1 Thursday, 19 February 2015
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.37 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 There were a few preliminary matters -- yes, Mr. Registrar, would
8 you please call the case.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And good morning, Your Honours.
10 This is case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 It was announced that the Prosecution had some preliminary
13 matters to be raised. And before I give you an opportunity to do that,
14 Ms. Hasan, I'd like to inform the parties about the fate of the marked
15 map yesterday. The map was marked by the witness, it has been scanned,
16 but the marking with the red pen did not result in a legible scanned
17 version of it, and therefore the parties are invited, together with
18 Mr. Registrar, to use one of the breaks in which the witness would again
19 mark exactly on that same map but now in black, make exactly the same
20 markings over the red markings so that it then can be scanned and that we
21 have an electronic copy that could be admitted into evidence.
22 That was my announcement. So at least one break is already lost.
23 Ms. Hasan.
24 MS. HASAN: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning, everyone.
25 The first matter is in relation to an exhibit that was shown
1 yesterday, P02100. The Prosecution has received a revised translation of
2 that. You may recall that's the one where the English says "to the
3 Main Staff" when it should say "to the Drina Corps." The revised
4 translation has been uploaded in e-court under document ID
5 0426-9441-A-ET, and we'd request that we have permission -- or the
6 Court Officer can replace the revision with the existing translation.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Court Officer is instructed to replace the
8 present translation by the newly uploaded one.
9 MS. HASAN: The same issue arises with respect to Exhibit P01661.
10 We have found an error in the English translation; specifically, the
11 frequency in that intercept is recorded incorrectly as 254.950 when it
12 should provide 245.950, and the revised translation has been uploaded
13 under doc ID 0080-4430-A-ET.
14 And if the Defence doesn't object, we'll request again that the
15 Court Officer replace it with the existing translation.
16 JUDGE ORIE: The Court Officer is hereby instructed to replace
17 the English translation of P01661 by the newly uploaded one as mentioned
18 by Ms. Hasan a second ago.
19 Ms. Hasan, have the translations been entirely revised or was it
20 just that you just asked for a revision of those points?
21 MS. HASAN: No. Well, we sent them for revision noting that we
22 have seen that this particular issue arises, so I presume CLSS looks at
23 the entire --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then that's --
25 MS. HASAN: Entire document. That's -- no.
1 JUDGE ORIE: That's not what has been done?
2 [Prosecution counsel confer]
3 MS. HASAN: Ms. Stewart advises that it was only those particular
4 matters I raised that were revised.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I'm asking this because it now and then happens that
6 there's not only one mistake but there are more. Therefore, the Defence
7 is urged to look at the whole of the document, and at least the error we
8 discovered has been corrected now, but if there's anything more, of
9 course, the Defence could address the matter again. Usually we do that
10 within 48 hours, Mr. Ivetic. And I'm addressing you because the
11 documents were related to the testimony of the present witness.
12 Then we move in -- there was one more, I do understand, in
13 private session?
14 MS. HASAN: That's correct.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then we move into private session.
16 [Private session]
11 Pages 31948-31950 redacted. Private session.
17 [Open session]
18 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
20 Ms. Hasan, I did not consult the Rules directly so I have to
21 verify that as well, whether I made any mistakes, because we always
22 learned our students: Don't say a word without having looked at the
23 rules, and I violated that general basic rule but I've seen them in the
25 Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
1 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
2 [Trial Chamber confers]
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Jevdjevic. Before we continue,
5 I'd like to remind you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration
6 you've given yesterday at the beginning of your testimony.
7 I also would like to inform you that you'll be invited during one
8 of the breaks to do the same markings on that map as you did yesterday
9 because since a red pencil was used, scanning in order to have a
10 electronic copy was not very successful, so under the supervision of the
11 Registrar and the parties you will be invited to make the same markings
12 but now in black so that it can be scanned again.
13 Mr. Ivetic will now continue his examination.
14 You may proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
15 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
16 WITNESS: MILENKO JEVDJEVIC [Resumed]
17 [Witness answered through interpreter]
18 Examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]
19 Q. First of all, good morning, sir.
20 Now, in relation to the geographic positioning of the two ABiH
21 listening posts, which yesterday we agreed we'd refer to only as the
22 northern and the southern locations without mentioning their names, what
23 comment, if any, do you have as to their possibility of intercepting
24 radio relay routes of the Drina Corps?
25 A. It's a very broad topic. Essentially both locations are very
1 remote from radio relay hubs and points where the radio relay devices of
2 the Drina Corps were located. It's one factor that restricts ability to
3 intercept radio relay communications.
4 Another factor is that these locations were in sites where they
5 cannot find themselves directly inside beams of the electromagnetic
6 waves. They are to the side or in other words on the flanks.
7 And, third in the azimuths of their receiver antennas at
8 intercepting stations were turned in the right direction, then there is a
9 possibility for that to happen. However, during proofing for this
10 testimony and my earlier appearances, I had the occasion to see many
11 intercepts from the two locations we are discussing now. And I noticed
12 that in their reports, at the beginning of every report, the azimuth of
13 the receiver antenna is indicated. And I wish to stress I always
14 remarked that their receiver antenna was turned to face towns and places
15 where our commands were located, not in the direction of our radio relay
17 Q. Now, in terms of the operation of radio relay devices by the
18 Drina Corps, what was the standard practice as to the power level that
19 they would be operated under?
20 A. The interpreter used the term "voltage" or "feed." I suppose you
21 don't mean the power supply, but I suppose that you actually mean the
22 power of the equipment.
23 Q. If I could use the B/C/S term, I believe I'm talking about
25 JUDGE ORIE: It may be clear but I'm seeking the common
1 understanding of the parties that the voltage under which you'd operate
2 something doesn't say anything about the power you use in the application
3 of that equipment.
4 MR. IVETIC: Definitely, I would agree.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I mean, 220 volts would help both for your hairdryer
6 and other machines, which doesn't say anything about the -- I would say
7 the watts, the power used in operating the device which is fed with a 220
8 volt, if it is 220 volt, not necessarily perhaps, but do the parties
9 agree on that?
10 MR. IVETIC: I do, definitely.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan.
12 MS. HASAN: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: So then that's -- unless the witness would say that
14 I missed the point, we'll just go on.
15 Please proceed.
16 MR. IVETIC:
17 Q. So, sir, perhaps I can phrase the question this way: What was
18 the standard practice in the Drina Corps as to what operating power
19 levels the units functioned according to?
20 A. The entire standard procedure and the rules that operators had to
21 adhere to before the war and during the war was that if radio relay
22 devices were operating at a shorter distance, they would use less power.
23 Specifically, the radio relay devices we discussed yesterday have the
24 possibility of operating at full power and at lower power. There is a
25 switch that you can turn to full power and decreased power. So at
1 shorter distance, we used less power.
2 Q. And what would be the result in terms of the transmission of the
3 electromagnetic signal from that radio relay device operating at
4 decreased power?
5 A. In practice that would mean that the reach, the range of these
6 electric magnetic waves would be smaller because you're using reduced
7 power, and that is a compulsory measure for protecting information, for
8 protecting the radio relay route from interception.
9 Q. If I can ask you in relation to your last answer to clarify for
10 us: Did you quantify how much smaller the range of the waves would be
11 when operating on the reduced power setting?
12 A. Full power of the radio relay devices we discussed yesterday
13 RRU-800 and FM-200 is 10 watts and reduced power is 5 watts. If the
14 distance between radio relay stations is smaller, then we always operated
15 at reduced power, i.e., 5 watts, to prevent that the electric magnetic
16 waves would reach larger distances and to prevent interception.
17 Q. Okay. Now I'd like to turn to the Krivaja 95 operation. And
18 first of all, sir, what was your specific tasking in relation to that
20 A. In that operation, I was an officer whose job it was to implement
21 the plan of communications for the execution of that operation.
22 Q. What role -- what role did the Main Staff play in the
23 establishment of the plan of communications for the operation Krivaja 95?
24 A. The Main Staff had no role. The operation was executed by the
25 Drina Corps, and the plan of communications for that operation was made
1 by the chief of communications of the Drina Corps.
2 Q. Were there any encryption devices in use during the Krivaja 95
3 operation? And now I'm going to first focus on radio devices.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. What type of encryption devices were used during that operation
6 for radio devices?
7 A. For radio device that operated in the radio network towards
8 subordinated units, we had an encryption device for the scrambling of
9 speech which is called KZU-63.
10 Q. Could you please describe for us how this unit, the KZU-63, would
11 be attached to a radio device to enable encryption?
12 A. It's a small portable device. Using a special cable, you connect
13 it to a radio device, and it's adjusted so that by inserting a particular
14 key or a code into it, the device encrypts speech and sends it, transmits
15 it on the air as encrypted speech. All the other devices that have the
16 same encryption device attached to it with the same key, the same code,
17 are able and only they are able to hear and understand that message.
18 Q. Was it possible for a participant of an encrypted radio
19 conversation to inadvertently switch off the KZU-63 device and still
20 participate in the communications with other participants still using
21 encryption, either to send or to receive communication from them?
22 A. Absolutely impossible.
23 Q. Could a participant in the encrypted radio network switch off the
24 KZU-63 encryption device and have it not be noticed by the other
25 participants in the communication?
1 A. If he turned off his device, he would have practically plugged
2 out of that radio network and he would no longer be able to hear anyone
3 else or be heard by anyone.
4 Q. And would there be anything else that would alert the other
5 participants to the radio network that something has happened to that
6 participant whose device has switched off?
7 A. Perhaps the mere fact that they would call him on that network
8 and nobody would answer. They would know that there is a problem with
9 the device because they would not hear him. That was the first indicator
10 for us. So if he's not answering, that means he's not hearing us and
11 we're not hearing him.
12 Q. And in the event that something like that happened, where a
13 participant dropped out of an encrypted radio conversation, what would be
14 the standard procedure?
15 A. The standard procedure would be wherever that participant was,
16 for the encryption man to go there, taking a device which is called key
17 charger, and enable that participant to participate in the encrypted
18 radio network again.
19 Q. Do you recall any such occurrence during the Krivaja 95 operation
20 where that happened?
21 A. I don't remember that such a thing happened. But if it had
22 happened, that would have been our routine procedure and it's a problem
23 very easily dealt with.
24 Q. Now, I want to focus on --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic --
1 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
2 JUDGE ORIE: -- earlier you asked about the planning of this
3 operation and the communications plan which was drafted for that purpose,
4 and the witness told us that it was for the Drina Corps it was drafted.
