1 Monday, 16 November 2015
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.31 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Morning, Your Honours. This is case IT-09-92-T,
9 The Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 No preliminaries were announced. Could the witness be escorted
12 in the courtroom.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Kovac.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kovac, I'd like to remind you that you're still
18 bound by the solemn declaration that you've given at the beginning of
19 your testimony.
20 Mr. Ivetic will now continue his examination-in-chief.
21 Mr. Ivetic.
22 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
23 WITNESS: MITAR KOVAC [Resumed]
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 Examination by Mr. Ivetic: [Continued]
1 Q. Good morning, General.
2 A. Good morning.
3 Q. We left off last week talking about your report, and I'd like to
4 again call up in e-court 1D5358, and page 259 in Serbian, page 261 in
5 English. It will be, I think, the previous page -- or the next page in
6 the B/C/S.
7 And here you have a list of attachments. Can you explain the
8 significance of the attachments to your report.
9 A. Attachments are defined, like in every monograph, every study, so
10 as to include important information or to substantiate with arguments the
11 information given in the body of the text. The attachments are provided
12 mainly in the form of schematics, charts, maps, plans, et cetera. I
13 think they carry some information which is not expressed in the body of
14 the text, or they make it more precise and clarify it.
15 Q. Okay. And if we could turn briefly to 1D5359 in e-court. I
16 think we see the same list before us. And ...
17 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
18 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand, Mr. Ivetic, that we have this
19 document in e-court twice. I don't know whether it's the same or ...
20 MR. IVETIC: I don't either. I will --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar has opened the first version of it.
22 Could you please try to find out what happened during the first break.
23 MR. IVETIC: We will, Your Honours. We will.
24 And, if we could, for the time being, just look at pages 2,3 and
25 4, in sequence, of the original and I guess, the translation. If the
1 version that's been opened has those pages. Now I don't know whether
2 what's been opened has those pages or not. It appears that it does.
3 Here's page 2 before us on the screen, for instance.
4 Q. And are these the attachments that we were just discussing
6 A. Yes, it's one of the attachments.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
8 MR. WEBER: Good morning, Your Honours. I had just a quick
9 opportunity to compare the two different uploads. I do see there's a
10 difference in the number of pages in the uploads in the B/C/S versions.
11 I just want to note that it appears that both versions, I cannot locate
12 specifically attachment 5 and I'm not sure that if all attachments are
13 uploaded. If they are not, could that please happen.
14 MR. IVETIC: They are not all uploaded. Some of the maps are too
15 big to ho into e-court. So we're trying to get those copied and that's
16 why we're not going to tender this at this time, since we still have to
17 provide the large map to the Prosecution and find a way to get it
18 reproduced so as to be able to introduce it with the rest of the
19 attachments. We should be getting the original in a day or so to be able
20 to try to do that.
21 JUDGE ORIE: We will then hear from you, Mr. Ivetic.
22 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Meanwhile, please proceed.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Before you do, it doesn't like the two schematics
25 on the screen are the same thing.
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 MR. IVETIC: I think that's why I asked for pages 2 and 3. I
3 think the schematic continues on the next page in English even if the
4 lines do not --
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Overlapping speakers] ... thank you.
6 MR. IVETIC: But I could be wrong.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
8 MR. IVETIC: Okay. We'll leave that for the time being.
9 Q. Now, what we have before us is a sketch of the HVO. I want to
10 ask you a general question, sir, in relation to the VRS, the ABiH and the
11 HVO armies, what -- how would you describe them in a military sense?
12 What kind of army type best describes these armies?
13 A. In several places in my report, I emphasise that in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina the war was a traditional civil war in terms of all
15 the elements that characterise a civil war. That in such a form of
16 conflict of national interests of the constituent peoples in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslim, Serbs, and Croats, armed formations were
18 gradually built. These armies have all the characteristics of
19 territorial, militia-type armies, created and built up during the war and
20 the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Considering that I've given a lot of information in my report, I
22 don't want to go into detail and waste time, but these are basically
23 militia-type armies. Armies that are territorial in character.
24 Q. Okay. And in terms of the chronology of the formation of these
25 three armies, the HVO, ABiH, and the VRS, what was the chronology of
1 which was -- what was formed when?
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
3 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, just so we have a clear record, if the
4 witness could break it down by individual formation or army.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Ivetic, would it be a good idea to take
7 them one by one? But if you --
8 MR. IVETIC: [Overlapping speakers] ...
9 JUDGE ORIE: It's your witness and sometimes chronology may cover
10 several ones. I leave it in your hands how to proceed. You're now aware
11 of what Mr. Weber --
12 MR. IVETIC: Okay --
13 JUDGE ORIE: -- would prefer.
14 MR. IVETIC: All right. Let do it this way then.
15 Q. General, in relation to the HVO, in relation to the other two
16 army, the VRS and the ABiH, when was it formed? Chronologically.
17 A. The beginnings of the establishment of the HVO date back to the
18 period when the Croatian army entered the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina
19 in the area of Bosnian Posavina and western Herzegovina; mainly western
20 Herzegovina where paramilitary units of the HOS were still active. The
21 Croatian Defence Council was established and built up using all the
22 logistics of the Croatian army from the time when the Croatian army was
23 clashing with the JNA in the area of western Herzegovina and, after that,
24 in the area of Kupres.
25 As for the BH army, the roots, the beginnings of the BH army were
1 described in the decisions of the political movement, SDA, the Party for
2 Democratic Actions, and continued to be developed from May 1991 after the
3 formation of the Patriotic League; that is to say, the beginning of the
4 civil war, and the Patriotic League directed all its decisions at
5 providing the material, the ideological and every other basis for the
6 future arming, using resources seized from the JNA and taken from one
7 part of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
8 In terms of its concept and political options, the Croatian and
9 Serbian people differed in their attitude towards Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 They sought and there strove to preserve nationally compact territories
11 of their own, whereas the Party of Democratic Action, in its strategic
12 concept, saw a unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is to say, one state
13 without any territorial divisions dominated by a Muslim majority. For
14 that reason, the Army of Republika Srpska was created last because they
15 had the feeling that Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain as a whole in a
16 so-called rump Yugoslavia, a smaller Yugoslavia. After the referendum in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina and especially after the decision of the Presidency of
18 the former SFRY, they understood that their strategic objective to remain
19 in the rump Yugoslavia was inachievable [as interpreted]. That's when
20 the Territorial Defence of the Serbian people was created in
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then by decision of the assembly on 12th May, the
22 Army of Republika Srpska was also established.
23 After the withdrawal of the units of the Yugoslav People's Army
24 from Bosnia, room was created for the clashes between these three
25 national armies.
1 Q. Okay. And now I'd to call up again your report, 1D5358.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: While that comes up, may I ask a follow-up
4 Mr. Kovac, you talked about the HVO but without any time-frame.
5 Can you help us with that?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I did mention that it
7 was the entry of Croatian units in the area of western Herzegovina and
8 Bosnian Posavina. In Bosnian Posavina, that happened even before the
9 clashes in Sarajevo, in the first half of April 1992; whereas, in western
10 Herzegovina that period began much earlier, some eight months earlier, in
11 May and June 1991.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
13 Mr. Ivetic.
14 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
15 Q. If we could turn to page 6 in both versions of the report, both
16 languages, I'd like to look at part of paragraph 10 with you, and it is
17 the -- starts in the middle of the last line in the bottom of the page in
18 English and it says: "It is important to note that it was not an
19 international conflict, nor was it ..."
20 MR. IVETIC: And we have to turn the page in English.
21 Q. "... any kind of aggression on BH by Yugoslavia. In question was
22 a classical civil war of a religious and ethnic character with a
23 significant participation of the Croatian army in parts of BH throughout
24 the course of the war."
25 Now, you have already again today mentioned a classical civil
1 war. Militarily speaking, what are the characteristics or attributes of
2 a war that is a classical civil war?
3 A. Militarily speaking, the main features of a civil war are
4 determined by political dimensions; namely, the political aims of the
5 conflicting parties in any state. On that basis, strategic objectives
6 are defined. On that basis, armed formations are defined. And all the
7 other elements are built up during the war.
8 In this paragraph, it is precisely stated that the war in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a war between states. No armed forces from
10 outside came to that war from outside except the Croatian forces in a
11 particular period that are mentioned. Other features of a civil war are
12 that there is not enough professional personnel in armed formations, and
13 the fate of the people is closely attached to armed units. Whenever
14 armed units move, they are followed by the people.
15 Also, from experience and from research into wars even before
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, another feature is that it's impossible to completely
17 exercise will from the strategic to the tactical level because there are
18 a multitude of armed units that are difficult to place under command
19 control, and the civilian population of the warring parties suffer. And
20 population is frequently moved to territories controlled by one's own
21 armed units.
22 I could go on, but these are the main characteristics of a civil
23 war, national or religious.
24 I also emphasised that in this war the religious conflict between
25 the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina was prominent.
1 Q. Okay. That was going to be my next question. In relation to the
2 religious aspect of the war, if we can take a look at paragraph 12 of
3 your report and we have to go on the next page in the Serbian to do that.
4 And in this paragraph, in the second part of the paragraph, you
5 mention a text called "The Islamic Declaration," authored by Alija
6 Izetbegovic and it is mentioned multiple times in your report.
7 I would first like to ask: How was that book received when it
8 was published in 1990?
9 A. First of all, let me note that Alija Izetbegovic during his life
10 expressed determinations of that type in his ties with the organisation
11 of Young Muslims, and that means extremist activity and organisation of
12 the state based on political Islam. "The Islamic Declaration" in that
13 context is a platform for organising and structuring Bosnia-Herzegovina
14 as a unitarian state dominated by the Muslim people, with relations
15 between people and a system of values that is not close to the Croatian
16 and Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One can say that "The Islamic
17 Declaration" was met by Serbs and Croats as a threat; that is, creating a
18 basis for conflict between peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And from 1990,
19 the Muslim people in their majority was accepted -- the Muslim people
20 accepted it as a basis for their organisation and for the creation of the
21 Green Berets and, later, their own army.
22 Q. I'd like to highlight a few portions of that book to ask you some
23 questions. So if we could please call up in e-court D557 MNA, and we'll
24 need the bottom of page 29 in the English and page 22 in Serbian, the
25 second paragraph from the top.
1 And, here, sir, the text in the English says: "First and
2 foremost of these conclusions is certainly the incompatibility of Islam
3 with non-Islamic systems. There can be neither peace nor co-existence
4 between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political
5 institutions. The failure of these institutions to function and the
6 instability of the regimes in Muslim countries manifest in frequent
7 change and coup d'etat is most often the consequence of their a priori
8 opposition to Islam, as the fundamental and foremost feeling of the
9 peoples in these countries. But claiming the right to order its own
10 world itself, Islam obviously excludes the right or possibility of action
11 on the part of any foreign idealogy on that terrain. There is it,
12 therefore, no lay principle, and the state should both reflect and
13 support religious moral concepts."
14 Sir, militarily speaking, how do you interpret this first
15 selection that we've read from "The Islamic Declaration" of
16 Mr. Izetbegovic?
17 A. In my previous answer, I talked about political Islam. I thought
18 that this concept contains within itself all these things quoted here and
19 political Islam implies a system of values and an organisation of social
20 relations based on Islam and exclusivity vis-ā-vis other peoples and
21 faiths and their exclusion from state administration and government.
22 This excerpt that you quoted says, generally speaking, that these
23 positions are an operalisation [as interpreted] of political Islam and
24 they reflect the attitude of Alija Izetbegovic and the top leadership of
25 the party towards organising the future state as uniatic [as interpreted]
1 and Islamic. It is that attitude that was the trigger for the resistance
2 of the other two constituent people in terms of how the future of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised.
4 I can comment in detail on each of these concepts, but I believe
5 the basic idea is reflected in this paragraph.
6 Q. And I'd like to just highlight one more part of this book by
7 going to page 55 in the English and it will be the second paragraph under
8 "Islamic governance" and it will be page 43 in the Serbian in the middle
9 of the page.
10 And it reads as follows: "We must therefore be, first, preachers
11 and then soldiers. Our weapons are personal example, the book and word.
12 When is force to be joined to these? The choice of this moment is always
13 a tangible one, and depends on a series of factors. There is, however, a
14 general rule. The Islamic movement should and can start to take over
15 power as soon as it is morally and numerically strong enough to be able
16 to overturn not only the existing non-Islamic government, but also to
17 build up a new Islamic one. This differentiation is important."
