1 Thursday, 6 December 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, is Mr. Ivetic going to be joining us at

6 some stage today?

7 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. He's working on that issue. He's

8 in -- contacting our office this morning.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, if he's got one eye on what's happening here,

10 something can perhaps be relayed to him.

11 We are where we are on this issue of translation, and we need to

12 address the whole thing as a matter of urgency, but it's clear that the

13 first thing that needs to be done is to be absolutely sure what are the

14 first 200 pages that require translation so that that job can be started

15 today.

16 Now, I've asked Mr. Dawson to take whatever steps he can to liaise

17 between Mr. Ivetic and CLSS to get that bit done, never mind the rest,

18 never mind the rights and wrongs of what's happened in the past. We'll

19 address that as and when we're required to address it. But there are

20 plainly schemes set up to enable translation to be done for you that are

21 not being triggered and that need to be triggered today.

22 MR. LUKIC: Okay.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, hopefully his time can be usefully spent today

24 in making available or making it clear and removing any doubt about what

25 the first 200 are. All right?

1 Now, I will instruct Mr. Dawson to communicate with him by e-mail

2 merely to set up a meeting about this among the three of them - that's

3 CLSS, Mr. Ivetic, Mr. Dawson - there will be no other e-mail exchanges at

4 this stage. I gather there have been several. I've seen -- I saw the one

5 the other day about the numbers of documents, for example. I don't know

6 the whole story. But there's no point in that continuing. Face-to-face

7 meetings are the only way to resolve this at this stage, and hopefully by

8 later today sometime that first step -- first hurdle will have been

9 negotiated.

10 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

12 [The witness entered court]

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Delic.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: The cross-examination by Mr. Hannis will now

16 continue.

17 Mr. Hannis.

18 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, we left off yesterday, we were talking

19 about Bela Crkva and where the general passed through. I discovered last

20 night some additional aerial surveillance -- aerial photographs which show

21 what I believe is the main road. This is shown in Exhibit P0093, which

22 was not something I disclosed to the Defence. I sent an e-mail to Mr.

23 Cepic and the rest of the Defence last night indicating that I would

24 request this morning to be able to show that to the general because I

25 think it would be a matter of interest to the Court and it may -- it may

1 clear up where he passed through and where that was vis-a-vis the mosque,

2 et cetera.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic -- sorry, Mr. Cepic.

4 MR. CEPIC: No objection, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 WITNESS: BOZIDAR DELIC [Resumed]

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 Cross-examination by Mr. Hannis: [Continued]

9 Q. Then, General, if we could start off by showing you an exhibit,

10 it's P0093. And I believe we need to go to page 8. Yes.

11 General, do you recognise what's depicted there?

12 A. Yes. This is the road leading towards Orahovac.

13 Q. If you could take the pen there perhaps and draw where that road

14 is, and we'll mark this as an IC exhibit.

15 A. [Marks]

16 Q. Thank you. And is that the road you told us about yesterday on

17 which you drove by on the 4th of April and those other occasions?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And would you agree with me that the mosque appears to be located

20 in about the centre of this picture, slightly to the right of centre? Can

21 you see it there?

22 A. Yes, I can see it.

23 Q. And, General, I had the advantage of sitting at my computer and

24 using my magnifying tool on the computer. It appears that there is no

25 minaret on the mosque at this time, and I would tell you this photograph

1 was taken, I think, in late June 1999. Do you have any reason to disagree

2 with that?

3 A. No reason. But we would know -- we should know exactly when it

4 was taken.

5 Q. This is indicated at page 1 of this exhibit.

6 MR. HANNIS: Your Honours, I think it's the 27th of June.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: But has that document -- or this photograph being

8 exhibited already?

9 MR. HANNIS: This entire exhibit, Your Honour, I think, was

10 admitted on the 27th of September. This was part of the forensic package

11 concerning Bela Crkva.

12 That's all the questions I have on that, unless Your Honours have

13 a question.

14 Can we give this an IC number.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be IC155, Your Honours.

17 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

18 Q. Now, General, I'm just -- I'm trying to wrap up several loose ends

19 I have and hope to finish before this session is over. So if you'll bear

20 with me, I may flip from topic to topic.

21 First of all, I wanted to ask you about radio call signs. During

22 1998 and 1999, did -- did you or any of your subordinate units use a radio

23 call sign -- the word was "Koritnik," K-o-r-i-t-n-i-k. I'm not sure I'm

24 pronouncing it correctly.

25 A. Koritnik.

1 Q. Was that a call sign used by your units?

2 A. My call sign was "Poljanica" usually. And my commanding officers

3 had the same call sign, but each of us had a separate number; although,

4 the name "Koritnik" is familiar to me.

5 Q. Did any of your battle groups use that call sign in either 1998 or

6 1999?

7 A. No. It was always "Poljanica." But it's possible that this sign

8 "Koritnik" was related to call signs of Prizren in communication with

9 Pristina, but I'm not sure. It's not necessarily Prizren. It could be

10 some other town. The call sign is familiar.

11 Q. When you say a call sign of -- of Prizren, who do you mean?

12 What -- is that a military body in --

13 A. Prizren garrison, the Prizren -- the Prizren garrison, the

14 Djakovica garrison, Pristina garrison. Everybody had a call sign.

15 Q. How about the call sign "Pastrik"? Does that sound familiar to

16 you?

17 A. It's familiar.

18 Q. Do you recall who that pertained to?

19 A. Well, it could have been one of the units. Maybe the Buza [phoen]

20 Battalion. If you have a document, that would be of assistance.

21 Q. Well, let me show you Exhibit P1052. There are three separate

22 pages here. Let's have a look and see if you can help us with any of

23 those.

24 And, actually, the first page doesn't have any units related to

25 the 549th, but we see a reference to battle group of the 125th being

1 "Ibar". Did you ever hear that call sign in connection with the 125th or

2 any of their subordinate units?

3 A. I hear it's connected to the 125th here, but all names, all place

4 names were used in various communication plans, so I heard all these

5 names, "Pastrik" and "Ibar," but -- I can see this, but it has nothing to

6 do with my unit.

7 MR. HANNIS: Can we go to page 2 of the B/C/S, which I think

8 pertains to the English page that's up right now. Yes.

9 Q. On this one, General, you'll see number 5 is listed as "1 BG

10 549th" with the call sign "Koritnik-40". Does that refresh your

11 recollection about whether any of your subordinate units may have used

12 that call sign?

13 A. This call sign was used in interactions through communications,

14 but in radio communications we used the normal call sign that I told you

15 about, but "Koritnik-40" is familiar.

16 Q. I guess I'm not understanding what's the difference between radio

17 communications and "interactions through communications," is how it was

18 translated in your last answer.

19 A. Well, that is when you use stations, when you exchange telegrams,

20 and this document specifies on which frequencies this is done. We had our

21 normal call sign, "Poljanica," and it changed every ten days; that is,

22 only numbers changed but the sign "Poljanica" remained for all commanders,

23 but it was the number that told you which unit is which and which

24 commander is which. I see that "Pastrik" -- "Pastrik" is familiar. That

25 was Pristina. Pristina Corps.

1 Q. Okay. If we could go to the third page, please. And here we do

2 see the second item is the forward command post for the Pristina Corps

3 with a call sign of "Pastrik-13".

4 A. Yes, "Pastrik" is the Pristina Corps in this communications at

5 that time, because this should relate only to a specific period of time.

6 You can also see that another one of my units is "Koritnik-80."

7 MR. HANNIS: And I think we have the wrong English page up for

8 this one. We may have to get the first English page we put up this

9 morning.

10 Q. General, if I understood your earlier answer, then, you said you

11 might have used the term "Koritnik" in -- in communications -- in

12 interactions through communications. I think you gave an example of --

13 like in a telegram. Are you saying then in a telegram there may have been

14 a reference to some entity which was referred to by "Koritnik" with a

15 number perhaps, so it's some sort of code name that is used in a telegram

16 when you want to --

17 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: One moment, General. One moment.

19 Mr. Cepic.

20 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, with your view, I never heard "telegram"

21 in the testimony of General Delic in relation to this issue, but if my

22 learned friend kindly can suggest us, can give us the reference.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it's in -- in the English at page 6, line 20,

24 where the translation of the answer is: "When you use stations, when you

25 exchange telegrams, and this document specifies on which frequencies this

1 is done."

2 Was that part of your answer, Mr. Delic?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, that was it.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: We will return to Mr. Hannis' question, then.

5 MR. HANNIS: Okay.

6 Q. So, General, is that correct, then? Are you saying this was not a

7 call sign that would have been used on the radio but, rather, it was a

8 sort of a code name that might be used in other communications, like

9 telegrams?

10 A. Koritnik was for a while assigned to my unit for a specific

11 activity. And it was used towards the superior command. Towards

12 subordinate units, we always used only "Poljanica."

13 Q. Okay. Do you recall what time period that was that "Koritnik" was

14 used toward the superior commands?

15 A. I don't recall. Probably sometime in 1998. I don't recall.

16 Q. Thank you. Now I want to move on to another topic. You told us,

17 I think, in your earlier testimony that -- that you -- you personally

18 never saw any instances of identity documents being taken from the Kosovo

19 Albanian refugees as they -- as they were leaving the country and going

20 into Albania, but did you not testify in -- in Milosevic that you -- you

21 did witness license plates being removed at the border from vehicles of

22 those people leaving?

23 A. No, I never said such a thing. In my testimony at the Milosevic

24 trial, I said that on one occasion - that was in the month of May -

25 sometime in mid-May, perhaps the 15th of May, together with a foreign TV

1 crew, Italian television, and perhaps another TV crew, from Denmark

2 perhaps, that were in my area, including Daniel Schiffer, I was on the

3 border and I saw license plates just thrown on the ground next to the

4 customs building. I was surprised, so I came to see the chief of the

5 secretariat to ask him whether he was aware of that, whether something

6 like that had been ordered. He, too, was surprised and he reacted

7 immediately, to the effect that something like that was not allowed.

8 Otherwise, I had no need to go to the border crossing. I only came

9 because of those TV reporters who wanted to cross over to the other side

10 and contact with other reporters who were in Albania.

11 Q. All right. General, I was referring to your testimony on the 6th

12 of July, 2005 at page 41946, which in the exhibit we have here, it's page

13 1162. And I -- your direct answer was: "I noticed that the border, there

14 were quite a few registration plates that were taken off. That's what I

15 noticed primarily. I didn't see the documents."

16 But are you talking about -- are you talking about ten license

17 plates or are you talking about hundreds? I had the impression that it

18 was a significant number enough for you to go make inquiries about it.

19 Correct?

20 A. Yes. There were a lot, several dozen license plates.

21 Q. Do you recall approximately when this was?

22 A. I've already told you, mid-May. It could have very well been the

23 15th of May.

24 Q. All right. Could we now look at Exhibit P1425. General, this is

25 a -- a report from you --

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, just one moment. Could you say again,

3 Mr. Delic, how many license plates you saw, in rough terms.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I said, "several dozen."

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 Mr. Hannis.

7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.

8 Q. Next, General, I want to show you Exhibit P1425. As I was saying,

9 this is dated the 8th of August, 1998 and a report from you on how your

10 units were engaged in combat task for the period 18 July to 6 of August.

11 Do you recognise that?

12 A. The copy is rather poor. Could we zoom in.

13 Yes, this could be a document from my brigade.

14 If we could see the signature as well.

15 MR. HANNIS: Yes. If we could go to the bottom of the page. And

16 I guess on to the next page, sorry.

17 Q. Do you need that enlarged?

18 A. No need. You should just enhance the passage you want to use.

19 Q. Okay. And in this document you're reporting about having engaged

20 in activities with the MUP in various locations, including Bela Crkva,

21 Orahovac in -- on the 18th and 19th of July, as well as other locations.

22 On this page we have a, at the bottom you're talking about some of

23 the problems, and one of them is that -- that it appears that the MUP

24 sometimes expected the army to carry out the entire task. And you're

25 indicating that the role of the VJ was to provide support.

1 Is that a problem that you experienced in the summer of 1998?

2 A. This here relates to one problem that occurred on the 25th of

3 July, 1998, when one unit of the MUP from Pirot refused to set out and

4 carry out a task. And in the course of execution of that task, another

5 unit - I believe from Leskovac - also stopped dead in its tracks and this

6 task could not be accomplished.

7 Q. After this, did you continue to have similar problems in joint

8 operations, or did you work that out and not experience the problem again

9 after the summer of 1998?

10 A. This concerned one activity, from the 25th until perhaps the 27th

11 of July, during one combat action. Because for those MUP units, it was

12 their first combat action as well, and that's probably the reason why this

13 problem occurred.

14 Q. Thank you. General, I want to ask you about some of the war

15 diaries of your subordinate units. Are you aware, first of all, that--

16 that subordinate units - for example, the 2nd Battalion, the Armoured

17 Battalion - kept their own war diaries?

18 A. Yes. It was the duty of every unit at the level of battalion to

19 keep a war diary.

20 Q. Have you had occasion to review or -- or see any of those war

21 diaries before testifying here this year?

22 A. Back in 2005 I saw the war diary of the 2nd Battalion. I did not

23 look at other war diaries.

24 Q. In looking at that war diary, did you see anything in it that was

25 not consistent with your knowledge of what had transpired during the war?

1 Did you see anything there that you believed or knew was wrong or

2 inaccurate?

3 A. I did not read these diaries in detail. I only looked at entries

4 for certain dates I was interested in, and I didn't find anything there

5 out of the ordinary, nothing special. They were written in the usual way.

6 Q. I just want to ask you if you recall whether the 2nd Battalion was

7 engaged in a task of -- of blocking Korenica and a line that included

8 Korenica and Meja or -- on or around the 26th and 27th of April, 1999.

9 A. That battalion was defending the border, and with a part of its

10 forces it was blocking one line, but it should be written in that diary.

11 I believe it was Korenica, and then the next place, Madenaj, I don't know

12 if Meja is mentioned.

13 Because I received that sort of thing in reports from battalions.

14 I know they were on that line.

15 MR. HANNIS: I would indicate that -- this diary is found at

16 Exhibit P2019, and we'll make submissions on it at a later date.

17 Q. I want to ask you, General, about the Armoured Battalion. If we

18 could look at Exhibit P2574.

19 First of all, can you tell me, who was -- who was the commander of

20 the Armoured Battalion in March of 1999?

21 A. Major Stevanovic.

22 Q. And I don't know if you can see. That's a cover page. If we

23 could go to the page 2 of the B/C/S and page 1 of the English.

24 I think you told me just a minute ago, General, that you had not

25 seen this one before; is that right?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Okay. And if we could go to the English page, which has the entry

3 for the 25th of March.

4 [Prosecution counsel confer]

5 MR. HANNIS: Well, I'm having trouble locating the English

6 translation.

7 Q. Let me ask you, General, if you -- do you see the entry for the

8 25th of March? Could -- could you read that for me? Because on my notes,

9 there's some questions about the translation that I had notes about.

10 Are you able to read that, or do we need to enlarge it for you?

11 A. If you can enlarge a little bit. Thank you.

12 "At 6.45, the unit marched to the Landovica sector, and after

13 carrying out reconnaissance, three tank platoons were set up, and in the

14 evening hours they were sent to the sector of the village of Zrze."

15 And it is impossible -- well, I is see that Major Nenad Stevanovic

16 is mentioned and Second Lieutenant Medic Dragan and Dragan Skrbic and the

17 last one was transferred to the Brnjaca sector.

18 Q. And who was Major Stevanovic?

19 A. He was a battalion commander. Medic was one of the komandiri and

20 so was Skrbic.

21 Q. And if you could read a little farther on. We have in the English

22 translation another reference to the commander of the 549th Chief of

23 Staff. That may -- I'm not sure if that's on the bottom of this B/C/S

24 page you have or if we have to go to the next page. See, there's a

25 reference to elevation 451? Can you read from there, please.

1 A. "Major Nenad Stevanovic with the 5th Company of the PJP and the

2 liberation of the village of Brestovac along the axis Baksina-Baksina

3 Strana-Brestovacke Padine, elevation 451, with the 2nd Tank Platoon and

4 the PJP Company under the command of the Chief of Staff of the 549th

5 Motorised Brigade. The attack went along the axis of the Orahovac and

6 Brestovac village, and in the same village they spent the night after it

7 was liberated."

8 Q. Okay. If I could stop you there. It's been translated as your --

9 what you read was translated as the -- with the 2nd Tank Platoon and the

10 PJ [sic] commander, the command of the Chief of Staff. It's not clear to

11 me. Was the Chief of Staff commanding the PJP as well as the tank

12 platoon, or how do you understand that entry?

13 A. The Chief of Staff at that time was the commander of Combat Group

14 7. Combat Group 7, that was a combat group that was composed of my

15 troops. Among those troops was the tank platoon. But he's just writing

16 about the tank platoon. He's not writing about the other forces, forces

17 from the other units. So these are the tank platoons that had arrived in

18 the night of the 24th, and in the morning they joined those units, the

19 Combat Groups 6, 7, and 2. Because otherwise, they were not part of their

20 organic composition.

21 MR. HANNIS: All right. Could we go to page 4 --

22 JUDGE BONOMY: I wonder, Mr. Hannis, if that's really been

23 helpful. Do you not think we should go over that again, that translation?

24 MR. HANNIS: Well --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Because it's -- it's not the same as what's on the

1 document, the English version of the document.