5 Now, yesterday we looked at -- at two plans, one of 1993, one of
6 1994. We also looked at the reconstruction of the communications as made
7 by the ABiH after the war. Do we have -- is that plan for the
8 Drina Corps, is that in evidence at this moment?
9 MR. IVETIC: It's about to be. It's one of the items I'd on my
10 list, Your Honours. I believe it's 06261.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll --
12 Ms. Hasan.
13 MS. HASAN: Sorry to intervene but, Your Honour, you raised the
14 issue of the two plans from yesterday and the dates of them, you
15 mentioned the dates.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
17 MS. HASAN: The kremen plan is from January 1994. The Drina plan
18 is part of a VRS, VJ, SRK operation known as Drina, which is dated
19 November/December 1993, and the Drina communication network we saw
20 yesterday is part of that operation but at the subordinate level of the
21 Drina Corps. And that's dated January 1994.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But, of course, the gist of my request was
23 whether we have -- what we saw yesterday was not summer 1995 but was
24 plans, that's at least how it was explained, plans for communication at
25 earlier periods. And we saw one reconstruction which deals with the
1 summer of 1995 but which was, first of all, a reconstruction, and second
2 was made only after the war. That's how it was introduced.
3 My question is do we have that plan the witness just talked about
4 for Krivaja -- it was -- planned in 1995 for Krivaja within the
5 Drina Corps? That's -- do we have that?
6 MR. IVETIC: Well, I believe we have what the witness is talking
7 about. I'm not sure it is exactly what you'd expect it to be. I can ask
8 the witness to discuss that if we --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. It's just for me to be able to follow and not
10 to -- you'll understand that my recollection is not always good enough to
11 know exactly whether a document is among the approximately 10.000
12 documents which are now in evidence.
13 MR. IVETIC: Okay. Then --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
15 MR. IVETIC: Perhaps then if I actually skip ahead, I can call
16 that up. The number 06261.
17 Q. And, sir, when this comes up, if you could please take a look at
18 and identify the same for us.
19 A. That is the communications plan that was elaborated by the chief
20 of communications of the Drina Corps for the Krivaja 95 operation.
21 According to that plan and in terms of equipment for speech protection
22 that I spoke of a moment ago, well, all of that has to do with this plan.
23 Q. Okay. And now looking at this plan, there are some reserve
24 participants listed, two -- two of them. First of all, were those
25 actually used during the Krivaja 95 operation?
1 A. No.
2 Q. There is also a -- there's also an entry for the MUP just above
3 the reserve participants. What position did the MUP or other civilian
4 police have in the communications system for the Krivaja 95 operation?
5 A. In this plan, one of the participants in this encrypted radio
6 network was the MUP as well. However, in reality in the field while this
7 operation was being carried out, they never appeared and never
8 participated in this operation and did not have a proper device. So they
9 were not part of the network that I headed.
10 Q. Okay. And would you explain for us there are a -- there are
11 several frequencies, I believe 22 in total that are listed in this
12 document. Can you explain for us how and when these frequencies would be
13 used, paying particular focus to how one would change between
15 A. Now we are talking about radio devices. The communications that
16 we carried out according to this plan were carried out with RU-2/2K. And
17 their frequency range is from 30 to 60 megahertz. In case we operated on
18 a particular frequency and if there was some jamming or something like
19 that, we had the following possibility: The person who was handling the
20 network would use a certain table of signals issuing an order to move to
21 one of the reserve frequencies. So in this work-plan, the envisaged
22 frequency number one is the one we see here, and the planner of this
23 activity planned for 21 reserve frequencies as well. Where it says
24 remark here, the way in which a reserve frequency would be used has been
1 Q. And just to be clear, you've identified the radio device in
2 question as a RU-2/2K. First of all, is that the correct denomination?
3 A. Yes, that is the correct denomination of that device. Otherwise,
4 that is a device that is fully compatible with the RUP-12. However --
5 yes, and they also work in the same frequency. They're absolutely the
6 same. However, this is a more modern version, if you will, because a
7 protection device could be plugged into this, so a modified RUP-12 was
8 called RU-2/2K.
9 Q. And the RUP-12 and the RU-2/2K variant of the same, could you
10 identify for us if those were simplex or duplex modes of radio
12 A. These radio devices work in simplex only; that is to say, using
13 one frequency. For as long as anyone is speaking on this network,
14 everybody else has to listen because in that case he takes over. It is
15 only when he let's go of the button he used to turn on, then it is only
16 then that the other participants in the conversation can say anything.
17 Q. Okay. And now I want to move --
18 MR. IVETIC: First of all, I want to tender the document as the
19 next Defence exhibit number.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I hear of no objections.
21 MS. HASAN: No objection.
22 JUDGE ORIE: But before we do so, Witness, I do understand that
23 this is something entirely different from what we looked at yesterday?
24 Yesterday we were looking at the radio relay structures, whereas this is
25 just radio communication.
1 Then before we admit the document, I see that there's
2 transcription -- I wouldn't call it a translation error. In the second
3 row of the frequencies, it starts with 12, 13, then again 13, where in
4 the original it reads "14."
5 Now, we could send that back for -- but perhaps it's far more
6 practical to put on the record that it's common understanding between the
7 parties that where it reads 13,272, that it indeed reads 14,272.
8 MR. IVETIC: I think that's practical and I don't see this
9 becoming an issue of --
10 JUDGE ORIE: No, I don't think that this will be the decisive
12 Mr. Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D910, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Is admitted into evidence.
15 And one of the reasons, if it would be just text it's easy to
16 change it, but this seems to be a very special format which may take far
17 more time to get it right.
18 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
19 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
20 Q. Now I want to focus on radio relay devices used during the
21 Krivaja 95 operation. Were there any encryption devices in use on radio
22 relay devices during that operation?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Could you briefly describe for us what encryption capabilities
25 were used and at which devices.
1 A. For carrying out the Krivaja 95 operation, from the forward
2 command post of the Drina Corps in Pribicevac, we established
3 communication with our command of the Drina Corps through RRU-1. Through
4 this device, we had the possibility of sending encoded, encrypted written
5 information, and we also had a KZU-61, and in that way we encoded speech
6 as well. I need to point out that with KZU-61 we could encrypt only
7 speech communication with other participants who had the same device.
8 Q. And for which of the radio relay routes of the Drina Corps that
9 we discussed yesterday did that encryption apply; that is to say, who
10 else -- who were the other participants that had the same capability?
11 A. As for radio relay routes, the ones we discussed yesterday, we
12 had encrypted communication from the corps command in Vlasenica and the
13 Main Staff. The device for the Main Staff was at Veliki Zep; that is to
14 say, along that line we had this device for encrypting speech.
15 Q. Okay. Now, did you have occasion to come into contact with any
16 UNPROFOR members during the course of this operation?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Can you please tell us what happened.
19 A. In one of the stages of the implementation of this operation when
20 our forces from the direction of Zeleni Jadar were advancing towards
21 Srebrenica, at that moment, according to our information, there was an
22 incident between the members of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
23 Srebrenica and UNPROFOR. There was an exchange of gun-fire. And on that
24 occasion a member of UNPROFOR was killed. He was located at a
25 check-point in the broader area of Zeleni Jadar. Through communications
1 equipment at the forward command post we received information to the
2 effect that the members of UNPROFOR who were at that check-point used
3 four APCs to move to our side because of this unpleasant situation that
4 they found themselves in. Literally, they withdrew towards our side,
5 towards Zeleni Jadar, and then General Krstic personally - from the
6 forward command post, he was the one who commanded that operation - he
7 sent me to Zeleni Jadar as an active-duty officer so that I take in these
8 UNPROFOR members and bring them to a secure position. I did that. I
9 went in the direction of Zeleni Jadar, and I encountered these four APCs
10 as they were moving towards the broader area of Pribicevac. I turned my
11 vehicle around and brought them to the broader area of the forward
12 command post.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I still have a question which I seek
14 clarification of.
15 You talked about KZU-61. That is different from KZU-63. Is that
16 well understood?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You understood that well, yes.
18 JUDGE ORIE: You said:
19 "I need to point out that KZU-61, we could encrypt only speech
20 communication with other participants who had the same device."
21 In what respect is that different from the KZU-63? Because I do
22 understand that for encryption you always use at both ends of the
23 communication devices which are able to, on the one hand side, to
24 encrypt, and on the other side to decrypt. In what respect is the KZU-61
25 then different from the KZU-63, or is it the same?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] KZU-63 are devices that are plugged
2 into radio transmitters that soldiers carry on their backs. The
3 dimensions are those of a regular back-pack, and these are portable
4 devices, portable radio devices. As for KZU-61, that is a fixed piece of
5 equipment that we would plug into an RRU-1, and it encoded speech that
6 goes through radio relay equipment between Pribicevac and Veliki Zep on
7 that radio relay route. In order to have this kind of encoded
8 communication with a participant on the other side, that other party
9 needed to have that kind of device too.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I understand that. You also said that this
11 allowed you for encrypted communication. In relation to the KZU-63, you
12 were asked whether you could switch that off. You said no, it couldn't.
13 Is that the same for KZU-61 or is that different? Because you said:
14 "We had the possibility of sending encoded, encrypted written
15 information, and we also had a KZU-61, and in that way we encoded speech
16 as well."
17 Could you also not switch that off, the KZU-61?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] KZU-61 is a device that technically
19 can be switched off and one can speak openly through an RRU-1. That is
20 the way it was conceived. You can have an open conversation as well.
21 However, when the encoder is turned on, then this speech goes through
22 there protective encoder and then it is encrypted.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I understand that.
24 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
25 MR. IVETIC: If we could return to the --
1 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time, I'm looking at the clock.
2 MR. IVETIC: Oh. I guess we'll have our first break.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll take a break. Can you tell us how much
4 time you would still need after the break, Mr. Ivetic?
5 MR. IVETIC: I think 15, 20 minutes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: 15, 20 minutes.
7 Mr. Jevdjevic, we'll take a break. We'd like to see you back in
8 20 minutes. You may follow the usher.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 And the parties and Mr. Registrar will use the break for the new
12 Mr. McCloskey, you were on your feet, but not anymore.
13 We'll take a break and resume at ten minutes to 11.00.
14 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
16 JUDGE ORIE: We briefly turn into private session but the witness
17 can be escorted in the courtroom already, although I will deal with one
18 matter before he enters the courtroom.
