible for

 6    everything that happens in that area.  The military engages in armed

 7    struggle and it makes sure that other entities involved in the defence, of

 8    course, carry out their tasks, but it receives the main brunt.

 9            THE INTERPRETER:  Could the counsel and the witness please not

10    overlap.

11            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

12       Q.   General, we will come back to that and you will provide some other

13    details.  You spoke about the control of the territory, General, and the

14    establishment of check-points, does that serve that purpose, too?  Can you

15    tell us something about that?  Did the military establish those

16    check-points and for what reason, if so?

17       A.   The corps units did set up check-points at access routes to the

18    sectors where their units were deployed, in order to ensure fuller combat

19    control to prevent any entry of unauthorised persons into the deployment

20    sectors and also to control its own personnel, to prevent them from

21    leaving those sectors.

22       Q.   And what kind of units manned those check-points from the

23    composition of the Pristina Corps?

24       A.   Primarily those were the units of the military police, because

25    that is their purpose and they have the capability to carry out such

Page 18016

 1    tasks.  Because they could find themselves in public transport, and one of

 2    the roles of the military police is to control the road traffic, military

 3    road traffic.

 4       Q.   General, did to that end the security department of the Pristina

 5    Corps issue a detailed instruction for the operation of military

 6    check-points?

 7       A.   Yes.  There is a very detailed report, very detailed document on

 8    how this task is to be carried out, forms that are to be used for the

 9    movement of vehicles, and the security organ actually was in charge of all

10    that.

11            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in order to move

12    forward a bit more quickly, the evidence of General Lazarevic on this

13    issue is contained in Exhibit 5D375.  There is no reason for us to open

14    this document now.

15            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

16            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

17       Q.   General, were there any mixed check-points that were manned both

18    by the military and by the MUP?

19       A.   As part of the coordinated action in carrying out tasks to

20    establish combat control, we did encounter certain problems, and we agreed

21    in the spirit of cooperation that those check-points should be closer to

22    each other.  And each check-point, the police check-point would have its

23    own duties and obligations, and the military check-point would have its

24    own obligations.  The military check-point checked military personnel, and

25    the MUP check-points checked their own units and the civilian traffic and

Page 18017

 1    all the other civilian structures.

 2       Q.   As far as I was able to understand, those check-points were set up

 3    on the basis of an agreement between the leaders of the MUP staff and the

 4    Pristina Corps command.  Perhaps if we could look at 5D376, and if you

 5    could explain to us -- it says here:  "Pursuant to an agreement between

 6    the leaders of the MUP staff and the Pristina Corps command, the 13th of

 7    May," that was the deadline for the resubordination.  Is this proof of the

 8    fact that the resubordination had not happened by the 13th of May, because

 9    we can see from this document that the mixed check-points were set up on

10    the basis of an agreement, that's from the MUP staff leaders?

11       A.   Well, the document speaks for itself and indicates that this is,

12    indeed, the case.  And I just wanted to add that on several occasions, I

13    think it was General Obrad Stevanovic who phoned and tried to get in touch

14    with me in order to have a closer coordinated action with regard to the

15    functioning of those check-points.  Perhaps it was also General Lukic, but

16    I remember that I contacted -- I was in contact with General Stevanovic on

17    the phone.  So it was done on the basis of an agreement to improve our

18    coordinated action.

19            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we now look at exhibit -- a

20    Prosecution exhibit, P1269.

21       Q.   And if you could comment very briefly on items 1 and 5 so that we

22    can proceed more quickly.  General, could you please look at this

23    document, the 8th of May, and very briefly items 1 and 5.

24       A.   This is an order from the 3rd Army commander from the forward

25    command post about the engagement of the military and MUP forces to

Page 18018

 1    establish combat control of the territory.  We have been discussing this.

 2    In item 1, he orders that all forces should be engaged in the area of

 3    responsibility of the corps to establish full control of the territory and

 4    the possibility of roads.  And in item 5, the Pristina Corps commander, as

 5    far as I can see, it was 20 days after the previous order, orders again

 6    that the Pristina Corps should resubordinate all military territorial

 7    units and the MUP units to the joint units -- tactical units, i.e.,

 8    brigades.

 9       Q.   Just let me see if I understand it correctly.  The Pristina Corps

10    commander orders, that's what you said.  As far as I can understand from

11    this document, just so that it is clear in the transcript, it was the 3rd

12    Army commander who ordered the Pristina Corps commander on the 8th of May

13    to again issue an order for the resubordination, which had not happened

14    obviously?

15       A.   Yes, definitely.  I do apologise.  I may have misspoken, but it is

16    quite clear from this document that this is an order of the 3rd Army

17    commanders to the Pristina Corps commander.

18       Q.   Thank you, General.  Let us move on.  We've seen that there were

19    some joint actions to rout and destroy Siptar terrorists according to the

20    orders, or rather, the coordinated action between the Army of Yugoslavia,

21    the Pristina Corps, and MUP.  Did the units of the Pristina Corps, were

22    they engaged in any independent operations or actions that they carried

23    out on their own?

24       A.   By your leave, Your Honours, I want to say that the last orders to

25    provide support to the MUP forces with this unfortunate heading of the

Page 18019

 1    Joint Command that is now causing this confusion were issued on [as

 2    interpreted] the 15th and the 16th of April to carry out

 3    counter-insurgency actions.  All the other orders, all the other

 4    instructions, and all the other combat documents never ever contained this

 5    title again.  They all pertained to a number of independent actions,

 6    battles, and combat engagements of the Pristina Corps within a combat

 7    operation, although in some orders the -- there are suggestions or orders

 8    for the coordinated action with MUP forces, but in some cases there is no

 9    coordinated action.  The only units that are engaged are the Pristina

10    Corps units.

11       Q.   You said up until the 16th, but not after the 16th.  Can you

12    explain to us, General, why not after the 16th?

13       A.   As early as on the 18th, the Supreme Command Staff issued an order

14    for the resubordination of the MUP organs and units to the military,

15    whereby there was no longer any need for any attempts to find some kind of

16    a modality for the coordination and support between the military and MUP;

17    and that is why such headings are no longer seen in any of the corps

18    documents.

19            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac, the English translation says:  "On the

20    15th and 16th of April ..." Was that accurate?

21            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No.  The General said after the 16th.

22    The General said that the last order with that heading was after the 16th,

23    and my question was:  Why after the 16th of April there were no longer any

24    orders bearing this heading.

25            JUDGE BONOMY:  [Previous translation continues]...

Page 18020

 1            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

 2       Q.   General, we will come back to this topic with some documents, but

 3    is it true that through -- that this resubordination was attempted until

 4    the end of May and did it finally succeed?

 5       A.   I'd say attempts were made up until the end of the war, and my

 6    answer would be that there was no resubordination of the forces, or

 7    rather, organs and units of the MUP to the Army of Yugoslavia, quite

 8    specifically to the Pristina Corps, as it had been ordered.

 9       Q.   General, we stopped at the independent actions launched by the

10    Pristina Corps.  There is no need to go into the document.  I will just

11    make a reference to it, it's 5D335 for the benefit of the Trial Chamber.

12            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you -- let me ask Mr. Lazarevic:  What you're

13    portraying is a picture of persistent attempts to order the

14    resubordination of the MUP forces to the Pristina Corps; is that a correct

15    statement?

16            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm saying that there

17    were several attempts in addition to the initial order dated the 20th when

18    we're talking about the 3rd Army command, the 20th of April, you saw that

19    on the 8th of May the army commander orders me to resubordinate the MUP

20    units.  And on the other hand there were attempts, direct contacts, to do

21    so, but there were problems of another kind.  But I have not been asked

22    that question yet so I have refrained from saying that.

23            JUDGE BONOMY:  I was only proceeding on what you said.  You said

24    you would say attempts were made up until the end of the war.  What were

25    the consequences of the failure of the MUP to accept resubordination?

Page 18021

 1            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The consequences, Your Honour, were

 2    dire in terms of combat because this resulted in heavy casualties, both in

 3    the military ranks and in the MUP ranks because it was impossible to

 4    establish heavy combat control in such circumstances, the circumstances of

 5    armed rebellion.  We suffered heavy casualties, and the defence system in

 6    Kosovo and Metohija in certain elements thereof saw its efficiency and

 7    effectiveness diminished.

