Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27295

 1                           Tuesday, 26 August 2008

 2                           [Lukic Defence Closing Statement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           [The Accused Pavkovic and Lazarevic not present]

 6                           --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

 7             JUDGE BONOMY:  Good afternoon, everyone.  We can now proceed to

 8     hear the closing arguments on behalf of Mr. Lukic.

 9             Mr. Lukic.

10             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.  At the beginning I just want

11     to say that me and my colleague Ivetic divided our work, so at the

12     beginning I will do my part and after that, Mr. Ivetic will probably do

13     the major part of our closing arguments.

14             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

15             MR. LUKIC:  And because of the speed, I'll speak in Serbian and

16     because of the speed Mr. Ivetic will speak in English.

17             [Interpretation] So once again, good day, Your Honours.  The

18     Defence of Mr. Lukic will attempt to put forward in a brief outline its

19     case; and to begin with, I would like to refer to what my colleagues have

20     already spoken about, the plan, the alleged plan, to expel Albanians.  I

21     think that my colleagues from the other Defence teams have provided

22     numerous arguments.  I will deal with a small segment of this issue, and

23     what I wish to add is the following.

24             It is not contested that before all of these events Serbia was a

25     signatory of the Dayton Accords, which referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 27296

 1     Those accords were signed in 1995 when hostilities ceased in this former

 2     Yugoslav republic.

 3             Annex 7 of those accords refers to the return of refugees and

 4     displaced persons.  Can one imagine that someone who had direct

 5     experience with war, the departure and return of refugees in his

 6     immediate neighbourhood could imagine that the same rules would not apply

 7     to him?  Can anyone in their right mind think that Slobodan Milosevic did

 8     not know that refugees, should there be any refugees, would not return to

 9     their homes once hostilities ceased?  To me, it doesn't seem like common

10     sense.

11             The participants in this agreement were inter alia Slobodan

12     Milosevic and Wesley Clark, so there was nothing unknown on that terrain.

13     Everything had already been a subject of long-term negotiations,

14     agreements, treaties, and the implementation of all this.  Up to the

15     outbreak of war in Serbia in 1999, most of the refugees from Bosnia and

16     Herzegovina who wanted to had returned to their homes.  International

17     organizations were helping to rebuild their homes and to enable

18     sustainable return.  One should know that the Dayton Accords of 1999 were

19     a daily topic in the Serbian media, as they were a daily topic in the

20     media of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and it was also something that those who had

21     fled to Serbia from Bosnia spoke about every day and they intended to

22     return to Bosnia.  So these accords were discussed in Serbia daily.

23             The return of refugees from Serbia to Bosnia was a Serbian

24     problem, so this was what was happening in 1998 and 1999 on a daily basis

25     in Serbia.

Page 27297

 1             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Lukic, do we have any evidence of this?

 2             MR. LUKIC:  I don't think that --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Line 7, would

 4     return, not would not return.

 5             MR. LUKIC:  -- it's commonly known fact.

 6             JUDGE BONOMY:  Well, it's certainly not a commonly known fact to

 7     me, but if there is evidence it would be helpful if you could point to

 8     it.

 9             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour, I'll try to do it when

10     Mr. Ivetic continues his part, I'll try to find it.  Thank you.

11             [Interpretation] According to the Prosecutor, someone had the

12     bright idea of expelling Albanians but first they said, Let's provoke

13     NATO to bomb us.  That is not a case which our Defence finds at all

14     credible.  I will paraphrase now and deal with what was achieved by the

15     alleged plan to expel Albanians according to the Prosecutor.

16             According to the Prosecutor, the expulsion was already completed

17     for the most part in mid-April 1999, a third of the Albanians had been

18     expelled and now there were only five times more Albanians than there

19     were Serbs, while before there were eight times more.  Does this sound

20     credible?  How has this changed the ethnic balance in favour of Serbs and

21     what sort of balance has been achieved.  Witness Haxhibeqiri said,

22     referring to Djakovica, that there were two to three per cent Serbs in

23     Djakovica, so how many Albanians would have to be expelled from Djakovica

24     in order to establish an ethnic balance.  The Prosecutor has failed to

25     show this and he has failed to show that this was done.

Page 27298

 1             The next point I wish the Chamber to pay attention to is the

 2     following.  Wouldn't it be logical for Serbs to expel Albanians from

 3     those parts of Kosovo where there was no KLA, from those parts where they

 4     were allegedly not protected?  Why would the Serbs be expelling Albanians

 5     from areas where there was the highest concentration of KLA?  What sort

 6     of logic is that?  Who in their right minds would push their people to

 7     get killed when they could do this, whatever they wanted to do, elsewhere

 8     with no problems at all?

 9             Now I would like to move on to the main topic of our Defence

10     case, and that is the MUP staff and Exhibit P1505, which is a decision on

11     the establishment of the staff dated the 16th of June, 1998.  By means of

12     this document, the Prosecutor wishes to show who were members of the

13     staff and what the tasks of the staff were.  Our Defence says the

14     following.  This document never came to life, either as regards personnel

15     or as regards functioning.

16             Numerous witnesses have testified about these circumstances and

17     written evidence has also been presented which clearly shows that this

18     decision never came to life.  We dealt with this in paragraph 690 to 785

19     of our final brief, and the OTP dealt with it in paragraphs 208 to 211 of

20     their final brief.  In the course of this trial we have heard the

21     testimony of Mijatovic, Adamovic, we have seen documents on the

22     appointment and the termination of duties of some persons, and those are

23     6D1044 to 6D1052.

24             We will prove, and I think we have proved - but we will show this

25     today - that the members of the staff from the first page of the decision

Page 27299

 1     did not include David Gajic; Radoslav Djinovic; Milorad Lukovic, Legija;

 2     and Zivko Trajkovic.  You can see that from the testimony of Miroslav

 3     Mijatovic.  We saw that while the staff existed there were personnel

 4     changes in the composition of the staff more than once.  No decision was

 5     issued about that in terms of establishing the staff.  So this is a

 6     legally imperfect situation but it was what it was.  We saw that at the

 7     outset.

 8             After the issuing of this decision, Miroslav Mijatovic arrived.

 9     In the summer of 1998 Dusko Adamovic arrived, after the decision had

10     already been issued, and Desimir Slovic also arrived.  The three of them

11     were members of the staff according to what Miroslav Mijatovic, Dusko

12     Adamovic, and Radovan Vucurevic said.  We see this from the personnel

13     decisions.  For example, Radoslav Djinovic on the 19th of June, 1998,

14     stopped being deployed in Kosovo.  We saw that Dusko Adamovic left Kosovo

15     because he was wounded when the staff was bombed, although this is not

16     mentioned in this decision, he is not mentioned, and he left according to

17     the decision of the 1st of April, but as Vucurevic said, they already

18     left on the 20th of March, the same day when they were wounded.

19             On the 29th of March, Desimir Slovic also left Kosovo, and he

20     again is not mentioned in this decision, and he was a member of the staff

21     and was wounded when the staff was bombed.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Line 17, the 29th of

23     March, not the 20th.

24             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] On the 15th of February before this

25     bombing, Novica Zdravkovic left.  So as of the 15th of February, he was

Page 27300

 1     no longer a member of the staff and he was replaced by Tomislav

 2     Blagojevic.

 3             After they left, that is, Adamovic, Slovic, and Vucurevic, on the

 4     29th of March Milenko Arsenijevic took their place as did Petar

 5     Bogdanovic and Voja Gucic.  In Mijatovic's testimony and in our final

 6     brief the documents speaking to this are enumerated.  We are convinced

 7     that we have managed to prove that the decision of the 16th of June,

 8     1998, to establish the MUP staff never came to life as regards unifying

 9     the state security and public security departments within the staff.  And

10     that we have proved that David Gajic and Milorad Lukovic, Legija, were

11     not members of the staff; and this was confirmed by all the members of

12     the staff who testified here.  This is also evident from documents.  When

13     members of the staff are listed in documents, especially members of the

14     state security, for example, P1099 and P2085.

15             We proved that Zivko Trajkovic, the commander of the SAJ, was not

16     a member of the staff either.  All the members of the staff confirmed

17     this, witness Joksic on transcript page 22026, and this was confirmed by

18     Radovan Vucurevic on page 23056 of the transcript.  Milos Vojnovic on

19     page 24148.  We also see this from the statement of Dusko Adamovic in

20     6D1613, paragraph 7; then Bozidar Filic on page 23949 and 23965 of the

21     transcript.

22             The next point that has to do with the staff personnel are the

23     members of the SUP -- the chiefs of SUP and the chiefs of the state

24     security department.  We are convinced that we have managed to prove in

25     the course of these proceedings that the chiefs of the SUPs and the

Page 27301

 1     chiefs of the state security departments in Kosovo and Metohija were not

 2     members of the staff, although that's what it says in the decision on

 3     establishing the staff.  According to this decision, the members of the

 4     extended staff would include those persons but that they were not members

 5     of the staff was also confirmed by Cvetic Ljubinko on transcript page

 6     8146, and this can be seen from Exhibits P1099 and P2805.

 7             It's clear then that the decision on establishing the staff never

 8     came to life as regards personnel.  Mr. Lukic's Defence has dealt with

 9     this in its final brief in paragraphs 731 to 755.  In point 2 in the same

10     decision, the tasks of the staff are listed and when the OTP describes

11     the tasks of the staff it relies on this decision exclusively without

12     analysing the other evidence adduced in the course of these proceedings.

13     We dealt with this in paragraph 756 to 766 of our final brief, our

14     closing brief.

15             During the proceedings here, we have shown that this situation,

16     that is, that the staff never began to function in the way envisaged by

17     the decision on the forming of the staff for the reason that terrorism in

18     Kosovo and Metohija had escalated to such an extent that a five-stage

19     plan for fighting against terrorism had been adopted at the state level.

20     And the authority to plan activities in relation to anti-terrorist action

21     was removed from the MUP and given to the Army of Yugoslavia.

22             After the global five-stage plan for the fight against terrorism

23     was adopted, which was drawn up by the Pristina Corps according to

24     Djakovic, who testified here, the planning of individual -- joint actions

25     was carried out by the Pristina Corps according to Witness Djakovic, and

Page 27302

 1     the excerpts on the maps were delivered to the MUP staff or directly to

 2     the PJP detachments.  And on the basis of this, the PJP detachments went

 3     into action.  The MUP staff neither amended or modified these plans in

 4     any way.  It simply forwarded them to the PJP units, as testified by

 5     Witness Dusko Adamovic.

 6             We have shown and proved that not a single plan for the carrying

 7     out of joint actions of the police and the army was drawn up in the

 8     staff.  To say the least, the OTP and the Defence teams of the military

 9     generals, in spite of all their attempts, have not succeeded in proving

10     such a case.  No one has ever seen such a document ever because there is

11     no such document in existence.

12             In the course of these proceedings, attempts were made to say

13     that 6D716 was drawn up in the MUP staff because it says "MUP command" on

14     it.  But Mile Djakovic confirmed that he compiled this document and that

15     it is not, in fact, an order, simply a document showing something.  This

16     role of the staff as regards planning, the planning of anti-terrorist

17     actions, that is, seemed incredible at the beginning of our Defence case

18     and His Honour Judge Bonomy asked whether this meant that the staff was

19     simply a letter box.  The claims made by Mijatovic who told the Chamber

20     that they would get more information about this from Adamovic, and this

21     was confirmed by Dusko Adamovic himself.

22             But we still think that our witnesses were not given credence at

23     that point.  The reason for this is that many testimonies from military

24     witnesses about this were heard and they all explained what it was that

25     Mile Djakovic was doing and they all claimed that it was the MUP that

Page 27303

 1     made the orders and the excerpts on the maps, those who testified to

 2     this.  But no one except Stefanovic finally confirmed that it was

 3     possible that some excerpts on the maps were sent to the MUP staff.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters note that there is a sudden

 5     echo in the room.  Could that be seen to.  Thank you.

 6             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Milan Djakovic confirmed that all the

 7     excerpts on the map were made by the Pristina Corps and sent to the MUP

 8     staff.  He was shown maps for detachment level and PJP company level,

 9     both for 1998 and for 1999, and he confirmed that they were all compiled

10     by the Pristina Corps staff in which he himself worked, or rather, people

11     who worked for him.  The excerpts on the maps were produced for the SAJ

12     and JSO, and this can be seen from the following exhibits in this case:

13     4D495, 6D619, 6D1620, 6D1621; and for SAJ:  5D1329.

14             Zivaljevic explained when testifying before this Trial Chamber

15     that the commanders of the detachments could not plan actions if

16     nothing -- for no other reason than for technical reasons.  Not only did

17     they not have the necessary knowledge, for example, Zivaljevic had not

18     attended military academy at all, but the MUP detachments had no staffs.

19     So quite simply there wasn't anybody who could do that, and this is to be

20     found on the transcript page 24820/12 to 19.

21             Witness Ilic in response to a question from Mr. Bakrac explained

22     that nobody in the police force had the necessary knowledge to plan any

23     kind of action which went beyond the level of a company and this is to be

24     found on transcript page 24359/21 to T24360/4.

25             Furthermore, we showed that neither the staff nor Sreten Lukic

Page 27304

 1     commanded PJP units on the ground nor did they lead any anti-terrorist

 2     actions.  The PJP had a separate structure from the staff and all

 3     commanders of the PJP from top to bottom, including the commander of the

 4     PJP himself, throughout the actions were in the territory of Kosovo and

 5     Metohija, both in 1998 and in 1999.  And there were a large number of

 6     documents and testimonies to bear that out, and this is particularly

 7     dealt with in paragraphs 676 to 773 of our brief.

 8             When the PJP commander on the ground -- was on the ground, then I

 9     assume it is clear that there can be no parallel command.  Who would

10     meddle in any of this from outside?

11             Communication means necessary for commanding units were not

12     accessible to the staff and we heard testimony about this by Defence

13     Witness Deretic and this particularly refers to 1999 when the MUP staff

14     had no means of communication whatsoever in Kosovo and Metohija except

15     for a courier service.  It was not possible to command units of the

16     courier service.  They had to have communication devices in order to

17     maintain communications, so even if they had wanted to - and they

18     certainly did not - and even if they were authorised - and they certainly

19     were not - the members of the staff would not have been able to command

20     the combat units of the MUP.

21             We provided to the Court and the Prosecution all the daily

22     reviews of the events compiled by the MUP staff, all of them, from July

23     1998 right up until the 20th of June, 1999.  I apologise, I meant to say

24     the 10th of June, 1999.  They are not all exhibits in this case but they

25     can be easily checked out because the Prosecution has them and the

Page 27305

 1     Trial Chamber has them, and we maintain, the Defence of Mr. Lukic

 2     maintains that not in a single one of them is there a report from the PJP

 3     on combat actions, not in a single one of them.  Of course all this holds

 4     true for the daily reviews that are part of the documents in this case.

 5             A decision to set up the staff and headquarters did not come into

 6     effect when it came to the staff guiding and coordinating the work of MUP

 7     units in KiM, SUPs, MUPs, border police stations all come under those

 8     work organization units.  During proceedings we showed the way in which

 9     planning worked, we showed in which the way leadership worked, and in

10     which way reporting worked within MUP, and by the same token within the

11     SUP in Kosovo and Metohija it is clear that the staff is not present in

12     any segment of planning and leadership for the work of SUP and smaller

13     organizational units.

14             The only field where the staff does appear is the field of

15     reporting.  You will not find the staff anywhere else outside the

16     reporting field, and we see that the staff was informed from the ministry

17     downwards, so from top to bottom, and in parallel fashion when the SUP

18     were informed, and from bottom to the top by the SUPs from Kosovo and

19     Metohija in parallel fashion and up to the head seat of the ministry.

20     And this is evidenced in P1044.

21             And linked to that, the Prosecution in its final brief provided

22     us with a schematic of MUP, a diagram produced by Philip Coo, before any

23     evidence was produced.  This diagram has nothing to do with reality and

24     does not reflect the actual situation and therefore cannot be used for

25     any purposes or in any sense.

Page 27306

 1             The Prosecution in claiming that the staff, and thereby Sreten

 2     Lukic was in a position of superiority to the police in Kosovo and

 3     Metohija, claimed that the staff was in fact the ministry in small.  The

 4     staff should have been paralleled with the provincial secretariat for the

 5     interior, and we heard that that secretariat had a thousand employees,

 6     whereas the staff just had ten members or even less.  The number of

 7     policemen, while the provisional secretariat was in existence, was almost

 8     the same as the number of policemen that existed in 1999 and 1998; and we

 9     heard testimony about this from Bozidar Filic.

10             Therefore, with the establishment of the staff the chains of

11     planning were not interrupted of leadership and reporting within the

12     frameworks of MUP.  The staff and not Sreten Lukic either had effective

13     control over the police in Kosovo and Metohija in the critical period.

14             I should like to stress that the -- neither the staff nor Sreten

15     Lukic were able to initiate disciplinary measures and proceedings against

16     members of the MUP, they had no role in any of that and could not have

17     had and could not have taken part in any of that, neither the staff nor

18     Sreten Lukic, either in criminal proceedings or in misdemeanour

19     proceedings against policemen in Kosovo and Metohija.  There were many,

20     many documents to bear this out, 6D464, 6D1339, 6D1340, 6D1343, 6D1344,

21     6D1345, 6D1346, and so on and so forth.  There are many documents

22     testifying to this that speak about disciplinary measures and criminal

23     proceedings.

24             This general area is regulated in detail by provisions, so we

25     cannot accept the claims of the Prosecution that Sreten Lukic was a

Page 27307

 1     general and therefore, by the same token, he must have wielded influence.