19 [Private session]
11 Pages 31967-31969 redacted. Private session.
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, before we continue, Mr. Ivetic, the Chamber
23 just gave a ruling that to the extent protective measures for this
24 witness which were granted in the Krstic case would still continue to
25 exist after a decision on the 12th of November, 2008, by the Popovic
1 Chamber that, to the extent that may have been the case, that they're
2 hereby rescinded by retroactive effect, which means that the parties can
3 refer to the evidence given by this witness in the Krstic case not only
4 in terms of substance but also in terms of this testimony be given in the
5 Krstic case.
6 Finally, it is the prerogative of the Presiding Judge of a
7 Chamber to seize any mobile phones that are ringing. I gave authority to
8 my colleagues to seize my mobile phone if mine rings.
9 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
10 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Q. Sir, if we could just finish up with the UNPROFOR members that
12 you encountered, could you please tell us if you recall what date it was
13 that you had that encounter with the UNPROFOR members withdrawing towards
14 VRS lines.
15 A. It was on the day when one of them got killed. And I think it
16 could have been the 10th of July, in the middle of the day.
17 Q. And under what conditions were these UNPROFOR members kept once
18 at the VRS side?
19 [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Following me, they arrived in the
21 broader area of the forward command post Pribicevac. They parked their
22 vehicles in a field, and nobody kept them anywhere. Nobody restricted or
23 controlled them. They were all treated as soldiers who had found
24 themselves in trouble an hour earlier, and they were not kept or
25 mistreated in any way.
1 Q. Okay. And now I'd like to focus on the forward command post for
2 communications at Pribicevac for Krivaja 95. How long did you stay there
3 before completing your duties at that location for that operation?
4 A. I remained until 11 July.
5 Q. And where did you go then upon completing your duties at the
6 Pribicevac communications command -- forward command post?
7 A. An hour or two hours before night-fall on the 11th July, I think
8 it could have been 7.00 p.m., I packed up the communications centre at
9 the forward command post. And with all my troops, I set out after what
10 we call elements of the combat disposition who were far in advance of us
11 ahead of the command post, so I passed Srebrenica and Potocari, arriving
12 at the command of the Bratunac Brigade in Bratunac.
13 Q. Did you report to anyone at that time?
14 A. At the command of the Bratunac Brigade, I found my own
15 signalsman, who was carrying the portable radio device for encryption,
16 and he was together with General Krstic in a vehicle. I asked him where
17 General Krstic was, and he answered that Krstic had also come to the
18 Bratunac Brigade Command, so I located General Krstic and then a meeting
19 followed at the command shortly after.
20 Q. Could you tell us who were the participants in this meeting.
21 A. There was the commander of the Main Staff, General Mladic; the
22 commander of the Drina Corps, General Zivanovic; then the Chief of Staff
23 of the Drina Corps, General Krstic; the commander of the
24 Zvornik Brigade - I think he was a lieutenant-colonel then - Pandurevic;
25 and to the best of my recollection, all the brigade commanders of the
1 Drina Corps who took part in that operation.
2 Q. And what was the timing of that meeting? What day and what hour
3 are we talking about?
4 A. The meeting was held on 11 July at the Command of the Bratunac
5 Brigade, and if I remember well, it was from 2200 to 2300 hours.
6 Q. What topics were the subject matter discussed at that meeting?
7 A. A brief analysis of the combat actions of that day was presented
8 at the meeting headed by General Mladic. And after that analysis, he
9 briefed us about the main concept; namely, that on the following day, the
10 12th July, all the units that participated in Krivaja 95 should regroup
11 and set out to execute the next operation, Stupcanica 95.
12 Q. And Stupcanica 95, what region or geographic area did that
13 operation involve?
14 A. The broader area of Zepa.
15 Q. Okay. Was anything else of significance discussed at that
16 meeting that you recall or that you had your attention drawn to?
17 A. To the best of my recollection, after General Mladic presented
18 the main concept, that on 12 July all the units should regroup towards
19 Zepa, Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic, commander of the Zvornik Brigade,
20 asked to speak, and he presented his opinion that the situation in part
21 of the front line facing Srebrenica was still unclear; meaning, the bulk
22 of the forces of the 28th Division which, according to our intelligence,
23 intended to try to break through, to break out of Srebrenica, and a
24 smaller part of their forces wanted to go towards Zepa.
25 Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic suggested that his forces should wait a
1 little for the situation in Srebrenica to become clearer concerning these
2 forces of the 28th Division who intended to move towards Zepa. And
3 regardless of this thinking of Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic, I remember
4 very well that General Mladic said no, no, no, tomorrow everybody goes to
5 Zepa. And he pointed at me and said, "And you, boy, you set up tonight
6 already a forward command post at Krivace between Srebrenica and Zepa."
7 Q. Okay. And did you immediately go to establish a forward command
8 post at Krivace between Srebrenica and Zepa?
9 A. Shortly after the official meeting ended and bearing in mind the
10 orders of General Mladic, I stood up immediately and was among the first
11 to leave that room. I gathered my soldiers and picked up my
12 communications centre, which was on a big vehicle, and immediately headed
13 to Vlasenica where the command of the Drina Corps was. Vlasenica itself
14 is further down the road from Srebrenica to Zepa.
15 Q. And then what else did you do that evening?
16 A. When I got to the command of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica, it was
17 past midnight, and I was reasoning that I wasn't familiar with the
18 location of Krivace where General Mladic had ordered me to set up the
19 communications centre, and it was not easy to do it so late. So I went
20 to the operations centre and used my own common sense because I, as a
21 signalsman, need much less time to get to that location than the brigades
22 who had involved -- who had been involved in the operation around
23 Srebrenica, needed time to assemble and get to Zepa.
24 So either I asked for somebody's permission or decided myself to
25 spend the night in Vlasenica and then replenish my unit with batteries
1 and other things, and then proceed to execute the order on the 12 July.
2 Q. Okay. And after establishing the communications centre at the --
3 at the forward command post at Krivace, did at any point in time some new
4 information come to light which changed the situation of the forces
5 available for that operation in relation to Zepa?
6 A. I didn't have such information.
7 Q. Did all the forces that were envisioned for the Zepa operation
8 stay in that region and complete the mission as to the Zepa?
9 A. The operation in Zepa began on 14 July in the morning hours. And
10 I remember from the plan of that operation after one day of fighting, one
11 part of the Zvornik Brigade was pulled out, and this part was commanded
12 by Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic himself, and was ordered to go back to
13 the area of that brigade because of the problems that their units had in
14 fighting the 28th Division that was trying to break out of encirclement
15 and link up with their own forces, the forces of the 2nd Corps in Tuzla.
16 Q. And what was your knowledge and understanding of the threat posed
17 by the problems that the Zvornik units had in fighting with the
18 28th Division that was trying to break out of encirclement?
19 A. I remember that Major Dragan Obrenovic, Chief of Staff of the
20 Zvornik Brigade, called me on the phone personally, since we have been
21 good friends from childhood and we finished all the military schools
22 together. He sounded panicked. He was calling me at my forward command
23 post knowing that I was close to General Krstic, and he asked me to try
24 to convince General Krstic, to get through to him the urgency of the
25 situation he was facing in fighting the 28th Division, because the
1 Zvornik Brigade had deployed all its available forces to hold the front
2 line facing Tuzla and its elite unit and its reserve unit that it had was
3 already on the front line towards Zepa, so he had literally taken out one
4 platoon to confront the whole division. He said that he had already
5 contacted many other people but they had shown little understanding for
6 the seriousness of his position, so he asked me to reason and convince
7 General Krstic that it was absolutely necessary to bring back
8 Vinko Pandurevic and his units to help him in his fight.
9 Q. And in terms of where this fighting was going on, did you have an
10 appreciation from the information that you received of where precisely
11 this fighting was going on between the 28th Division and the platoon that
12 had been mustered up by Major Obrenovic?
13 A. From my estimate and my knowledge about that battle, the fighting
14 was taking place along the transversal where even earlier the sabotage
15 groups had contact with the units in Tuzla. It's across Pobudje, the
16 broader area of Konjevic Polje, Cerska, Udrc, towards Tuzla. So
17 somewhere in the area of Crni Vrh in the direction of Zvornik.
18 Q. Sir, I thank you for answering my questions both on behalf of
19 myself, General Mladic, and the team.
20 MR. IVETIC: I have no further questions in direct examination.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
22 Mr. Jevdjevic, you'll now be cross-examined by Ms. Hasan. You
23 find Ms. Hasan to your right. Ms. Hasan is counsel for the Prosecution.
24 You may proceed, Ms. Hasan.
25 MS. HASAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Cross-examination by Ms. Hasan:
2 Q. Good morning, Witness.
3 A. Good day.
4 Q. Just to start, can you tell us what -- what -- what's your
6 A. Jevdjo.
7 Q. And was that what people would call you during the war time as
9 A. That is how they addressed me, those who were in closer
10 communication with me.
11 Q. Are there any other Jevdjos that you know of in the Drina Corps
13 A. In the Drina Corps, no. In the protection corps -- regiment
14 there was my brother. Everybody called him Jevdjo too. And there was
15 this other man in the Visegrad Brigade.
16 Q. Let's go to your testimony in relation to Zeleni Jadar. Now, you
17 testified yesterday, do I understand you correctly, that you were only
18 involved in the operation to the extent of setting up the communications;
19 is that correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And you made a brief reference to a document that suggested that
22 you had been in a leadership role; do you recall, recall that?
23 A. The interpretation I received was "leadership"? In our country,
24 only the commander and the Chief of Staff can be leaders.
25 Q. Okay.
1 MS. HASAN: Let's turn to 65 ter 19555, please.
2 Q. Perhaps this document will help refresh your recollection on what
3 role you had. So what this is, it's an order from the Drina Corps
4 Command. It's dated the 29th of May, 1995. We see that it's marked
5 urgent. And it relates to the order for the taking over of Zeleni Jadar,
6 of the Zeleni Jadar sector.
7 And among others, it's addressed to the command of the
8 Zvornik Brigade, Bratunac Brigade, and the Skelani separate battalion.
9 It provides at the beginning:
10 "Following UNPROFOR departure from the Zeleni Jadar check-point,
11 Muslim forces will probably try to place Zeleni Jadar under their
13 "In order to prevent the incursion of enemy forces into
14 Zeleni Jadar and place the Zeleni Jadar factory complex and the
15 Skelani-Podravanje road under our control, I hereby order the
16 following ..."
