Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27242

 1                           Monday, 25 August 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The Accused Pavkovic and Lazarevic not present]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE BONOMY:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             I notice the absence -- the continued absence of Mr. Lazarevic,

 8     first of all.  Can you confirm, Mr. Bakrac, that he is content to proceed

 9     in his absence?

10             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I can confirm that

11     for the record.  We discussed it on Friday, and he said that he if he was

12     not able to come into court and follow the proceedings because of the

13     consequences of the operation, that he agrees for us to go ahead and that

14     he will follow the proceedings as well as best he can.

15             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

16             Mr. Aleksic, I note that Mr. Pavkovic is not present.  I

17     understand that he is unwell.  Is he content that we should proceed in

18     his absence?

19             MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I can confirm

20     that.  My client was feeling unwell on Friday, and he said that if he was

21     not in a position to come in on Monday that he agreed that we continue

22     without him.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

24             Well, we can now continue to hear the submissions of the

25     Lazarevic Defence.

Page 27243

 1             Mr. Bakrac.

 2             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Good

 3     morning to everybody.

 4             On Friday, we left off presenting the closing arguments on the

 5     topic of orders, the orders that were titled "Joint Command for KiM."

 6     And I'm going to say a few more things in that regard and try to make our

 7     position clear to the Trial Chamber.

 8             In testifying before this Trial Chamber, the accused General

 9     Lazarevic stressed that the operatives of the Pristina Corps and in view

10     of the experience gained in 1998 with respect to the planning,

11     coordinating actions for its units with MUP, and providing support to MUP

12     continued to use orders titled "Joint Command."  The term was used in

13     situations in which the coordinated actions with MUP took place and not

14     in other situations.

15             General Lazarevic explained that after the actions which -- which

16     according to the orders had the joint order title, the Pristina Corps and

17     the command of the Pristina Corps was the one who demanded of its

18     subordinate units to report back and to analyse the actions.  And I'd

19     like to point to 5D373, a Defence exhibit, which confirms that the corps

20     command was the one which demanded an analysis of the actions, multiple

21     actions.  And I'd like to remind the Trial Chamber that we're talking

22     about eight actions that were carried out pursuant to orders with the

23     heading "Joint Command."  So the Pristina Corps asked for an analysis of

24     those actions, and nobody else.

25             From a Defence exhibit, 5D84, which I'd like to point to for the

Page 27244

 1     benefit of the Trial Chamber, is a combat report of the Pristina Corps

 2     command sent to the command of the 3rd Army, and in that we can clearly

 3     see that for the action to block and route the Siptar terrorists in the

 4     region of Jablanica, that that's what it's about; and the heading there

 5     is "Joint Command" and the number is -- exhibit number is P2003.  The

 6     decision was made by the command of the frequent and not by some Joint

 7     Command.  From Exhibit 5D85, we can also see that the action in the

 8     region of Jablanica was undertaken on the basis of a decision made by the

 9     command of the Pristina Corps.  General Lazarevic confirmed all these

10     allegations during his testimony.

11             So those, then, are combat reports that are authentic of that

12     same day, of the same day when one could not even assume or could not

13     have known or didn't know that this trial would ever take place; and then

14     in that report what was written was this:  On the basis of an order from

15     the command or we followed orders by the Pristina Corps, not orders by

16     some sort of Joint Command.  It was always the Pristina Corps that was

17     mentioned.

18             The fact that the command of the 3rd Army with a forward command

19     post in Pristina where as we saw according to the testimony of General

20     Pavkovic himself, General Pavkovic spent almost 90 per cent of his time

21     there and reported to the Supreme Command Staff about the anti-terrorist

22     actions; and report P1446 testifies to that as actions which were

23     undertaken on the basis of an order issued by the Pristina Corps.

24             Now, the fact that the orders of -- headed the Joint Command

25     were, in fact, Pristina Corps command is confirmed by General Delic, who

Page 27245

 1     in his testimony states that his command received these orders in

 2     envelopes together with other documents from the Pristina Corps command

 3     which had the stamp of the military post of the Pristina Corps.  During

 4     his testimony, he recognised the specific envelope for the specific

 5     action in the Jablanica region; and that is the order P2003 titled "Joint

 6     Command, "and the reference in the transcript is 19350.  The specific

 7     envelope that General Delic talked about is Exhibit PD 1365 [as

 8     interpreted].

 9             This witness furthermore in his testimony, in the transcript

10     19353, quite decisively stated that there was no dilemma as far as he was

11     concerned that we were dealing with documents from the corps and that he

12     knew that they were documents belonging to his -- of his command, or

13     rather, of the command of the Pristina Corps.

14             Before the Trial Chamber here, there were other commanders from

15     brigades that testified, and they also agreed that the orders with the

16     joint heading of "Joint Command" were, in fact, orders by the Pristina

17     Corps.  Milos Mandic was one such witness who testified that they were

18     orders issued by the Pristina Corps, the superior command to him, and

19     that his brigade wrote all his -- all their combat reports and sent them

20     exclusively to the Pristina Corps which reacted to them and undertook the

21     corresponding measures commensurate to them.  And that is to be found in

22     5D1331, paragraphs 27, 28, and 29.

23             And I'm going to mention another example, a Defence Witness

24     Mihajlo Gergar, also the commander of a brigade, who without any doubt

25     confirmed that the orders headed "Joint Command" were, in fact, orders by

Page 27246

 1     the Pristina Corps that he received in envelopes with a map of the corps

 2     command together with other orders.  That is 5D1400, paragraph 31 and 32.

 3             We had other testimony by an operative of the Pristina Corps,

 4     General Radojko Stefanovic, testifying before this Trial Chamber; and in

 5     his testimony, he says that the form of the documents the "Joint Command"

 6     heading was recorded in the computer, on computer, and was used in 1999,

 7     as well as 1998, only with the aim of denoting joint actions of the Army

 8     of Yugoslavia for KiM.

 9             And a Court witness, General Djakovic, finally confirmed the

10     allegations and claims made by Witness Stefanovic and said that the

11     documents headed "Joint Command" were, in fact, recorded in the computer

12     and used exclusively to denote joint actions of the MUP and only as ones

13     in 1998 and 1999.

14             I'd also like to indicate to the Trial Chamber and to bear out

15     all the evidence and exhibits and claims to take a look at all the

16     orders; and once it has looked at the orders, it will be able to see that

17     the last order is dated the 16th of April, 1999.  Now this date clearly

18     coincides with the order of the resubordination of the MUP to the Army of

19     Yugoslavia dated the 18th of April; that is to say, two days later.

20     Since the order for which the Defence claims never actually came into

21     being about resubordination was passed on the 18th of April, there was no

22     longer any need for the joint actions to be denoted in any other way, and

23     we can see this from all the exhibits and evidence presented.

24             The accused General Lazarevic until January 1998, and that has

25     been shown without doubt here, was Chief of Staff of the Nis Corps and

Page 27247

 1     had nothing to do with Kosovo province.  At the beginning of 1998, or

 2     more exactly in January 1998, the then-Chief of the General Staff of the

 3     Army of Yugoslavia, General Perisic, through his order appointed him

 4     Chief of Staff of the Pristina Corps, and they are Exhibits 5D1323 and

 5     5D1324.  Therefore, General Perisic was the man who promoted General

 6     Lazarevic to -- and brought him to Kosovo.  At the end of April 1998, he

 7     was sent to the forward command post of the Pristina Corps in Djakovica

 8     to deal with questions of defending the state borders, and he stayed

 9     there until the end of that year.  We saw that around -- as for the

10     actions and engagement to defend the state borders in this trial, nobody

11     challenged the fact of whether the units of the Yugoslav Army could be

12     deployed or not.  That was accepted.

13             Now, if we look at Exhibit 1D760, and I'd like to emphasize

14     pages 15 and 16 for the benefit of the Trial Chamber, you'll see that at

15     a meeting of the supreme defence command, it was precisely General

16     Perisic the -- who proposed to President Milosevic the promotion of the

17     then-Colonel Lazarevic to the rank of general with the clear statement of

18     reasons that he was a very highly qualified and capable officer.

19             I'd like to remind you of the last piece of evidence -- or

20     rather -- no, the last witness who testified before this Court, Court

21     witness General Dimitrijevic, who said here that General Lazarevic -- it

22     was not the proposal of General Perisic, but the proposal of the entire

23     collegium of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia that appointed

24     him.  And he said it was quite clearly that it was according to the

25     assessment of the entire collegium of the General Staff of the Army of

Page 27248

 1     Yugoslavia that General Lazarevic was considered to be an exceptionally

 2     capable officer and that the collegium to a man proposed him for

 3     promotion, and that is transcript page 26743.

 4             When General Pavkovic took over the duties as -- his duties as

 5     commander offer the 3rd Army, General Lazarevic as Chief of Staff of the

 6     Pristina Corps was appointed commander of the Pristina Corps.  In

 7     addition to us having seen how General Dimitrijevic assessed and

 8     testified about the position of the entire collegium of the General Staff

 9     of the Army of Yugoslavia with respect to the accused Lazarevic, it was

10     also customary practice in the Army of Yugoslavia for the Chief of Staff

11     to be promoted to a commander when such a place became -- post became

12     available.

13             From Prosecution exhibits, minutes from the 8th Session of the

14     Supreme Defence Council dated the 20th of December, 1998, we can without

15     any shadow of doubt conclude that the cadre solutions in the Army of

16     Yugoslavia are passed according to proposals made by the General Staff

17     and that these decisions are discussed and opportunities are given for

18     any comments to be made.

