140901ED

Page 24999

1 Your Honour.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. What we have on our screen now is the

3 first -- no, what we have on our screen now is the second page which is

4 the city centre of Sarajevo rather than what we saw on page 1 of this

5 document; page 1 mainly dealing with the western part, including

6 Dobrinja, of Sarajevo.

7 Please proceed, Mr. Lukic.

8 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. You are right.

9 So this document has to be understood that the second page is

10 actually the right part of the first page. They should be connected in

11 that way. That's the right part then --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Unfortunately we have now twice the --

13 MR. LUKIC: That's the --

14 JUDGE ORIE: There are we are.

15 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

16 Q. [Interpretation] Just for the record and to understand this map

17 that you marked, Mr. Bukva, in the Galic case, would you just tell us

18 what these abbreviations or acronyms mean? We see KM, for instance.

19 A. It's the usual sign for the command post of a certain unit.

20 Q. What is Lpbr?

21 A. That's the acronym for light infantry brigade.

22 Q. What is R?

23 A. R is how I marked locations where weapons and ammunition were

24 manufactured.

25 Q. What about N?

Page 25000

1 A. N is a designation for weapons and ammunitions depots.

2 Q. TN?

3 A. TN means locations where heavy weaponry was deployed and

4 concentrated.

5 Q. Whose units did you mark on this map?

6 A. Enemy units.

7 Q. So that we don't go through them one by one, because one whole

8 day in the Galic case was spent marking this map, only tell us what the

9 numbers on this map mean; for instance, 142nd Lpbr?

10 A. That's the establishment name of the unit. In this case

11 142nd Light Infantry Brigade. Or this flag in the shape of a square,

12 inside it's written "1.K," it means the 1st Corps. I should just like to

13 emphasize that these were the chief targets we identified in the area of

14 responsibility of the 1st Corps of the BH Army. There were many more, of

15 course. But these were the main ones and the most interesting to our

16 side.

17 Q. On this map -- for instance, you mentioned 1K, the 1st Corps. Is

18 that the command or the units of the 1st Corps?

19 A. That was the command post of the 1st Corps, and in this specific

20 case it is located at the address Danijel Ozma Street number 2, and that

21 was across the street from the building of the Presidency. The place

22 where the command of the 1st Corps was was a residential building, and

23 its basement was used for the requirements of the command of the

24 1st Corps while the rest of the building was still occupied by local

25 residents, the same people who lived there before the war, civilians.

Page 25001

1 Q. Was it normal for the commands of the units of the BH Army to be

2 placed in civilian facilities?

3 A. That was practically a rule. I would just like to say that two

4 or three units were located in the prewar barracks of the former JNA.

5 All the other Muslim units used buildings of a similar type like the one

6 that was used for the 1st Corps command. This was something that the

7 Muslims resorted to often and, like I said, it could be considered a

8 rule.

9 Q. And what were your duties? Could you please tell us briefly.

10 A. When the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was formed after a decision of

11 the Assembly of Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it was

12 called before, on the 12th of May, 1992, I was appointed chief of

13 intelligence and security corps part -- as part of the intelligence and

14 security department of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. And that was my post

15 throughout the entire period, with the formation of the Army of

16 Republika Srpska and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps until the signing of the

17 Dayton Agreement.

18 Q. And could you please tell us, what were your duties? What was

19 your organ doing?

20 A. My department that I led was assigned with gathering information

21 of all kinds, but the focus was information about the armed forces of

22 Bosnia and Herzegovina. So my department mostly dealt with gathering

23 information about the enemy, about the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

24 the so-called armija. Of course, we gathered different kinds of

25 information, too, about the general situation in the field, about the

Page 25002

1 relations within the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the morale, the

2 weapons that the army had, their plans, their objectives, movements,

3 regrouping of the forces, and all the things that are important from the

4 security aspect, a high level of security as far as our units were

5 concerned.

6 Q. And this gathering of intelligence, did that also include the

7 positions of the enemy forces?

8 A. Yes, absolutely. The most complete answer to your question would

9 precisely be the last thing that I said. Everything that was important

10 regarding the enemy, everything that was important and that could affect

11 the security of our armed forces and our civilian population that was in

12 the combat zone.

13 Q. Thank you. And can you please tell us what the sources of your

14 information were?

15 A. We used various sources for information. Most frequently,

16 reconnaissance of enemy communications, then conversations or interviews

17 of people who switched to the other side or who escaped from territories

18 under Muslim control, by monitoring the media, enemy media, by direct

19 reconnaissance on lines of contact, by sending our reconnaissance units

20 into the depth of enemy territory, information coming from settlements.

21 That would be more or less it.

22 Q. And when you listen to enemy communications, were you able to

23 anticipate enemy actions? Do you have any examples for that?

24 A. There are many, many examples of that. At the

25 Slobodan Princip Seljo barracks, which was a former JNA barracks, we

Page 25003

1 formed a listening centre by apparatus that we had at hand with just some

2 professional devices, and we were able to successfully monitor enemy

3 communications traffic, particularly at the beginning of the war.

4 And so I can immediately give you an example from the beginning

5 of the war. War had not officially broken out yet, but this was an

6 attack on a JNA column in Dobrovoljacka Street. I just happened to be

7 there when Izetbegovic, from Lukavica, where he was brought from the

8 airport, informed Ganic in a telephone conversation about the plan of the

9 withdrawal of the command from Bistrik. And then after that telephone

10 conversation when Ganic --

11 Q. I'm sorry. Could you tell us who was supposed to pull out?

12 A. The command from Bistrik under the command of General Kukanjac.

13 So after that conversation, Izetbegovic and Ganic continued the

14 conversation and chaos broke out in the enemy communications. We could

15 clearly hear different armed groups calling to each other and openly

16 calling for Osa and Zolja weapons to be brought, everything that they had

17 that was available to them of weaponry. On the basis of that

18 communication, it was quite clear that the column in Dobrovoljacka Street

19 would be attacked, and this is what did happen.

20 For some eight to ten minutes of that conversation on enemy

21 communications lines, I actually told General Djurdevic [as interpreted]

22 about those eight to ten minutes of communication, and General Gagovic

23 also, who at that time was in Lukavica. I was disappointed when

24 General Djurdjevac just commented on that by saying, "Bukva, we have

25 guarantees from Mr. Doyle and the UNPROFOR commander that the process of

Page 25004

1 the pullout of the command from Bistrik would proceed without any

2 incidents." Unfortunately, my assumptions turned out to be correct and

3 there was a massacre that took place in Dobrovoljacka Street.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bukva, could I ask you a question. The Chamber

5 has heard some evidence about the events in the Dobrovoljacka Street but

6 not, as far as I remember, from the preceding communications within the

7 federation circles.

8 Now when you listened into this communication, was it -- first,

9 was it recorded; second, was it transcribed in one way or another?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The audio that I talked about was

11 recorded and it's somewhere in the archives. I don't know exactly what

12 happened to the recording.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask the parties whether any effort was made

14 to trace such recordings?

15 Because, Mr. Lukic, often when the Prosecution relies on

16 intercepted communications, they often come with audio and

17 transcriptions. Is there any underlying audio or are there any

18 underlying transcripts or have you searched for them or have you sought

19 the co-operation of the Prosecution to find it?

20 MR. LUKIC: We did talk with Mr. Bukva about that, and we

21 couldn't locate those intercepts. But I think that maybe the next

22 question can put a bit more light on this, if --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then I'll wait for that. But you did not speak

24 with the Prosecution about it?

25 MR. LUKIC: No, we did not.

Page 25005

1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

2 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

3 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bukva, you said that this should be

4 somewhere in the archives. Did this archive remain in Republika Srpska

5 or did the JNA take it with you when it withdrew to Serbia?

6 A. No, the archive is in Republika Srpska. The last place where I

7 know it was located was the Vrbas barracks in Banja Luka.

8 Q. Thank you. And this communication took place on the same day

9 that the attack happened; is that correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Now I would like to ask you something else. We will try to get

12 to --

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, could I nevertheless ask one or two

14 follow-up questions.

15 You said the last place where you know it was located was the

16 Vrbas barracks in Banja Luka. When was it that you know that it was

17 located there?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was on the 8th of March, 2007,

19 when I was demobilised from the Army of Republika Srpska. That was the

20 last day of my active military service and the last day that I know that

21 the archive was at the Vrbas barracks in Banja Luka.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And do I then understand that, if I could say

23 so, that control over these archives has always been in Republika Srpska

24 hands and not in federation hands?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, that is correct. It was

Page 25006

1 always in our possession.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 Could I ask the Prosecution to try to find out whether any such a

4 collection of audio is known to it, either in audio or in transcription.

5 Please proceed.

6 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bukva, one follow-up question about this.

8 Today do you have to ask permission from the Defence Ministry of Bosnia

9 Herzegovina in order to have access to anything that is located at the

10 Kozara barracks?

11 A. Yes, that was a rule already when I was still in active military

12 service. Right after the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia Herzegovina was

13 formed, as well as all the other joint defence organs, everything that

14 had to do with the archives and other military issues was directly in the

15 jurisdiction of the Ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the

16 archive in this case. That was also treated in the same way. As far as

17 I know, these rules are still in force today.

18 Q. Thank you. I would briefly like to put some questions to you

19 about the departure of the JNA and the forming of the

20 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. When the JNA left the territory of Bosnia and

21 Herzegovina, what did that lead to, their departure from the territory?

22 A. The departure of the JNA from the territory of Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina was a political decision reached or respected fully by the

24 military leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in an attempt

25 to contribute to a peaceful resolution of the conflict in

Page 25007

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have to say that the Yugoslav People's Army in the

2 period before the interethnic conflicts broke out was a significant

3 factor of stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I have proof of that.

4 At least on two occasions, and perhaps even three, the civilian

5 population asked to be allowed to go into the barracks where I served,

6 Slobodan Princip Seljo, in Lukavica, and when they came I spoke to those

7 people, among whom were Serbs, Muslims, Croats, about their fears which

8 grew from day-to-day for the simple reason that armed groups of Muslims

9 began to appear in the Dobrinja settlement. These groups were headed by

10 well-known Sarajevo criminals, such as Juka Prazina, Musan Topalovic,

11 Caco, Ismet Bajramovic, Celo, and so on and so forth. And this caused

12 fear among the civilian population, and they sought safety in the

13 compound of the barracks where I was serving. I repeat: This happened

14 twice, perhaps even three times. I don't remember exactly. This in

15 itself indicates that the people trusted the JNA.

