Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3802

 1                           Tuesday, 9 October 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.41 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.  Madam Registrar.  Would

 6     you please call the case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case

 8     IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  There seems to be a problem with the sound.  Yes.

10     Now it's okay.

11             Yes.  We have a late start.  We earlier advised you, Mr. Mladic,

12     to use the toilet facilities not just prior to the start of the

13     proceedings.  Today you arrived some -- anything between 30 and 40

14     minutes before the start of the proceedings.  You waited until the very

15     last moment.  The Chamber is not willing to delay the start of the

16     proceedings any further, so please be aware that you should use the

17     toilet facilities well prior to the start of the proceedings.  It also

18     means that we'll not interrupt the examination of a witness by a late

19     entry into the courtroom.  So if you have not used the toilet facilities,

20     then you'll have to wait until the first break in order to enter the

21     courtroom.

22             Then there was one preliminary.  Mr. Groome.

23             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, it just has to do with the scheduling

24     of the next witness, Mr. Wilson.  He had some delays in his travel to The

25     Hague, but he is here now, although his luggage has yet to arrive.  The

Page 3803

 1     earliest the Prosecution would be able to call to testify would be

 2     tomorrow at noon.  Based upon the current schedule it seems that we may

 3     finish with this witness before that.  I was going to suggest to the

 4     Chamber that if the administrative hearing that's scheduled for the end

 5     of week, the Prosecution has provided the materials to the Defence and

 6     the Chamber staff, so perhaps we might be able to use that time, although

 7     I don't expect that will take much time.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me ask this:  Mr. Wilson was scheduled for the

 9     Prosecution for three hours, if my recollection serves me well?

10             MR. GROOME:  I don't believe it was as long as that, Your Honour,

11     but I have it here.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, three hours.

13             MR. GROOME:  Three hours, yes.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  It used to be two hours.  Yes.  So my recollection

15     serves me well.  We were informed that the Defence would take six hours,

16     which makes it nine.  On average we have approximately three and a half

17     effective time for examination for a witness, therefore, we might run out

18     of time if we only start -- it could fit, perhaps, just in this

19     time-frame.  Nine hours is -- we're usually sitting four hours and

20     three-quarters of an hour a day, one hour less for breaks, three breaks

21     of 20 minutes, which brings us down to three hours and 45 minutes.  For

22     two days three hours and 45 minutes is seven and a half hours.  We need a

23     scheduled nine hours, so we should at least have one and a half hours

24     tomorrow, and it's even a bit risky to start at such a late moment.

25             MR. GROOME:  I appreciate that, Your Honour.  As we've indicated

Page 3804

 1     for the last several months that the witness could only be here to

 2     testify on the Thursday and Friday, we've -- we've taken every step

 3     possible to move him forward into Wednesday given the time considerations

 4     that Your Honour is raising now.  But now with this delay in his travel,

 5     there is a considerable amount of work to be done.  It's being done this

 6     morning, but Ms. Bolton's best estimate of the earliest possible moment

 7     she could call him is noon tomorrow.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Well, I just pointed at potential problems we

 9     may face.

10             Then Mr. Ivetic, for the present witness you'll be able to

11     conclude today?

12             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, that's my plan, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  And would there be some time left then for the

14     Prosecution.

15             MR. IVETIC:  That was also my plan.  I'll see if I can get it

16     going with the late start.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Then could the witness be escorted into the

18     courtroom.  Well, the late start, as a matter of fact, we are -- was ten

19     minutes of Mr. Mladic's time he used elsewhere and not available for

20     cross-examination.

21                           [The witness takes the stand]

22                           WITNESS:  PYERS TUCKER [Resumed]

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Tucker.

24             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  I'd like to remind you that you're still bound by

Page 3805

 1     the solemn declaration you gave at the beginning of your testimony that

 2     is that you'll speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

 3     truth.  Mr. Ivetic will now continue his cross-examination.

 4             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 5                           Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]

 6        Q.   Good morning again, Colonel.  Yesterday we left off looking at

 7     paragraph 16 of your statement and I'd like to begin again there, so if

 8     we can have Exhibit P137 up in e-court and paragraph 16 of the same,

 9     which is I believe in the fourth page in the English and also in the

10     B/C/S versions.

11             And now yesterday we dealt with the issues raised with the Serbs.

12     I'd like to now briefly deal with the issues that you report the Serbs

13     raised with UNPROFOR, and here at paragraph 16 we see that they were a

14     cease-fire throughout Bosnia, equivalence in humanitarian aid, and

15     halting the Republic of Croatia military involvement in Bosnia.  You

16     confirmed for us yesterday at transcript page 3798 that the UNPROFOR BH

17     command had information to it -- available to it evidencing the presence

18     of troops of the Republic of Croatia on the territory of

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  What was your understanding at the time?  Was such a

20     presence of the Croatian Army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

21     accordance with or in violation of the various United Nations

22     Resolutions?

23        A.   We knew that the -- there were forces of the Republic of Croatia

24     in Bosnia-Herzegovina because it was reported to us.  We did not have our

25     own people actually on the ground at those locations, and our

Page 3806

 1     understanding was that this was in contravention to the -- to a Security

 2     Council Resolution.

 3        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now I want to spend some time talking about this

 4     issue relating to the Serb request for a simultaneous cease-fire

 5     throughout Bosnia.  If we look at paragraph 26 of your statement, and

 6     that would be at page 7 of the -- of the exhibit in e-court, this is in

 7     relation to the first meeting between General Morillon and

 8     General Mladic, and you list four agenda items of General Morillon, and

 9     the third is to seek a cease-fire throughout Bosnia.

10             Would you agree with me that at this point the Serbs and the

11     UNPROFOR BH command had the same objective; that is to say, a cease-fire

12     throughout the entire territory of Bosnia?

13        A.   That was our understanding at the time.

14        Q.   And would you agree with me, generally speaking, that the side

15     that was reluctant to enter into a general or universal cease-fire on the

16     entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the Bosnian Muslim side?

17        A.   The Bosnian Muslim side similarly to the Bosnian Serb side

18     proclaimed the desire for -- for peace throughout the area of conflicts.

19     There's a difference between what people proclaimed on both sides and

20     what they actually did on the ground.

21        Q.   Okay.  On this issue I'd like to revisit some of your testimony

22     from the Oric case.

23             MR. IVETIC:  If we can have 1D368 up in e-court.  And I believe

24     it should be page 2 of that document.  This should be transcript page

25     5795 from the Oric case.

Page 3807

 1             And, sir, just to give you an introduction, this is your

 2     testimony from the Oric proceedings, and this is your answer to the

 3     question that had been asked on the previous page:

 4             "By this stage, had you and General Morillon had some experience

 5     in trying to facilitate and assist in the negotiation of cease-fires in

 6     Bosnia?"

 7             And what we have here at the top of the page, line 1 -- I'm

 8     sorry, it's the next page in e-court.  I apologise.  I must have had the

 9     wrong -- what we have here at the top of the page is your answer to this

10     question which proceeds:

11              "Yes, we had been trying to negotiate cease-fires since we had

12     arrived in... Bosnia.  There was a recurring theme to cease-fires, which

13     was that the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted a cease-fire or cease-fires

14     to cover all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in other words they wanted to

15     consolidate their gain and consolidate what they had taken, whereas the

16     Bosniak leadership declared that they wanted cease-fires.  The reality of

17     the way they behaved was that whenever they were under pressure

18     militarily from the Serbs, they wanted local cease-fires, but then

19     contrived to try and break those cease-fires and provoke the Serbs."

20             Sir, would you agree with your prior testimony from Oric as being

21     correct on the topic of the Bosnian Muslim position as to cease-fire

22     agreements as witnessed by you during your deployment in Bosnia?

23        A.   Yes, I do.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Would you agree with me that a particular strategy or

25     goal of the Bosnian Muslim leadership during the time period of your

Page 3808

 1     deployment seems to be to try and provoke responses from the Serbs to try

 2     and support their calls for a military intervention by NATO or some other

 3     outside forces on their behalf?

 4        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 5        Q.   In that sense would you agree that the more dire or the more

 6     desperate a situation seemed, the better the argument or chances for such

 7     a military intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslim forces?

 8        A.   Yes, that is certainly a possibility, certainly a conclusion one

 9     could reach.

10        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And in terms of terminology, is a cease of

11     hostilities agreement basically the same thing as a cease-fire agreement?

12        A.   We considered cessation of hostilities being rather more than a

13     cease-fire.  A cease-fire was simply they stopped shooting at each other.

14     Cessation of hostilities goes rather beyond that with many other actions

15     to bring about a normalisation of the situation.

16        Q.   Now I'd like to ask you, during the time period that you were the

17     military assistant to General Morillon, that is from October 1992 to your

18     departure in 1993, how many cease-fire agreements or cessation of

19     hostilities agreements do you estimate that you brokered?

20        A.   I would have to go back through my -- my files in order to give

21     you an accurate answer.  There were at least two or three general

22     cease-fires across the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there were

23     numerous what I'll call local cease-fire agreements which were brokered

24     and none of them held.

25        Q.   I think I can perhaps refresh your recollection.  I do have some

Page 3809

 1     of your testimony from the Perisic case at transcript 9232.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  This is at 1D369 in e-court and it's page 56 of that

 3     document.  Fifty-six in e-court.  It should be starting at line 15.

 4        Q.   And the question that you were asked is:

 5             "Just as a general matters, can you tell the Chamber in your

 6     estimation how many cessation of hostilities/cease-fire agreements do you

 7     think you brokered during the time that you were there?

 8             "A. Many.  How many?  10, 20, 30, I don't know.  There were so

 9     many of them and none of them were ever adhered to.

10             "Q. When you say none of them were ever adhered to would it be

11     fair to say that the both parties - and by that I mean the Bosnian Serbs

12     and the Presidency as you called it - broke those cease-fires?

13             "A. Yes.  All -- in my view all three parties, the Bosnian

14     Muslims, the Bosnian Croats, and the Bosnian Serbs broke cease-fire

15     agreements when it suited them."

16             Do you recall this testimony from the Perisic case and would it

17     refresh your recollection as to the number of cease-fire agreements and

18     the fact that all three parties routinely broke them?

19        A.   As I said a little bit earlier, in terms of the global, as in

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina, wide, I think there were two or three in terms of

21     local cease-fires, there were, indeed, many, and all three parties broke

22     them when it suited them.

23        Q.   Can you tell me in whatever terms you're comfortable with, that

24     is to say any qualifications you think are necessary, but to what degree

25     did the Bosnian Muslim infantry forces outnumber the Bosnian Serb

Page 3810

 1     infantry?

 2        A.   My guess, this was -- I don't have accurate figures, and I'm

 3     trying to cast my mind back a long time now, which is something like 2 to

 4     1 or 3 to 1.

 5        Q.   And would that take into account the Bosnian Croat forces and the

 6     Croatian Army?

 7        A.   I couldn't -- I couldn't answer that accurately.

 8        Q.   Okay.  That's fair enough.  Yesterday at transcript pages 3755

 9     through 3750 -- strike that.  Let's -- let's back up.  At paragraphs 21

10     and 26 of your statement, and that would be on page -- the bottom of page

11     5, leading on to page -- well, 7 is 26.  You provided some evidence

12     relative to utility shortages in Sarajevo, and then yesterday at

13     transcript page 3755 through 3757, you told us about utilities in

14     Sarajevo, and yesterday you only talked of the Serb side.  I would like

15     to present you with some of the testimony you gave in the Galic case on

16     this very same topic and see if we can add these details, as I didn't see

17     them in your statement nor in what you testified to yesterday.

18             First of all, am I correct that General Morillon and the BH

19     command of UNPROFOR took steps with the Muslim side to try and address

20     the issue of utilities in Sarajevo?

21        A.   That is correct.

22        Q.   Okay.

23             MR. IVETIC:  Now, if we could call up 1D367 in e-court, and this

24     should be the first page of that document in e-court, this will be

25     transcript pages 10029 through 10031 from the Galic case beginning at

Page 3811

 1     line 12 on the first page.  And here it's Judge Orie asking you about

 2     this, sir, beginning at line 12:

 3             "The last question is you have told us about one of the tasks

 4     performed was to discuss issues of restoring utilities:  Gas, water

 5     supply, electricity.  Could you tell us whether the parties were

 6     cooperative if it came to restoring these utilities, whether both parties

 7     behaved similarly or differently?  Could you elaborate a bit more on

 8     that?

 9             "A. Utilities were something which General Morillon considered

10     very important, and at the meetings at which utility repair was

11     discussed, both sides were entirely cooperative.  These meetings were

12     very complex because you needed to bring to one place, at one time, both

13     technicians who had the right knowledge and a cease-fire that was agreed

14     by both sides, and the technicians needed to know a safe route through

15     the minefields in order to reach the area that they needed to carry out

16     repairs.  When we looked at what happened on the ground the co-operation

17     which we received from the Bosnian Serb authorities was generally of a

18     high order."

19             Now, sir, I'd like to stop here and ask you:  Do you stand by

20     your prior testimony in this prior case in Galic that the co-operation

21     from the Bosnian Serb authorities was generally of a high order?

22        A.   I stand by what was said -- what I said at that time.  There is a

23     difference between what people say in a meeting and what happens

24     thereafter, obviously.

25        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to continue with your answer then to this

Page 3812

 1     question from the Galic case.

 2             "The co-operation we received from the Bosniak local commanders

 3     varied considerably, and it was our belief that in some areas where the

 4     Presidency authorities had high control, things generally went well.  But

 5     there were other areas where the local commanders were radical, and from

 6     the perspective of general discipline and obedience, were unreliable,

 7     that all sorts of tricks were used in order to prevent the repairs from

 8     taking place.

 9             "Judge Orie:  I'm trying to understand this.  The supplies of

10     water, electricity, and gas, also served their own population.  What was

11     the specific reason why they would play tricks which would result in not

12     restoring the supplies when their own population would suffer from it?

13     Do you have any explanation about that?

14             "A. I do have an explanation, and it is as follows:  There were

15     elements within the Bosnian leadership who believed that the only way to

16     take back that which had been taken from them by the Bosnian Serbs, that

17     could only happen by either international intervention in Bosnia or by

18     the provision of arms and ammunition to Bosnia, which was not possible at

19     that time because of the arms embargo.  Those people believed that the

20     only way to secure such international assistance was to depict the

21     situation in Sarajevo to be so severe that the international community

22     would be -- would be willing to intervene.  Therefore, it was not in

23     their interest to see any improvement in the situation in Sarajevo.  It

24     was not in their interest to see any -- to see the lot of the civilian

25     population improve.  To put it more -- to put it bluntly, the more

Page 3813

 1     suffering the better, because that played to the television cameras and

 2     would ultimately lead to the pressure that they wanted in order to

 3     achieve international intervention."