 8            JUDGE BONOMY:  I'm understanding that as saying that these were

 9    casualties which might have been avoided had there been resubordination;

10    is that what you're saying?

11            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is exactly what I'm saying, and

12    if you will bear with me I can tell you in 20 seconds this.  Specifically

13    speaking in the Drenica area, the commander of the brigade informed me

14    that some 200 metres from the point of coordinated action a MUP unit was

15    securing that area.  There the terrorist units attacked command of the

16    battalion and the commander of the battalion as they were moving and

17    massacred them, him and another five persons.

18            JUDGE BONOMY:  You're painting a picture also of not just the VJ

19    but the MUP suffering additional casualties because of this.  Have you any

20    idea why there was a refusal to accept general resubordination?

21            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my information is

22    indirect, not extremely indirect, but it is indirect.  I obtained it

23    through the reports of subordinated commanders, through contact with my

24    subordinated army commander, namely, that MUP units in the area of Kosovo

25    and Metohija had not been issued an order from the minister of the

Page 18022

 1    interior of the Republic of Serbia to resubordinate themselves to the army

 2    units in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.  And they simply could not

 3    act upon our orders because the minister of the interior, according to the

 4    Law on Internal Affairs is the only authorised person to regulate the use

 5    of the operation forces of that ministry.

 6            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

 7            Mr. Bakrac.

 8            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  I

 9    apologise.

10       Q.   I just wanted to direct you in regard of these independent

11    actions.  The reference is 5D335, 5D361, 3D314, 5D393, and in order not to

12    open them all, we shall just open 5D416, and, General, would you comment

13    on it and then we will move on.

14            General, this appears to be your order, so would you kindly

15    comment on it.

16       A.   This is an order seven days prior to the commencement of the

17    second large-scale land operation from Albania of the 19th of May, and I

18    warned the commanders of that fact and I order - let me not say some sort

19    of a partisan tactic - but specifically that all brigades and independent

20    battalions should undertake preparations for the execution of combats,

21    clashes, and all other tactical activities because I assess that there

22    would be a complete severance of the communications and command systems

23    and that the situation in that part of the battle-field would become

24    dramatic.  Then I go on to explain how that should be done, and I suggest

25    an order to the commanders, telling them that there would be no assistance

Page 18023

 1    from without, but that in keeping with the general order on the defence of

 2    the country each one should take their own decisions, in keeping with that

 3    general order of mine for the defence of the country.

 4       Q.   Thank you, Mr. Lazarevic.

 5            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is Exhibits 5D393,

 6    which are --

 7            JUDGE CHOWHAN:  General, I'm sorry to intervene, but this is the

 8    right time before we go forward.  Could you tell us what were the reasons

 9    for the minister of interior not passing orders for resubordination of

10    MUP?

11            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that is a big question

12    mark for me.  I don't know whether anyone knows the answer to that in this

13    courtroom.  I really don't know why, and I would not like to speculate on

14    that.  It was really difficult for me, as was to the other staff of the

15    MUP in Kosovo and Metohija, to comprehend why such orders had not come

16    through, because I had sustained heavy casualties and they had sustained

17    even heavier casualties in the Jablanica region because of the failure to

18    coordinated action.  Why that was so, or why that had not been done I

19    really didn't know, I didn't know who Vlajko Stojiljkovic was.

20                          [Trial Chamber confers]

21            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac.

22            JUDGE CHOWHAN:  But, sorry, the next question is, General, I'm

23    sorry to ask you this question.  Because of the ground realities and the

24    difficult situation you were confronted with, and you also felt the need

25    for cooperation or whatever or working together with the MUP and you

Page 18024

 1    wanted that this be formalised, did you agitate this somewhere that why

 2    this was not put in a formal way or why formal orders were not being sent

 3    or something was not being done?  Was there any agitation from your side

 4    as the corps commander?

 5            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I certainly did raise

 6    in all modesty, let me say, certain activities, and I tried to conduct

 7    some sort of a minor mission impossible on my part, and I ordered

 8    something which I superiors did not order.  You had occasion to see this

 9    order of mine, which observed on the strictly military standpoint, I did

10    not have the right to order and interpret things in a way that had not

11    been ordered to me.  What I'm trying to tell you is that the kind of order

12    that I received was simply unfeasible in practice; namely, to

13    resubordinate organs and units of the MUP to the corps.  What organs?

14    What units?  What centres of security?  I as the commander did not know

15    what these structures were.

16            Secondly, if you will allow me, let me tell you what I did then.

17    The army commander [as interpreted] who knew all this, but I sent my, so

18    to speak, third man, my assistant, my operations man who I hope will be

19    taking the stand here and we will have occasion to hear him.  And he went

20    from secretariat of the interior to secretariat of interior from

21    detachment commander to detachment commander and tried to maintain the

22    necessary level of cooperation.  All right.  There was no subordination,

23    but we did not want to detract from our mutual relations in order to

24    actually be able to weather this tide of the chaos, war, that we were in

25    the midst of.

Page 18025

 1            JUDGE CHOWHAN:  Thank you.

 2            JUDGE BONOMY:  I certainly don't find that an answer to the

 3    question that was asked.  Did you agitate with anyone higher up the

 4    hierarchy about this?  I don't think you've answered that.

 5            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If, Your Honour, you mean someone

 6    from the MUP, from the police --

 7            JUDGE BONOMY:  No, no, from your -- anybody who -- I mean, we've

 8    seen what General Pavkovic did to try to have this matter raised, but what

 9    did you do about it is what Judge Chowhan was asking.

10            No, no, let the witness answer.  He's been asked a question and

11    he's been asked whose cage he rattled to try to get something done about

12    this, and he told us he had somebody in the MUP, but Judge Chowhan is more

13    concerned about what he had done through his own chain of command about

14    this.

15            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise if I was not

16    sufficiently clear, but I primarily meant my own attitude, my obligation

17    towards the 3rd Army commander, by whom I sat day and night and reported

18    to him, informed him, and I saw and monitored.  And you will allow me to

19    say, Your Honour, that that was the utmost I could have done amid that

20    chaos of war.  Had I had any other occasion, I would have taken advantage

21    of it, but I was with the commander at all times and I reported on this to

22    him.

23            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

24            Mr. Bakrac.

25            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can I just ask for a

Page 18026

 1    minute of your attention.  The batch of documents that we have prepared is

 2    voluminous and we are trying to follow a system which Your Honours are

 3    perhaps unaware of.  So that when a subsequent question is raised, and

 4    that will be the case, you will actually be able to see what the corps

 5    commander and the commander of the army did on that score in their

 6    documents, in regards to this question of the resubordination of units.

 7            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Aleksic.

 8            MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour, I think

 9    that page 61, lines 6 and 7, the witness also responded what the 3rd Army

10    commander had taken in connection with that, and it is not reflected in

11    the transcript.

12            JUDGE BONOMY:  I don't understand what you're saying about this.

13    The transcript at present says that he was with the commanders at all

14    times and reported on this to him.  What do you say is missing?

15            MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, you are asking

16    what measures were taken, and the witness said:  I did this and I know

17    that the army commander also took other measures from his competence, and

18    that is not reflected in the transcript.

19            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

20            Mr. Bakrac.

21            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was interrupted

22    twice.  I should just like to invoke some exhibits in conjunction with the

23    previous subject matter, that's 5D443 and 5D395.

24       Q.   General, did the units of the Pristina Corps suffer frequent

25    attacks by the KLA and did they have significant losses?

Page 18027

 1       A.   Not a single day passed in the war without there being losses due

 2    to rebel attacks.  The losses of the Pristina Corps were twice as high due

 3    to terrorist attacks than they were due to NATO attacks.

 4            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we refer to 5D221.

 5       Q.   You gave us an example, saying that you ordered the brigades to

 6    collect information and plan actions at their own level.  Did the command

 7    of the Pristina Corps - I'm speaking now of independent actions - did it

 8    plan actions at its own level?

