Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 41677

 1                           Monday, 23 November 2015

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around this

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you.  And good morning, Your Honours.  This

 9     is case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11             Before we start with the examination of the next witness, the

12     Chamber would like to hear the Defence's position on the report of

13     Mr. Dunjic, which we discussed last week.

14             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, the Defence will be utilizing

15     Dr. Stankovic to defend the report with his supplements or additions to

16     the same, primarily matters that he can confirm and have the same opinion

17     as in the report, or where his opinion may be more extensive or differ

18     would be the subject of a short supplement to that report or notations in

19     relation to paragraphs of that report.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, another matter is how much time

21     Mr. Stankovic would need to prepare his position.

22             MR. IVETIC:  The materials have been given to him and the

23     preliminary estimate is that he believes by some time in the first part

24     of January he should be able to have it all done with the -- any

25     supplement thereto.  But that's a very preliminary estimate since, again,

Page 41678

 1     he has just received the materials recently and I don't know how

 2     extensive of a review is required, but we will update if any new

 3     information comes to our attention.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And is it your intention that then a new

 5     supplementary report will be produced or just that Mr. Stankovic will

 6     prepare for, if I could say so, defending?  That means being

 7     cross-examined on the expert report of Mr. Dunjic.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Well, I think any work product of Mr. Stankovic,

 9     whatever form it takes, would qualify as an expert report if it is any

10     material that is not contained in the Dunjic or different from the Dunjic

11     or expanding on the Dunjic.  And I don't know if we could deal with that

12     as a proofing matter or as a completely new report since it's relating to

13     the existing report that has already gone through the 94 bis process.  So

14     I'm kind of not -- not quite in a position yet to know without seeing how

15     substantive any additional supplement would be to qualify it as a new

16     report or simply a matter of proofing on the existing report.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, one of the options also considered by

19     you, if I understand you well, was just to accept the report, not

20     necessarily the content of it, and refrain from asking the expert to be

21     called to be cross-examined.  Have you considered that?  Because that

22     would change the situation a bit for the Defence.  I think that was one

23     of the options considered when we dealt with the matter last time.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, I also recall that was one of the options that

25     was raised in court and that Mr. McCloskey indicated he would consider.

Page 41679

 1     I think we were waiting for the Defence response before coming to a final

 2     view.  And I will double-check with Mr. McCloskey, but I think for

 3     various reasons we began looking skeptically at that option and

 4     considered that the most prudent course would be the allowance for a

 5     certain level of examination, depending on what was submitted.

 6             So probably -- and those discussions were taking place with some

 7     intensity between Mr. McCloskey and other members of the team directly

 8     concerned with the Dunjic report.  I can check quickly to see if what I

 9     have related is fully accurate and get back to the Court at the next

10     break.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Would you please do that.  Because it sounds

12     as if that option, report is there, no need to call anyone for -- to be

13     cross-examined or on -- on that report.  Of course, it could not be

14     Mr. Dunjic but also not Mr. Stankovic, whether that option is now --

15             MR. TIEGER:  I can certainly appreciate that the Court would like

16     to know where it stands and I'll get back immediately.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you very much.

18             Mr. Ivetic, perhaps it's best to wait for the final position of

19     the Defence.  Then before we start with the -- yes, Prosecution.

20             Then before we start with the next witness, I'd like to briefly

21     deal with the associated exhibits related to this witness.

22             Pursuant to its Rule 92 ter motion for Witness Akashi, dated the

23     27th of October, 2015, and most recent exhibit list received on the

24     20th of November, the Defence has tendered 37 associated exhibits.  The

25     Chamber notes that three of these have already been admitted into

Page 41680

 1     evidence, leaving 34.  The Chamber reiterates to the Defence its guidance

 2     that the Chamber should not be flooded with associated exhibits, and the

 3     Chamber also recalls the preference for documents to be tendered during

 4     the witness's examination in court which allow the witness to explain and

 5     comment on them.

 6             The Chamber therefore invites the Defence to reduce the number of

 7     associated exhibits it is tendering through this witness.  Alternatively,

 8     could the Defence explain why these documents need to be tendered as

 9     associated exhibits, as opposed to being tendered during the

10     examination-in-chief of this witness?

11             Mr. Ivetic, there's a clear invitation here.  Of course, we do

12     not know, also in view of the time you have asked for

13     examination-in-chief, how much of these associated exhibits you'd like to

14     touch upon during your examination, but if there's any observation you'd

15     like to make you have an opportunity to do so.

16             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, Your Honours.  I note some of the associated

17     exhibits are rather lengthy.  I will be dealing with the lengthy ones in

18     court so we'll only be dealing with parts of those exhibits which will be

19     presented to the witness and which then we will not need to have

20     introduced since they'll be read into the record.  So I will try to limit

21     the number of lengthy exhibits that come in.  It's still likely to be a

22     large number because there are a lot of small, one- or two-page documents

23     that were used with the witness in parts of his testimony from the

24     Karadzic case.  I can perhaps reassess at the conclusion of the evidence

25     which of those I might be able to exclude.  Of course, some of them

Page 41681

 1     relate to the Prosecution's cross-examination during the Karadzic case so

 2     I feel if I try to exclude any of those, then I could be accused of not

 3     giving a full picture of the testimony.  So I'm hesitant to do that.  But

 4     will I try to see if I can shorten things as far as exhibits are

 5     concerned after the conclusion of all aspects of the testimony.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Of course, this Chamber doesn't know anything

 7     about the cross-examination of this witness in Karadzic.  We haven't --

 8     it has not been tendered, it has not been presented to us.  And usually

 9     the --

10             MR. IVETIC:  It is a part of the Rule 92 ter statement, I

11     believe.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me see.  Then I thought I read some 90 or

13     95 pages of transcript.  I saw here and there Ms. Edgerton dealing with

14     some matters.

15             MR. IVETIC:  Then I could be mistaken.  In any event, I think I

16     will deal with the associated exhibits at the very end after we finish

17     the witness so we'll have time to --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Just a couple of matters.  I don't believe that

20     cross-examination was included.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Could I then express my surprise, Mr. Ivetic, that

22     where I having read the 90 pages over the weekend and having no

23     recollection as to what was tendered, that you apparently think that

24     cross-examination is part of that.  I saw that Ms. Edgerton has

25     intervened a couple of times.

Page 41682

 1             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, Mr. -- I didn't mean to interrupt,

 2     Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  No, no, please.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  I was only going to respond to the other matters

 5     raised by Mr. Ivetic and indicate that I appreciate and I am confident he

 6     will do his best to follow the Court's guidance.  In support of that

 7     effort I'd simply note that it was my impression from working with these

 8     materials that they were -- these were matters all raised in the

 9     examination, discussed at some point during the examination, and it

10     seemed to me that it might indeed be the most efficient way of

11     proceeding.  Otherwise we'll have two discussions of those -- of many of

12     those documents in court - the one in the transcript from the Karadzic

13     case that's been submitted and the one that Mr. Ivetic might be

14     attempting to elicit in response to the Court's guidance.

15             So, in that sense, I would, I suppose, support the exceptional

16     request to -- that identifies as -- this many documents as associated.

17     In any event, we'll both have to consider I think at some point which of

18     the documents that seem, if any, that seem to have been associated or

19     considered to have been associated by the parties up to this moment or

20     not and possibly adjust our examinations accordingly.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.  I still do not see any

22     cross-examination in the materials.  I think it finished on one day and

23     then there was a little bit remaining for the next day.  And then on that

24     next day, I think the accused then concluded his examination-in-chief

25     and -- I have not seen any cross-examination.

Page 41683

 1             MR. IVETIC:  You are correct, Your Honours.  I apologise.  I

 2     stand corrected.  I, of course, did read the whole thing in preparation

 3     for the witness and [Overlapping speakers] ...

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I understand that.  You may not have been

 5     aware.  At the same time, I think it's important to know what exactly was

 6     presented to this Chamber and what was not.

 7             Then, I think it's time to ask the usher to escort the witness

 8     into the courtroom.

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10                           [The witness entered court]

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning, Mr. Akashi.

12             THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Akashi before you give evidence, the Rules of

14     Procedure and Evidence require that you make a solemn declaration, the

15     text of which is now handed out to you.  May I invite you to make that

16     solemn declaration.

17             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

18             I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole truth,

19     and nothing but the truth.

20                           WITNESS:  YASUSHI AKASHI

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please be seated, Mr. Akashi.

22             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Akashi, I have addressed you as Mr. Akashi.  I

24     have read that in other -- before other Chambers often you were addressed

25     as Your Excellency.  It's not any way as a depreciation of your titles

Page 41684

 1     and your -- the honours that have been given to you, but it's just this

 2     Chamber has developed a habit in just addressing everyone as Mr. or Mrs.

 3     Please don't misunderstand that.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much.  You're most gracious and I

 5     fully understand.  I think titles have only the effect of inflating some

 6     people.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I don't know whether I would support that.

 8     But, Mr. Akashi, you'll first be examined by Mr. Ivetic.  You'll find

 9     Mr. Ivetic to your left.  Mr. Ivetic is a member of the Defence team of

10     Mr. Mladic.

11             Mr. Ivetic, please proceed.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

13                           Examination by Mr. Ivetic:

14        Q.   Good morning, sir.

15        A.   Good morning.

16        Q.   I would like to first ask to you please state your full name for

17     the purposes of the record.

18        A.   Yes, my full name is Yasushi Akashi.

19             MR. IVETIC:  And I would ask for 1D5815 to be displayed in

20     e-court.  I do have a hard copy for the ambassador of this document.

21        Q.   And, Ambassador, while we wait for the same I can ask you a

22     question.  Did you have occasion to testify in the case at this Tribunal

23     in relation to Radovan Karadzic?

24        A.   Yes, indeed, I did.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Akashi, then you'll certainly have read again

Page 41685

 1     that you were asked at that time whether you had any papers before you.

 2     If you want to consult anything other than the hard copy of the testimony

 3     in the Karadzic case, would you please tell us that you are doing it and

 4     what you are consulting.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I will follow your instruction.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 7             MR. IVETIC:

 8        Q.   Ambassador, this document before us in e-court is the transcript

 9     from the Karadzic proceeding dated 24 April 2013.  Does that accord with

10     your recollection of the first day you started to testify in direct

11     examination in the Karadzic case?

12        A.   Yes, I do.

13        Q.   And if now we could turn briefly to page 79 of the document, and

14     it will be tabbed in the hard copy at the top for your convenience, here

15     on the screen we now see the transcript from the same case, dated

16     25 April 2013.  Sir, does that accord with your recollection of the

17     second day that you testified in direct examination in the Karadzic case?

18        A.   Yes, this seem to be the -- in accordance with what I said on

19     that day.

20        Q.   Okay.  And, sir, did you have occasion to review this transcript

21     from the Karadzic case in these last few days before today?

22        A.   I cannot say I went through every word of it, but this seems to

23     be in general accord with what I said.

24        Q.   Okay.  And after the -- after your review, do you think the

25     transcript is accurate and complete as to the testimony that you gave in

Page 41686

 1     the direct examination in the Karadzic case?

 2        A.   In general, yes.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And if I were to ask you today questions exactly the same

 4     as those in the Karadzic transcript, would your answers today be in

 5     substance the same as in this transcript?

 6        A.   I hope so.  But you said in substance, yeah.

 7        Q.   And, sir, you have taken a solemn declaration to tell the truth

 8     today.  Can you tell us if your answers in the Karadzic case were

 9     truthful in nature as recorded?

10        A.   As I saw the events in those days, yes.

11        Q.   Okay.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, we would thus tender 1D5815 as a

13     public exhibit.  And as we indicated, we would deal with the associated

14     exhibits after the conclusion of the testimony.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  I hear of no objections.

16             Mr. Registrar.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D1361, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  D1361 is admitted.

19             Please proceed.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.  At this time I have a

21     short public summary of the transcript for the public to know some of the

22     matters that were testified about, a copy of which has been given to the

23     booths.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Have you informed Mr. Akashi about the purpose

25     of this summary?

Page 41687

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, and I can repeat again --

 2        Q.   Ambassador, this is a short summary just for purposes of the

 3     public.  It is does not form part of your evidence.  Your transcript is

 4     your evidence.

 5        A.   I understand.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Ambassador Akashi joined the UN in February of 1957.

 7     He served from then on in a variety of offices and functions in his

 8     career, ranging from ambassador to under-secretary-general, until he

 9     retired from the UN in 1997.  In 1992, Ambassador Akashi was appointed

10     the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for the

11     former Yugoslavia and served in that capacity during the war in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  After retiring from the UN he went back to Japan.

13             In his transcript from the Karadzic case, Ambassador Akashi

14     testifies as to a number of matters including, but not limited to, the

15     following.  He says the basic trouble --

16             THE WITNESS:  Excuse me, Mr. Ivetic.  I think there's an error

17     here.  In 1992 I was appointed the Special Representative of the

18     Secretary-General of the UN for Cambodia.  And it was in January 1994

19     that I was appointed on the same -- the same, similar job with regard to

20     former Yugoslavia.

21             MR. IVETIC:

22        Q.   I agree with that and I misspoke.  And I apologise.

23             MR. IVETIC:  Ambassador Akashi says the basic trouble with

24     UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia was a lack of unity of opinion within the

25     Security Council where at least three differing viewpoints prevailed.

Page 41688

 1     This made the work of UNPROFOR difficult.

 2             There was no peace to keep in the former Yugoslavia, and the UN

 3     Secretary-General and others had serious doubts about the UN going there,

 4     but European countries exerted pressure on the UN to step in.