2 MR. HANNIS: I -- I agree, Your Honour. It's -- the reason I

3 asked the question was because the English translation here was not clear

4 to me. I'm not sure that the answer I have now is any clearer.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the English translation is very clear in the

6 sense that it attributes command of the PJP to a VJ officer, but that's

7 not what the answer that the witness has given says.

8 MR. HANNIS:

9 Q. General, could you have a look at that again, because our English

10 translation suggests that the -- that the PJP company in this particular

11 action was commanded by the Chief of Staff of the 549th. Is that not what

12 it says?

13 A. Let me read once again. "With the 2nd Tank Platoon and the PJP

14 company, which was under the command of the Chief of Staff of the 549th

15 Motorised Brigade, which was attacking along the axis" -- regardless of

16 what was written here, the Chief of Staff was commanding the Combat Group

17 7, and this is quite obvious from all the documents. This is a battalion

18 diary, but this is what it says here in effect, really. And it is

19 impossible for the Chief of Staff to command a company and a platoon.

20 Q. General, I understand you say that all the documents show that and

21 that it's not possible, but that is what it says in B/C/S, isn't it, that

22 the -- that the -- or that the Chief of Staff is commanding the tank

23 platoon and -- and the PJP company? That's what it says. Maybe it was

24 written down wrong, but what is what it says, isn't it?

25 A. It is a misinterpretation. It says: "With the tank platoon" not

1 "the tank battalion."

2 Q. I -- I agree, and I think I said "tank platoon."

3 JUDGE BONOMY: It may have been translated differently, though.

4 But that's been helpful. Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

5 MR. HANNIS:

6 Q. General, if now we could move to page 4 of the English and page 6

7 of the B/C/S, one more entry in this diary I want to ask you about. It's

8 on the 18th of April. Do you find that in your B/C/S? I think we'll have

9 to enlarge the page on the bottom right. Yeah. That last one.

10 Are you able to read that now?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. All right. I want to ask you about the -- the last sentence. It

13 says, in the English translation: "Sergeant -- Sergeant Igor Petlic

14 intercepted refugees and appropriated 2.000 Deutschmarks."

15 You were aware of that incident, weren't you?

16 A. Yes. Yes, I heard about Sergeant Petrovic maybe. It's not really

17 very legible.

18 Q. Okay. Well, you -- you did more than hear about it, didn't you?

19 Didn't you write a warning to your -- to your subordinates in which you

20 made reference to this sergeant and this incident? Do you recall that?

21 A. I think that Sergeant Petrovic was mentioned in a report.

22 Q. Okay. Yeah, our English has been translated as -- as "Petlic,"

23 but I think you're right that it was "Petrovic."

24 If we could show you now Exhibit 5D895, which is dated two days

25 later, the 20th of April.

1 And this is -- this is from you. First of all, in the first

2 paragraph, you say, starting at the end of the second line: "There have

3 been individual cases of conduct in combat operations where the provisions

4 and instructions regulating conduct in combat and the provisions of the

5 International Law of War have not been applied in full."

6 In addition to the incident with Sergeant Petrovic, what other

7 individual cases did you have in mind or did you know about when you wrote

8 this document? Can you recall?

9 A. Mr. Hannis, you ask a lot of me. Of course I remember those

10 cases, but you found Sergeant Petrovic in some kind of a diary and I had

11 no knowledge that any such entry existed there. But as early as on the

12 20th he is mentioned in a warning, and it is noted here that he was

13 arrested and sent to Nis to be criminally responsible, to be held

14 criminally responsible. I responded to any case that came to my

15 attention. My security organ, my police would respond the very same day.

16 And it is noted here what he had done, and the commanding officers of

17 units are warned about an order from the Pristina Corps, and then six or

18 seven -- or rather, six tasks are listed here for the units. The

19 commanding officers are warned hereby, because all those tasks and

20 instructions had already been given to the units, so I don't see what's

21 controversial about all this, because this shows that all the organs of

22 the brigade carried out their tasks in a professional manner.

23 Q. Right. You do mention Sergeant Petrovic in -- in paragraph 4

24 specifically, about being arrested, sent to Nis, held criminally liable

25 for robbing a convoy of refugees.

1 Now, in your reminder down below, you say: "Commands and

2 specialised organs shall take effective measures to prevent all forms of

3 crime, as has been ordered several times to date."

4 How many times prior to the 20th of April had you given those

5 kinds of warnings? When you say "several times," are you talking about

6 five? Ten? Twenty?

7 A. I received a wrong interpretation. These are not special organs.

8 This is command and professional organs, and by this we mean the military

9 police organs. Every time when I noticed something happening in a unit, I

10 would send out a warning specifying what had happened, and in many

11 occasions I would even mention the name of the person involved. But one

12 must stress the following: Every time I would receive a warning from my

13 superior command - and on this occasion, that is warning 455-140 -- I --

14 64 - I was supposed to relay that down to my units down the chain of

15 command. Sometimes I would receive orders relating to the discipline.

16 And if I received such an instruction from the Pristina Corps, I would

17 have to do the same thing with this order I received from the corps

18 commander, even though I may have written another order to that effect a

19 couple of days earlier. So I would have to write my own order and send it

20 to the lower units.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Again, the same as yesterday, Mr. Hannis. You have

22 to try to focus the witness on the particular point you're dealing with,

23 which hasn't really been addressed.

24 MR. HANNIS: I -- I agree, Your Honour.

25 Q. I understand, General, when you got an order from your superior

1 that you had to pass on those warnings. But in this case, this seems to

2 be one that you generated yourself without a prior order, because you knew

3 about the incident regarding Sergeant Petrovic. Isn't that part of the

4 basis for you issuing this warning on this occasion? "Yes" or"no," if you

5 can.

6 A. No, Mr. Hannis. If I may be allowed to explain. I received the

7 warning with the number that is indicated here from the corps. But since

8 I had had such a case in my own unit, I didn't have to pass on the warning

9 from the Pristina Corps command. I did pass on those items, but the

10 warning from the Pristina Corps also pertained to some events in other

11 units, but that is not important for me. So I put that aside and I

12 mentioned two cases that happened in my own unit, and that is why I

13 referenced the warning from the Pristina Corps but I talk about

14 incidentals in my own unit.

15 Q. Did you not issue warnings of your own?

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, the witness had already said at 18.23:

17 "Every time when I noticed something happening in a unit, I would send out

18 a warning specifying what had happened, and on many occasions I would even

19 mention the name of the person involved."

20 Is that not the answer to your question?

21 MR. HANNIS: That is.

22 Q. And my question, that I don't think you've answered yet, you said

23 that this had been ordered several times to date. And I asked you if that

24 meant, five, ten, twenty, or more. As of the 20th of April, how many

25 previous times, approximately, had you issued such warnings?

1 A. Well, if you insist, Mr. Hannis, at collegium meetings I sometimes

2 issued verbal orders to my subordinate officers. This -- once they noted

3 down in their notebooks, it becomes legally binding. I would have

4 collegium meetings every other day in the evening. I would meet with my

5 commanders. And they were always warned that they have to abide by the

6 rules.

7 I can say that I pointed them to that several dozen -- dozen

8 times. I told them how important it was to stick by the rules, be it

9 military discipline, International Law of War, or conduct in combat. At

10 every meeting I did so.

11 Q. And one of the reasons was because there were regular occurrences

12 of crimes. That's why you had to keep reminding them; right?

13 A. Well, that is not so. If you look at the number of people, there

14 were less crimes than usual -- than what would be usual in peacetime. But

15 even one crime, for me as an officer in a unit, is one crime too many. I

16 wanted to have no crimes committed in my unit.

17 Q. With regard to Sergeant Petrovic and this -- this crime of robbing

18 a convoy of refugees, in your exhibit, which is our P962, of the criminal

19 proceedings against people in the 549th between May of 1998 and July of

20 1999, he's not listed. Do you know what happened to his case? Why isn't

21 he listed in that report of yours?

22 A. I know that, as far as the unit is concerned, he went before the

23 court and some measure was -- he was sanctioned, but I do know why he is

24 not there on the list. When we asked from the military court to provide

25 us with all the cases -- all the proceedings that have been instituted

1 against the soldiers and officers in our unit, he was not on this list.

2 And that is why I did not include him. But there is a criminal report

3 against him, and he was prosecuted.

4 Q. Do you know what happened to him? Wasn't he released in 2002,

5 purportedly due to lack of evidence?

6 A. I cannot say that. I think that he was not released. I think

7 that he was sentenced to a couple of months in prison. I don't know

8 whether he actually served it or whether it was a suspended sentence, but

9 I don't know that for a fact. I do know that he was brought before the

10 court.

11 Q. All right. Let me move on. I'd like to show you Exhibit P -- or

12 5D878. This is from the 15th of February, 1999.

13 General, do you recall this exhibit -- or this document?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And I want to direct you to a particular provision. And it's on

16 the second page of the English, under item 3. And I think we may have to

17 go to the second page of the B/C/S as well.

18 Do you see the third paragraph under item 3 mentions that in

19 January and February, most officers sent their families to Serbia and

20 Montenegro. The last sentence in that paragraph says: "At the insistence

21 of municipal administrative organs, we have again revised the 'Plan for

22 the Protection of the Population in Case of an Armed Rebellion.'"

23 Can you recall that? Was that something that you did?

24 A. I participated -- or rather, my officers participated in updating

25 this plan. The plan had been in existence from an earlier time.

1 Q. And did that plan also include how the armed non-Siptar population

2 was going to be engaged in protecting the population?

3 A. This plan was quite simple. It's just a couple of pages. What it

4 was all about is that there were villages where there were just a few

5 houses, just a few Serbian households. And then, under the protection of

6 the MUP primarily, they were to be moved into town. In this case, it was

7 a sports hall, a gym of some sort, where they were to be accommodated and

8 protected. And then furthermore, if the situation in the town got more

9 serious, there were parts of the town where the Serbian population was in

10 the minority, and then they were to be moved to those part of the -- parts

11 of the town where they could be protected.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. And this also dealt with providing assistance, medical assistance,

14 food supplies, so there was no need for my units to get involved.

15 Q. Right. And -- and part of the way for reducing the need for

16 units -- your units to be involved was to provide for task for the

17 civilian protection, the civilian defence, and the armed non-Siptar

18 population, that is, the Serb and Montenegrin population; correct?

19 Weren't they included in this plan?

20 A. No mention is made of armed Serbian and Montenegrin population.

21 As far as I can see, there is no mention of them at all.

22 Q. Well, we don't have the plan in front of us. We just have this

23 document referring to revising that plan.

24 Let me now move to another exhibit related to that issue. Can we

25 show you Exhibit P1976.

1 And, General, I'll at -- tell you this is one of those Joint

2 Command command orders. This is dated, I think, the 15th of April, 1999.

3 And do you recall having received this order? It's for rounding and

4 destroying the Siptar terrorist forces in the area of Jezerce.

5 A. Yes. My unit played a less-important role.

6 Q. Okay. We'll talk about that in a minute. If we could go to page

7 2 of the English. And on the B/C/S page, it's on the screen now. Could

8 you look at item number 2, "Task of the Pristina Corps." And this has

9 that phrase that we've seen several times before. It says: "The Pristina

10 Corps with reinforcements and armed non-Siptar population of Kosovo and

11 Metohija supports the -- supports the MUP forces in routing and destroying

12 of Siptar terrorists in the area of responsibility."

13 Now, I want to follow up on that. If you could go down -- I'm not

14 sure it's on this page for you. If it is, it's the last paragraph. And

15 in English, it's near the bottom of page 2.

16 The last sentence says: "Engage the armed non-Siptar population

17 on safeguarding military facilities and communications and on the

18 protection and defence of the non-Siptar population."

19 So here we have a more specific task for the armed non-Siptar

20 population.

21 MR. CEPIC: Excuse me. We don't see on our screens, or if it's

22 possible in B/C/S, especially for the witness.

23 MR. HANNIS: Isn't it that -- I believe it was that last

24 paragraph, at the bottom of page 1.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: It must have been on that page, Mr. Cepic, because

1 the next page is paragraph 3.

2 MR. CEPIC: Maybe I made a mistake, but I didn't see it. Maybe

3 it's my mistake, but ...

4 MR. HANNIS:

5 Q. Do you see it, General? The last sentence on that page?

6 A. Yes, I can see it. Yes, I can see it. It's the last sentence,

7 last paragraph.

8 Q. Then do you know why that order specified that they be engaged in

9 the protection and defence of the non-Siptar population, as opposed to all

10 the civilian population?

11 A. This is a sentence that is quite illogical, and it is complete

12 nonsense, what it says here. The armed non-Siptar population --

13 Q. Well, I'm going to stop you there, because you told us previously

14 that these Joint Command orders were professionally and well written. The

15 only problem was they had "Joint Command" in the title. Are you changing

16 your mind now?

17 A. No, I did not change my mind. But writing and mentioning the

18 armed non-Siptar population -- and here you have tasks of the Pristina

19 Corps. And if you go on to look at the tasks for the units, you see that

20 the task is given to this armed non-Siptar population. A corps cannot

21 issue any tasks to the armed non-Siptar population if it is under the

22 defence -- or military departments and through them, with the Ministry of

23 Defence, and they take care of that. They're in charge of them. So the

24 army cannot command them.

25 And in my zone, it would be particularly stupid, because I did not

1 have any armed non-Siptar population in it, especially not the Serbs,

2 because they had already been expelled from my zone, so I did not have any

3 problems with that.

4 But could you please look at the tasks of the unit so that I can

5 see whether my unit was issued any tasks related to the armed non-Siptar

6 population.

7 Q. Your -- your task is at 5.3, which is on page 5 of the English.

8 And while we're looking for that, I -- I want to remind you, when we

9 talked yesterday about your thesis, you -- and you talked about commanding

10 the forces that would be used in dealing with the armed rebellion in

11 Kosovo. You told us the problem was between the MUP and the VJ, because

12 the law wasn't clear on how those competencies should be allocated, et

13 cetera. But you said there was no problem regarding the civil protection,

14 the civil defence, the armed non-Siptar population, because those bodies

15 found the Ministry of Defence and because of the VJ's liaison with that,

16 there wasn't a problem. And you told us in your thesis that the army had

17 overall responsibility for the defence; isn't that correct?

18 A. Your assertions are absolutely ridiculous, Mr. Hannis. Once

19 again, you're talking about my final paper and not at a single point in

20 time should that be allowed in this courtroom, to discuss that, because

21 that is a school paper. In 2005 and today it is being discussed. My

22 final paper is no official document. People will laugh in Belgrade when I

23 tell them that this Court discussed my final paper for two hours. And the

24 defence of that particular paper was half an hour in 1997. This is a

25 pleasure for me or satisfaction that a court at this level discusses my

1 final paper from university. But it is ridiculous to link that to what

2 actually happened in 19--

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Delic, you've made your point. Repeating it

4 over and over does not add any strength to the point you've made.

5 Mr. Hannis.

6 MR. HANNIS:

7 Q. General, are you disowning your paper? I thought it was a pretty

8 fine piece of work. It seems to describe pretty accurately what the

9 situation was, and it foresaw pretty clearly what came to pass afterwards.

10 Do you now want to remove yourself from it?

11 A. You are thinking along the wrong lines, Mr. Hannis. When I come

12 back to Belgrade, I'm going to ask for my paper to be published, printed,

13 publicised, but there is going to be a foreword too that will have to do

14 with this Court.

15 You told me about 5.3. As for my unit, there is no mention of

16 armed non-Siptar population.

17 Q. No, but there is a task to ensure complete road passability and

18 combat control over the territory, and one of the things that the armed

19 non-Siptar population is supposed to do in that document is to ensure

20 communications. Doesn't that relate to complete road passability?

21 Do you need to go back and look at the tasks --

22 A. Where did you see a task for the armed non-Siptar population? You

23 saw tasks for all units. But you only saw that task in general terms.

24 There is not a single unit that involves a task for the armed non-Siptar

25 population. It is perfectly reasonable for me within my zone to make sure

1 that roads are accessible and that the territory is accessible, but not --

2 I'm not going to do that through the armed non-Siptar population.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: So we -- we have a conundrum. We have the corps

4 directed to engage - that's the word you used - the non-Siptar population

5 and then no specific task given to them, and you say quite simply that

6 that is illogical and complete nonsense. So that's where we stand on

7 this.

8 Can you help us to unravel it in some way? Just calm the emotions

9 for a moment and tell us how we ought to see our way through what you say

10 is the command of the VJ expressing themselves in an illogical and

11 completely nonsensical way.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Paragraph 2 of every order is the

13 task received from the command. From paragraph 5 onwards are the tasks

14 addressed to the subordinate units. It is obvious that the corps

15 commander believed that the armed non-Siptar population has no role to

16 play within this task. He issued tasks to all his units. I only see the

17 task for my unit and part of the task for the 243rd Brigade, but nowhere

18 is there any mention of the armed non-Siptar population within the

19 brigades, and there is no mention of them in the tasks in specific terms

20 as the armed non-Siptar population; therefore, they did not receive any

21 tasks.

22 As for me, I'm just carrying out paragraph 5.3, and nothing else

23 in that order interests me, except from item 6 onwards and item 1,

24 "Information about the enemy." It is only 5.3 that matters to me.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, is there a specific task in any

1 paragraph allocated to the armed non-Siptar population?