19             From Exhibit P1000, we can see that the General Staff of the Army

20     of Yugoslavia proposed to the Supreme Defence Council that the General

21     Lazarevic become commander of the Pristina Corps, having been Chief of

22     Staff previously.  The meeting of the Supreme Defence Council was held

23     with everybody present; and nobody, not even President Djukanovic, had

24     any criticisms to make to that proposal.  No objections were made with

25     respect to the manner of his appointment in the Army of Yugoslavia.  We

Page 27249

 1     see P1738 that governs this area.

 2             So this is how the accused Vladimir Lazarevic became a general

 3     and the way in which he became commander of the Pristina Corps.  There

 4     were no obscure games behind the scenes which resulted in this.

 5     Everything -- all this is supported, in our opinion, by firm proof and

 6     evidence, and we have drawn the Trial Chamber's attention to a number of

 7     them.

 8             In the closing arguments -- in his closing arguments, my learned

 9     colleague Mr. Hannis mentioned, and in the final brief too, he says that

10     General Lazarevic in 1998 attended five meetings of the so-called Joint

11     Command in Pristina and that in 1998, as Chief of Staff of the Pristina

12     Corps, he signed a decision to route the STS in the region of Slup and

13     Voksa, and that is exhibit -- Prosecution Exhibit P1428.

14             In our final brief, in paragraphs 522 to 541, we speak at length

15     about the exhibits and testimony on that subject to the effect that the

16     so-called Joint Command was no body whatsoever, no command at all, and

17     that the meetings of the police and military and later political

18     structures which were held during one period of time almost daily were

19     referred to by that name; whereas, it was, in fact, a place where they

20     exchanged information about the topical current security situation.

21             At the -- in Kosovo which was then already boiling, General

22     Lazarevic contributed to the implementation of the plan through his role

23     in the Joint Command, that this was so cannot be proved beyond reasonable

24     doubt based on his attendance at five of these meetings or one order

25     which General Lazarevic signed as the Chief of Staff.

Page 27250

 1             General Lazarevic had no role whatsoever in the so-called Joint

 2     Command which, as we have already said, was clearly not any sort of body

 3     at all.  Meetings of the police, military, and political structures at a

 4     point in time when the KLA was in control of 50 per cent of the territory

 5     of Kosovo, and there was an imminent threat of the secession of a part of

 6     the sovereign state, were legitimate and quite normal.

 7             At these meetings, no decisions were made and the evidence shows

 8     this.  General Simic, a witness here, explained who it was that made

 9     decisions, the way in which decisions were made, and the procedure that

10     was followed; and every time that General Pavkovic attended one of these

11     meetings, he knew about it.  General Djakovic also testified about this,

12     and we dealt with this in greater detail in our final brief.  Here, I

13     will only mention Voksa and Stup because that is what my client is

14     charged with.

15             From the notes at the meeting of the so-called Joint Command,

16     starting from the 22nd of July until the 30th of October, 1998, we see

17     that there are notes from 70 meetings.  An analysis leads to the

18     conclusion that General Lazarevic attended only five of these 70

19     meetings; and a linguistic and logical interpretation of the notes in

20     September 1998 --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not catch the dates.

22             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] -- it can be concluded that General

23     Lazarevic was not a member of the Joint Command.

24             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac, you gave dates there which the

25     interpreter did not catch I think probably because of the speed at which

Page 27251

 1     you are speaking.  If you could give us the dates again, please.

 2             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you, Your Honour.  I'm

 3     trying to finish today.

 4             The dates are the 22nd of July, 1998 -- I do apologise, the

 5     minutes of the 23rd of August, 1998, and the 21st of September, 1998.

 6             When you look at the heading of the minutes of the meeting of the

 7     23rd of August, you will see that it says that absent were Mr. Minic,

 8     Matkovic, Andjelkovic; and those present were Obrad Stevanovic and

 9     Colonel Lazarevic.  So, evidently, as there were other people present,

10     these were persons who did not generally attend these meetings.  In the

11     notes of the 21st of September, 1998, apart from the usual heading where

12     it says "absent," there is also a note saying everyone present and

13     Lazarevic.

14             When one analyses these notes or these minutes, one can see that

15     General Lazarevic was at the forward command post in Djakovica on two

16     occasions practically.  And why do I say two occasions?  Because in

17     September, General Lazarevic attended two or three meetings which were

18     interconnected.  He spoke about the current security situation at the

19     state border.  He explained that together with the corps commander he

20     went to several of these meetings in order to give information on the

21     security situation at the state border.  If you look at the minutes of

22     these meetings or the notes, General Lazarevic's defence is confirmed.

23     He spoke about the situation on the border and in the border belt, and

24     that was the full extent of his role and his participation.

25             The OTP suggested to the Trial Chamber that General Lazarevic, as

Page 27252

 1     the Chief of Staff of the Pristina Corps, personally signed a decision on

 2     breaking up the forces of the sabotage -- of the Siptar terrorist forces

 3     in the Stup and Voksa area dated the 14th of August, 1998, envisaging

 4     support for the MUP forces; and in addition to this, this action took

 5     place in the border belt.  But the Defence would also like to mention

 6     that the Chief of the General Staff, General Perisic, was then on the

 7     ground when this action was being carried out and was informed about it

 8     from the commander of the 3rd Army, Samardzic.

 9             I draw your attention to transcript page 17796, 17797, and

10     Exhibit 5D1173, point 3.

11             This action was approved by the 3rd Army commander, General

12     Samardzic, who signed the approval on the map; and the idea for this

13     action was explained to General Pavkovic by General Djakovic orally at

14     the time.  There is written evidence to this effect on record, and you

15     have the testimony of General Djakovic.  The accused Lazarevic signed a

16     written decision which was previously approved by Generals Samardzic and

17     Perisic for the simple reason that the commander of the Pristina Corps,

18     General Pavkovic, was touring the border belt at the time together with

19     the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, General

20     Perisic; and we have seen evidence showing that if the commander was

21     physically absent, the Chief of Staff was the person authorised to sign a

22     decision.

23             Defence witnesses Goran Jevtovic and General Miodrag Simic in

24     connection with this order commented on the paragraph from point 6 of

25     this order, that command of combat actions would be carried out by the --

Page 27253

 1     well, I mean, it will be commanded from the forward command post of the

 2     Pristina Corps in Djakovica.  Both witnesses agree that this referred to

 3     the combined command post where the MUP forces were commanded by their

 4     own commander and the army was commanded by the army commander.

 5             And, finally, a Court witness, General Djakovic, testified before

 6     Your Honours in this courtroom and confirmed that the idea for this

 7     action, Stup and Voksa, as he said was something he took more than half

 8     an hour to explain to General Samardzic and then General Samardzic signed

 9     the map and the decision in his presence.  So this was only a technical

10     matter, putting a signature to the decision.  All this evidence is quite

11     clear and shows unambiguously that the OTP cannot rely on this document.

12             In his closing arguments, my learned friend Mr. Hannis said that

13     the accused Lazarevic testified that in 1998 and 1999, units of the Army

14     of Yugoslavia and MUP had full cooperation and coordination; although,

15     it's not clear why this would be unusual and unlawful.

16             The Defence would like to remind the Trial Chamber of the

17     testimony of some Prosecution witnesses who were high-ranking officials

18     of the OSCE and KDOM.  They established that coordination and cooperation

19     between the legitimate organs of a state, the MUP and the Army of

20     Yugoslavia, in anti-terrorist operations or actions is not only

21     legitimate and normal but also necessary, especially in a situation where

22     weapons and force are being used in order to cut off a part of the

23     sovereign territory of an internationally recognised state.  The MUP and

24     Army of Yugoslavia, let me point Your Honours to the exhibit, had a

25     constitutionally established obligation to protect the integrity and

Page 27254

 1     sovereignty of the state.  That's 1D134, Articles 54, 72; and 1D [as ,

 2     Articles 63 and 77.

 3             We wish to remind you that General Maisonneuve, Prosecution

 4     witness, stated that coordination between the Army of Yugoslavia and the

 5     MUP was very necessary and he evaluated this coordination as

 6     professional.  He also agreed that every operation implying the

 7     participation of the Army of Yugoslavia and the MUP had to have close

 8     cooperation so that each formation would know about the plans of the

 9     other in order to avoid friendly fire.  Also, this witness stressed the

10     need when joint actions were being carried out that coordination should

11     be carried out, so that each unit would have clear responsibility --

12     responsibilities.  That's transcript page 11183.

13             Colonel Crosland, another OTP witness, confirmed that based on

14     his experience which he gained serving throughout the world, it's to be

15     expected that there should be coordination and cooperation between

16     various elements of the forces of the MUP and the Army of Yugoslavia in

17     Kosovo in order to avoid friendly fire inter alia.  That's transcript

18     page 9815.

19             Another Prosecution witness, General Dusan Loncar, pointed out

20     especially the importance of coordination and coordinated action between

21     the MUP and the army and even the foreign ministry of foreign affairs.

22     He said it was not only necessary but indispensable.  Bearing in mind the

23     KLA activities, he went on to say that full cooperation between the two

24     armed components of the state was necessary, the MUP and the Army of

25     Yugoslavia, that is, in carrying out combat operations.

Page 27255

 1             The use of units of the Army of Yugoslavia in joint actions with

 2     the Ministry of the Interior in the fight against renegade and terrorist

 3     groups was completely legitimate and based on law.  The Defence wishes to

 4     remind the Trial Chamber of a Prosecution exhibit, the Rules of Service

 5     of the Army of Yugoslavia, where in paragraph 447 - and that is Exhibit

 6     P1085 - shows that it is permissible to use the units in peacetime,

 7     especially to fight sabotage terrorist and other hostile armed groups.

