Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 17097

 1                           Friday, 20 September 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around the

 6     courtroom.

 7             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 9             This is the case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11             Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

12             Meanwhile, I use the opportunity to put the following on the

13     record.  The Chamber recalls the Prosecution requests to use common

14     charts with upcoming witness, John Clark, and witness RM016DD and the

15     Chamber hereby grants the same.

16             Then a follow-up to the decision of the 14th Rule 92 bis motion.

17     Witness RM37's statements and associated exhibits were admitted on the

18     28th of June of this year on the condition that the Prosecution provide

19     the required attestation pursuant to Rule 92 bis B.  The Chamber has

20     reviewed the attestation in the meantime, and hereby confirms admission

21     of P2227 up to and including P2229.

22             The last item I'd like to deal with is a short corrigendum.  And

23     it's a follow-up to a decision on the Prosecution's 22nd motion

24     Rule 92 bis.  The motion was filed on the 23rd of August of this year,

25     and one of the admitted transcript portions in the Chamber's decision for

Page 17098

 1     Witness RM001 appears as 6422, lines 13 to 15, the decision should read,

 2     lines 13 to 25.  Furthermore all references in the decision to Rule 65

 3     ter numbers 7701A and 7701B should be understood as referring to 6701A

 4     and 6701B.

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, when I said that the 22nd motion Rule 92 bis

 8     motion was filed on the 23rd of August I made a mistake because it was

 9     the decision which was filed on that day and it's a correction to that

10     decision.

11             Good morning, Mr. Milovanovic.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Apologies for continuing with a procedural matter

14     when you entered the courtroom, but we'll now immediately start.

15             Mr. Lukic, if you're ready, and after I have reminded

16     Mr. Milovanovic that he is still bound by the solemn declaration he has

17     given at the beginning of his testimony, you may proceed.

18                           WITNESS:  MANOJLO MILOVANOVIC [Resumed]

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic: [Continued]

22        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

23        A.   Good morning.

24             MR. LUKIC:  Can we call up in e-court P2219.

25        Q.   General, you were shown this document.  As we could see, the

Page 17099

 1     translation is wrong.  At this time, I should like to ask that a

 2     translation be revised.  We -- I think we do know the correct translation

 3     of item 2 of page 17005, line 19.  Therefore, on that page our --

 4     transcript can we find the correct translation.

 5             This is my question for you, General.  My learned friend Groome

 6     tied the issue of this document with the incident at Dobrinja and the

 7     incident at Markale that we've referred to as Markale I of February 1994,

 8     but I'll not be asking you about that specifically because this is a

 9     matter for experts in ballistics to deal with.

10             I'll ask you this:  Were you aware of the fact that the Muslim

11     authorities opened fire at their own population in order to gain the

12     sympathy of western countries and make NATO proceed with air-strikes?

13        A.   There were stories to that effect all around, especially after

14     the incident of 27 May 1992, when those citizens lining up for bread or

15     water in Vase Miskina Street were killed.

16             The Serbs were accused.  Now, the investigation into who was

17     responsible was discontinued because a Muslim delegation abandoned talks

18     for, I believe, Cutileiro Plan 2.  The negotiations fell through.  This

19     was especially much talked about after Markale I.  I'm not that familiar

20     with the incident at Dobrinja, though I am familiar with Markale I.  I

21     had several talks with the Chief of Staff of UNPROFOR, General Ramsey.

22             On that first evening, blame was attached to the Serbs right

23     away, and this was aired.  However, over the course of the following

24     several days, it turned out that it wasn't the sort of shell that he was

25     mentioning and then some other issues surfaced as well.  So the incident

Page 17100

 1     which was initially attributed to the Serb -- was open to doubt.

 2             As for the Muslims, well, it was common knowledge that the

 3     Muslims waged wars amongst themselves.

 4        Q.   You have answered my next question, in part.  It is of a more

 5     general nature.

 6             Was it during and before the international conference and in the

 7     course of a visit of a foreign delegation the case that civilians would

 8     be killed on a massive scale in Sarajevo?

 9        A.   I can state quite responsibly that such incidents where Muslim

10     civilians would be killed on a massive scale would take place precisely

11     at the time or prior to certain negotiations.  Or, if the Muslim side,

12     and this was something that they always aspired toward, prompted NATO to

13     engage in air-strikes against the Serbs.  So they would be provoking the

14     Serbs, who would then respond, and that's how it would end.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, no time-frame, no specifics.  Just

16     general statements which will not assist the Chamber.  Whereas, the

17     Chamber would be interested in having detailed information about such

18     events.

19             Please proceed.

20             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, my question was general, and your answer was general,

22     too, then.

23             This is my next question:  Do you know of any specific, say,

24     around Markale I, what conference was in course at the time, if you

25     remember?

Page 17101

 1        A.   I don't know which conference it was specifically.  It was about

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I don't know the specific topic.  General Mladic

 3     and Karadzic were both present.

 4             I think it was an attempt to stop the war in Sarajevo.  It had to

 5     do with a demilitarisation of Sarajevo.

 6        Q.   Following the incident at Markale, pressure was brought to bear

 7     upon the Serbs to withdraw their armaments; right?  And I mean around

 8     Sarajevo.

 9        A.   Following Markale, NATO issued an ultimatum that we should

10     withdraw our artillery away from Sarajevo.  At first, it was

11     30 kilometres; and then, as I said, in the agreement, 20 kilometres were

12     referred to.  The Serbs were faced with a choice:  Either to withdraw

13     their artillery, i.e., to fulfil the ultimatum; or to refuse to implement

14     the ultimatum and suffer bombs.

15        Q.   Were any obligations imposed upon the Muslim side in situations

16     such as this one?  Say, post-Markale, in terms of withdrawal of weaponry.

17     We heard that the Serbs were supposed to withdraw their weapons away from

18     Sarajevo.  Was something of the nature imposed upon the Muslims?

19        A.   I don't know that in the ultimatum NATO requested something of

20     the sort from the Muslims but I do know that commander of UNPROFOR

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina, General Michael Rose, placed a similar requirement

22     upon the Muslims, that they should withdraw their weaponry.

23             Our counter-request was that, since we were more powerful and

24     withdrawing our artillery away from Sarajevo, the Muslims should withdraw

25     elements of their infantry from their positions into barracks, because

Page 17102

 1     their infantry was powerful.  The negotiations on the

 2     9th of February arranged this, but this was never effected.  We withdrew

 3     our artillery, but the entire Muslim corps continued to occupy their

 4     positions.

 5        Q.   You were shown two documents:  P2200 and P2221.  The question

 6     that followed had to do with fuel air-bombs.  Your -- you said that you

 7     weren't familiar with those.

 8             I'll explain to you now what it was that you were shown, in fact.

 9     This sort of bombs used the blast effect to kill personnel rather than

10     damage buildings.  Fuel air-bombs were used in Vietnam when the Americans

11     called them a specific name because they were used for the destruction of

12     forests and vegetation.  They were called Daisy Mower.

13             Did the Serb army possess such bombs, to the best of your

14     knowledge?

15        A.   No.  I said over the past days that I only heard of these fuel

16     air-bombs in connection with my studies of the Vietnam war.

17        Q.   You were next asked to describe the launchers of aerial bombs.

18     They were referred to as "skalamerija".  The Greek word "skelanos" means

19     distorted.  In our language, in slang it's a term that is used for any

20     sort of item that -- whose purpose isn't really known or to what use it

21     can be put.  Any sort of contraption, really.  Would this term of

22     "skalamerija" be an official term that is used?

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome.

24             MR. GROOME:  Just seems I let the previous question go.  But now

25     this one question seems -- again, Mr. Lukic seems to be testifying or

Page 17103

 1     providing evidence which I'm not sure it's the most appropriate way to

 2     get this before the Chamber.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  That came to my mind as well, Mr. Lukic.

 4             MR. GROOME:  Perhaps the Chamber might permit exceptionally the

 5     interpreters just to explain to us what the word "skalamerija" means in

 6     English.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  It means "contraption."

 8             MR. LUKIC:  I think it's usually in this courtroom that we

 9     sometimes have citations from vocabulary, or from -- from books, how they

10     are explained.  So I wanted to ask General whether it's official name for

11     this weapon or some -- it's something -- what he used to name this

12     weapon.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Ask questions of fact, Mr. -- yes, let me see.

14     Whether it's the official name of this weapon is one.  But I'm just

15     looking at the -- what the witness said about this name at all.

16     Because -- let me check.  I'm looking at page 17015.

17             Do you know what weapons Mr. Lukic is talking about?  And did you

18     have a name for that weapon he refers to?  What name did you use?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Over the past day, I referred to

20     this "skalamerija," "the contraption".  In Serbian it means that it's an

21     item that was put together in a makeshift way, looks quite cumbersome,

22     but is useful.  Colonel Rajko Balac, chief of artillery, and I referred

23     to it as "skalamerija" and it was called "skalamerija 94," in fact.  It

24     was no official name for it.  An official name for it would be "aerial

25     bomb launcher."  I wasn't aware of any code-name for it, M94, or anything

Page 17104

 1     of that kind.  As for the piece itself, I only saw a model of it.  I

 2     never saw it in real life, in transport, or in combat.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  The reason why I was a bit confused, Mr. Lukic, is

 4     because the witness used the name "skalamerija" himself previously.  So

 5     apparently it's not an official name.  I still am a bit lost where we are

 6     going at this moment.

 7             But put clear questions to the witness, and you might get me on

 8     track again.

 9             MR. LUKIC:  I will move on.  I had not dwell on this -- this

10     topic anymore.

11        Q.   [Interpretation] General, I'd like to ask you questions about

12     President Karadzic now.

13             Did it so happen in the war-time years in Bosnia-Herzegovina that

14     you received orders directly from President Karadzic?

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, it's my recollection that the witness

16     said that this happened now and then and that he then told Mr. Karadzic

17     there was no use of doing it because he would always first verify with

18     Mr. Mladic.

19             So, therefore, I do not know if there's anything in addition to

20     that you'd like to know.  Ask the witness, but he has told us quite a bit

21     about that.

22             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   I wanted to specifically ask you about 1995, when problems emerge

24     in the western front, threatening entire municipalities in

25     Republika Srpska.

Page 17105

 1             Can you describe the situation in more detail for us, please.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Are you still with -- receiving orders from

 3     Mr. Karadzic directly?

 4             MR. LUKIC:  Yes.  Yes, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Well, that's not clear from your question.

 6             Could you tell us about direct orders you received in the -- at

 7     the western front in approximately 1995, receiving direct orders from

 8     Mr. Karadzic?

 9             Did you receive such orders?  First question.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did receive such orders in

11     July and August 1995 up until the time when General Mladic arrived on the

12     western front which was sometime in early August 1995.  He attended a

13     meeting of the Supreme Command in Drvar and stayed by my side until the

14     end.

15             However, despite the fact that General Mladic was present,

16     President Karadzic visited with me at the IKM of the Main Staff and tried

17     to give me orders.  But I did tell him things that I told him before,

18     that this was duality of command, the introduction of parallel lines in

19     command.  Specifically --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Milovanovic, you've told us that already.

21             Mr. Lukic, are you interested to know what orders, when, where,

22     what about?  Okay.  Let's ask.

23             Could you give us one of these orders:  Given where, when, and

24     what about.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I can just speak of

Page 17106

 1     one.  I cannot recall the places, times, and objectives as for others.

 2     But, for instance, on the 3rd of August, 1995, Karadzic; Krajisnik; the

 3     minister of defence, Ninkovic; the chief of state security,

 4     Krnajic [phoen], stopped by at my staff, and also Karadzic's advisor,

 5     General Subotic.

 6             Karadzic started about speaking renaming the Main Staff into the

 7     General Staff.  I asked him -- actually, I asked him whether all of those

 8     present should be listening, and he said that everybody else should leave

 9     expect for Krajisnik, and then he said to me, General, we are renaming

10     the Main Staff into the General Staff.  General Mladic will be replaced

11     and he will be the special advisor for defence for Republika Srpska and

12     the Republic of Serb Krajina.  And I shot back by way of a response

13     saying that I would not be head of that General Staff.

14             Krajisnik added, Radovan, let him be now.  This is an initial

15     action on the spur of the moment.  As a soldier, he will have to receive

16     his orders.  The order did arrive the next day.  Again, I refused it even

17     in writing; that is to say, all generals of Republika Srpska refused and

18     signed a petition to the Assembly of Republika Srpska.  It was the

19     Assembly that appointed Ratko Mladic as head of the Main Staff, so it is

20     only the Assembly that can relieve him of that duty, not the president.

21             MR. LUKIC:  I would just intervene here for the sake of the

22     correct transcript.  The witness didn't say the "president" but he said

23     the "Supreme Commander."