2 MR. HANNIS: No, there's not a specific enumerated task.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: No.

4 Is one possibility, Mr. Delic, that should you find it necessary

5 in executing your task to seek the assistance of the armed non-Siptar

6 population, that you've got it from -- you've got authority for that from

7 paragraph 2?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do not have authority.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, what --

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because that was supposed to --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, what is that phrase "engage non-Siptar

12 population" about?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, first of all, you

14 should know the level of organisation on the part of that population. In

15 my zone, there practically weren't any people, because the previous

16 population had been expelled the previous year and I had nothing and no

17 one to organise --

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Address my question. What is that supposed to do

19 in that document, that sentence, "engage the armed non-Siptar population"?

20 Why is it there? -- Why is it there if there's no task? Or is that -- or

21 is that what you say is illogical and nonsensical?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I'm saying that it's illogical

23 because it doesn't appear anywhere later in the tasks. There is no task

24 for that population, and not a single commander could have used them.

25 They get tasks through the Ministry of Defence through the Municipal

1 Defence Department, and they have plans of their own and they carry out --

2 well, the civil defence and the civil protection, the population are tied

3 to them, and they carry out their tasks.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: And that, of course, depends on us accepting

5 evidence that the armed non-Siptar population is a reference to civil

6 defence and civil protection, and that's a matter to be determined in the

7 course of the case.

8 Mr. Fila.

9 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] If you wish, I may be of assistance.

10 Delic told you a few moments ago from 5 onwards is the task of the

11 Pristina Corps. The previous paragraphs, he said where they come from,

12 and that is going to be an answer to this question that you've been

13 putting, how come that paragraph 2 is there. Thank you.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Fila.

15 Mr. Hannis.

16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 Q. General, let me ask you about another topic, the coordination with

18 the MUP. In 1999, when you were tasked to carry out joint actions, how

19 was that coordination done? You -- you explained to us that you got the

20 order via courier at least some of the time. Did -- did the -- did your

21 MUP counterpart receive the same order or a similar order through his --

22 through his organ and then did the two of you meet? How -- how did that

23 work in 1999?

24 A. I received orders down my own chain. I don't know what the chain

25 is for the MUP to receive their orders, but usually I would speak to the

1 chief of the secretariat, because the chief of the secretariat in the

2 territory is the counterpart of the commander. They're in the same town.

3 Usually he would have the same information that the -- the unit, the

4 company of the PJP that is in that town, and one of the MUP detachments

5 that is in that territory would take part. After all, that is what is

6 written in my own order, what MUP units are going to be there. It was his

7 duty to ensure -- because in my barracks, there weren't any facilities for

8 us to meet, so usually we would meet at the MUP premises and then that is

9 where we would carry out coordination.

10 Coordination is reaching agreement and commanders of MUP units

11 took part in this; also commanders of the local PJP companies; and the

12 chief of the secretariat was just in attendance.

13 After that, I would return to my unit. I would call my Chief of

14 Staff, my operations officer, and I would draft documents.

15 Q. When you -- you had the -- the Joint Command order, which would be

16 an order for routing and destroying the terrorists in a certain area. Did

17 you see -- did -- did the police, did the MUP, have that same order? Did

18 they have that same order and map like you did that described in general

19 terms what the -- what the task was about?

20 A. We received orders for the same task; that is to say, that we

21 received orders for the same task, but I received the orders I received,

22 although "Joint Command" is written on them, but I got them from my

23 command, from the command of the Pristina Corps; whereas, the MUP got

24 their orders from some command of theirs in Pristina. I don't know what

25 their name was, was it a MUP staff or something. However, when we were

1 carrying out coordination, I would have my own order, and I don't know

2 what kind of a document the MUP had. I always used my own order and my

3 own part of the map, the one that I got from Pristina. I would use an

4 ordinary pencil on my map, which was empty, and then I would mark some

5 elements that I needed for coordination, and then later on I would

6 transfer that to my officers so that they could carry out my order and

7 draw a -- my decision.

8 And as far as the map is concerned, sometimes -- sometimes that

9 would be in the order of the corps command -- we would use a coded map,

10 which was the same for the army and for the MUP. That is a map for

11 maintaining communication. And even at corps command level there, is the

12 same map with the same numbers that I -- like the one I have. And that is

13 used for maintaining communication between and among different units.

14 Q. Okay. I understand that. You're saying that when you had a coded

15 map, the MUP would have also had the same map with the same code markings

16 on it? Right?

17 A. That is what was written in some orders. This is a map on which

18 there were only some numbers. It is only some numbers that were marked

19 there. And with these numbers I wouldn't have to say I'm going to

20 Pristina -- to Prizren, for instance. I would say I'm going to number 51.

21 And the same map was in Pristina and I had the same map too.

22 Q. And the MUP had the same map; right? Because you're working

23 together and you have to understand when you're talking about a number,

24 you have to be sure it means the same thing for both of you. Right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. You talked about meeting with the -- the PJP commander.

2 Did you have any joint operations with -- that included either the -- the

3 SAJ, the S-A-J, from the MUP or the JSO, during either 1998 or 1999? Do

4 you recall?

5 A. In 1998, on one occasion I supported the SAJ. That was when

6 Orahovac was being liberated. After that I was no longer with the SAJ.

7 As for this other unit, I was never with them.

8 Q. You never had any dealings with the JSO and only once with the

9 SAJ; correct?

10 A. Just once or perhaps twice we were neighbours, but the JSO, I just

11 came across them en route once or twice.

12 Q. And the SAJ at that time you mentioned regarding Orahovac in 1998,

13 how was that coordination done? Did you also -- did they sit in a meeting

14 with you, as well as PJP, to do the coordination?

15 A. That time was completely different. I was in the field when I got

16 a call from the commander, General Pavkovic, and I already knew that

17 Orahovac had been captured for one whole day. I was close to Rogovo with

18 one of my combat groups. General Pavkovic told me that that afternoon MUP

19 would move to liberate Orahovac and from that location where I was, I was

20 supposed to support the MUP forces at his request. Since I said to him I

21 had no communication with the MUP, no contact with them, no way to get in

22 touch, he told me that they would be coming to Zrze, there would be a PJP

23 unit from Djakovica, and later on SAJ would come. That's where I got in

24 touch with them, and I was with them that first day. That was the 18th of

25 July.

1 Q. Thank you. And with regard to the JSO, you said you came across

2 them en route once or twice. Do you recall if that was in 1998 or 1999?

3 A. In 1998 I only saw the members of that unit, a few of them. In

4 1998 I saw a few members of that unit in town, in Djakovica. As I was

5 passing by, they were in the yard of the MUP secretariat in Djakovica.

6 And in 1999 I saw -- it was sometime in the beginning of April, after our

7 combat action was completed, I saw that unit or a part thereof. They had

8 a few vehicles of their own and we ran into each other on the road.

9 Q. All right. And what area was that when you came across them in

10 1999 in April?

11 A. Close to Malisevo.

12 Q. All right. Thank you. General, you were aware of the plan in

13 1998 called "Grom 98"?

14 A. I heard of something called Grom. I thought it had something to

15 do with this five-stage plan. I am not able to tell you anything about

16 that with any certainty. I heard of Grom, but what exactly that means, I

17 don't know.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I thought it was something to do with the five-stage plan, nothing

20 else.

21 Q. I know in -- in the Milosevic trial there was some evidence about

22 Colonel Crosland and Paddy Ashdown being in Kosovo and reportedly seeing

23 shelling in the area of Suva Reka and surrounding villages. I just want

24 to ask you: When was that? Do you recall when they were there?

25 A. Yes, there is video footage. That was September 1998. But at the

1 Milosevic trial I challenged --

2 Q. Yes, I -- I understand that --

3 A. -- that the Good Lord could have seen what he claims to have seen.

4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I just wanted to know when it

5 was. Let me ask you one last area and then I'll -- I'll finish up,

6 General. At -- on the 4th of December, on Tuesday this week, you -- you

7 were answering a question about informing MUP. You said: "In a similar

8 way, we would inform the MUP" -- this is at page 19456, line 2.

9 "In a similar way, we would inform the MUP if we were to notice

10 anything untoward happening on the territory which did not come under our

11 competence and something that the MUP should see to and resolve or if

12 there was something linked to the members of the police force generally

13 speaking."

14 And you were then asked: "And not only the police but civilians

15 too?"

16 And you said: "Yes."

17 Now, if you saw crimes being committed by MUP members in 1999

18 during the war, what action would you take?

19 A. Well, that depends on specific circumstances. In any case, if

20 there is the smallest chance for me to prevent the commission of a crime,

21 I would certainly do that. The last resort would be that if I cannot

22 prevent it, I would report it to their commanding officer, their chief,

23 and demand that he take steps.

24 Q. Did you ever see any MUP members committing crimes during the war

25 in 1999?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Did you ever -- did you ever have it reported to you by your

3 subordinates or by civilians, by anyone, that MUP had committed crimes

4 in -- in your area? Did that happen during the war in 1999 even once?

5 A. I received notification from my subordinates, but not about

6 crimes, about some other acts on several occasions, and I passed that on

7 to my colleague in the MUP. Some observations of my commanding officers

8 from the field.

9 Q. Well, what kind of observations are you talking about? You say

10 they were not crimes. What were the observations about?

11 A. Well, you could treat it as a criminal offence. Inappropriate

12 treatment of a civilian, something like that.

13 Q. Well, that's precisely what we want to know about. What kinds of

14 observations were you receiving from your subordinates about MUP engaging

15 in inappropriate treatment of civilians?

16 A. Well, you see, eight years later you're asking me for details.

17 I'm telling you in every specific case, if my commanding officer reported

18 to me that somebody was mistreating a civilian, I would report it to my

19 colleague -- or rather, inform him that in such-and-such a place his

20 policemen are not working properly and that he should take steps because

21 they were mistreating a specific person.

22 Q. And do you recall any specific examples of the mistreatment? Can

23 you tell us something more specific? Are you talking about murder, rape,

24 robbery, or just an insult?

25 A. No. No way. No murders. I never heard of any rapes. As for

1 theft or robbery, I believe that sort of thing happened, but I cannot give

2 you the place now. Maybe it's written somewhere in one of my reports.

3 But at any rate, I informed my colleague about such things.

4 Q. So did you never report up to the Pristina Corps that MUP members

5 were engaging in criminal activity against the civilian population during

6 the war?

7 A. Certainly, on one occasion, in one report, I know for sure that

8 there is a reference to that. But it was not about civilian population.

9 I believe theft or robbery is concerned.

10 Q. Theft or robbery against whom? Civilians?

11 A. Those were abandoned houses, if I remember well.

12 Q. Okay. So what I would term "looting" by MUP members; is that what

13 you're talking about?

14 A. That seems to imply a multitude of occurrences. I said that I had

15 written something like that in one of my reports to the superior command,

16 but we cannot talk about a multitude of cases. It was an individual case,

17 or maybe several cases.

18 Q. When did you write that up? When did you send that report up to

19 General Lazarevic or the Pristina Corps? Do you recall?

20 A. I don't.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I have no more questions for this

23 witness.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.

25 Mr. Cepic.

1 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I do have some questions.

2 Thank you.

3 Re-examination by Mr. Cepic:

4 Q. [Interpretation] General, good morning. It's me again.

5 A. Good morning.

6 Q. We owe the Trial Chamber one piece of information. Namely, on

7 Tuesday - that's on page 19401 of the transcript - you responded to my

8 question about the terrorist who was arrested in Prizren, and the

9 Presiding Judge asked if we had any identification for that person.

10 That's why I would like to call up Exhibit 5D228.

11 General, you recognize this sort of document?

12 A. This is a document from the Pristina Corps.

13 Q. Thank you. Please look at 1.2, the second item. It begins with

14 the words, "Guards of the support battalion" -- "Guards of the logistical

15 battalion," rather. Read it, please.

16 A. "Guards of the logistical battalion of the 549th Motorised Brigade

17 captured terrorist Gashi Shukri, son of Dervish, who was under --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please read more slowly.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry. Could you read more slowly. Just start

20 again. We've lost the translation.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Guards of the Logistics Battalion

22 of the 549 Motorised Brigade took into custody terrorist Gashi Shukri, son

23 of Dervish, who was moving under cover around the redeployment area of the

24 unit. Before his capture, he discarded an AP rifle with three clips of

25 ammunition and a knife marked 'KLA'." He confessed that he was a member

1 of the terrorist organisation KLA. He's being processed by the security

2 organs and the military police."

3 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Thank you, General.

5 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, to corroborate this, we

6 also have an exhibit; namely, the criminal report against Gashi Shukri,

7 which is 5D903.

8 Q. General, Prosecutor Hannis put to you a number of questions about

9 volunteers. You answered that you had them in your unit. You stated that

10 there were some foreign nationals as volunteers within your existing

11 units. What I want to know is how they came to you, how they came to be

12 included in your units.

13 A. They came in an organised way. One of the centres for volunteers

14 was in Belgrade. They rallied there. They were trained. They were

15 subjected to medical examinations, after which they were sent to the

16 admissions centre of the 3rd Army in Nis. As far as I know, they

17 underwent training there from seven to ten days in duration, and then

18 depending on the requirements of the Pristina Corps, they would be

19 transferred to the Pristina Corps to specific brigades. And there they

20 were assigned according to their military occupational specialty.

21 Q. General, do you perhaps recall the legislation concerned? Was it

22 allowed for foreign nationals to be members of the army during the war as

23 volunteers?

24 A. Yes, that matter is stipulated in the Law on Defence and the Law

25 on the Army, I believe. I don't know the exact article.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 MR. CEPIC: Could we have on our screens Exhibit number P984,

3 please.

4 Q. [Interpretation] General, we have the Law on the Army before us.

5 MR. CEPIC: [Previous translation continues] ... Could we have

6 Article 8, please. The next page, please. I think that in English it is

7 on the third -- third page.

8 Could we zoom in Article 8, please. Also in English, please.

9 Q. [Interpretation] General, look at Article 8, and could you please

10 read aloud the third paragraph of that article, the last paragraph.

11 A. "Service in the army shall be performed only by Yugoslav citizens.

12 As an exception - in time of war - also individuals who do not have

13 Yugoslav citizenship may also serve if they join the army as volunteers."

14 Q. My learned friend Mr. Hannis put to you yesterday the two analyses

15 you made, one for the action in Jeskovo, which is numbered 51998 [as

16 interpreted], and the deblocking of Retimlje and the road to Orahovac,

17 P1995. It says that there were no persons captured or arrested in those

18 actions. The first exhibit was P1998.

19 I would like to know whether anybody was arrested during your

20 actions, your operations.

21 A. You mean earlier operations?

22 Q. I mean any operations you performed.

23 A. Yes, on a number of times, especially on the state border.

24 Q. What is the procedure of arrest?

25 A. When such persons are arrested, they are first disarmed, searched,

1 then they are restrained, escorted, and within the shortest possible time

2 they are turned over to security authorities to be identified, and so on.

3 Q. General, do you perhaps remember why in those two operations that

4 I just mentioned nobody was arrested?

5 A. With regard to these two activities -- but we should make a

6 distinction there, because as far as Jeskovo is concerned, I was directly

7 there on the ground, and you can read in the security organ's report and

8 in the book of that commander that was a special unit. For the duration

9 of the fighting, we constantly heard those cries, "Allahu Akbar," they

10 were all in black uniforms and none of them surrendered. None of them

11 discarded their weapon.

12 Q. You mentioned a special unit. Whose special unit?

13 A. A special unit of the KLA. Specifically of the 125th Brigade of

14 the KLA.

15 Q. General, in this second operation nobody was arrested either. You

16 mentioned something about columns of people, convoys.

17 A. In that second activity, the terrorists persistently defended that

18 area, Upper and Lower Retimlje, Randubrava, Studencane, and the route

19 along which they were withdrawing together with the civilian population.

20 It goes through Dobrodeljane towards Pagarusa. I knew that in this first

21 sector the 124th Brigade is located. And I knew that the 123rd Brigade

22 was somewhere to the north-west of Suva Reka. But in this territory,

23 practically from Malisevo and Suva Reka, in that territory there were five

24 terrorist brigades from the operations zone Pastrik, and they defended

25 this route bitterly, persistently. In several places where my commanding

1 officers showed me, I found blood-stains, soldiers' caps soaked with

2 blood, pieces of a human skull in one place even, but not in a single

3 place could you find a dead body of the terrorist, because they fought to

4 the last until they had pulled their last man out. And only six

5 terrorists in six -- in black uniforms, but that's a special unit of their

6 General Staff where we had hand-to-hand combat, there were only those six

7 we found dead, dressed as Mujahedin, in black uniforms and long beards.

8 Those were the only six bodies we found on the ground. We can only assume

9 for the rest how many casualties they had, and we found around 30 fresh

10 graves in a place near Pagarusa and we supposed that that's where they

11 buried their fallen fighting men.

12 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, is it appropriate time for the break?

13 JUDGE BONOMY: You won't be finishing during this period? No?

14 MR. CEPIC: I will finish in next 20 minutes maybe.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. All right.

16 MR. CEPIC: 25.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Another break, Mr. Delic. Could you leave, please,

18 with the usher, again. We shall resume at 11.15.

19 [The witness stands down]

20 --- Recess taken at 10.46 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 11.16 a.m.