16 The political decision that I referred to led to a situation, a

17 political situation, of complete differentiation along ethnic lines

18 because with the departure of the JNA, the people understood that

19 something that they had faith in until the day before had disappeared,

20 and it was clear that hard times were coming. So everybody followed the

21 principle: I'm going to where my people are a majority. This led to

22 demographic shifts among ethnic lines, and already at that time it was

23 known, this truth was becoming evident among the people, that war in

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina was inevitable.

25 I have to emphasize that the greatest disappointment with the

Page 25008

1 departure of the JNA was felt among the Serbian people, because the Serb

2 people were traditionally committed to the JNA and they always supported

3 the army. The fact that the JNA left the territory created the need to

4 respond in an adequate manner to Muslim and Croat preparations for what

5 was about to happen, and the Serb people self-organised, created armed

6 groups, and then later they formed the Army of Republika Srpska.

7 Q. I'm sorry, we have little time left and a lot to cover. Could

8 you just, please, give me briefer answers. Tell us, briefly, what was

9 the first time when you met General Ratko Mladic?

10 A. I don't remember the exact date when I first met

11 General Ratko Mladic, and that's understandable, but I know it was after

12 the decision of Republika Srpska to establish its army and after the

13 departure of the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina. I know that for a fact

14 because I clearly remember the situation when I met General Ratko Mladic.

15 It was in the building of the command of the unit I served in, the

16 351st Communications Regiment, Signals Regiment. And since I was the

17 only one from that unit left in Lukavica, I met the general in the

18 hallway of that building and suggested to him to occupy the office of my

19 former commander.

20 Q. Why were you left there alone? Where were the others from your

21 unit?

22 A. With the withdrawal of the JNA, my unit, the 351st Signals

23 Regiment of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, left with all

24 the other troops to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I, as a native

25 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had expressed my desire to stay there and my

Page 25009

1 commander did not have a problem with it.

2 I also have to stress that the Muslims left the Yugoslav People's

3 Army, I mean officers and non-commissioned officers who are Muslim, took

4 place after the JNA decided to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. Muslim officers

5 and non-commissioned officers were until that moment part of the JNA and

6 after that they left the JNA. Out of an approximate number of

7 120 officers and NCOs in my unit, approximately two or three of us

8 remained. And another noteworthy thing to say in view of certain

9 misinterpretations concerns the assets that were left behind: One rifle

10 with one combat set, that's 150 rounds; one pistol; two hand-grenades,

11 and that was it. All the rest was taken by the unit to the Federal

12 Republic of Yugoslavia --

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And one helmet.

15 JUDGE ORIE: If you ask the witness to give short answers

16 focussed on your question, then you should stop him at the point where he

17 moves away from your question rather than to -- it's you who --

18 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, although --

19 JUDGE ORIE: -- is in control of the --

20 MR. LUKIC: Mr. Bukva covered several next questions. I wanted

21 to ask about the assets left behind after the withdrawal of JNA. But

22 thank you. And --

23 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bukva, we really have to stream-line this

24 from now on. So from which units was the Army of Republika Srpska

25 established? Especially the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

Page 25010

1 A. After the departure of the JNA, the VRS was formed of the units

2 that remained on the ground along territorial lines, and we used them to

3 form as much as possible the VRS and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Those

4 were these troops.

5 Q. In your view, when did the Army Republika Srpska become

6 operative?

7 A. It went very slowly because the decision was taken on the

8 12th of May, 1992. It took a long time to do that job because it's a

9 process, a time-consuming one. But at any rate, at the end of 1992 you

10 could call it an army, an organised army.

11 Q. Thank you. I should like to ask you something about the Muslim

12 side now. Who were the leaders of the Patriotic League? To whom did the

13 Patriotic League belong? What kind of information did your service

14 obtain?

15 A. The Patriotic League was the militant wing of the SDA. It was

16 the prime mover of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hardened criminals in

17 Sarajevo were used for that purpose. It was enough to give them weapons

18 to know that an armed conflict would ensue. The political leadership of

19 the SDA was fully aware, and it was done with complete awareness.

20 Q. Did your service gain any information about the existence of

21 prisons in Sarajevo for Serbs?

22 A. Within the general range of issues that we collected information

23 on, we also had information about these prison locations, but our

24 information was incomplete and many of them remained undetected until the

25 end of the war because some of them were private prisons.

Page 25015

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --

2 MR. LUKIC: [Overlapping speakers] --

3 JUDGE ORIE: First in general terms, any objections against

4 associated exhibits announced?

5 MS. MacGREGOR: No, Mr. President.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll deal with that in a minute, Mr. Lukic.

7 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: But let's not make the witness further wait for us

9 to deal with administrative matters. We'll, at the end of this session,

10 deal with the associated exhibits.

11 Please proceed.

12 MS. MacGREGOR: Thank you, Mr. President.

13 Cross-examination by Ms. MacGregor:

14 Q. Good morning, Colonel Bukva. A few preliminaries. You were --

15 A. Good morning.

16 Q. You were a witness for the defence in General Galic's trial at

17 this Tribunal in 2003; is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. During that trial you testified for three days; is that correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Now, on your visit to The Hague this time, can you tell us when

22 you arrived in The Hague?

23 A. This time I arrived on Tuesday. I was here at 8.00 in the

24 evening. Yes.

25 Q. So today being Monday, you've been here almost a week.

Page 25016

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And did you follow the testimony of the Defence witness who

3 preceded you, Velimir Dunjic?

4 A. Partially, yes. Partially. On the internet.

5 Q. Did you speak with Mr. Dunjic after his testimony finished?

6 A. No, I didn't see him afterwards. He left. I don't know when.

7 Q. I'm going to move on now to some general questions about the

8 structure of the SRK intelligence section that you were posted to.

9 Starting in May 1992, is it correct that you worked in the SRK section

10 for intelligence and security affairs?

11 A. Yes, it's correct, but it's correct that it wasn't sector,

12 section, but department. It had two departments: The security

13 department and the intelligence department, and the chief of the

14 department was one person. The chief of the security department was at

15 the same time the chief of the security intelligence affairs of the

16 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

17 Q. Who is the chief that you're now referring to?

18 A. The chief of the department for security and intelligence affairs

19 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was at that time

20 Lieutenant-Colonel Lugonja, and he was the head of that department during

21 the whole war. So I -- I was the chief of the -- both intelligence and

22 security departments of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and he was my

23 superior along that line of reporting.

24 Q. I want to make sure that the record doesn't become confused with

25 the word "section," "department," et cetera, especially because it's

Page 25017

1 possible some of it is lost in translation. So to be clear,

2 Colonel Marko Lugonja was the chief of the SRK section for intelligence

3 and security affairs; is that correct?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. And you worked directly under him as the chief of the

6 intelligence department at the corps level?

7 A. That is correct. Yes.

8 Q. Now, I think you also just said that you were also the chief of

9 the security department underneath Colonel Lugonja; is that correct?

10 A. No, no. I'm going to be completely precise. The department for

11 security and intelligence affairs of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

12 comprised two entities, two departments: One for intelligence - and I

13 was the chief of that department; the other one was for security affairs,

14 and the chief of that department was Lieutenant-Colonel Lugonja at the

15 time. But the chief of the security intelligence affairs was the chief

16 of the department of security, Lieutenant-Colonel Lugonja. So do you

17 understand that? Those -- the chief was Lugonja of those both

18 departments and he was my superior.

19 Q. Thank you for your clarification. It may help to explain, if you

20 can answer, as you were the chief of the intelligence affairs, who was

21 the chief of the security affairs also underneath Colonel Lugonja?

22 A. Lieutenant-Colonel Lugonja was performing two functions. He was

23 the chief of the intelligence security department and at the same time

24 the chief of the security department. I was the chief of the

25 intelligence department, and let me just add that I was also his deputy.

Page 25018

1 In his absence I stood in for him.

2 Q. Thank you for the clarification. Did you also have colleagues

3 Marinko Milidrag and Brane Lubura?

4 A. Yes, they were in the department. I have to say that we lacked

5 manpower as far as cadre was concerned because we focused on

6 lower-ranking organisational units to bring them up to full complement.

7 So besides Marinko and Lubura, we also had Zoran Kos who was in charge of

8 some administrative affairs. As for professional duties, we had Lugonja,

9 he was the chief, there was me, Milidrag, and Lubura.

10 Q. As a member of the SRK intelligence staff, is it correct that

11 Colonel Lugonja had two chains of command that he was required to report

12 up?

13 A. No, you couldn't put it that way. There are no two chains of

14 command. The department for security and intelligence was an

15 organisational unit of the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, but it

16 was an element by establishment of that command. And so in the command

17 it was subordinated to the corps command, in the command and disciplinary

18 aspect. But in the professional aspect, our department was subordinated

19 to the administration -- to the security administration of the Main Staff

20 of Republika Srpska Army. So the chief of the department was not - let

21 me put it that way - subordinated to the corps commander in the

22 professional sense, I repeat.

23 Q. I may have confused the question by talking about two chains of

24 command. To simplify it, on some matters Colonel Lugonja was required to

25 report directly to the SRK corps command, and on other matters he was

Page 25019

1 required to report directly to the VRS Main Staff intelligence structure;

2 is that correct?

3 A. No. In the professional sense, Colonel Lugonja reported

4 exclusively to his superior command along the professional line; i.e.,

5 the security administration. But as an organ of command, he could inform

6 the commander about some things but not to report to him or to submit

7 reports to him about his work. He didn't have to do that.

8 Q. We'll come back to his reports to the corps commander in a few

9 minutes. I want to go to what you've just said about the professional

10 reporting line. The top of that for Colonel Lugonja, or the next step

11 up, so to speak, would be General Tolimir at the VRS Main Staff; is that

12 correct?

13 A. No. His superior was Beara because Beara was the chief of the

14 security administration. His immediate superior was Beara, but the next

15 superior up the chain was Tolimir, yes, that is correct.

16 Q. Thank you. You referred to reporting that Colonel Lugonja may

17 have done to the corps commander. Now, the corps commander during the

18 time you were in the SRK was either General Milosevic or General Galic

19 depending on the date; is that correct?