 8     It is also permitted, under paragraph 448 of this same exhibit, for

 9     public roads and facilities of high significance for the defence of the

10     country can be guarded by the army if an attack or sabotage are expected

11     and on other occasions.

12             It's clear, then, that a simple enumeration of facts saying that

13     General Lazarevic was the one who approved or participated in coordinated

14     actions with the units of the MUP cannot constitute evidence of any kind

15     of criminal plan or criminal responsibility of General Lazarevic.  To

16     show that, it would be necessary to provide evidence.  We have, however,

17     shown by numerous exhibits that his actions were lawful and legitimate.

18             Finally, in his closing arguments, my learned friend Mr. Hannis

19     pointed out that the accused General Lazarevic contributed to the joint

20     criminal enterprise by incorporating volunteers into the Army of

21     Yugoslavia.  The Defence wishes to point out to the Trial Chamber, first

22     of all, that receiving volunteers into the Army of Yugoslavia was a

23     lawful act regulated by the Law on the Army of Yugoslavia in Articles 8

24     and 15 of this law, and that's Prosecution Exhibit P984.

25             In Article 15 of this law, it's permitted if a state of war is

Page 27256

 1     declared for the Army of Yugoslavia to receive volunteers into its ranks,

 2     and Article 8 provides that it can also receive volunteers who are

 3     foreign nationals.  The Supreme Command Staff in an order it issued said

 4     that volunteers were to be admitted while complying strictly with the

 5     law.  This referred to those who wanted to go to the areas of

 6     responsibility of the Pristina Corps.  Volunteers were to be received

 7     after triage or selection was carried out.  In this same order, it is

 8     commanded that during their training, volunteers were to be told

 9     especially that illegal and other impermissible acts would not be

10     tolerated and that legal measures would be enforced, those which are

11     provided for in case of war.  Transportation to the place where they were

12     to be received into the 3rd Army was to be organized by the 1st and 2nd

13     Army for volunteers from their territories, and the command of the 3rd

14     Army was to provide transport up to the -- or rather, the command of the

15     3rd Army was to organize transport up to the Pristina Corps.

16             General Vasiljevic in his oral testimony confirmed that there

17     were two reception centres in Grocka near Belgrade and in Medja near Nis

18     where screening of the volunteers was carried out, and that on that

19     occasion about 50 per cent of the volunteers who applied failed to pass

20     the check and were not received into the Army of Yugoslavia.  There is an

21     exhibit on record, P1938, which is actually information provided by the

22     command of the 3rd Army on the reception and deployment of volunteers in

23     the 3rd Army; and from this exhibit, it can clearly be seen that these

24     two collection centres existed near Belgrade and Nis where volunteers

25     were received and screened, and that this reception and screening were

Page 27257

 1     never done at the level of the Pristina Corps.

 2             Bearing in mind the stated facts and point 11 of the exhibit

 3     mentioned, as well as the testimony by Witness Vasiljevic, it is clear

 4     that the reception of the volunteers and taking them into the Army of

 5     Yugoslavia did not come under the authority of the Pristina Corps or

 6     General Lazarevic.  The volunteers who came -- arrived in the Pristina

 7     Corps with their papers in order saying that they had passed their

 8     screening tests had to, by law, be received into the Pristina Corps.  And

 9     we see no reason for General Lazarevic to refuse such orders.  However,

10     in addition to this, to the fact that the screening of volunteers was

11     carried out at the level of the superior commands in Belgrade and Nis,

12     the command of the Pristina Corps, General Lazarevic, although he was not

13     in charge of receiving the volunteers and selecting them, nonetheless

14     exercised firm control over those who were received into the Pristina

15     Corps.

16             From Exhibits P1938 and P1943, we can see that straight away, in

17     a very short period of time, after they had been received part of the

18     volunteers were sent away from the corps at the insistence of General

19     Lazarevic.  They were sent back, and another portion of the volunteers

20     were held in detention because they had been suspected of perpetrating

21     certain crimes.

22             General Lazarevic in his testimony before this Court confirms

23     these claims with respect to the procedure in which the volunteers were

24     received and stressed that the reception of the volunteers at the level

25     of the brigade -- or rather, was at the level of the brigade of the

Page 27258

 1     Pristina Corps was at the -- under the authority of the superior command

 2     and then was sent down to the subordinate units.  The accused Lazarevic,

 3     on page 17979 of his testimony, stressed that on the basis of an order

 4     from the command of the 3rd Army, the Pristina Corps command issued its

 5     own order to form a reception subcentre at the level of the Pristina

 6     Military District for volunteers from Kosovo.  The substance of that

 7     order was that from the subcentre, all the volunteers from Kosovo were

 8     sent out to the reception centre of the 3rd Army in Nis in order to

 9     undergo the prescribed procedures.  So there was no way, therefore, in

10     which the volunteers from Kosovo could be received straight away and join

11     up with the Pristina Corps straight away in Kosovo without having

12     previously been through the screening process in the reception or

13     collection centre in Nis.

14             I am going to round up this topic by indicating PD 315 --

15     Exhibit 315 to -- 5D to the Trial Chamber, an order signed by General

16     Lazarevic, in which we can see that General Lazarevic took additional

17     steps to control the volunteers; and from this exhibit, we can clearly

18     see that once he noticed any abuse in the use of arms by recruits and

19     volunteers, he would issue orders to his subordinate officers that

20     whenever non-military conduct was observed, that those persons should be

21     sent to a medical commission straight away and after a decision that

22     these persons should be sent away from the army.  And this can clearly be

23     seen from Exhibit 5D315.

24             The Prosecutor suggested to us that in the units of the Army of

25     Yugoslavia, there were volunteers of whom separate units were set up.  A

Page 27259

 1     Defence witness, Vlatko Vukovic, in his oral testimony claims that in his

 2     battalion there was no permanent volunteer or platoon as a military unit;

 3     and he goes on to explain that on one occasion after the beginning of a

 4     large land offensive by the KLA across Mount Pastrik, he ordered the

 5     command of the 1st Company to establish a volunteer platoon only for that

 6     occasion.  He also mentioned that that particular platoon was composed of

 7     soldiers from units that were subordinate to him who were doing their

 8     regular military service and not made up of volunteers who had signed up

 9     as volunteers.

10             Those soldiers who signed up voluntarily for the action in the

11     combat diary or war diary were referred to as phantoms.  Witness Vukovic

12     went on to explain that this name, "phantoms," was a code-name, a signals

13     code-name used just for that action for the 30th of May, 1999, and that

14     this encrypted name was -- came into being by the commander, who thought

15     it up.

16             Now, I'd like to indicate P2010, a Prosecution exhibit, and draw

17     your attention to that, which is the war diary of the 2nd Battalion,

18     Vukovic's battalion, and to take a look at the entry for the 28th of May

19     in that war diary.  From this exhibit, you will clearly and unequivocally

20     find confirmation of the testimony given by Witness Vlatko Vukovic.  This

21     Prosecution exhibit which represents a telegram sent out by Vukovic's

22     battalion fully corresponds to the exhibits and evidence; and from the

23     entry of the 28th of May, 1999, you can clearly see that Vukovic issued

24     the order for a volunteer platoon to be formed.  During the 29th of May,

25     he issued them an assignment to take control of a certain defence line.

Page 27260

 1     Therefore, the Prosecutor went on to suggest that volunteer detachments

 2     existed which were called "phantoms"; whereas, I ask you to look at the

 3     exhibits and to find an explanation of how those units were formed.

 4             And with the Trial Chamber's permission, I would like now to move

 5     on to another area and to deal with what the Prosecutor stated with

 6     respect to the credibility of General Lazarevic's testimony.  In the

 7     closing arguments, the Prosecutor puts to the Trial Chamber that the

 8     accused Lazarevic was not quite sincere and frank in testifying before

 9     the Trial Chamber on all points.

10             First of all, with respect to what he said in his interview to

11     Mr. Philip Coo with respect to the Joint Command, the Prosecution allows

12     for the possibility that memories after six or seven years after the

13     event, that that is based on that memory, but that there is no

14     significant discrepancy between what the accused said in his interview

15     and in his testimony before the distinguished Trial Chamber.

16             Now I would like to remind the Trial Chamber that General

17     Lazarevic, several days after his Initial Appearance before this

18     Tribunal, demanded and requested that he give an interview to the

19     Prosecutor.  We claim, we state, that someone who was ready to lie or not

20     to tell the truth would not ever ask to testify or to provide interviews

21     without previously having become acquainted either with the attending

22     material, the attachments.  Any reasonable person would, first of all,

23     look at the supporting material and see what the Prosecution has against

24     him and then hold forth on the subject.  The disclosure of evidence would

25     last until the autumn of 2005, and General Lazarevic gave his interview

Page 27261

 1     in February, as I say, several days after his Initial Appearance before

 2     this Tribunal.

 3             General Lazarevic testified before this Trial Chamber; and he

 4     testified, once again, in front of all his witnesses -- or rather, before

 5     all his witnesses.  Now, we claim again that somebody who had the

 6     intention of not telling the truth would never do something like that.