18 Sir, militarily speaking, what do these words in "The Islamic
19 Declaration," what are they calling for, what kind of action?
20 A. Specifically without going into any detailed descriptions, this
21 kind of concept and conclusions means that armed formations should be
22 established and that they would create a new Islamic government and a new
23 Islamic state, according to the wishes and will of a Islamic political
24 system. That is the basis of "The Islamic Declaration." That is the
25 core of "The Islamic Declaration" as a platform for activity in
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I expressed that a moment ago when I spoke about the
2 Patriotic League and the Green Berets that were paramilitary formations
3 that preceded the establishment of the BH army.
4 Q. Okay.
5 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, at this time the Defence would tender
6 D557 MNA.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
8 MR. WEBER: Your Honours, this exhibit was last discussed, I
9 believe, on the 22nd of January 2015 at transcript page 30443. At that
10 time the Defence had tried to tender this 77-page declaration and the
11 Chamber had requested submissions from the Defence as to why the whole
12 portions are relevant. I believe that we're in the same position. If
13 the Defence would like to file those submissions, we're willing to
14 accordingly respond to them. On the last time that it came up, the
15 Chamber had set a deadline and there were no submissions that had been
16 received by the Defence, so the Trial Chamber denied the admission of
17 D557 without prejudice at the time. So I believe it's a renewed
18 situation where we should now get those submissions.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
20 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, in this instant moment, this is a text
21 that has been cited multiple times in the expert report of the witness we
22 have before us, who has now given us evidence of how the words in "The
23 Islamic Declaration" were received and what effect they had on the events
24 that transpired. Therefore, I think it is necessary to have a full
25 picture of the context of these words and the text that was published in
1 1990 that is being cited in the expert report of this witness, which is
2 why I have renewed the request of the Defence to have this introduced
3 into evidence at this time, since I believe it arises from the expertise
4 of the witness and is an important document to have in the record so that
5 we can understand the evidence of this witness in this regard.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I see in footnote 6 that as a general
7 reference to the whole of "The Islamic Declaration" is the -- therefore,
8 it's not very specific. So you are saying that the witness refers to it
9 but -- and he does, but I've got no idea whether that refers to all of
10 the 77 pages or whether there are special portions. For example, I see
11 on our screen at this moment something about Pakistan. I don't know
12 whether he refers to that in this context as well, how relevant that is.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, on the basis of what you said the
15 Chamber is not yet convinced that the whole of "The Islamic Declaration"
16 should be admitted into evidence. You've read a specific portion, I
17 think, even two specific portions. There's no problem in admitting that
18 into evidence but if you want more than the portions you specifically
19 dealt with, then the Chamber invites you again to make submissions as why
20 the rest is needed and then specific.
21 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, we are guided by your decision and
22 will then do. So I will do so.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Meanwhile at this moment, only 77 pages are
24 uploaded so the portions I think you dealt with, you read them into the
25 record, so even there might not be a need to have those pages in
1 evidence, but we wait for your further submissions and at this moment --
2 May I take it that what you just told us at this moment is that
3 you, at this moment, withdraw your renewed application for -- or
4 tendering of the whole of the document and that we'll hear from you what
5 portions you'd like. Or if you insist on the whole of it, that we learn
6 from your submissions why it is that we should admit that or ...
7 MR. IVETIC: The second of the options that Your Honour has
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we leave it for the time being. The
10 status remains as it was before.
11 Please proceed.
12 MR. IVETIC: Thank you. If we could return to the expert of
13 General Kovac. That is 1D5358. And page 8 in both languages and
14 paragraph number 17. And paragraph 17 begins on the bottom of the page
15 in English and bleeds over to the next page and most of paragraph 17 is
16 on this page in the Serbian.
17 Q. But here you talk of the actions of the SDA as to the creation of
18 the Patriotic League and as to its activities in relation to the JNA.
19 When did all these activities begin in relation to the release of the
20 book that we just looked at, "The Islamic Declaration"?
21 A. Already in 1991, in May, activities started, aimed at
22 implementing "The Islamic Declaration" with the view to the
23 Islamicisation of society and the establishment of paramilitary
24 formations. The basic task of the SDA was carried out by
25 Lieutenant-Colonel Sefer Halilovic, who had deserted from the JNA, and
1 together with a number of associates, he worked on the organisation of
2 staffs of the Patriotic League throughout the territory of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily in municipalities where the Muslim
4 population was the majority population.
5 The extremist part of the Patriotic League were the members of
6 the Green Berets. They were a better trained formation for carrying out
7 these tasks in the initial period of the conflict with the units of the
8 JNA. And in terms of taking over materiel and other equipment from
9 depots and barracks of the JNA and the Territorial Defence. The
10 Patriotic League, throughout this period, from May until April; that is
11 to say, May 1991 until April 1992, so it's almost a year, they held
12 several meetings that have been accentuated in this report. There was a
13 constant ascent in terms of organisation and as the crisis was coming to
14 a head, units of the Patriotic League were being established either
15 within Territorial Defence units in municipalities with a majority Muslim
16 population -- well, in conclusion, one can say that "The Islamic
17 Declaration" was a political platform for the military organisation of
18 the Patriotic League and the Green Berets. For transmitting these
19 positions to the people and in order to win over the members of these
20 organisations from a moral point of view.
21 Q. How did the Patriotic League compare in size to the peace-time
22 JNA army?
23 A. As JNA units were withdrawing from Slovenia and later on Croatia,
24 were becoming so different. They were basically on paper only. They did
25 not have real combat power because, inter alia, members of the Muslim
1 people had deserted from these units as the civil war was getting closer.
2 As the Patriotic League was getting stronger, and you can see
3 from these documents the hostile attitude taken towards the JNA and the
4 blockade of the places where JNA troops were staying and also making it
5 impossible for them to move freely through Bosnia-Herzegovina. And as
6 the crisis developed, they were taking over part of the weapons of the
7 JNA and materiel wherever they could. The JNA was getting weaker and
8 weaker from a moral and personnel and any other point of view. We had
9 this situation that at the very beginning of the civil war, that is to
10 say, the 6th of April, the Patriotic League had about 120.000 members and
11 there were about 103 municipal staffs and a series of units at brigade
12 and detachment level. They are specifically listed in the report.
13 Q. And did the then-existing military laws allow for the creation of
14 such a privately armed group by a political party?
15 A. All laws and regulations starting with the constitution and the
16 Law on Defence and the Law on the Army did not allow the creation of
17 paramilitary formations. However, unfortunately -- however,
18 unfortunately - may I continue now? - it was the reality of civil war
19 itself that brought the conflict parties into a situation in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were supposed to set up units in order to
21 protect themselves from this unitary concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 Q. Now, I want to take look at another document, Exhibit D412, and
23 this is referenced in paragraphs 1.97 and 2.7 of your report. And while
24 we wait for that document to come up on the screen -- and we see that it
25 is dated the ... 29th of April, 1992. And if we could -- it says it's
1 from the Territorial Defence Staff. If we could look at the next page
2 with the signature. I guess the ... this is the original without the
4 Could you tell us, based upon the structure that is sending this
5 document -- if we can go to the first page in English, so we can follow
6 along in English as well, where it is the staff of the Territorial
7 Defence in the Ministry for National Defence of the Republic of BiH, what
8 can you tell us about this structure that is sending out this document?
9 A. Territorial Defence Staffs of republics of the former SFRY did
10 not have the right to use units of the TO - or Territorial Defence, let
11 me give the full name - without decisions taken by the Supreme Command or
12 the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In that
13 sense, this document, in this period, is, in essence, unlawful in
14 relation to the regulations of the joint state that was the Socialist
15 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the time.
16 As for the content of the document itself, basically it expresses
17 aggression, an aggressive attitude towards the units of the JNA along the
18 lines of blockade, preventing them from moving about freely, taking over
19 their weaponry, equipment, materiel, and carrying out combat operations
20 vis-ā-vis the structures of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. And now I'd like to take a look at 65 ter number 31023 in
22 e-court --
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before that comes up, can -- Mr. Kovac, can you
24 tell me what is written in handwriting on top of the page? You see in
25 B/C/S at the moment. Oh, thank you. It was missing. I couldn't see it
1 in the English. Now it's clear.
2 Please continue.
3 MR. IVETIC: If we could look at 65 ter number 31023. And I
4 think we'll see it is dated also the 29th of April, 1992 from the
5 Ministry of Interior, and we see at the bottom of the B/C/S the name of
6 Alija Delimustafic, which I think is on the next page in English, but
7 let's stay with this page for now.
8 Q. And I'd like to ask you: How do the activities that are being
9 ordered by Mr. Delimustafic in this document compare with the one we just
10 looked at; and what conclusions do you draw from the same?
11 A. We have to proceed from the fact that at that time this was not
12 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We see that this document also
13 invokes a decision of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In essence,
14 this was not a joint government of all three peoples. This was the
15 government of the Muslim people, and that can explicitly be seen through
16 this document of Delimustafic's. This order is based on that decision of
17 the Presidency or, rather, Alija Izetbegovic, and the decision of the
18 republic staff of the Territorial Defence. We also see in terms of the
19 content of these paragraphs in the order, this just means spelling out in
20 more precise terms the same positions that are contained in the order of
21 the territorial staff of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 Another thing: We see here that the units of the police of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina had already become units of the Muslim people only in
24 the area that was under the control of Muslim units.
25 Q. Okay.
1 MR. IVETIC: If we could tender this document at this time.
2 MR. WEBER: No objection.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
4 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 31023 receives exhibit number
5 D1355, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
7 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
8 Q. Now I'd like to talk more about this concept of the Territorial
9 Defence by first looking at your report, 1D5358, and page 29 in the
10 English, page 28 in the Serbian, and I think it's paragraph 1.57 and
11 onwards where you talk about the Territorial Defence, but I'd like to
12 look at paragraph 1.58 with you.
13 In this paragraph, you describe that the JNA was the core of the
14 Yugoslav armed forces under the 1982 Law of ONO. Was the Territorial
15 Defence part of or separate from the JNA under this law?
16 A. The Territorial Defence of all republics was an integral part of
17 the armed forces of the SFRY, the former Socialist Federal Republic of
18 Yugoslavia. In no way could these units be considered as separate armed
19 units. They were part of a single system of command and control over the
20 armed forces of the SFRY.
21 Q. And in relation to the JNA, did the command of the JNA command
22 over the Territorial Defence?
23 A. At the top of the strategic level of command there --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
25 MR. WEBER: I guess it's okay. I might have prematurely gotten
1 up because I guess we're talking about a doctrinal level. However it
2 goes into a factual level I believe there has already been discussion of
3 different types of territorial defences in different time periods, if we
4 could have greater specificity.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Because you were on your feet I interrupted the
6 witness, and please try to avoid be prematurely on your feet so that the
7 witness can finish his answer.
8 Witness, I interrupted you for the reason I just explained.
9 Could you please resume your answer.
10 I leave it to you, Mr. Ivetic, whether you want to repeat the
11 question either in exactly the same way or in any other way.
12 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
13 Q. Sir, in relation to the Territorial Defence under the 1982 Law on
14 ONO, in relation to the JNA, did the command of the JNA command over the
15 Territorial Defence?
16 A. At strategic level, there was a single command. That was the
17 Supreme Command. And it commanded units at operative and strategic
18 level; that is to say, through the General Staff of the JNA.
19 We can say that at operative and tactical level and in accordance
20 with regulations, it was defined that in the zone in which armed forces
21 are being used, the protagonist, in terms of the unification of all the
22 forces, is the command of the JNA, from strategic to tactical level.
23 Q. Okay. And Territorial Defence units under the SFRY, were they
24 trained to be -- what kind of units were they trained to be?
25 A. In relation to the concept of All People's Defence and social
1 self-protection, the units of the Territorial Defence are conceived as
2 units of a structure that would defend a particular zone, area in terms
3 of acting together; that is to say, JNA units and TO units. So their aim
4 is to operationalise the concept of All People's Defence, to make it
5 possible for the largest number possible of soldiers to take part in
6 defence from external aggression. This concept is based on the position
7 of the then-Yugoslavia that was not a member of any military alliance,
8 namely neither of the Warsaw Pact or NATO. And it had to be capable of
9 defending itself.
10 The second basis for this organisation is the socialisation of
11 the function of defence in the then-system of socialist self-management.
12 Or rather, getting the function of defence as close as possible to each
13 and every citizen, making it possible for these citizens to take part in
14 defence against external aggression. However, unfortunately, this state
15 had overlooked the possibility of civil war and breaking up the country
16 through a civil war. In that way, and the units of the Territorial
17 Defence were taken advantage of as a material basis for the creation of
18 national armies.