17 And this is an order from General Zivanovic.
18 If we look at item 3 --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please slow down.
20 MS. HASAN: Yes.
21 Q. If we look at item 3, it provides, the order, again, of
22 General Zivanovic:
23 "Engage the following officers from the Drina Corps command to
24 command the attacking forces in the Zeleni Jadar sector."
25 And we see three names: Colonel Obrad Vicic, Colonel Stojan
1 Veletic, and Major Milenko Jevdjevic. And these are persons you made
2 reference to yesterday during your testimony.
3 So according to this order from General Zivanovic, you were
4 supposed to be a leader of this attack. In fact, this was an order that
5 you were to lead this attack. Does that help you remember about what
6 role you had?
7 A. If you just go on reading, that is to say read the next sentence,
8 just where you stopped, you will see that it says here:
9 "I will personally command the forces from the forward command
10 post of the Drina Corps at Pribicevac."
11 Major-General Zivanovic says that this attribute of command and
12 control only belongs to him.
13 Q. So you're denying what it says very clearly in this order, that
14 he was engaging you to command the attacking forces?
15 A. I don't know. Probably this is a misinterpretation or a
16 mistranslation. It says here that Zivanovic is telling himself that he
17 will personally command the forces from the forward command post.
18 Everybody else assists him in particular areas. I was the man in charge
19 of the field of communications, and that is unequivocal and I never
20 denied that.
21 Q. Well, I think the order is clear.
22 MS. HASAN: I'd offer 65 ter 19555 into evidence.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's comment, Ms. Hasan, that the order is
24 clear. But I do understand you tender it.
25 Mr. Registrar.
1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit P7130, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: P7130 is admitted.
3 Please proceed.
4 MS. HASAN:
5 Q. And you testified yesterday in relation to this -- in relation to
6 this attack that it was carried out without a single bullet being fired;
7 is that correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan, it always assists us if you would have a
10 page reference. If not, then of course it's no drama, but...
11 MS. HASAN: I actually don't have one for this one but I
12 certainly can look it up and bring it to your attention as soon as I find
14 JUDGE ORIE: I'll find it anyhow. But if you have it there, then
15 I can immediately follow what you're referring to. That's the issue.
16 But I'll search for "bullet" and then ...
17 MS. HASAN: Could we have P01153, please.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. By the way, it is 31878.
19 Please proceed.
20 MS. HASAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Q. Witness, this is an order from General Zivanovic. It's dated the
22 2nd of June, 1995, regarding the restoration of the control over the
23 facilities and the Zeleni Jadar asphalt road.
24 And we see it's issued to the command of the Bratunac Brigade and
25 the commander of the Drina Corps Manoeuvre Battalion. And it states that
1 the conditions were right to "launch the final stage of liberating
2 Zeleni Jadar in its entirety."
3 Are you familiar with this order?
4 A. During proofing, I did have an opportunity to see it.
5 Q. Now, to sum it up, it outlines the steps of how to remove a UN
6 observation post at Zeleni Jadar, and if we look at --
7 MS. HASAN: On page 1 at the end, and this is at the end of the
8 page in the B/C/S, and the third bullet point, I believe, from the top of
9 the English. It's on the second page of the English, I apologise. Okay.
10 Q. And there it says -- in outlining how to take over this OP, it
12 "If they fail," and this is a reference to UNPROFOR, "to follow
13 the order," of surrender, which is previously discussed, "one should fire
14 a Zolja hand-held rocket-launcher into a power generator, with readiness
15 to neutralise a personnel carrier, while taking care to avoid physically
16 injuring any UNPROFOR personnel."
17 Do you see that there?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Okay.
20 MS. HASAN: Now, if we look down in the English on page 2, and
21 it's about the fourth bullet point in the English, and I think we have to
22 turn now to page 2 of the B/C/S.
23 Q. It provides:
24 "If the UNPROFOR continue threatening to use weapons towards
25 Legenda, use a Zolja to neutralise a personnel carrier."
1 Do you see that?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And you'd agree that the Legenda referenced here is Milan Jolovic
4 from the Drina Wolves; is that right?
5 A. Yes. That unit was called the Podrinje Detachment of special
6 forces battalion of the brigade.
7 Q. And as far as you remember, did that unit also take part in this
9 A. Yes.
10 MS. HASAN: Now if we scroll down in the B/C/S, and in the
11 English we have to turn the page to the signature page --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, it was put to you that the name
13 was the Drina Wolves. Is that confirmed by you as well, that that was
14 the name used to refer to that unit?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Its official name in our
16 establishment was not the Drina Wolves but they themselves called
17 themselves that, so others called them that too.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, thank you.
19 Please proceed, Ms. Hasan.
20 MS. HASAN:
21 Q. Now if we look at the handwritten note there at the bottom, it
22 reads: "For Skelani SPB (Jevdo should convey) self-propelled guns to be
23 included at 0500." That would be you, a message that you were to convey;
25 A. No.
1 Q. Now, this order to remove UNPROFOR from their observation point,
2 which details calls to surrender and then to -- to use weapons to
3 disengage them, that was carried out, wasn't it?
4 A. Firstly, this telegram was received at the command of the
5 Bratunac Brigade, and someone from the command of the Bratunac Brigade
6 probably in his own hand for some reason stated, probably thinking of the
7 communications plan, that Jevdjo would convey or transmit the plan of
9 JUDGE ORIE: I'm stopping you there. Could you please answer the
10 question. The question was whether the order, and the details were given
11 by Ms. Hasan, was carried out or not.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ms. Hasan said -- well, this speaks
13 only about the plan if members of UNPROFOR do this, if they do that, so
14 these are assumptions. This entire order is based on assumptions. Or,
15 rather, on a sequence of steps. If somebody does this, then this should
16 be applied.
17 So this is not an order for attack for combat activities because
18 otherwise what would have been written in the letterhead would have been
19 order to attack. It is only an order for the territory held by the
20 Drina Corps that positions should be moved from one line to another; that
21 is to say, within that framework that is under its control, of course,
22 everything outside the protected area and outside the Muslim positions.
23 So this was just relocation, and that is also what the title
24 says, relocating one's own lines to a better territory so that our
25 territory would be in our rear, behind us. And also include
1 self-propelled weapons. That is not what I am supposed to convey. With
2 the best of intentions and to interpret this as a soldier who took part
3 in this, maybe this means that the Bratunac Brigade has, just in case,
4 artillery prepared somewhere, include self-propelled guns. That is not
5 what is stated here that I should convey that. These are two different
7 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan, did you intend to take the witness back
8 again to the stamp or did you just wanted an answer to your question?
9 MS. HASAN: No, absolutely, I just wanted him to answer my
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 Witness, apparently it's of some concern to you what is written
13 at the bottom here, but that is not what you were asked about. I think
14 you explained that in this order various scenarios are described and
15 therefore you say it's not an order. At the same time, if at the end of
16 the order it says Legenda and Petrovic shall take control of the UNPROFOR
17 check-point and make detailed arrangement before continuing along the
18 asphalt road crossing Jadar, I mean, that's clearly an order, isn't it,
19 although some possible scenarios, what would have happened in between,
20 are described. But if you say it's not an order, this last paragraph
21 certainly at least very much resembles what an order is, isn't it?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The entire document, the entire
23 operation, was not conceived as an order to attack. Only to relocate --
24 JUDGE ORIE: No one talked about an order to attack. It was just
25 referred to whether this order was put in place, yes or no.
1 You told us already that some of the portions were written in a
2 way as if this happens, then do that; if this happens, then do that.
3 That's clear.
4 Ms. Hasan will now put further questions to you, and I would urge
5 you to carefully listen to what she wants to know rather than what you
6 consider relevant to tell her.
7 Please proceed.
8 MS. HASAN:
9 Q. So, Witness, and please try to just answer the question, was this
10 order of General Zivanovic carried out? Simple: Yes or no?
11 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan, that's not an appropriate question.
12 The witness has rightly explained that the order contains various
13 possibilities. Now, if you want to know whether it was carried out, you
14 can, as I did, either refer to the last part, where there's no such
15 conditions, or you should put to the witness did they point weapons, was
16 this said or not, because all the same -- you have to be specific there.
17 You can't ask a yes or no on the basis of this order.
18 Please proceed.
19 MS. HASAN: I'll move on.
20 Q. Witness, it -- would you agree with me that -- and you having
21 reviewed this -- this document, that it was essentially, leaving aside
22 whether you claim it happened or not, an order to terrorise or scare
23 UNPROFOR and get them in -- to leave the OP. Would you agree with that?
24 A. No.
25 Q. Okay.
1 MS. HASAN: Could we please have 65 ter 32038.
2 Q. Witness, this is the -- what's going to appear is your testimony
3 from the Popovic case.
4 MS. HASAN: And if we could e-court page 54.
5 Q. And you're asked at line 17, and I'll read this out slowly so you
6 can follow along:
7 "Q. And I understand how important that was. And, basically,
8 this is an order to scare the daylights out of UNPROFOR and get them to
9 leave that OP; correct? "
10 And your answer was:
11 "Well, more or less, yes."
12 Do you stand by that testimony.
13 A. I stand by that part of my testimony, but this is probably,
14 again, a case of taking things out of context. If UNPROFOR were to put
15 up resistance, that is how the entire order is treated. If UNPROFOR were
16 not to resist with using weapons in any way, the order says very nicely
17 that our forces would just pass through and put their positions within
18 their own area of responsibility. In case they resist, then there is an
19 envisaged scenario; namely, that in a way it be made known to UNPROFOR by
20 firing a gun into the air, et cetera, that quite simply they should not
21 interfere in that part of the situation.
22 Q. And since you have provided us with your interpretation today
23 saying parts of it wasn't followed and parts it was and it was
24 conditional, well, let's look at what you said in Popovic at line 7:
25 "Q. So we can conclude that this order was followed, can't we?
1 "A. Well, the person who issued the order would probably know
2 that best if he were to carry out an analysis. Last week, I spoke in
3 detail about the events I remember from that period of time.
4 "Q. Well, was it carried out or not?"
5 And your answer was:
6 "It was, but later on some people were dissatisfied with this
7 because was it enough to secure those factories, because the Muslim side
8 could control the Zeleni Jadar area with fire-power. But I remember that
9 the Zeleni Jadar-Jasenova road could be used after this, and that was
10 very important for our units on the ground there."
11 So, do you stand by that testimony you gave in the Popovic --
12 before the Popovic Trial Chamber?
13 A. Of course.
14 MS. HASAN: Your Honour, I note the time. Is this an appropriate
15 time for the break?
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we'll take a break now.