 4             Sir, do you recall this testimony of yours that you gave in the

 5     Galic case?

 6        A.   Yes, I do.

 7        Q.   And would you still agree that it is correct and truthful as to

 8     the situation you testified about there, especially the problems from the

 9     Bosnian Muslim side, with regards to co-operation?

10        A.   Yes, I do.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I inquire?  Is there dispute about the

12     truthfulness and accuracy and the correctness of this testimony?

13             MR. VANDERPUYE:  No, Mr. President, there isn't.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Why are we spending time on matters which are not in

15     dispute?  Agree with the Prosecution on the matter and then --

16             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, yesterday they spent some considerable

17     time presenting evidence of utilities.  They presented evidence of

18     utilities in their statement which is different than what is said here,

19     which does not incorporate what is said here, so I have every right to

20     present matters within the witness's knowledge and ask him whether they

21     are far more complete than the answers that he gave yesterday.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  I do understand that this is adding to what the

23     Prosecution presented, but still not in dispute.  I mean, if you say you

24     have emphasised A, B, and C, D is important for the Defence, is there any

25     dispute about D?  If there's no dispute about D, you agree with the

Page 3814

 1     Prosecution that the testimony of the witness on matter D is accepted as

 2     in accordance with the truth and then we can move on.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  And then Your Honour should present -- you present

 4     the Prosecution with the opportunity to spend court time yesterday

 5     presenting to the public their side and we are limited from presenting

 6     our side which is just as relevant and is just as important to the

 7     [Overlapping speakers] --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, if you present an agreement with the

 9     Prosecution on certain facts, the public will know about it as well.  And

10     from what I understand is that here the Prosecution does not contest the

11     accuracy.  I do understand that until now it has not been easy to agree

12     with the Defence on other matters, at least the progress made in

13     negotiations on agreed facts was not very impressive at this moment.

14     Now, I'm not saying who is to be blamed for that.  But if there is a

15     matter which you believe to be true and the Prosecution believes to be

16     true, then that's obviously a matter you could agree on, present it to

17     the Chamber, the public will see it, and we don't have to spend time on

18     it in court.  Please proceed.

19             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

20        Q.   When you say that were elements from within the Bosnian

21     leadership that were looking for intervention, can you perhaps identify

22     any of the officials or give an idea of how high up they were in the

23     hierarchy?

24        A.   I think you mean within the Bosnian Muslim leadership.

25        Q.   I apologise.  I misspoke.  I did mean the Bosnian Muslim

Page 3815

 1     leadership.

 2        A.   Our understanding was that they reached very close to the top.

 3        Q.   Would it be fair to say, sir, that these elements represented the

 4     majority or controlling position in the Bosnian Muslim leadership?

 5        A.   I'm not in a position to be able to answer that.

 6        Q.   Fair enough.  The situation that you have identified here in

 7     relation to utilities, would you agree with me that this position of the

 8     Bosnian Muslim -- of an element within the Bosnian Muslim leadership

 9     continued throughout the time period that you were assigned in 1992 and

10     1993?

11        A.   Yes, it did.

12        Q.   Now, if we can just discuss one other point about the utilities

13     issue.  Do you recall that the transfer valve or transfer station for the

14     natural gas was located at Mali Zvornik in Serbia proper?

15        A.   Yes.  I believe that was correct or that is correct.  I certainly

16     recollect that there was a lot of discussion at one stage about this

17     site, that it needed repair and that it needed a specific piece of

18     equipment.

19        Q.   And one more thing.  Did you have information at the time that

20     the provider of the natural gas was actually Russia, that is to say that

21     the -- it was not -- it was not a domestic resource of the Yugoslav

22     republics?

23        A.   Our understanding was that the gas came from Russia, but the

24     pipeline led through Serbia through Bosnian Serb territory before it

25     ended up in Sarajevo.

Page 3816

 1        Q.   Did you in fact ever verify if the supply of gas had been

 2     terminated due to issues of nonpayment of amounts owed to the Russian

 3     provider of the natural gas?

 4        A.   There were a number of statements made to General Morillon about

 5     why the gas pressure in Sarajevo was so low most of the time.  That was

 6     one of them, but General Morillon and his staff, we did not ourselves

 7     investigate anything like that.  We were too busy trying to prevent the

 8     suffering.

 9        Q.   You say a number of statements were made to you.  Were any one of

10     those statements that in fact there were 300 million US dollars owed to

11     the Russian provider by the Sarajevo authorities for gas that had already

12     been provided?

13        A.   I don't recall that fact.

14        Q.   Now I'd like to move on to another topic.  At several parts of

15     your statement you talk about the deployment of CanBat 2 -- the Canadian

16     battalion.

17             MR. IVETIC:  And if we could start at paragraph 26 of P137.  That

18     would be the seventh page in e-court, I believe, in both versions.

19        Q.   And I'd like to kinda go through with you the various parts of

20     your statement relating with CanBat to get the whole picture because it

21     keeps popping up and it needs to be clarified.

22             Now, this paragraph here, 26, first off, this was raised for the

23     first time at this meeting that General Morillon had with General Mladic

24     on 27 October 1992.  Is that accurate?

25        A.   That's correct.

Page 3817

 1        Q.   And now if we look at paragraph 28 on this same page, we see here

 2     that General Mladic advised that the government of the Republika Srpska

 3     would have to give an answer to this as he was not authorised, and that

 4     he would give you an answer -- their answer at the next meeting.

 5             Now, if we turn to the next page, that's paragraph 35, and we

 6     have this letter that I guess had been written to Biljana Plavsic on the

 7     same topic, what I want to know is this paragraph 35 relating to the same

 8     meeting or a different meeting where CanBat 2 was raised?

 9        A.   General Morillon sent the letter to Biljana Plavsic separately to

10     the meeting with General Mladic which you referred to a minute ago.

11     General Morillon's approach was to come at the issue from as many angles

12     as possible in order to try and secure the deployment of this

13     Canadian battalion which was sat outside the borders of

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in the end, if I remember correctly, ended up

15     parked by the side of the road for about five months before eventually it

16     was permitted to come into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17        Q.   Now, in any event --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Is this an answer to the question, Mr. Ivetic?

19             MR. IVETIC:  Not entirely.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  The question, Mr. Tucker, was whether what is

21     written in paragraph --

22             MR. IVETIC:  35.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, 35, but we started with the -- paragraph 26, I

24     think.  No, it was -- let me have a look.

25             MR. IVETIC:  26.

Page 3818

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, 28, where you said Mladic also said that all

 2     agreements made in Geneva -- no, it's that Mr. Mladic did not have the

 3     authority to agree to the deployment of CanBat 2.  And then at paragraph

 4     35, your statement says that Mladic referred to a letter that

 5     General Morillon had sent to Biljana Plavsic the same day regarding

 6     securing the deployment of CanBat.

 7             The question was whether these two things happened during the

 8     same meeting --

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  -- or whether they -- yes.

11             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  That was in the same meeting.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you.  Please proceed.

13             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

14        Q.   Now, I want to ask you about what you have recorded at paragraph

15     59 of your statement, which is page 13 in the English and page 13 through

16     14 in the B/C/S.  And this is your evaluation that at this second meeting

17     where CanBat 2 was discussed, your evaluation was that by his words,

18     General Mladic was implying that he alone had the ability to decide on

19     CanBat 2's deployment.

20             Can I ask you if indeed you would permit that this could also

21     have been bravado on the part of General Mladic?

22        A.   In my opinion, General Mladic was not a person who went in for

23     bravado without it being carefully calculated.  General Mladic, our

24     understanding was, was very concerned at that time, particularly about

25     the attacks by Republic of Croatia forces in the Trebinje area.  He also

Page 3819

 1     had the issue of the -- the Sava valley, and that was really worrying

 2     him, and he was trying to use that as a lever - so the deployment of

 3     CanBat 2 as a lever - to try and get General Morillon to do more about

 4     the presence of the Republic of Croatia forces and the pressure he was

 5     under both in the south and the north.

 6        Q.   Indeed, if we look at paragraph 68 on the top of page 16 in

 7     e-court, you're still describing the same meeting with General Mladic,

 8     and you describe his behaviour as being bombastic.  Would that not mean

 9     again that the meeting was bravado more so than actual exclamation of his

10     authority?

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

12             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  The witness has

13     already answered the question.  Mr. Ivetic has put it to him a number of

14     times.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  Mr. Ivetic at this moment is pointing at the

16     language used in the statement by the witness and is exploring the

17     consistency and he's allowed to do so.

18             Could you answer the question.

19             THE WITNESS:  Sorry, I'm trying to find the question in the

20     previous --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I'll -- if you look at paragraph 68, which

22     deals with the same meeting with General Mladic, and I'll read the

23     relevant part.

24             "In comparison with Mladic's bombastic behaviour at the meeting

25     on the 15th of November, at this meeting Mladic is back in his box."

Page 3820

 1             That's the language you --

 2             THE WITNESS:  Yes, and what is the question about the language?

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  The question is whether -- well, perhaps you put it

 4     to the --

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 6             JUDGE ORIE: -- the witness.

 7             MR. IVETIC:

 8        Q.   Your reference to Mladic's bombastic behaviour at the meeting on

 9     15 November.  Wouldn't you then therefore agree that the views expressed

10     on the 15th of November were bravado or bluster on the part of

11     General Mladic?

12        A.   They were factually, at least in our view, bombastic.  What lay

13     behind the reasons why he was behaving in that manner is, of course, a

14     matter of opinion.

15        Q.   In any event, you were not aware of the normative structure of

16     the VRS or the Republika Srpska government so as to understand the

17     authority and jurisdiction of each?

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

19             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'm not sure what my

20     colleague means by "normative structure," either with respect to the VRS

21     or the government.  It seems to me to be rather vague.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  I understood it to be the -- how responsibilities

23     and powers and authority was divided between government and the top of

24     the army.

25             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.  Constitutionally and by the legal statutes.

Page 3821

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Could you answer that question.

 2             THE WITNESS:  We understood that the army was under the command

 3     of the president and the Assembly of the Republika Srpska, and we knew

 4     that because that is what Dr. Karadzic and -- described to

 5     General Morillon at the -- at that first meeting which we were discussing

 6     a few minutes ago.

 7             MR. IVETIC:

 8        Q.   And when you said earlier that the -- that it was factually

 9     bombastic, could you describe for us what exactly you mean by that?

10        A.   What I mean is standing up at a meeting where we sat at tables

11     and talking loudly, shouting, waving his arms about, and gesticulating.

12        Q.   Now, if we can turn to paragraph 67 of your statement.

13             MR. IVETIC:  Page 15 in both the B/C/S and the English.

14        Q.   Here we have a meeting between General Morillon and

15     President Radovan Karadzic, dated 20 November 1999, and again the issue

16     of CanBat 2 is raised.  And Mr. Karadzic also verifies that this is a

17     matter to be decided in an Assembly session set for Monday.  Am I correct

18     that in all other meetings with the Bosnian Serb leadership, irrespective

19     of who was talking, they essentially confirmed what had been originally

20     told to you by General Mladic, that he did not have authority, that the

21     Assembly was the body that had authority over the deployment?

22        A.   That is correct.  It was only at that one meeting with

23     General Mladic when he made the statements that he and he alone could

24     decide.

25        Q.   And I believe it's at paragraph 253 of your statement where you

Page 3822

 1     talk about the UNMOs.  Am I correct that they, too, could not be deployed

 2     except upon obtaining the approval of the Bosnian Serb Assembly?

 3        A.   That is correct as well.

 4        Q.   And if we look at paragraph 76 of your statement, pages 17 in the

 5     English and the B/C/S, this is now a meeting of 27 November 1992 in which

 6     both Karadzic and Mladic are apologising for not -- for being unable to

 7     convince the Assembly to let CanBat 2 to deploy but offering an

 8     alternative compromise.  And with respect to the alternative that was

 9     proposed, it would have accomplished the same purpose, that is, getting

10     international eyes on the ground in Banja Luka.  Am I correct?  The

11     alternative was to have a Dutch or a Belgian --

12        A.   Yes, I was just reading paragraph 76.  Yes.  That is -- that is

13     correct.  That was the alternative offer, but the Dutch and Belgian

14     governments did not agree to that themselves, and they ended up being

15     located near where the British Battalion was based.

16        Q.   And so it was not either Mladic nor Karadzic nor the national

17     Assembly of Republika Srpska that prevented this alternative from being

18     put in place already as of November 1992?

19        A.   They prevented the Canadian battalion being deployed.  They did

20     not prevent the -- the transport company from being deployed.  The

21     deployment of the transport company was ultimately then decided by the

22     national governments.

23        Q.   And when you say national governments, we're talking about

24     Belgium and/or Holland.

25        A.   That's correct.

Page 3823

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I seek some clarification of this part of your

 3     statement.  There was an apology that the Assembly was not convinced to

 4     agree to the deployment of CanBat 2.  Now, at the same time, the

 5     statement says that "but did give their agreement for..."  Is that the

 6     Assembly or is that Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic?

 7             THE WITNESS:  We did not know what the Assembly said because we

 8     were not present.  It was Karadzic and Mladic who told us that that is

 9     what the Assembly had -- had decided.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  So they conveyed the message --

11             THE WITNESS:  They conveyed the message to us.  We never had

12     communications direct with the -- the Serb Assembly.  It was always

13     passed to us through mostly Karadzic, sometimes Mladic, and sometimes

14     Lukic.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now the alternative, was that more or less

16     equivalent what you were seeking with the deployment of CanBat 2?

17             THE WITNESS:  The location was equivalent.  The issue was that it

18     was a combined Dutch and Belgian battalion, and I forget which one -- one

19     of the two governments did not agree for their transport forces to be

20     deployed in that area.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But the deployment in itself, would the

22     government, both governments, have agreed would have been equivalent to

23     what your plans were with CanBat 2?

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  Our concern was to have a balance between

25     where the UNPROFOR forces were deployed.  In other words, some forces to

Page 3824

 1     be deployed in Serb areas, some forces to be deployed in Muslim areas,

 2     some forces deployed in Croat areas, in order to have eyes on the ground

 3     and contact with local politicians, military, in order to have a balanced

 4     picture and a balanced representation on the ground.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Might I say this, at the same time, now looking at

 8     the clock, I might invite you not to proceed but rather that we take a

 9     break first.

10             Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.  We'll take a

11     break of 20 minutes and we'll resume at 10 minutes to 11.00.

12                           [The witness stands down]

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 10.53 a.m.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

16             Perhaps meanwhile, Mr. Stojanovic, the Chamber of course will

17     observe the official Tribunal's winter recess, meaning that the last

18     sitting day this year will be the 14th of December, and we are wondering

19     whether we should restart in view of the 7th of January.  I do not know

20     whether you have any views about what you'd like the Chamber to do as far

21     as scheduling in the early days of January is concerned.  Perhaps once

22     the witness -- could you give it some thought and then inform the Chamber

23     perhaps at the end of this session.

24             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I understand, Your Honour.  We

25     discussed the matter, and I will let you know at a later stage.

Page 3825

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you.