24             JUDGE ORIE:  At least that's what you heard.  It will be

25     verified.

Page 17107

 1             But the president was the supreme commander.  We do agree on

 2     that.

 3             MR. LUKIC:  It is the same person only --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay, yes.  No different, but Mr. Karadzic --

 5             MR. LUKIC:  It's a different term, yes.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 7             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Let me just ask you, what did you say?  It was only the assembly

 9     that could replace and not the president, or did you say it could only

10     have been the assembly, not the Supreme Commander, if you remember at all

11     what it was?  It's the same person, of course.

12        A.   Believe me, I don't remember whether I said Supreme Commander or

13     president.  But I know for sure that I mentioned the name of

14     Radovan Karadzic irrespective of which term I used and his dual role is

15     something that everyone is well aware of.

16        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  Was there a clash, a conflict between

17     General Ratko Mladic and the president, the Supreme Commander,

18     Radovan Karadzic; and, if so, what did it consist of, and from when did

19     it date?

20             Could you tell us in a few sentences?

21        A.   Throughout the war and especially after the war, there was a lot

22     of talk about that.  However, I never saw the two of them quarrel, and I

23     never was present during anything like that.  That there was this

24     conflict is something that I first of from Ms. Biljana Plavsic on

25     Saint Vitus Day, the 28th of June, 1993.  A class of soldiers was being

Page 17108

 1     sworn in on that occasion, and she delivered a speech to them.  And she

 2     started saying that the Supreme Command could not take General Mladic and

 3     she turned to me, addressed me, in front of these masses, and she said,

 4     General, I ask you to protect General Mladic.  I tried somehow to caution

 5     her about that but that did not go.  However, when she said that, there

 6     were 10.000 people there, parents, relatives of the young soldiers, and

 7     there was applause all round.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the next

 9     sentence.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Between Mladic and Karadzic there

11     were other --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  You said, "... there were 10.000 people, parents,

13     relatives of the young soldiers," and there was -- and then the

14     interpreters got lost.  Could you repeat what you said after "parents,

15     relatives of the young soldiers, and ..."

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  What we can see in the

17     transcript was "applause all round."  But then another sentence followed.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Then you said "applause all round," and then you

19     added something.  Could you repeat what you then added after you said

20     "applause all round."

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I tried by way of a grimace to

22     caution Biljana Plavsic and to indicate to her that this was not the

23     place to discuss that.  However, she went on, and I think that after

24     referring to the applause I said that I never saw or heard the two of

25     them quarrelling or squabbling.  I attended sessions of the

Page 17109

 1     supreme command when the two of them exchanged views in a tone that was a

 2     bit sharper, also in terms of content, but I think that that is normal

 3     dialogue of two -- of the two most responsible people in the army.  So it

 4     never looked like a quarrel to me.

 5             As for an open misunderstanding, not between General Ratko Mladic

 6     and Supreme Commander Karadzic, that happened at the 50th Session of the

 7     National Assembly of Republika Srpska on 15th and 16th of June -- I'm

 8     sorry, April, 1995.  Karadzic and all deputies of the SDS rejected

 9     Mladic's expose about the situation and the needs of the VRS.  That was

10     made public, and I know that on the following day, in order to have a

11     shock absorber of this, if you will, the two of them toured the positions

12     of the 30th Division, the 1st Krajina Corps on Mount Vlasic.  And then

13     that was recorded, pictures were taken, it was filmed, and so on.  So it

14     was mitigated a bit.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, I'm -- put your next question to the

16     witness, and please focussed.  The witness gives very lengthy answers and

17     they have got often to do something far away with the question.  Please

18     keep focussed.

19             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   General, now I'm going to ask you something about the situation

21     in the Army of Republika Srpska, and we can provide short and concise

22     answers with regard to that.

23             Is it true that the VRS had a shortage of fuel and in which

24     periods was this most pronounced, if that was the case at all?

25        A.   Throughout the war, we had fuel shortages.  We were using the

Page 17110

 1     ammunition reserves that we had inherited from the JNA, and our materiel

 2     resources went down from day to day.  This culminate before the assembly

 3     in Sanski Most.

 4        Q.   Was there a shortage of manpower in the VRS?

 5             You can answer.

 6        A.   According to establishment of VRS, we did not have a shortage of

 7     soldiers.  We, however, had a lack of officers.

 8        Q.   The sanctions that Yugoslavia imposed against Republika Srpska,

 9     how did they affect the situation in terms of the combat readiness of the

10     VRS.  Please go ahead.

11        A.   Now I see that I can go ahead.  The sanctions that were imposed

12     on the 4th of August, 1994, well, I personally expected a catastrophe.

13     However, these were sanctions of the government of the

14     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, rather, the government of Serbia.

15     However, these were not sanctions of the people of Serbia.  One of the

16     measures included in these sanctions was, for example, prohibiting

17     politicians and generals of Republika Srpska to cross the Drina river.

18     Any time I had to cross the Drina river I would cross it without any

19     problems whatsoever at the border; that is to say that the persons who

20     were implementing this decision did not observe this decision of their

21     government.  This national patriotism was at work among the Serbs on the

22     other side of the Drina.  However, sanctions caused moral problems in the

23     commands of the Army of Republika Srpska in the Main Staff, in the corps

24     commands, because, until then, we always thought that we had a support in

25     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, regardless of what happened.

Page 17111

 1             However, we lost that support after rejecting the plan of the

 2     contact group.  Especially when sanctions were imposed in real terms on

 3     paper, we lost this one and only ally that had positive thoughts at least

 4     about us, if nothing else.  However, when we realised that the behaviour

 5     of the people in Serbia was quite different from the behaviour of the

 6     government, we calmed down and we continued the war.

 7             Sorry, may I just conclude?  So the imposition of sanctions by

 8     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against Republika Srpska did not

 9     decrease the combat readiness of the Army of Republika Srpska.

10        Q.   What about the balance of power in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  How

11     was it affected by supplying the Muslim and Croat side with weapons?

12     Also pressures by NATO?

13        A.   From the beginning of the war, our army was always on the losing

14     end as regards the balance of power.  First of all, the Muslims had

15     Croats as their ally, then Croatia as ally.  So not to go into the

16     actually balance, 4:1, 5:1, I can talk about specific operations.  For

17     example, Operation Storm, 11:1 in manpower, 23:1 in equipment in that

18     particular operation.  So every cannon, every piece of equipment that

19     crossed the border of Bosnia-Herzegovina went to the Muslim/Croat

20     coalition, not to the Serbs.  So it's only natural that we lost our

21     power, and if you look at our warfare, you will see that in the second

22     half of the war, we strove for victory, in particular, directions so that

23     we would keep up the morale of the army and the people, like the

24     counter-attack in Bihac and right now I cannot remember, Spreca.  That is

25     to say, small-scale operations that have to be efficient, though, in

Page 17112

 1     order to keep up combat morale.

 2             I will just give you one example:  On the 31st of August, 1994,

 3     the Muslim Supreme Command issued a public statement, saying that in the

 4     fighting until then, during 29 months of war, they lost 235.627 soldiers.

 5     My conclusion when I heard that was that they were trying to justify NATO

 6     air-strikes against the Serbs that started on the 29th of August.  And

 7     the question is:  How big their army was if they had that kind of losses,

 8     a quarter of a million people.  Eight per cent are world norms not -- or

 9     standards.  Not to go into that now.  We'd have to be talking about the

10     Chinese army.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Approximately three minutes, the question started by

12     the affect by supplying the Muslim and Croat side with weapons.  I've not

13     heard any specific reference to apart from all the weapons that entered

14     into Bosnia and pressure by NATO.  I've heard about who tried to

15     influence NATO.  But we are far away from the questions.

16             Mr. Lukic, you should keep in control of the examination of the

17     witness.  And please keep that in mind by both putting clear, concise

18     questions, and by interrupting the witness if he moves away from what you

19     asked him.

20             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, it's not clear yet.  You said that 23:1 was the ratio in

22     terms of equipment.  In whose favour in this operation that you referred

23     to?

24        A.   Of the Croat armed forces.

25        Q.   Is it correct that the Main Staff was undermanned throughout as

Page 17113

 1     well?  It was manned by 33 per cent.  That's the information I have.

 2             Please go ahead.

 3        A.   Throughout the war, 36 per cent was the highest level of manning

 4     reached.  That was a conscious policy on the part of the head of the

 5     Main Staff so that as many officers as possible would be on the front

 6     line to command units, to lead units; whereas we, in the staff, took care

 7     of staff work and usually one man would be doing two or three related

 8     jobs.

 9        Q.   Now briefly about units attached to the staff.  You mentioned the

10     10th Sabotage Detachment, the 65th Regiment, and so on.  When they were

11     sent to the front line, is it correct that, at the same time, they would

12     be resubordinated to the commander who would be heading that particular

13     operation or action, or did people from the Main Staff command them in

14     those situations when they would be sent into combat?

15        A.   If the operation in question was not a complex one - in other

16     words, if not more than one or two corps were included - then parts of

17     those units were resubordinated, such as battalions.  Seldom did it

18     happen that entire regiments or guards brigade would be subordinated.

19     However, if it was a complex operation headed by either the commander of

20     the Main Staff or myself, then that unit was placed under our command;

21     that is to say, under the command of someone from the Main Staff.  So the

22     corps did not command the Protection Regiment which would be included in

23     their operation.

24        Q.   So the corps only commanded parts of units, if they had been

25     resubordinated; correct?

Page 17114

 1        A.   Yes.  But resubordination is always limited, in terms of time and

 2     space.  It has a beginning and an end, as well as two points in the

 3     field.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  You also mentioned the equipment which remained in

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Is it true that in the territory controlled by the

 6     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council, there were

 7     still warehouses of the former JNA?  And, if you know, can you tell us

 8     which warehouses remained in their territory?

 9        A.   I do know that there were some, but I can't name any single

10     warehouse in the territory of the Federation.  I wasn't there during the

11     war or in peacetime.  But I do know what was left behind was the

12     ammunition factory called Igman near Konjic and a cartridge factory which

13     was taken from us in Gorazde called Pobeda.  So they could continue

14     producing ammunition for the needs of the coalition armed forces.

15        Q.   Thank you.  We are nearing the end.

16             Let me ask you something about General Mladic next.  We know that

17     following the meeting at which General Zivanovic had his going away

18     party, or farewell party, you went to the west again.  It was sometime

19     after the 20th of July, 1993; correct?

20        A.   I think it was the 23rd of July, 1995.  I know because that

21     afternoon I returned to the western part.

22        Q.   General Mladic, too, arrived in the western front - correct? - in

23     August?

24        A.   Yes, in early August.

25        Q.   At the western front, did you discuss with him any events

Page 17115

 1     concerning Srebrenica in July, or were you busy with something else?

 2        A.   I did not discuss Srebrenica with him because I was busy

 3     preparing a session of the Supreme Command, which took place on the

 4     1st of August, I believe.

 5             Later, events became more turbulent.  On the 4th of August, Knin

 6     fell; on the 5th, Petrinja fell.  Croats went further afield with

 7     Operation Storm --

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  The question was focussed on whether you discussed

 9     Srebrenica or whether you were busy with other things.  I don't think

10     that Mr. Lukic would like to know exactly what other things you were busy

11     with.  He was primarily interested in whether you discussed Srebrenica.

12     The answer has been given.

13             Please proceed.

14             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15        Q.   As a matter of fact, I am interested in it and I'm sorry if it

16     wasn't reflected in my question.  Save for Knin and Petrinja, which other

17     municipalities fell during that period and what was it that kept you

18     busy?  You may begin answering.

19        A.   I cannot enumerate them all, but during that time, between the

20     1st of August and the Supreme Command session, following that date,

21     11 municipalities in western Krajina fell, starting with Glamoc, and

22     there was another municipality which fell the same day as Glamoc.

23        Q.   Was it Grahovo?

24        A.   Yes.  It fell in the morning, and that day I evacuated people

25     from Glamoc, so it wasn't lost in combat.  Then there were other

Page 17116

 1     municipalities which fell one after another.  Even before the

 2     1st of August, before Croats arrived in Knin, Drvar had been bombed.  So

 3     it was Drvar that fell, then Petrovac, then Kljuc, and all the way up to

 4     the Ugar river.  Eleven municipalities in total.

 5             So I didn't care much to talk to General Mladic or to discuss

 6     Srebrenica at the time.

 7        Q.   Did General Mladic ever tell you that he was in any way involved

 8     in the killing of prisoners in Srebrenica?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   As for your other colleagues from the Main Staff or in terms of

11     other possible sources in Republika Srpska, did you ever hear from any of

12     those that General Mladic was involved in either capturing or killing of

13     those prisoners in Srebrenica?  You may answer.