 9       A.   For certain situations in the assessment of the corps command, if

10    these situations were serious, the corps command issued special decisions

11    and orders to the brigades, telling them to independently or in

12    cooperation with other brigades carry out these complex tasks in the

13    course of the war.

14            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] May we now look at Exhibit 5D396.

15       Q.   And could you comment on this, could you tell us whether this is

16    an example of what you were just saying, and especially could you comment

17    on items 4, 5, and 6 on page 2, these are brief.  Do you recognise this

18    order?

19       A.   Yes, I do, certainly.

20       Q.   Please comment on items 4, 5, and 6, this is an order issued by

21    you to break-up and destroy STS in the Kacikol general area.

22       A.   By Their Honours' leave, let me explain that.  In the immediate

23    vicinity of Pristina to the east, some 10 kilometres away, there was a

24    strong build-up of terrorist forces on the main road from Pristina to

25    Medvedja leading to that part of Serbia.  I then issued a decision and

Page 18028

 1    ordered the 354th Infantry Brigade to become engaged in breaking up this

 2    strong build-up which was threatening Pristina itself, and in item 3 I

 3    order that they use their own forces for fire support; and as in every

 4    other order, I tell them to prevent torching and destroying buildings and

 5    to open fire only on buildings where there is resistance and where they

 6    pose a danger to their own forces.

 7            In item 5, as always, I say prevent maltreatment and persecution

 8    of civilians and treat refugees in the spirit of the previously issued

 9    orders; in practically every combat order I say this.

10       Q.   When you say, or rather, you said here open fire only on buildings

11    where there is resistance and where they pose a danger to your own forces.

12    Did the corps carry out an assessment as to how many so-called UBS, that

13    is, lethal weapons, were used in the war and what effects these had?

14            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] In the meantime let's call up 5D1275.

15            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I beg for Their Honours' indulgence

16    because this appears to be a military question but it is of significance

17    for everything going on in this courtroom.  So if Their Honours will bear

18    with me, I will talk about the amount of ordnance used in the war and the

19    amount of ammunition because these facts demonstrate with mathematical

20    accuracy what was done and how.  This table was created in the war by

21    counting every bullet and every projectile that was used.  This table,

22    however, needs to be seen in the light of what is important here, and that

23    is that the corps did not carry out any kind of systematic campaign of

24    destruction and killing, on the contrary.  In my entire military career, I

25    never found another example of this sort of extremely restrictive use of

Page 18029

 1    ordnance.  If I may, Your Honours, I would like to add a few sentences

 2    because it will mean a great deal to me if I can explain with greater

 3    precision what this means.

 4            According to military doctrine, to carry out a combat task with

 5    the minimum of military efficiency, to neutralise 25 per cent of the enemy

 6    forces, when this is translated to the situation of the Pristina Corps it

 7    would mean that in view of the numbers of rebel forces, the brigades and

 8    the zones, as they call them, it would have been necessary to use 0.74

 9    combat kits of the Pristina Corps.  The effect of this would have been

10    taking 5 to 6.000 members of the KLA out of action.  That would have been

11    the minimum requirement.

12            The second parameter, Your Honours, is that in view of the

13    duration of the war the corps would have had to use 20 combat kits in

14    three months of work.

15            The third parameter contained in the combat documents would be the

16    following:  The corps had approval from the 3rd Army to use in the first

17    15 days of the war four combat kits to carry out its tasks.

18            And finally, in three months of war, the corps used 0.41 per cent

19    of its combat kits.  Using this, it could neutralise 10 to 14 per cent of

20    the rebel forces, which is twice less than the minimum.  It's half the

21    minimum.  According to the combat documentation of the corps, in war with

22    the -- in fighting, 1.095 terrorists were killed, and this amounts to 3

23    per cent of their numbers, which demonstrates the extreme restrictiveness

24    and use of the principle of humaneness, which was set above the principle

25    of military efficiency.

Page 18030

 1            And to conclude, we did this not because we were not well-trained

 2    as officers and soldiers, but because had we used bigger and more lethal

 3    technology and ordnance, there would have been a lot of destruction and a

 4    lot of casualties because the terrorist forces used mainly inhabited

 5    places and they used civilians as live shields, human shields.  And that

 6    was the highest standard of the application of international laws of war

 7    and humanitarian laws of war, and there is a whole study that was

 8    conducted during and after the war about the use of ordnance and this

 9    doctrine of military inefficiency but military humaneness which was set

10    above efficiency.

11            Thank you for bearing with me.

12            JUDGE BONOMY:  Well, I hope you understood it, Mr. Bakrac.  I find

13    it very difficult to follow any of that, and it's compounded by the fact

14    that the document's not translated.  And indeed, I have no idea of the

15    relationship between the document and what's just been said by

16    Mr. Lazarevic.  It sounds like an area for expertise if there had been

17    some.

18            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, let me just check the

19    translation.  The document has been translated, but I can explain.  This

20    is an assessment of the amount of ordnance used, and this was done at the

21    level of the Pristina Corps for the period from the 24th of March to the

22    10th of May, 1999.  General Lazarevic commented on the relationship

23    between the amount of ordnance used and the parameters he explained, which

24    is his view of the situation.

25            JUDGE BONOMY:  When was this document compiled?

Page 18031

 1            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 10th of May, 1999, at the

 2    command post of the Pristina Corps.  This is not an assessment, Your

 3    Honours, it's a report of the rear organ on the use of ammunition up to

 4    the 10th of May, 1999, and there are other reports for the period up to

 5    the end of the war.  This document refers to the numbers of projectiles

 6    and the numbers of bullets used by the units of the Pristina Corps.

 7            JUDGE BONOMY:  Well, we may return to it later once I've seen the

 8    translation, but I can make nothing of it as it stands.

 9            Please continue.

10            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  We have

11    information that there is a translation, and during the break we will try

12    to discover why it is not on the screen.

13       Q.   General, we said that the civil authorities continued functioning

14    in Kosovo and Metohija.  What tasks were they performing inter alia?

15       A.   Well, to the best of my knowledge, which is indirect and which I

16    obtained through the officers subordinate to me because I have to say I

17    did not have any direct contacts except perhaps an exchange of letters

18    within individuals, but I really do know from the reports coming from my

19    subordinate units that they exerted enormous efforts to take care of the

20    civilian population, to make sure that public services continued to

21    function, that the population was supplied with necessities, and that

22    after strikes, everything would continue to function, the market

23    inspection, the judiciary, everything that's needed.

24            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, to avoid looking at

25    each and every document and to expedite matters, I'll just give you the

Page 18032

 1    references, 2D375, 5D29, 5D1199.

 2            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

 3            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

 4       Q.   General, we touched on this issue a little while ago, so let's

 5    round it off now.  The question relates to the relationship between the

 6    civilian authorities and particular units which were part of the army and

 7    of the 3rd Corps.  In the case of the Army of Yugoslavia, were there any

 8    misunderstandings of the role of the Army of Yugoslavia in wartime and its

 9    relationship with the structures of the civilian authorities and the

10    civilian government, because we saw that a state of war implies military

11    administration.  So could you comment on this and then we'll look at a

12    Prosecution document.

13       A.   I learned about several such occurrences here in this courtroom.

14    In that period during the time of the war, I did not have information that

15    any units of the army acted incorrectly or undertook things that were not

16    within their competence, but I learned about this here.

17       Q.   Please look at P1208.  This refers to the command of the Pec

18    Military District.  The commander of the Pec Military District issued an

19    order on the 30th of May, 19 --

20            THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.

21            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

22       Q.   -- 30th of March, 1999.  Could you please comment on item 1 and

23    then we'll move on and round off this topic before the break.

24       A.   The commander of the Pec Military District, which was part of the

25    Pristina Military District and subordinated to the 3rd Army at the time,

Page 18033

 1    on the 30th of March, 1999, referring to a non-existent order by the

 2    supreme commander ordered that all republican and other local authorities

 3    be placed under the command of the Pec military district.  My comment on

 4    this is that it just doesn't make sense, that it's absolute nonsense.