 2             Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5             MR. IVETIC:

 6        Q.   Now, Colonel, I'd like to move to another topic, and this is one

 7     that you discuss at paragraphs 136 through 147 of your statement, and for

 8     the need to refresh anyone's recollection, that's at page 32 of the same.

 9     And it's the UNHCR aid convoys and the problems with the same.  And if I

10     may say so, the general picture that you paint is one where the Serbs

11     wanted full timings, full manifests of the load, names of drivers, serial

12     numbers of guns, and then on the other hand you say that convoys were

13     delayed by Serb forces checking all containers and that you considered

14     this to be a deliberate obstruction.  Is this an accurate general summary

15     of the picture in relation to aid convoys?

16        A.   That was not a general description of all aid convoys.  That was

17     a description of what was happening at a certain period of time with some

18     aid convoys.

19        Q.   Could you perhaps provide some specifics for us?

20        A.   That was around the time of January or February 1993, when

21     General Morillon went -- or tried to get to Gorazde but was held up and

22     prevented from -- from doing so.  And there were a number of convoys, I

23     believe was Rogatica, or near Rogatica, that they were -- they were held

24     up, and we passed a convoy which was being searched in the way that --

25     that I described.  In other words, every single can being opened and

Page 3826

 1     every single item being off-loaded and checked.  Around that time - I

 2     can't recall if it was that specific convoy - but around that time there

 3     were requests for all the details that I described just then.

 4             One of the things which it may be useful to bear in mind when

 5     considering these is that the communications which the UN had in Bosnia

 6     at that time depended totally on INMARSAT communications.  There were no

 7     land-lines connecting any of the UN locations or sites, unlike on the

 8     Bosnian Serb side, which had close to complete normal communications.

 9     What this meant was that to fax one page over INMARSAT cost over $50 and

10     that was when you could get through.  What I -- the reason I explained

11     this about the difficulty -- extreme difficulty that the UN had

12     communicating is that the -- its ability to co-ordinate the kind of

13     detail which we were being asked to provide was utterly impossible given

14     the communication means that we had at our hands, and the Bosnian Serbs

15     knew that.

16        Q.   Okay.  You have indicated that this was one time in January or

17     February of 1993.  Could you then explain for me in paragraph 141 on page

18     33 of your statement your conclusion that:

19             "In order to contain the enclaves and exacerbate the conditions

20     in them, the Bosnian Serbs deliberately placed obstructions in the way of

21     almost all efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to the enclaves."

22             Are we talking about one instance?  Are we talking about all of

23     them?

24        A.   We're talking about almost all of them.  When the Bosnian Serb

25     wanted to allow a convoy to get through, it got through, and there is

Page 3827

 1     previous testimony about the conveys that did get through.  When they did

 2     not want the convoys to get through, then an entire panoply of reasons

 3     and excuses were used to prevent them from getting through.

 4             It was our belief that if they had wanted them to get through, it

 5     would have been a simple matter to -- to get them through, but that it

 6     did not suit their -- their aims to allow them to get through.

 7        Q.   Now let me put this to you and you can tell me whether you agree

 8     with it or not, but another logical explanation for the foregoing - that

 9     is the stringent requirements of the Serbs and the delays and the

10     examination of conveys - another logical explanation for this would be

11     that the Serbs were fearful of the UNHCR convoys being utilised for the

12     transport of weapons and military supplies to the Bosnian Muslim forces

13     in the enclaves and elsewhere.  Would you not agree with that?

14        A.   That was certainly a reason, an excuse which was given to us by

15     the Bosnian Serbs and many occasions, and I understand that on a small

16     number of occasions that actually was found to be -- found to be correct.

17     However, that does not provide in our view at the time anything like

18     sufficient reason for making people starve.

19        Q.   Well, can you tell me in your view did the Bosnian Serbs have a

20     legitimate reason to be wary of aid convoys escorted by UNPROFOR, driven

21     by UNHCR, being used for the clandestine transport of weapons and

22     supplies by the Bosnian Muslims?

23        A.   They in our view had a legitimate reason to be concerned but not

24     to stop them.

25        Q.   Am I correct that the official position of UNPROFOR was that no

Page 3828

 1     weapons should be allowed on aid convoys, and whenever you became aware

 2     or had suspicions that weapons might be hidden, you searched them

 3     yourselves, and if anything was found you would lodge a firm protest with

 4     the offending side?

 5        A.   That is absolutely correct.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I would seek clarification of one of the

 7     previous answers of the witness.

 8             Mr. Tucker, you said, "I understand that a small number of

 9     occasions that actually was found to be correct," about weapons being

10     transported in aid convoys.  Could you give us an idea on -- on how many

11     occasions this happened, and also approximately about the size?  Are we

12     talking about five rifles or about 500 machine-guns?  Could you tell us.

13             THE WITNESS:  Two specific examples that I know of and was

14     involved with was when some explosives were hidden in -- I think it was

15     oxygen bottles.  It was gas bottles of some kind which were being

16     transported into Sarajevo for one of the hospitals, and I forget how

17     many, there was one or two gas bottles were found to have had explosives

18     in them rather than gas.  That was one situation.  That was around, I

19     think it was about January or February of 1993.

20             The second incident was in the Lasva Valley in about February

21     1993, when a UNHCR convoy to take aid into a Bosnian Croat area we had

22     received a tip-off that it had small arms underneath the sacks of flour,

23     and we immediately searched the convoy and found something like 20 AK-47s

24     and a couple thousand rounds of ammunition underneath the -- those are

25     two specific instances that I know of.

Page 3829

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  And you have the details of these two instances.

 2     Are you aware of any other examples?

 3             THE WITNESS:  I was not aware of any other examples and was

 4     not -- no other examples were reported through -- to me or to

 5     General Morillon.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 7             MR. IVETIC:

 8        Q.   I'd like to ask you, when you say these are the only two examples

 9     that you are aware of, were these instances where the UNPROFOR themselves

10     searched the vehicles and found these weapons or where the Bosnian Serbs

11     found the weapons?

12        A.   I believe, but this is going back a long time in memory, that the

13     explosives in the -- in the gas battles were found by the Serbs when they

14     halted a convoy and that the small arms were found by UNPROFOR.

15        Q.   And so then am I to understand your testimony that you believe

16     there is only one occasion when UNPROFOR found weapons in convoys, or

17     would you like me to refresh your recollection?

18        A.   To the best of my recollection now, those are the only two that I

19     can recall knowing about or having been reported.  There were a number of

20     accusations by mainly the Bosnian Serbs of the usage of UNPROFOR vehicles

21     for transporting people around the battle-field, but I think that was

22     mainly in the Bihac area.

23        Q.   I don't know if this was during your time, but do you also recall

24     that there was an incident in Sarajevo where a Mr. Hakija was actually --

25     was actually -- Hakija Turajlic in the beginning of 1993 was being

Page 3830

 1     secretly transported in a UN vehicle and was found and was shot?

 2        A.   Yes.  He was moved in the daily shuttle which took the cleaners

 3     from Sarajevo to the airports, and he just joined the queue of cleaners

 4     as if he were another cleaner.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If I may just interrupt, sir.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Sure.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Tucker, you're talking of people being

 8     transported around the battle-field.  What type of people are these?

 9     Some type of soldiers, civilians, and -- or what was the purpose of

10     transporting these people?

11             THE WITNESS:  The accusation from the -- or the allegation from

12     the Bosnian Serbs was that it was soldiers.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

14             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

15        Q.   Now, sir, I'd like to as I promised earlier refresh your

16     recollection, and in doing so I'd like to turn to 1D369 and page 65 in

17     e-court of this document, which is the transcript from the Perisic trial

18     at T9241, lines 1 through 10.  And, sir, this is your answer, and if you

19     could read along as I read to you:

20             "No, it was our position that no weapons should be allowed

21     through, and we -- whenever we became aware or had suspicions that

22     weapons might be hidden in humanitarian aid, we searched them ourselves

23     as well.  And on a number of occasions, we found weapons and made the

24     strongest protest to whichever side was responsible for placing those

25     weapons in the humanitarian aid.

Page 3831

 1             "Q. Okay.  Well, as a matter of reality, the strongest protests

 2     that were made, be they to one side or the other, as we've discussed

 3     cease-fires, often fell on deaf ears; correct?

 4             "A. Like most requests for humanity in that part of the world."

 5             Does this refresh your recollection of there being actually a

 6     number of occasions when UNPROFOR itself found weapons being transported

 7     in convoys that it was -- humanitarian aid convoys that it was supposed

 8     to escort?

 9        A.   My understanding is that we made a number of searches, but not

10     all searches found things.  The two times that I specifically recall are

11     the two which I've described to you just now.

12        Q.   Okay.  And -- and for those two you said one was found by the

13     Bosnian Serbs.  So I'm confused by this language here where you say "on a

14     number of occasions we found weapons."

15        A.   I can't recall precisely whether the high explosives were found

16     by the Serbs or by UNPROFOR.

17        Q.   Okay.  If -- I would like to show you what has been marked as

18     1D358.

19             MR. IVETIC:  This is a video, and it has -- it has transcripts in

20     e-court in both languages, and I'm aware that the booths ought to have

21     been provided with the same, so in accordance with the standing order I

22     guess on videos we play it twice I presume.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And transcripts have been provided.

24             MR. IVETIC:  It's my understanding that they were provided to the

25     booths.

Page 3832

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  I see nodding yes from at least some of the booths.

 2     Yes, could it be played twice.

 3             That's for technical reasons, Mr. Tucker, not -- first round,

 4     please.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Could it be replayed, restarted with sound.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  One moment.  Your Honours, on my

 8     end it says that the sound is turned on.  I don't know.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, we do not hear anything.  That's the only

10     thing I can tell you.

11             MR. IVETIC:  I know.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  It's the same.  Could we --

13             MR. IVETIC:  Allow me to try ...

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome.

15             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, if it assists, if Mr. Ivetic gives us

16     the DVD, Ms. Stewart can try to play it through our system and see if

17     that helps.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the usher assist.

19             MR. IVETIC:  We have given DVDs to the Registry and to the

20     Prosecution.  I do have it on USB stick if that's easier.  The file is

21     VTS01_1VOV.

22             MR. GROOME:  We have a copy now, I believe.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I do not know whether you received

24     training as well.  Your Case Manager had, but apparently he's not here.

25             MR. IVETIC:  I don't believe this was part of the training, Your

Page 3833

 1     Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  But whatever is there.  How much time would

 3     it take, Ms. Stewart, to play it?

 4             MR. IVETIC:  If it assists, I could perhaps go to further

 5     questions -- oh.

 6                           [Video-clip played]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  I hear -- now I don't see anything, although I hear

 8     a track.  Can we -- no.  Let's -- if you -- the help of the OTP is highly

 9     appreciated, but could you meanwhile continue, Mr. Ivetic.

10             MR. IVETIC:  I will do that, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I think here we are.  Could we start on from the

12     beginning so that we play the first round.

13                           [Video-clip played]

14             MR. IVETIC:  This should be the end.  If we could now go back to

15     the beginning and play it through a second time.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tucker, just for your information, in order to

17     check the transcript, it's played twice so we'll now hear it with

18     translation.  Please proceed.

19                           [Video-clip played]

20             THE INTERPRETER:  "[Voiceover] At a check-point in Ilidza in

21     trucks of the United Nations that had papers that they were transporting

22     humanitarian aid for the Muslims in Hrasnica, the Serb army uncovered

23     24.500 bullets.  Today at Ilidza a convoy was stopped that had been

24     transporting humanitarian aid for Butmir and Hrasnica.  During a routine

25     inspection conducted by members of the military police from Ilidza, it

Page 3834

 1     was discovered that the containers carrying flour had a false bottom and

 2     in this enclosed space there were tin boxes.  This was enough reason to

 3     doubt the regularity of the convoy.  The members of the French battalion

 4     escorting the convoy were unable to tell us what was contained in the

 5     enclosed space under the containers.  The convoy was stopped and

 6     representatives of UNPROFOR and UNHCR and the police were called, and in

 7     their presence an on-site investigation was performed.

 8             "The containers were removed from the trucks and then with a

 9     crane the top part of the container was separated from the platform to

10     which it had been fixed.

11              "Reporter:  Mr. Popadic, from the on-site investigation that was

12     performed, can you tell us what was discovered in the trucks that were

13     transporting humanitarian aid for Hrasnica?

14             "Mr. Popadic:  In the trucks that left for Hrasnica this morning

15     at 9.45, we discovered 12.7 millimetre ammunition, 5.000 rounds; 7.9

16     millimetre sniper ammunition, 19.540 rounds.  These were found as you can

17     see under false bottom underneath the container.  This is the second time

18     that in the zone of responsibility of the Ilidza Brigade we find weapons,

19     ammunitions among the humanitarian aid needed by the Muslim side.

20             "Reporter:  Were you able to see whose ammunition it is, where it

21     is from?

22             "Mr. Popadic:  All the ammunition was manufactured in Konjic and

23     air-lifted to the airport in Sarajevo, and after that taken by ground

24     transport this time driven by the French forces, which escorted the

25     detected amount of ammunition.  We requested official information from

Page 3835

 1     the gentlemen from the UN who were in charge but we were not able to

 2     receive any, the explanation being that they were not authorised to

 3     provide information.  Off the record, the UNHCR representative claimed

 4     they had nothing to do with trucks or containers and that they were only

 5     in charge of the cargo transported in the containers while anything

 6     underneath the containers was of no concern to them.  The members of the

 7     French Foreign Legion apologised saying that they were only escorting the

 8     convoy.  The UN police said it would investigate the incident and inform

 9     us of the results in a timely manner.  Who loaded the trucks at the

10     airport and where the ammunition was loaded remains a mystery.

11             "Reporter:  What about airport checks and how many such conveys

12     have passed?

13             "Mr. Popadic:  We don't know.  However it is an indisputable fact

14     that UNPROFOR is unmasked for the umpteenth time transporting and

15     distributing weapons and ammunition for Muslims under the guise of

16     humanitarian aid."

17             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you and my thanks to the Office of the

18     Prosecutor for assisting me with that technical aspect.

19        Q.   Sir, first of all, where is Hrasnica located, if you recall?

20        A.   You'll have to show me a map.

21        Q.   Do you recall that that is near the Sarajevo airport?

22        A.   I believe it is.

23        Q.   Is this an incident that you know anything about; that is to say,

24     do you believe it was during the time period that you were in Sarajevo?

25        A.   I don't recall an incident of the kind that you describe during

Page 3836

 1     my time.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  And for the record, we as of yet have not been able

 3     to get a date for this recording.  It was used in the Tolimir trial also

 4     without a date.  We are trying to find the date for the same.

 5        Q.   Can you tell us this procedure that we saw here of the UN

 6     officials assisting the Bosnian Serb authorities in doing the

 7     investigation, taking photographs, et cetera, was that the standard

 8     protocol that was in place?

 9        A.   At the time that I was in Bosnia, we were setting up operations.

10     What the standard procedure was, I'm not sure when that was actually

11     established.  The UN police were brought in for a whole range of reasons.

