130130ED

Page 7667

1 A. How could I know what instructions were given to Colonel Indic?

2 Q. Thank you. Please do tell us freely what you do know and what

3 you don't know. That's why I'm putting these questions to you. Now we

4 need page 16 in the French version, the third paragraph from the bottom.

5 In English the ninth paragraph on page 16. And in B/C/S, the last

6 paragraph on page 23.

7 This is what you say -- actually, you're going back to Indic once

8 again. You say that Indic had a weight that I would call a general

9 political weight. It was far more important for general strategy within

10 the global strategy.

11 This political weight that Indic had, is this something that he

12 got through the political leadership, the military leadership, and in

13 which way did he receive this, and how was it reflected?

14 A. I would like to request that we move into private session,

15 Your Honour.

16 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.

17 [Private session]

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 7668

11 Page 7668 redacted. Private session.

Page 7669

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 [Open session]

24 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

Page 7670

1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Sir, in your view, was the VRS an organisation that had not

3 been --

4 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

5 JUDGE ORIE: Do I understand that you'd like to raise a matter?

6 And do you wish to raise it in open session?

7 Please proceed.

8 Ms. Bass, no, then -- could you please switch on your microphone

9 if --

10 MS. BASS: [Interpretation] Could we move into private session,

11 Your Honour.

12 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.

13 [Private session]

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 7671

11 Page 7671 redacted. Private session.

Page 7672

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 [Open session]

20 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. So, this was my question: Are you trying to tell us that in the

24 Army of Republika Srpska a lower-ranking person could control a

25 higher-ranking person? And are you trying to say that the VRS was not

Page 7673

1 based on the same principles as other armies in the world and that

2 anarchy prevailed in the VRS?

3 A. As any UNPROFOR officer, we did not think that anarchy prevailed,

4 but Sarajevo was so much the centre of attention by the media that we

5 could not tolerate any mistake in the implementation of the strategy in

6 Sarajevo.

7 This means that everything was done, in my opinion, so that the

8 general strategy, the general philosophy, be in line with the one who

9 decided.

10 Q. Again, I'm going to ask you the following: This is your opinion,

11 and you don't have any proof in the form of orders or statements by any

12 members of the VRS; is that correct?

13 A. [No interpretation]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, the witness has told us on what basis

15 he -- or formed this opinion. If -- if he would have seen orders saying,

16 Bypass General Milosevic, phone me directly. I think the witness would

17 have told us that. In that -- that's --

18 MR. LUKIC: If -- if that can be applied to the whole statement,

19 then I don't have to go back and ask the same question. Because this

20 explanation, I think, it's my impression we have in the whole statement.

21 So if he can clarify in that way so --

22 JUDGE ORIE: Well, perhaps you may misunderstand. But if there's

23 no clear reference to other documents, and if the witness says that he

24 gained a certain impression, then - and I think this is confirmed by his

25 testimony until now - that it was, rather, on the basis of the

Page 7674

1 information and the reports he received rather than on any direct orders,

2 which, of course, would come as a surprise anyhow. But if such a

3 surprise would be there, he certainly would have told us.

4 We could ask the witness to do that.

5 Witness RM120, if, at any point where the practice seemed to

6 deviate from what you would usually find in a hierarchical structure, if

7 at any point you saw documentary evidence, which would prove -- and

8 documentary evidence from within the VRS which would prove that the

9 normal hierarchical structures were not followed, please do not forget to

10 tell us what documents you saw in that respect.

11 Mr. Lukic, please proceed.

12 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. And I would just add, if --

13 also if the gentleman has any conversation with the members of VRS,

14 through which his claims could be confirmed, we would like to hear that,

15 and from whom he hear it -- heard the information.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We very much urge you, Witness, to tell us any

17 factual information. (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 Please proceed.

23 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 Q. [Interpretation] Let us now move to page 24 of your statement,

25 paragraph 5. The page 24 of the English version, paragraph 3. In the

Page 7675

1 French version, it is the fifth paragraph from the bottom. In the B/C/S

2 version, it is page 35, the fifth -- the penultimate paragraph.

3 You go back to Indic and you said:

4 "It is my impression that he informed Mladic about Milosevic's

5 acts."

6 However, a while ago, you told us that you do not know in which

7 way he informed him and what orders he had had to that effect; is that

8 correct?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. Thank you. Yesterday the OTP showed you a document. The number

11 it was assigned yesterday was P812. So can we please bring it up on the

12 screen.

13 For the record, until it is brought up, this is an order from the

14 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska of the 6th of November, 1994.

15 It is signed by General Ratko Mladic. And he says that he was informed

16 that there was a meeting held on the 15th of November, 1994 of local

17 leaders of the authorities of the Serbian Sarajevo in Vogosca, at which

18 they adopted a decision to blockade the UNPROFOR, capture the heavy

19 weapons under UNPROFOR control, and to use heavy weaponry to fire at

20 civilian targets in the city of Sarajevo.

21 By this order -- actually, General Mladic issues an order that

22 all this should be prohibited. My question is: Is it true that you can

23 actually see from this document General Mladic did not order such things

24 to be done and that there was another -- obviously a parallel chain of

25 command, or of issuing orders.

