1 Tuesday, 20 October 2015
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: Good morning to everybody in and around the
7 Madam Registrar, please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
11 And just to mention that Judge Orie is not with us this morning
12 for urgent personal business, and Judge Fluegge and I have decided that
13 in the interests of justice we sit pursuant to Rule 15 bis so that we do
14 not waste time.
15 We have heard of no preliminaries from either side. May the
16 witness please be called in.
17 But before we do that, can we go into closed session.
18 [Closed session]
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
13 Sir, you have testified here before.
14 THE WITNESS: I have.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Under protective measures of pseudonym and face
16 distortion. Those protective measures will continue to be applied in
17 this hearing. Because of the pseudonym protective measures, you will be
18 referred to as GRM097. Your name will not be mentioned. Please help the
19 Chamber by also making sure that you do not say anything during your
20 testimony that may reveal your identity.
21 THE WITNESS: Okay. Thank you.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you so much.
23 You will now be examined first by Mr. Ivetic. I see he is
24 standing. Mr. Ivetic is a member of the team of Mr. Mladic's Defence.
25 Mr. Ivetic.
1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 WITNESS: GRM097
3 Examination by Mr. Ivetic:
4 Q. Good morning, sir.
5 A. Good morning.
6 MR. IVETIC: I would like to first ask for 1D4146 in e-court, but
7 it should not be broadcast.
8 Q. And, sir, I would ask you to look at the sheet that is on the
9 screen in front of you. And if you can confirm for us if your personal
10 details are accurately recorded therein.
11 A. They are accurate, yes.
12 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I would tender this document under
13 seal as the next Defence exhibit.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Ivetic.
15 Madam Registrar, may you please give it a number.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D04146 receives Exhibit Number D1297.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Exhibit D1297 is admitted under seal.
18 MR. IVETIC: Now I would like to take a look at 1D4147 on the
19 screen. And if it's easier, I also have a hard copy, with the assistance
20 of the usher, which we can provide to the witness.
21 MS. EDGERTON: I take it this is not being broadcast either.
22 MR. IVETIC: That's -- agreed, should not be broadcast.
23 Q. And, sir, now on the screen and in hard copy, I would ask you do
24 you recognise this written statement which you have before you?
25 A. I do recognise it, yes.
1 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to page 4 in e-court, which is the
2 last page in the hard copy. And again, none of this should be broadcast.
3 Q. Can you confirm for us whose signature appears on this last page
4 of the statement?
5 A. That's my signature.
6 Q. Since signing this statement on the date that is entered on this
7 last page, have you had a chance to look through your entire statement to
8 see if everything is correctly written therein?
9 A. Yes, I have. Yes, at the time I signed it. Yes.
10 Q. And do you stand by everything as being correct as of the date of
11 the giving of this statement?
12 A. I do, yes.
13 MR. IVETIC: And if we could go briefly into private session.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
15 [Private session]
15 [Open session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
18 Yes, Mr. Ivetic.
19 MR. IVETIC:
20 Q. Sir, if I were to ask you questions today arising out of the same
21 factual scenarios as in your written statement, would your answers today
22 to those questions be the same in substance as contained in your written
24 A. They would be.
25 Q. Insofar as you have taken a declaration to tell the truth today,
1 does that mean that what is written in your statement is also truthful in
3 A. It is.
4 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I would tender under seal the document
5 before us, 1D4147, as the next Defence exhibit.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam Registrar, may you please give it a number.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Receives Exhibit Number D1298, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: And D1298 is admitted under seal.
9 MR. IVETIC: And Your Honours we would tender also under seal
10 1D4148 which is the document that is referenced in the footnotes of the
11 statement which we've just admitted.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Any objection, Madam?
13 It's admitted. May it please be given a number, Madam Registrar.
14 THE REGISTRAR: D1299.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Under seal.
16 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours. At this time, I have a
17 short summary of the statement without any identifying information.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. You may proceed, sir.