12     That was one of them.  What the precise protocol and procedures were for

13     doing it was not my responsibility or area of knowledge.

14        Q.   In the incidents that you have identified that you do have

15     knowledge of weapons being transported in aid convoys, are you familiar

16     with the investigations that the UN performed and was anyone ever

17     disciplined or punished for the inclusion of those weapons in those

18     convoys?

19        A.   The two incidents that -- that I described earlier, I know that

20     the Muslim authorities were complained to by General Morillon.  That's

21     the gas bottles.  And with the -- the Croats' weapons, I know that

22     General Cordy-Simpson who is the Chief of Staff in Kiseljak called in I

23     think it was Colonel Kordic into account and told him that he would no

24     longer accept humanitarian aid from him in order to -- to pass it through

25     and that everything would have to be searched.

Page 3837

 1        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And are you familiar with efforts on the parts

 2     of the Bosnian Muslims to dig a tunnel under the tarmac of the Sarajevo

 3     airport to use that for the transport of weapons, munitions, and

 4     personnel?

 5        A.   At the time I was in -- in Bosnia we heard rumours of such, but

 6     we had no hard confirmation.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Fair enough.  Would you agree with me that under the

 8     circumstances neither the UNHCR nor UNPROFOR had the type of control over

 9     the aid convoys to ensure that no weapons were deposited as contraband

10     and that the same could effectively be hidden from both UNHCR and

11     UNPROFOR?

12        A.   Yes.  That is -- that's a realistic statement of the situation.

13        Q.   Now, as far as aid convoys to the enclaves are concerned, you at

14     paragraph 143 of your statement, which is again P317, and it's the top of

15     the 34th page in e-court of the English, you at that paragraph identify

16     another explanation given to you, namely:  "That the local Bosnian Serb

17     population along the route were up in arms about something or beyond

18     their control and would not let convoys past."

19             Now, on this point would you agree with me that there was a lot

20     of animosity from the Serb community, especially around Srebrenica,

21     stemming from allegations of attacks conducted by Bosnian Muslim

22     Commander Naser Oric and his forces from Srebrenica on Serb villages on

23     the periphery of Srebrenica?

24        A.   There was a lot of animosity from all population -- parts of the

25     population against the others for attacks carried out against them.

Page 3838

 1        Q.   Thank you, sir, but I believe you mentioned it later in your

 2     statement.  Mr. Oric admitted to you that his forces would, on a daily

 3     basis, kill 5 to 15 Serbs; is that correct?

 4        A.   That is correct.  That's what he told us.

 5        Q.   Okay.  If we -- first of all, did you accept this alternative

 6     explanation specifically for the aid convoys that were directed towards

 7     the enclaves that was given to you by the Bosnian Serb authorities?

 8        A.   The Bosnian Serb authorities, when they wanted to get something

 9     through, it got through.  The example is the convoy to Srebrenica at the

10     end of November, which Karadzic and Mladic wanted to get through, and it

11     stumbled against the obstacle of local resistance of the kind you just

12     described, and they then got it to go round or got them to accept the

13     convoy to go through.  I can't remember what the precise situation was.

14             My point is that when they wanted a convoy to get through, they

15     could get it around the objections of the local -- of a local village or

16     a local element of the population.

17        Q.   If we look here at paragraph 146 of your statement.  It's on the

18     same page near the bottom of the same.  The last line of that paragraph

19     you testify and say:

20             "Local commanders along the route would also often make

21     additional demands or would harass the convoys."

22             Doesn't this seem to support the -- the complaints made to you by

23     the Bosnian Serb authorities in relation to convoys going to the

24     enclaves?

25        A.   Of which complaints are you referring to?

Page 3839

 1        Q.   That the local population up in arms about things that were

 2     happening locally were creating problems that were beyond the control of

 3     the central Bosnian Serb authorities.

 4        A.   That certainly happened, but I restate my previous point about

 5     when the Bosnian Serb authorities wanted something to happen, then it did

 6     happen.

 7        Q.   And if we could then turn to paragraph 73 and 74 of your

 8     statement, page 17 in the e-court version.  And I believe this is the

 9     convoy to Srebrenica that you talked about a few questions ago.  And here

10     you are reporting that Dr. Karadzic at times was flustered,

11     General Mladic was embarrassed and angry, and they apologise for a

12     blockage at Bajina Basta.  And you go on in saying that it was your

13     assessment that recalcitrant local Bosnian Serb commanders, probably

14     militia, were reluctant to let the convoy past.

15             First of all, would you agree with me that the reactions on the

16     parts of General Mladic and Mr. Karadzic appeared to be genuine?

17        A.   At that -- on that occasion, yes, indeed, they did appear to be

18     genuine.  They wanted that convoy to get through because there was going

19     to be a meeting in New York at which Karadzic was going to be attending

20     shortly.

21        Q.   And would you also agree that this incident lends support to the

22     complaints made to you by the Bosnian Serb authorities that aid convoys

23     were being held up by local authorities who were up in arms about things

24     that were happening in their locality?

25        A.   These difficulties with local populations were certainly a

Page 3840

 1     reality and a factor.  It was also in our view sometimes when the Bosnian

 2     Serb authority did not want a convoy to get through, which was most of

 3     the time, that that excuse was then used again as the reason why the tap

 4     was being opened very slightly, but they never wanted the tap to be

 5     opened fully.  They controlled the tap and they controlled the amount of

 6     aid that was allowed through, and they willingly used every possible

 7     excuse they could think of in order to justify that.

 8        Q.   If we could turn to page 32 of your statement in e-court, and

 9     it's paragraph 135 that I'd like to direct your attention to at present.

10     Here you are talking about the discovery of a mass grave containing 50

11     bodies of Bosnian Serb soldiers that had been killed by the Muslim

12     defenders of Kamenica and that General Milovanovic and Mr. Karadzic did

13     not want to release this info to the public for fear that the local

14     Bosnian Serb population would be creating future problems for future

15     convoys of aid if they were aware of this information.  Do you see that,

16     sir, at paragraph 135 of your statement?

17        A.   Yes.  I -- I see that, and that is what -- I don't understand

18     what your question is.

19        Q.   I haven't got to the question yet.

20        A.   Oh, okay.

21        Q.   I was just asking if you were able to follow thus far.

22        A.   Yes, thank you.

23        Q.   And first off can you verify that the defenders at Kamenica were

24     Bosnian Muslims?  I added that but it's not reflected in your statement.

25        A.   Yes, they were.  They were being attacked.

Page 3841

 1        Q.   And does this show an instance where the Bosnian Serb

 2     authorities, in fact, tried to avoid inflaming local Bosnian Serb

 3     citizens in order to assist aid convoys to get through?

 4        A.   This was indeed an instance where they -- they were trying to

 5     help.  I refer back to the tap being opened very slightly.

 6        Q.   I'd like to move to Srebrenica briefly, and if we can look at

 7     Exhibit D18 in e-court.  Although this document is dated 30 July

 8     1995 [sic], it talks about events in Srebrenica in the years prior, and

 9     it is a report of the commander of the BiH General army staff Mr. Delic.

10     If we can turn to page 3 in the English and page 3 in the B/C/S original.

11     There is a paragraph there that begins:

12             "Three groups transported a quantity of weapons, equipment, and

13     communications equipment in the autumn of 1994.  This method was very

14     slow and risky, so we sought a way to re-open the air corridor which

15     operated in the first half of 1993, when five tonnes of MTS, ten tonnes

16     of UBS had been transported, 20 soldiers, 29 passengers evacuated, and

17     six out of ten flights had been successful."

18             First of all, sir, you see here the translator's note that UBS

19     stands for weapons, ammunition, and explosives.  Are you familiar that

20     MTS is an abbreviation for materiel technical supplies, a military term

21     in the Yugoslav military parlance?

22        A.   So what is the question?

23        Q.   Are you familiar with the fact that MTS is an abbreviation for

24     military technical supplies, a military term for military supplies in

25     the Yugoslav army --

Page 3842

 1        A.   No, I was not.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Fair enough.  During the time period that you were in

 3     Bosnia, that is to say until the end of March 1993, were you aware of an

 4     air corridor being used by the Bosnian Muslim forces in Srebrenica to

 5     transport such items?

 6        A.   Yes.  It was from Tuzla, that airfield into the enclaves, and

 7     there was a white painted Hip helicopter -- or rather I saw one white

 8     painted Hip helicopter.  There might have been more.

 9        Q.   I apologise.  I was waiting for the transcript to catch up.

10     Would you agree with me that such amounts of supplies, including ten

11     tonnes of weapons, ammunition, and explosives is a rather significant

12     amount if accurate?

13        A.   If accurate, it is a significant amount.  However, it is not a

14     significant amount in respect of the defence of an area the size of the

15     Srebrenica pocket.  You would have needed far more ammunition than that

16     in order to be able to mount a robust defence of an area of that size.

17        Q.   And in fact, Commander Naser Oric advised you that his forces

18     were conducting daily raids to get more supplies from the Bosnian Serb

19     forces; isn't that accurate?

20        A.   That is precisely.

21        Q.   If -- if we can move along, I'd like to address a matter that is

22     contained at paragraph 133 of your statement.  Again, this is

23     Exhibit P317, and it will be page 31 in both the B/C/S and the English.

24     And here I believe you mentioned it briefly yesterday about a Bosniak

25     army offensive where, at least according to President Karadzic, 1.260

Page 3843

 1     Bosnian Serb civilians had been killed in a particular area since

 2     20 January 1992.  You say that you had heard some reports about this but

 3     were not able to verify the numbers.  Would I be correct in concluding

 4     that this offensive was alleged to be carried out by Naser Oric's troops

 5     from within Srebrenica?

 6        A.   That was our understanding.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, you refer to D18 as dated the 30th of

 8     July, 1995.  Is that a slip of the tongue or is that an error in the

 9     transcript, because what I see in the document is 30 July 1996, or is

10     there a difference between the original and the -- let me have a look at

11     the original.

12             MR. IVETIC:  There's not.  They both say 1996.  It's either a

13     slip of the tongue or an error and either way we need to correct it.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

15             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

16        Q.   And for the record, here in this paragraph you identify reports.

17     Could you explain for us what source you had for these reports which are

18     not mentioned here?

19        A.   These reports were statements to us by various members of the

20     Bosnian Serb leadership like, for example, as recorded in paragraph 133.

21     There were also some reports in international newspapers about an

22     offensive being carried out by the Muslims in that area, and I recall

23     there was one particular article, I think it was in something like the

24     Wall Street Journal, which talked about some Muslim forces having even

25     gone across the river in -- the Drina River into Serbia proper itself.

Page 3844

 1     Those were the two sources.  Or two types of source.

 2        Q.   And in fact, sir, did you have occasion to go to the exhumation

 3     of certain bodies from this incident and to interview eyewitnesses?

 4        A.   General Morillon and myself were taken to the exhumation of some

 5     bodies which was going on as we were there on the outskirts of Kravica.

 6     We didn't actually speak with any eyewitnesses.

 7        Q.   And am I correct that you did prepare a report on this matter but

 8     that as far as trying to collect legal evidence as to what had happened

 9     in support of any subsequent prosecutions, that was not part of your task

10     and/or objective at that time?

11        A.   It was not part of our task, and we did not have the means or the

12     wherewithal to do such.

13        Q.   Irrespective of the actual number of victims, would you agree

14     with me that such an offensive conducted by the Bosnian Muslim forces

15     from within Srebrenica was rather significant in terms of its military --

16     in terms of the attack?  This is a significant attack, not just a raid.

17        A.   Our understanding from the information available to us was that

18     it was a fairly significant attack which needs to be placed in the

19     context of the plans which were written by the Bosnian Serb Army in

20     November to attack the other way.

21        Q.   So are you saying, sir, that Commander Naser Oric conducted his

22     attack based upon orders from the Bosnian Serb military in November?

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   Would you agree with me that Commander Naser Oric conducted this

25     attack based on his own rationale and his own reasons and it was rather

Page 3845

 1     significant and not related to any Bosnian Serb military plans?

 2        A.   His attack was related to the fact that a conflict had started

 3     much earlier and was a reaction to that attack.  Taken in and of itself,

 4     that attack was indeed locally significant.  Whether Oric started that

 5     attack out of his own plans or whether he was ordered to do so from

 6     Sarajevo, I obviously do not -- do not have information about.

 7        Q.   Do you know if any other UN organs ever responded to report that

 8     you presented on this topic; this is to say, the alleged massacre of

 9     Bosnian Serbs by the Muslim forces from Srebrenica?

10        A.   We certainly reported it up to HQ UNPROFOR in Zagreb.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like to move to another area.  At paragraph

12     299 of your statement, that's page 71 of the English, page 70 of the

13     B/C/S.  You in your second explanation state that:

14             "Mladic was expressing frustration that the international media

15     and international condemnations focused on the highly visible attacks by

16     his artillery and heavy weapons, whereas the media were never present or

17     never noticed when the Bosniaks carried out infantry attacks which he

18     then had to defend using his heavy artillery because he did not have the

19     infantry."

20             Do you concede that this is a legitimate gripe on the part of

21     General Mladic?

22        A.   I'm not comfortable with the word "concede" and I'm not

23     comfortable with the word "legitimate."  They should not have been

24     fighting and they should not have been attacking civilians in the first

25     place.

Page 3846

 1        Q.   Would you agree with me that the fighting involved two sides?

 2     The Bosnian Muslims based in Sarajevo and the Bosnian Serbs?

 3        A.   Yes, but who started fighting?

 4        Q.   Well, sir, in this part of your testimony, it would appear that

 5     the Bosnian Muslims were the ones that started the fighting by -- that's

 6     at least how I understand, by them carrying out infantry attacks.  Am I

 7     mistaken in your terminology?

 8        A.   In that location at that time, you are correct.  There are

 9     thousands of other events which also need to be taken into consideration.

10        Q.   If I can -- if I can return -- well, strike that.  In fact, sir,

11     would you agree that the Bosnian Muslim forces would often provoke

12     attacks by the Serbs in such a manner by making infantry offensives to

13     provoke counter-fire from the Serbs at times when they were seeking

14     something from the international community?

15        A.   That did happen.

16        Q.   And one such occasion would be what is described in paragraph 302

17     of your statement on page 72.  Is that not correct?

18        A.   I can't see --

19        Q.   We'll wait for you.  302.

20        A.   Yes, that is correct.

21        Q.   And again we talked about it at the beginning of my examination,

22     but did you feel that this strategy on the part of the Bosnian Muslim

23     forces was aimed to try to obtain the military intervention of others on

24     their behalf against the Bosnian Serb forces?

25        A.   That was our perception.

Page 3847

 1        Q.   Yesterday at transcript page 3785, you were asked about - and I'd

 2     like to get more details about the incident where you describe at

 3     paragraph 303 of your statement on the same page that we have now just a

 4     little lower -  the shelling conducted from the Kosevo Hospital by a

 5     group of Bosnian Muslim mortars.

 6             Am I correct, sir, that this incident occurred during a time

 7     period when there was a relative lull in the hostilities in Sarajevo?