 5     Governments were in many ways compelled to do something to respond to the

 6     voices of public opinion and media cries.

 7             Some UNPROFOR officers, such as General Briquemont, felt the

 8     mandate given to the peacekeepers was extremely ambiguous and almost

 9     impossible to implement.

10             Demilitarization of the safe areas, including Srebrenica, was a

11     constant issue raised, and it was repeatedly pointed out that the lack of

12     demilitarization affected an indispensable element of the safe area

13     concept itself.  Many reports to the Security Council reported problems

14     as to all the safe areas.

15             As to six safe areas, the problems included several defects or

16     shortcomings in both the concept and implementation of the safe areas,

17     which led the Secretary-General and others to have serious reservations

18     and express their concerns.

19             First, only less than a quarter of requested UN troops to

20     implement the agreements were provided.  Second --

21             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry to interrupt, but this typewritten

22     version seems not in perfect accord with the original text.  There were

23     some slips.

24             MR. IVETIC:

25        Q.   Yes.  I think that the final transcript usually gets combed and

Page 41689

 1     those typos get fixed.

 2        A.   Okay, fine.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Akashi, what is written now will be reviewed

 4     before it becomes the final transcript.  And there is an audio available

 5     to check whether everything is okay.  And that's usually done the same

 6     day or the same night.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much for your reassurance.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

 9             MR. IVETIC:  Second, the Bosnian side used the safe areas to rest

10     and re-equip their troops and other purposes.  Third, the disarmament

11     provisions were not implemented.  Fourth, there was not always

12     demarcation of the safe areas.

13             Ambassador Akashi agreed with observations of others that

14     premature recognition of Croatia and Bosnia worsened the situation.

15     European governments should have heeded the advice of Badinter Commission

16     of the EU to make sure first the constitutions of Bosnia and Croatia

17     provided for the vital interests of both majority and minority groups.

18             At one point in time, the main -- an issue was that neither the

19     Bosnian government nor the United States government wanted a long-term

20     cease-fire because of concerns of making territorial holdings of the Serb

21     forces permanent.

22             As a result of active military assistance from the United States,

23     Germany, and the Islamic states to Croatian and Bosnian forces, the

24     overall power balance drastically shifted against the Serb side as the

25     war progressed.  It was the UN's consistent position that if there were

Page 41690

 1     infractions by any side, that the use of air power was to be applied

 2     equally to the parties.  But this position was not shared by NATO or some

 3     governments.

 4             As to the Markale 1 shelling, the Ambassador appointed a

 5     commission of experts that determined the attack could have come from

 6     either side.

 7             And that completes the summary.

 8        Q.   Ambassador, I would now propose to return to parts of your

 9     transcript from the Karadzic proceedings to ask you some questions to

10     clarify and seek further information.

11             MR. IVETIC:  If we could thus have D1361 on our screens, and

12     page 5 of the same, which should correlate to transcript page 37667 of

13     the underlying transcript.

14             And, sir, here at lines 10 through 12, you say and I quote:

15             "The basic trouble with UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia was

16     lack of unity of opinions or viewpoints in the Security Council."

17             You then in the remainder of this answer through line 19 say that

18     at least three different viewpoints prevailed among the permanent members

19     of the Security Council.

20             What were these three different viewpoints?

21        A.   One was the viewpoint of the United States that the Bosnian

22     government was basically the victim of the aggression by Bosnian Serb

23     forces supported by Serbia.  And second viewpoint was that of the Russian

24     Federation which considered the -- the Bosnian Serbs as a minority group

25     which was defending its rights against the majority group, which was the

Page 41691

 1     Bosnian government.  The third viewpoint was held by countries like the

 2     United Kingdom and France which felt that the most important thing to do

 3     is to stabilize the situation, not the designation of who was the main

 4     culprit of the difficulties, and that some kind of peace and the

 5     cessation of hostilities was the main objective of the international

 6     community.

 7             Of course, German position was somewhat different, somewhere

 8     between, you might say, the position of the United States and that of the

 9     French and the British.  And many Islamic countries who were

10     non-permanent members of the Security Council were anxious that the

11     injustice, as they saw it, suffered by the Bosnian government should be

12     corrected.  So these were three or you might say four different

13     viewpoints.

14        Q.   Thank you, sir.  Next I'd like to turn to page 8 which should

15     correlate to transcript page 37607 of the underlying Karadzic transcript,

16     and here first I'd like to focus at lines 15 through 25 on this page.

17     And here, you again discuss the Security Council compromises that led to

18     ambiguity in resolutions which were difficult to understand and difficult

19     to implement on the ground.

20             Did anyone from the ground ever tell the Security Council of

21     these problems that were being experienced by those trying to implement

22     their resolutions?

23        A.   I think many of us did that, within the limit of basic politeness

24     which we always adhered to, vis-à-vis members of the Security Council,

25     and including the Secretary-General himself.  His reports pointed out the

Page 41692

 1     difficulty of implementing Security Council resolutions which did their

 2     best to hide the differences among Security Council members and tried to

 3     paper over these differences with the use of ambiguous and seemingly

 4     elegant phraseology.

 5        Q.   And now, sir, looking at the earlier part of this same page, more

 6     specifically your answer at lines -- beginning at lines 4 through 14,

 7     here you talk of the media and how governments were compelled to do

 8     something to respond to public opinion and calls from the media.

 9             Was the media presenting a full and accurate picture of what was

10     happening on the ground?

11        A.   I think to generalise the media would not be doing justice to the

12     media.  There was a big variation about the accuracy of the -- or balance

13     of the media coverage.  For instance, if you take up only television

14     media, I think, on the whole, BBC was more accurate and more balanced

15     than CNN, for instance.  Some are more emotional than others, and --

16     so -- but I think there was a proclivity on the part of commercial media

17     to sensationalise issues and to simplify the picture.

18        Q.   And next I would turn to page 34 of the transcript, which is the

19     underlying page 37696, and here if we could focus on lines 11 through 16,

20     your answer here talks about the topic that you just raised, the media

21     that sometimes "tended to exaggerate the nature of incidents so they can

22     sort of sensationalise their nature."

23             Do you recall any specific examples of this that related to the

24     former Yugoslavia?

25        A.   I cannot offhand recall specific instances.

Page 41693

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Then if we can turn to page 11 in e-court and that

 2     will be transcript page 37673 of the underlying transcript, and here the

 3     question posed from you is at lines 4 through 9 and it deals with the

 4     part of your -- where your book where you say that neither the Bosnian

 5     government nor United States government wanted a long-term cease-fire

 6     based on the view of not wanting Serb territorial holdings to be

 7     permanent.

 8             Then at lines 15 through 17, you are asked, in essence, if this

 9     selection from your book refreshes your recollection on different

10     interests of foreign elements and domestic elements prolonging the war.

11     And then on the next page at line 3 we finally get your answer to these

12     questions, which is recorded as:

13             "Yes, that was my interpretation of events at that time."

14             Do you recall any specific matters or events that brought you to

15     that interpretation?

16        A.   I negotiated in Geneva, I think it was in June 1994, so could --

17     we had heard proximity talks between three parties in the Bosnian

18     conflict, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian government, and the Croat -- Bosnian

19     Croats.  And since they did not want to meet face to face with two

20     others, the -- I had to go through different rooms where three parties

21     were ensconced.  And the -- I was able to extract a commitment on the

22     part of Bosnian Serbs to agree to at least a four-month cease-fire

23     proposed by the UN and they did agree to it.  But Bosnian government did

24     not want to accept cease-fire as being too long, and this coincided with

25     the American viewpoint presented by Ambassador Redman that cease-fire

Page 41694

 1     period should be for one month.  And Croats were somewhere in a position

 2     vacillating between these different periods.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And further down on the page from line 11 through 23

 4     you talk about a visit of President Carter to Bosnia, and in lines 16

 5     through 17 you say:

 6             "But Bosnian government did not particularly appreciate Carter's

 7     visit."

 8             Could you please explain for us what this relates to?

 9        A.   Yeah, I was negotiating at the time towards the end of 1994 as

10     general cessation of hostilities agreement between the three parties, and

11     I found the Bosnian government reluctant to accept the four-month period.

12     I think Serbs were somewhat more willing to do it, and the Croats, as

13     usual, vacillated between two other positions.  And -- but in the end I

14     was able to extract agreement among the three parties for a general

15     cessation of hostilities agreement for a four-month period.  And

16     President Carter helped me with regard to getting agreement of Bosnian

17     Serbs which were, I think, any way forthcoming.  So I -- like what media

18     said, I'm not sure how much President Carter's help was actually needed.

19     It was obvious that Bosnian government was not happy with that visit by

20     President Carter, and yet I think the coincidence of interests by the

21     three parties enabled us to get four month's cessation of hostilities.

22     But at the end of that, hostilities again were rekindled.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Next I'd like to turn together with you to page 24 in

24     e-court which should correlate to transcript page 37686 of the underlying

25     transcript.  And at lines 5 through 8 as your answer, you say:

Page 41695

 1             "Yes.  Demilitarization of safe areas, including Srebrenica, was

 2     one of our preoccupations, and we never stopped pointing out that the

 3     lack of demilitarization of safe areas is an indispensable component of

 4     the safe area concept itself."

 5             First of all, do you mean to say that the lack of

 6     demilitarization of safe areas is an indispensable component of the safe

 7     areas concept or do you mean to say demilitarization is an indispensable

 8     component of the safe areas concept?

 9        A.   Demilitarization of the safe areas was very important and as you

10     quoted in -- even indispensable part of safety and security of safe

11     areas.  But as I said elsewhere, other elements like delimitation or

12     delineation of the scope of respective safe areas was also important, and

13     the freedom of movement by UNPROFOR and others was also important.  In

14     addition, the very presence of the UN to supervise the safe areas was

15     also important.  Here, if our presence was just symbolic, then that would

16     not be sufficient to ensure safety and security of these areas.  So these

17     three or four different elements were interlocking assurances for the

18     effectiveness of safe areas.

19             But I must add that in the case of Srebrenica and Zepa, the

20     delineation and demilitarization at one period or the other, I think in

21     initial period was partly achieved and then somehow they deteriorated.

22        Q.   And in this part of the transcript you say "we never stopped

23     pointing out."

24             To whom was this that you never stopped pointing out this

25     problem?

Page 41696

 1        A.   Primarily to the Security Council.

 2        Q.   And, sir, what did the Security Council do, if anything, in

 3     response?

 4        A.   I regret to say that, as I said earlier, the lack of unity of its

 5     members, including the permanent members, was characteristic of the

 6     Security Council in the whole Yugoslav episode.  This is in sharp

 7     contrast to the effectiveness of the Security Council and its unity

 8     during the Cambodian conflict in which there was a remarkable degree of

 9     unity of approach as well as attitude.  And so you might say this is a

10     fundamental underlying necessity for the effectiveness of the UN, that

11     its members, particularly permanent members, be united in the basic

12     objectives.

13        Q.   And in relation to demilitarization, was that also raised with

14     the Bosnian government?

15        A.   Yes, all these matters were raised with the Bosnian government,

16     as well as with the Bosnian Serb party.

17        Q.   And as to demilitarization what was their response?

18        A.   Bosnian government insisted that their military forces had to

19     remain, particularly with regard to Sarajevo they emphasised.  You know,

20     it was a seat of the government and therefore they needed military

21     presence sufficient to enable the tranquility and safety.

22        Q.   And now if we can turn to page 49 in e-court of the transcript

23     and that should correlate to 37711 of the underlying Karadzic transcript.

24     At lines 7 through 15 of the same, you were asked a question by

25     Mr. Karadzic and it goes as follows:

Page 41697

 1             "Do you remember -- do you remember our meeting on 22nd of April,

 2     1994, in Belgrade, where I claim that the BH army launching attacks from

 3     the safe areas and that I seeked and requested the UN to proceed

 4     immediately to Gorazde to be able to accurately report who was

 5     attacking?"

 6             "A.  I think in our meeting on the 22nd of April, 1994, we

 7     discussed many things.  That meeting started at 12.00 noon and went on

 8     until 11.30 that night.  So it was a marathon negotiation.  We discussed

 9     many, many things centring, of course, around Gorazde crisis."

10             Ambassador, was one of the things discussed during that marathon

11     negotiation these matters that were raised by Mr. Karadzic in his

12     question?

13        A.   Could you repeat what Karadzic raised at that meeting?

14        Q.   He raised -- he claimed that the BH army was launching attacks

15     from safe areas and that he requested the UN to proceed to Gorazde to be

16     able to accurately report who was attacking.  That's his question, and

17     I'm asking if you recall if that specific item was one of the items that

18     would have been discussed at that marathon negotiation.

19        A.   I -- I do not specifically remember reference to this matter, but

20     I hasten to add that we had a small UN presence in the form of the UNMOs,

21     military observers.  I think they numbered eight.  And what Karadzic was

22     asking is not a UN presence but a more numerous UN presence.