19 MR. IVETIC: GRM097 was deployed to the former Yugoslavia as an
20 UNPROFOR member in 1994 among other deployments.
21 He notes the Serbs were already being blamed for the Markale
22 shelling on 6 February 1994. Although the assumption was that the Serbs
23 were responsible, UNPROFOR began receiving information that cast doubt on
24 that assumption. It was highly unusual that the Serbs would fire a
25 single round. Given that the height and proximity of buildings to the
1 place where the shell landed, the shell would have come at a very high
2 trajectory, suggesting that it had been fired at close range.
3 UNPROFOR also received information that the shell may have been
4 fired by a Mujahedin group who missed their target.
5 At several meetings with the Bosnian government, General Rose
6 even told the Bosnians that evidence was emerging that the market-place
7 shelling may have been carried out by their side.
8 All the circumstances led the witness to believe that in all
9 probability it was not the Serbs who fired the shell on Markale market.
10 Further, the Bosnian government pursued a strategy of trying to
11 blame Serbs for atrocities in order to obtain international intervention
12 on their side.
13 And that completes the summary.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
15 MR. IVETIC: Now, I'd like to ask some follow-up questions.
16 If we could first --
17 MS. EDGERTON: Just before we go a little bit further and so it
18 doesn't get sort of swept away, could we deal for a moment with the
19 associated exhibits that my friend tendered.
20 D0414 -- pardon me, 1D04148 has just been admitted, but what's
21 been uploaded in e-court doesn't appear to be what 1D04148 has been
22 represented to be. 1D04148, as it's been uploaded, is a photograph. If
23 we could just have a check of that and perhaps deal with it as we go on,
24 but I just wanted to raise the matter before we dealt with the evidence
25 in more detail.
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Ivetic.
2 MR. IVETIC: It should not be the photograph. It should be
3 another document. I suggest that we then -- I suggest that we vacate,
4 for the time being, that document that's been given that number, and then
5 at the break I will check to see what the correct information is and
6 we'll -- or just wait. We could just wait. I'll deal with it at the
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Let's wait and you can deal with it after the
10 MR. IVETIC: Okay. Now -- and again, we should not broadcast the
11 statement, but I'd like to call up the statement which is now D1298 under
13 Q. And I'd like to talk about paragraph number 6 of that statement.
14 And here you say, and I quote:
15 "Although the assumption was that the Serbs were responsible for
16 this shelling, we began to receive information which cast doubt upon that
17 assumption. This information was relayed to us via various reports which
18 were briefed to the General during his routine daily staff updates and
19 his intelligence staff."
20 Can you tell us anything about how reliable the sources of these
21 reports were considered to be?
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Madam.
23 MS. EDGERTON: But we've just -- if we could go into private
24 session for a moment, please.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
1 [Private session]
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
9 Yes, Mr. Ivetic.
10 MR. IVETIC:
11 Q. Sir, can you tell us anything about how reliable the sources of
12 these reports were considered to be within UNPROFOR; that is to say, the
13 reports casting doubt on the responsibility of the Serbs?
14 A. There was a significant amount of information being circulated at
15 the time. The reliability of the sources, you know, at times is
16 questionable, that's why all the information would have been checked.
17 You mentioned the -- one of the options that we understood was -- what
18 happened was that the Mujahedin group, which we'd not seen in Sarajevo,
19 had targeted a -- a group of Jews leaving the city. That was just one
20 report that came in which we then couldn't verify. Other reports then
21 came from in from Sector Sarajevo from the French headquarters, from the
22 UNMOs who were stationed around -- around the city. We also had our own
23 national intelligence sources that we were fed into the headquarters.
24 And again, they were at the same time looking at the totality of
25 information based on different sources and making judgements.