19 Q. One final question before the break, under the SFRY system, were
20 Territorial Defence units foreseen as being used as manoeuvre units?
21 A. Basically Territorial Defence units had a space structure, aerial
22 structure. In terms of the equipment of certain units, some of them are
23 defined as manoeuvre units of the Territorial Defence; namely, that they
24 could move from one area or space to another within the republic or
25 within the combat zone, but that is a smaller number. Basically their
1 structure was one based on area. That is to say, that they were manned
2 by people from that particular area in order to carry out tasks within
3 that local area. That is to say, the municipality, the local commune,
4 and so on.
5 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, I see we're at the time for the first
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we are.
8 Witness, we take a break. We'd like to see you back in 20
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 JUDGE ORIE: We'll resume at ten minutes to 11.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.
15 [The witness takes the stand]
16 JUDGE ORIE: You may proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
17 MR. IVETIC:
18 Q. I'd like to look at paragraph 1.71 of your report found on
19 page 32 in English, 31 in the Serbian.
20 In this paragraph, you talk about the mistrust of JNA officers of
21 the TO. And then in the next paragraph, 1.72, which starts on the bottom
22 of the page in the Serbian and goes onto the next page, you talk about
23 the reorganisation of the entire system in 1986 under the plan Jedinstvo.
24 What was the objective of this 1986 reorganisation.
25 A. The facts are presented in this report to say that in this period
1 from the death of Josip Broz, national tensions sporadically were rising
2 in the former Yugoslavia, and the estimate was that it was possible to
3 expect the abuse of some Territorial Defence units and utilize them
4 unlawfully. There were also many other factors that contributed to a
5 change in the organisation of the Yugoslav People's Army, in the sense
6 that there was a shift from the army principle to Military Districts, and
7 in the Yugoslav theatre of war, as envisaged by the defence plan, a new
8 model of organisation was made which, from these Military Districts,
9 united JNA units and TO units at local level without taking into account
10 republican borders, because they did not coincide with the military
11 estimate of what a Yugoslav theatre of war would look like. If
12 necessary, I can elaborate.
13 Q. I think that's enough for now. I want to ask about one other
14 specific part of this paragraph and I think we need to go onto the next
15 page in the Serbian in order to discuss that.
16 In talking about the Jedinstvo plan of reorganisation, you talk
17 about the JNA taking over and being in charge of storing TO weapons and
18 ammunition in its depots.
19 Under the SFRY system, what kind of weapons and weapons systems
20 was the Territorial Defence equipped with?
21 A. The Territorial Defence was basically well equipped. The same as
22 the majority of JNA units, especially in the B class, those that did not
23 have a full complement of personnel. The Territorial Defence units in
24 the more developed republics, such as Slovenia, had even more modern
25 equipment, in communications, some infantry weapons, and moveable
1 anti-aircraft defence systems.
2 Why did these estimates get things correctly? We can see that
3 now in hindsight the aim was to increase the security of weapons and
4 reduce the possibility that arms may be abused at local levels by
5 political elites which had already been growing from Communism into
6 national organisations in the territories of republics, which were
7 ever-more open to separatist activity and the possibility of secession
8 from the SFRY.
9 Q. I'd now like to focus on the JNA for a bit. If we could turn to
10 page 243 in the English and page 241 of the Serbian of your report, I
11 propose to look at paragraph 6.8 of the same.
12 And in this paragraph, you say: "The former JNA, and
13 consequently all three armies in the war in BH, did not have a classical
14 Soviet model of commanding (centralised command model), which is strictly
15 determined by the will of the superiors, but a combined command model
16 which resided upon unity of command and subordination and which enabled
17 subordinates to exhibit full creativity when decisions were made and
19 And now we have to go to the next page in the B/C/S: "This was
20 particularly true of the war in BH in periods between major operations,
21 when full creativity and independence was expected of decision-makers at
22 all levels of command. After 1960, the JNA abandoned the Soviet model of
23 command, increasingly decentralising the organisation of the armed" --
24 MR. IVETIC: And now we have to go to the next page in the
1 Q. "... forces and the command function. Flexibility and creativity
2 of subordinates in the chain of command were, in fact, a characteristic
3 of the armies of all three warring sides. Over 70 per cent of the time
4 in the war in BH was spent in conflicts at the lowest tactical level and
5 exchanges of fire, actions which were decided by commanders, komandir, of
6 squads, platoons, companies (batteries) and commanders of battalions in
7 all three armies in BH."
8 Now, first of all, how did the JNA come to this abandonment of
9 the Soviet model in 1960? What were the reasons for the same?
10 A. As far as the model of command is concerned, there are basically
11 these three classical models, not only the centralised and decentralised
12 but also the combined one. But that is more in theory. In terms of
13 doctrine, each of them has its own features determined not by individual
14 states and armies but each state and army can be discussed separately as
15 to the way they used the army.
16 As for Yugoslavia after the Second World War and before the war,
17 it had this centralised model, but as all functions were becoming more
18 socialised, so did -- so was the defence system. There was a prominent
19 need to decentralise the system of command, but not as far as
20 decentralising it. Instead, it developed into a combined model of
21 command. This combined model of command was improved after the
22 constitutional changes in 1974, by giving more independence and more
23 powers to republics; also in the functions of defence and in forming TO
24 units. Through combat rules, through textbooks, and also "The Strategy
25 of Armed Struggle," which was the basic doctrine document in the JNA, one
1 can see a clear option, a clear choice of the combined model of command
2 which is legally formulated in the basic combat documents beginning with
3 the combat rules of the employment of units, up to the rules that
4 determined the work of commands and staffs.
5 Q. In this paragraph you have used the term "lowest tactical level,"
6 and then earlier today you talked about strategic and operative level.
7 Could you please define for us what are these various levels
8 within the army.
9 A. Specifically then during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the civil
10 war, but also in most armies in the world, these three levels of command
11 are basic and dominant.
12 The strategic level means the political level and the top
13 leadership of the army; that is to say, the political/military level of
14 command. The operative level means operative units, that is, the level
15 of corps and operative groups. And the tactical level is from brigade
16 commands downwards. All tactical groups that were formed as temporary
17 units, and within itself it contained several tactical levels, such as
18 companies, batteries and platoons, and that level was present in all the
19 three armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
20 Q. Now, I'd like that take a look at Exhibit P2629 in e-court.
21 Last week when you talked about Prosecution experts whom you
22 reviewed, you mentioned General Sir Dannatt. We have, at least in the
23 English, the statement of General Lord Dannatt. Is this one of the
24 reports that you reviewed for purposes of your expertise in this case,
25 the Mladic case?
1 A. I studied this report, but looking at it and drawing from my own
2 knowledge and experience, I formulated my own report on commands in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Considering the previous level of command, that is
4 to say, in the JNA, there are other factors that are important to the
5 definition of the command system. That is to say, the availability of
6 adequate command structure in militia-type armies which have few
7 professional soldiers. It's difficult to apply the centralised model of
8 command. And another factor is the technology the equipment and
9 techniques. Communication systems were mostly obsolete; they consisted
10 mainly of the assets of the former JNA and these communications systems
11 did not make it possible to have real time communication. Superior
12 commanders received a picture of the situation on the ground mainly
13 through reports from lower commanders. This was very important for
14 communication between different levels of command. We know that modern
15 armies --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat the names of various
17 communications systems in modern armies.
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Ivetic, you should interrupt the witness,
19 otherwise we will not have a proper transcript.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MR. IVETIC:
22 Q. General, the interpreters have asked you to repeat the names of
23 the various communications systems in modern armies that you mentioned so
24 that had they could translate the same.
25 A. I apologise. I sometimes forget myself and speed up. I'll slow
2 I think I was talking about the technological factor which is
3 very important for types or models of command. The technological factor
4 in armies in Bosnia-Herzegovina was obsolete. Communications systems
5 were mostly obsolete, too old, and they did not make it possible to
6 communicate information in real time from the lowest tactical level up to
7 the operative and later, strategic level, so that commanders at the
8 operative level, and especially at the level of the General Staff, had
9 delayed information. A lot of time passed before they received the
10 reports about the situation on the ground, and for that reason, the
11 centralised model of command could not apply. Modern armies today have
12 developed command and information systems from tactical to strategic
13 level under the symbolic name of C3I or C4I, that enable communication in
14 real time, secure communication, including video images showing key areas
15 in the theatre of war.
16 Q. I'd like to look together at page 7 in the English and page 6 in
17 the Serbian of General Lord Dannatt's report, and paragraph 28 of the
18 same. And he is talking about the Soviet model, the Befehlstaktik, as he
19 calls it, the centralised command model used in conscript armies.
20 And if we could turn the page in both versions of the report.
21 At the end of the paragraph he says: "The fact that the armed
22 forces of all three former warring factions in Bosnia exhibit the same
23 inflexibility does not surprise me as the core of their military
24 leadership is all drawn from the former JNA."
25 And then in paragraph 30, he claims that the VRS and the JNA are
1 both based on the Soviet, or Befehlstaktik, model of centralised command.
2 What are your observations or conclusions about General Dannatt's
3 description of the command style employed by both the JNA and the VRS.
4 A. I was talking a moment ago about the development of the command
5 system in the JNA, and I emphasise again the Soviet model, after the
6 Cominform, was abandoned militarily and otherwise, in 1964, especially
7 after the constitutional changes in 1974 and beginning with 1980s, this
8 model was modernised, also through new strategic and doctrine document
9 and instructions and command and control and the combat rules of units at
10 the level of corps and brigades.
11 I don't think we can talk about the transfer of the centralised
12 model of command from the JNA onto the armies involved in the civil war
13 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead, we can talk about the transfer or shift
14 towards combined -- a combined model of command. Also, for technological
15 reason, the obsolete equipment, the lack of sufficient professional
16 personnel, the units and commands of both the VRS, the ABH, and the HVO
17 transferred a lot of responsibility and independence to subordinate
18 units, especially to the operative level, and that is the level of corps
19 and operative groups.
20 Q. Now in testifying at this trial in support of his conclusions,
21 General Dannatt, at transcript page 19056, lines 15 to 23, suggested that
22 Yugoslavia was a "looser member of the Warsaw Pact."
23 Was Yugoslavia ever a member of the Warsaw Pact?
24 A. Yugoslavia was never a member of the Warsaw Pact and Cominform is
25 a well known event, from 1964 when there was a danger of the Warsaw Pact
1 intervening and they built up forces preparing for an aggression against
2 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. From that time on,
3 Yugoslavia received significant assistance from the west, primarily from
4 the US, in order to rearm many branches and services in the army,
5 beginning with its aviation and tank units, artillery, et cetera. Those
6 weapons remained in the units of the JNA. After the Cominform,
7 politically speaking, Yugoslavia profiled itself as a neutral and later
8 non-aligned state, and did not belong to any political or military
9 alliance. It had more communication and more co-operation and received
10 more assistance from NATO than from the Warsaw Pact, but it was a
11 non-aligned state.
12 Q. And now General Lord Dannatt also in supporting his conclusion
13 that the JNA followed the Soviet model, at transcript page 19093, line
14 22, to 19094, line 2, claimed that this was because many officers of the
15 JNA were sent for instruction to Russia.
16 Do you know if the JNA ever sent officers to any other foreign
17 nation for instruction?
18 A. In keeping with its own estimates, the JNA did send its officers
19 for training to other countries. We can say that up to 1948 it was
20 mostly in the Soviet Union, but after that many of those officers
21 suffered professionally and were completely marginalised. And after the
22 Cominform, the bulk of officers were sent to prestigious military
23 academies in the west, but mostly they relied on their own system of
24 training and schooling of officers. Many career officers also graduated
25 from schools in the west, but most of them graduated from domestic
2 Q. Now, also in his testimony in this case, General Dannatt, at
3 transcript page 19107, lines 7 through 21, claimed that the VRS came from
4 a Military District of the JNA; and then later at 19164, lines 3
5 through 20, he clarified that he was talking of the 2nd Military
7 What can you say to about this? Is it fair or accurate to say
8 that the VRS, in essence, was the 2nd Military District or that the
9 Main Staff of the VRS equated to the command of that district?
10 A. Quite frankly, there are no facts to support this kind of
11 assertion, and this kind of position cannot be based on the projection of
12 personnel or materiel or the establishment of the Military District when
13 compared to the Army of Republika Srpska.