Page 7686

1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. [Interpretation] We would like to leave page 1 in e-court, in the

3 B/C/S version. However, can we have page 2 in the English version.

4 Do you see the third paragraph here. This is what it says:

5 "It is interesting that days before this action started, the

6 units of the army were leaving Sarajevo followed by the command of -- the

7 commander of the 1st Corps Karavelic which means that at a certain point

8 units from outside the town should also join in the battle."

9 You are aware of the fact that this offensive that was under way

10 in May 1995 was an all-out offensive in the territory of all of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that right?

12 A. I cannot confirm that it was an all-out offensive. The concerns

13 of the people in Sarajevo were mainly concerns related to the town

14 itself. Everybody knew more or less what was happening outside, but they

15 were not giving much attention to it.

16 Q. Now you see the penultimate paragraph down here in the English

17 version. This is what it says:

18 "It is it possible that there are representatives of military and

19 civilian life of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina who are in favour

20 of political negotiations. However, it is evident that they cannot state

21 their opinion because A. Izetb is holding all the strings."

22 This is a reference to Alija Izetbegovic, isn't it? Is that your

23 understanding?

24 A. I'm reading the document. I'm discovering it, and -- yes.

25 Q. Is it correct, did you see that out in the field, that Muslims,

Page 7687

1 at the time, had rejected the peace option and were only in favour of the

2 war option?

3 A. I cannot answer this question because I was not aware of such a

4 position.

5 Q. Thank you. Very well. Now I'd like to ask you something about

6 the positioning of the Muslim forces.

7 Is it correct that the Muslim forces tried to be as close as

8 possible to UNPROFOR units and UNPROFOR headquarters, as well, in

9 Sarajevo and in the vicinity of Sarajevo?

10 A. It is correct that the Bosnian Muslim forces tried to get closer

11 to UNPROFOR units, but I do not remember that they tried to get closer to

12 HQs.

13 Q. Is it also correct that the units of the

14 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, the Muslim units, tried to

15 intermingle as much as possible with the civilian population?

16 A. As far as the mingling with the civilian population is concerned,

17 I cannot answer this question.

18 What I know is that they tried to mingle with UN units, as I said

19 earlier.

20 Q. Can we now have 1D609 in e-court, please.

21 This is a transcript of your testimony in the Karadzic case. We

22 need 37 -- or, rather, we only need page 38.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Not to be broadcasted.

24 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 [Interpretation] So we need page 38. 13143 should be the

Page 7688

1 transcript page number, and we should focus on lines 7 through 11?

2 Q. This is what you say here, as you're speaking about the Muslim

3 units:

4 [In English] "So they were also finding themselves in the midst

5 of the population. There was a total mix of the UN forces, of the

6 population, and the Muslim forces."

7 JUDGE ORIE: What line are we, Mr. --

8 MR. LUKIC: Eight to 11, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yep. Thank you.

10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Is your recollection better now, Witness, and do you accept what

12 you said here. Just so you know, we're in open session now.

13 Do you accept what you said in the Karadzic case?

14 A. I confirm what is stated in this document on the screen.

15 What UN forces were worried about was to be mixed with Muslim

16 forces; but, of course, since the population is present everywhere, there

17 was automatic mixing with the entire population.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 Could we now have 65 ter 9745, please, on our screens. It's a

20 short document. It's a document of the Command of the Sarajevo-Romanija

21 Corps dated the 16th of May, 1995.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Just for the record, this is Exhibit P811,

23 Your Honours.

24 MR. LUKIC: Yeah, I'm sorry, I didn't include the numbers from

25 yesterday.

Page 7689

1 Q. [Interpretation] We see here, sir, that this has to do with

2 preparation of a launcher from an aerial bomb.

3 Is it correct that this document, which was written by

4 General Milosevic, is not being sent on to General Mladic or to the

5 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska?

6 A. What is your question exactly about this document?

7 Q. Can one see from this document -- actually, I'll say it.

8 This document shows that General Mladic and the Main Staff had

9 not been informed about the use of these air bombs. Do you know at all

10 who it was that decided on their use and who had received reports about

11 that?

12 A. This is an internal document of the SRK. UN units were not

13 supposed to know anything about this document, nor the recipients.

14 Q. Very well. Thank you. We're now going to go to your statement,

15 P807, that is. We need, in French, the 20th page, the fifth

16 paragraph from the bottom. And in the English version, page 20, fourth

17 paragraph. And in B/C/S page 29, the last paragraph.

18 You're talking about the taking of hostages. And you say:

19 "The important thing is that orders, in my view, came from Pale."

20 Can we agree, yet again, that this is your opinion and that you

21 did not have any proof in your hands that would confirm this?

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Excuse me, Mr. Lukic. Where are we reading on

23 page 20?

24 MR. LUKIC: Should be on the page 20, paragraph 4, from the

25 bottom.

Page 7690

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Paragraph 4 from the bottom is a question.

2 MR. LUKIC: We'll come back to that. I'll move on.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think it's on page 21 in English, the second

5 paragraph. Maybe, at least.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It is on page 20. And it

7 is the second or third paragraph from the bottom of the page.

