Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 19132

 1                           Tuesday, 12 November 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around this

 6     courtroom.

 7             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.

 9             This is the case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11             The Chamber was informed that the Prosecution would wish to raise

12     two short preliminary matters.

13             MR. GROOME:  Good morning, Your Honours.

14             Your Honours, last Friday, the Chamber entered its decision on

15     the Prosecution's 27th Rule 92 bis motion.  The Chamber admitted RM054's

16     closed session testimony in Kvocka and one associated exhibit without

17     designating them to be admitted under seal.  We believe this may have

18     been an oversight and would ask the Chamber to investigate and consider

19     amending its decision.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll seriously consider that.

21             MR. GROOME:  The second matter, Your Honour, in response to the

22     Trial Chamber's request to be notified regarding translations of the

23     documents on our 11th motion to amend Rule 65 ter exhibit list dated the

24     2nd of August, 2013, the Prosecution now confirms that all English

25     translations have been received and uploaded into e-court for all

Page 19133

 1     993 documents.  These have been assigned 65 ter numbers 29171 through

 2     30163.

 3             And that's all I wanted to say, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for this update, Mr. Groome.

 5             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I apologise, there's one other very

 6     brief matter.  Yesterday I sent an e-mail regarding the scheduling

 7     problem next week.  In discussing the matter with Mr. Lukic this morning,

 8     he believes that can he accomplish all he needs to in six hours, so the

 9     scheduling problem is no longer relevant.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then, of course, the parties should be very

11     disciplined in sticking strictly to the estimates.  But that then

12     resolved the matter I wanted to put on the record; that is, whether we

13     would sit either two hours somewhere during the week or to have a short

14     session on Wednesday.

15             But we leave it, as matters stand now, to the parties.

16             Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

17             Yes, and, as a matter of fact, I can quickly respond, Mr. Groome,

18     about the status of the documents admitted in the 27th Rule 92 bis

19     decision.  Because, on the 8th of November, in its decision on the

20     Prosecution's 27th motion to admit evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis, the

21     Chamber admitted into evidence in relation to RM054 excerpts of the

22     witness's testimony from Prosecutor versus Kvocka and -- et al and the

23     document bearing Rule 65 ter number 13888.  These documents should have

24     been admitted under seal, and therefore the Chamber instructs the

25     Registry to change their status to under seal.


Page 19134

 1                           [The witness takes the stand]

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Dannatt.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, good morning.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  May I remind you that you're still bound by the

 5     solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony that

 6     you will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic will now continue his cross-examination.

 9             You may proceed.

10             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

11                           WITNESS:  FRANCIS RICHARD DANNATT [Resumed]

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]

13        Q.   Good morning, General.

14        A.   Good morning, Mr. Ivetic.

15        Q.   I'd like to take up where we left off yesterday, the Krstic trial

16     and your book.

17             MR. IVETIC:  If I could have in e-court 1D1448, page 17.  This

18     ought to correspond to pages 260 and 261 of the book.  And I would like

19     to focus on the left at about three-quarters of the way down on the page.

20             And it begins:

21             "During the trial it become very apparent that his principal

22     failing had been a personal moral one.  His body language in the dock

23     increasingly indicated that he knew that his principal mistake was in

24     blindly accepting the order given to him directly by Ratko Mladic on

25     12 July 1995 to instruct his troops to conduct mass killings."

Page 19135

 1        Q.   Sir, here, you again seem to reference an explicit order given

 2     directly to Krstic from Ratko Mladic on 12 July 1995.  Can you please

 3     confirm for us that this conclusion by you is not based on any physical

 4     orders that you saw from General Mladic ordering any kind of massacre?

 5        A.   No, that's correct.  It's my assumption on the basis that, within

 6     the chain of command that was operating, the one person that could give

 7     an instruction to General Krstic was General Mladic.  And my personal

 8     observation during the course of the Krstic trial was that General Krstic

 9     had done something that he was most uncomfortable to do and had done so

10     as a result of following instructions from another person.

11        Q.   Is your assumption also based upon your review of

12     Richard Butler's report entitled:  "The Srebrenica Narrative"?

13        A.   I think I would stay with what I wrote in my book.  It was my

14     observation over an extended period of time giving evidence and watching

15     the effect of that evidence in examination and cross-examination on the

16     demeanour of General Krstic who, to my observation, and it's my opinion,

17     had begun with giving me the impression of a confident, professional

18     military man, but when confronted by the material that was put to him

19     during the course of the time that I was giving evidence, seemed to look

20     increasingly uncomfortable.  And I drew the deduction that there was a

21     realisation that he knew that he had done wrong.  And as I have just

22     said, the only person who could have given him instructions was his

23     military superior, which we know in the chain of command was

24     General Mladic.

25        Q.   So did you not have this conclusion or predisposition against

Page 19136

 1     General Mladic before you were an expert in the Krstic case?

 2        A.   I don't think I felt it my duty to come to a conclusion about

 3     anyone's guilt.  I appeared in this court 13, 14 years ago in order to

 4     give my opinions on a range of matters for the benefit of the Court.  I

 5     did not feel then or now it's my duty in court to express an opinion on

 6     anyone's guilt or not.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Dannatt, the question simply was whether you had

 8     this conclusion before you were an expert.  That's a factual question.

 9     Whether it was your duty or not to develop any opinion is a different

10     matter.

11             Did you have that opinion?

12             THE WITNESS:  I did not have that opinion, sir, no.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

14             MR. IVETIC:

15        Q.   If we can turn to page 12 of your book in e-court which should

16     correlate to pages 224 to 225 of the book, and if we can focus on the

17     middle paragraph of the page that is on the right-hand side:

18             "But not everyone believed [sic] so" --

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  "Behaved so."

20             MR. IVETIC:  "... behaved so.  The following Sunday, Sky TV

21     released an interview with Radovan Karadzic in which he taunted NATO for

22     its inability to arrest him and indeed asserted that it would be stupid

23     of us to try.  I looked on with interest, knowing that he would not be

24     able to run forever, but having no idea that he would elude capture for

25     so long.  I had been given orders that if he did come into the Banja Luka

Page 19137

 1     area he should be detained.  Such an arrest would undoubtedly have been

 2     another major bump on the path to peace, but I thought that it would

 3     certainly be very worthwhile.  Privately, though, I believed that

 4     arresting General Ratko Mladic was quite another matter.  The Bosnian

 5     Serb army was very loyal to him and an arrest at that time could have had

 6     a very violent backlash, one that was not worth the risk given the

 7     sensitive process in which we were then immersed.  Like Karadzic, this

 8     monster could not run forever.  One day justice would apprehend him."

 9        Q.   Can you confirm for us whether your views of General Mladic being

10     a monster date from the time-period when you were in Banja Luka in 1995?

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   Okay.  Do you still hold these same views of General Mladic that

13     he is monster and that you desire him to be apprehended by justice?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   If we can now turn to your statement.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Which is P2629, marked for identification.

17     Paragraph 27 of the same, which would be page 7 in the English, page 6 in

18     the B/C/S.

19        Q.   Here, sir, you describe how the British Army has changed from

20     centrally controlled to this manoeuvrist approach.  Does that mean that

21     it is common for an army's doctrine to change in order to address the

22     present factual circumstances facing a nation?

23        A.   Over time, it is possible to do that, yes.

24        Q.   Did your extensive research and experience reveal if the

25     Yugoslavian military, that is, the JNA, or the Yugoslav defence doctrine

Page 19138

 1     change at all or were they static and unchanging from their inception

 2     until the dissolution of Yugoslavia?

 3        A.   The model of a centralised command and control system, I believe,

 4     remained in places throughout the lifetime of the JNA and of the VRS.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  It's only now that the interpreters have finished

 6     their interpretation.

 7             Please proceed.

 8             MR. IVETIC:

 9        Q.   General, do you consider the British approach to mission command

10     doctrine to be demonstrative of other NATO nations and their armies?

11        A.   It is demonstrative of those that are predominantly volunteer

12     armies, which I would include the United States.  And over the last

13     ten years a number of European armies that previously relied heavily on

14     conscripts have become increasingly made up of volunteers, and as their

15     level of training and education has increased, they are moving more

16     towards the NATO model, which is a model based on the manoeuvrist

17     approach, mission command and Auftragstaktik which lends itself to armies

18     that are professional as opposed to conscript.

19        Q.   I'd like to now take a look at 1D1449.  I can introduce that as

20     being an article dating from 2009 in the Canadian Military Journal by a

21     Keith Stewart.

22             And I'd like to look together at the bottom of the first column

23     of the first page.  Start:

24             "Information age scholars Donald S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes

25     have proposed a spectrum of command and control approaches in which they

Page 19139

 1     distinguish between 'order specific,' 'objective specific' and 'mission

 2     specific' philosophies.  These discussions have focused upon the levels

 3     of control centralisation and directive specificity in orders.  'Order

 4     specific' approaches tend to be adopted by command organisations that

 5     maintain centralised control and issue regular, detailed orders.  The

 6     Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) and former Soviet armies are cited

 7     as examples.  'Mission specific' approaches are at the opposite end of

 8     the scale and describe low levels of central control such as employed by

 9     the Israeli Army and by the German Army during the Second World War.  The

10     centre of the spectrum is occupied by 'objective specific' approaches."

11             Sir, do you agree, based upon your expertise, with what is

12     written here about there being a spectrum of command and control

13     approaches --

14             JUDGE ORIE:  One second.  Again, it is only now that the

15     interpreters were able to finish their interpretation.  Could we all slow

16     down.

17             Could you answer the question, Mr. Dannatt.

18             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  If there --

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, could you read with us whether you --

22     your question was complete already?

23             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  It was.

25             Could you then answer the question.

Page 19140

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes, a second time, I say yes.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 3             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  I missed it the first time.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  That's all right, sir.

 6             MR. IVETIC:

 7        Q.   If we can return to the text and the next paragraph, which will

 8     bleed onto the next page:

 9             "Within this category, Alberts and Hayes contrast 'problem

10     bounding' and 'problem solving' approaches.  The former, they suggest, is

11     consistent with British doctrine, and it is speculated here that it is

12     broadly equivalent to the" - and if we can go to the next page.  Again it

13     will be the left-hand side - "approaches adopted in the Canadian and

14     Australian armies.  Alberts and Hayes observe that although British

15     headquarters provide directives based upon objectives to be accomplished,

16     they tend to present them in very general terms.  They propose that

17     'problem bounding' directives are less detailed than those issued by

18     commanders in 'problem solving' environments - 'often by a factor of

19     three to one, reflecting this lack of detail.'  By contrast, problem

20     solving approaches are characterised by a tendency to provide more

21     substantial guidance as to how objectives are to be met.  Alberts and

22     Hayes suggest that it is this approach that has been adopted by the

23     US Army since the Second World War."

24             General, do you agree with what is presented here?

25        A.   That is Alberts' and Hayes' opinion.  I read it with interest.

Page 19141

 1     Thank you.

 2        Q.   Can I take that as a disagreement then, sir.

 3        A.   No, you can't.  I think it's an interesting comment.  I think

 4     it's a very general comment to sweep up into one sentence an operational

 5     approach said to be adopted by the US Army since the Second World War.

 6     In that 60- or 70-year period, the US Army has gone through several

 7     transformations based on experiences in places such as Vietnam, and their

 8     approach to command and control, their approach to training, equipment

 9     and discipline has changed more than once over that extended period of

10     time.

11             So I say again, I note Alberts' and Hayes' opinion.  I don't

12     necessarily share it.

13             MR. IVETIC:  If we could take a look at the next paragraph that

14     begins "differences."

15             I'd like to skip to the middle of that paragraph where it starts

16     talking:  "A high-profile example ..."

17        Q.   And I'd like for you to follow along as we introduce that part:

18             "A high-profile example of this difference in command philosophy

19     resulting in friction is provided by the American General Wesley Clark,

20     who believes that it was a major contributing factor to his

21     well-publicised disagreement with the British KFOR commander,

22     Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Jackson, during the Kosovo campaign.

23     Clark reflected that 'in the British system, a field commander is given

24     mission-type orders, not detailed and continuing guidance ... the

25     American military has always aspired to this model, but has seldom seemed

Page 19142

 1     to attain it.'  Likewise, in his now notorious assessment of the US

 2     Army's early experience in Iraq, the British Brigadier, Aylwin-Foster,

 3     states, 'that commanders and staff at all levels were reluctant to

 4     deviate from precise instructions.'  This raises another interesting

 5     issue.  Although it is one that cannot be developed further here:

 6     namely, that as well as representing a 'top-down' managerial approach, a

 7     culture of command by detailed orders is also 'demand-driven.'  That is,

 8     unless they are carefully trained otherwise, personnel will expect and

 9     prefer to receive detailed direction - especially in high-risk

10     situations."

11             And I'd end there and ask you, sir, since you -- I -- I believe

12     you have personal knowledge of General Clark and General Jackson's

13     experiences in Kosovo.

14        A.   Uh-huh.

15        Q.   Do you agree with the differences between the British and the US

16     doctrine as described by General Clark, on the one hand, and by Brigadier

17     Aylwin-Foster on the other hand?

18        A.   I think their opinions interesting, and not far removed from

19     reality.  As the quote said, the US aspire to mission command, but in a

20     very large army, they have not always been able to deploy it, have not

21     always been able to follow it in the way that they would like to.  And

22     Brigadier Aylwin-Foster's comments are interesting and they were

23     controversial at the time, and they caused a bit of trouble at the time,

24     actually.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'd like to turn to the JNA.  If we can go to

Page 19143

 1     your statement.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  P2629, marked for identification, at page 6 in the

 3     English and page 5 of the B/C/S, paragraph 24 is what I would like to

 4     look at.

 5        Q.   Here, sir, you talk about the antecedents for the VRS being in

 6     the JNA and that the doctrinal roots of both are in the Soviet model.  In

 7     this paragraph and the next one of your statement, you cite several JNA

 8     publications from the early 1990s.  Do you consider that these

 9     publications are fully representative of the entirety of the origins and

10     the doctrinal roots of the JNA?

11        A.   I think they are a sufficient basis on which the VRS was founded

12     from the doctrinal -- received doctrinal understanding of the JNA,

13     bearing in mind that many of the officers and leaders of the VRS had

14     former service in the JNA and therefore had been educated and trained by

15     the method of command and control practiced by the JNA.

16        Q.   For purposes of your research and review, did you ever come

17     across the name of Dr. James Gow from the King's College in London and

18     someone who has testified for the Prosecution as an expert in other

19     proceedings such as the Celebici case?

20        A.   I'm aware of James Gow.  I don't know him personally.

21             MR. IVETIC:  If we can please have 1D1446 in e-court.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Is it -- Mr. Ivetic, is it Gall or is it Gow?