14 Perhaps more time would be needed to describe this entire process
15 of withdrawing the JNA from the territory of Croatia where part of the
16 units from that area were deployed in the area of Croatia too.
17 Q. We'll get to some more details. But staying for a moment with
18 the comparison between the 2nd Military District of the JNA and the
19 command of the same and the Main Staff of the VRS, how would you compare
20 the number of officers present in the commands of the 2nd Military
21 District, on the one hand, and the VRS Main Staff on the ordinary?
22 A. As regards the professionals, the Military District is different
23 from the top echelons of the organisation of an entire army. In terms of
24 personnel, when the General Staff, say, of the Army of Republika Srpska,
25 it wasn't properly manned so one cannot speak of similarities in terms of
1 personnel and also officers of the Military District did not, for the
2 most part, become officers on the Main Staff of the Army of
3 Republika Srpska. On the contrary. Most of the officers of the
4 2nd Military District left together with their units after the decision
5 was made to withdraw to the territory of the Federal Republic of
6 Yugoslavia. Very few officers made up the command at the level of the
7 VRS, the Main Staff as it was called. At first, these were just tens of
8 officers -- or, rather, ten, 15, and then only later were the elements of
9 the organisational structure of the Main Staff built. So this kind of
10 symmetry does not exist between the command of the Military District and
11 the command of the Main Staff. Not in terms of structure, not in terms
12 of personnel. Personnel.
13 Q. And if we could return to your report, 1D5358, and if we could
14 look at page 51 in the English, page 50 in the Serbian, and if we can
15 look at paragraph 2.10.
16 You have already talked a little bit about the withdrawal of the
17 JNA from Bosnia. Here, in this paragraph, you say in the middle of the
18 paragraph, line 4 at the end -- the sentence beginning on line 4 in the
19 English: "It should be added at this point that most of the JNA assets
20 which were in the possession of the JNA units were transferred to FR
21 Yugoslavia during the pullout."
22 Now when you say "most ... assets were transferred," what kind of
23 assets are you talking about here?
24 A. I'm talking about all modern, complex assets, I'm referring to
25 all units. And primarily as regards the air force, then more modern
1 tanks, more modern artillery equipment, and part of the logistics that
2 have to do with maintenance institutes. Due to blockades and similar
3 problems that we discussed a moment ago, it was hard to get all that to
4 the territory of the Republic of Yugoslavia. Also, signals equipment and
5 the like.
6 Q. And in this paragraph, you also say that the other two ethnic
7 communities seized some assets of the JNA. How did the removal, on the
8 one hand, of most assets to Yugoslavia and the seizure of other assets by
9 the other two ethnic groups, how did those affect the ability of the VRS
10 to function with similar capabilities as the 2nd Military District of the
12 A. As for weaponry and equipment itself, I referred to the more
13 modern equipment that could have been exported, and if not, it was the
14 local communities that got a hold of that because of the blockade of
15 barracks and the impossibility to get this to the Federal Republic of
17 As for the Serb people, after the decision was made to have the
18 JNA withdrawn, the Serb people were compelled to ask for weapons and take
19 weapons the same way, from the TO. That is to say, where they were the
20 majority population. They did that from the JNA units that were in such
21 areas to take materiel, weapons, et cetera, as did the other two ethnic
22 communities, the other two peoples in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina
24 Q. And now, the VRS Main Staff headquarters in Han Pijesak, what was
25 that structure foreseen to be under the old Yugoslav military system?
1 What kind of command post was that?
2 A. From the days of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, that's the way
3 infrastructure was built. This was the central zone of the Yugoslav
4 theatre of war. It was a reserve position for the Supreme Command. From
5 the days of the kingdom, it was improved. Work conditions were improved.
6 And there was proper maintenance for it to be able to function.
7 As for the theatre of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the Serb
8 population is the majority population in that area, it was assessed that
9 this position would be appropriate for the Main Staff of the Army of
10 Republika Srpska.
11 Q. If we could look at paragraph 2.49 of your report, found on page
12 62 in the English and 61 in the Serbian, here you say that the VRS was
13 formed on 12 May 1992. But "only as of the 5 June 1992 is it possible
14 and justified to say that the necessary prerequisites were created for
15 commanding the military organisation at all levels in accordance with
17 Could you explain that for us, just briefly.
18 A. By virtue of the fact that the decision was made to establish the
19 Army of Republika Srpska during the commotion of civil war, it cannot be
20 considered possible to command all units at all levels of command when at
21 many of these command positions there weren't proper appointments yet.
22 Who would carry out duties heading these units? This date, the 15th of
23 June, just speaks about the fundamentals of the system of command,
24 certainly not about a properly established hierarchy system of command
25 that would be too simplified to say that an army could be created within
1 a span of a single month. These are just the contours of an army and
2 they were gradually built upon throughout the war. Many problems in
3 terms of commands were not resolved even up until the end of the war.
4 The situation was similar in the BH army and in the HVO. I've already
5 said at the very start that these were militia-like people's armies
6 without sufficient personnel in terms of officers, commissioned and
7 non-commissioned, in relation to establishment.
8 Q. And ... if we could look together at P3027 in e-court, this is
9 dated 16 April 1992 and is from the Ministry of National Defence of the
10 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 If we were to go to the next page, I think we see it is signed by
12 the president. This talks about the -- or, pardon me, the minister,
13 Mr. Subotic. This talks about the formation of the Territorial Defence
14 or TO as the armed force of the Serbian republic. In a military sense,
15 what does this mean? How was this initial army structured?
16 A. In essence, this was not an army yet. It has to be brought into
17 the context of the situation prevailing in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the
18 time. This was the beginning of the civil war itself, about ten days
19 after these armed conflicts between the paramilitaries and also taking
20 weapons from depots of the TO, the JNA, the control of ethnic territories
21 and the protection of villages and towns based on the structure of the
23 This document is a reaction to the already adopted documents by
24 the Muslim people and the Croats. In essence, it represents the
25 beginning of the armed organisation of the Serb people as well, because
1 it was obvious that there would not be any other armed protection except
2 for their own units that they would establish themselves.
3 So, in that sense, one can say that this was the start of the
4 Army of Republika Srpska or, rather, the organisation of the Serb people
5 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Q. Did the later integration of these units organised as Territorial
7 Defence units into the Army of Republika Srpska cause any difficulties in
8 relation to the manner of operation of the units?
9 A. Gradually some of these units were renamed; others were unified;
10 but they, in themselves, did not constitute a problem, unless they
11 remained at the level of paramilitary organisation. But there were some
12 units that became renegade units, in relation to the command system of
13 the VRS. Even up until 1993. And later on. These were smaller units
14 that constituted a problem in terms of command, the use of units of the
15 VRS, and especially for carrying out agreements and the like. Basically
16 most of these TO units did become part of the structure of the VRS
17 through a regular process, whereas, part of them were politically taken
18 advantage of and they were actually paramilitary units.
19 Q. If we can call up 1D5358, your report, page 65 in the English and
20 page 63 in the B/C/S, and look at paragraph 2.55.
21 MR. IVETIC: We're still waiting for the English, it looks like.
22 Q. And, here, you talk about the fact that the reserve officers
23 accounted for most of the officer corps in the VRS and that there's a
24 high percentage of casualties within that officer corps.
25 What effect did the prevalence of reserve officers have on the
1 command and control abilities of the VRS?
2 A. The Army of Republika Srpska did not have enough personnel but
3 they also did not have enough reserve officers. One can say that these
4 reserve officers were not very professional because in the pre-war period
5 for quite a while they had not been receiving training, and therefore one
6 could not say they were prepared to carry out their duties. Basically
7 they were soldiers too. At a higher academic level though, most of them
8 had university degrees and with a bit more of military training, but they
9 could not be compared to professional officers in any way. These numbers
10 that pertained to their presence did not really resolve the problem of
11 the lack of professional officers. Professional officers constituted a
12 small part of the structure. Or perhaps it would be better to say the
13 establishment of the VRS included very few professional officers,
14 especially at tactical level. That is to say, brigades, brigade
15 commands, to platoon level. This is precisely stated in the report.
16 Commanders of companies and even battalions were soldiers or reserve
17 officers at battalion level, but mostly these command duties were carried
18 out by soldiers who came from their own settings. This shows that this
19 was a territorial people's army of the militia type.
20 Q. If we could look very briefly at P338. This is an analysis, and
21 I have a paper copy if it will assist you to have a paper copy since I
22 know the text is rather tiny in e-court.
23 This is an analysis of the Army of Republika Srpska drafted in
24 1993 relating to the time-period of 1992. I'd like to look at page 71 in
25 the English and page 68 in the Serbian. And I want to look first at this
1 table that's at the bottom of page 68 and I'd like for you to explain to
2 us what is the difference between these categories, the first one being
3 "envisaged war establishment strength" and in Serbian it is "[B/C/S
5 What is that compared to actual strength?
6 A. According to war establishment; that is to say, as prescribed, as
7 established and the manning level is what the situation actually was. If
8 I may note, this pertains to the total number of officers, professional
9 and reserve officers. To the best of my recollection, there were a lot
10 less professional officers. There were about 1500, and the remainder of
11 this figure of over 6.000 were reserve officers. So if we take into
12 account their representation at tactical level, it goes down even to less
13 than 5 per cent of the prescribed levels by establishment.
14 Q. I apologise. I think we need page 64 in the B/C/S.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Because what we're looking at is not
16 corresponding with the English version we're looking at.
17 MR. IVETIC: Okay. Well, the headings were the same and I
18 apologise for that. I just looked up and saw that the two did not
19 correlate to one another.
20 Q. Now looking at this table on the bottom of page 64, based upon
21 this information, the conclusion as to the GS VRS, which I believe is the
22 Main Staff, it says that at 51 per cent of its establishment strength if
23 I'm reading the table correctly.
24 First of all, am I reading the table correctly; and if so, how
25 would that affect the functioning of the Main Staff, especially as to
1 command and control?
2 A. Main Staff is in this first line. And that refers to the figure
3 of 50 per cent of 122 so at the level of 51 per cent, together with all
4 categories of personnel.
5 As for officers, it is less than 50 per cent, about 45 per cent,
6 as far as I can see.
7 As for the last line, it refers to the level of the entire army.
8 Out of the envisaged 12.961, there were only 1.332 officers. But that's
9 at the level of the entire army. And then, if we take into account that
10 most of -- most of these officers out of the 1.332 were at commands of
11 operational and strategic level, then we see that there were very few
12 professional soldiers in the units at tactical level; brigades,
13 battalions, companies, that is.
14 JUDGE ORIE: The 51 per cent, could you explain to that -- to me
15 again, what that now stands for? I see 51 is at the very last column,
16 although there's no heading for it, but I think in the original B/C/S the
17 heading says percentage.
18 Now, what is 51 per cent a percentage of?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this percentage, 51
20 per cent, pertains to the manning level as related to the establishment
21 of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska for all categories of
22 personnel. Officer, non-commissioned officer, soldiers. Not only
23 officers therefore.
24 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... yes. Do I
25 understand, then, that the -- let me see.
1 I see that, according to establishment, the total would be 146.
2 Is that well understood?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All categories of personnel in the
4 Main Staff, yes, that is to say, NCOs and soldiers included.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Now, I know that the actual war strength was 72. Is
6 that well understood?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there were 72. But we can see
8 here a significant lack of officers. It is significantly less than 51
9 per cent.
10 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... yes. But on the
11 total, I have difficulties in understanding how 72 out of 146 could be 51
12 per cent. 50 per cent of 146 is 73. So how 72 could be more than 50
13 per cent is a puzzle for me. I would rather think of 49 per cent.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is 146. And 90, I think, in the
15 previous column.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Then perhaps my -- some of the columns are not --
17 but even what does the 90 stand for? I've got no idea. Because -- at
18 least in the English translation, but I see the same is true for the
19 original, there's no heading for that column.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In addition to all these categories
21 of personnel, there is an empty rubric. I believe it's also a
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, what we believe is -- could you now tell me
24 what 51 per cent represent what of what? A percentage is always a number
25 in relation to a total number. Now could you tell me what the number is
1 and related to what total number I find 51 per cent?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As this table is drawn up, 72 is
3 from 140 to -- I can't see the last digit well. Is it 6 or 0? I think
4 it's 0. But that's the ratio. Now beginning with the next one --
5 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... no. You said 72
6 out of 140? Where I do find the 140?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Next, according to the war
8 establishment, the fourth column in the first row. 140, and then is it 6
9 or 0? But in terms of percentage, it should be 0.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Could we enlarge that so that we can see whether
11 it's, indeed, 140 or 146. No, could we enlarge it in the original. In
12 the English, it's clear.