20 A. Correct, yes.

21 Q. And the corps commander held daily morning meetings with his

22 command staff at which different units reported on the activities over

23 the course of the past 12 hours; is that correct?

24 A. No, I have to correct you in one part. The morning briefings at

25 the corps commander were attended by the command organs of the corps;

Page 25020

1 chiefs of the departments, the administrations, and so on. They were not

2 attended by commanders of the units, operational units. Only the organs

3 of command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

4 Q. Otherwise my description is accurate?

5 A. Could you please repeat your question?

6 Q. Sure. The corps commander held daily morning meetings, the staff

7 that was present was as you just described, and that staff would report

8 on the activities that had occurred during the past 12 hours; is that

9 correct?

10 A. Yes. One correction regarding that as well. At that meeting,

11 the organs of command would first of all be informed about the events

12 over the previous 12 or 24 hours, but these meetings were held in the

13 operations centre and that was an office, a room where all the data from

14 the field would come in over the previous 24 hours. So at that morning

15 meeting, all the organs of command had the opportunity to receive

16 information about the current situation at the front, and in -- depending

17 on the events or on the overall situation, they could plan their

18 activities and possibly make proposals for some activities of our forces.

19 Q. Are you saying, at the morning meetings, that the organs of

20 command would both receive the information from their subordinates and

21 report that information to the corps commander?

22 A. Not submit reports. They would mostly receive assignments. I

23 said depending on the situation and reports from the field that all came

24 into the operations centre, the organs of the command, after certain

25 analysis, would receive assignments in terms of planning possible

Page 25021

1 activities on our part.

2 Q. We've spent a lot of time on what is a very simple question and,

3 in fact, I'll just read to you some of your testimony from Galic so you

4 can understand the basis of my question. This is at transcript

5 page 18366 of your Galic testimony.

6 "The way that the corps command worked, the commander made it an

7 obligation to have a morning meeting, and this was an extensive meeting.

8 Its objective was that the organs of the command learn about the

9 situation on the front in the previous 12 hours of the previous night."

10 Do you agree with your testimony? Can you please answer verbally

11 for the record?

12 A. Yes, that is what I said.

13 Q. And you often --

14 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. MacGregor, I'm a bit puzzled by page 29,

15 line 14, where you talk about receive the information from their

16 subordinates. It's not entirely clear to me how in that meeting those

17 present would receive any information from their --

18 MS. MacGREGOR: I was --

19 JUDGE ORIE: -- subordinates.

20 MS. MacGREGOR: I was -- sorry, Mr. President. I was also

21 unclear in my understanding of the --

22 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if you clarify it with the witness --

23 MS. MacGREGOR: Yeah --

24 JUDGE ORIE: -- that would be most appropriate way of proceeding.

25 MS. MacGREGOR: If you can give me one moment to look back at the

Page 25022

1 source of the question.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.

3 MS. MacGREGOR:

4 Q. Colonel Bukva, you answered one of my questions, and this is at

5 page 29 of the temporary transcript, starting around line 4, you answered

6 that:

7 "These meetings were held in the operations centre, and that was

8 an office, a room where all the data from the field would come in over

9 the previous 24 hours. So at that morning meeting, all the organs of

10 command had the opportunity to receive information about the current

11 situation at the front."

12 So my question to you is: From whom were they receiving the

13 information about the current situation at the front?

14 A. The information, in the form of regular combat reports, was

15 received from regular units, from the brigades, and these regular daily

16 combat reports would report on the situation at 1700 hours and the

17 situation in the morning. So the brigade commands, yes, were obliged to

18 submit regular combat reports which were all sent to the operations

19 centre where the duty operations officer of the corps was. And he, in

20 turn, would report to all the organs of the command about the situation

21 on the basis of reports that he received from the units, from the

22 brigades. He would compile one report and then would report or inform

23 the organs of the command about the situation in the field.

24 So I hope that I was clear. This would be done on the basis of

25 reports that were coming in from the brigades, and these -- this

Page 25023

1 information would be submitted at these morning briefings which were

2 organised by the commander.

3 JUDGE ORIE: This clarifies the matter.

4 MS. MacGREGOR: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President.

5 Q. In the absence of Colonel Lugonja, as his deputy you would

6 sometimes attend these meetings; is that right?

7 A. That is correct. As his deputy, yes.

8 Q. In the Galic trial you attended -- you testified that you

9 attended 20 to 30 per cent of such meetings. Do you stand by that

10 testimony?

11 A. Yes, yes. I do. That is a percentage that I am sure of, 20 to

12 30 per cent at the most.

13 Q. I'm going to talk now -- ask a few questions about reports that

14 were drafted by you or also by your colleagues in the intelligence

15 unit -- intelligence department. Now, these written reports were

16 required to follow a certain form; is that right?

17 A. Which reports are you thinking of? Could you please say that

18 again for me?

19 Q. Intelligence reports.

20 A. No, they didn't have to be drafted in any specific format. No.

21 Q. For example, what would the first item of the report be about

22 often?

23 A. I cannot answer that question. I don't understand. I said that

24 the reports that we were submitting to the superior in the professional

25 sense didn't have any specific kind of form. I assume that you're

Page 25024

1 thinking of combat reports that were being sent from the

2 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to the Main Staff. If that is your question,

3 then, yes, I can answer that question.

4 Q. No, but I do want to ask you about combat reports. Am I correct

5 that you did not create combat reports?

6 A. No, you are incorrect.

7 Q. One of your duties was to draft combat reports as opposed to

8 intelligence reports?

9 A. No. Combat reports were drafted by the command and they were

10 signed by the commander. That's a combat report. And that report has

11 certain elements. The first item would be information about the enemy;

12 the second item would be one's own forces and so on and so forth.

13 Q. I asked if you drafted combat reports. Based on the answer that

14 you just gave, I understand that you did not.

15 A. No, no.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 A. No.

18 Q. Now you've had an opportunity to review this statement in front

19 of you. You've talked about several documents in that statement. All of

20 them are combat reports; is that right?

21 A. Right.

22 Q. None of them are intelligence reports; is that correct?

23 A. No, it's not.

24 Q. Which document in your statement do you discuss that is an

25 intelligence report?

Page 25025

1 A. I don't think there are any. I believe there is only an order to

2 subordinate units or, rather, subordinate organs. I'm not sure.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. MacGregor, twice now where the question of the

4 same structure, that is, a negative, and then to ask confirmation, it

5 creates a confusion, apparently. Could you please keep this in mind when

6 phrasing your next questions.

7 MS. MacGREGOR: Yes, thank you, Mr. President.

8 Q. Moving back to the topic of intelligence reports. As an

9 intelligence officer, you were tasked with providing high-quality

10 information about anything that would impact the risk to the corps; is

11 that correct?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. And earlier today when Mr. Lukic asked you about sources, you

14 talked about a number of sources that you consulted, including listening

15 to communications. Would you also speak to people that had come through

16 from the Muslim-controlled parts of Sarajevo?

17 A. I did so myself in a number of cases when such talks were of

18 special interest or, rather, when the sources, the people who had crossed

19 over to our territory from the Muslim side, had extremely interesting

20 information that was useful to us. In such cases when we had an

21 especially interesting source, I would talk to these people and my

22 associates, such as Milidrag Lubura. But most of such cases were handled

23 by our organs in brigades in the location where the person crossed over

24 to our territory. For instance, if the person crossed over into the

25 territory covered by the Ilidza Brigade, the case would be handled by our

Page 25026

1 organ within the Ilidza Brigade.

2 Q. This would include Serb civilians or Serb members of the armed

3 forces who had come over from the Muslim-controlled sides; is that

4 correct?

5 A. Any person who would come over from the Muslim-controlled

6 territory, including civilians and Serbs who had been mobilised by force

7 and managed to escape at some point to territory under our control. But

8 it was not only Serbs. Any person who had managed to leave Sarajevo or,

9 rather, the part of the Sarajevo that was under Muslim control. There

10 were convoys that exited Sarajevo legally, such as one that I remember,

11 the convoy of Jews, of the Roma, et cetera. Only the Serbs did not have

12 the right to leave Sarajevo, so there was no Serb convoy, and it was for

13 understandable reasons because they were used as live -- human shields.

14 And I remember another convoy, a convoy of Macedonians. Those were the

15 three organised convoys that left Sarajevo.

16 Q. Earlier today at transcript page 11, this was in your testimony

17 about using various sources for information, you included:

18 "... conversations or interviews of people who switched to the other

19 side." Can you just clarify -- sorry, it's not in your statement. It

20 was from your testimony this morning. Do you need me to repeat the

21 question?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So I'm not referring to your statement. I'm referring to an

24 answer that you gave this morning. You were talking about the sources of

25 information and you referred to: "... conversations or interviews of

Page 25027

1 people who switched to the other side." And my question is just what you

2 are referring to with that phrase, "people that switched to the other

3 side"?

4 A. Maybe that's a little inconsistency, but it's implied that these

5 people had crossed over to our side. We're talking about the same thing.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. I could not be possibly interviewing people who had left our side

8 to the other one. I could only talk to people who had come over to our

9 side.

10 Q. Thank you for the clarification. That does explain it.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask for one clarification as well.

12 You said only the Serbs did not have the right to leave Sarajevo.

13 Were the Muslims free to leave Sarajevo as they wished?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no organised departure of

15 Muslims from Sarajevo that I know. I mean, in convoys. I don't know why

16 they would leave Sarajevo, but I know that they did leave based on the

17 intelligence we had. And I have to say that, in doing so, they abused

18 the Sarajevo airport which our forces had turned over to the UN force

19 exclusively for humanitarian needs. Still, we had information that

20 certain structures in Sarajevo - that is to say, the Muslims - were

21 leaving for third countries using that airport.

22 And another thing --

23 JUDGE ORIE: No, I stop you.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Muslims --

25 JUDGE ORIE: I stop you there at this moment. You apparently

Page 25028

1 make a distinction between organised departure and non-organised

2 departure. When you talk about Muslims abusing the airport, was that

3 because they had a right to leave or was this unauthorised departure?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I wanted to

5 clarify. The airport was abused insofar as, at the beginning, the

6 Muslims were leaving across the runway illegally, and for the most part

7 these were armed troops, armed Muslim troops. And again, later, at a

8 certain point they built the tunnel under the runway with the entrance at

9 Dobrinja and one exit at Donji Kotorac, and that's the way in which they

10 abused the airport.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Now I go back to my initial question. You said

12 Serbs were the only ones who were not allowed to leave. I take it that

13 you were referring to Serb civilians?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Now in general terms, were Muslim civilians free to

16 leave as they wished, apart from at night crossing a runway or in very

17 small numbers, perhaps, using a tunnel, but in general terms were Muslim

18 civilians free to leave?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know the answer to that

20 question. But it is a fact that there was not a single Muslim convoy

21 that left Sarajevo.