1 So, it was, you know, throughout the whole period we, on the day
2 of the market massacre, weren't actually in the city. We were in Croatia
3 and then moved into Bosnia to be with the Bosnian Croats in and around
4 Mostar. And so it was only then when we got back to the headquarters the
5 following day, on the 6th, that the General was then appraised of the
6 totality of the situation, the investigations that had taken place. And
7 throughout the whole course of that day and the days following, the
8 weight of the evidence was suggesting that it wasn't carried out by the
10 Q. And now in paragraph number 7, starting on the last two lines --
11 two words on this page and bleeding on to the next page, it is said:
12 "The initial assessment (redacted) was that if it was
13 a mortar round that had been fired by the Serbs, the firing point would
14 have been at the most forward of their front line. Mortars are
15 doctrinally deployed in depth, to the rear of the forward trenches, but
16 within their effective ranges for their own force protection."
17 Can you explain for us why per doctrine mortars are deployed in
19 A. Very simply, in terms of you would make maximum uses of the
20 ranges available to you. Somewhere like Sarajevo, for example, different
21 parts of the city could be targeted by different firing positions. What
22 you wouldn't want to do was to have your fire-power deployed forward,
23 which would make it vulnerable first of all to counter-battery fire if it
24 was within range of your own mortar position, but also, more importantly,
25 vulnerable to potential infiltration or infantry assault. So given that
1 any artillery or mortar position would have to be properly bedded in,
2 properly safeguarded in terms of protection, and therefore the last thing
3 that you wanted to do, necessarily, was to keep moving it. Although,
4 with mortars, that's the benefit of that fire system. It could be easily
5 quickly deployed.
6 So you would have it in depth, ideally in dead ground. Certainly
7 not in a forward position that would make it vulnerable.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Ms. Edgerton.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Can we go into private session, please, for a
10 moment, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
12 [Private session]
11 Page 40058 redacted. Private session.
9 [Open session]
10 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Madam Registrar.
12 Yes, Mr. Ivetic.
13 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
14 Q. Sir, in this paragraph you describe the buildings and their
15 proximity to where the shell landed at the market. Did you have occasion
16 to visit the site or is this information based upon what others had told
18 A. We had occasion to visit the site. It was in the centre of the
19 city, and so shortly thereafter, I think literally on the next day when
21 think, visited the site. And obviously, you know, throughout the whole
22 war while I was there for that period.
23 Q. Now you've already mentioned one of the ultimate reports talking
24 about it being an errant shell being from a Mujahedin group that had
25 missed their target. What information did UNPROFOR have as to the
1 Mujahedin in Bosnia or in to Sarajevo?
2 A. With regards to the whole presence of Mujahedin around Bosnia,
3 I'm not entirely sure of the exact details. All I can do is reference
4 you to my own experiences. Prior to this operational tour, I was
5 operating in Central Bosnia, and we did come across them in Central
6 Bosnia, both, you know, home-grown Mujahedin in many respects and also
7 foreign fighters. But we -- certainly during the period of time that we
8 were in Sarajevo, I didn't see any in Sarajevo. So this was a report
9 that came in from one of our sources, and then after that it was probably
10 discounted on the grounds that it couldn't be verified.
11 Q. And you identified the totality of the reporting and the
12 circumstances earlier. Did the totality of the reporting arriving at
13 UNPROFOR discuss, apart from this potential Mujahedin source, did it
14 discuss any other alternate sources for the shell in question?
15 A. As I said, there was different viewpoints. Some said it was
16 detonated in situ. Some said it was obviously fired from, you know,
17 within the city itself to make it look as if it was the Serbs. There was
18 also reports that it was -- the mortar was thrown or a device was thrown
19 from the building immediately to its front, to the north -- north-east,
20 wherever it was. But again, some of these couldn't be verified.
21 There was an analysis carried out by an artillery officer from
22 within the headquarters who -- his assessment at the time was that, based
23 on his experience and his understanding, that it was then fired from the
24 Serb side as opposed to any of the two sides.
25 Q. And in paragraph number 10, which is on this page, and I won't
1 mention the name of the individual, but in relation to saying that the
2 Serbs were guilty of the previous shelling and that there was an
3 inference to this incident. First of all, to what previous shelling does
4 your statement refer to?