 7             My colleague Mr. Hannis especially emphasizes that the accused

 8     Lazarevic did not testify sincerely and truthfully about P1966, exhibits,

 9     and P1967, and they are ordered titled "Joint Command for KiM" and have

10     the following number, 455/56, strictly confidential, and a supplement,

11     455/56/1 of the 22nd of March, 1999.  I'd like to remind the

12     Trial Chamber that it is a decision linked to the action to route the

13     Siptar terrorists in the region of Malo Kosovo.

14             The Prosecution goes on to claim that the accused was not sincere

15     and rank with respect to the supplement to this order when he suggested

16     that the command post of the Pristina Corps had been dislocated and that

17     it was in the village of Lausa.  We should like to point to exhibits and

18     evidence which confirm the testimony of General Lazarevic in this area

19     and leave no doubt as to his sincerity.  Witness Mihajlo Gergar, for

20     example, on page 21530 of the transcript, in response to a question put

21     to him by Mr. Stamp, said that the command post of the Pristina Corps was

22     in the Pristina sector, and that the commander informed him that for this

23     specific action a group of officers from the Pristina Corps would arrive

24     in the Lausa village sector to command the units of the army in that

25     particular action.  These claims are borne-out by Witness Radojko

Page 27262

 1     Stefanovic as well, the main operative in the Pristina Corps, who on page

 2     21666 of the transcript to 21668, in testifying about this supplement to

 3     the order, P1967, says, first of all, that it was signed because it was a

 4     telegram, in fact, since the signature is on the left-hand side, and that

 5     in the sector of Lausa village, the command post was of the 354th

 6     Brigade, and that the corps commander sent to the -- a team through the

 7     corps command which led the action from the command post at the village

 8     Lausa sector.  And this witness also goes on to record two concrete

 9     names, the names of officers who were sent to this command post, and goes

10     on to explain that Lausa and the hill there was a suitable place for

11     leading the action.

12             The Prosecution also casts doubt on the testimony of General

13     Lazarevic and his sincerity with respect to the armed non-Siptar

14     population which is mentioned in certain directives, orders -- and orders

15     which we mentioned at the beginning of our presentation.  General

16     Lazarevic testified and said that the term relates to the civilian

17     defensive protection and that the name was inherited from the times of

18     All People's Defence, the All People's Defence system.  The Prosecutor

19     went on to suggest that the accused Lazarevic for executing certain tasks

20     used the armed non-Siptar population by relying on P2808, Exhibit P2808.

21             We agree that in the order to rout and destroy the Siptar

22     terrorist forces in Malisevo, Malo Kosovo, and that general area, P2808,

23     there is a clause stating that the armed non-Siptar population will be

24     engaged to secure military facilities and roads and for the defence of

25     built-up areas without a Siptar population.

Page 27263

 1             Now, we'd like to draw the attention of the Trial Chamber to the

 2     fact that that clause word by word was transcribed from an order of the

 3     3rd Army, Grom 3, from the 27th of January, 1999, where under point 5.1,

 4     a task was given for the Pristina Corps to engage the armed non-Siptar

 5     population.  In his testimony, the accused Lazarevic in addition to

 6     explaining the fact that as corps commander, he had no authority under

 7     the law to change the tasks set by the army command, nonetheless stressed

 8     that he as corps commander never issued any specific order to his

 9     subordinate units to deploy any element of the armed non-Siptar

10     population.

11             Your Honours, in the corpus of -- in the body of the exhibits and

12     evidence shown, we have a large number of Pristina Corps orders, and I'd

13     like to call upon my learned friend of the Prosecution where -- any

14     instance where a specific task was given to any section of the armed

15     non-Siptar population.  You have detailed orders with respect to the

16     deployment and tasks of the units, their movements, but nowhere will you

17     find a single task issued to the armed non-Siptar population.  Therefore,

18     General Lazarevic was telling the truth.

19             The Prosecutor, nonetheless, spreads its doubt and suspicions on

20     this fact and deduces that the clause is to be found in Lazarevic's

21     version of Grom 3, which if you look at the date comes before Grom 4 by

22     the 3rd Army and Grom 4 of the staff of the Supreme Command.  Given a

23     situation of war and chaos, the Defence can interpret this only as being

24     a technical error in the date when it was registered or some other

25     technical problem that might have happened, unless the Prosecutor claims

Page 27264

 1     that at one point in time in the Army of Yugoslavia the chain of command

 2     went from the Pristina Corps towards the Supreme Command Staff.  So,

 3     apart from a technical error, there can be no other logical conclusion.

 4             And, finally, the Prosecution has suggested that the accused

 5     Lazarevic was not truthful and sincere to the Trial Chamber when

 6     testifying about Witness Peraj and Lazarevic's alleged presence at the

 7     forward command post in Djakovica on the 28th of April, 1999.  In order

 8     to support its allegations, the Prosecution states that there is a combat

 9     report of the 125th Motorised Brigade where it is stated that in that

10     brigade, Lazarevic was there between 9.00 and 12.00, and that the Defence

11     offered evidence -- offered up evidence which showed that Lazarevic on

12     that same day at 9.00 was several kilometres away and that is to -- the

13     document that speaks about the elements of the 37th Motorised Brigade

14     which were lodged in a stream which couldn't move out of a stream with

15     their motorised vehicle.  They state that Lazarevic could not have been

16     in two places at the same time.

17             We wish to draw the Trial Chamber's attention to the fact that

18     combat reports are documents in which precise times are not entered to

19     the minute.  In addition to this, the witness General Lazarevic -- or

20     rather, General Zivanovic, the commander of the 125th Motorised Brigade,

21     on transcript page 2608 to 2609 testified that from the place where

22     General Lazarevic allegedly saw elements of the 37th Brigade to Pec where

23     the command post of his brigade is, there is a 15- to 20-minute drive.

24     So if somebody entered into the combat report that from 9.00 to 12.00 the

25     general was in the brigade command, then it's quite logical and possible

Page 27265

 1     that he arrived there at 20 past 9.00.

 2             Finally, all this is not really important because the Prosecutor

 3     made an error concerning the date because all of this refers to the 29th

 4     of April, a day when the Reka operation was already over.  In view of the

 5     fact that the Defence also had evidence about the 29th showed nonetheless

 6     where General Lazarevic was on the 29th.  However, Witness Peraj claims

 7     he saw him in Djakovica on the 28th, and there was certain -- there was a

 8     certain amount of confusion in the cross-examination which can only show

 9     that there might have been a mistake about the date, the 27th or the

10     28th.  All the other evidence clearly shows that on the 28th of April in

11     the afternoon, the action in the Caragoj valley was already over.  The

12     29th of April then, as regards this action, is of no importance

13     whatsoever.

14             Let me remind you of the testimony of General Lazarevic

15     concerning the dates of the 27th and 28th of April.  General Lazarevic

16     pointed out that on the 27th of April, he was in Pristina and that he

17     knew that because on that day there had been a modest celebration of

18     statehood day in Pristina in the presence of the commander of the

19     3rd Army and the commanders of the subordinate units.  On the 28th of

20     April, General Lazarevic says that in the early morning hours, he moved

21     with the command from the Kisnica area and the area of Gracanicka Jezero

22     towards the urban part of Pristina, and that in the early morning hours,

23     he toured a group in Pristina which was commanded by Colonel Filipovic

24     and received a humanitarian organization, the Serb Sisters Circle, and

25     that he spent the whole day in Pristina.  He also testified about the

Page 27266

 1     29th of April and said that in the morning, he went from Pristina in the

 2     direction of Pec in order to visit the 125th Motorised Brigade, and at

 3     about 9.00 in the morning, he met these elements of the 37th Brigade.

 4     But as we said, that date is actually of no importance.

 5             The testimony of General Lazarevic about where he was on the 27th

 6     and 28th of April is confirmed by numerous documents and by other

 7     witnesses.  Witness Milutin Filipovic confirmed before this Chamber the

 8     statements of General Lazarevic that on the 27th of April, 1999, there

 9     was a celebration of statehood day in Pristina and that there were many

10     members of the corps present there including General Lazarevic and

11     General Pavkovic.  That's transcript page 19163.

12             This same witness went on to testify that on the following day,

13     the 28th of April in the morning, General Lazarevic visited his command

14     and that then they went to the Grand Hotel where they received a

15     humanitarian organization, the Circle of Serbian Sisters, which as this

16     witness remembers well was represented by Zaga Pavlovic.  That's

17     transcript page 19164.

18             I wish to draw the Trial Chamber's attention to a Prosecution

19     exhibit, P2297, and the entry for the 28th of April.  That is the war

20     diary of the 52nd Battalion of the military police which in part secured

21     the corps command.  From the entry of the 28th of April, one can clearly

22     see and confirm General Lazarevic's statement that the command of the

23     Pristina Corps on that morning moved from Kisnica to the town of Pristina

24     itself.  Exhibit P1086 and P159 which are the war diary of the 52nd

25     Artillery Rocket Brigade, PVO, it can be seen -- of the anti-aircraft

Page 27267

 1     defence, that is, it can be seen that from the entry of the 10th of

 2     April, 1999, under point 7 one can see that General Lazarevic spent a

 3     brief time at the command and Djakovica and was briefed on the situation

 4     at the state border in the area of Kosare and Morine.

 5             Also P1086 and 5D170, the entry for the 26th of May, 1996 --

 6     1999, under point 6 one can see that commanders of the 3rd Army and

 7     Pristina Corps arrived on a visit.

 8             Your Honours, why am I mentioning all these exhibits?  The 52nd

 9     Artillery Rocket Brigade of the anti-aircraft defence covered the

10     Djakovica garrison.  General Lazarevic testified as did many other

11     witnesses that from the beginning of the war, he was in Djakovica on only

12     two occasions.  From the exhibits I have shown you, it can clearly be

13     seen that the arrival of the corps commander was, in fact, entered into

14     the war diary.  If the corps commander was in Djakovica on the 27th or

15     the 28th of April, had he been in Djakovica on those dates, it would have

16     to have been entered clearly in the war diary; however, the war diary

17     contains no entry showing that the commander visited, which is additional

18     evidence that he did not.

