130912ED

Page 16612

1 not later than tomorrow after having reviewed all the details of the

2 submissions that were made.

3 [The witness takes the stand]

4 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Butler, you're still bound by the solemn

6 declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony and

7 Mr. Ivetic will now continue his cross-examination.

8 WITNESS: RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.

11 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]

13 Q. Good day, sir.

14 A. Good day, sir.

15 Q. Before we take up at the topic where we left off yesterday,

16 I would like to revisit another topic. I'd like to return to the meeting

17 that you testified about yesterday that you had with General Milovanovic,

18 and this would be the one that you either attended with Jean-Rene Ruez or

19 Barry Hogan, which we have established you do not recall being recorded.

20 Can you help us at all about the month or the year that such a meeting

21 would have taken place?

22 A. No, sir, I just -- I just can't remember, recall at that point in

23 time.

24 Q. Fair enough. Can you recall at all where, what locale, this

25 meeting was held at; i.e. was it a military building, a hotel, a

Page 16613

1 restaurant, private home? Are you able to provide any details in

2 relation to where the meeting would have been held?

3 A. I believe that it was in a conference room in a hotel in

4 Banja Luka, if I recall correctly.

5 Q. Could it have been at the Krajina military hotel in Banja Luka?

6 A. I could tell you it wasn't the Krajina Corps headquarters. It

7 could have been the military hotel, but clearly you seem to know more

8 about it than I do, so ...

9 Q. Let me ask you this, sir: Do you recall how many times in total,

10 how many meetings in total, you would have had with General Milovanovic?

11 Was it just that one or were there other --

12 A. It was just the one, sir.

13 Q. And are you sure that this meeting had been requested by

14 General Milovanovic rather than being requested by the Office of the

15 Prosecutor?

16 A. My understanding, as it was told to me, was that it was a request

17 of General Milovanovic. Again, I received my information from the chief

18 of Prosecutions on this. I'm sorry, the chief of investigations,

19 Mr. Ralston. You know, I had no foreknowledge of any of these issues.

20 I was simply called into his office one day and said, You're going to

21 Banja Luka in several days and here is why.

22 Q. Fair enough, sir. I'd like to call up 65 ter number 19462. And

23 to see if that can assist you with remembering details. There we go.

24 Sir, these are notes or a record of a meeting, and it's dated -- well,

25 the typed version is dated the 26th of March, but then that's crossed off

Page 16614

1 and it says 27 March 2001, and I can tell you these are notes that are --

2 that purport to be from General Milovanovic, and I'd like to go through

3 with you the introduction to see if you have knowledge of this meeting.

4 As you can see it says there:

5 "On 26," crossed off-hand, written "27 March 2001,

6 General Milovanovic and his associates held a meeting with

7 representatives of The Hague Tribunal at the request of the guests. The

8 meeting was attended by Mr. Barry Hogan, Mr. Richard Butler,

9 Mr. Ken Corlett, and a translator on behalf of the Tribunal. And

10 alongside General Milovanovic, Colonel Mikajlo Mitrovic,

11 Lieutenant-Colonel Darko Matijasovic, Mr. Zoran Cvetkovic, and Ms.

12 Branka Tanasic as a translator. The meeting was held on the premises of

13 the Krajina military hotel in Banja Luka and commenced at 1000 hours."

14 First of all, sir, does this appear to be the meeting in question

15 or is it another meeting other than the one we were discussing earlier?

16 A. No, sir. This is the meeting in question, and I now recall that

17 Ken Corlett, who was the ICTY liaison to the RS, was present as well,

18 yes, sir.

19 Q. Okay. And if you would look with me at the fifth paragraph from

20 the top in the English and in the B/C/S, it is recorded here as follows:

21 "Mr. Hogan thanked for the opportunity to attend and began by

22 saying that he first wanted to clarify the circumstances under which this

23 meeting was taking place. As far as he had understood,

24 Ms. Carla Del Ponte, she and Mr. Milovanovic had a conversation in

25 December," crossed out, handwritten, "October, and they talked about the

Page 16615

1 possibility of Mr. Milovanovic giving an interview. When she returned to

2 The Hague and reported on this, Mr. Butler and he were assigned by the

3 Tribunal to contact Mr. Milovanovic.

4 "General Milovanovic went on to say that he considered the

5 conversation informal, and that he had so far had similar conversations

6 on the subject with Mr. Harland, Mr. Graf, and Ms. Del Ponte."

7 Do you recall what Mr. Hogan is recorded as saying, does that

8 refresh your recollection as to matters or is it news to you?

9 A. Again, sir, I never knew the circumstances behind what predicated

10 the meeting. I was never given a back story. I was just told to

11 participate, as such, and I can only again testify to what I was told

12 were the circumstances as to why I was selected to go on this meeting.

13 MR. IVETIC: And if we can turn to page 6 of the English, and I

14 believe it's also -- should also be page 6 of the B/C/S --

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, before we look at it any further, could

16 you give any information about the author of this, what seems to be a

17 record of a meeting? Because it's not signed, not dated, not -- there is

18 no name under it. Could you have any -- would you be able to give any

19 information as where it comes from?

20 MR. IVETIC: I can, Your Honour. I thought I had started off by

21 saying they purport to be the notes of Mr. Milovanovic. That is what is

22 represented to me by the Office of the Prosecutor whose document this is,

23 and it was sent to me by the Office of the Prosecutor after the session.

24 And that's what it says in e-court, so beyond that I obviously can't

25 confirm.

Page 16616

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, I'm not saying that you should, but

2 I'm just wondering where it comes from and what it exactly is.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, this has, my understanding, been disclosed

4 long ago, but with the topic and with the many documents I just helped

5 out yesterday and sent it on to the Defence. I don't have independent

6 recollection of it but I also had shown the Defence an interview with

7 General Milovanovic where they begin the interview with a reference to

8 this meeting and the fact that he is turning over a -- Milovanovic turned

9 over this.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey, I'm -- at this moment my simple

11 question was where -- oh, you would say -- you were about to say where it

12 came from. I apologise for interrupting.

13 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry for being a bit Bosnian in my response, but

14 I meant to be -- at this interview Milovanovic provides his -- his notes

15 of that meeting, and that's all we have of the meeting.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I certainly would not have interrupted you if

17 you would have said, It was given to us during an interview by

18 Mr. Milovanovic. That's --

19 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't recollect it, I'm just stating what's in

20 the recording of the meeting, and of course we have General Milovanovic

21 coming next so ...

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ivetic, please proceed, and again

23 apologies.

24 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

25 Q. This is the second paragraph in the B/C/S, the first paragraph on

Page 16617

1 the English, sir. And please bear with me as I read it into the record,

2 and then I'll have some questions about it:

3 "General Milovanovic added that for the first testimonies of

4 Serbian officers he requested written guarantees from Ms. Del Ponte, that

5 these officers would not be arrested during or 48 hours after their

6 testimony which was provided and that paved the way for the officers to

7 testify. After that, the response was better and better because the men

8 realised that they were not being summoned to testify just because they

9 were Serbs. In 1999, as Minister of Defence of the RS, he was supposed

10 to pay an official visit to NATO and he asked NATO for a guarantee that

11 during his stay he would not be taken into custody by the Tribunal but he

12 received no guarantee. Mr. Butler added that he often conducted

13 investigations and interviews with people from NATO and that they turned

14 out not to be good collaborators or the greatest of friends. He firmly

15 believes that this letter did not even reach The Hague Tribunal. As for

16 the Tribunal, much attention is given to the protection of witnesses.

17 Copies of the records of conversations are provided and no one should be

18 afraid of giving these testimonies. Instead they should be used to help

19 the Court."

20 Does this writing correspond to any memories you have of the

21 meeting with General Milovanovic that you had discussed with us

22 yesterday?

23 A. Yes, sir. One of the issues that was discussed -- and again,

24 looking at the two paragraphs in context, I do recall that when we

25 started the process where the Republika Srpska government would make

Page 16618

1 their officers available to members of the Office of the Prosecutor for

2 interview, that they wanted guarantees that those individuals would not

3 be immediately apprehended. Obviously, you know, in hindsight, if one

4 recalls the case of General Talic, who was attending a military meeting

5 out of the country and was subsequently arrested, I believe, by the

6 Austrians, not an unreasonable request by -- as I think it was in 1999 he

7 was the minister of defence. So one of the things that obviously I did

8 discuss was the fact that, you know, we had obviously a process where the

9 rules of the Tribunal, you know, put certain limits on witness statements

10 and testimonies, and individuals had to be warned, and I believe at the

11 time - I don't know if it is still the case - that in the case of an

12 individual who is suspect, that the transcripts or at least a recording

13 of the interview was provided to the individual in question. So that was

14 from the notes that he's given. It does talk about for the most part the

15 general areas that was discussed.

16 Q. Now, at the time of this meeting, in March of 2001,

17 General Milovanovic is no longer an official within the government. He's

18 a private citizen; is that accurate?

19 A. I don't recall exactly what his status was in 2001.

20 Q. Okay. Do you know or recall why this meeting attended by four

21 Tribunal OTP staff and three VRS army officers and two other VRS

22 personnel -- pardon me, RS personnel, would not have been recorded or

23 documented, apart from the notes that are said to come from

24 General Milovanovic?

25 A. Again, my understanding of it was that the primary purpose of the

Page 16619

1 meeting was to deal with procedural issues, not to formally interview the

2 general. Again, I can't tell you why I even was selected to go on this

3 other than presumably he was aware of me from my testimony related to

4 General Krstic.

5 Q. Okay. Now I would like to go back to the topic that we had left

6 off with yesterday in court. As you might recall we had started talking

7 about Kravica, and to make sure that we are all on the same page as to

8 what we are talking about, I'd like to let you know that during the

9 course of this trial, this Chamber has heard evidence of a Prosecution

10 witness, RM374, who gave testimony at transcript page 12775 through

11 12779, that he heard from a direct eye witness to the event at Kravica,

12 where the detainees being transported on a bus took over control of the

13 weapons of the guards after overpowering them on the bus, and that

14 shooting ensued between both sides, the Serb policemen guards on the one

15 hand and the armed detainees on the other hand that were on the bus, and

16 that he was not sure it was Kravica, although in one of his interviews he

17 had said it was Kravica. Did your review of the evidence and research

18 include this type of occurrence, and is this what you understood when we

19 broached the topic late in the day yesterday?