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   Did General Ratko Mladic order you to have the people in

16     Srebrenica killed?

17        A.   Order me?

18        Q.   Yes, you.

19        A.   No.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, they have not even discussed it.  Why --

21     it's -- it goes without saying, I would say, that the whole context of

22     the testimony of this witness, that it's a totally superfluous question.

23             MR. LUKIC:  We had a base for this question in the questions from

24     the Prosecution side, in direct.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Did the Prosecution claim in any of the questions

Page 17117

 1     that Mr. Mladic would have ordered General Milovanovic to kill people in

 2     Srebrenica?

 3             Mr. Groome, is that ...

 4             MR. GROOME:  I certainly don't recall saying anything -- anything

 5     like that.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Neither do I.  But, if so, please take us to it,

 7     because we may have missed something, Mr. Lukic.

 8             Please proceed.

 9             MR. LUKIC:  I just need two or three more minutes so maybe I

10     should continue.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then you're invited to conclude your

12     cross-examination in the next five minutes.

13             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14        Q.   [Interpretation] We heard what General Mladic said on the

15     12th of May, 1992, when he contributed to the discussion in -- following

16     Kalenic's statement when he cautioned the politicians against engaging in

17     genocide.  Could you conclude at any point in time that General Mladic

18     changed his position during the war?  Please go ahead.

19        A.   No.  Until I went to the west in late October, General Mladic had

20     not changed his position in terms of waging war or his position vis-a-vis

21     the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22        Q.   That was to be my next question, or at least part of it.  Did

23     General Mladic during the war ever order to have civilians or captured

24     enemy soldiers tortured, to the best of your knowledge, or killed?

25        A.   No.  I did hear on Radio Sarajevo a statement made by

Page 17118

 1     General Mladic.  All of Bosnia-Herzegovina could hear it at the beginning

 2     of the war that the Presidency building is to be targeted to stretch out

 3     the Muslims.

 4             Another thing which I heard was a conversation in jest between

 5     him and Colonel Balac.  Balac was sent to the environs of Srebrenica

 6     where he established communication with the Main Staff or the other way

 7     around.  I don't know who called whom, but Tolimir, General Mladic and I

 8     were in the office, as well as someone else, perhaps.  When

 9     General Mladic, through laughter, asked Balac, Klaso, are there any Turks

10     there? - Klaso meaning because of the fact that they were in the same

11     generation at the academy - he answered, Yes, there are as many as ants.

12     And Mr. Mladic laughed and he said, Fire at them.  And then -- then

13     somebody in the office started waving at General Mladic to be careful

14     what he was saying over communication lines --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness repeat

16     the very end of his answer.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you repeat the very last part of your answer.

18             We have on the transcript that somebody started waving at

19     General Mladic to be careful what he was saying over communication lines.

20             What did you then say following that?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Tolimir tugged at his

22     sleeve.  He was upset, telling him, Watch your mouth.  We are probably

23     being listened to.  And later on, we did find out that the telephone

24     conversation between the two of them was indeed intercepted, although I

25     don't know which armed force did, whether it was UNPROFOR or the Croats.

Page 17119

 1     It was broadcast on a Radio Sarajevo for several days.

 2             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did General Ratko Mladic order you anything, ever,

 4     which you believed that was unlawful and contrary to the laws and customs

 5     of war?  Please go ahead.

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Were you ever present when he ordered someone else to do

 8     something that would be unlawful and contrary to the laws and customs of

 9     war?  Go ahead.

10        A.   No.

11        Q.   Tell us, in a few sentences, what kind and man and general was

12     General Ratko Mladic?  And that would be my last question.

13        A.   I can put it all in one sentence.  During my service with

14     General Mladic, he was a charismatic person, a giant with a soft heart,

15     meaning that he did not hold things against people for long.  He was a

16     just and fair commander.  He protected his subordinates.

17        Q.   Does that conclude your answer?

18        A.   Yes, it does.

19        Q.   And this concludes my questions, General.  Thank you for

20     answering them.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Lukic.

22             We'll take a break.  But before doing that, Mr. Groome, could you

23     tell us how much time you would need to re-examine the witness.

24             MR. GROOME:  I think about -- approximately 45 minutes,

25     Your Honour.

Page 17120

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Approximately 45 minutes.

 2             Then you may already follow the usher.

 3                           [The witness stands down]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll take a break and we resume at 11.00.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Milovanovic, you'll now be re-examined by

10     Mr. Groome.

11             MR. GROOME:  Thank you.

12                           Re-examination by Mr. Groome:

13        Q.   Good morning, General Milovanovic.

14             All the questions I'm going to ask you this morning are going to

15     be very precise and focussed.  Could I ask you to limit your answers to

16     the precise piece of information that I'm seeking.

17             Yesterday at transcript 17088 to 89, Mr. Lukic asserted to you

18     that:

19             "No one from the army could make decisions as to whether a convoy

20     would pass through or not."

21             And you replied, "Yes."

22             I want to explore that answer in a bit more detail.

23             Now, when we speak of convoys am I correct that there were two

24     categories of convoys, the first carrying humanitarian assistance into

25     the enclaves; and the second, convoys resupplying the UNPROFOR troops

Page 17121

 1     stationed in the enclaves; is that correct?

 2             You can answer whenever you're ready.

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Now with respect to the commission that Mr. Lukic inquired about

 5     yesterday, the -- the commission of the RS government that only dealt

 6     with humanitarian convoys, it had nothing to do with the UNPROFOR

 7     resupply convoys; is that correct?

 8        A.   There was a committee for co-operation with foreign

 9     intermediaries in the war.  Primarily, UNPROFOR, UNHCR, et cetera.

10     Within that committee, there was a commission for the delivery of

11     humanitarian aid.  It was that commission which took decisions.

12             The army did not take any decisions.  It was supposed only to

13     make way for the convoy, and the issues that I detailed yesterday.

14             As for UNPROFOR resupply convoys, likewise the UNPROFOR commander

15     would go through that particular committee.  We only received information

16     that an UNPROFOR convoy would take such and such a route, at such and

17     such a time, and these convoys were checked just as humanitarian convoys

18     were.

19        Q.   Now Exhibit P2222 is a chart of your comments regarding the

20     convoys.  And in item 3 of that chart, you identify

21     Colonel Milos Djurdjic as the member of the Main Staff on this commission

22     or committee.  Am I correct that the Main Staff was represented on this

23     commission?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Now, General --

Page 17122

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome, the witness made a distinction between

 2     the committee and the commission.  In your last question you did put them

 3     together again.  Commission being within the committee.

 4             MR. GROOME:  Yes.  And just so the Chamber knows why in

 5     yesterday's question and answer it was the word "commission" that was

 6     being used to refer to this body.  So it may be a nuance in the

 7     translation.  But I believe it's clear what we're speaking about -- the

 8     people who dealt with these convoys.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

10             MR. GROOME:

11        Q.   General, is it not the case that, despite the existence of a

12     committee, which included a Main Staff officer, that the final say on

13     whether a humanitarian convoy was allowed to proceed was -- was made by

14     General Mladic?

15        A.   Before the commission was formed, yes.  But not after it was

16     formed.

17        Q.   General, I want to read you a question and answer from the

18     Tolimir case and ask you whether it causes you to reconsider that answer.

19             It's evidence that was taken on the 17th of May, 2011, at

20     transcript page 14213.

21             The question put to you by Mr. McCloskey was:

22             "Who had final control?  The commission or Mladic?

23             "A.  Final control was in the hands of the army, Mladic at

24     check-points."

25             Do you remember giving that answer and does that affect your

Page 17123

 1     answer today?

 2        A.   I do remember and the answer given then does not affect in any

 3     way the answer I gave a moment ago.  You read out to me the term

 4     "final control," which is the control of UNPROFOR at check-points,

 5     whereas, your previous question had to do with a decision and who had the

 6     final say, Mladic or the committee.

 7        Q.   If the commission said that a convoy should proceed and Mladic

 8     said that the convoy should not proceed, would the convoys proceed into

 9     the enclaves?

10        A.   I don't know because I did not experience such a situation.

11        Q.   I want to now turn back to directive 7/1.  It's your evidence

12     this week that Mladic rescinded the portion of the order in directive 7

13     that you identified as being unlawful by not including the text in

14     directive 7/1.

15             My first question, in this regard, is whether Karadzic ever

16     complained that Mladic had dropped a portion of Directive 7?

17        A.   I am not aware of that.

18        Q.   Now, yesterday after the transcript recorded you as saying that

19     directive 7 was not mentioned in directive 7/1, the Chamber drew your

20     attention to two passages where it was.  Having in mind those two

21     passages, would that be an indication that Mladic intended directive 7/1

22     to be read in conjunction with directive 7?

23        A.   Yes.  In the items where General Mladic refers back to directive

24     7.

25        Q.   Now, General, if a directive or order refers to another directive

Page 17124

 1     or order, would I be correct that the subordinate receiving that document

 2     would have the responsibility of reviewing the earlier directive or

 3     order?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5             MR. GROOME:  Could I ask that P1470 be brought to our screens.

 6     This is directive 7/1.  And could I ask that we go to 3, page 3 in the

 7     original, and 4 in the translation.

 8        Q.   On 3, can I draw your attention to the bottom of the page; and,

 9     in the English it's the full -- the first full paragraph at the top of

10     the page.

11             Now, General, this paragraph is composed of a single, long

12     sentence.  Am I correct in understanding that from this sentence that we

13     can see that the Sadejstvo 95 operation included operations around

14     Srebrenica and Zepa?

15        A.   I am not clear about the question, really.  Was it:  Do I agree

16     with this or -- can you help me with it, please.

17        Q.   Yes.  The question is:  Does Sadejstvo 95 include military

18     operations in the area of Srebrenica and Zepa, according to this?

19        A.   I don't know.  Nowhere is Srebrenica mentioned, and I am not

20     familiar with Operation Sadejstvo co-ordinated action 95.  I heard about

21     the operation in another case, but it was not within my sights when I was

22     at the Bihac front line.

23        Q.   Can I draw your attention to the bottom two lines in the

24     original.

25             MR. GROOME:  Perhaps if the usher could assist us by focussing in

Page 17125

 1     on that.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation]  I can see it well.  There's no

 3     need to zoom in on it.

 4             MR. GROOME:

 5        Q.   So is it not clear from a plain reading of this document that

 6     Operation Sadejstvo 95 includes operations - and I'm quoting - "around

 7     Srebrenica-Zepa and Gorazde enclaves."

 8        A.   You're right.  Those are the last words in that paragraph.  So it

 9     does include activity around Srebrenica.

10        Q.   Now, in referring to this operation, Mladic states:

11             "By carrying out planned combat battles and operations in

12     accordance with directive number 7."

13             Is this not a clear reference to the planned operations in

14     accordance with directive number 7?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   So do you agree with me that the phrase that you identified in

17     directive 7 as being unlawful has been incorporated into 7/1, by

18     reference?

19        A.   Yes.  I said, speaking to you, I believe, that the

20     Supreme Command acted inappropriately by sending directive 7 to

21     second-level units instead of sending it to the Main Staff only and the

22     Main Staff would then adapted it for the purposes of subordinate units.

23     Subordinate units would, in that case, on the basis of Mladic's

24     directive, rather than Karadzic's, be drafting their own orders.

25        Q.   But, General, you just told us that a subordinate would have the

Page 17126

 1     responsibility of looking at the documents referred to in an order or

 2     directive.  Wouldn't a person, an officer, reading this sentence from

 3     directive 7, wouldn't they go back and look at directive 7 to find out

 4     what were the planned combat battles and operations that are in accord

 5     with directive number 7 [sic]?

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Groome, are we to understand that at line 20,

 7     page 29, where you first referred to "directive 7," you want to say

 8     "directive 7/1."

 9             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour.  Much obliged.

10        Q.   General Milovanovic, may I repeat the question so there's no

11     confusion.  I misspoke.

12             Given what you've told us about the responsibility of a

13     subordinate to go back and look at the earlier order or directive that's

14     referred to, wouldn't an officer, reading Mladic's statement here, or

15     order here, in directive 7/1, wouldn't they be obliged to go back to

16     directive 7 and within this sentence refer them to the order you said was

17     illegal?

18             JUDGE ORIE:  You may answer the question, Witness.  You always

19     may answer the question when it's clear that Mr. Groome has finished it.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I still stand by this, the

21     distribution of directive 7 was inappropriately carried out by the

22     Supreme Commander --

23             JUDGE ORIE:  That was not the question.  The question was whether

24     someone reading the reference in directive 7.1 to directive 7 would have

25     to look at directive 7 in order that to be fully able to implement

Page 17127

 1     directive 7.1.  That's the question.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 3             MR. GROOME:

 4        Q.   And my next question is:  Wouldn't this line from Mladic's order

 5     in 7.1, by carrying out planned combat battles and operations in

 6     accordance with directive 7, isn't that a specific reference to the line

 7     of directive 7 that you testified the day before yesterday was unlawful?