5 A. The -- the day before the attack on the Markale market-place,
6 there was a shelling of Dobrinja, which is one of suburbs of Sarajevo,
7 close to the airport, where on that occasion around five mortar rounds
8 landed killing about ten people and wounded a number more. (redacted)
14 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, we may want to do a redaction to be on
15 the safe side as to line 11.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
17 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
13 And you will remember the two redactions, Madam Registrar. Thank
14 you so much.
15 Yes, Mr. Ivetic.
16 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
17 Q. Dealing just briefly with the Dobrinja shelling we've just
18 discussed, was there an analysis performed of that shelling by UNPROFOR?
19 A. There was by Sector Sarajevo, yes.
20 Q. Do you recall who would have performed that analysis?
21 A. Colonel Sonnic, who was the Chief of Staff of Sector Sarajevo,
22 was present at the scene.
23 Q. Were there any armija BiH units or facilities in the Dobrinja
24 neighbourhood that UNPROFOR had knowledge of?
25 A. Yes, there was. There was at least a brigade formation, an
1 infantry brigade, in Dobrinja, which we visited after the cease-fire.
2 Q. And do you have any knowledge of where those units were situated
3 in Dobrinja in relation to where the shelling occurred?
4 A. Not exactly, but they were in and around the area.
5 Q. Now, returning to Markale. Based on the totality of the
6 reporting that was coming into UNPROFOR about this incident, what was the
7 vibe or feeling of others in UNPROFOR as to who was ultimately
8 responsible for that shelling?
9 A. As I said, within the headquarters, as the information kept
10 coming in, it was being verified, was being examined by the G2, the
11 intelligence staff within the headquarters, and the briefings took place
12 which suggested that it had been carried out by the -- by the Bosnians
13 themselves, Bosnian Muslims themselves. It was quite an extraordinary
14 sort of feeling at that time that we'd heard previously on arrival when
15 we were briefed that the Bosnian government side were prone to staging
16 events, you know, and this, of course, was our first real example where,
17 you know, they'd potentially fired upon their own people, whether it was
18 directed or whether it was carried out by another agency of the Bosnian
19 government without, dare I say, the official sanction of the president or
20 whoever. But it was, you know, quite unbelievable sort of atmosphere in
21 the headquarters when we were realising the extent of, A, the tragedy,
22 and who perpetrated it.
23 Q. Now taking into account the time of your entire deployment to the
24 theatre, did you have any other instances or facts that you experienced
25 that led you to conclude that the BiH side was engaging in shelling its
1 own territory in Sarajevo?
2 A. That's obviously a difficult question to answer. But certainly,
3 you know, whenever something was going to be taking place, you know, it's
4 always convenient that Sarajevo would be shelled. This is one of the
5 reasons why mortar-locating radar was brought into the city very shortly
6 after the cease-fire to start verifying where rounds were coming from.
7 And from the reports that those radar operators gleaned from their
8 systems, on a number of occasions they did discover that mortar rounds
9 were fired from within the city at certain targets.
10 I always remember, I can't recall when it was, seeing a -- a news
11 report on television where the back of the Presidency building was being
12 filmed, static filming. There was no interviews taking place but just a
13 camera pointing at the Presidency building, and the rocket then suddenly
14 hits literally the centre of the frame. Which again, you know, a rocket
15 coming at low altitude could only have come from a certain area of the
16 city so close to the Presidency building. (redacted)
20 MR. IVETIC: And now if we can go into private session for some
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
23 [Private session]
11 Pages 40065-40071 redacted. Private session.
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
13 Yes, Mr. Ivetic.
14 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
15 Q. Now, in paragraph 15 of your statement you talk about experiences
16 in Sarajevo that the Bosnian government pursued a strategy of trying to
17 blame Serbs for atrocities in order to obtain international intervention.