22 JUDGE ORIE: So when you said only the Serbs are not allowed to

23 leave, that's not accurate in the sense that you do not know, as you told

24 us now, whether Muslims were free to leave?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My personal opinion is that --

Page 25029

1 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not --

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- these two issues have nothing in

3 common.

4 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not asking you about your opinions. I'm asking

5 you about facts.

6 Please proceed, Ms. MacGregor.

7 MS. MacGREGOR:

8 Q. Returning to the issues of sources of intelligence. You had

9 personnel along the front line who would monitor the activities of the

10 enemy and report to you; is that correct?

11 A. Yes, my subordinates did that.

12 Q. And you would monitor the media?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Now, you talked about how it wasn't just Serbs who you would

15 interview for intelligence information. Did you also speak to non-Serbs

16 that were captured by the VRS?

17 A. No. For the most part, if you mean prisoners of war, these talks

18 were conducted by our lower-level organs - that means organs in

19 brigades - because the information in the possession of these persons was

20 of most interest to brigades.

21 Q. You said before that if a brigade unit subordinate to you came

22 across information that was important, that then you would speak to that

23 person. So surely it's possible that a captured ABiH soldier would have

24 information that was important from an intelligence perspective; is that

25 not correct?

Page 25030

1 A. Maybe I wasn't quite clear. My section did that work but not me

2 personally. I remember one case in particular. It was -- I can't

3 remember the name of the person or the brigade. He was the intelligence

4 organ in his brigade, and in a state of inebriation he crossed over into

5 our territory and I interviewed him personally. That's the only case I

6 can remember. I can't remember the name.

7 Q. I'll refer you to your testimony --

8 A. Later on that man --

9 Q. Excuse me. I'll refer you to your testimony from temporary

10 page 34. I asked you if you would speak to people that had come through

11 from the Muslim-controlled parts of Sarajevo. Your answer, at line 34,

12 line 8:

13 "I did so on a number of cases when such talks were of special

14 interest or, rather, when the sources, the people who had crossed over to

15 our territory from the Muslim side, had extremely interesting information

16 that was useful to us. In such cases when we had an especially

17 interesting source, I would talk to these people and my associates," and

18 then it continues to say most of the cases were handled by organs

19 underneath -- in the brigades where they came in.

20 So I understand you are saying mostly it was handled by the

21 brigades, but you said yourself in a number of cases of special interest

22 you would perform the interviews. So is that correct? If you can answer

23 verbally for the record.

24 A. Yes, that's correct. But that did not concern only prisoners of

25 war. I said persons who had come in from the other side. It could be

Page 25031

1 civilians, it could be prisoners of war.

2 Q. So if at some point --

3 A. But I clarified --

4 Q. At some point a prisoner of war would have information that would

5 be of special interest to an intelligence section, is that not true?

6 Actually, let me rephrase that. Is it true that a captured POW would

7 have helpful intelligence information?

8 A. Well, that goes without saying. That's why I said that the

9 brigades dealt with the bulk of that work. Why? Because the POW would

10 be somebody from the vicinity of that brigade and he would have

11 information about the forces facing that brigade, and it's logical that

12 our brigade intelligence officer would conduct the interview, but

13 sometimes somebody in the section would handle the interview. I just

14 remembered this intelligence officer who wandered off into Grbavica and I

15 talked to him for about ten minutes, seeking information that I was

16 interested in at the time in a room designated for the purpose, not in

17 the -- on the premises of the brigade.

18 Q. When I ask you a question, if you can try to answer it accurately

19 the first time, because this takes a lot of time. So, for example --

20 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. MacGregor, you introduced the most recent part

21 of your questioning by referring to prisoners of war. That caused most

22 of the confusion. We clearly see that we have information dealt with on

23 the brigade level and by the level on which the witness functioned, and

24 we have prisoners of war and those who crossed over. This is constantly

25 going through another -- and in your questions, especially the last

Page 25032

1 series of questions, you started by reference to the prisoners of war.

2 That creates confusion. Not to say that the witness was in every respect

3 always accurate, but apparently he's thinking in two different groups and

4 two different levels, and an accurate phrasing of the question would have

5 certainly avoided most of the confusion.

6 Please proceed.

7 MS. MacGREGOR: Yes, Your Honour. The term "prisoner of war"

8 actually came first from the witness.

9 Q. Mr. Witness, if I can just try to clarify what your evidence is.

10 I asked you if you spoke to non-Serbs that were captured by the VRS, and

11 your answer was:

12 "No. For the most part, if you mean prisoners of war, these

13 talks were conducted by our lower-level organs."

14 So you can clarify for me if we're talking about -- let's talk

15 first about prisoners of war. Did you sometimes conduct interviews of

16 prisoners of war? If you can answer verbally for the record, please.

17 A. I've already explained. Only in one case did I feel the need to

18 interview such a prisoner myself, otherwise no.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. The bulk of that work was done by our brigade organs.

21 Q. So is there a second category of persons, which I would describe

22 as non-Serbs captured by the VRS, would you consider that to be a

23 separate group from prisoners of war? For example, civilians.

24 A. Yes, yes. Civilians, Serbs and Croats alike.

25 Q. And Muslims.

Page 25033

1 A. No. Muslim civilians did not cross over to our side.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Here again there is a possible source of confusion.

3 When you are talking about these civilians - as you said, Serbs

4 and Croats alike - did you capture them when they crossed over?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You can't say that we detained

6 them, but when they crossed over it would be noticed and logically, since

7 they were coming from enemy territory, they would be interviewed.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. That's -- that's a clear answer.

9 Ms. MacGregor, I indeed misspoke. You started your line of

10 questioning with persons captured --

11 MS. MacGREGOR: Yes.

12 JUDGE ORIE: -- and then the witness apparently, immediately in

13 his answer, understood people being captured as prisoners of war. And

14 apparently here now there is a category, again, of people who were

15 interviewed, crossed over, but were not captured and in that sense were

16 no prisoners of war. And there is another, if I may give you some

17 guidance on another matter as well, it may also be important to make a

18 distinction between those dealt with at the brigade level and those dealt

19 with at the witness's formation level but not necessarily be interviewed

20 by him personally. That is still a distinction that may create some

21 confusion.

22 Please proceed.

23 MS. MacGREGOR: I think I will probably return to this topic when

24 I have a chance to look over the past few pages of testimony. I'm going

25 to continue with a new topic before we take the break, if that's okay,

Page 25034

1 Mr. President.

2 JUDGE ORIE: That's okay. We have another seven minutes to break

3 time.

4 MS. MacGREGOR: Thank you.

5 Q. For the time being we're going to set aside the topic of what

6 sources you consulted. I want to refer now to the topics that you were

7 required to report about. So is it correct that you would collect

8 intelligence on, for example, the number of personnel under the ABiH?

9 A. Yes, yes. I said any information that was of interest to our

10 units. Anything that could pose a threat to our troops and civilians was

11 interesting to us, including the strength of the enemy, the weaponry they

12 had, their plans, deployment, movements, regrouping, all these things

13 were directly linked to our interests.

14 Q. Did this include information about the morale of enemy forces?

15 A. Combat morale. We were interested in the combat morale of the

16 enemy army, their willingness to fight. Because, you see, there were a

17 lot of incidents in their ranks, mutual clashes, internal clashes, and

18 this information was of great importance to us.

19 Q. You referred to the number of personnel as an example of

20 information that you would collect. So, for example, if a VRS combat

21 operation resulted in a loss of a significant number of personnel, would

22 that be helpful intelligence to gather?

23 A. By all means that information would be relevant to our estimates.

24 It would be useful, but it was not of particular interest. We always

25 received that information as part of our quest for other intelligence.

Page 25035

1 Q. Why is it that a loss of a significant number of personnel would

2 not be particularly interesting from an intelligence perspective?

3 A. I didn't say that we were not interested. I said that

4 information would be obtained in pursuit of other interests. It was not

5 a priority. It was useful but it was not our primary interest. Because

6 there were far more important issues in which we were more interested.

7 We were, for instance, more interested in how many troops were alive than

8 dead, for instance, in a brigade that was facing us. It's much more

9 important how much personnel, how much able-bodied fighting men they had.

10 It was far more important than finding out their losses.

11 Q. Surely the amount of personnel alive is directly related to the

12 amount that are killed in action for determining that intelligence.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Could I try to cut this short. Apparently the issue

14 you want to raise and the issue you are questioned about, Mr. Bukva, is

15 that you are interested in the strength, personnel strength of the

16 troops. And, of course, if a significant number of the troops would die,

17 then a smaller number would remain but could be completed with others, I

18 take it. And therefore you're emphasizing that you'd like to know how

19 many troops remained at the end after losses, after completion,

20 et cetera, rather than the exact number of people who had died in an

21 operation. Is that well understood?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, roughly. That's a good

23 understanding. For our purposes, far more important is the information

24 of combat-ready personnel. The information about losses could be

25 interesting but not necessarily.

Page 25040

1 MR. LUKIC: -- cease-fires that are not followed.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

3 MR. LUKIC: And according to the statements, it's the other side

4 to be blamed for.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yeah. Okay. Then we reached, then, a more concrete

6 level.

7 Ms. MacGregor, please proceed.

8 MS. MacGREGOR: Thank you, Mr. President.

9 Q. Colonel Bukva, if you see on the screen in front of you, on the

10 left side of the screen in the B/C/S language, do you see the rules of

11 service for military security organs. And do you recognise this

12 document?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Does this document outline the rules for the work of your unit?

15 A. Yes.

16 MS. MacGREGOR: If we can please turn to page, in the English,

17 13, in the B/C/S, 11.

18 Q. We're going to look now at chapter 3, paragraph 29. In this

19 paragraph there is a reference to security organs conducting

20 counter-intelligence evaluation. Can you please tell the Chamber what is

21 meant by "counter-intelligence evaluation"?