19             We have also shown you an exhibit which shows that General

20     Lazarevic on the 28th of April at the command post in Pristina signed a

21     combat report.  He personally signed a combat report, and this is in our

22     closing brief, in our final brief.  I wish to point the Trial Chamber to

23     parts of our final brief where in paragraphs 450 to 461, we dealt in

24     detail with testimony of Witness Nike Peraj as regards these facts which

25     we wish to present to you now briefly, as regards General Lazarevic's

Page 27268

 1     presence at the forward command post in Djakovica.

 2             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Bakrac, there's certainly no need to repeat

 3     what's in your final brief.  I may have misunderstood you earlier, but I

 4     thought you said on Friday that a large part of your submission would be

 5     made by Mr. Cepic and would be a detailed review of the final brief of

 6     the Lukic Defence.  Now, have I misunderstood you?  I wouldn't like to

 7     think that you're ruling out the possibility of dealing with that

 8     adequately if that's your intention.

 9             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, that will be

10     shorter than my arguments, so I think that it will fall within the

11     time-frame, and we will be finished today in any case.

12             JUDGE BONOMY:  Yes.  It is important that you deal with the

13     credibility of Mr. Lazarevic; on the other hand, as I say, there's no

14     need to repeat things which are already in your final brief.  So please

15     continue.

16             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, I agree, Your Honour.  We have

17     dealt with this in far greater detail in our final brief, and I have

18     completed that topic now.

19             I only wanted to say that as regards the action in the Djakovica

20     area and the Reka action, we have a detailed discussion of that in

21     paragraphs 359 to 466 of our closing brief, and we ask the Trial Chamber

22     to read what we say carefully.

23             Your Honours, my learned friend Mr. Hannis in his closing

24     arguments suggested that the military organs did not take sufficient

25     measures to punish those responsible for crimes, and he gave an example

Page 27269

 1     of Markovic's book, P1011.  We wish to remind Your Honours that Djuro

 2     Blagojevic, a Defence witness, who at the relevant time was the military

 3     prosecutor at the command of the Pristina Military District, explained

 4     that two military prosecutor's offices in the Kosovo area in the course

 5     of the war received 2.832 criminal reports, of which 492 were for

 6     violations of international humanitarian law.  These criminal reports

 7     were submitted by the security organ of the Pristina Corps.  Both

 8     Prosecution and Defence witnesses confirmed that the submission of a

 9     criminal report is where the obligation of the military commander stops.

10             General Vasiljevic explained that by submitting a criminal

11     report, filing criminal report, with the judicial organs meant that

12     General Lazarevic had fulfilled his duty.  That's transcript page 8969.

13     We saw that there was even a military disciplinary court in Nis for

14     serious violations of military discipline, and General Lazarevic's remit

15     was only to punish less-serious violations of military discipline.  A

16     Prosecution witness, General Vasiljevic, spoke about this.

17             The fact that filing a report fulfils the duty of the commander

18     can clearly be concluded and drawn from the main -- I apologise to the

19     interpreters.

20             In Article 138 of the FRY constitution, it says:  "Military

21     courts are independent and proceed according to the law."

22             In Article 2 dealing with military courts, it says that:  "The

23     military courts are independent and act on their own."  No one can

24     influence them.  Why am I saying this?  We wish to ask the Trial Chamber

25     when analysing these allegations by the Prosecution to bear in mind that

Page 27270

 1     in the 78, I think, days of the war, the organs of the Pristina Corps

 2     filed 492 reports concerning serious violations of international

 3     humanitarian law.  If we bear in mind the constitutional provisions we

 4     have shown you and the testimonies showing that from that point on the

 5     courts were independent in carrying out their judicial functions and that

 6     filing a report transfers all responsibility and all responsibility of

 7     General ends there, and, then, although we claim that the results of the

 8     final trials are not bad, this has no influence on the measures General

 9     Lazarevic took for the perpetrators of crimes to be brought to justice

10     and tried.

11             Prosecution witness General Vasiljevic in his testimony before

12     this Tribunal as regards these issues pointed out unambiguously that

13     there was no intention on the part of the Army of Yugoslavia to cover up

14     crimes; and he stressed that General Farkas after touring the units of

15     the security organ of the corps gave a very good assessment and said that

16     the people in these units should be promoted.  That's transcript page

17     8976 to 8977.

18             This same witness, General Vasiljevic, confirmed that the reports

19     of the security organ of the corps on the crimes committed were dealt

20     with by the judicial organs, all of them except for the Gornja Klina case

21     which could not be dealt with because there could be no on-site

22     investigation in that area because the KLA had control over it.  However,

23     to the best of his knowledge, this case was tried ultimately before the

24     military court in Nis.  That's transcript page 8789 to 8790.  General

25     Geza Farkas in his testimony pointed out that at a meeting of the staff

Page 27271

 1     of the Supreme Command of the 8th of June, 1999, it was established that

 2     over 95 per cent of investigations in Kosovo had actually been carried

 3     out as regards the members of the Army of Yugoslavia.

 4             I wish to draw the Trial Chamber's attention to an exhibit which

 5     shows beyond doubt the contribution General Lazarevic made to discover

 6     the perpetrators of crimes rather than covering up.  On the 26th of

 7     April, we saw an exhibit saying that on the 8th of May - and let me

 8     repeat - the assistant chief of security of the Pristina Corps, Stevan

 9     Djurovic, informed General Vasiljevic of the results of the

10     investigations carried out by the Pristina Corps.  So, on the 8th of May,

11     General Lazarevic sent General Djurovic, the deputy of the security

12     organ, to see what the security organs were doing.  However, 5D379 shows

13     that as early as on the 26th of April, 1999, General Lazarevic personally

14     requested that professional personnel of the military medical academy

15     forensic pathologists be sent to carry out sanitization of the terrain

16     because there were indicia that some crimes had been perpetrated by

17     members of the army.  So where is the cover-up in that?

18             You can clearly see from this exhibit that General Lazarevic was

19     requesting from the General Staff that experts be sent from the military

20     medical academy in order to establish what happened and to investigate

21     indicia that some military personnel were involved in the commission of

22     some crimes.

23             I'd like to remind the Trial Chamber that we heard testimony from

24     Major Milosavljevic in this court, and a medical expert from the military

25     medical academy who pursuant to General Lazarevic's request went to

Page 27272

 1     Kosovo on two occasions and conducted exhumations and dealt with the

 2     bodies found in two localities, Slovinje and Mali Alas.

 3             We'd also like to remind of the following, that the Defence

 4     offered up Exhibit PD 1366 [as interpreted], from which we can see that

 5     on the basis of expertise by Dr. Milosavljevic, for Slovinje in Lipljan

 6     municipality, UNMIK, the police in Kosovo, launched proceedings against

 7     some local Serbs.  5D1366 is the exhibit number, and we can see that

 8     those proceedings are still underway today in 2008; and they are still

 9     being conducted because General Lazarevic already on the 26th of April

10     asked for forensic pathologists to be brought in to review the matter,

11     draw up documentation, and on the basis of that documentation, UNMIK is

12     trying people in Kosovo but not members of the Army of Yugoslavia.  And

13     General Lazarevic said that teams should be called in because there were

14     indications that someone from the army had committed crimes.

15             Now, Your Honours, I'm going to cede the floor to my colleague

16     Mr. Cepic for his portion, and if I might be allowed ten minutes at the

17     very end to speak about the state of mind of my client and pursuant to

18     your decision.

19             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you, Mr. Bakrac.

20             Mr. Cepic.

21             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

22     Mr. President, members of the Trial Chamber, it is a privilege for me to

23     be able to present part of the closing arguments for the Defence team of

24     General Lazarevic.  As my colleague Mr. Bakrac said before me, I'm going

25     to deal with part of the Lukic final brief because there were certain

Page 27273

 1     statements made during the closing arguments.  So I'd like to start off

 2     with General Lukic's brief, and that portion of it, or rather,

 3     paragraph 353, in order to add something to a statement made in that

 4     section.

 5             Mention is made of Pauk, the Pauk group, within the frameworks of

 6     the Army of Yugoslavia, and I'd like to draw the attention of the

 7     Trial Chamber to General Stojanovic's testimony, Momir Stojanovic, and a

 8     reference in the transcript 1977 [as interpreted] to 19780, in which

 9     General Stojanovic explained that it was individuals who were received in

10     regular fashion to become members of the Army of Yugoslavia through

11     regular reception centres or collection centres and who as such were

12     deployed to units along the very border and at Kosare where it was most

13     difficult to defend the border line, individuals who had committed no

14     crimes and were later arrested for -- on other suspicions.

15             I'd also like to focus on paragraph 358 of that same brief, and

16     add to that the mention of Milan Jolovic is mentioned, a.k.a. Legenda.