20 A. Well, again, to the degree of my research on Kravica, I don't

21 know whether it is in my narrative, I hope it is in my revised narrative

22 because we did -- if we got the information that soon. But certainly I

23 have testified that there are medical records from the Bratunac medical

24 centre reflecting the fact that on 13 July 1995, two individuals -- one

25 individual was wounded who was a member of the Bratunac Red Beret, so I

Page 16620

1 know that's in my narrative, and one RS police officer were killed from

2 the Special Police, and a third RS police officer had his hand burned and

3 was wounded and being treated. And, of course, down the line, when

4 Colonel Borovcanin who was present at that location explained that, so,

5 I mean, I am aware of it, but, I mean, the older question or the broader

6 question with respect to Kravica, whether it was a premeditated act or

7 what, whether it was a reactionary act, as I've testified in the Karadzic

8 case, I believe that what predicated it isn't as important as the

9 outcome.

10 Even if I were to accept a premise that the shooting at Kravica

11 warehouse started as a result of an attempt by Muslims who were detained

12 there to escape, one, I am aware of survivor testimony from witnesses

13 there who talk about the executions occurring in waves over a space of

14 several hours, and I'm also aware of the casualties there, in the sense

15 that when one looks at the number of prisoners who were held at Kravica

16 warehouse and their outcomes; for example, if one takes an easy

17 mathematical number of a thousand being detained at the Kravica

18 warehouse, there are three known survivors. There are multiple possible

19 outcomes for people held in the warehouse in -- when the shooting starts:

20 They are either instantaneously killed; they are wounded and die even

21 with medical intervention; they are wounded but will survive with medical

22 intervention; or they are unwounded or so slightly wounded that they

23 don't require medical intervention.

24 Just as a function of statistical probability, what you have is

25 out of a population of a thousand, you have 997 who are killed, and you

Page 16621

1 have, on the other end of the spectrum, three who survive. You have no

2 members of the population group in the middle who were taken to Bratunac

3 medical centre and died of their wounds or who were taken to Bratunac

4 medical centre and survived their wounds.

5 Consequently, when one looks at the outcome, my view is that the

6 inescapable conclusion was that regardless of how the Kravica warehouse

7 massacre started, at some juncture a decision was made that all of the

8 people who were held at that location were going to be killed. The end

9 result of that can offer no other conclusion.

10 Q. Is it your testimony that the decision that all of them would be

11 killed occurred after the attempted break through and the fire-fight?

12 A. I don't know when that decision was made. Individuals have

13 testified with respect to that. I don't know when that decision was

14 made. All I can do, again, is recount that at some juncture, the

15 decision had to have been made simply based on the results.

16 Q. Okay. Can the results of your investigation exclude the

17 possibility that the decision was made by those policemen physically

18 present at the Kravica site after the attempted escape and after the

19 fire-fight between armed detainees and the guards?

20 JUDGE ORIE: If the witness says that he can't say whether it was

21 before or after, that means that he doesn't exclude the possibility that

22 it was after. Mr. Ivetic, to that extent, the question has been

23 answered. Further, the question was composite by including those who

24 would have made the decision, which was not yet part of the previous

25 testimony. So if you want to further pursue that, at the same time if

Page 16622

1 the witness doesn't know when the decision was taken, it's likely but you

2 could further explore that who would have taken such a decision. Do you

3 know whether who took that decision?

4 THE WITNESS: No, sir. I mean, again I can catalogue who was

5 there by rank and position but I cannot testify as to who made the

6 decision.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

8 MR. IVETIC:

9 Q. Since you can catalogue who was there by rank and position, would

10 you agree with me that no officer of the VRS was present?

11 A. Again, you're asking me now to speculate on an unknown. I am

12 aware that many of the people there were police. Certainly at least one

13 member of the Red Beret were there and I am aware of information that

14 other members of the Bratunac military police may have been there at some

15 point. I can't -- again, I'm not aware of any VRS officers being there

16 at 1700 when or even shortly thereafter, when the massacre occurred, but

17 again I can't exclude that possibility simply because I just -- I'm sure

18 I don't know all of the facts related to that.

19 Q. Do you know from your investigation, and can you confirm, that

20 prior to this event, prior to this date, there were no organised

21 executions?

22 A. I would disagree. I testified prior that I consider the

23 Jahorina -- sorry, let me try that one again. The Jadar River massacre

24 to be evidence of an organised execution.

25 Q. Perhaps we misunderstood each other. In relation to Kravica,

Page 16623

1 before this date, before --

2 A. I'm sorry, you're talking before 13 July?

3 Q. Correct, correct.

4 A. No, sir, the mass executions, there were no -- to my knowledge,

5 there were no mass executions that occurred on 12 July. So 13 July would

6 be the beginning of the series of mass executions.

7 Q. And the -- you indicated a person from the Red Berets, I believe

8 from your revised written narrative I remember reading something that he

9 may have been travelling on the road, passing by Kravica, when he was

10 wounded?

11 A. Again, from my narrative, I don't believe I speculate as to how

12 he got there, simply I note the fact that there is a document from the

13 Bratunac medical centre that places him there. As I recall, we -- after

14 we learned about the fact that he was there, we did try to interview him,

15 and his -- if I recall correctly, what we discovered was that several

16 years after the war he perished in an automobile accident.

17 Q. Would you be surprised if I told you that this incident in

18 Kravica does not appear in your narrative at all?

19 A. Which one?

20 Q. The revised narrative.

21 A. The --

22 Q. The most recent one.

23 A. As I said, a lot of the information that we received pertaining

24 to the circumstances came after 2003, in my -- so again, as I've said,

25 some of the issues are in the narrative, some of them would be in other

Page 16624

1 documents, but I have testified about that because I think a lot of that

2 information came to light at the Tribunal after my departure and coming

3 up to the trial of Borovcanin, who was part of the Popovic trial.

4 Q. I agree with you as to the dates and my question is, it's not in

5 your narrative, you didn't testify about it during direct examination,

6 how did you think that this Chamber was going to get that very important

7 information to assess what actually is in your narrative if you don't

8 offer it?

9 A. I'm confused by your question. The information that is my

10 narrative is the most complete information that I had at the time of

11 publication. As I've testified before, one of the techniques that the

12 Office of the Prosecutor uses is to introduce documents related to these

13 particular issues in my subsequent testimony. Again, I don't control

14 what the Office of the Prosecutor does or does not choose to lead me

15 through my testimony. It's his ten hours, not mine.

16 Q. So would you agree with me that to get a full and as accurate as

17 possible picture of your knowledge and conclusions, it would be necessary

18 for myself, as I did, and for the Chamber, to review all of your prior

19 testimonies rather than to rely upon just the written reports and just

20 the direct examination in this case?

21 A. Again, I would reply that that is entirely dependent upon the

22 ultimate determination of this Trial Chamber or any past Trial Chamber as

23 to how much to rely or not rely on the information that I provide as part

24 of their ultimate decision process.

25 Q. But you will agree with me that for the Chamber to know what

Page 16625

1 there is to rely upon they would need to know the entirety of it and that

2 entirety is not in your reports?

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, this is getting very vague and the

4 references and speculative, and it's unnecessary.

5 MR. IVETIC: We have been talking about a specific incident. We

6 are talking about a specific incident that he's gone through in great

7 detail. It's not vague.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, Mr. Ivetic, would you not interrupt

9 Mr. McCloskey, not only for Mr. McCloskey but also for the interpreters.

10 MR. IVETIC: Understood.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, was it your intention to primarily draw

12 the attention of the Chamber that a report which is not updated in

13 respect of such new information, that that would be cumbersome for the

14 Chamber to rely upon? Because if that was your intention, then you

15 succeeded.

16 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I also would like then to

17 draw the Chamber's attention to the fact that it also goes towards the --

18 whether the person is an expert, whether they are -- whether they have a

19 bias. And if they don't bring forward information and the Defence has to

20 pull it out of them I think that goes towards that consideration as well.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You consider that to be bias and that's what

22 you want to bring to the attention of the Trial Chamber.

23 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honours. And if that's clear then I can

24 move on to a different topic.

25 JUDGE ORIE: It's clear that you've drawn the attention of the

Page 16626

1 Chamber to it and that you consider it to be bias. Please proceed.

2 MR. IVETIC: Thank you. Now I'd like to look at the revised

3 Srebrenica Military Narrative which is 65 ter number 4627 and I'd like to

4 focus on page 6 in both languages.

5 Q. And, sir, from -- I apologise, page 1 in both languages - there

6 we go - which is page -- page 1 in the text which is page 6 in e-court.

7 Now I know where I'm going.

8 Sir, this section that is entitled, "executive summary" goes from

9 page 6 in e-court for five pages which should get us to page 11 in

10 e-court, and in this section there are no references to either intercepts

11 or documents or witness testimony that would support the assertions.

12 Would you agree with me, sir, that this is a different format and

13 different approach than for the other reports on the brigade, corps and

14 Main Staff levels which you authored for use at trial?

15 A. No, sir. Again, I believe I have executive summaries in all of

16 those products. Part of my military background, the formats that we use

17 in reports are obviously to include an executive summary. I certainly

18 recall being cross-examined by Mr. Haynes, I believe, for the better part

19 of a session as to why I did not footnote my executive summary. And

20 I think at the end of the day my answer was that, I mean, it's a summary

21 of the information and that what I expect is that any reader of the

22 document would go to the base document or the base paragraphs in the

23 various sections of the narrative and the documents that I do cite in

24 those to rely on for certain issues. An executive summary is just that,

25 it's a quick executive summary. It's not a substantive component of the

Page 16627

1 report.

2 Q. Would you agree with me from your military intelligence

3 background that these executive summaries or situation reports or

4 sit-reps are meant to apprise a commander of something without their

5 having to read the entire remainder of the report and to urge a

6 particular course of action in essence to advocate for the commander to

7 accept the facts reported therein and act in accordance with a -- to

8 adopt a course of action in accordance with the facts as set forth in the

9 summary?