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: I don't see "counter-intelligence" in

23 paragraph 29, unless there is a part of it I don't see.

24 MS. MacGREGOR: Sorry. You're right. It's paragraph 27, a

25 little bit further up on the English and hopefully on the same -- it may

Page 25041

1 need to go -- yeah. Thank you.

2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You should repeat your question.

3 MS. MacGREGOR:

4 Q. Colonel Bukva, do you see the reference to "counter-intelligence

5 evaluation" that we're discussing? I see that you're nodding. Can you

6 just explain what your understanding of --

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. What's your understanding of that term?

9 A. Counter-intelligence evaluation is a thought process in the work

10 of the intelligence and security organs. It's one of the tasks of the

11 security organs. It's done on the basis of gathered intelligence data,

12 and its objective is, on the basis of the evaluation of the intelligence,

13 to propose measures that lead to the prevention of intelligence threats

14 to one's own forces. So a counter-intelligence evaluation could be in

15 the form of a document, but actually it's a continuing, ongoing thought

16 process of intelligence organs that alters depending on the situation in

17 the field. If I have been clear.

18 The security organ at any point in time must have a proposal for

19 solutions for a specific situation in keeping with the intelligence that

20 is available to it on the basis of its intelligence work.

21 Q. Is counter-intelligence evaluation a thought process that you

22 applied in your intelligence gathering -- one of the thought processes

23 that you applied?

24 A. No, no. It states here clearly that security organs --

25 intelligence organs, that's a different category. These are two separate

Page 25042

1 organs that in principle function for the same objectives. Security

2 organs, on the basis of intelligence data that we prepare for them and

3 other information available to us, conduct this process of

4 counter-intelligence evaluation and propose to the command organs

5 prevention measures.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 MS. MacGREGOR: We can take this document from the screen.

8 Q. Colonel Bukva, I'm now going to turn to your evidence about the

9 locations of ABiH and VRS forces in Sarajevo during the war. In

10 paragraph 18 of your statement, you discuss specifics about the personnel

11 strength of the ABiH, and you state that the ABiH had 38.000 armed

12 soldiers in Sarajevo.

13 Now, you testified in the Galic trial that the ABiH had 35.000 to

14 38.000 armed men. Is your Galic testimony accurate?

15 A. Yes, correct, on the basis of information that was available to

16 us at the time. This figure corresponded to the actual figures, the

17 number of men under -- carrying weapons in Sarajevo.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to repeat the

19 number.

20 MS. MacGREGOR:

21 Q. Can you repeat the number -- can you please repeat the number you

22 just provided in your last answer?

23 A. I said based on information that we had at the time, the number

24 over the four-year period varied, but it ranged from 35.000 to 38.000

25 armed soldiers in Sarajevo.

Page 25043

1 Q. You testified in the Galic trial, and this is at transcript

2 18364, lines 4 through 11, I'm going to read an excerpt from that

3 testimony.

4 "I said at the beginning that in the city itself there were about

5 38.000 armed troops. Out of that there were 30.300 or, let's say, 31.000

6 were in the BH Army units -- were part of the BH Army units. And several

7 special units, special MUP units also existed in Sarajevo, in the part of

8 the Sarajevo under Muslim control. We assessed that these troops

9 amounted to the strength of one brigade."

10 Is it correct that approximately of the 35- to 38.000 that you've

11 referred to, is it correct that 31.000 were in fact in the ABiH?

12 A. Again, I say that the number varied. In any event, according to

13 our estimate, it -- our estimate was what I just referred to, and we

14 operated on the basis of the assumption that these figures were accurate

15 figures.

16 Q. Were between 4- and 7.000 of those personnel in fact members of

17 special MUP units?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. If you could please take a look at paragraph 23 of your

20 statement. Now, the second sentence of this statement -- excuse me, this

21 paragraph, you talk about the location of the command post of the

22 105th Light Infantry Brigade at Bistrik.

23 A. Yes. Yes.

24 Q. Now, if you look at paragraph 24 you -- in the third sentence of

25 that paragraph, you talk about the position of the 115th Brigade

Page 25044

1 positioned at Bistrik. So I just wanted to clarify with you: Are both

2 of these references correct or should they both be referring to the

3 115th Light Brigade?

4 A. Right. Actually, the command posts of both of these brigades

5 were at Bistrik, the 105th and the 115th Brigade. At Bistrik, that was

6 the higher command of the 4th Corps -- actually, that was the location of

7 the former 4th JNA Corps command.

8 Q. In a moment we'll have an opportunity to look at the map that you

9 marked in the Galic trial and then we'll return to this topic. Now, in

10 paragraph 21 of your statement you state that the ABiH had heavy weaponry

11 positioned at Zlatiste. Now, Zlatiste was actually held by the VRS,

12 wasn't it?

13 A. No, no.

14 Q. When you refer to Zlatiste, can you just describe where that is

15 in Sarajevo?

16 A. That is - how can I explain it to you? - it's at Mount Trebevic

17 below -- in any event, it's a location at Trebevic, let's say, roughly

18 above -- above Skenderija. Perhaps a better orientation point would be

19 the Olympic venue. I think that the Olympic venue for the bob-trail was

20 below it. So Zlatiste is there --

21 Q. Let's look at --

22 A. -- near that Olympic bob-trail.

23 MS. MacGREGOR: If we could look at D613, page 2 of that exhibit.

24 Q. This is the map that you marked in the Galic case. We're going

25 to look at the east side of Sarajevo on this map. And if you like, we

Page 25045

1 can just have one page up on the screen so that it's bigger, the east

2 side of the map. Page 2. Okay.

3 So, sir, if I can direct your attention slightly to the right

4 middle are the words in red "Stari Grad." Now, I see the word "Zlatiste"

5 to the south-west of Stari Grad. Do you see where I'm referring to?

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could we enlarge it a bit further for the

7 witness.

8 JUDGE ORIE: But then including the word "Zlatiste," I would

9 suggest. That is further down. Could we zoom out again. Could we move

10 to the lower part of the map.

11 MS. MacGREGOR: Your Honours, I also have a hard copy that I

12 could provide to the witness if that would --

13 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I think at this moment we can clearly see it

14 on the screen.

15 Witness, do you see the words "Zlatiste" which seems to be below

16 the yellow road lowest on the map, which may well be the Pale-Lukavica

17 road?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I do see it. Yes.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Please -- please proceed.

20 MS. MacGREGOR:

21 Q. And is the location on this map consistent with your

22 recollection?

23 A. Could you please reformulate the question? What do you mean,

24 "according to your recollection"?

25 Q. Does this map seem accurate to you?

Page 25046

1 A. Yes, this is a map of the Sarajevo city.

2 MS. MacGREGOR: If we can zoom out again and, in fact, show both

3 sides of the map, east and west. I'm also going to ask if the court

4 usher can provide this hard copy of the map to the witness. It may

5 assist when we're looking at multiple places at the same time.

6 I do have one hard, colour copy as well extra if it would assist

7 the Bench.

8 Q. Sir, if you look at Zlatiste on the map that you marked in the

9 Galic case, you see that you have not marked at Zlatiste the

10 112th Vitez Motorised Brigade. In fact, you've marked the 112th Vitez

11 Motorised Brigade on page 1 of the map.

12 A. Yes, that is the Boljakov Potok sector. Boljakov Potok. There

13 is one thing that is creating confusion here. According to what I know,

14 one area in this section has a similar name, Zlatiste or something like

15 that. In any event, what is being discussed here is this area here, not

16 Zlatiste in any case because at that point Zlatiste was on our side. We

17 were controlling the area that was on this side of the road. So this is

18 an inconsistency here, because the location that I am speaking of is the

19 one that is marked. So in terms of the name, geographically,

20 Boljakov Potok is where I indicated the heavy weaponry of the

21 112th Vitez Brigade is there. There is a location that has a similar

22 name, so it's possible that there is some confusion here because of that.

23 So it is not in the area that we're looking at here on this side, the

24 area with the name of Zlatiste.

25 Q. I think now that the matter has been clarified on the record,

Page 25047

1 that there are two places that have the name Zlatiste.

2 MS. MacGREGOR: If we can please look --

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Same or similar. Or similar. And

4 that's how it's been recorded in the transcript, as Zlatiste. It could

5 be that but it could be similar. I mean, it's been a long time since

6 then, so I cannot remember the precise name.

7 MS. MacGREGOR:

8 Q. On the eastern side of the map --

9 MS. MacGREGOR: And for e-court, we can just look at the eastern

10 side for this question so it will be bigger.

11 Q. If you focus on approximately the centre of the map to the right,

12 you'll see where you've marked the 115th Brigade. There is what looks to

13 me two places where you marked the number 115. Do you see those

14 locations? It's blown up as well on this --

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. Do you see that --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- between those numbers, 115 and 115, on the map the area of

19 Bistrik is marked? Do you see that?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now looking over to your left and up a bit, we see a flag with

22 the number 105 in it. Now, I return again to my question about the

23 location of the 105th versus the 115th. From this map they do not appear

24 to both be in Bistrik, but what is your testimony about their location?

25 A. The point is the command of this brigade was in Bistrik, but the

Page 25048

1 whole unit was based in this installation marked by a flag inside which

2 "105 Pbr" is written. That's where the whole unit -- the actual unit

3 was. But the command post was in Bistrik.

4 Q. The command post of which brigade was in Bistrik?

5 A. The 105th Brigade. Its command post was in Bistrik. But this is

6 an inconsistency. The place marked by the flag marks the location of the

7 unit, the whole unit.

8 Q. So you have not marked the location of the 105th Brigade command

9 post on this map; is that correct?

10 A. You noticed that well. It's an inconsistency, indeed. But the

11 information is correct. The flag should have been in Bistrik. Instead,

12 I marked the actual place of deployment of the unit. I made a mistake.

13 This is not the command post but the unit, whereas the command post was

14 in Bistrik together with the 115th Brigade.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask the witness one clarification.

17 We see these little flags in the map. Sometimes at the bottom of

18 the flag there is a small triangle, sometimes there is a small circle.

19 Could you tell us first what a flag with a small triangle stands for?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I almost have forgotten these

21 topographic designations and how units should be marked. The triangle

22 with a flag that is rhomboid is a designation for a brigade. A circle

23 with a triangular flag marks a battalion, I believe. The command post of

24 a battalion. For instance, the triangular flag in a circle is a

25 battalion command.