23        Q.   I understand.  And now if we can turn to the next page in e-court

24     which will correspond to page 37712 of the underlying Karadzic

25     transcript, and at lines 17 through 22 you are giving an answer and you

Page 41698

 1     say that -- you talk of many reports of the Secretary-General to the

 2     Security Council as to these problems.  And this is in reference to

 3     Karadzic's question about paragraph 3 of the document you were looking

 4     at.  So I'd like to look at that document.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  And that is number -- 65 ter number 16806.  And I

 6     also have a hard copy of the same to provide to the witness.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, may I draw to your attention that the

 8     last answer, that the whole last line has not been translated and

 9     transcribed because you immediately started your next question not

10     waiting for the finalization of the translation.

11             Please proceed.

12             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise.  Then.  Perhaps to be on the safe side

13     I should ask the ambassador --

14        Q.   Sir --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  It will be worked over -- I mean, overnight.  That's

16     not the problem, but then we have to wait until tomorrow, I think.  The

17     witness said that it was not about the presence but about increasing the

18     number of those present.

19             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  But I leave it our transcribers to finalize it.

21             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

22        Q.   And now that we have this document in front of us, we see it is

23     dated the 23rd of April, 1994, and references a meeting with Bosnian Serb

24     civilian and military leaders.  If we could turn to page 2 of the same

25     and look at the paragraph 3 that Mr. Karadzic was basing his question on,

Page 41699

 1     and it says:

 2             "In view of the importance and urgency to reach a concrete

 3     agreement on the Gorazde crisis, Mr. Akashi suggested that this item be

 4     addressed first.  Dr. Karadzic, in addressing the issue, said that the

 5     fundamental problem of the safe areas was that they did not meet the

 6     criteria of safe areas as defined in international conventions.  Of the

 7     six designated safe areas only two - Srebrenica and Zepa - had been

 8     delineated but still remained undemilitarized.  The others served as

 9     strongholds for the BiH armija.  Consequently there was a need to solve

10     not only the issue of Gorazde but the status of other safe areas as

11     well."

12             Now, in the transcript you say -- strike that.

13             Did the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

14     about these problem -- include anything about these problems?

15        A.   Mr. Ivetic, could you repeat your question.

16        Q.   Yes.  When we were looking at the transcript we talked about

17     reports to the Security Council on the topic of safe areas.  Did those

18     reports also encompass these that have been raised in this document as

19     expressed by the Serb side, by Dr. Karadzic in particular?

20        A.   There were several reports of the UN Secretary-General referring

21     to the questions of difficulties encountered by the UN in order to

22     implement the safe area concept.  And so maybe there are slight

23     differences in the way the matter was described or analysed, but in the

24     basic line Secretary-General's approach was the same and consistent.

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 41700

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I see we're at the time for a break.

 2     I would at this time tender this document as the next exhibit.  Then we

 3     can take that break.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter number 16806 will be Exhibit D1362,

 6     Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  D1362 is admitted into evidence.

 8             Mr. Akashi, we'll take a break.  We'd like to see you back in

 9     20 minutes.  You may follow the usher.

10             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

11                           [The witness stands down]

12             JUDGE ORIE:  We will resume at five minutes to 11.00.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, the Chamber was informed that you wanted

16     to raise a matter.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.  I indicated to the Court I

18     wanted to get back to you as quickly as possible and -- in response to

19     your inquiry earlier today.  And that's why I've asked for this brief

20     time.  I wanted to advise you that Mr. McCloskey's initial response to

21     the possibility of the simple tendering of the report with nothing else

22     was apparently predicated on his understanding that it had either been

23     proposed by the Defence or that the Defence did not object.  Our current

24     understanding, however, is that the Defence does object, and in light of

25     that we do not consider that the preferable option but instead consider

Page 41701

 1     that a targeted, short, proofing note-style contribution by Dr. Stankovic

 2     would be the more suitable option.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 4             Mr. Ivetic, you can confirm that that option was not accepted by

 5     the Defence.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  While most of the discussions were between

 7     Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Lukic, the part I was there for talked about

 8     potentially submitting the transcripts of the cross-examination in the

 9     prior proceeding which we felt then would unfairly prejudice us if we did

10     not have a chance to, in essence, re-direct an expert on those topics.

11     But again, most of the discussions were between Mr. Lukic and

12     Mr. McCloskey directly without my involvement.  I was only there for a

13     part of the discussions last week, I believe it was Thursday.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  So then as matters stand now, unless there's

15     any change in the positions is that we'll -- that the Dunjic report will

16     be added to by Mr. Stankovic and that Mr. Stankovic will be called to be

17     briefly examined and be cross-examined.

18             That's -- unless we hear otherwise from the parties, that's what

19     the Chamber now understands the case to be.

20             Then could the witness be escorted in the courtroom again.

21             Meanwhile I used the time for P7681.

22             On the 19th of November of this year, during the testimony of

23     Mitar Kovac, Exhibit P7681, a military report, was admitted into

24     evidence.  To be found on transcript page 41640.  The Chamber notes that

25     the original has a stamp in the upper left-hand corner with the date the

Page 41702

 1     11th of April, 1993.  However, in the English translation, the date is

 2     11 April 1992.  The Chamber hereby requests the Prosecution to verify and

 3     correct the translation.

 4             Mr. Weber.

 5             MR. WEBER:  Yes, Your Honour.  And thank you.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And the transcript, line 8, on page 25 should

 7     read "11 April" instead of "1 April."

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, you may proceed.

10             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

11             If we can call up again the transcript of the Karadzic case,

12     which is D1361, and if we could turn to page 74 in e-court which should

13     correlate to page 37736 of the underlying transcript.

14        Q.   Sir, here, you are talking about the Secretary-General's

15     reservations about the concept of safe areas.  And in lines 2 through 21

16     on the page, you outline some of the problems raised by the

17     Secretary-General in more detail.  At lines 13 through 14, you say the

18     "UN Security Council in its wisdom did not heed very much to these

19     opinions of the Secretary-General," as to the safe areas.

20             To your knowledge, was there a particular member or members of

21     the Security Council that had views in relation to addressing these

22     problems that were listed here in your answer?

23        A.   I do not quite understand your question, Mr. Ivetic.

24        Q.   In relation to the problems that are raised here in your

25     testimony that the Secretary-General addressed to the Security Council,

Page 41703

 1     do you recall if there was any discussion within the Security Council as

 2     to those problems?

 3        A.   Yes, indeed.  There was a prolonged and repeated discussions in

 4     the Security Council with the participation of all its members.

 5        Q.   Okay.  And in the end, was there a particular position that

 6     prevailed within the Security Council in relation to these problems?

 7        A.   I'm afraid not.

 8        Q.   Okay.  And you said a little bit before the break that in

 9     relation to disarmament, after some initial success the situation

10     deteriorated.  Were there any indications that more weapons were being

11     brought into the safe areas after they'd been declared?

12        A.   It's difficult to generalise because there was six safe areas and

13     situation differed from one area to another.  And in the question which

14     we were discussing just before the recess, it was the -- the most urgent

15     issue was connected with the Gorazde safe area.  So it varied from time

16     to time.

17        Q.   Okay.

18             MR. IVETIC:  And now if we can turn to 1D4661 in e-court, and I

19     have a hard copy of that document as well for the witness.

20        Q.   And this is a document that was discussed with you within the

21     Karadzic transcript at pages 37727 through 37729.  And you can perhaps

22     see from the copy on the screen and soon in the hard copy that will be

23     given to you that this is dated -- first of all, it's from

24     General de Lapresle to Mr. Annan dated 14 February 1995 with the subject:

25     "Unidentified fixed-wing aircraft flights in Tuzla."

Page 41704

 1             MR. IVETIC:  And if we could turn to the next page in both the

 2     hard copy and in e-court, I propose to discuss ...

 3             I see counsel on his feet.  I don't know if there's --

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. Ivetic, just in respect of the hard copy, it may

 5     be that you only wish to present this portion of the document.  There's

 6     just a -- and it's only a tiny portion of the document that appears to me

 7     to be missing and it's point 9 and then in the back of that is a map.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  That's correct.  I inadvertently left those off.  I

 9     just saw that but I'll --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  So that you'll provide them now --

11             MR. IVETIC:  I can provide them.  I will not be asking questions

12     about that section, but if you want the -- in fairness the whole idea of

13     having a hard copy is to give the complete document to the gentleman, so

14     I should provide them.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  And could I meanwhile, before Mr. Akashi focuses on

16     the next question, ask one thing.

17             Mr. Akashi, you answered one of the previous questions by saying

18     it's difficult to generalise because there were six safe areas and the

19     situation differed from one area to another.  And then you said:

20             "And in the question we were discussing just before the recess,

21     it was the -- the most urgent issue was connected with the Gorazde safe

22     area."

23             And you said it varied from time to time.

24             I remember that Mr. Ivetic in his question referred to a

25     situation deteriorating as far as demilitarization is concerned.  Now

Page 41705

 1     what I read from your testimony from before the break, and I'll read that

 2     part of your answer.  You said:

 3             "But I must add that in the case of Srebrenica and Zepa, the

 4     delineation and demilitarization at one period or the other, I think an

 5     initial period was partly achieved and then somehow they deteriorated."

 6             So I wondered whether Mr. Ivetic's question was about that

 7     portion of your evidence.  It was.  And I'm slightly confused that in

 8     your answer now you are referring to Gorazde, whereas in that portion of

 9     your answer before the break you referred to Srebrenica and Zepa where it

10     deteriorated over time.

11             Could you help me out.

12             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I think we were paying attention to different

13     periods.  I think when I talked about temporary improvements of the

14     situation with regard to Srebrenica and Zepa, Srebrenica safe area was

15     the first of the six to be established, and in the initial period,

16     delineation and disarmament part went rather well in Srebrenica, in

17     particular.  This was a local agreement, not of general application to

18     all safe areas.  Anyway, the other areas came into existence at a

19     somewhat later period.  But in the initial period, there were ups and

20     downs, and there were short periods of some optimism on the local

21     situation, particularly in Srebrenica.

22             But then there was a focus of worldwide attention after the

23     Markale market situation in Sarajevo in February 1994, and the attention

24     shifted to Gorazde in April 1994.  And in those areas there were

25     certainly no demarcation of boundaries, nor any substantive disarmament

Page 41706

 1     efforts.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for this clarification.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  May I just -- one follow-up question.

 4             You said and the attention shifted to Gorazde and in those areas

 5     there were certainly demarcation of boundaries or no demarcation of

 6     boundaries?  What did you say?

 7             THE WITNESS:  Here again, difficult to generalise, but there were

 8     general difficulties of demarcation, and I think the cases of Sarajevo

 9     and Zepa were rather specific and temporary.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  My question was only about what -- the last

11     sentence you said.  Because in my view there was a "no" missing in the

12     transcript.  I read in the transcript:

13             "... there were certainly demarcation of boundaries, nor" and

14     then it went on.  Were there demarcation or no demarcation of boundaries?

15             THE WITNESS:  In the majority of the cases, no demarcation.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

18             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

19        Q.   Ambassador, if I could draw your attention to item number 7 on

20     the document that we have before us which reads:

21             "We are not yet in a position to comment in detail on these

22     events, but it appears that two clandestine resupplies have taken place.

23     The equipment being delivered is assessed to be of a high value/high

24     technology such as new generation antitank guided missiles or perhaps

25     surface to air missiles.  Regardless it is unreasonable to expect that

Page 41707

 1     just two aircraft deliveries could provide enough supplies required for

 2     the BiH forces, and that more resupply flights are likely.  The origin of

 3     the cargo aircraft or the jet [sic] is not known."

 4             And in relation to this document, if we could look at the

 5     transcript for the Karadzic case, D1361, page 65 of the same in e-court

 6     and that will be page 37727, lines 10 through 12.  You say in relation to

 7     this:

 8             "1995.  I do not specifically recall an incident in February 1995

 9     with regard to Tuzla airport.  The incidents at or around Tuzla were very

10     frequent."

11             And I wanted to, first of all, ask you:  Does your answer about

12     incidents being very frequent relate to incidents of the type that we

13     just looked at or in general?

14        A.   Could you repeat your question.

15        Q.   Yes.  In relation to here where you say, "The incidents at or

16     around Tuzla were very frequent," when talking about incidents are you

17     only talking about the type that we just looked at and which was then

18     shown to you in this same transcript, dated from February 1995?  What is

19     it that you're talking about when you say "incidents"?  That's basically

20     the question.

21        A.   Throughout the two years, 1994 to 1995, particularly in 1994, the

22     question of the opening of the Tuzla airport for the freedom of movement,

23     particularly to facilitate movement of humanitarian goods, was very much

24     on my agenda.  But I -- I think this report you mentioned stemmed from

25     one incident which occurred in February 1995, and I do not have specific

Page 41708

 1     recollection of that incident.  I think it was dealt with at the military

 2     level rather than at the political, diplomatic level.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic.

 5             Mr. Mladic, apart from speaking aloud a minute ago, would you

 6     please draw your attention to what happens here in the court rather than

 7     to communicate in a way, as you know, you're not allowed with the public

 8     gallery.  So if you turn a little bit, then it will be better visible for

 9     us that you're focusing on what happens here rather than to deal with

10     other matters.  I invited you to slightly turn, Mr. Mladic, away from the

11     public gallery.

12             Please proceed.

13             MR. IVETIC:

14        Q.   Ambassador, in February of 1995, were there any --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mladic, the first thing you now do is again turn

16     to the public gallery which I just told you not to do.  This is the last

17     warning.