 5    There's nothing one can say about such a document.

 6       Q.   Now look at 5D37, please, dated the 25th of April, 1999, and

 7    please comment on it.  It's a brief document.

 8       A.   The very same commander that issued the nonsensical order that we

 9    have just seen cancelled, revoked, his previous order on the 25th of April

10    that was based on the military -- Pristina Military District command, and

11    I know for a fact that the commander of the Pristina Military District

12    under my command used my previous order in which I prohibited the issuing

13    of any orders related to the civilian government and used it as a basis to

14    revoke his own document.

15            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we look at P -- Exhibit P1982,

16    again a Prosecution exhibit.

17       Q.   If you could comment on that, if you know what that is.

18       A.   This is yet another similar document, this time it is the 7th

19    Infantry Brigade that had just a few days before that arrived.  It was

20    transferred to the Pristina Corps area.  Again he refers to this

21    non-existent order, but in milder terms establishes some kind of staffs,

22    Municipal Assemblies, coordinates orders.  This is couched in different

23    terms, determining who would take care of the civilians, protect law and

24    order, but it is without a shadow of a doubt an order that cannot be

25    carried out by anyone, including the addressees, and nobody has the right

Page 18034

 1    to issue such an order.  And when the order -- when he received the order

 2    on the 23rd of March [as interpreted], he for all intents and purposes

 3    revoked this one.

 4       Q.   The order that we're referring to now, we've already called it up,

 5    that's 5D374, this is an order of the Pristina Corps commander of the 23rd

 6    of April prohibiting in item 5 any such actions.

 7            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise, but there

 8    is an error in the transcript, it's not March -- yes, yes, it's my

 9    mistake.  It's the 23rd of March.  In fact, when I gave the reference --

10    no, I'm sorry.  Let's clear this up.

11       Q.   This order of yours, what date does it bear?

12       A.   The 23rd of April, as far as I can remember, measures to stabilize

13    the defence.  That's what it is called.

14       Q.   Yes, well there was an error in the transcript, so now we've

15    clarified it.  Did the military district command, following this order of

16    yours, the Pristina Military District command issue its own order?

17    Because we saw that the units within its composition had tried to do

18    something like that.  That would be 5D35, Exhibit 5D35, we can look at it

19    on the screen, in particular item 4, 5D35.  Page 2, item 4.  That is when

20    the Pristina Military District command was resubordinated to you.

21       A.   Well, resubordinated, he is quoting my order, I prohibit any

22    issuing on any orders on this part of the commanders regarding the

23    functioning of the Crisis Staffs or authorities, and all the other

24    commands complied with my order.

25            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Perhaps this would be a convenient

Page 18035

 1    time for a break.  I think, according to our schedule, we should have our

 2    break now for --

 3            JUDGE BONOMY:  We shall resume at 4.00.

 4                          --- Recess taken at 3.30 p.m.

 5                          --- On resuming at 3.59 p.m.

 6            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac.

 7            MR. BAKRAC:  [Microphone not activated]

 8            [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 9       Q.   General, we talked about the relationship between the Army of

10    Yugoslavia and the civilian authorities.  You touched upon the

11    relationship with the MUP.  Maybe we with wrap up this topic.  Let me ask

12    you the following:  What was the relationship between the Army of

13    Yugoslavia, the corps units, and the MUP units during the war and in what

14    way was the coordination done and at what level?

15       A.   I would say that the relations were correct in accordance with the

16    purpose and function of those two structures within the defence system.

17    As for the coordination, it was carried out in accordance with the

18    instruction and the Rules of Combat of Army of Yugoslavia.  As for the

19    level, during the war the coordination at the higher level, the MUP staff

20    and the corps command, was practically impossible because of constant

21    relocations and constant engagements.  And it boiled down to individual

22    contacts between the people from the corps command and people either in

23    the staff or outside of the staff, Brakovic, General Stefanovic, who was a

24    colonel in the -- and Stefanovic, who was the colonel in the corps

25    command, and it was going on to a much higher extent at the level of the

Page 18036

 1    brigade commanders and the secretariats of the interior and the commanders

 2    of those.

 3            THE INTERPRETER:  Could the counsel please speak into the

 4    microphone.  The interpreters couldn't hear the question.

 5            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We heard -- there are no documents

 6    from the staff command or the corps command that does not regulate the

 7    coordination.  It is something that must be done in combat conditions.

 8            JUDGE BONOMY:  Was there a Stevanovic both in the VJ and in the

 9    MUP?

10            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I want to cut a long

11    story short and then I'm inconsistent.  One of the assistants in the MUP,

12    the assistant to the minister of the interior was

13    General Obrad Stevanovic.  And in the Pristina Corps command there was the

14    colonel, Radojko Stefanovic, he was the chief of the operations and

15    training organ.  So there's just one sound that distinguishes the two

16    surnames, but they dealt with the coordination, so did Colonel Brakovic

17    from the police.  This is as far as I know.

18            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

19            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, lest we should be

20    opening all those documents, 5D997, 5D333, and 5D369 all speak about this

21    relationship.

22       Q.   General, now I would like to ask you - and this is something that

23    we started talking about before the break - the issue of resubordination.

24    This is something that has been discussed at length in this courtroom.

25    You said that there had been no resubordination.

Page 18037

 1            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please now look at --

 2       Q.   We've seen often here in courtroom an order from the supreme

 3    commander and the Chief of the General Staff and the army commander,

 4    that's 4D299.  Now I would like us to see 51267 [as interpreted].  It's

 5    your document, it's dated the 20th of April, if we could elicit your


 7            JUDGE BONOMY:  Could you give us that number again, please.

 8            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] That's P1267, it's a Prosecution

 9    exhibit.

10            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

11            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

12       Q.   It appears to be your order, and His Honour Judge Chowhan, if I

13    understood it correctly, he asked you if you had issued any orders.  So

14    this is the order for the resubordination dated the 20th of April.  Could

15    you please comment on it.  You said something that it contains more items

16    than the previous ones.

17       A.   By the Trial Chamber's leave I would like to say that

18    resubordination as a process, as an action, is something that is extremely

19    complex.  And if I may be allowed to say that we've heard in this

20    courtroom some comments ranging from a statement that it was impossible to

21    resubordinate to such institutions.  We heard that from a general that had

22    been doing that for 30 years in the military and all the way up to a

23    statement that this is something that can be done ad hoc, in two, three

24    hours.  And I assure you, based on my personal experience, it is mission

25    impossible, I use that term for the second or third time today.  Acting on

Page 18038

 1    the orders of the 3rd Army commander, referring to the order of the

 2    Supreme Command Staff, on the 20th of April I issued an order.  In item 1

 3    I copy the two referenced orders and, Your Honour, let me read what it

 4    says here so that we all get an idea of how difficult it is.

 5             "Units and organs of the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia, in

 6    the brigades' zones of responsibility shall be resubordinated to the

 7    brigade commands for carrying out combat tasks."

 8            There are two departments here.  No units, no organs, I assure

 9    you, for me this was simply impossible to carry out, to implement; and

10    that is why I was late in drafting this order.  And to be quite frank, I

11    have to tell you that I also wrote an order that contained only two or

12    three sentences, and then I tore them up and then I tried to draft

13    something really smart.  I tried to say that the MUP units, without

14    enumerating which units, should continue carrying out their regular tasks

15    in terms of protecting the personal and -- security of person and property

16    and the law and order, and that in terms of combat they should be

17    resubordinated to the brigades.  And I even came up with this deadline, I

18    invented this deadline, because I was -- I could see that this was not

19    easy to do.

20            So this is the gist of this order that I sent to my subordinate

21    units, and I think that you can see that this was also sent to the MUP

22    staff in Pristina, it's down there at the edge of this sheet.  You can't

23    see it now.

24            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Lazarevic, who was your opposite number in the

25    MUP in Kosovo?

Page 18039

 1            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to know

 2    that after all these years.  I stand here in front of you as an accused

 3    and yet I don't know that.  In the military you know --

 4            JUDGE BONOMY:  Did you try to identify who that was?

 5            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To this date I don't know that.  It

 6    hasn't been defined.  In the military you know that the lower-ranked units

 7    are resubordinated to the higher-ranked units.  It is impossible for an

 8    assistant minister of the interior to be resubordinated to me or an organ

 9    that was established by the minister to be resubordinated to me.