22 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, while the witness is coming in, I just

23 wanted to introduce two new faces on our side over here. To my far right

24 is Eleni Vossou, an intern who will be working with us. To my immediate

25 right is a Vladimir Petrovic, who's an intern working with us as well, to

1 be distinguished from Vladimir Petrovic on the other side. It's part of

2 our effort to maintain equality of arms with the Defence. We've got

3 equality of Petrovics. I don't know if we'll ever get a Mr. Fila on this

4 side.

5 Thank you.

6 [The witness takes the stand]

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Mr. Cepic.

8 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Q. [Interpretation] General, just a few more questions. My colleague

10 asked you about the area of responsibility of the brigade or the zone of

11 responsibility. You marked it in blue on IC153. That was a map. You

12 marked the sectors of deployment. But outside of the border belt and the

13 area of deployment that you marked, were you responsible for public law

14 and order and the security -- or safety of person and property of the

15 citizens in your area of responsibility?

16 A. No, because during the war in my territory, in the Prizren sector,

17 all the organs functioned normally; local self-government, the MUP, the

18 judiciary, all the other organs.

19 Q. Thank you. Again, in answer to a question by my colleague

20 Mr. Lukic, you mentioned military check-points. I would now like to know

21 the following: At the military check-points, were military personnel --

22 military police officers had powers vis-a-vis which persons?

23 A. Well, naturally, only persons in military uniforms. Only

24 soldiers, reserve soldiers, volunteers, all those who wore military

25 uniforms.

1 Q. Thank you, General. My next question stems from that answer. Are

2 you responsible in a state of war for the status of other structures in

3 the defence system? So if there's another unit of the Army of Yugoslavia

4 that has not been re-subordinated to you, MUP, civilian protection, civil

5 defence, the municipal assembly, and so on?

6 A. I am responsible for my units, the units that reinforced my units

7 and the re-subordinated units. As for all the other units, I can be made

8 responsible for them only in terms of logistics, supplies, or whatever is

9 written in an order that has to be issued by my superior command to that

10 effect.

11 Q. Now, in relation to all those other structures that I mentioned.

12 A. Well, as regards all the other structures, there can be

13 cooperation with them, if necessary, because they're also state

14 institutions, organs, and so on, so there can be exchange of information.

15 In some cases when some of those civilian structures are involved, some

16 assistance can be provided to them. But as a rule, everyone is supposed

17 to do their own job.

18 Q. Thank you. During the war, was there a military administration,

19 military rule?

20 A. No, there was no need for that. I've already indicated that all

21 the state organs functioned fully in my area, completely normally, despite

22 the difficult situation.

23 Q. Thank you. You gave us an answer regarding the check-points. Now

24 I would like to move on to a different topic. My colleague Mr. Hannis

25 asked you yesterday and today some questions about that, and this is the

1 basis for my next question. During the war, did you, as a brigade

2 commander, issue any tasks in any way whatsoever to any structures that

3 involved armed population?

4 A. No. In my area, I never saw any non -- any armed non-Siptar

5 population, because as early as in 1998 the people had already been

6 expelled from all the villages in which they were in the majority. In my

7 area, there was also the village of Novake and the village of Velika Hoca,

8 where Serbs were in the majority.

9 Q. Thank you. Well, to follow up on that and another question by

10 Mr. Hannis, he showed you an order, and you can see here that there are no

11 tasks for the civilian population. This concerns Jezerce. You explained

12 that this term was used as the level of the municipality. What I would

13 like to know is whether it would be necessary for an engagement of any

14 such structures of the armed population - but let me extend that to

15 include also the civil defence and the civilian protection - for a

16 specific order on the re-subordination to be issued by their organ in

17 charge? Could you please explain that?

18 A. Had any such decision been made or such an order been issued, on

19 the re-subordination, for instance of a ministry detachment with all the

20 units -- ministry department with all the units that are linked with it,

21 then the situation would be different. I would have had the right to set

22 tasks to them. But as -- as it was, they worked in accordance with their

23 own plans.

24 Q. Thank you, General. In item 2 of the order we saw that mention

25 was made of the armed non-Siptar population. That was Exhibit --

1 Prosecution Exhibit P1978 [as interpreted], order of the Joint Command for

2 the Jezerce action.

3 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, that was translated as P1978. I think

4 it's P1976.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.

6 MR. CEPIC: That's correct. That's correct. Thank you.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

8 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. And in item 2, you explained this reference to the armed

10 non-Siptar population. What I'm interested in is whether such a provision

11 in an order comes from a higher level or is it the product of the work of

12 the level -- of this particular level?

13 A. Well, item 2 in every order comes from the higher level.

14 Q. Thank you. My colleague Mr. Hannis asked you about the

15 term "singleness of command" or "unity of command." We saw in your

16 analysis post-action reports. You explained -- or rather, you explained

17 that there was combined command over the military and MUP forces, and you

18 stressed that there were two separate chains of command that remained

19 intact, the MUP chain of command and the Army of Yugoslavia chain of

20 command. Now, I would like to explore the difference between those two

21 terms, "objedinjena," combined command, and "jedinstvena komanda," unified

22 command.

23 A. Unified command would imply that there is a single chain of

24 command. And when you have combined command, I don't know how it worked

25 with other commanders, but in my case that's how I worked with this MUP

1 unit right from the start. I came to realize that the easiest thing would

2 be for me and the MUP unit commander to meet in a certain place. He would

3 come accompanied with some of his organs; I would come accompanied with

4 some of my own organs. And everybody commanded their own units. And if

5 any actual concerted -- concerted or coordinated action was required, then

6 there would be no middleman. The two of us would deal with it directly.

7 He would ask for help or support from me directly, and I would provide it

8 by deploying the required unit. So no time was lost. It was very

9 efficient.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.

11 MR. CEPIC: Yes, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Was either of the expressions you used just now the

13 same expression as "Joint Command"?

14 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, "objedinjeno

15 komandovanje," combined command, is mentioned in P1995. It was said that

16 combined command was embodied in the Joint Command. I think it was an

17 analysis of the Jeskovo action that concerned MUP and the army, and I can

18 perhaps show that exhibit. That would be easier.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: No. I just want to be clear. Everyone seems to

20 read "Joint Command" as something rather different from "combined

21 command." That's my only reason for asking. But it's the word "Joint

22 Command" that seems to spread terror in the ranks, rather than "combined

23 command." And I just want it to be clear that we weren't discussing the

24 same word again. So please continue.

25 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Well, to

1 clarify things, we can maybe just cast a brief look at this exhibit, to

2 make things even clearer.

3 Q. General, when you say "combined command through a joint command of

4 the MUP and the army," this is something that we saw in those analyses

5 that you made. I don't want to open this document, so that we can move

6 forward more efficiently, but can you please explain that?

7 A. That means that I, as the commander of the army, and he, as the

8 commander of the MUP, are in the same location. We're close to each

9 other. He's in command of his units; I'm in command of my units.

10 Together we monitor this activity, and if necessary, if his units need

11 support, he comes to me and asks for it directly from me. And I can

12 directly issue an order to my unit to provide this support to him.

13 In practice, it turned out, in my case, to have been the most

14 economical and the most effective way to proceed.

15 Q. Thank you. Just to clarify things --

16 MR. CEPIC: [Previous translation continues] ... Could we have the

17 third page of this document which we see right now on our screens. The

18 last page, please, in B/C/S.

19 I think that the page before the last one in English.

20 Q. [Interpretation] Could you please look at that. In English,

21 that's the last passage; and in B/C/S, or in Serbian, that's the first

22 sentence on the page that you have in front of you. Could you please read

23 the second sentence, "The commanding over the envisaged forces was

24 combined ...."

25 A. "The exercise of command over the envisaged forces was combined

1 with the joint command of the forces of the MUP and the VJ."

2 So that's precisely what I've been explaining.

3 MR. CEPIC: Could we have the first page, please.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you do, is that sentence you've just read,

5 is it in the English on the page we've got on the screen?

6 MR. CEPIC: Yes, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Where is it?

8 MR. CEPIC: But the translation is -- it is the -- it is on the

9 bottom of the -- bottom of the page, last sentence.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

11 MR. CEPIC: And it is the wrong word for "objedinjeno," which we

12 call in Serbian language "objedinjeno".

13 JUDGE BONOMY: So are you saying the word in the second-last line

14 on the page should be "combined," rather than "joint" in English?

15 MR. CEPIC: Yes, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

17 MR. CEPIC: "combined by joint command," to be more precise.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: No, I'm not understanding, then.

19 Mr. Delic, would you read that sentence again, please.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The exercise of command over the

21 envisaged forces was combined by a joint command of the MUP and VJ

22 forces," or "through or under."

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

24 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. [Interpretation] Let's just clarify one more thing while we're on

1 this document.

2 MR. CEPIC: Could we have the first page, please, of this

3 document.

4 Q. [Interpretation] General, we don't have to read it. You have it

5 in front of you on your screen. It says here in the first sentence that

6 you provided support to the MUP forces pursuant to an order of the

7 Pristina Corps Command, strictly confidential number 455-63, dated the

8 23rd of March, 1999. Is that one of those documents bearing the heading

9 of the Joint Command?

10 A. Yes, this is one of those orders.

11 Q. Thank you. General, sir, my colleague Mr. Lukic asked you about

12 the action in the villages of Bela Crkva and Celina, and you drew them --

13 drew in the movement of the MUP units on the map, and on that occasion you

14 stated that this was the 23rd PJP Detachment.

15 I found that a bit confusing. And could we just clarify this

16 through these documents.

17 Could we have P2015 on our screens, please. Could we please see

18 paragraph 4 and paragraph 5.1 on our screens.

19 In paragraph 5.1, is there any specific MUP unit referred to in

20 the tasks of supporting your unit, General?

21 A. No. As far as I can see, no.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 Can we have a look at 1981, P1981, rather.

24 General, did you write this order on the basis of the previous

25 document that we saw on our screens?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 Can we please have a look at paragraph 4.

4 General, in paragraph 4 we see that what is planned here is an

5 action with the 37th Detachment of the PJP; however, later you indicated

6 that this was the 23rd Detachment of the PJP and you highlighted that it

7 was the 23rd, not the 37th Detachment, as referred to here in this order.

8 A. No. In this activity, it was both the 37th and the 23rd that were

9 involved. The 37th participated with the main forces from the axis of

10 Suva Reka, and only with one company from Combat Group 6 from Orahovac,

11 from my units. The 5th and the 6th Company of the PJP were engaged in

12 other tasks. I did not know about that at that moment of coordination.

13 So the MUP sent this 23rd Detachment that was active along the axis that I

14 drew, indicated yesterday with part of the forces, and another part of the

15 forces were in the area between Mala Krusa and the village of Pirane.

16 Q. I would like to know the following.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you do.

18 MR. CEPIC: Sorry.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you mean to refer to the 5th and the 4th?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Although they are indicated

21 here in my order, this is what had been agreed upon at the coordination

22 meeting. Afterwards, however, the chief of the secretariat called me and

23 told me that these units would not take part; however, that they would

24 regulate this and that the 23rd Detachment of the PJP from Djakovica would

25 carry out this combat action instead of them, and that is who appeared on

1 that axis on the following day.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic.

3 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Q. [Interpretation] Very briefly, General. We saw these documents

5 with the heading where it says "Joint Command." Until when were you

6 receiving these documents?

7 A. Well, I think that I got only a few documents, but this was in

8 April. The last document that I got has to do with Jezerce.

9 Q. Do you know why later on you did not receive such documents?

10 A. Well, around the 20th of April an order on re-subordination came,

11 and that is when this process ensued. One order, another order, attempts

12 to carry out re-subordination, which did not take place. At any rate,

13 these orders were no longer there, those that bore the heading "Joint

14 Command."

15 Q. Did re-subordination take place?

16 A. Re-subordination did not take place.

17 Q. Thank you. General, Mr. Hannis asked you in detail about a

18 Prosecution exhibit, P2002.

19 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Could I please have it displayed on

20 our screens. It is an analysis of the activity of crushing STS in the

21 Malisevo-Pagarusa area. So could I please have page 2 in the B/C/S

22 version -- or rather, in Serbian, and page 3 in English. The one-but-last

23 paragraph in English. In Serbian it is the fifth paragraph, the fifth

24 from the top, that starts with the following words: "During the course of

25 the third day ..."

1 Q. So if you look at the last part of this paragraph, you indicate

2 that evacuation was carried out and that about 30.000 refugees were taken

3 care of. You did say that you were not in the village of Belanica.

4 I would be interested in the following: Did you perhaps have

5 information about inhumane treatment of civilians?

6 A. No, I did not have such information. I've already said yesterday

7 that in front of me, in front of my units, part of the population had left

8 in that direction and another part came forward to my unit on this asphalt

9 road between Malisevo and Orahovac. But I do not have such information,

10 especially for Belanica, because I was not there personally and none of my

11 officers went there either, because this was outside the area of activity

12 of my unit. This is on the axis of my neighbours.

13 Q. Thank you, General. Those were all my questions. Once again,

14 thank you.

15 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Cepic.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer].

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry about that delay, Mr. Delic. I just wanted

20 to be sure that there weren't any other areas that we wish to explore with

21 you.

22 That completes your evidence. Thank you for coming again to the

23 Tribunal to give it. You are now free to leave the courtroom.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

25 [The witness withdrew]

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Our next

3 witness is General Momir Stojanovic.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Stojanovic.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you please make the solemn declaration to

9 speak the truth by reading aloud the document which will now be shown to

10 you.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

12 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.

14 WITNESS: MOMIR STOJANOVIC

15 [Witness answered through interpreter]

16 JUDGE BONOMY: You will now be examined by Mr. Bakrac, who appears

17 for Mr. Lazarevic.

18 Mr. Bakrac.

19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

20 Examination by Mr. Bakrac:

21 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

22 A. Good morning.

23 Q. We've already introduced you, but could you please do so for the

24 record. Could you please state your full name.

25 A. My name is Momir -- Momir Stojanovic, father's name Bogovid. I am

1 a retired general.

2 Q. Could you please tell us where and when you were born?

3 A. I was born on the 12th of October, 1958 in Djakovica.

4 Q. General, which duties did you perform in your military career?

5 A. In my professional career, I performed all the duties in the

6 military intelligence service -- in the military security service from the

7 operations officer to the head of the military security agency of the Army

8 of Serbia and Montenegro. I was also -- I held all the command posts up

9 to the level of the corps commander. Chief of Staff of the corps.

10 Q. And when did you retire?

11 A. In 2005.

12 Q. Would you be so kind as to tell us, how long did you serve in

13 Kosovo and Metohija and what post did you hold there?

14 A. In Kosovo and Metohija I served between 1993 and 1999. First I

15 was the deputy chief of the security department in the Pristina Corps

16 Command, and later on I became the chief of the security department in the

17 Pristina Corps Command.

18 Q. General, our time is limited, so I will be asking you questions

19 only about the relevant period. So could you please tell us, in 1998 and

20 1999 which post did you hold in that period?

21 A. In 1998 and 1999 I was the chief of the security department in the

22 Pristina Corps Command.

23 Q. General, could you please tell us, what is the role of the

24 military security service organs in the chain of command of the army?

25 A. The organs of the military security service are professional

1 organs of the command. They're immediately subordinate to the unit

2 commander, but along the professional line they are subordinated to the

3 chief of the security organ in the command that is immediately superior.

4 So during 1998 and 1999, in professional terms the chief of the security

5 section of the 3rd Army was in charge and in command of the security

6 department in the Pristina Corps Command.

7 Q. General, let me just warn you about something. I'm -- if I make a

8 pause, I make a pause in order to wait for the interpretation to be

9 finished, so I'm not waiting for you to complete your answer.

10 What you just told us, does that mean that in professional terms,

11 or in technical terms, you were in charge of all the security organs in

12 the Pristina Corps?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. In addition to the security organs in the Pristina Corps, in 1998

15 and 1999 were there any other military security service organs in Kosovo

16 and Metohija?

17 A. Yes. In addition to the military security service organs in the

18 Pristina Corps, in 1998 and 1999 in Kosovo and Metohija there were also

19 the organs of the military security service of the command of the military

20 district in Pristina. And in professional or technical terms, they were

21 subordinate to the intelligence section of the 3rd Army.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's Correction: Security section of

23 the 3rd Army.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were also the organs of the

25 14th Counter-intelligence Group both in terms of command and technical

1 terms, it was under the security administration of the General Staff of

2 the Army of Yugoslavia.

3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. General, could you please tell us, how were the military security

5 service organs manned in the commands and in the units of the Pristina

6 Corps in 1998 and 1999?

7 A. In 1998 the military security service organs were present in all

8 the organisational units of the Pristina Corps, down to the level of the

9 Independent Battalion. Because of the complex security situation on the

10 state border with the Republic of Albania and the overall security

11 situation in the territory, the security administration of the Army of

12 Serbia and Montenegro in June 1998 reinforced the organs of the Pristina

13 Corps by sending some personnel, experienced operations officers, and from

14 that time on the military security service organs were present in all the

15 organisational units of the Pristina Corps, down to the level of combat

16 group and border post.

17 Q. General, could you please tell us, what are the basic tasks of the

18 military security service organs when it came to terrorism and terrorist

19 activities in Kosovo and Metohija.

20 A. The task of the military security service organs when it came to

21 terrorism was to detect, document, and stop anti-terrorist, subversive,

22 and any other illegal activities in commands, units, and installations of

23 the Pristina Corps or aimed against them.