18 You say examples of this were the ongoing fire of mortars from schools,
19 hospitals, and other civilian areas and from areas adjacent to UN
20 positions, which would draw return fire from the Serbs in those areas.
21 And you also say that:
22 "Throughout the subsequent cease-fire for Sarajevo, signed by
23 both sides, the Bosnian Government Military were guilty of the vast
24 majority of the breaches of its terms."
25 Now, in relation to the cease-fire that was signed and that is
1 the subject matter of this paragraph, what was UNPROFOR's stated position
2 as to what would happen if a side failed to adhere to the terms of that
4 A. The agreement was equally applicable to the Bosnian government as
5 it was to the Bosnian Serbs, and the NATO ultimatum certainly in terms of
6 the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the compliance to the terms of the
7 agreement was reaffirmed. And certainly one of the press briefings that
8 General Rose gave with Vice-President Ganic, where Vice-President Ganic
9 said that General Rose would carry out the agreement to the word should
10 the Serbs not comply. And General Rose, in front of the press, again
11 confirmed that it was equally applicable to the Bosnian government side
12 as well.
13 Q. Now, in relation to the outgoing fire that you identify in this
14 paragraph from civilian areas, was the intensity of the same affected by
15 any events in particular?
16 A. I think you have to realise that the Bosnian government was
17 physically located in amongst its own people, because that's how they
18 were. At the end of the day, the Serbs were outside the city or within
19 suburbs of the city itself. And therefore, when I refer to firing
20 amongst the, you know, the civilian population, that's because that's how
21 they were physically deployed. There wasn't a delineation of civilians
22 and military. They were -- they were mixed together.
23 And so, you know, around this time immediately prior to the, you
24 know -- from the point when we first arrived, very soon thereafter there
25 were certainly sniper fire and outgoing sort of mortar rounds from behind
1 our building, in our view, designed to create a retaliation from the
2 Bosnian Serb side. And then during the actual cease-fire itself, as it
3 was put into place, there was a number of violations which we constantly
4 complained to the Bosnian government on, the fact that the Bosnians were
5 breaking this -- breaching this cease-fire with a view to provoking the
6 Serbs into retaliation.
7 Q. And now during your deployment as part of UNPROFOR, were NATO air
8 strikes against the Bosnian Muslim side ever ordered or requested by
9 UNPROFOR for breaches of the cease-fire agreement that you've just
11 A. Not in relation to the cease-fire. Prior to the use of close air
12 support in Gorazde, that was the first time that NATO had -- in
13 support of the United Nations had used close air support. But as early
14 on as February, maybe early March, there were two occasions where UN
15 forces were being attacked by, in one case the Bosnian Croats, first of
16 all, in the area of Fojnica, and then what we believed were Bosnian
17 government forces in the region of Ribnica. Close air support was
18 requested for those acts but wasn't carried out.
19 Q. To your knowledge -- or what was your knowledge of the position
20 of NATO as to the prospect of carrying out air strikes against the
21 Bosnian Muslims?
22 A. I had, you know -- I had no talks with NATO commanders. That was
23 something which was done at the higher levels. But all of us realised
24 that it was highly unlikely that NATO would strike Bosnian government
25 forces irrespective of the circumstances.
1 Q. Now, in paragraph 16 of your statement, which we also should not
2 broadcast, you talk about the Bosnian government refusing to approve a
3 water system established by an American humanitarian activist in the
4 pretext that the water was not clean enough. And you say "because the
5 government did not want to alleviate the suffering of civilians in
7 Can you explain for us what you mean here when you say "the
8 government did not want to alleviate the suffering of civilians in
10 A. The impact of the cease-fire, from our perspective, was an
11 opportunity to return the city to normality. And one of the things which
12 the people were desperate for, given the time of year, was for their
13 electricity to be able to be turned on, particularly at night, for the
14 gas to come on, and for them to have running water. Because at this
15 stage, obviously for the last 18 months or however long it was, people
16 were having to go down to the river, which was unclean, in order to get
17 their water. And so one of the things which we had an issue with with
18 the Bosnian government was the fact that the US government through
19 Fred Cuny, who was a US government employee, had established this water
20 treatment plant designed to purify the water, which could have -- when
21 turned on would be able to give a substantial part of the population
22 clean running water and therefore wouldn't need them to go to the river
23 to get the actual water supplies.