10 A. Yes, sir. The one thing I don't do, however, is I do not assume

11 that a general officer or a commander who is pressed for time is the same

12 as triers of fact and law who will, I take it, go through the entire

13 document because they are ultimately responsible for assuming the

14 decision of the guilt or innocence of an accused. They are not going to

15 do that based off of a six-page executive summary of a 100-page document.

16 Q. Thank you, sir. Now I'd like to move to some preliminary

17 methodological observations in reference to your

18 Brigade Command Responsibility Report, and that is 65 ter number 04624.

19 Now that we have it on the screen, if we could turn to page 4.

20 A. I'm sorry, sir, you said the brigade or corps command report is

21 the one I'm looking at on the screen, sir.

22 Q. I'm looking for the brigade report. I apologise. It should be

23 number 04625. I misspoke.

24 And now if we can go to page 4 in both versions, and I'd like to

25 focus on the paragraph at the top, 1.0, it's at the top of both the

Page 16628

1 original and the translation, and reads:

2 "The Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

3 hereinafter referred to as the Army of the Republika Srpska or the VRS,

4 was formed from the remnants of the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA)

5 which remained in Bosnia following the announced withdrawal of all JNA

6 forces in May 1992."

7 Now, sir, would you agree with me that TO or Territorial Defence

8 units, that in fact made up a considerable part of the

9 Army of the Republika Srpska, especially at the brigade level, cannot be

10 referred to as remnants of the former Yugoslav National Army?

11 A. I do not equate Territorial Defence units as being part of the

12 Yugoslav National Army in that sense. My view, though, is that one looks

13 at the leadership and a significant components of the VRS, those

14 officers, the command structures, and even in the case of the

15 1st Krajina Corps being the former JNA 5th Corps, as well as the

16 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps being at least parts of the former JNA 4th Corps,

17 I believe that my conclusion is sound.

18 Q. Your conclusion doesn't have this detail. Your conclusion does

19 not in this paragraph mention the TO. The TO doesn't factor until the

20 third paragraph where it appears out of the blue. Would you agree with

21 me that as written, this portion of your report is at least misleading,

22 if not inaccurate and contradictory, as written?

23 A. I guess if I'm talking about issues in sequence, the fact that

24 I mentioned the TO in the third paragraph versus the first paragraph, I'm

25 not exactly sure what your point is.

Page 16629

1 Q. Reading your report, someone who is relying upon your report --

2 A. I take it they will read the entire report in context and not

3 paragraph by paragraph. I mean, these reports are designed to be read in

4 sequence and completely.

5 Q. If we can return for a moment to that first paragraph, and I'd

6 like to read the remainder of that paragraph, or the next part of it,

7 I should say. Again the first paragraph is 1.0:

8 "As organised at that time, it was comprised of five

9 geographically based corps under the command of the Main Staff, a body

10 composed of a nucleus of senior Bosnian Serb officers from the former JNA

11 2nd Military District headquarters."

12 Is this meant to imply that the Main Staff of the VRS was in fact

13 the heart or nucleus of the JNA 2nd Military District headquarters

14 transplanted --

15 A. What it is --

16 Q. -- to a new organisation?

17 A. I'm sorry.

18 Q. To a new organisation.

19 A. No. What I'm saying is that many of the key officers who

20 ultimately stood up the Main Staff held correspondingly similar positions

21 from the JNA 2nd Military District when they were assigned there prior to

22 the withdrawal of the JNA.

23 Q. I'd like to ask a few follow-up questions in that regard. The

24 JNA 2nd Military District headquarters, when you make reference to that

25 body, would you agree with me that that body, when it existed, had over a

Page 16630

1 hundred officers within its composition? Maybe you as an expert might

2 know the precise number, do you?

3 A. I would suggest that the best information I have and that I would

4 have put forward on the 2nd Military District and their transition would

5 be in the Main Staff report which was written seven years after this, and

6 in some of those notes that I have there, it might have those documents

7 that you're asking. I don't recall off of the top of my head how many

8 officers were in the 2nd Military District at the time of 1992.

9 Q. Okay. I understand you don't know the specific number. Do you

10 recall if it was over a hundred?

11 A. Again, sir, if I don't know the specific number, I'd be

12 speculating if I knew it were over a hundred or not.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Well, let's not -- you can say, I don't know whether

14 it was 200 or 300, then you don't know the number, but nevertheless you

15 know that it was more than a hundred. I leave it to that.

16 THE WITNESS: Again -- yes, sir.

17 JUDGE ORIE: But the logic behind it is not compelling.

18 Please proceed.

19 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

20 Q. Would you agree with me that at the time of its formation, the

21 Main Staff of the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

22 later known as the VRS, was comprised of a total of 12 persons by way of

23 comparison, of whom five were generals?

24 A. For the origin of the Main Staff I would not disagree with you on

25 that.

Page 16631

1 Q. Would you agree that during the entire duration of the 1992

2 through 1995 period the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska never

3 attained even half of the number of officers that were within the

4 composition of the JNA 2nd Military District when it existed?

5 A. Again, I've never done a specific analysis comparing the manpower

6 of that, but I wouldn't disagree with the proposition. I mean, I know

7 from my research historically that not only was the VRS Main Staff

8 understaffed with the qualified officers that it needed, but almost all

9 of the entity, the subordinate levels, suffered from a significant

10 shortage of appropriately skilled officers.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, if the witness has testified that he

12 doesn't know how many officers there were in the 2nd Military District,

13 how could he possibly answer a question whether in the VRS the number

14 ever went -- never went to half of what is for the witness an unknown

15 number? I mean, apart from putting your questions, listening to the

16 answers, might assist as well. Please proceed.

17 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

18 Q. Do you recall during the time period of 1992 to 1995 what is the

19 highest staffing level of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska

20 attained in terms of officers?

21 A. I don't recall a specific number. I know that the

22 Office of the Prosecutor has those documents. And, again, my memory

23 could be refreshed on that because I know that we do have several

24 documents which relate to the manning of the VRS Main Staff at certain

25 points in time during the war. So that information is available.

Page 16632

1 Q. Did the VRS Main Staff ever attain a level of a hundred officers,

2 50 officers? Do you have any way of narrowing down that unknown number,

3 again based upon your expertise?

4 A. Again, sir, it's been a while since I looked at that specific

5 document. I believe that it may be cited in my Main Staff report, but

6 I just can't give you a number with any degree of confidence, whether

7 it's 60, whether it's 75 or whether it's a hundred. I mean, I know that

8 they obviously had enough officers to do the job, as far as they were

9 concerned, but I also know that from their own reporting, that they

10 didn't feel they had as many officers as they wanted.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I see I think we are either at or just

13 before the time period for the break.

14 JUDGE ORIE: I think we are at the time of the break.

15 Could Mr. Butler be escorted out of the courtroom.

16 [The witness stands down]

17 JUDGE ORIE: We will almost take a break. Mr. Stojanovic, one

18 question in relation to the earlier request you made for -- the

19 announcement that you would seek a certificate. Could you give us the

20 date and the page reference exactly where, as you said, after the

21 delivery of the decision of the Chamber, that you put that motion orally,

22 I take it, at the time to decide on the matter? Could you give us a page

23 and line reference for that, and a date reference? We may find it but if

24 you have available somewhere, then ...

25 MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, not at this moment,

Page 16635

1 the decision on the motion, and therefore was misplaced to introduce it

2 at that point in time in that context. Since then, we have not heard

3 from you any further. Therefore, the Chamber was not aware that there

4 was anything pending, and therefore the Chamber this morning heard a

5 brief submission and decided on that. Please look carefully in our

6 22nd of August decision. If there is anything further to be said about

7 it, then of course you're welcome to further raise the matter, but this

8 is my recollection of the issue.

9 The Prosecution is also invited, of course, to consider whether

10 this is an accurate reflection of the procedural history on this matter.

11 Then, Mr. Ivetic, if you're ready, please continue your

12 cross-examination.

13 [The witness takes the stand]

14 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. Now, sir, I'd like to understand your report and testimony that

16 you gave just before the break where you said that many officers that had

17 been assigned within the 2nd Military District headquarters went to the

18 VRS. Now, according to my lay person's knowledge, I have counted up the

19 members of the -- the 12 members of the Main Staff and I've come up with

20 five of those 12 who, according to my information, definitely were not at

21 any point in time members or assigned to the 2nd Military District of the

22 JNA in any capacity. Can you confirm that as being the results of your

23 research?

24 A. Are you going to give me the names? I mean, I just can't give

25 you a five of 12, whether that's true or not true, I mean --

Page 16636

1 Q. Well, let's do it this way. Why don't you tell me who you counts

2 as the many within the VRS Main Staff who would have been assigned to

3 significant positions within the JNA 2nd Military District. Maybe that's

4 a better way of approaching it.

5 A. Again, my memory is a little unclear on this, but I believe that

6 General Mladic held a position on the 2nd Military District staff. I

7 believe he was Chief of Staff at one juncture. I think General Gvero at

8 the time or at that time he was a colonel. I believe Colonel Tolimir was

9 a member of that staff. I know General Milovanovic at the time I don't

10 believe was. And I believe at that time Colonel Skrbic, and

11 Colonel Djukic, who were logistics officers may have also been members of

12 the Main Staff at that --- or members of the 2nd Military District. But,

13 again, it's been a while since I've looked at that, so I'm just trying to

14 recall off the top of my head.

15 Q. Okay. Now, let's take them one by one. In relation to

16 General Mladic, would you agree with me that he only was transferred into

17 the 2nd Military District as Chief of Staff shortly before the withdrawal

18 of the 2nd Military District and was only appointed to replace

19 Commander Kukanjac approximately -- essentially one day before being

20 selected commander of the VRS Main Staff on 12 May 1992?

21 A. I would agree with your first assertion, with respect to him

22 being appointed to replace General Kukanjac for a very short time.