18             Please proceed.

19             MR. IVETIC:

20        Q.   In February 1995, were there restrictions in place on the use of

21     the air-space over Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is, the operation of aircraft

22     by the warring parties?  Do you recall?

23             Ambassador, do you recall if there any restrictions on the use of

24     aircraft in the air-space above Bosnia in February of 1995?

25        A.   I -- I remember there was general restriction.

Page 41709

 1        Q.   And do you recall if during this period there were any

 2     restrictions in place in regard to providing weapons to any of the

 3     warring parties?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, we would tender 1D4661 as a Defence

 6     exhibit at this time.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D1363, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  D1363 is admitted.

10             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.  Next I'd like to look at page 25 of the

11     transcript in e-court, which will be 37687 of the underlying transcript.

12        Q.   And at lines 17 through 25, and it goes onto the next page, you

13     talk about the expert committee that was established to investigate the

14     first Markale market shelling.  And here you say, at line 21 and onward,

15     that two members each were picked from countries friendly to each of the

16     parties.

17             Do you recall the way this alignment worked, who was considered

18     to be members of the commission that would be from countries that were

19     friendly towards either of the sides?

20        A.   I think this committee consisted of five members, and two of them

21     came from countries with some favourable attitude towards Bosnian Serb

22     party and two others from Islamic countries.  And the fifth member who

23     served as the chairman was from Canada, which in my opinion was

24     considered neutral and impartial.

25        Q.   Okay.  And if we could turn to page 26 in e-court, which is the

Page 41710

 1     very next page of the transcript, in the continuation of your testimony

 2     about this committee, you talk of the conclusion reached by the experts,

 3     which you accepted fully, was the attack could have come from either

 4     side.

 5             Did you have faith in these experts and the conclusion that they

 6     reached?

 7        A.   So far as, yeah, they were able to reach their conclusions, I

 8     think this is expert view.  And -- but that was a rather general

 9     conclusion in character under the circumstances because there was only

10     one mortar bomb, and the crater created by the result of the bombing was

11     not very precise due to the fact that the bomb fell not directly on the

12     ground but it encountered some object in the market on the way to finding

13     its place on the ground.  So it was not extremely precise or conclusive.

14     And the general conclusion reached by the expert committee was that in

15     view of the general angle and the estimated distance between the Markale

16     market and the place where the mortar was issued, there were in the

17     general areas partly occupied by the Bosnian Serb party and partly

18     occupied by the Bosnian government side, so their conclusion was that the

19     mortar could have come from either one of the two parties.

20             This is quite contrary to the press reports which had appeared in

21     the "New York Times" and others that it came from one party or another.

22     But you know, under the circumstances, we have to rely on the expert

23     opinion however inconclusive it might be.

24        Q.   Okay.  And if we could next turn to page 31 --

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If I may just ask a question.

Page 41711

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  These experts who constituted this five-member

 3     committee, were they experts in mortar investigations or ...

 4             THE WITNESS:  Sir, they were experts in ballistics.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Ballistics.  Thank you so much.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Welcome.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  If we could now turn page 31 of this same

 8     transcript, which should correlate to page 37693 of the underlying

 9     Karadzic transcript.

10        Q.   Here, on lines 16 and onward, you were asked about the weapons

11     exclusion zone in Sarajevo and weapon collection points.  And here, from

12     line 21 onwards to 25, you say that UNPROFOR would have an intermediary

13     presence between the opposing forces.

14             Did the intermediary presence of UNPROFOR, was that allowed in

15     every instance; that is to say, did it work as planned?  Did the parties

16     permit the intermediary presence of UNPROFOR in every instance?

17        A.   So far as I recollect, yes.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mladic, no speaking aloud.

19             MR. IVETIC:  I'm told that the Serbian translation stopped.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  If that's the case that will be repaired.

21     Let's wait for a second.  By the way, whispering to Mr. Stojanovic's ears

22     would do the same instead of speaking aloud.  But could you confirm,

23     Mr. Stojanovic, that the B/C/S translation is now accurate again.

24             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  I confirm

25     that we hear now this B/C/S translation, but we did not hear either the

Page 41712

 1     previous question or the previous answer.  That's what the General was

 2     saying.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then -- what's your suggestion, we could

 4     re-read it, which may be the best.  Mr. Stojanovic, if you could assist

 5     in telling us from where -- is it from:  "Here, on lines 16 and onward"?

 6             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it's from the

 7     question asked by Mr. Ivetic and I believe it is from line 17 on page 34.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, in 17 Mr. Ivetic says that he has been told

 9     that the Serbian translation stopped so ...

10             MR. IVETIC:  I think it must be --

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Is it line 8?  Mr. Ivetic.

12             MR. IVETIC:  It must be.  I don't have any means of verifying, of

13     course, since I was listening to the English.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's -- I'll read, then, from line 8.

15             The question was:

16             "Here, on lines 16 and onwards, you were asked about the

17     weapons," I take it, "exclusion zone in Sarajevo and weapon collection

18     points.  And here, from line 21 onwards to 25, you say that UNPROFOR

19     would have an intermediary presence between the opposing forces.

20             Did the intermediary presence of UNPROFOR, was that allowed in

21     every instance; that is to say, did it work as planned?"  And then I take

22     it, "did the parties permit the intermediary presence of UNPROFOR in

23     every instance?"

24             And the answer given then by the witness was:

25             "So far as I recollect, yes."

Page 41713

 1             Does that complete, Mr. Stojanovic, the lacking translation?  If

 2     so, we'll proceed.

 3             MR. STOJANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, it does, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 5             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Then if we could turn the page to the next page of

 7     the Karadzic transcript, which will then be 37694 of the underlying

 8     Karadzic transcript, and in this section at line 19 and onwards at the

 9     bottom of the page, you were discussing a document identified as a

10     protocol that talked about the right to self-defence and the -- in the

11     event of withdrawal of the interposition of UNPROFOR from the

12     interposition area or if UNPROFOR is not able to prevent or stop attacks.

13     I wish to look at that document with you and that is D112 in the Mladic

14     case, and I do have a hard copy of that as well.  Hopefully.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Usher, could you ...

16             MR. IVETIC:

17        Q.   While we wait for that hard copy, you can see on the screen that

18     this is dated 16 August 1994.  And it's from yourself to Mr. Annan and

19     others in New York and it's entitled:  "Weapon collection points."

20             And in relation to the same, if we look at item number 2, it

21     says:

22             "The recent fighting around Visoko-Olovo-Kladanj could pose a

23     complex and dangerous situation whereby a BiH offensive seriously

24     threatens the BSA forces in that area, which is in very close proximity

25     to the northern edge of the Sarajevo EZ.  BiH action may be in the form

Page 41714

 1     of a provocation or a real desire for tactical gain.  Should the BiH move

 2     heavy weapons into the zone, this would put them in clear violation of

 3     the EZ.  In recent days, the BiH have also fired weapons already within

 4     the zone.  BiH activity has already prompted the BSA to seek to withdraw

 5     their heavy weapons from the WCPs."

 6             And if we could turn the page and look at, first, items 3 and 5,

 7     3 talks of "the protocol to the Sarajevo WCP agreement of

 8     14 February 1994 (attached) recognises the BSA's legitimate right of

 9     self-defence.  If the BSA comes under more pressure from the BiH, their

10     demand to have access to their weapons could become a more pressing

11     reality under the protocol referred to above.  There are several

12     scenarios that could prevail, and the staff at BH command and UNPROFOR HQ

13     are examining these."

14             And in item 5:

15             "This problem is now being examined in detail.  It raises many

16     questions including the numbers and types of weapons that the BSA might

17     justifiably be allowed to use under various scenarios; and the reactions

18     of NATO, the media, and the international community should commander BH C

19     authorise release of an appropriate number of weapons.  In the interim,

20     however, we would very much appreciate your early initial views on this

21     very difficult and potentially pressing problem."

22             The first question I want to ask is:  Here you reference a

23     protocol to the weapons collection agreement that is attached to this

24     document.  Do you recall if you were present at the time the weapons

25     collection agreement was negotiated and this protocol was discussed?

Page 41715

 1        A.   I was present in Sarajevo at the initiation period of negotiation

 2     between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serb party.  After I saw

 3     that there was a distinct possibility of meeting of minds eventually on

 4     this issue, I departed from Sarajevo to meet with president of the

 5     Yugoslav republic in Belgrade and saw the -- all the details of the

 6     agreement between the two parties about Sarajevo had been put into

 7     detailed points only after my departure and the actual negotiation on the

 8     part of UNPROFOR was General David Rose, commander of our Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina sector, but under the supervision of General de Lapresle from

10     our headquarters in Zagreb.

11        Q.   Okay.  And at the time that this cable that we have in front of

12     us was drafted and sent, was the release of weapons to the Serbs from

13     weapon collection points seriously being considered to allow the Serbs to

14     defend against these BiH attacks?

15        A.   I think from the Bosnian Serb viewpoint, all -- they had to

16     prepare for all possible situations.  I'm not sure whether, you know, it

17     is possible to consider and put all the details in agreement of this

18     kind, but I can understand why two parties may want to prepare themselves

19     for all eventualities.  But our concern was how to breach the differences

20     between the two parties.  Of course, from the Bosnian Serb viewpoint, the

21     more weapons collection points there are, the better.  And from Bosnian

22     government side, the fewer these weapon collection points, the better.

23     Because it will be easier to defend those points if there are only very

24     few in number and it would facilitate monitoring and control of weapons

25     collection points if they were fewer.  But we had to eventually agree on

Page 41716

 1     the midway points to meet the two parties' concerns halfway.

 2        Q.   And if we turn briefly to page -- I believe it's 4 of this

 3     document, we can look at the actual -- yes, it is.  And we see before us

 4     a typed document which has at the top the fax header line that another

 5     witness identified as BH command forward command which was the UNPROFOR

 6     forward command in Sarajevo.  And this is entitled:  "Protocol of

 7     understanding between the civilian/military representatives of the

 8     Republika Srpska and UNPROFOR."

 9             Do you happen to know who drafted this document?  Do you have any

10     information as to that?

11        A.   I think General Michael Rose had a major hand on the UNPROFOR

12     side.

13        Q.   Okay.  And at the time that you wrote this cable and forwarded

14     this protocol, did you believe that this protocol reflected what had been

15     agreed to with the Serb side in relation to weapon collection points?

16        A.   I certainly hope so.

17        Q.   And now if we can look at P631, and again I have a hard copy for

18     your convenience.

19             MR. IVETIC:  And it would assist, the usher's assistance, and --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  For the -- if I just can interrupt you for a second.

21     In the previous document we were talking about the NAC decision.  NAC was

22     an acronym for what?  The parties have no disagreement on that?  It came

23     up a few times in court, both in the initial appearance -- Mr. Tieger,

24     NAC, any idea?  What your understanding is of NAC acronym.

25             If the witness could tell us what NAC stands for.  It's in the

Page 41717

 1     previous document.  We don't have to stop now, but if the parties could

 2     just consider whether there's any agreement on what NA --

 3             MR. IVETIC:  I can propose the Defence's view and see if that

 4     assists.  I think it would mean the North Atlantic Council, a reference

 5     to a body that oversaw NATO.  But I, unfortunately, don't have a copy of

 6     that document in front of me to be able to see the context of where it

 7     was used.  I do know it is in a document but I can't remember precisely

 8     the formulation of how that was ...

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, Mr. President, I just remember an earlier

10     discussion during which the meaning of an acronym was resolved on the

11     basis of an explicit reference in the document.  I don't recall if this

12     was the same -- okay.  So presumably -- we'll take a look at whether

13     surrounding documentation sheds direct light on the meaning or whether

14     we're otherwise in a position to come to agreement on precisely what the

15     acronym means.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

17             Mr. Akashi, if you could help us out to tell us what NAC stands

18     for as an acronym in the previous document we looked at?

19             THE WITNESS:  I'm afraid, Excellency, I'm unable to help in this

20     case.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you so much for at least --

22             THE WITNESS:  I think our military colleagues like to indulge in

23     a lot of acronyms.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, yes, it seems to be very popular in ...

25             Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

Page 41718

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 2        Q.   Now, Ambassador, we have this document before us which is dated,

 3     I believe, 12th September 1994, again from you, going to several

 4     individuals in New York, again on weapon collection points.  And the

 5     first page of this document appears to say that the protocol we just

 6     looked at was determined to be unsigned and invalid and it attaches the

 7     opinion of a legal advisor who I think -- from the next page his name

 8     might be Stefan Katz [phoen], but I don't know -- do you know if there

 9     was any legal advisor present for the negotiations with the Bosnian Serb

10     side as to weapon collection points on the part of the UN?

11        A.   We had our legal advisor at UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb,

12     certainly.  But negotiation in this particular case was conducted in

13     Sarajevo and in the case of Bosnian Serbs probably at Pale, and I don't

14     think we had legal advisor as such, but there was a head of civil affairs

15     which was Mr. Sergio De Mello.

16        Q.   Okay.  I just waiting for the transcript to catch up with us.

17             And during this time-period, that is, September 1994, when this

18     second cable was written, were there any discussions relating to the

19     potential use of air power against the Serb side, if you recall?

20        A.   I do not offhand recall.

21        Q.   Okay.

22             MR. IVETIC:  Let's me see if we can look at D116 in e-court,

23     and -- oh, I do have a hard copy of that as well which I can provide to

24     the usher.