13 Yes. Seems to be, rather, 146 than a 0 at the end. But apart
14 from that ... and then you would still say that even if it's 140, then 72
15 makes 51 per cent?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 146. In the English version, you
17 can see it's a 6. And judging by the sum of these previous numbers, it's
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And, therefore, 51 per cent is not accurate
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not going into that part of
22 arithmetic, sir. Arithmetically speaking, no, it's not correct.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, it seems to be an error --
24 MR. IVETIC: I think we're at the time for the next break, if I'm
25 not mistaken.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we are perhaps even already beyond that.
2 Witness, we'd like to see you back in 20 minutes. You may follow
3 the usher.
4 [The witness stands down]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, could you, after the break, could you
6 try also to clarify what the double numbers in some of the columns mean
7 such as officers 61 and then also 59 or 50 and 94. Because that's not
8 entirely clear. And is there any way that we could understand what the
9 empty -- the columns without titles, what they stand for? Unless we
10 should translate anything from the left part, but I still do not know
11 exactly how to interpret this table.
12 Mr. Weber.
13 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, just to assist, I would just note that
14 we've had evidence related to this table from Mr. Theunens back on 9th of
15 December, 2013, if that assists Mr. Ivetic with -- and on the specific
16 numbers that the Chamber just asked about.
17 JUDGE ORIE: I must admit that I had forgotten about that. I
18 hope that is -- can be forgiven.
19 We take a break, and resume at quarter past 12.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 12.16 p.m.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, as far as timing is concerned, I think
23 you have a little bit less than half an hour left.
24 MR. IVETIC: I've got more. I think. I'm approximately, I
25 think, from my questions about hour and a half to two hours even
1 depending how the speed of the answers comes.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you asked for three hours. You are over two
3 and a half hours how. That's -- and I think the witness cannot be blamed
4 for not answering your questions.
5 MR. IVETIC: No, I agree.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Try to stick as much as you can to your
7 original timing --
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- because I don't see many explanations at this
10 moment why it should be more.
11 There was one other matter about two versions uploaded into
12 e-court. Has that been clarified?
13 MR. IVETIC: That has, Your Honours, there should be only one
14 version, that is 1D5359. That is the correct version, although it is
15 still not complete because of that issue with the maps that we mentioned
16 earlier. And that I discussed with the Office of the Prosecution to see,
17 once we get the original from Belgrade, how we can reproduce that in a
18 format to get it into e-court given its size, as indeed many of the maps
19 had difficulty of being uploaded in to the system due to the size of the
20 scans were that generated from them. But I'm told there is now only one
21 document in e-court bearing that 65 ter number so we've at least made it
22 more -- easier to locate the document in question.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then please proceed.
24 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
25 Q. General, the Trial Chamber has asked me to try to see if you can
1 help clarify this table a little bit further.
2 In relation to the "[B/C/S spoken]" or "actual war establishment
3 strength," for the Main Staff, there's a number under officers of 61 and
4 then to the right of that is a number that is 50, with that column not
5 being labelled. What is your understanding of that figure at the top of
6 50 and then under 1st Krajina Corps underneath we see 59 in that same
7 position in that unmarked column?
8 A. Could you tell me again which column is it?
9 Q. If -- well, we just lost the pointer. If -- there. Up a little.
10 Up a little. Stop there.
11 Right where the cursor is located on the Serbian version, which
12 is the number 50, and it's the first unmarked column in the part of the
13 table that says "actual war establishment strength." What's your
14 understanding of what that 50 would entail?
15 A. That number 50, I believe, is the percentage ratio, the number of
16 officers, 122, and the actual strength, 61. And that is exactly 50
17 per cent.
18 Q. And there's a number below that, which is 94, and then in the
19 column for officers, there's a second number as well, which is 59.
20 Do you have any understanding or appreciation of what those
21 figures might represent?
22 A. I didn't see it in the key, nor did I deal with that second
23 number, but that first number in the denominator is the ratio between the
24 planned, or envisaged, and the actual.
25 JUDGE ORIE: But it's -- under 61, we see 59. Could you explain
1 what that 59 stands for? And we are still in the first row. And now the
2 first column, "actual war establishment strength," under 61, we see 59.
3 What does 59 stand for?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's when you look at the total,
5 the ratio between the number of professional officers and the total
6 number of officers. You can see that in the last line, where you see
7 that, in total, in relation to the VRS, the number of -- the number of
8 officers is 6.000-something and the actual number of professional
9 officers is 332. So this is the number of professional officers out of
10 the total number of officers. So 59 were professional officers and 2
11 were reserve officers.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And what then stands the 94? What does that relate
13 to there in the next column? You see there 50 and below it 94. What
14 does then the 94 stand for?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's a percentage. The first
16 number is 50 per cent. It means that 61 officers are 50 per cent out of
17 122. 59 professional officers is 94 per cent of the envisaged slots for
18 professional officers.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Which would then mean that the shortage is mainly in
20 terms of non-professional officers. Is that well understood?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. The main shortage was of
22 professional officers. That -- you can see that in the ratio of totals
23 in the last line. So professional officers were significantly short of
24 the required number.
25 JUDGE ORIE: But if the 59 stands for -- these were the
1 professional officers. If that is 94 per cent of the envisaged war
2 establishment, that would mean that approximately some perhaps 64, 65, or
3 66 professional officers were envisaged because 59 is 94 per cent of the
5 Now, if that would be true, then the shortage would mainly be
6 with the non-professional officers.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't know what the
8 interpretation said, but the essence is more easily expressed like this.
9 This percentage means that out of the total of 61 officers in the
10 Main Staff, 59 were professional officers, which is 94 per cent.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then since you would expect 122 officers
12 in total, then the main shortage would be in the non-professional
13 officers. I -- I have difficulties in explaining it in any other way.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The separation was not made
15 according to whether an officer was professional or reserve, but this
16 internal analysis was made from the viewpoint of the needs of the
17 command, to establish the state of the cadres, professional officers,
18 reserve officers, and total officers.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Earlier you explained the 61 and the 59 as referring
20 to the professional officers and the non-professional officers. So it
21 sounds in my ears at this moment as if you're contradicting your earlier
23 If you don't know, tell us as well.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do know. This ratio is quite
25 clear now. I am again saying 61 officers is the total number. 59
1 professional and -- I don't see the problem here.
2 Now, up to 122, that difference can be filled with both
3 professional or reserve officers, but there were none. So these slots,
4 these empty slots, both professional and reserve officers were eligible
5 for them. According to establishment, it says for a vacancy, it says
6 "officer." It doesn't specify professional or reserve.
7 This analysis was done for internal needs, but when you define
8 establishment, you define a vacancy just as "officer," regardless of
9 whether you fill it with a professional one or a reserve one.
10 JUDGE ORIE: I'm still -- I'm still a bit lost. Because there
11 were 61 officers, if I understand you well, and earlier you told us that
12 59 were professional officers but I know do understand that -- well, I
13 don't know how to understand it, to be quite honest.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe that this
15 internal analysis was made for the needs of the command. It's easiest to
16 follow this number in the denominator, which is the total number of
17 officers, regardless of which category. It says 61, and that's 50
18 per cent of the needs.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: 61 is not the denominator; it's the numerator.
21 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE ORIE: My colleagues understand it, and they told me how I
24 have to understand it, that 59 officers, professional officers as you
25 said to us, but at least 59 out of 61, that gives a percentage of 94. I
1 was confused because the 61 were compared to the envisaged war
2 establishment of 122 and then that's 50 per cent. I now understand that
3 I have to look at different columns, that 59 out of 61 is 94.
4 Please proceed.
5 MR. IVETIC: Okay. I have no further questions about this table
6 or this document, so I don't know if Your Honours had anything else that
7 you wanted us to specifically address?
8 JUDGE ORIE: No. I think we slowly get to understand it.
9 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I just put one question to the witness.
11 Can I take from this table that the Drina Corps and the
12 1st Krajina Corps were overstaffed at that point in time?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, do you mean
14 overstaffed vis-ā-vis the establishment? Or in relation to what?
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: If I compare the first column with the total in
17 the second-last column and in the last column, we see a percentage: 113
18 for the 1st Krajina Corps, and 115 for the Drina Corps. Can you explain
19 these two numbers for me?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can explain each of these
22 This percentage relates to all categories of personnel relative
23 to establishment. So they had a bit more military personnel than
24 envisaged by establishment. And that's the case with most armies. They
25 have a higher complement of military personnel whenever possible.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: I'm not interested in other armies. Only the two
2 figures. That means the 1st Krajina Corps and the Drina Corps, all
3 together, were overstaffed with respect to establishment; correct?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They had slightly more than the
5 full complement, yes.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
7 Mr. Ivetic.
8 JUDGE ORIE: And, Mr. Ivetic, if -- at any point in time you
9 could resolve the puzzle if the 59 officers on the first row would be 94
10 per cent, then it could not relate to the 61, because that would give 97
11 per cent. But.
12 MR. IVETIC: 96.7.
13 JUDGE ORIE: 96.7, yes.
14 MR. IVETIC: I've tried through the witness get the document
15 explained. I would love to be in a position to assist you but
16 unfortunately I'm not the one who drafted the document.
17 JUDGE ORIE: If the witness adopts this report in -- this table
18 in his report, then at least he should be able to clearly explain what it
19 is about.
20 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honours the Prosecution's expert is the
21 one who adopted this table in his report and he did not explain it.
22 That's where my confusion lies. I tried with the Prosecution expert as
23 did Your Honour to get this explained and I don't think we got it
24 explained. Otherwise we would still not be here asking the same
25 questions today.
1 To be fair to our expert, the Prosecution expert likewise was
2 unable to explain it.
3 JUDGE ORIE: But it was originally drafted for internal purposes
4 I do understand. So therefore to say that it's the Prosecution expert
5 who failed to do what he had to do, that's -- well, we'll consider it.
6 We consider all of your observations.
7 Mr. Weber.
8 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, the -- Mr. Theunens did fully explain
9 what this is it is at transcript pages 20526, to 20527 and that then also
10 relates to this document, these figures, and as discussed during that
11 testimony, the one chart that we looked at also relates to additional
12 information that's in the report. And that's explained in the
13 transcript. Just to refer the claim to that.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. My problem is that when I'm logged in during
15 the breaks I can't consult my transcripts because I'm logged in, in
16 court. But we'll certainly look at it.
17 Mr. Ivetic.
18 MR. IVETIC:
19 Q. To follow up on Judge Fluegge's questions in relation to the 1st
20 Krajina Corps and the Drina Corps, I think if I'm reading the table
21 correctly, for the 1st Krajina Corps they had 59 per cent of the officers
22 that were foreseen under the establishment of whom 17 per cent were
23 professional officers; and for the Drina Corps, it looks like 45 per cent
24 of the officers foreseen under formation of which 18 per cent were
25 professional officers.
1 In your opinion, what would such a figure as to officers, how
2 would that affect command and control within the corps compared to as
4 A. First of all, let me say that I understand the meaning of all
5 these numbers, and I know how they correlate. The only question is
6 whether the ratio between them is well calculated or not.
7 As for the 1st Krajina Corps, there were 17 per cent of officers
8 out of the total envisaged number; and for the Drina Corps the complement
9 was 18 per cent relative to the total existing number.
10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not get the specific
11 numbers in the table.
12 MR. IVETIC:
13 Q. For purposes of the interpreters, they've asked you to repeat
14 since they did not get the specific numbers and please try to stress what
15 type of officers are you talking about, since I note that that also did
16 not get translated.
17 A. The 1st Krajina Corps was filled with 2.371 officers out of which
18 398 were professional officers. And that is 17 per cent of the total
19 number of officers in the 1st Krajina Corps.
20 The Drina Corps. Out of 588 officers, 108 were professional
21 officers, and that is 18 per cent out of the total number of officers in
22 the Drina Corps.
23 Q. And how would such staffing affect the abilities of the
24 command -- of the corps to effectuate command and control as envisaged by
25 war-time establishment?
1 A. Quite clearly, the general conclusion is that these two commands
2 of corps and all the operative commands shown in this table were
3 understaffed by officers, not even one-fifth of the establishment, which
4 adversely affected the powers, professionalism and ability to command
5 forces in combat actions.
6 Q. Okay. Now I'd like to shift gears, and I'd like to take a look
7 briefly at 1D6135 in e-court.