8 MR. LUKIC: Yeah, I think I called page 20.

9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: But this is a quote of a quote.

10 MR. LUKIC: Yeah.

11 JUDGE FLUEGGE: In fact. It is a quote in a question to the

12 witness.

13 MR. LUKIC: Yes. So I'll ask the witness directly then the

14 question without the quoting.

15 Q. [Interpretation] Did you know in which way orders were conveyed

16 in respect of the hostage crisis in 1995?

17 A. I would like to move into private session, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.

19 [Private session]

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 7691

11 Page 7691 redacted. Private session.

Page 7692

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 [Open session]

18 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

20 A certain number, Mr. Shin, could be 20 or 5 or -- what I see is

21 that the motion has stated 24. I think in an informal communication, we

22 received the number of 21, and if you stick to that relatively large

23 number, the Chamber might want to further consider whether it is in line

24 with or whether there are good reasons to admit them all where we

25 insisted on limited numbers of associated exhibits.

Page 7693

1 Could you give us a more precise indication of what "a certain

2 number is."

3 MR. SHIN: Yes, absolutely, Your Honour.

4 At this stage we are anticipating to tender a -- 9 documents as

5 associated exhibits, some five of which are one-page documents, including

6 both the B/C/S and English. And the others are always very brief

7 documents.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Have you informed Mr. Lukic which ones are the lucky

9 remaining documents?

10 MR. SHIN: We have not yet discussed that, Your Honour but I

11 would happy to do so when convenient.

12 JUDGE ORIE: If you put it on the record now because Mr. Lukic, I

13 take it, wants to know what he has to deal with.

14 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

15 JUDGE ORIE: If could you please do it now by 65 ter number.

16 MR. SHIN: Yes. And should I indicate at this stage -- should I

17 tender them at this stage and indicate whether they are to be under seal.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Once we have the 65 ter numbers at the end we can

19 see how to proceed.

20 But, first of all, Mr. Lukic should know which ones you wish to

21 tender.

22 MR. SHIN: Yes. The associated exhibits that we would seek to

23 tender are 65 ter 05744, 05745, 09715, 10076, 11188, 11198, 11200, 11201,

24 and 11210.

25 And I believe that's nine documents.

Page 7694

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 MR. LUKIC: This is helpful, and I'll proceed based on this

3 knowledge. And, at the end, we ask discuss the admittance and whether it

4 should be --

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then you have an opportunity to object or not

6 to object.

7 Let's proceed.

8 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. It was exactly on one of the

9 documents that Prosecution intends to tender. So we need document number

10 9715.

11 Q. [Interpretation] It's a document of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

12 This document is from a period -- or, rather, it was issued one day after

13 NATO aircraft bombed Serb positions on the 26th of May, 1995; is that

14 right? You can see that from the document itself, too.

15 A. Oh, I apologise. Yes. Yes, yes, I have it on my screen.

16 Q. The document was issued a day after NATO aircraft, on the 25th

17 and 26th of May, bombed Serb positions around Gorazde; is that correct?

18 A. On the 27th of May. Yes, that's the day after the bombing; yes,

19 and the hostage taking.

20 Q. At that moment, UNPROFOR no longer had normal communication with

21 the Serb forces; is that correct?

22 A. There was communication with Lukavica after the Vrbanja bridge

23 event. There was communication with Serb authorities.

24 Q. We'll get to the Vrbanja bridge as well.

25 Is it also correct that that was the time when the Rapid

Page 7698

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 [Open session]

10 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Sir, this is what you say here:

14 "In my opinion, General Mladic certainly, in his general

15 strategy, said to the commander of the SRC to accept pressure and

16 terrorise the population and kill the inhabitants."

17 So do you allow for the possibility that General Mladic said to

18 General Milosevic that they should defend themselves from the constant

19 offensives being launched from the inhabited section of Sarajevo towards

20 the Serb positions?

21 Could that have been one of the orders?

22 A. I do not know what type of orders had been given, but we all

23 witnessed that, amongst the population, there was a certain number of

24 casualties, injured people, killed people.

25 About the orders, nobody knew the command structure of the SRK.

Page 7699

1 Q. We now need the 22nd page, paragraph 5 of the French. The

2 22nd page, paragraph 6, of the English version. 32nd page, second

3 paragraph of the B/C/S version.

4 You say:

5 "It is possible, although I do not have that information at all,

6 that higher echelon gave artillery means and reinforcements in order to

7 increase the intensity of the shelling of the city."

8 Obviously you do not have information. Obviously this is

9 guess-work on your part, again. But I'm going to ask you this: Were you

10 asked, when you were making this statement, to assume some things, to

11 speak about things that might have happened, or were you asked to testify

12 to facts?

13 A. I would like to move into private session, please.

14 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.

15 [Private session]

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 7700

11 Page 7700 redacted. Private session.

Page 7702

1 more territory than they held at that particular time?

2 A. On both sides, the objective was probably to gain, progressively,

3 step by step, some ground, and this is quite normal in any army of the

4 world.

5 Q. I'm asking you this because the witnesses that have been examined

6 so far told us that the Army of Republika Srpska only held its own

7 positions at that time and never advanced, nor did it have any intention

8 to conquer, to take more territory.