24 And literally, you know, in fact Madeleine Albright, when she
25 visited Sarajevo with General Shalikashvili, went to visit this water
1 treatment plant because it was, you know, such an important facility.
2 And then as soon as it was finished, they turned the water on, and the
3 Bosnian government refused to allow them to supply its own people with
4 water. They said it wasn't clean enough, which was ridiculous.
5 And certainly our view was because we'd effectively established a
6 cease-fire, therefore Sarajevo now wasn't in the news for the reasons
7 that the Bosnian government wanted Sarajevo, let's say, to be in the
8 news, to maintain a narrative of a city under siege, you know, people
9 suffering. People were now walking the streets, and so this eroded the
10 narrative from the government perspective. And this was yet another
11 example where they wanted the suffering to continue because that's what
12 hit the headlines, and of course it was something which, from a UN
13 perspective, we were all trying to end. We were -- we wanted to restore
14 normality as best we could for the people themselves.
15 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, we are at the break.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
17 Mr. Witness, it's time to take a break. We'll come back in
18 20 minutes' time. But before you leave the room, could we please go into
19 closed session.
20 [Closed session]
16 [Open session]
17 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Madam Registrar.
19 Mr. Ivetic, I'm sure you want to continue --
20 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: -- in open session.
22 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
24 MR. IVETIC:
25 Q. Sir, you had previously mentioned mortar-identifying radar in
1 Sarajevo. Who was it that operated that mortar-firing identification
3 A. They were members of the British army contingent of UNPROFOR from
4 the Royal Regiment of Royal Artillery.
5 Q. Were there any instances that you recall where the reporting of
6 outgoing rounds from Sarajevo by UNMO differed from that which was being
7 otherwise reported or known to UNPROFOR?
8 A. We were only there for a relatively short period of time when
9 there was fire taking place in Sarajevo because of the -- the cease-fire.
10 But immediately the night before the -- on -- I think it was the first
11 day after the cease-fire had taken place, that evening we heard from
12 behind, again, the residency, the fact that mortar rounds had been fired
13 towards the Bosnian Serb positions. Complaints were made to the Bosnian
14 government Ministry of Defence through their liaison officer, Chef de
15 Cabinet Zijad Sisic, that these fire breaches were taking place.
16 General Divjak still at that time had responsibility for
17 negotiations with us. He complained that we were not reporting
18 cease-fire violations by the Bosnian Serb army. (redacted)
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just before you go on, I'm not sure you answered
1 the question and I'm also not sure what the question was.
2 Mr. Ivetic, you question was:
3 "Were there any instances that you recall where the reporting of
4 outgoing rounds from Sarajevo by UNMO ..."
5 Were there shots -- rounds fired by UNMO?
6 MR. IVETIC: The reporting by UNMO.
7 THE WITNESS: Around -- around the city of Sarajevo, we had the
8 United Nations Monitoring Officers deployed.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: But then the question continues to say whether
10 they differed from that which was being otherwise reported or known to
12 I'm not sure whether that answer -- this answers that part of the
14 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I believe the witness has stated that
15 the reporting was of 11 incoming rounds as opposed to outgoing rounds,
16 when in fact the knowledge was that they were outgoing rounds, based upon
17 the activities that the witness described and the complaints made to the
18 Bosnian government Ministry of Defence.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Well, I thought your question was intended to find
20 out -- to get a comparison between the firing which was being reported
21 otherwise or known to UNPROFOR in comparison with what the reporting they
22 had received. But if you're satisfied with the answer, I'm happy with
24 MR. IVETIC: I think I need one clarification further from the
25 witness. When he says it was reported that there were 11 incoming rounds
1 as opposed to outgoing rounds.