25                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

Page 41719

 1             MR. IVETIC:

 2        Q.   And while we wait for the hard copy to reach you, from the

 3     version on the screen we can see that this is from General de Lapresle to

 4     Mr. Annan and Mr. Stoltenberg, dated 19 September 1994, with the subject

 5     of:  "Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone violation - 18 September."

 6             And if I can summarise portions of the same to ask a question.

 7     Here in part 1, we see the second sentence that says:

 8             "The BiH and BSA exchanged approximately 300 mortar rounds and

 9     6.000 small-arm rounds.  The attack was initiated by the BiH armija and

10     was supported by mortars firing from residential areas within the city

11     limits."

12             And then it gives precise information as to parts from where they

13     fired and where they fired upon.  And then the bottom two lines -- two

14     sentences, I should say, read:

15             "These initial attacks were followed by a restrained BSA response

16     using heavy weapons.  Between 1807 and 1838 hours, the BSA retaliated

17     from Poljine WCP (BP 910645) with 12 120-millimetre mortar rounds.  The

18     BSA mined access to the base plate to prevent FreBat 5 from" - and if we

19     can go to the next page - "interfering.  The BSA responded, targeting the

20     Zetra stadium, the Presidency, the north area of the cathedral, and

21     Sedrenik.  The commander BHC called on both sides to immediately cease

22     all military actions or he would be obliged to take all appropriate

23     measures to protect the civilian population of Sarajevo including

24     air-strikes.  He also warned the BSA not to withdraw weapons from the

25     weapon collection points.  Copies of the commander's letters are

Page 41720

 1     attached."

 2             And the first question I have for you is:  Do you recall if

 3     air-strikes were ever sought or requested against the Bosnian government

 4     side for their violation of the weapons exclusion zone?

 5        A.   I do not recall the instances of the kind you mentioned,

 6     Mr. Ivetic.  But despite my clear instructions to differentiate

 7     air-strikes as distinct from close-air support, I'm afraid that some --

 8     some of our military leaders rather used these two terms without

 9     discrimination.

10             But at my level, at least, I always kept the differences in mind.

11     Close-air support was an act of -- clearly an act of self-defence with

12     very clear restraint.  The NATO was asked to attack only the object which

13     was in the process of hostile action with a view to killing UNPROFOR

14     personnel or the weapons which they were using as self-defence means.

15     While air-strike was a more political act in which we tried to send a

16     message of restraint to either of the two parties, not to worsen the

17     general situation which may hinder our objectives for humanitarian

18     assistance or for general stabilisation of the situation.

19             So that may not be my precise answer, but that's, I understood,

20     as to what was an air-strike and what was CAS, close-air support action.

21     But as I said, this distinction was not always kept in mind by the

22     military people.  But it was very important thing for us in order not to

23     confuse or give unnecessary apprehensions particularly to the Bosnian

24     Serb party but also to -- as a message to the Bosnian government side as

25     well.

Page 41721

 1        Q.   And if we look at item 2 on this document, we see that the

 2     author, General de Lapresle says:

 3             "The key facts are that the military action taken by both sides

 4     contravened UN S.C.R. 836, breached the 9 February 1994 airport

 5     agreement, and violated the 20-kilometre TEZ.  The BiH initiated the

 6     attack and the BSA response was both defensive and restrained.  The BSA

 7     did not withdraw weapons from the WCPs."

 8             Now, this is dated approximately -- the incident is six days

 9     after the memo we just looked at, the cable we just looked at which said

10     that the protocol had not been signed and therefore has no legal

11     standing.  Did anyone inform the Serb side prior to this incident that

12     the protocol we previously looked at was no longer considered valid by

13     the UN?

14        A.   Is that a question addressed to me?

15        Q.   Yes, yes.

16        A.   I do not have a specific answer to your point.

17        Q.   That's fair enough.  And --

18             MR. IVETIC:  Oh, Your Honours, I see we're about one minute away

19     from the break point.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  We are.  If you want to touch upon a new --

21             MR. IVETIC:  Well, I do.  But I'm going to another document, so

22     we might actually eclipse the one minute rather quickly.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, then take that -- use that one minute.

24             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.  If we could look at 1D4654.

25        Q.   This is a rather lengthy document but one that you're well

Page 41722

 1     familiar with, sir.  It is a book entitled:  "In the Valley Between War

 2     and Peace," and it lists you -- I apologise the copy in e-court has a

 3     poor reproduction of the cover page so we can't see it.  It's all black.

 4     But the first question I have for you:  Is this book entirely authored by

 5     yourself?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  And then if we can turn to page 27 in e-court, it

 9     should correspond to pages 46 through 47 in the actual document, or the

10     underlying book, I should say.  It looks like we need the prior page in

11     e-court.

12        Q.   And beginning on the bottom of the -- of page 46, you are talking

13     about a situation where you say:

14             "During the joint press conference after our discussion,

15     Admiral Boorda and myself clearly stated that if NATO forces use air

16     power in the Sarajevo region upon UN request, it will be used impartially

17     against all the violators of cease-fire.  This attitude, to maintain

18     impartiality with regard to all three parties to the conflict (Serbs,

19     Croats and Muslims), was in clear contrast to the subsequent NATO council

20     decisions which targeted only Bosnian Serb forces as an enemy.  The

21     hard-headed and pragmatic approach of Admiral Boorda to air attack by

22     NATO forces appeared to be in sharp contradiction to the approach

23     advocated by the high leadership of the US administration, including

24     President Bill Clinton."

25             First of all, could you tell us who Admiral Boorda was?  What was

Page 41723

 1     his function?

 2        A.   He was the Force Commander of NATO southern command headquartered

 3     in Naples, Italy.

 4        Q.   Okay.

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honour, I see we've eclipsed the break time by

 6     approximately one minute.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we did.

 8             Mr. Akashi, we take a break again.  We would like to see you back

 9     in 20 minutes.  I again invite you to follow the usher.

10             It's a little bit more than one minute, Mr. Ivetic.  Therefore,

11     we'll resume at 20 minutes past midday.

12                           [The witness stands down]

13             JUDGE ORIE:  I announced already the time at which we will

14     resume.

15                           --- Recess taken at 11.59 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 12.21 p.m.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Can the witness be escorted in the courtroom -- or

18     is there one preliminary matter, Mr. Tieger?

19             MR. TIEGER:  There is, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  How much time would it take?

21             MR. TIEGER:  I have two -- actually two.  The first takes

22     15 seconds and the second takes a couple of minutes perhaps.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Then we wait for the witness to be escorted

24     in the courtroom.

25             Please proceed.

Page 41724

 1             MR. TIEGER:  The first one is quite simple and concerns the

 2     Court's inquiry about the acronym NAC.  We agree with Mr. Ivetic that it

 3     refers to the North Atlantic Council.

 4             The second, Mr. President, is that the Court asked us to respond

 5     by today's date with respect to excerpts concerning the "Islamic

 6     Declaration," and I -- although sometimes we wait until end of the day to

 7     deal with those matters, I thought it was probably best to deal with it

 8     now so it didn't escape our attention.

 9             First of all, I wanted to clear up one quick -- or quickly clear

10     up one apparent misconception about the tendering of the document,

11     whether in its entirety or excerpts, and that is that somehow the

12     impression, I think, was left that it was the Prosecution which was the

13     moving force behind tendering the entirety of the document.  That's not

14     the case.  We have never considered it to play a particularly significant

15     role in this case.  However, when it was proposed to us by the Defence

16     that they tender the entirety of the document, we had no objection to

17     that.  Particularly in light of the various assertions reflecting the

18     nature of the document, we considered that it would be fine if the Court

19     could see the entirety and make its own assessment of what it was about.

20             However, in light of the Court's preference and request, we have

21     identified certain excerpts that go to both directly contextual issues

22     that -- it is our submission that certain sentences or small portions

23     have been misleadingly lifted from a larger paragraph or passage and also

24     some selections that perhaps more broadly illustrate the tenor or nature

25     of the document in the way that might be the case if the Court had the

Page 41725

 1     entirety.

 2             That said, we're also asking if it's not perhaps a -- at this

 3     point a bit more prudent and efficient to defer tendering of any further

 4     excerpts for the following reasons:  Number one, there's at least one

 5     additional witness who we know raises the issue of the "Islamic

 6     Declaration."  Number two, we've identified at least some discrepancies

 7     between the identified portions by the Defence and those that were

 8     referred to in court.  And number 3, there still seems to be a

 9     translation in English issue that would benefit from some discussion.

10             So if the Court agree with that, we'd asked that you defer it.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we usually prefer to have already in evidence

12     and then later perhaps replace new excerpts by the old ones.  But perhaps

13     here where there are a few other matters as well, especially that we are

14     not yet at a point where we have, I would say, a clean English version,

15     that means just a translation of what the B/C/S presents, under those

16     circumstances -- and I see Mr. Stojanovic is not opposed to it, to -- to

17     wait for a while, but not forget about it.  That excerpts still are

18     sought to be admitted and that we know later which excerpts.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Understood, Mr. President.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Then could the witness be escorted into the

21     courtroom.

22                           [The witness takes the stand]

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I think you're a little bit over one

24     hour and a half by now, so may I take it that you will conclude in the

25     next session of one hour.

Page 41726

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, sooner than the end of the last -- this

 2     session.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please proceed.

 4             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you.

 5        Q.   Your Excellency, we just looked at a part of your book where you

 6     contrasted Admiral Boorda's approach with that advocated by the high

 7     leadership of the US, including President Bill Clinton.  What was your

 8     understanding of the approach advocated by the American leadership and

 9     Mr. -- President Clinton?

10        A.   I'd rather prefer not to comment on the highest political

11     leadership of any -- any country.

12        Q.   Can you help us at least to identify in relation to -- in

13     relation to Admiral Boorda's position, was it complementary or contrary

14     to the position of the UN?

15        A.   Here again I do not want to indulge in any speculation.  But from

16     my acquaintance with Admiral Boorda, I had highest the regard and very

17     deep respect with regard to Admiral Boorda as a person, as an admiral,

18     and he had a very astute understanding of human nature and nature of

19     conflicts.  So he was not just a soldier, but I thought he was a good

20     statesman.

21        Q.   Okay.  If we could turn to the next page in e-court, which should

22     contain pages 48 and 49 of your book, I would propose to discuss with --

23     the last paragraph on page 48 which continues onto page 49, and it starts

24     off:  "On the same day ..."  And I believe in reference to the prior

25     paragraph it looks like we're talking about February 18.  And you say

Page 41727

 1     here:

 2             "On the same day, I met with Karadzic in Pale where the

 3     headquarters of Bosnian Serb forces was situated, and also held

 4     discussions in Sarajevo with President Izetbegovic.  In the meeting with

 5     Karadzic, we had to answer his questions on the definition and kinds of

 6     heavy weapons to be removed from the 20-kilometre exclusion zone.  We

 7     also had to respond to the question:  If Bosnian Serb forces were

 8     attacked by Bosnian government forces, would they be able to retrieve the

 9     weapons of the Serb side which had been placed under the control of the

10     United Nations?  On the number of collection sites, there was clear

11     discrepancy between Karadzic, who wanted a maximum number for easy

12     access, and the UN side, which desired a minimum number because of its

13     troop limitation.  However, we somehow managed to come to a mutually

14     acceptable compromise."

15             The first question I would ask is if this section accurately

16     reflects the negotiations that were undertaken and the result.

17        A.   I hope so.

18        Q.   And where you say here that Karadzic wanted a maximum number of

19     sites for easy access, was this in relation to retrieving weapons if

20     attacked or something else?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   And if we can turn to page 30 in e-court, which should correspond

23     to pages 52 and 53 of your book -- I see again I'm one page off.  If we

24     could go to page 29 in e-court, that should now correlate to those pages.

25             And again here at the bottom of the first page, the

Page 41728

 1     second-to-last paragraph reads as follows and it will bleed onto the top

 2     the next page, page 53:

 3             "On July 22nd, I talked with US Secretary of Defence William

 4     Perry who came to visit Zagreb.  From his calm attitude and his readiness

 5     to listen to me, I had the impression that he was a sincere man.  In our

 6     joint press conference after the meeting, he said that there was a

 7     meeting of minds between us on the use of force between NATO and UN

 8     sides, and it was agreed with the UN side that use of force should be

 9     robust but should be carried out prudently.

10             "But I was startled to find out that in the statement of Defence

11     Secretary Perry on his return to the United States, the phrase

12     'prudently' had been omitted and stress was put on taking robust measures

13     against the Bosnian Serb forces.  It was clear from the statement of

14     President Bill Clinton himself that his posture was that there should be

15     a clear distinction between good and evil, and that the good side, that

16     is the Bosnian government, should be supported, and that the Bosnian Serb

17     forces should be labelled as evil."

18             The first question I want to ask you is:  Apart from this

19     instance, do you recall if there were any other instances when the

20     agreed-to text was deviated - when I say "agreed to," between NATO and

21     another party - was deviated from in subsequent announcements or ...