Page 25049

1 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Could you then explain to us. You see the

2 lowest marking in the map with a text attached to it, which seems to

3 refer to a school, see you -- do see that? It's just above the word

4 "Stari Grad" at this moment at the very lower part of the map.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Stari Grad, yes.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's at Hrid.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Just above that. Do you see handwritten text? Two

9 words, the second apparently being "skola"?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Stop.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. This is a primary school.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Now, there is a line between that text to a

14 flag which is just above it with a circle at the bottom and then a

15 triangular flag above it. Could you tell us exactly what that indicates?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Inside the flag we see "1/115."

17 That's the 1st Battalion of the 115th Brigade. It was deployed in a

18 primary school in a part of town called Hrid. 1 means the 1st Battalion,

19 slash 115, meaning from the 115th Brigade.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that explanation. May I seek one more

21 clarification to better understand how certain items are referred to. Do

22 you see -- in the centre of this map, do you see "GS KM" in a square box?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I see it. It says "GS" --

24 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] Is that -- what does GS stand

25 for?

Page 25050

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a rectangular flag with a

2 line -- two lines inside. GS means Main Staff of the Army of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And below that, we see KM and that was the command

4 post of the Main Staff of the BH Army, and it was inside the building of

5 the Presidency of the BH.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now I -- it seems that there is a line between

7 the bottom of this rectangular flag to a triangle which is a little bit

8 further to the left, just left below where it reads "100-112," do you see

9 that little triangle?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: What does that triangle stand for? Is that the --

12 how is that linked to any of the text in flags?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They are linked by this line. This

14 triangle is part of the flag. But to make the picture more

15 understandable, that's how we draw the sign. Whereas the triangle --

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand that the triangle indicates

17 the location where the Main Staff was situated and that is depicted by a

18 line with a -- linking this square flag to that little triangle.

19 My last question is: The 100-112 reference stands for what?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see a triangular flag here and

21 inside it -- and in its base is a circle. Next to it we read "KM." This

22 is not "100," it's "IDO," that means reconnaissance sabotage detachment,

23 slash 112, that's the number of the brigade from which this detachment

24 came. So this is a command post and the unit was deployed in the same

25 place. Daniel Ozma Street number 7, I believe. That's where this

Page 25051

1 reconnaissance sabotage detachment of the 112th Brigade was deployed.

2 JUDGE ORIE: You've answered my questions.

3 Mr. Lukic, this is exactly the type of information which one

4 would expect in a legend, or perhaps you could agree on the basis of the

5 evidence of the witness what the legend would be for this map and the

6 translation for it.

7 Please proceed.

8 MS. MacGREGOR: Thank you, Mr. President.

9 If we can please have in e-court 08282B, as in boy. Also, if I

10 could ask the court usher to bring the hard copy of the map and place it

11 on the easel.

12 Your Honours, this map is very difficult to see in e-court. I've

13 made colour copies for each of you and also for the Defence.

14 Unfortunately, the very best copy is the copy that the witness will be

15 looking at.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, for the record the document is

17 Exhibit P2952.

18 MS. MacGREGOR: Thank you.

19 Q. Colonel Bukva, the map that's being placed next to you is a map

20 of the ABiH. It's dated 15 March 1995. I'm going to be asking you to

21 look at that map and to compare something with the map that you marked in

22 the Galic trial. So in a moment I'll ask you to get up and have a look

23 at the map. I'll remind you that while you're pointing at the map and

24 far away from the microphone, it will be hard to record your answers so

25 if you can wait a moment before you head over there so I can explain to

Page 25052

1 you what we'll be looking at.

2 Okay. Do you see on the right-hand side of the map that there

3 are numbers marking the grids? At this point you can just nod if you

4 want to let me know that you understand. On the very right-hand side of

5 the map there is handwritten numbers.

6 A. You mean these numbers?

7 Q. Correct. And there are similar numbers along the bottom of the

8 grid -- excuse me, along the bottom of the map. Do you see those

9 numbers? I see that you're pointing to them?

10 JUDGE ORIE: The witness was first pointing to the numbers 52 to

11 62 at the right-hand side of the map, and then later to the numbers at

12 the bottom ranging from 23 to 40.

13 Please proceed.

14 MS. MacGREGOR:

15 Q. I'm going to ask you to look on that map where the 102nd Brigade

16 is marked, and I'll give you some guidance. If you look at the grid

17 between -- I'll start on the right-hand side, it's between 56 and 55, at

18 that particular row. And then if you go over to the left, looking along

19 the bottom, between numbers 26 and 27.

20 MS. MacGREGOR: Your Honours, I have circled in red on the hard

21 copies that you have the flag that I'm going to be asking the witness

22 about, and also for the Defence.

23 Q. Colonel Bukva, do you see there in that square a flag with the

24 marking -- excuse me, with the number 102?

25 A. Yes.

Page 25053

1 Q. Okay. Now keeping your eye on that to orient us, two grid

2 squares to the right are four oval shapes that mark the neighbourhood of

3 Alipasino Polje. Are you able to locate that neighbourhood? It's in the

4 same row between bottom map grid numbers 28 and 29.

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I can confirm that the witness was pointing with

6 his pointer directly to these four ovals.

7 MS. MacGREGOR: And I see that the witness is also nodding.

8 Q. If you -- you can have a seat again so that you can look at your

9 own map.

10 Now, I'm going to ask you on your own map, on page 1 of that map,

11 to look at where you've marked the 102nd Brigade.

12 MS. MacGREGOR: In e-court if we can please have D613, page 1.

13 It's approximately in the middle of that page. Okay. That perspective

14 is good.

15 Q. Witness, do you see, either on the screen or in the hard copy in

16 front of you, where you've marked the 102nd?

17 A. Yes, I see that.

18 Q. Now, if you again look for the neighbourhood of Alipasino Polje,

19 you'll see that you've marked the 102nd Brigade almost directly above

20 that neighbourhood. Do you agree with that description?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So you've marked it much further west -- excuse me, much further

23 east on your map than the marking on the ABiH map of this same brigade;

24 is that correct?

25 A. The command post of the 102nd Infantry Brigade, according to our

Page 25054

1 information, was in the wire factory at Alipasin Bridge. You can see

2 here Alipasin Most, bridge. This is -- could I look again at your map?

3 The command of the BH Army. There is a difference but I still maintain

4 that this information -- this data is from 1995; right?

5 Q. According on the date on the map, yes.

6 A. This is certainly the data that we had. At that moment it was

7 correct. Especially because right next to the command post of the

8 102nd Brigade was an ammunition plant. It's possible it moved for

9 security reasons. It happened during the war, command posts were

10 relocated because there was always a danger they would be detected and

11 exposed to artillery and other fire.

12 Q. Could I --

13 A. According to this, according to their map, their MAD, mixed

14 artillery battalion, was in this location, if you look at the map that I

15 drew. So it's possible that this command post moved to what was earlier

16 the command post of their mixed artillery battalion.

17 Q. I believe you're referring to the MAD that you marked on your map

18 on the -- is that correct? The one that is slightly to the left and

19 above the 102 --

20 A. Yes. Yes.

21 Q. But even that flag where it says "MAD" is still significantly

22 further east than the location marked 102 on the ABiH map; correct?

23 A. I repeat: For the reasons I described, it's possible they

24 changed the location of their command post. It wouldn't be unusual. But

25 for us, the location of the wire factory at Alipasin Bridge was the

Page 25055

1 identified command post of the 102nd Brigade at that time.

2 Q. Okay. You've referenced just now that at times command posts

3 would relocate or reorganise because of strategic advantages or other

4 reasons. Is it correct that intelligence on where enemy forces were

5 located is specifically relevant only when you know the certain date of

6 that intelligence? And I'm not sure if I've asked that in a confusing

7 way.

8 Let me ask it this way: If I asked you where something was

9 located, is it correct that your answer might change depending on what

10 date I was asking about?

11 A. You're right. It's a variable, and movements on the front line

12 are a regular occurrence. For instance, if we had some artillery in one

13 firing positions and the situation requires that they be moved, our prior

14 information would no longer be correct. Units move and positions move.

15 All elements of a combat disposition are in a certain juxtaposition at

16 one moment and in a different juxtaposition at a different moment. The

17 brigade would redeploy its units and move them from one theatre of war to

18 another, from one part of the front line to another.

19 Q. So in your statement --

20 A. That's why this is a complex matter. It has to be followed

21 constantly.

22 Q. So in your statement in paragraphs 20 through 27, you describe

23 very specific locations of ABiH forces and weaponry, but you don't

24 include any dates as to what -- as to when this intelligence would be

25 accurate. So as you've described it in your statement, it's difficult to

Page 25056

1 verify where things are located without a date; is that correct?

2 A. No, that's not correct. This data relates to the period when the

3 corps was under the command of General Galic.

4 JUDGE ORIE: But that still is quite a period of time, isn't it?

5 If you say they move from one place to another, that could have been done

6 during the tenure of General Galic as well.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. MacGregor.

9 MS. MacGREGOR: [Microphone not activated] As I understand it,

10 the map -- the ABiH map is already in evidence --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

12 MS. MacGREGOR: Thank you. As I understand it, the ABiH map is

13 already in evidence, so I won't be moving that into evidence. Okay.

14 JUDGE ORIE: There is one issue, Ms. MacGregor. You gave us a

15 marked version to look at and I take it that the copy in evidence is not

16 the marked version. Therefore, it's important that we know exactly what

17 you marked for us and what we looked at, which is, I would say, one of

18 the few clear flags on that map.

19 MS. MacGREGOR: Correct.

20 JUDGE ORIE: And perhaps it would be best if you enlarge the

21 relevant portion, including the Alipasino Polje area, and tender that

22 into evidence so that it's later possible to know what we looked at and

23 what we compared as far as positions are concerned.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE ORIE: There is a suggestion that you tender again the same

Page 25057

1 map with your marking and on -- at page 2, an extract of that map which

2 more clearly indicates exactly where that marking is in relation to the

3 surrounding -- surrounding buildings and streets, et cetera.

4 MS. MacGREGOR: And if it's all right with the Chamber, I'll work

5 on that --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

7 MS. MacGREGOR: -- on a break and get back to you. I think

8 unfortunately when it's zoomed in on e-court, it is very, very difficult

9 to see. So I think Judge Fluegge's --

10 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I did that, and it certainly gives a better

11 indication than just without. At least it's clear where the flag is.