17     I'd like to stress that no evidence was shown that a person with that

18     name and surname had ever taken part in any activities on the territory

19     of Kosmet relevant to the indictment.  In paragraph 465 and 466, the

20     Defence of General Lukic deals with reserve police units, or rather,

21     departments, and there was no precise answer under whose structure --

22     under whose authority they existed.  I would like to say that it is clear

23     from the evidence that we're dealing with structures within the

24     frameworks of the Ministry of the Interior; and, furthermore, the Defence

25     of General Lazarevic did show evidence indicating that certain problems

Page 27274

 1     did exist around the military recruits who were kept in reserve police

 2     departments.  And all this is explained in greater detail in paragraphs

 3     752 to 759 of our final brief, so the problems in relation to military

 4     recruits and how long this structure was in existence for, March, April,

 5     May, June of 1999.

 6             The next thing I'd like to point out is the following, civil

 7     defence and civil protection.  The Defence of General Lukic in 467,

 8     paragraph 467 onwards, especially 470, addresses that structure and

 9     quotes the words of General Gajic to the effect that the weapons were

10     stored in the Army of Yugoslavia depots.  Now, I'd like to stress with

11     respect to those allegations and the testimony of General Pantelic and a

12     statement which was under 3D1113, paragraph 30 of that exhibit where

13     General Pantelic clearly states that the ownership of the weapons used by

14     the army is the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the federal government

15     who owns the weapons, has ownership of the weapons.  And these statements

16     are borne-out by document 3D744, where it is clearly stated that the

17     administration for supplying the federal ministry must pass a decision

18     for -- in any case where weapons are handed over to someone else.

19             Then we have both Prosecution and Defence witnesses who confirmed

20     that we were dealing with independent structures.  I shall quote the

21     testimony of Prosecution witness Aleksandar Vasiljevic on page 8963 of

22     the transcript, General Farkas 16290 transcript page; and I'd just like

23     to mention that General Farkas before the security organs of the Army of

24     Yugoslavia was in the federal defence ministry and was best placed to

25     know about all these issues.

Page 27275

 1             Then I'd like to point out paragraph 648 of that same material

 2     where it speaks of the border belt and its authority.  I think there was

 3     an error in interpreting the authorisations in the border belt, who has

 4     what authority and what right to control the border belt; and, also, I'd

 5     like to point out provisions of the law in crossing state borders and

 6     movement along the border belt.  And they are Exhibit 3D1122.

 7             In Article 48, we clearly see that border military units are

 8     there to provide security for the state border and have control over the

 9     passage and movement of individuals in the border belt outside

10     settlements and border crossings in order to prevent unauthorised border

11     crossing, the crossing of the state border, and violations of the border

12     itself.

13             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Cepic, what is the error in interpreting or

14     where is the error in interpretation that you're referring to?

15             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] The error is in the interpretation of

16     this provision in paragraph 644, where it states that the overall border

17     belt is exclusively controlled by the forces of the Army of Yugoslavia;

18     however, by indicating --

19             JUDGE BONOMY:  Yes.  You mean it's an error in Mr. Lukic's

20     interpretation that you're criticising?

21             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely.

22             JUDGE BONOMY:  And is it paragraph 644 or 648?

23             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] In both paragraphs that is the

24     interpretation given.

25             JUDGE BONOMY:  Now, thank you.  We could return to that I think

Page 27276

 1     after the break, so we'll interrupt you at this point and resume at ten

 2     minutes to 11.00.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.

 5             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Cepic.

 6             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 7             Let me continue where I left off, authority within the border

 8     belt, and I quoted Article 48 of the Law on Crossing Borders and Movement

 9     in the Border Belt.  And now I'd like to quote provisions for that same

10     law, which says that control of crossing borders and passage and residing

11     in the border belt is done by the organs of the interior.  And it is

12     clearly concluded that outside built-up areas, it is the Army of

13     Yugoslavia that exercises control; whereas, in settlements within the

14     border belt along with border crossings and other tasks are performed by

15     the organs of the interior.  In addition, we saw examples in this case of

16     Kotlina, Ivaja, Zegra, and some other localities where the organs of the

17     interior performed their duties under their remit and authorisations.

18             And as to the humane conduct of members of the Yugoslav Army in

19     the border belt, we deal with that in our final brief, and I'd just like

20     to make a differentiation that was stressed by the Lukic Defence in their

21     final brief that we have examples on the casualties of a MUP patrol that

22     reported to General Delic -- or rather, a family that fell casualty

23     because of mines set along the road.

24             The Defence of General Lukic, in paragraph 779 of its final

25     brief, quotes the words of General Lazarevic to the effect that the

Page 27277

 1     command of the Pristina Corps had between 5 and 600 men, and I'd like to

 2     point out that reference where my client states that this relates to the

 3     main command post if you count the elements.  Elements, yes.  Now, what

 4     remains unclear is that elements along with the corps command are, in

 5     fact, the command -- company providing security, the reconnaissance

 6     company, and the signals company, and all the other units.  And all this

 7     is set out in detail in the instructions for the work of the commands and

 8     staff, and the exhibit was 5D1252 in points 43 to 76, where these

 9     elements of the command post are mentioned and set out.  Let me just add

10     not to 5 to 600 professional officers in a corps command.  How many would

11     the higher units have to have then, if that were the case?

12             I'm now going to look at the crime base.  My colleague Mr. Hannis

13     in his closing arguments, on pages 26920-26922, he spoke about Izbica and

14     said that the only forces in the field were the MUP forces and the forces

15     of the Army of Yugoslavia, and he showed us a diagram to that effect of

16     the movement of forces and all this in connection with the order of the

17     Pristina Corps which had the heading Joint Command and was in e-court as

18     P1968.

19             Now, I'd like to deal in brief with this and stress in particular

20     that in the area, there was a vast concentration of forces of the KLA;

21     and during the testimony of General Zivanovic, we heard claims and saw an

22     excerpt which was 5D1241, the exhibit number, the third video-clip in

23     order, and it was the celebrations in the village of Prekaze in the first

24     half of March 1999.  While the negotiations were going on in France, a

25     pompous parade was held of KLA forces in that locality with several

Page 27278

 1     hundred fighters marching past, parading past.  In a word, you can

 2     clearly see that the territory was under their control.

 3             We heard testimony about the action in that area by General

 4     Nikolic [as interpreted] and General Zivanovic as well as General Mandic.

 5     The Prosecutor omitted to indicate on the map the movement of forces of

 6     the Tactical Group 252 which went from the south to the north, probably

 7     wishing to show that the intention of the legitimate forces was to go

 8     from north to -- to expel from north to south the population, which does

 9     not correspond to the truth and the evidence presented.

10             The Prosecutor omitted to state that General Nikolic -- or

11     rather, let me be more precise.  He did say that we saw -- just a

12     correction on page 36, line 20.  It is General Dikovic not Nikolic,

13     Dikovic, D-i-k-o-v-i-c.

14             And the Prosecutor quotes Dikovic's combat report of the 28th of

15     March, 1999, where he is asking for instructions because of a possible

16     movement of civilians and then states that there was no report for the

17     following day.  And I'd like to indicate -- to show the Trial Chamber

18     evidence and exhibits which the Prosecutor tendered into evidence, P2047

19     and P2048, and they are combat reports of the following day from which we

20     can see quite clearly that General Dikovic in the region of Srbica was

21     there to take on a new assignment and that the forces were under his

22     command in another area, outside the area previously designated.

23             We explained all this in detail in our final brief, and I draw

24     Your Honours' attention to paragraphs 125 to 174 in our final brief.  I

25     also draw attention to the testimonies of General Dikovic, General

Page 27279

 1     Zivanovic, and the markings on the maps, C157 and C164.  I draw attention

 2     to the testimony of the members of the MUP, Sladjan Pantic, who in his

 3     testimony fully corroborated the axis of movement of General Dikovic's

 4     units and the fact that the forces of the Army of Yugoslavia returned

 5     above the village of Vocnjak and did not go any further.  They did not

 6     advance.

 7             Likewise, I wish to point out once more that the judicial organs

 8     of the Army of Yugoslavia after the discovery of mass graves took all the

 9     necessary action to illuminate what happened.  Djuro Blagojevic testified

10     to this, a witness here.  As to documents, P955 General Gojovic's report,

11     the report of army prosecutor General Pavkovic, Stanimir Radosavljevic,

12     4D171.  He was General Pakovic's Defence witness, that is.  And Djuro

13     Blagojevic's words to the effect that an investigation had been carried

14     out independently of the civilian judicial organs, and that it had been

15     established that there was no army participation in the alleged -- or

16     rather, in the incident in Izbica.

17             I now wish to speak about Orahovac, a location dealt with both by

18     the Prosecutor and General Lukic's Defence, the anti-terrorist action in

19     late March 1999.  The Prosecutor said that on transcript pages 26855 to

20     26859, and they refer to the order of the Pristina Corps command, P2015,

21     and the order of Colonel Bozidar Delic which is marked P1981.

22             General Lukic's Defence wishes to put forward an erroneous

23     interpretation of the words in the command -- in this order, saying that

24     it is issuing an order to the MUP forces, which according to our firm

25     belief cannot hold water.  If we look at that order carefully, we see

Page 27280

 1     that -- so the word "support" is wrongly defined, and the word

 2     "coordinated action."  If we look at this order carefully, we see quite

 3     clearly that tasks are issued exclusively to the forces of the Army of

 4     Yugoslavia and that coordinated action and support were to be carried out

 5     together with the MUP forces.  In this order, we see that support will be

 6     given to the 37th Detachment of the PJP, the 4th and 5th Company of the

 7     Djakovica and Prizren PJP.

 8             And now we arrive at a situation which indicates clearly that the

 9     army neither planned nor ordered -- issued orders to the members of the

10     MUP.  We heard the testimony of a protected witness who was a member of

11     quite a different unit of the PJP, a member of the 23rd Detachment of the

12     PJP, and who was a direct participant in this action.  He stated quite

13     explicitly that in that action only orders within the MUP chain of

14     command were obeyed.  We saw diagrams showing the deployment of the

15     forces of the 23rd Detachment.

16             Could we move into private session for a moment so I can give you

17     the references?

18             JUDGE BONOMY:  These are documents under seal, are they?

19             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] I believe so, Your Honour, but just

20     in case.  Yes, yes, they are.