 8        A.   No.

 9        Q.   Can you tell us what other planned operations in directive 7 this

10     could be a reference to?

11        A.   I can't reproduce directive 7 off the top of my head now, but we

12     will avoid any confusion by saying that the author of directive 7/1,

13     that's to say General Mladic, aimed at cutting his directive short

14     because these details are already contained in directive 7.  In order for

15     him to provide an assignment to subordinate units that would be clear and

16     precise, he said something that is normally used also by you lawyers,

17     pursuant to item such and such, to article such, of such and such a law.

18     And those who are reading the text are then obliged to go back to that

19     article or law that is cited and see what it is about.

20             MR. GROOME:  Could I ask that P1468 be brought to our screens.

21        Q.   It's an order for defence and active operations, operative

22     number 7, dated 20 March 1995 issued by Major-General Milenko Zivanovic,

23     who was at this time commander of the Drina Corps.  So that there is no

24     confusion regarding the chronology, directive 7 was issued on the

25     8th of March, 1995, and transmitted by General Milovanovic on 17th of

Page 17128

 1     March.  P1468 is an order by Zivanovic dated the 20th of March, P1470.

 2     Directive 7/1, was signed by Mladic on the 31st of March.

 3             Now, General, in your testimony at page 16996, you referred to an

 4     order in which Zivanovic copied the illegal phrase from directive 7.  Can

 5     I ask that we go to page 3 of the original and page 5 of the translation.

 6     And if I can draw your attention to section 2, the tasks of the

 7     Drina Corps.

 8             And now if we turn to the next page of the translation, we can

 9     see that Zivanovic writes:

10             "By planned and well thought out combat operations, create an

11     unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

12     or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

13             Is this the passage that you were referring to in your evidence

14     the last couple of days?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Now, according to your evidence, this order issued by Zivanovic

17     would be contrary to the wishes of the commander.  Are you aware of any

18     order communicated to Zivanovic that, after 7.1 came out, this particular

19     passage in this order targeting the civilian population should have been

20     rescinded?  Is there any explicit order to that effect?

21        A.   It can be found in Karadzic's directive 7.  Zivanovic copied this

22     from the original, which is directive 7.  You yourself mentioned

23     chronology.  The corps received Karadzic's directive sometime on the 17th

24     or 18th.

25        Q.   I think that everyone here is clear of the chronology.  So my

Page 17129

 1     simple question to you is, is that this order came out before 7.1.  Once

 2     7.1 came out, was there ever an explicit order to Zivanovic to withdraw

 3     this order that he had issued to his subordinate units?

 4        A.   That I don't know.

 5             MR. GROOME:  Could I ask that P1465 be brought to our screens.

 6        Q.   This is an order dated the 2nd of July, 1995, issued by the same

 7     Major-General Milenko Zivanovic.  Now, General, this order is several

 8     months after the issuance of directive 7/1.  Can I draw your attention to

 9     item 2 in this order, and it can be found on 2 in the original and 3 in

10     the translation.  The section starts with the phrase:

11             "The command of the Drina Corps, pursuant to operations

12     directive number 7 and 7/1 of the Main Staff of the VRS."

13             My first question to you is:  Does this indicate that Zivanovic's

14     understanding of the relationship between directives 7 and 7/1 were that

15     they were -- they both remained in effect and must be considered in

16     conjunction with each other?

17        A.   I can't comment on this because I don't know what Zivanovic had

18     on his mind when he was writing this.  He referred to both directives,

19     but I don't know which one he gives precedence to.  And under the command

20     system, it was directive 7/1 that he should have given preference to.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Witness, this -- the plain language of this

22     document doesn't give preference to either.  They're treated equally, are

23     they not?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see that, but I stand by what

25     I said; that's to say, Zivanovic should have given a preference or

Page 17130

 1     primacy to Mladic's directive.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  And on what basis?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I say that on the basis of military

 4     subordination within the system of VRS where certain authorities cannot

 5     be sidestepped.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Is it sidestepping if Mr. Mladic himself refers to

 7     directive 7 in the directives 7/1 he issued?  That's not sidestepping.  I

 8     mean, Mr. Mladic gave it its place in 7/1.  So, therefore, it's not

 9     entirely clear to me what you mean.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The fact that General Mladic refers

11     to directive 7, Karadzic's directive, does not constitute any

12     sidestepping of authority because Karadzic sent the directive to Mladic

13     for implementation.  Now it was up to Mladic to determine how he would

14     convey this on to the units.

15             And I did say that my previous evidence that Zivanovic made the

16     mistake of not waiting for Mladic's directive but drafting his order for

17     the defence effort on the basis of Karadzic's directive.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

19             MR. GROOME:

20        Q.   General, again before I read you a passage of this let's keep in

21     mind that this document, this order, is several months after Mladic's

22     directive 7/1 and specifically references the two.  So if we can go to

23     item 4 on page 2 in the original and 3 the translation.  Halfway down

24     that paragraph, after the word "objective," we read:

25             "By a surprise attack to separate and reduce in size the

Page 17131

 1     Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves to improve the tactical position of the

 2     forces in the depth of the area, and to create conditions for the

 3     elimination of the enclaves."

 4             Would it be a fair interpretation of this sentence that Zivanovic

 5     understood that both the separation of Srebrenica and Zepa and the

 6     removal of the civilian population from those enclaves, as indicated in

 7     directive 7, were still in effect?

 8        A.   I may be mistaken.  But in none of the directives, either 7 or

 9     7/1, did I see the term "eliminate the enclaves."  Nor can it be found in

10     the transcription of tasks - that's item 2 - where Zivanovic lists the

11     tasks of the corps.

12        Q.   Can you read the sentence that starts:

13             "... by surprise attack, to separate and reduce ..."

14             Can you read that sentence for us, please.

15        A.   "Objective:  By a surprise attack fully separate and reduce in

16     size the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, improve the tactical position of

17     the forces in the depth of the area, and create conditions for the

18     elimination of the enclaves."

19        Q.   So I don't understand your evidence.  Is your evidence that this

20     is not related to directive 7 and 7/1 and that it's something that

21     Zivanovic has done on his own accord?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And so it's your evidence that his reference to "elimination of

24     the enclaves" is substantively different than directive 7's order:

25             "By planned and well thought out combat operations create an

Page 17132

 1     unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

 2     or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

 3             My question to you is:  If that situation is created -- create a

 4     situation of no hope for further survival or life in the enclaves, how is

 5     that different than the elimination of the enclaves?

 6        A.   In the following way:  The order issuing authority in

 7     directive 7, that is to say, Karadzic, makes it incumbent upon the army

 8     to create conditions of unbearability and Zivanovic spells that out in

 9     concrete terms, says:  Creates conditions for the elimination of

10     enclaves; that is to say Karadzic did not say why life conditions should

11     be made more difficult.  That is understandable, presumably.  And

12     Zivanovic thought that it meant elimination of enclaves and that's what

13     he wrote.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome, I think the witness has now been given

15     large opportunities not to testify about facts but about the

16     interpretation of documents which is the primary task of the Chamber.

17     Again, we have not stopped it, but ... there's one or more -- one or two

18     more questions fine.  But let's not --

19             MR. GROOME:  I'll move forward.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  -- stay with this forever.

21             MR. GROOME:  I'll move forward.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, please.

23             MR. GROOME:  Can we please go to the last page on both versions.

24        Q.   And General, when that comes up on your screen, can I draw your

25     attention to the type written text directly under Zivanovic's name.  It

Page 17133

 1     reads:

 2             "Typed in two copies and delivered to:  1.  Original in the

 3     archive of the Drina Corps Command; 2.  Main Staff of the VRS."

 4             Does this indicate that Zivanovic sent a copy of this to the

 5     Main Staff?

 6        A.   According to this, yes.

 7        Q.   Does this mean that the Main Staff approved this order?

 8        A.   I cannot conclude that on the basis of this document.

 9        Q.   I want to draw your attention to a portion of an interview that

10     you gave on the 24th of August, 2009, in which this very document was

11     discussed.

12             On this topic, on this particular document, you were asked what

13     it means, this endorsement.  Your response was:

14             "Original to archives, Drina Corps Command.  You are right.

15     Number 2, Main Staff of Republika Srpska.  That means that it's probably

16     been approved by the Main Staff."

17             Do you recall expressing that with respect to this document back

18     in 2009?

19        A.   I do not recall, but I stand by what you said a moment ago.

20        Q.   So it is your evidence today that this order of Zivanovic was

21     sent to the Main Staff and approved by ...

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome, you left out the word "probably" and --

23             MR. GROOME:  Yeah --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  -- therefore, could you please put the question

25     again to the witness.

Page 17134

 1             MR. GROOME:

 2        Q.   So is it your evidence today that this order was probably sent to

 3     the Main Staff --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  It was probably approved, that's at least what you

 5     read to us.

 6             Mr. Groome would like to know whether your evidence is that the

 7     reference to the Main Staff of the VRS means that the order is --

 8     probably been approved by the Main Staff.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My final statement, if you will,

10     shall be as follows:  From this document, I see that the document was

11     sent to the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.  But I do not

12     know what the reaction of the commander of the Main Staff was, whether he

13     approved it, whether he did not approve it.  I cannot see that from this

14     document.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  That's clear.  But apparently in your previous

16     interview -- or could you say, Unless there is a response by the

17     Main Staff that they disapprove it, that sending it and subsequent

18     silence on the matter would mean that it is approved?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not necessarily.

20             However, it is not impossible that General Mladic and Zivanovic

21     spoke and that he gave him approval in that way, just orally.  Now

22     whether Zivanovic wrote that down somewhere, I don't know.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  A simple question:  If Mr. Mladic would not -- if

24     the Main Staff would not have approved and if Mr. Mladic would not have

25     approved, what would he have done in order to express such disapproval,

Page 17135

 1     under normal circumstances?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He would have stopped the order,

 3     and he would have given his own amendments, changes, et cetera.  So he'd

 4     order, Zivanovic, change such and such a thing in such and such a way,

 5     and Zivanovic would be duty-bound to do that and to send it to

 6     General Mladic again with those corrections.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, is there anything to your knowledge that this

 8     action was taken; that is, stopping the order and giving his own

 9     amendments, changes, et cetera?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know.  I was on the other

11     end of Republika Srpska.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome, you may ...

13             MR. GROOME:

14        Q.   General, yesterday at transcript page 17003 in response

15     between -- in response to a question put to you by Judge Fluegge

16     regarding directive 7, you said:

17             "No.  I saw this directive for the first time in the Tribunal

18     building sometime around the 29th of May."

19             What year were you referring to?

20        A.   I'm correcting the date and place when I first saw this.  I saw

21     this directive, that is to say its top and the end, on the

22     18th of October, 2005, in Banja Luka.  It was shown to me by

23     Prosecutor Peter McCloskey.  I saw it again during my testimony on that

24     29th of May.

25        Q.   And is it also your evidence or your belief that General Mladic

Page 17136

 1     did not see directive 7 before Karadzic issued it?

 2        A.   That I don't know.  But I do know that General Mladic appointed

 3     General Miletic to form the directive.  So he must have seen that.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Groome, if I might just ask.

 5             Mr. Milovanovic, you were asked by Mr. Groome what year of the

 6     29th of May were you referring to.  You have still not given that.  Could

 7     you please give us that?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 2007 is the year.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

10             Yes, Mr. Groome, you may proceed.

11             MR. GROOME:

12        Q.   General, if it were to be that Miletic did not consult either you

13     or General Mladic about the contents of this directive, would that have

14     been a breach of the principles of command and control that you've given

15     evidence about during your testimony?

16        A.   No.  I said yesterday that I would have consulted everybody in

17     the Main Staff had I been in Miletic's shoes.  Now whether Miletic did

18     consult someone, I don't know.

19             MR. GROOME:  Can I ask that 17473A be brought to our screens.

20        Q.   General, I'm going ask you to look at each page.  The text is

21     very short.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I nevertheless go back to the previous

23     question, Mr. Groome.

24             The question was whether -- if Miletic would not have consulted

25     either you or General Mladic about the contents, whether that would have

Page 17137

 1     been a breach of the principles of command and control.

 2             Your answer was:  I would have consulted everyone.  Whether

 3     Miletic did consult someone, you do not know.

 4             Do I understand that Miletic was under a duty to consult with

 5     Mr. Mladic?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know how Miletic behaved.

 7     I've said several times already that I would have consulted both Mladic

 8     and the entire staff.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Would you have done that because you

10     considered it your duty to do that under the system of command and

11     control?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Groome.

14             MR. GROOME:

15        Q.   General Miletic was your direct subordinate.  Did you ever

16     reprimand him for having done this?