22             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, just -- yeah, so there's no -- so the answer

23     is clear and the question doesn't inadvertently expand it and I don't

24     want to -- I would just suggest that the passage upon which this relies

25     insofar as I read it doesn't necessarily -- doesn't refer to a specific

Page 41729

 1     text.  It refers to some kind of consensus between the two people

 2     involved.  So to -- so we've got an apples and oranges situation where

 3     this is now, I think, being incorrectly characterised as agreement on a

 4     specific text and now the witness is being asked to answer as if that

 5     were the case.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, does this cause you to rephrase your

 7     question?

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Then I'll wait for that.  Please proceed.

10             MR. IVETIC:

11        Q.   Do you recall if there were other situations where language

12     agreed to between the UN and another party was then presented differently

13     or deviated from in subsequent pronouncements?

14        A.   From my limited experience of negotiations, these things have

15     happened and do happen with -- yeah, with some frequency.  So I think we

16     should not generalise from specific instances.

17        Q.   And in a general sense, do you stand behind what you have written

18     in your book in this particular section?

19        A.   Yes.  But my -- those passages should not be quoted out of

20     context.  I hope.

21             MR. IVETIC:  I will be glad to ... I guess, Your Honour, I would

22     then perhaps take those chapters and extract them from the book and

23     tender that as a reduced document, just the chapters in their entirety

24     that these selections were taken from, to address --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, it's a bit difficult for the Chamber at this

Page 41730

 1     moment to say:  Do it this way or that way.  I mean, context should be

 2     there.  Whether that always requires the whole of a chapter, I do not

 3     know because I haven't read the book or the booklet as you called it, I

 4     think, in the Karadzic case.

 5             So therefore, I would invite, first of all, the parties to seek

 6     an agreement on what is such context that it would not mislead the

 7     Chamber in any way.  And if do you not agree, well, then finally our

 8     problem is that we'd have to look at the whole book to see whether the

 9     excerpt is adequate.  But could the parties first focus on it and try to

10     resolve the matter.

11             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, we can.  At least --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And we'll -- the parties were the first, Mr. Akashi

13     to take care that you're not quoted out of context.  At the same time, as

14     you may understand, this Chamber is not seeking to have large documents,

15     even where contextualisation seems not to be necessary, to have that in

16     evidence.

17             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I appreciate your judgement, which is

18     very, very prudent, yeah.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

20             MR. IVETIC:

21        Q.   Your Excellency, I have no further questions for you at this

22     time.  I thank you for your indulgence.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Akashi, you will now be cross-examined by

24     Mr. Tieger.  Mr. Tieger is counsel for the Prosecution.  You will find

25     him not yet standing but now standing to your right.

Page 41731

 1             Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

 4        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Ambassador.

 5        A.   Mr. Tieger, good afternoon.

 6        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, you were asked during your examination-in-chief

 7     in the Karadzic case about whose interests it was to prolong the war

 8     longer than was inevitable or necessary.  And I think there was some

 9     references to that today as well, and you were even directed to a portion

10     of your book in respect of that question.

11        A.   A booklet, I prefer.

12        Q.   That's -- that's modest of you, and I will comply with your

13     request.

14             In that connection, may I direct your attention to a meeting you

15     had with Mr. Izetbegovic on the 2nd of February, 1994.

16             MR. TIEGER:  And that's 65 ter 09621.  If the Registrar could

17     call that up, please.  Sorry, that seems to be the wrong document.

18             Sorry, Mr. Registrar, that would be correct.

19        Q.   Now, if we look at this meeting held on the 2nd of February,

20     Mr. Ambassador, looking at pages 1 and then going on to page 2 of the

21     e-court, and on page 2 of the B/C/S, we can see a reflection of

22     Mr. Izetbegovic's expression of distrust in the Geneva process.  And he's

23     recorded as stating:

24             "The BiH government had to accept unwillingly the partition of

25     the country based on ethnic division due to the pressure from the

Page 41732

 1     international community which had imposed the arms embargo without any

 2     recourse to the principles recognised by international law."

 3             And he went on to say that the Serb ethnic cleansing was not

 4     punished but rewarded, and continued that:

 5             "If the international community wants to create a Serb republic

 6     in Bosnia, they can do so only with the Serb municipalities, but the

 7     Serbs took 15 of our municipalities by force."

 8             I wanted to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, whether it was correct that

 9     the Bosnian government's attitude toward a permanent cease-fire reflected

10     its concerns that that would cement or make permanent the results of

11     ethnic cleansing?

12        A.   I think certainly, as you said, the concern and the preoccupation

13     of the Bosnian government is that the acceptance of certain geographical

14     delineation might lead to more permanent division of the country of

15     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I remember Dr. Karadzic quoting from

16     Robert Frost that somehow fences make or contribute to making good

17     neighbours, so that was a general reflection of his philosophy that we

18     have to recognise ethnic divisions.  But in the circumstances in which

19     there was much mingling of different ethnic or cultural groups, as in the

20     case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think it was some kind of physical,

21     artificial attempt to create more divisions than necessary in a

22     multi-ethnic country and society.

23        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

24             MR. TIEGER:  I'd tender that document, 09621.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

Page 41733

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P7691, Your Honours.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted.

 3             MR. TIEGER:

 4        Q.   And, Mr. Ambassador, if I could ask you about one more related

 5     document or document related to the same issue.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  If I could call up 65 ter 11148, please.

 7        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, this is a document stemming from an earlier

 8     period.  It's a transcript of a portion of a tape of the 124th Bosnian

 9     Presidency Session held on the 20th of June, 1992.  And on page 1 of the

10     English, we -- and I think it's page 24 hard copy of the B/C/S, we can

11     see General Halilovic discussing recent events in Bihac, noting that some

12     kind of agreement reached on exchange and resettlement and urging the

13     Presidency to take a stand, stating "because we're playing directly into

14     the hands of those whose intention it is to create some ethnic

15     territories, to move the population, and to create clean national units."

16             And he continues on to describe a situation where people were

17     given two to three hours to pack their personal belongings and leave.

18     And then if we turn the page, going to page 3 in English --

19             MR. IVETIC:  Can we have the B/C/S corresponding because it does

20     not match what's on the screen.

21             MR. TIEGER:  I don't know how that anomaly occurred because ...

22                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

23             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  That would be -- I have this, according to

24     Ms. Stewart, as page 26 in the B/C/S.  I think the apparent discrepancy

25     arises from the fact that the English pages are more limited than the

Page 41734

 1     B/C/S for some reason.

 2        Q.   So now I'm on page 3 where Mr. Izetbegovic, I think under the

 3     heading "president," turns to the question that Halil asks --

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Ms. Stewart tells me it's 28 in B/C/S I'm sorry.

 5        Q.   He notes that:

 6             The situation in Banja Luka is similar.  They are threatened with

 7     destruction and told you can either move out and then we'll do an

 8     exchange.

 9             He continued:

10             We can choose between either accepting this or not accepting

11     this.  If we don't accept it, then these people really can get hurt.  If

12     we accept it, we're legalising ethnic division, that is the alteration of

13     the demographic picture of Bosnia, the creation of ethnically clean

14     territories, like some precondition for the creation of some kind of

15     Serbian state in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16             And on the next page, and I think on it's -- next page in

17     English, please, and the same page in B/C/S, page 28, Mr. Izetbegovic

18     notes:

19             "Can we have peace at that price?  No, we can't.  Even if that

20     were to happen, regarding all these agreements, I think they later simply

21     point their cannons and kill all those people.  Wherever they surrendered

22     their weapons, et cetera, they ended up getting hurt."

23             Mr. Ambassador, would this passage from a meeting in June of 1992

24     reflect another expression of the same concerns by the Bosnian leadership

25     about the demographic impact and purpose of ethnic cleansing?

Page 41735

 1        A.   I should think so.  And I can well appreciate the overriding

 2     concern about the so-called clear delineation along ethnic line of --

 3     over a larger political entity, yeah.

 4        Q.   Thank, you, sir.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  I'd tender 65 ter 11148.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, should the B/C/S be the full version

 8     that's longer than the English or should it correspond to what's in

 9     English --

10             MR. TIEGER:  I certainly agree they should correspond.  If

11     there's a -- I'm not quite sure how that happened, but I think

12     Mr. Ivetic's point is correct.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, please.

14             Mr. Ivetic, you want to have the same excerpts in B/C/S as in

15     English, only portions are translated --

16             MR. IVETIC:  Yes, my -- well, my understanding is that the B/C/S

17     is some 26 pages and the English is some five pages, so we have a lot

18     that is not translated.  If it is being entered into evidence, I

19     thought --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  I would suggest the following, that Mr. Tieger makes

21     an excerpt from the B/C/S version which corresponds with the English one.

22     And if you want to add any portion, that you address Mr. Tieger so that

23     he can include that in the new -- to be uploaded version, the same in

24     both languages.

25             MR. IVETIC:  That would be perfectly acceptable.

Page 41736

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Then, Mr. Registrar, let's reserve a number at this

 2     moment, because it's certainly not this document in its entirety.  Or

 3     perhaps we could already do the English which is apparently the

 4     selection.

 5             Mr. Registrar, number would be?

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  P7692, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  P7692 is admitted into evidence, but the B/C/S

 8     version should again be uploaded and now in full accordance with the

 9     English translation.

10             Please proceed.

11             MR. TIEGER:

12        Q.   In connection with the questions raised during your

13     examination-in-chief in the Karadzic case about the Muslims' alleged lack

14     of interest in peace, you were also asked by Dr. Karadzic whether you

15     remembered that "we," that is, the Bosnian Serb side, "have been ready to

16     give up territory for peace, that we did not claim to keep all the

17     territory that we controlled."  And that's found at page 56 of D1361, the

18     statement.

19             In that connection, that is, the -- this issue of peace and

20     giving up territory, may I first show you another document and then I

21     will ask you further about that.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Can we call up, please, 65 ter 02393, e-court

23     page 41 and B/C/S page 38.  That's the 40th Session of the Bosnian Serb

24     Assembly.

25             There we see Dr. Karadzic speaking to the members of the assembly

Page 41737

 1     and noting toward the bottom quarter of the page:

 2             "I guarantee that everything that extends the war is an attempt

 3     by the West to enable Muslims to bring territories back in order not to

 4     beg Serbs.  But now the entire international community has to beg Serbs

 5     to give some territories back.  So, we have to prepare ourselves to lose

 6     as little -- as less as possible in a firm, responsible, and statesman

 7     manner.  But that we get the main part," and then he goes on.

 8             We also see above that, just above, Dr. Karadzic referring to

 9     some of the discussions and saying:

10             "We did not say then how much of a percentage nor did we outline

11     the borders but said we wanted to separate and strategic goals would

12     be" --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. --

14             MR. TIEGER:  Too fast.

15             "... and strategic goals would be territorial connection with the

16     Drina river, Neretva river, sea, Sarajevo, Sava river, Una river,

17     et cetera."

18             And then we turn the page in English to page 42, still on the

19     same page in B/C/S.  Dr. Karadzic points out in respect of giving

20     territory up, we -- for example, at the -- about the seventh or sixth

21     line down:

22             "We also cannot give that much at Nevesinje, we cannot give

23     Srbobran, we cannot give town of Kupres.  We are not willing to give

24     right bank in Jajce ..."

25             And then he continues just toward the bottom of that paragraph:

Page 41738

 1             "We have to keep strategic directions and quality of the

 2     country," and then just two lines down, another example of what can't be

 3     given up, "we have to keep Sarajevo."

 4        Q.   Now, did Dr. Karadzic make -- tell you, as he explained in this

 5     passage of his speech to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, that it was his

 6     intention to give back as little as possible and only certain parts that

 7     did not conflict with the Bosnian Serb strategic objectives or other

 8     interests?

 9        A.   Dr. Karadzic, with whom I had a lot of discussions on different

10     occasions, conveyed to me the -- his principal concern is like what you

11     quoted from him, from the Serb National Assembly.  As you know, at one

12     stage in the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs had at the maximum occasion

13     about 70 per cent of the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but

14     in the end, the Bosnian Serb party at Dayton accepted the division of the

15     country, about 49 per cent for themselves and 51 per cent to the Bosnian

16     government side.

17             So depending on at which stage of the conflict you consider the

18     division as rational and acceptable would very much depend on the

19     perspectives of two parties, or three parties, as -- as you may choose

20     from, and I think the efforts -- a great deal of efforts were paid by

21     UN and UN-associated mediators to take into account the principal

22     concerns of the parties with as little as possible by way of exchange of

23     territories.  But I think this was a very difficult exercise and as I

24     discussed the matter with people like Lord Owen, Stoltenberg and others,

25     I think mediators made honest efforts to meet as many principal concerns

Page 41739

 1     as possible of the parties in the conflict, but this -- perhaps a perfect

 2     solution is the enemy of a good, reasonable solution, and I think that

 3     was the principal conclusions of the Dayton agreement.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  I tender those pages from the 40th.  I presume -- I

 5     don't know -- I don't recall offhand if there is an ongoing selection

 6     from the 40th to add those to or if this will be the beginning of that,

 7     but either way I know that's the practice of the Chamber.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Perhaps Mr. Registrar could help us whether we

 9     had started already with the excerpting or whether this is -- then a

10     number should be there already.  If not, would you please assign a

11     number, Mr. Registrar.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I believe it needs a number, in fact.

13                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  While verifying whether a number was already ever

15     assigned, we provisionally now assign a new number.

16             Mr. Registrar will verify whether portions had already been

17     selected and admitted.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, the number will be P7693.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  And is reserved for the excerpt of this session.