 8        A.   That I cannot specifically recall.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Let me recall first for you what you said yesterday at

10     transcript page 375.  The question was:

11             "Q. Thank you, Mr. Tucker.  Did you receive any information

12     concerning the shelling or artillery fire directed against hospitals in

13     particular?

14             "A. Yes, I did, and in particular around the two hospitals in

15     Sarajevo."

16             Don't you think it would be fair and more accurate to identify

17     that Bosnian Muslim forces staged mortar attacks from within

18     Kosevo Hospital in Sarajevo?

19        A.   No, I don't, and the reason is that I'm aware of a number of

20     times that both hospitals were hit by artillery fire and tank fire.  I

21     know of one incident which is the one you refer to in paragraph 303.

22             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, are we at the time for the break?

23             JUDGE ORIE:  We are approximately at the time for the break, and

24     we will take the break once the witness has been escorted out of the

25     courtroom.  A break of 20 minutes, Mr. Tucker.

Page 3848

 1             And we will resume at 10 minutes past 12.00.

 2                           [The witness stands down]

 3                           --- Recess taken at 11.51 a.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 12.12 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  While the witness is escorted into the courtroom,

 6     Mr. Stojanovic, could you briefly set out the position of the Defence.

 7             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  We've

 8     discussed it, especially when it was announced that the Karadzic Defence

 9     has a similar request.  We should adjourn on the 14th of December, before

10     the recess, and begin on the 4th of January.  Our suggestion would be to

11     postpone the beginning of the recess by a week, because there is the

12     Orthodox Christmas in order to meet our obligations and duties as

13     Orthodox believers, and then it could be -- it could be made up for

14     between the 12th and the 21st.

15                           [The witness takes the stand]

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tucker, could you have one minute of patience.

17     We're dealing with another matter.

18             You'd like us to continue sitting in the first week of the

19     recess?  That, unfortunately, is not possible for the Chamber.

20             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Let me just repeat.  In January,

21     our proposal would be to make it Monday the 11th of January, after

22     Christmas, instead of the 4th of January.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me have a look -- I think, Mr. Stojanovic, when

24     I look at January of 2013, the first Monday is the 7th and the second is

25     the 14th.  So when you're talking about the 4th and the 11th as being

Page 3849

 1     Mondays, then that seems -- that's at least not our impression of what

 2     January looks like in 2013.

 3             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, then our proposal would be

 4     to begin on Monday, the 14th of January, if I'm not mistaken, instead of

 5     the 4th of January, as the plan was originally.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, originally the plan was on the 7th, I think.

 7     The 14th is Orthodox new year, and the 7th is Orthodox Christmas.  I do

 8     understand that you are -- Mr. Stojanovic.

 9             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Bearing all the aforesaid in

10     mind, and I'll not talk about days of the week anymore to avoid

11     confusion, our proposal would be to begin on Wednesday, the 16th of

12     January.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  We would then lose seven days.

14             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] As far as we are concerned, Your

15     Honour, our proposal would be to make up for these seven days, if

16     possible, as I mentioned, from the 15th -- or, rather, 16th December

17     until the 21st December, respecting, of course, the time of the Catholic

18     Christmas.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  As I said before, if you would have proposed

20     this at an earlier stage, we might have considered it, but at this moment

21     it's not possible to sit during this first week of the recess.  The

22     Chamber will consider your proposal and may come with other suggestions.

23     At this moment, we'll now --

24             Mr. Tucker, we have already taken too much of your time.

25             Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.

Page 3850

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 2        Q.   Colonel, before the break you had indicated that you only believe

 3     you knew of one instance where the Bosnian Muslims had fired a mortar

 4     from Kosevo hospital.  I'd like to refresh your recollection and then

 5     perhaps seek your comment regarding the testimony you gave at the Galic

 6     trial at transcript page 10023 of the same.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  That's at 1D366, Your Honours, in the e-court, and

 8     should be the first page of the same.

 9        Q.   And if I've given the correct page number, this should be the

10     answer that you, sir, are giving to Judge El Mahdi on his questions.  And

11     it starts at line 3, and I begin:

12             "It is not something that I witnessed first-hand.  It is my

13     belief and supposition from these various sources that firing by mobile

14     Bosniak mortars from within the grounds of Kosevo hospital was something

15     that happened a lot more than once.  Whether it happened daily or once a

16     week or that, I cannot say.  The only other thing that I can say is that

17     we, that General Morillon, tackled the head of Kosevo Hospital, asking

18     him why do you allow this to happen?  Why do you not protest to the

19     Presidency or to the ABiH?  And he denied any knowledge of that

20     happening."

21             Does this more accurately reflect your knowledge of the number of

22     times that the Bosnian Muslim forces had initiated shelling from

23     Kosevo Hospital?

24        A.   No, it does not.  The one specific instance that we have hard

25     evidence is the one that I've described to you.  The rest were rumours

Page 3851

 1     and stories and things for which we did not have hard evidence.

 2        Q.   Fair enough.  Now, I'd like to continue on with the testimony

 3     here, first of all asking the question of Judge El Mahdi:

 4             "Yes.  When you say from out of the hospital, you don't mean from

 5     the hospital itself but from the surroundings of the hospital.  It is not

 6     from the hospital.  The shooting did not come from the hospital itself or

 7     from vehicles that may have been parked in the area of the hospital, the

 8     surrounding of the hospital?

 9             "A. Kosevo Hospital is not one single building.  It is a whole

10     complex of buildings, and between those buildings there are parking

11     areas, grass areas.  And when I say the firing was from Kosevo Hospital,

12     I mean it was from those areas between the buildings of Kosevo Hospital.

13             "Judge El Mahdi:  Was it the only hospital in Sarajevo or were

14     there other hospitals in Sarajevo too?

15             "A. There were other hospitals in Sarajevo as well.

16             "Judge El Mahdi:  As far as you know, were the other hospitals

17     also used in the same manner, that is to say, the surrounding -- that

18     firing would come from the surrounding area of those hospitals, or was it

19     only the case of the surrounding area of the Kosevo Hospital that firing

20     was carried out in the other hospitals too?

21             "A. I must answer in several steps.  The first step is to say

22     that I have no knowledge of such firing from the proximity of other

23     hospitals in Sarajevo.  Secondly, the other hospitals in Sarajevo were

24     very different types of building.  Kosevo Hospital was the only hospital

25     which was spread out over quite a large area.  The other hospitals were

Page 3852

 1     solid, single buildings, with a small building next to it, maybe.  So

 2     they did not lend themselves to that -- to the kind of tactic.  The third

 3     thing is that the head of Kosevo Hospital was known to us as a radical

 4     hard-liner and was someone who --"

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. --

 6             MR. IVETIC:

 7        Q.   " ... and was someone who we believed would have certainly

 8     supported this kind of tactic in the greater interest, as he saw it, of

 9     supporting the Bosniak cause, whereas the directors of the other

10     hospitals were, in our view, much more medically focused and refused to

11     have anything to do with the kind of action that the director of

12     Kosevo Hospital, in our view, participated in."

13             Does -- does this accurately and fairly represent your knowledge

14     of the director of Kosevo Hospital being complicit in these attacks by

15     Bosnian Muslim mortars from his hospital?

16        A.   It was not our knowledge.  It was our perception that given his

17     beliefs that he might be involved in that, and we know of one incident as

18     already described of where that did happen.  Whether he was complicit in

19     that obviously we do not know.

20        Q.   Fair enough.  And now just to finish up with the last three --

21     four lines, five lines of this examination from Judge El Mahdi.  He asked

22     you:

23             "And the other hospitals, as far as you know, were they also the

24     object of firing, or were they spared?

25             "A. I have no specific knowledge that they were either targeted

Page 3853

 1     or spared.  What I do know is that in reports of firing, it was always

 2     Kosevo Hospital which came up, never the other hospitals."

 3             And I'd like to ask you now here.  When you're saying you have no

 4     specific knowledge of these other hospitals being either targeted or

 5     spared, does that mean that you did not have information that these

 6     hospitals were targeted by incoming artillery fire?

 7        A.   We had no information obviously about what was being targeted,

 8     because we never knew where they were aimed at.  All we could observe was

 9     where shells landed, and shells did land on the -- on the other hospitals

10     as landed in many places in Sarajevo as well.

11        Q.   And do you perhaps recall the name of the director of the

12     hospital in Kosevo whom you had suspicions was a hard-liner?

13        A.   I certainly can't remember it sat here.  Whether it is in my

14     notes, I would have to go back and look.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, could I seek clarification of part of an

16     answer.

17             It was read to you as your previous testimony that you said:

18             "What I do know is that in reports of firing, it was always

19     Kosevo Hospital which came up, never the other hospitals."

20             Reports of firing, were you referring to reports of fire outgoing

21     from Kosevo Hospital?

22             THE WITNESS:  No.  It was reports of fire coming in to

23     Kosevo Hospital from the Bosnian Serbs.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, a few lines further down you said:

25             "All we could observe was where shells landed, and shells did

Page 3854

 1     land on the other hospitals as landed in many places in Sarajevo as

 2     well."

 3             So I'm a bit confused about your saying reports always pointed at

 4     Kosevo Hospital, and you explained that that was reports on incoming fire

 5     on hospitals, and you say that the other hospitals were fired -- were hit

 6     as well.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.  What I mean is that when Kosevo Hospital was

 8     hit, we were informed by the -- either by somebody from the hospital or

 9     by somebody from the Presidency, that's the Bosniak Presidency, that

10     Kosevo Hospital had been hit, whereas we didn't receive direct reports

11     from other hospitals being hit.  We only heard about other hospitals

12     being hit through the UNMOs or through routine UN reporting.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  So you're drawing the attention to the fact that the

14     hospital itself reported being hit, whereas other hospitals also being

15     hit did not report it.

16             THE WITNESS:  That is correct, sir.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

18             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

19        Q.   Colonel, are you familiar with General Abdel-Razek who was the

20     UNPROFOR Sector South commander from 21 August 1992 to 20 February 1993?

21        A.   Yes, I know him.

22        Q.   Okay.  In regards to questions relating to the Bosnian Muslims

23     placing forces and/or mortars near humanitarian buildings, Mr. --

24     General Abdel-Razek at transcript page 3639 of these proceedings on the

25     5th of October, 2012, testified that he complained to Mr. Ejub Ganic

Page 3855

 1     about this and said:

 2             "I remember the answer from Mr. Ejub Ganic.  He used to tell me,

 3     Where should we go?  We are fighting close to the city.  I told him, You

 4     have to go.  You are creating lots of problems, and if I were on the

 5     other side I would have retaliated to any firing, to any shelling, and

 6     this is a problem."

 7             Sir, would you agree with General Abdel-Razek that retaliatory

 8     fire should have been expected from the positioning of any forces near

 9     humanitarian buildings such as the hospital?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

11             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I object to the

12     question that Mr. Ivetic has put because I think there was rather

13     extensive testimony on this issue, and it was also the subject matter of

14     redirect examination in which General Abdel-Razek qualified his meaning

15     of the term "retaliatory" or "retaliation."

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Then you can deal with that in re-examination

17     as well and deal with it with this witness.

18             At the same time, Mr. Ivetic, I had no opportunity yet to verify,

19     but I take it that you have done that, that you are not in any way

20     twisting the evidence General Abdel-Razek gave about retaliatory fire.

21             MR. IVETIC:  I've only excluded the last sentence of that answer,

22     which is:  "I hope that I answered your question."  And that's transcript

23     page T3639.  He answered again as "Regarding the PTT building --"

24             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, please.

25             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

Page 3856

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  If you could answer the question, if you still

 2     remember the question, Mr. Tucker.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  I agree with what General Abdel-Razek said.

 4     I would, however, add that when firing in retaliation, you do not fire at

 5     an empty grid reference.  You look at what it is you're firing at, and if

 6     you see that you're firing at a hospital, then that should be pause for

 7     thought for the people considering whether to fire retaliatory.  But the

 8     point that Razek -- General Razek said about it causing problems, that is

 9     also of course correct.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, if you're talking about retaliatory fire,

11     what do you mean by it?  You have already said that that is not -- you do

12     not fire at an empty grid reference.  What would you then fire at if not

13     at an empty grid reference?

14             THE WITNESS:  A grid reference is always on a map.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  No, I do understand, but did you intend to say

16     that you would return fire to where the source of the fire -- of the

17     incoming fire was, or do you -- retaliation is, of course, a rather

18     complex term.  How do you understand it when you read the answer of

19     Mr. Abdel-Razek, and how do you use that term yourself?

20             THE WITNESS:  The way that General Abdel-Razek describes it, I

21     agree with his -- his statements.  I would, however, add that myself as

22     an artillery officer, I've been engaged in the planning of artillery and

23     counter-artillery, and retaliatory fire is just that, is that you never

24     look at -- or whenever there's incoming, you have to look at whatever it

25     is you're firing at, and if you then look at the map and say, ah, that's

Page 3857

 1     a hospital, that is something that should be taken into account.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If, sir, as you look at where you're firing at and

 4     you find it's a hospital and you can determine with certainty that that's

 5     where the fire came from, what do you then do?

 6             THE WITNESS:  In the training that I received in the British

 7     Army, we were not allowed to fire back, even though fire came from it.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So do I understand you to say that a protected

 9     institution that attacks is still protected?

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13        Q.   Colonel, am I correct that General Morillon, in complaining of

14     this tactic of the Bosnian Muslim mortars shooting from the hospital,

15     told Mr. Alija Izetbegovic that his forces were violating the Geneva

16     Conventions?

17        A.   I believe he did and he complained to Ejub Ganic as well.  And it

18     was not just about firing from the hospital.  It was also from firing

19     from immediately next door to his headquarters in the residency in

20     Sarajevo.

21        Q.   Thank you, sir.  At paragraph 304 of your statement, and that's

22     page 73 in the English.  It's -- sorry, Exhibit P317, and again it's page

23     73 in the English, page 74 in the B/C/S, and it's paragraph 304 that

24     we'll be looking at, sir.  Okay.  304 is at the top in English.

25             Sir, in this paragraph that's now being magnified on the screen,

Page 3858

 1     you identify knowledge of two incidents where it is believed that the

 2     Bosnian Muslim forces fired on their own people.  The second incident you

 3     mention, is this the one more commonly referred to in the media as the

 4     Markale 1 massacre?

 5        A.   I'm not familiar with the name Markale 1 massacre.  What I know

 6     it as is the first marketplace shelling.

 7        Q.   Okay.  If I can direct your attention to something from the

 8     Karadzic trial, and that's document 1D371 in e-court, page 89 of that

 9     document.  And while we wait for that, sir, I would like to brief you on

10     the fact that this is your testimony from the 18th of January, 2012, in

11     those proceedings, at transcript page 23309, and it's beginning at line

12     12 of the same, in the middle of the page, and I will quote for you, sir:

13             "Q. Is it true that you met in Germany with a British officer who

14     informed you that the shell at Markale marketplace came from Muslim

15     positions?