17        A.   No.  Because I did not have an opportunity.  I told you when I

18     was first in contact with this directive.

19             MR. GROOME:  Can I now ask that 65 ter 17473A be brought to our

20     screens.

21        Q.   And, again, General, this is a relatively short document.  I'm

22     going to -- when you've had a chance to look at this page, please

23     indicate that, and we'll advance to the next page.

24        A.   I've read it.

25        Q.   Next page, please.  I'm not terribly interested in the

Page 17138

 1     handwritten text.

 2        A.   I've read it.

 3        Q.   Next one.  General, having looked at these, does this refresh

 4     your recollection that on the 17th of March, you not only transmitted

 5     directive 7 to the 1st Krajina Corps but to the Drina Corps, the

 6     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and the Herzegovina Corps?  I've asked

 7     Investigator Yarmah to be present in court with the originals if you

 8     should care to see them.

 9        A.   There's no need for the originals.  But these documents that you

10     showed me just now dispelled my dilemma about that document that we

11     discussed yesterday.  It only went to the 1st Krajina Corps.  So I

12     thought that with the regular sending to the other corps that that was --

13     that the head of office forgot.  However, now, I see that it was sent to

14     all the corps on -- at the same time.  My signature is there.

15             However, in relation to what I said yesterday, I can just say the

16     following:  The directive went simultaneously to all the corps and we see

17     in the documents that they sent back when they received it.  We saw that

18     one of them received it on the 18th.  And then the Herzegovina Corps,

19     there is no confirmation on the document when he received it.  I mean,

20     there is no stamp of the head of office of the Herzegovina Corps.  So I

21     don't know when they received it.

22        Q.   Can we return to page 1.  Are you referring to the endorsement by

23     Zivanovic returning a signed copy of your transmittal letter, as

24     instructed in the letter itself?  And it's at the bottom of that page.

25     Thank you.

Page 17139

 1        A.   Yes.  But something is strange here now.  I sent this on the

 2     17th of March, 1995, via courier.  And, ah, this is the 18th of March.  I

 3     thought that it was the 18th of September.  That's what it said.  So he

 4     received it on the following day.  Now I cannot remember the date when he

 5     issued his combat order.  You did refer to the chronology.  I think it

 6     was the 23rd?

 7        Q.   It was the 20th of March.  But that's not the focus of this

 8     particular inquiry.  What I want to ask you is:  In each of the four

 9     transmittal letters signed by you that we've now seen the fact that

10     you're attaching a directive is clearly marked on the document; is that

11     not correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Now, General, the day before yesterday, you defined a directive

14     for us and you said that at transcript page 16974.  You said:

15             "A directive in war time is the highest form of doctrinally

16     ordering or directing the activities of any military, including ours."

17             General, is it really your evidence that you, as the

18     deputy commander of the army, someone expected to take command of the

19     army in Mladic's absence, is it really your evidence that you did not

20     read the directive?

21        A.   I did not read the directive.  The directives were packed in

22     envelopes.  And on the envelope, it said, directive number 7 of the

23     Supreme Command of the Army of Republika Srpska.

24             Since I was in the Main Staff in passing, I happened to be there.

25     I didn't read it.  I stand by that.  I've told you when I first came in

Page 17140

 1     contact with that directive.  I read it in greater detail when I

 2     testified in May and June 2007.

 3        Q.   General, then can I ask you, you've testified a few minutes ago

 4     that it is the obligation of a subordinate, when he receives a directive

 5     of an order that refers to an earlier one, is the obligation of that

 6     subordinate to go back and review that.

 7             When you read 7/1 and saw that it referred to directive 7, why

 8     did you not at that point go and read directive 7?

 9        A.   I saw directive 7/1 at the time when I saw directive 7, within

10     the indictment of General Miletic.

11        Q.   So it -- it's your evidence today that as the deputy commander of

12     the VRS, you did not have sight of two directives prior to the date -- I

13     think you -- in 2005.

14             Is that your evidence?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   I want to now switch to some evidence that Mr. Lukic dealt with

17     today regarding Sarajevo.  And in answer to a question of his, you

18     described the -- the ultimatum by -- from NATO to withdraw artillery.

19             MR. GROOME:  Could I ask that 65 ter 09714 be brought to our

20     screens.

21        Q.   It is order issued by General Milovanovic on the

22     9th of February, 1992 [sic].  General, this order is issued -- I'm sorry.

23     This order is issued via teleprinter.  Once you have a chance to look at

24     it, can I ask you to confirm that, in fact, it is an order of yours?

25             JUDGE ORIE:  You think you said "1992," Mr. Groome.

Page 17141

 1             MR. GROOME:  I'm sorry.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  But I take it you wanted to refer to "1994."

 3             MR. GROOME:  That's correct, I misspoke.

 4        Q.   So my first question is:  Do you recall issuing this order.

 5             Let me know when I can ask you a question.

 6        A.   Yes, go ahead.

 7        Q.   And do I fairly characterise this document by saying when faced

 8     with the ultimatum, you issued an order for inoperable weapons to be

 9     moved into Sarajevo so that they would be the ones that were moved back

10     in compliance with the ultimatum.  Would that be a fair characterisation

11     of this?

12        A.   Yes.  Because I pointed out for as long as ultimatum-based

13     threats of bombing are still on.

14             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, the Prosecution tenders 09714 as well

15     the previous exhibit, 65 ter 17473A.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  In the absence of any objections, Madam Registrar.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 17473A receives number P2248, and

18     document 09714 receives number P2249, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  P2248 and P2249 are admitted.

20             MR. GROOME:

21        Q.   General, I only have a few more questions for you.  Today at the

22     temporary transcript page 21, Mr. Lukic asked you:

23             "Did General Mladic during the war ever order to have civilians

24     or captured enemy soldiers tortured, to the best of your knowledge, or

25     killed?"

Page 17142

 1             Your answer was, "No."

 2             MR. GROOME:  Can I ask 65 ter 10635 be brought to our screens.

 3        Q.   This is a memoire written by General Milovanovic called:  "My

 4     View of the War in Bosnia:  1992 to 1995."

 5             General, when you see the first page of the document, can you

 6     tell us is it, in fact, the document I've just described?

 7        A.   Yes, this was the work material for my book that is now called:

 8     "Truths and Delusions Concerning the War in Bosnia:  1992 to 1995."

 9        Q.   When did you write this book?

10        A.   2005.

11             MR. GROOME:  Can I ask that we now go to page 37 in both versions

12     of the document, and in the translation I would draw the Chamber to the

13     last few lines of the first full paragraph.

14        Q.   I apologise, General Milovanovic, I'm not sure exactly where the

15     passage is in the original, but I will read the passage I am interested

16     in and you'll hear in the translation:

17             "The Muslim Supreme Command had ordered them to tie up our troops

18     so that we could not come to the aid of those of our forces fighting

19     against a major Muslim offensive in Sarajevo which had started on

20     16 June 1995.  The response of the VRS to these raids by the Muslims led

21     to the tragic events in Srebrenica, where the Serbian forces did some

22     things that they should not have done and for which there had been no

23     military justification."

24             My question is simply:  Do you still stand behind this passage?

25        A.   Yes.  That is my analytical approach to the problem after the

Page 17143

 1     war, ten years after Srebrenica.

 2             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I do intend to -- no, actually I've

 3     read that into the transcript.  There's no need to tender that.

 4        Q.   General, my last exhibit that I'm going to ask you to comment on

 5     is a portion of an interview that you gave on the 7th and

 6     8th of July, 2009.  The transcript can be found at 65 ter 30269B.  And

 7     when that's up on the screen, I'm going to ask Ms. Stewart to play the

 8     audio, and I'd ask you to listen carefully.

 9             I do want General Milovanovic to be able to hear his voice, so

10     perhaps if we could not have translation and just rely on the transcript,

11     and if that could be played again, if that's suitable.

12                           [Audio-tape played]

13             MR. GROOME:  Could I ask that the transcript be put up on the

14     screen so that the General has the benefit of seeing the written text.

15        Q.   General, was that, in fact, your voice that we just listened to?

16        A.   Yes, it was.

17        Q.   At the end you said:

18             "He came in and took over the command from Krstic.  He was the

19     one to come in Srebrenica and it happened to him, what happened."

20             "... happened to him, what happened," were you referring to the

21     massacre of the men in Srebrenica?

22        A.   It is stated explicitly here that I said "it happened to him."

23     So whatever fate befell him is -- was something of his own doing.  He

24     ended up indicted.

25             MR. GROOME:  I have no further questions.

Page 17144

 1        Q.   Thank you, General Milovanovic.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Groome.

 3             We are already a bit late for the break.

 4             Mr. Lukic, how much time would you need for further questions?

 5             MR. LUKIC:  I'll consult with my colleagues and the client.  If

 6     any, very short, very few.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Because if it's a matter of one or two

 8     minutes, we could consider to take those few minutes now.  If it's more,

 9     we should take the break --

10             MR. LUKIC:  If I have to --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, yes, please consult.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13                           [Defence counsel confer]

14             MR. LUKIC:  We obviously are waiting for my response, only I do

15     not know what I have to respond to.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  The question was how much time you would need, if

17     any at all.

18             MR. LUKIC:  We will have to go through the re-direct

19     to [Overlapping speakers] ...

20             JUDGE ORIE:  [Overlapping speakers] ... so you need the break to

21     find out.

22             MR. LUKIC:  Yes.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll take the break first.

24             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, could I simply tender the last exhibit,

25     30269B.

Page 17145

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  The excerpt of the interview.

 2             MR. GROOME:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar, the number would be.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, just to clarify in that.  At this

 5     moment I don't have the audio.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  You don't have the audio.  Could we reserve a number

 7     and already have the transcript under that number and MFI it until we

 8     have the audio.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honours.  Document 30269B receives

10     number P2250.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  And is marked for identification.

12             I asked to this, Mr. Groome, that where you earlier referred to

13     P2222, that is not yet admitted.  It is marked for identification.

14             MR. GROOME:  I stand corrected.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

16             Mr. Milovanovic, we take a break.  You may follow the usher.

17                           [The witness stands down]

18             JUDGE ORIE:  We take a break and resume at 12.30.

19                           --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.

20                           --- On resuming at 12.31 p.m.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll wait for the witness to be escorted into the

22     courtroom.

23             Mr. Lukic, could you give us any further indication.

24             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  It's zero seconds.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Zero seconds.

Page 17146

 1             Then Mr. Groome.

 2             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, with respect to 65 ter 30269B,

 3     Ms. Stewart has provided the Registrar with a copy of the audio.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar had informed me about that.  Which

 5     means that the audio, now having been added - Mr. Lukic, I heard of no --

 6     I think there were no objections - P2250 is therefore now admitted into

 7     evidence.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Milovanovic, the Defence has just informed the

10     Chamber that there are no further questions for you, which means that

11     this -- your testimony is concluded.  I'd like to thank you very much for

12     coming to The Hague and for answering all the questions that were put to

13     you by the parties and by the Bench, and I wish you a safe return home

14     again.

15             You're excused.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

18                           [The witness withdrew]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  While the next witness is to be prepared to be stand

20     by, I'd like to deliver a decision of the Chamber.  It is a decision on

21     the Prosecution's motion to add Witness RM183 to the Prosecution's Rule

22     65 ter witness list.

23             On the 12th of July, 2013, the Prosecution filed a motion for

24     leave to add Witness RM183 to its Rule 65 ter list.  The Prosecution

25     submits that the motion should be considered in light of its 20th of

Page 17147

 1     June, 2013, notice of its intention to reduce the evidence it adduces in

 2     support of its case.  Given the decrease in total number of witnesses and

 3     live witnesses resulting from the notice and the motion, the Prosecution

 4     states that the Defence will require less preparation time and will not

 5     be prejudiced such benefits constituting good cause to add the witness to

 6     its Rule 65 ter witness list and demonstrating that the addition is in

 7     the interests of justice.

 8             On the 26th of July, the Defence filed its response objecting to

 9     the motion in its entirety, based on the Prosecution not justifying its

10     late amendment to its Rule 65 ter witness list, its lack of showing good

11     cause, the proposed mode of testimony and the potential impact on the

12     fairness of the trial.  The Chamber recalls and refers to the applicable

13     law concerning amendments to the Prosecution' Rule 65 ter witness list as

14     set out in its previous decision filed on the 22nd of August, 2013.  At

15     the outset, the Chamber notes that the Defence's objections regarding the

16     mode of testimony through which Witness RM183 will eventually testify are

17     premature and misplaced.  Instead, the proper forum for such arguments

18     would be in response to a motion tendering the evidence.  Accordingly,

19     those parts of the response dealing with the proposed mode of testimony

20     will not be further considered in this decision.