12 It's also clear where Alipasino Polje is, so it gives a better

13 opportunity to get an impression of where that flag exactly is located.

14 MS. MacGREGOR: If Your Honours have an opportunity to look at

15 the hard copy, it actually is incredibly much easier to see everything on

16 that map than -- than you would guess from the e-court version.

17 JUDGE ORIE: I tend to disagree, but we have them both.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam MacGregor, if I might just ask a question.

19 Am I correct to say that in fact that flag we are talking about you

20 associate with the 102nd Light Brigade, and I thought you said that 102

21 is -- can be seen on the map here, and I would like you to show it to me

22 if you can, please.

23 MS. MacGREGOR: If you give me a moment just to review your

24 question, Your Honour.

25 The 102nd can be seen on the large map in the location -- the

Page 25058

1 large ABiH map in the location where I've placed a red circle on the hard

2 copy which I've provided to the Chamber.

3 JUDGE ORIE: But I think what --

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

5 JUDGE ORIE: What just -- can we see there, is there an

6 indication of 102? Can we read something that makes that flag or is

7 it --

8 MS. MacGREGOR: On the hard map next to the witness, yes, you

9 can. On the version that you have, I certainly can't read "102" in

10 there. I don't know --

11 JUDGE ORIE: Our eyes may be --

12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That's just below the flag itself, a little bit

13 to the right. Is that correct?

14 MS. MacGREGOR: I actually think it's inside the triangle of the

15 flag, Your Honour. It's --

16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You can't see anything on the hard copy.

17 JUDGE ORIE: That's exactly why we have difficulties. Could we

18 again have Exhibit - what was it? - 2959 -- 2952 on our screens. And

19 could we enlarge on where the flag appears.

20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: No, further down.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Much further.

22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Much further down. To the left. To the left.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Where now can we --

24 MS. MacGREGOR: A little --

25 JUDGE ORIE: -- see the --

Page 25059

1 MS. MacGREGOR: A little north-west of centre.

2 JUDGE ORIE: No, I see where it is, but I would like to read the

3 "102" somewhere.

4 MS. MacGREGOR: Again, it's inside the flag. At this level you

5 won't be able to see it.

6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And --

7 MS. MacGREGOR: It is on the hard copy of the map.

8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can you explain, Ms. MacGregor, the number below

9 the flag, a little bit to the right?

10 MS. MacGREGOR: Your Honour, I --

11 JUDGE ORIE: One -- one second, please.

12 [Trial Chamber confers]

13 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break now, and the Chamber would like to

16 have an opportunity to look at the map which is in the courtroom at this

17 moment so as to know for sure whether we really -- we find 102 just --

18 what seems to us to be just below the flag rather than in the flag

19 itself. We would like to have an opportunity to do that. But we first

20 invite the witness to follow the usher and be back with us in 20 minutes

21 from now.

22 [The witness stands down]

23 JUDGE ORIE: We take a break, but most likely the Chamber will

24 first have a look at the map but does that --

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 25062

1 MS. MacGREGOR: Okay.

2 JUDGE ORIE: -- at this moment.

3 MS. MacGREGOR: If I can please have Prosecution Exhibit P4900 in

4 e-court; specifically, page 21 of the English version and page 17 of the

5 B/C/S version.

6 Q. While we wait for that to come to the screen, Colonel Bukva, I'm

7 again going to show you the document that we looked at before, the rules

8 of service for military security organs. We're going to focus on

9 chapter 5, a few paragraphs in this chapter. And the title of the

10 chapter 5, as you see hopefully on your screen now, is: "The Operational

11 Procedure of Security Organs in Criminal Procedure." I draw your

12 attention to paragraph 52.

13 MS. MacGREGOR: It may help to enlarge the B/C/S left-hand side

14 of the screen. Thank you.

15 Q. Now, I read from paragraph 52:

16 "When there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime within

17 a security organ's competence has been committed ..."

18 Now stopping there, can you explain for the Chamber what types of

19 crime would fall under a security organ's competence as referred to here?

20 A. Perhaps I won't remember all of them that are listed in that law,

21 but first of all, I just need to remind you that these rules of the

22 security service applied to peacetime conditions and it was taken over

23 from the former JNA. In the rules of the procedure of the JNA, it is

24 stated, among other things, that crimes - and here we're talking about

25 crimes committed against the armed forces - are those crimes which

Page 25063

1 jeopardise the security -- the personal security and the property of the

2 armed forces.

3 To be clear, once again, I have read the whole paragraph, what is

4 being discussed here are crimes that are perpetrated against members of

5 the armed forces.

6 Q. You've said -- you said these rules were the rules of the former

7 JNA, and is -- is it correct that the VRS, for the most part, adopted

8 these rules?

9 A. Yes, yes. Like I said, this rule was taken from the JNA. And it

10 applied to peacetime conditions. Since Republika Srpska never proclaimed

11 a state of war, we operated according to the peacetime rules. So this

12 article was in force in the VRS.

13 Q. And it was in force during the years of the war, even though

14 technically the VRS had not declared a war. Is my understanding correct?

15 A. Republika Srpska never declared a state of war, not the VRS. The

16 assembly is the one that declares a state of war as the supreme organ of

17 power. Since this did not happen in Republika Srpska, then the

18 Army of Republika Srpska operated according to peacetime rules, and the

19 security services, accordingly, operated to this rule which had been

20 inherited from the JNA.

21 Q. Thank you for the clarification. Continuing with paragraph 52

22 where we left off:

23 "... authorised officers of the security organ are obliged the

24 take necessary measures to ensure that the perpetrator of a crime is

25 found, that the perpetrator or accomplice does not go into hiding or

Page 25064

1 escape, that traces of the crime and objects that may serve as evidence

2 are discovered and secured, and also that all information that may be of

3 use for the successful pursuit of criminal proceedings is gathered."

4 Is that description consistent with your understanding of your

5 obligations during your time at the SRK intelligence department?

6 A. Here we're talking about the obligations of the security organs,

7 and this is a completely different area which doesn't have anything in

8 common with the intelligence organs. So this paragraph does not refer to

9 intelligence organs. And in the heading of the chapter it states: "The

10 Operational Procedure of Security Organs in Criminal Procedure." So they

11 did have some duties in relation to investigative procedures, but

12 intelligence organs did not do any such jobs.

13 Q. So you were not required to, for example, ensure that

14 necessary -- excuse me, to take necessary measures to ensure that a

15 perpetrator of a crime is found?

16 A. That does not -- that is not stated in the law. The law did not

17 oblige us to do that, no.

18 Q. Your focused on the use of the word "security" -- excuse me, the

19 phrase "security organs" at the top of the chapter. I'd like to look a

20 little bit more into how this manual defines that term so that we can

21 better understand it.

22 MS. MacGREGOR: If we can please look at paragraph 2. This is

23 both e-court and English -- excuse me, both English and B/C/S e-court

24 page 6.

25 Q. We're going to look now at a chapter that's called: "Competence

Page 25065

1 and Tasks of Security Organs." Would you agree with me this, again, only

2 refers to security organs and not to intelligence organs?

3 A. That is correct. I agree.

4 Q. If you look at paragraph 2, there is a reference to detecting and

5 preventing activities aimed against the armed forces and the preparations

6 of the armed forces for the country's defence. Now, your job was to

7 detect information that would put the SRK at risk; is that right?

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 MS. MacGREGOR: If we can please look at paragraph 6(b). It's on

10 the same page in the B/C/S but on the next page on the English.

11 Q. I'll read again:

12 "Security organs are responsible for the detection, tracking, and

13 prevention of hostile activities by individuals, groups, or organisations

14 against the armed forces and members of the armed forces ..."

15 Now, would you agree that your job included the detection,

16 tracking, and prevention of those hostile activities?

17 A. What is written in the paragraph refers to counter-intelligence

18 activities which are conducted by the security organs and organs of the

19 military police. So these are counter-intelligence activities whose

20 purpose is to prevent the endangerment of units of the JNA or, in this

21 case, units of the VRS. This --

22 Q. Where do you see the reference --

23 A. -- did not apply. You need to differentiate between security

24 work and intelligence work which has a completely different function.

25 Q. I understand. I'm attempting to do that. I don't see a

Page 25066

1 reference in paragraph 6(b) to counter-intelligence work. Can you show

2 us where that is?

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Counter-intelligence is, according to the

4 witness's evidence, is the function of security; therefore, this topic

5 here relates to counter-intelligence because it's for security. In --

6 MS. MacGREGOR: Your Honours, if I may ask him about this. The

7 entire manual is actually referring to security organs and --

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's right.

9 MS. MacGREGOR: -- then I'd like to ask his understanding of the

10 term.

11 Q. I ask again: Is there a specific reference to

12 counter-intelligence in paragraph 6(b)?

13 MR. LUKIC: Sorry. We have it in the title. It says: "Security

14 organs should carry next tasks." So it says "security organs," so it

15 creates only confusion.

16 JUDGE ORIE: It's -- but I think the issue is whether it says

17 anywhere "counter-intelligence" because that was part of the witness --

18 his answers. I give an opportunity to Ms. MacGregor to further explore.

19 MS. MacGREGOR:

20 Q. There are two issues I'm trying to explore with you,

21 Colonel Bukva. So let's start with the issue of -- you have described

22 paragraph 6(b) as referring to counter-intelligence activities. Can you

23 explain why you believe 6(b) is only referring to counter-intelligence

24 activities?

25 A. It's not just 6(b) that refers to counter-intelligence

Page 25067

1 activities. Generally, all functions of the security organs could be

2 referred to by a single name and that would be counter-intelligence,

3 protection of units and institutions of the Army of Republika Srpska.

4 Protection from threats from the opposite side, coming from the enemy

5 side. So under one name, all measures that intelligence or security

6 organs undertake are counter-intelligence activities. These are

7 preventative measures, organisational measures, all types of measures

8 undertaken by security organs.

9 Q. In your answer you've just said that:

10 "... under one name, all measures that intelligence or security

11 organs undertake are counter-intelligence activities."

12 And then you said:

13 "These are preventative measures, organisational measures, all

14 types of measures undertaken by security organs."

15 So those two sentences are slightly different. The first

16 sentence implies that intelligence organs undertake counter-intelligence

17 activities. Do intelligence organs undertake counter-intelligence

18 activities as you understand that term?