21             JUDGE BONOMY:  Very well.  We shall go into private session.

22                           [Private session]

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 27281

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16                           [Open session]

17             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Cepic.

19             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

20             In the final brief of General Lukic's Defence, General Kosovac's

21     words are misquoted; that's paragraph 532.  He explained that there could

22     have been no resubordination because these were different structures,

23     both as regards command systems, recruitment systems, goals, and purpose,

24     different logistics, completely different, conditions of development; and

25     that's 15816 to 15817 in the transcript.

Page 27282

 1             Likewise, Major Mladenovic, a Defence witness for General

 2     Lazarevic, explained that as regards -- he was a judge, and he explains

 3     that as regards disciplinary responsibility, there could have been no

 4     resubordination because the documents governing sanctions and norms were

 5     quite different in numerous aspects.  I also wish to point to the

 6     testimony of MUP witnesses who said that they regretted there had been no

 7     resubordination.  Let me mention Witness Bogunovic, transcript 25132,

 8     25133; and Witness Damjanac, transcript 23763 and 23764; and where Judge

 9     Mladenovic explains this is transcript page 21245.

10             The Ministry of the Interior had its own training system, and

11     this is seen clearly from 6D1328, 6D370; and then planning and other

12     activities also differed, as can be seen from the minutes from the MUP

13     collegium.

14             What is also significant is that General Lazarevic's Defence and

15     other military defence teams, let me call them that, adduced a large

16     number of combat reports and interim reports of the units of the Army of

17     Yugoslavia, and not in a single one of these reports does it say that a

18     single MUP unit or a single member of the MUP was resubordinated at any

19     point in time throughout the relevant period and there were a large

20     number of these combat reports.

21             I now wish to draw attention to some technical points.

22     Paragraph 828, the Defence of General Lukic speaks about activities in

23     the Orahovac area, wishing to explain the movement of their forces

24     through a military port.  Colonel Vukovic is misquoted here.  He

25     allegedly said that the 4th Company of the 23rd Detachment had already

Page 27283

 1     moved through the village; but if we look at Vukovic's statement

 2     carefully, 5D1442, paragraph 22, this does not stand because Vukovic

 3     explained in paragraph 21 that when the military forces were moving

 4     through the village of Bela Crkva, there was a PJP unit there.  And let

 5     me remind Your Honours of (redacted)

 6     (redacted) and paragraph 840 of the submission.

 7             The witness was referring only to forces of the Army of

 8     Yugoslavia and not MUP forces in the village of Celina.

 9             I also wish to draw the Trial Chamber's attention to the numerous

10     documents presented by the Defence and referred to in its closing brief

11     concerning the humane treatment of civilians in the Orahovac area by the

12     MUP forces [as interpreted]; also documents of the 252nd Brigade, 5D --

13     we have an error in the transcript.

14             I was referring to the humane treatment of civilians by the army.

15     Inter alia, there are documents of the 252nd Brigade, 5D963, 964, 965,

16     973, 974; and a (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18     transcript page 9721, lines 12 to 20, where in response to a question by

19     the Presiding Judge, he quite clearly stated that members of the army in

20     that area behaved humanely.

21             General Lukic's Defence in connection with Suva Reka, paragraphs

22     882 and 883, also put forward erroneous claims because there were no

23     orders to the 37th Detachment, and we heard a protected witness who was a

24     member of the MUP who explained quite clearly that members of the VJ had

25     no connection with any activities in the town of Suva Reka in late March

Page 27284

 1     199 --

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not catch the year.

 3             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] And in Suva Reka in Belgrade before

 4     the war crimes chamber, there is a special trial now ongoing exclusively

 5     against members of the MUP.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  1999 was the year.

 7             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] I now wish to refer to a third

 8     location, the village of Belanica.  We heard quite a lot about the event

 9     in that area.  I wish to point out that the Defence of General Lukic

10     omitted to quote an order by the KLA leader, Colonel Bislim Zyrapi, he

11     was their chief, and the movement of their units.

12             What links three out of four orders with the heading "Joint

13     Command," joint command of the Pristina Corps, they had to do with the

14     crime base, and my colleague Mr. Bakrac spoke about this.  I ask the

15     Trial Chamber to pay special attention to the transcript of the testimony

16     of Bislim Zyrapi, especially transcript pages 5990 to 6008.

17             And if possible, could we have in e-court Exhibit P2447.  For the

18     sake of clarity, Colonel Zyrapi in his testimony clearly explains the

19     situation, the movement of the KLA forces, starting from the 24th or the

20     25th of March up to the 1st of April.

21             Can we zoom in on the map, please, and have it enlarged.  A

22     little more, please.  Thank you.

23             Colonel Zyrapi said that these zones that are marked here were

24     under the exclusive control of the KLA as well as other areas of the

25     territory.  And according to his testimony, he was in this southern

Page 27285

 1     portion marked here.  But if we start from the north, we will clearly see

 2     that this northern zone was under the control of the KLA and that the

 3     action, according to the words of Colonel Zyrapi and according to what

 4     the Defence witness said, was directed exclusively against those forces.

 5     Colonel Zyrapi went on to explain that in the northern area -- well,

 6     forces existed in the northern area.  He mentioned the 112th Brigade of

 7     the KLA, and this entire picture he substantiated through his testimony.

 8     Therefore, it is diametrically opposed to what the Prosecutor claims in

 9     his final brief.

10             As I was saying, diametrically opposed --

11             JUDGE BONOMY:  Just one moment, please, Mr. Cepic, there's a

12     matter I need to discuss with Mr. Haider.

13                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

14             JUDGE BONOMY:  Sorry about that, Mr. Cepic.  Please continue.

15             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

16             We have the northern section that we discussed, which is where

17     the village of Izbica is located, and the explanations of Colonel Zyrapi

18     that it was a matter of fighting between the KLA and the Serb forces, and

19     that the members of the KLA took with them the civilian population.  And

20     that is linked to the order, P1968, of the 24th of March, 1999.

21             Let's now move southward and the sectors that Colonel Zyrapi

22     denoted with the letters A, B, C, and D.  He clearly testified to the

23     action, the struggle between the Serb forces and the KLA and how it

24     evolved, starting with the most southerly part moving north and stresses

25     which villages were under KLA control, and says that throughout the time

Page 27286

 1     they were moving the civilian population.  They did that all the time.

 2     According to his testimony, once again, the civilian population was moved

 3     or moved at the village of Belanica.  A large collection of the

 4     population was rallied.  And Colonel Zyrapi issued an additional order

 5     for the movement of civilians, and it is P2457.  And in point 3 there, we

 6     see that express order.  All this coincides with the actions that were

 7     undertaken pursuant to orders P2015, an order referring exclusively to

 8     the forces of the Army of Yugoslavia, and P1969, in great detail and

 9     fully argued.

10             And not to take up too much time, I'd just briefly like to deal

11     with the shelling that was raised by Kravetz, Ms. Kravetz.  And the

12     Presiding Judge on 7959 of the transcript stressed in one of his

13     questions that we heard testimony about shelling in the courtroom but

14     that nobody could explain what the damages incurred were.  It is logical

15     to conclude that even if there was shelling, therefore, it was directed

16     exclusively against the positions of the KLA who were outside built-up

17     areas and not in settlements.  And closer reference is listed in our

18     final brief.

19             For Suva Reka and Belanica from paragraph 109 to 124 -- I've been

20     given the signal from my colleague that I should speed up.  So let me go

21     back to the map once again, Colonel Zyrapi's map, and all the actions and

22     all the movements here move from south to north, diametrically opposed to

23     what the Prosecution is claiming.

24             I'd now like to deal with Kacanik and Urosevac, and I'm going to

25     draw the Trial Chamber's attention to paragraphs 254 to 337 of the final

Page 27287

 1     brief of our Defence team and state that what General Lukic's Defence

 2     states in its brief that the villages of Slatina, Dubrava, and others

 3     were in the area of Defence of the 243rd Brigade is erroneously

 4     interpreted, that's not right.  I believe that the city of The Hague is

 5     in the area of defence of some unit of the Dutch army, for instance.  And

 6     the city of Belgrade, once again, was in the area of defence of some army

 7     unit or other.  However, what is being mixed up here is the area of

 8     deployment, the region of deployment, which are always outside inhabited

 9     areas or built-up areas, and General Krsman Jelic explained this on 19147

10     and 48 of the transcript; whereas, the area of defence is of a much

11     broader concept, and General Krsman Jelic drew that for us in IC 141.

12     And, anyway, we heard the testimony from people that investigations in

13     Kotlina, for example, done by the members of the MUP, as I say we

14     explained that in greater detail previously.

15             Now just very briefly, both the Prosecutor and the Defence of

16     General Lukic referred to the relationship between Colonel Zivanovic and

17     Colonel Gergar.  I'm just going to refer to an exhibit by Colonel Gergar

18     during the war.  It is 5D1329, Exhibit 1329, from which we can clearly

19     see that Colonel Gergar himself marked in the forces of the Army of

20     Yugoslavia, the units, et cetera, but he had no further knowledge for

21     other larger units.  And this is clearly shown on the basis of this map.

22     And with regard to the fourth order linked to the crime base, P1975,

23     Bajgora, while that action was underway, Colonel Gergar had to see to

24     about 15.000 civilians, take care of about 15.000 civilians.  And we deal

25     with this in our brief.  I'd just like to indicate PD 601, 5.9, where

Page 27288

 1     urgent food supplies are requested for the people, as well as the

 2     testimony of Colonel Savic, and this was confirmed by Prosecution

 3     witnesses about supplies and care in the village of Kicic.

