Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 41761

 1                           Tuesday, 24 November 2015

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 12.02 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good afternoon to everyone in and around this

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you.  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  This

 9     is case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11             Due to a major failure of our ICT systems, especially the

12     service, if I understand well, we couldn't start at 9.30.  We had to wait

13     for quite a while.  Since Mr. Mladic had to wait for a long time in the

14     holding cell, he was given an opportunity to return to the UNDU, but he

15     has preferred to stay here, which is highly appreciated by the Chamber,

16     so that we can see whether we can conclude the testimony of Mr. Akashi

17     today.

18             Mr. Tieger, could you give us an indication as to how much time

19     you'd still need.

20             MR. TIEGER:  I don't intend -- given the pace of yesterday, I

21     certainly don't intend to -- basically I would think I would use my

22     allotted time, which is the bulk of the next two sessions, so that I have

23     an hour and 15 minutes left.  I'm trying to move forward as quickly as I

24     can, but I don't think, unless the pace quickens, it will be appreciably

25     faster than that.

Page 41762

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Because we have -- as a matter of fact, I

 2     think we have two sessions left.  We can continue until a little bit

 3     after 2.15 this afternoon.  But since Mr. Mladic has been waiting for the

 4     whole of the morning, we'll have to impose some limits on ourselves.

 5                           [Trial Chamber and Legal Officer confer]

 6                           [The witness takes the stand]

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  I think ... first of all, Mr. Akashi --

 8             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  -- welcome back in this courtroom.  Due to a major

10     failure of our ICT system, we couldn't start at 9.30, which we regret

11     very much.  We'll try to see whether we can conclude hearing your

12     evidence this morning.

13             Before we start, perhaps unnecessary, but I would like to remind

14     you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the

15     beginning of your testimony.  We were just in the midst of a discussion

16     when you entered the courtroom about whether we could conclude, yes or

17     no.

18             Mr. Ivetic, I'm looking at you.  Is there anything, if Mr. Tieger

19     would use -- I think you said 1 hour and 15 minutes -- 15 minutes.

20             MR. TIEGER:  And I was about to say I will certainly look for

21     ways to stream-line as we go, but that's where we stood at the beginning

22     of the day.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  And how much time you think would you need,

24     Mr. Ivetic?

25             MR. IVETIC:  I've got approximately 40 minutes.

Page 41763

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  40 minutes.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  So we're cutting it close.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then we would either take two longer sessions,

 4     but, of course, Mr. Mladic, because of you, we usually take sessions of

 5     one hour, or we should attach a third short session to see whether both

 6     options will be considered.  Let's first now continue.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8                           WITNESS:  YASUSHI AKASHI [Resumed]

 9                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger: [Continued]

10        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.

11        A.   Good morning, Mr. Tieger.

12        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, yesterday you referred to your frequent requests

13     to visit Banja Luka in light of the information you were receiving about

14     ethnic cleansing and violations of human rights, and in that connection,

15     we looked at your code cable of the 7th of April, 1994, referencing one

16     such request.  That's P7694.  I'd like to jump forward some months later

17     in 1994 to September of that year.

18             MR. TIEGER:  And in that connection call up, please, P2048.

19        Q.   Now this is a code cable sent by you to Mr. Annan on the 20th of

20     September, 1994 -- oh, I'm sorry.  This is -- and it contains a letter to

21     Dr. Karadzic on that same date.  And if we could turn the page, please,

22     to page 2, as we see at the bottom of paragraph 1, you continue to raise

23     the problem of human rights abuses in the Banja Luka area, referring to

24     the most recent departure of Muslims who arrived in the -- in

25     Central Bosnia.

Page 41764

 1             Is it correct that that's -- that was a further reflection or

 2     ongoing reflection of the same problem that you had protested previously?

 3     And you'll have to answer audibly, Mr. Ambassador, rather than with a nod

 4     of the head.

 5        A.   What is the question, Mr. Tieger?

 6        Q.   Yeah, it -- would the -- your reference there to the departures

 7     of non-Serb population from the area of Banja Luka, is that part of the

 8     continuing effort to bring to the attention of Mr. Karadzic and the

 9     Bosnian Serb leadership the ongoing human rights abuses in Banja Luka?

10        A.   Indeed, it was.

11        Q.   Now, apparently as we see from the letter, Banja Luka was not the

12     only area where that was happening.  As you note at the beginning of your

13     letter, you wished to convey your utter dismay at the fact that in the

14     past few days alone, over 2500 Muslim civilians have been forcibly --

15     forcefully expelled from the area of Bijeljina and Janja.  And as you

16     note later, a little bit later, many of them had been expelled and

17     apparently robbed en route by a man named Vojkan.  And that was an

18     accurate reflection of the information you were receiving that you sought

19     to bring to the -- to protest --

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   -- to Mr. Karadzic about?

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   Okay.  Now, your letter indicates that just one month before you

24     had also raised the same issue, the issue of forceful expulsions of the

25     non-Serb population, and that Dr. Karadzic had said to you that such

Page 41765

 1     expulsions were not in accordance with the policies of the Bosnian Serb

 2     authorities.  And I think's found in paragraph 2 of your letter.  Is that

 3     correct?

 4        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 5        Q.   Okay.  In addition, this matter was pressed by Mr. de Mello who

 6     met with Dr. Karadzic on the 8th of September --

 7        A.   Mm-hm --

 8        Q.   -- in regard to the same problem and received the same assurances

 9     from Dr. Karadzic; correct?

10        A.   Yes, we kept receiving assurances which were not reflected on the

11     changes on the ground.