16             "A. When I was back in Germany after my time in Bosnia, I met by

17     coincidence a British Sergeant Major who was a specialist in crater

18     analysis and artillery intelligence who had been on the investigating

19     team looking into what I believe is referred to as the first marketplace

20     incident, and he said to me that he believed that the first marketplace

21     incident had been fired or had come from the Muslims."

22             Sir, does this accurately reflect the source of your knowledge

23     for this incident that occurred after you had left Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24        A.   Yes, it does.

25        Q.   And would you be able to provide the identity of the British

Page 3859

 1     sergeant major, and if so, I would suggest we go into private session for

 2     privacy concerns without knowing.

 3        A.   No, I don't recall the person's name, and because I wasn't making

 4     notes, I didn't record it in my notes.

 5        Q.   Fair enough, sir.  Then we can stay in open session.

 6             At paragraphs 101 through 102 of your statement, that would be

 7     page 24 in e-court of P317, you identify or talk about the attack on the

 8     residency, that is General Morillon's headquarters and home, and you

 9     identify that the crater analysis and other information you received

10     provided further evidence that it was a Bosnian Muslim unit or Bosniak

11     unit that was responsible for the firing and had fired upon the

12     residency.  Am I correct that the Bosnian Muslims initially had tried to

13     pass blame on the Serbs?

14        A.   That is correct.

15        Q.   Can you provide us any further details of what you or

16     General Morillon did to complain to the Bosnian Muslims after it was

17     determined that they had done -- that they had performed the attack?

18        A.   General Morillon complained to President Izetbegovic and to

19     Ejub Ganic, and he made a public statement on -- at a press conference

20     which was held at the headquarters of Sector Sarajevo at the PTT building

21     and said that that is what had happened.

22        Q.   Did the UNPROFOR BH command consider the residency to be a

23     legitimate target?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   Yesterday, sir, at transcript page 3765 onwards, you testified

Page 3860

 1     about your observations about the Serb shelling at Sarajevo, and at

 2     paragraph 90 of your statement, which is, I believe, at page 21 of your

 3     statement in e-court, you talk of terrorism by artillery with the purpose

 4     to intimidate and break the will to resist.

 5             Would you agree with me that the Serb artillery had superiority

 6     over the artillery of the Muslims?

 7        A.   Overwhelming superiority.

 8        Q.   And would you say that the Serbs used overwhelming force by

 9     artillery when responding to attacks?

10        A.   In most cases, yes.

11        Q.   Sir, in your years of service, have you ever had occasion to hear

12     of a United States Army policy or doctrine called shock and awe or

13     overwhelming force doctrine?

14        A.   Yes, I have.

15        Q.   Would you agree with the proposition that for overwhelming force

16     the doctrine and concept shaping today's American force structure, the

17     aims of this doctrine are to apply massive or overwhelming force as

18     quickly as possible on an adversary in order to disarm, incapacitate, or

19     render the enemy militarily impotent with as few casualties and losses to

20     ourselves and to noncombatants as possible.  The superiority of American

21     forces technically and operationally is crucial to successful

22     application.  Would you agree that this is a fair summation of the

23     overwhelming force doctrine as applied by NATO and the United States

24     armed forces?

25        A.   Whether it's applicable by NATO I'm not in a position to state.

Page 3861

 1     I've certainly heard to it referred to by the United States.  However,

 2     there's a key point there, and that is to noncombatants, and that is not,

 3     generally speaking, what we saw happen in Sarajevo.

 4        Q.   Isn't the concept behind overwhelming force to try and overwhelm

 5     your opponent and therefore lessen the duration of the conflict so as to

 6     lessen the amount of overall casualties to yourselves and to

 7     noncombatants?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Do you consider the overwhelming force doctrine as applied by the

10     United States armed forces to be terrorism?

11        A.   That is not for me to comment about.

12        Q.   And yet you feel comfortable commenting about the Bosnian Serb

13     forces.  Is that accurate?

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

15             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Yes, Mr. President.  That's an objectionable

16     question.  It's argumentative, and I think the witness has already

17     answered the question.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I didn't understand the question, as a matter

19     of fact.

20             "... you feel comfortable commenting about the Bosnian Serb

21     forces.?"

22             Well, the question was not whether the witness would under no

23     circumstance comment on the US forces but whether the overwhelming force

24     doctrine as applied by the United States armed forces to be terrorism.

25             Now, that is a very composite question.  Apart from that, it is

Page 3862

 1     asking for opinion.  You could even consider that it's asking for expert

 2     opinion to some extent, and you know, Mr. Ivetic, the position of the

 3     Chamber is that if a witness of fact expresses any opinion, that it

 4     should be clear on the basis of what facts he does so for the Chamber to

 5     consider that testimony.

 6             Would you say that the witness commented anywhere that the

 7     Bosnian Serb forces were terrorists?

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  Paragraph 90.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Paragraph 90.  Let's have a look.  And then perhaps

10     explore the factual basis underlying the two.  That is in respect of a

11     certain concrete situation, isn't it?  And therefore if the witness has

12     given a general statement about the US forces, then to compare that with

13     a specific situation which is explained to the witness, that might not be

14     comparable, and therefore the question -- you would not comment on the

15     US, but you do comment on the Serb forces, is under totally different

16     circumstances.  I do not mind if you want to further explore that, but

17     please not one general statement not linked to any concrete event to

18     where the witness expressed his views and what he would describe as

19     terrorism by artillery in a very concrete situation.

20             You may proceed, Mr. Ivetic.  I take it that this will serve you

21     as guidance.

22             MR. IVETIC:  It will, Your Honour, and I think we can leave it

23     with what has been said about this, and I will move to specific instances

24     from his discussion in the statement to ask about specifics of other

25     areas that I believe constitute expert knowledge, and then I should be

Page 3863

 1     able to conclude by the end of this session with the witness as far as my

 2     side is concerned.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, and apparently I do understand that

 4     you do not make that comparison anymore about --

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  -- the general sweeping statement.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, I took your instruction to heart.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Please proceed.

 9             MR. IVETIC:

10        Q.   At paragraph 202 of the statement at page 3 -- of P317, that

11     would be page 47 to 48 of the same, you talk about cluster bombs as being

12     an appalling weapon that should never be used in civilian areas.  Can you

13     confirm for me whether in fact NATO and British forces used such cluster

14     bombs in federal Yugoslavia in 1999, including at sites near civilian

15     locations?

16        A.   I cannot answer that question.

17        Q.   Fair enough.  Then I move on.  Colonel, yesterday you testified

18     several times about Cerska, and you have mentioned it at your statement

19     at paragraph 161 of the same.

20             MR. IVETIC:  That's page 38 in the English and B/C/S for those

21     who have e-court open.

22        Q.   I would like to clarify some of the matters relating to this

23     topic.  First of all, I was a bit confused yesterday.  Did you intend to

24     imply that Cerska was an example of a widespread campaign to displace

25     Bosnian Muslims, including the torching of homes?

Page 3864

 1        A.   The attack on -- Cerska was on the extremity of the

 2     Cerska-Srebrenica-Zepa enclave, and it was the -- one of the early

 3     targets in an ongoing campaign, and when Cerska was captured, then the

 4     refugees who had fled to Cerska from previous ethnic cleansing in the

 5     area to the south of Zvornik and in the area to the -- towards Sarajevo,

 6     who had gathered in Cerska when Cerska was attacked, because they were

 7     inside a surrounded area, had no option but to flee towards the centre of

 8     the surrounded area, in other words, through Konjevic Polje and on

 9     towards Srebrenica.

10        Q.   What about the torching of homes?  Is it your position that homes

11     were torched in Cerska?

12        A.   I restate that I personally did not visit at Cerska.  I was in

13     Konjevic Polje at the time.  It was General Morillon who went up into

14     Cerska.  General Morillon's report from Cerska was that Cerska itself had

15     been an area where there had been fighting, but that there had not been

16     in Cerska specifically the torching of houses, the burning of houses.

17        Q.   And at paragraph 163 of your statement, you also indicate that

18     you had heard that a large number of houses at Cerska appeared to have

19     suffered battle damage but not many had suffered fire damage.  When you

20     say battle damage, is this the same thing you described yesterday as

21     combat damage?

22        A.   Yes, that is damage due to soldiers shooting at each other.

23        Q.   And as you use that term or those terms, would that indicate

24     legitimate fighting had occurred, that is to say combat, which caused

25     this damage?

Page 3865

 1        A.   The damage in Cerska, the way that General Morillon described it,

 2     was as a result of fighting.

 3        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Now, here at paragraph 161 of your statement,

 4     that's again on page 38, you say that the Bosniak commander at Tuzla told

 5     you about the alleged massacre of civilians in Cerska.  I'd like to

 6     refresh your recollection with something from the Perisic trial.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  That's 1D369, pages 92 to 93 in e-court, and these

 8     should be transcript pages 9268 and 9269.  And I will only be interested

 9     in the short part that starts at page -- at page 9268, line 12, and goes

10     on for the next five lines of the next page.

11        Q.   And when that comes up, sir, we'll see what it is that I'm

12     talking about.  And the question that was posed in this trial to you was

13     as follows from line 12:

14             "Q. It did indeed.  In February you received some information, I

15     believe, from among others, President Izetbegovic and Ganic, with regard

16     to the massacre at Cerska and that massacre included relatively strong

17     allegations with regards to people being put in houses and burned, the

18     entire village was burned to the ground, that some 700 wounded or more,

19     and I'm not sure about the figure --

20             "A. That's correct.

21             "Q.  -- were in that particular village and this needed your

22     attention?

23             "A. That's essentially correct.

24             "Q. Okay.  And President Izetbegovic and Ganic made arrangements

25     with the - and I'm asking here - the war committee in Srebrenica to

Page 3866

 1     facilitate or at least from their standpoint your entry into Srebrenica;

 2     correct?

 3             "A. I can't confirm whether they made arrangements, with whom

 4     they made arrangements.  They simply told General Morillon that they

 5     would inform the people inside the enclave that General Morillon was

 6     going to try and come into the enclave in order to see for himself what

 7     the situation was."

 8             Does this testimony of yours from the Perisic trial refresh your

 9     recollection that indeed in addition to the commander at Tuzla that

10     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and Mr. Ejub Ganic also told you about the alleged

11     atrocities in Cerska.

12        A.   The sequence of events was the other way around.  It was

13     initially Alija Izetbegovic and Ejub Ganic who told General Morillon.

14     General Morillon then travelled to Tuzla, and then while he was in Tuzla,

15     he was told in more detail by the Bosnian Muslim commander in Tuzla.

16     Then General Morillon went into Konjevic Polje and visited Cerska.

17        Q.   Would you agree with me that Mr. Ganic and Mr. Izetbegovic were

18     the source for many of the stories that were reported or heard by

19     General Morillon and yourself relating to atrocities?

20        A.   Yes, that is correct, in the same way that General Morillon

21     listened to what was told to him by both the Bosnian Serbs and the

22     Bosnian Croats as well.

23        Q.   Did you find it to be on multiple times that Mr. Ganic or

24     Mr. Izetbegovic would advise you of alleged atrocities that turned out to

25     be false when investigated, apart from Cerska?

Page 3867

 1        A.   There were certainly other events when the situation as described

 2     to us by one side or the other, when we actually found out the details,

 3     was different to the way it had been described to us.

 4        Q.   Did you consider Mr. Izetbegovic on Mr. Ganic to be members of

 5     the faction within the Bosnian Muslim leadership that promoted

 6     international armed intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims and

 7     against the Serbs?

 8        A.   I'm not in a position to -- to know that.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Fair enough.  Do you recall complaints being made by a

10     Mr. Akmadzic, who was the senior Croat in the Bosnian government at the

11     end of 1992, that Mr. Izetbegovic was no longer the lawful president of

12     Bosnia, having overstayed his tenure?

13        A.   Yes, I remember that.

14        Q.   Okay.  Fair enough, sir.  Now, I'd like to turn to paragraph 106

15     of your statement, which is at page 25 of the same in e-court, and that

16     would be P317 in e-court, and it's the same page in B/C/S, so page 25 of

17     P317.  And while we wait for that, sir, I can preface my question by

18     telling you this is a paragraph where you give a very definite opinion on

19     the Bosnian Serb Army having a very efficient and comprehensive

20     communications.

21             And 106 is in the approximate middle of the page.  And so, sir,

22     here the very definite opinion you give, would you agree with me that the

23     only source for this particular conclusion is the limited times during

24     meetings with yourself and General Morillon that General Mladic or one of

25     the other officers of the VRS tried to obtain information for you via

Page 3868

 1     telephone?

 2        A.   No, that is not correct.  You are correct that in those occasions

 3     that you describe that certainly helped us form that opinion, but it was

 4     also the continuously built-up opinion of the various UNPROFOR battalions

 5     in the execution of their -- their duties, and it was their reporting and

 6     experience in the field that they believed that the Bosnian Serb Army had

 7     efficient communications.

 8        Q.   Would you agree with me that you never witnessed the functioning

 9     of the communication system available to the VRS during combat

10     situations?

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   I'd have to ask you to clarify.

13        A.   As I say, no, I did not see them functioning during combat

14     situations.

15        Q.   Thank you, sir.  At paragraphs 111 through 112 of your statement,

16     and that's on the next page, page 26 in the English and also page 26 in

17     the B/C/S, you provide a set of conclusions about co-ordinated

18     concentrations of fire.  Are these statements made in your capacity as a

19     fully trained and qualified artillery officer?

20        A.   Yes, they are.

21        Q.   Do you consider yourself to possess an expert's skill set of

22     knowledge on this topic?

23        A.   At that time, yes, I -- yes, I did, as at that time I was a

24     trained artillery officer.

25        Q.   Does that mean that you feel you are no longer possessing an

Page 3869

 1     expert knowledge or skill set to opine about this topic?

 2        A.   What I mean is that almost 20 years have passed since I left the

 3     army.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Am I correct that you have not consulted any written works

 5     prepared by other experts on the area of structure, command and control

 6     of the VRS in rendering this testimony at these paragraphs?

 7        A.   That is correct.

 8        Q.   At paragraph 230 of your statement, that's page 55 in e-court in

 9     English and page 54 in the B/C/S, you state that:

10             "Again, the co-ordination and specialist knowledge that this

11     required means it can only have been ordered at the highest levels of the

12     Bosnian Serb Army."

13             Would you agree with me that in fact you concluded that this

14     shell at issue originated from Serbia?  And if you need clarification, we

15     can also pull up paragraph 232.  Perhaps in -- this is the incident on 24

16     March, 1993, sir.

17        A.   What is the question?

18        Q.   You state here that this incident shows that it can only have

19     been ordered at the highest levels of the Bosnian Serb Army.  And my

20     question for you, sir, did not your expert analysis determine that this

21     shell originated from Serbia, and that is to say outside of the area

22     controlled by the Bosnian Serb Army?