8 While we wait for it I can introduce it as being an outgoing code
9 cable from Janvier, UNPF HQ, Zagreb, dated 10 August 1995 and its subject
10 matter is memorandum of understanding with NATO and in the text it talks
11 about air operations. I'd like to ask you about one specific section.
12 It's on page 2.
13 And the first paragraph says: "The provisions of this MOU relate
14 to co-ordination between FC UNPF and CINCSOUTH concerning NATO air
15 operations, following the NAC decisions of 25 July and 1st August 1995."
16 And if we look down at number 4, the desired effect: "Should
17 deterrence fail and once operations have commenced, cessation of the
18 attack and/or elimination of the threat of attack against the Safe Area
19 will be the desired effect. Determination of this objective having been
20 achieved will be based upon the common judgement of CINCSOUTH and FC
21 UNPF. In order to be in a position to make such judgement, CINCSOUTH and
22 FC UNPF agree to share fully information on the progress and effect of
23 the air operation and the situation on the ground."
24 Sir, can you help out with this abbreviation CINCSOUTH. To which
25 entity is that acronym referring to?
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
2 be asked to speak into the microphone. Thank you.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Can you speak into the microphone, please.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The acronym and the agreement in
5 total were adopted in terms of the following operations that occurred in
6 the Bosnia-Herzegovina theatre of war with the activity participation of
7 the units of the Croatian army and with the logical support of parts of
8 NATO forces. Basically after Srebrenica and after the rapid deployment
9 force and air force of NATO --
10 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... witness,
11 witness, sorry to interrupt, but the question was what CINCSOUTH stands
12 for. Could you tell us.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In terms of how I understand it.
14 It means joint exchange of information and activity between the commands
15 that signed the agreement.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Have the parties ever considered what CINCSOUTH
17 stands for and is there any dispute about it.
18 MR. IVETIC: In the Defence's position it's an acronym for
19 particular part of the NATO alliance. I don't know if the Prosecution
20 disputes that or not.
21 MR. WEBER: I haven't really thought about it but if could I come
22 back, I'm sure it's something that we could verify.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please proceed.
24 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
25 Q. If we look at the item labelled number 5 and phase 1 planning, it
1 says: "During phase 1 joint planning will be conducted to approve sets
2 of targets to be struck, identify the zone of action ZOA," and then on
3 the next page just briefly:
4 "Co-ordinate modalities for air-land plans and agree on the
5 consultive process for determining when air operations should cease."
6 Now this document is signed by Bernard Janvier, lieutenant
7 general, force commander of the UN Peace Forces on the one hand, and
8 Leighton W. Smith, admiral, Commander-in-Chief allied forces, southern
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's CINCSOUTH.
11 MR. IVETIC: That's CINCSOUTH.
12 JUDGE ORIE: There we are.
13 MR. IVETIC: If we go to the last -- page 5, I think, we'll have
14 the --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay.
16 MR. IVETIC: If -- is there a page 5? I don't ... should be the
17 page 6 in the e-court version that has that information.
18 Q. So if we can take into account that these are the signers of this
19 memorandum of understanding, from a military perspective, if the UN
20 Protection Forces are engaged in planning to identify targets to share
21 information on the progress and effect of their operations, militarily
22 speaking, what is the status of UN Protection Forces once they undertake
23 these activities?
24 A. Already in terms of the previously presented facts in the report
25 and especially in this period and in terms of the previous bombings, part
1 of the UN forces openly sided with one sides in the conflict --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could Mr. Ivetic please
3 turn off his microphone. Thank you.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Through the planning and
5 implementation of activities against the forces of the Army of
6 Republika Srpska. Therefore, in this way, part of the force became a
7 warring party.
8 MR. IVETIC: We would tender 1D06135 into evidence.
9 MR. WEBER: No objections.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, there's no B/C/S translation. I think
11 the important -- the document is of such importance that we first mark it
12 for identification and that you take care of a translation.
13 MR. IVETIC: I will. And I will let the translation service know
14 that it's been requested to be done that so that it will be done.
15 JUDGE ORIE: -- yes. Madam Registrar.
16 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 1D06135 receives exhibit number
17 D1356, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And pending translation, it is marked for
19 identification, under number D1356.
20 Please proceed.
21 MR. IVETIC:
22 Q. Now, I'd like to focus on Sarajevo for a bit, and I'd like to
23 return to your report, 1D5358. 1D5358.
24 And I'd like to turn to page 108 in the English and page 107 in
25 the Serbian and paragraph 4.15 which in both languages bleeds over to the
1 next page.
2 Here, you give the demographic information for Sarajevo, and you
3 I think refer to some of the attachments. Can you just briefly tell us
4 what is the significance of the demographic makeup of the population?
5 What effect did that have on the war-time situation in Sarajevo as you
6 see it?
7 A. I think that without being familiar with the demographic factor,
8 its structure, and its history in this area, it is impossible to
9 understand the beginning and the logic of the civil war in the Sarajevo
10 theatre of war. This report establishes the direct relationship between
11 the Sarajevo front line and the demographic structure of the town itself.
12 Also, I think it is necessary to bring that structure into
13 context or, rather, the context of the town municipalities. The city of
14 Sarajevo consisted of ten municipalities. In the report and in the
15 attachments on the basis of the census from 1991, that ethnic structure
16 has been represented. Also, I believe that one should take into account
17 the fact that Sarajevo was not only a Muslim city. It was also a Serb
18 city, as a matter of fact, the biggest Serb city in the territory of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Exact numbers are provided here in terms of the
20 structure of the entire city, how many Serbs, Muslims, Croats, Yugoslavs
21 and other national minorities live there. The military dimension is
22 derived from that and many other developments in the Sarajevo theatre of
24 Q. And if we could look at paragraph 4.18 which is on page 111 in
25 the English, page 109 in the Serbian, and in that paragraph, you say that
1 the Serbs did not lay siege to Sarajevo but, rather, it was a divided
3 Could you explain for us what you mean by this term "divided
5 A. In military terminology, the term "siege" is used for conflicts
6 between peoples and states as far back as antiquity where the fate of
7 cities was resolved in that way. "Blockade" is also a military term.
8 Basically, this is not a blockade of the city of Sarajevo. This is a
9 divided city and a mutual blockade of the Serb parts of town and the
10 Muslim parts of town.
11 There's a diagram showing the exact deployment of forces. When
12 this is compared to the demographic structure of the city, what can be
13 seen clearly is that throughout the war there were four municipalities
14 with a majority Muslim population, and they were under the control of the
15 BH army; whereas, five municipalities of the city were under the control
16 of the Army of Republika Srpska. However Trnovo as, the tenth
17 municipality of the city, changed hands.
18 Q. And in paragraph 4.28 on page 112 in the Serbian and page 113 in
19 the English, you talk about the decision of the Muslim political and
20 military leadership not to proclaim Sarajevo a free, i.e., open, city.
21 In a military sense, when a city is declared an open city, what
22 obligations are on the warring sides that are imposed by international
24 A. Open city means that in the territory of that city there are no
25 military forces, no military materiel. Also that there is no military
1 action coming out of that city and also that no logistical or other
2 support is provided to that city from another area. An open city
3 basically means a demilitarised city. And Sarajevo, as a divided city,
4 between the BH army and the VRS, was never an open city. It was a
5 divided city and many of these things have been referred to in the report
6 itself. In the Muslim part of Sarajevo, there was the General Staff of
7 the BH army. There were all the staff units, staff support units and
8 also independent units. At the level of the army and the majority force
9 of a corps, which was the equivalent, if police forces are included, of
10 40 to 50.000 armed persons. In that context, it is impossible to speak
11 of an open city.
12 Q. And if we could just briefly take a look at 1D1255 which is an
13 excerpt from a United Kingdom Ministry of Defence manual. I don't think
14 we have a translation of this one so I will have to read the portion I'd
15 like to look at.
16 5.38.1 which says: "The term non-defended locality has a special
17 meaning. It is one where all the following conditions are met:
18 "A. All combatant, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military
19 equipment must have been evacuated;
20 "B. No hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations
21 or establishments;
22 "C. No acts of hostility shall be committed by the authorities
23 or by the population; and
24 "D. No activities in support of military operations shall be
1 How does this relate to what you have been telling us in relation
2 to what you called an open or free city?
3 A. I think that my previously stated positions are in line with
4 these presented here. Conclusions related to the Sarajevo theatre of war
5 are as follows: Sarajevo was a divided, protected and mutually blockaded
6 city. So divided, mutually blockaded.
7 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, we tender this as the next Defence
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
10 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, with respect to JSP 383, we see that on
11 the facsimile header on this that it was -- it's appears to be from 2004
12 and the actual text of this was -- has been amended and changed. I just
13 ask -- it's hard for me to evaluate it with respect to the amended text
14 if I don't see the full version of the manual. Could the Defence upload
15 that and make that available to us before we decide on this.
16 MR. IVETIC: The full version? Sure.
17 MR. WEBER: Of whatever this comes from.
18 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll have it marked for identification for the
20 time being.
21 Madam Registrar.
22 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 1D01255 receives exhibit number
24 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked for identification.
25 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Pending -- it depends on when you receive the full
3 MR. IVETIC: I will e-mail that, so that it gets there faster
4 than going through the e-court system because that takes some time. And
5 then we can upload it after that.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So then Mr. Weber will receive it within 24
7 hours from you.
8 MR. IVETIC: I think so, yeah.
9 JUDGE ORIE: And we would receive your position in the 48 hours
11 MR. WEBER: Yes. And I think that the only thing we could
12 possibly say is that if the particular positions here had been amended or
13 changed, we may seek to have those amendments also admitted with the
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So the matter we would hear from both -- at
16 least within three days from now.
17 MR. IVETIC: But I don't know what amendments after 2004 would
18 have to do with the situation in 1992.
19 JUDGE ORIE: We'll wait for whether they are there and what the
20 observations are. Let's just proceed for the time being.
21 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
22 Q. If we can return to your report, 1D5358, and page 146 in the
23 English and paragraph 4.137, which should be, I think, page 144 of the
24 Serbian. I apologise, I guess it's page 146 of the Serbian and 148 of
25 the English. 4.137. And we're almost there. Okay.
1 And here in this paragraph, you say: "Sarajevo was a militarily
2 occupied city, i.e., according to the terminology of the international
3 law of war, a defended city."
4 And in relation to this, you cite to SFRY regulations. I want to
5 take a look at 1D456 with you, an excerpt from the Department of Army
6 United States manual. And if we could turn to page 2 at the bottom, we
7 see under 40, "defended place" defined: "Investment, bombardment,
8 assault and siege have always been recognised as legitimate means of land
9 war far. Defended places in the sense of Article 25, HR, include:
10 "A, a fort or fortified place.
11 "B, a city or town surrounded by detached defence positions,
12 which is considered jointly with" --
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: You should slow down if you read.
14 MR. IVETIC:
15 Q. "B a city or town sir rounded by detached defence position, which
16 is considered jointly with such defence positions as an indivisible
18 "C. Place which is occupied by a combatant military force or
19 through which such a force is passing. The occupation of such a place by
20 medical units alone is not sufficient to make it a defended place."
21 And then: "Factories producing munitions and military supplies,
22 military camps, warehouses storing munitions and military supplies, ports
23 and railroads being used for the transportation of military supplies and
24 other places devoted to the support of military operations or the
25 accommodation of troops may also be attacked and bombarded, even though
1 they are not defended."
2 The question I have for you, General, is: How does this
3 definition or description of "defended place" compare to what you are
4 discussing in your report as a defended city?
5 A. What is presented here are basic elements that, as a matter of
6 fact, restrictively define the concept of a defended city.
7 Restrictively, because they even bring into context logistical elements,
8 namely, that such a city cannot be considered a defended city. A moment
9 ago I presented the basic facts involved, namely, that from the very
10 start of the civil war, even before the armies, the national or ethnic
11 armies, were originally established, Sarajevo was being divided. There
12 were roadblocks were being set up on both sides, and in that process of
13 civil war, there was division. So it was a divided city and it was a
14 defended city, on both sides. On one side, the Muslims were the majority
15 population; on the other side, the Serb population was the majority
16 population, and I think that this fully complies with the definition of a
17 defended city.
18 MR. IVETIC: And Your Honours we would tender this as the next
19 document and I suppose Mr. Weber would have the same comments that he had
20 about the UK manual so I suggest we do the same thing if that's
22 MR. WEBER: I can be more specific about this one. The material
23 is incomplete, United States field army manual 2710 as it indicates by
24 the cover page, was originally adopted in 1956. This is the appendix to
25 the 1976 amendments. I did have an opportunity to check those and the
1 particular provisions that were noted by the Defence have been superceded
2 and changed so we would ask that the cover materials from this particular
3 upload by added in to it, and we would have no objection to the admission
4 of it.