12        Q.   I'm going to look quickly at the reference -- you reference

13     Mr. de Mello's efforts.

14             MR. TIEGER:  In that connection can I call up 65 ter 03478.

15        Q.   This is a code cable dated 9th of September, 1994, from you to

16     Mr. Annan.  As we see in paragraph 1, it refers to Mr. Vieira de Mello's

17     travel on the 8th of September to Sarajevo and Pale to re-establish

18     contact with the Bosnian Serb leadership.  And if we turn to page 2 and

19     specifically paragraph 6, we see a reference to what you referred to in

20     your letter of September 20th.  HCA, and that's Mr. de Mello, then

21     appealed to Karadzic to put an end to the ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka

22     and Bijeljina and to make public his intention to seize the criminal

23     network in accordance with assurances given three weeks earlier to Akashi

24     and himself.  It continues to refer to Dr. Karadzic's assurances and

25     representations in respect of those crimes.  And it refers again to

Page 41766

 1     Vojkan, noting:  HCA reiterated our hope that Karadzic would soon allow

 2     Akashi and UNPROFOR to verify independently humanitarian conditions in

 3     both regions and repeatedly pressed for the arrest of Vojkan, who

 4     Karadzic said might be acting under Arkan's instructions, along with

 5     members of his gang.

 6             I take it that the reference there --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. ...

 8             MR. TIEGER:

 9        Q.   I take it, Mr. Ambassador, that the reference by Mr. de Mello to

10     the hope that would Karadzic soon allow you and UNPROFOR to verify

11     independently conditions in both regions is another reflection of your

12     ongoing but unsuccessful efforts to gain access to the areas?

13        A.   That's correct.  It was a frustrating exercise to keep repeating

14     our strong demands for rectification of the conditions of life in those

15     areas.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

17             MR. TIEGER:  I tender the document, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Tieger -- yes, Mr. Registrar, the number

19     would be?

20             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P7698, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted into evidence.

22             Mr. Tieger, I -- it took me a while to get back to the English

23     channel.  It's a pattern now.  You're speaking so quickly that the

24     interpreters, French interpreters, get behind and then Mr. Akashi gives

25     you the good example by talking so quietly that the interpreters catch up

Page 41767

 1     again.  But I'd rather that the interpreters can follow you as well.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Your gentle admonition

 3     earlier should have been sufficient but this will have its impact.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   I'd like to direct your attention to a related document,

 7     Mr. Ambassador.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Can we call up, please, 65 ter 15781.

 9        Q.   As it comes up, sir, you'll see that it's a document dated the

10     15th of September, 1994, from you to Mr. Annan, relating to

11     Mr. de Mello's meeting with Mr. Simic, the vice-prime minister of FRY,

12     and we can see that on the first -- the first page.  As we see in

13     paragraph 3, Mr. de Mello briefs Simic on his last meeting in Pale with

14     Dr. Karadzic and Professor Koljevic and it refers to some of the subjects

15     covered.

16             Turning quickly to paragraph 7 on page 2, it reflects that

17     Mr. de Mello explained to Mr. Simic the issue of ethnic cleansing in

18     Banja Luka and Bijeljina than he had met with Dr. Karadzic on that

19     subject or those subjects, and again explains that Dr. Karadzic indicated

20     that he had taken steps, initiated investigations particularly on the

21     role of Major Vojkan Djurkovic.  However, Mr. de Mello stressed that this

22     was an insufficient response as the cleansing itself was apparently

23     continuing.  And that by the time the investigations were over, there

24     would be nobody left to expel.  And finally, a reference to your

25     continuing efforts to gain access to Banja Luka.

Page 41768

 1             This document, sir, is an accurate reflection of the ongoing

 2     efforts to press Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership to end the

 3     cleansing in those areas?

 4        A.   Yes, it was one clear proof of our continuing efforts and our

 5     failure to get any results.

 6        Q.   Thank you, sir.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  I tender the document.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P7699, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted.

11             MR. TIEGER:  May I have 65 ter 31392, please.

12        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, as this document comes up, you will see, as the

13     Chamber and parties will, that it's a report on morale from the

14     East Bosnia Corps command dated the 2nd of October, 1994.  And if we turn

15     to page 2, paragraph 1.5, we see a reference to the following:

16             "Since some Muslims moved out of Bijeljina and Janja, a number of

17     residential units were obtained for the needs of IBK soldiers and

18     officers, which affected morale positively."

19             And in the context of the information you had at the time and the

20     matters with which you were dealing, is that a reference, as you

21     understand it, to the departures of Muslims and the expulsions that you

22     and Dr. de Mello had met with Dr. Karadzic about?

23             MR. IVETIC:  Object to the question.  Misstates the document.  If

24     you read the next line you'll see what it refers to.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, does this cause you to read more or to

Page 41769

 1     phrase your question differently?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  No, I don't find those references mutually

 3     exclusive, and I think it's up to the Chamber to decide and it's up to

 4     the witness to answer.  In fact, it refers not to the people who fled but

 5     to the people who filled those accommodations.  But in any event, I think

 6     it's up to the witness.

 7             MR. IVETIC:  I believe -- I don't know how else you can interpret

 8     a large number of soldiers who had fled.  Those are precisely people who

 9     had fled, counsel.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Let me -- one second, please.

11             MR. TIEGER:  "Found permanent accommodation in Bijeljina and

12     Janja."

13             JUDGE ORIE:  The objection is denied.  The matter may be

14     revisited during re-examination.

15             Please proceed.

16             MR. TIEGER:

17        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, the question is simply whether that is a

18     reference, as you would understand it, to the ongoing issue of Muslim

19     departure from those -- the areas of Bijeljina and Janja.

20        A.   Yeah, I -- I think reference is precisely to the ongoing

21     phenomenon.

22             MR. TIEGER:  I tender the document, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P7700, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted.