23             MR. IVETIC:  Gow, G-o-w, I apologise.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Your answer related to Dr. James Gow?

25             THE WITNESS:  It did, yes.

Page 19144

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 2             MR. IVETIC:

 3        Q.   Sir, we see one of Dr. Gow's publications or books on the screen.

 4     This is something that we received from the Prosecution in disclosure.

 5     Have you had occasion to ever review this book and read it?

 6        A.   I've not read that book, no.

 7        Q.   Okay.  I'd propose to take a look at some of the things that are

 8     said about the origins of the Yugoslav military.

 9             MR. IVETIC:  If we can go to page 40 of this document in e-court,

10     page 33 of the book, and it will be starting with the last sentence on

11     this page and will then bleed then on over to the next page dealing with

12     December 1941.  And I begin:

13             "The next major step came in December, when the 1st

14     Proletarian" -- I apologise.

15             And then if we go, yeah:

16             "... Shock Brigade was formed.  By the end of the war, there had

17     been 295 brigades.  These were elite units, service in them was the

18     highest honour for every individual fighting man - specifically under

19     Communist leadership which could operate wherever necessary.  Thus, while

20     retaining a national, or territorial character (in the main), these were

21     the first formations of an army that could be directed from the centre to

22     perform tasks anywhere.

23             "Prior to this, the military effort depended on local feelings

24     but this led to low reliability.  For instance, Djilas describes how

25     Montenegrin peasants, who had been quick to rise up and take action,

Page 19145

 1     abandoned the cause once the Italians mounted an offensive:  'To escape

 2     artillery fire, they had abandoned the position.  The peasants sped back

 3     to their homes, hoping to save their families and animals, and no force

 4     on earth could have stopped them.'  The territorial specificity of the

 5     early partisan detachments meant not only that members might fight only

 6     for their own village, but that they were in constant touch with their

 7     households, frequently sleeping there.  This kind of attachment had

 8     awkward consequences, especially if an individual was killed.  To avoid

 9     these situations and create a less territorially defined, more flexible

10     military structure, brigades were introduced."

11        Q.   And I'll stop right there and ask you, sir, was this something

12     that you came across in your research, the earlier territorial-based

13     units and the switch to brigades in 1941?

14        A.   This is very interesting comment on the early days of what became

15     the JNA, and I note, with interest, the earlier part of the quotation

16     that you read out.  That brigades, and I quote now, "were the first

17     formation of an army that could be directed from the centre to perform

18     tasks anywhere."

19             What that tells me is that the realisation that leaving it just

20     to the man on a the ground to do whatever he thought was right was not

21     going to be militarily effective, as the rest of your quote would

22     indicate, and that therefore there was a need to have better trained,

23     more centrally controlled units which could carry out their tasks as

24     required in a better fashion.  I find that very interesting.

25             MR. IVETIC:  If we could scroll down not to the next paragraph

Page 19146

 1     but the one thereafter, I'd like to continue the talk of the brigades.

 2     Dr. Gow's book reads as follows:

 3             "The brigades' greatest attraction was mobility.  The concept of

 4     mobile territorial units was, to some extent, an inheritance of the

 5     former Royal Army's thinking, a product of the incorporation of some of

 6     that army's officers in the new movement.  It was also a descendant of

 7     the Serbian forces in the First Balkan War."

 8        Q.   Did your research into the doctrinal roots of the JNA include

 9     research of the Royal Yugoslav Army and the Serbian forces in the

10     First Balkan War?

11        A.   No.  But thank you for drawing my attention to it.

12             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to page 47 in e-court.  And this will

13     be page 40 of the underlying book.

14        Q.   And I'd like to direct your attention to the first

15     paragraph under the heading:  "Military legitimacy in the post-war

16     period:  The functional imperative."

17             And it reads as follows:

18             "Taking military doctrine as the imperative of functional

19     legitimacy, the post-war evolution of the YPA (including the change from

20     the Yugoslav Army to the Yugoslav People's Army) falls into three phases.

21     In the first, the YPA was established as a conventional standing army.

22     In the second, the army returned to its partisan roots, becoming a

23     territorial militia army.  In the final period, the army no longer

24     encompassed the territorial aspect of defence; instead, it became one

25     element in a duplex defence system, the two structures being an

Page 19147

 1     operational army and a territorial defence force.

 2             "Official versions of the post-war development of the armed

 3     forces give the dates for the three stages as follows:  1945 to 1958;

 4     1958 to 1968, and 1969 onwards.  These are the dates when new military

 5     doctrines were formally adapted on the basis of new defence laws.

 6     However, if account is taken of the three factors said to define military

 7     doctrine, a different picture emerges."

 8             In the course of your research and work on preparing your expert

 9     statement on the origins of the JNA and the VRS, did you, in fact, come

10     across information about these changes in military doctrine by the

11     Yugoslav forces?

12        A.   Yes.  But I would comment, and I repeat a comment as I made

13     yesterday --

14        Q.   Please continue, General.

15        A.   I would repeat a comment that I made yesterday, that sometimes

16     loose language is used in military discussions, and the three phases of

17     development of, let's call the JNA, actually represent the following of

18     three strategies as opposed to doctrines.  I say again what I said

19     yesterday, a doctrine indicates how an army thinks.  A strategy is the

20     headline of what it does.  And what you have just described to me that

21     I'm sufficiently familiar with is three stages of development when the

22     strategies, the national strategies of Yugoslavia, changed.  And they

23     describe that very accurately.

24             Thank you for drawing that interesting passage to my attention.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 19148

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, may I briefly consult with my ...

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Since the interpretation has finished now, you may

 3     briefly consult with your client.  But usual conditions:  Short and

 4     whispering rather than audible speech.

 5                           [Defence counsel confer]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. -- Mr. Mladic, would you please return to your

 7     initial volume.

 8             Mr. Ivetic, could you ask Mr. Mladic to return to his initial

 9     volume.

10             Mr. -- Mr. Mladic, I stop you now.  I will not allow any further

11     consultations if Mr. Mladic does not speak at low volume.  Then he has to

12     wait until the next break, which is in 15 minutes from now, and then you

13     can take instructions during that break, Mr. Ivetic, and you can put

14     whatever questions you wish after the break.

15             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to page 44 -- page 51 of the document

16     in e-court, which should be page 44 ... I apologise.  Next page.  Last

17     paragraph of the page, and it will bleed over onto the next page, talking

18     about the restructuring of the Yugoslav military:

19             "Before long, there was another new military doctrine and

20     concomitant re-organisation.  General People's Defence (GPD) came into

21     force in 1969.  The Yugoslav armed forces were to get a radically

22     different structure.  Territorial Defence was emphasised by a division of

23     responsibility.  Until this point and in other instances of armed," if

24     can you go to the next page, "forces based on a territorial principle,

25     sole responsibility for defence had been with the central institution of

Page 19149

 1     defence; usually, territorial forces have been integrated with, or

 2     adjunct to the army.  GPD divided responsibility between the YPA and

 3     socio-political communities.

 4             "According to the 1969 National Defence Law, the Yugoslav armed

 5     forces would comprise two equal elements:  The YPA and Territorial

 6     Defence.  Whereas the YPA would be the responsibility of the federal

 7     authorities, Territorial Defence would be organised by socio-political

 8     communities, that is, republics, autonomous provinces, communes and work

 9     organisations."

10        Q.   We can end there, I think, and I'll ask you again:  Do you stand

11     by your testimony that the changes in the Yugoslav military doctrine

12     relate only to strategy and do not relate to command and control, based

13     upon what we've just read here?

14        A.   Yes, what we've just read there is a very clear description of a

15     shift in national strategic stance, one that I completely recognise, and

16     the way Territorial Defence is described and organised is something that

17     one recognises throughout the latter history of Yugoslavia and into the

18     way, in many ways, that the part of Bosnia that was controlled by the

19     Serbs operated.  Local defence is very much part and parcel of the

20     organisation.  That was a strategic shift.  It's -- doesn't actually have

21     that much bearing of the doctrine of military command and control.

22             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to the next page, which should be

23     page 47 of the underlying book, the last two paragraphs on the page:

24             "As in earlier periods, however, much of the doctrine was

25     theoretically compatible with self-management and thus was a welcome but

Page 19150

 1     secondary feature.  If 1967 offered a ten-year perspective on the armed

 2     forces' progress that would indicated -- that which indicated a

 3     continuing need to work intensively on the optimal solution to problems

 4     in that quarter was not the need to produce a more social form of

 5     defence.  Although, in practice, GPD met civilian demands for

 6     self-managing principles to be applied to the armed forces, bringing

 7     defence into line with the decentralising confederative tendencies of

 8     society at that time, the changes did not owe anything to the theoretical

 9     argument.

10             "The 1969 changes constituted a diminishing of the YPA's

11     institutional status, where previously it had sole and virtually

12     unquestioned authority in defence matters, it had been reduced to a

13     co-equal."

14             And then if we could turn to two paragraphs down from here.

15             A little more.  Should begin:  "War-time experiences ..."

16             Up a little bit.  Just missed it.  There we go:

17             "War-time experience had shown that small units operating locally

18     could not be centrally commanded.  Were Yugoslavia to be attacked, it

19     would have been highly unlikely that the YPA could achieve full

20     mobilisation before certain areas were occupied by the enemy; certainly

21     it could not have provided anything more than specialist local leadership

22     in the event of territory being seized."

23        Q.   Sir, does this that we've just gone through comprise your

24     understanding of the system that was introduced subsequent to 1969 in

25     Yugoslavia in relation to the Yugoslav army and the Territorial Defence

Page 19151

 1     system?

 2        A.   Yes, I recognise that.  And it is an interesting description of

 3     one part of the development of what was going on in the former

 4     Yugoslavia.  I have to question, however, in my own mind, the relevance

 5     to -- between that and the situation of the Bosnian Serb Army between

 6     1992 and 1995.  Different conflicts at different points in history, and I

 7     stand by the centralised nature of the VRS.  But thank you for bringing

 8     this to my attention.  I found it very interesting.

 9        Q.   Could you give us your understanding of the changes that were

10     being instituted in 1988 in the Yugoslav army according to your research

11     and expertise, sir?

12        A.   I won't go into that.  Thank you.  I can't answer that question.

13     Perhaps you'd like to tell me.  You've been very instructive so far this

14     morning.  Thank you.

15             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to page 66 of the book in e-court.

16     And if we could focus on the middle paragraph of the page that starts:

17     "It is not clear why that tradition was ended ..."

18             And I would start with the line right there, three lines from the

19     top on the screen:

20             "Already in 1974, the co-equality" --

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mladic, please sit down.

22             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

23             MR. IVETIC:

24        Q.   "Already by 1974, the co-equality of the two elements of the

25     armed forces in the five-year-old GPD system had become imbalanced, the

Page 19152

 1     YPA, de facto, having become the senior element.  Gradual erosion of

 2     regional authority in the Territorial Defence Force (TDF) was completed

 3     in 1980 with the establishment of a Council for Territorial Defence.

 4     Answerable only to the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, which

 5     was staffed by soldiers, and of which the minister was always the most

 6     senior YPA officer, the council's foundation meant a concentration of the

 7     [sic] YPA control; the TDF became an integral part of the YPA itself.

 8     Creeping centralisation within the YPA culminating with the changes which

 9     included the LAD's abolition was signalled by the end of 1987.  At that

10     time, the ZMD, which assumed the responsibilities of the LAD and its

11     equivalent in Zagreb, was formed.  The year 1988 would appear to have

12     been one of transition."

13             Does this accord with your knowledge of the facts and the changes

14     being undergone by the Yugoslav military in 1988, just a few years before

15     the dissolution of that army?

16        A.   Yes, in very general terms, I would recognise that.  But if I'm

17     allowed to offer a comment, 1988 is still quite sometime before the very

18     different circumstances in Bosnia in 1992 to 1995.

19        Q.   Do you agree that changes meant to centralise the defence forces

20     would not necessarily have been completed by 1991?

21        A.   That is entirely possible, but I think I have to draw a

22     distinction between the shifts in national strategy reflecting -- which

23     were then reflected in organisational changes don't necessarily of

24     themselves, within the professional part of the military -- and your

25     quotes have drawn attention several times to the term "co-equal," that

Page 19153

 1     the professional military did not necessarily, by the argument that

 2     you're developing, mean that a decentralised form of command and control

 3     was accepted, even if there was a degree of decentralisation earlier and

 4     recentralisation of the way the strategy was carried out.

 5        Q.   But you will agree with me that the VRS when it was formed took

 6     in former Territorial Defence units which then became a part of that

 7     army?

 8        A.   Yes, I will agree with you that -- with that, but I will also

 9     comment, and an organisational chart which I've seen that we have not

10     looked at today shows that from an early date, the VRS was formed on an

11     organisational structure based on corps which had territorial areas of

12     responsibility.  And within those territorial areas of responsibility,

13     everything that occurred was the responsibility of the military

14     commander.  And he always -- corps areas, it was a general, either of

15     major-general or lieutenant-general rank, who were answerable directly to

16     the Main Staff headed by General Mladic.

17        Q.   Do you consider that the absorption of TO, Territorial Defence

18     units and commanders, with the history of the duality of the All People's

19     Defence doctrine that we just went through, introduced elements of

20     decentralisation and confusion within the VRS during the early days of

21     its formation?

22        A.   I think confusion is a very good word to introduce into our

23     conversation, particularly as not all the military operations that the

24     VRS were conducting were ones of defence, which Territorial Defence was

25     naturally an expression of, but many of the operations were operations of

Page 19154

 1     offence, of moving into areas not previously controlled by Bosnian Serb

 2     forces, and, therefore, not -- there is not a direct applicability of all

 3     aspects of Territorial Defence being relevant to the activities of the

 4     VRS who, in some areas, conducted offensive operations.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic --

 6             MR. IVETIC:  We're at the time for the break, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  -- time for a break.  Mr. Dannatt, we'd like to see

 8     you back in 20 minutes.  You may follow the usher.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10             JUDGE ORIE:  And then before we actually take that break,

11     Mr. Groome, the Registry informs me that it has not yet received

12     notification that the documents we earlier talked about, that's documents

13     covered by the 27th -- the decision on the 27th motion, 92 bis, have been

14     uploaded into e-court.  But once that has been done, the Registry will

15     assign numbers and give the status as ordered by the Chamber this

16     morning.

17             MR. GROOME:  Thank you, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  We take a break, and we resume at ten minutes

19     to 11.00.