10            JUDGE BONOMY:  We've had some evidence, though, that what you

11    needed to do at a lower level in trying to arrange resubordination was to

12    persuade the appropriate MUP official or officer to make an order that his

13    unit was to be resubordinated to you.  Now, it sounds as though you didn't

14    make any effort to liaise with someone at your level in the MUP to try to

15    achieve that.

16            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With all due respect of all the

17    "experts," including one that we heard here, whoever discusses

18    resubordination in those terms, in the military sense, does not know what

19    resubordination is.  Let me be quite specific.  I ordered at the beginning

20    of the war that the units of the Pristina Corps should comply with the

21    Rules of Service of the Army of Yugoslavia in wartime, the rules on

22    military discipline.  How can a member of the police comply with the Rules

23    of Service of the Army of Yugoslavia when he does not belong to the Army

24    of Yugoslavia, he's not a member?  So who was I to search for in Kosovo

25    and Metohija and to tell him, Well, you are my opposite number.  In the

Page 18040

 1    army you issue an order, an order is obeyed.

 2            I was not given an order as to who was being resubordinated to me.

 3    The Defence counsel quoted from both orders, he referred to both those

 4    orders in a couple of sentences, and on the basis of that it was

 5    impossible to carry out that task.  It is impossible to do it on the basis

 6    of this order here.  This was just an effort to blend together oil and

 7    water, as we say.  It is impossible to do so.  We heard this man from the

 8    General Staff who testified in this case that it was, indeed, impossible.

 9    An order was written.  I did it, I acted accordingly, but that mission

10    failed.

11            JUDGE BONOMY:  Who is the person from the General Staff to whom

12    you're referring?

13            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Kosovac, the man who had

14    been dealing with organization at the level of General Staff in the

15    military for 30 years, and I think that he is one of the biggest experts

16    on this particular issue.

17            JUDGE BONOMY:  You began your answer by saying "with all due

18    respect to all the experts, including one in particular, who was the

19    expert in particular that you were referring to at that stage?

20            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Actually, I meant to correct myself,

21    Your Honour, when I referred to experts, I meant those who perhaps had

22    aspirations after expertise, and I said there was just one expert who we

23    saw here but that did not refer to him.  In a way I wanted to say that

24    what we heard in this courtroom with my knowledge of the facts, not to

25    mention military doctrine, that is simply not possible the way it has been

Page 18041

 1    described by some.

 2            JUDGE BONOMY:  Just deal with my question.  The English

 3    translation of the start of your answer suggests to me that you were being

 4    critical of Mr. Radinovic.  Would that be a mistake on my part, to

 5    understand your evidence that way?

 6            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With due respect, I didn't misspeak.

 7    What I did say was that one expert was here.  I did not comment on his

 8    positions on resubordination.

 9            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac.

10            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

11       Q.   General, did you get reports from subordinated units on abortive

12    attempts at resubordination?

13            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] In the meantime we can call up on the

14    screen Exhibit 5D792.

15            JUDGE BONOMY:  One separate question, Mr. Lazarevic.  Assume for

16    the moment that the order made by the Supreme Command Staff for

17    resubordination had, in fact, been communicated to the appropriate person

18    in the MUP, assume that for the moment, are you saying that even then, in

19    these circumstances, resubordination just cannot be made to work properly?

20            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am convinced of that and I

21    answer-- my answer to your hypothesis is affirmative because these are two

22    systems of responsibility of control and command of organization of

23    functioning.  And from what I know from the military aspect of what

24    resubordination is, it cannot refer to these two systems.  Your Honour,

25    you cannot ad hoc resubordinate and end the story there.  Resubordination

Page 18042

 1    implies commanding the formation in question.  Prior to the execution of a

 2    task, a task has to be received.  There should be preparations.  The task

 3    should run its course, and action can be for three days, but combat

 4    control and the defence of the state lasted for three months.

 5            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

 6            Mr. Bakrac.

 7            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

 8       Q.   General, I'm going to repeat my question and we already have PD792

 9    [as interpreted] on the screen in front of us.  Did you receive from

10    subordinated units reports about failed resubordination exercises?  You

11    can take a look at this supplementary combat report of the 23rd of April,

12    1999, and at the very bottom of the page it is written:  "Units -- MUP

13    units from Istok."

14       A.   Specifically starting on the 20 of April, the first day of

15    readiness, to put it that way, up to the 10th of June, units reported on

16    failure to execute that task, some in harsher form, others in less harsh

17    form.  Here specifically we have the report of the 7th Motorised Brigade

18    of the 25th of April, where they report that units of the MUP from Istok

19    and Klina, despite our request, have not do this date submitted to us any

20    figures, any data, on their available sources and resources, but are

21    awaiting a decision of the superiors on resubordination to our brigade.

22       Q.   And that is the 7th Infantry Brigade.

23            General, when I stop I'm actually waiting for the translation to

24    end, for the interpretation to end.  So this is the interim combat report

25    of the 23rd.  Let us now look at 5D795 of the 25th of -- your deadline for

Page 18043

 1    resubordination.  So the exhibit number is 5D795.

 2            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we see page 3 on the screen.

 3       Q.   Take a look at the penultimate or the two penultimate paragraphs,

 4    rather.

 5            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] It is the last page in the English

 6    version as well.

 7            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The commander of the brigade is

 8    informing me that pursuant to my order of the 20th of April,

 9    resubordination of MUP units in Klina and Istok was to be carried out to

10    the brigade.  By the order of the brigade of the 21st of April, the same

11    were under the obligation to submit reports by the 23rd on their available

12    forces and resources.  The same have not done so, avoid cooperation with

13    our unit, stating that they are waiting for a decision from their superior

14    organs.  Please take measures at your level for the implementation of this

15    order.

16       Q.   Did you send to the brigades operations organs from the corps to

17    see what the problem was?  And later in May, on the 17th of May --

18            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we see 5D1084.

19            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a combat report of the

20    commander of the 37th Motorised Brigade from the 17th of May, 1999,

21    informing me that Colonel Stefanovic, the one whom I mentioned, at Paprica

22    from the corps command were visiting the unit in connection with the

23    resubordination of territorial police units in the brigade's area of

24    responsibility.  So I personally sent teams from the corps command to the

25    brigades.  I dispatched to look for command -- police commanding officers

Page 18044

 1    on the ground to coordinate with them.  And if they couldn't do so, my

 2    order, my request, was that they should maintain cooperation on the level

 3    of - shall I put it this way - combat feasibility.

 4            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

 5       Q.   Exhibit 5D817 is along the same lines in order for us to proceed

 6    expeditiously.  General, did you report -- did you inform the superior

 7    command on the failure to resubordinate; and if so, when?

 8       A.   Sometime between the 20th and the 23rd of April I had several

 9    repeated reminders from the commander of the 37th Motorised Brigade to the

10    effect that he had -- he was encountering problems regarding

11    resubordination, that he had increased casualties.  He referred to the

12    Travnik [as interpreted] incident with five people being massacred from

13    the battalion command, to which I reacted by saying to the -- by saying in

14    written form to the army commander, although we were together at the same

15    command post every day, that there was no resubordination conducted in

16    keeping with his order.  This is not that document on the screen.

17            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Zecevic.

18            MR. ZECEVIC:  Your Honours, 79, 24, it's not Travnik, it's tragic

19    accident.

20            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

21            MR. BAKRAC:  [Microphone not activated]

22            THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for counsel, please.

23            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we have Prosecution Exhibit

24    P179 -- 23.

25       Q.   Can you take a look at it and tell us whether it is your document

Page 18045

 1    on the -- on failure to resubordinate --

 2            JUDGE BONOMY:  Can we have the number again, please.

 3            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] P1723.

 4            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

 5            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is a document of the corps

 6    commander sent personally to the commander of the 3rd Army, in which

 7    attention is drawn to the fact that according to the order of the army

 8    commander there was no resubordination of the MUP forces, notwithstanding

 9    a number of -- of -- despite a number of meetings having been held to

10    discuss that particular issue.