Page 41770

 1             MR. TIEGER:  And just one more question about the question of

 2     housing and Muslim departure.  If I could have 65 ter 02382, please,

 3     pages 161 in the English and 168 in the B/C/S.  And as I read the

 4     English, we'll have to move quickly to 169 in the B/C/S.

 5             161 in the English.  All right.

 6        Q.   This is a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly conducted in

 7     September of 1993 and speaking is Mr. Srdic, a delegate from the Krajina

 8     region from Prijedor, who says the following:

 9             "Gentlemen, think about this thoroughly.  This is just the mask

10     Federations of veterans and families of killed soldiers.  We have the

11     opportunities to see there have been no families of killed soldiers who

12     have not solved housing problem.  There are some of them, but they have

13     not done what they have [sic] been asked.  They should have cleansed

14     their municipalities as we had done, and they would have not had any

15     problems [sic].  If any agreement was made, if somebody came back, we

16     would say that many people have been in municipality.  You, that had done

17     the job, take the responsibility as the war criminals."

18             MR. IVETIC:  None of this is in the Serbian.  I think it's in the

19     next page.

20             MR. TIEGER:  I tried to indicate earlier that we'd need to

21     switch.  I'm sorry, I didn't signal as we were going.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Tieger speak more slowly, especially

23     when reading, please.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, it's not the first time today.  Please

25     proceed.

Page 41771

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And it would always be good to give a clear

 2     reference where you are reading from, especially for the interpreters.

 3     It's very helpful.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  That concludes the passage I wanted to raise.

 5     Assuming we've had enough opportunity to see the B/C/S at the top of the

 6     next page, I wanted to ask this question.

 7        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, in your discussions with Dr. Karadzic when he

 8     offered repeated assurances to your protests, did he tell you about any

 9     link being drawn by RS officials, by Republika Srpska officials, between

10     the departures of Muslims, between the cleansings, and the availability

11     of housing for Serb soldiers or Serbs generally?

12        A.   I do not specifically recall discussion on that linkage between

13     the two phenomenon.

14        Q.   Thank, you, sir.

15             MR. TIEGER:  And I would tender this excerpt, Mr. President.  It

16     should be added to P2508.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  But it is -- we'll then finalize that later

18     in -- because it's --

19             MR. TIEGER:  It's an ongoing --

20             JUDGE ORIE:  -- ongoing exercise.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

23        Q.   Mr. Ambassador --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  The portion you read is admitted as such in P2508.

25             MR. TIEGER:

Page 41772

 1        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, in the last paragraph of your September 20th

 2     letter that we looked at earlier, you stated to Dr. Karadzic that you

 3     could not understand how such a deplorable situation could continue and

 4     even accelerate despite all the commitments repeatedly made to stop the

 5     forcible expulsions.  And in that connection, I'd like to show you a

 6     transcript of a meeting at which the -- at which Vojkan was discussed and

 7     at which the policy of the Bosnian Serb leadership was discussed.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  May I have called up, please, P6723.

 9        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, we're looking now at a transcript from the

10     14th Session of the Supreme Command held on the 31st of March, 1995, or

11     at least a portion of that.  And if we could turn just for the -- this

12     begins at pages 3 and 4 with a discussion about convoy of Muslims and

13     Croats.  But the pertinent section I wish to particularly bring to your

14     attention begins at the top of page 6 in the English and on page 6 of the

15     B/C/S with Dr. Karadzic speaking.  And he begins with saying:

16             "Let me first say something.  This is what it is, Srdja Srdic

17     keeps pestering us that this should be done by his CK, Red Cross, that

18     state agencies, et cetera, should do it."

19             So that's another reference to the individual we -- who was

20     speaking at the Bosnian Serb Assembly.

21             MR. IVETIC:  I think we need the prior page in B/C/S.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.

23        Q.   And then Dr. Karadzic continues:

24             "Muslims remaining there in any way is disastrous for us."

25             And he goes on to explain his view of why.  After mentioning

Page 41773

 1     numbers in respect of Muslims and the Serbs in the areas of the Krajina,

 2     that is, Kljuc, Sanski Most, Banja Luka, he continues:

 3             "It is the standpoint of our policy there has been a separation

 4     of peoples, of cultures, of worlds, birds of a feather flock

 5     together ..."

 6             Now that reference to the policy and the separation of peoples,

 7     of cultures, of worlds, is not dissimilar, I take it, Mr. Ambassador, to

 8     what Dr. Karadzic told you about good fences making good neighbours?

 9             MR. IVETIC:  I object to the question.  If he's going to quote

10     from a document verbatim, he should quote verbatim and finish the

11     sentence.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  And you're again invited to read more slowly.

13     Especially the French interpreters are not able to follow.

14             MR. TIEGER:  I'll read it -- I could have done it two ways.  Let

15     me finish the sentence and ask the two questions I had.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  If do you it all slowly then everything will

17     be fine.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  I read the entire relevant portions:

19             "It the standpoint of our policy there has been a separation of

20     peoples, of culture, of worlds, birds of a feather flock together, what

21     Vojkan did is not allowed, for Vojkan to work illegally.  He was excluded

22     from the state commission, et cetera.  What do private agencies do, they

23     find probably for big money, they secure him a foreign visa and secure

24     him a passport to travel to that foreign country.  What happens now, if

25     that were done by a state institution, we would be accused of ethnic

Page 41774

 1     cleansing."

 2             And then if we turn to page 66 of the English -- excuse me,

 3     page 7 of the e-court, 66 in the hard copy, and still page --

 4             MR. IVETIC:  I can't find it in the B/C/S.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  It's page 7 of the B/C/S, precisely in the middle of

 6     the page.  I'll read it.  It's the next portion of Dr. Karadzic speaking

 7     after -- he is listed as speaking twice after General Mladic has spoken.