 2     There is nothing like that in the police force.  It's a well-ordered

 3     system.  It is a system ordered by provisions, and each person's power

 4     and authority are precisely determined.  You can't say that somebody

 5     certainly has influence or certainly does not have influence.

 6             Even a Prosecution witness by the name of Cvetic confirmed that

 7     the MUP staff had nothing whatsoever to do with these procedures and

 8     therefore need not have even been informed about any of this, and this is

 9     to be found on transcript page 8152.  Only with lacking this segment in

10     the hands of the staff and Sreten Lukic, we clearly see that there was no

11     effective control by the staff.  Had they had everything else in their

12     hands, if they were not able to initiate proceedings to take disciplinary

13     measures, then they could not have had effective control.

14             Furthermore, neither the MUP staff nor Sreten Lukic could have

15     appointed anyone or relieved anyone of their duties, that is to say

16     policemen in Kosovo and Metohija, they were not able to replace a single

17     policeman.  And we deal with this in our brief paragraph 675 to 685.  And

18     there's another essential point.  The MUP staff is not an organizational

19     unit of the MUP either, it does not have the authorisation or rights of

20     an ordinary organizational unit.  A part of SUP, the territorial part of

21     SUP, is an organizational unit, the staff is not.

22             During these proceedings we have seen a number of minutes from

23     meetings held in the MUP staff and that's what it said, they weren't

24     staff meetings.  The only minutes from a staff meeting is the minutes

25     that are denoted as P3120, dated the 23rd of July, 1998, and these

Page 27308

 1     minutes from the meetings held in the MUP staff were held once a month,

 2     as the Prosecutor noted himself.  Now, can -- could one command an action

 3     by holding meetings just once a month?  Would that be feasible?  Is that

 4     the way in which actions were commanded?  And that's what we find in the

 5     Prosecution's final brief in paragraph 214.

 6             All the meetings in 1999 during the war were attended by Obrad

 7     Stevanovic.  He was in Kosovo and Metohija and had all the authority from

 8     the minister as being his assistant, and it was as if the minister had

 9     attended those meetings.  Now, we brought a police -- we brought an

10     expert for police matters.  The Prosecution failed to do that.  They

11     couldn't find anybody to claim what they were saying, not even Babovic

12     they couldn't even bring Babovic in, and they challenged the credibility

13     of our expert and they say that he didn't deal with the police in Kosovo

14     in his work.

15             Nobody dealt with the police in Kosovo at that time because

16     nothing like that existed at that time.  What did exist was the police of

17     the Republic of Serbia.  The Republic of Kosovo did not exist and by the

18     same token the police of Kosovo did not exist in 1998 and 1999.  It

19     simply did not exist and nobody dealt with those matters because the body

20     did not exist.

21             I'd now like to discuss the importance of Sreten Lukic's role.

22     Many people testified here about that.  Now, if some people from outside

23     were to observe Sreten Lukic -- well, it would depend how they viewed

24     him, in what field, in what area.  If they looked at him as somebody who

25     provided information, then he appeared important because that was his

Page 27309

 1     job.  It was his job to know about the security situation in Kosovo.  In

 2     1998 he sent feedback information to the SUPs, he sent back information,

 3     the information he had gathered, to the SUPs in Kosovo and the

 4     headquarters in Belgrade.  Once the war broke out, that was no longer

 5     possible so the information was just sent to MUP headquarters in

 6     Belgrade.

 7             However, if observers met him in conditions where decisions were

 8     called for, then they would have gained the impression that his function

 9     and post carried no weight at all.  For example, Aleksandar Vasiljevic, a

10     Prosecution witness, has told you here that he was not the number one man

11     but the number ten man.  He said this referring to his role in the middle

12     of the war, and during that time the OTP claims that Lukic was the senior

13     officer of MUP in Kosovo and Metohija.  And Vasiljevic was testifying

14     about the 1st of June, 1999.  Later on the Prosecution changed this and

15     said that Lukic was the highest appointed official in Kosovo and

16     Metohija.

17             Obrad Stevanovic, when he arrives in Kosovo and Metohija or any

18     other functionary from the headquarters or Dragan Ilic, general, the head

19     of the criminal -- the crime police, he was the be-all and end-all.  They

20     were the ones who decided what was going to be done.  They didn't ask

21     Sreten Lukic, they didn't report to him.  They would inform him if they

22     wanted to do so on a need-to-know basis; if not, they wouldn't.  General

23     Ojdanic as the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command describes him as an

24     adjutant in the middle of the war on the 11th of April, 1999, and this is

25     to be found in Exhibit 3D1125 on page 75.

Page 27310

 1             Sakic claims that Protic told him that Lukic didn't give him an

 2     apartment when he was chief of the public security department and that he

 3     was the fifth wheel again and second violin and this is to be found on

 4     transcript page 22156.  After the war Sreten Lukic was appointed to a

 5     post where a colonel -- the rank of colonel would have been sufficient,

 6     whereas he had the rank of lieutenant-general.  Naumann doesn't remember

 7     Lukic having been present at meetings at all and this is to be found in

 8     the transcript on page 8378.

 9             Judge Bonomy, you asked him:  "Was Mr. Lukic present at any of

10     these meetings?"

11             And he says:  "I don't remember."

12             The agreement and the annex was signed by Djordjevic and Byrnes,

13     and it is something that exclusively refers to Kosovo and Metohija.  This

14     annex relates specifically to KiM.  We will see that at meetings Gajic

15     was separately informed from Lukic and he was subordinate to him.  It

16     would be sufficient if Lukic were to report for both of them, surely.

17     Abrahams doesn't write to Lukic, doesn't write letters to Lukic in 1998.

18     Dimitrijevic doesn't claim that for Kosovo and Metohija Lukic was the

19     main person.  So if we look at the segment of decision-making and

20     leadership, then there's no staff there and there's certainly no Lukic

21     there either.

22             And this brings us to why the new government decided to as the

23     take is to include Sreten Lukic in the security department and

24     Mr. Zivkovic testified to that, the former premier, and he explained the

25     type of information they required both from domestic and foreign

Page 27311

 1     intelligence agents and agencies.

 2             The OTP attempts to draw an inference from 1998 to 1999.  They

 3     say that what happened in 1998 certainly happened in 1999 also, and we

 4     say this is not correct and that the evidence shows it is not correct.

 5     Some of the elements which certainly cannot relate to both time-periods

 6     are the following.

 7             As we know, on the 24th of March, 1999, the NATO air-strikes

 8     began.  This was something that was not happening in 1998.  A state of

 9     war was declared and this means that there was specific circumstances

10     such as mobilisation which did not obtain before.  Some laws and bylaws

11     came into force which were not in force in peacetime.  The numbers of the

12     KLA increased from 18.000, it increased greatly and the KLA began

13     forcible mobilisation.  In 1999 the KLA was much better organized and

14     Mr. Byrnes worked a lot on that.  He worked on the organization of the

15     KLA, they were better armed.  And this was done for the most part during

16     the stay of the KVM in Kosovo.  The KLA took territory and was preparing

17     for a spring offensive and for cooperation with NATO.  And we heard in

18     the course of these proceedings that they did cooperate, that they did

19     provide NATO with information.  In Rule 70 documents we saw the manner in

20     which this was done, we saw how they sent information to the other side

21     which was bombing Serbia regarding the precision and success of the

22     air-strikes.

23             In 1999 urban terrorism escalated.  It should be observed that

24     NATO was bombing columns of civilians returning to their houses, to their

25     homes, in Korisa and Bistrazin.  Not a single column leaving the country

Page 27312

 1     was bombed.  Not a single bridge, road, or railway leading out of the

 2     country towards Macedonia or Albania from Kosovo and Metohija was bombed,

 3     not a single one.

 4             And now briefly about the engagement of the MUP in 1998 first.

 5     As the KLA committed the most brutal crimes in 1998, murders, abductions,

 6     and so on, the MUP of Serbia was obliged under the law to take measures

 7     to prevent these crimes.  They were duty-bound to do so by the Law on

 8     Criminal Procedure, the Law on Ministries, the Law on the Interior on

 9     Internal Affairs, and many other pieces of legislation.  There was no

10     special decision needed for the engagement of the MUP, no special

11     decision, least of all a decision by the president of the FRY, Slobodan

12     Milosevic.  The MUP was simply acting in accordance with the law, both as

13     a whole and each individual member of the MUP did the same.  They didn't

14     need anyone's decision to do that.

15             When terrorist activities outgrew the ability of the MUP to deal

16     with that evil and to protect the citizens, the state leadership of the

17     FRY decided to engage the Army of Yugoslavia, and this began in July

18     1998.  Before that, the state leadership reached a decision that the plan

19     should be made.  The plan was drawn up by the army.  When the plan was

20     adopted, it began to be implemented through the planning of individual

21     actions.  And let us repeat that the MUP staff for KiM never drew up

22     these plans, either in 1998 or in 1999, although this is listed as one of

23     its tasks in the decision on its establishment dated the 16th of June,

24     1998.

25             And now briefly about the credibility of witnesses.  We have seen

Page 27313

 1     that the OTP objected to the credibility of Defence witnesses because

 2     they were participants in these events, and truly the Defence did attempt

 3     to bring in as many witnesses as possible who did participate in these

 4     events and have first-hand knowledge.  Does this mean that only witnesses

 5     with second-hand knowledge are credible?  That's what the OTP would seem

 6     to claim.  The OTP was able to examine each of our witnesses.  They were

 7     able to collect documents to impeach our witnesses.  And as we have seen,

 8     it was far easier for the OTP to gain -- to obtain documents than it was

 9     for the Defence.  For example, Cedomir Sakic's statement, which the

10     Defence attempted to obtain for a year with no success.  You know that we

11     were engaged in litigation with either the FRY or Serbia and Montenegro.

12     We had great problems with the MUP of Serbia; they wouldn't allow us

13     access to documents.  When we finally managed to gain access to

14     documents, they punished the person who made it possible for us to access

15     the documents acting on the minister's orders.  The situation has

16     improved recently, we have to admit.  But this meant that we were short

17     of time and that we were late in obtaining evidence we needed.

18             Let me stress briefly that Adamovic is misquoted in paragraph 215

19     of the OTP final brief.  He is not speaking about a meeting of the staff

20     but about the meeting at which the five-stage plan was discussed with

21     members of the army.  This was not a meeting held in the MUP staff.  It

22     was quite a different meeting, but this is misinterpreted here and you

23     can see this from Adamovic's testimony.

24             Now we wish to refer Albanian witnesses.  Very often one had the

25     impression that witnesses who were Albanians and who were allegedly

Page 27314

 1     victims of crimes had been instructed on what to say.  For example, what

 2     they say about the armbands they saw on the Serb forces, that is, the

 3     members of the MUP at the beginning of the air-strikes from the 24th of

 4     March until mid-April.  It can be seen from the evidence that members of

 5     the MUP did not wear armbands before the 15th of April, 1999; however,

 6     Albanian witnesses described armbands which must have been shown to them

 7     from photographs of the police in 1998 and this is best illustrated by

 8     the fact that they often saw the police wearing white armbands.  In 1999

 9     the police did not wear white armbands at all.  Before the 15th of April,

10     1999, they wore no armbands and throughout 1999 they never wore white

11     armbands.  Every witness who claims to have seen a policeman with a white

12     armband is not telling the truth, he has been instructed to say that

13     based on photographs taken in 1998.

14             We have also seen that all the witnesses of Albanian ethnicity

15     deny that the KLA was present in the villages.  This is contrary to all

16     the evidence, combat reports, the testimony of Zyrapi, and so on.  We see

17     that actions and combat were conducted only in villages where the KLA was

18     present.  Of course, the two-villages tactic was used as General

19     Lazarevic explained to us, but no action was undertaken unless the KLA

20     had first conducted an attack.  We saw the testimony of Witness Gavranic

21     for the territory of Gnjilane.  The KLA was present there but they did

22     not attack the police and the army and no anti-terrorist actions were

23     conducted on his territory except for two in marginal areas in the

24     direction of other municipalities because there was no need, no one had

25     been attacked, although there was intelligence to show that the KLA was

Page 27315

 1     present there.  However, the fact that they did not attack the police was

 2     sufficient for there not to be any anti-terrorist actions in the area.

 3     Of course the witnesses are afraid, very afraid.  It wasn't that someone

 4     paid them not to tell the truth or asked them not to tell the truth.

 5     Most of them were probably afraid for their lives because we know what

 6     happened in other cases where Albanians were accused.  We saw the

 7     situation described by Shaban Fazliu, the situation prevailing in Kosovo.

 8     The KLA is in control of Kosovo today and of course an Albanian

 9     testifying in open session here will not tell us what he knows.

10             As regards credibility, I will comment briefly on Protic and

11     Sakic.  Protic arrived, and in the evaluation of this Defence team he

12     lied shamelessly in certain parts of his testimony.  The OTP says that

13     what he claims is for the most part true.  The Defence does not deny that

14     he participated in transporting the bodies but that is not crucial for

15     this case.  What is crucial for this case is what contacts he had with

16     Sreten Lukic.  He was brought here to incriminate Sreten Lukic, not to

17     tell us about the transport of the bodies.  We heard about that from

18     other witnesses, from people working on investigations, from people who

19     exhumed the bodies.  There's nothing being challenged there.  What is

20     being challenged is what contacts he had with Sreten Lukic.

21             Does anyone in this courtroom know how many times Protic

22     allegedly called Sreten Lukic or the voice which to him sounded like

23     Sreten Lukic?  Was it three times, two times, or only once?  We don't

24     know because it all depends on which of his statements we read.

25             On page 11310 my learned friend Mr. Stamp put to Protic that he

Page 27316

 1     testified in Belgrade three times.  He said, "You have had an opportunity

 2     to review the record of these three different occasions when you spoke

 3     about these events in 1999?"

 4             And Protic says:  "Yes, after each of my testimonies I was given

 5     records of my testimony."

 6             And Mr. Stamp:  "And was what you said in each one of these three

 7     occasions true to the best of your knowledge and belief?"

 8             And Protic said:  "Yes, of course."

 9             And then the first disaster that Protic was engaged in took

10     place.  Stamp asked him about the voice which sounded like Sreten Lukic

11     and now things become complicated.  Protic says that Lukic addressed him

12     by his first name Bozidar in all his statements, and yet here before this

13     Tribunal he said three or four times that Sreten Lukic addressed him by

14     his last name, Protic.  We find this on page 11311, 11312, 11313 of the

15     transcript.

16             Judge Bonomy -- well, at the insistence of His Honour Judge

17     Bonomy my learned friend Mr. Stamp asked him again and tried again to get

18     him to say that Sreten Lukic addressed him by his first name, but he

19     persisted in saying that Sreten addressed him by his last name.

20             According to Protic, he went to the staff in order to call the

21     staff; that's his testimony.  According to him, on each of those three

22     occasions he happened to be given a telephone which had a direct line

23     with Belgrade.  Among the large number of telephones where you had to

24     dial the extension for Belgrade, three times by accident, without anyone

25     to assist him, he happened to grab a telephone which had a direct

Page 27317

 1     connection.  And witness Deretic explained how many such telephones there

 2     might have been in the staff during the war, one or two, and both in the

 3     same office.  So if one were to analyse this evidence, Protic enters an

 4     office and uses a telephone which is in the same office where Sreten

 5     Lukic is answering the telephone.

 6             Then on page 11329 my learned friend Mr. Stamp tells him that he

 7     called Sreten Lukic three times, so each time he called Sreten Lukic.

 8     The first time he explains but he wasn't sure on cross-examination

 9     whether he was dialling a Belgrade number.  The second time he explained

10     again how he dialled the number, what sort of voice he heard, and so on.

11     But in cross, again he's not sure what city he called.

12             And then we come to the third occasion, we'll take this as our

13     example to illustrate all this, he explains and says, This person told me

14     to go to the parking lot behind Rilindija and there were trucks there.  I

15     would be met there by some men who would tell me which truck to take.

16     There were four or five other trucks on the parking lot and I was to take

17     only one.  That's on transcript page 11327.

18             On page 11328 my learned friend Mr. Stamp asked him:  "On that

19     occasion you took the bodies to the 13th May police centre in Batajnica.

20     Why did you take the bodies there?

21             "A.  That's what I was told.

22             "Q.  By who?

23             "A.  The voice I had a telephone contact with."

24             During cross-examination Protic admitted that he didn't call

25     anyone the third time.  So all these explanations are false, fabricated.

Page 27318

 1     He is not telling the truth.  In his statements Protic said that the

 2     liaison person was a man waiting for him in a burgundy-coloured Golf, but

 3     he denied that before the Court and said he had never seen that man's

 4     face and that this man met him only once when he was going to Janjevo.

 5     The next thing Protic claims is that he had been Sreten Lukic's driver

 6     for six months, he was the personal driver of Sreten Lukic for six

 7     months, and he repeats that here too.  He repeats that on page 11329.

 8             He says:  "I was able to recognise his voice because I was his

 9     driver for six months."

10             Later on on page 11330 he claims again that he was Lukic's

11     driver.  During the cross-examination on page 11377 he says that he

12     wasn't Sreten's driver but Obrad Stevanovic's driver and that perhaps

13     from time to time he might have driven Sreten Lukic somewhere, and he

14     repeats that later on at 11378 and 11379.  And he acknowledges that

15     Sreten Lukic had his own driver who was another person and also confirms

16     that he never drove Sreten Lukic after July 1990 and this is on page

17     11380.  And he said that he'd never even talked to Sreten after the time

18     he left Kosovo in 1990.