11            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

12       Q.   General, I can see here that you indicated that there were

13    problems and unresolved questions, in view of the fact that the MUP was

14    tolerating criminal activities on the part of its members.  Can you

15    explain?  On what basis did you say that?

16       A.   We spoke today about the work of mixed check-points, and this

17    sentence, this statement, refers to reports by primarily the 37th

18    Motorised Brigade, to the effect that the work of the mixed check-points

19    was fraught with numerous problems and unresolved questions.  And as the

20    commander of brigade suggests -- or actually, he is informing me that

21    allegedly the MUP was tolerating criminal activities by its members.

22    Appraising the possible gravity of that piece of information, I informed

23    the army commander of it in written form.

24            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if you will bear with

25    me for just one minute.

Page 18046

 1                          [Defence counsel confer]

 2            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can we have Exhibit

 3    5D376 brought up on the screen.

 4       Q.   This is dated the 13th of May.  It is a letter by the staff

 5    leader.

 6            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we see the second page.

 7       Q.   You told us that this is associated with the check-points.  Did

 8    you have this piece of information, that the leader of the MUP staff

 9    requested that all measures be taken at the check-points in order to

10    improve the conduct and the appearance of the police there?  Is this what

11    you had in mind when you said what you did?  Please take a look at the

12    final, last, paragraph.

13       A.   This is a document by the staff leader -- staff head of the MUP,

14    General Lukic.  I believe that pursuant to the information that he had

15    available -- made available to him by my people, and also from a mutual

16    exchange of information with people from the military - and I mean

17    primarily the security organs - that he took measures and that this

18    possibly also refers to such occurrences.  Concretely I haven't seen this

19    particular document during the war, but I'm quite confident because I know

20    that whatever information we received from the MUP we took it into very

21    serious consideration and checked it, either on our own or with them.

22    But -- and we took joint measures with MUP organs in order to ascertain

23    the truth.

24            And with the permission of the Trial Chamber I should just like to

25    add one sentence, namely, that in that war there were numerous or quite a

Page 18047

 1    few, shall I say, instances of reporting that did not correspond to the

 2    reality, to the truth, coming from various quarters.  The commander of the

 3    army was very zealous, and he demanded that everything be addressed and

 4    resolved in a very short procedure as urgently as possible.  I have to say

 5    so even though he is present here.  He had commissions set up, and that

 6    indeed yielded results.

 7            I personally insisted that whenever any information was obtained,

 8    that every effort should be exerted for the truth to be ascertained.  Let

 9    me not give you any further examples.  I just want to tell you how

10    seriously we took all this information, how in earnest we checked it and

11    verified it, whether it came from subordinated or any other entities.

12    Sometimes I didn't know from whom they came.

13            The commander of the army would be by me, and, for instance, we

14    heard that the army went inside a depot near Pristina and took some

15    technical goods from there.  And I would say, General, that is impossible,

16    allow me, give me three hours to check that out.  He didn't allow me.  He

17    set up a commission himself, and it was ascertained that it had not been

18    the military, but it had been some civilians who did that.  I apologise

19    for having spoken at such length.  I just wanted to give you a concrete

20    example of such practices.

21       Q.   General, we saw here - and we also have Exhibit 5D434 to show it,

22    and it is a report on a tour by the staff of the Supreme Command, the tour

23    was carried out from the 23rd to the 26th of May, 1999.  And on the 24th,

24    you wrote this information that there had not been resubordination.

25            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we have this document on the

Page 18048

 1    screen, page 4, item 11.

 2       Q.   And could you please comment on it.  It's a report of the team of

 3    the Supreme Command Staff.  Page 4, item 11.

 4            In this report in item 11, does it say that resubordination had

 5    failed to take place?

 6       A.   Yes.  This team from the General Staff wrote in this report that

 7    there was no single command for forces, no unified command, but that

 8    cooperation with MUP units is achieved through agreements which are not

 9    respected at lower levels.  Although cooperation is functioning for the

10    present, should there be an escalation of the aggression this could have

11    serious consequences for the members of the MUP and the army.  And there

12    is no doubt that this team also observed and noted this fact.

13       Q.   Thank you, General.  And to round off this topic --

14            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] And I would like now to have 5D1289

15    called up on the screen.

16       Q.   This is a document issued by the Ministry of the Interior, and the

17    last paragraph - it's dated the 6th of May, this whole document, 1999 -

18    and this last paragraph, is it also evidence that resubordination had

19    failed to take place and who was responsible for the MUP units?

20       A.   Well, the document speaks for itself --

21       Q.   Just a minute, General.  I do apologise for interrupting you.  I

22    thought that we would not have a problem with translation.  Most documents

23    have been translated, but this translation has not arrived yet.  So could

24    you please read the document very slowly.  We'll have it marked for

25    identification.  The last paragraph is very brief.  Could you read it out

Page 18049

 1    slowly.

 2            MR. ACKERMAN:  Excuse me, Your Honour, the translation -- we have

 3    the translation in e-court, but it would take me a second to find the

 4    number, but we do have it.  If you want me to spend a little bit of time,

 5    I can find it.

 6            JUDGE BONOMY:  It would be helpful if you do so but I think

 7    Mr. Bakrac just wishes the last paragraph read, and we can proceed with

 8    that.

 9            MR. HANNIS:  Your Honour, I would indicate that 5D434 is -- this

10    exhibit appears to be the duplicate of one that's already in evidence,

11    that's --

12            JUDGE BONOMY:  That's what Mr. Ackerman said.

13            MR. HANNIS:  Yes, I believe it's 3D692, and it was in evidence on

14    the 12th of September.

15            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

16            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do apologise.  Errors

17    do occur.  Our documents seem to have got mixed up.  There's a large

18    number of documents.  If 3D will make it easier for us to follow, then I

19    would like to ask for 3D692 to be called up on the screen.

20            No, Your Honour, that's not it.

21            JUDGE BONOMY:  Let's go back to your exhibit and ask the witness

22    to do what you asked him already, read the last paragraph.

23            Mr. Visnjic.

24            Hold on, Mr. --

25            MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, just let me say the

Page 18050

 1    following.  Mr. Hannis referred to the 3D number which is the same as

 2    5D454, the previous document used by Mr. Bakrac, not the last one that was

 3    in e-court.

 4            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we have 5D1289.

 5       Q.   And then please read that sentence, it's very brief, so we can

 6    move on.

 7       A.   "For the situation on the ground, the behaviour and work of

 8    members of the MUP and the carrying out of the instructions given, the

 9    following shall be responsible:

10             "The heads of the secretariats and the commanders of PJP

11    detachments and SAJ detachments, those are the special anti-terrorist

12    units."

13       Q.   Thank you, General.

14            MR. HANNIS:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, I have an objection about the

15    last one.  We don't have a translation.  There appears to be a signature

16    but I don't see a stamp on it so I have a concern about the authenticity,

17    and it's particularly a problem when I can't read the English.

18            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Lazarevic, what is this document?

19            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this document is from

20    the ministry headquarters in Pristina.  It's not a military document.

21            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

22       Q.   Just a moment.

23            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if you look at this

24    document you will see that it has the stamp, or rather, the ERN number of

25    the Prosecution Y0048073.  It's from the EDS, so the Prosecutor should

Page 18051

 1    take care of the authenticity of his own documents.

 2            JUDGE BONOMY:  He's perhaps decided that he's so doubtful of its

 3    authenticity that he hasn't used it for all we know, Mr. Bakrac.

 4            Mr. Hannis, are you still concerned about its authenticity?

 5            MR. HANNIS:  I am, Your Honour.  I'm checking -- I understand most

 6    of these with the ERN that start with the Y are documents that we received

 7    from Mr. Milosevic.

 8            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Lazarevic, let me return to what I was asking.

 9    Have you seen this document before this trial?

10            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

11            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac, what's the point you're trying to make

12    with this document?

13            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my client is charged in

14    the indictment of having effective control and command over forces which

15    are listed, and they include forces of the MUP and PJP; however, here we

16    have a document showing who was issuing orders and who was in control and

17    it's a document dated the 6th of May.  Therefore, I feel it's a very

18    significant document for our defence.