23 I would offer that I know that the ascension of General Mladic to the

24 Main Staff or being appointed as the commander of the Main Staff is an

25 issue of analysis by other military analysts. It was not an area that

Page 16637

1 I particularly focused on simply because how he became the commander in

2 1992 was not particularly important with respect to the fact that he

3 still was the commander in July of 1995. I know that for other aspects

4 of the various investigations, the interactions between how he became the

5 commander and the decision process is germane with respect to the crimes

6 as charged in 1992 but those are not my area of expertise so I didn't

7 look at that particularly closely.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I didn't want to interrupt when you

9 consulted with Mr. Mladic. The Chamber noticed that by gestures,

10 General Mladic in the -- during the testimony of this witness, expressed

11 agreement or disagreement with what the witness said. Mr. Mladic should

12 refrain from doing that, and the appropriate way of expressing agreement

13 or disagreement would be by instructing counsel to put further questions

14 on the matter. Would you please keep that in mind and would Mr. Mladic

15 also keep that in mind. Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

16 MR. IVETIC:

17 Q. Well, sir, this issue of the 2nd Military District of the JNA and

18 the VRS Main Staff is a significant feature of several of your reports.

19 I'd like to focus a little bit more on that. Did your research reveal

20 that in fact General Mladic came to the 2nd Military District of the JNA

21 on 9th of May, 1995, exactly three days before being named as the

22 commander of the VRS Main Staff? Is this three-day stint what you're

23 talking about as him being assigned as Chief of Staff of the --

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: You said 1995, Mr. Ivetic.

25 MR. IVETIC: 1992. I apologise, 1992. I apologise. Thank you,

Page 16638

1 Your Honour.

2 A. Yes, sir, I believe there is a document in my Main Staff report

3 that corresponds to that. It may, in fact, even be a copy of the

4 appointment orders.

5 Q. Do you think that General Mladic, serving as a Chief of Staff for

6 three days in a headquarters, that was in the midst of a chaotic

7 situation where they were attacked upon withdrawing from their

8 headquarters and attempting to leave the country, qualifies for him to be

9 referred to as having been a nucleus of the 2nd Military District in any

10 real sense of the word? Apart from name only?

11 A. Well, again, sir, going back to my brigade command report, you'll

12 notice the section is topic background synopsis. And as I've indicated,

13 and it had been indicated in the past when questioned about these issues,

14 how the Main Staff was formed in 1992, particularly with respect to the

15 brigade report, was not a matter of serious research by me. The topic of

16 import for me was how the Main Staff functioned or did not function as it

17 related to the events of Srebrenica in July of 1995. Again, as a matter

18 of the break down of the work by the military analysts, I am aware that

19 there were other areas that military analysts were studying that directly

20 corresponded to the formation of the Main Staff in 1992 and how that

21 related to the crimes as charged in that particular area.

22 So, again, I'm only providing enough of a background synopsis so

23 a reader can understand the issues in context. I'm not seeking to be the

24 authoritative source of information on the origin of the Main Staff in

25 1992.

Page 16639

1 Q. Are you attempting to infer to the reader that the Main Staff, in

2 terms of its organisation, authority and cohesiveness, inherited the

3 organisation, authority and cohesiveness of the 2nd Military District of

4 the JNA, which -- was that the intention? Because that's how I read your

5 reports.

6 A. No. My purpose of documenting out the organisational structure

7 of the 2nd Military District, how it was organised, is to note that the

8 VRS Main Staff organised itself in similar lines with respect to how the

9 staff were variously organised. I believe as part of my Main Staff

10 report, I do discuss the fact that obviously many of the functions of a

11 military district command would not correspond to what a Main Staff, as

12 it was organised, was doing and many of those functions are assumed by

13 the RS Ministry of Defence.

14 That is the point that I'm trying to make, to be able to

15 correlate back that the functions that these officers had within the

16 context of their JNA service was not dissimilar to the functions that

17 they had when they created this entity known as the Main Staff.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you in that reasoning, is the focus on

19 the 2nd Military District of the JNA or is it more generally focused on

20 the JNA as it functioned?

21 THE WITNESS: Again, sir, from my context of what I was looking

22 for, it is simply, it's not a focus on the 2nd Military District

23 specifically. It's just part of the broader pattern of facts that I use,

24 one, to establish that the VRS adopted most, if not all, of the former

25 JNA command and staff processes and they did so primarily because, as

Page 16640

1 serving JNA officers, many of them who had served in high-ranking

2 positions such as General Mladic or General Milovanovic they did so

3 because this is what was familiar to them.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

5 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Were both Generals Tolimir and -- pardon me, were both

7 Colonels Tolimir and Salapura persons who you included in the reference

8 to many from the 2nd JNA military district being appointed to the VRS

9 Main Staff as a former nucleus of the 2nd JNA Military District?

10 A. I am not sure at what point in time Colonel Tolimir or

11 Colonel Salapura got there or if Colonel Salapura was ever on the

12 military district staff. I know that that information is available and,

13 in fact, in the case of Colonel Salapura he may very well have testified

14 to that. I just don't know the answer to that off the top of my head.

15 Q. Do you know if it would have been more than a few days' time?

16 A. The circumstances as they were occurring in the early months of

17 1992, particularly as it deals with the issue of the Main Staff and JNA

18 officers being transferred in and transferred out, was very chaotic. I

19 am aware that on a number of occasions, officers were getting transferred

20 in and out of various military district staff as well as corps positions

21 rather rapidly, but I can't tell you specifically how many days or how

22 many weeks Colonel Salapura or Colonel Tolimir might have been on the

23 staff before essentially the JNA ceased to exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24 Q. How about Colonel Stevo Tomic? Was he one of the many that you

25 identified as being the nucleus of the JNA 2nd Military District who

Page 16641

1 later -- who then became part of the Main Staff, and how many hours or

2 days was he at the JNA 2nd Military District?

3 A. I don't recall that particular name. He may have been there but

4 I just don't know that name off the top of my head.

5 Q. Would you be surprised that neither Generals Gvero, Manojlovic --

6 Milovanovic, Maric, nor Colonel Beara, nor Colonel Grubor, nor

7 Colonel Ilic, the remaining officers of the Main Staff, none of them had

8 been assigned within the JNA 2nd Military District headquarters?

9 A. I know obviously the case of Milovanovic because I've heard his

10 testimony as how he came to be his position. I understand Colonel Beara

11 at the time was a naval officer, so it would make sense obviously that at

12 that time he wasn't part of the 2nd Military District. Colonel Ilic I

13 know was operating, he was associated early on with one of the brigades

14 of what would later be the Drina Corps, so I know he didn't join the

15 Main Staff until later. Colonel Grubor I think ultimately became a corps

16 commander of Herzegovina corps. I don't know his background prior to

17 that.

18 Q. Okay. In relation to the JNA 2nd Military District, do you know

19 how many of those officers would have been ethnically non-Serb and that

20 may have joined any of the other armed entities that were operating

21 between 1992 and 1995?

22 A. I can't give you a percentage. What I can tell the Court is as a

23 result of my research, I was able obviously to establish that through

24 middle of 1991 and 1992, the broader pattern that was occurring within

25 the JNA was that officers who were JNA or TO officers serving with the

Page 16642

1 JNA, who were not ethnically Serb, were leaving JNA service in part

2 because they no longer believed that the JNA represented their interests.

3 So whether it was by design or whether it was by default, the end result

4 was that coming into the early months of 1992, most of the key positions

5 within the JNA with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina were held by

6 individuals who were ethnic Serbs, either from Bosnia itself or I think

7 in larger numbers, frankly, ethnic Serbs from Serbia.

8 Q. I'm trying to wrap my mind around your assertion earlier that the

9 VRS and that the Serbs inherited all of the command processes and

10 structures of the 2nd Military District. Would you agree that personnel

11 of other ethnicities who had been in positions within the

12 2nd Military District headquarters for longer than a few days, who had

13 been there for years or months, might also be considered to be a nucleus

14 of the 2nd JNA military district and, in fact, would have taken that

15 knowledge and expertise to the various armed forces that they joined

16 after leaving the JNA as you've now stated in the early months of 1992?

17 A. I wouldn't disagree with you. I don't see where that assertion

18 is inconsistent. Obviously, JNA-trained officers from all the parties

19 are going to take their knowledge with them and attempt to use that

20 knowledge to the best of their ability. What my position is is that the

21 VRS in general got the better of that deal because they were able to

22 operate, one, because by 1992, most of the JNA structures were ethnic

23 Serbian, again, by either design or default. And that when you look at

24 the origins of many of the VRS corps commands particularly, they have

25 direct lineage back to previous JNA commands. That is not something

Page 16643

1 that, you know, in most cases, that the ABiH can lay claim to.

2 MR. IVETIC: One moment, Your Honours, if I may briefly consult.

3 JUDGE ORIE: You may briefly consult. Keep the volume down.

4 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]

5 MR. IVETIC:

6 Q. Now, sir, in relation to your conclusion that the VRS got the

7 better of the deal, I'd like to ask a couple of follow-up questions.

8 Generals Halilovic and Delic from the Armija BiH, had they in fact been

9 at command positions within the structure of the 2nd Military District in

10 the JNA?

11 A. I -- I seem to recall General Halilovic, I don't know off the top

12 of my head whether General Delalic was or not.

13 Q. Are we talking about Delalic or Delic?

14 A. Delic, I'm sorry.

15 Q. Now in reaching your conclusion, did you have the information or

16 take into account that the physical headquarters of the

17 2nd JNA Military District remained in the hands of the Bosnian Muslim

18 armed forces with the VRS relegated to Crna Rijeka near Han Pijesak which

19 was the rear command post of the district as well as the fall-back

20 command post of the JNA 2nd Army?

21 A. Sir, with respect, the document that I relied on the most for

22 that, my conclusion, is the VRS's own analysis of their combat operations

23 for 1992. The assertions that I raise with respect to how effective the

24 VRS was, particularly compared with the other armed entities are those

25 that the VRS themselves were telling their audience. This is how they

Page 16644

1 were -- this is the conclusion that they were coming to, not my

2 conclusion.

3 Q. Well, I'd like to know about your conclusion which you just gave

4 to us, and I'm asking you if you had this information available. You're

5 telling me what you relied upon, but did you disregard this information?

6 Did have you it available to you?

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey.

8 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm unclear which conclusion we are talking about

9 from my listening here. Are we still on that innocuous comment about the

10 nucleus of where the people came from or is it something else?

11 MR. IVETIC: If I can assist, Your Honours. It is at transcript

12 page 57 of the temporary transcript where the witness in giving his

13 answer says, "What my position is that the VRS in general got the better

14 of that deal because they were able to operate," and then he keeps going

15 on and on. So if this is not the individual's position then I don't know

16 what to rely upon anymore.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, let's re- read the portion you just referred

18 to. You said page 56 -- 57.