21             The Chamber considers that the witness's evidence is prima facia

22     relevant and of probative value with regard to good cause the Chamber

23     considers that the Prosecution has not shown good cause to add the

24     witness to its Rule 65 ter witness list at this stage.  However, the

25     Chamber finds that addition of the witness will result in a limited

Page 17148

 1     additional burden for the Defence, in particular, given that the

 2     witness's evidence deals with issues that have been raised with other

 3     witnesses.  In this respect, the Chamber has also considered that the

 4     Prosecution proposes to tender the witness's evidence pursuant to

 5     Rule 92 bis through a motion which is still to be filed.  Should the

 6     Defence require additional time to respond to such a motion, the Chamber

 7     will consider such a request.

 8             In light of the aforementioned, the Chamber finds that it's in

 9     the interests of justice to allow the addition of Witness RM183 to the

10     Prosecution's 65 ter witness list, and this concludes the Chamber's

11     decision.

12             If the witness is ready he can be escorted into the courtroom.

13     Unless there are any preliminary -- any other matters to be raised before

14     we do that.

15             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  No, Your Honour.  In fact in speaking with

16     Mr. Stojanovic, we hope to conclude this witness's testimony today as

17     well.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  That ... .

19                           [The witness entered court]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon, Mr. Soja.  Before you give evidence,

21     the Rules require that you make a solemn declaration, the text of which

22     is now handed out to you.

23             May I invite you to make that solemn declaration.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.  I solemnly declare

25     that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

Page 17149

 1                           WITNESS:  MILOMIR SOJA

 2                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please be seated.

 4             Mr. Soja, you'll first be examined by Ms. Hochhauser.

 5     Ms. Hochhauser is counsel for the Prosecution.  You find her to your

 6     right.

 7             You may proceed, Ms. Hochhauser.

 8             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Thank you.

 9                           Examination by Ms. Hochhauser:

10        Q.   Good afternoon, Witness.

11             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  And good afternoon to the Chamber.

12        Q.   Can you please state your name.

13        A.   My name is Milomir Soja.

14        Q.   Mr. Soja, you gave a statement to the ICTY dated 24 July 2004,

15     and also testified in the trials of Dragomir Milosevic and

16     Radovan Karadzic; is that correct?

17        A.   Yes, it is.

18             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  If I could please have 65 ter 30264 on the

19     screen.

20        Q.   And, Mr. Soja, when you're able to see something on the monitor

21     in front of you, can you tell us, please, is that the statement that you

22     gave to the ICTY in 2004?

23        A.   Yes, it is.

24        Q.   And have you had the opportunity to review this statement?

25        A.   Yes, I have.

Page 17150

 1        Q.   Can you confirm that it is both accurate and truthful?

 2        A.   I can.

 3        Q.   Have you also had the opportunity to listen to the audiotape of

 4     your testimony from the Dragomir Milosevic case in your own language?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And can you confirm that that is also both accurate and truthful?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   In regard to both the 2004 statement, that's now on the screen,

 9     and your prior testimony from the Dragomir Milosevic case, can you tell

10     the Chamber whether, if asked the same questions today, you would

11     provide, in substance, the same information that you provided in that

12     statement and prior testimony?

13        A.   Yes.

14             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honours, with that, I tender 65 ter 30264

15     which is the statement as well as 30265, which is a selection of relevant

16     transcript from the Dragomir Milosevic case, along with one associated

17     exhibit which is a drawing prepared by Mr. Soja which has the

18     65 ter number 28333.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic, no objections.

20             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No objections, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  First the 2004 statement.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 30264 receives number P2251.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, and with the testimony.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 30265 receives number P2252.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  And one associated exhibit.

Page 17151

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 28333 receives number P2253,

 2     Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  P2251, P2252, and P2253 are admitted into evidence.

 4             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honour, if I might proceed to a brief

 5     summary of the witness's evidence for the public.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so and I take it that you have explained

 7     to the witness what the purpose of it is.

 8             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Yes.  He is aware.

 9             The witness is an electrical engineer.  Before the outbreak of

10     the war, he was employed by Energoinvest in its power electronics

11     department.  He was mobilised at the outbreak of the war in 1992.  And

12     after his release from the armed forces in December of 1994, he took up

13     his work obligation in the company Energoinvest Automatika in Ilidza.

14             In the spring of 1995, Mr. Soja and one of his colleagues were

15     asked to go to the Pretis ammunition factory in Vogosca, Sarajevo,

16     regarding the modification of the ignition system for an air-bomb

17     launcher.  They were accompanied by an officer from the Ilidza Brigade of

18     the VRS.

19             At Pretis, Mr. Soja met Major Krsmanovic, an officer of the

20     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  Krsmanovic told the witness that at that time

21     that in addition to the launcher of the Ilidza Brigade, there were two

22     functional air-bomb launchers, one in Vogosca and the other in Ilijas.

23     Mr. Soja subsequently learned that the SRK also had an air-bomb launcher

24     in Blazuj.  And in case I've mispronounced that it's B-l-a-z-u-j.

25             Mr Soja reports that Major Krsmanovic was opposed to the

Page 17152

 1     electronic modification of the launchers since this would have rendered

 2     the equipment less reliable.  However, the witness was asked to perform

 3     modifications using electronic components as the Ilidza Brigade intended

 4     to use this new system on their air-bomb launcher.

 5             Twice the witness attended to malfunctioning modified air-bomb

 6     launchers out in the field.  On the second occasion in the summer of

 7     1995, the witness was requested to attend the launching of an air-bomb,

 8     targeting the cold storage plant in Stup from a launcher positioned close

 9     to the witness's workplace.  The first attempted launch failed.  That

10     same evening, the witness observed the launch of the air-bomb from a

11     distance of about 150 metres.  The air-bomb did not reach the cold

12     storage plant but exploded prematurely on the territory under the control

13     of the VRS.

14             During the relevant time, Mr. Soja heard the launching and

15     detonation of air-bombs about five to six times.  And his evidence states

16     that there is a characteristic sound connecting with their launching and

17     detonation.

18             Your Honours, that concludes my summary.  I have two very brief

19     areas of questioning.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

21             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  If I could please have 65 ter 09119 on the

22     monitor.

23        Q.   And as its coming up, I'll ask you, Mr. Soja, in your prior

24     testimony of what is now exhibit number P2252, beginning at the bottom of

25     e-court page 8 and into e-court page 9, you discuss how you learned of

Page 17153

 1     the existence of modified air-bomb launchers in positions in Vogosca,

 2     Ilijas, Ilidza and Blazuj.  Can you tell us, looking at 09119, which is

 3     now on the screen, and discusses the issuance of aerial bombs from the

 4     Pretis factories.  Do the brigades and commands listed therein comport

 5     with your knowledge of the positions of modified air-bomb launchers in

 6     and around Sarajevo?

 7        A.   The Ilidza Brigade, that figure tallies.  With the Ilijas Brigade

 8     it has to do with Blazuj.  With the Igman Brigade the number is fine.

 9     Although items 2 and 3 is something I'm not exactly aware of, I don't

10     know what it pertains to, so items 2 and 3 I'm not certain which brigades

11     those are.

12        Q.   But items 1, 4, and 5 are consistent with the locations you

13     discuss in your statement?

14        A.   Yes, based on what I could hear from the people I came in contact

15     with concerning the launchers.

16        Q.   And just to be clear, the Igman Brigade covers the Blazuj

17     launcher that you were -- that you talked about; is that right?

18        A.   Yes.

19             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honours I would tender 65 ter 09119, at

20     this point.

21             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] No objection.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 09119 receives number P2254,

24     Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

Page 17154

 1             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  If I could please have 65 ter 03826 on the

 2     screen.

 3        Q.   And, sir, as it's coming up, I'll ask you, you are familiar with

 4     the mechanical elements of the modified air-bomb and launcher production.

 5     Can you tell us about the materials listed here.  Were these typical of

 6     those used in the production of the launchers that you saw?

 7        A.   The materiel on the left were the mechanical components that

 8     could be used for a launcher.

 9             The list on the right-hand side has to do with the electrical

10     components.

11        Q.   And the electrical components, are those also consistent with

12     what you knew of the launchers that you saw?

13        A.   The launcher I saw had a completely different type of electronics

14     of its ignition system than shown here.  But such elements as the cables

15     and starter, all those could be used to devise electrical ignition of the

16     launcher which used aerial bombs.

17        Q.   And to be -- the devising the electrical components of the

18     launcher is in fact the task that you were asked to work on in that

19     time-period; is that right?

20        A.   In the factory I worked, where I was under work obligation, we

21     had a different solution to this.  We used different electrical --

22     electronic components.  In principle, it may well be the same but we went

23     about it another way.  These are classical standard electrical components

24     whereas we relied on electronics more.

25             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honours, I would tender 03826 into

Page 17155

 1     evidence.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 03826 receives number P2255,

 4     Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 6             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Okay.  I have no further questions, Your Honour.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic, are you ready to cross-examine the

 9     witness?

10             Mr. Soja, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Stojanovic.

11     Mr. Stojanovic is counsel for Mr. Mladic.

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Stojanovic:

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.

14        A.   Good afternoon.

15        Q.   I will try to conclude my examination by the end of the day

16     today, and let us try to be as focussed as possible.

17             Can we have Exhibit P2251 in e-court.  Page 2 in the B/C/S and in

18     the English version of the witness's statement.

19             Let us focus on the last paragraph of item 2.  My question has to

20     do with clarifying something in this part of your statement.  You say

21     that while you served your military term with the JNA in Slovenia, in

22     Ribnica, you were trained to operate a multiple rocket-launcher.  Please

23     tell us what kind of training it was and what kind of skills and

24     knowledge did you acquire in terms of this weapon's precision and use,

25     since you were trained as marksman?

Page 17156

 1        A.   In Ribnica, I was assigned to the unit of multi-rocket-launchers,

 2     the so-called VBRs.  I was there on secondment from the sabotage unit.  I

 3     was trained as a gunner of the 120-millimetre rocket-launcher.  It was a

 4     standard asset that JNA units had.

 5             I cannot recall any specific details which had to do with the

 6     weapon's precision, but the weapon did have its standard characteristics

 7     such as range, sights, procedures, and everything else that was

 8     prescribed for such standard assets.  It also had appropriate precision.

 9     I can't say that at distances of 5 kilometres, it could hit a target with

10     an error of minus or plus 5 metres.  That's something I can't say any

11     longer.  But we underwent the kind of training as planned and envisaged

12     within the units of the JNA.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I am waiting for the transcript - do not hold it

14     against me - so that we have everything in the transcript.

15             In the same document, let us look at page 3, the last

16     paragraph in the B/C/S.  In the English version, it is also page 3,

17     item 4, paragraph 4.

18             You say that sometime in the spring of 1995, from Risto Ceranic,

19     your company's manager, you were notified that some work had to be done

20     on an aerial bomb launcher that was to be produced at Ilidza for the

21     needs of the Ilidza Brigade and you make reference to the Pretis factory.

22             Let me ask you this first:  Can you provide us with any more

23     detail in terms of when it happened in the spring of 1995?

24        A.   I really can't recall anything precisely when it was that spring.

25     Let's say in early spring.  I really can't recall the date.

Page 17157

 1        Q.   I'm asking you this because of one incident in our indictment.

 2     Was it before May 1995?

 3        A.   It is possible that it was before May.  I think it was before

 4     May.

 5        Q.   You mention the Pretis factory.  Let me ask you this:  In terms

 6     of your knowledge about the Pretis factory, do you know that even before

 7     the war it was one of the largest factories for special-purpose

 8     production in the former SFRY.  It was a factory where the rocket

 9     projectiles for the Orkan-type multiple rocket-launcher was produced and

10     also FAB-100 and -250 aerial booms were produced there?

11        A.   The Pretis was a well-known factory in the former Yugoslavia.  It

12     was a large one.  It was best known as a car factory.  It was also

13     well-known that all large factories in the former Yugoslavia had at least

14     a department each tasked with special-purpose production for the needs of

15     the JNA.  To tell you the truth, I didn't know what the Pretis was

16     included in.  What I did know was that they produced larger-calibre

17     ammunition, shells, in principle, rather than standard ammunition.

18             But I can't be any more specific than that.  I don't know which

19     shells precisely they produced or whether they produced the aerial bombs

20     of this kind.

21             It is possible, because they did produce larger-calibre shells,

22     at least according to what I could hear.

23        Q.   According to your statement, you were received - you and your

24     work-mate - by someone by the last name of Krsmanovic.  And you referred

25     to it on page 4 in both versions of your statement.  Apparently it was

Page 17158

 1     your impression that he was the most senior in terms of rank of the

 2     people involved in the project concerning aerial bombs.

 3             Let me ask you this:  Can you tell us anything in more detail, if

 4     you have any knowledge, as to who Mr. Krsmanovic is?