20                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

22                           [The witness takes the stand]

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

24             MR. IVETIC:  If we could move along to another document, 1D1234.

25     This is dated the 24th of March, 1994.  It is a UN document sent to the

Page 19155

 1     Chairman of the Commission of Experts, Mr. Cherif Bassiouni.  And if we

 2     could turn to page 2, we can see that it is the report on the military

 3     structure of the warring parties.

 4             Now, I'd like to turn to page 6 in e-court.  And I'd like to go

 5     through some of the items here, starting with number 10:

 6             "The TDFs and, in the case of Croatian, the ZNG, are known as

 7     militias (milicija) and have a separate command structure from the

 8     regular army.  Nevertheless, they join in the armed conflict, frequently

 9     operating with the regular army and under regular army officers' command.

10     But they also operate independently in certain geographic areas, usually

11     where most of the personnel in these units comes [sic] from."

12             Number 11:

13             "In addition, two other types of paramilitary groups and

14     formations are also engaged in military operations.  They consist of: (a)

15     what is called special forces; and, (b) local police forces augmented by

16     local armed civilians.  All the warring factions make use of such forces

17     among their combatants, but the lines of authority and the structure of

18     command and control are confused, even to the combatants."

19             Number 12:

20             "There are 37 reported special forces which usually operate under

21     the command of a named individual and with substantial apparent autonomy,

22     except when they are integrated in the regular army's plan of action."

23        Q.   And I would stop there and ask you, sir --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, before you do so, I would like to know

25     more about the -- what this document exactly is because it was sent to

Page 19156

 1     Mr. Bassiouni, I do understand --

 2             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  -- but it comes from the administrative secretary --

 4             MR. IVETIC:  Correct.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  -- and the document reads in its heading that it's

 6     the 10th draft of a certain document.  Is there a final version of this

 7     document, because it seems to be very much an internal working document

 8     of the commission.

 9             MR. IVETIC:  There is, Your Honour.  And I can --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  With an unknown author.

11             MR. IVETIC:  Mm-hm.  The final expert report is in -- in e-court

12     as 1D1447.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Why don't we then look at the final report instead

14     of a working document which, by its character, seems to be an unfinished

15     product.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Because some of the language is not in the final

17     product.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  That there may be good reasons for that, but I let

19     you go at this moment.  But please be aware that this is -- that I

20     express the concern on behalf of the Chamber for the use of this

21     document.

22             Mr. Groome.

23             MR. GROOME:  Could I also ask for some clarification as to which

24     period or what period, is it even a period that's within the indictment

25     or is this a reference to the pre-indictment period.

Page 19157

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Well, if we look at number 5, which would have been

 2     on page 3, it's talking about in May 1992, the JNA's FRY forces

 3     officially withdrew from Bosnia, and it's talking about the ORBAT

 4     subsequent thereto.  If you could scroll down, I think that's down -- oh,

 5     there it is.  So we're talking about periods that would be within the

 6     indictment period.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But is that the time-frame for the -- I mean,

 8     I see that it's mentioned there.  But is that the time-frame for the

 9     document as a whole or ... or I'm just trying to find ...

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, if you could assist the Chamber in

12     finding, apart from one line which says that at a certain moment the JNA

13     withdrew, which seems not to be in dispute, but whether that defines the

14     time-frame for what is said in the report.  Otherwise, it's still unclear

15     to the Chamber.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Well, Your Honours, I'm a little confused.  We have

17     a gentleman who is being presented as an expert witness --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  And if you can answer my question, then I would

19     appreciate that.  Otherwise, we can move on.  But I think Judge Moloto

20     would have a question.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  My question to you, Mr. Ivetic, is if this is a

23     draft and you say the final document doesn't have some of the language

24     that is contained in it, in this draft, isn't that indicative of the fact

25     that even the drafters of this document decided to abandon that language

Page 19158

 1     and therefore move away from the positions expressed by that language?

 2     And that now, we are not putting to the witness the final position of the

 3     drafters but we're putting to them something that was work in progress

 4     and which they abandoned?

 5             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to 1D1447, the third page of the

 6     same.  And this -- this is the 1994 final version of the UN expert

 7     report.  If we can turn to the -- I had it as the third page.  Is this

 8     the third page in the document in e-court?

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  That is the third page.

10             MR. IVETIC:  Ah.  We need to go to the 31st; I apologise.  I have

11     the abbreviated version in front of me.  The 31st page, if we look at

12     paragraphs 119, 120, and 121, I think we'll find that the exact identical

13     language is in the final report but for the change of instead of

14     35 special -- 37 special groups, it's now 45.  So I will combine my

15     questions to the expert.

16        Q.   Sir, did you have knowledge of such a confused situation with

17     such a large number of groups operating with apparent autonomy in the

18     region at any point in time during the existence of the VRS?

19        A.   Most certainly.  And you touch on confusion, which is a point

20     we've already touched on already.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.  If we can now turn to -- if we could turn to

22     paragraph 122 which should begin on the bottom of this page of the

23     official version.  We'll stick with that.  And it reads as follows:

24             "Some towns and villages formed paramilitary units, which are not

25     to be confused with the special forces mentioned above.  These local

Page 19159

 1     forces operate in the areas of their towns and villages.  Occasionally,

 2     they also lend support to similar groups and other combatants in the same

 3     opstina (county) and neighbouring areas.  Their command and control is

 4     local, and the chain of command difficult to establish, through

 5     characteristically, these groups, like the special forces, have an

 6     identifiable leader.  Frequently, the unit or group is called by the

 7     leader's name.  Otherwise, the unit or group uses a politically

 8     significant name or the name of their town, village, or area.  The

 9     leadership is local, mostly consisting of political figures."

10        Q.   Did you take into account the existence of such formations in

11     terms of your expertise?

12        A.   Most certainly.  But I would also point out to you what I have

13     already said, that in the case of the Bosnian Serb part of Bosnia, that

14     the VRS operated under a corps arrangement where the geographic area of

15     the country was divided into corps tactical areas of responsibility and

16     within those areas of responsibility, irregular and militia special

17     forces and other armed groups came under the authority of the VRS itself.

18     Whether they always followed that authority is another issue but they, by

19     regulation, were under the command of the commander of that corps

20     tactical area of responsibility.  And in my experience, these groups were

21     small and by definition incapable of carrying out large-scale military

22     operations, such as the movement of 30.000 civilians from Srebrenica and

23     the undoubted execution of around 8.000 of those, their burial,

24     exhumation and reburial.  That kind of activity requires a high degree of

25     command and control and resources and is not characteristic of the kind

Page 19160

 1     of militias, special forces, and armed civilian groups to which you

 2     refer.

 3             I also note that much of what you refer to refers to Croatia and

 4     its development and not to Bosnia.

 5        Q.   That was why I wanted the draft report that had all the 47 forces

 6     named which included Croat, Bosnian, and Serb forces.  Was that part of

 7     your expertise, sir, that that there were these forces on all three of

 8     the groups that I've mentioned, the Serb side, the Bosnian side and the

 9     Croatian side?

10        A.   Irregular forces characterised all three warring factions in that

11     particular war, yes.

12        Q.   Now, I would like to move to a related topic.  If we could take a

13     look at your statement again, P2629, marked for identification.

14             MR. IVETIC:  And we'll be looking at page 10 -- pardon me,

15     page 11 in the English, page 10 in the Serbian.

16        Q.   Paragraph 38 of your statement.  And I want to focus on the last

17     part of this paragraph where you say:

18             "An example of one of the groups Mladic would have been

19     responsible for can be found on video," and then you list it and you

20     identify it as the Skorpions video.

21             And I want to ask you, first of all, what is the basis of your

22     research that leads to the finding that Mladic would be responsible for

23     the group that is depicted in the Skorpions video?  What sources or

24     documents did you consult for this?

25        A.   The basis for my comment is founded on the overall conclusions of

Page 19161

 1     my research, and if the Court will forgive me for a degree of repetition,

 2     within the Bosnian Serb republic part of Bosnia, the country was divided

 3     into corps tactical areas of responsibility and all the military groups,

 4     whether VRS or irregular, were under the command of the corps commander

 5     of that area an answerable directly to the Main Staff in which the senior

 6     person was General Mladic.

 7             That is the basis of the comment that you've just drawn my

 8     attention to.

 9        Q.   Based upon your expert review, can you tell us from what area or

10     municipality the Skorpions come from?

11        A.   I can't remember now.

12        Q.   Can I refresh your recollection that it's Djeletovci, Croatia?

13        A.   Thank you.  And I'm -- I -- just point out the significance of

14     that, would you?

15        Q.   Are you aware that, in fact, this unit was affiliated with the

16     assistant minister of interior for the Republic of Serb Krajina,

17     Mr. Mrgud Milovanovic?

18        A.   I'll take your word for that.

19        Q.   Well, I'm asking if your expert review uncovered that, sir?

20             JUDGE ORIE:  The answer of the witness clearly indicates that the

21     witness has no personal knowledge but that he has no reason to challenge

22     what you said, Mr. Ivetic.

23             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, sir.  I agree with that.

24             MR. IVETIC:

25        Q.   Do you consider yourself to be an expert with sufficient

Page 19162

 1     knowledge of the laws and regulations in respect to the police forces of

 2     the SFRY, the FRY, the Republika Srpska, and the Republic of Serbian

 3     Krajina, such as to be qualified to render expert opinions as to those

 4     laws?

 5        A.   The word "sufficient" is, I think, relevant.  My expertise is

 6     based on a wide-ranging set of subjects and issues, and bringing those

 7     wide-ranging issues together I believe qualifies me to be of assistance

 8     to the Court, to the extent that I can at this time.

 9        Q.   There has been significant and detailed testimony at this trial

10     describing of how the Skorpions unit was under the direction and control

11     of Mr. Milovanovic as well as the Serbian State Security Police or DB.

12             Did you have access to information of that nature at the time

13     that you were rendering this opinion about the Skorpions that is set

14     forth in your statement?

15        A.   My opinion with regard to the Skorpions is that if they were

16     operational in the Bosnian Serb republic, then, by account of the

17     explanation that I have given today two or three times, they would have

18     been operating within one of the corps areas of responsibility that

19     you've referred to the Krajinas.  This could well be under the 1st or

20     2nd Krajina Corps area of responsibility, and, therefore, by the same

21     process that I've described more than once, ultimately under the control

22     and command of General Mladic.

23        Q.   Did you have occasion to study the laws on resubordination of the

24     Ministry of Interior forces to the army at the time of war, specifically

25     the Law on Internal Affairs, provisional Law on Internal Affairs relying

Page 19163

 1     for the time-period of war, was that part of your research?

 2        A.   I believe I have looked at those documents.  I can't recall the

 3     exact document now, but I am aware in general terms of the relationship

 4     between the police and the military within the context, which I've

 5     referred to several times, of the corps tactical areas of responsibility.

 6        Q.   Were you aware that police units resubordinated to the army for

 7     purposes of combat retained their police commanders during that combat?

 8        A.   Yes.  And that during that period of combat, they were under

 9     command of the military in the tactical area of responsibility of the

10     corps in which they were operating with its relationship that I've

11     referred to several times to the Main Staff and to General Mladic.

12        Q.   Were you aware that after combat is completed and that the police

13     units then return to their police work they are no longer resubordinated

14     to the army?

15        A.   Yes, that is entirely likely.  If they're no longer taking part

16     in military operations, then their primary function is the policing of

17     the civilian community and that is what I would expect them to do.

18        Q.   Okay.  Would you agree that such an analysis of whether police

19     forces were subordinated or not to the army at particular instances is

20     lacking from your expert statement?

21        A.   If it's an omission, I'm very grateful that you've brought it out

22     in cross-examination for illumination of the Court.  I think that's why

23     I'm here.

24        Q.   Now I'd like to switch to another topic.  You mentioned yesterday

25     your belief that the 2nd Military District -- at least I think you were

Page 19164

 1     talking about the 2nd Military District.  You said a Military District

 2     was created --

 3        A.   2nd.

 4        Q.   So are we talking about the --

 5        A.   2nd Military District.

 6        Q.   And your belief that that was created such as to become the VRS.

 7     I'd like to ask you if your research uncovered that the headquarters of

 8     that district as well as the units subordinated to the district as

 9     non-Serb personnel left, they were not replaced by anybody and thus the

10     overall size of the headquarters and personnel in the units shrunk?  Or

11     shrank.

12        A.   Yes, that's right.  I mean, it was, back to this word

13     "confusing," a confusing period and inevitably a military headquarters,

14     any military headquarters, populated by a variety of people when there

15     is, as happened in 1992, a parting of the ways on ethnic grounds, I think

16     is the right way to say it, then a number of people are going to leave,

17     to take up alternative employment or occupation within the grouping of

18     which they have -- from their ethnic origin.  This left the Bosnian Serb

19     people a reduced number to populate that headquarters until such time it

20     was reorganised and more were appointed to it.

21        Q.   Now the VRS Main Staff headquarters was located near Han Pijesak.

22     Did your research reveal that this location was actually the fallback or

23     rear command post of the 2nd District and the 1st Army, rather than being

24     a primary command post?

25        A.   Yes.  That's where General Mladic went to exercise command when

Page 19165

 1     he was appointed around about the 12th of May, 1992.

 2        Q.   The JNA 2nd military headquarters, when it had been situated in

 3     Sarajevo, when it had been fully staffed according to the formational

 4     rules of the JNA, would you agree with me that it had perhaps over a

 5     100 members in this composition?  Perhaps you even know the precise

 6     amount that I don't.

 7        A.   No, I don't know the precise number.  It depends which units that

 8     you count as part of the overall headquarters, whether it's just the

 9     commander and his immediate staff or whether it's the support staff,

10     whether it's the communications staff, whether it's the local protection

11     staff.  You can answer that question in a variety of ways.

12        Q.   Okay.  Let's talk about what we do know, the VRS.  Would you

13     agree that the time of its formation, the Main Staff of the VRS was

14     comprised of a total of 12 persons of whom five were generals?

15        A.   Yes, that's the number that I've seen written down and the fact

16     there were five generals doesn't entirely surprise me.  It was to be the

17     Main Staff and they were senior people.  Some of them were already

18     generals.  Some of them got promoted quite quickly to become generals,

19     heading up the Main Staff functions, which is what I would expect to see

20     on the Main Staff of an army.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask you whether, when reading the number of

22     12, whether you would consider that to include support staff, et cetera?

23             THE WITNESS:  No, sir, I wouldn't.  My understanding of that 12

24     is that they were principally staff officers or immediate assistants in

25     order to carry out the initial staff functions of the Main Staff.

Page 19166

 1     Undoubtedly, that number would have grown as support staff and

 2     communication staff and close-protection staff were added over time.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 4             MR. IVETIC:

 5        Q.   Do you have an opinion of what percentage of manpower the

 6     Main Staff operated under for the duration of the time-period 1992

 7     through 1995?