23        A.   I don't understand your question.  I think you're mixing two

24     things.  One is the statement about the co-ordination of massed artillery

25     fire which requires control at the highest level and authorisation for

Page 3870

 1     the expenditure of ammunition, transport, soldiers, et cetera; then

 2     secondly, you were asking about this incident in Srebrenica which was not

 3     a mass of artillery fire.  It was a small number of shells which were

 4     fired.  It is those small number of shells which were fired and which hit

 5     the football stadium and the area around it, I believe around the 24th of

 6     March.  It is those shells that I believed were fired out of -- from the

 7     Republic of Serbia.

 8        Q.   And then again, sir, I direct you to the last sentence of

 9     paragraph 230 where you're talking about those shells, and you say:

10             "Again, the coordination and specialist knowledge that this

11     required means it can only have been ordered at the highest levels of the

12     Bosnian Serb Army."

13        A.   The -- in order to hit the -- the football field in Srebrenica

14     and when the helicopters were trying to evacuate, you had to have people

15     observing that situation.  You had to have people who could see where the

16     shells were landing, and that was on the Bosnian Serb territory.  The

17     shells themselves seemed to have been fired from Serbia itself.

18        Q.   Okay.  Your analysis of the crater at paragraphs 231 and 232, 232

19     is at the top of the next page in e-court, do you consider yourself to be

20     a trained specialist or expert to render forensic ballistic evidence?

21        A.   No, I do not.

22        Q.   Can you identify if you took any photographs of the scene and the

23     craters you examined?

24        A.   No, I had no camera with me.  I had about half an hour at the --

25     at the location.

Page 3871

 1        Q.   How long does it traditionally take to perform this type of

 2     analysis?

 3        A.   It depends on the actual condition of the crater itself.  If it's

 4     a crater in what they would describe as good condition, then it can be

 5     done in a few minutes.  If they have to look around and find and search,

 6     it can take several hours.

 7        Q.   How did you rate this crater?

 8        A.   Firstly as I said, I am not a trained crater analysis expert.

 9     This one was a fairly messy one.

10        Q.   Did you take any measurements?

11        A.   I didn't have any measuring equipment.  I described that the

12     hole -- that crater was very deep.

13        Q.   Okay.  Have you authored any publications on the topic of

14     forensic ballistic analysis or crater analysis?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   Thank you, sir.  At paragraphs 289 to 294 of your statement, and

17     that's at page 69 in the English and page 68 in the B/C/S, you discuss

18     margin of error in the use of artillery and accuracy testimony.  Have you

19     authored any publications on the topic of margin of error in use of

20     artillery?

21        A.   No, I've not authored anything.  However, that is part of the

22     standard training which in the British Army artillery officers --

23     everybody in the artillery undergoes.  There's nothing specialist about

24     that knowledge.  It is general artillery knowledge and part of standard

25     training.

Page 3872

 1        Q.   Would you agree with me it is specialist as to other soldiers

 2     that are not trained artillery officers?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And would it be specialist knowledge as opposed to the everyday

 5     citizen?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Do you or did you consider yourself an expert in this field?

 8        A.   In that field, yes.

 9        Q.   Did you consult any manuals or reference materials in preparing

10     this part of your statement?  And again we're talking about paragraphs

11     289 through 294.

12        A.   No, not any manuals or reference materials.  As I have just said,

13     that is -- what I describe is a standard part of artillery training.

14        Q.   Did you personally draft these paragraphs yourself or were they

15     drafted by members of the Office of the Prosecution?

16        A.   They were drafted by me.

17        Q.   Okay.  Was this entire statement drafted by you, sir?

18        A.   It was.

19        Q.   How many times prior have you testified in any capacity on the

20     margin of error in artillery?

21        A.   I have conducted training of my own soldiers in that and other

22     aspects of -- of artillery.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  The question was about giving testimony on that

24     matter, Mr. Ivetic --

25             MR. IVETIC:  Correct.

Page 3873

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  -- because the answer is about -- and the relevance

 2     of how often you testify -- there were areas where I have never testified

 3     upon; still, I do know something about it.  What -- I'm trying to

 4     understand the gist of your question, what it brings us.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Well, Your Honours twofold:  It gives us the bases

 6     for the purported expertise of the witness and it proves my point that

 7     this is improper expert testimony that was not subjected to Rule 94 bis.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now I understand it.  You say the witness was

 9     never called to testify on this expert matter.  Is that how I have to

10     understand what is behind your question?

11             MR. IVETIC:  That's one aspect of it and the other aspect is,

12     Your Honour, is that we have what is very clearly expert-like testimony

13     that is being presented in a statement that was drafted by the witness

14     and therefore should have been a Rule 94 bis analysis with all the

15     protections afforded thereunder.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that's clear.  Please proceed.

17             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

18        Q.   At paragraph 294 of your statement - and I apologise, I think

19     that is page 70 in both the English and the B/C/S, although I don't have

20     it noted for the B/C/S - you identify that the conclusions in the

21     following paragraphs were from the intelligence and operations branches

22     of the HQ BH command.  Would it be correct to state that someone else

23     created these conclusions and reported them to you?

24        A.   In general terms, yes, but not in one single -- one single

25     document.  What I have done here is assemble into one very short

Page 3874

 1     statement things that came up and were reported and were discussed and

 2     were analysed, as you can imagine, at multiple times during the conflict.

 3        Q.   Fair enough.  Could you identify for us who is this intelligence

 4     and operations branch?  What services are -- are --

 5        A.   Yeah.  This was the intelligence and operations branches of the

 6     HQ BH command main headquarters, which was in Kiseljak, which was under

 7     the command of the Chief of Staff of BH command General Cordy-Simpson.

 8        Q.   And are we talking military intelligence from various domestic

 9     armies, or are we talking intelligence services?

10        A.   No.  I mean the military intelligence as in the meaning of G2 in

11     the NATO terminology.

12        Q.   From which countries?

13        A.   From the countries who contributed soldiers to the headquarters

14     of UN BH commands.  By memory, it would be the British, Dutch, Danish,

15     US.  There were a number of other countries who contributed but it's a

16     matter of record to find out where they came from.

17        Q.   Fair enough.  And with regard to these paragraphs that are in

18     part based upon the work that these branches did, am I correct that you

19     were not an eyewitness to all of the events that are recorded here?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   No, I'm not correct, or no you were not an eyewitness.

22        A.   No, I was not an eyewitness to many events.  These were reports

23     which were forwarded to -- for discussion at meetings that

24     General Morillon had and were forwarded to General Morillon in his

25     forward headquarters in the residency in Sarajevo.

Page 3875

 1        Q.   Thank you, sir.  And you do not know the bulk of the materials

 2     that were reviewed by these intelligence and operation branches in

 3     reaching the conclusions in their reports, do you?

 4        A.   Some of them were reviewed, some of them were not.  When there

 5     were major incidents or major events which led to conclusions, then, yes,

 6     those were reviewed in more detail.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I'm slightly in doubt what to do.  You

 9     said you would finish during this session.  We are approximately at the

10     time where the session should have finished already.  How much more time

11     would you still need.

12             MR. IVETIC:  One more question, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  One more question.  Please proceed.

14             MR. IVETIC:

15        Q.   Sir, yesterday you testified about seeing houses and villages

16     that were -- that were destroyed in the Banja Luka area.  Am I correct

17     that you first saw those houses in 1996 when you were redeployed as part

18     of SFOR and not in 1992 on 1993?

19        A.   That is correct.

20        Q.   Thank you, Colonel, for your answers.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I apologise for going slightly over

22     but I have completed.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  I'm not -- you're -- as a matter of fact,

24     you're staying well within the time-limits you indicated before -- the

25     Defence indicated before.

Page 3876

 1             Could the Witness -- we take a break of another 20 minutes.

 2     Could you follow the usher, Mr. Tucker.

 3                           [The witness stands down]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll take a break, and we'll resume at 25 minutes

 5     to 2.00, but could I already inquire, Mr. Vanderpuye, how much time you

 6     would need.

 7             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, I'm just going to take a quick

 8     look at the transcript.  I don't anticipate much at all.  I have written

 9     down just a question or two.  I want to show him a transcript reference,

10     but I'll take a look at it during the break.  It shouldn't be long.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  So limited time.  Then we'll find time then later on

12     to further discuss the scheduling for early January.

13             We take a break and we resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 1.14 p.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 1.37 p.m.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

17                           [The witness takes the stand]

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tucker, first Judge Fluegge has one or more

19     questions for you.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Indeed.  I would like to take you back to a set

21     of questions put to you by the Defence this morning in relation to the

22     convoys and how they were checked and searched if necessary.  You refer

23     to two occasions where there were some complaints.  Who was usually

24     present during these checks on the spot and checking the convoys?

25             THE WITNESS:  My understanding is that the checks were conducted

Page 3877

 1     either by UNPROFOR soldiers or by UN police accompanied by UNPROFOR

 2     soldiers.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Are you aware that sometimes representatives of

 4     the media were also present?

 5             THE WITNESS:  I can't confirm specific -- I believe that

 6     sometimes they were, but which particular occasion, then, that obviously

 7     I don't know.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And who would invite the media to take -- to be

 9     present during these checks?

10             THE WITNESS:  The couple of occasions that I heard about it, it

11     was arranged by UNPROFOR public communications or -- I forget what the

12     terminology was, but the people responsible for communications with

13     the -- with the media.

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That is UNPROFOR.  And have you any knowledge

15     about other entities who call the media to be present?

16             THE WITNESS:  I don't know specifics, but I would imagine that

17     media could be called by one or other of the -- the warring factions,

18     authorities, or local -- or the media might even have just been -- been

19     there, because the locations that such searches would have taken place

20     were fairly limited, because there are only a few routes which were well

21     known along which the convoys were -- were moved.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you for that.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Judge Moloto has a question for you as well.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Tucker, you talked about combat damage to

25     houses, and you said General Morillon determined combat damage by the

Page 3878

 1     fact that there were bullet holes in the walls of the buildings.  My

 2     question to you is:  How did he determine that that was caused by combat

 3     damage?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Obviously, we would not have been present when the

 5     shooting actually took place, and it would be conceivable that somebody

 6     could just shoot away at a building.  Our supposition was that the amount

 7     of damage that would have to have been caused in order to make it look

 8     like combat, because most houses in Bosnia have got the odd hole in them,

 9     so the odd hole is simply not relevant.  It is large numbers of holes,

10     and -- and the use of high explosives.  Yes, it is conceivable that

11     somebody could have done that deliberately in order to make it look as if

12     there had been fighting somewhere.  Conceptually you are correct.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So in fact, General Morillon's determination did

14     not exclude this possibility that in fact it could have been done

15     deliberately without any -- without any fighting, without any combat.

16             THE WITNESS:  That is technically possible.  If we're talking

17     about Cerska specifically, when General Morillon arrived in Cerska, when

18     he went up the narrow road that led from Konjevic Polje to Cerska, the

19     Bosnian Muslim front line soldiers said, "You can try and go through but

20     the Serbs will never let you."  Morillon drove up the road, and when he

21     arrived at the outskirts of Cerska, he came across a couple of Serb

22     soldiers who were on guard.  They were very surprised to see

23     General Morillon.

24             And when General Morillon was then introduced to the platoon

25     commander, a quite low-level soldier, the platoon commander was also very

Page 3879

 1     surprised to see General Morillon.  And the platoon commander was the

 2     commander of a regular army unit of the VRS, in other words, not a

 3     militia or a specialist unit, and was very professional in his conduct

 4     towards General Morillon, and gave -- and spoke quite freely to

 5     General Morillon in a way that gave General Morillon the impression that

 6     what the platoon commander was saying was entirely consistent with what

 7     he could see of the damage in -- in the area.  And that we knew that

 8     there had been heavy fighting there.  We knew that the refugees had fled

 9     from there, and we knew that there had been sounds reported of heavy

10     fighting in that area.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Did you know whether heavy fighting was taking

12     place from within a house, within houses?  Surely they could have been

13     fighting on a front line somewhere, not necessarily from within houses.

14             THE WITNESS:  The front line was further -- was further forward

15     from Cerska, and as the front line was originally a number of kilometres

16     away from Cerska, and as the Serbs attacked, they came closer and closer,

17     and the evidence which General Morillon saw and which was consistent with

18     the reports from the refugees was that the Muslim soldiers had been

19     pushed back from the front line and had eventually resisted or their last

20     stand had been in the houses themselves, hence the -- hence the damage

21     there, and had then either been killed, captured, or had also withdrawn

22     back to Konjevic Polje.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But all what you are telling us now isn't in your

24     statement.  All we get from your statement is that the determination that

25     this was combat damage is made solely on the basis that these were bullet

Page 3880

 1     holes in the buildings.  That's the only evidence we have so far.  Now

 2     you're giving us a little more than you gave us in your statement.  I'm

 3     just -- I'm just concerned --

 4             WITNESS:  Yeah --

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  -- that what you are telling us now is not

 6     contained in your statement.

 7             THE WITNESS:  My apologies if -- if that.  I could have written

 8     500 pages of -- of --

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Not 500 pages.  Five lines, five more lines would

10     have done.

11             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  I have one question.  A bit of a linguistic matter.

14     I earlier asked you about the way in which you used the word "retaliatory

15     fire."  I'm not a native English-speaking person.  I always link

16     retaliation to some kind of retribution.  Now I've heard in this Tribunal

17     before the language of return, fire meaning that you return the fire so

18     as to eliminate the source of fire, rather.

19             When you are talking or when you are joining the language used by

20     others about retaliatory fire, would that be the neutral return fire with

21     the clear military purpose of eliminating the source of fire or would it

22     also have an annotation of revenge or ...

23             THE WITNESS:  The military term is counter-battery.  Retaliatory

24     fire or the use of -- the way that we used it in UNPROFOR was in the

25     first instance very specifically to fire back at where you were fired

Page 3881

 1     from, and sometimes there was also an element of punishment, of

 2     retribution.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And when you used the language here in

 4     relation to the Kosevo Hospital where I think Mr. Abdel-Razek said that

 5     if he would be in such a position he would use retaliatory fire, would

 6     you consider this including the revenge element, or would you -- when you

 7     said, well, I understand that he says so, would you also think of revenge

 8     rather than the more neutral military term?

 9             THE WITNESS:  I can't comment on the way General Abdel-Razek

10     meant it.  I would use it in those context with an element of the -- the

11     revenge, the punishment aspect.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you for that.

13             Mr. Vanderpuye, you have more questions for the witness?

14             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Yes, just one --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Just one.

16             MR. VANDERPUYE:  -- Mr. President, and it does actually follow on

17     what you've just asked the witness concerning what General Abdel-Razek

18     said.  If you bear with me one second, I will get the quote that I wanted

19     to read to the witness.

20                           Re-examination by Mr. Vanderpuye:

21        Q.   Mr. Tucker, in respect of this notion of retaliatory fire or

22     counter-battery fire, I just wanted to let you hear what

23     General Abdel-Razek said about that.  He testified about this in the

24     Karadzic case as well on 20 July and reaffirmed it here, and what he said

25     was he had a conversation with General Galic about this, and he said

Page 3882

 1     specifically this --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  What's the source exactly, Mr. --

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  It's in the Karadzic transcript at page 5554,

 4     and in this -- the transcript of these proceedings at page 3676.