17 Witness, we'd like to see you back in 20 minutes. You may follow
18 the usher.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 JUDGE ORIE: We resume at quarter past 12.00.
21 --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 12.18 p.m.
23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Ms. Hasan.
1 MS. HASAN: May we see Exhibit P02100.
2 Q. Witness, this is the regular combat report from the 3rd of June,
3 1995, which we looked at yesterday. And it's in relation to this
4 document that you had testified at transcript page 31878, lines 22 to 25:
5 "That whoever it was who wrote this probably wanted to exaggerate
6 his own contribution to these events."
7 Now, you may recall that this document set out that the
8 population, the civilians in that area, left in panic. So according to
9 you, sir, that would have been something impressive to tell your
10 superiors, or to tell a superior?
11 A. When I said that somebody tried to exaggerate, I meant the entire
12 document. Quite simply, one of the hundreds of sentences in this
13 document; namely, that the population had fled in panic. And my
14 testimony was that there was no population living there, and therefore
15 they could not have fled there panic. So this flight of civilians would
16 not be impressive for any officer. But my testimony was there was nobody
17 living there in the first place, and therefore they could not flee in
19 MS. HASAN: Well, let's look at page 2 in the English and page 2
20 in the B/C/S -- oh, sorry, I apologise. The English - keep it - it
21 starts on page 1.
22 Q. And it says:
23 "In a very precise and professional operation, they forced the
24 strong and courageous UNPROFOR check-point in Zeleni Jadar to withdraw in
25 panic to Srebrenica."
1 Do you see that there?
2 MS. HASAN: It looks like it's also page 2 in the -- sorry, page
3 1 in the B/C/S, item 2.
4 Q. Just at the beginning there. I'll give you an opportunity to
5 read that.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Perhaps it can be enlarged a bit further.
7 MS. HASAN: Okay. And if we turn to item 3. That's the next
8 page in both versions.
9 Q. It says:
10 "We have -- we have had no casualties. We expended small amounts
11 of ammunition and three Zoljas, hand-held rockets."
12 Now, that's consistent with General Zivanovic's order of the 2nd
13 of June, isn't it?
14 A. What do you mean it's consist with the order? What is it that
15 you are specifically citing and then saying that it is in keeping with
16 General Zivanovic's order?
17 Q. Well, for one thing, that ammunition, including Zoljas, were
19 A. I've already told you and I said in all my previous testimonies
20 that to the best of my knowledge this action was carried out without a
21 single bullet fired. It was completed by 9.00 in the morning. We
22 transferred our forces from one area to another, and not a single bullet
23 was fired let alone three Zoljas. My knowledge from that period does not
24 tally with what this report says.
25 Q. Well, let's look at what DutchBat officer Major Franken says.
1 MS. HASAN: And that's P1417. Your Honours, that's his admitted
2 statement in this case. If we could see page 10 in the English and page
3 17 in the B/C/S version.
4 Q. And he describes the VRS attack on OP Echo in paragraph 38, and
5 he says:
6 "On 3 June 1995 the VRS attacked OP Echo. We got report through
7 Bravo Company, the company responsible for that area, that there was some
8 movement in front of OP Echo. The movement proved to be Serb infantry.
9 Then the Serb infantry used the loud-speaker to tell the OP that they had
10 to go, they had to withdraw because the Serbs wanted to come in.
11 B Company asked me permission to do that which I denied. Then they came
12 under attack and in the end the Serbs took OP Echo over and the crew
13 withdrew in the very last moment with my authorisation. The attack was
14 conducted by about 40 infantry supported by a tank, (T55), a main battle
15 tank, and a gun on the edge, ridge at Zeleni Jadar. The observation
16 tower was hit by the firing main battle tank and the area was fired at by
17 the anti-aircraft gun standing up there used to support the Serb attack."
18 So, Mr. Jevdjevic, do still maintain that no force was used in
19 this attack?
20 A. To the best of my knowledge because we were listening with our
21 own ears to hear what would happen, and we were expecting gun-fire at any
22 moment. But then in the early morning hours, we received reports that
23 our forces had just crossed over to the line they wished to reach. So
24 that event remained in my memory as the only planned combat activity
25 where we accomplished the mission without combat, and I stand by the
1 evidence I gave yesterday and earlier today.
2 Q. And would you agree with me, then, that the report that is --
3 that bears your name that we just previously looked at, that -- that
4 would have meant that you were operating outside of your regular
5 communications duties; is that correct?
6 A. Absolutely not.
7 Q. So you could have authored that report, despite the fact that you
8 were -- you claim you were just -- just engaged in communications?
9 A. The interpreter just told me that you claim I could have authored
10 that report. I never said that.
11 Q. What I'm asking is, that report bears your name. Now you claim
12 that that is -- that couldn't have been you, okay? But it would mean,
13 right, the fact that it bears your name, that you were acting outside
14 your regular communications duties.
15 A. Either I am getting a very strange interpretation or I failed to
16 understand your logic. I maintained --
17 JUDGE ORIE: I'll phrase the question again.
18 If you would have been the author of that document, which you say
19 you're not, would that mean that such activity, writing such a report and
20 being involved it as described, that that would have been beyond, outside
21 what your real functions were; that is, being engaged in communications.
22 Would you agree with that.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan, I take it that this resolves the matter.
25 MS. HASAN: Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
2 MS. HASAN:
3 Q. Now, Witness, you told us - I'm going to move on to a different
4 topic - that you were at the Pribicevac forward command post during the
5 Krivaja 95 operation. Could you tell us when it was that General Mladic
6 arrived at the IKM on 10 July?
7 A. To the best of my recollection, around 10.00.
8 Q. And is that 10.00 in the morning or 10.00 in the evening?
9 A. 10.00 a.m.
10 Q. And do you recall how long he stayed on the 10th of July at the
11 forward command post?
12 A. At the very location of the forward command post, he spent very
13 little time. He was going further on towards the forward lines where the
14 observation posts were, and it was not within my field of vision. But he
15 stayed in the broader area of the forward command post perhaps until
16 later afternoon. He was at the observation posts near the forward
17 command post.
18 Q. How far were these observation posts from the command post --
19 forward command post?
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, no communications, as you -- turn,
22 Please proceed, Ms. Hasan.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Several hundred metres.
24 MS. HASAN:
25 Q. Now, if someone was trying to reach General Mladic from the
1 Main Staff or from Vlasenica, they could reach him, couldn't they?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And General Mladic was also at the Pribicevac forward command
4 post on the 11th of July; isn't that right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And could you share with us when he arrived and when he left.
7 A. I think he arrived before noon; and he left the forward command
8 post in the early afternoon, around 3.00, 4.00 p.m.
9 Q. And as you were at the forward command post, do you agree that
10 the chain of command remained intact throughout that Krivaja 95
12 MR. IVETIC: Object to the question as being unclear. Which
13 chain of command?
14 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan, you perhaps be a bit more precise. I
15 think I understand your question but to avoid any confusion.
16 MS. HASAN:
17 Q. Well, I'm referring to the VRS chain of command and the command
18 over this Krivaja 95 operation.
19 MR. IVETIC: Well, then I would ask that she split up the two
20 questions. Those are two different chains of command.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, then the witness can answer the question. And
22 if there's any need to follow up, then we'll find that from his answer.
23 Witness, could you please answer the question.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The operation was commanded by the
25 Drina Corps, and that chain of command remained unchanged throughout the
2 MS. HASAN:
3 Q. Now, Witness, I'm going to move on --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Could we ask the witness also, was there anything --
5 you said within the Drina Corps the chain of command functioned normally.
6 Of course, the Drina Corps was under the command of the Main Staff of the
7 VRS, the main command. Was there anything there which you think was
8 interrupted in any way, chain of command from the Drina Corps up and down
9 from the Main Staff and command to the extent you know?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Everything functioned normally.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Both at the level of the Drina Corps and at the
12 level above the Drina Corps, as far as you are aware of?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't understand what you're
14 asking me. Everything functioned normally. The Drina Corps was carrying
15 out the operation. It established the forward command post. The forward
16 command post was commanded by someone from the Drina Corps. In this
17 case, General Krstic. In Vlasenica, where the command of the Drina Corps
18 is based, it continued to function according to the previous plan. And
19 the Main Staff and their command, in their location, continued to
20 function according to their plan.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
22 MS. HASAN:
23 Q. So, Witness, I'm going to move on to the evidence you just gave
24 towards the end of your testimony today about this meeting that you claim
25 took place on the night of 11 July. And this is, in fact, an account
1 that you have been given -- that you gave in the Krstic case, and this is
2 when General Krstic tried as well to put that meeting on the 11th of
3 July. You were aware of that; right?
4 A. What are you claiming should have been clear to me?
5 Q. Well, that General Krstic was also claiming that the meeting you
6 were referring to took place on the 11th July and not the 12th of July.
7 A. I don't know what General Krstic claimed, but I know that the
8 meeting that I, too, attended was held on 11 July.
9 Q. Now, we happen to have the contemporaneous diary that was taken
10 by Mirko Trivic who is the commander of the 2nd Romanija Brigade.
11 MS. HASAN: And if we could take a look at those; it's
12 Exhibit P01467. And if we could turn to page 28.
13 Q. And you see there, it says:
14 "Order: Remain at the line reached. The brigade commanders are
15 to come to the Drina Corps IKM in Bratunac by 2100 hours via Srebrenica
16 and Potocari (the Bratunac Brigade KM)," command.
17 Now, in fact, you attended the meeting that took place at 2100
18 hours with all the brigade commanders; correct?
19 A. Yes, except that I said that, to the best of my recollection,
20 that meeting began around 2200 hours.
21 Q. And you did travel through -- from -- from the forward command
22 post at Pribicevac through Srebrenica and Potocari; isn't that the case?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And Mirko Trivic goes on to record that General Mladic arrived at
25 2200 hours. That also accords with when you've told us this meeting took
1 place; is that correct?
2 A. Yes. Although this thing that resembles a diary is something I
3 see for the first time.
4 Q. Now, he then notes after congratulations and greetings, and in
6 [As read] "(Despite the fact that Vinko Pandurevic and I warned
7 him [sic] that the soldiers should rest) he ordered ..."
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: The English reads: "I told him," not "I warned
10 MS. HASAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
12 MS. HASAN:
13 Q. Now, does that -- is that consistent with your recollection of
14 what happened at that meeting?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And what about the next point he notes down:
17 "By 0800 hours tomorrow, General Krstic must prepare a decision
18 for the liberation of Zepa!"
19 Does that accord with your recollection of what took place at
20 that meeting?