19 MR. IVETIC: Seven. For the record, I do have to state the

20 Defence's position where an expert witness is concerned, I don't believe

21 there can be anything to be considered an innocuous conclusion. All

22 conclusions are expert and are able to be cross-examined by the Defence.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you answer the question, your question.

24 The question is about the conclusion in terms of getting the better deal

25 of the former JNA officers. What you relied upon and whether you

Page 16645

1 disregarded the information, the information being summarised,

2 Mr. Ivetic, as that much of the knowledge, experience and skills had

3 flown to other armed forces.

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I mean, I don't disagree with

5 Mr. Ivetic's general assertion with respect to the fact that particularly

6 those two headquarters that he had announced as well as other former JNA

7 garrisons fell under the control of the various warring factions, some of

8 them that were not ultimately what would be the VRS. There were

9 thousands of former JNA weapons that found their way into the hands of

10 the other warring factions. But I believe, again, when one looks at the

11 totality of the information, and again, the VRS concludes the same thing

12 in their own analysis, that they believe that they ended up in a much

13 superior position, as far as war fighting capabilities go, as they came

14 into the end of 1992 and early 1993. And, frankly, one of the things

15 that they attribute to the success that they are having is their superior

16 abilities at the command and staff levels that allowed for a superior

17 employment of their own forces. It was something that they noted that

18 they were doing quite well, that their adversaries were not doing as

19 successfully.

20 MR. IVETIC:

21 Q. Sir, are you here as an expert witness giving us expert opinion

22 or are you here to tell us what the VRS was pumping its chest about in

23 1992?

24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, argumentative.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, the witness explained on what, as you

Page 16646

1 asked him, he based his conclusion. Your question apparently is: Have

2 you considered the possibility that the VRS, in stating so, was

3 exaggerating and was trying to show to be better than they really were.

4 That is your question I take it, Mr. Ivetic?

5 MR. IVETIC: That would be my follow-up question, yes.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Then I don't understand the question that you put to

7 the witness. Could you please answer that question?

8 THE WITNESS: If one looks and reads the entire combat analysis,

9 which in the English language runs somewhere I think around 150 pages,

10 the VRS talks about the things that they think they are doing very well

11 and it also talks about the things that they are doing poorly. At the

12 end of the day, their own combat analysis of their battlefield

13 performance and the role of -- and how their army is performing is not

14 designed to be a public document. It's designed to be a document for

15 their benefit as part of their self-analysis. As professional officers I

16 don't think they would be inflating their positives and deflating their

17 negatives if the purpose of that report ultimately is to draw conclusions

18 on how to be more effective in the combat environment in the outlying

19 years.

20 MR. IVETIC:

21 Q. From your study and research and expertise, can you tell us how

22 many officers would be needed in order to have the VRS Main Staff

23 functioning at full strength as it was intended under the formative

24 regulations or structure of the VRS?

25 A. Again, sir, as I've testified before, I know that the

Page 16647

1 Office of the Prosecutor has those documents, and I've seen them in the

2 past. I don't recall a specific number that I can give you to answer

3 that question at the moment. I mean, I know the information is available

4 out there. It's something I probably knew and forgot years ago.

5 Q. Okay. If we can look at paragraph 1.1 of the document which is

6 up on the screen which is the VRS brigade Command Responsibility Report.

7 We see here -- you again are focusing on the structures of the

8 2nd Military District and its subordinate units including a corps

9 command. Do you consider that the prevalence of references within your

10 reports to the pre-existing structures of the 2nd Military District of

11 the JNA in terms of explaining VRS structures are at least misleading or

12 misplaced, given all these factors that we have discussed today?

13 A. No, sir. I don't. If I understand your question correctly,

14 I think the implication is that because I relied very heavily on the JNA

15 corps related documents and extrapolated them up for the

16 2nd Military District, I'm somehow being inaccurate as to the total

17 picture. I mean, is that what you're implying, sir?

18 Q. No, sir. I'm implying to the fact that this concept of the

19 2nd Military District and the nucleus of the same being inherited by the

20 VRS and that these comparisons between the VRS and the

21 2nd Military District imply that this finished, organised military entity

22 that had been in existence for some time was basically good to go and

23 ready and became the VRS. And I'm asking you if, in fact, that rosy of a

24 picture is misleading given these factors that we have been discussing

25 here today.

Page 16648

1 A. I -- if that's the inference you're drawing, you're incorrect.

2 I -- I -- in both the idea I tend to push in my reports and certainly

3 I've testified to, is the fact that 1992 was a very chaotic time.

4 Nobody -- it wasn't rosy for anyone let alone the situation where

5 General Mladic is trying to effectively organise an army out of what was

6 at that time in Bosnia a disparate group of municipal-backed military

7 formations, paramilitaries and other entities, you know, conducting

8 combat operations against each other without centralised direction, it

9 seems, at least with respect to military centralised direction. I don't

10 think I've ever tried to lay out the idea that somehow there was a magic

11 seamless transition from the JNA as it existed until its collapse and

12 when the VRS stood up.

13 Q. Okay. I'd like to move away from that topic and go to another

14 topic with you. One thing I didn't ask you about in relation to your

15 background is the time period after the Office of the Prosecutor, and I'd

16 like to spend some time briefly going through that now. In the course of

17 your employment within the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have

18 you remained at the same position or have you been promoted?

19 A. I have -- when I started in 2003 with Immigration and Customs

20 Enforcement I worked out of the office of Atlanta with respect to dealing

21 with traditional criminal issues, specialising in human smuggling and

22 human trafficking. I was promoted from that office and brought to

23 Washington, D.C., within a short time frame, in order to begin the

24 process of helping to establish for the agency what is now the

25 Human Rights Violators & War Crimes Centre.

Page 16649

1 Q. Okay. I'd like to look at document 1D1233 with you. Perhaps on

2 the safe side we should maybe not broadcast the same. I don't know --

3 I haven't received any information to that effect but I think to be on

4 the safe side, perhaps we should not broadcast the same. Sir, this is

5 dated 22 September 2006. I believe it indicates that it originated from

6 you. Do you recognise this?

7 A. Yes, sir. I authored this document.

8 Q. Okay. And at this time you were an intelligence research

9 specialist, human rights violators unit from Atlanta, Georgia. Would

10 this have been before or after you were promoted to Washington, D.C.?

11 A. This would be about the time I was going up there, so I couldn't

12 tell you if this -- you know, I was still sitting in Atlanta when I wrote

13 this memorandum and I can't tell you how shortly thereafter I got

14 promoted and moved to Washington.

15 Q. Okay. Looking at the subject of this document, and I guess I'll

16 read it into the record. It says:

17 "Background primer on the genocide, crimes against humanity, and

18 war crimes associated with the capture of the UN safe area of Srebrenica

19 in July 1995 during the Bosnian war and associated ICE human rights

20 violations -- violation cases presently under investigation."

21 Now, this is a very legal sounding title, sir. Did you have any

22 legal assistance in drafting this primer report?

23 A. No, sir. This is my document entirely. The conclusions that

24 they were genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, in part, are

25 related to previous judgements of previous courts on the issue.

Page 16650

1 Q. Okay. I'd like to ask you about portions of this 14-page report,

2 but, first, if I may am, I correct that the work of your unit focused --

3 at the ICE, I should say, focuses on prosecuting Bosnian Serbs who

4 emigrated to America, or have you also worked on cases prosecuting ethnic

5 Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Muslim suspects as well?

6 A. I can tell you that your perception is incorrect. I can tell you

7 broadly that we are investigating individuals of all of the ethnic

8 groups, and a number of those have been brought to trial. I obviously am

9 not in a position to discuss before this Chamber ongoing investigations.

10 Q. Are you in a position to tell us what portion of the all-time

11 case load of your unit have been ethnic Serbs as opposed to

12 Bosnian Muslims or ethnic Bosnian Croats?

13 A. No, sir, I'm not in a position to do that.

14 Q. All right. Are you in a position to tell us how many criminal or

15 removal proceeding trials you have testified in against ethnic Serbs as

16 opposed to ethnic Croats and ethnic Bosnian Muslims?

17 A. I can tell you that I have -- that the overwhelming majority of

18 the trials that I have testified in are related to ethnic Serbs from

19 Bosnia primarily because that is where my expertise lies.

20 Q. Okay. If we can turn to page 3 of this primer by you, and I'd

21 like to focus on some language in the middle of the first paragraph up at

22 the top that says:

23 "These locations and the associated offences have been

24 extensively investigated and documents by the ICTY and in almost all

25 cases, significant forensics evidence and witness testimony exists

Page 16651

1 concerning these crime scenes. In all cases, these crime scenes are well

2 substantiated as being located outside the context of any ongoing

3 military combat operations. This precludes any potential defence by an

4 accused that his acts are associated with lawful combat as opposed to war

5 crimes."

6 Are you wearing a prosecutor's hat when you're drafting this memo

7 for your bosses at ICE, do you believe?

8 A. No, sir. I'm wearing the hat of somebody who is capable of

9 reading previous judgements on the subject and being able to relate what

10 they say.

11 Q. And what are you relying upon when you are making an affirmative

12 statement that accused are precluded from any potential defences? Is

13 that also what prior judgements would have to say about future defendants

14 or are you making a pre-judgment, sir?

15 A. No, sir, I'm drawing a conclusion on the fact that there will be

16 cases in investigations where individuals will claim that their

17 activities were legitimate combat operations, which would mean that under

18 US immigration law it wouldn't necessarily mean that they were involved

19 in potential acts of persecution. For individuals who were assigned to

20 various small military units that were engaged or that were somehow

21 associated with criminal acts related to Srebrenica 1995, they would not

22 be able to claim that, you know, based on the results of the forensics of

23 those grave sites, that they were involved in lawful combat operations,

24 and that was the point I'm trying to make.

25 Q. If we can turn to the next page, I'd like to focus on the first

Page 16652

1 half of the first paragraph which reads as follows:

2 "Kravica warehouse massacre. On 13 July 1995, several thousand

3 Bosnian Muslim soldiers and male civilians who were retreating to

4 friendly territory were captured by Bosnian Serb military units. They

5 were disarmed and collected at various locations."