 8        A.   I'm sorry, was your question to do with percentage?

 9        Q.   Yes.  Percentage of the manning of the staffing of the

10     Main Staff.  You said people were added and it grew.  I would like to

11     know what your opinion is based upon your research of how much it grew

12     and what level it attained of its staffing as foreseen by the

13     regulations?

14        A.   I don't think I can offer a view on what percentage or what

15     numbers.  It's quite clear that it grew for the reasons that I've already

16     given.  I can't give you a figure.

17        Q.   Okay.  Well, my figure is based on Mr. Richard Butler, at

18     transcript page 16813 of this trial, where he said the Main Staff was

19     manned with only 37 per cent of the officers that were foreseen by the

20     establishment.

21             Would you agree or disagree with that figure, sir, based upon

22     your research and expertise?

23        A.   I do apologise, I'm not entirely clear of the question you're

24     asking me.  Could you just -- this percentage figure?  Percentage of

25     what?

Page 19167

 1        Q.   Officers, as foreseen by the establishment documents for the VRS.

 2        A.   Ah-ha, okay.

 3        Q.   It was operating at 37 per cent of its --

 4        A.   Okay.  I think what you're suggesting to me -- and I apologise if

 5     I'm drawing out the question but I can't answer a question until I

 6     understand it.  I think you're suggesting that there was an establishment

 7     figure of officers and men for the Main Staff of a certain size but that

 8     it was only filled to 37 per cent?

 9        Q.   That's what Mr. Butler says, sir.  And I'm asking if you agree or

10     disagree?

11        A.   I've not got no reason to disagree with Mr. Butler.

12        Q.   Okay.  Would you agree that a proper analysis of the command

13     structure of the VRS should take into account the officer staffing levels

14     at all ... let me start again.  Would you agree that a proper analysis of

15     the command structure of the VRS should take into account the officer

16     staffing levels within all units subordinated to the -- to the

17     Main Staff?

18        A.   No, I don't particularly agree with that.  I think what matters

19     more is what the Main Staff actually achieved.  How many people were in

20     the Main Staff, actual number against their establishment, I don't think

21     is relevant.  This is an input conversation.  What I'm suggesting is that

22     the output, what the Main Staff achieved, was really rather more

23     relevant.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome.

25             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I must object to this line of

Page 19168

 1     questioning.  When I look back at Mr. Butler's testimony, I see that it

 2     was put to him the figure of 37 per cent and I just read the first line

 3     of his answer:

 4             "Well, again, yes, sir.  I mean, while I don't understand -- or I

 5     don't recall the specific numbers ... I think I've testified I've never

 6     done analysis of the specific numbers ..."

 7             So it doesn't seem that Mr. Butler has offered that figure of

 8     37 per cent or any precise number that I can find.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  What I see is that the page referred to is that by

10     January 1995 that the Main Staff was only staffed at 37 per cent of the

11     officers that were foreseen under the establishment.  41 per cent of the

12     necessary junior officers, and 50 per cent of the necessary soldiers or

13     it says non-officers, but perhaps it should -- we should understand it as

14     non-commissioned officers.  That is what I read on page 16813.

15             MR. GROOME:  That's the question, Your Honour.  I think we need

16     to look at the answer to see what Mr. Butler said.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Let me see.  Yes, it's the question, I do

18     agree.

19             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise [overlapping speakers] --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  And the witness, Mr. Butler, then said indeed that

21     he had not studied it.  So it is the position of Defence that was put to

22     you rather than the evidence, the testimony, given by Mr. Butler.

23             Mr. Ivetic.

24             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.  If we can call up document, P338.

25        Q.   It's one that apparently you did look at.  It's an analysis of

Page 19169

 1     the combat readiness of the VRS from 1st April 1993.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to page 71 in the Serbian this should

 3     be page 80 in the English.

 4        Q.   First of all, sir, can you advise that you in fact did review

 5     this document for purposes of your expertise?

 6        A.   I don't think it's come up on my screen yet.

 7        Q.   I apologise.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  If we can get the first page in English.

 9             THE WITNESS:  It looks familiar.

10             MR. IVETIC:

11        Q.   Okay.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Now, if we go again to page 80 in English --

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We haven't seen the first page in English.

14             MR. IVETIC:  Oh.  I apologise.

15        Q.   Sir, this does this appear to be a document that you would

16     have --

17        A.   Yes, I recognise that document.

18             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to page 80 in English that will

19     correlate to page 71 in the B/C/S.

20        Q.   I would like to take a look at the last bullet point with you,

21     which reads as follows:

22             "In total, in the Army of RS, of the 14.541 officer establishment

23     posts, 7.287 or 51 per cent are filled with officers, of whom 1.579 or

24     22 per cent are active officers, and of the 12.032 non-commissioned

25     officer establishment posts, there are 12.942 or 108 per cent

Page 19170

 1     non-commissioned officers, of whom 1.190 or 8 per cent are active

 2     non-commissioned officers ..."

 3             Sir, would you agree that such a low staffing level of active

 4     officers and active -- and a low staffing level of active NCOs, or

 5     non-commissioned officers, would negatively affect the ability of the VRS

 6     command and control to function irrespective of which model is employed?

 7        A.   Not necessarily.  It depends on who the additional people were,

 8     what their educational background, what their previous experience had

 9     been, and my conclusion would be that's where you have got less

10     experienced or less well-trained people, there is a greater degree to

11     exercise a tighter degree of control in order to ensure that the intent

12     of the commander is carried out in the best possible manner.

13             MR. IVETIC:  If we could take a look at the next paragraph in

14     English, which is at the top of the page in the B/C/S -- of the next page

15     in B/C/S, I think we see the ethnic makeup of the officer corps of the

16     VRS and we see that one quarter of the same is non-Serb:

17             "The national structure of active officers serving in the Army of

18     RS" --

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry, Mr. Ivetic, where are you reading?

20             MR. IVETIC:  It's the first paragraph in English after the last

21     bullet point.  It's in the middle of the page --

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

23             MR. IVETIC:  -- in e-court.  Should be the top of the page in the

24     B/C/S:

25             "The national structure of active officers serving in the Army of

Page 19171

 1     RS is:  37 Montenegrins, 204 Yugoslavs, 62 Croats, 26 Macedonians,

 2     33 Muslims, 13 Slovenes, 2.165 Serbs, 3 Albanians, 1 Bulgarian, 2 Czechs,

 3     4 Hungarians, 3 Ruthenes, 1 Turk, 1 Jew, 1 Pole, 1 Roma, 1 Ukrainian,

 4     21 of undeclared nationality."

 5        Q.   Would you agree, sir, that based upon this information, the VRS

 6     did not replace non-Serb officers as a matter of policy?

 7        A.   No, I don't agree with that conclusion at all.  What you

 8     describe -- what is described in the document here is that the Army of

 9     Republika Srpska was indeed made up of many nationalities and different

10     ethnic groupings.  But what you don't describe is those who had formed

11     units under headquarters of the 2nd Military District who left the

12     2nd Military District and went elsewhere.  I find it totally unsurprising

13     that the VRS was made up of different nationalities.  And with the

14     indulgence of the Court, I will comment that when I commanded the British

15     Army, it was comprised of individuals from 42 different nationalities.

16        Q.   Did those officers that left the 2nd Military District go on to

17     join other armies and do you consider their departure to have been

18     voluntary?

19        A.   Well, I don't know how you possibly expect that I could answer

20     that question, to tell you where all the officers that left the

21     2nd Military District went to.  I think we can conclude from evidence

22     that the majority of them left to go to other factions and continued

23     their involvement in the war in that way.  And I believe that yesterday I

24     mentioned that it was an interesting feature of the first conference that

25     we held in the early days of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement

Page 19172

 1     to see the commanders of the three warring factions in the south and the

 2     west of the country greeting each other as former comrades as they had

 3     all had former service in the JNA.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I'm a bit puzzled by the last bullet

 5     point and the following paragraph you have drawn our attention to.

 6     Because in the last bullet point, I see that there were close to

 7     1600 active officers involved.  Whereas, in the following paragraph, the

 8     active officers are represented by their ethnic or national background,

 9     but that is about approximately 2.500 active officers, so I have -- I'm

10     puzzled by how can you give the ethnic or national background of close to

11     1600 officers by telling us how it was divided over the two and a half

12     thousands.

13             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I invite you to read the bullet point

14     that says that there are 1.579 active officers and that there are

15     1.190 active non-commissioned officers which, indeed, I believe would be

16     the figure of the ethnic makeup which is over 2600.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I try to read it.  In the bullet point you

18     referenced to the 1190, which, by the way, would make the problem even

19     bigger than it is, is about non-commissioned officers, you would say the

20     active officers would include the non-commissioned officers?  Because

21     where the language "active officers" is used in the last bullet point,

22     second line, the number of 1579 appears.  The same language, "active

23     officers," is used in the following paragraph, which amounts to some, all

24     together I would say close to 2500 --

25             MR. IVETIC:  2500, correct.  That's what [Overlapping

Page 19173

 1     speakers] --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, because you -- you asked me to read it

 3     carefully.  I tried to do that.  I've now explained to you what my

 4     attempt of careful reading led me to -- led me to believe what was said.

 5     And the puzzle now has not been resolved for me.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  My understanding was that it was in relation to both

 7     commissioned and non-commissioned officers.  I was hoping that the expert

 8     would be able to enlighten us further and he is not been able to.

 9             THE WITNESS:  I wasn't aware that was a question that you put to

10     me.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  The question was not put to the witness.

12     Mr. Ivetic, it is unsuccessful attempt to shift the blame, if there's any

13     blame, to someone else, which is not appreciated.  If you thought that it

14     would be an explanation by adding up 1579 to 1190, then the puzzle still

15     would be there because there is a considerable difference between that

16     total and the total of the numbers we find in the first paragraph

17     following the last bullet point.

18             You may proceed.

19             MR. IVETIC:

20        Q.   General, for purposes of your analysis, did you take into account

21     the organ known as the Supreme Command which existed at all times in

22     Republika Srpska and exercised command over the army and the defence

23     system?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   As an expert, can you please tell us how many members of the

Page 19174

 1     Supreme Command there are?

 2        A.   No, I'm not going to be tested in that way.  It has a composition

 3     of about six or seven members, and it was not a fixed membership.  It did

 4     change over the course of the war in 1992 to 1995, but it was headed by

 5     the president, President Karadzic.

 6        Q.   As an expert, can you tell us if General Ratko Mladic was ever a

 7     member of the Supreme Command?

 8        A.   Well, this was a moot point, and it was decided, to my mind quite

 9     correctly, that he should not be a formal member.  Because -- and this

10     gets into a very interesting philosophical debate as to what the

11     Supreme Command represented and what the Main Staff represented.  If the

12     Court will indulge, I will try and explain that and be as brief as

13     possible.

14             The Supreme Command decided national, what one would call in

15     military terms grand strategy, what the nation of Republika Srpska wanted

16     to achieve and issued direction on that, set out, if you like, grand

17     strategic objectives.  They were then sent in a directive of one sort or

18     another to the military command to carry out the military objectives to

19     formulate what in doctrinal terms we would call military strategy.

20             And that was the responsibility of the Main Staff to develop that

21     military strategy into campaign plans at what we would call, in military

22     terminology, the operation level of war.  And that was why it was very

23     important that General Mladic was not a member of the Supreme Council but

24     took instructions from the Supreme Council in order to be able to carry

25     them out by the military, the army under his command.  And that

Page 19175

 1     separation of membership was often debated but it was felt to be more

 2     appropriate that he was not a member of the Supreme Command.

 3        Q.   Were the military court systems and the military prosecutors also

 4     separate from General Mladic's command?

 5        A.   It's usual for the military judiciary system to stand apart from

 6     the command and control system of the military so that it retains

 7     independence.

 8        Q.   Now I'd like to move on to General Mladic's presence on the

 9     ground in Srebrenica and the Hotel Fontana that you testified about

10     yesterday.  At transcript page 19071, you talked of Mladic keeping close

11     control and issuing directions.  I wish to now take a look at part of

12     your testimony from the Krstic case.

13             MR. IVETIC:  1D1444, page 71 of the same, which should correlate

14     to transcript page 5713 of the underlying document.

15             If we could focus on lines 24 through 25 for the question and

16     then we'll have to turn the page for the answer which is on lines 1

17     through 4.

18        Q.   Sir, I read:

19             "Judge Riad:  But there was no sign of General Mladic giving

20     direct orders to the subordinates of General Krstic?

21             "A.  No, sir.  I think we've looked at that several times

22     previously, and I can see no evidence of General Mladic giving direct

23     orders to constituent parts of the Drina Corps and therefore bypassing

24     the normal corps command and control structure.  I don't see any evidence

25     of that."

Page 19176

 1             Do you stand by this testimony as being truthful such that you

 2     would so repeat the same today?

 3        A.   Absolutely.  I don't see any evidence of that.  That's not to say

 4     it didn't happen.  But I don't see and didn't see any evidence of that.

 5        Q.   Now, yesterday we talked about Mladic leaving for meetings in

 6     Belgrade.  You discuss this at paragraph 40 of your statement.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  This is, again, P2629, MFI, it's page 12 of the same

 8     in English, page 11 in B/C/S.

 9        Q.   And I'd like to draw your attention to the part where you say:

10             "I am aware that in the trial of Momcilo Perisic, Carl Bildt

11     testified that he met with Mladic and Milosevic on 14 July 1995 and

12     Sir Rupert Smith testified that he met with Mladic and Milosevic on

13     15 July 1995.  Mladic was therefore personally informed and involved with

14     what was going on above him and below him.  In my opinion, he was very

15     much part of the plan and its execution."

16             Sir, was it your understanding for purposes of this meeting that

17     Mr. Mladic appeared of his own accord or was he requested to be present

18     by someone?

19        A.   I presume you're referring to the meeting between Mr. Mladic and

20     Mr. Milosevic the 14th of July?

21        Q.   Both of these meetings.

22        A.   I think it's an interesting question.  I -- I can't remember

23     whether he was requested to attend or not.  But having looked at the

24     substance of the conversation that took place particularly between

25     Mr. Mladic and President Milosevic as recorded in Mr. Mladic's notebook,

Page 19177

 1     the tone of the conversation was such that he would probably have been

 2     asked to attend because the tone is critical.

 3        Q.   Now we're mixing apples and oranges.  I'm talking about 14th and

 4     15th July.  You're talking about the meeting with Milosevic that occurred

 5     several weeks later.