 8     And the quote is:

 9             "That is why we, because we turn a blind eye at a private agency

10     which makes these private arrangements.  When a private" --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Where are you reading, Mr. Tieger?

12             MR. TIEGER:  I'm reading from the top of page 7 in the English

13     and the middle of the page in B/C/S.

14             MR. IVETIC:  I don't see it in either language.

15             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  We have page 7 of the English, please,

16     scroll down.  "For them have UNPROFOR guard them," the first paragraph.

17     And in the second -- second sentence of that first paragraph --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we have that and you started reading as:

19     "That is why we ..."

20             MR. TIEGER:  That is why we, because we turn a blind eye at a

21     private agency which makes these private arrangements.  When a private

22     Muslim and a private agency make arrangements for him to go to Germany,

23     no one can accuse us."

24        Q.   My question for you, Mr. Ambassador, is:  During the course of

25     these repeated representations about the actions he was allegedly taking

Page 41775

 1     with respect to what Vojkan was doing, did he ever tell you that he

 2     turned a blind eye to what Vojkan and others like him were doing because

 3     of his view that it insulated the Bosnian Serb leadership from being

 4     accused of ethnic cleansing?

 5             MR. IVETIC:  Object to the question.  It takes the matter out of

 6     context and the remainder of the first part that was not read illuminates

 7     this matter greatly, I think.  The Prosecutor is misrepresenting the text

 8     of this document.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  The objection is denied.

10             Please proceed.

11             THE WITNESS:  I do not recall specific reference to -- to the --

12     to the matter you have just drawn my attention to.

13             MR. TIEGER:

14        Q.   Okay.  Contrary to turning a -- contrary to the -- let me put it

15     this way.  What Dr. Karadzic told you was he was actively investigating

16     and seeking to arrest and punish Vojkan, not turning a blind eye to his

17     activities; right?

18        A.   I do not recall that specific discussion.

19        Q.   Okay.  All right.  I'd like to turn to one more example of the

20     representations that were made to you by Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian

21     Serb leadership that were not fulfilled.

22             MR. TIEGER:  And in that connection can we turn, please, to

23     65 ter 30739.

24        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, this is a weekly report from the 24th through the

25     31st of July, 1995, from the UNPROFOR HQ Sarajevo.  It has a section

Page 41776

 1     beginning on page 3 of the English, page 4 -- it says -- actually page 4

 2     of the e-court on Srebrenica and Zepa.

 3             You see the discussion begins there, referring to some of the

 4     events that had taken place up to that point.  And then it continues on

 5     to the next page, page 5, at the bottom of the first paragraph of page 5.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Next page, please.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, no B/C/S translation available?

 8             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.  I'll read slowly and --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And take care that everything is well in

10     context and take care that the -- if you want to tender it later, that a

11     translation be made.

12             MR. TIEGER:  That's precisely why I showed where the subject

13     began in the report and where it is related to the quote I'm bringing to

14     the Ambassador's attention.

15        Q.   At the bottom of that first paragraph, it states:

16             "The persistent refusal of the Serb side to provide a list of the

17     prisoners held after the fall of Srebrenica, the alleged killing in Zepa,

18     even after negotiations, of the ABiH commander Avdo Palic, and the

19     announced intention of the Serbs of trying other 'war criminals' seemed

20     to justify anxieties."

21             Now, that reference to the persistent refusal of the Serb side to

22     provide a list of prisoners is a reflection, is it not, Mr. Ambassador,

23     of pressure from the international community to get access to people who

24     had been taken prisoner and of concern about their fate; is that right?

25        A.   Could you -- could you repeat your question, please.

Page 41777

 1        Q.   Yeah.  With respect to the reference there to the persistent

 2     refusal of the Serb side to provide a list of prisoners, that reflects,

 3     does it not, ongoing efforts and pressure by the international community

 4     to get access to people who had been taken prisoner and reflects concern

 5     about their fate; is that right?

 6             Or to put it another way, I presume that refusal -- the reference

 7     to refusal is in context a reference to requests that were unfulfilled?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I tender the document, Mr. President, 30739.  And I

10     know it needs a translation.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar, the number would be?

12             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P7701, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Marked for identification.

14             MR. TIEGER:

15        Q.   Perhaps I can take the next two documents together,

16     Mr. Ambassador, since they appear to be related.

17             The first one is 65 ter 03544.  And this is an outgoing code

18     cable from you to Mr. Annan dated the 14th of August, 1995, in reference

19     to the missing population from Srebrenica.  And on page 2, we see a

20     letter to Dr. Karadzic which was attached, in which you express concern

21     about the reports of grave violations of international humanitarian law

22     in and around Srebrenica, and, among other things, request immediate

23     access for representatives of UNHCR, the ICRC, et cetera, to persons

24     displaced, and further that you permit representatives to visit and

25     register any persons detained against their will.

Page 41778

 1             And I said I want to take two documents because I thought they

 2     were related.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  If we could also call up 13311.

 4        Q.   And this is an outgoing code cable dated the 22nd of August,

 5     1995, which refers, among other things, as we see from the top -- from

 6     the first page, to meetings with the Bosnian Serb leadership, including

 7     Dr. Karadzic, on the 21st of August.  And I believe these are meetings by

 8     the chief of mission, Mr. Ambassador, not yourself.

 9             If we turn to page 3, there's a reference to the discussion

10     regarding Srebrenica at that meeting, noting:  I reminded Karadzic that

11     accordance with the directives of UN Resolution 1010, concerning reports

12     of grave violations of international law, the SRSG had written to him on

13     12 August to request access and cooperation for UNPROFOR to investigate

14     the allegations.  To date, the SRSG has not received Karadzic's response,

15     nor had the latter reacted in any positive manner to the request.  I urge

16     Karadzic to give urgent consideration to SRSG's request.  Karadzic

17     claimed that he had lately been preoccupied with the crisis in Banja Luka

18     and other areas and promised to look into the matter.