 5        A.   I saw Mr. Krsmanovic twice in my life.  The first time was when

 6     we came to see what kind of requests they had in order to create our

 7     variant of electrical launching system of aerial bombs.  The second time

 8     was when I attended a failed bomb launch which was supposed to target the

 9     cold storage facility at Stup.  As far as I recall, he had the rank of

10     major, and I have no other information about him.  There was no one to

11     ask, and I didn't hear any such information.  I simply have no other

12     information, save for what I stated.

13        Q.   I'm asking you this because I'm interested in the following:  In

14     any testimony thus far, were there any indications in your statement

15     which would show that it was an officer of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

16        A.   Based on my impression and based on what I could see, I concluded

17     that he was an active-duty officer.  I simply had no other knowledge,

18     either back then or now.

19             Now, whether he was an active officer with the SRK or whether he

20     had come from Yugoslavia to perform some specific tasks, that's something

21     I don't know.  I think he was an active-duty officer.

22        Q.   At which point did you see the launcher in real life, as well as

23     a modified aerial bomb?

24        A.   I saw the launcher for the first time in the Energoinvest

25     factory, where the mechanical segment of the launcher was being

Page 17159

 1     manufactured at the same time as the electronic part that we were

 2     producing.

 3             I must say that I had no idea that in this factory, Energoinvest,

 4     which was an adjacent facility, something of the sort was being produced.

 5     That was when I saw the launcher for the first time.

 6             As for the modified aerial bomb, I saw it probably when I went

 7     out for an intervention, and I was also able to see it when this failed

 8     launching of the bomb took place aimed at the cold storage place in Stup.

 9        Q.   Do you know who was charged with designing and manufacturing the

10     launcher that you were referring to in Energoinvest?

11        A.   I don't know who the constructor of the mechanical segment of the

12     launcher was.  What I do know is that it was finally made in a factory

13     called Tat [phoen], which is a well-known factory.

14        Q.   At that time was the launcher already on a mobile platform or was

15     it still on the plant floor, as it were?

16        A.   The launcher was mounted on a -- a truck that was parked in the

17     factory.  That was when I saw it for the first time.

18        Q.   Can you help us with the technical components of it?  The aerial

19     bomb would have rocket motors fitted on it, right, and they would be the

20     ones who would set the bomb in motion.

21             Is my reasoning correct?

22        A.   If you mean to say that the rocket motors are fitted onto the

23     rear body of an aerial bomb, then you're right.  Onto the rear of the

24     body of an aerial bomb.

25        Q.   Can you tell us this:  Where exactly were these rocket motors

Page 17160

 1     fitted onto the rear part of the aerial bomb?

 2        A.   The aerial bomb that I saw on this particular occasion already

 3     had rocket motors or engines fitted on to it.  Where this was done, I

 4     don't know, but quite possibly it could have taken place in the Pretis

 5     factory.  They were quite capable of doing this sort of job.

 6             The area where I was at the time, well, it brings to mind Pretis,

 7     as the most plausible candidate for such a job in this area that was

 8     under the control of the Bosnian Serbs.

 9        Q.   Will you agree with me that in order for such a projectile to be

10     manufactured a multi-disciplinary approach was required.  There had to be

11     electrical engineers, people versed in mechanical engineer, et cetera, in

12     order to come up with such a type of projectile?

13        A.   Yes.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic, could I briefly take you back to one

15     of your previous questions.

16             You asked where exactly were these rocket motors fitted onto the

17     rear part of the aerial bomb?

18             I understood that, but I may be wrong, that you asked where

19     exactly those motors would be attached to the bomb, or is that

20     mis-understood.

21             Yes, because the witness did not answer that question.  The

22     witness did answer another question.  That is, in what factory, in what

23     work-shop, et cetera, was this done, and that's, of course, a totally

24     different question from the one which I understood you to ask the

25     witness.

Page 17161

 1             I just put it on the record.  If you are satisfied with the other

 2     answer, not to your question, then please proceed, if you want to receive

 3     the answer please put the question again.

 4             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe I

 5     received an answer to my question.  Since I -- my -- my -- my question --

 6     the initial question was whether it was the rear part of the bomb where

 7     the rocket engines were fitted, and I got an answer to that question

 8     already at that point.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  I think the witness told us that it was fitted on

10     the rear part.  And then, I think, you then asked him where exactly

11     they -- on the rear part they were fitted.

12             Now, if you are satisfied with the answer that it was on the rear

13     part, then there was no need to put the question, because I think the

14     witness had answered that already.

15             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.  If you'll allow me to, I

16     will eliminate this ambiguity from the transcript.

17        Q.   Witness, you heard this.  Can you tell us which part of the body

18     of the aerial bomb were the rocket engines fitted onto?

19        A.   The rocket engines were attached to the posterior part, or the

20     rear part, of the bomb.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to ask you this:  If my understanding is

22     correct, there were two occasions when you were in person able to see

23     these modified air-bombs.

24        A.   Yes, two times.

25        Q.   Were you, on both of these occasions, able to see how many rocket

Page 17162

 1     engines were attached to the rear part of the air-bomb?

 2        A.   There were three rocket engines.

 3        Q.   I'm asking you this because of a document I'll use later.  Did

 4     you, at any point, hear, if not see, that there were modified aerial

 5     bombs with four rocket engines?

 6        A.   I heard that there were bombs with a single rocket engine.  Were

 7     there ones with more?  Well, I'm sure there were.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And now let me ask you this in a technical sense.

 9     The design and the part of job as you, as an engineer, had to allow for

10     the ignition of which engine or engines?

11        A.   Well, we first had to make it possible for the fuse of the bomb

12     to be armed, and then for the ignition of the engine -- engines.  So the

13     segment we were working on covered both these issues.  First, we had to

14     make sure that the fuse would be armed; and then electricity had to reach

15     certain points of the rocket engine, from which the rocket engines would

16     be ignited.

17        Q.   Technically speaking, did it also imply the ignition of all the

18     three rocket engines attached to the rear part of the aerial bomb at the

19     same time?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   These rockets, anti-hail rockets, that were supposed to counter

22     hail storms and that were supposed to get ignited all at once, where were

23     they obtained from?

24        A.   In conversation with Major Krsmanovic, whom we mentioned earlier,

25     I heard that what was being used as rocket engines to ignite these aerial

Page 17163

 1     bombs were -- that it was actually rocket engines used as anti-hail

 2     rockets.  And I heard that this came from Serbia.  I don't know if there

 3     was a plant in Bosnia-Herzegovina that produced such rocket engines.

 4     Perhaps there was one, but I didn't hear of it.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And would you agree with me that at least in these

 6     two cases that you yourself witnessed, these were ordinary anti-hail

 7     rockets, original anti-hail rockets of the Grad type?

 8        A.   I was told that these were anti-hail rockets but I wasn't able

 9     to -- or anti-grad rockets, but I did not see them and I did not hear of

10     anyone producing makeshift rocket engines so it had to be a standard

11     industry product.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes that it may involve the

13     Grad rocket type, called G-r-a-d, which also means hail incidentally in

14     B/C/S.  We're not sure.

15             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  Based on your training and experience such a rocket

17     engine industrially produced would have had to go through the usual

18     process of testing before it -- it is sent out onto the market?

19        A.   At any rate, the rocket engines, including the ones used to

20     counter hail storms, had to go through certain testing before being put

21     to use.  Anti-hail rockets are used in civilian situations.  What I mean

22     to say is that the civilians would be the ones operating them so they had

23     to be standard engines and rockets used in countering hail storms

24     nowadays.  At any rate, I think it's the same system that is being used.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Let me just remind you of this.  I'd rather that we

Page 17164

 1     not go into the document again.  You were shown a document detailing

 2     electronic parts that were used by the manufacturer, and you said that

 3     this wasn't something that you normally used in your line of work.

 4             My question is this:  Would such electrical parts be in the

 5     function of -- or in the service of igniting an engine of the anti-hail

 6     rockets, just as these engines were fitted onto the bombs that you were

 7     able to see?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   If I understand you correctly, the principle and the objective

10     are the same, but the road taken to reach that objective was different

11     from the technical standards that you applied and the people who were

12     requesting the supply of that material there.

13        A.   Yes.  Those were classical electrical components.  Whereas, we

14     used electronic components.  But the principle is the same.

15        Q.   Another technical question before we move onto documents.  We

16     were also told that such an anti-hail rocket engine would be able to lift

17     the weight of a FAB-100.  So I'd like to ask you this:  Based on your

18     expertise, can confirm for us that such an engine would be able to lift

19     and set in motion such a bomb weighing 100 kilograms?

20        A.   I don't have any specific knowledge of the characteristics of

21     these engines, but I did hear that the smaller bombs only had a single

22     engine.  I did say that previously, that this was something I heard.

23             I have no knowledge, but I suppose that it's possible.  If three

24     engines can lift a bomb that is two and a half times heavier then I'm

25     sure a single one would be able to lift a lighter bomb, a bomb as light

Page 17165

 1     as this one.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, perhaps we should

 4     now take the break if we plan to work until 2.15, and I do believe that

 5     we will complete the examination of the witness today.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  How much time would you still need, Mr. Stojanovic?

 7             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I have four documents left and

 8     three photographs.  No more than 20 minutes.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  That would then leave at least ten more minutes for

10     either re-examination or questions from the Bench.

11             We take the break, and we first ask the usher to escort the

12     witness out of the courtroom.  We'd like to see you back in 20 minutes.

13                           [The witness withdrew]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  And we will resume at a quarter to 2.00.

15                           --- Recess taken at 1.24 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.46 p.m.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

18                           [The witness takes the stand]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic, you may proceed.

20             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             Could we please -- oh, we already have it in e-court.  So I don't

22     need to call up another document.  P2251, page 4 B/C/S and English.

23        Q.   And could you please help us with this, sir, and could you

24     explain an answer that you provided here.  You say:

25             "During the summer of 1995," Your Honours, I am reading chapter

Page 17166

 1     5, the third paragraph, "I heard a number of times a characteristic sound

 2     of the air-bombs flying in the area.  For the first time when I was at

 3     home in Osijek, next time when I was in Stup.  I also heard this sound

 4     later but cannot remember where I was then."

 5             Can you tell us, to the best of your recollection, how many times

 6     did you have the opportunity of hearing this characteristic sound?

 7        A.   I cannot say exactly how many times I cannot be precise, but

 8     five, six, or about ten times.  I really don't know.

 9        Q.   Can you tell us when this was, which time-period, which year?

10     When did that happen?

11        A.   That was roughly the beginning of the summer, when that last

12     fierce fighting took place around Sarajevo.  Roughly in that period.

13        Q.   That's what I wanted to ask you.  The sound that you heard, does

14     that correspond to the time of intensive combat activity during the

15     summer of 1995?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And now please take a look at the next paragraph of your

18     statement.  You say:

19             "I do not know if air-bombs were used against civilian objects."

20             Now I'm going to ask you whether, at any point in time, you had

21     any knowledge as to the objectives or, rather, the targets at which these

22     projectiles were fired?

23        A.   As I've already said, I heard this characteristic sound several

24     times.  It had to do with the flight of an air-bomb.  However, I know

25     directly of this one case, when I was present during this failed attempt

Page 17167

 1     to fire, and later on I was relatively nearby in Energoinvest when the

 2     bomb was launched towards the cold storage plant.  And then there's this

 3     other case that everybody knows of, I think it was it was even the media,

 4     that one of these bombs hit the building of radio television.  As for

 5     these other targets, I'm really not aware of the specific ones involved

 6     or, rather, the places where the bombs fell.

 7        Q.   [No interpretation]

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  We are not receiving interpretation.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Can you hear the English now?

10             JUDGE ORIE:  [Microphone not activated] we can.

11             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] I shall repeat my question.

12        Q.   Sir, in view of your military involvement throughout these years

13     of the war, can you tell us, can you -- or can you confirm for us whether

14     the facility of the Simis factory, the cold storage plant, was the place

15     from where the artillery of Bosnia-Herzegovina fired at the positions of

16     the Army of Republika Srpska?

17        A.   That plant was certainly used by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18     However, what kind of weapons and artillery pieces were used for activity

19     from there, I cannot confirm that.  It is possible that there were

20     artillery pieces there too, but it is certain that very often there was

21     firing against -- against Ilidza and this other location where I spent

22     the last year of the war in my work obligation.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] And I would like to ask for P3.

25     In e-court, that is page 39.

Page 17168

 1        Q.   I would just like to ask you to help us with this, because I

 2     assume that you are familiar with the terrain?

 3             This is a photograph that you had see a bit later.  It is one of

 4     the three incidents from the indictment in this case, and it has to do

 5     with something that, according to the indictment happened on the

 6     26th of May, 1995.

 7             Now this is what I'm asking you:  In view of your place of

 8     residence, can you recognise this part of Sarajevo?