9 So I'm asking you what is the source of your information to the

10 effect that the Army of Republika Srpska at that time intended to

11 advance, to conquer new territory, and to move forward the front line

12 ahead of it?

13 A. There was no order; at least UN members were not aware of that.

14 But at the battalion levels, troops reported that locally some ground had

15 been gained, little by little.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, is there any chance that where -- in the

17 French version is slightly different from the English version, I would

18 say. That, instead of gaining terrain held by the other party, that it

19 is more that they gained terrain coming closer to the actual

20 confrontation line. That is what also in English the document says,

21 "Getting closer to the confrontation line," which means not necessarily

22 conquering territory held by the other party. And I even see in the

23 French version that the word "grignotage" is used which seems not to be

24 exactly translated into English, but I might be wrong.

25 MR. LUKIC: Unlike you, I don't speak French. Thank you for the

Page 7703

1 clarification.

2 JUDGE ORIE: I know a few words.

3 Please proceed.

4 MR. LUKIC: Give me one second --

5 JUDGE ORIE: But the English also explains that the gain of the

6 terrain is not necessarily at the expense of the other party but is

7 approaching more closely to the confrontation line. And that is the same

8 in both languages.

9 MR. LUKIC: Thank you. Well, I'll move on anyways.

10 Q. Let us now talk about the situation in Sarajevo itself. The

11 title in your statement is military situation in Sarajevo. We need

12 page 27, paragraph 2, in the French version. Also in the English

13 version, 27 and 2. And in the B/C/S version, it is page 39, the second

14 paragraph.

15 Here, you are asked about the freedom of movement in

16 Bosnia and Herzegovina. And you said that it was in the -- the

17 responsibility of the Command for B and H. I'm going to ask you

18 specifically about Sarajevo.

19 Is it true that the Muslim authorities controlled the exit of

20 civilians from Sarajevo?

21 A. When you speak about civilians, you want to know that they were

22 free to enter and get out of the city; right?

23 Q. Precisely that.

24 A. UN forces were at check-points, and I think that the Muslim

25 authorities had to control several check-points that were not held by the

Page 7704

1 UN forces; people who were getting out of the city and entering the city,

2 of course.

3 Q. Thank you. At that time, were you aware of the fact that Serbs

4 were not allowed to leave Sarajevo and that Serbs were, in point of fact,

5 held hostage in Sarajevo?

6 A. This is a appreciation that I was not aware of, so I cannot

7 answer your question.

8 Q. Very well. Thank you. Did you know that Serbs would be killed

9 if they attempted to leave the town?

10 A. I don't think that anyone at the United Nations was informed of

11 that.

12 Q. Did the United Nations have exact data, how many Serbs had been

13 killed in Sarajevo by the Muslim authorities and by criminals at the time

14 while you were there?

15 A. The UN units in their sectors of responsibility could, when

16 possible, check whether people had been injured or killed.

17 The second source of information was the information coming from

18 Sarajevo authorities, Muslim authorities. But, of course, we were very

19 careful when it came to this source of information. This means that we

20 only numbered those that the UN units could check.

21 Q. So -- so you did not know, you did not have the exact figure of

22 Serb civilians that had been killed.

23 A. What the UN units knew came from what they had seen. We could

24 only use actual facts. For the remaining part, we received some

25 information from the Muslim authorities, but the -- this information

Page 7706

1 record what it's about. It's a weekly report from civilian affairs of

2 the UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo.

3 We see there it was Phillip Corwin who sent it. And, further

4 down, we see all the addressees.

5 I asked you about the Muslim offensive in May; that is to say,

6 from mid-May. Is it correct that the May offensive lasted from mid-may

7 until the 8th of June. Is that the information that you have?

8 A. Yes. I can see the document, but I only see the cover page.

9 Q. This document refers to the June offensive. However, I asked you

10 about the May offensive. Is it correct that the offensive of the Muslim

11 forces in May lasted from mid-may until the 8th of June.

12 Do you remember that?

13 A. The units of Sarajevo were more concerned with what happened in

14 Sarajevo, rather than in surrounding -- the surrounding areas. And the

15 date of the beginning and the end of offensive was not the main concern

16 of those who had to address the -- the problems that the Sector Sarajevo

17 was faced with.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Witness, could I ask you to, first of all,

19 answer to the question. It may be that people may have other concerns.

20 However, the question simply was whether you were aware of an

21 offensive, May up till the beginning of June.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was aware of an offensive, yes.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.

24 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. [Interpretation] When we saw this document on the screen, now we

Page 7707

1 know what this document actually is, but could we now take a look at

2 page 3 of that document.

3 Paragraph 11. Actually, I don't know how this was marked. No.

4 No, this is Roman numerical II actually:

5 [In English] "Bosnian government forces attacked to break siege

6 of Sarajevo."

7 [Interpretation] I do apologise. We need page 3, the top of

8 page 3. [In English] My mistake, I said 11, but it was Roman II.

9 [Interpretation] Paragraph 4 says:

10 [In English] "Reports that Bosnian government forces were finally

11 to launch an operation to end the siege of Sarajevo gained credence early

12 in the week with increasing evidence of a major concentration of

13 government forces north of Sarajevo in the Visoko-Breza area.