19             So nine years went by since the time when he talked to Sreten

20     Lukic for the last time and it was only several times before that.

21             I should like to stress that Protic was a person who entered a

22     flat illegally, a policeman looting a flat and moving into it, and he

23     asked Sreten Lukic to legalise this illegal entry into that flat which

24     the latter refused to do.  Sreten Lukic refused to have any contact with

25     him when he asked him for advice as to what to testify in reference to

Page 27319

 1     this indictment and the counts in it.  So he's angry with Sreten for

 2     having sent him to the south of Serbia, he's angry with Sreten for having

 3     retired him.  Well, had Sreten Lukic considered that he was guilty and

 4     that this man had something to hide, he surely would have wanted to

 5     satisfy him and meet his requirements rather than act contrary to what he

 6     demanded had he thought there was any danger and had he had anything to

 7     hide.  There was discussion whether he told the truth in Belgrade.  Judge

 8     Bonomy asked him.  He said, Yes, I did tell the truth in Belgrade.  Then

 9     he said, No, I didn't tell the truth in Belgrade, in fact, I'm telling

10     the truth here and now.  He changed his testimony in that respect.

11             With regard to the credibility of Protic's testimony we heard

12     testimony from a number of witnesses and we pin-pointed Aleksandar Kostic

13     and Sakic, Kostic regularly cooperates with the Prosecution of this

14     Tribunal, and Dragan Furdulovic, another witness.  It is clear that all

15     of them expressed doubt as to the credibility of the testimony of Bozidar

16     Protic.

17             Witness Sakic who took part in the events painted quite a

18     different picture than the one painted by Protic, particularly with

19     respect to the critical part, that is to say how Protic calls him and he

20     says that it's not true that Protic used a stable telephone line but used

21     a mobile telephone, that it was not true that he separated from him, that

22     it was not true that they turned in to Pristina and went to the centre of

23     Pristina and so on and so forth.

24             We'd like to stress that had the Prosecution had Mr. Sakic's

25     statement given to the investigating organs in Serbia, as we said the

Page 27320

 1     statement was not accessible to General Lukic's Defence or Sakic himself,

 2     and this is the way in which the MUP treated the Lukic Defence, an

 3     illustration of that.  It is quite obvious that Sakic said the same thing

 4     in Belgrade that he told the Court here and he confirmed this when I

 5     asked him that, that is to be found on transcript page 22161, and I'd

 6     like to point out that the Prosecution did not include Sakic's statement

 7     in Belgrade because it's obvious that in fact he testified here in this

 8     court the same as he did in Belgrade many years before.

 9             Now, as far as the transportation of bodies is concerned, I don't

10     think it was shown that the staff or that Sreten Lukic had anything to do

11     with any of that.  Of course we have to exclude Protic there.  I think I

12     have sufficient elements to prove to the Trial Chamber that they should

13     not believe him and not trust him and not trust his credibility.

14             As far as the transport of bodies is concerned, we heard

15     testimony from Gvozden Gagic and saw the discussions held in the staff.

16     We saw that General Ilic spent time in Kosovo and Metohija during that

17     period, from the 23rd of May to the 1st of June, 1999, and (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21             And now finally or to close my part of the presentation, I would

22     like to say that there was an error in our brief and we failed to deal

23     with 72(C), deportation from Srbica, the village of Vocnjak, Turicevac,

24     Izbica, Tusilje and Cirez and if there's enough time later on I shall

25     deal with that topic in greater detail after my colleague Mr. Ivetic

Page 27321

 1     completes his closing arguments.  If not, we should like to challenge the

 2     allegations in the indictment as to that.  Thank you.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  Members of the Panel, as you know, my name is Dan

 4     Ivetic --

 5             JUDGE BONOMY:  Just a second, Mr. Ivetic, until I see what

 6     Mr. Lukic is referring to at the end of his submission.

 7             Mr. Lukic, you're saying you omitted to say anything about Srbica

 8     in your final brief, is that it?

 9             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour, we omitted that.

10             JUDGE BONOMY:  And what is the point you're trying to make?

11             MR. LUKIC:  We are trying to use this opportunity at least to say

12     that we don't agree with the allegations from this part of the

13     indictment.

14             JUDGE BONOMY:  Indeed.

15             MR. LUKIC:  And I think that Mr. Lazarevic's Defence refuted this

16     part, so ...

17             JUDGE BONOMY:  So what is it you now want to say on that?

18             MR. IVETIC:  I think, if I could perhaps lead it up, our position

19     is that the omission of 72 -- of arguments relating to paragraph 72(C) in

20     our final brief in no means should be considered a concession of those

21     allegations and that we do, in fact, contest and deny those allegations

22     based upon the evidence that has been presented at this trial.

23             JUDGE BONOMY:  And is that the extent of the submissions you have

24     to make on that?

25             MR. IVETIC:  Well, if we have time depending on how fast I can

Page 27322

 1     get through with this, Mr. Lukic does have a brief -- brief submission on

 2     that part that we would do orally, I'm going to try and leave some time

 3     for if I can cut corners here and there on my submissions on the

 4     remainder of the case.

 5             JUDGE BONOMY:  Well, please continue then, Mr. Ivetic.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 7             I want to remind you that these proceedings are to be viewed in a

 8     serious manner, not only because of the crimes that are alleged being

 9     serious but also because of the severity of the potential and unjust harm

10     that could result to an innocent accused such as, we submit, Mr. Lukic,

11     if the Prosecution case is to be believed.  Given the severity of the

12     foregoing, it is truly astounding to me the manner in which the

13     Prosecution has prosecuted this case, without regard for detail, without

14     regard for getting it right.  They have recycled allegations and ignored

15     the evidence that we have all heard in the interim two years of trial.

16             Yet, this is apparently the best case the Prosecution cares to

17     put forth after two years of trial.  Your Honours, at the outset I wish

18     to remind you that you have a dual responsibility for, just as you have a

19     duty to provide justice to victims, you also have a duty and obligation

20     to protect and uphold the rights of the accused including ensuring that

21     the findings are based upon full and true facts, not

22     mis-characterizations by the Prosecution, not guilt by association, and

23     lastly you have a duty to uphold the right of freedom and acquittal for

24     an innocent accused when the facts so dictate.

25             This needs to be borne in mind for this is a case where countless

Page 27323

 1     Prosecution witnesses came and changed their story, dramatically changed

 2     their previous sworn testimony and statements upon appearing at this

 3     trial with this Prosecution.  I call upon you to recall your own words,

 4     Judge Bonomy, on the 31st of August, 2006, that it would have been the

 5     grossest miscarriage of justice if the Prosecution's written witness

 6     evidence had been presented without cross-examination and confrontation,

 7     you shuddered to think what might have happened without

 8     cross-examination.

 9             I submit that the case being presented by the Prosecution now in

10     writing and orally is primarily the same pre-trial, pre-cross-examination

11     version and therefore must be subject to the same caution and reason for

12     scrutiny that was called for during the trial.  Flashy PowerPoint

13     presentations have been presented to provide materials out of context and

14     dress up bare allegations or misrepresentations.

15             The Chamber will recall how this case began, with the Prosecution

16     trying to resubmit wholesale questionable documentary evidence from the

17     Milosevic trial, including footage of strife in South America which they

18     cast as being Kosovo refugees in Albania and then they presented footage

19     of graves predating the indictment as purported evidence under the

20     indictment.  Indeed, I submit this is a story of the case thus far has

21     been an overzealous Prosecution seeking victory for its case at all costs

22     even if truth, justice, the integrity of the proceedings and the innocent

23     accused are sacrificed in the process.  I have the utmost faith and the

24     experience of distinguished members of this panel will not succumb to the

25     Prosecution's arguments and will not allow these things, including the

Page 27324

 1     trial's integrity, to be sacrificed merely to reward the Prosecution.

 2             Now, I propose that I begin with something that I was stunned and

 3     shocked to hear about in the Prosecution's submissions.  My colleague

 4     Mr. Stamp asserted that the Podujevo killings by SAJ reservists was the

 5     lead illustration, indeed one of only two illustrations that he had to

 6     show Lukic had command responsibility over and was directly linked to

 7     perpetrators of crimes.

 8             Since we have an indictment in this case, albeit a rather general

 9     and overexpansive accusatory document, the only crimes Mr. Stamp can be

10     talking about are required to be those in the indictment.  Podujevo is

11     not in the indictment, never was charged in the indictment.  Why after

12     two years of intense litigation and even more years of preparation on

13     their part is the leading cause for the Prosecution against Sreten Lukic

14     the killings in Podujevo something for which legal liability cannot

15     attach in these proceedings.

16             It does not make sense but it shows how misguided and

17     misrepresenting the Prosecution's submissions are.  Remarkably the

18     Prosecution quotes Goran Stoparic, an insider police witness but they

19     cite only to his witness statement which they drafted and they ignore the

20     greater bulk of his testimony, his own words.  Why doesn't the

21     Prosecution want the whole story to be shown to the world that is

22     watching these proceedings?  Why is the Prosecution afraid of drawing to

23     the Court's attention Stoparic's sworn testimony of how the Podujevo

24     tragedy actually occurred and its aftermath?  Simply put, the truth hurts

25     them.  They cannot obtain a conviction if forced to deal only with the

Page 27325

 1     sworn testimony and the truth.  But we must point out and address the

 2     testimony, the truth to reveal the Prosecution's deck of cards.

 3             Now, Stoparic, rather than being ordered to commit any crimes

 4     against civilians, explains how the SAJ reservists at Podujevo had been

 5     unloaded from their transport and were waiting for instructions when

 6     certain individuals just on their own opened fire.  Stoparic verified

 7     that during his entire stay in Kosovo as a reservist in SAJ, police

 8     superiors never issued orders to kill civilians.  That's at transcript

 9     page 727.  Stoparic further stated that the actions of police officials

10     at Podujevo possibly prevented further killings.  Transcript page 725.

11             Most telling is Stoparic's own words at transcript page 744, line

12     25 through 745, line 7.

13             "Q.  Therefore, we may conclude that the killings of those people

14     was not intentional or planned by the SAJ or the police for that matter?

15             "A.  I have been testifying several times concerning that event

16     and I kept repeating that no one had ordered anything of that nature.  I

17     never ordered such a thing and no one did.  I'm quite positive about

18     that."

19             Your Honours, Stoparic could not be more explicit in debunking

20     the myth of the Prosecution's case.  These words are the death now to

21     Mr. Stamp's submissions of the key crime he alleges against Lukic, the

22     non-indicted Podujevo that he perhaps is prosecuting in some other case

23     but surely cannot be seriously prosecuting here.  We have a wide range of

24     evidence that the Serbian MUP in Podujevo not only reacted quickly to the

25     crime by saving survivors, offering medical assistance, and doing an

Page 27326

 1     on-site investigation, but also gathered up all the SAJ reservists and

 2     sent -- not just the shooters, and sent them on their way back through

 3     Kosovo.  Paragraphs 316 through 323 of our brief details some of the

 4     evidence in these efforts.  I will not repeat that, but I do feel I have

 5     to highlight a portion of the testimony of Mr. Stoparic at transcript

 6     page 748 through 750.

 7             He described how the commander of the SAJ was swearing at them

 8     and took them out -- took out the SAJ reservists and was angry at them.

 9     He said:  "I still remember clearly his words and I can quote them quite

10     precisely if you want me to.

11             "Q.  I don't believe that is necessary but you may as well if you

12     want the Trial Chamber to hear it.

13             "A.  His behaviour was such that one could conclude he was very

14     worried about the things that took place and in his brief speech he told

15     us:  You are not the people to be counted on, one can't work with you.  I

16     was under the impression that he wasn't very happy about the things that

17     took place.

18             "Q.  Were you under the impression that this incident was a shock

19     for the other policemen as well?

20             "A.  There was a person, a man whose nickname was Vuk, Wolf, he

21     was a very good professional, an SAJ officer and he used even harsher

22     words.  He even took one of the children out to the street to bring him

23     to the ambulance that was there.  None of the members of the SAJ as far

24     as I could see was happy about that, were not happy but they were

25     probably horrified."

Page 27327

 1             How can anyone using common logic and reason draw from this

 2     testimony the inference that the Podujevo killings were intended, ordered

 3     or planned by the MUP?  Only Mr. Stamp, I submit.

 4             Stoparic himself testified that on the bus ride back from Kosovo

 5     the SAJ reservists were criticised and chastised and the perpetrators

 6     were eventually arrested and eventually convicted and more importantly,

 7     the perpetrator was not redeployed to Kosovo again.  All the other

 8     testimony and evidence from this Prosecution through Stoparic, through

 9     Vasiljevic is that there's no other crimes alleged against the SAJ

10     reservists, or some like to call them and try to engage in guilt by

11     association, former Skorpions, during their entire stay in Kosovo.

12             Now, the entire lack of authority by Lukic over the SAJ and their

13     commander Trajkovic is discussed in our brief at paragraphs 410 through

14     415 so I'll not go into details about this.  But as for Mr. Stamp's focus

15     on the fact that the judgement against the perpetrator of the shootings

16     came too late in 2003, this conveniently avoids the evidence led from

17     several witnesses about the functioning of the MUP and the judiciaries in

18     Serbia.  And the fact that the work of the police and duties and

19     responsibilities of the same cease upon the presentation of the criminal

20     denunciation report and file to the prosecutor with the prosecutor being

21     independent of the police and bearing all further responsibility to

22     prosecute the case.  This was testified to by Judge Danica Marinkovic,

23     transcript pages 23469, 23471, 23472, and also by witness Dragan

24     Furdulovic at transcript page 24744 and 24749.

25             Another matter that the Prosecution fails to bring to the Court's

Page 27328

 1     attention is the testimony we had that Sreten Lukic after becoming chief

 2     of the public security sector and assistant minister after the democratic

 3     government was elected into power, in that position he authorised

 4     measures to permit the surviving victims of Podujevo to be safely and

 5     securely brought to testify against the perpetrators resulting in a

 6     conviction of the maximum sentence.  We had testimony from Mr. Furdulovic

 7     about that at transcript page 24708.  I am shocked that Mr. Stamp

 8     believes that someone who exercises his official duties to assist in the

 9     protection of witnesses and bringing them to court to reveal the truth

10     and obtain justice is to be considered a criminal.

11             Now if I can move on to another point a closely related matter.

12     There were two charts that were -- well, there were multiple charts but

13     there were two charts I want to focus on from the brief and from the

14     closing arguments.  Annex E is the chart on the structure of the MUP

15     forces in Kosovo during the indictment period.  There is no citation to

16     the record to indicate where this information was proven and upon which

17     the OTP relies; however, we know this to be the exact same chart produced

18     long before the evidence opened and without hearing the evidence by the

19     then-OTP in-house expert Captain Philip Coo, formerly of the Canadian

20     navy -- Canadian army, who since that time has been disqualified, and

21     rightly so, for not being a proper expert witness and who never was

22     presented as an expert on the MUP.  It is simply astounding that the OTP

23     would try to recycle such assertions in this case, which had not been

24     credibly adjudicated or supported by the trial evidence.

25             JUDGE BONOMY:  Which annex are you referring to, Mr. --

Page 27329

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Annex E, Your Honours, that's the annex --

 2             JUDGE BONOMY:  Annex to what?

 3             MR. IVETIC:  Pardon me, to the OTP brief, it's cited at paragraph

 4     7 of the OTP brief.  It's a chart with the structure of the Ministry of

 5     the Interior MUP in Kosovo during the indictment period and I believe

 6     they flashed it during their closing arguments.

 7             JUDGE BONOMY:  But it's not an exhibit?

 8             MR. IVETIC:  It's not an exhibit, correct, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE BONOMY:  So it's simply part of a submission, it's not

10     evidence in the case, it's just something presented to guide the

11     Trial Chamber?

12             MR. IVETIC:  Correct, to misguide the Trial Chamber.

13             JUDGE BONOMY:  All right.  Thank you.

14             MR. IVETIC:  And also --

15             JUDGE BONOMY:  I think -- well, just a moment, now that --

16     perhaps you want to reflect on what you've just said.  That may be its

17     impact, but I hope you're not suggesting that is its deliberate impact.

18             MR. IVETIC:  No, no, the impact of presenting such evidence leads

19     to that regrettable possibility.

20             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Also, Your Honours, we have annex C and the

22     Prosecution has also identified at paragraph 7 of their submission which

23     is supposed to be a death chart.  I actually looked through this, Your

24     Honours, and calling it a proof of death chart is not only misleading,

25     it's inaccurate.  If one includes such a chart, one at least ought to

Page 27330

 1     highlight the fact that hidden deep within is a concession by the

 2     Prosecution that there is no proof from this trial from any of the

 3     victims listed in the indictment that they actually are deceased and no

 4     proof of bodies or proof of the manner of death.

 5             We also have -- it is -- Ms. Kravetz in talking in her closing

 6     arguments talked about Mala Krusa and Mr. Stamp chose to focus -- did not

 7     talk about Mala Krusa and Mr. Stamp also likewise did not talk about Mala

 8     Krusa.  I submit that it's perhaps due to the fact that annex C

 9     demonstrates that none of the victims scheduled in the indictment for

10     Mala Krusa have been proven dead and in fact one of them has been proven

11     alive.  This simply cannot be proper evidence upon which this Chamber is

12     expected to convict anyone.

13             Likewise, the proof of death chart demonstrates that the

14     Prosecution is trying to assert criminal liability for unscheduled

15     victims, an incredible 15 for Krusa that are not in the indictment, and

16     that is the case for some of the other crime scenes as well.