2 Q. Who was reporting the 11 incoming rounds as opposed to outgoing
4 A. (redacted)
6 MR. IVETIC: And let's go briefly into private session.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: May the Chamber please move into private session.
8 [Private session]
11 Pages 40081-40107 redacted. Private session.
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
15 Yes, Mr. Ivetic.
16 MR. IVETIC:
17 Q. Sir, first of all we're in open session, so please be careful of
18 what you say so as not to personally identify yourself.
19 In relation to the close air support around Gorazde in 1994, how
20 did the Bosnian Serb army perceive UNPROFOR after commencement of that
21 air support?
22 A. The view was that we'd sided with the Bosnian government against
24 Q. And what actions were taken by the Serb side with respect to UN
1 A. We had at that stage roughly 150 military observers or soldiers
2 from UNPROFOR who were either acting as observers or safeguarding the
3 weapon collection points in terms of maintaining control, and they were
4 all effectively detained, effectively, in a hostage-type situation.
5 Q. And how were they treated when they were so detained?
6 A. As far as we were concerned they were well treated. I don't
7 think that the soldiers themselves or the Bosnian Serb military viewed
8 them as combatants in that physical role. I think their issue was more
9 with the United Nations hierarchy, which was ourselves, who had ordered
10 the close air support on their forces around Gorazde.
11 Q. And in terms of communications emanating from the Serb side, how
12 did they refer to the situation and react?
13 A. We -- we were openly described by General Mladic as aggressors
14 who had, you know, who had struck the Serbian people, and therefore he
15 demanded that we stop all air action against his forces.
16 Q. Now, in relation to Sarajevo, and you earlier talked about weapon
17 collection points, I'd like to show you a document.
18 MR. IVETIC: D112 in e-court. I also have a hard copy, with the
19 assistance of the usher.
20 Q. This is -- while we wait for you to get the hard copy, this is
21 dated 16 August 1994, from Akashi to Annan, and it discusses weapon
22 collection points and the problem caused by BiH threats and potential BiH
23 violations of the exclusion zone. And here on the first page, it says
24 essentially prompting the BSA to seek to withdraw weapons from weapon
25 collection points.
1 On the second page of this document, if we can go to that, it
2 says in the paragraph number 3 that -- it talks about an attachment
3 protocol which recognises the BSA's legitimate right of self-defence if
4 they come under pressure from the BiH.
5 First of all, sir, prior to yesterday in proofing with myself,
6 had you ever seen this cable, the first two pages of which we have now
7 seen in e-court and the hard copy of which is in your hands?
8 A. I have not -- I wasn't in Bosnia in August, so I've not seen the
9 first two pages. I've seen the third page which were the points of the
10 agreement. I hadn't previously seen the protocol, which is dated 19th of
11 February, because I wasn't at that meeting.
12 Q. Now, have you had a chance to read through the protocol of
13 understanding which is, I believe, page 4 in e-court and 5 in e-court of
14 this exhibit?
15 A. Yes, I have.
16 Q. And what are your comments of how this protocol either compares
17 or departs from the actual situation on the ground relating to
18 enforcement of the weapon collection points?
19 A. The protocol is in line with the principle of the establishment
20 of the weapon collection points. You will recall originally the Bosnian
21 government request was to have all their weapons -- all the Bosnian Serb
22 weapons withdrawn 30 kilometres from Sarajevo. That was then reduced to
23 20 kilometres from Sarajevo. And then Bosnian Serbs concerns that they
24 would be left defenceless if the Bosnian government forces were to break
25 the cease-fire and then go on the offensive were then met by the
1 establishment of between nine and ten, I don't exactly recall, weapon
2 collection points which would be controlled by UNPROFOR. But the
3 understanding was that if required, the Serbs could have access to their
4 weapons to defend themselves.
5 Q. And did a situation ever arise, to your knowledge, where the
6 Serbs sought to exercise their right of self-defence by retaking weapons
7 from weapon collection points?