 4             And just one more sentence -- a correction to the transcript, the

 5     exhibit is 5D615.  5D615 was the previous exhibit number.

 6             I shall briefly deal with Meja, and I draw the Trial Chamber's

 7     attention to the extensive explanations provided by our team and what

 8     Mr. Bakrac emphasized in the paragraphs of our brief.  And I'd just like

 9     to correct something said in paragraphs 1318 of the final brief of

10     General Lukic's Defence where they interpreted the words of Colonel

11     Jevtovic wrongly.

12             And, finally, to wind up, the legal basis for the activity and

13     actions of the forces was clearly stressed previously.  I would just like

14     to challenge the claims made, or rather, put right the claims made in

15     General Lukic's defence brief, wherein paragraph 691 they claim that

16     during the war, that we have the basis for the work of the MUP.  It is

17     the Law on Defence, 985, 5985 [as interpreted]; however, the

18     interpretation of that is wrong.  It is not correct because it does not

19     derogate the basic law for action of the Ministry of the Interior, and it

20     is Exhibit P1737 that is relevant there.

21             And I'd like to draw your attention to provision 1 of that same

22     document which states that the internal affairs are determined by law and

23     the republican organs ensure the security of the republic through their

24     activities and the security of the citizens and ensure that the

25     constitution and laws establishing other citizens' rights are carried

Page 27289

 1     through.  The internal affairs of the state administration is conducted

 2     by the MUP.

 3             On the other hand, the constitution of the Federal Republic of

 4     Yugoslavia ascribes quite a different task to the Army of Yugoslavia, and

 5     we have 1D139 as being the relevant exhibit there which states that the

 6     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has an army which defends the sovereignty

 7     of its territory and the independence and constitutional order of the

 8     country.

 9             Your Honours, thank you for listening to me with such great

10     attention.  It was a privilege for me to be part of the General Lazarevic

11     Defence team.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you, Mr. Cepic.

13             Mr. Bakrac.

14             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] With your permission, Your Honours,

15     I'd like to take up these ten minutes that are left to us to summarize

16     the mens rea of General Lazarevic as to whether he was conscious of the

17     existence of any plan and whether in a possible plan of that kind he took

18     part consciously.  We maintain -- our position this:  We maintain that in

19     view of the evidence that we drew the Trial Chamber's attention to, there

20     was no plan, no plan existed, and that General Lazarevic could not have

21     taken part in it therefore.

22             My learned friend Mr. Hannis, in his closing arguments of the

23     20th of this month, stressed that we heard numerous witnesses testifying

24     in court here and that they all deny the existence of the plan for three

25     reasons, one of the reasons being, as Mr. Hannis referred to Witness

Page 27290

 1     Mijatovic, that a large number of witnesses, military officers, did not

 2     know of the existence of a plan, they were not told of the existence of a

 3     plan, and they were not in a position to be acquainted with any such

 4     plan.

 5             We'd like to draw the Trial Chamber's attention to the fact that

 6     General Lazarevic's Defence witnesses for the most part were officers who

 7     were occupying positions of brigade commanders immediately subordinate to

 8     General Lazarevic.  Now, had a plan of any kind existed and if General

 9     Lazarevic took part consciously in any such plan, those witnesses are

10     precisely the sole individuals through which General Lazarevic would have

11     been in a position of putting that plan into effect.  They were

12     immediately subordinated to him.  If they knew about the plan and took

13     part in the plan, then it was through the brigade commanders that that

14     plan would necessarily have had to be implemented.

15             Now, since the Prosecutor himself puts through his case and his

16     thesis and assertions that many of them did not know of the existence of

17     a plan or were not in a position to learn of its existence, then there

18     was a greater burden of proof -- there is a greater burden of proof on

19     the Prosecutor himself to prove that General Lazarevic was part of a

20     plan, took part in the plan, knew about the plan, and put into effect the

21     plan.  To have assertions is not enough.  The assertion that General

22     Lazarevic at the relevant time for the indictment was commander of the

23     Pristina Corps is just not sufficient to do that.

24             As to the mens rea of General Lazarevic, his state of mind, his

25     participation in the plan, the Prosecution has not offered up a shred of

Page 27291

 1     evidence to show that.

 2             I call upon the Trial Chamber - and I'm going to skip over some

 3     concrete examples here - I'd like to remind the Trial Chamber of the

 4     testimony of General Lazarevic himself when Judge Bonomy noticed that at

 5     one point we travelled through numerous which showed orders for seeing

 6     and caring for the civilian population, orders issuing cautions to

 7     subordinate units to behave humanely towards the civilians and to show

 8     full respect for humanitarian law, and to do their utmost to take every

 9     effort to ensure that the civilian population were properly treated in a

10     humane way and in a proper manner.

11             And I'd like here to indicate and draw your attention

12     to paragraphs 845 to 921, and I'd like to ask the Trial Chamber to look

13     into these exhibits in great detail; and from all of them, we can see

14     that care and attention paid by General Lazarevic to the civilian

15     population, his concerns for the civilian population.  And the evidence

16     and exhibits are dated from mid-March, the second half of March, from the

17     very beginning of April; therefore, the exhibits show that from the very

18     outset of the war, General Lazarevic paid great care about conduct

19     towards the civilian population.

20             And I'd especially like to point out to the Trial Chamber the

21     fact that General Lazarevic insisted in Exhibit PD365 [as interpreted],

22     points 3, 4, and 5, that the subordinate units -- he demanded that the

23     subordinate units provide for the unimpeded engagement and work of the

24     military investigating organs and the judiciary, and that all members of

25     the corps should adhere strictly to international humanitarian law and

Page 27292

 1     all the orders of the Pristina Corps to date.  In the same order, it is

 2     requested that help be provided for the return of displaced persons;

 3     P2029, point 4 also indicates this.

 4             It should also be stressed, and this can be seen from P1306, that

 5     General Lazarevic issued a special order demanding that in all units of

 6     the Pristina Corps, Special Forces be formed to look after the civilian

 7     population, and they are ordered to find out the numbers of displaced

 8     civilians in the areas where the units are deployed in order to provide

 9     sufficient foodstuffs for the population and other necessities of life.

10     That's P1306.

11             And to avoid repetition, there are numerous exhibits showing that

12     General Lazarevic was careful to ensure that his units treated civilians

13     humanely, and that they returned them to the villages and towns from

14     which they had been displaced.  And I wish to draw Your Honours'

15     attention to 5D372, where General Lazarevic orders his subordinate units,

16     and I quote that:  "The return of the civilian population to their towns

17     and villages from which they had moved out should be speeded up."  He

18     asks the brigade commanders not to allow the civilian population to be in

19     places where refugees gather, but that they should be returned to the

20     places from which they had fled.  So he is not carrying out a plan to

21     expel them; on the contrary, he's demanding that civilians be returned to

22     the towns and villages from which they had fled due to the fighting.

23             There is numerous evidence also which this Defence has tried to

24     show were not just something on paper, that the subordinate units

25     actually did implement these orders, and that they reported to General

Page 27293

 1     Lazarevic about the way in which his orders were being implemented.

 2             And, finally, let me say that all the exhibits we have mentioned

 3     indicate that the accused General Lazarevic legitimately believed and had

 4     reason to believe that as the corps commander, he was fighting to

 5     preserve the sovereignty and integrity of his country, and the most

 6     impressive piece of evidence for this assertion for the Defence was

 7     provided by the Prosecutor, in fact.  The Prosecution office which

 8     brought an insider witness from the VJ, K-73, who said that General

 9     Lazarevic was someone all the officers thought highly of, that they

10     considered him a professional soldier, a good, honest, and honourable

11     man, and a strong commander.  In the opinion of this witness, General

12     Lazarevic was never a politician or a careerist.  He was a military

13     leader, a soldier who was defending his country.

14             Let me remind Your Honours that this witness asked the Chamber

15     for permission to address General Lazarevic directly; and on that

16     occasion, he said that it had been an honour for him to serve his country

17     under the command of General Lazarevic.

18             Your Honours, bearing in mind all the evidence to which the

19     Defence has pointed in its closing arguments and final brief, we propose

20     and we move that the Trial Chamber acquit General Lazarevic of all

21     responsibility in relation to all the counts of the indictment.

22             Thank you, Your Honours, for allowing me extra time for my

23     closing arguments.

24             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you, Mr. Bakrac.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 27294

 1             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Hannis, do you envisage asking to address us

 2     further?

 3             MR. HANNIS:  I do, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE BONOMY:  Have you any idea of the extent of that?

 5             MR. HANNIS:  I'll try to be very short because --

 6             JUDGE BONOMY:  No, I'm not asking you to be very short.  I'm just

 7     asking you if you can give me some guidance on what you envisage.

 8             MR. HANNIS:  Well, right now, in light of what's been said, maybe

 9     an hour, and there may be some more after Mr. Lukic.

10             JUDGE BONOMY:  All right.  Thank you very much.

11             And be clear that we do wish you to address anything that you

12     feel, in light of all that's been said, ought to be drawn to our

13     attention without having too close regard to the issue of timing at this

14     late stage in the proceedings.

15             We have to adjourn now and that will have to be until tomorrow,

16     I'm afraid, because I'm told all the courtrooms will be fully occupied

17     this afternoon.  Tomorrow, the sitting time is 2.15.  If at a reasonable

18     time we were to discover that the morning was available, then you would

19     be notified in the hope that we could re-arrange things; but as presently

20     advised, that is unlikely and therefore we adjourn now until 2.15

21     tomorrow.

22                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.48 a.m.,

23                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 26th day of

24                           August, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.