24 Q. General, what powers did the organs of the military security

25 service have?

1 A. In accordance with Article 30 of the Law on the Army of

2 Yugoslavia, the organs of the military security service have the right,

3 the power, and the duty that corresponds to those of the organs of the

4 interior. Again, in accordance with the Law on Criminal Procedure and the

5 Law on Military Courts, the organs of the military security service

6 participate in the actions that precede the institution of criminal

7 proceedings.

8 Q. General, we spoke about powers. Those powers that organs of the

9 military security service have, against whom could they use them?

10 A. They could use them against all the personnel of the Army of

11 Yugoslavia and all those persons involved in hostile activities targeting

12 the commands, units, and installations of the Army of Yugoslavia.

13 Q. General, could you please tell us, what are the powers of the

14 military security service organs vis-a-vis the military police?

15 A. The organs of the military security service, in technical and

16 professional terms, are in charge of the military police organs.

17 Q. Do the military security service organs have the right to issue

18 orders to the military police?

19 A. No. Only the commander of the unit that has military police units

20 within its formation have the right to do so. The military security

21 service organs propose to the commander of such a unit how the military

22 police units are to be -- should be used.

23 Q. What are the obligations of the security organs in the units of

24 the Pristina Corps vis-a-vis the commanders of those units?

25 A. The military security service organs are professional organs of

1 the appropriate commands, units, and installations of the Army of

2 Yugoslavia, and they are subordinate to the commanders of those units.

3 But in professional terms, in technical terms, as I've already indicated,

4 they are subordinate to the chief of the security organ in the immediate

5 command that is immediately superior to the one where they are.

6 Q. What measures may a military security organ propose in relation to

7 these persons?

8 A. The organs of the military security service have to report to

9 their -- to their unit commander about any hostile or other illegal

10 activities that have already been carried out or is expected to be carried

11 out either in units and also against the units, facilities, or personnel

12 of those units. On the basis of the assessments and analyses, they

13 propose to the unit commanders measures to be taken so that the hostile

14 activities can be documented and sanctioned and also measures that are to

15 be taken to prevent the expected hostile activities or to reduce the

16 consequences thereof.

17 Q. When you say "measures that are to be taken," what measures are

18 you talking about?

19 A. I am referring specifically to specific measures to be taken in a

20 specific unit. They can be organisational in nature. They may pertain to

21 personnel. They can be disciplinary measures or even a criminal

22 prosecution.

23 Q. General, did you -- and if yes -- as the chief of the security

24 department report about the activities of the security organ? And if so,

25 to whom did you report?

1 A. As the chief of the security department in the Pristina Corps

2 Command, I reported every day on the results of the work of our organs to

3 the corps commander. Also, every day I would send a telegram up the

4 technical chain of command to the security section in the 3rd Army command

5 and to the security administration of the General Staff of the Army of

6 Serbia and Montenegro. But when NATO aggression against the Federal

7 Republic of Yugoslavia started, I reported only to the security section of

8 the 3rd Army about the results of my work. In the later period, those

9 telegrams of mine were accompanied by proper documents, in the proper

10 format as envisaged by the rules.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Were the reports to the 3rd Army command security

12 section and the security administration of the General Staff identical?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

15 Mr. Bakrac.

16 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

17 Q. General, could you please tell us briefly how these telegrams were

18 structured.

19 A. The telegrams that the Pristina Corps Command security department

20 sent during 1998 and 1999 to those addressees contained three parts: The

21 first part pertained to the security situation at the state border; the

22 second part pertained to the security situation in the territory; and the

23 third part pertained to the security situation in the units and commands

24 of the Pristina Corps.

25 Q. You mentioned the situation in the territory as part -- being part

1 of those telegrams. What I want to know is whether the security organs

2 were in fact in charge of the security situation in the territory.

3 A. No. They were in charge -- or rather, the situation in the

4 territory was something that other organs dealt with; primarily the organs

5 of the Ministry of the Interior and the organs of the State Security

6 Service.

7 MR. STAMP: Before we move on to the next question, I'm wondering

8 if I heard wrongly or if there's an error in the transcript. I think at

9 page 60, Line 21 it is recorded here: "When the NATO aggression against

10 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia started, I reported only to the

11 security section of the 3rd Army about the results of my work."

12 I thought you said you reported only to the security section of

13 the General Staff. But maybe I'm in error. Would we -- could we clarify

14 now, I think.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stojanovic, can you clarify that point. You

16 said that the situation was different once the NATO aggression started.

17 You reported only with -- by telegram to only one organ. Who was that?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me clarify. In 1998 --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: No, no, just -- just please answer the question.

20 The position changed when the aggression started in March 1999, and you

21 said in your earlier answer that at that stage you reported only to the

22 security section of ... Now, was it the 3rd Army or the General Staff?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The security section of the

24 3rd Army.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Your answer was accurately recorded,

1 you will be relieved to know.

2 Mr. Bakrac.

3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let us be clear.

4 Q. What is the reason you meant to clarify? What is the reason this

5 changed with the beginning of the aggression?

6 A. Normally, along professional lines, the security section of the

7 Pristina Corps should report about the results of its work to the

8 immediately superior organ; that's the security section of the 3rd Army.

9 However, on orders of the chief of the security administration of the

10 General Staff of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro, in the course of 1998

11 and all the way until the NATO aggression started, I reported the same

12 contents with the same telegram to the security section of the 3rd Army

13 and the security administration of the General Staff. After the NATO

14 aggression started, on orders of the chief of the security administration

15 of the General Staff, I was only duty-bound to report to the security

16 section of the 3rd Army command.

17 Q. General, you explained who was responsible for the state of

18 security in the territory, and that's where my learned friend Mr. Stamp

19 intervened. I would like to know why in your reports to the superiors you

20 reported on the security situation in the territory. We saw you said it

21 was one of the elements in your reports.

22 A. The security situation in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija was

23 part of my reports because in the course of 1998 but also in 1999, in

24 terms of intensity and forms of its manifestation, Kosovo and Metohija

25 witnessed the most brutal form of terrorism, which at all times endangered

1 commands, units, installations, and members of the army of the Federal

2 Republic of Yugoslavia, and they were precisely those who are meant to be

3 protected by the security organs of the military.

4 Q. General, in the course of this trial we have reviewed quite a lot

5 of your telegrams from 1998. I would like to move to that subject briefly

6 and to show you a number of documents. There are many of them, but we

7 will look only at a few of them.

8 It seems that they come from you personally. I would like to know

9 what kind of information the military security service had about the

10 arming of Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija.

11 A. As for the arming of Albanian terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija,

12 the military security service of the Pristina Corps had information that

13 after the dissolution of state institutions in the Republic of Albania,

14 after the break-up of pyramid financing and savings schemes, there

15 occurred a dissolution of all institutions, including the army and the

16 police. Under those circumstances, an enormous arsenal from the depots of

17 the Albanian army came into the possession of numerous gangs, primarily in

18 the north of Albania, and then these weapons, through illegal channels in

19 end 1997 and especially in the first half of 1998, were intensively

20 smuggled into Kosovo and Metohija. The general standards in the area of

21 Albania were such that poverty was rampant and there was a lot of money in

22 the area of Kosovo and Metohija, so these weapons were purchased and

23 sometimes even given as a present to members of terrorist units in Kosovo

24 and Metohija.

25 Q. At that time, in 1996, 1997, 1998, were there any border posts on

1 the Albanian side, do you know?

2 A. No. In end 1996 and throughout 1997 and into 1997 -- 1998, the

3 gangs in the north of Albania looted some of the border posts facing our

4 country, burnt them, and from that time on not a single border post on the

5 border of Albania with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was manned, and

6 regular border service did not function.

7 Q. General, when, according to your information, did there occur a

8 more massive incursion of terrorists from the territory of Albania and

9 their major grouping in the area of Kosovo and Metohija?

10 A. Individual incursions of smaller groups of Albanian terrorists

11 from the territory of Albania to the territory of Kosovo and Metohija

12 began back in March 1998, and it became massive, in groups of up to 100

13 terrorists, or hundreds of terrorists, and their spillover across the

14 state border began later in 1998.

15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 5D1304. That is

16 apparently a report of the security section of the 3rd Army, dated 18

17 April 1998. It seems to have been compiled by Colonel Petar Kuzmanovic.

18 Could you please look at this document and comment on it briefly and tell

19 us whether it was compiled based on your operative information, your

20 intelligence.

21 A. Yes, this was written based on the intelligence in the position of

22 the security organs of the Pristina Corps.

23 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, one of the reasons why

24 we are opening this document is a mistake we have in the translation of

25 the date. In English we see "1996," and in the original it's "1998".

1 JUDGE BONOMY: We can note that and move on, unless there's

2 something else you want to deal with in the document.

3 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Yes. General, could you give us a brief comment on these -- on

5 this document from April 1998. Is this the intelligence you had at your

6 disposal?

7 A. Yes. This document pertains to the organisation of illegal

8 smuggling of arms and military equipment from the territory of Albania to

9 Kosovo and Metohija. Such intelligence reports came in every day. This

10 particular document pertains to the intervention and conduct of Albanian

11 citizens on both sides of the border involving illegal smuggling of

12 weapons, naming persons who are involved, but it also covers information

13 that points to the presence of foreign nationals who are illegally coming

14 in and are present within terrorist groups in Kosovo and Metohija,

15 primarily from Islamic countries. That is the kind of intelligence we had

16 throughout 1998 and 1999.

17 Q. General, this problem of massive illegal incursions of terrorists

18 and arms smuggling, how did you deal with it from the viewpoint of your

19 prescribed duties?

20 A. Certainly for the security organs of the Pristina Corps and the

21 overall organs of command of the Pristina Corps this was a very grave

22 security problem, since we knew that through illegal channels persons from

23 Kosovo and Metohija were sent regularly for training to North Albania in

24 order to be returned after training and arming into Kosovo and Metohija.

25 Our security organs facing this problem detached one group of experienced

1 operatives and a group of officers combatting crime from the military

2 police to a forward command post, and their job was to interrogate and

3 process the terrorists who were arrested and to deal with problems on the

4 state border, the forward command post of Djakovica, that is.

5 Q. Was there any criminological and forensic investigation into each

6 border incident?

7 A. Yes. Each incident on our state border with Albania was processed

8 fully, in terms of on-site investigation and compiling the necessary

9 criminological and forensic documentation. That practice continued

10 throughout, including after the arrival of the KVM.

11 Q. When you mentioned the OSCE mission, did you report to them about

12 each border incident? Did they come to inspect the location?

13 A. Yes, the liaison officers in the subordinate units of the command

14 of the Pristina Corps, as well as the liaison team with the mission of the

15 OSCE attached to the command of the Pristina Corps, regularly informed the

16 mission of the OSCE about all border incidents, and almost in every case

17 representatives of the OSCE mission visited the location. In contacts

18 with the competent investigative organs and organs of the command, they

19 regularly emphasised appropriate work of our investigative organs of the

20 state border with Albania.

21 Q. How were the arrested terrorists treated in these border

22 incidents?

23 A. The terrorists whom the security organs on the state border

24 arrested when they attempted to illegally cross the state border one way

25 or another, in one direction or another, were turned over through local

1 competent commissions to the security authorities, but prior to that

2 interviews were conducted with them, and later on, together with all their

3 belongings, their statements and other documents found on them, they were

4 turned over to the competent authorities of the Ministry of the Interior,

5 with a proviso that those terrorists who opened fire while attempting to

6 illegally cross the state border at our border authorities, wounding or

7 killing a member of the Army of Yugoslavia, were turned over to the

8 military prosecutors of the competent military court.

9 Q. General, in addition to these illegal transfers of terrorists and

10 weapons from the territory of Albania, were there any other activities of

11 terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija? And if so, what did you know about

12 that?

13 A. In addition to the smuggling of weapons, military equipment, and

14 illegal border crossings of terrorists from Albania into Kosovo and

15 Metohija, the information we had in the security organ of the Pristina

16 Corps pointed to intensive activity of terrorist groups in the area of

17 Kosovo and Metohija itself. It manifested itself primarily in the

18 evacuation of certain populated areas with a majority Albanian population,

19 so that these settlements can be fortified and prepared for defence.

20 After that, the terrorists would impose a curfew in such places, that is,

21 introduced restrictions on the movement of the population.

22 Q. Perhaps it would be a good idea while you are saying this to look

23 at 3D994. That seems to be one of your reports. I would appreciate your

24 comments.

25 I'll repeat. 3D994.

1 Do you recognise this report?

2 A. If we could just make the lettering larger. Thank you.

3 Q. Is this your report to the security administration of the General

4 Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia to the security section of the

5 3rd Army command and to the security organ of the 14th

6 Counter-Intelligence Group?

7 A. Yes, of the 10th of June, 1998.

8 Q. To move on more quickly, could you concentrate on paragraph 5 from

9 the top.

10 A. The fifth paragraph in the document before us presents our

11 processing of intelligence, indicating the terrorist units are evacuating

12 women, children, and elderly men from villages in the territory of

13 Djakovica municipality, leaving behind armed terrorists who are preparing

14 for armed combat.

15 I want to emphasise that this intelligence also indicates some of

16 the reasons for the migration of population in 1998.

17 Q. Could you now look at the eighth and the ninth paragraph and tell

18 us something about that.

19 A. "Information indicates or intelligence indicates that on the 15th

20 of June, it is expected that a state of war will be proclaimed and the KLA

21 will engage large-scale armed action."

22 I want to emphasise that this refers -- this telegram refers to

23 the 16th of June, 1998, when brutal terrorist actions of the so-called

24 Liberation Army of Kosovo, almost 40 per cent of the territory of Kosovo

25 and Metohija were placed under KLA control, and it is in this light that

1 we should view their intentions in the wake of the proclamation of the

2 state of war. They were probably aware of their strength and the control

3 they achieved.

4 Q. You said actions in anticipation of the state of war

5 proclamation. Tell us, who was supposed to proclaim the state of war?

6 A. The leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

7 Q. What kind of secret police was established in Djakovica, as we see

8 in the next paragraph?

9 A. On a parallel track with the evacuation of certain settlements in

10 the area of Djakovica municipality, where in addition to the Drenica

11 region, intensive terrorism began, smaller units of a secret military

12 police of the KLA were formed, and they would later grow into the military

13 police of the KLA, headed by Fatmir Limaj, known under the pseudonym

14 Celiku. Those armed group, as we see from this telegram, after the forced

15 mobilisation of Albanians was proclaimed, served to intimidate the

16 population and more specifically, the persons who refused to join the

17 armed units of the KLA.

18 Q. Let us now look at another telegram, 3D998. Could you just

19 comment. This is another one of your telegrams. The last two paragraphs.

20 The penultimate paragraph. In the area of Sopot village.

21 A. "As a result of the exchange of information with the SUP of

22 Prizren, we received information that armed terrorists appeared in the

23 area of Sopot village, municipality of Djakovica, and they exerted

24 pressure on local residents to leave the village." That's what I was

25 talking about before.

1 It says also that "Electronic surveillance produced information

2 indicating that on the border between Yugoslavia and Albania from the

3 Albanian side there is organised admission of citizens of Siptar

4 nationality from Kosovo and Metohija who are then directed towards Bajram

5 Curi, where an admission centre is located. There are also training

6 centres for terrorists."

7 What is important here, that the terrorists in the north of

8 Albania performed selection among the incoming citizens from Kosovo and

9 Metohija separating men who can be trained and place other citizens in

10 different locations.

11 Q. General --

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, is the date of that the 18th of June,

13 1998?

14 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, 16th of June, 1998. If we are

15 talking about 3D998.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, it's -- the stamp has the 18th, but that may

17 be a date of receipt. Thank you.

18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] If I may be of assistance, or maybe

19 the -- I can ask the witness to tell you.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can, if I may, Your Honour. This

21 stamp bears the date of the 18th. That is the date when it was received

22 at the security administration of the General Staff of the army and when

23 it was registered there.

24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we can move on. The

25 telegram of this witness, 3D997 pertains to the same subject. There's no

1 need to open it again.

2 I would like to now look at one document, 5D1305, that we haven't

3 seen before in this courtroom.

4 Q. It's your telegram dated 18 July 1998. Just give us a brief

5 comment before we adjourn for the break.

6 A. Yes --

7 MR. STAMP: [Previous translation continues] ... was a translation

8 of this document provided to us? Well, there's one here. I just saw

9 that. There's one.

10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was informed that

11 everything for this witness and the next two of my witnesses has been

12 translated. We followed your suggestions. We showered the CLSS --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: It's there. Please continue.

14 MR. STAMP: May I just indicate I rose because we had not had

15 translation up until yesterday. Perhaps this came into the system early.

16 But I can work with this.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Please look at this and give us a comment on the first, second,

20 and third paragraphs of this telegram. It looks like it is one of yours.

21 Is it?

22 A. Yes, it's my telegram dated 18 July 1998. The first paragraph

23 deals with the attack of the terrorists on the town of Orahovac itself.

24 Let me emphasise again, it's end June, beginning of July, when the

25 terrorist leaders believed that they were so strong that they could attack

1 Orahovac itself. They attacked the health centre, kidnapped several

2 dozen, around 30 Serbs, seized medical supplies from the health centre,

3 and I believe nothing more was ever heard of these people, as far as I

4 know.