5 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
6 JUDGE ORIE: And then we need a translation anyhow. Yes. Same.
7 Here, there's no need to send you anything. You just check and then
8 we'll hear from you.
9 Madam Registrar, the number would be.
10 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter number 1D456 receives exhibit number
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Pending a translation, pending hearing from
13 the Prosecution its position, the document is marked for identification
14 under that number.
15 Please proceed.
16 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
17 Q. Now, you've talked about the strength of the ABiH forces in
18 Sarajevo. I forget, you said some range beginning at 40.000 and I
19 believe going up to some other higher number than 40.000. How
20 significant a fighting force did this represent, the ABiH forces, in
22 A. In the report I provided detailed information regarding the
23 growth and reorganisation of the BH army in the Sarajevo theatre of war,
24 especially of the 1st Corps. From the very beginning of the war, there
25 were 38 to 40.000 troops and --
1 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... before we --
2 these details are already in your report?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Details that have to do with the
4 growth of the 1st Corps of the BH army, yes. That is contained in the
5 report and there is a trend of constant growth of these forces. And
6 that's what I wished to speak about in greater detail.
7 JUDGE ORIE: I was just wondering whether Mr. Ivetic was asking
8 what is already to be found in the report or whether he has any questions
9 in addition to the report. First one is not needed. The second, of
10 course, you could do.
11 MR. IVETIC: Let me simplify it.
12 Q. In relation to other armed units of the ABiH, how did the ABiH
13 forces in Sarajevo compare in terms of their size?
14 A. The 1st Corps of the BH army was the strongest corps of the
15 Muslim forces throughout the war. At the end of the war, it included
16 78.000 persons. As for equipment and weaponry, the 1st Corps received
17 the best weapons and equipment. And, well, I wouldn't want to go into
18 any further detail especially ...
19 Q. I don't know if we've got the full translation. But I think that
20 we have enough details now for our purposes since we do have more in your
21 report and I would like to look at some other parts of your report. So
22 if we can return to 1D5358 --
23 JUDGE ORIE: Before we start doing that, Mr. Ivetic, I'm looking
24 at the clock. It's time for a break.
25 MR. IVETIC: Oh. I apologise.
1 JUDGE ORIE: And could you try to -- I mean, you went half an
2 hour over your time estimate. Try to limit it to finish in the next
3 session because that's -- I mean --
4 MR. IVETIC: I will do my best to move quicker and I've also been
5 removing questions so I will aim for beating that, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes, I'm especially thinking about CINCSOUTH
7 where apparently the witness should give the answer, whereas, if you look
8 for more than one minute at the document, everyone seems to agree on what
9 it is. And therefore, the witness not knowing it, perhaps should not
10 have been asked about it.
11 Witness, we'd like to see you back in 20 minutes.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber will consider how much time will further
14 be granted, Mr. Ivetic. We'll do that during the break, the break which
15 will last until 25 minutes to 2.00.
16 --- Recess taken at 1.16 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 1.35 p.m.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, the Chamber expects you to conclude your
19 examination-in-chief today.
20 MR. IVETIC: I will do, Your Honour.
21 [The witness takes the stand]
22 MR. IVETIC:
23 Q. General, we still have a few areas to cover and we have
24 approximately 38 minutes to finish, so if we could try to keep the
25 answers to a -- shorter rather than longer, and if I need anything
1 clarified, I will ask a follow-up. And I'd like to look at your report
2 again, 1D5358, this time page 42 in the English and page 40 in the
3 Serbian, and paragraph 4.118.
4 And, I'm sorry, I must have misspoken, the page is 142 in the
5 English and 140 in the Serbian and the paragraph is indeed 4.118.
6 In this paragraph, you talk of the ABiH placing its soldiers and
7 units amongst civilians. Is that practice in accord with military
8 doctrine and/or law?
9 A. No, it is not in accord with either doctrine or law. That
10 situation prevailed all the time during the war.
11 Q. If we can turn to page 167 in the English and 165 in the Serbian,
12 and look at paragraph 4.186. While we wait for it, in this part of the
13 report you're examining an example of the use of artillery fire during
14 the war as to Sarajevo and, you identify here that the artillery of
15 Crepoljsko where the firing position of one of the corps artillery groups
16 probably was to -- was used to neutralise the fire of enemy mortars.
17 And the question I have is in relation to the next line that
18 says, "The expenditure of ammunition was not even 5 per cent of the
19 minimum required for neutralisation according to table norms."
20 Can you please explain this concept to us. What are the table
21 norms for neutralisation? How do they apply?
22 A. As an artillery man, I know this very well. There are rules and
23 firing tables that specify ammunition for different types of targets.
24 They set the norms for the type of target in the specific case for -- for
25 the calibres in question. It was determined that it was 5 per cent less
1 than the tabled norms.
2 Q. And, generally speaking, when artillery or mortars are used to
3 neutralise a target, are we talking about -- what type of what number of
4 rounds are we talking about? Are we talking about one or more?
5 A. Specifically for this type of target, one needs five times more
6 ammunition than indicated here, but because of the position of the
7 target, the number of projectiles specified in the table was not
9 Q. Do you happen to have any knowledge as to norms of ammunition
10 expenditures for neutralisation of targets in any other armies apart from
11 the Yugoslav ones, and how they would compare to the norms that were in
12 place in the Yugoslav armies?
13 A. It just happens so that my masters paper referred to this subject
14 and, while writing it, I also studied foreign experiences and norms. US
15 and Russian norms are by about 20 per cent higher than the norm in the
16 Yugoslav People's Army and that's closely linked to the economy
17 capacities of a given country, regardless of the fact that this process
18 is technological.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, can I ask something.
20 You earlier said something in relation to paragraph 4.186 about
21 tables, et cetera. The beginning of that paragraph reads that: "What
22 was used to neutralize the fire of enemy mortars ..."
23 Could you tell us how many mortars did the BiH army have in
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for the total number for the
1 entire corps --
2 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ...
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- that number is not --
4 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... yes. I mean
5 within the city of Sarajevo, that is, the -- if I could say, the inner
6 ring I -- or the divided part of the city, as you call it.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Inside the city, I did not find
8 that number, the total number for the 1st Corps, but it can be calculated
9 indirectly through the materiel used in Sarajevo because mortars were
10 used as battalion firing groups, and I can calculate that number
11 arithmetically and present it the next time.
12 JUDGE ORIE: But how can you calculate a number? Isn't it a
13 matter of presence of mortars which --
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, through the establishment of
15 units that were within the inner ring of Sarajevo.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But didn't you explain earlier to us that what
17 is supposed to be there is not always there. And would that be any
18 different from the -- for the -- for the 1st Corps?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is true, both in terms of
20 personnel and assets of all the armies in Bosnia. The envisaged
21 establishment was different from reality. But one can calculate a rough
22 number within a certain range.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, you -- in the same paragraph I read:
24 "The expenditure of ammunition was not even 5 per cent required for the
25 neutralization according to table norms."
1 But if you wouldn't know what is there on the ground, how could
2 you then calculate that it's less than 5 per cent of the minimum?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we are talking about
4 one target here. One mortar unit. That represented the battalion firing
5 group of one battalion. Not talking about the corps. And here
6 specifically we have one target for which there exists a norm since the
7 JNA. It's a mortar platoon.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see that.
9 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
10 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
11 Q. Now, in -- see if we could go in order. If we turn to page 141
12 in English, page 138 in Serbian, paragraph 4.111.
13 In this part of your report, sir, you are talking about the 1994
14 shelling at Markale market, and in this specific paragraph, you say that
15 one mortar shell cannot cause those casualties as seen in Markale, and
16 you mention something about even in laboratory situations.
17 Could you please explain for us briefly what you meant here.
18 A. Unfortunately, the number of those killed and wounded cannot be
19 placed in the context of one mortar projectile of 120 millimetres.
20 Through a combination of circumstances in addition to studying the
21 artillery capacities of individual units, I had a position in the General
22 Staff in the technical centre of the Army of Serbia, which deals also
23 with modelling on -- on practice grounds, and in simulating this
24 exercise, you cannot even get approximate effects to what this projectile
25 had, which made me conclude that it was not possible to achieve that
1 effect with only one projectile. It had to be a reinforced explosive
2 device with subprojectiles or shrapnel that managed to injure such a
3 number of citizens.
4 Q. Now, I propose to leave Sarajevo and talk about Srebrenica, which
5 is in part 5 of your report and in 5.19 which is to be found on page 189
6 in English, page 187 in the Serbian, you mention the safe area agreement,
7 the demilitarization agreement.
8 In a military sense, is the concept of a demilitarised zone
9 codified under law and/or doctrine?
10 A. Yes, it is defined on the basis of international law and national
11 regulations in the former JNA, and after that, the rules of active
12 command in the Army of Republika Srpska. It is clearly defined what that
13 area is and how it must be observed in terms of ...
14 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat the last few words.
15 In terms of relation towards ... what?
16 MR. IVETIC:
17 Q. Sir, you're being asked to repeat last few words of your answer
18 so the interpreters can interpret them.
19 A. So in terms of norms and doctrine, it is clearly defined what
20 that area is and how it is to be treated.
21 Q. And based upon your knowledge and review of the material, was the
22 situation in Srebrenica following the signing of the demilitarization
23 agreement, was it consistent with what -- did it fulfil the requirements
24 of a demilitarised zone as understood under doctrine and law?
25 A. According to the enactments of the United Nations, according to
1 reports and the documents of the BH army, according to the documents of
2 command and reports of the VRS, as well as according to subsequent
3 information from studies and monographs, it is obvious that that area had
4 never been demilitarised, nor did it meet the standards of a protected
6 Q. In terms of the UNPROFOR forces that were put in place in
7 Srebrenica, what is your assessment if that number of forces was
8 sufficient to accomplish the demilitarisation of that area?
9 A. If the agreement on demilitarization of that area had been
10 observed in keeping with international law, then those forces could have
11 been sufficient. However, since that did not happen until the end of the
12 war and instead military forces increased from an operative group, the
13 8th Operative Group, to the forces of the 28th Division, the report
14 presents information from ABH sources what the ratio of forces was, what
15 the balance of power was, and together with the forces in Zepa, it was a
16 10.500 to 11.000. The conclusion is that not in a single moment since
17 the signing of the agreement had there been any will to honour it.
18 Q. If we look at paragraph 5.20 which is on the bottom of our
19 screens in both languages, you say here according to paragraph 7 of
20 Article 60 of the Protocol and here you're talking on the Protocol of the
21 Geneva Conventions. "If one of the parties to the conflict commits a
22 material breach of the provisions listed above, the other party shall be
23 released from its obligations under the agreement conferring upon the
24 zone the status of demilitarised zone."
25 How did this apply to the situation in Srebrenica, just briefly?
1 A. It's exactly as this paragraph defines it. Since there was no
2 demilitarisation and their activities from the protected area only
3 increased, the Army of Republika Srpska was no longer bound by the
4 agreement because it was not a protected area.
5 Q. Moving on, if we go to page 205 in the English and 202 at the
6 bottom of the Serbian and it bleeds onto 203, paragraph 5.69 and 5.7
7 [sic] of your report, you talk about the Krivaja 95 action being a forced
8 action. Could you just briefly explain what you mean by that.
9 A. This operation, which was in a way forced upon the Army of
10 Republika Srpska, is displayed in several ways.
11 First, the forces of the 28th Division kept broadening the area
12 they controlled. Ever more often and more intensively they carried out
13 raids out of that area, committing sabotage and terrorist actions against
14 in civilian population, and in a brief period they killed over 310
15 soldiers, policemen and civilians from March to June 1995. The
16 authorities and the Army of Republika Srpska were forced, were compelled
17 to react.
18 Q. And in terms of the operation itself, in your opinion who had
19 operative command over the Krivaja 95 operation within the VRS?
20 A. In terms of planning and execution, it was the command of the
21 Drina Corps based on Directive 7 and Directive 7.1.
22 Q. And we have seen footage of General Mladic on the ground in
23 Srebrenica. How do you interpret and see the role of General Mladic on
24 the ground during the Krivaja 95 operation?