6 And I'd like to stop there and I'd like to turn to page 9 of your

7 report, the last sentence of the page:

8 "A much smaller group includes males who escaped by joining a

9 column of BiH 28th Division soldiers that fought their way to friendly

10 lines after their capture," and then on the next page, "capture of

11 Srebrenica."

12 Sir, in both instances, are we talking about the same

13 Bosnian Muslim column, those that you first identify as retreating and

14 then those that you identify as fighting their way through enemy lines?

15 A. You really lost me when you flipped back and forth. I just don't

16 understand the context. Could you try that again, sir?

17 Q. Sure, if we could turn to page 4. Page 9 was talking about males

18 who left Srebrenica after it was captured and joined a column of the

19 28th Division that fought their way through enemy lines. Would that be

20 the same group of people that are on this page described as several

21 thousand Bosnian Muslim soldiers and male civilians who were retreating

22 to friendly territory?

23 A. In the context of the first line of page 4, what I am talking

24 about are, as part of the larger column, the thousands of people who were

25 captured starting the evening of 12 July 1995 and through the 13th and

Page 16653

1 14th who were captured by Bosnian Serb military units, so that's the

2 group I'm talking about in that particular line.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So I got that part.

5 Q. Okay. And would you agree with me, militarily speaking, the

6 descriptions of retreating and fighting through enemy lines are not

7 identical? They don't have the same meaning? They are not very precise?

8 A. I'm again in the context -- if you can go back to the second

9 notation you did so I can look at ...

10 Q. Page 9, last line.

11 A. Thank you. I take your point with respect to that. I mean,

12 I don't see any particular conflict with respect to the column retreating

13 from Srebrenica and fighting its way to friendly lines. I understand

14 that you could, and again I take your point on that.

15 Q. Will you also agree with me that irrespective of whether they

16 were retreating or fighting through enemy lines, that ambushes by Serb

17 forces upon the column would be considered legitimate and lawful military

18 exercises?

19 A. Again, as I've testified many times before, the column as

20 constituted, despite the fact that the mixed character of the column, in

21 my view the column constituted a legitimate military target which meant

22 that it was subject to attack by ambush. Again, ultimately it will be

23 for the Court to conclude whether that was a lawful exercise or not.

24 [Defence counsel and Accused confer]

25 MR. IVETIC: I apologise to the witness and to Your Honours for

Page 16654

1 attending to my client without first seeking leave.

2 JUDGE ORIE: That's no problem. Mr. Ivetic, just to understand

3 your line of questioning, are you saying the witness has ignored more or

4 less that there may have been a lot of combat casualties and ignores that

5 in this document? Is that what you are about to establish?

6 MR. IVETIC: No, I was trying to establish what we just discussed

7 that whether or not they were retreating or fighting through, that it

8 would -- the ambushes upon them would still be a lawful exercise which

9 I think the witness has just answered.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed.

11 MR. IVETIC:

12 Q. If we could turn to page 4 of the document again, I'd like to

13 take up where we left off, in the first paragraph. And it says:

14 "One of these locations was the Kravica warehouse, approximately

15 8 kilometres from Bratunac. At around 1700 hours on 13 July 1995,

16 Bosnian Serb Special Police, and Bosnian Serb soldiers, some identified

17 from the Bratunac Brigade, began shooting prisoners in the warehouse."

18 Now, sir, yet again, another report authored by you, this one

19 well after you would have known about the facts of the attempted escape,

20 the wounding of one Serb policeman, the killing of another, does not make

21 mention of that. Do you think that you're being entirely accurate or is

22 this portion of your report misleading the reader as to the genesis of

23 this event?

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. McCloskey.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: That is a conclusion that has not been

Page 16655

1 established by the facts of this case, that this is a fact. This is an

2 allegation that's been made by some people. There are certain facts

3 related to it. But to treat the story of the burned hands as if it's a

4 fact that is established, is incorrect, is not borne out by the record.

5 It can be stated much simpler the account of the burned hands or the

6 account of the shooting or the account of something. Why aren't you

7 taking that into account? Fine. But to establish it as some sort of a

8 fact is wrong.

9 JUDGE ORIE: That's what Mr. Ivetic apparently is seeking is to

10 know from the witness why nothing has been said about the burned hand

11 issue, which, as you said, Mr. Ivetic, the witness was aware of by then.

12 MR. IVETIC: Correct.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Could you answer that question?

14 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I mean, first of all, with respect to

15 this particular document, again, as I've discussed in my prior testimony,

16 the issue of Kravica warehouse being a crime scene is the ultimate fact

17 in question that I'm trying to draw the reader -- and, again, my readers

18 in this particular document would be agents who have no familiarity

19 whatsoever with the events that occurred in Srebrenica in 1995. I've

20 talked at length about my issue of the Kravica warehouse. Whether or not

21 it was predicated by an escaping Bosnian Muslim prisoner or whether or

22 not it was predicated by an order by the people there at the time to

23 shoot everybody, I again go back to what I said previously: At some

24 point clearly the intention was to kill everyone who was stored in that

25 warehouse. That ultimately has been the finding of various

Page 16656

1 Trial Chambers, and, again, I rely on those legal issues and legal

2 findings for this memorandum. Not my own personal views on issues.

3 MR. IVETIC:

4 Q. This memorandum has no footnotes; correct, sir?

5 A. Correct, sir. This memorandum was an internal document for our

6 investigators to give them a basic context of how the programme is

7 conducting these investigations. The fact that I've been cross-examined

8 about it a number of times doesn't exclude the fact that it was always

9 meant to be an internal document, it was never meant to be disclosed, and

10 it was never meant as a -- to be a public document with respect to an

11 authoritative source. It was -- as the business goes, this is internal

12 work product.

13 Q. And was it intended to give officers who were working on

14 investigations a full picture or was it meant to advocate a particular

15 position?

16 A. It was neither. What it was meant to do was to give officers who

17 had absolutely zero knowledge on east Bosnia in general or Srebrenica

18 specifically enough background information so that they would at least

19 understand why they were conducting these investigations in the first

20 place.

21 Q. And wouldn't such a -- strike that. And with no citations to

22 footnotes, no citations to, for instance, this set of accounts from

23 Kravica that are of importance, that they could only find by looking

24 through their testimony which I'm sure that they would not have had

25 access to or know how to easily find without more assistance, don't you

Page 16657

1 think that you're being unfair to the officers doing the investigation by

2 giving them one side of the facts rather than an impartial picture of

3 both sides?

4 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. The judgements that he's referred to

5 where this incident has been repeatedly concluded is a strong indication

6 that this is not a one-sided version. And I don't normally go to

7 judgements but that question, ignoring the judgements, suggesting

8 otherwise is absolutely inappropriate.

9 MR. IVETIC: I'm sorry, is counsel's position that this trial is

10 inappropriate? Does he stand on his objection?

11 JUDGE ORIE: Are you serious, Mr. Ivetic? Are you serious in

12 that question? Tell us.

13 MR. IVETIC: I'm asking --

14 JUDGE ORIE: No, no. My question is are you serious when you put

15 that question to Mr. McCloskey?

16 MR. IVETIC: I was reacting to Mr. McCloskey's objection,

17 Your Honour.

18 JUDGE ORIE: I'm asking whether you were serious.

19 MR. IVETIC: I was reacting to Mr. McCloskey's question, Your

20 Honour, I said that.

21 JUDGE ORIE: You refuse to answer the question.

22 MR. IVETIC: I take exception, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber will consider how seriously it should be

24 taken. Whatever the case is, you have put approximately seven questions

25 in one with a lot of suggestions. Could you perhaps put clear questions

Page 16658

1 to the witness. If this would be about a subject matter you wanted to

2 touch upon, please do so, but in a different format.

3 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, then I need guidance from the

4 Chamber. I'm reciting back to the witness his testimony that he's

5 already given. Do I need to ask him again if there are no footnotes and

6 citations?

7 JUDGE ORIE: Well, that's not the same question you asked before

8 because you implied a lot of other observations in there. But, then, now

9 the question simply is: Whether there are no footnotes and citations, it

10 seems that looking at the document, Mr. Ivetic, I see no footnotes on

11 none of the pages.

12 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour. And then the witness has said

13 there are none. So I'm asking where is the compound part of my question.

14 I need your guidance to know how to break it up, since I was only

15 reciting the witness's prior testimony.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Just take them one by one. And that's my guidance

17 at this moment.

18 MR. IVETIC: Okay.

19 Q. Is it correct, sir, that there are no citations and footnotes in

20 this document?

21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: This question is already answered.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Next question, please.

23 MR. IVETIC:

24 Q. So with your testimony that there are no citations and footnotes

25 in the document, don't you think that it would be unfair to the officers

Page 16659

1 investigating this -- these matters, not to give them a full account but,

2 rather, giving them one side of the account?

3 JUDGE ORIE: There is one thing implied in this question, that is

4 by not giving footnotes, you are not giving them a full account but a

5 one-sided account. Now, a full account and a one-sided account is not --

6 are not two opposing matters. You have a full account and an incomplete

7 account, and you have a neutral account and you have a one-sided account.

8 So therefore the question from an analytical point of view, Mr. Ivetic,

9 may need some further explanation, but let's try to take it one by one.

10 By not adding footnotes, have you given not a full account of the events

11 you describe?

12 THE WITNESS: I agree, sir. This is a -- by design this is a

13 summary account, not a one-sided one.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That -- the first question was simply whether

15 it was a full account or not. You say it is summary. The next question

16 is whether it is a one-sided account, whether you wanted to highlight one

17 side rather than both sides.

18 THE WITNESS: No, sir. My intention was to, I hope, correctly

19 summarise the facts of the previous judicial findings in these matters.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You say it's not one-sided in respect of the

21 judgements you want to summarise here.

22 THE WITNESS: I don't believe so, no, sir.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Then the next question is by giving this summarised

24 account without footnotes, would you consider this to be unfair to the

25 readers, the officers, who would read this document?

Page 16660

1 THE WITNESS: Not only would I not consider it to be unfair, the

2 officers who were involved in these cases thanked me for providing enough

3 background information so they had, at least beginning their portion of

4 the investigations, enough knowledge to be able to understand what the

5 department level and what the agency level leadership was looking for in

6 these investigations that we were asking them to conduct on a

7 case-by-case basis.