19 A. No, no, you misunderstood me. Intelligence organs do not carry

20 our counter-intelligence measures. Counter-intelligence measures are the

21 result of the work and of the evaluation of the situation, the results of

22 information that is gathered and evaluation of the situation --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to slow down.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, Witness, could you please slow down and

25 could you resume your answer by where you said:

Page 25068

1 "... the results of information that is gathered and evaluation

2 of the situation ..."

3 And could you resume from there.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. On the basis of intelligence

5 information gathered and the conclusions on the basis of an evaluation of

6 the situation, security organs propose measures of a preventive nature,

7 organisation and technical nature or any other nature whose objective is

8 to neutralise negative influences or effects on the units of the Army of

9 Republika Srpska which would be coming from the enemy's side.

10 MS. MacGREGOR:

11 Q. You seem to be emphasizing right now that only the security

12 organs were involved in counter-intelligence evaluation. And I refer you

13 to your testimony earlier today at temporary page 49, where I ask you

14 about the reference to counter-intelligence evaluation in paragraph 29 of

15 this same document. Your answer, starting at line 19 on page 49, is as

16 follows:

17 "Counter-intelligence evaluation is a thought process in the work

18 of the intelligence and security organs. It's one of the tasks of the

19 security organs."

20 So I may be misunderstanding you but there are at least two times

21 where you have referred to counter-intelligence work as being a task of

22 both the security organ and the intelligence organ. So can you please

23 clarify if it is, in fact, a role that both types of organs undertake?

24 A. No, it's a misunderstanding, and I apologise if I'm the one who's

25 responsible for that, but I state decisively the following. I repeat:

Page 25069

1 Intelligence organs work on intelligence and that has nothing to do with

2 counter-intelligence. That work has nothing to do with

3 counter-intelligence work. As for the security organs, and I said that

4 when I speak about the counter-intelligence evaluation that is the basic

5 method of work of the security organs, exclusively the security organs.

6 So I don't know how this misunderstanding came about. So the main method

7 of work of security organs is counter-intelligence, and I said that it's

8 a thought process that goes on continuously.

9 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] --

10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Ms. MacGregor, you should perhaps make a

11 distinction between counter-intelligence and counter-intelligence

12 evaluation. Counter-intelligence is not the same as counter-intelligence

13 evaluation.

14 MS. MacGREGOR: I understand what your point is, Your Honour. I

15 will go back through the testimony. I believe that it hasn't been that

16 clear as a distinction.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Now, could I --

18 MS. MacGREGOR: I'll move on.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just try to seek some clarity. Let me just

20 try to tell you how I understood your testimony in this respect and if

21 could you then perhaps either confirm or say that I understood it all

22 wrong.

23 I do understand that intelligence is collecting all kind of

24 information which -- especially about enemy forces, which is relevant for

25 any operational decision-making process. Is that more or less well

Page 25070

1 understood?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, in principle, yes, that is

3 well understood.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Now I understand counter-intelligence to be the

5 activity to undermine the intelligence of the opposing armed forces; that

6 is, either to block their sources of information or to prevent them from

7 learning secret information from your armed forces. And I also

8 understood that you said gathering information about the enemy,

9 intelligence, was the task of the intelligence service; whereas

10 undermining, blocking, frustrating, the intelligence of the opponent

11 armed forces was the task of the security unit. That is how I more or

12 less understood your testimony. Is that well understood or do you say

13 no, you're totally wrong in understanding my testimony?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You have understood it excellently,

15 precisely as it should be understood.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Before I start blushing, Ms. MacGregor will continue

17 her examination -- her cross-examination.

18 MS. MacGREGOR: [Microphone not activated] If we can go back,

19 then, to paragraph --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

21 MS. MacGREGOR: If we can return to paragraph 6(b).

22 Q. This part I read to you is as follows:

23 "Security organs are responsible for the detection, tracking, and

24 prevention of hostile activities by individuals, groups or organisations

25 against the armed forces or members of the armed forces."

Page 25071

1 Would you agree that your role included the detection and

2 tracking of such information?

3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think that was 6(a).

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.

5 MS. MacGREGOR:

6 Q. It's, if you look at 6(b), the detection and prevention -- oh,

7 I -- sorry, yes. With the word "tracking." Can you look, Mr. Witness,

8 at paragraph 6(a). I'll read again.

9 MS. MacGREGOR: Thank you to Judge Fluegge.

10 Q. "The detection, tracking, and prevention of intelligence

11 activities ..."

12 MS. MacGREGOR: Actually, I'm sorry. I am sticking to 6(b) but

13 removing the word "tracking" and that -- I see where the confusion is.

14 Q. Colonel Bukva, were you responsible for the detection of hostile

15 activities by individuals, groups or organisations against the armed

16 forces?

17 A. Well, your question seems to indicate again that the gist has

18 been misunderstood. No. Intelligence work is directed towards the

19 enemy, not towards one's own forces. What you're talking about, 6(b), is

20 the work of the security organs, exclusively the work of security organs.

21 Q. Do you agree that the title of this manual is: "The Rules of

22 Service for Military Security Organs," the entire manual?

23 A. Yes, yes. I think that is what it says on the cover of the

24 document.

25 Q. And you testified --

Page 25072

1 A. These are the rules of the security organs.

2 Q. And you testified this morning that these were the rules that

3 outlined your obligations as part of the intelligence organ?

4 MR. LUKIC: Objection. I wanted to object before. Now you

5 have -- at page 49, the question was put in reference of security organs.

6 Not intelligence organs. And all the answers were in connection to

7 security organs, when first it was [overlapping speakers] --

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you want to say that it misstates the

9 evidence.

10 MR. LUKIC: Yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: The objection is granted.

12 MR. LUKIC: There are separate rules for his service.

13 JUDGE ORIE: There was a ruling, Mr. Lukic. The objection is

14 granted.

15 Please rephrase your question.

16 MS. MacGREGOR: I'm not sure I understand the objection. I'm

17 referring to testimony that this witness gave earlier when we referred to

18 this document, much earlier. The first time we looked at this document.

19 And I can find the reference if you like. I see that we're past the time

20 for the end of the day, but I'm not referring to the testimony he just

21 gave just a few minutes ago.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then -- yes, what I should have done, as a

23 matter of fact, is I should have given you an opportunity to respond.

24 Where are you referring to if not to page 49?

25 MR. LUKIC: It's 49, line 3. It's --

Page 25073

1 JUDGE ORIE: No, no --

2 MR. LUKIC: It's not a couple of minutes ago.

3 JUDGE ORIE: But -- no, Ms. MacGregor has an opportunity to

4 indicate where she is referring to if it is different from what Mr. Lukic

5 referred to.

6 MS. MacGREGOR: I will have found it in a moment if you grant me

7 just a small dispensation. Okay. Sorry. Okay. I --

8 JUDGE ORIE: If -- you found it?

9 MS. MacGREGOR: Yes. I am at transcript page 48. And this is

10 when I first showed Colonel Bukva this document. And at line 24, I

11 asked:

12 "Does this document outline the rules for the work of your unit?"

13 And he answered:

14 "Yes."

15 And that is the question -- that is the answer that I was

16 questioning him about at this point in time.

17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And your next question makes clear that this

18 paragraph, there is a reference to security organs conducting

19 counter-intelligence evaluation.

20 MS. MacGREGOR: Yes, the next question which is specifically

21 about paragraph 28. The point I'm getting at is that the entire manual

22 is entitled -- is directed towards security organs. That's the only

23 point I'm trying to get across, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE FLUEGGE: There is no dispute in that respect. It all is

25 about security organs.

Page 25074

1 MS. MacGREGOR: And he's testified that the manual did apply to

2 his work. I just trying to confirm that. That's all I'm actually trying

3 to confirm.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: And I think what he's trying --

5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: His unit. "If this document outlines the rules

6 of the work for your unit." That was your question. What do -- that was

7 very unclear. Which unit did you refer to?

8 MS. MacGREGOR: Shall I -- I'll put the question to him with more

9 specificity.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And could you please -- if you further want to

11 explore the matter, irrespective of whether that is -- will greatly

12 assist the Chamber, then perhaps the way in which it was organised - that

13 is, which tasks were put together in what kind of units and what these

14 tasks exactly were, security, intelligence - should be clearly

15 distinguished. The organisational aspect is not the same as the

16 functional aspect in terms of task. Could you please keep that in mind.

17 I'll leave it to you whether you want to further explore the matter.

18 MS. MacGREGOR: I would just have one question.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Then please put that question to the witness.

20 MS. MacGREGOR: I withdraw the question.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, then that's -- yes. Then please proceed.

22 MS. MacGREGOR: Yes.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: It's time.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have no -- yes, yes. It's time.

25 MS. MacGREGOR: Yes, I'm sorry. That's what I meant,

Page 25075

1 Your Honours.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But is this a withdrawal only for the day or

3 for the week, to say so?

4 MS. MacGREGOR: I have further questions for this witness.

5 JUDGE ORIE: But not that one question you had on your mind?

6 MS. MacGREGOR: I'm going to take the opportunity to think on it,

7 Your Honour.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's always very wise. I think everyone

9 would agree with that.

10 Mr. Bukva, we'll adjourn for the day. We'll resume tomorrow

11 morning at 9.30 in this same courtroom, II. And I inform the parties

12 that we are more or less condemned to stay in this courtroom II for the

13 rest of the week, the technical problems not having overcome yet.

14 But before you follow the usher, Mr. Bukva, I would like to

15 instruct you that you should not speak or communicate in whatever way to

16 whomever about your testimony, whether that is testimony you have given

17 today or whether that is testimony still to be given tomorrow. If that's

18 clear to you, you may follow the usher.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 [The witness stands down]

21 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. MacGregor, in terms of time, where are we?

22 MS. MacGREGOR: [Microphone not activated] I believe -- I believe

23 I've used just over half of my time, and I intend to finish tomorrow,

24 probably not in the first section -- session but in the second session.

25 I would imagine I have about an hour to an hour and a half more of

Page 25076

1 questions.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Then that's clear to us. We adjourn for the day and

3 will resume tomorrow, Tuesday, the 2nd of September, 9.30 in the morning,

4 in this same courtroom, II.

5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.22 p.m.,

6 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 2nd day of

7 September, 2014, at 9.30 a.m.