14 President Izetbegovic has recently flagged this operation ..."

15 [Interpretation] Do you remember that at the time, that is to

16 say, mid-June, a new offensive was launched by the Muslim forces?

17 A. Yes. I realised that through the various reports that were given

18 to me by the authorities.

19 Q. Because of this offensive, now we will move on to page 4. That's

20 what we need. Number 9, top of the page.

21 We see that in UNPROFOR vehicles -- or, rather:

22 "UNPROFOR vehicles were denied access to the logistic supply

23 route across Mount Igman."

24 Do you remember that? That UNPROFOR trucks, at the time, could

25 not move along because of the offensives that were launched in and around

Page 7708

1 Sarajevo?

2 A. That's correct. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. Thank you. Now we'd like to go back to your statement. We need

4 page 28, the first paragraph; that's the French version. In English,

5 again, page 28, first paragraph. In B/C/S, page 40, last paragraph.

6 This is what you say there:

7 "The Serb forces were firing shells using either guns or tanks

8 which had been hidden within the total exclusion zone or they used

9 weapons that were taken from the Weapons Collection Point, which were

10 taken by them and they used these weapons to fire from within the zone on

11 the city."

12 At that time, that is to say, the time when these offensives were

13 launched, and that is the period that you speak about in this part of

14 your statement, did you receive any information to the effect that, from

15 that very same zone, Muslims opened fire from heavy weapons?

16 A. No information on this type of offensive was -- was sent to us,

17 but we -- we suspected that this was happening. We suspected it

18 strongly.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Shin.

20 MR. SHIN: Your Honours, I may be mistaken, but it may -- it

21 doesn't appear clear from the statement that this is referring to the

22 June period. So if the counsel could please clarify - if that's his

23 intent - that this is referring to the June period, that would be

24 appreciated.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic.

Page 7711

1 about the end of 1994.

2 And, in relation to that could you look at your statement,

3 page 28, paragraph 6 of the French version. In English, page 28, fifth

4 paragraph. And in B/C/S page 41, fifth paragraph.

5 This is what you say there:

6 "From November onwards, there was no freedom of movement and,

7 unfortunately, supplies became very, very poor," or rather, "the volume

8 of supplies was very, very low."

9 How long did that going on?

10 A. The numbers recorded by the UN were as follows: Approximately

11 two months -- there was almost no freedom of movement anymore, and at the

12 UN level, we took action so as to help the population a little bit.

13 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to ask for document 1D613 -- no, sorry.

14 1D614. Could that please be displayed.

15 Before it's on our screens, may I ask you the following: What

16 were supplies like in April and May, in the spring of 1995; do you

17 remember?

18 A. We all shared the impression that the supply level was a little

19 bit better then.

20 Q. Thank you. Now we see this document corroborating what you've

21 told us just now.

22 In the first paragraph in the third line, there is a reference to

23 resupplying Sarajevo and the eastern safe areas by helicopter.

24 And in the second paragraph it says that UNPROFOR continues to

25 have access by land convoys. And it says:

Page 7712

1 "Preliminary information obtained from UNHCR seems to indicate

2 that humanitarian supplies, in principle, do not appear to be running

3 low," and that, "... currently the UNHCR is meeting 75 per cent of their

4 targets."

5 Does this correspond to your own knowledge from that time? The

6 document is dated the 17th of April, 1995. Mr. Annan sent this document

7 to Mr. Akashi.

8 A. UN soldiers had not identified the -- the -- the percentage

9 specifically; but, yes, they noticed an improvement in humanitarian

10 supply and the -- the level of -- of food that the population had at its

11 disposal.

12 Q. The deterioration that we saw at the end of 1994 took place after

13 the attack of the Bosnian forces at Mount Igman, when the Bosnian forces

14 went through the demilitarised zone in Igman, is that correct, and when

15 they killed all the soldiers at the command post of the

16 Army of Republika Srpska.

17 A. We don't know if -- if there was a casual link. What we do know

18 is that the Muslim units had used the demilitarised zone and that orders

19 had been given, in order to try and -- and find those people who had done

20 something that was against the protocol, ensuring the neutrality of the

21 demilitarised zone.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we now please have 1D621 in

23 e-court. We will see that, yet again, this is a letter from Mr. Akashi

24 to Mr. Annan dated the 7th of April, 1995.

25 We need page 2 in e-court now. 5 (c): Siege of Sarajevo. I

Page 7713

1 shall briefly read it out:

2 [In English] "The lifting of the siege of Sarajevo remains of

3 paramount importance to us. As with the airport routes, consent of the

4 parties is the key; without this, the only other option is enforcement.

5 It must be emphasised that during the early part of the

6 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, life for the average resident of

7 Sarajevo improved considerably."

8 And a bit further down it says:

9 "All progress came to a halt, due to the refusal of the Bosnian

10 side to attend the Central Joint Commissions, designed to negotiate,

11 amongst other things, the status of Sarajevo. The flagrant disregard of

12 the COHA by the B and H, when they launched two military offensives in

13 the Travnik and Stolice areas also contributed considerably to the

14 worsening situation in Sarajevo. Additionally, the killing of two

15 Serbian children by sniper fire within Sector Sarajevo influenced and

16 hardened BSA attitudes."