5 The next paragraph also describes a border incident on the Kosare

6 border post, where the location was searched and arrested persons were

7 searched and documentation was found showing that in the ranks of the KLA

8 they -- there were also foreign nationals from Saudi Arabia, from Yemen,

9 and six nationals of Saudi Arabia who somehow procured for themselves

10 passports of the Republic of Macedonia. This shows that there were

11 mercenaries fighting for the KLA.

12 Q. General, it seems that in this paragraph -- could you just explain

13 that. Is it -- is my reading correct? It seems that at one point a group

14 of 700 terrorists attempted to cross the border illegally and come into

15 Kosovo and Metohija, resulting in an armed skirmish.

16 A. Yes, this figure is correct. Later on through the following

17 telegrams and after interviews of some terrorists who were arrested, we

18 came to this figure of that group that attempted to come in on that day.

19 This shows the dramatic state of security on the state border with

20 Albania.

21 Q. Just one brief question before we have to adjourn for the break.

22 We can move to page 2. But it seems from your report that the

23 terrorists took control of the town of Orahovac.

24 A. Yes. In this action, they managed to reach the centre of

25 Orahovac, where in one building around 250 policemen were surrounded and

1 they could not get out unless there was an intervention of other security

2 forces.

3 Q. Thank you, General.

4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I believe this is a good time for the

5 break, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: We do have to break at this stage, Mr. Stojanovic.

7 That will be for an hour. Could you leave the courtroom, please, along

8 with the usher and we will see you again at 1.45.

9 [The witness stands down]

10 --- Recess taken at 12.47 p.m.

11 --- On resuming at 1.46 p.m.

12 [The witness takes the stand]

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

14 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. General, let us proceed where we broke off. I would be interested

16 in the following: All of these reports came from your security organ from

17 the 3rd Army. What about the security organs of other strategic groups --

18 or rather, armies of the Army of Yugoslavia had any knowledge about the

19 activity of Albanian terrorists in the territory of their own areas of

20 responsibility respectively? And while you are talking, I would like to

21 call up 3D1000.

22 A. Yes, certainly. Before all knowledge concerning activities,

23 plans, and intentions of the Albanian terrorists in the territory of

24 Kosovo and Metohija, it was first and foremost that the security organs of

25 the 2nd Army district in Podgorica that had this information and

1 knowledge, because the area of responsibility of that army bordered with

2 the state border towards Albania. Therefore, there was a problem of

3 securing that part of the state border, vis-a-vis the Republic of Albania

4 was a problem, and it was within the remit of the Podgorica Corps.

5 Q. When you say "the Podgorica Corps," what republic is that?

6 A. The Republic of Montenegro.

7 Q. Please, now we have in front of us 3D1000. Could you have a look

8 and could you give us your comments on the second and third paragraphs.

9 And could you tell us whether you received this kind of information from

10 the command of the 2nd Army -- or rather, their security organ.

11 A. Yes. I did receive this information. And in the second paragraph

12 of the document that is in front of us, there is a reference to two

13 arrested citizens of the Republic of Albania, and you can see that they

14 are 18 and even 14 years old.

15 In this case, they were reconnoitering of the state border belt in

16 order to prepare the terrain for the entry of a larger group of

17 terrorists, and that, as I said, is the area of responsibility of the

18 Podgorica Corps.

19 This shows that Albanian terrorists even used 14-year-old children

20 to attain their own objectives and such risky efforts like crossing the

21 state border illegally.

22 Also, in the third paragraph of the document that is in front of

23 us, there is a reference to what I testified about a few moments ago, and

24 that is the taking in of Albanian refugees in the territory of the

25 Republic of Albania. Also, a selection of these refugees, and the sending

1 of military-age citizens, able-bodied, to centres that had already been

2 established in the north of Albania, where terrorists from Kosovo and

3 Metohija had already been trained.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Can we see the end of this document, please.

5 How was this information relayed to you, Mr. Stojanovic?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This information was cc'd to me from

7 the security department of the 3rd Army, and it probably came from the

8 security administration of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

10 Mr. Bakrac.

11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Q. General, do you know that at that time, in 1998, the villagers

13 from Albanian villages -- certain Albanian villages in Kosovo and Metohija

14 turned to the Army of Yugoslavia for protection against the growing number

15 of terrorists?

16 A. Yes, there are many such examples, especially in the spring of

17 1998, when there was a great deal of activity on the part of Albanian

18 terrorists in many localities in Kosovo and Metohija. The representatives

19 of the Army of Yugoslavia, in this case specifically the units of the

20 Pristina Corps, were addressed by the local population of some villages.

21 Q. Can you give us some examples?

22 A. Yes, certainly. The citizens of the villages of Brovina,

23 Batusa, Korenica turned to the Army of Yugoslavia. All of these villages

24 are in the territory of the municipality of Djakovica and all of them are

25 in the border belt in the area facing Albania. But such requests also

1 came from villagers in the Dragas municipality. I can say, with your

2 permission -- I can, rather, give another example, say the villagers from

3 Batusa, which is in the border belt facing Albania, and that is where the

4 only road leading to our border post of Karaula facing the border of

5 Albania, that's the only road. So the local villagers asked the army to

6 protect them from activities -- or rather, from the terror of the KLA.

7 I personally interviewed eminent and influential members of that

8 village community, and then, together with the commander of the

9 Pristina Corps, General Pavkovic, and the Chief of Staff of the

10 Pristina Corps, General Lazarevic, I attended a meeting between the

11 villagers and the representatives of the army in which an agreement was

12 reached to the effect that the army would ensure the security of the

13 villagers of those villages and, in turn, the villagers asked the army to

14 protect them from mistreatment at the hands of Albanian terrorists from

15 the village of Junik, which was a neighbouring village and which was near

16 the village of Batusa.

17 During the night they would break into the village and pressure

18 the villagers to receive weapons, and they would search their premises and

19 ask them for money to buy weapons.

20 Q. On that occasion, was some aid given to this village? And could

21 you tell us what happened after that contact with you and those

22 activities.

23 A. Yes. Agreement was reached. These are very honourable, loyal

24 people, a very honourable, loyal community, Albanian community. Then the

25 corps commander ordered -- well, this was on other occasions too, but now

1 that I'm talking about this village, I remember that his order was to help

2 this village in terms of basic food supplies and medical assistance, and

3 that was certainly done. However, a few days after this agreement was

4 reached, one of the representatives of the mentioned village, and the most

5 influential person from that village, Zenal Batusa, who took part in the

6 negotiations with the representatives of the military, when he set out for

7 the town Djakovica, he was kidnapped in a deceitful way by a terrorist

8 from the terrorist stronghold of Junik, and we did not know what his fate

9 was after that.

10 On the following day, the villagers of that village, out of fear,

11 started moving out in an organised way to the town of Djakovica itself.

12 The representatives of the military, including myself, asked them and gave

13 them guarantees yet again that they would provide for their security.

14 However, they feared further reactions of the terrorists from the village

15 of Junik and then they moved out in a collective manner to the very centre

16 of the town of Djakovica. This is yet another example of the reasons for

17 the relocation of the Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija during

18 1998.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, are there documents about this?

20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. But there is a

21 videoclip which, by mistake, was omitted from our list. With your

22 leave -- I'm not going to finish today for sure, but with your permission,

23 could we deal with that video clip tomorrow morning? There are other

24 documents, and this video clip has to do with that particular meeting that

25 we discussed, and there are other issues that I wish to raise with this

1 witness in this regard.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

3 MR. STAMP: I'm sorry, if we're going to deal with the video clip,

4 is that what I see here? And since it's raised now, can we be notified as

5 to what it's about and given a copy or something?

6 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sure that's going to happen, Mr. Stamp, and the

7 issue will not arise until tomorrow, so let's proceed at the moment.

8 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this afternoon we are

9 going to send this to Mr. Stamp so that he can be ready. I'm just asking

10 you for permission, because it's not on our list. To err is human, as

11 they say. It just so happened that this video clip is not included on our

12 list. So with your permission, yes --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the -- the permission will depend upon the

14 impact that the late notification might have on the Prosecution, so we'll

15 hear about that tomorrow. The main thing for you is to disclose it, its

16 identity, as quickly as possible so that they can check their position.

17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

18 While we are waiting for the fate of this video clip, let us look

19 at --

20 JUDGE BONOMY: We're not waiting on its fate. You can deal with

21 that behind the scenes. Just let's proceed, and tomorrow morning

22 Mr. Stamp will tell us whether he objects to you using it or not. If --

23 if it takes you until then to reach it.

24 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] That's what I meant. I was

25 misunderstood. But let's not waste any time.

1 3D996.

2 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Sorry to interrupt. I think you didn't use the

3 proverb correctly, fully. And that would have impressed Mr. Stamp. "To

4 forgive is divine" was the other part of it, and that would convince him

5 more.

6 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, I accept that, Your Honour. I

7 take all the blame. Yes.

8 3D996.

9 Q. General, while we are waiting for this exhibit to appear in

10 e-court, I think that it is a telegram of yours, in actual fact, very

11 often in this courtroom we heard of the village of Korenica. Could you

12 please take a look at this document now, and I would like you to pay

13 particular attention to the third paragraph.

14 Is this your telegram?

15 A. Yes, by all means. May I continue?

16 Q. Go ahead. Give us your comments.

17 A. You asked me about the third paragraph. It says in it that:

18 "On the basis of intelligence received, the people of Korenica

19 village in the municipality of Djakovica are prepared to ask the Army of

20 Yugoslavia for protection. During the course of the day, the security

21 organs of the Pristina Corps established contact with influential persons

22 from the mentioned village. They were informed of our request that they

23 not receive weapons and they were given security guarantees by our units.

24 The villagers asked for time for consultation, so the next contact or a

25 meeting was scheduled for the 16th of June this year."

1 Q. Tell us, what happened after that? This is quite clear, what is

2 written here and what you read out us to. What happened then?

3 A. In this specific case, like in many other cases, when the leaders

4 of terrorist groups of the KLA in Kosovo and Metohija would receive

5 information about any kind of talks between the inhabitants of local

6 Albanian villages and when they were saying that they were not prepared to

7 take weapons, they would exercise influence over these villagers and even

8 threaten them openly to give up on that altogether.

9 In this specific case, during the course of the night, after our

10 talks, from the terrorist stronghold of the village of Nec in the

11 municipality of Djakovica, which functioned within the 137th Brigade of

12 the Kosovo Liberation Army, headquartered in the village of Ramoc, not far

13 away from that village the representatives of that terrorist staff came

14 and threatened the inhabitants of the mentioned village, telling them to

15 stop all further communication with the representatives of the army.

16 Q. General, now I'm going to put a question to you. We heard

17 testimony from a protected witness here, a K witness. Was pressure

18 brought to bear against Muslim members of the army, and are you aware of

19 any such cases?

20 A. Yes.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you -- before you go on to explain that, I

22 didn't realize we were finished with this document.

23 What was the source of your information about the threatening of

24 the inhabitants of the village?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, our operative

1 positions that were throughout the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, and

2 in this specific region, reported to us on this. Later on a local

3 inhabitant of that village, an elderly man, admitted that to me

4 personally.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: In what context?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He admitted that, saying that two or

7 three young men from that village had already been in this staff in the

8 village of Nec and had received arms, weapons, and that they had received

9 a message through those young men not to continue with their negotiations

10 with the army.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: But how did you meet this -- this villager?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I met with this villager legally,

13 the inhabitant of the village of Korenica, because this village is -- it's

14 the first village next to the municipality of Djakovica, close to the

15 bridge at Erenik and the forward command post of the corps, and this

16 village was not affected by any terrorist activities. And later on I

17 ordered my subordinates, security organs to verify this information.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry, there must be some misunderstanding

19 between us. How was it you came to be speaking to this person? Did he

20 come to you? Did you go to him? Did you just happen to come across him

21 in the street? What -- how did that happen?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. Now I understand you,

23 Your Honour. I went to his house in the village of Korenica. It was an

24 eminent villager, and I talked to him in his yard.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

1 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at the beginning we

2 provided this information.

3 Q. But let me ask you: General, your place of birth, how far is it

4 from the village of Korenica?

5 A. I was born in Djakovica, and that's -- that's the first village.

6 If you move from Djakovica in the direction of the state border with

7 Albania, that's the first village. That's, for all intents and purposes,

8 a village that would be part of the town of Djakovica were it not for the

9 River Erenik.

10 Q. If I understand you correctly, you completed your elementary and

11 secondary education there.

12 A. Yes. I completed my elementary and secondary education there, and

13 then I went to attend the military academy from there.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Does that mean you speak Albanian?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in 1998 and 1999 I was

17 able to understand Albanian quite well, and I was able to use it. But in

18 the intervening years I have not used it, and my knowledge of Albanian has

19 deteriorated.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

21 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. General, we touched upon the topic -- the question was whether

23 there was any pressure on the soldiers of Muslim ethnicity, whether you

24 have any such information. And let us ask for 5D1303. Your telegram is

25 important to us because of the testimony of a protected witness.

1 Could you please comment on the last paragraph on the first page

2 of this document, please.

3 A. Units of the Pristina Corps in 1998 and 1999 and indeed in the

4 year -- in the earlier years, were staffed from other garrisons and other

5 training centres, so that in 1998 it received a regular recruitment

6 contingent that -- soldiers that had come from other training centres.

7 This last paragraph pertains to the results of electronic reconnaissance

8 measures where conversations with five soldiers of Muslim ethnicity were

9 intercepted, and a few days before that, as soon as they were transferred

10 from the Valjevo garrison to the 549th Brigade, they deserted. And then

11 measures of electronic reconnaissance were used to record the

12 conversations of these five soldiers. After their desertion, they were in

13 the terrorist staff in the village municipality of Drenovac in the

14 municipality of Orahovac.

15 The parents of those soldiers advised them in order to obtain

16 asylum that they should talk to the authorities there. By that, they

17 meant the authorities in Albania; that they should tell the authorities

18 that the military forced them to kill civilians and children, small

19 children, which was definitely part of the overwhelming propaganda effort.

20 Q. Thank you, sir. Let us now wrap up with this period and all those

21 terrorist activities.

22 Could we please look at 5D1307. It is your telegram dated the

23 24th of July, 1998, and it appears to be somewhat longer than the others.

24 Could you please tell us very briefly -- could you please look at

25 the first page and then tell us briefly, what is this telegram about? And

1 then just comment on it very briefly.

2 A. Yes. This telegram that was written in late July 1998 is an

3 overview of the overall security situation in Kosovo and Metohija. And

4 let me just give you some of the information contained therein. This

5 overview specifies that in March -- in the period between March and June

6 the members of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army grew in number to

7 25.000 of armed terrorists. The telegram also specifies the location of

8 the greatest terrorist strongholds, places where there's the biggest

9 concentration of terrorist forces. And it is also stated that they hold

10 approximately 50 per cent of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

11 And I would like to say that this is the period in which the

12 terrorist units managed to cut off virtually every road leading from

13 Kosovo to Metohija. The only road that could still be used to supply the

14 MUP and military units in the garrisons in Kosovo and Metohija with food

15 and other necessities was the one leading from Strpce and Prizren to the

16 territory of Metohija.

17 In addition to that, in this telegram that I drafted I presented

18 an assessment of the plans, intentions, and activities of the terrorists

19 in the forthcoming period.

20 Q. General, let us look briefly at page 2, the last-but-one paragraph

21 in Serbian.

22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is the fourth

23 paragraph from the bottom in English. It begins with the words, "We have

24 reliable information ..." And it appears that in this telegram the

25 situation regarding Djakovica is also presented.

1 Q. So could you please just comment briefly whether this is what you

2 talk about in this report too.

3 A. Yes. This paragraph pertains to the information that was

4 available to us, and that was confirmed several times, that there are

5 about 63 armed terrorists in the village of Ramoc. This number of 63 grew

6 to about 100 terrorists. That was in the end the, 137th KLA Brigade,

7 commanded by Mr. Naim Maloku. They held this entire area under their

8 control -- or rather, this is the area of the villages in Djakovica -- in

9 the hinterland of Djakovica, right next to the Albanian border. This is

10 the belt that is called Caragoj or Reka e Keqe or Llug i Crnagorat. So

11 these are all names for one and the same area that contains the villages

12 of --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to list the

14 names a bit more slowly.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stojanovic, could you go through the names of

16 villages again, please. And when you're dealing with that sort of detail,

17 try to speak a little more slowly to assist the interpreters. But if you

18 could give us the villages where you say "this is the belt that is

19 called," and then you named a number of places. And then you went on to

20 talk about it -- the area containing the villages of, and then there was a

21 list of villages.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is a valley behind

23 Cabrat, this is the high ground. It's between Djakovica and the border

24 belt with Albania, and it includes the following villages: Meja, Racaj,

25 Pacaj, Dolosaj, Ramoc, Nivokaz, and further on it goes to the village of

1 Junik. That is the largest village in Metohija.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

3 Mr. Bakrac.

4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. And just for the record, General, what is the name of this valley?

6 You said that it has three names.

7 A. Yes, surely I will say. The Albanians call this valley Caragoj

8 and they also called it Reka e Keqe, that would mean bad river, Losa Reka

9 in Serbian, because after the war it was mostly inhabited by Montenegrins

10 and it was also called Llug i Crnagorat, the Montenegrin valley, if you

11 want a translation of that name.