25 A. It is natural that the commander of the Main Staff should be in
1 the key area where combat is going on. That was typical of
2 General Mladic throughout the war. His physical presence in some place
3 does not mean he commands an operation, because that would also go
4 against the regulations and the powers involved in the command over the
5 Army of Republika Srpska.
6 Q. Now, we've had some evidence that General Mladic left
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina for some meetings in Belgrade after the fall of
8 Srebrenica. What effect per the military doctrine and regulations did
9 General Mladic's departure from Bosnia to attend meetings in Belgrade
10 have on his role as commander of the Main Staff? Could he exercise
11 command and control when outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
12 A. If a person - in this specific case, the commander of the
13 Main Staff - is outside the combat zone and was not the operative
14 commander, was instead in a neighbouring state without the technical
15 systems and the support enabling command, it is natural that he is not
16 commanding, he is not effectively the commander of the Main Staff and his
17 duties are instead discharged by somebody who is on the ground.
18 Q. And by operation of the rules of regulations who would be that
19 someone on the ground who commands when the commander is away?
20 A. In the specific case, there was no obligation for the commander
21 of the Main Staff to be present constantly. His second in command is the
22 Chief of Staff, General Milovanovic in this instant case, who was dealing
23 with problems in the western part of the theatre of war, in Krajina, in
24 the area of operation of the 1st and 2nd Corps because there was already
25 intelligence that the Croatian army and the BH army were planning an
1 incursion into the area of the VRS.
2 Documents were signed by General Gvero when Mladic was absent.
3 According to the rules, it was possible for a member of the command, the
4 eldest officer in a certain area, to represent the Main Staff, and I
5 believe in this case, that's what happened.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I put one follow-up question.
7 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: In which way was -- would that have been
9 communicated to the army: The hand-over of command in the absence of the
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In depth, the army is informed
12 through a signed document. You can see from the logo, the memorandum and
13 from the signature that a different person is signing for the given
14 person and that you can see in the document that General Gvero signed on
15 the 13th and 14th.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: There is no formal hand-over necessary?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A formal hand-over is not necessary
18 because it's not a hand-over of duties. It's a standing in for a certain
19 period of absence for a superior who is absent. And that can be
20 regulated in war situations verbally.
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
22 Mr. Ivetic.
23 MR. IVETIC: If we can turn to page 238 in English and it bleeds
24 onto page 239 and page 236 in Serbian and it goes on to page 237 in
25 Serbian, I'd like to look at paragraph 5.164.
1 Q. In this section of your report, and most of it is it on the next
2 page in both languages, you are talking -- are you reciting a quotation
3 from General Mladic at the second hotel Fontana with Mr. Nesib Mandzic
4 and the quotation is there of the words on both pages. From a military
5 perspective, how do you assess or understand these words?
6 A. From the military point of view, I can say this, bearing in mind
7 the nature of the army and what I said earlier, the lack of professional
8 officers at the tactical level, and bearing in mind the previous spiral
9 of violence and revenge in Podrinje, the victimisation of civilians in
10 villages and populated areas around Srebrenica, I think General Mladic
11 knew that there was a huge potential for revenge, so he insisted that
12 arms be laid down so that the situation could be kept under control in
13 this smaller area. And that was his main motivation in demanding that
14 the members of the 28th Division lay down their arms.
15 Q. Now in relation to this same transcript of that discussion, one
16 of the Prosecution's experts Mr. Butler said at transcript page 16831,
17 lines 3 through 9, as follows: "I mean, in the technical sense, that
18 Srebrenica has just been captured, General Mladic is seeking the
19 surrender of the 28th Division rather than to continue to engage them in
20 battle, the fact that he would offer a cease-fire and the fact that he
21 would make the necessary provisions to allow for those individuals to
22 travel to, in this case, the Hotel Fontana, to negotiate that surrender,
23 I mean, that's all technically proper."
24 Would you agree with Mr. Butler that, from a military
25 perspective, this language is all technically proper?
1 A. As far as military regulations are concerned and the legality of
2 these actions, it is all in keeping with the regulations and in keeping
3 with the situation as it was.
4 Q. Now, after this meeting, General Mladic had another meeting at
5 the Hotel Fontana and as to that meeting, first of all -- that was with
6 other civilian leaders, including a Muslim female individual. Have you
7 also reviewed the information as to that meeting for purposes of your
9 A. Yes, I've looked at that information.
10 Q. Now with respect to the transcript from that meeting, the
11 Prosecution at transcript page 494 through 495 has characterised that
12 meeting as follows: "Mladic did hold a third meeting at the
13 Hotel Fontana at 10.00 on the 12th and his murder plan began to reveal
14 itself at that meeting."
15 And in calling a "murder plan," the Prosecution cited to this
16 language which I will now read to you before asking my question.
17 The language that they considered to be the murder plan is based
18 upon the citation, quote, of General Mladic talking to these people
19 saying: "As I told the gentleman last night you can either survive or
20 disappear. For your survival, I demand that all your armed men, even
21 those who committed crimes, and many did, against our people, surrender
22 their weapons to the VRS."
24 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection. That's a complete misstatement of the
25 Prosecution's case.
1 JUDGE ORIE: First of all, Mr. Weber is dealing with this
2 witness. If you want to consult with Mr. Weber, that's fine.
3 MR. WEBER: Your Honours, if I may.
4 MR. IVETIC: [Overlapping speakers] ...
5 JUDGE ORIE: One second.
6 MR. WEBER: We did notify the Chamber before the witness that the
7 Prosecution would be separating between two counsel, with Mr. McCloskey
8 handling the Srebrenica aspect so ...
9 JUDGE ORIE: And it's not. I think it's -- it's --
10 MR. IVETIC: And I did know that ahead of time and I do
11 understand that they both will be representing the Prosecution in this
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you're right. I'd forgotten about that. I
14 apologise for that.
15 MR. McCLOSKEY: No, I know that's not normal. It was also given
16 the nature of the objection, the questions would have come to my
17 direction any way so ...
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, under those circumstances - and I must just
19 admit that I had forgotten - if there's anything you would like to object
20 to at this moment, Mr. McCloskey, you have an opportunity to do so.
21 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't object to any statement that Mr. Ivetic
22 wants to put to the witness, but to characterise it as the Prosecution's
23 case for the murder operation, it's just so beyond wrong that I had to
25 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I'm citing from Mr. McCloskey himself
1 in the opening statement where he describes the third meeting at the
2 Hotel Fontana and says, "His murder plan began to reveal itself at that
4 I don't know how else to interpret those words, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Well, again, "to reveal itself" means that
6 apparently that's an element in -- that at least how I understand those
7 words whether right or wrong, but --
8 MR. IVETIC: Okay -- I can rephrase --
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- apparently, you are quoting a portion of the
10 opening statement and you'd like to put a question to the witness in
11 relation to that quote. If you would -- do we need to repeat the quote
12 or -- perhaps that's best and then you put the question to the witness.
13 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
14 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The quote is here.
15 MR. IVETIC: Well, to simplify things, I can even ask a --
16 rephrase the question since the gentleman has reviewed the entirety of
17 that third meeting.
18 Q. General, do you consider any words uttered by General Mladic at
19 that third Fontana meeting to be consistent with the Prosecution's claim
20 that a murder plan began to reveal itself at that meeting?
21 I think that should resolve any problems.
22 A. I did not learn of any murder plan in any of the materials and
23 documents. I believe that the citation from the third conversation in
24 Fontana is actually based on professional responsibility and the wish to
25 protect the lives even of those who had committed misdeeds and all the
1 others who surrendered their weapons, so that misfortune would not befall
2 anyone, in terms of the breakout. I think that all of this was aimed at
3 the protection of the fighters of the 28th Division.
4 Q. Okay. And we only have three more questions to go.
5 First, I want to ask you: Are you familiar with the allegation
6 that General Mladic, in talking with Momir Nikolic, and when asked what
7 would happen to the Bosnian Muslim males at the soccer pitch in
8 Nova Kasaba made a hand gesture which Nikolic interpreted as meaning that
9 they would all be killed. We have that multiple times at our trial,
10 including transcript page 12148 and onwards, and transcript page 11938
11 and onwards.
12 My first question is, simply, are you aware of that allegation?
13 A. I heard of such allegations as I watched the footage. And that
14 was the first time that I saw that part of the testimony. I think, and I
15 know that in the JNA and later on in the Army of --
16 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Ivetic had
17 three questions. The first one was whether you are aware of it.
18 You've answered that question.
19 Mr. Ivetic, next question.
20 MR. IVETIC:
21 Q. In relation to the same, General Dannatt said that he considered
22 such a hand gesture to be a perfectly acceptable way of conveying an
23 order, and that's at transcript page 19052 through 19053. Do you agree
24 with General Dannatt, that is, do you consider a professional officer can
25 receive an order of that nature in a hand gesture that he then has to
2 A. In the Army of Republika Srpska, according to all regulations,
3 there was no symbolic language of issuing orders or of communication.
4 Secondly, I think that Captain Nikolic as the security organ in a
5 brigade and the commander of the Main Staff cannot have such
6 communication. It is impossible.
7 Thirdly, the organ of security to have functional relations with
8 the commander of the Drina -- the communications person of the
9 Drina Corps and then in terms of command with the commander of the Drina
10 Corps, and I believe that this could not have happened this way and it
11 could not be interpreted this way.
12 Q. And the last question: In your opinion, what obligations were by
13 duty imposed upon Captain Nikolic if he believed that this was the way to
14 interpret the hand gesture as an order to undertake such a drastic
16 A. Functionally, he had to report to the security organ of the
17 superior command, and in terms of the chain of command, his brigade
18 commander. Functionally up to the top. That information would have
19 meant unlawful action on the part of the commander of the Main Staff and
20 measures based on the law should have then been taken vis-ā-vis him.
21 Such an order is not carried out in such a situation, and such an order
22 would be contrary to the interests of the state and people.
23 Q. General, I thank you for your patience.
24 MR. IVETIC: And Your Honours as well. That completes the direct
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
2 Mr. Kovac, we'll continue tomorrow.
3 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Just I may have missed it, but tomorrow morning, a
5 videolink has been scheduled.
6 MR. IVETIC: That's correct, Your Honours. Although I -- today I
7 was told that that videolink may actually not last the whole day. I
8 don't know the time estimates of both parties in relation to that. But
9 there's a videolink scheduled for tomorrow and then for Wednesday. We
10 had already in advance said that if the Wednesday ended early that
11 General Kovac would return. I don't know the situation as to Tuesday,
12 but we do need to let the general know if he will be on call for
13 potentially part of the time tomorrow, since that was not originally
14 communicated to him.
15 MR. WEBER: Is the one for tomorrow the one with the two-hour
16 direct examination estimate from the Defence?
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, could you ...
18 MR. WEBER: If it is, I think that that witness probably will
19 last most of the day tomorrow and then there is a videolink also for
20 Wednesday. So it is possible we could have a small session. Possibly.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps the option would be best, Witness, if you
22 would remain at stand by, not necessarily within this building and be in
23 touch with the Victims and Witness Section and then most likely halfway
24 the morning, we would be able to tell you whether there's any chance that
25 we'd like to continue your examination in the latter part of tomorrow
1 morning's session. That would be, well, let's say, on from 12.00 or
2 12.30. If you would be so kind to do that, to make yourself available,
3 though not necessarily here waiting in a small witness room. That would
4 be appreciated. And it may well be that we'll only continue on Wednesday
5 for you.
6 I, again, instruct you not to speak or communicate with whomever
7 about your testimony, whether already given or still to be given. So,
8 therefore, we'd like to see you back either tomorrow or the day after
10 You may now follow the usher.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
12 [The witness stands down]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, you were -- touched, among other
14 matters, also in the report in relation to -- to Markale or to the
15 Markale incidents where the witness refers to a witness statement or
16 testimony which he has considered which is KW586. Is that in evidence
17 before this Chamber? Because there's no further footnoting or anything.
18 MR. IVETIC: It is not yet in evidence. My understanding, if
19 that's the witness I'm thinking of, that is a witness who is still on our
20 list and may --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Could be. I have got no idea who KW 586 is.
22 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I do know who it is and it is the
23 Prosecution's understanding that the Defence will be presenting that
24 witness so the matters might be more appropriately addressed with that
1 JUDGE ORIE: Well, then, the Chamber doesn't know what the
2 reference is about, but apparently you know, Mr. Weber, and that is, in a
3 party-led trial, an important thing.
4 We'll adjourn for the day, and I apologise for building to a bad
5 reputation, not remember that tomorrow is Friday, or tomorrow is
6 videolink day, but we resume tomorrow, Tuesday, the 17th of November,
7 9.30 in the morning, in this same courtroom, I.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.22 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 17th day of
10 November, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.