19                          [Trial Chamber confers]

20            JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac, you'll need to do some work on

21    establishing the authenticity of this document.  We will not allow it to

22    be exhibited in -- without some substantiation, such as confirmation of

23    who was responsible for it.  That need not be by method of a stamp, but

24    you will need to find some way of authenticating it.

25            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 18052

 1       Q.   General, in view of the fact, as we have heard that there was no

 2    resubordination, how did the cooperation between the Army of Yugoslavia

 3    and the Ministry of the Interior proceed?

 4       A.   I would say that this cooperation continued at the same level as

 5    before, with mutual respect and attempts to survive the horrors of war.

 6    And by Their Honours' leave, the end of the war was dramatic.  A whole

 7    basic MUP unit found itself in a very difficult situation in the Jablanica

 8    area.  They were completely surrounded, and I ordered a combat operation

 9    to rescue that unit.  There were losses in the army in that action.  So

10    what I want to say is that the obligation to defend the country and to

11    carry out our tasks was always respected, and what we could not do was

12    impossible.  I'm not trying to justify either myself or General Lukic, but

13    truly I'm telling you that as direct participants we did our very best to

14    carry out these tasks under the prevailing conditions.

15            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the reference for the

16    continuation of cooperation is 5D444 and 5D448.

17       Q.   And my last question on this topic:  You mentioned carrying out a

18    deblockade of the MUP forces surrounded by terrorists.  When was this in

19    Jablanica?

20       A.   This was in late May, as far as I can recall, and there were heavy

21    losses.  There was danger that the entire unit would be decimated.  I

22    issued an order that the whole action - and that's what it was called, the

23    action for deblocking the MUP units, it's a rather odd title, but that was

24    the name of the combat action.

25            MR. ACKERMAN:  Excuse me, just a moment.  Your Honour, just for

Page 18053

 1    the record, that document 5D376 is actually in e-court with Prosecution

 2    Exhibit Number P2159, and so the translation is available there.  So it is

 3    a Prosecution exhibit but not admitted.

 4            JUDGE BONOMY:  Well, that's where it shall remain for the moment.

 5    Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.

 6            Mr. Bakrac.

 7            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I ask for your

 8    guidance.  It's not exhibited, but it was used by the Prosecutor so is it

 9    up to me to establish its authenticity?

10            JUDGE BONOMY:  It's not being suggested it was used by the

11    Prosecutor.  It simply is in his system as one of his potential exhibits.

12    Now that you wish to use it, you require to establish its authenticity.

13            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I

14    misunderstood the interpretation.  I thought that they had used it.

15       Q.   General, did the command of the Pristina Corps take any measures

16    to assist the civilian population and the civilian authorities in looking

17    after the civilian population?  And while you are responding, I will ask

18    for Exhibit P1306, a Prosecution exhibit, to be called up on the screen.

19    It was not used by the Prosecution, but my colleague Mr. Hannis promised

20    me that he would not object to its being used.  This was in April 2007, if

21    my learned friend recalls.  So it's P1306, the command of the Pristina

22    Corps, it's dated the 16th of April, 1999, securing the civilian

23    population to the commander personally.

24            It seems to be your document.  It seems that you not only signed

25    it but also drafted it, General.  Can you comment on it for us?  I think

Page 18054

 1    this order is important, so please go slowly item by item.

 2       A.   There's no doubt about the authenticity of this document.  I

 3    composed it under difficult circumstances, and I confess that I tried to

 4    do something that was not strictly in line with military rules and

 5    military doctrine.  And now as an accused, I have tried to find an example

 6    of something like this in military science, but I haven't found anything.

 7    This was just an attempt that I made to establish within the corps units

 8    special elements of combat which would secure the civilian population from

 9    accommodation, looking after them in all respects, supplies, helping to

10    shelter them, assisting, providing supplies, organizing economic

11    activities, medical support, and so on and so forth.  This is a permanent

12    order.  All units had to establish special forces which would deal with

13    assisting the civilian population.  I required that all members of the

14    corps be familiarised with this order and that they consistently carry it

15    out, that all commanders carry it out consistently and brief me on its

16    implementation.  That is the essence of one such order in conditions where

17    I myself couldn't know how many of my soldiers were killed or wounded

18    every day.

19       Q.   Thank you, General.  Let us now move on to Exhibit 5D389.  I would

20    like you to look at it and to comment on it briefly.

21       A.   This is an order which serves to operationalise further the

22    previous order, in the sense that the brigade commanders are required with

23    the assistance of the civil authorities to find safe sectors, facilities,

24    and premises to house the civilian population and to tell me where there

25    were such facilities, such buildings, that were not under threat of combat

Page 18055

 1    operations and were not constantly targeted by NATO air-strikes.

 2       Q.   We see at the end of this document that again you say that

 3    information about possible sectors for the reception of new temporarily

 4    displaced persons should be found.

 5       A.   Some of the displaced people had gone back to their homes,

 6    particularly to Pristina, Podujevo, to the east [as interpreted], and in

 7    the preparatory part, I asked the brigade commanders to get in touch with

 8    the representatives of the civilian authorities and to provide them with

 9    all the assistance in providing accommodation of those displaced

10    civilians.

11            MR. ZECEVIC:  Sorry, Your Honours, page 90, line 19, it says "to

12    the east," actually it's the place in Kosovo called the Istok which is --

13    in Serbian it's the same word, Istok is east, but in this case it was the

14    name of the place.

15            JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

16            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

17       Q.   General, did you from your subordinate commands, we have seen

18    these two documents, receive any feedback about those orders that you had

19    issued?

20       A.   In implementing these orders, all the brigades sent in reports on

21    efforts to receive the refugees, the displaced persons, about the efforts

22    to take them back to their homes, to take care of them, and about

23    everything that the corps units had done in this respect.

24            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] And can we look at 5D1101 --

25       Q.   To see whether the commands subordinate to the brigades sent such

Page 18056

 1    orders out, 5D1101.  This is the command of the 52nd Mechanised Artillery

 2    Brigade --

 3       A.   No, mixed.

 4       Q.   It's dated the 22nd of April, 1999.  It says here:  "Pursuant to

 5    an order of the Pristina Corps command dated the 19th of April," so we

 6    will be opening those orders.  They will be dated every other day, but you

 7    can see here there's a reference to the 19th of April.  And it says here:

 8            "Relating to providing shelter for the refugees in -- and because

 9    of the continuing NATO air-strikes against the Yugoslav Army units and the

10    expected ground invasion result in an increased movement of the civilian

11    population in the units' area of responsibility which considerably

12    aggravates the overall security situation," and it goes on like that.

13       A.   The order is in line with the order from the Pristina Corps

14    command that in contact with the Gnjilane MUP organs and the adjacent

15    brigade, that the civilian population should be taken care of as much as

16    possible, as was ordered by the corps command.

17            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we now look at Exhibit 5D11 --

18    I'm sorry, 390.

19       Q.   This is the command of the 2nd Artillery Rocket Brigade from

20    Djakovica, that's the anti-aircraft artillery and rocket unit, and they

21    provide you with the information as to where the accommodation for the

22    civilian population had been found and they provide additional locations

23    for such accommodation in the future.

24       A.   Yes.  They indicate the settlements where the civilian population

25    is put up.  They stated that on the 4th of May there were 35 to 40.000

Page 18057

 1    people in Djakovica and that it was possible to accept a new group of

 2    displaced persons, that there were facilities to accept them.

 3            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I selected documents

 4    that are relevant for various areas in Kosovo, so we have another exhibit

 5    which is related to Podujevo.

 6            THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The interpreters didn't

 7    catch the exhibit number.

 8            JUDGE BONOMY:  The exhibit number, Mr. --

 9            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] 5D486.

10       Q.   General, let us proceed quickly.  It appears on the basis of this

11    report dated the 4th of May you again receive information about locations

12    where it is possible to receive civilian population, but it is interesting

13    to note that we have the same problem of communication, the road

14    communication for Podujevo.