 6        A.   Yes, that's quite possible.

 7        Q.   Do you recall this meeting 15th of July as being the one that you

 8     talked about where you said General Smith, according to General Mladic's

 9     diary --

10        A.   Yeah --

11        Q.   -- made some comments and that your opinion was that General

12     Mladic did not do enough as a general and seemed to not do anything and

13     you made certain comments about that.  Do you recall it now?

14        A.   I do.  And you're right, I confused in this conversation, the

15     subsequent meeting with President Milosevic later on when he criticised,

16     as recorded by General Mladic's notebook, his activities.  But to return

17     to the meeting which involved General Smith --

18        Q.   Yes --

19        A.   -- again, in the record of that, which I've seen, General Smith

20     raises the question of massacre, rapes, and executions with Mr. Mladic.

21     There's no record that I've seen which says what Mr. Mladic did about it.

22     But the point that I've endeavoured to make and I think is very important

23     is that when a senior general, in this case representing the

24     international community, and, of course, I mean General Smith, was to

25     draw to the attention of one of the commanders of one of the warring

Page 19178

 1     factions an allegation of misconduct, he can therefore -- he must --

 2     Mladic can no longer say that he is unaware of what might or might not

 3     have been going on.  And therefore when such allegations of such

 4     significance are made, it would be extraordinary if he had not then

 5     conducted some investigation to see what had gone on.  I have no idea

 6     what investigation that he did conduct.  But if he did not conduct an

 7     investigation, then he was negligent.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, we'll have a break in five minutes from

 9     now, so therefore ...

10             MR. IVETIC:

11        Q.   Well, sir, I'm a little confused by your answer.  I'd like to

12     call up 65 ter 1932, which was a document that was indeed on the

13     Prosecution's list for direct examination with you and is a memo dated

14     17 July 1995 from Yasushi Akashi to Mr. Annan of the UN - and I'll wait

15     for it to come up on our screen - in reference precisely to this meeting.

16     And I think it shows that your approach is flawed.  It states as

17     follows --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic.

19             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, in that one question Mr. Ivetic has

20     made two comments now with respect to the witness.  I think that is

21     improper.  I think he is entitled to put questions but not his comments

22     about what he thinks it may show.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, rather than commenting on the document,

24     you're invited to put a question to the witness.

25             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.  I'd like to first introduce the document to

Page 19179

 1     the witness and the contents of the same.

 2        Q.   Sir, you can read along --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, there are better ways of doing that.

 4     You are aware of that.  Please proceed.

 5             MR. IVETIC:

 6        Q.   "Mr. Carl Bildt, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and myself met in

 7     Belgrade with President Milosevic on Saturday, 15 July.  I was

 8     accompanied by General Rupert Smith.  Milosevic, at the request of Bildt,

 9     facilitated the presence of General Mladic at the meeting.  Mladic and

10     Smith had a long bilateral discussion.  Despite their disagreement on

11     several points, the meeting reestablished dialogue between the two

12     generals.  Informal agreement was reached in the course of the meeting on

13     a number of points between the two generals which will, however, have to

14     be confirmed at their meeting scheduled for 19 July.  In view of the

15     highly sensitive nature of the presence of Mladic at the meeting, it was

16     agreed by all participants that this fact should not be mentioned at all

17     in public."

18             Sir, given that General Smith and General Mladic had agreed on a

19     number of points to be confirmed at a 19 July meeting already scheduled

20     and given the instruction to keep Mladic's presence at this meeting

21     confidential, does this shed some new light on another reason why

22     General Mladic didn't need to rush back to Srebrenica to investigate

23     claims made by General Smith?

24        A.   The short answer is -- is no.  Your question and this document

25     don't tell me what the number of points were.  And you missed the point

Page 19180

 1     of how command and control works.

 2             General Mladic didn't have to rush back to Srebrenica to commence

 3     an investigation.  He had merely to pick up a telephone, give an

 4     instruction to a staff officer to initiate an investigation.  I don't

 5     think that your question -- well, I'm sorry, you rather lost me on the

 6     point you were trying to make and I think I have probably said that I can

 7     all usefully and unhelpfully say.

 8        Q.   If we can briefly --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic --

10             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Your question is full of assumptions, suggestions,

12     which need to be specified before we -- one of those questions would be

13     whether the meeting was and what was discussed during the meeting,

14     whether that was a reason for something still to be established, that

15     Mr. Mladic rushed back to investigate, for example, that's -- those are

16     all implicit assumptions, suggestions, which, without being made

17     explicit, would not elicit answers that would assist the Chamber.

18             Please proceed.

19             MR. IVETIC:  If we can turn to the next page of this document,

20     we'll see the compacts understandings agreed to and reached between

21     General Rose -- pardon me, General Smith and General Mladic and we'll see

22     whether they're reasonable.

23        Q.   Do you see the second paragraph here saying:

24             "The specific agreements will be revealed after the meeting of

25     General Mladic and General Smith scheduled for Wednesday, 19 July 1995."

Page 19181

 1             Would you agree that it would appear that the international

 2     negotiators requested that everyone, including Mr. Mladic, keep this

 3     under wraps?

 4        A.   No, I'm sorry -- I don't -- I don't follow the question.  I

 5     understood from the previous document that it had been decided for

 6     unspecified reasons to keep the presence of Mr. Mladic at that meeting

 7     secret.  But forgive my stupidity, but I don't see the question that

 8     you're trying to ask me now.  Perhaps you would be kind enough to explain

 9     it in great detail so I can give you answer.

10        Q.   Sure.  Can we start reading from the top:

11             "Understanding from Belgrade discussions, situation in Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina, 15 July 1995.  General press line.  Mr. Akashi at his

13     request and in the presence of Bildt and Mr. Stoltenberg was informed of

14     certain possible relaxations in the Bosnian Serb position.  The specific

15     agreements will be revealed" --

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You should slow down.

17             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Nobody can follow.

19             MR. IVETIC:  "The specific agreements will be revealed after the

20     meeting of General Mladic and General Smith, scheduled for Wednesday,

21     19 July 1995.

22             "Srebrenica.  Full access to the area for UNHCR and ICRC."

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, we could invite the witness -- first ask

24     him whether he is familiar with those under items "Srebrenica" or ask him

25     to read it.  There's no reason to read it aloud.  And perhaps even we

Page 19182

 1     could take a break, if there's a hard copy of this page, so that the

 2     witness could familiarize himself with those points and you can ask any

 3     further questions.

 4             MR. IVETIC:  I don't have a clean hard copy.  I don't know if the

 5     Prosecution does.  It's their document.  Otherwise I could have one

 6     printed and brought up.  I just --

 7             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, apart from the sarcasm, the

 8     Prosecution will -- Ms. Stewart will print the document for the witness.

 9     I don't keep hard copies of every document that we've disclosed to the

10     Defence.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I think it's appreciated that either party would

12     provide the witness during the break with a clean hard copy of this page.

13     And we already ask the witness to leave the courtroom.

14             We'd like to see you back in 20 minutes.

15             THE WITNESS:  Fine, sir.

16                           [The witness stands down]

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I take it that the clean copy will find its way to

18     the witness and --

19             MR. IVETIC:  I hope so.  I don't know how to effectuate it.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  I beg your pardon?

21             MR. IVETIC:  I hope so.  I don't know how to effectuate it on my

22     side.

23             MR. GROOME:  I have it here and I'll leave it with the Registrar,

24     Your Honour.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Groome.  We'll take a break and we'll

Page 19183

 1     resume at quarter past 12.00.

 2                           --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.

 3                           --- On resuming at 12.18 p.m.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.

 5             Meanwhile, I briefly address the following.  The -- it is the

 6     about the Prosecution's submissions related to P1501, P1502, P1736,

 7     P1379, P1740, and P1481, made in its submissions made in the informal

 8     communication of the 31st of October.

 9                           [The witness takes the stand]

10             JUDGE ORIE:  I'll deal with all those exhibits individually

11     after -- at a later point in time.

12             Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.

13             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

14        Q.   General, have you an opportunity to review the understanding from

15     the Belgrade discussions and in particular the points that were agreed as

16     to Srebrenica?

17        A.   I have, yes, thank you.

18        Q.   Would you agree that this sheds new light on what was actually

19     discussed at the meetings and what actions Generals Mladic and Smith

20     agreed to, to address the concerns of General Smith from the first part

21     of the meeting?

22        A.   I agree it's a very interesting document.

23             At the time, General Smith only knew what General Smith knew.  We

24     now know rather more.  The date of the meeting and the dates of the

25     activities agreed are themselves interesting because by the 21st of July,

Page 19184

 1     1995, when it was agreed that Generals Smith and Mladic will observe the

 2     move of the Dutch battalion out of Srebrenica, the killings and the

 3     burials would already have been complete.  Therefore, there was no reason

 4     for access to Srebrenica by General Smith to be denied.

 5             Furthermore, I'm very interested by the totality of the

 6     agreements reached on that occasion, and they are quite widespread.

 7     Agreement seemed to have been reached on UNPROFOR resupply routes, troop

 8     rotations, freedom of movement agreements, and even discussion of a

 9     conference for a cessation of hostilities.  These are significant events

10     that would not have come about unless something very significant had

11     happened.

12             My deduction, as an expert witness and with some considerable

13     knowledge of the circumstances, is that General Mladic conceded these

14     points in considerable fear that the actions that had taken place around

15     Srebrenica would play to his and the Bosnian Serb republic's

16     disadvantage, and he made a number of concessions at that time to try and

17     improve his position.

18             That is my view.

19        Q.   Sir, would you concede that another reasonable view from this

20     same document is that a general who had just personally left with

21     Srebrenica and had seen with his own eyes that no one was being raped and

22     no one was being killed, would agree to the international negotiators to

23     allow them to come in, take a look, agree to all their demands and show

24     that he didn't have anything to hide.

25             Isn't that another possible reading from this document, sir?  And

Page 19185

 1     the circumstances?

 2        A.   No.  You know as well as I know that those who were massacred in

 3     the area of Srebrenica were buried a considerable distance away from

 4     Srebrenica and that any civilians remaining in Srebrenica would be

 5     unaware of what had happened to those who were taken away.  I do not

 6     agree with your analysis at all.

 7        Q.   As an expert, sir, did you examine the relevant VRS regulations

 8     to determine what the effect was of General Mladic's leaving the zone of

 9     responsibility of his army, that is to say, if his command continued or

10     reverted to some deputy?

11        A.   Yes.  This is an interesting and moot point and gets at the heart

12     of a relationship between a commander and his deputy commander who, under

13     VRS regulations, is also the Chief of Staff, and, as we know was

14     General Milovanovic.

15             When General Mladic left the country and went to Serbia, then, in

16     leaving the country, command devolved from him to General Milovanovic.

17     That was the regulation.

18             What we know from practice is that when General Milovanovic

19     exercising authority as the authorised deputy invariably then cleared any

20     decisions he taken with General Mladic and made sure that he was

21     completely comfortable and up to speed with events that had happened.

22             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, we would tender Prosecution

23     65 ter number 1932 as the next available Defence exhibit in this trial.

24             MR. GROOME:  No objection.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

Page 19186

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 1932 receives number D410, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 3             MR. IVETIC:

 4        Q.   If we can return to your statement, P2629, page 19 in the

 5     English, page 16 in the B/C/S, in the middle of paragraph 56 you state

 6     that:

 7             "In accordance withstanding procedures for operational security,

 8     the commercial telephone system would not be the normal method of passing

 9     sensitive information, military orders or routine reports."

10             Do you know if General Mladic in the vehicle that he was using to

11     travel to Belgrade had any secure communications equipment?

12        A.   I have no idea.  And I don't think I can understand why you think

13     I would know that.  But thank you for asking the question.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Dannatt, there's no need to express, again and

15     again, your appreciation for what Mr. Ivetic brings to your attention.

16     If you just answer the questions, that would --

17             THE WITNESS:  I apologise.  It's my natural courtesy, sir.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Please proceed.

19             MR. IVETIC:  If we can take a look at another topic then, the

20     issue of reporting, I'd like to call up 1D1444 in e-court, page 81 of the

21     same.  It's, again, the Krstic transcript.

22             And I'd like to start from line 10 and go onward through the

23     questions and answers that were given:

24             "Judge Riad:  General Dannatt, I would still like to have some

25     precisions" --

Page 19187

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Would you please kindly slow down for the

 2     interpretation.  Thank you.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  Let me start again.

 4        Q.   "Judge Riad:  General Dannatt, I would still like to have some

 5     precisions, although I have understood you very clearly.  You spoke

 6     about -- of the daily combat reports, and I can just quote one part of

 7     your report.  You say:  'I have seen evidence of daily combat reports

 8     that are clearly in a laid-down format which provides a full account of

 9     all activity.'

10             "Did this daily combat report give an account of the massacres?

11             "A.  No, Your Honour.  I have not seen direct reports of what you

12     would describe as massacres.  As I said in an earlier answer, there

13     were -- and I wouldn't expect to do so either, because I think most

14     people would have realised that to commit to paper, in a formal daily

15     report matters like that, was laying themselves open to subsequent

16     investigation as indeed the business of this court is all about.

17             "But one does see in some places references to things that one

18     knows afterwards were indirect references, whether it's to prisoners, and

19     I'm thinking now of the Zvornik Brigade's report complaining, if you

20     like," if we can go to the next page, "of the large number of prisoners

21     being held in schools and other reports relating subsequently to engineer

22     equipment being moved and fuel being requested or being made available.

23             "So I see no direct reference to what you've described, sir, as

24     massacres, but I have seen several examples of indirect references that

25     we now know refer in part to that process.

Page 19188

 1             "Judge Riad:  Now, to go further, if these daily combat reports

 2     were submitted to the Higher Command, so the Higher Command was not

 3     informed about the executions if they are not mentioned in the combat

 4     reports, just to follow the echelon, how would you know about it?

 5             "A.  In a direct sense, Your Honour, I agree with you, and -- I

 6     would agree with that point, sir."

 7             Do you stand by this testimony as being truthful and accurate as

 8     to these points, such that you would so testify today?

 9        A.   Entirely.

10        Q.   Okay.

11        A.   The point being, if I can make the point, is that the reports

12     were going to the higher headquarters and the reason that they were in --

13     in an opaque fashion was for the reasons that I gave, that to be precise

14     and detailed would invite those reports becoming evidence at some point

15     in the future.  So although the higher headquarters, the higher command,

16     the Main Staff, was not being informed, it offers no comment on whether

17     the commander himself was aware of what the situation was.

18        Q.   Now I want to take a look at another topic.

19             MR. IVETIC:  To do, so I'd look at 1D1448 in e-court.  And when

20     we get that, I'd like page six of the same.