8 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand your reasoning. Would you agree

9 with me that if it would have been a misleading account, that they might

10 have praised you nevertheless because they were not aware of the

11 misleading character of the information they received and they thanked

12 you for?

13 THE WITNESS: That is a conclusion that -- obviously when you're

14 giving information to people who are completely ignorant of a particular

15 situation, yes. I mean, I obviously take your point that the fact that

16 they were praising me doesn't mean that I was giving them accurate

17 information.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Ivetic, we'll first take a break. The

19 guidance you were further seeking is contained in the few questions I put

20 to the witness. I hope that will assist you.

21 Could the witness be escorted out of the courtroom.

22 [The witness stands down]

23 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break and we will resume at 20 minutes to

24 2.00.

25 --- Recess taken at 1.20 p.m.

Page 16661

1 --- On resuming at 1.41 p.m.

2 JUDGE ORIE: The witness will be escorted into the courtroom.

3 [The witness takes the stand]

4 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

5 MR. IVETIC: [Microphone not activated] thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Sir, when drafting this document, and in particular the paragraph

7 that we still have up on the screen, did you anticipate and expect for

8 the investigating officers to undertake on their own to go back and check

9 the transcripts of all your prior testimony, to learn about, for

10 instance, the Kravica account of detainees having overtaken guards and

11 having engaged in a fire-fight leading to casualties on both sides?

12 A. No, sir. All I -- my expectation was that simply was with this

13 information, if they interviewed an individual who stated that he was at

14 Kravica, that the investigating agent would simply have enough background

15 information to know that that might be of some significance.

16 Q. Do you know, sir, that one of the individuals who was removed

17 from the United States as a result of the work of the unit based upon

18 this report was exonerated by the state court of BiH this year?

19 Mr. Nedjo Ikonic?

20 A. Yes, sir, I am aware of that. He's not the only one.

21 Q. How many have been exonerated?

22 A. I believe there was an individual who was removed in 2005, since

23 he was exonerated, I don't know that I want to give his name in open

24 court. That's obviously a discretionary matter for the Court. But --

25 JUDGE ORIE: I do not -- the Chamber does not insist on

Page 16662

1 mentioning the name.

2 MR. IVETIC: I don't either. I'm asking numbers. I'm happy

3 with numbers.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

5 THE WITNESS: Again, our position is when -- recognising those

6 issues, you know, the fact that as far as the United States government is

7 concerned, our equity in investigating these issues has circles around

8 whether or not the individual was truthful to the United States

9 government as part of his process to becoming a refugee into the

10 United States. We do not have jurisdiction over these actual war crimes

11 simply as a restriction of the laws that are or were in place in the

12 United States. So, again, I take your point that he was acquitted in

13 Bosnia but he did acknowledge his guilt in the United States for

14 misrepresenting material facts on his immigration applications to come to

15 our country.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, could I ask you something? You earlier

17 used the word "was exonerated," is that the witness used "acquitted."

18 That's not exactly the same. Did you intend to refer to being acquitted?

19 MR. IVETIC: I did, Your Honours and I apologise. I was

20 translating the B/C/S into English and it sometimes comes out wrong.

21 JUDGE ORIE: I just wanted to seek clarification of the use of

22 those words. Please proceed.

23 MR. IVETIC:

24 Q. If I could turn to page 6 of this document, just a few more

25 questions and then we can move on to another topic.

Page 16663

1 The middle of the second paragraph of this paragraph reads as

2 follows:

3 "Notwithstanding the general co-operation between the ICTY and US

4 government, the specific names of over 11.000 Bosnian Serb military

5 personnel assigned to units associated with the Srebrenica crimes was not

6 made available to US Immigration and Customs Enforcement until

7 July 2003."

8 Now, I note, sir, that this is, I believe, just before you left

9 the OTP. Were you involved in the transfer of this information or do you

10 have any knowledge of the same? Apart from what's written here?

11 A. Yes, sir. I was involved in the transfer of that information.

12 The United States government was investigating the case relating to

13 Marko Boskic, who was a member of the 10th Sabotage Unit in July 1995.

14 Their investigators were here at -- for a point in time investigating

15 that. They made a request with respect to the Office of the Prosecutor,

16 if they could get additional names of individuals associated with Eastern

17 Bosnia in July 1995. And since I was travelling back to the United

18 States on home leave, I was designated by the chief of investigations to

19 hand carry that list and deliver it to the immigration authorities.

20 Again, at that time, I was a UN employee and at that time I did not even

21 have an application in to Immigration and Customs Enforcement. So in

22 that capacity, I was operating strictly on orders from the OTP.

23 Q. Did that information that you provided assist you in getting

24 hired by ICE?

25 A. No, sir, it did not.

Page 16664

1 Q. Okay. If we can turn to page 10, I have just one more section

2 from this and one more question to ask you about. The second to last

3 sentence on the page reads as follows:

4 "All ICE requests should be forwarded to IRS Butler who will

5 co-ordinate them and ensure no duplications of requests or efforts."

6 Now, here, they are talking about requests of immigration and

7 naturalisation to the ICTY. Can I assume that IRS Butler refers to you?

8 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

9 Q. Okay. And am I understanding this correctly that you in your own

10 memo are volunteering or appointing yourself as official liaison between

11 the US immigration service and the Prosecutor of the ICTY?

12 A. I don't know that I appointed myself into that motion, but the

13 decision was taken that in light of the OTP's position that they didn't

14 want to be bombarded by requests, and our position that we did not want

15 dozens of agents in disparate communities doing different investigations

16 to bombard them with requests, a decision was made by my agency that the

17 request would come through me and that I would at least organise them.

18 I would also add that while it's not visible in this memorandum, again

19 our requests from Immigration and Customs Enforcement particularly in

20 these days did not go directly to the ICTY but also had to go through the

21 legal attache office at the US embassy. So, again, part of this was to

22 ensure that the established process by which various organs of the

23 United States government communicated with the ICTY and the

24 Office of the Prosecutor, which are tracked by the Department of State,

25 are maintained and we did not get into a scenario where an individual

Page 16665

1 case agent would try to pick up the phone and directly call people at the

2 OTP.

3 Q. Okay. I forgot one other critical point, if we can turn to the

4 last page of this document. And while we are waiting for that, sir, you

5 list and direct for among other information sources that the officers

6 should look at the Karadzic and Mladic case. So I have to ask you: Do

7 you believe a conviction of Mr. Mladic would further the efforts of your

8 office in prosecuting people in the US for crimes that you say occurred

9 in Srebrenica?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. Okay. Then we can leave this document behind and move on.

12 You testified during direct examination for the Prosecution on

13 the topic of the ABiH intercepts. Would you agree with me that the ABiH

14 intercepts figure prominently in your conclusions and your reports,

15 especially in the narrative Srebrenica report?

16 A. I do agree that they are catalogued in the report, and clearly

17 I do rely on them, as well as my other -- the other documents to form my

18 conclusions, yes, sir.

19 Q. Now, at transcript page 16116 on last Tuesday you said that you

20 were personally very skeptical about the intercepts themselves,

21 particularly since their source was the other party opposed to the Serbs,

22 until you verified them. Now, first of all, when you say intercepts,

23 I would like to make sure we are talking about the same things. Are

24 we -- are the intercepts that you are talking about limited to those from

25 the ABiH 2nd Corps and relating to Srebrenica and July 1995 and the

Page 16666

1 surrounding area, or do your comments and review relate to intercepts

2 from other sources relating to other areas and other time periods?

3 A. What I'm relating that comment to are the intercepts that I have

4 had an opportunity to review as part of the first part of my

5 investigation, when I was actually here, which includes those -- I

6 believe they are commonly called the ABiH 2 corps intercepts, which we

7 received from various collection sites and ABiH 2 corps itself. I've

8 testified in the past about what I think the OTP refers to as tactical

9 intercepts. They are not in my reports because the OTP obtained them

10 after my departure here. But, I again, the same situation is applied.

11 I mean, I look at them skeptically at first but I have come to believe

12 that they are authentic, and that is why I testified to them in certain

13 cases. I know that there is a broader body of intercept information that

14 encompasses 1993, 1994, and from other sources. I don't believe I've

15 ever reviewed that particular information, so obviously I'm not in the

16 position to corroborate anything outside of the collections that I just

17 spoke of.

18 Q. And in relation to these intercepts, at transcript page 16119 of

19 this trial, you have testified that there are two aspects to apprising

20 the reliability of these intercepts which you and other analysts were

21 involved in. Before we get to those two aspects themselves, can you

22 please identify for me who apart from yourself was involved in this

23 verification process of the intercepts?

24 A. Well, with respect to the military analysts, again my primary

25 assistants were Ms. Amanda Brettle and Sally Latin. I understand and

Page 16667

1 obviously was involved in part of the process with authentication which

2 Ms. Stefanie Frease undertook as part of a member of the Srebrenica team.

3 Q. Did you consider yourself personally to be qualified to perform

4 this type of analysis?

5 A. I would tell you yes. The reality is that as an intelligence

6 officer, I am required, as part of my position, to analyse incoming raw

7 information, as it were, and make determinations as to the reliability of

8 that information. The fact that I was doing it here -- again, I've done

9 it in other locations for the US government. So I'm not unfamiliar with

10 not only the capabilities but also the limitations of information that

11 intercepts can bring.

12 Q. Okay. Now, at page 16119 of the transcript, you say that the

13 first prong of analysis is that you look at the technical perspectives to

14 see if a party had the technical capability of intercepting the

15 communications. And if I understand you correctly, your testimony is

16 that in your opinion, the ABiH did have the technical capability to

17 intercept these communications. Am I correct?

18 A. Yes, sir. I mean, I've actually in the course of the

19 investigation, I recall visiting at least one of the collection sites

20 where the equipment was. I know that I have looked at various maps

21 pertaining to where the individual collectors or their antennas were

22 located and verified that appropriate line of sight existed. So, you

23 know, they weren't trying to collect through a mountain. I mean,

24 obviously you have to be able to have some line of sight to the various

25 radio emitters that you're seeking to select on, that the equipment that

Page 16668

1 they had was technically capable of doing that, and that the operators

2 themselves had enough of an understanding of the target environment in

3 order to understand what they were collecting.