17             JUDGE BONOMY:  Is that a convenient time to interrupt?

18             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honour, I forgot we were on the one and a

19     half hour schedule.  That would be a convenient time, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE BONOMY:  I should make it clear to you that we are very

21     conscious of the difficulty that's posed by trying to establish the death

22     and the cause of death of large numbers of personnel, that there may be

23     aspects of the chart you're referring to which fail to provide all the

24     detail that one would wish.  The Trial Chamber's very conscious of the

25     detail into which we shall require to go to establish that individuals

Page 27331

 1     were murdered beyond reasonable doubt.  On the other hand, Mr. Ivetic,

 2     the fact that people were killed without necessarily establishing who

 3     exactly may be an element of the general assertion about murder being one

 4     of the means by which the joint criminal enterprise was implemented.  So

 5     the chart when it refers to unscheduled victims may nevertheless assist

 6     us in determining whether or not there were people killed who do not

 7     feature necessarily in one of the lists of individual victims.

 8             It's a matter for you how much time you spend on this, but it's

 9     very difficult to -- for you to achieve a great deal, I suspect, beyond

10     the very general statements, for which there is some foundation in what

11     you've already said.

12             So we shall resume at ten minutes past 4.00.

13                           --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 4.11 p.m.

15             MR. LUKIC:  Your Honour, I owe you these references for Dayton

16     Agreement.  The actual agreement is not part of our evidence but it's

17     mentioned and discussed in some -- in some documents.  For example, it's

18     3D559, it's 1D32, those are stenographic notes from the parliament of

19     Republic of Serbia from 23rd of March, 1999, so it was discussed the day

20     before the bombing.  It's also 2D16, 2D241, there are talks in between

21     federal minister Jovanovic with minister of foreign affairs of Germany,

22     Mr. Fischer, P403, P605, which is Mr. Sainovic's interview, and P560.

23     That's what I found in this short period.

24             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

25             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you.

Page 27332

 1             JUDGE BONOMY:  Now, Mr. Ivetic, while I'm the last person who

 2     would wish to cramp your style, I'm told that when you are reading you

 3     were speeding up.  I think it was noticeable you were trying to pace your

 4     delivery, but when you read just be conscious of the need not to go too

 5     fast.  Thank you.  Please continue.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.  Thank you, Your Honour, for that and I

 7     will try as hard as I can.  I know we're all anxious to try and get these

 8     proceedings concluded.

 9             JUDGE CHOWHAN:  I think Lord Bonomy wants you to be relaxed and

10     speak nicely is what it is.

11             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

12             If I could just finish up on the annex relating to the death

13     charts and focusing on the words of Judge Bonomy before the break about

14     these charts being important for showing persons who were murdered.  I

15     would point out and perhaps Your Honours have already seen, so but the

16     charts also have persons for which the forensic evidence shows they died

17     non-violent deaths, that is to say they were not murdered.  You have Agim

18     Hyseni from Vucitrn, who died a natural cause of death.  Some had

19     respiratory problems, Hyseni Kada.  Some had unascertained causes of

20     death.  So I would ask you to look at that evidence very carefully to see

21     what it actually does prove and why the Prosecution is providing it.

22             As to Vucitrn, the witnesses that the Prosecution called did not

23     testify to the massacre of civilians that the Prosecution keeps

24     presenting.  They testified as to one or two persons, a handful of

25     things, and we have the exhibit of Sabrit Kadriu, P2377, where this

Page 27333

 1     witness is not giving names based on any kind of personal knowledge that

 2     could be considered proper evidence in this trial.  He's merely reciting

 3     a list that he and others compiled based on information gathered after

 4     the fact with no regard to the nature and manner of the death nor even

 5     the location.  And perhaps that explains why we have persons listed for

 6     Vucitrn who were not killed but had, as I indicated, natural causes --

 7     natural and non-violent causes of death.

 8             So I ask you to look at that carefully.

 9             Moving along.  Ms. Kravetz on behalf of the Prosecution talked

10     rather briefly about the Milosh Giliq Street in Djakovica incident and

11     curiously she claimed that there were no KLA in Djakovica in April.  This

12     quite simply is incorrect.  We have the benefit of the cables that were

13     sent to and from the American State Department which rely upon their

14     sources, intelligence and others on the ground, information which was

15     received by this Defence and which is allowed to be unclassified for use

16     in these proceedings under Rule 70.  These sources cannot be argued to be

17     unauthentic.  They cannot be said to be prepared or influenced by the

18     accused and they are contemporaneous with the events alleged.

19             If we look at just a few of these I would highlight 6D1637,

20     6D1638, and 6D1639, they are covered at paragraph 155 of our brief.  We

21     see that the KLA not only was in Djakovica, it controlled a quarter of

22     the city itself and was actively trying to take over the city centre.  It

23     controlled all the area around Djakovica, again all according to the

24     information available to the US State Department.  Under such

25     circumstances where the Djakovica SUP doesn't even control its own city,

Page 27334

 1     let alone the entire area under its jurisdiction.  How can they have been

 2     sure of everything that was going on in the city interior?  We have the

 3     testimony of Mr. Zlatkovic who showed the chaos that was prevailing in

 4     Djakovica resulting from the NATO bombings, the daily attacks of the KLA,

 5     and fires resulting, power outages, et cetera.  He confirmed that the SUP

 6     Djakovica knew nothing of the tragic events at Milosh Giliq and therefore

 7     nothing could be done about it or reported.

 8             How was Sreten Lukic who was dodging NATO bombs in far-away

 9     Pristina with no phone lines to Djakovica, how was he supposed to know

10     about this event?  Indeed, the daily situation reports or bulletins that

11     my colleague Mr. Lukic talked about prepared by the MUP staff based upon

12     the reports that were sent by courier from the SUPs was the method of

13     communications available.  These reports show, as indeed the Prosecution

14     concedes at paragraph 1091 of its brief, these bulletins do not include

15     Milosh Giliq nor the Suva Reka killings, for that matter, even though

16     they include reports of other crimes that were being investigated and

17     processed.

18             Now, the problem with the Prosecution is that they think that

19     this is evidence that the crimes were being hidden by Mr. Lukic and the

20     MUP staff.  We submit otherwise, that they show that they were not aware

21     of these incidents and therefore could not have been put on notice of

22     these crimes.

23             We have dealt with Milosh Giliq -- with the Milosh Giliq incident

24     in our brief so I will not go into more detail on it, but I will

25     highlight the fact that the evidence before this Panel is that this

Page 27335

 1     tragic event occurred at the hands of persons from the neighbourhood with

 2     evidence of these persons engaging in drinking and perhaps drug use.

 3     There's no evidence that the persons were acting in their official

 4     capacity, in any official capacity with the police whatsoever and only

 5     one is said to have been a firefighter within the SUP.  Simply put, the

 6     facts do not support the overreaching allegations of the Prosecution.

 7             Now I wish to turn to Suva Reka.  Ms. Kravetz for her part

 8     briefly dealt with Suva Reka and the Berisha killings.  Again she

 9     indicated and represented to you that there was no KLA presence and no

10     fighting going on.  I have to point out that this is yet again incorrect,

11     albeit not critical to the events in question because we have the

12     testimony of one of the participants, but we do have evidence that

13     one-half of Suva Reka was in the hands of the KLA.  That's at transcript

14     page 25443.

15             Now, as I said, this is not material to the Court's consideration

16     of this incident because of the following.  But first of all let me

17     correct another part.  Mr. Stamp talking about Suva Reka claims that

18     Goran Stoparic gave evidence that Colonel Mitrovic and his unit led the

19     so-called Operation Suva Reka wherein the Berisha family members were

20     killed.  Now, Goran Stoparic did not, in fact, testify at all about Suva

21     Reka and likewise there is no evidence that the Berisha family killing

22     took place as part of any operation.  The perpetrators alleged were all

23     members of the OUP, that is to say the ordinary town police department

24     but neither Ms. Kravetz nor Mr. Stamp seemed to be interested in the

25     specific facts or details of this crime and tragedy, but Your Honours

Page 27336

 1     must be, for that is what you have to base your decision on to do

 2     justice.

 3             The best witness we have for this incident is the Prosecution's

 4     own K-83, another touted police insider.  This is a man who was a

 5     participant in the event and an eye-witness participant in the actual

 6     murders themselves.  At no point in time did this witness ever allude to

 7     or indicate that he and others received any instructions or orders to

 8     shoot at or kill anyone, least of all the Berisha family members who were

 9     in the pizzeria on that day.  In describing how the event transpired and

10     how and why his cohorts began shooting and threw grenades into the

11     pizzeria, the witness illuminated how misguided and wrong the

12     Prosecution's theory is, for after on their own and without warning

13     shooting several persons outside the Berisha home, the individuals

14     involved consumed an astounding two bottles of one litre each of hard

15     liquor.  And how did they drink it?  The witness said like water.  That's

16     at transcript page 3990.  Then in the stupor of their private drinking

17     party they proposed to one another on their own accord again that they

18     throw grenades into the pizzeria, which they did and which they followed

19     with shooting.  There's no operation, no plans or orders from the police

20     superiors.

21             Look at transcript page 3988 and 3989.  This crime is tragic, but

22     as it boils down to it, it is a private act and conduct of persons

23     perhaps drunk or perhaps on their way to getting drunk engaged in a

24     frolic, a departure from any official duties that they could have had

25     with the OUP Suva Reka.

Page 27337

 1             Now, the Prosecution cites to efforts by the perpetrators and

 2     others to cover up this crime by removing the bodies or some of the

 3     bodies.  There simply is no credible evidence that Sreten Lukic had any

 4     role in the burying of bodies at the firing range or their subsequent

 5     removal.  It is clear that the event was hidden at the level of the

 6     perpetrators and locals of Suva Reka.  We have evidence that when the

 7     Prizren SUP sent a criminal investigative team to investigate the initial

 8     bodies of males who had been killed outside the Berisha home, they were

 9     not told about the pizzeria incident nor taken there, and in fact one of

10     the perpetrators of the crimes served to provide security for the

11     investigative team and of course he didn't mention anything about what

12     had transpired.

13             We have evidence that, as was established in Belgrade where this

14     case is subject to criminal investigative proceedings, not even the OUP

15     chief in Suva Reka had knowledge, this is from 6D1631, paragraph 64.

16     With no one reporting the incident, there cannot be any notice and any

17     subsequent duty to investigate or discipline, and the evidence is clear

18     that neither the OUP chief, the SUP chief, nor the criminalistic police

19     in Prizren had any information on this event, and therefore the

20     information reported to the MUP staff did not contain any information

21     about this event.

22             So accordingly as to this indictment -- as to this incident there

23     cannot be established any breach of duty or act or omission leading to

24     the liability of Mr. Lukic.

25             I would stress that this is the very same Sreten Lukic who to the

Page 27338

 1     contrary was instrumental until the efforts to illuminate this crime, to

 2     have it investigated and then turned over to the prosecutorial

 3     authorities when he was the assistant minister and head of the RJB.

 4     Indeed we heard from Witness Furdulovic and other evidence including

 5     6D1068 and transcript page 24699 through 24701 as to the proper discharge

 6     of his duties by Lukic authorising the interviews of witnesses and

 7     suspects who were employees of the ministry per the requirements and the

 8     rules as his position holds and the support that he gave to the

 9     investigations that have ultimately resulted in this case being pursued

10     in Belgrade against the actual perpetrators.  Lukic never refused or held

11     back authorisation for anyone to be interviewed as part of the

12     investigation, showing his openness and professionalism, not a man with

13     anything to hide.  We will return to that later.

14             Moving along to Kotlina, which Ms. Kravetz highlighted in the

15     oral submissions last week.  Curiously this is one of the few times in

16     their closing arguments that the Prosecution did not have the assertion

17     that there was no KLA presence in the village.  Perhaps because we have

18     the paragraphs of the KLA headquarters found in the village, the pictures

19     of the deceased persons with weapons near their bodies, near the bunker

20     that was in the shape of a well, too much evidence for the Prosecution to

21     overlook.  However, they do claim that "extensive" evidence supports

22     their case when in fact it boils down to one witness, Mr. Hazbi Loku for

23     whom the forensic evidence, even that of the Prosecution contradicts

24     vital aspects of his claim.  Now, the Prosecution did not touch much on

25     the forensics in their oral submissions.  At least they did not dwell on

Page 27339

 1     the actual forensic findings.  They merely wanted to misstate that the

 2     forensic findings corroborated the manner of death described, but the

 3     forensics do not, in fact, corroborate the Prosecution theory of how this

 4     event occurred.  I would point to the substantial discussion of this

 5     event and the findings of the forensic pathologist and expert

 6     Dr. Stankovic.  His experience in the field is very significant and I

 7     believe that at the end of the day looking at the submissions and the

 8     evidence you'll find that missing body parts and impossible placement of

 9     bodies and injuries tell a tale different from that presented by the

10     Prosecution.  And surely given this forensic evidence, it is not possible

11     to say that the only or even the most reasonable inference of what

12     happened is the OTP side, particularly not when their star witness

13     describes injuries and a manner of death for named persons whom he

14     supposedly eye-witnessed that do not coincide with the forensic evidence

15     of the Prosecution.  Surely this shoddy evidence would be an affront to

16     the integrity of these proceedings if accepted.

17             I think we have discussed Izbica in our brief and have adequately

18     addressed the evidence that was led by the Prosecution and illustrating

19     the forensic problems with the Prosecution's case and that evidence;

20     however, as the Prosecutors have raised that in their closing arguments,

21     including Mr. Cepic, I have just a few points to highlight.

22             Liri Loshi and his vaunted tape.  The forensic evidence and the

23     forensic examination of -- forensic testimony of Dr. Stankovic saying the

24     bodies are not filmed in their natural positions at the location of death

25     or what's called the situs.  Forensics, this time of the Prosecution in

Page 27340

 1     their written evidence, say some of the graves never had any human

 2     remains in them.  Prosecution witnesses say that the bodies -- that

 3     bodies were even brought from elsewhere and buried there months later,

 4     albeit the witnesses for the Prosecution give conflicting numbers as to

 5     the total number of people that perished and/or were buried at Izbica.

 6     The neutral evidence in this case shows a strong KLA presence in and

 7     around Izbica and continued combat in the area over a span of months with

 8     civilians present every time.

 9             So no one forced them to leave, and, Your Honours, a critical

10     fact that the Prosecution either did not know or did not bring to the

11     Court's attention and Liri Loshi had to have known and did not bring to

12     the Court's attention but which was revealed by KLA documents and the

13     testimony of General Bislim Zyrapi, Chief of Staff of the KLA, Liri Loshi

14     was the KLA commandant for Padalista, this is far from independent,

15     trustworthy evidence.  All this together provides the highly reasonable

16     and we submit almost certain inference that the Izbica evidence was

17     fiddled with, was staged by the KLA.

18             Addressing Mr. Cepic's remarks that the military prosecutor

19     transferred the case to the civilian prosecutors, when was that?  Where

20     are the documents?  Was it when the military courts were shut down after

21     the war because then all pending files were transferred.  Your Honours,

22     this is no more than smoke -- more smoke than substance from Mr. Cepic.

23     We direct you to review the evidence that is before you, not Mr. Cepic's

24     allusions to evidence that is not before anyone.  We think the evidence

25     is clear that the Prosecution has not proven the case as to Izbica that

Page 27341

 1     can be the basis for a conviction against anyone in this courtroom.

 2             Your Honours, I will briefly move to what was said about sexual

 3     assaults briefly, for two reasons.  First, because I cannot say much

 4     without going into private session and I think that we have covered that

 5     in the relevant portions of our brief, our final brief, but briefly also

 6     for another matter, because despite the prominence of the allegations of

 7     sexual assault in the opening statements, which we've highlighted in our

 8     portion of the brief dealing with this, and the provenance of allegations

 9     of sexual assaults in the closing arguments, it must be remembered how

10     very little evidence was actually led by the Prosecution in this case and

11     presented about sexual assaults.  This is not a case about persons

12     alleged to be direct participants in a sexual assault or rape, and thus

13     it must really be shown more than the mere fact that such and assault

14     occurred.  People, the right people had to know about it and it had to be

15     part of a widespread and systematic plan for purposes of these

16     proceedings.

17             Respectfully, Your Honours, the purported sexual assaults of a

18     handful of persons by unidentifiable persons -- by unidentifiable

19     perpetrators does not make a case before this Tribunal against these

20     accused, and again I have to keep pointing out how remarkable it is how

21     the Prosecution chose to present its case.  They knowingly presented

22     K-63, the husband of a victim, and used his testimony to allege

23     conclusions about the perpetrators, the colours of uniforms, their

24     association with the police, et cetera.  They then did not ask the actual

25     victim to identify the perpetrators.  I asked the victim about -- when I

Page 27342

 1     asked the victim about this, she not only told us about her husband's

 2     problems differentiating colours and other concentration problems that

 3     would affect his credibility as a witness, of which the Prosecution

 4     surely knew of if they interviewed the persons.  She also flatly refuted

 5     his identification of the perpetrators, saying that they certainly were

 6     not the Serbian police.  Now, the Prosecution ought to have had this

 7     information.  They did their investigation.  Why would they present such

 8     inaccurate evidence on such a critical matter?  And let's not forget that

 9     K-63 was also the witness who repeatedly denied speaking with the

10     Prosecution in advance and in preparation for his testimony and only

11     relented after the Prosecution itself admitted to such contact.  Are we

12     to believe that K-63 is really credible evidence?  I suspect not.  And

13     again I will not belabour the point because we have covered sexual

14     assaults in our brief.