21        Q.   That will be, again, your book -- excuse me.  Again, if we can

22     turn to page 6.  That should correlate to the underlying book pages, I

23     believe, 182 and 183.  And I'd like to go through the part on the

24     left-hand side which reads as follows:

25             "The 5 October cease-fire brokered by Lieutenant-General

Page 19189

 1     Sir Rupert Smith, Michael Rose's successor, as commander of the UNPROFOR

 2     mission had brought to an end an eventful summer in which many of the

 3     Bosnian Serb army (VRS) gains of the previous two years had been

 4     dramatically swept aside.  The predominantly Muslim Army of

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina (the ARBiH, which I will refer to as the Bosniak

 6     army), together with the Croats of the HV (Croatian regular army) and HVO

 7     (Bosnian Croat army), who after their violent differences earlier in the

 8     war had joined together in the Croat-Bosnian Federation of Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina, had made substantial territorial gains in September at the

10     expense of the Serbs, who had been punished for non-compliance with UN

11     demands by targeted NATO air-strikes and powerful artillery bombardments.

12     These Federation operations had been conducted with careful precision and

13     had been so overwhelming successful that I suspected, from my experience

14     of teaching at Camberley, that professionals rather than the brave but (I

15     suspected) moderately train the Croat and Bosnian armies had been at

16     work.  Were the NATO bombing and artillery strikes around Sarajevo,

17     Banja Luka, and Doboj somehow part of the same well-orchestrated plan?

18     Had the UN and even NATO been manipulated?  If so, by whom?  I could not

19     help feeling that the Pentagon probably had the answer.  Over the six

20     months I was in Bosnia, I spent quite some time talking to the commanders

21     on all three sides, and these conversations confirmed me in my view that

22     expert campaign planning had been brought in to align the situation on

23     the ground with the outcome that international negotiators felt they

24     could deliver."

25             Do you stand by these words as being truthful and accurate as to

Page 19190

 1     the facts that are set forth therein?

 2        A.   I most certainly do.  But I would point out that there are a

 3     number of questions in the text as well as statements.

 4        Q.   Yes.  Could you clarify for us one of those questions, where you

 5     ask:  Had the UN and even NATO been manipulated?  If so, by whom?  What

 6     answer did you believe the Pentagon could offer to that question, sir?

 7        A.   I'll try and keep this answer brief.  By 1995, the warring

 8     factions and the international community had grown tired of the war in

 9     Bosnia, and efforts were increased to bring it to a conclusion.  The

10     failure of earlier potential peace agreements - I'm thinking of the

11     Vance-Owen Plan, in particular - had foundered for many reasons, one of

12     which was that the land holding between the two principal sides, the

13     Bosnian Serb republic and the Federation, was unsatisfactory and not

14     equal.  For there to be a negotiated conclusion to this war, the land

15     holdings had to be about 49 per cent, 51 per cent of the land mass of

16     Bosnia.

17             By a process which I found puzzling and which I investigated out

18     of personal and professional curiosity, I wondered how the operations

19     conducted by the Federation forces - that is, the Bosniaks and the

20     Croats - during the spring and summer of 1995, had managed to be so

21     successful that by the cessation of hostilities on the 5th of October, lo

22     and behold, the land holdings of the two sides was about 50-50.  And,

23     therefore, on the ground, the precondition circumstances for a peace

24     agreement had been arrived at.

25             In my professional view, the Bosniaks and the Croats were not

Page 19191

 1     capable of springing together seven military operations into a

 2     co-ordinated campaign supported by air-strikes and the use of artillery

 3     to have achieved this on their own.  To do this, they needed expert

 4     military assistance, and it is my belief that they received this from a

 5     contracted United States advisory company.  The net result was that a

 6     situation was arrived at on the ground whereby Mr. Holbrooke was able to

 7     bring the parties together at Dayton and end the war.

 8        Q.   And who is it, sir, that you believe manipulated NATO and the UN?

 9        A.   I speculate, but I think you know my answer that it was in the

10     wider international community interest to end this war and the leading

11     player in the international community by that stage was the

12     United States.

13             I will also add as a tail-piece that General Smith said to me on

14     one occasion while this activity was going on, It seems rather strange

15     that wherever the Federation forces advance, circumstances were such that

16     he felt it was right to order air-strikes.  And he wondered to me

17     privately who was pulling the strings, and he felt that his strings were

18     being pulled.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I didn't interrupt the witness for -- I

20     think for good reasons but, of course, speculation which was the first

21     part of his answer is not what the Chamber assists.

22             The second part of answer, of course, refers to facts.  That is

23     conversations the witness had with General Smith and therefore I'm glad

24     that I didn't interrupt, although the speculations observation stands.

25             Please proceed.

Page 19192

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 2        Q.   Now, General, the appraisal of General Krstic by General Mladic

 3     which we looked at yesterday, this occurred shortly after this

 4     time-period when the Bosnian Muslim and Croat armies were attacking the

 5     Serbs with the support of NATO air-strikes.

 6             Do you concede that perhaps the appraisal of General Krstic is

 7     more focussed on this event and defending the republic in the face of

 8     such overwhelming enemy forces supported by the United States?

 9        A.   I have always paid considerable tribute to General Krstic's

10     abilities as a military commander and I have no doubt that his conduct

11     throughout the war from 1992 to the cessation of hostilities in

12     October 1995 was of a very high order.  That is, of course, a separate

13     issue to the issue of any misdoings by him.  I note that he was convicted

14     of a number of offences and is in detention as a result of a sentence

15     passed by this Tribunal.

16        Q.   And do you rely upon that conviction for any of the expert

17     opinions that you have formulated for purposes of this trial, sir?

18        A.   Well, I wouldn't be so presumptive as to have a view that's

19     contrary to the findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the

20     former Yugoslavia.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Which is not an answer to the question whether would

22     you have different views.  The question was whether you relied on those

23     findings by the Tribunal when preparing your report.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That question is not on the record.

25             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  Consistent with an earlier answer

Page 19193

 1     today, when I gave evidence in the trial of the Tribunal against

 2     General Krstic, I left that hearing in my own mind convinced that he had

 3     been guilty of at least the offences relating to Srebrenica, and that was

 4     when I formed my view.  That view has not changed.

 5             I hope that answers your question.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Not fully, as a matter of fact.  Your personal

 7     convictions about the matter is not the same as whether you used it as a

 8     basis for your report.  You can ignore your own feelings in drafting a

 9     report.  You can rely on your feelings which, as you explained, are

10     related to the findings of this Tribunal.

11             THE WITNESS:  I think it is fair to say that I took as fact the

12     findings of the Tribunal and therefore it was a working assumption on my

13     part that General Krstic was guilty of the offences as charged and

14     therefore he had a major role to play in the massacres at Srebrenica.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

16             MR. IVETIC:

17        Q.   Yes.  If we could rewind to the conversation you had with

18     General Smith that we just talked about, where you mentioned that he

19     remarked that he felt as if his stings were being pulled.

20             Could you give us some indication, if not a month or day, but

21     perhaps was that still he was commander of the UNPROFOR forces?

22        A.   Yes, it was.  When I deployed to Bosnia on that occasion, it was

23     in October 1995.  General Smith was the commander of UNPROFOR, and I was

24     the commander of Sector South-West.  So he was my immediate boss, someone

25     I had worked for on a number of occasions in the past and would count as


Page 19194

 1     a friend, and the conversation that I just alluded to was a private

 2     conversation between us in October or November, I can't remember exactly

 3     when, 1995, when we were reflecting on the current situation and how we

 4     had got there.

 5        Q.   And just to complete the picture, by that time the offensives by

 6     the joint Croat-Muslim forces and the NATO air-strikes had been

 7     completed?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Thank you, sir, for answering my questions.

10             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, that concludes my cross-examination.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome, any need to re-examine the witness?

14             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour, I have a few questions.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Then please proceed.

16                           Re-examination by Mr. Groome:

17        Q.   General Dannatt, yesterday at transcript page 19109, you agreed

18     with Mr. Ivetic that the command model employed by individual armies lies

19     along a spectrum with the manoeuvrist approach and the centralised

20     command approach at opposite sides of the spectrum.

21             My question on this topic is whether you have an opinion

22     regarding where on this spectrum the Army of Republika Srpska falls.

23        A.   To be short, it falls closer to the paradigm of centralised

24     control.  I think it's a point that I've made many times over the last

25     two days, and I would do so in the context that centralised control is

Page 19195

 1     the effective way of controlling a disparate, largely conscript, not

 2     highly trained army and reduces risk when it comes to the translation of

 3     a commander's intent into successful operations on the battle-field.

 4        Q.   Now Mr. Ivetic has also made the point that difficulties in fully

 5     staffing officer positions may have had an impact on the command

 6     structure.  In your review of General Milovanovic's evidence, did you see

 7     anything to suggest that he felt the ability to command subordinates was

 8     either compromised or diminished by not having all staff positions

 9     filled?

10        A.   No.  And in my wider experience -- and it was a point I was going

11     to make earlier but if I may I'll make it briefly now.  When we discussed

12     an hour or two ago the different nationality and ethnic makeup of the

13     Main Staff, I reflected on the time in my career when I commanded the

14     Allied -- NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and had officers from

15     17 different nations under my command, and the multinational nature of

16     that did not reduce the effectiveness of that headquarters but there were

17     a relatively small number of officers on who one could completely rely

18     and others that -- let's be kind and say made up the numbers.

19             So my point is that numbers in a headquarters don't actually

20     dictate the effectiveness of that headquarters which was the point that I

21     was trying to make earlier.  What really matters is the output, the

22     effectiveness of the headquarters, not the number of staff officers

23     sitting at desks and looking at screens or talking into radios.

24        Q.   Now again this topic you said at transcript page 36 today:

25             "There is a greater degree to exercise a tighter degree of

Page 19196

 1     control in order to ensure that the intent of the commander is carried

 2     out in the best possible manner."

 3             In a situation of possible staff shortages, can you explain what

 4     you meant in more detail including at what levels of the command

 5     structure would you expect to see a tighter degree of control?

 6        A.   Well, without repeating part of my last answer, I would just say,

 7     again, that numbers in a headquarters don't have a direct bearing on the

 8     efficiency of that headquarters.  The efficiency of a headquarters is

 9     more determined by the quality of the key staff officers.

10             I'm just looking at the second part of your question to make sure

11     that I answer it rather than run the risk of waffling.

12        Q.   If I could ask you to address this concept of tighter control in

13     such a situation and whether that -- is that one level or did you intend

14     that to mean more than one level of command?

15        A.   Well, the way of exercising tighter control is in part to pass

16     more detailed orders and, in second, to require more regular and detailed

17     reports on how the conduct of operations is going.  In that way, the high

18     headquarters is best informed, and if operations are not going in the way

19     that the superior headquarters or superior commander requires, then

20     further direction can be given and adjustments can be made.

21             Now, this isn't necessarily something that is just done by radio

22     or e-mail.  The position and influence of the commander is important, and

23     it's a common command or leadership technique that where greater

24     supervision needs to be made, a commander will go forward to the

25     subordinate headquarters, make a judgement for himself on how things are

Page 19197

 1     going, and, if appropriate, give further direction, encouragement or

 2     whatever else he feels is necessary.

 3        Q.   Now if I can change topics --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome, if you would allow me one question in

 5     between.

 6             I'm a bit puzzled by the percentage discussion and the quality of

 7     those remaining.  I have not heard but I'm asking you whether the

 8     functionality, if the functionality is affected, that that would have a

 9     great effect?  For example, if all persons knowledgeable on

10     communications would fall out, then the functionality, apart even if you

11     would have 92 per cent staffing level, it wouldn't function any further.

12     Now, first of all, I would like you to tell me whether you would agree

13     with this thought?  And, second, if so, whether you would tell us whether

14     or not you noticed any basic functionality failures within the command

15     structure.

16             THE WITNESS:  Quite clearly, if there were insufficient members

17     of staff in any given function and that function ceased, then there would

18     be a partial or potentially complete failure in command and control.

19     But, Your Honour, it's very interesting, in another document that I have

20     read, I think it was actually part of General Milovanovic's evidence,

21     that he says that at no stage throughout the war did command and control,

22     particularly relating to communications to enable command and control,

23     break down except for one very short period when a number of NATO strikes

24     destroyed a number of command installations.  And I think, if I remember

25     correctly, he said that the length of time that communications had broken

Page 19198

 1     down was only a matter of hours and it may have only been -- I think the

 2     number 2 hours comes to mind.

 3             So following General Milovanovic's evidence, it would appear that

 4     the main command, control and communications function of the VRS remained

 5     intact through 1992 to 1995.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  I just gave that as an example but perhaps the same

 7     would be true for a complete failure of transportation facilities or --

 8     well --

 9             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, military operations are characterised

10     by things going wrong.  It always happens.  We call it the fog of war.

11     If transportation collapsed, it would be a problem, it would be a

12     nuisance.  But I picked up on communications because if communications

13     break down, you can no longer exercise control and you can't exercise

14     command.  That is an important distinction.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  You say it's a vital function of command.

16             THE WITNESS:  If we cannot speak, we cannot communicate, I can't

17     decide, I can't give direction, I cannot command.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome, you may proceed.

19             MR. GROOME:

20        Q.   Mr. Ivetic spent a considerable amount of time today asking you

21     questions about the military history of the Yugoslav army and he put a

22     passage from Professor Gow's book to you at transcript page 18.  It said:

23             "War-time experience had shown that small units operating locally

24     could not be centrally commanded."

25             And this was a description of an earlier point of history in the

Page 19199

 1     Yugoslav army.  Did you see any evidence that the VRS was comprised of

 2     small units operating locally that could not be centrally commanded?

 3        A.   The short answer is no.  My understanding from my research is

 4     that the VRS was an organised army.  It was poorly resourced at times in

 5     terms of fuel, ammunition, and equipment, but it retained a coherent

 6     structure.  And in my personal experience, right through the latter days

 7     of the war and into the implementation period of the Dayton Peace

 8     Agreement, it remained a coherent organisation.

 9             That said, we were aware of militias and irregular units on all

10     sides that played a role in the war, but that didn't characterise the

11     nature of the VRS which -- which remained an organised being right

12     through the war.

13             MR. GROOME:  Could I ask that 65 ter 790 be brought to our

14     screens.

15        Q.   Now, Mr. Ivetic pursued this line of questioning with respect to

16     paramilitary groups and Territorial Defence groups.  This particular

17     document that you will now see before you was issued on the 12th of May,

18     1992, I believe.