4 Q. Now, I'm sure, based upon what you've just told us, that you

5 sound like you've logged quite a number of hours sitting in front of an

6 RRU-800 radio device of the type used by the VRS. Can you please tell us

7 how often you've had occasion to utilise such a device in the US army to

8 send and receive such communications?

9 A. None. But then again my qualification is not talking on a

10 particular radio. My qualification is reading and analysing what is

11 captured from those particular radios by intelligence collectors.

12 Q. In the course of your duties as an intelligence officer with the

13 United States armed forces, have you had occasion to personally

14 participate hands on in the technical aspects of signal interception of

15 communications carried over an RRU-800 radio relay network?

16 A. I am about at the limit of what I can discuss with respect to my

17 specific work with signals intelligence. So at this point I don't

18 believe I can comment any further.

19 JUDGE ORIE: What does impose that limit?

20 THE WITNESS: Sir, I would be at the risk of potentially

21 disclosing classified information, or at least information my government

22 considers classified with respect to the capabilities and limitation of

23 our own collection equipment. Again, as I've testified, and I can

24 testify, I obviously was not involved with intelligence collection

25 related to Bosnia in the pre-war years or even, you know, through the

Page 16669

1 conflict. But I cannot exclude the possibility obviously that some of

2 the equipment he is discussing I've not had some involvement with in

3 other environments in the world. So I don't know how to get past that.

4 JUDGE ORIE: If we take out the reference to the specific

5 equipment, then the question would remain whether, in the course of your

6 duties as an intelligence officer with the United States Armed Forces,

7 whether you had occasion to personally participate, hands on, in the

8 technical aspects of signal interception.

9 THE WITNESS: I can answer that question affirmatively, yes, sir.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

11 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

12 Q. I'm going to try and phrase this in a careful enough way to see

13 if you can answer this one. Am I correct, sir, that your duties at the

14 US army that we went through the other day, generally speaking, dealt

15 with analysis of SIGINT that others had intercepted rather than actually

16 personally intercepting such communications?

17 A. Correct, sir. It was not my primary duty. It was simply, again,

18 as a focus of an analyst's ability to understand the limits of

19 intelligence collection and the conditions that it's done under because I

20 have to understand that in order to pass a judgement as to whether or not

21 the information is reliable as a component of my own broader analysis.

22 So, again, just like, you know, not only in the SIGINT field but in the

23 HUMINT field I am called upon to make judgements pertaining to the

24 ability, the reliability of various intelligence collection methods and

25 means as part of relying on them.

Page 16670

1 Q. Now, as to your conclusion that the ABiH had the technical

2 capability of intercepting communications from the VRS, did you rely

3 solely upon your own knowledge and experience or did you rely upon any

4 other technical experts, either within the OTP or external to the OTP?

5 A. I relied on, one, the testimonies and, first the statements and

6 the testimonies of many of the individual collectors. I relied on

7 looking at analysis of the information and cross-indexing it against

8 other facts that we knew to exist, such as documents and orders or other

9 events that occurred on the ground that would tend to confirm or deny

10 that the intercepts were valid. I am aware that we had several

11 individuals who were -- or at least one individual who was a member of

12 the -- I think it was Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau in the

13 United States who was an expert in audiotapes because the Tribunal or the

14 OTP had obtained audiotapes of some of these intercepted conversations

15 and we went to the degree of looking at those audiotapes in order to

16 determine if they were also authentic. So those are the resources that

17 I used.

18 Q. Can you tell me, sir, were you able to physically review the

19 actual radio equipment that the ABiH 2nd Corps were using or their

20 antenna setup that they were purportedly using to intercept VRS

21 communications in situ?

22 A. Well, again, not in a contemporary setting. I did go to one of

23 their collection sites. I did see their and antenna array and get a

24 description of the antenna array that they used in 1995. They did bring

25 out for us some of the short-wave or radio equipment that they were using

Page 16671

1 in 1995. But, again, what they were using in 1995 at that site and what

2 they were using when we inspected in 1998 was different. So we could see

3 the equipment but we couldn't actually see it working because it was a

4 live site.

5 Q. And when you say that you got a description of the antenna array

6 and the equipment and they brought out short-wave or radio equipment,

7 were you relying upon the written documents from 1995 as to what the

8 technical capabilities of both the DX radio [Realtime transcript read in

9 error "video"] equipment and the antenna arrays attached there to were?

10 A. I was relying on my discussions with the various individuals at

11 that one site.

12 MR. IVETIC: One correction to the transcript, page 85, line 12,

13 should be "DX radio equipment," unless I misspoke, which is shorthand for

14 short-wave.

15 Q. But, sir, in relation to the radios themselves and the antennas

16 themselves, did you visually examine them? Did you take any -- take

17 anything apart or perform any technical test to determine the

18 capabilities of those pieces of equipment, or was it solely based upon

19 these discussions that you just mentioned with the various individuals at

20 that one site?

21 A. No, sir. I did not take any equipment apart or conduct any

22 technical tests of that nature.

23 Q. Were the short-wave radios that were shown to you at this time in

24 1998 civilian or military models?

25 A. They were civilian models.

Page 16672

1 Q. Okay. Would you agree that --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one thing? How do you see the

3 difference between a civilian model radio equipment and military?

4 THE WITNESS: Most -- the radio frequency spectrum in most

5 countries are divided between frequencies that are available for the

6 general public's use, frequencies that are available for government use,

7 frequencies that are available for commercial use. It mattered because

8 obviously off-the-shelf civilian equipment normally does not have the

9 crystal or the frequency setting in order to reach up into -- or to

10 monitor frequency waves that are dedicated government or military use,

11 particularly if they are from a certain country.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, I understand that answer. Is it on the

13 basis of documentation of that equipment or by type numbers that you

14 established whether it was civilian or military?

15 THE WITNESS: My personal observation, I can see that it was

16 civilian, and of course that is what predicated my question in the

17 discussion with some of the radio operators, which was how they were able

18 to use civilian equipment to essentially intercept frequencies that were

19 authorised or used by military and government forces in that particular

20 region, which then led to the discussion about how they were able to

21 modify the radios in order to reach those particular frequencies.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So they were modified civilian models? Is

23 that how I have to understand it?

24 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, as it was discussed with me with the two

25 radios that I saw what they said is they basically were able to go in and

Page 16673

1 using crystals or other circuits that they were able to obtain abroad,

2 outside of the former Yugoslavia, they were able to modify these civilian

3 radios to be able to listen to frequencies that correspondingly the VRS

4 was using during the conflict.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

6 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

7 MR. IVETIC:

8 Q. The two radios that were presented to you, were you able to

9 visually see any modifications to them or did they look like stock,

10 off-the-shell, civilian models?

11 A. They looked like off-the-shelf civilian models. I could not

12 visibly ascertain anything from the outside.

13 Q. RM279 identified the receivers, civilian receivers in question as

14 being a Kenwood 450 and ICR-100, and that's at transcript page 13553 of

15 this trial. Did you, in fact, at any point in time, attempt to review

16 the technical manuals published by the manufacturers and find out the

17 technical specifications in relation to those devices?

18 A. No, sir, I did not.

19 MR. IVETIC: If we can look at P1646 briefly in e-court. If I've

20 got my numbers right this should be a photograph.

21 Q. Sir, this has been represented to be one of the radio receivers

22 used by the ABiH 2nd Corps. Does this look like one of the ones that was

23 presented to you on this occasion, at this location -- at one of the

24 locations in 1998?

25 A. It may have been. I mean, I have a memory of one of the radios

Page 16674

1 being white. It may have been one of the ones they showed me or not. I

2 don't recall.

3 Q. That's fair enough. At this time I would like to ask you, sir,

4 what is your understanding of the types of radio communications equipment

5 that were in use by the VRS at the various echelons of the Main Staff,

6 the corps, the brigade and the battalion echelons on the territory of

7 Srebrenica, Bratunac, Zvornik, et cetera, in July of 1995? Did you have

8 that? I mean, I'm not asking you to recite them now.

9 A. I appreciate that. I could answer that. Boy, I knew that

10 question dead on back in 2000, obviously because one of General Krstic's

11 primary defences was that the intercepts were essentially fake or in

12 their entire body and that we had to go through an entire drill to

13 validate that. I can say generally, you know, what the VRS was using was

14 what most militaries use which is a standard ultra-high frequency

15 multi-channel radio relay setup. I believe that many of the documents

16 that the OTP has actually lays out the entire communication schematic of

17 the VRS. The key thing for me, frankly, was that this particular network

18 operated what we call in the clear or in the red, which means that they

19 were not operating this network in an enciphered mode. For whatever

20 reason they were either unwilling or unable to obtain the necessary

21 cipher from the FRY. I don't know the reason behind that. But they were

22 operating the radio equipment, the encryption -- it was not encrypted,

23 and as a result it could be intercepted because the frequency spectrum

24 that it operated on lended itself to be intercepted.

25 Q. Was it your understanding that none of the radio communications

Page 16675

1 equipment of the VRS was being operated in encrypted mode? Is that your

2 understanding of the circumstances?

3 A. No, sir. I mean, clearly when one looks at the teletype messages

4 that are going back and forth, those are encrypted, and as a result, the

5 ABiH was not able to collect against them. I'm sure some of the tactical

6 communications among key officers would have been encrypted by encryption

7 devices that you might find, for example, on the RU 12 or things of that

8 nature. But in July of 1995, in at least the portion of the VRS

9 communications backbone that was in Eastern Bosnia on the multi-channel

10 network, those communications were not encrypted.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I'm looking at the clock -- Mr. Ivetic,

12 yes.

13 MR. IVETIC: We can take the break for the day. Sorry.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Butler, I again would like to instruct you

15 that you should not speak or communicate in whatever way with whomever

16 about your testimony, whether already given or still to be given.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

18 JUDGE ORIE: And we would like to see you back at 9.30 tomorrow

19 morning in this same courtroom.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

21 JUDGE ORIE: You may follow the usher.

22 [The witness stands down]

23 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow,

24 Friday, the 13th of September in this same Courtroom I at 9.30 in the

25 morning.