 5        Q.   He said as follows --

 6             MR. VANDERPUYE:  May I proceed, Mr. President?

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, but you quote from 5554 in Karadzic?

 8             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Yes, sir.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I always like to have an opportunity to follow it.

10     It's not uploaded?

11             MR. VANDERPUYE:  No, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Was it public?

13             MR. VANDERPUYE:  It was public testimony and repeated in these

14     proceedings as well.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  If you would then give me one second, please, so

16     that we can see whether we can get it on our screens through the

17     internet.  I openly state that if nothing is uploaded in e-court, I would

18     try to find it on -- is that quotation already in our transcript of

19     today, Mr. Vanderpuye?  If that's the case, you'll forgive me not to be

20     able to remember all the numbers.  I mean, are you quoting what has been

21     quoted already, or are you choosing a new quote?

22             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I'm quoting what's already been quoted 5th

23     October, transcript page 3676, from the witness' prior Karadzic

24     testimony.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, and that had an 1D number?

Page 3883

 1             MR. VANDERPUYE:  No, sir.  It's just in the transcript of the

 2     proceedings.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Yes.  Please proceed.

 4             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5        Q.   What General Abdel-Razek said in a conversation he had with

 6     General Galic is he said as follows:

 7             "You should not retaliate.  I will accept that there are forces

 8     that are positioned in certain places, but you should be wise.  You

 9     should not retaliate against areas where there are many civilians.  You

10     can retaliate somewhere else along the front, but to attack areas where

11     there are civilians, this is a mistake.  It brings major injuries, it

12     hurts us, it hurts public opinion, because in brief there are civilians

13     getting killed, and there are humanitarian facilities and hospitals that

14     are getting destroyed and unable to function.  So they should move away

15     from shelling any civilian population centres."

16             And he reaffirmed that in his testimony.  Is that consistent with

17     counter-battery fire or retaliatory fire as it was used in UNPROFOR

18     during your -- during the period of time that you were engaged in Bosnia?

19        A.   UNPROFOR was not engaged in any counter-battery fire or

20     retaliatory fire.

21        Q.   No, I'm asking whether it's consistent with your understanding as

22     it was used in UNPROFOR of retaliatory fire during the time that you were

23     engaged there?

24        A.   But UNPROFOR did not use counter-battery.  It was only the armed

25     forces engaged in conflict who engaged in retaliatory fire.

Page 3884

 1        Q.   What I'm -- maybe I can be a little bit more clear.  What you

 2     said in response to Mr. President's question was that you had an

 3     understanding of what retaliatory fire was in UNPROFOR.  Do you recall

 4     that?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Is what I've spoken to you or read to you about what

 7     General Abdel-Razek said consistent with what understanding?

 8        A.   Yes, entirely.  What General Abdel-Razek said, which you've just

 9     read out to me, is absolutely proper, correct, and should be the case.

10             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. Tucker.  I have no further

11     questions.

12             Thank you, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Vanderpuye.

14             Have the questions by the Prosecution or the question by the

15     Prosecution and the questions by the Bench triggered any need for further

16     questions, Mr. Ivetic?

17             MR. IVETIC:  No, Your Honour, and I thank the Colonel again for

18     his testimony.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then, Mr. Tucker, this concludes your

20     testimony in this Court.  I would like to thank you very much for coming

21     to The Hague.

22             No loud talking in court.

23             MR. IVETIC:  If I might have a moment to consult.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I do understand we are at the very end of the

25     examination of this witness.  If Mr. Mladic at a very low voice would

Page 3885

 1     like to consult with you on any matter related to perhaps further

 2     questions, then --

 3             MR. IVETIC:  I'd appreciate that, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  I see Mr. Mladic already wrote a little note.

 7                           [Defence counsel and accused confer]

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, the general would also like to thank

 9     the colonel for his testimony.  That's all we have for the colonel.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

11             Then this concludes -- as I said before, this concludes your

12     testimony.  I continue where I said I thank you for coming to The Hague

13     and for having answered the questions that were put to you both by the

14     parties and by the Bench, and I wish you a safe return home again.  You

15     may follow the usher.

16                           [The witness withdrew]

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic and Mr. Groome, about the scheduling

18     for early January.  First of all, I'd like to express that -- the regret

19     that it is impossible in this Tribunal to grant both Christian and

20     Orthodox people sufficient time at Christmas to celebrate.

21     Unfortunately, it's impossible to meet the -- and to accommodate all of

22     us, and it may be understandable that because the Tribunal is based in

23     The Hague that the -- for staff, et cetera, that the emphasis will be on

24     the Christmas at the 25th and the 26th of December.

25             Now, in order to, nevertheless, accommodate to some extent, to

Page 3886

 1     the limited extent possible, the Chamber has on its mind not to sit on

 2     the 7th of May and the 8th of May -- January, I'm sorry.  The 7th of

 3     January and the 8th of January, and then to sit in the afternoon of

 4     Wednesday, the 9th of February, and then for the -- oh, yes.  I make

 5     again a similar mistake.  I apologise.  I'm -- yes.  No, no.  I'm sorry.

 6     I should focus on January and nothing else.  So therefore then to sit in

 7     the afternoon of Wednesday, the 9th of January, which might enable people

 8     to come back in the morning hours and time still -- further to be

 9     considered, and then in the week after that, not to sit on the 14th and

10     to sit on the 15th but then again starting in the afternoon.

11             This is what we have on our mind at this moment, but before

12     finally deciding on the matter, we would want to give an opportunity to

13     the parties to bring to our attention whatever they deem fit to do.

14             Mr. Groome.

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 3887

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  About the videolink, we'll further have to explore

 5     that, Mr. Groome.  And would -- in that country, would the representative

 6     of the Registry still be there the day after the 15th?  I'm not

 7     mentioning the --

 8             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I don't know about -- whether the

 9     Registry staff has any plans to be there.  It's simply OTP staff.  So

10     again we'll have to explore that further with the Registry.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then let's further explore that.  Thank you

12     for your observations.

13             Mr. Stojanovic, I can imagine that it is not very satisfactory

14     but we find ourselves also in a position where we cannot -- unfortunately

15     we cannot meet everyone's wishes.

16             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] We understand that, Your Honour.

17     We would have only one request.  If it could be not Wednesday but

18     Thursday afternoon, the 10th of January, because you understand if we are

19     coming from home, that means one whole day of transfer, which means that

20     we would have to leave our homes, to depart on the 8th.  That is why our

21     preference would be for Thursday, the 10th.  Monday is a big Orthodox

22     holiday for all of us, the patron saint's day for most of us, and that

23     means staying with our families.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic, if we would then take the Wednesday

25     off, would you then -- I don't know whether you'll travel back or not,

Page 3888

 1     but if we would sit on the 14th, would that cause you great problems if

 2     we would start only on Thursday, the 10th of January?  So one more day in

 3     the first week, one day less in the second week?

 4             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  It's

 5     difficult for me to say because both of them are holidays.  The decision

 6     is up to you.  We would be happiest if it could be as you said on the

 7     15th in the afternoon and that we begin on the 10th in the afternoon, but

 8     the decision is yours to make.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  The Chamber would wish that we could meet all

10     wishes.  We'll further consider the matter.  But if the Chamber would not

11     be willing to lose more than three days, would you then prefer not to sit

12     on the 7th and the 8th and the 14th, or would you prefer not to sit on

13     the 7th, the 8th, and the 9th, and then to sit on the 14th?

14             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] If that is the choice, Your

15     Honour, then we would prefer not to work on the 9th rather than the 14th.

16     Not to work on the 9th, to begin on the 10th, and if we have to make up

17     for that day, then to work on the 14th.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  We will consider the matter and keep in mind your

19     submissions.

20             Mr. Groome, I think you suggested to start tomorrow morning with

21     the -- with scheduling issues before the next witness would arrive.  Do

22     you have any further information about the arrival of the witness and --

23     well, the witness has arrived, but the preparation of the witness?  What

24     would be the earliest moment to start with the witness?

25             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, my latest information has not changed.

Page 3889

 1     I tried to get updated information over the last break but was unable, so

 2     as far as I know it remains to be noon.  We do have the matter of

 3     tendering exhibits for this past witness, and there are two other issues

 4     that I could productively raise with the Chamber.  I'm not sure that it

 5     would take all the way up until noon to deal with all of these matters,

 6     but be that --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm a bit surprised that once the witness is excused

 8     that we now hear about -- the Chamber has expressed its concern about the

 9     associated exhibits and has not heard from the Prosecution any further on

10     the matter.  So I do not know what your intentions are, but certainly

11     tendering all of the associated exhibits as you intended is not something

12     the Chamber does expect you to do.

13             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, the Prosecution is prepared to make

14     submissions on the exhibits that we are tendering.  Mr. Vanderpuye is

15     prepared to make that today or tomorrow morning, whatever pleases Your

16     Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  One second.  First Mr. Stojanovic.

18             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Just one thing, Your Honour.

19     For the coming witness, we announced earlier six hours.  Maybe it can be

20     of assistance that talking to Mr. Petrusic, who is proofing this witness,

21     we now hear that our new estimate would be four hours.  This could

22     perhaps be useful to take into account for all of us to know that the

23     examination-in-chief would be shortened by two hours.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  That is good to know.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  The cross-examination, interpreter's

Page 3890

 1     correction.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  That is good to know, Mr. Stojanovic.  At the same

 3     time, we inquired yesterday with the Defence whether the six hours is

 4     still accurate and then we received the message that it was, but -- or as

 5     a matter of fact the message was that it was sufficient.

 6             Then ...

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Vanderpuye -- perhaps first Mr. Groome.

 9     How much time you think you would need with the witness which will be

10     called tomorrow?

11             MR. GROOME:  Ms. Bolton informs me that she believes she will

12     require between 2.5 and three hours.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  And four hours for the -- that makes seven and a

14     half.  That should fit into the days still available to us.

15             Mr. Vanderpuye, the Chamber very much would like you to tender

16     whatever you wish to tender at this moment, not to say that we would

17     immediately decide on the matter, but you may submit whatever you wish in

18     relation to the tendering of documents, associated exhibits, or

19     non-associated exhibits.

20             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I think it would be

21     helpful to note, Mr. President and Your Honours, that at least as far as

22     I can determine from the Defence position or response to the 92 ter

23     motion, they appear to acknowledge and at least concede that the 41

24     exhibits of the 58 that are associated that are on my list to tender,

25     they appear to at least concede that these documents are discussed in

Page 3891

 1     detail for the most part and either are written by the witness or concern

 2     matters within his personal knowledge, and that's in paragraph 12 of the

 3     Defence response to the Prosecution motion.

 4             They take issue with -- I have seven documents in particular, one

 5     of which is -- yes.  They take issue with seven -- eight documents,

 6     rather.  And with respect to those eight documents, four of them concern

 7     the annex to the final report of the UN commission of experts that is

 8     referred to in the statement.  These were documents that were shown to

 9     the witness in the Galic case and to which he refers in his statement.

10             I'm prepared -- obviously I'm prepared not to tender those

11     documents.  I don't know that they are necessarily essential to a

12     reasonable understanding of the -- of his -- of his evidence.

13             With respect to -- I can give you the numbers in particular, but

14     with respect to document, for example, 8424, I'm similarly disposed to

15     remove that from the tender list as well.  And with respect to document

16     3432, this is a document that I am not tendering in any event, nor am I

17     tendering document 5807, which is the last of the documents that the

18     Defence appears to object to.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm trying to find 3432 on my list.  Page 2.

20             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Yes.  It's shaded.  It should be shaded.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  It's shaded.  You did not intend to tender them

22     anyhow, isn't it?

23             MR. VANDERPUYE:  That's correct, Mr. President.  Would you like

24     the numbers of the --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, let me first before we -- I have to check.

Page 3892

 1     You say -- let's first seek the position of the Defence on the matter.

 2     There are two issues.  The one is to take issue with a specific document

 3     for specific reasons; and the second issue, and I would have to check,

 4     that is the number of associated exhibits, and I think, as a matter of

 5     fact, that the Defence did take issue with that.

 6             Could I hear from the Defence.  I'm checking at this moment

 7     the --

 8             MR. IVETIC:  If I can begin answering while you're looking, Your

 9     Honours, for purpose of the time.  The -- my understanding was that

10     previously when the Defence had objected that the motions were not in

11     compliance with the guidelines that after a while we were told that to

12     not use that anymore as a -- as a bases, so I don't believe that in this

13     particular instance we've objected to the large number of exhibits as

14     being not in compliance with the guidelines.

15             We did identify, as counsel indicated, eight instances where we

16     had specific objections to specify documents.  Counsel has dealt with all

17     of them except for number 19264, which is at paragraph 39 of the

18     witness's statement and for which we did have an additional objection

19     based upon the fact that he's merely reciting a paragraph from the

20     document into the record.  The document is not offered by him and he does

21     not identify any prior knowledge of the document or personal knowledge of

22     the matters contained therein.

23             So those were the specific objections that we made to the

24     associated exhibits, and if counsel is removing the ones that he's

25     identified, then we're only left with the specific objection to number

Page 3893

 1     19264.

 2             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, you'll find that on page 4 --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  One second.

 4             MR. VANDERPUYE:  -- and I'm not tendering it.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I see that it's only on the specific documents

 6     that the Defence has -- has reserved its right to -- no, have complaint,

 7     and that the request to have them admitted would be denied.  So you have

 8     limited your response there to that.

 9             We'll consider it and we'll finally decide on the matter

10     tomorrow.

11             Now at what time should we start, Mr. Groome?  A brief -- if we

12     would start with the witness not later than 12.00, how much time you

13     think you would need.

14             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I think the matters that I wish to

15     raise should only take about 15 minutes.  I do have some recent

16     information from the -- from Ms. Bolton, although that doesn't change the

17     start time.  The witness's bag with the clothes that he wanted to wear to

18     court doesn't arrive in The Hague until 10.00 tomorrow, so just simply to

19     have a time just to prepare himself to appear before the Chamber.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, in order to lose as little time as possible,

21     perhaps it would be good that we take half an hour in the first session

22     at 11.00, that we then take a break of half an hour, and that we then

23     start with the testimony of the witness starting at 12.00, which would

24     allow sufficient time, I take it, for the matters you wish to raise, and

25     then that we have full sessions on from 12.00, that is, one session of

Page 3894

 1     one hour, one session of 55 minutes, and then 20 minutes' break between

 2     them.

 3             MR. GROOME:  The Prosecution is grateful, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Any comments on that?  If not ...

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we adjourn for the day, and we will resume

 7     tomorrow, Wednesday, the 10th of October, at 11.00 in the morning in this

 8     same Courtroom I.

 9                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.17 p.m.,

10                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 10th day

11                           of October, 2012, at 11.00 a.m.