 9        A.   I think that it is the neighbourhood opposite the radio

10     television and close to the bus depot of the Sarajevo Bus Company.

11        Q.   Will you agree with me that the facility to the left of this

12     apartment building marked with a red circle, so this place with a red

13     roof, is that the police station in that part of Sarajevo?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Also, in view of the fact that you possibly are familiar with

16     this area, could you give us an estimate as to how far away this red

17     circle is from the mentioned police station?

18        A.   Well, I cannot say exactly.  Approximately it may be, say, about

19     100 metres.  I really don't know.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  General guidance to the parties, distance are be to

22     be measured rather than to be estimated.

23             Please proceed.

24             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

25     Together with the Prosecution, we are going to do that, as we did in two

Page 17169

 1     other situations.  May I just clarify this with the witness, the place

 2     where the modified air-bomb fell.

 3        Q.   Can you give us an estimate as to how far away the building of

 4     Radio TV Sarajevo is from the place where this projectile fell?

 5        A.   Well, it's roughly a couple of hundred metres.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'm going to ask that we look at P3, again,

 7     together.  So it is P3.  In e-court, it would be page 40.

 8             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask the witness --

10             Do you know where the projectile fell, or is it on the basis of

11     the red circle that you gave your estimate?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the basis of the red circle.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, Mr. Stojanovic, only the red circle

14     covers at least 20, 30, if not more, metres.  So, therefore, it doesn't

15     really help.

16             Please proceed.

17             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with all due

18     respect, this red circle is an agreed location on the basis of the

19     testimony of other witnesses and we have the exact location of where the

20     projectile fell.  There is a document and the exact address of the place

21     where the projectile fell.  So, I believe, that there is going to be no

22     dispute between us and the Prosecution with regard to that.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  The only thing I said is that the red circle, I take

24     it, then, that the -- it's an agreed place where the projectile fell.

25     But the projectile does not -- is not 40 metres long but is 1 or 2, or 3

Page 17170

 1     metres.  And, therefore, there is an inherent inaccuracy already by using

 2     a red circle rather than a very specific point to start your measurement.

 3             But let's proceed.  Please proceed.

 4             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 5        Q.   Sir, could I now ask you, please, to take a look at this

 6     photograph as well.

 7             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is incident --

 8     it is the incident that occurred on the 16th of June, 1995, and the

 9     location is the square of international friendship and that's the

10     indictment reference.

11        Q.   Sir, do you know this part of Sarajevo?

12        A.   Well, not in great detail but I know a bit, like any other part

13     of Sarajevo.  I cannot say.

14        Q.   I would be interested in the facility across this road that goes

15     to Ilidza.  The road is popularly known as Bitumenka.  Do you see it in

16     this photograph?

17        A.   Yes, I do.

18        Q.   My question is as follows:  How far away was Bitumenka from the

19     approximate location where the projectile fell, from this red circle?

20        A.   Well, it's about 100 metres, or maybe a bit more,

21     100, 200 metres, roughly.

22        Q.   Thank you.  At any point in time, during the years of the war,

23     did you know whether the area known as Bitumenka was also used for the

24     needs of the Army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina?

25        A.   I did not know about the use of these areas, and let me not

Page 17171

 1     engage in guess-work.  Now I do have an opinion of my own, but, no, I

 2     don't know.

 3        Q.   During your involvement, did you have any direct or indirect

 4     knowledge of such a modified weapon being tested?

 5        A.   I heard from Mr. Krsmanovic that they tested one launcher on the

 6     hill of Zuc and that they had some problems then with these cables for

 7     firing, and probably that's why he mentioned that testing to me.

 8        Q.   Did you have any knowledge as to whether the

 9     Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the summer of 1995, had the human

10     resources and technical resources -- in view of all the persons that you

11     had from before the war did they have the resources to make such a

12     projectile?

13        A.   From the point of view of technical and human remain resources, I

14     think they were certainly capable of making something like this.

15        Q.   I'm going to conclude with the following question:  In view of

16     your training in the JNA and your professional education and training,

17     can you tell us anything about the precision of such a weapon?

18        A.   I really have no information about its precision.  What I do know

19     for sure is that, on that launcher, there were some elements for

20     targeting.  That is to say, taking a particular position in terms of

21     height and direction.  So it was used for sighting.  Now how close these

22     bombs fell in respect of the desired target, that is something that I

23     don't know about.

24        Q.   Did you see who it was that used these sighting devices on the

25     mentioned launchers in those two cases when you were nearby?  Were these

Page 17172

 1     professionals?

 2        A.   The first time I was there, no one used it because we came there

 3     to repair a technical thing that went wrong.

 4             Second time I'm not sure.  Possibly the bomb had already mounted

 5     on the launcher before it was in this position.  But, at any rate, there

 6     was an appropriate team there that was in charge of this launcher.  And

 7     they handled it.  I, myself, do not remember seeing a man handling that

 8     part of the mechanism.  I really have no such recollection.

 9        Q.   Thank you, sir.  I'm going finish with the following question.

10             Did you have any information, at any point in time, that the

11     Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska was in any way involved in

12     setting targets for the use of this modified weapon?

13        A.   I have no knowledge about that.  I personally do not.

14        Q.   Thank you.  I have no further questions for you.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Before I give you an opportunity to put further

16     questions, I would have a few questions for the witness.

17                           Questioned by the Court:

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, could you explain to us what the whole

19     purpose of this exercise with these modified air-bombs was?  Was it the

20     huge explosive power in the body of the bomb, or was it a lack of other

21     ammunition?  Or was it -- why did they use such a rather complicated way

22     of non-standardized production of projectiles?

23             What was the purpose of it, instead of using the standard rockets

24     through a standard rocket-launcher, or using other projectiles?  If you

25     know.

Page 17173

 1        A.   This is my opinion in that regard.

 2             It is a fact that the forces of the Army of Republika Srpska at

 3     this point in time in the war were very poorly supplied with ammunition.

 4     That could have been one of the reasons.

 5             Now, the second possible reason - these are just my assumptions,

 6     that's what I'm telling you about now - is -- well, you said it was

 7     complicated.  But, actually, it was a very simple way of hitting a target

 8     with an air-bomb, much simpler than doing it from an aircraft because you

 9     need an aircraft and specialised pilots, and so on and so forth, so this

10     was a simple way of firing an air-bomb that, at any rate, was more

11     destructive than standard shells.  I assume that all of this led to the

12     motivation for constructing this kind of weaponry.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I do understand that it's more easy, perhaps,

14     to fire it from the ground than to drop it from an aeroplane.  But if you

15     say they're more destructive than standard shells, that is, that it would

16     cause more damage upon impact?

17        A.   Certainly.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Now, the one time you observed that a modified

19     air-bomb was fired at the Simis cold storage facility, you said it landed

20     in VRS-controlled territory.

21             How far was that approximately from where the target was, the

22     target being the Simis cold storage?

23        A.   According to my knowledge, the bomb did not fall and detonate,

24     but, rather, exploded in mid air.  The device that I was working and was

25     actually put out of commission.  It was no longer used in the development

Page 17174

 1     of the asset due to that failure and I have no further contact with the

 2     crew of that launcher.  I never received any official information as to

 3     what had happened.

 4             As far as I know, as far as I heard, the bomb exploded in the

 5     air.  It had not fallen.  It exploded in mid air before reaching the cold

 6     storage facility.  It never reached the target and for some reason

 7     detonated in mid air.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now you told us that sometimes three

 9     propelling rockets were mounted on the modified air-bombs, sometimes

10     more, sometimes one.  You were specifically involved in the ignition

11     mechanisms.  Could you tell us whether the precision of the

12     simultaneously igniting several propelling rockets mounted to such an

13     aerial bomb, whether that would have any possible impact on the accuracy

14     of the ballistics to be expected?  That is, the trajectory you would

15     expect the bomb to fly.

16        A.   Yes.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Would it be -- would the ballistic characteristics,

18     due to these technical issues, be better or worse than, I would say,

19     normal projectiles, such as mortars or other standard produced

20     projectiles?

21        A.   In any case, there was a problem to deal with, which was the

22     simultaneously ignition of the rockets.  If that problem is solved

23     appropriately and adequately, then, in principle, the asset would be on a

24     par, at the same level as the other artillery assets.

25             As far as I know, with mortars too you have additional charges

Page 17175

 1     depending on the weight of the gun powder.  It is that that determines

 2     the place where the shell will land.  Any artillery weapon, in principle

 3     has potential difficulties with the system providing initial acceleration

 4     to the shell.

 5             In this case, specifically, it had to do with the simultaneous

 6     ignition of the rocket engines.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Was that problem resolved so that it really

 8     would -- that they would ignite all exactly at the same moment?

 9        A.   As regards the solution I attempted to reach, we used ultra quick

10     electronic starters to ignite the engines.  As for standard solution,

11     according to the material I saw a moment ago, and according to my

12     knowledge, they relied on very simple solutions using simple starters,

13     simple switches.  All engines were connected to a single starter.  Once

14     contact is established, separate wiring is used to lead electrical

15     impulses to all the engines at the same time.

16             I don't think it amounted to a specific technical problem.  The

17     length of wiring was the same from the starter to the ignition mechanism,

18     voltage is released simultaneously through the entire wiring system, and

19     the rest was up to the characteristics of the specific engines, in terms

20     whether they would, indeed, ignite at the same time or not.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  If ignition would not be exactly at the same moment,

22     could that influence the trajectory by creating a disbalanced propelling

23     power?

24        A.   I have no experience and no knowledge so as to be able to speak

25     about any time delays in the ignition of engines.

Page 17176

 1             Of course, the greatest problem would be if one or several

 2     engines failed to ignite completely.  That could be a problem.  However,

 3     I simply have no knowledge.  If you bring the voltage simultaneously to

 4     the entire circuit, well, then I can't really say what sort of delay we

 5     could have in the different times of ignition in specific engines.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Last question:  Did I understand you well that

 7     you have no knowledge about the ballistic characteristics of these

 8     modified air-bombs with the propelling rockets mounted to them?

 9        A.   If you have in mind precision and range, then, indeed, I have no

10     knowledge as to that, in terms of this weapon.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, I have no further questions.

12             Ms. Hochhauser.

13             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Just one.

14                           Re-examination by Ms. Hochhauser:

15        Q.   At page 77, line 23, in response to one of the Judge's questions

16     just now, you -- regarding the simultaneous ignition and finding a

17     solution, you said "as regards to the solution that I attempted to

18     reach," and I just want to be clear, the solution that you attempted was

19     never -- was never successful ; is that right?

20        A.   There may have been a misinterpretation.  We did reach a

21     solution, as for the problems in that solution had nothing do with the

22     launching of the rocket.  To put it expertly a comparator device was too

23     sensitive which was involved in the process of arming the bomb and thus

24     disabled the launch.  The bomb was not launched in the first place.  In

25     order to perform a launch, as I mentioned at the beginning of my

Page 17177

 1     testimony, one needed to arm the fuse.  If that failed the electronic

 2     system would not allow ignition.  Such problems amounted to a failed

 3     launch such as the case when I was present.  But I did come up with a

 4     solution.

 5        Q.   But, I guess, what I'm trying to ask is:  Other than the failed

 6     launch that you witnessed, you're not aware -- are you aware of whether

 7     your solution was ever successfully utilised?

 8        A.   The launcher, with my solution, definitely fired air-bombs with

 9     my device.  It is just that such problems occurred too often, resulting

10     in a disability to launch, and that is why the solution, as envisaged by

11     me, was ultimately terminated.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And I do understand that you then returned to a

13     rather simple electric system compared to a more complex electronic

14     system you had -- you had drafted, you had ...

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  The crew of the launcher, on

16     the day of the failed launch, came to see us at the factory, and we

17     produced appropriate cabling so that they could do it in the standard way

18     with a switch and a battery, as I have explained a moment ago.

19             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  I have no further questions.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Stojanovic, no further questions.

21             This, then, concludes your testimony, Mr. Soja.  I would like to

22     thank you very much for coming a long way to The Hague and for having

23     answered all the questions that were put to you by the parties and by the

24     Bench and I wish you a safe return home again.  You are excused.  You may

25     follow the usher.

Page 17178

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2                           [The witness withdrew]

 3             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  Your Honour, if I may.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 5             MS. HOCHHAUSER:  There is just one issue, and I can raise it more

 6     properly on Monday, if we're in a hurry to get out, about the adjudicated

 7     fact that was redacted on page 4, an unredaction of that.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  If would you not mind we would do that on Monday,

 9     because we have taken already -- we've stolen already, six -- six or

10     seven minutes from those who are assisting us.

11             We adjourn until Monday, the 23rd of September, at 9.30 in the

12     morning, in this same courtroom, I.

13                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.23 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day of

15                           September, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.