20             Please proceed.

21             MR. TIEGER:

22        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, you've made reference during the course of your

23     testimony, both previously and today, to your effort to point out some of

24     the either complexities or oversimplifications of the war in your booklet

25     as seen by yourself and others with whom you shared an understanding.

Page 41740

 1     So, for example, we turn to page 38 of -- page 22 in e-court of your

 2     booklet, which is page 38 of the hard copy.  That's 1D46 -- 1D04654.

 3             You point out that crimes were committed by all parties to the

 4     conflict, Muslim, Serb and Croat.  I take it that's not a -- something

 5     you need to refer to your booklet to know that you mentioned.

 6             But it's correct, is it not, Mr. Ambassador, that that does not

 7     mean that there was no difference between the parties in terms of the

 8     quantum of crimes.  And by way of example, as you note explicitly in your

 9     book, referring to comments by Lord Owen in that case, there was -- and

10     I'm pointing -- I'm now at page 25 -- page 15 in the e-court, page 25 of

11     the hard copy.  There was "a quantum difference between the horrors

12     perpetrated by them."

13             And that's a correct reflection both of the -- of what you

14     pointed out in your book and of the realities of the situation; is that

15     right?

16        A.   That's a very important point.

17        Q.   And I believe at page 22 of your book, you also note - and that's

18     under a chapter subheading entitled:  "The madness of exclusive

19     nationalism" - that in the situation of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnian

20     Serb forces committed the most atrocious acts.  Although you note that

21     all sides were responsible for crimes and atrocities.  And that's correct

22     too?

23        A.   That's correct.

24        Q.   Now, you also point out in your book that this quantum difference

25     reflected another difference and that one that General Rose cited and

Page 41741

 1     that you also cited in chapter one of your booklet.  And that's found at

 2     page 16 of the e-court, page 26 of the hard copy:

 3             "Although all three sides were to some extent guilty of war

 4     crimes, genocide did not form part of official Bosnian government policy

 5     in the way that it clearly did with the Serbs."

 6             And that's also a point you made in your book and that reflected

 7     the reality as you understood it; correct?

 8        A.   Correct, sir.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  And I'll be tendering those portions of the booklet

10     but I'll wait until the end to amass them and work with the Defence as

11     the Court noted earlier.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, we'll wait for the outcome of that

13     conversation.  Please proceed.

14             MR. TIEGER:

15        Q.   Now earlier today, Mr. Ambassador, you were asked some questions

16     about the total exclusion zone and weapons retrieval.  And specifically

17     you were asked to compare the document you wrote in -- or the dispatch

18     you sent in August of 1994, which is D112, that contained the protocol to

19     the -- to P631 which is the document you sent on September 12th

20     describing -- further describing your understanding of the -- of what had

21     happened in connection with the protocol.

22             MR. TIEGER:  And I want to just call up P631 again very quickly.

23        Q.   I'm going to just remind you about the contents of about this

24     because you were asked about it in the Karadzic case as well, and before

25     I turn your attention to that passage I just wanted to bring this

Page 41742

 1     document to your attention again.  Here, you note in your dispatch to

 2     Mr. Annan that:

 3             "The attached protocol is a Bosnian Serb proposal that was never

 4     accepted by us.  The protocol was sent to us in error, and was forwarded

 5     to you without a full examination due to the urgency of the question at

 6     the time."

 7             He goes on to explain that the Bosnian Serbs had expressed

 8     concern during discussions in February and rather than entering into any

 9     written agreement, UNPROFOR noted their concerns and gave assurances that

10     UNPROFOR units would be interpositioned between the two sides along the

11     confrontation lines.  The Bosnian Serb side nevertheless reserved its

12     right to take adequate measures in case of an attack.

13             "We did not endorse their position."

14             It attaches also the legal advisor's comments contained on the

15     following page, in particular point 4 of the following page, where it is

16     pointed out:

17             "From the available information, I have found that the protocol

18     of understanding was a draft that had been prepared and submitted by the

19     Bosnian Serb negotiators but was found unacceptable by the UNPROFOR

20     negotiators and was never signed.  Accordingly, it cannot be regarded as

21     having any legal standing."

22             And I point that out because you were asked about that in the

23     Karadzic case but in your cross-examination and that can be found out --

24             MR. TIEGER:  If we can call up 65 ter number 33522, first to page

25     13, it's where the discussion begins.  And you can see toward the bottom

Page 41743

 1     of the page beginning to describe -- discuss the document.  If we can

 2     continue onto the next page.  And next page, please.  Go to the -- okay.

 3        Q.   Let me see at the very bottom of the page at 15, at 37755:

 4             "I'll ask you the question in a different way then.  Dr. Karadzic

 5     in his comments yesterday asserted to that you this additional protocol,

 6     which he said provided or allowed the Serbs a right to remove heavy

 7     weapons from the weapons collection point in case of attack, was

 8     concluded, and that would" --

 9             MR. IVETIC:  If we go to the next page.  I think it's on the next

10     page.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, I'm sorry, I didn't realise.  Thank you.

12             Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

13        Q.   "... was concluded, and that was agreement between UNPROFOR and

14     the Bosnian Serbs.  These two documents taken together, Mr. Ambassador,"

15     that means referring to the document you sent in August and the one we

16     just looked at in September, "would tend to show that contrary to what

17     Dr. Karadzic observed, this protocol was, in fact, never concluded; isn't

18     that correct?"

19             And you responded:

20             "Yeah.  I think copies of these messages I sent to New York

21     headquarters seemed to endorse what you have concluded from it."

22             I take it, Mr. Ambassador, that you stand by that position?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Now in -- you were also asked by Dr. Karadzic during the course

25     of the direct examination now in evidence about the assurances and

Page 41744

 1     representations of the Bosnian Serbs.  By way of example, at page 22 of

 2     the e-court, Dr. Karadzic asked you to confirm that you always achieved

 3     something in Pale and never left with empty hands.  Although you didn't

 4     confirm that.  Or by way of another example, Dr. Karadzic pointed out

 5     alleged Bosnian Serb intentions to fully implement terms of agreement.

 6     And that can be found at page --

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Do you want to show it to the witness?

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I don't think that will be necessary.  This is a

 9     predicate to other matters and it's in evidence, so it's -- certainly if

10     the witness would want some clarification, I'm happy to do so.  But I --

11     I think for purposes of moving on to the next point that should be

12     sufficient for him.

13             MR. IVETIC:  And just to clear up, I think the transcript that we

14     have on the screen where they have been going to the pages you cited is

15     the cross-examination, so the numbers you're referencing are in relation

16     to D13 -- 1561.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  1361.

18             MR. IVETIC:  1361.  Thank you, Your Honours.

19             MR. TIEGER:  And apologies to the Registrar for not making clear

20     that we moved from the document reflecting the cross-examination back to

21     the 65 ter statement in evidence which is the direct examination.

22        Q.   In any event, Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to ask you this.  In

23     contrast to the suggestion that you could rely upon the representations

24     made by Dr. Karadzic, it is correct, isn't it, as you stated in your

25     booklet, at e-court page 43 - and that's, again, 1D4654, page 43 - that:

Page 41745

 1             "Karadzic as a negotiator had the tendency to twist the truth

 2     rather nonchalantly - a trait I observed not a few times."

 3             That's a correct reflection of what's in your booklet, sir, and

 4     of what you found to be the reality on the ground?

 5        A.   Unfortunately, yes.

 6        Q.   And I think you confirmed that in your testimony in the Karadzic

 7     case, and that's 65 ter 33522, page 19:

 8             "As I came to know these tendencies, I was, of course, made more

 9     cautious, and I became, as time went on, much more cautious."

10             And that's at transcript 37759.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Lines 3 and 4.

12             MR. TIEGER:

13        Q.   And that was in response to the question what kind of weight did

14     you give to any undertakings, representations, or agreements entered into

15     by Dr. Karadzic.  And I take it you stand by that testimony, sir?

16        A.   Yes, indeed, I do.  I was particularly struck by this trait or

17     characteristic of Dr. Karadzic not only during the negotiations in

18     April 1994, but his response to my frequent requests for a visit to

19     Banja Luka, he gave a promise to me and then later he sidetracked by

20     raising one reason or another.  And as a total consequence of that all, I

21     never managed to visit Banja Luka during my tenure of duty in the former

22     Yugoslavia.

23        Q.   Let me turn then to some of the discussions surrounding Gorazde,

24     the representations that were made and the reflections of the reality on

25     the ground, and also the efforts you made to visit Banja Luka and also

Page 41746

 1     contemporaneous indications of why you were trying to visit Banja Luka.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, that seems to be quite an area which

 3     might take quite some time.  I'm looking at the clock to see whether we

 4     are --

 5             MR. TIEGER:  I think that's a good suggestion, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But before we take that break, I've got --

 7     first of all, I'd like to put on the record that Mr. Registrar informed

 8     me that the number P7693 which was reserved for the 40th Session of the

 9     Bosnian Serb Assembly, that there's no excerpt yet there.  So, therefore,

10     that 65 ter 02393 will for the time being be attached to P7693 and is

11     admitted.

12             I further have a very short question for you, Mr. Akashi.  You

13     were earlier asked about the - let me take it literally - the quantum

14     difference and you were asked, because you pointed at that in your book,

15     whether that reflected the real situation.  I think you confirmed that.

16     I noted that in that page of your book, you're mainly quoting Lord Owen

17     and General Rose.  Do I understand your answer to be that you agree with

18     Lord Owen and General Rose in respect of what is written in that

19     paragraph?

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes, in that respect.  But with regard to General

21     Rose, I think he was not always accurate, although he was accurate most

22     of the time, and I think General -- the Lord Owen was probably closer to

23     my own evaluation of the situation than any of the military people did.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But the portions read to you which are quotes

25     from others, you agree in that respect --

Page 41747

 1             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Having clarified this, we'll take a break and

 3     we'd like to see you back in 20 minutes again.  You may follow the usher.

 4                           [The witness stands down]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  We will resume at 20 minutes to 2.00.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 1.21 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 1.40 p.m.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue, there are two matters which I'd

 9     briefly like to raise.

10             Mr. Ivetic, witnesses later this week, I do understand that after

11     this witness has concluded his evidence that we would continue with

12     Mr. Kovac.  But after that, that might not take up the whole week, up to

13     and including Thursday.

14             Any ...

15             MR. IVETIC:  The witness that was originally scheduled to testify

16     after the completion of General Kovac was unable to travel on that day

17     and has thus been rescheduled.  So we don't as of right now have any

18     witnesses that can we could move up to that date given that most of the

19     remaining witnesses are fixed either in relation to video-link or to

20     their own schedules.  And so that we right now after General Kovac

21     finishing, which I think, given the remaining estimates, will probably

22     take place on Wednesday, we'll probably be missing that last day,

23     unfortunately, of the week, Thursday.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  And this witness unable to travel, when was that

25     known?

Page 41748

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Last week.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Last week.  Okay.  Try to do your utmost best.  Then

 3     there's one other matter which is -- deals with the Rule 92 ter motion

 4     Djoko Razdoljac.  And it will not take much time so I think slowly we

 5     could try already to get the witness in.

 6             On the 1st of September of last year, 2014, the Defence filed a

 7     92 ter motion for Djoko Razdoljac.  He is not on the Defence list,

 8     19th of May, 2014, the Rule 65 ter witness list, as a result of the

 9     Chamber having instructed the Defence to remove him from an earlier

10     version of its witness list.  This was because Razdoljac's evidence had

11     been admitted during Prosecution's case already.  The Chamber addressed

12     this issue during the Pre-Defence Conference at transcript page 20977 and

13     advised the Defence how to proceed procedurally should it wish to have

14     further evidence from this witness admitted.  And under these

15     circumstances, where this procedure has not been followed, the Chamber

16     denies the Rule 92 ter motion.

17                           [The witness takes the stand]

18             JUDGE ORIE:  And the procedure implied seeking permission to do

19     what you apparently did without asking permission.

20             Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, I had indicated to you just before we adjourned

23     that I wanted to follow up on your testimony that you were particularly

24     struck by the trait or characteristic of Dr. Karadzic to twist the truth,

25     not only during the negotiations in April 1994 but also in respect of

Page 41749

 1     your frequent requests for a visit to Banja Luka.

 2             So I'd like to first turn to the -- to April 1994.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  And if we could call up 65 ter 10949, please.

 4        Q.   While this is coming up, Mr. Ambassador, I can tell you that this

 5     is an outgoing code cable from you to Mr. Annan, dated 7 April 1994,

 6     concerning meetings with Dr. Karadzic and President Izetbegovic.  And if

 7     we turn to paragraph 3, we see that on the question of Gorazde you

 8     expressed the Security Council and your own deep concern over the current

 9     situation, and then it states:

10             Although Dr. Karadzic has given me his assurances that the BSA,

11     the Bosnian Serb army, will not attack Gorazde town and that General Rose

12     may visit the enclave in the next few days, I stressed the importance of

13     having accurate UNPROFOR information on what was happening in order to

14     allay the fears of the international community and prevent the situation

15     from reinforcing the negative image of the Bosnian Serb army.