21 A. That fact is in keeping with what I already testified to; namely,
22 that General Mladic ordered that everyone should move the next day to the
23 operation in Zepa. Now whether he ordered Krstic to prepare a decision
24 or not, I don't remember such details, but I remember our destination was
1 Q. Do you recall that General Mladic addressed the soldiers who were
2 to take part in the Zepa operation in Vijogor village before they left?
3 You were aware of that; right?
4 A. Absolutely not.
5 MS. HASAN: Now, if we turn back to page 25 in the English and
6 the B/C/S. And we can go through this page by page to where we were.
7 Q. But you will see here that Mirko Trivic recorded this meeting as
8 having taken place on the 12th of July, not on the 11th July as you
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Ms. Hasan, you are saying "this meeting."
11 I read here 0900 hours. I don't know if that -- I think it
12 refers to 9.00 a.m., but we are talking about a meeting late in the
14 MS. HASAN: That's correct. So it will help, then, to just turn
15 to the next page so there's -- we have 0900 hours, 12 July 1995. His
16 notes continue. And we can go to the following page. And we can
17 continue to the next page. We come to the page we were just looking at.
18 And when we turn to the page after that, the notes continue. And he
19 reports on events at 2300 hours. And if we follow along to the next
20 page, we see the next diary entry, Wednesday, 13 July, 1000 hours.
21 And, Your Honours, I can find the reference to the testimony on
22 this diary, if that would be useful.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Fluegge raised the issue, so I leave it in his
24 hands to --
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think we went through several pages and we saw
1 an entry, 11th July, 12th July, and then here a reference to a 13th July.
2 Thank you. Please proceed.
3 MS. HASAN:
4 Q. Now, Witness, I suppose, then, you are claiming that Trivic's
5 diary is incorrect?
6 A. I only maintain that I'm absolutely certain the meeting was held
7 at around 2200 hours on 11 July. There are some events that I remember
8 less well, some others I remember better, but I maintain with absolute
9 certainty that that meeting was held around 2200 hours on 11 July.
10 Q. So this document is wrong, this diary is wrong?
11 A. I don't go into what Colonel Trivic wrote or whether he was
12 mistaken about the date. But out of all the events from that period, my
13 clearest memory, an unmistakable memory is that that meeting was held on
14 11 July and began around 2200 hours.
15 Q. Now before you left this meeting, did anyone, including
16 General Krstic, give you any precise orders about the communications that
17 were to be set up for this Zepa operation?
18 A. No, because there was no need.
19 Q. Now, how was it that you knew which units precisely were to be
20 involved in that operation?
21 A. Because General Mladic ordered that evening that all the units
22 that had taken part in the operation in Srebrenica, all be transferred to
23 the operation in Zepa. That's how I knew.
24 Q. And did you ever receive orders on the set-up of the
25 communications for this operation?
1 A. Well, General Mladic ordered me. That was perfectly enough.
2 Q. So you did not receive any other orders?
3 A. No.
4 MS. HASAN: Can we look at Exhibit D00290, please.
5 Q. And in the -- in the meantime, sir, were you aware you were -- I
6 take it, then, that you were not aware that Krstic issued Zepa attack
7 order on the 13th of July and that in that attack order he provides
8 orders for the set-up of communications at the Drina Corps forward
9 command post. And this is the order appears on our screen right now.
10 MS. HASAN: And if we turn to page 4 in the English and 3 in the
12 Q. We see here that on the 13th of July at -- under item 10:
13 "Command and communications." And the Chief of Staff orders:
14 "The Drina Corps forward command post in Krivace shall start
15 working at 1800 hours on 13 July 1995.
16 "Communications shall be ready for the attack at 0600 hours on 14
17 July 1995."
18 Do you see that there?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And Krivace, that's where the forward command post for the
21 operation was established; right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And you're claiming that you did not act pursuant to these
25 A. This order was written two days after the decision was made and
1 the basic concept of the commander was generated for the operation in
2 Zepa. All these decisions have to be formalised in writing, and thus in
3 every order there is a paragraph that determines where the forward
4 command post would be, when it would start operating, what the
5 communications system would be like. It all has to be written in the
6 order because the army is such an institution.
7 All the points in the order have to be specified in a particular
8 sequence. When this order was written, I had been in the forward command
9 post already one day and a half. I was setting up the communications
10 system and I was waiting for the other units to arrive in the area -- in
11 the sector of Zepa.
12 Q. Now, we can go back a page, but the order includes a lot of
13 details of where the various units involved in this operation, what axis
14 they were going to be at, details of which you would accept are important
15 for you as a communications officer to be aware of; isn't that correct?
16 A. That's true. However, we communicated with those units using
17 radios with whip antennas, and these antennas beam in all directions
18 equally. So wherever those units were located and regardless of their
19 deployment, with that type of communication, I can more easily
20 communicate with them.
21 It is true that even for that type of communication it's
22 important for me to know these units' axis of attack, whether they are on
23 a clearing or a hilly or mountainous area so that I should know how the
24 signals would spread. However, with all my prior experience, all these
25 details were not crucial for the execution of that operation. The main
1 thing for me to know was which units would be participating.
2 Q. And it's clear that you hadn't informed your superior command
3 that you had already set up communications at the Krivace forward command
4 post; isn't that right?
5 A. Which superior command do you mean now? When you say "my
6 superior command"?
7 Q. Yes, your superior command. So General Krstic, the Chief of
8 Staff, was not informed that you had already set up the communications at
9 the forward command post.
10 A. Well, I've told you --
11 JUDGE ORIE: One second.
12 Mr. Ivetic.
13 MR. IVETIC: Can I ask where that is in the document? Because I
14 don't see it.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Let me see. Did you refer to a document?
16 MS. HASAN: No.
17 MR. IVETIC: Then I'd ask for the reference from the question at
18 line 24 for "it's clear that." "It's clear that" implies that it's in
19 the document.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Well, not necessarily.
21 The witness may answer the question.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My Chief of Staff, General Krstic,
23 at the joint meeting on the 11th of July, clearly heard where the forward
24 command post of the Drina Corps would be for the Zepa operation, and he
25 clearly heard when I was ordered to go there and set up a communications
1 centre. For us soldiers, that is, quite simply, the beginning and the
2 end of it all. It doesn't cross anybody's mind to go into any kind of
3 unnecessary formality at moments like that.
4 MS. HASAN:
5 Q. Trivic recorded in his diary that at that meeting that you claim
6 you attended on the night of the 11th, he had ordered -- Mladic --
7 General Mladic had ordered Krstic to produce "this attack order
8 tomorrow," and I put it to you that that could only have occurred on the
9 12th of July which is why General Krstic issued this order, the attack
10 order, on the 13th of July?
11 A. You are absolutely not right. I remember that this order was
12 written by Colonel Vicic, operations officer in the Drina Corps, and for
13 the entire day, the previous day, he was writing this order and he was
14 waiting for General Krstic to sign it. Because I was waiting for all of
15 them up there for two days since I was at the IKM already on the 12th and
16 the units were relocated from the area of Srebrenica during the night
17 between the 13th and the 14th.
18 Q. Let's move on. On the night of the 11th when you claim you
19 travelled to this meeting, you moved with all of your communications
20 personnel in a large military communications truck; isn't that right?
21 A. Yes, except for one soldier who was with General Krstic.
22 Q. And what was his name?
23 A. Plakalovic.
24 Q. And according to you, you left Pribicevac for Bratunac via
25 Potocari; isn't that right?
1 A. Absolutely.
2 Q. You passed through Potocari without an escort.
3 A. Absolutely.
4 Q. Well, I put it to you that there's no way you would have
5 travelled through Potocari on the night of the 11th in a VRS military
6 truck. I put it to you that the offensive was still going on and that
7 Potocari had not yet been taken by the VRS, and therefore you could not
8 have possibly driven through there that night.
9 A. First of all, I should like to correct you. When I testified
10 previously, I said that as soon as night fell, I passed through
11 Srebrenica and Potocari; that is to say, it wasn't night-time. It was
12 just as night was falling. That is when the day turns into the night.
13 So I know that our units had orders not to enter Potocari, or quite
14 simply as they were going after the 28th Division, that should not be the
15 point where they should focus. However, from communications, I had
16 knowledge that the road from Srebrenica via Potocari to Bratunac was
17 accessible because that is the main road and definitely the shortest road
18 to Bratunac, and I set out through Potocari because I had an officer 's
19 idea that this unit -- this area had been left by the units of the
20 28th Division.
21 Q. Now, when you passed through Potocari, you saw crowds of
22 civilians, you saw UN DutchBat officers, and you saw members of the VRS;
23 is that correct?
24 A. Correct. I stated that during some of my previous testimony,
25 that I saw lots of people, and this left a particular impression on me, a
1 strange impression, as to all the things that war can produce. However
2 they were they were intermingled, the population and UNPROFOR, so I can
3 just tell you about what I saw along the main road that I was going down.
4 I didn't stop but I saw lots of people. I saw members of UNPROFOR, they
5 were all mixed, and in my assessment I saw a few members of the Army of
6 Republika Srpska.
7 Now, I don't know from which unit they were, but it remained in
8 my mind that they were talking to the people there, so then I thought
9 that they may have been soldiers from the surrounding villages who
10 perhaps knew someone and therefore talked to them, so they were holding
11 their rifles on their shoulders. A few of them. I saw a few of them as
12 I was passing there, and I said that during every one of my previous
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one clarifying question. You said in
15 the area of Potocari, the units of the 28th Division had left already.
16 Was that true for the whole of the route you took?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
18 JUDGE ORIE: So no units of the 28th Division nearby the road you
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed.
22 MS. HASAN: Let's have a look at P02117.
23 Q. What we'll see here is the RS MUP special police brigade report.
24 And it's from the deputy command, Deputy Commander Ljubisa Borovcanin.
25 And he's writing to the Pale police staff sector and others, reporting on
1 the activities of the RS MUP combat unit on 12 July 1995. You see the
2 report, it's dated 13 July 1995. And he reports here that:
3 "During the course of 12 July, MUP units were engaged in
4 offensive actions from the direction of Zuti Most towards Potocari. At
5 0530 hours, we sealed off the check-point at Zuti Most and then proceeded
6 along the road toward Potocari. There was no strong armed resistance
7 from the Muslims, so we took control of Potocari by 1300 hours, and with
8 a right hand flank we took control of the Budak and Milacevici features."
9 Sir, you wouldn't have passed through Potocari when combat was
10 still going on, would you?