12 General, on page 2 you seem to be talking about the village of

13 Korenica again, and you have information that the people there received

14 weapons.

15 A. Just -- I just need some more time to look for it.

16 Q. It's the same paragraph. It's at the end of it.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. "The village of Junik is making efforts to arm the village of

19 Korenica and Babaj Boks, although the villagers are trying not to do so,

20 although some of the younger villagers have taken up arms and they're in

21 the village." Is that so?

22 A. Yes, that is so.

23 Q. General, let us now leave this period behind. Tell us, please,

24 you made an overview of the situation and what happened then? What was

25 the response to this security situation in Kosovo and Metohija?

1 A. The overall situation in mid-July 1998 was extremely complex and

2 difficult. This assessment of mine, which I believe was made at the

3 request of the security administration of the General Staff of the Army of

4 Serbia and Montenegro, was meant to give an overview of the situation, and

5 soon after that -- I don't know whether this report of mine or whether the

6 information from other sources and security organs present in Kosovo and

7 Metohija played a role in that, but as a result, a comprehensive plan was

8 made to fight terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija.

9 Q. Until when did the counter-terrorist activity last, the efforts to

10 suppress terrorist hot spots in Kosovo and Metohija?

11 A. The counter-terrorist activities against the terrorists in Kosovo

12 and Metohija, as far as I know, lasted between late July 1998 and the end

13 of September 1998.

14 Q. After the agreement that established the OSCE mission, the

15 Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement and the establishment of the OSCE mission in

16 Kosovo, did the terrorist activities continue?

17 A. No, definitely not. As far as I know, on the 13th of October,

18 1998 the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement was signed, and after that there

19 was an agreement between the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of

20 Yugoslavia and the representatives of the OSCE mission. This was an

21 agreement on the deployment of the Kosovo Verification Mission in Kosovo

22 and Metohija. After that, there was an agreement signed between the NATO

23 commander and the chief of the General Staff on the air verification

24 mission. So by -- once these agreements were signed, all the activities

25 on fighting the terrorist hot spots in Kosovo and Metohija stopped.

1 Q. Yes, General, but did terrorist activities, activities of the KLA

2 cease once this mission was in place?

3 A. No. I personally believe as I sit here from this vantage point

4 that a mistake was made if the objective was to normalise the situation

5 and to create the best possible security conditions for the life of the

6 population in Kosovo and Metohija.

7 After the OSCE mission was established and after its mandate in

8 Kosovo and Metohija, the terrorist staffs in Kosovo and Metohija did not

9 stop carrying out their terrorist pinpoint actions. They did not stop

10 sending their members to the Republic of Albania illegally to be trained

11 and armed, but the worst thing from the point of view of the security in

12 Kosovo and Metohija is that, as you know, after the signing of this

13 agreement, part of the units that were part of other strategic units of

14 the army that had been re-subordinated to the Pristina Corps left the

15 territory of Kosovo and Metohija. Some of the MUP units, as far as I

16 know, went back to their original locations, leaving behind only some

17 check-points. And what I know for sure is that some combat groups were

18 withdrawn to the barracks. Only a small number of combat groups remained

19 in the border area facing the Republic of Albania, and I think two or

20 three combat groups that were deployed on the roads leading from Kosovo to

21 Metohija on the most critical points.

22 The terrorist staffs exploited this situation to re-take some

23 locations and to put a more compact territory under their control.

24 Q. Did you acquaint with the OSCE mission with such activities of the

25 terrorists? Did you inform them of the incidents and violations of the

1 agreement?

2 A. Yes. I know that at the level of the corps command there was a

3 team for cooperating with the OSCE mission in the province, and it was

4 headed by Colonel Kotur, and one of my duties was to inform the chief of

5 the team, the liaison team, Colonel Kotur, as well as all the other

6 bodies, about the plans and activities of Albanian terrorists for the

7 execution of various actions, terrorist actions, and I believe that he

8 informed the OSCE mission accordingly.

9 Q. Can we now look at 5D1308. And, again, it looks like it's your

10 telegram. But interestingly, it's the 15th of December, 1998, when the

11 OSCE mission has been there for a while.

12 Could you please comment on paras 6 and 4 of this telegram. First

13 of all look at page 1. In item 1, it seems that you invited the OSCE

14 mission to inspect a site of a violation of the state border. And then we

15 will move on to paras 4 and 6.

16 A. The first page pertains to the intelligence that we had about the

17 existence of centres, and it says: "Training continues in North Albania,

18 as well as arming." This first page deals in greater detail with the

19 contents of that training in North Albania and the various locations, the

20 duration of the training, and the organisation, the contents of that

21 training.

22 Q. Look at page 2, please. Forget what I said about paras 4 and 6.

23 It was for another document. Look at paragraphs 3 and 4. It seems that a

24 large group of terrorists tried to break through the state border.

25 A. I don't have the second page.

1 Q. It begins with: "On 13 December ..."

2 A. I don't see the passage on the screen.

3 Q. The document should be 3D1029 -- no, no, it's the wrong document.

4 3D1029. I misspoke earlier. 3D1029. Page 2, please. The second page in

5 B/C/S too. "On 13 December," that's the beginning of the paragraph.

6 A. "On 13 December 1998, around 8.00, a group of about 150

7 terrorists, led by Gjem Gashi" - he is well known - "departed and arrived

8 at the entrance to the village of Ljubizda Has in early morning hours of

9 14th of December, 1998 where they were detected by organs protecting the

10 state border."

11 And then it goes on to explain that they were waiting trucks to be

12 transferred to local KLA staffs in the territory. That is consistent with

13 our intelligence that compact groups were formed, sent to Albania. Once

14 armed and trained, they were sent back and placed by terrorists into the

15 various areas of responsibility.

16 Q. Thank you. Can we now look at 5D1308, para 4 and para 6. Comment

17 briefly and then we'll move on. It looks like another one of your

18 telegrams to the security organs of the corps command, dated 16 December

19 1998.

20 A. Yes. These are the results of interviews with some terrorists who

21 were captured while trying to illegally cross the state border. They

22 confirm how large the group was and they confirm what I said earlier, who

23 was leading which group, that they were divided into various groups,

24 Urosevac, Glodjani, et cetera, groups, which confirms that the terrorists

25 sent their members to Albania to be trained and armed in a very planned

1 way.

2 Q. General, in the end of 1998 did you have intelligence that

3 terrorists are preparing broad offensive actions in Kosovo and Metohija?

4 A. Yes, we had quite a bit of that intelligence. They called it

5 preparations for their spring offensive.

6 Q. Did you have any information - let us look at para 6 in this

7 document - that even in foreign states new members were being recruited

8 into the KLA and being sent to Kosovo, although the OSCE mission was

9 already based there?

10 We need para 6 of this document.

11 And if you did have this intelligence, how did you obtain it?

12 A. Can I see para 6 in B/C/S.

13 Q. We have it in English, but we need to move one page forward in

14 B/C/S. Next page, please. This is -- this just looks like "6". It's 5,

15 in fact.

16 A. Yes. Para 6: Throughout 1998 and especially the second half of

17 1998, we had intelligence. We knew that in addition to young men that

18 were sent by terrorist staffs in Kosovo and Metohija to Albania to be

19 trained, we knew that those training camps were also receiving young --

20 young men of Albanian ethnicity who were temporarily employed in other

21 countries, who arrived from Germany via Turkey, and other countries.

22 I would like to emphasise here that Albanians temporarily employed

23 in Germany receive recruitment call-ups from the Kosovo Liberation Army by

24 post, and their call-up notices bear the inscription: "Your homeland is

25 calling on you."

1 These call-ups also contain language that if they don't come, the

2 Kosovo Liberation Army would come to get them.

3 Let me just say that through this foundation, "Homeland is calling

4 upon you," throughout 1998 and in the relevant period in 1999 taxes were

5 collected from all ethnicity Albanians temporarily employed in European

6 Union countries to the tune of 3 per cent of their salaries. All these

7 moneys flowed into the fund of the Homeland is Calling foundation, were

8 channeled to Dardanija Bank, and used to finance the purchase of weapons.

9 Q. General, did you have your own sources in the ranks of KLA? Did

10 you receive information from them?

11 A. The military security service had a confidential and very broad

12 network even in the highest echelons of the terrorist organisation in

13 Kosovo and Metohija and in the terrorist staffs.

14 Q. No. No, strike that. After the arrival of the OSCE mission, were

15 units of the Pristina Corps able to conduct their normal training?

16 A. After the OSCE mission settled in Kosovo and Metohija, Pristina

17 Corps units were able to conduct normal training but they had undertaken

18 to notify all activities, including training, to the OSCE mission via the

19 liaison team.

20 Q. General, before we leave this topic - and it's an important topic,

21 because we have heard evidence here and exhibits, such as - let us look at

22 3D1033. I believe it's one of your reports in the form of telegram to the

23 security administration of the General Staff and the security section of

24 the 3rd Army.

25 Look at para 3, on the last page, please, and give us a few

1 comments. Maybe it doesn't mean much to you, but we have heard a lot of

2 related evidence in this trial.

3 A. Para 3.1 says that Combat Group 1 of the 15th Armoured Brigade, on

4 the morning of 19 December, 1998, deployed in the area of Batlavsko Lake

5 for regular company exercises. While doing so, they were observed and

6 filmed by the OSCE mission members. The usual practice was for OSCE

7 mission members to escort convoys of the Army of Yugoslavia to their point

8 of destination, but it says here that filming was not allowed for the

9 simple reason that it was not possible to film this very narrow area of

10 Batlava Lake, when the exercises were going on.

11 Q. If I understood well, it was always a training ground of the army.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Did you inform the security administration of the

14 General Staff this telegram reached them?

15 A. Yes, of course. I said that every day in the course of 1998,

16 until March 1999, I sent daily telegrams to the security section of the

17 3rd Army and the security administration of the General Staff of VJ.

18 Q. Did any members of the OSCE mission give you any information? And

19 while you give us an answer, let us look at 5D1309, paras 2.6.

20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there's a reference to

21 a diplomat here. He's named. And this diplomat provided some

22 information. Maybe we should go into private session? Or can we just

23 show it this way openly?

24 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll show it without exposing it to the public.

25 And there's no need for you to refer to the name.

1 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. General, please don't read the name aloud. Just give us your

3 comments. What kind of information did you receive from one of the

4 diplomats?

5 It's 5D1309, penultimate paragraph, 2.6?

6 A. As part of our regular exchange with the state security sector for

7 Kosovo and Metohija --

8 Q. I'm sorry I interrupt you. It's page 2 in English. The Trial

9 Chamber needs to follow as well.

10 A. The military security service also had a regular exchange with the

11 State Security Service, and this paragraph contains intelligence available

12 to the State Security Service about the contacts that one member of the

13 verification mission had -- sorry, it's, rather, a comment that many

14 reports of the OSCE mission about the security situation in Kosovo and

15 Metohija are objective, but two out of three top men in the KVM select

16 among this information and channel it further on towards -- that is,

17 depending on the national interests of their respective countries.

18 Q. General, at that time, in December, in addition to this

19 information about continued activity on the part of the terrorists, in

20 terms of training and arming, already then, in December, in addition to

21 the presence of the OSCE mission, did you have intelligence to the effect

22 the Albanians were leaving the territory of Kosovo?

23 A. Yes, certainly. There was quite a bit of knowledge to that

24 effect.

25 First of all, the leaders of the terrorist units of the KLA were

1 sending their -- their families away throughout 1998 -- or rather, in the

2 second half of 1998. They primarily moved them to the territory of the

3 Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Albania.

4 Also, we learned through electronic surveillance --

5 Q. Sorry for interrupting, but while you are talking, let's have a

6 look at 3D1034. It is yet another one of your telegrams, dated the 22nd

7 of December, I think. And could you give us your comments on point 2.2

8 and 3.

9 A. Yes. That is precisely what I started talking about. 2.2 has to

10 do with the results of measures of electronic surveillance whereby

11 information was received indicating increased belligerence among KLA

12 members and a desire for revenge because of the recent deaths of some of

13 their members during an all-out action to stop the entry of terrorists in

14 the area of the Liken border post when 36 terrorists were liquidated.

15 In all of these localities that were under the control of the

16 terrorists, there was a curfew from 10.00 p.m. until 6.00 a.m., and then

17 the Siptars, rather than do anything else, moved their families through

18 illegal channels and sent them abroad.

19 The information that we received from telephone communications

20 indicated that Albanians from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija were

21 talking to their relatives, who were temporarily employed in European

22 Union countries, and they were telling them to temporarily move from

23 Kosovo, because in 1998 and 1999 that was the most undesirable of places

24 in which one could live.

25 Q. Could we briefly look at 3.3 on the next page, because these

1 villages are included in the indictment. So could you briefly tell us

2 about your knowledge regarding 3.3.

3 A. Yes. This has to do with the same incident. Our intelligence

4 indicated that there were some wounded terrorists in the area of the Liken

5 border post, which I talked about a few moments ago; that they were

6 receiving medical treatment in villages like Celina in the Orahovac

7 municipality.

8 Also, this shows that the terrorists were planning yet again to

9 attack some of our combat groups. Specifically here, Combat Group 3 of

10 the 559th in the area of the village of Damjane.

11 Q. And where was there a terrorist staff exactly? In what village?

12 Is it correct that the terrorist staff was in the village of Velika Krusa?

13 A. We had intelligence about strong terrorist -- strongholds in the

14 villages of Velika Krusa, Bela Crkva, Kusljin, Drenovac. All of these are

15 villages between Prizren and Djakovica. But the terrorist staffs were

16 farther away from the roads, because the village of Velika Krusa is on the

17 road between Prizren and Djakovica. The terrorists avoided placing their

18 terrorist staffs and headquarters close to important roads. They

19 preferred inaccessible terrains, but they did send some of their groups

20 out into roads, organising ambushes, and our forces sustained casualties

21 on a daily basis due to these ambushes.

22 Q. General, I'm going to show you a document now of the 3rd Army

23 dated the 5th of March of the security department from the 5th of March,

24 and could you please give us your comments on 2.2. Are you aware of what

25 happened, and was that based on your intelligence? It is the 5th of

1 March, 1999. 3D1050.

2 A. Could you please repeat the paragraph that you'd like me to

3 discuss.

4 Q. 2.2.

5 A. Yes. Yes. This paragraph in this document states that "The Main

6 Staff of the KLA for the Drenica sector, under the command of

7 Sami Ljustaku, issued an order to evacuate the local civilian

8 population" -- and I wish to note that in that area, the population is

9 exclusively Albanian. So this civilian population is supposed to -- or

10 rather, civilians from the villages at the foot of Mount Cicavica from the

11 village of Drvare onwards to Vucitrn and station them in the depth of the

12 territory of the Drenica sector. This also indicates forceful relocation

13 of the population from their homes.

14 Q. General, we have two more documents. We'll have a look at them,

15 and then we're not going to be dealing with documents any longer.

16 I would be interested in the following: Your security service of

17 the Pristina Corps, did it have any information indicating that the OSCE

18 mission in Kosovo and Metohija went beyond the mandate entrusted to them?

19 A. Yes, certainly. Not the mission on the whole, but individual

20 representatives of the OSCE mission. There is a great deal of information

21 to that effect. Time permitting, I can give you a few examples.

22 Q. Just a few.

23 A. The organs of the military security service arrested, documented,

24 cut off, and then brought criminal charges in view of the intelligence

25 activity of Kastrati, Bekim who was a lieutenant -- or rather, a member of

1 the Army of Yugoslavia previously.

2 During these proceedings, he confessed that when the mission of

3 the OSCE arrived in Kosovo and Metohija from two members of the OSCE

4 mission who were US citizens he was recruited by them and he was in this

5 way recruited by the intelligence services of the United States of

6 America. He also confessed that these same members of the OSCE mission

7 recruited three other fellow citizens of his, and it was their task to

8 observe the locations, positions, strength and activities of the army and

9 MUP forces in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija and to inform the two

10 mentioned OSCE mission members via telephone using numbers that they had

11 left them.

12 When the OSCE mission withdrew from Kosovo and Metohija,

13 Bekim Kastrati was equipped with a satellite telephone by these two OSCE

14 mission members in order to continue communicating with the OSCE mission,

15 which withdrew into the Republic of Macedonia, and -- as is well known,

16 and in the beginning of the war he provided information to these two

17 members of the mission about the activities, positions, strength, and

18 composition of MUP and army units in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

19 Mr. Kastrati was --

20 Q. That will do, General.

21 A. May I just say a few more things?

22 Q. I would like to ask you to look at this one example that we have

23 in written form too. And could you give us your comments on that.

24 5D1311. Our time is limited.

25 Since this is a multiple-page document. This is the command of

1 the 3rd Army, the security department. I think that they sent this to the

2 Supreme Command Staff. And on page 1, there is a letter stating that two

3 statements of the KLA -- of members of the KLA are attached to this

4 document.

5 And on the next page, we see a statement of Aslan Sopi. That is

6 page 6, in e-court; in B/C/S, in page 4.

7 So could you please give us your comments with regard to the end

8 of the second paragraph.

9 So it's page 6 in e-court -- I meant English. And in B/C/S, it is

10 page 4. Yes. I see.

11 A. Could it please be zoomed in a bit.

12 Q. Yes, the second paragraph.

13 "In addition to these forms of assistance ..." It's a long

14 paragraph. Can you see where it says "in addition to these types of

15 assistance"? Have you found it?