19             Just wait until we can see this.

20             Now, here -- this is a document entitled:  "Decision on forming

21     the Army of the Serbian Republic of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

22     Herzegovina on 12th of May, 1992."

23             Can you draw your attention to Article 2 which states:

24             "Former units and staffs of Territorial Defence are re-named into

25     commands and units of the army whose organisation and formation will be

Page 19200

 1     established by the president of the republic."

 2             Can I ask for your comment on this article given the line of

 3     questioning Mr. Ivetic had about the -- the inability of a centralised

 4     command to control Territorial Defence units.

 5        A.   I come back to the answer that I gave Mr. Ivetic on a number of

 6     occasions.  That, irrespective of the existence of irregular militia

 7     special forces units, the nature of organisation of Republika Srpska and

 8     the VRS was that the territory controlled by the VRS was divided into

 9     corps tactical areas of responsibility.  And all those militaries,

10     paramilitaries, and when taking part in military operations, police

11     forces, within that area, came under the control of that corps

12     headquarters.  And, as we all know, the corps were given geographic

13     names:  1st Krajina Corps, 2nd Krajina Corps, Drina Corps, et cetera.  So

14     that, I think, gives ample clarification of the situation and it's

15     enshrined by Article 2 of the decision on the 12th of May that you've

16     just redrawn my attention to.

17             MR. GROOME:  Your Honours, the Prosecution would tender this

18     exhibit, 65 ter 790, into evidence.

19             MR. IVETIC:  No objection.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 00790 receives number P2799,

22     Your Honours.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  P2799 is admitted.

24             MR. GROOME:  Could I now ask that P501 be brought to our screens.

25        Q.   General Dannatt, I want to show you another document which may

Page 19201

 1     illustrate the same point with respect to paramilitaries.  This is an

 2     order signed by General Mladic on the 28th of July, 1992, and is in

 3     response to some of the armed groups that Mr. Ivetic has brought to your

 4     attention.

 5             The order is signed within two months of Mladic's appointment.

 6     The first part of the order describes the problem roughly in the same

 7     terms as Mr. Ivetic has described it.

 8             Once you can orient yourself to the name of the order and the

 9     date, can I ask that we go to e-court page 2 and look at the actual text

10     of the order issued by Mladic himself.

11             And we see here, in paragraph 1 of this order:

12             "All paramilitary formations and their leaders, if their

13     intentions truly are honourable, are to place themselves in the service

14     of the just struggle for the survival of the Serbian people and are to

15     offer to incorporate themselves into the regular SRBiH army units, to be

16     deployed in accordance with their military specialities and level of

17     military training."

18             Before I seek your comment on this, I would ask that we go to the

19     next page, and if I could draw your attention to paragraph 7, which

20     states:

21             "I will hold the corps commanders in their areas of

22     responsibility and the SRBiH army Main Staff chief of intelligence and

23     security affairs responsible for the implementations [sic] of this

24     order."

25             Is this an illustration of the concept that you've just described

Page 19202

 1     for us in your last answer?

 2        A.   I think it's more than an example.  I think it's the -- it's the

 3     order, the unambiguous order that these special units must come under the

 4     corps commanders in their areas of responsibilities.  I apologise for

 5     repetition, but I think I've made that point probably half a dozen times.

 6        Q.   Now if I can change to a different topic.

 7             Mr. Ivetic has suggested to you today, with respect to the

 8     15th of July, 1995, meeting, that the desire to keep Mladic's presence at

 9     that meeting confidential somehow prevented him from taking appropriate

10     steps to investigate General Smith's claims.

11             Based upon your experience as a senior commander, is this a

12     plausible reason for General Mladic to have failed to have done anything

13     in response to the report by General Smith?

14        A.   I give a two-part answer --

15             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, the question misstates the evidence and

16     the questions that were raised.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Would you please assist Mr. Groome in where you

18     think he misrepresented the evidence so that he can correct this.

19             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  I believe I indicated that the

20     document showed that appropriate steps were taken.  The -- the document

21     being the document that was introduced, the 15 July understanding reached

22     between Generals Smith and General Mladic as reported by Yasushi Akashi,

23     another participant of that meeting.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  I think Mr. Ivetic is right, that at least in his

25     question it was not suggested that Mr. Mladic could not take the

Page 19203

 1     appropriate steps to investigate.  I think there was no reference to an

 2     investigation.

 3             The witness has testified about that, about what he considered to

 4     be a natural duty to investigate if that information reaches you, but it

 5     was not the suggestion Mr. Ivetic made.  So would you please rephrase

 6     your question.

 7             MR. GROOME:

 8        Q.   General, let me add one more element to my question.

 9             The agreement that Mr. Ivetic put before you, General Smith, when

10     he was before this Chamber, was asked about this agreement and whether

11     UNHCR ever did gain access to Srebrenica to which he replied at

12     transcript page 7344 to 45:

13             "I don't think UNHCR ever got access in the end to Srebrenica.

14             "Q.  Did Mladic ever give an explanation as to why they were not

15     given access?

16             "A.  Not in my memory, no."

17             Having the benefit of General Smith's evidence on this point,

18     does that cause you to question the sincerity of the agreement that was

19     entered into with General Smith on the 15th?

20        A.   Yes.  It causes me to -- to doubt the sincerity of it, but there

21     was a terrible track record throughout the duration of that conflict of

22     agreements being reached at conferences that were never carried through

23     on the ground.  So as disappointing as that observation is, it is not a

24     surprise.

25        Q.   Mr. Ivetic also spent some time asking questions about matters

Page 19204

 1     related to General Mladic being in Belgrade during this period.  Given

 2     all of the circumstances and your study of the documents and the -- the

 3     practical ways in which command function was exercised by the VRS, do you

 4     have an opinion whether or not Mladic was in command of his troops while

 5     in Belgrade on the 14th, 15th and 16th of July?

 6        A.   By the letter of the law and VRS regulations, when he was in

 7     Belgrade, he was not technically in command of the army.  Command having

 8     devolved to General Milovanovic as deputy commander.  But, in practice,

 9     and I have said this before, General Milovanovic would have done nothing

10     that did he not think General Mladic would have agreed with, and any

11     decisions that he took, he would have cleared with General Mladic at the

12     first available opportunity.

13             Therefore, whether, in Belgrade or in Sarajevo, General Mladic

14     continued, in effect, to continue to exercise command over the army.  And

15     you invited an opinion, and if I can express an opinion, the lack of

16     evidence that's come to light of General Mladic conducting an

17     investigation into the allegations put to him by General Smith occurs

18     because, actually, General Mladic did not need to conduct that

19     investigation because he knew exactly what had gone on.

20             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, I have no further questions.

21             MR. IVETIC:  One or two in recross based upon the document that's

22     now on the screen.  With Your Honours' permission.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But I'd like to -- if you would not ...

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE ORIE:  I would like to clarify the issue about the document


Page 19205

 1     in which the agreement was laid down.

 2             I tried to analyse the line of questioning and the answers given

 3     by the witness.  I just try to summarise that and would like to hear from

 4     the parties whether my recollection is correct or not.  And I invite the

 5     witness also to carefully listen to my summary.

 6             It started with a -- an observation by the witness that if you

 7     receive information about executions and rapes, that the witness

 8     considered it to be appropriate to take as a measure, to investigate.

 9     That's how it started.

10             Then, Mr. Ivetic, you put to the witness the content of the

11     document in which the agreements were described, which is the -- I think

12     it's the memo sent to Mr. Annan and sent by Mr. Akashi.  Then you took

13     the witness to the relevant portion where the content of the agreements

14     are described, and you asked the witness whether the instruction to keep

15     Mladic's presence at the meeting confidential, or secret, whether that

16     shed any light on another reason why General Mladic didn't need to rush

17     back to Srebrenica, as you said, to investigate claims made by

18     General Smith.  So we are still dealing with the need to investigate.

19     The witness then said no.

20             And then I think the further questions were mainly about what was

21     agreed.  I got the impression, first of all, that no explanation had yet

22     been given by the witness, so, therefore, whether there's any other

23     explanation, it's unclear what the first explanation was.  And I, in

24     re-reading it, I gained the impression that to investigate allegations of

25     executions and rape were then, in one way or another, linked to all kind

Page 19206

 1     of other matters which were agreed upon; that is, ICRC to have access,

 2     et cetera, et cetera.

 3             So, therefore, the -- both questions and answers are puzzling me.

 4             I then understood from your question, Mr. Ivetic, that -- and it

 5     was an implicit assumption, I think, in your question - that the

 6     obligation to keep matters secret and the silence in the document

 7     containing the agreements would have a direct link with the executions

 8     and rapes as they were put on the table by General Smith.

 9             First of all, is my summary of questions and answer more or less

10     in line with your understanding of what was asked and what was answered?

11             MR. IVETIC:  Except for the last part, Your Honour, and perhaps

12     it's because when I started reading that section you did not let me

13     finish.

14             The secrecy is also in relation to the agreements that were

15     reached, including the one that is for the ICRC to have immediate access

16     to prisoners of war, to assess welfare, register and review procedures at

17     Bosnian Serb reception centre in accordance with the Geneva Conventions

18     as to Srebrenica.

19             So if a general like General Smith makes -- raises issues of --

20     of misconduct having occurred, and if a general like General Mladic

21     agrees send in international agencies to assess whether everything is

22     being done properly, that was the -- the -- the crux of the question, and

23     the second paragraph of that understanding on the second page says that

24     these specific agreements will be revealed after the meeting scheduled

25     for Wednesday, 19 July 1995.  So again there was an overarching cloak of

Page 19207

 1     secrecy over this meeting and for the agreements reached not to be

 2     revealed until that later date.  That was the direction I intended to go.

 3     I apologise if I was inartful.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  That's the crux of your position.

 5             Mr. Groome, do you have any comment on my summary of what was

 6     asked and what was -- the answers were?

 7             MR. GROOME:  I don't think it's inaccurate.  I had some other

 8     impressions, but I'm not sure it is all that relevant for me to voice

 9     them.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Then I have the following question to you.  Because

11     it comes down, to some extent, to the inclusion or the exclusion of an

12     investigation into executions and rape in this document as part of what

13     was agreed.  If I would put you to the following, that giving access to

14     camps, et cetera, would not in any way resolve the issue of persons being

15     executed because they usually do not live in camps but they are buried,

16     as you have said, already by that time, that's how I understood your

17     testimony, therefore the content of the agreement seems not to cover the

18     issue - at least that issue - raised by General Smith, that executions

19     and rapes had happened.  And I'm focussing primarily on executions

20     because rape victims may still be visited by ICRC, if need be.

21             Could you please comment on this understanding of the relation

22     between what Mr. -- General Smith put on the table and the content of the

23     agreement -- agreements reached.

24             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, yes, I agree with your assessment.  I

25     see nothing in the page headed "Understandings from Belgrade discussions"

Page 19208

 1     that tells me that there had been any conversation, any further

 2     conversation, between General Mladic and General Smith, and between

 3     General Mladic and anybody else, that instigated any kind of

 4     investigation into the allegations that General Smith had put to

 5     General Mladic previously.  And the agreement, the understanding about

 6     the ICRC having immediate access, is -- is very clear.  It's -- it's

 7     fine.  But they're going have access to people who were alive, who were

 8     at the Bosnian Serb reception centre.  These weren't the people missing

 9     because by that stage they were dead and they were buried some distance

10     away from Srebrenica itself.  History records that, and that is fact.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, any further questions?  I'm wondering

12     whether -- how much time you would need because we are at a time --

13             MR. IVETIC:  I would say approximately five minutes.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Then would you prefer - and perhaps you want to

15     consult with your client - to do that now?

16             Mr. Groome, next question being whether you would wish to start

17     with Ms. Tabeau's evidence today after a break which would leave us some

18     20 to 25 minutes.

19             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour.  My request would be in this

20     session that we finish General Dannatt's testimony and that in the next

21     session we begin Ms. Tabeau's testimony.  She is waiting.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, if that is agreeable to Mr. Mladic.

23     Because, otherwise, we would take break.

24                           [Defence counsel confer]

25             MR. IVETIC:  My client is asking for the break at this time,

Page 19209

 1     Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll take the break first.

 3             Could Mr. Dannatt follow the usher.  We'd like to see you back in

 4     20 minutes.

 5                           [The witness stands down]

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  We take a break, and we resume at quarter to 2.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 1.23 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  While the witness is brought in, I now address some

10     of the exhibits I referred to before the -- before.

11             P1501, the Chamber accepts the Prosecution's position that it

12     relates to, in addition to the testimony of witnesses with whom he has

13     been used in court, other documentary evidence and that the Prosecution

14     intends to rely on it in its final closing brief.

15             Accordingly, the Chamber considers that P1501 can remain in

16     evidence in its current form.  I'll deal with the others -- I'll just

17     continue.

18                           [The witness takes the stand]

19             JUDGE ORIE:  With the apologies to you, Mr. Dannatt, I just deal

20     with a few administrative matters.

21             As to P1739, P1740 and P1481, the Chamber accepts the

22     Prosecution's submissions that the length of these documents cannot be

23     meaningfully reduced without significantly undermining their potential

24     probative value and notes that these can also remain in evidence in their

25     present form.


Page 19210

 1             Turning to P1502 and P1736, the Chamber instructs the Registry to

 2     replace their current versions with the redacted ones and, in particular,

 3     with doc ID 0293-5619-RED and doc ID 0095-0901-RED.

 4             Mr. Ivetic, you still had a few questions for the witness.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  My apologies again, Mr. Dannatt, for dealing with

 7     other matters.

 8                           Further Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

 9        Q.   General, I would direct your attention to the document which is

10     still up on the screen in e-court, which is P501 which is dated the

11     28th of July, 1992.  I would like to go through some of the provisions

12     that were skipped and ask for your comment on the same.  Beginning with

13     paragraph number 2:

14             "Individuals and groups which had carried out crimes, looting and

15     other types of criminal acts are not to be included into units.  They are

16     to be disarmed, arrested, and criminal proceedings are to be instituted

17     [sic] against them in SRBiH army courts regardless of their citizenship."

18             In relation to that paragraph, is there anything inappropriate

19     about a general issuing such an order as to paramilitary groups when

20     determining whether they would be integrated into the VRS or not?

21        A.   No, I think that's a very proper exclusion of groups that he did

22     not want to come into the military command and control structure and I

23     take it as of -- a tacit acknowledgment that things had happened in the

24     past that they didn't wish to happen in the future.

25        Q.   If you look at 3:

Page 19211

 1             "Paramilitary formations, groups and individuals which refuse to

 2     be placed under unified SRBiH army command are to be disarmed and

 3     arrested, in co-operation with the MUP /Ministry of Interior/ and

 4     criminal proceedings are to be initiated against them for crimes

 5     committed."

 6             The same question, sir:  Would this --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I ask for Mr. Groome.