15       A.   The commander of the 354th Infantry Brigade had really a lot of

16    work with the civilian authorities, finding shelter for the civilian

17    population.  There was also the medical battalion in the corps, and they

18    joined in.  50.000 displaced persons who had come back from Macedonia were

19    taken care of, but here he warns that on the Podujevo-Luzane axis there is

20    a strong terrorist presence and they pose a threat to the civilian

21    population.  In light of the fact that I demanded that the military should

22    physically secure the deployment sectors, he is trying to tell me that he

23    doesn't have enough forces, enough troops, to carry all that out.

24            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, 5D793 is another

25    exhibit that speaks to this, it is a report from the 7th PBR.

Page 18058

 1            And could we please have 5D1033 up on the screen.  This is the

 2    command of the 37th Motorised Brigade, the date is the 20th of April.

 3       Q.   Can you comment on it, because this follows immediately after your

 4    order of the 19th, the command of the 37th Motorised Brigade issues this

 5    order.

 6       A.   Acting pursuant to the order of the corps command, the commander

 7    of the 37th Motorised Brigade ordered his units to take the measures that

 8    I defined in the towns of Srbica and Glogovac, he demands from his

 9    subordinates to get in touch with the representatives of the authorities,

10    the civilian protection, and the MUP, and to do that together.  And they

11    really, really evinced a great deal of concern and care for the civilian

12    population in Drenica.

13            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Could we please have 5D1004 up in

14    e-court.

15       Q.   General, did you also issue orders to the military district

16    commands once they were resubordinated to you, to the effect that the

17    civilian population should be protected and taken care of?

18       A.   Well, this is just one military district command, not commands,

19    because the other military district was the one in Nis that was

20    subordinate to the army commander.  But yes, here we see a very clear

21    order from the military district commander to take care of the civilian

22    population, to report on it, and to take all other measures.

23       Q.   General, could we now please look at Exhibit 5D1037, dated the 3rd

24    of May, 1999.  If you could explain to us what this is all about, and if

25    we could see what you did when you get -- when you got the feedback about

Page 18059

 1    this problem from the commander of the 37th Motorised Brigade.

 2       A.   The commander of the 37th Motorised Brigade sent a number of such

 3    reports from the 3rd of May onwards to the corps command and personally to

 4    me, reporting to me that the civilian authorities in the town of Glogovac

 5    were not functioning, that the civilian population was at the brink of

 6    barely surviving, that there was not enough food, that there was great

 7    danger, that there would be outbreaks of disease, that there wasn't enough

 8    water.  So he was asking for help basically to take care of the civilian

 9    population because he did not have the assets to do so.

10       Q.   And what did you do after that, General?

11       A.   Apart from sending logistics organs from the corps there to verify

12    whether the corps command organs could do something, I also wrote to the

13    president of the Temporary Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija,

14    Mr. Andjelkovic, and I asked him in his capacity of the executive organ in

15    the province to take measures to help the population in that area.

16       Q.   General, let us look at this exhibit, and I would like to ask you

17    to read the last paragraph to see what you wanted the president of the

18    Temporary Executive Council to do, that's Exhibit 5D412.

19            It appears -- well, there is no medical care, water, and power in

20    the town and food-supplies are running low.  This is what you reported to

21    the president of the Temporary Executive Council, did you not?

22            THE INTERPRETER:  Could the counsel and witness please not

23    overlap.

24            THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct.  I informed

25    the president of the Temporary Executive Council of the province of Kosovo

Page 18060

 1    and Metohija about the problems that the civilian population was facing,

 2    the problems about taking care of them in the centre of Drenica on the

 3    basis of the report that I had received from the brigade commander,

 4    notifying him that the brigade command and the MUP organs in the field

 5    actually tried to do something using their own assets and resources and

 6    that we were not in a position to assist them, that we were not able to do

 7    so.  And I propose that at the level of the province government and the

 8    civilian protection structure, that this report be considered as a matter

 9    of urgency and that urgent measures be taken to feed the population and to

10    provide medical care.

11            As we have already heard from Mr. Andjelkovic, who has testified

12    recently - and I know that for a fact - he did act upon this proposal or

13    demand, if I should put it that way, and he sent Mr. Andric and some other

14    people that he trusted and they provided assistance to this population,

15    food and medicine.

16            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

17       Q.   General, I have to apologise to you, I'm a little bit tired.  I

18    asked you the wrong question when I said you sent the report.  I actually

19    meant to say you notified.  But this is an example of the cooperation

20    between the civilian authorities and the military where you were able to

21    do so, when you were able to assist, you signalled this to the civilian

22    authorities?

23       A.   Yes, and the most important thing is that the fact that I talked

24    to the president of the Temporary Executive Council, this actually helped.

25            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we have 5D506 of the

Page 18061

 1    27th of April, 1999, which also describes measures to provide to the

 2    civilian population.

 3       Q.   General, can we take a look at another two other documents, the

 4    first is 5D816, dated the 23rd of April.  This is an order on the

 5    relocation on military territorial detachments from inhabited places.

 6    Please comment on item 3, it is not very long.  Or read it out for us.  I

 7    think that it is really important from the aspect of the things that you

 8    have been charged with.

 9       A.   I have accentuated repeatedly -- I accentuated repeatedly and

10    ordered that inhabited places should -- that military units should leave

11    inhabited places in order to create, as I said today, living space for the

12    return and normal life of the civilian population on the one hand; and on

13    the other, if there were any units -- if -- if units were found possibly

14    in that area, they would be the target of all terrorist and NATO forces,

15    so that commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade in the area of the Istok and

16    Klina towns in item 3 ordered his units to accelerate the return of

17    civilians going back to their towns and villages which they had left.  He

18    also said that civilian shelters in the sectors of defensive units should

19    not be allowed and that civilians should be ensured to return --

20    allowed -- enabled to return to the settlements which they had earlier

21    abandoned.

22       Q.   Thank you, General.  Another question on this topic:  Did you act

23    in concert and coordination with the MUP forces in order to provide for

24    the civilian population?  And while we wait for your answer can we have

25    Exhibit 5D365 brought up on the screen.

Page 18062

 1       A.   I should say that all these activities were undertaken in

 2    coordination and cooperation with the civilian authorities and with the

 3    MUP forces in the field.  This order is one from the initial period of the

 4    war, one that I drafted personally.  And in items 1 as well as 2 and the

 5    other ones, I insisted that in concert with the MUP forces of the Republic

 6    of Serbia the regime of security should be fully implemented, focusing not

 7    only on the protection of units and law and order, but also the protection

 8    of the civilian population.  In the areas of combat activities, the work

 9    and engagement of military and judiciary investigative and judicial organs

10    should be ensured, and all members of units should be called to account.

11    And the next item states that a system should be rendered to MUP forces on

12    protecting and ensuring the return of displaced persons.

13            So all these measures were done in consultations and coordination

14    in order for all of us together to assist the civilian population.

15       Q.   Thank you, General.

16            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, by your leave I should

17    like to move on to a new topic.  I do not need private session and I'm

18    not -- I'm feeling rather poorly.  So if I can ask you that we finish,

19    that we adjourn, some ten minutes earlier.

20            JUDGE BONOMY:  Well, if that's the position, we shall, but you

21    seem to me to be needing every minute that's available to you the way this

22    is progressing.  But if you feel that you can't make use of these ten

23    minutes, we have to accept that from you.

24            MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I feel feverish, Your Honours.  All

25    of a sudden I have started to make mistakes in asking my questions, and I

Page 18063

 1    do not really feel capable of continuing.  Were there more time, I would

 2    really do my utmost, but ...

 3            JUDGE BONOMY:  Very well.  We shall adjourn until Monday.

 4            Mr. Lazarevic, this is a particularly important stage of your

 5    evidence.  It's vital, as I've said before, that in the breaks between

 6    your periods on the witness-stand that you have no discussion whatsoever

 7    with any person about the evidence in this case, that's without exception.

 8    There's no person with whom you should have any discussion about the

 9    evidence.

10            We'll adjourn now and we will resume on Monday here at 9.00.

11                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.22 p.m.,

12                          to be reconvened on Monday, the 12th day of

13                          November, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.