17 Q. [Interpretation] The information you had at the time, was it

18 along the following lines: That the Muslim side was working on making

19 life worse in the part of Sarajevo that was under Muslim control?

20 A. As we said earlier, we noticed that living conditions in Sarajevo

21 improved. But, despite this, freedom of movement was not easy for all

22 units within the UN.

23 Q. Is it correct that the Muslim authorities, at the time, in spring

24 and summer, the spring and summer of 1995, did not allow UNPROFOR to move

25 throughout Sarajevo, precisely because of these major offensives that

Page 7714

1 were being launched and carried out?

2 A. In the city of Sarajevo itself, in the urban enclave of Sarajevo,

3 we had no restrictions in terms of freedom of movement. But in the

4 surrounding areas, we were very limited by the Muslim units and the

5 Muslim decision-making level.

6 Q. Let us move on in your statement, please. Page 28, the last

7 paragraph. Also in English it is page 28, the last paragraph. And

8 page 42, the third paragraph, in the B/C/S version.

9 Here, you say:

10 "The authorities of the Bosnian Serbs deliberately wanted to

11 terrorise the population by firing at the population, which was

12 completely innocent."

13 In this connection, is it correct that UNPROFOR was not aware of

14 either of strength or the structure or the disposition of the units of

15 the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely, of the 1st Corps of the

16 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was in the city of Sarajevo?

17 A. The instructions given were to -- not to check the positioning of

18 both sides but to accomplish our mission, which was to make sure that the

19 population could live on. Knowing the exact positioning of both sides

20 was not the major concern for UNPROFOR forces.

21 Q. So you did not know either where the facilities were or the

22 commands of both the 1st Corps and of the 8th Brigades which comprised

23 the corps or the command posts of the platoons or of the companies. You

24 did not know where those were; is that correct?

25 A. We had some knowledge of the positioning. As to the exact

Page 7715

1 position of the command posts, we did not know them.

2 Q. As you had some knowledge about their positions, can we then

3 agree that the command centre staffs, the units of the 1st Corps of the

4 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, actually covered the entire city of

5 Sarajevo?

6 A. We did not know whether they covered the entire city of Sarajevo.

7 Having said this, we could not see with our own eyes the exact

8 positioning of the CPs, unless there had been an incident and we went

9 on-site.

10 Q. When a shell landed in Dobrinja, you did not know whether the

11 shell landed there because what was exactly targeted was the command post

12 of the 101st Brigade of the 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina. Or did you know that?

14 A. Soldiers noticed in the field that the shell had landed, and they

15 tried to determine by technical means the origin of fire. Now, knowing

16 whether it had landed on a Bosnian Muslim army unit, we did not know

17 that. We just witnessed what had happened on-site.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you are asking questions about a shell

20 landing, which is rather in the abstract. Therefore, the answer doesn't

21 tell us that much, rather than if we know about certain incidents.

22 MR. LUKIC: I don't think that we can go into particulars with

23 this witness. Only -- all I wanted to establish is whether the UNPROFOR

24 knew about legitimacy of the grenade fired.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You need certain elements for that: Where

Page 7716

1 does the shell land, what do I know about the environment where it

2 landed, what could have been there, what was there, et cetera. It

3 requires quite some analysis, I would say. But if -- you announce you

4 move on and --

5 MR. LUKIC: I have only one follow-up question.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.

7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Sir, is it correct that every time when a shell landed on the --

9 in the area of Sarajevo, you considered that to constitute targeting the

10 civilian population, because you were unable to actually establish the

11 locations of the military elements that were comprised within the

12 1st Corps?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Thank you. During your stint in Sarajevo, is it fair to say, is

15 it correct, that the Muslim side would always intensify the fighting

16 before and in the course of international conferences that were being

17 held and were dealing with the issue of the fate and status of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina?

19 A. I do not exactly remember the casual link between conferences

20 being held and combat escalating. I cannot establish a link between

21 that.

22 Q. Thank you. You can just tell me what you know. Can we now have

23 1D624 brought up on the screen.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Before we do so, could I ask -- could I try to find

25 verification of one of the previous answer which was a composite

Page 7717

1 question.

2 You were asked, Witness, whether every time a shell landed in the

3 area of Sarajevo, you considered that to constitute targeting the

4 civilian population. Let's first leave it to that and leave out the

5 remainder of question.

6 Let me just try to give you an example. If a shell would land

7 close to the confrontation line in a -- in an area, although within the

8 Sarajevo area, which was not, or only -- or at least not densely

9 inhabited, would you consider that to be a target to the civilian

10 population?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It would be very difficult for me

12 to know what the exact objective would be. But the exact quantity of the

13 shells that landed, landed in urban areas. Some landed on UN posts

14 because we suffered casualties, casualties because of shells that had

15 been fired and targeting the city.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I -- I understand that. But did it never

17 happen that shells landed in an area of combat close to the confrontation

18 line with no UN presence at that point, or an area which was not

19 populated, or only sparsely populated?