16             So I take it then that this is an accurate reflection of that

17     portion of the meeting that took place on April 6th, 1994, in respect of

18     the assurances that Dr. Karadzic gave you about Gorazde town?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   Now you also -- perhaps it's useful then to turn also to

21     paragraph 12 on page 4 in which we see a reference to the other issue you

22     mentioned just before the break, where your cable reflects the following:

23             Turning then to the issue of ethnic cleansing and the violation

24     of human rights in Banja Luka and the need to halt this practice, I

25     suggested that I visit the area towards the end of next week.  I further

Page 41750

 1     requested that UNPROFOR be permitted to increase its UNMO and civil

 2     affairs presence in the area and to install CIVPOL elements to reassure

 3     the population.

 4             Is it correct, Mr. Ambassador, that this is a reflection of the

 5     frequent requests by you to visit Banja Luka in response to the

 6     information you were receiving about ethnic cleansing?

 7        A.   Indeed, it is one such instance.

 8        Q.   And just -- no.  It's fine.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that document, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P7694, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Can we turn next, then, to 65 ter 03459.

14        Q.   This is a document dated the 16th of April, 1994, again from you

15     to Mr. Annan.  And it contains a chronology of events mainly involving

16     Gorazde for 15 April and 16 April 1994 as we see in the cover.

17             If we turn to page 3, for example, which appears to reflect, as

18     we see from the preceding page, events of the 15th of April, 1994.  We

19     see at 1920 Gorazde reported to be shelled again.

20             Dr. Karadzic's response that it could be the Bosnians shelling

21     themselves.

22             If we then turn to page 4.  At 2000 hours we see the reference to

23     casualties arriving at Gorazde hospital for medical evaluation.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Evacuation.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, I misspoke.  Medical evacuation.

Page 41751

 1             And another example at page 5.  At 1045, General Rose outlines

 2     the need to act if Serbs enter the town.

 3        Q.   Now, you're more than welcome to read the entirety of the

 4     document if it is necessary, Mr. Ambassador, and I just highlighted a few

 5     examples, but is it correct to say that this document reflects the fact

 6     that operations by the Bosnian Serb army were under way in the Gorazde

 7     area, prompting deep concerns by yourself and the international

 8     community?

 9             It's not necessary to characterise the entirety of the document

10     or every --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Could we have the witness's answer verbally,

12     please, for the record.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

14        Q.   I think Judge Moloto noted what I noted which was you were

15     nodding your head affirmatively.  If you could answer verbally so it can

16     be picked up by the transcript.

17        A.   Yes, I have read and these paragraphs reflect the sequence of

18     events.

19        Q.   Thank you, sir.

20             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  And also the paragraphs which were read to you and

22     which are not on our screen at this moment?

23             THE WITNESS:  These are evolution of events in and around Gorazde

24     in those days.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Registrar.

Page 41752

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter number 03459 will be Exhibit P7695,

 2     Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  P7695 is admitted.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Can we next turn to 65 ter 03460.

 5        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, as you can now see, this is another code cable

 6     from April from you to Mr. Annan, dated 17 April 1994, concerning the

 7     Gorazde crisis and, in particular, meetings with Dr. Karadzic and with

 8     President Izetbegovic.  And it indicates immediately below that subject

 9     heading information concerning your meeting with Dr. Karadzic and with

10     others present who are listed.

11             And it reflects the following:

12             "Despite the promises made by the Serbs last night on my

13     preconditions for our meeting today, it turned out during the course of

14     the day that most of the promises were not fulfilled:  1, none of the UN

15     personnel had been released before the meeting, and only the Canadian

16     soldiers and three UNMOs were released after my repeated request during

17     the meeting; 2, even during the meeting, there was no cease-fire by the

18     Bosnian Serb army which kept advancing to the edge of the town, and

19     several rounds impacted in the town itself resulting in further civilian

20     casualties; and 3, no concrete agreement was reached, thus no UNPROFOR

21     troops were deployed in Gorazde today."

22             Is that a reflection, Mr. Ambassador, of what you were describing

23     in your testimony before the break; that is, the -- some of the reasons

24     why you were struck during the Gorazde crisis by Dr. Karadzic's tendency

25     or characteristic of twisting the truth?

Page 41753

 1        A.   Yes.  I found repeatedly that his words and the situation on the

 2     ground in Gorazde did not correspond to each other.  And I remember --

 3     I'm not sure whether it was on this day or on a day before or right after

 4     this meeting with Dr. Karadzic, but Mr. Churkin, a special envoy of the

 5     Russian Federation who accompanied me in one of the negotiations, decided

 6     to leave the meeting in total disgust and he decided to go back to

 7     Sarajevo and he did not return.

 8             But contrary to the advice of some of my associates who remained

 9     with me at Pale, I was very patient.  I wanted to follow up on the

10     progress of the return of UNPROFOR captives, and either no progress or

11     extremely limited progress was registered.  And Churkin did not want to

12     stay with Karadzic for the press conference.  He had left.  But in order

13     to save Karadzic's face, I decided to stay for the joint press

14     conference, but at -- upon -- after the press conference, Karadzic

15     invited me to stay for dinner.  I said I do not want to stay for dinner,

16     and he should understand my reasons.  My reason was my total disgust with

17     the lack of progress and the discrepancy between his words and progress

18     on the ground.

19             And I also remember I was negotiating with Karadzic in Geneva on

20     Gorazde, and -- but there, again, the progress was extremely slow or

21     almost nil, so I decided to leave Geneva to go back to my headquarters in

22     Gorazde.  I did it in a somewhat dramatic way so that Karadzic should

23     know that -- my disillusionment with negotiations.  And finally when I

24     was checking out from the Hotel Intercontinental, Karadzic sent for me

25     and asked for urgent meeting in which I decided to go back to the hotel,

Page 41754

 1     and -- but here again, I checked everything he promised.  I checked it

 2     with our troops and UNMOs on the ground again, and still there were

 3     frequently discrepancies.

 4             So the -- the progress was finally registered when we met with

 5     President Milosevic in Belgrade, and there I accepted to negotiate with

 6     Karadzic, and General Mladic was there, and we negotiated with each other

 7     for more than 11 hours.

 8             Finally, I -- upon my proposal to have a smaller restricted

 9     meeting, including Milosevic, Karadzic, and General Mladic on their side,

10     and General de Lapresle and myself on the UN side, I -- I referred to

11     imminence of NATO air-strike - air-strike as distinct from close-air

12     support - and I appealed to them to heed these indications which were

13     real.  And I appealed to their sense of history of the Serb people, proud

14     people with a glorious history.  And I told them that, you know, they are

15     faced with a crucial choice and their judgement in -- you know, vis-à-vis

16     their history was at stake.  And Milosevic immediately understood the

17     vital importance of the occasion and the imminence of a decision, but

18     Karadzic and Mladic had still difficulties.  But, in the end, they had to

19     come around.

20             And we reached a final agreement towards midnight, and the next

21     morning we came back to examine the text of the agreement.  And Karadzic

22     still made some points, technical points.  General Mladic, once he got

23     satisfaction on the main points from his viewpoint, he was not -- he did

24     not, you know, need any more examination of the text.  And we signed the

25     crucial document.

Page 41755

 1             And when I left the Presidency in Belgrade, I looked at my watch.

 2     I know it was 20 minutes to midday, and my deadline was midday.  So I was

 3     very moved that, here again, after Sarajevo crisis in February 1994, here

 4     again in Gorazde in April 1994 we were able to avoid the catastrophe of a

 5     massive air-strike by NATO through means of diplomacy.  Yeah.  So these

 6     describe these events.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I tender this document, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P7696, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  P7696 is admitted.

12             MR. TIEGER:

13        Q.   Now, Mr. Ambassador, I note that in paragraph 2 of your cable for

14     the April 17th meeting it refers to the fact that the Serbs insisted that

15     the right bank of Drina river is their territory and that was their basis

16     for certain of the positions they took.

17             In that connection, if I could also turn you to 65 ter 13405.

18     This is a document also dated the 17th of April from Mr. Andreev to

19     Mr. De Mello.  Also concerning so -- it begins by saying:

20             "The fate of Gorazde appears now to be the hands of the Bosnian

21     Serb forces.  Serb forces have taken all high ground to the north of the

22     town and have reached the river to the south.  They are within a

23     kilometre or two of the town centre in all directions.

24             "When we left Pale today, we had only the most limited of oral

25     agreements."

Page 41756

 1             It lists some of those, including immediate cease-fire,

 2     withdrawal of forces, maximum restraint, limited medical evacuation, and

 3     release of all remaining UN hostages.

 4             And if we turn to the next page --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. ...

 6             MR. TIEGER:

 7        Q.   Paragraph 3, it states:

 8             "In retrospect, it is clear that the Serbs have used their

 9     negotiations with the United Nations as a cover for the prosecution of

10     their offensive."

11             And it explains that in more detail.  It concludes by saying:

12             "Attacks continued during our presence in Pale."

13             Paragraph 4 notes that:

14             "No real progress was made today," and notes in the middle of

15     that paragraph, Dr. Karadzic insisted that "the right bank of the Drina

16     will be ours."

17             Mr. Akashi, does that conform with your recollection of the

18     circumstances at the time and is that another reflection --

19        A.   Yes, indeed.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  One second.  Yes.  It's only now that the French

21     translation has finished.

22             MR. TIEGER:

23        Q.   I think we are caught up now, Mr. Akashi.  And I had asked you

24     whether that conformed with your recollection of events at the time and

25     was it another reflection of the discrepancies between what you were told

Page 41757

 1     and what was happening on the ground?

 2        A.   Yes, I would say certainly it was so.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  I would tender that document, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P7697, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  P7697 is admitted.

 7             MR. TIEGER:

 8        Q.   Let me change directions slightly and show you a document that --

 9     not emanating from you, Mr. Ambassador, but from the Bosnian Serb army;

10     that's P5039.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, while waiting for the document, would

12     you please keep in mind that we want to finish at 15 minutes past 2.00

13     sharp today.

14             MR. TIEGER:

15        Q.   This is a document dated the 17th of April titled:  "Very

16     urgent," comes from the Chief of Staff of the VRS Main Staff,

17     General Milovanovic.  And it reflects that it -- on the 17th of April at

18     2055 hours the president of Republika Srpska ordered, and if we look

19     at -- so number 1, we see an order to now stop the fire by artillery and

20     mortars into the city of Gorazde.

21             And number 2, within the 3-kilometre radius on the right bank of

22     the Drina river capture all features and in particular the urban parts of

23     the city, and then withdraw the heavy weaponry outside the zone of the

24     3-kilometre radius.  Dig it in and camouflage it.

25             And with respect to the left bank as reflected in item 3, to take

Page 41758

 1     up favourable positions so that the whole zone is encircled by the Army

 2     of Republika Srpska.

 3             Is that consistent with the information you were receiving at the

 4     time from the -- from your sources on the ground and inconsistent with

 5     the representations you were receiving from Dr. Karadzic?  That is,

 6     number one, that in fact artillery and mortars had apparently been fired

 7     into Gorazde town; number 2, contrary to his representation on April 7th,

 8     that the Army of Republika Srpska was engaged in the attack on Gorazde

 9     town?

10        A.   Yes, it corresponds to my memory of the situation as we saw from

11     UN side.

12        Q.   Thank you, sir.

13             MR. TIEGER:  And finally, I think I can conclude if we call up

14     65 ter 16806.  That may be a document that is now in evidence as D1362.

15        Q.   That's an outgoing cable from you to Mr. Annan on the 23rd of

16     April, 1994, reflecting information from your meetings with Dr. Karadzic

17     and General Mladic.

18             You were asked in your examination-in-chief this morning about a

19     certain portion of this document but I want to direct your attention to

20     another portion and that is paragraph 4 on page 3.  There, you're

21     addressing the critical need to resolve the crisis.  You state in the

22     middle of the page -- you also refer to NATO could take decisions which

23     could have tragic repercussions all around.  You state that there should

24     be no illusions on any side of the seriousness of the present situation

25     and of the international community's revulsion towards it.  And you note

Page 41759

 1     that it was a tragedy, a human and humanitarian tragedy out of proportion

 2     to any provocation that the Bosnian Serb army may have initially had from

 3     the BiH.  And then you referred to the unacceptably high civilian

 4     casualties of just the previous day, almost 100.

 5        A.   Yes, I did my very best, I recollect, to make the Bosnian Serb

 6     side, its leadership to be fully aware of the consequences of their

 7     action around Gorazde.  It was very clear from this that they were using

 8     Gorazde in order to improve their general situation throughout Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina.  But they went so far with regard to Gorazde issue that they

10     were going out of their way, out of achieving immediate objective in

11     Gorazde, and I gave the most frank warnings in that regard.  And this

12     corresponds to what I said earlier today with -- at the meeting with

13     President Milosevic.

14        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

15             MR. TIEGER:  It's now 2.15.  We have to conclude for the day.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Akashi, we'll conclude for the day and

17     we'll adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.30.  We all expect that tomorrow

18     morning that we'll be able to conclude hearing your evidence.  Meanwhile,

19     I instruct you that you should not speak or communicate in whatever way

20     with whomever about your testimony, whether that's testimony given today

21     or testimony still to be given tomorrow.  If that is clear to you, you

22     may follow the usher.

23             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Thank you very much, Excellency.

24                           [The witness stands down]

25             JUDGE ORIE:  We adjourn for the day, and we resume tomorrow,

Page 41760

 1     Tuesday, the 24th of November, 9.30 in the morning, in this same

 2     courtroom, I.

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.17 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 24th day of

 5                           November, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.