15             Now, another thing that astounded my from the oral presentations

16     of the Prosecution was that they seriously suggested that due to the fact

17     that the border region saw heavy bombing, it was illogical for persons,

18     Albanian civilians or anyone for that matter, to willingly flee in that

19     direction.  Now, as a corollary to this it was presented that identity

20     cards were taken as a planned widespread and systematic method of

21     identity cleansing - I think that's the first time we heard this word -

22     identity cleansing at the border to try and erase all records of the

23     persons' existence and in this regard it was also seriously suggested by

24     the Prosecution that using Pristina as an example they would show the

25     same tactics were used throughout Kosovo, that Pristina was an exemplar

Page 27343

 1     and model for all.

 2             First and foremost, it is entirely logical and supported by the

 3     evidence that a land invasion by NATO was feared by everyone, that the

 4     air war was hitting all within Yugoslavia, albeit the hardest in Kosovo.

 5     Therefore, we submit, it is entirely within the bounds of human logic

 6     that persons caught in a war zone would want to try and escape from that

 7     war zone, and to do that you have to go where the bombs aren't falling.

 8     NATO was not bombing the countries surrounding Yugoslavia, and for Kosovo

 9     residents the closest choices were Macedonia and Albania and therefore it

10     was highly reasonable and logical for persons to cross dangerous ground

11     to get to an area of safety.  I simply cannot believe that the

12     Prosecution would try to say that that is illogical or impossible.  Such

13     a stance is incredible.

14             Also we have evidence that the roads and bridges near the border

15     with -- with -- near the Kosovo border with these countries were not

16     bombed by NATO, perhaps with an aim towards a ground invasion and perhaps

17     in view of the fact that the refugee flow was resulting from the

18     bombings.  Either way, this deeply undercuts the representations made by

19     the Prosecution.

20             We have evidence from Mr. Zlatkovic and from other sources of the

21     situation where multiple convoys of Albanian civilians heading back to

22     their villages from the border were bombed by NATO, Meja, Bistrazin near

23     Djakovica.  We even saw the footage, the video footage of the efforts of

24     the police including Mr. Zlatkovic to assist victims of the NATO crime.

25     So I submit it does not support the Prosecution's assertion.

Page 27344

 1             Now, as to this newly coined identity cleansing, we have the

 2     considerable testimony that even assuming for the sake of argument,

 3     arguendo, that identity documents were taken, this act would not in any

 4     way erase the records of one's existence nor prevent one from entering

 5     back into the country is seeking replacement documents.  In this regard

 6     we have the testimony of Mr. Vucurevic and of Mr. Dujkovic that there was

 7     simply no way to filter out and destroy only Albanian citizenship records

 8     because the original books were kept in duplicate and they did not

 9     differentiate based on ethnicity.

10             Likewise, there was significant evidence that no such orders

11     existed for the taking of identity documents.  Mr. Ognjenovic from the

12     Vrbica border crossing testified that the Albanians were doing it on

13     their own.  Even after passing the border in the no-man's land between

14     Yugoslavia and the other side.  He and his men collected the documents,

15     preserving them, sending them to issuing SUPs in accord with the law and

16     then eventually left a sack at the border crossing upon their withdrawal,

17     turning that over to the international officials that monitored the

18     withdrawal.  Nobody was destroying these documents.  Efforts were being

19     undertaken to preserve the documents.

20             But the most compelling evidence on this score ought to be

21     considered from Ms. Kravetz who said that the pattern for this crime came

22     from Pristina which served as a model for the rest of Kosovo and

23     Metohija.  There is a slight problem with this picture, however.  Not a

24     single one of the witnesses that this Prosecution brought from Pristina

25     testified that their identity documents were taken from them at the

Page 27345

 1     Djeneral Jankovic border crossing.  Indeed, we had Ms. Bala, Mr. Kabashi,

 2     K-63, K-62, none of them testified that they had their personal documents

 3     taken or destroyed while passing through Djeneral Jankovic.  What does

 4     that mean?  Likewise we have three witnesses from Urosevac of the

 5     Prosecution, Mr. Hyseni, Mr. Krasniqi, and Mr. Bucaliu, all of whom also

 6     went through Djeneral Jankovic and who again did not testify that their

 7     documents were taken away or destroyed, because they weren't.

 8             We had two other witnesses, Mr. Shaqiri and Mr. Qamil from

 9     Gnjilane who went through the Globocica border crossing and they too did

10     not have their documents taken away.  Not a single one of these witnesses

11     brought by this Prosecution supports their case.  And yet Pristina, and I

12     presume the border crossing the Pristina witnesses went through is

13     supposed to be the linchpin to their identity cleansing experiment.  I

14     submit that if Pristina is a model, that with the other evidence

15     indicates that there was no plan to take identity documents.

16             And of course let's not forget that there was evidence persons

17     crossed into -- from Kosovo into Montenegro and Serbia proper also

18     without having their documents taken away from them.

19             So what are we left with on the part of the Prosecution?  Let us

20     not forget one of their star witnesses as to this identity cleansing,

21     Ms. Sadije.  For the moment let us not focus on a fact that she changed

22     her testimony 180 degrees from her sworn statement nor the conflicting

23     accounts of how she was being shot, when she was shot, et cetera.  The

24     Prosecution cannot change her testimony and cannot change the fact that

25     this testimony was shown to be false by the official response from the

Page 27346

 1     government that she did not previously have issued identity documents and

 2     also it's remarkable given this plan that she was successful to get proof

 3     of her citizenship, this plan that the Prosecution alleges of erasing

 4     person's identities, that one of the persons was able to go in the year

 5     2008 and get proof of citizenship issued and get identity documents for

 6     the first time at that time.

 7             So this story of identity cleansing and destroying all trace of

 8     persons who left, it's not true at all.  This case it shows you can't

 9     come up with a big fancy buzz word to try and cover up just how weak your

10     evidence is in this matter, and surely the Trial Chamber, as experienced

11     it is, will not fall for such a ploy on the part of the Prosecution.

12             Now, the Prosecution's case is dependent upon the assumption that

13     persons did not leave Kosovo and Metohija for reasons other than criminal

14     reasons, that is to say the criminal plans or actions of Yugoslav and

15     Serbian forces.  This is the basis of the expert report by Mr. Patrick

16     Ball and until recently this was the mantra of the Prosecution.  But in

17     the closing statements it is not any longer said that the crimes

18     themselves made them leave but simply that the "actions" of forces was

19     "mainly" the reasons persons left.  This is at transcript page 26778,

20     lines 3 through 7, and I believe it was Ms. Kravetz.

21             This is intriguing and baffling, but it is a concession on the

22     part of the Prosecution, a telling one I think, conceding that their

23     prior allegations and arguments, including those of Mr. Ball, are not

24     accurate.  Certainly there are a whole bunch of actions of armed forces

25     that are legitimate in nature and which cannot be the basis for criminal

Page 27347

 1     liability of these accused that are the legitimate and

 2     understandable reasons -- that there are also legitimate and

 3     understandable reasons for people to become frightened and/or leave their

 4     homes and the country, particularly in the middle of a war zone that are

 5     not related to crimes.

 6             Some examples from the evidence have been cited in our brief, and

 7     by way of example the Chamber will recall the testimony of the SUP chief

 8     from Gnjilane, Mr. Gavranic.  First of all, recall that this man

 9     persuaded a convoy of Albanian citizens -- Albanian civilians to return

10     to their homes, arrested persons engaged in crimes against Albanians, and

11     in the end was requested by one of the witnesses -- the Albanian

12     witnesses here to provide a -- to provide an escort for their convoy,

13     which he did, to escort them wherever they wanted to go.  In short not

14     even the Prosecution can attack the credibility or good character of this

15     witness.

16             Mr. Gavranic testified as to his knowledge of persons leaving,

17     and this was precisely because of the NATO air-strikes, that it struck

18     military installations in the nearby area near these settlements in

19     Gnjilane and when troops legitimately redeployed to other areas, the

20     citizenry wanted to leave for fear that the nearness of these forces to

21     Gnjilane and the villages in Gnjilane would draw NATO strikes and thus

22     present the possibility of collateral damage upon them if NATO missed or

23     used excessive force.  Now, Gavranic explained how he and his officers

24     tried to persuade people to stay but they were adamant about going.  This

25     is at transcript page 22700 through 701.

Page 27348

 1             Well, given how small we have heard Kosovo and Metohija is,

 2     imagine the situation that during daily air-strikes, both the Yugoslav

 3     Army and the Serbian MUP are constantly having to move around to avoid

 4     being hit, changing their locations even multiple times in a day, et

 5     cetera.  Well, this activity of troops of the VJ and the MUP is not

 6     hostile, is not combat, is not even malintentioned, but it still can

 7     bring the civilian population to fear risk from NATO bombs, not from the

 8     forces themselves.

 9             Now, to get a full grasp of the picture, it should be recalled

10     what amount of forces that we're talking about that would be legitimately

11     moving around to avoid being struck by these NATO bombs that were seeking

12     them out wherever they were.  We have evidence that the MUP strength was

13     10.021, approximately, before the war and grew to 15.000 during the war

14     period.  On the VJ side we have 6D-164, page 2.  As of the 18th of April,

15     1999, 71.668 members of the Pristina Corps.  Imagine what these units of

16     the VJ and the MUP spread out over Kosovo and moving around, it is

17     legitimately reasonable to assume some civilians left because they had

18     fears that NATO was going to strike these forces and perhaps strike their

19     villages.

20             However, this in no means is conduct that can be labelled

21     criminal on the part of the Army of Yugoslavia or the Serbian MUP.  And

22     if this is the type of conduct the Prosecution is relying upon when it

23     says actions of forces rather than crimes led people to mainly leave,

24     then the indictment in this regard must fail.

25             While we're talking about reasons why persons left I would be

Page 27349

 1     remiss if I did not note that Patrick Ball not only engages in creating

 2     his own science, as my colleagues pointed out and as the expert testimony

 3     of Dr. Fruits provided.  The exercise of Mr. Ball also engages in

 4     extraordinary creation of a new psychological study, because although the

 5     Prosecution fails to provide us with any of the credentials of Mr. Ball

 6     or criteria used by Mr. Ball or credible sources of Mr. Ball in the field

 7     of psychology, it does expect us to embrace and accept as true Mr. Ball's

 8     conclusion that fear among civilians from bombings lasts only two days

 9     and then dissipates, which of course would conveniently allow him to

10     remove fear of bombing as a potential reason for flight and thus

11     re-affirm his own results.  Congratulations, Mr. Ball.  But I submit that

12     is not a proper way of conducting evidence at a trial.

13             Now, again the Prosecution selected Pristina and highlighted

14     Pristina as the role model, the suitable model for how things happened

15     elsewhere in Kosovo during the indictment period.  Well, let's look at

16     Pristina and what the evidence has to offer for us.  I think the most

17     instructive place to look is the evidence provided to us, thankfully, by

18     the Rule 70 provider, the United States of America who produced 6D1637

19     which has information based upon their own contacts on the ground in

20     Pristina during the height of the war.  This exhibit provides that both

21     ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Pristina were becoming increasing

22     concerned, huddling together in bomb shelters, and growing afraid and

23     uncertain because NATO started bombing during the day.  It further says

24     that due to the bombings, there is a lack of work, many factories are

25     shut down, and many persons, including ethnic Serbs, are leaving the

Page 27350

 1     city, because with lack of work they are not being paid and do not know

 2     how to make ends meet in Pristina anymore.  This is very substantial

 3     evidence.  This is something that does not fit into the Prosecutor's neat

 4     little picture nor in Mr. Ball's theorys, but it is a fact,

 5     uncontroverted evidence in this case, evidence that I think warrants a

 6     close scrutiny of the Prosecution's allegations.

 7             The reserve police detachments, RPO.  I honestly had thought I

 8     would not have to discuss the RPO too much, but with the insinuations

 9     that the Prosecution and Mr. Cepic made in closing arguments I see the

10     record has to be set straight.  Both the Prosecution brief and I think

11     the submissions of Mr. Cepic mix and match reserve policemen with the

12     RPO, as if they are the same thing; they are not.  As a preliminary

13     matter it is our position, and I believe it's born true by the evidence,

14     that the RPO were disbanded with the start of mobilisation and the

15     proclamation of war as military conscripts and reservists had to go to

16     their wartime units and reserve policemen therein had to go to their

17     police posts.  This is borne true by discussions held at meetings at the

18     premises of the MUP staff.  I think P1996 is one example.

19             Now, the genesis of the RPO begins with Exhibit P1415.  We see

20     that document does not mention the MUP staff or the MUP for that matter

21     having responsibility for this.  From P2166 we see that it is not Lukic

22     or anyone from the MUP talking about the RPO, and indeed the RPO and the

23     defence of villages was something that was part of the global plan to

24     suppress terrorism, and Mr. Djakovic told us who drafted that plan and

25     that no MUP members were involved.  P1114, from this document dealing

Page 27351

 1     with the area Kosovska Mitrovica we see that the RPO in the town of

 2     Vucitrn is entirely made up of 32 VJ reservists, not a single reserve

 3     policeman, and the RPO in Cvjenarej [phoen] is commanded by a VJ

 4     reservist, commanded by a VJ reservist, has one police reservist and 110

 5     VJ reservists.  The documentation is clear that the RPO comprised

 6     primarily of army reservists and therefore when mobilisation and the war

 7     were called up these bodies ceased to exist because mobilisation would be

 8     impossible and it would be impossible to grow to the record -- to the

 9     number of 70.000 members without the RPO disbanding.

10             It should be recalled that even Mr. Cepic presented evidence that

11     army personnel could not be commanded by the police, apart from being

12     labelled police and having communicated with the police and having some

13     police reservists therein, the RPO did not have a role within the

14     Ministry of the Interior command structure.

15             The MUP have lists of them because in accordance with the law

16     they had to keep lists of everyone who had legally possessed fire-arms.

17     P1063, P1060, P1065 all are communications within the Ministry of

18     Defence.  None are sent to the MUP.  I hope that answers the questions

19     posed by Mr. Cepic.  And further I would only note that Mr. Cepic has

20     provided no proof for his assertion at paragraph 757 and in his

21     submissions yesterday -- or yesterday that the RPO continued to exist

22     after the mobilisation declaration of war, none whatsoever.  The minutes

23     from the SUP staff meeting state otherwise.

24             Paragraph 754 of the Lazarevic submission says that many had

25     military uniforms due to lack of police uniforms, but surely that's not

Page 27352

 1     true because VJ reservists are given VJ uniforms.  755 of the brief of

 2     Lazarevic states that Mitic claims that there was a problem with

 3     unauthorised registration of men who were military conscripts by the MUP

 4     and there is a document cited, 5D1014 and also I think you need to look

 5     at P1415 because you'll see that the registration was actually done by

 6     the military district in Pristina, not by the MUP.  And again, 5D1014,

 7     this document is dealing with reserve police, not the RPO.  Again, the

 8     military defences keep misconstruing and misunderstanding how the police

 9     works.

10             But in the end we would submit that the Prosecution has presented

11     no evidence of the involvement of any of these persons in any crimes.

12             Turning back to P2166, Mr. Hannis the other day commented that

13     one of his favourite exhibits was P2166.  I don't know if it's because

14     they cite to it so much in their brief, because they do, but I submit

15     that they ought to have spent more time reading it because they surely

16     don't.  First off, I think we would be remiss if we did not take into

17     account the testimony of a witness brought here by the Trial Chamber,

18     General Dimitrijevic, himself at the head of the intelligence security

19     service of the VJ General Staff for many years and who testified that no

20     stenographic notes or minutes were kept at these type of meetings and

21     that P2166 does not correspond to his recollections of the same.  This is

22     at transcript page 26597 through 26599.  Likewise, Dimitrijevic also

23     concluded that P2166 was written at some later date and does not

24     accurately reflect what was said.  That's at transcript page 26615.

25     Respectfully, Your Honours, Mr. Hannis's favorite document has to be

Page 27353

 1     considered in light of Mr. Dimitrijevic's telling testimony.

 2             Going further, it is important to take a look at what is actually

 3     contained in the document and what precisely is attributed to Mr. Lukic

 4     and what the author of this document, Susic, has put into it, recalling

 5     that there's been some indication that this was put together from several

 6     meetings.  Lukic in his briefing as set forth in the document nowhere is

 7     attributed as actually uttering the words "Joint Command," and further,

 8     the briefing by Lukic focuses exclusively on what would be considered

 9     routine police affairs.  Others talk of the conduct of actions under the

10     general plan for suppression of terrorism as we have indicated.

11             And now as for the references to the Joint Command in this

12     document, it must be taken into account that General Dimitrijevic

13     testified that the name Joint Command was in fact not used during these

14     meetings and in fact did not exist.  In reality, what does Mr. Hannis's

15     favourite exhibit really tend to show us anyway, that the highest state

16     leadership of Yugoslavia and Serbia was convening meetings.  Isn't that

17     the job of such organs in every country.  Is the state of the union

18     speech in the United States some big criminal conspiracy just because the

19     legislative members, executive members, and governmental organs are

20     present?  Is it a crime for a servant of a state to meet with the

21     president of the country to report on activities of the governmental

22     organ?  Well, I have yet to see any support for either of the foregoing

23     being a crime or proof of a crime, and I would submit if it were, jails

24     around the world would be full and countries governmentless.  The

25     propositions being made by the Prosecution simply are not, are not the

Page 27354

 1     only, let alone the only, reasonable conclusions or inferences to be

 2     drawn from the evidence, no matter how much Mr. Hannis likes this

 3     exhibit.

 4             Another topic we need to briefly touch upon is the evidence of

 5     trains and the evidence of Mr. Bucaliu.  It is truly remarkable that the

 6     Prosecution would steadfastly cling to the flawed testimony and analysis

 7     of Mr. Bucaliu that has already been discredited at trial, but at

 8     transcript page 26781 through 26782 Ms. Kravetz in claiming the frequency

 9     of number of trains was increased again cites to Mr. Bucaliu.  The

10     problem with this logic and argument is the same as it was during this

11     trial.  Common logic and mathematics coupled with the Prosecution's own

12     exhibits, the very same exhibit brought by Bucaliu debunked his claims

13     soundly.