20 Did that ever happen?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course. Such a scenario

22 happened.

23 JUDGE ORIE: And did you consider that an attack to the civilian

24 population, such a shell landing there? Targeting the civilian

25 population.

Page 7718

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot answer this question and

2 draw the conclusion that happened because there was a mistake in the

3 firing or simply a manoeuvre action. I cannot answer this question.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Although those situations were included in the

5 previous question, and then you answered that you would consider them all

6 to be targeting the civilian population, I now understand, from this

7 answer, that it depended on the circumstances, whether you could, in any

8 way, determine whether the civilian population was targeted.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot specifically tell whether

10 every time the civilian population was targeted, but I can tell you that

11 the general objective was, as I said in my statement, to terrorise the

12 population. Knowing whether in every single case it had been thought

13 about and decided to target the population, I cannot answer this

14 question.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

16 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.

17 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. [Interpretation] Did UNPROFOR know that the Muslim side was

19 trying to portray the situation in Sarajevo worse than it was? Let that

20 be my first question.

21 A. To answer your question, of course, this was everybody's concern,

22 and the Muslim side was trying to portray - maybe sometimes in an

23 exaggerated way - what the situation was in Sarajevo.

24 Q. Thank you. The next question is: Is it true that the Muslim

25 side was actively creating the situation in Sarajevo worse than it was?

Page 7719

1 A. We cannot say whether there were active measures to extend this

2 phenomenon, but some behaviours, some statements, showed that this was

3 the objective of the Muslim side.

4 Q. Thank you. Can we have 1D625 uploaded, which is a document which

5 will only confirm what you have just told us. This is a document sent on

6 the 16th of June, 1995, by Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan, where he described

7 his meeting with Mr. Muratovic. (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 Q. Thank you. In item 1, the second sentence from the bottom says:

11 [In English] "Muratovic also stated that his government would

12 embark on a course of military action if its needs in Sarajevo were not

13 met."

14 [Interpretation] Did UNPROFOR receive this news that the Muslims

15 would continue their offensive actions if their requirements were not

16 met? And do you know what exact requirements that were supposed to be

17 met were in question?

18 A. May I request that we move into private session?

19 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.

20 [Private session]

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 7720

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 [Open session]

7 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

9 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] We need page 2, the next page of this

10 document.

11 Q. Here, you will see in point 3, it refers to what Mr. Muratovic

12 said, or how that is conveyed by Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan; namely,

13 Mr. Muratovic's words in connection with the supply situation. Three

14 lines from the bottom of this highlighted part:

15 [In English] "And his wish to see the perpetuation of the

16 logistic crisis in the enclaves, prompting us to consider more extreme

17 resupply measures."

18 [Interpretation] More extreme measures are being referred to.

19 What extreme measures were already being taken so that more extreme

20 measures needed to be taken?

21 Can you explain that to us?

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, in all fairness to the witness, and this

23 line, this sentence starts:

24 "Presumably Muratovic's opposition to UNPROFOR convoys passing

25 through the FRY is based on two considerations ..."

Page 7721

1 So apparently this is a presumption of someone. And that should

2 be clear, because you presented it more or less as the position taken by

3 Mr. Muratovic.

4 Please proceed.

5 MR. LUKIC: I will move on. I will leave this topic. I will

6 move to the next page on point 8. I'll read more text so everybody has

7 better picture. I apologise if I missed something the last time. I

8 quote:

9 "Muratovic's views in the meeting, and the attitude with which

10 they were expressed, suggested a decreased willingness on the part of the

11 government to co-operate with United Nations' efforts to calm the

12 situation in Bosnia, and in Sarajevo in particular."

13 Q. [Interpretation] Did you have, at that time, in your -- the

14 impression in your dealings with the Muslim side that the Muslim side had

15 abandoned attempts at resolving the crisis in a peaceful manner and had

16 opted for war?

17 A. UN soldiers present in Sarajevo were concerned with trying to

18 have the population survive. I am unable to answer your question because

19 I -- I did not have that feeling or that impression. It's -- it's very

20 difficult to -- to say something like that.

21 For UNPROFOR within Sarajevo, it -- it was difficult to -- to see

22 a parallel between the humanitarian situation and the military situation.

23 I -- I find it difficult to understand your question.

24 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I apologise if I didn't phrase my

25 question correctly.

Page 7722

1 Let's move onto the following topic. Can we see document 1D623

2 on the screen now in e-court, please.

3 I asked you a while ago if you had been aware of any active

4 actions on the part of the Muslim side aimed at portraying the situation

5 in Sarajevo worse than it was. And their actions to, indeed, recreate a

6 situation that was worse than it was.

7 I should now like to ask you to take a look at this document

8 which is dated the 15th of July, 1995, from the main UNPROFOR staff in

9 Sarajevo sent to Mr. Akashi. It was sent by Mr. Phillip Corwin. Under 1

10 in his first sentence he says, and I quote:

11 [In English] "At the very last minute, the Bosnian side, this

12 afternoon, rejected a proposal to restore utilities to Sarajevo. The

13 Serbian side had agreed to the necessary technical arrangements," and so

14 on.