8 A. Not in my time when I was there. These weapon collection points
9 had been surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces during the crisis in Gorazde.
10 I don't recall if any of those weapons were actually removed from those
11 sites, but in my time there they didn't breach the accord.
12 Q. And I'd like to show you a second document, P629. And again, I
13 have a hard copy in addition to the one that will be shown on the screen.
14 With the assistance of the usher, we can get that to you. And this is
15 dated 12 September 1994.
16 MR. IVETIC: I apologise. This is a different number. It's a
17 different document.
18 Q. We'll skip that and I'll deal with that and we'll deal with that
19 tomorrow, and I'll go to another line of questioning since apparently we
20 have the wrong document number again.
21 In relation to Sarajevo --
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I think the hard copy can be given back to the
24 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
25 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, I'd just like to take a note of the number so
1 that we can prepare for this as well.
2 MR. IVETIC:
3 Q. In relation to the incoming artillery and mortar fire in
4 Sarajevo, how would you best describe it according to available military
5 terminology and tactic for such fire?
6 A. In the short time that we were there, it was quite sporadic.
7 There is normally three types of artillery fire, which is destructive,
8 neutralising, or suppressive. And so even suppressive fire which is
9 designed to disrupt an enemy in a relatively short period of time is used
10 and as part of that it may continue to harass or be described as
11 harassing fire.
12 Q. Could you tell us from a military perspective a little bit more
13 about this concept of harassing firing?
14 A. It's designed to, you know, keep the opposition on edge, to
15 deprive them of the ability to conduct operations in a stable
16 environment. It's -- obviously creates fatigue. It creates, dare I say,
17 fear. And ultimately you never know when you're going to get hit,
18 because it's not a prelude to a major attack. It's something which, in
19 those types of operations, are designed to keep the enemy occupied.
20 Q. And is harassing fire a legitimate military tactic taught in the
21 British armed forces?
22 A. We normally refer to it as suppressive fire. It's understood as
23 harassing fire, and certainly in US military doctrine it's physically
24 described as harassing fire, as I understand it.
25 Q. And in relation to -- you've identified that the -- that the
1 Bosnian government forces were in and amongst their people in Sarajevo --
2 strike that. Let me put the question this way.
3 In the instances that you described earlier of Bosnian government
4 forces firing from civilian areas, what, if anything, did the Bosnian
5 government forces do to -- with respect to civilians that were still in
6 those areas from where they were mounting fire missions?
7 A. As I described earlier, you know, regrettably for the population
8 of Sarajevo, they were in amongst the soldiers. I -- you know, I do not
9 recall specific events, dare I say. But ultimately, you know, the
10 Bosnian government soldiers would fire from civilian areas because they
11 were there to defend those civilian areas, and inevitably when they fired
12 on the Bosnian Serbs, counter-battery fire would then return. At the
13 same time, others would fire at those areas where they were targeting
14 civilians or military depending on what their motives were. So
15 regrettably, this is what happens when you have civilians intermingled
16 with military in a siege-type of operation.
17 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I see we are at the 12.00 point, so I
18 think we need to adjourn for the day. I can also report that I will deal
19 with the one document for which we had the wrong number and thus the
20 continuation of my direct will be a little bit shorter than I had
21 anticipated. It will only be, I think, dealing with just that one
22 document, some questions arising from the same. So I wanted to give fair
23 notice of that to the other side.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
25 Sir, unfortunately we've got to end the hearing for the day
1 today. But before we release you, I just want to warn you that you may
2 not talk to anybody about the evidence you've testified to or you still
3 have to testify to until you are excused from further hearings. So
4 please make sure that you don't talk to anybody about that.
5 May we please move into closed session.
6 [Closed session]
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, madam.
15 We'll adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow morning,
16 Wednesday, the 21st of October, 2015, at 9.30, same courtroom, I. Court
18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 12.02 p.m.,
19 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 21st day
20 of October, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.