14             Looking at P1331, that is the train log-book from Bucaliu we see

15     that 228 trains were registered for the 78 days of the NATO bombing

16     campaign.  Bucaliu himself testified that the regular traffic was about

17     ten trains a day.  Now, that would amount to 780 trains during the stated

18     time-period of the NATO war and the indictment period.  Bucaliu testified

19     that P1331 was authentic and that all trains passing through had to be

20     registered.  So if the regular train traffic was ten trains a day, there

21     should be something more than 780 trains that were registered in this

22     book.  There were not.  Indeed, there was no increase in trains but

23     rather a drastic decrease.  Now, it should be noted that this

24     contradiction was itself acknowledged by Judge Bonomy at transcript page

25     3044 that the OTP is continuing to promote such damaged goods as this

Page 27355

 1     evidence is quite telling as to the weakness of their case.

 2             We have set forth in our brief the evidence establishing that all

 3     joint anti-terrorist actions were conducted in 1998 pursuant to the

 4     global five-stage plan with all actions being planned and maps being made

 5     by the Pristina Corps and that 1999 the functioning of the joint actions

 6     was conducted in the same manner.  And again, we had -- as my colleague

 7     indicated, we had the person most involved in the VJ and MUP

 8     interactions, Milan Djakovic, come and tell that he and the corps drafted

 9     the plan, made all the maps, et cetera.

10             Now, I do have to touch on some issues of VJ and MUP interactions

11     since I need to satisfy Prosecutors Hannis, Stamp, Kravetz, and Cepic and

12     to clarify some points.  It boils down to not understanding how the

13     police operates and not analysing the documents.  Indeed, the Law on

14     Defence is important to understand the activities of the police during

15     war and so are the instructions received from the ministry leadership in

16     Belgrade.  6D269 dated February the 18th, 1999, is an important document

17     for you to consider, it comes from the chief of the public security

18     sector General Djordjevic and demonstrates the genesis of VJ and MUP

19     interaction and indeed the communications between the two.

20             Section 16 of Djordjevic's dispatch is also important.  It

21     directs all MUP organs to get in touch with other state organs, such as

22     the -- and including the VJ.  This dispatch is not limited to Kosovo,

23     rather, it tasks SUPs all throughout Serbia, all throughout Serbia, to

24     get together with the VJ in the area in regard to exchanging information

25     with the aspect -- or with the defence of the country in mind, a

Page 27356

 1     perfectly legitimate and reasonable and logical instruction.  This was

 2     also sent to the MUP staff in Pristina and this is the reason why Lukic

 3     had meetings with the military generals.  Those are the meetings he's

 4     talking about in his interview which the Prosecution has latched on to.

 5     These are perfectly legitimate meetings and these are not any kind of

 6     parallel institution bypassing the MUP or otherwise -- the MUP chain of

 7     command or otherwise establishing some sort of separate command.

 8             Let me touch on the Lukic interview.  Your Honours, respectfully,

 9     the translation is horrid and the questioning by the OTP is horrid.  They

10     mix terms and topics and do not accurately reflect what was discussed.

11     We have previously filed an objection on this topic and stand by it.

12     Take note that the Prosecution provides the term Joint Command to Lukic.

13     Lukic starts off saying in his interview so-called and then adopts the

14     Prosecution's shorthand because they keep repeating it so much.  But

15     they, including the interpreter, don't even always use the same term, the

16     same Serbian term to describe it.  Sometimes it's "zdruzena komanda" and

17     sometimes it's "zajdnicka komanda."  But Lukic is clear these are merely

18     meetings to exchange information and we submit they are in compliance

19     with the instructions from chief of sector in 6D269.  Now it should be

20     noted that this dispatch and those that follow it from Djordjevic and

21     which are in the record never once tasked anyone in Kosovo, anyone from

22     the MUP in Kosovo with getting in touch with a Joint Command.  If such a

23     thing had even existed in 1999 wouldn't Djordjevic, chief of the RJB, and

24     someone who the Djakovic notes show was present for a large number of

25     these meetings that have somehow come to be labelled Joint Command

Page 27357

 1     wouldn't he direct people to go to it?  And doesn't it follow if he's

 2     directing people to go to meetings with the army at the level of each

 3     SUP, is the Prosecution's case -- does it mean that there had to be seven

 4     or eight more Joint Commands somewhere in Kosovo?  It just doesn't make

 5     sense.

 6             Another matter for the Prosecutors including -- and also

 7     Mr. Cepic to consider which I think Your Honours will see right away.

 8     The dispatches from the MUP in Belgrade sending the PJP units to Kosovo,

 9     look at the language there, 6D291, for instance, the PJP detachments are

10     not sent to Kosovo to be deployed at the MUP staff or to take orders from

11     it; rather, the language used says that they are sent to the assistance

12     of the SUPs, they go directly to the SUPs.  If the PJP were to be under

13     the MUP staff, then it would be logical for them to be deployed to the

14     staff but they are not.  Very telling and yet very much ignored by the

15     Prosecution.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel kindly slow down for the

17     interpretation.  Thank you.

18             MR. IVETIC:  What the Prosecution also ignores is the evidence

19     that they themselves have presented.

20             I apologise, I didn't have it on the right channel to hear the

21     interpreter's request.  I will slow down.

22             What the Prosecution also ignores is the evidence that they

23     themselves have presented.  I do not have time to highlight all the

24     errors in the Prosecution's brief.  Later I will highlight some egregious

25     ones that relate to my client; however, for the moment I would like to

Page 27358

 1     focus on some that relate just to Lukic's interview.

 2             Paragraph 228 of the Prosecution brief in claiming that the Joint

 3     Command issued orders for joint actions and that Lukic acknowledged this

 4     and that his role was to ensure that the orders were carried out by the

 5     MUP, well, first of all, there is simply no citation in the brief for

 6     this assertion that -- as to what Lukic's role was.  That part is sheer

 7     fabrication by the Prosecution.  As for the Joint Command commanding the

 8     actions, the Prosecution cites to the Lukic interview, and I think it is

 9     instructive to read this part so I would refer Your Honours to take the

10     time to read page 49 of the Lukic interview and to see that it does not

11     in fact mention any Joint Command task in commanding these actions,

12     rather, Lukic says very clearly, very succinctly that the tasks were

13     defined by the Pristina Corps for joint VJ and MUP actions after the

14     general decision by the state leadership to adopt the global plan in

15     1998.  That is exactly what the other evidence in this case has proven.

16     His interview is consistent with it.  The only thing that is not

17     consistent is the reading and inference that the Prosecution provides for

18     this, which is not even remotely possible, given the plain language of

19     the interview, and for this they seek life in prison given a

20     mis-characterization of the evidence.  That is something that I am

21     shocked and disgusted at, Your Honours.

22             Another matter that needs review, the allusions in the brief at

23     paragraph 219 of the Prosecution that Lukic admitted that his predecessor

24     had command over certain special units.  Your Honours, I would tell you

25     to closely check the pages cited from the Lukic interview because my

Page 27359

 1     reading of the same reveals that Lukic is talking about the time he

 2     became chief of the RJB, that is to say 2001, not when he became manager

 3     of the MUP staff in Pristina in 1998 and 1999.

 4             Lastly on this topic the Lukic interview was cited several times

 5     in the brief, for instance, at paragraph 1004 of the Prosecution and by

 6     Mr. Stamp in his oral closing remarks to demonstrate that Lukic admitted

 7     to a dual reporting by the PJP to him as well as to the PJP commander

 8     Lieutenant-General Obrad Stevanovic.  Your Honours, it's truly and

 9     honestly a shame that the Prosecution did not read the interview, perhaps

10     because it was a poor translation, perhaps because there was no

11     transcript until February of this year, even though the interview was

12     taken sometime in I believe 2003.

13             Lukic in this section that they cite is talking about the year

14     1998 and 1998 alone.  During that time-period the commander of the PJP,

15     Obrad Stevanovic, was in Belgrade most of the time and Lukic and the

16     staff in Pristina had obligations toward the Kosovo Verification Mission

17     to report manoeuvres, police presence, et cetera, to pass along

18     communications.  You'll recall that Mijatovic, his deputy, was the main

19     liaison of the MUP with the mission.  Likewise, the staff acted as a

20     logistics forwarding communications to Belgrade and from Belgrade, a post

21     office, if you will.  That is the sense in which the dual responsibility

22     is talked about.  But in 1999 logic and common sense dictate that when

23     the commander of all PJP, assistant minister, head of the police

24     administration, Lieutenant-General Obrad Stevanovic comes down to Kosovo,

25     as we've heard in the evidence, when he spends the entire time, the

Page 27360

 1     entire Kosovo war at the MUP staff, using the staff as his own office as

 2     his mailing address, as we heard from several witnesses, there is no need

 3     for any dual responsibility.  Stevanovic is there.  He remains -- he

 4     remains as the commander of the PJP, he remains to be the last person,

 5     the last member of the MUP to withdraw from Kosovo and Metohija.  So the

 6     role of the staff in this regard ceases, particularly with the KVM no

 7     longer on the scene.  You really have to look at the context of the

 8     evidence, Your Honours, not stitch together a patchwork of assumptions

 9     and misquotations as the Prosecution has done.

10             Ljubinko Cvetic, he was highlighted in the Prosecution's oral

11     submissions and as well as in the written submissions.  This vaunted

12     police insider witness whom Chester Stamp rallied to the defence of in

13     his oral submissions, well, the final brief of the Prosecution is replete

14     with citations to incredible propositions for many of which the sole

15     evidence of record is Ljubinko Cvetic.  Now, however, Mr. Stamp does not

16     seem aware that Mr. Cvetic's evidence is inconsistent with the proffered

17     command chart of the MUP, the document prepared by Philip Coo that we --

18     we have the Prosecution presenting again.  And, Your Honours, we had our

19     discussion before, I am told that that chart is, in fact, tendered into

20     evidence as P255.

21             JUDGE BONOMY:  Yeah.

22             MR. IVETIC:  Mr. Stamp does not seem aware that Mr. Cvetic's

23     evidence is inconsistent with this chart.  Is it a case of seeking out

24     victory rather than truth and justice?  I don't know.  But we have a very

25     interesting thing.  The linchpin of the Prosecution case against

Page 27361

 1     Mr. Lukic is Exhibit P1505.  Ljubinko Cvetic is the key insider witness

 2     against the police, the former SUP chief in Kosovska Mitrovica.  What did

 3     Ljubinko Cvetic say about P1505 in these proceedings?  Nothing.  The

 4     Prosecution failed to present it to him.  Why would they fail to present

 5     such a key bit of evidence to one of their key witnesses to comment on?

 6     Could it be that they were concerned that he would not give them answers

 7     that were supportive of their case?  Not a single Prosecution witness,

 8     fact or expert, was presented as to the nature and scope of P1505 in the

 9     functioning of the staff.  Multiple witnesses were presented by the

10     Defence demonstrating that P1505 did not come to life as my colleague

11     Mr. Lukic pointed out.  The Prosecution here has a live witness that they

12     failed to present this to.  They are relying upon a mere document to

13     prove their case.  Remarkable.  Incredible.

14             Now, in short, since I know we're -- I'm trying to condense as

15     much as I can, the topics for which Cvetic is used within the

16     Prosecution's brief are the so-called Joint Command and the MUP staff.

17     However, we must take into account that Cvetic, according to his own

18     testimony, never was a member of the MUP staff for Kosovo and Metohija,

19     that's at page 8146 of the transcript.  Now, this flies in the face of a

20     critical averment to the Prosecution, again which is based on P1505, and

21     they claim that all SUP chiefs were part of this expanded MUP staff

22     managed by Sreten Lukic.  How is it that the OTP's key police insider

23     witness negates this claim soundly?  Ergo, the Prosecution's claims as to

24     P1505 cannot be supported by their own evidence.

25             Secondly, as Mr. Cvetic was not a member of the MUP staff, Cvetic

Page 27362

 1     cannot be considered to have reliable, credible knowledge about the

 2     activities of that staff.

 3             Now, in a similar nature Cvetic testified under oath and very

 4     explicitly that he was never present nor participated in any information

 5     exchanges that the VJ General Djakovic has christened as the Joint

 6     Command.  His testimony in this regard is at transcript page 8080, lines

 7     16 through 17.  Now, coincidentally while we're on the topic Djakovic

 8     testified a few times that he had a habit of interpreting things via or

 9     utilizing military shorthand or terminology or logic.  It is interesting

10     to note that in discussing coming up with the informal name for these

11     meetings with Mr. Pavkovic that Djakovic used the term command, both in

12     describing the MUP staff, he calls it the MUP command, and for the

13     meetings themselves.

14             It should be noted in this regard that when questioned about the

15     regular offices of the MUP staff he conceded that by his military logic

16     any office is to be considered a command post.  That's transcript page

17     26456 and also 26521.  Thus, Djakovic's use of the term command must be

18     taken with a grain of salt, as otherwise it can lead to mistakes in

19     interpretation given such a dilute and lax criteria for something being

20     referred to as a command according to him.

21             Now, returning to Cvetic, by ordinary logic his allegations

22     relative to these meetings cannot have a high level of probative value or

23     credibility.  He simply doesn't have first-hand knowledge.  Now, this is

24     especially true given the evidence we have of Cvetic and his behaviour

25     whilst acting as the SUP chief in Kosovska Mitrovica.  The Chamber ought

Page 27363

 1     to be reminded this man defended by the Prosecution was actually

 2     dismissed from his post in the middle of the war because his SUP had not

 3     undertaken to uncover and investigate a single crime on the territory,

 4     see P1989 in this regard.  He boldly claimed that not a single policeman

 5     was processed for the murder of an Albanian in all of Kosovo and

 6     Metohija.  While this was perhaps true for his SUP while he ran it, it

 7     certainly is not true nor corroborated by the evidence of record.

 8     Indeed, after he was removed, even the Kosovska Mitrovica SUP returned to

 9     its job of investigating and processing reports of crimes and detaining

10     or arresting perpetrators and submitting them for prosecution, including

11     MUP employees.  See, for instance, the testimony of Mr. Bogunovic in this

12     regard or the exhibit relating to JSO reservist Goran Vasilinovic

13     [phoen].

14             We have had multiple witnesses testify as to the charges

15     investigated, processed, and filed against perpetrators of crimes

16     including police members, civilians, and VJ members.  We have some of

17     that in the portions of 6D614 that were admitted into evidence.  There

18     simply is no way for the credibility of Cvetic to stand in the face of

19     such overwhelming documentary and testimonial evidence to the contrary,

20     particularly when it is alleged that he hid in the basement of the SUP

21     and neglected his official duties to investigate crimes.

22             Paragraph 276, and there's others in the Prosecution brief

23     relying upon Cvetic, therefore must be disregarded to the extent they

24     claim a lack of investigations and the evidence is contrary to this fact.

25     We have heard the evidence presented by various witnesses as to the

Page 27364

 1     investigations conducted by the MUP, the creation of the KiM dossier to

 2     collect and continue investigations as to crimes committed, the testimony

 3     of 62, Mr. Kostic, Mr. Furdulovic, and even K-84, among others, in this

 4     regard and we have the KiM dossier with the 20-odd thousand files that

 5     one of the witnesses testified to, several dozen against police members

 6     for murder all processed properly, cases against civilians, cases against

 7     the VJ.  Simply put, there's no way to account for the wide disparity

 8     between the evidence and Mr. Cvetic's testimony of no processed cases at

 9     all, at least not in any way that preserves the testimony of Cvetic.

10             General Drewienkiewicz or DZ, I must make a few comments to draw

11     to the Chamber's attention another of the Prosecution's vaunted

12     witnesses.  First of all, the Prosecution cannot, as we have said time

13     and again, make up for their own failure to call a police expert by

14     asking military and lay persons with no training or knowledge of the

15     Serbian MUP to opine on what they believe the role of Sreten Lukic was

16     and what the staff did.  For one thing recall that all of General

17     Drewienkiewicz's interactions would have been through a translator and we

18     have seen how difficult it can be for certain things to translate

19     correctly.  Documents in this case by the KVM and by military personnel

20     have given a variety of titles for Sreten Lukic, almost all of them

21     incorrect.  Proper evidence must be analysed as to Sreten Lukic's role

22     and authority as we presented it already.

23             But returning to General Drewienkiewicz, please recall, Your

24     Honours, that General Drewienkiewicz was sent as deputy head of the

25     OSCE-KVM mission to monitor and verify, among other things, one of the

Page 27365

 1     main things that he was supposed to do down there was the withdrawal of

 2     the agreed number of MUP forces from the province.

 3             Now, we've heard testimony and evidence that the KDOM stood in

 4     place of the KVM, negotiating agreements on behalf of the KVM, one such

 5     agreement was this base-line agreement that we've heard about, the 10.021

 6     policemen that were allowed to remain in Kosovo and Metohija.  We saw a

 7     Rule 70 document confirming the withdrawal of the specified number of

 8     police and we saw the documents about this reduction.

 9             Shaun Byrnes, the head of the US KDOM who negotiated the

10     agreements, told us about this base-line, told us that all documentation

11     was turned over to the KVM and that he personally told them and gave it

12     to them.  General Maisonneuve, the KVM sector chief in Prizren, a

13     subordinate of General Drewienkiewicz, he knew about the base-line and

14     compliance with the reduction.  However, for some reason General DZ

15     spends from October to March of the next year in Kosovo and Metohija

16     supposedly to verify the police draw-back of forces and claims that the

17     Serbs refused to give him a base-line figure and that he does not have a

18     base-line figure.  KDOM was uncooperative, KVM never had a base-line.