11 A. According to the information I had and on the basis of which I
12 made this assessment in terms of whether I could take that road or not,
13 spoke in favour of that. Namely, that the 28th Division left its own
14 civilians in Potocari and that they started their breakthrough towards
15 Tuzla and that they were grouping in the part of the enclave towards
16 Konjevic Polje. It is absolutely illogical that any one of them had the
17 intention to stay that close to that road after I passed that way. And
18 to this day I believe that was quite a risk on my part. So sometimes
19 we'd talk to colleagues, officers, and, for example, I even received
20 information stating that Vinko Pandurevic, commander of the
21 Zvornik Brigade, as he went to that meeting he passed through Potocari.
22 But when he saw what he saw, he went back taking a different route via
23 Sas when going to Zeleni Jadar. But I really don't see what this
24 document specifically says refuting what I have been saying so far. I
25 can guarantee and I assert that --
1 JUDGE ORIE: You don't have to bother about to what extent it
2 supports or not. If you just answer the questions and tell us about what
3 you know or what you -- what you considered at that time, you don't have
4 to enter into a comparison of your own thoughts and what is written down
5 here unless specifically asked.
6 Please proceed.
7 MS. HASAN:
8 Q. Witness, you don't contest then, as I understand it, that
9 Potocari had not been taken at the time, sorry, that you claim to have
10 passed through it?
11 A. When I passed through Potocari, there were no members of the
12 28th Division in Potocari. There were only civilians there, mixed with
13 UNPROFOR, and a few members of the Army of Republika Srpska. Not a
14 single member of the 28th Division was in Potocari at that point in time
15 because then they were far to the west as they were regrouping for their
16 breakthrough towards Tuzla.
17 Q. What information did you have that informed you that it was safe
18 for you to pass through Potocari?
19 A. Already in the afternoon, sometime when NATO air force struck, at
20 the forward command post, we had a radio intercepting group of the
21 Drina Corps that monitored the communications of the 28th Division.
22 Already then in the afternoon of the 11th of July, we had information
23 that their main plan was that civilians should go to the UNPROFOR base in
24 Potocari and that they should group in the western part of the enclave,
25 the 28th Division, that is, and that they should get ready for a
1 breakthrough to join their main force in Tuzla and their auxiliary forces
2 towards Zepa. So they had the entire afternoon to carry out this
4 So I absolutely had that information, and that was my assessment,
5 that the 28th Division was no longer there on that road that I had
6 intended to take.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan, I'm looking at the clock. Would it be
8 time for a break?
9 MS. HASAN: Yes, that's appropriate. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, you may follow the usher. We'd like to see
11 you back in 20 minutes from now.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 JUDGE ORIE: We resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 --- Recess taken at 1.15 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 1.36 p.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I was a bit embarrassed that before the
18 break I'd forgotten that you'd asked for a matter to be raised in private
19 session. Should that be with or without the witness?
20 MR. IVETIC: Without.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Without the witness. Then we briefly move into
22 private session.
23 [Private session]
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
25 [The witness takes the stand]
1 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan, if you're ready you may continue once the
2 witness has put on his earphones again.
3 MS. HASAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 Q. When you travelled -- when you left Pribicevac and travelled down
5 to Srebrenica to pass through Potocari to get to Bratunac, did you pass
6 any check-points?
7 A. I passed through an area that is called Tucak, I think where
8 there used to be an UNPROFOR check-point.
9 Q. Did you pass through a check-point at Zuti Most?
10 A. Yes, I did pass the check-point at Zuti Most, and over there
11 there were a few soldiers, I think from the Bratunac Brigade, or
12 policemen and so on. Somebody was there at that check-point. Before
13 that operation was carried out, they had been there.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could I seek clarification of the previous answer.
15 You said you "passed through an area that is called Tucak, I
16 think where there used to be an UNPROFOR check-point."
17 The question was whether you passed any check-points. Did you
18 pass at Tucak any check-point; and, if so, manned by whom?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that the Prosecutor asked
20 about the check-point in Zuti Most that was held by members of the
21 Army of Republika Srpska. Am I right?
22 JUDGE ORIE: Well, that was her last question. The previous
23 question was when you travelled -- when you left through Pribicevac and
24 travelled down to Srebrenica to pass through Potocari to get to Bratunac,
25 did you pass any check-points. That was the question. And then you told
1 us that there was a place where there used to be an UNPROFOR check-point,
2 but you did not answer the question whether there was a check-point at
3 the time when you passed, and I was seeking clarification of that.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that moment, it was not manned.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
6 Please proceed.
7 MS. HASAN:
8 Q. So, Witness, then let's first deal with the Zuti Most
10 MS. HASAN: Let's look at P00724. Could we go to page 3 in the
11 B/C/S and page 2 in the English.
12 Q. And under the heading "12 July," if we scroll down a little bit
13 in the English, I'm -- it reads in the second-to-last paragraph,
14 second-to-lasts line:
15 "The first task" -- and I don't know if can you see that in the
16 B/C/S. Let me double-check for you. Yes.
17 "The first task - to take control of the UN check-point on
18 Zuti Most - was completed successfully without any incidents. The Dutch
19 UN members did not react."
20 Now this is a MUP report on the combat engagement of the special
21 police brigade and other police in Srebrenica 1995, and it's a report
22 Ljubomir Borovcanin dated -- he wrote about the events between 11 and 21
23 July 1995 and the report itself is dated 5 September 1995. So according
24 to him, the UN were manning the check-point at Zuti Most and it was only
25 on 12 July that they successfully took over control of that check-point.
1 Do you contest that?
2 A. Could you, please, in the Serbian version -- I haven't got the
3 12th. I just have the 13th. So could you please tell me which
4 paragraph that is under that date so that I could read it?
5 Q. Yes. If you look at the top of the Serbian version, you see it
6 begins -- should begin "between 0500 and 0630 hours," and look -- and I
7 don't read Cyrillic, but towards the end of that paragraph.
8 JUDGE ORIE: It's a bit unclear whether that's a new paragraph or
9 the end of the first paragraph. There is a bit of --
10 Sir, the two lines following the first paragraph which consists
11 of some eight lines, and then we have two paragraphs. That was the
12 paragraph Ms. Hasan was reading from. And that details with the
13 12th of July.
14 Have you found it?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, no.
16 MS. HASAN:
17 Q. Witness --
18 A. What you are reading out is not written here.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Well, Witness --
20 MS. HASAN:
21 Q. You can see in the brackets --
22 MS. HASAN: I'm sorry, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 Witness, look at the two lines following the first full
25 paragraph. The first full paragraph starts with 05 to 6.30, that takes
1 approximately -- not only approximately but exactly eight lines, and then
2 the two following lines.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I see that.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
5 MS. HASAN:
6 Q. So, sir, you just testified and told this Chamber that you passed
7 the check-point at Zuti Most where there were members of the
8 Bratunac Brigade or other VRS members, and Borovcanin is reporting here
9 that that check-point hadn't been taken control of until the 12th of
10 July. So is Borovcanin providing false information in his report?
11 A. I remember that on that road I just came across members of the
12 Army of Republika Srpska who were on the road towards Potocari and
13 Srebrenica from Bratunac and that I passed by them. The entire road had
14 not been blocked by any kind of fortification obstacles. It was free,
15 this road, and I just passed there. I didn't stop. And to tell you the
16 truth, I don't remember having seen members of UNPROFOR on that road.
17 Q. Well, let's move, then, to see what members of DutchBat say about
18 who was on that road on the night of the 11th. And I'll read you an
19 excerpt from DutchBat officer Lieutenant-Colonel Alko Koster testimony in
20 the Krstic case.
21 MS. HASAN: Oh, sorry. I stand corrected. It's
22 Lieutenant Koster, not Lieutenant-Colonel Koster. And I'll read that
23 excerpt. He is asked about Potocari on the 11th of July. If we could
24 have a look at 65 ter 32024.
25 Q. And I will read this to you so you can follow along:
1 "Q. And what hours were you on duty in the [sic] area on the
2 afternoon/evening of 11 July [sic]."
3 This is line 3.
4 "A. Eleventh. From the 11th, the afternoon, sir, I was on duty
5 until approximately 8.00 p.m. and then I went up to the compound for
6 approximately two hours, and then returned to my position, where I stayed
7 the whole night, the morning, the afternoon of the 12th of July, and also
8 the evening of the 12th of July."
9 And I'll just skip a few lines to line 13. And, sir, I
10 understand you speak English, if you wish you can also follow the
12 "Q. Now, while you were gone from the area briefly on the evening
13 of the 11th, did you have a deputy that was in command while you were
15 "A. Yes, sir, he was.
16 "Q. And to your knowledge, on the afternoon or evening hours of
17 July 11th, was there any vehicular traffic from the VRS military along
18 that road?
19 "A. No, sir. I have not seen any vehicle movement, VRS vehicle
20 movement on that road, and neither I was reported to by my deputy on the
21 11th of July.
22 "Q. Was there some kind of roadblock or check-point there?
23 "A. Yes. We installed sort of a roadblock to guide and to guard
24 the refugees, so a vehicle couldn't get through without being reported to
25 me, without being seen by me."
1 MS. HASAN: And if we turn to the page.
2 Q. "Q. Would this have been a significant event if a VRS vehicle had
3 come through this area on July 11th?
4 "A. Yes, sir.
5 "Q. Did you notice any VRS soldiers in this area around where the
6 people are, or anywhere around this compound, around this road, on the
7 afternoon or evening of July 11th?
8 "A. Not on the [sic] -- not on July 11th, sir.
9 "Q. Would that have been a significant event if VRS soldiers had
10 been amongst the [sic] people or in this area?
11 "A. Yes, sir. I would have seen them, I would have been
12 reported, and also I guess the refugees would have panicked. So it's not
13 been reported and I have not seen them.
14 "Q. Can you be sure that no VRS vehicle came through this area
15 and no VRS soldiers were in this area" --
16 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan.
17 MS. HASAN: I'm sorry.
18 Q. "And no" --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Hasan.
20 MS. HASAN: I'll start that question again.
21 Q. "Q. Can you be sure that no VRS vehicle came through this area
22 and no VRS soldiers were in this area on the evening or afternoon of
23 July 11th?
24 "A. Yes, I'm sure about it, on the 11th; yes, sir."
25 So, Witness, do you also claim that Lieutenant Koster is wrong
1 about that?
2 A. He is not right because at the time when I passed there -- well,
3 he himself says in that statement of his that you read out that he had
4 left that point at 8.00 and that he stayed for two hours.