19             Those two documents we just looked at, Mr. Ambassador, do those

20     correctly reflect ongoing efforts by yourself and other members of the

21     international community to obtain information about the whereabouts and

22     fate of those persons who had been taken prisoner following the taking of

23     Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serb army?

24        A.   Yes, Mr. Tieger.  I think as -- since particularly from the

25     meeting which took place with President Milosevic and others on the

Page 41779

 1     Bosnian Serb side with several of us from the UN and from the rest of the

 2     international community, we made persistent efforts for them to fulfil

 3     their promise, including the visit by ICRC to the areas of Srebrenica to

 4     investigate and verify whether the persistent rumours about possible

 5     tragedy that has taken place could be confirmed.  But these efforts were

 6     in vain, efforts on our part.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I tender those two documents, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 03544 will be Exhibit P7702.

11             And 65 ter 13311 will be Exhibit P7703.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  English translations are -- is available for the

13     first one, not for the second one.  Is -- the first one, then, yes, they

14     are together in one -- under one number.  P7703 will be marked for

15     identification awaiting a translation of a portion of it.

16             Please proceed.  And is marked for identification, I should say.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

18             May I have 65 ter 04472, page 89, please.  In the -- page 89 in

19     English and page 165 in B/C/S.

20        Q.   And just to wrap up our discussion on this issue, I wanted to

21     draw your attention to the following, Mr. Ambassador.  At the bottom of

22     the page, after a discussion in paragraph 408 concerning the reaction of

23     the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and his concerns about the

24     situation, the blockages of humanitarian aid, the shellings, we see at

25     paragraph 409, the following:

Page 41780

 1             "Illustrative of his frustration, ICRC" --

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could we wait until we have 409 on the screen, in

 3     B/C/S.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Turn the page in B/C/S, please.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  There we are.

 6             MR. TIEGER:

 7        Q.   "Illustrative of his frustration, ICRC had not been granted

 8     access to the Srebrenica area to ascertain the fate of" - and if we turn

 9     the page, please - "the missing until a few days after the London

10     meeting.  Once granted access by the BSA to the Batkovic camp in

11     North-Eastern Bosnia, ICRC was only able to register 164 prisoners from

12     Srebrenica and 44 from Zepa.  The ICRC representatives were told that no

13     other prisoners were being held and were accordingly shown a number of

14     empty detention centres in the Bratunac area.  As of

15     November 1999," which clearly is a -- that's right.  "As of

16     November 1999, 7.336 individuals from Srebrenica remain unaccounted for,

17     based on the number of tracing requests for missing persons received by

18     ICRC."

19             And, Mr. Ambassador, does that reflect what you indicated to us

20     earlier; that is, the efforts -- that is, that the efforts by the

21     international community to repeatedly obtain information about and access

22     to persons who had been taken prisoners remained unsuccessful?

23        A.   Yes, Mr. Tieger, I think this is part of a -- a great deal of

24     efforts on our part to identify whether all those ominous rumours have

25     the factual basis, and we were still left in a very heavy fog as to what

Page 41781

 1     exactly took place in and around Srebrenica.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  May I tender that document, Mr. President.  The

 3     portion of the document, of course.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Two pages.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  You still have to upload because it's now a 113-page

 7     document.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Yeah.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar, could you reserve a number for the

10     excerpt still to be uploaded.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  That will be P7704.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And then admission will -- even after the

13     uploading will be decided upon once we have B/C/S translation.  Oh, it's

14     there.  No, I see it's there.  The number is reserved for the excerpt to

15     be uploaded.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I have a few other, I think, documents for which no

18     B/C/S translations were provided but we'll deal with that later.  And

19     that's both for the Prosecution and for the Defence.

20             MR. TIEGER:

21        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, during the course of your testimony in the

22     Karadzic case, you were asked during cross-examination about a portion in

23     your booklet referring to the detention of UN personnel.  That portion --

24     and I'll read the quote, the question that you were asked and the answer

25     you gave at that time, that occurs at 65 ter 33522, e-court page 29 going

Page 41782

 1     onto page 30.

 2             "And the question was, at page 31 of the booklet, e-court pages

 3     18 and 19, where you refer to the detention of UN personnel following the

 4     NATO air-strikes in May of 1995, and I'd like to know whether you agree

 5     with me that UN personnel who were taken hostage on that occasion were

 6     used, actually, as human shields in order to compel NATO forces to stop

 7     the air-strikes."

 8             And your answer was:

 9             "I think the term 'human shield' is frequently used by

10     journalism, but in this particular case, I think if we construe Bosnian

11     Serb action of taking UN [sic] personnel as -- as hostage, if this act is

12     construed as taking hostages and making them as human shield is certainly

13     not an exaggeration, journalistic exaggeration."

14             Now, first of all, Mr. Ambassador, that reflects the information

15     provided during the course of the Karadzic case; is that right?

16        A.   Yes, it was.

17        Q.   Now, I just to put -- just to ask you about a contemporaneous

18     expression of that same point, I'd like to turn to 65 ter 33520 which is

19     a code cable dated the 30th of May, 1995.  And just to put it somewhat in

20     context, because there was a lot happening that day, we see at

21     paragraph 11 on page 4 of this document reference to the air-strike.  And

22     then beginning in the third sentence of that paragraph:

23             "In response, the Serbs surrounded a number of weapon collection

24     points, all safe areas except Zepa were also shelled, resulting in

25     particularly heavy casualties in Tuzla where over 60 civilians were

Page 41783

 1     killed and over 130 injured."