19     What on earth was Drewienkiewicz doing on the ground in Kosovo?  How is

20     it possible everyone around him including his own subordinate had access

21     to and knew the base-line and he didn't?  This is simply too incredible

22     to believe and we must question the real reason for Drewienkiewicz's

23     presence and deployment to Kosovo and Metohija as a result.

24             It should be recalled that General Drewienkiewicz refuted another

25     subordinate's claim, Ciaglinski, that he handed over evidence of burned

Page 27366

 1     passports to him for safe-guarding.  Drewienkiewicz did not verify that.

 2     How could he not remember that if it happened?  It didn't.

 3             Ciaglinski's claim in that regard can also -- Ciaglinski's claims

 4     included the horseshoe plan which Drewienkiewicz also refuted, as did --

 5     as did Colonel Kotur and other evidence that we have, including from

 6     Prosecution witnesses such as Pesic, Loncar, and Abrahams, who debunked

 7     the existence of said plan, and indications are that the horseshoe plan

 8     was a myth, a hoax thought up by German intelligence to bolster support

 9     for the war.  This Trial Chamber must take such information with a grain

10     of salt and certainly, certainly the evidence of Drewienkiewicz does not

11     come up to par to convict someone for 20 years to life.

12             Just briefly on two witnesses utilised by the parties in their

13     oral submissions, Shaun Byrnes and K-25.  First of all, K-25 did not have

14     any personal dealings with the staff and he was not in a position, we

15     submit, due to his rank and function to make any valid conclusions about

16     the functioning of the staff or even the planning and command of actions,

17     how that was undertaken.  He was at too low of a level.  Shaun Byrnes,

18     this is a man who testified after August 1998 the VJ did not participate

19     in any anti-terrorist actions, and yet we have a whole bunch of other

20     evidence that in fact all operations were the legitimate anti-terrorist

21     actions of the VJ and the MUP.  His credibility is put in doubt by the

22     fact that he could be so wrong about this point.

23             Now, likewise, for all his complaints voiced here about Lukic and

24     MUP, remarkably the Rule 70 documents from the United States authored by

25     him and by others contemporaneously about the events do not have the same

Page 27367

 1     information nor the same complaints.  This is very curious indeed.  Why

 2     would you say one thing publicly to the press and to the world and then

 3     say something privately when reporting to your superiors?  You have to

 4     take into account the very significant evidence of his contacts with the

 5     KLA, his encouragement that they save quality troops to be used later, a

 6     reverence to what Joksic testified about meant the spring offensive that

 7     the KLA was planning.

 8             You have all those rather detailed information sheets from the

 9     RDB, I think there was seven of them, of suspicious contacts between

10     Byrnes and KLA members.  And then you have Byrnes who does not even try

11     to explain any of that.  He just blanket denies them all like they didn't

12     happen.  This was not my translator, no, I was never there.  The last

13     time I heard such a blanket denial without explanation, respectfully --

14     the last time that I heard such a blanket denial without explanation,

15     respectfully, was President Clinton with respect to Monica Lewinsky and

16     he was ultimately found to have -- the blanket denial turned out not to

17     be accurate.  I suspect that is the case here as well.

18             But what is more revealing is the Rambouillet negotiations and we

19     heard testimony that Shaun Byrnes himself arranged for and permitted the

20     KLA leadership, persons even he called criminal terrorists to carry guns

21     onto the plane and take them to the peace negotiations in France.  Have

22     you ever heard of such a thing?  Imagine what kind of information and

23     mistruths did Byrnes have to give and what he had to hide to get -- to

24     get that past the officials at both airports that criminals were carrying

25     guns.  That goes towards his credibility, which I submit is quite suspect

Page 27368

 1     and marred.

 2             Vasiljevic, Aleksandar Vasiljevic, I would be remiss if I did not

 3     take a few moments to review this star insider witness of the Prosecution

 4     of the VJ's military intelligence branch.  Now, albeit the testimony of

 5     Vasiljevic did change quite a bit from his sworn statement, including the

 6     testimony in the Milosevic trial as regards the MUP and the way he

 7     testified here.  Originally in his statement and in Milosevic Vasiljevic

 8     tried to place blame for an event in Gnjilane to the SAJ that he calls

 9     Skorpions.  However, at trial in our proceedings he did admit that it was

10     a VJ group that was responsible for the same and that his service had no

11     evidence of any post-Podujevo crimes by the SAJ reservists whom he calls

12     Skorpions.

13             And as my colleague indicated, Vasiljevic admitted that Lukic was

14     the ninth piglet or the lowest ranked at the meetings, at the one meeting

15     he attended but this was only after being confronted with the transcript

16     and the video recording of his own words.  This is the witness we're

17     supposed to believe.  Until he gets caught with his pants down, he'll

18     continue to say a lie.  His credibility is suspect and it ought to also

19     be recalled that he was a suspect before he became a favourite of the

20     Prosecution.  So you have to recall even he said, well, I gave that

21     interview as a suspect, I may not have been telling the truth.

22             In any event, given his propensity to say untrue things and then

23     later correct them, one wonders if it's a matter of time before he

24     corrects everything false that he has said.  One such falsehood that he

25     did not get around to correcting was his testimony that among the JSO

Page 27369

 1     were persons who had a combined 150 years of jail sentences, according to

 2     information from his service he says at the time.  Unfortunately for him

 3     and the Prosecution, General Dimitrijevic, the Trial Chamber's own

 4     witness and himself the former head of the VJ military intelligence

 5     refuted Vasiljevic, saying that VJ intelligence had no such information.

 6     This is at transcript page 26755 through 26756.  So of course we can't

 7     take Vasiljevic's claim for this and there is no other evidence to show

 8     that this is -- that this would be true.

 9             It should be noted in this regard that at the time of formation

10     of the JSO Vasiljevic was actually retired, whereas Dimitrijevic headed

11     the intelligence service.  So who are we going to believe has the more --

12     better intelligence or information, Vasiljevic or Dimitrijevic?

13             Another factor the Chamber should take into account is the sworn

14     testimony of two of the subordinates of Vasiljevic, indeed the very

15     persons that he pegged as the source for his allegations about various

16     crimes by the MUP in Kosovo and Metohija.  That would be General

17     Stojanovic and Sergej Perovic.  Both testified in the defense of the

18     co-accused, General Lazarevic, and asserted that investigations by their

19     service could not confirm any of the alleged crimes and indeed Perovic

20     denied ever having reported to Vasiljevic anything about bodies at a bus

21     station in Kosovska Mitrovica, thus the value of Vasiljevic's testimony

22     is decreased, I submit very significantly.

23             And lastly on this topic it ought to be pointed out in the bodies

24     there at Djakovica, I apologise, not Kosovska Mitrovica.  So the value of

25     Vasiljevic's testimony is decreased particularly since Perovic was

Page 27370

 1     situated in Djakovica.

 2             Now, Vasiljevic does have a reason to shade his testimony against

 3     Mr. Lukic.  Let's recall that he was arrested by the MUP, by the RDB and

 4     imprisoned for some time, as he testified to.  He had some run-ins with

 5     the RDB after that during the time of the Kosovo conflict and similarly

 6     he has another reason to shade his testimony against Mr. Lukic for when

 7     Lukic was head of the RJB in 2003 and during the anti-corruption

 8     crack-down led by the police under Mr. Lukic after the assassination of

 9     Prime Minister Djindjic and called the sabri or Sabre Operation,

10     Vasiljevic's colleague and then the chief of VJ intelligence General

11     Tomic was indeed apprehended and detained as part of this corruption

12     crack-down.

13             Now, the Prosecution's final trial brief presents unsupported

14     assertions that present an incomplete, incorrect, skewed and unreliable

15     record of the proceedings that have been conducted to date.  As I think I

16     said, I cannot point to all the of them, for we do not have time for that

17     but I think I have a duty to assist the Trial Chamber by handling some of

18     the most egregious and representative of these absurdities.

19             As to the -- Your Honours, I'm told by my colleagues that it's

20     time for a break.  I thought we had another 15 minutes in this session.

21             JUDGE BONOMY:  Well, we would have a break in about five minutes

22     or so, I imagine, but I thought you might be winding up anyway and that

23     we would allow you to complete our submission and then have our break.

24             MR. IVETIC:  I think I can do that probably.

25             JUDGE BONOMY:  Yeah, very well, please continue.

Page 27371

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 2             As to the MUP staff, the Chamber will find in the Prosecution's

 3     brief an assertion by the Prosecution that the RDB chief in Kosovo, David

 4     Gajic, was a member of the staff and that the JSO commander Legija was

 5     also a member.  I ask you to note that the citation given for these

 6     assertions which gives the impression that the citations are supportive

 7     of these assertions is 180 degrees s counter.  They cite to Joksic, a

 8     Defense witness who spent a great deal of time negating this assertion

 9     and proving that Gajic and Legija were not members of the staff.  If one

10     reads the citation to the record provided by the Prosecution, all that

11     the references say is that Gajic was head of the RDB in Kosovo and that

12     Legija was head of the JSO.  None of the cites offered support the OTP

13     proposition which is the linchpin of their case.  This is incredible

14     misrepresentation of their brief.  You will also see in the brief, I

15     don't have the citation in front of me, but relative to Gornje Obrinje.

16     It's one of the only citations to Gornje Obrinje.  You will see that

17     witness Paunovic and other witnesses testified that the killings in

18     Gornje Obrinje were retaliation by the VJ and MUP forces.  Not a single

19     one of the citations says this and not a single witness was called or led

20     to make such a preposterous claim.  You cannot believe a word of what is

21     contained in the OTP's brief because they make a mockery of candour and

22     honesty in their citations.

23             Looking at paragraph 197 closely, neither -- the Gornje Obrinje

24     paragraph is paragraph 62 of the OTP's brief.  I thank my colleague for

25     that assistance.

Page 27372

 1             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Ivetic, I'm not prepared to sit back any

 2     longer and listen to allegations of lack of candour when there have been

 3     many instances in this trial when the Lukic briefs have been less than

 4     accurate without the allegation being made against you of lack of

 5     candour.  Do you consider that what you're doing is an appropriate way to

 6     be addressing us in regard to matters which do not simply on the face of

 7     your assertion justify that claim?

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Well, Your Honours, perhaps candour is a strong word

 9     but I submit when these allegations and when this document is being

10     presented and asking for 20 years to life in prison, depriving someone of

11     their liberty for the rest of their life, that's a very serious matter,

12     and when after two years of trial the citations are exactly 180 degrees

13     the allegations, and I'm not talking about one or two but all throughout,

14     that is a very serious matter especially when it's the Prosecution doing

15     it.  And so therefore, I only ask that the Trial Chamber take very

16     careful notice of what is being presented by the Prosecution and what

17     actually they are citing to because in my opinion, they as the

18     Prosecution have a duty to present a truthful account of the evidence.

19     And if the evidence says one thing and they -- and indicative of

20     innocence and they twist that to make it indicative of guilt, it's

21     certainly something that is a cause for concern in my book.

22             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Ivetic, we'll break now because I'm going to

23     listen to what you've said.  I don't think it's been recorded in the

24     transcript, and then we'll deal with it after the break and that will be

25     at five minutes past 6.00.

Page 27373

 1                           --- Recess taken at 5.34 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 6.12 p.m.

 3             JUDGE BONOMY:  Now, Mr. Ivetic, your actual remarks were that the

 4     Prosecution submissions make a mockery of candour and honesty, and that's

 5     just one of a series of remarks that bear the interpretation that there

 6     is a deliberate attempt on the part of the Prosecution to mislead the

 7     Bench.  Now, we recognise the highly charged atmosphere which surrounds

 8     this stage in the proceedings; nevertheless, we regret that you have not

 9     had the courtesy to recognise that the language you've just used is not

10     appropriate language for counsel appearing in any Tribunal.  At this late

11     stage in the proceedings, we choose to simply record that we do not

12     accept that there is a basis for claiming that the Prosecution

13     deliberately set out to mislead the Bench.

14             Now, please continue and complete your submissions.

15             MR. IVETIC:  I will, Your Honour, and for the record I think

16     you'll note that I did upon recollection say that I just wanted the

17     Chamber to take close note of the citations and make sure that they

18     support what the Prosecution alleges in the part just before the last

19     break, and really that is all that is important here is to make sure that

20     truth and justice are done.

21             With respect to religious objects, I will just state that we have

22     had evidence of SUP chief from Prizren, Vojinovic, that of the over 15

23     mosques in his city, not a single one was damaged during the war.  That's

24     at 6D1532, paragraph 29, as well as transcript page 24198.  And now the

25     final part of my submissions about Sreten Lukic the person.

Page 27374

 1             I will not belabour the submission to point to the specifics of

 2     his health condition.  Through our confidential filings relative to

 3     provisional release earlier in the case they are of record.  The Chamber

 4     has access to his health there and we urgent you to take them into

 5     account and also to seek a report from UNDU for an update as to his

 6     health now.  Sreten Lukic according to the evidence was instrumental in

 7     investigating and urging an investigation by the Serbian authorities of

 8     war crimes not only in Kosovo but elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, a

 9     man who exerted so many efforts to promote and foster the rule of law and

10     to establish meaningful cooperation with among others the ICTY.  You

11     heard the testimony of Kostic, Furdulovic, former Prime Minister Zivkovic

12     and even the Prosecution's own insider witness K-84 crediting Sreten

13     Lukic as the man responsible for directing the MUP to illuminate and

14     investigate and prosecute crimes, even those within their own midst.

15     Prosecutions are now underway in Serbia including sometimes against

16     police personnel for individual crimes committed in Kosovo, including

17     Suva Reka, for instance, as one of the indictment locations all because

18     of the courage that Sreten Lukic had and his good ethics and

19     professionalism in empowering the police to investigate everyone and

20     anyone, including those in the MUP.

21             You heard about the efforts under the tutelage of Lukic to

22     establish the KiM dossier and you heard that the MUP established full

23     cooperation with the ICTY even before the Government of Serbia had

24     established a law and a formal obligation to do so.  Lukic, like any good

25     policeman in Serbia, sacrificed to uphold the law and order and for the

Page 27375

 1     greater good.  It was not very popular to take the stand that he did when

 2     he became chief of the RJB, to reform the MUP, to arrest persons, and

 3     stamp out corruption in Operation sabre, including persons with

 4     connections to political parties in the government.  I recall -- I recall

 5     and I ask you to remember evidence presented by a protected witness in

 6     this case that death threats were issued against Lukic by Serbs for his

 7     stance against crime and in investigating the crimes of the past during

 8     that stage.  The democratic changes in Serbia were congratulated and

 9     supported by the West including the ICTY and in that atmosphere Sreten

10     Lukic was selected as the best possible person to lead and reform the

11     MUP.  And I think if you convict such a person you have to think about

12     what kind of message that would send to the outside world about those who

13     would take the hard road and stand up for law and foster investigation

14     and prosecution of crimes, and indeed I submit that a conviction in this

15     case would stifle any future persons in a similar situation.

16             Indeed, a conviction would reward the Prosecution but it would

17     also encourage future generations to hide crimes rather than fight

18     against and investigate them, because what is the use of being a

19     professional, committing your life to illuminating, investigating, and

20     preventing crimes if at the end of the day you can be held just as

21     accountable as the perpetrators merely by -- because of guilt by

22     association or the fact that you wear the same police uniform as some of

23     the persons.

24             This would be the first time that a subordinate like Lukic is

25     charged for what is alleged and purported to have been said and done by

Page 27376

 1     his superior officers, such as Minister Vlajko Stojiljkovic, deceased;

 2     deputy minister and chief of the RJB, Lieutenant-General Djordjevic;

 3     assistant minister and chief of the police administration and commander

 4     of the PJP, Lieutenant-General Obrad Stevanovic; assistant minister and

 5     chief of the UKP, General Dragan Ilic.

 6             Lukic cannot stand in place of these persons.  Just because one

 7     is deceased and the OTP is choosing him to be the poster child for their

 8     case does not change the fact that the Prosecution has made a mistake.

 9     For Lukic is not a perpetrator of crimes.  If anything, the evidence

10     shows he is a victim.  We would ask you to acquit Mr. Lukic on all counts

11     and in every respect as to the Prosecution's indictment, and at this time

12     I would like to say it has been an honour and privilege for myself and

13     for Mr. Branko Lukic to represent and act as counsel for Mr. Sreten

14     Lukic, who we feel is a very just person.

15             At this time I have two corrections for the transcript.  I will

16     state them.  If the Chamber feels that they need to be verified they can

17     be done so.  At page 73, line 6, I was talking about General Tomic,

18     T-o-m-i-c, the transcript reflects a different surname.  And at page 71,

19     line 22, it is reference should be to the JSO, whereas the initials in

20     the brief I think state JAS or something of that sort.  I hope that that

21     can be located and corrected.  That is I believe all for the Lukic

22     Defence, Your Honours.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

24             However, Mr. Lukic indicated a desire to say something to rectify

25     the omission of references to paragraph 72(C) I think.

Page 27377

 1             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  If I can get ten minutes.

 2             JUDGE BONOMY:  Yes.

 3             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you.

 4             [Interpretation] We are dealing with deportation from Srbica,

 5     paragraph 72(C), the village of Vocnjak, Kladernica, Turicevac, Izbica,

 6     Tusilje, and Cirez.  At the beginning of the NATO bombing they were in

 7     the area of deployment of the KLA which was confirmed and expounded by an

 8     OTP witness, Mr. Zyrapi.  There were KLA headquarters in some places such

 9     as Turicevac where the headquarters were in the school and people kept

10     joining up there.  We have that in P2241, the statement by Hadije Fazliu.