5 I said in my statement that I passed there around 2100 hours,
6 whereas he left around 2000 hours and he was away for two hours so he
7 could not have seen me. Even had he been there. So I'm absolutely
8 certain that I did pass that way, and he himself says in his statement
9 that at the time when I passed there he was absent from that point.
10 There's something else I wish to add here. Maybe for them it
11 would be illogical to expect a military vehicle of the Army of
12 Republika Srpska to pass along that road from the direction of
13 Srebrenica. It would have been of interest to them that if vehicles from
14 Bratunac were passing in the other direction towards Srebrenica. At any
15 rate, when I passed there, he was not there, and he could not have seen
17 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, he is wrong, we do understand your answer.
18 You're explaining why he is wrong. And then you select part of that
19 statement. Now, if you wish to do that, that's fine. But he talked
20 about being replaced and a deputy there, et cetera. So you're not here
21 to argue and to tell him why he is wrong and what may have been on their
22 mind. You just say he is making a mistake. And that's -- because if you
23 start explaining, then, of course, if you already do that and you're not
24 invited to do that, but then take all of the information in the statement
25 into consideration and not just the part you selected. This is not
1 argument. This is testimony.
2 Please proceed, Ms. Hasan.
3 MS. HASAN: Thank you.
4 Q. Let's move on a little. The communications centre that you set
5 up at the forward command post for the Krivaja 95 operation, now that
6 communication centre was basically mounted on a truck; that's right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And within that vehicle, you had the means to establish
9 communications between -- sorry. You had the means to establish
10 communications with subordinate units of the Drina Corps?
11 A. Both subordinate and superiors.
12 Q. And in that vehicle, you had an RRU-1 device; is that correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now, the members of your unit that were with you at this
15 communications centre, that included Oliver Sekulic; is that correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Momir Bakmaz.
18 A. Bakmaz, yes.
19 Q. I apologise for my pronunciation. Veljko Vukosavljevic?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Mirko Plakalovic.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you recall anyone else?
24 A. There were two or three more soldiers who were with me from the
25 operation in Srebrenica, but I don't remember their names.
1 Q. Now, you left Pribicevac at approximately 1900 hours, is that
2 correct, on the 11th of July? That's what you claim?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And you go --
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And you continue -- you continue to Bratunac and sometime after
7 midnight you arrive in Vlasenica; right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now, you didn't return to Pribicevac after that to set up
10 communications again, did you?
11 A. No.
12 Q. And, in fact, all the components of the communications centre
13 that you had which had been installed for the Krivaja 95 operation moved
14 with you.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. What time on the 12th of July were communications -- was the
17 communications centre at Krivace operational?
18 A. In the early afternoon.
19 Q. And when you moved with your vehicle, am I correct that the
20 communications equipment in your vehicle was not functioning. It was
22 A. No, it was not working.
23 Q. So then from around 1900 hours on the 11th of July, which is when
24 you claim you left Pribicevac, to the time you arrive in Vlasenica, until
25 you set up communications the next day in Krivace, your communication
1 centre, the Drina Corps IKM was out of operation.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. It was not possible during that time to communicate through a
4 teleprinter, was it?
5 A. It was not possible to communicate through that teleprinter that
6 was used at the IKM.
7 MS. HASAN: If we could have a look at 65 ter 4399, please.
8 Q. And what you see here is an 11 July Drina Corps order to block
9 the linking up of the forces of the 28th enemy division with the forces
10 in the enclaves. And it is addressed to a number of commands, including
11 the Drina Corps IKM. You see that there?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And it is marked "very urgent." Now, this is an order from --
14 MS. HASAN: If we turn to the last page.
15 Q. Signed for General Zivanovic. And we see here a received stamp,
16 and it's dated 11 July, 2230 hours, processed 11 July, 2250 hours. And
17 am I correct that this means the cryptographer received this document at
18 2230 hours, he processes it at 2250 hours, and then it gets sent; is that
20 A. He encrypted it up to 2250. Out of that entire telegram, he made
21 an encrypted tape ready for transmission.
22 MS. HASAN: I'd offer 65 ter 4399 into evidence.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P7131, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
1 MS. HASAN: Could we have a look at now D00289, please.
2 Q. And we see here this is a very urgent 11 July order to block the
3 linking up of the forces of the 28th enemy division with the forces in
4 the enclaves, the same order we saw before. And it's a teletyped
6 MS. HASAN: And if we turn to the next page, we see that in
7 handwriting it says "received, 11 July 1995 at 2350." It has a number
8 and it bears a signature. Do you recognise that signature.
9 A. Yes.
14 JUDGE ORIE: We turn into private session.
15 [Private session]
15 [Open session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
18 MS. HASAN:
19 Q. So according to this document, which is addressed to the
20 Drina Corps IKM, it was received on 11 July at 2350 hours when you claim
21 the communications centre of the forward command post was completely
23 Now, I first want to ask you a question about this handwriting.
24 Was it normal at the IKM to -- to write it this way as opposed to the
25 previous document where we saw a stamp. Was that the typical way you
1 noted that a telegram had been received?
2 A. Yes. Because at the IKM, sometimes we didn't have the usual
4 Q. And at the Pribicevac -- when the IKM was at Pribicevac, sir, you
5 did not have that stamp, did you?
6 A. I don't remember that detail because only the encryptor does such
7 things, but I think we didn't have that stamp.
8 Q. And I take it that you take the position that this document which
9 is dated 11th July, 2350, was not received at the Drina Corps IKM as is
10 indicated here?
11 A. Correct. That's my position.
12 Q. And the reason you claim that you dismantled the communications
13 centre at the forward command post is because, in your assessment, the
14 combat was over, you had precise knowledge, information, about where the
15 28th Division was moving, and, therefore, you decided to pick up and go.
16 Did you receive any orders to move the IKM?
17 A. I made my own assessment. Considering that the combat
18 disposition had gone forward and my commander, the commander who was
19 commanding that operation, was very busy with that operation, I decided I
20 would be more useful to him if I followed. Because when the combat lines
21 move forward, the communications centre has to move forward too. And the
22 IKM has to move. I supposed that the commander had forgotten to order me
23 to move the forward command post, and I decided to follow him and follow
24 the combat lines. That's the reason I packed up my equipment and headed
1 Q. The intelligence that you had, you said you received from a radio
2 reconnaissance platoon. Now, the 4th Reconnaissance Platoon was located
3 just about 100 or so metres from the forward command post. Am I right?
4 A. One group of intercepters from that platoon.
5 Q. And it was on the basis of information that they had gathered
6 that you understood -- well, that they knew where the 28th Division was
7 and, on that basis, you decided to move. That's correct?
8 A. Not only based on that information.
9 Q. Well, what other information did you have; and from whom?
10 A. We had information from the units that were in contact with the
11 enemy. That means the units who were in direct fire contact from the
12 enemy. From them, we knew where the enemy was exactly. And the other
13 information we gathered from intercepts.
14 MS. HASAN: So let's take a look at 65 ter 04147.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Should we do that today or should we do that after
17 MS. HASAN: I would prefer to do it today, but I'll leave it your
18 hands, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Well, how much time would that take? I can imagine
20 that sometimes there's a good reason to just conclude a certain portion
21 of the evidence.
22 MS. HASAN: It's just a question of pulling up the document, I'll
23 briefly explain what it is, and have the witness comment on.
24 JUDGE ORIE: We have only a couple of minutes. That would be
1 MS. HASAN: I think it's manageable. I hope so.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Then I would agree. And with the assistance of all
3 those in the booth, you may proceed for those few minutes.
4 MS. HASAN: So 65 ter 04147.
5 Q. This is an interim report from the 4th Radio Reconnaissance
6 Platoon. It's dated the 12th July, and it is passing on information
7 intelligence department, Drina Corps intelligence section -- department.
8 And it's addressed to the Drina Corps Pribicevac forward command post.
9 This is processed by teleprinter; right?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And you'd agree that that's the signature of (redacted) on
12 that document?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And in handwriting, it says "received 12 July at 0740 hours."
15 And it provides:
16 "Commanders and signalsmen, by monitoring this network, we
17 reached the conclusion that they were all present ..."
18 And I'll pause there, "they" being in the previous paragraph it
19 explains Naser's men. And it continues:
20 "That they were heading in a direction unknown to us yet together
21 with the people ... and their groups."
22 You see that there? So how is it possible, sir, that the
23 intelligence being received by the 4th Reconnaissance Platoon was
24 indicating to the Drina Corps Command intelligence department that
25 they -- there was no information about where the 28th Division was? And
1 so I put it to you that, in fact, there was no information to the
2 knowledge of the Drina Corps at that moment about the whereabouts of the
3 28th Division?
4 A. This is information from only one group of interceptors. The
5 radio reconnaissance platoon of the Drina Corps had several intercepting
6 groups in its area of responsibility, and during the execution of the
7 Srebrenica operation, it sent one intercepting group to the centre at
8 Pribicevac. I received information - and not only I - from that group.
9 This report contains information collected by a different intercepting
10 group in a totally different part of the Drina Corps area of
11 responsibility, and you see that reference is made here to Naser's
12 people. Naser, at that time, was in Tuzla, not with the 28th Division.
13 This is information from a different intercepting group, not the one at
15 And I sincerely hope that somebody will ask me how it is possible
16 that this telegram was received on 12 July at Pribicevac where I maintain
17 there was no communications centre.
18 MS. HASAN: Your Honour, I will leave it at that.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Are you tendering this document?
20 MS. HASAN: Yes, I will do that now then. Thank you,
21 Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P7132, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.
25 P7132 is admitted, under seal; and P7131 is to be put under seal
1 as well.
2 We adjourn for the day.
3 Witness, I'd like to instruct you that you should not speak with
4 anyone or communicate in any way with whomever about your testimony. We
5 have no court hearing tomorrow, so therefore we'd like to see you back on
6 Monday morning at 9.30 again.
7 And I take it, Ms. Hasan, then we'll easily conclude the
8 testimony by that day. I'm also looking at Mr. Ivetic.
9 We'd like to see you back then.
10 [The witness stands down]
11 MS. HASAN: Your Honour, I'm not sure that it's necessary --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Could we move into private session, because you were
13 uncertain about whether it has to be under seal. Is that the issue?
14 MS. HASAN: Yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we move into private session very
17 [Private session]
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume on Monday,
15 the 23rd of February, 9.30 in the morning, in this same courtroom, I.
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.24 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Monday, the 23rd day of
18 February, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.