15 [Interpretation] So I'm asking you if you knew, if you were aware

16 of this position of the Muslim authorities in mid-June 1995 when they

17 themselves actually rejected a proposal for a network, a supply network

18 of either water or electricity or heating to be restored to their parts

19 of the city, the parts of the city under their control?

20 A. UN soldiers knew that the Muslim side had opposed the -- the

21 proposal as indicated in this document, yes. We had learnt about it.

22 Q. Thank you. We have a couple of minutes more. Can we now go to

23 page 31 of the French version, paragraphs 2 and 3. English version,

24 page 31, the penultimate and ultimate paragraphs. And the B/C/S version

25 of your statement, page 45, paragraphs 5 and 6.

Page 7732

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 [Open session]

4 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.

6 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Although in your responses you mainly focussed on Sarajevo, I

8 should like to show you a number of documents. But before that, I should

9 like to ask you this: After the Muslim offensive in April and May 1995,

10 the offensive continued into June as well, as we could see.

11 Could we have 1D612 uploaded in e-court, please. Shortly, we

12 shall see on our screen a document dated the 15th of June, 1995, issued

13 by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Command of the 1st Corps from

14 the forward command post at Mount Igman.

15 They talk about the successes scored by the Muslim forces in this

16 offensive, and it says:

17 "By 1200 hours on 15th of June, 1995, in the operation to break

18 the siege of Sarajevo the joint forces of the Army of Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina, accomplished the following successes."

20 We can see that in this action in and around the city of Sarajevo

21 they refer to the forces of the 3rd Corps - that is the first bullet -

22 they say what they liberated, what they took. Then the forces of the

23 7th Corps. That is it the second bullet. The third one refers to the

24 forces of the 4th Corps, then they refer to the 16th Battalion of the

25 1st Corps, and a division, and the forces of the 4th Division or

Page 7733

1 Artillery Battalion.

2 Did you have in UNPROFOR data, information, namely that the

3 offensive launched in and around Sarajevo comprised not only those forces

4 which were inside Sarajevo, namely those of the 1st Corps but also at

5 least as far as we can see from this document, also the forces of at

6 least another three corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

7 A. The units that were inside the city of Sarajevo within the

8 confrontation line had very little information on what was going on, on

9 the other side, outside the city therefore, apart from a small section of

10 Mount Igman. So we did not have the information that I now see on my

11 screen.

12 Q. Thank you. You participated in meetings.

13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Can we please go into private session

14 now.

15 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.

16 [Private session]

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 7734

11 Pages 7734-7735 redacted. Private session.

Page 7737

1 would need to have that article in evidence as well.

2 MR. LUKIC: We would love to have it, Your Honour, as well. But

3 we couldn't locate that document.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It is a D exhibit in another case.

5 Mr. Shin, perhaps you could ...

6 MR. SHIN: Yes. The article in question is readily findable

7 publicly on the Internet and it has also been disclosed.

8 JUDGE ORIE: You are presenting evidence in which that document

9 appears. And then to say to the Defence that they can find it on the

10 Internet seems not to be the appropriate answer.

11 MR. SHIN: I'm sorry, Your Honour. I should have reversed my

12 remarks. It has been disclosed. We have disclosed it tot he Defence and

13 we're happy to provide another copy.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's a better answer.

15 MR. LUKIC: I think you should check it with Ms. Janet. I don't

16 think that she disclosed that one.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if not -- I'm not entering a debate at this

18 moment on who -- this is exactly, Mr. Shin, and over your shoulder I'm

19 looking to Mr. Groome as well, this is exactly the kind of problems you

20 get from these amalgamated statements: That portions are falling away,

21 that it is it difficult to understand it. And that is what is hereby

22 demonstrated and, if you would provide the -- or check at least whether

23 Mr. Lukic has this article available then it can be tendered into

24 evidence and we'll [Overlapping speakers] ...

25 MR. LUKIC: We will tender it into evidence [Overlapping

Page 7738

1 speakers] ... yes, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Lukic, your client was removed from the

3 courtroom. As we usually do, that removal is valid until the next

4 witness appears in court. Which brings me to the next question. I think

5 you've got, on the basis of your estimate, a certain amount of time left.

6 Where are you? How much more would you need?

7 MR. LUKIC: I'm in the -- almost in the middle.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that -- you asked for six hour and a half.

9 MR. LUKIC: And I will finish in that time-frame [Overlapping

10 speakers] ... with the -- Ms. Registrar.

11 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] ... which would mean that you

12 have --

13 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] than two hours.

14 JUDGE ORIE: No, no you have far more. You have approximately

15 two hours and 15 minutes left.

16 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] ... like that.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but you asked for six and a half hours, so

18 that's ...

19 MR. LUKIC: I have two hours and 15 minutes left?

20 JUDGE ORIE: Approximately, yes.

21 MR. LUKIC: Yes. I will finish in two hours and 15 minutes.

22 JUDGE ORIE: That is also important to know when Mr. Mladic

23 should be present tomorrow to come back to the courtroom.

24 Mr. Lukic, needless to say, if there's any book which is relevant

25 for your case, and we saw that apart from the book that Mr. Mladic also