16 A. Yes, I remember. "In addition to these forms of assistance" --

17 well, Mr. Aslan Sopi, who was arrested, states here in his statement that

18 the terrorist staffs are receiving assistance through various humanitarian

19 organisations. However, I believe it is particularly important to point

20 out that he says that the territory -- that the terrorist staff in the

21 Llab region that was commanded by a commander whose nickname was Remi was

22 regularly visited by terrorists, and then he describes how old they were

23 and what they looked like. Every day they came in, as he says here, even

24 twice a day. And they gave them information about them bringing maps,

25 military maps, that included the disposition of units of the VJ and the

1 MUP in the territory of all of Kosovo and Metohija.

2 So these three members of the OSCE provided coded maps to the KLA

3 terrorists where the positions of the MUP and army units in Kosovo were

4 marked.

5 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, 101, line 22, it says "was regularly

6 visited by terrorists," where in fact the witness said by the -- the three

7 members of the OSCE mission. Thank you.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

9 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in order to move on

10 faster, 5D1310 is within the same context, but we are going to move on.

11 Q. General, you have just spoken about these maps, that you had

12 information from the terrorists about these maps.

13 Could we have a look at 5D1312 now. This seems to be information

14 from the Supreme Command Staff, and enclosed are some maps where the

15 positions of the army are marked. And it seems of civilians and the KLA.

16 Could you give us your comments and tell you whether you know

17 about this -- tell us whether you know about this. So this first page is

18 information from the Supreme Command Staff.

19 A. No. May I correct you? It is from the intelligence

20 administration of the Supreme Command Staff.

21 Q. Is this information that they received from you?

22 A. This is information that they received through their own

23 activities.

24 Q. Could you now please take a look -- or rather, this refers to

25 precisely marked positions and coordinates of the units of the Army of

1 Yugoslavia and the MUP. And could we please have a look at the last page.

2 Can you give us your comments and tell us whether this is a coded

3 map and what is marked there.

4 A. On my screen, the map is not positioned properly. Now it's all

5 right.

6 This is a coded map that the terrorist staffs from the territory

7 of Kosovo and Metohija submitted to the representatives of the NATO

8 representatives in Macedonia, and in it the positions of civilians and KLA

9 members are marked, and I assume that these arrows -- rather, it includes

10 the positions of the army as well, and the arrows indicate the planned

11 activity of the army.

12 The aim of this report is to inform NATO where civilians are so

13 that they would not bomb civilians. And here you see the KLA as well,

14 which is to say the KLA positions are marked there too. So in fact, this

15 was a handover of information on the location of military units and also

16 the location of civilians and of the KLA. So that is useful for later

17 planning of bombing specific targets in the territory of Kosovo and

18 Metohija.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: How did this come into the hands of the

20 intelligence administration of the Supreme Command Staff?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the intelligence

22 administration has a series of measures -- or rather, a methodology of

23 work which is rather similar to the work of the military security service.

24 However, the volume of work is different. Through their operative

25 positions in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, they got ahold of such

1 maps and they informed the Supreme Command Staff about that.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: That -- that really doesn't help. Was someone

3 arrested? Was there a -- a mole who handed it over? How -- how did it

4 come into the hands of the intelligence service?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, one of the methods of

6 work - and I think that this document says so, as well; I'll try to find

7 the passage - well, they received this through their contacts and their

8 positions in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, the intelligence

9 administration did.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: So -- so one side are trying to pass information to

11 NATO, and someone else is undermining the efforts to pass information to

12 NATO; is that what you're saying?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, precisely. Your Honour,

14 there were many loyal Albanians in the area of Kosovo and Metohija who

15 were not extremists and who were not terrorists.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac.

17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. General, let us go back to other activities of your agency. After

19 the OSCE mission left Kosovo and Metohija and after the NATO air-strikes

20 began, what kind of security problems did you face then?

21 A. After the OSCE mission left and the air-strikes began -- if you

22 mean the military security service, I can say we faced a multitude of

23 problems. The greatest problems were primarily security problems and very

24 difficult conditions of work under day and night bombing. And a

25 particular security problem was the beginning of massive migration of

1 population out of Kosovo and Metohija.

2 Q. You said the problem of migration of the Albanian population, but

3 we don't have it in the transcript. Never mind.

4 You say "problem."

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Why was it a problem? Why was it a problem to you?

7 A. Well, it was a multifaceted problem when the Army of Yugoslavia

8 did not believe it was natural and desirable. We were rather surprised by

9 the fact that a certain number of Albanians are beginning to move out in

10 an organised way. We, in the command of the Pristina Corps, were very

11 much concerned over that.

12 Q. Did you have any information about the reasons ethnic Albanians

13 were leaving Kosovo and Metohija, and did you know whether Serbs were

14 leaving as well?

15 A. Yes, of course. I said a moment ago that the territory of Kosovo

16 and Metohija was the last place on earth where normal life could go on, so

17 people were going away, fearing for their own safety. That's one reason.

18 And the second reason is that a lot of misinformation was being spread by

19 a certain number of ethnic Albanians, dissemination of leaflets by night

20 into people's mailboxes, and these leaflets said that the right moment is

21 being awaited for armed struggle and that Podujevo is especially in danger

22 because it's on the border with Serbia; that Chetniks would come from

23 Serbia and slit all of their throats. So fearing for their own security

24 and because of that misinformation and various rumours, people started to

25 move out.

1 Q. As a soldier who graduated from the highest military schools, can

2 you give us your assessment. Was it -- was it a good thing for the army

3 that people were leaving, from the viewpoint of war, the air-strikes, the

4 expected -- the anticipated ground invasion? Or ground aggression?

5 A. Anyone with a modicum knowledge of military matters would know and

6 tell you that this massive evacuation of the Albanian population was not a

7 good thing for the Army of Yugoslavia. It weakened the army directly for

8 a very simple reason: We in the corps command knew very well that our

9 forces in Kosovo and Metohija were safe as long as the population was

10 there. If the population moved out, then NATO pilots would have an easy

11 job of bombing. They would no longer have to worry about choosing their

12 targets. So we, in the army, did not want the population to move out. We

13 felt safer as long as people were still living in Kosovo and Metohija.

14 Q. Could you just please slow down for the interpretation.

15 My next question is: As a member of the collegium of the command

16 of the Pristina Corps, did you hear at any time, at collegium meetings or

17 any other meetings in the corps command, of the existence of a plan or any

18 measures or procedures geared at driving out Albanian civilians from the

19 province?

20 A. Not as a member of the collegium of the corps, not as a member of

21 the security organs of the Pristina Corps have I ever encountered a piece

22 of intelligence or any other information that would indicate that somebody

23 was ordering or planning or carrying out this massive expulsion of ethnic

24 Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija.

25 Q. Did you try to use the media to appeal to the ethnic Albanian

1 population not to move out, to warn them, to explain?

2 A. Yes. I'll give you just one example. Albanian news -- Albanian

3 language newspapers Bujko and Koha Ditore in Kosovo and Metohija, for

4 instance, refused to publish such an appeal by the government of Serbia,

5 an appeal to Albanian people not to move out and to stay in their homes.

6 I personally believe that it was part of a preconceived plan and scenario

7 to use this evacuation, this migration as a way to present it all as a

8 major humanitarian catastrophe.

9 Q. Can you explain how the command of the Pristina Corps operated

10 after the beginning of NATO bombing.

11 A. The command of the Pristina Corps - which before the NATO

12 aggression held regular meetings of its collegium on a daily basis; those

13 were regular meetings and extended meetings, that is, those attended by

14 commanders of subordinate units, such as brigades, were held once a week -

15 changed its method of work. Just before the NATO aggression started, the

16 command of the Pristina Corps abandoned its peacetime location and did not

17 return until the day the army withdrew completely from Kosovo. And after

18 moving from that location, they deployed dispersively in various locations

19 around Pristina and changed these locations frequently.

20 As for the meetings of the collegium, they were no longer held in

21 full composition. Instead, the head of the collegium held one-on-one

22 meetings with a narrow circle of members, for safety reasons among other

23 things, because there was bombing day and night, but throughout the

24 command functioned continuously.

25 Q. At those meetings, in addition to the corps command members, were

1 other people present, such as representatives of the local

2 self-government, party personnel, persons, and other politicians?

3 A. No. I claim categorically that no, that was not the case. The

4 meetings of the Pristina Corps command were attended only by the officers

5 from the Pristina Corps or, at times, the 3rd Army commander, or some

6 other officers from the 3rd Army command, depending on the nature of the

7 problems discussed at the collegium meeting.

8 Q. And before NATO air-strikes began?

9 A. This also applies to the period before the NATO air-strikes began.

10 Q. What issues within your remit did you report on to the corps

11 commander at those meetings?

12 A. I, as the chief of the security organ, informed the commander

13 regularly about all the security phenomena in the units and the security

14 phenomena that affected the security of the units, facilities, and

15 commands, the facilities that were protected by the military security

16 service. I also informed the commander about the strength, the location,

17 the plans, the intentions, the arming process, and the activities of the

18 Albanian terrorists. I also informed him about all the intelligence that

19 was interesting from the security point of view from the Pristina Corps

20 units.

21 Q. General, in light of your personal experience and the experience

22 from the reports of the subordinate security organs, did the commanders in

23 practice take into account the assessments of the security organs and the

24 orders of the -- of officers regarding sanctions to be applied against

25 soldiers who committed disciplinary infractions?

1 A. Yes, these were all commanders that were highly responsible and

2 professional.

3 Q. Did the corps command take appropriate measures against those

4 commanders who did not comply with the orders and the commanders in whose

5 units there were omissions that had certain consequences?

6 A. Yes, definitely. This was -- this kind of responsibility was at

7 the very core of the operation of the Pristina Corps. The corps commander

8 regularly, as regards the commanders of those units that did not comply

9 with the orders and did not take into account the observations of the

10 security organs and who would not comply with the orders and that resulted

11 in certain consequences, he would take certain measures, either in terms

12 of personnel policy, disciplinary, or even criminal prosecution.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Bakrac, I think that must in English be as

14 regards the members of those units. Is that -- is that correct?

15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, Your Honour.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, you said "criminal prosecution." Could the corps

19 commander take such measures?

20 A. Yes, the corps commander can institute criminal proceedings.

21 Q. Yes, but through whom?

22 A. Well, through the competent organs of the security service and the

23 military police.

24 Q. Does he have the powers to impose criminal sanctions on anyone?

25 A. No, the corps commander does not have the power to impose criminal

1 sanctions.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 Could you please tell me, now that you're talking about those

4 omissions in certain units and the possibility for the commander to take

5 certain measures, in terms of personnel policy, could you please tell us

6 some -- give us some examples of some measures that were taken by the

7 commander during the war.

8 A. Well, there is a number of such measures. As far as I can

9 remember at this time, for instance, the commander of the 58th Light

10 Infantry Brigade, Colonel Milentijevic, was removed from his post and

11 criminal proceedings were instituted against him. Then the commander of

12 the 175 Infantry Brigade, Colonel Petrovic was also removed from his post.

13 Several battalion commanders. I think about 40 battalion commanders were

14 relieved of their duty, and some of the officers were brought before the

15 military disciplinary court.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: That -- that -- I'm sorry, Mr. Bakrac, but I think

17 my intervention in relation to page 109, line 17 is inaccurate. This is

18 all about action taken against commanders.

19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours. I understood that

20 you asked about the situation in the units, and that's why I said "yes."

21 I didn't understand that you were asking me specifically who this referred

22 to, the commanders.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Commanders and leaders. Komandanti

24 and komandiri, depending on the level of command.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Over what period do you say 40 commanders were

1 relieved of their duty?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 40 battalion commanders were removed

3 from the post, most of them before the beginning of the NATO aggression.

4 I can't recall the exact figure, but that was before the NATO aggression.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, during what period of time?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this is the period between

7 March and June, the 16th of June.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Petrovic.

9 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I just want to note

10 that on page 111, line 13, the witness said, "Most of them after the

11 beginning of the NATO aggression."

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.

13 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] And the transcript reflects a

14 different answer.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: And one of them was prosecuted. Is that the

16 position?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Several of them were prosecuted, had

18 criminal charges brought against them. But I am talking about brigade

19 commanders here. I'm talking about the highest level of command.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: No, I think you're talking about battalion

21 commanders. It's been translated in English as "brigade." Have I got

22 that wrong?

23 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, perhaps it's a bit

24 confusing, because what he said was: "One commander of the 58th light

25 Infantry Brigade, Milentijevic, was sent to a military court to be

1 court-martialled, and the 175th units commander was replaced and then he

2 talks about 40-something other officers. He makes a distinction between

3 two types of commander, as in komandir and komandant. In English, there

4 is no such distinction.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: And are you intending to explore what the criminal

6 charges were? Because if not, I would like to ask what were the criminal

7 charges brought against commanders.

8 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. General, do you recall what was the indictment against

10 Milentijevic, the commander of the 58th Light Brigade.

11 A. The 58th Brigade is a brigade that is fully replenished from the

12 reserve force. Lieutenant Colonel Milentijevic was replaced for the

13 following reason: Certain military conscripts from his units demonstrated

14 a lack of discipline. In this specific case, it had to do with the

15 following: A group of military conscripts took a vehicle and went to

16 their respective homes. The vehicle had an extent and some of them --

17 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Stojanovic,

18 you were asked what was the criminal -- or what were the criminal charges

19 against the commander?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We're talking about the commander

21 here, Lieutenant-Colonel Milentijevic.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. What were the criminal -- you said that he

23 was the subject of criminal charges. What were these criminal charges?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For failure to take action to

25 protect the health and lives of persons which resulted in the death of

1 certain members of his unit.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, you -- you were also translated into English

3 as saying -- you were talking about brigade commanders here. I'm talking

4 about the highest level of command.

5 Now, the one you've just dealt with was a brigade commander, but

6 have you mentioned any other brigade commanders?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. I mentioned the

8 commander of the 175th Infantry Brigade.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: What was his --

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Who was --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... the charges

12 against him?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He was replaced because by failing

14 to take necessary measures, he made it possible for a group of volunteers

15 from his unit to commit crimes in the village of Zegra, we later

16 prosecuted that. And that is why he was replaced from his duty.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: And his name?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] His name is Colonel Petrovic.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, are there any other either brigade or

20 battalion commanders that were the subject of prosecution?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Commanders of brigades,

22 Mr. President? I don't have information about others. As for lower

23 levels of command, like battalion commanders and company commanders, there

24 were several of them. There is Captain Petrovic, who had criminal charges

25 brought against him and who was actually convicted. I think from the

1 202nd Logistics Base. But that does exist in the documents of the

2 relevant military courts.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you have these documents here, Mr. Bakrac?

4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with this witness, no.

5 But we will have representatives. We'll have a judge and a prosecutor

6 from the military court as witnesses here, and we are going to tender

7 documents through them on the cases that were prosecuted.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there anything else you want to deal with before

9 we interrupt for the evening?

10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, I would like to

11 move on to another topic, so yes, well, there is one minute left, but this

12 may be a good point to take a break -- or rather, to finish for the day.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stojanovic, you could perhaps think overnight

14 of -- of more details of these officers who were in command of units at

15 battalion level who you know were the subject of criminal proceedings, and

16 you can tell us more about that tomorrow morning. We have to bring our

17 proceedings today to an end. We will resume at 9.00 o'clock --

18 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Excuse me. We will resume at 9.00 tomorrow morning

20 in this courtroom.

21 Meanwhile, overnight it's vital that you should have no discussion

22 whatsoever with any person about the evidence in this case. And that

23 means any of the evidence, whether it's given by you or by anyone else,

24 any discussions you have between now and returning here should be about

25 other subjects. Discussion of the evidence is off limits.

1 Now could you please leave the courtroom with the usher, and we

2 will see you at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

4 [The witness stands down]

5 MR. LUKIC: Your Honour.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp, there's something you wanted to raise?

7 MR. STAMP: It's a matter relating to an order made on the 5th of

8 October by this Court that the Defence for General Lukic submit the

9 father's name and other particulars in respect to persons on the witness

10 list by the 30th of November, a date which has passed, and the order has

11 not been complied with. I don't think it is something the Prosecution

12 needs to file anything about, but I think we should place on record that

13 the fact that the Defence has failed to comply with the order so far is

14 hugely inconvenient, to say the least.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

16 Mr. Lukic, can you assist on that?

17 MR. LUKIC: Yes, I can, Your Honour. I just learned from my

18 assistant that Mr. Ivetic is working on that issue as well, apart from the

19 translation issue.

20 And I have one -- one more thing --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

22 MR. LUKIC: -- with your leave.

23 We called the Detention Unit and asked them if it's possible to

24 visit Mr. Lukic on Saturday, because we have only next week before we

25 depart from our respective homes, and I need one full day to discuss our

1 future witnesses with Mr. Lukic. And with this schedule, it's not

2 possible. So if you can assist us with the prison warden to allow us, me

3 and Mr. Ivetic, to visit our client on Saturday morning.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: We shall --

5 MR. LUKIC: The whole day would be preferable.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll investigate that and let you know what can be

7 done.

8 MR. LUKIC: Okay. Thank you, Your Honours.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

10 We'll adjourn now until 9.00 tomorrow.

11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.33 p.m.,

12 to be reconvened on Friday, the 7th day of

13 December, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.

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