 8             Is there any dispute about 2 and we have now 3 to be not

 9     inappropriate?

10             MR. GROOME:  No, Your Honour, and I'm sitting here wondering --

11     maybe there has been some misunderstanding but I've never suggested that

12     anything in this order was inappropriate.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I think what Mr. Groome, if I under

14     stood him well, wanted to establish was kind of inclusion or

15     subordination of groups, and he has not expressed in any way -- and

16     apparently he now says that 2 and 3 are not inappropriate at all.

17             Please proceed.

18             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I direct your attention to

19     paragraph 38 of the witness's report, which indicates:

20             "Moreover, there is documentary evidence of General Mladic

21     accepting command of all paramilitaries and territorial organisations,"

22     and so [overlapping speakers] ...

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Does that arise from the re-examination?  You could

24     have asked this question in cross-examination, isn't it?

25             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.  But it is arising from Mr. Groome's dealing

Page 19212

 1     with this document, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  I'll not stop you any further.  But let's try

 3     to -- of course, all -- and that's a matter that was -- that arose a

 4     couple of times, all may be almost all or that's clear and there seems to

 5     be no dispute about these matters that where the general rule is

 6     described in paragraph 1, that some exceptions are made.

 7             Please proceed.

 8             MR. IVETIC:

 9        Q.   If you can take the time, sir, to look through the remaining

10     items on this page, 4, 5, and 6, I believe, and I would ask you in

11     relation to those, is this a demonstration of General Mladic doing

12     precisely what you as an expert would expect of a proper general to do

13     when integrating units that had previously been labelled paramilitaries

14     into the armed forces that one commands?

15        A.   With relation to all those paragraphs, I agree with you, that is

16     exactly what he should be doing.  It was a noble intent expressed in

17     1992.  My query would be whether that intent was followed through in the

18     totality of the war to 1995.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  But that's not the question that is put to you.  And

20     there seems -- Mr. Groome, may I take it that there is no disagreement

21     on -- between the parties no dispute about this to be an appropriate ...

22             MR. GROOME:  No, we're in a full agreement with respect to that,

23     Your Honour.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Therefore, the ...

25             MR. IVETIC:


Page 19213

 1        Q.   Would shortages in qualified officers have affected the ability

 2     for these orders to have been complied with at all levels down the chain?

 3        A.   It might have affected their compliance in an immediate

 4     time-frame, but I don't see why it should have affected their compliance

 5     over an extended time-frame.

 6        Q.   Thank you for those answers.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, that concludes the re-cross.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

 9             Mr. Groome, you're on your feet.

10             MR. GROOME:  One question arising.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  One question arising from further cross.

12             Please.

13                           Further Re-examination by Mr. Groome:

14        Q.   General, what would be the implications of -- once this order is

15     issued, of -- the period after this up until the end of the war, of

16     paramilitary groups such as the Skorpions being incorporated into VRS

17     military operations?

18        A.   Well, sir, my understanding would be that this order, as passed

19     in 1992, had an open-ended validity and that other paramilitary groups,

20     as might have been set up during the course of the war, should also have

21     come under command of the main VRS structure, as was the intention behind

22     this order issued in 1992.

23             MR. GROOME:  Nothing further, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, Defence, no further questions?

25             MR. IVETIC:  None for this witness, Your Honour.


Page 19214

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you.

 2             Then, Mr. Dannatt, I would like to thank you very much, because

 3     you're -- we have concluded your -- to hear your evidence.  I'd like to

 4     thank you very much for coming to The Hague and for having answered all

 5     the questions that were put to you by the parties and by the Bench, and I

 6     wish you a safe return home again.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, thank you.  And I will remain at the

 8     disposal of the Court if I can assist at any stage in the future.  Thank

 9     you, sir.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for that offer.  You may follow the usher.

11                           [The witness withdrew]

12             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, all that remains now is for the

13     Prosecution to move to formally admit the expert statement of

14     General Dannatt that's been marked for identification as P2629.  And I

15     would also tender at this time as a demonstrative exhibit, P2630, marked

16     for identification, that's the chart that has the updated citations.

17             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, we would supplement our previous

18     objection to the entry in evidence of the -- a statement as an expert

19     report based upon the witness's concession under oath that someone else

20     of a legal background, perhaps working for an international prosecutor's

21     office, drafted the agreement with him.  Statement, pardon me, not the

22     agreement.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, the Chamber denies your objections,

25     including the one raised newly today, and admits into evidence P2629 and

Page 19215

 1     P2630.

 2             Mr. Groome.

 3             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, just apart from that, just to make very

 4     clear for the record that the person who served as his legal research

 5     assistant, although she has a background in international criminal law,

 6     she has never and does not work for the Office of the Prosecutor.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Well, I carefully listened to what Mr. --

 8     Mr. Ivetic said for an international prosecutor's office.  Not this.

 9     That's how I understood it.  And apart from that, we have -- in this

10     understanding of the additional submission, we have ruled there is no

11     specific position that the person which may have assisted in drafting the

12     report was specifically employed by the ICTY Office of the Prosecution.

13             MR. IVETIC:  Correct.  And my statement was made on the witness's

14     testimony where he said he didn't know.  So I did not specify --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  You could have further explored the matter, but you

16     didn't, and that's the understanding of the Chamber.  And we now have on

17     the record, Mr. Groome, that you say, even if the witness doesn't know,

18     you know where she was not employed.

19             MR. GROOME:  That's correct, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  That's on the record.

21             Then could the next witness be escorted into the courtroom.

22                           [The witness entered court]

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon, Ms. Tabeau.

24             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Tabeau, you'll be with us only for 15 minutes


Page 19216

 1     today and we'll continue tomorrow, but, nevertheless, I would like to

 2     invite you to make the solemn declaration, which is required by the

 3     Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 5     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 6                           WITNESS:  EWA TABEAU

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Ms. Tabeau.  Please be seated.  You'll

 8     first be examined by Ms. Marcus.  Ms. Marcus is counsel for the

 9     Prosecution, which may not come as a surprise to you.

10             Please proceed, Ms. Marcus.

11             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you very much, Your Honours.  Good

12     afternoon.

13                           Examination by Ms. Marcus:

14        Q.   Good afternoon, Dr. Tabeau.

15        A.   Good afternoon.

16        Q.   You provided an updated CV to the Prosecution in the past few

17     days; is that correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19             MS. MARCUS:  Your Honours, that CV is uploaded and it has been

20     now assigned the MFI exhibit number P2789.  I will be tendering all the

21     materials at the very conclusion of Dr. Tabeau's testimony as I mentioned

22     yesterday.

23             Your Honours, Dr. Tabeau has brought along with her hard copies

24     of her reports for ease of reference during her testimony.  I have not

25     have had an opportunity to ask the Defence if they have any objection to

Page 19217

 1     her having them in front of her, but I'd like to ask the Chamber now and

 2     the Defence if that would be acceptable.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  As long as they're unmarked, I have no objection.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Tabeau, you heard, as long as they are unmarked,

 5     the Chamber also has no problems.  But they should be unmarked.  Not even

 6     your own notes written on it, just the clean copies.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Ms. Marcus.

 9             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you.  Your Honours, as discussed prior to the

10     commencement of Dr. Tabeau's testimony, part of Dr. Tabeau's evidence

11     will be tendered via Rule 92 ter and 94 bis, and some solely via Rule 94

12     bis.  I will now lay the foundation for those transcripts and reports to

13     be tendered via Rule 92 ter.

14        Q.   Dr. Tabeau, did you testify before this Tribunal on the

15     7th of December of 2010 in the Stanisic and Simatovic case?

16        A.   Yes, I did.

17        Q.   And in that case, did you present a proof of death, or POD,

18     expert report dated 6th of August, 2010?

19        A.   Yes, I did.

20        Q.   Did you also testify before this Tribunal in the Karadzic case on

21     the 25th and 26th of April, and the 1st of May of 2012?

22        A.   Yes, I did.

23        Q.   In the Karadzic case, during that testimony, did you tender an

24     IDPs and refugees expert report from the Slobodan Milosevic case which

25     was dated 4 April 2003?

Page 19218

 1        A.   Yes.  But actually not the whole report, just the annexes to this

 2     report.

 3        Q.   Before coming to court today, did you have an opportunity to

 4     review the portions of those testimonies and the sections of those expert

 5     reports which the Prosecution is tendering now in this case?

 6        A.   Yes, I did.

 7        Q.   Are there any clarifications you would like to make to that

 8     evidence at this time?

 9        A.   No, there are no clarifications.

10        Q.   Do you confirm the truthfulness and accuracy of that evidence?

11        A.   Yes, I do.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly pause between question and answer.

13     Thank you.

14             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you.  I will try my best.

15             Your Honours, the Stanisic and Simatovic testimony is P2785, MFI.

16     The section of the Stanisic and Simatovic POD report is P2787, MFI.  The

17     excerpt of the Karadzic testimony is -- is P2786, MFI.  And the portion

18     of the Milosevic IDPs and refugees report is 11102, MFI.  Those are

19     Dr. Tabeau's 92 ter materials.

20             I will now move on to the attestation process for

21     three additional items --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  One second.

23             MS. MARCUS:  Yes, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  The number 11 --

25             MS. MARCUS:  Oh, I'm sorry.  I'm sorry.

Page 19219

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Could you please repeat the portion of the Milosevic

 2     IDPs and refugees report.

 3             MS. MARCUS:  Yes, my apologies.  That would be P2788, MFI.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 5             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you.  I will now move on to the attestation

 6     process for three additional items which Dr. Tabeau has prepared in the

 7     past few days in preparation for her testimony today.

 8             Could I ask the Court Officer to please call up 65 ter -- well,

 9     I'll give the exhibit number.  P2790, MFI, which is a one-page addendum

10     to the POD annex, P2797, MFI.  This addendum pertains to four victims.

11        Q.   Dr. Tabeau, was this addendum pertaining to four victims prepared

12     by your team under your supervision in preparation for your testimony

13     today?

14        A.   Yes, it was.

15        Q.   Was it prepared using the identical methodology as the POD annex?

16        A.   Yes, it was.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Ms. Marcus, could you repeat the 65 ter number for

18     P2790 MFI.

19             MS. MARCUS:  The 65 ter number, Your Honour, is 30454 and the MFI

20     number is P2790.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

22             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23        Q.   Did you review it in detail in the same way in which the way you

24     reviewed the POD annex prior to it being to submitted today?

25        A.   Yes, I did.

Page 19220

 1        Q.   Do you affirm the accuracy of this addendum?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3             MS. MARCUS:  Could I ask the Court Officer to now please call up

 4     P2791, MFI, which is 65 ter 30455.  This is a table of name

 5     correspondence between the POD annex and the victims list which was

 6     attached to the indictment.

 7        Q.   Dr. Tabeau, was this document prepared by your team under your

 8     supervision and reviewed comprehensively by you in preparation for your

 9     testimony today?

10        A.   Yes, it was.

11        Q.   Can you tell us, very briefly, please, what the purpose of this

12     document is.

13        A.   There are minor spelling differences in the names of victims in

14     the schedules as compared with the spelling of these names in the annex

15     to the POD report prepared for this case.  This document explains the

16     spelling differences, explains the sources which basically relate to the

17     names as reported in the operation census and on the schedules.

18        Q.   Do you affirm the accuracy of this document?

19        A.   Yes, I do.

20             MS. MARCUS:  Could I now ask the Court Officer to please call up

21     P2793, MFI, which is 65 ter 30465.  This is a list of corrections or

22     clarifications to the proof of death annex, which is now given the MFI

23     number P2797.

24        Q.   Dr. Tabeau, did your team prepare this list of corrections and

25     clarifications to the POD annex under your supervision in preparation for

Page 19221

 1     your testimony today?

 2        A.   Yes, we did.

 3        Q.   Did you have an opportunity to review it comprehensively prior to

 4     coming to court?

 5        A.   Yes, I did.

 6        Q.   Do you affirm its accuracy and the accuracy of the POD annex in

 7     conjunction with these corrections and clarifications?

 8        A.   Yes, I do.

 9             MS. MARCUS:  Your Honours, the POD report, which will be P2796,

10     MFI, contains updated numerical data emerging from this table of

11     corrections.  In other words, that report has been updated with these

12     corrections.  The Prosecution was, however, not planning to produce an

13     updated version of the POD annex in that it is 656 pages, and this might

14     be cumbersome.  We what we were planning was, with leave of the Chamber,

15     is just to have the POD annex kept as it is and with this table of

16     corrections one can compare the two.  This is just as we do in our

17     practice with witness statements and we tender a clarification with it,

18     that was the way in which we planned to proceed with the POD annex.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Is there any objection by the Defence on this way of

20     proceeding?

21             MR. IVETIC:  With respect to the POD annex, no.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Then you may proceed as you suggest, Ms. Marcus.

23             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

24        Q.   Finally, Dr. Tabeau, based upon your expertise, do you affirm the

25     truthfulness and accuracy of the results of the analysis carried out in

Page 19222

 1     your expert reports for this case; namely, the 2013 Srebrenica update

 2     report, P2794, MFI, and its annexes, P2795, MFI; the proof of death

 3     report, P2796, MFI, and its annex, P2797, MFI; and the IDPs report for

 4     the Mladic case, P2798, MFI?

 5        A.   Yes, I do.

 6             MS. MARCUS:  Your Honours, I would just now, in my two minutes

 7     remaining, present a very brief public summary for the witness, and I

 8     have explained the purpose of this to the witness.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  If can you do it in two minutes, you're invited to

10     do so.

11             MS. MARCUS:  Thank you.

12             Dr. Ewa Tabeau is a demographic expert and statistician whose

13     evidence relates to the demographic shifts which occurred during the wars

14     in the former Yugoslavia.  She testifies about the process of updating

15     the list of Srebrenica missing and the DNA-based identification of

16     Srebrenica victims.  Dr. Tabeau also provides expert evidence pertaining

17     to the circumstances of deaths of approximately 2.000 named victims from

18     the municipalities component of the Mladic case.

19             Your Honours, that concludes the public summary.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Ms. Marcus.

21             Ms. Tabeau, we'll adjourn for the day.  But I'd like to instruct

22     you that you should not speak or communicate in whatever way with

23     whomever about your testimony, either given today, or still to be given

24     in the following days.  We'd like to see you back on -- tomorrow, at 9.30

25     in the morning in this same courtroom, III.  And you may follow the

Page 19223

 1     usher.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

 3                           [The witness stands down]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume tomorrow,

 5     Wednesday, the 13th of November, 9.30 in the morning, in this same

 6     courtroom, III.

 7                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.15 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 13th day of

 9                           November, 2013, at 9.30 a.m.