 2             And then the last sentence of that paragraph:

 3             "The Serbs reacted by surrounding additional weapon collection

 4     points, taking UNMOs into custody and using a number of them as human

 5     shields to deter further air-strikes on potential targets and cutting

 6     electricity to the city."

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  It reads "attacks" rather than "strikes."

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, yes.

 9             "... to deter further air attacks on potential targets, and

10     cutting electricity to the city."

11        Q.   I mention it was a cable of the 30th of May and I should have

12     mentioned, Mr. Ambassador, it was from you to Mr. Goulding with

13     information to Mr. Annan and Stoltenberg.

14             Mr. Ambassador, this was a contemporaneous expression of what was

15     happening on the ground and the taking of UN personnel as hostages and

16     human shields to deter air attacks; is that correct?

17        A.   That's correct.

18             MR. TIEGER:  I tender this document, Mr. President.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be MFI P7705, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Marked for identification.  It's not a very long

22     document, six pages, so I take it that full translation will be provided.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Of course.  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'm trying to

24     adhere to the schedule.  I think --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, about the schedule, I'd like to -- we have two

Page 41784

 1     options.  Either we take a break now, then we would -- that would be a

 2     break of 20 minutes.  Then we would sit from 1.20 to 2.20.  And if that

 3     would be agreeable to the Defence, we would then take another break and

 4     sit from 20 minutes to 3.00 until 3.30.  This would be an overall session

 5     not longer than usual, but for the day, of course, since Mr. Mladic

 6     arrived at 9.00 in the morning, would be longer.

 7             Another option would be to continue for half an hour, then take a

 8     break of half an hour, which is a bit of a longer break.  That would be

 9     from 1.30 to 2.00.  And then have a second session from 2.00 to 3.30.

10     The latter option would have the advantage of having three hours overall

11     available, whereas in the first option it would be only two hours and

12     50 minutes.

13             But we have the short sessions usually in order to accommodate

14     Mr. Mladic.  Therefore, I'd like to hear from the Defence whether the

15     option providing a little bit more time, that is, two sessions of one

16     hour and a half with a longer break, would be agreeable to the Defence.

17                           [Defence counsel confer]

18                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

19             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, the Defence, in an effort to

20     accommodate Mr. Akashi who needs to finish today, is agreeable with the

21     second option to sit the longer sessions and have the maximum time to

22     complete the testimony.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  The Chamber certainly appreciates that and I take it

24     that all who are benefiting from this attitude will also appreciate that.

25             Mr. Tieger, you can continue until 1.30 and then you have

Page 41785

 1     20 minutes after the next break.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3        Q.   As long as we're on this document, Mr. Ambassador, let me direct

 4     your attention, if I might, to paragraph 14.  It refers at the last

 5     sentence we can see on the page and then moving on to page 5:

 6             "There has been a complete breakdown in negotiations to reopen

 7     the Sarajevo airport and utilities are again being cut.  The problem of

 8     resupply in Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves has been further

 9     aggravated."

10             Mr. Ambassador, we referred a moment ago to the issue of using UN

11     personnel as human shields to deter air-strikes.  Was it also the case

12     that restrictions on humanitarian aid or necessities of life, such as

13     utilities or water, were also used as instrumentalities or weapons of war

14     to -- by the Bosnian Serb authorities to advance objectives?

15        A.   I think all these measures taken by the Bosnian Serb side were a

16     means to express their utmost unhappiness about the two air-strikes, one

17     on the 25th and the other on the 27th of May.  I tried to remind

18     Mr. Tieger and the others that these were air-strikes as distinct from

19     close air support action, and in this particular instance, the action was

20     taken in full consultation between our Sarajevo headquarters for UNPROFOR

21     Bosnian command and overall headquarters in Zagreb.  It was not an

22     isolated ad hoc action, but it was a consequence of deliberate, serious

23     thinking and the reflection on the part of the entire UNPROFOR.

24        Q.   Let me move, if I may, to a different and earlier time-period and

25     an approximately 24- to 36-hour period within that time-frame.

Page 41786

 1             If I could first have 65 ter 10106, and I'm going to show you

 2     three documents together, I think, in the interests of expediency because

 3     they relate to the same matter and almost precisely the same day.  They

 4     are both from either the 11th or 12th of March.

 5             This is a code cable from you to Mr. Annan dated the 12th of

 6     March.  In the middle of the first paragraph you refer to your arrival

 7     back in Sarajevo, and then note, among other things:

 8             The closure of the Blue Routes across the Sarajevo airport by the

 9     Bosnian Serbs which they say is in response to the killing of the two

10     girls by the shelling last night of down-town Sarajevo with heavy

11     weapons, and by the fact that my aircraft was hit by machine-gun fire as

12     it taxied after landing in Sarajevo.

13             So you refer to those -- among other things, those three aspects

14     of the situation including the closure of the Blue Routes.

15             And again to refresh your memory on that -- or not to refresh, to

16     expand what was happening on that date --

17             MR. TIEGER:  If we could turn to D461 from March 11th, 1995.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.  Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:  And if we could turn to page -- we'll see the cover

20     page first.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:

23        Q.   This is a document from the Main Staff of the Army of

24     Republika Srpska dated the 11th of March, 1995.  And if we could turn to

25     page 3 of the document in both the English and the B/C/S, in the middle

Page 41787

 1     of the page at point II, under the heading:  "Situation in the

 2     territory," we see that:

 3             "Due to sniper fire and the death of two girls, all [sic]

 4     movement of humanitarian organisations and convoys is prohibited until

 5     further notice."

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  It reads "any," but ...

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, I said "all."

 8             "...any movement of humanitarian organisations and convoys is

 9     prohibited until further notice."