11     Witness Hadije Fazliu says on the 26th of March Serb forces shelled the

12     village of Turicevac but there were no casualties they went to the

13     village of Tusilje, which means going in-depth into KLA territory.  Now

14     this method of movement and capturing civilians was something Mr. Zyrapi

15     testified to, IC105.  He drew the withdrawal of the KLA into regions F

16     and then G.  So the KLA is using the civilians as a human shield.

17     Witness Fadija Fazliu in a statement also says that on the 29th of March

18     in the village of Tusilje police and military forces arrived and he says

19     that of the policemen that they were dark blue camouflage uniforms.  OTP

20     witnesses such as K-25 and K-79 and then Defence witnesses Vladimir Ilic

21     and Zivaljevic, Nikcevic Radojica, and others testified that the police

22     units which took part in the anti-terrorist actions, the PJP, in 1999

23     wore green camouflage uniforms with combat vests where it was clearly

24     written in front and at the back the word "police."

25             From the village of Tusilje and Turicevac where in the area of

Page 27378

 1     operations at that time when an anti-terrorist action was being carried

 2     out in the area of Drenica and that is order number 455/73, otherwise

 3     P1968.  The witness says that they were told to go to Klina, which meant

 4     pulling out the civilians from the combat zone.  The witness also

 5     mentions that in passing through her own village of Turicevac she stayed

 6     on in the village and that no forces arrived there but that they had no

 7     food.  Once again, P2241.  When the witness Hadije Fazliu says in her

 8     statement that on the 1st of April policemen arrived with civilian

 9     vehicles and that they were wearing uniforms and that they asked the

10     citizens to go to Glina [as interpreted], the witness does not describe

11     the uniforms and she refers to these men as policemen who arrived in

12     civilian vehicles, civilian cars.  Therefore, there's no certain

13     indicator of the fact that they were policemen of the MUP of the Republic

14     of Serbia at all.

15             After they reached Jasenica they returned to Brocna the following

16     day.  She says that at the border crossing they weren't asked to show any

17     ID cards or produce any money.  In the entire statement the witness

18     doesn't say at any time that anybody ordered her or other civilians that

19     they had to go to Albania.  If we look at the dates of the movements, and

20     this is -- if you compare this to the statements of Milazim Thaqi from

21     which it emerges that at the same time in the direction of Djakovica from

22     Izbica his family was moving along that route and that the Serbs returned

23     them to the village of Tusica -- or rather, Kladernica and Izbica.  That

24     is P2246, the statement by Milazim Thaqi, page 6, paragraph 5.  And that

25     the witness wasn't stopped anywhere by the police or escorted by the

Page 27379

 1     police or followed by the police anywhere, which meant that she could go

 2     back because nobody forced her to go to Albania.  The witness Rrahmani

 3     Xhevahire, an OTP witness, says in her statement that two days after the

 4     bombing from her village of Bukos with her extended family she went to

 5     the village of Kozica.  That means at her own initiative she left her own

 6     village.  This is shown in Exhibit P2239, page 2, para 6.

 7             From this we can see that the reason, exclusive reason for these

 8     people leaving the village was the start of the NATO bombing.  Three days

 9     later from Kozica they set out for Srbica.  However, the police returned

10     them to the check-point, at the check-point sent them back, and they

11     decided to go to Glodjane to her husband's uncle where they stayed for

12     some ten days.  So they decided where they were going to go themselves.

13     After that, they decided to go back to Kozica.

14             Defence witness Bogunovic Nenad testified in the following

15     manner.  He said in the region of Cirez and Kozica on the 29th of March,

16     1999, there was not a single police unit present.  The Exhibit is 6D614,

17     paragraph 97.  Witness Rrahmani in his statement says that in mid-April

18     while they were in Kozica which is high up in the mountains they saw a

19     unit in Cirez three or four trucks and several tanks and in the regions

20     of Kozica and Cirez in mid-April there were no MUP units.  This can be

21     seen from an order of the 37th Motorised Brigade in point 5 of that

22     order, 11, which defines independently without the MUP reconnaissance

23     work being carried out.  It is P2239.  I apologise.  Apart from P2239 you

24     can also see it in 5D1029.  Also in the combat report of the 37th

25     Motorised Brigade dated the 19th of April in point 4 the state in the

Page 27380

 1     territory it is noted that NATO on the 18th of April in the evening hours

 2     acted against the brigade units in the village of Cirez, that is to say

 3     targeted the units in Cirez, and it is 5D1023.  Also in a report of the

 4     37th Motorised Brigade of the 21st of April, 1999, point 2, it is stated

 5     that the 3rd Motorised Brigade was deployed in the region of the village

 6     of Cirez.  5D1087 is the relevant exhibit.

 7             And that in the region of Kozica and the village of Cirez at the

 8     beginning of April there were no MUP units present, and this is confirmed

 9     by an order of the 37th Motorised Brigade of the 4th of April, 1999.  It

10     is Exhibit P2813, point 4.13.(redacted)

11     (redacted)

12             [In English] We have to redact this, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE BONOMY:  That will be done.  Please continue.

14             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Prosecution witness K-24 in a

15     statement dated November 1999 with respect to the events in Cirez at one

16     place says that she is -- that a policeman came to the door of the cellar

17     wearing a dark blue camouflage uniform.  That is P25848.  However, during

18     the cross-examination of this witness she showed her clothing.  She was

19     wearing black and she said that the policeman was wearing that same

20     colour.  The transcript is 4792, lines 7 to 22.  In her statement she

21     mentioned no hats.  She didn't mention that anybody was wearing hats.

22     She describes in her statement of 2006, however, seven years later she

23     says they were wearing hats and she said that they had a double-headed

24     eagle emblem and the emblem of a tiger.  There is no evidence to show

25     that anybody of the Serbian members had a tiger or a double-headed eagle

Page 27381

 1     as their emblem, members of the MUP, that is.

 2             OTP witness Salihu Abdullah in his statement when he explains

 3     that he was taken prisoner with a group of men on the 29th of March,

 4     1999, states that some of the members of the Serb forces on their

 5     shoulders had blue, yellow, and red bands.  That is P2255.  As far as

 6     members of the MUP are concerned, the bands began to be worn on the 15th

 7     of April, as we said today, and there were never three colours worn at

 8     the same time and this can be seen from 6D237.

 9             The same witness in his statement says that when they were taken

10     to Glogovac into custody they were beaten and that the policeman who

11     secured them allowed a paramilitary to separate one of the men, Rahman

12     Topilla, and that he then killed them.  He also said that they were

13     interrogated by Momo Peljevic who ordered another policeman to beat them.

14     Defence witness Petar Damjanac who was the chief of Glogovac officially

15     up until the 1st of May, 1999, and came several days later after that in

16     no way had any knowledge about anything like that ever having happened.

17             Now, as far as the inspector is concerned, Momo Peljevic, witness

18     Damjanac claims that an inspector like that never existed in Glogovac or

19     in the entire Pristina SUP for that matter and that is at transcript page

20     23769, lines 7 to 15.

21             Witness Salihu who at the end of his statement says that when the

22     war was over and when the Serbs withdrew he returned to his village of

23     Baks and says that his family was still in Vucitrn.  Therefore, the

24     family was in Vucitrn throughout.  In a statement witness Salihu explains

25     that he was taken prisoner on the 20th of September, 1999, in an action

Page 27382

 1     launched by Serb forces that lasted for three days, that is Exhibit

 2     P2255, and that he was in the triangle between Baks, Vrboc and Cirez

 3     himself.  At the time in that area we have the 37th Motorised Brigade

 4     present carrying out anti-terrorist actions in which the members of MUP

 5     did not take part and this can be seen from a report of the 37th

 6     Motorised Brigade, Exhibit 5D1036 and 5D1058.

 7             And this is supported by the combat report of the Pristina Corps

 8     dated the 2nd of May, 1999, 6D1470, point 1, last paragraph.  This

 9     witness explains the kind of uniform of the men killing the prisoners,

10     shooting them, and although he was in the immediate vicinity he did not

11     mention any insignia or markings that can be linked to the police.  He

12     explains that all the members of the paramilitaries who took him prisoner

13     had Seselj's insignia and blue eagle, a square with a blue eagle, but no

14     police unit had such insignia.

15             JUDGE BONOMY:  I suspect you did say something after "insignia"

16     and didn't just collapse, so thank you, Mr. Lukic, for your submission.

17             Now, you've already heard that there will be some Prosecution

18     rebuttal.  Can I ask of the Defence whether any Defence counsel intends

19     to say anything or at least to seek to say anything in rebuttal of any

20     other Defence submission.

21             Mr. Bakrac.

22             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as you may suppose, I

23     don't know what my learned friend Mr. Hannis will say, although a lot was

24     said at the expense of my colleague Mr. Cepic who has been moved to the

25     other side of the courtroom.  There are many things that do not deserve

Page 27383

 1     any comments.  So we will have just 10 or 15 minutes.

 2             JUDGE BONOMY:  But I'm concerned only at the moment whether you

 3     have anything to say in rebuttal of anything submitted by any of the

 4     other Defence counsel.

 5             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, Your Honour, with respect

 6     to the sixth Defence team we will speak for 10 or 15 minutes.

 7             JUDGE BONOMY:  I see.

 8             And Mr. Fila.

 9             MR. FILA: [Interpretation] With respect to my colleague

10     Mr. Ackerman, two to three minutes; and I hope so Mr. Hannis and I will

11     not have to disappoint.

12             JUDGE BONOMY:  Mr. Aleksic.

13             MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in connection with the

14     Lukic Defence I have two or three references for the transcript to add to

15     what my colleague Mr. Lukic said.

16             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE BONOMY:  What we've decided to do is to hear Defence

19     rebuttal at this stage because in the course of rebuttal something might

20     be said that has an impact on the Prosecution case when it's too late for

21     the Prosecution to say anything about it.  So we want you to treat

22     discretely what you now have to say about any other Defence case and the

23     first person that has something to say I understand is Mr. Fila.  So

24     we'll hear your submissions in relation to your rebuttal of Ackerman now,

25     Mr. Fila.

Page 27384

 1             MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as I said, I'll be very

 2     brief.  Mr. Ackerman said that at the meeting in Nis Pavkovic spoke about

 3     his request to stop working -- I'm trying to speed up.  This is Exhibit

 4     P1468, these are minutes from the Joint Command of the 26th of October,

 5     1998.  My colleague Mr. Ackerman said that Pavkovic asked that the Joint

 6     Command stop with its work, and Pavkovic did put forward a request by the

 7     command of the 3rd Army that the Joint Command stop its work because

 8     probably by mistake Mr. Ackerman identified Pavkovic with the command in

 9     Nis, but at that period of time he was not in the 3rd Army.  He was

10     appointed only later on, he was at another post at that time, and a

11     document should be looked at which is referred to by the Prosecutor which

12     is a letter from the federal government from which it is evident that

13     after that discussion these military documents on the so-called work of

14     the Joint Command were sent to Slobodan Milosevic's secretary, that's

15     P1317, and that the Joint Command ceased working.  That's the first

16     point.

17             And one should also note that Minic chaired this meeting, which

18     was the meeting before the last, which shows that what the Prosecutor

19     said is incorrect, that Minic presided over the Joint Command until the

20     14th of September, 1998, but it was rather until the 28th of October,

21     1998, which means that Minic presided over the Joint Command throughout

22     its duration and this is evident from the fact that he opened and closed

23     meetings and he did that in other situations and you never find that with

24     Sainovic.

25             And the third point that has to be raised is the conclusion of my

Page 27385

 1     colleague Mr. Ackerman that the Joint Command should be compared to the

 2     combined General Staff of the USA.  And all we can say is that the USA

 3     staff does not contain any police units so we don't think it's a good

 4     comparison, but I do accept that it's normal for there to be coordination

 5     between the army and the MUP in wartime.  Thank you, that's all.

 6             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you, Mr. Fila.

 7             Mr. Aleksic.

 8             MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Very

 9     briefly.  Today my colleague Mr. Lukic on page 7 from lines 21 to page 8,

10     line 4 spoke about the testimony of General Milorad Djakovic concerning

11     planning and my colleague Mr. Lukic said that the excerpts of these

12     decisions and maps were delivered to the MUP staff or directly to the PJP

13     units and on the basis of this he said the PJP units and the commanders

14     went into action.  I ask the Chamber to look at the testimony of General

15     Milan Djakovic, pages 26396 to 26398, especially transcript page 26398,

16     lines 2 to 13, where General Djakovic responded to Your Honour's

17     questions, to questions of the Presiding Judge, and said some things

18     slightly different.  He said that these documents which were received

19     from the Pristina Corps were the basis for the unit commander.  And when

20     he received those he had to work for at least four or five hours to draw

21     up his own decision based on that, and then that was the basis for

22     action.  So it was the PJP unit commander who issued a command which was

23     the basis for the PJP going into action.

24             Thank you, Your Honours.  That's all.

25             JUDGE BONOMY:  I take it you have nothing to say in rejoinder to

Page 27386

 1     Mr. Fila's submission?

 2             MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour.  Thank

 3     you.

 4             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

 5             Mr. Cepic.

 6             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I'll be very

 7     brief and less temperamental, referring to the words of my colleagues

 8     Ivetic and Lukic.  First of all, I wish to mention the following.  I'll

 9     start with the decision on the establishment of the MUP staff, exhibit

10     number P1505 in e-court.  My colleague Mr. Lukic said that it was never

11     implemented, that we have not, to put it more precisely, found evidence

12     in these proceedings that it was implemented.  I would like to refer to

13     the testimony of one of their Defence witnesses and also to the testimony

14     of Philip Coo who on pages 12071 to 12073 and later on 12074 to 12075

15     explained quite clearly what the situation was which he found in the MUP

16     archives.  There were only a few reports not to the number of reports

17     there should have been that the shelves were empty, whereas in the

18     military archives the shelves were full of documents which were all there

19     in good order.  One of the Defence witnesses of General Lukic in his

20     statement which is under seal 6D1631 in paragraph 120 explained quite

21     clearly that the PJP reports were sought but were not received and that

22     efforts were made to find them.

23             We saw that they exist because we saw 5D1418, which is a dispatch

24     of one of the police brigades sent to the superior command --

25             MR. LUKIC:  [Previous translation continues]...  I don't see

Page 27387

 1     that --

 2             JUDGE BONOMY:  Just a second, Mr. Lukic.  You were speaking over

 3     the translation.

 4             MR. LUKIC:  Sorry.

 5             JUDGE BONOMY:  Please continue.

 6             MR. LUKIC:  I don't see that this has anything to do with our

 7     closing arguments today.  If it's analysis of our final brief, they

 8     should have done it before, but this is not rebuttal.

 9             JUDGE BONOMY:  Well, it's rebuttal of your submission about P1505

10     and that I think -- beyond that, Mr. Cepic has not strayed.  He'll be

11     conscious of the restraints upon him at this stage of the proceedings,

12     but what we've heard so far falls within the Rules.

13             So please continue, Mr. Cepic.

14             MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Point 2 of

15     that document which speaks of planning, organizing, and control is the

16     basis of my intervention and we have an example 5D1418, a combat report

17     of the 25th of May, 1999.  I wish to draw attention to it to avoid

18     wasting time, and I would also like to refer to the allegations put

19     forward by Mr. Ivetic that military judicial organs did not exist or did

20     not operate after the end of the state of war, which does not correspond

21     with the truth.  Not only do we have testimony and documents, but it's an

22     indubitable fact that military judicial organs continued doing their job

23     until 2004 or 2005.  And clear analysis of all this can be found in 4D171

24     which is a report of the army prosecutor Stanimir Radosavljevic, where in

25     the paragraph before last investigative activities are mentioned in

Page 27388

 1     relation to the site of Izbica which is mentioned here.

 2             And let me conclude by saying that Gordana Tomasevic, a

 3     Prosecution witness also spoke of this and pointed out that civilian

 4     judiciary organs began investigation in that direction.  Thank you.  I

 5     have nothing further to say.

 6             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you, Mr. Cepic.

 7             Mr. Ivetic or Mr. Lukic, do you have any rejoinder to any of

 8     these submissions?

 9             MR. LUKIC:  Just this document 5D1418 is self-explanatory, has

10     nothing to do with planning or actions.

11             JUDGE BONOMY:  Thank you.

12             Mr. Hannis, this is probably a good time to adjourn for this

13     evening.

14             MR. HANNIS:  I would agree, Your Honour, and I would agree to

15     take seven minutes off my presentation tomorrow if we can adjourn seven

16     minutes earlier tonight.

17             JUDGE BONOMY:  We have no need to take seven minutes off your

18     presentation tomorrow.  You, as we already indicated, should take the

19     time you feel is appropriate.  You've already indicated restraint

20     prevails, but it is not helpful to us to avoid dealing with some --

21     anything significant on which you feel that we can be further assisted.

22     So anything that's important to the determination of the case, we ought

23     to be fully addressed on within reason.

24             We've changed the schedule for tomorrow since time became

25     available in the morning.  We are sorry that we cannot move it earlier,

Page 27389

 1     but we're restrained to 10.45.  The indications we have had informally

 2     are that it may be possible to complete the case within the morning, but

 3     we have available time in the afternoon and will not be surprised if at

 4     least some of that time has to be used.

 5             So we shall now adjourn until 10.45 tomorrow morning.

 6                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.55 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day of

 8                           August, 2008, at 10.45 a.m.