10        Q.   And finally another document of the 12th of March related to the

11     same subject, Mr. Ambassador, and that's 65 ter 12003.  This is a report

12     the next day from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command to the Main Staff.

13     And if we turn to page 2 of the English and page 3 of the B/C/S, we see

14     again a report on the situation in the territory which reflects that the

15     order about closing of the Blue Roads has been delivered or issued to the

16     units and it is being implemented in practice.

17             Now, Mr. Ambassador, we had looked earlier at actions taken with

18     respect to utilities and humanitarian supplies in the period of May.  Do

19     these documents referring to the closing of the Blue Routes in March also

20     refer to restrictions on humanitarian aid or necessities of life as means

21     of obtaining particular objectives or retaliating?

22        A.   So what is the point of your question?

23        Q.   Yeah, we had looked earlier at -- and you had commented on the --

24     the use of restrictions of aid or necessities of life in the period of

25     May.  Now we're looking at one in March of 1995.  I simply wanted to ask

Page 41788

 1     you if that's another reflection of the same practice.

 2        A.   I think, yes, this is part of our efforts to put pressure on the

 3     Bosnian government as well as on the efforts, humanitarian efforts, of

 4     the United Nations, UNHCR, and all the rest, indeed.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  And, Mr. President, I tender 10106 and 12003.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  They will be Exhibits P7706 and P7707,

 9     respectively, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  And we have translations for both?  Yes, we have.

11             P7706 and P7707 are admitted.

12             MR. TIEGER:

13        Q.   Finally, Mr. Ambassador, on the specific issue in Sarajevo and

14     the air-strikes and sort of looking at a number of the issues we've just

15     discussed, I wanted to turn your attention to 30743 which is an UNPROFOR

16     weekly sitrep from the week of 28 May 1995.

17             MR. TIEGER:  And if we can go to -- I just want to canvass this

18     very quickly.  If we could go to e-court page 2 and beginning at

19     paragraph 4 in the English and paragraph 4 in the B/C/S as well, of

20     course.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we would need the -- paragraph 4 you said.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we need for both -- at least for the B/C/S the

24     next page, and we start in English at the bottom of this page -- well,

25     the first line was -- but I take it you have the text.

Page 41789

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.  It begins:

 2             "At 1620 hours on 25 May, NATO aircraft conducted an air-strike."

 3             It continues by noting the retaliation by the Bosnian Serbs

 4     shelling the safe areas of Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Srebrenica, and

 5     Gorazde.  It continues by noting that the Serbs raised the ante by taking

 6     over 300 UN -- UNPROFOR personnel as hostages, some of whom were placed

 7     in key areas to deter further air-strikes.

 8             Continue to paragraph 6:

 9             Events following the air-strikes have so far resulted in about

10     80 dead and over 160 injured.  Further, the Serbs are subjecting 325

11     UNPROFOR personnel to inhumane and humiliating treatment.  They have

12     closed the airport, blocked land access, cut the water and electricity

13     supplies to Sarajevo, severely restricted UNPROFOR's movement, and

14     continuing to flout the ultimatum.

15             And we see a similar reference if we turn to paragraph 17.  On

16     page 7, I believe.  There it is.  Water and electricity supplies to

17     Sarajevo were cut by the Serbs as of Friday afternoon.  And it continues

18     that the small amount of electricity that exists would only be sufficient

19     for emergencies, such as government buildings and hospitals.

20             Mr. Ambassador, is this weekly situation report an accurate

21     reflection of the circumstances in the areas mentioned, that is, both

22     Sarajevo and the other safe areas, in late May of 1995?

23        A.   Yes, Mr. Tieger, it does.  And we had anticipated that due to

24     these air-strikes, we felt that Serbs, Bosnian Serbs reacted in the way

25     we anticipated, and this shows that another page has been turned in the

Page 41790

 1     history of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  And our original

 2     peacekeeping mandate with these kinds of air-strike actions by NATO with

 3     our full agreement, we entered -- we turned a page from peacekeeping to

 4     something akin to peace enforcement, and this was done on our part

 5     with -- on the basis of very clear reflection on the consequences.  And,

 6     of course, at that stage the Rapid Reaction Force was not yet in

 7     existence, so we took certain risks, but, at the same time, these actions

 8     necessitated our review and possible changes to our pre-existing mandates

 9     with regard to safe areas.

10        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

11             MR. TIEGER:  I'd tender 30743.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P7708, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted into evidence.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   Now I just want to turn to the same issue of restrictions on

17     humanitarian supplies in another geographic area.  This Trial Chamber has

18     received information - and that's P004 -- P00042 - regarding the food

19     situation in Srebrenica at the beginning of July 1995, specifically a

20     report dated 8 July 1995, that, among other things, with the present rate

21     of delivery of convoys less than 25 percent of the needs of the

22     population would be met, and also referring to problems with water, and

23     more specifically referring to the fact that the UNHCR planned convoy for

24     a week is three.  However, due to the persistent refusal by the Bosnian

25     Serb army to allow into the enclave these convoys, an average of one

Page 41791

 1     arrives per week.

 2             In that connection, also I wanted to show you a contemporaneous

 3     document from Srebrenica sent by Colonel Karremans - that's

 4     65 ter 25557 - who describes in point 1 that:  For some months the

 5     general situation within and around the enclave of Srebrenica is

 6     deteriorating.  And concludes at the bottom of that paragraph:  Being

 7     hostage of the Bosnian Serb army for over more than three months,

 8     something has to be done.

 9             And then turning to paragraph 6 specifically, on the next page,

10     he notes that on top of that:  The food situation within the enclave is

11     getting dramatic.  Within some days the warehouses will be empty.

12             He also notes there is hardly no medical aid available throughout

13     the enclave and that schools are closed since the shelling of Srebrenica

14     lately.

15             And do you understand that, Mr. Ambassador, to be a reflection of

16     the restrictions on humanitarian aid to which the inhabitants of

17     Srebrenica were subjected in the period preceding the military operation

18     against -- the take-over of Srebrenica in early July?

19        A.   I think all these shortages of food, water, and in addition

20     the -- I think fuel was becoming extremely short, which necessitated that

21     our -- that the Dutch contingent had to conduct their missions on foot

22     instead of on vehicles.  And these several months, in particular, several

23     weeks, preceding July 11th were -- and the attack itself started around

24     July 5th or 6th, it was graduated attempts to put pressure on -- on

25     the -- on the safe area of Srebrenica.

Page 41792

 1        Q.   Thank you Mr. Ambassador.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that document, Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P7709, Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted into evidence.

 6             The first page on the top still contains some Dutch text but

 7     apparently it's an attachment to something.  Mr. Tieger, I do not insist

 8     on a translation of that.  But if the parties would --

 9             MR. TIEGER:  If you wish to consult with your colleagues.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, that's why I didn't speak on behalf of the

11     Chamber.  But if anyone wants this title, part 4, attachment 24,

12     threatening situation in Srebrenica, if you would like to have that

13     translated then we'll hear from you.

14             Please proceed.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

16        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, during your direct examination by Dr. Karadzic in

17     your previous appearance, he asked you at transcript page 37734, whether

18     you were aware that he was pressed and the non-beneficial relationship

19     with UNPROFOR.  Do you recall that he referred in meetings with you to

20     dissatisfaction with UNPROFOR and to his view that the relationship was

21     non-beneficial or that UNPROFOR was in his way?

22        A.   Could you rephrase your question?

23        Q.   Sure.  Well, maybe the simplest way is to show you a document,

24     65 ter 03501.

25             Now, this is a code cable from you to Mr. Annan dated the 14th of

Page 41793

 1     March, 1995, referring to meetings with Bosnian Serb officials, including

 2     Dr. Karadzic.  And on the second page, at paragraph 5, you refer to his

 3     comment that the Bosnian Serbs would never accept control of the border

 4     between themselves and the Krajina Serbs, and that:

 5             "UNPROFOR would be asked to leave if our intention was to exert

 6     such control."

 7             Karadzic said:

 8             "We must ask ourselves what interest we have in keeping you

 9     here - you are here to carry out the aims of the Security Council to

10     maintain Bosnian and Croatia within their Communist (currently

11     recognised) borders.  The aims of the Security Council are being

12     furthered by you, while our objectives are being eroded."

13             Now, was that a reference to or reflection of Dr. Karadzic's

14     position that UNPROFOR's objectives or mandate was incompatible with the

15     Bosnian Serb objectives or that in some manner he was considering the end

16     of UNPROFOR's presence in Bosnia and the advantages it would present to

17     the Bosnian Serbs?

18        A.   I think certainly there was an increase of more belligerent words

19     and attitude from Bosnian Serb leadership as manifested in those remarks

20     made by Dr. Karadzic in one of our meetings in March 1995.  But by and

21     large, I think throughout the mission we had difficulty maintaining the

22     basic tenets of peacekeeping operations based on the consent and

23     agreement of the parties to the conflict.  On the one hand, the Bosnian

24     government, although it accepted grudgingly our presence, what they

25     wanted in truth was some kind of a peace enforcement.  On the other hand,

Page 41794

 1     I'd say that Bosnian Serb party was not anxious to -- to have our

 2     presence, that -- even mere presence because of -- we were --

 3     our mandates were helping with facilitating humanitarian assistance, on

 4     the one hand, and also facilitating the stabilisation and achievement of

 5     cease-fires.  And in our -- in performing these tasks, we were basically

 6     considered hindrance to their achievement of their objectives.  So we had

 7     to vacillate between two parties:  One wanting more vigorous activities

 8     on our part; the other wanting minimum of our achieving our mandated

 9     tasks by the UN Security Council.  We had to navigate very carefully

10     between those two waters.

11        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that document.  I see we're at the time for

13     the break.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Mr. Registrar, the number would be?

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that document is already in

16     evidence as P2050.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Then there's no need to decide.

18             Mr. Akashi, we take a break of half an hour exactly.  We would

19     like to see you back after half an hour.  You may follow the usher.

20             Mr. Tieger, after the break, we will resume at three minutes past

21     2.00.  You have until 2.30 and then you have --

22                           [The witness stands down]

23             MR. TIEGER:  For the benefit of the Court and Mr. Ivetic, I don't

24     believe I'll need all that time.  In fact, I'm going to say ten minutes

25     to the max and more -- closer to five.

Page 41795

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then we'll take a break, and -- well, in view

 2     of this message, we take a break until five minutes past 2.00.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 1.36 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 2.06 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  While we are waiting for the witness to be escorted

 6     in the courtroom, if my information is accurate, for the next witness

 7     there are two hours remaining for cross-examination.  And then, of

 8     course, we wonder whether we would be able to conclude the evidence of

 9     that witness by tomorrow, but I don't know how much time the Defence

10     would need, which, since there's no other witness available, as I

11     understand well, would mean that we could then cancel the Thursday

12     session.

13             I leave it in the hands of the parties because it would be a pity

14     if just for ten minutes we would have to come to court on Thursday.

15                           [The witness takes the stand]

16             MR. IVETIC:  I agree, Your Honours, and I'll do my best to try to

17     complete the witness tomorrow since that's what we were planning on

18     doing.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, if that's possible, then, of course that's ...

20             Welcome back, Mr. Akashi.  Mr. Tieger will now continue his

21     cross-examination.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, just before we adjourned, I had been asking you

24     about some of the views of Dr. Karadzic in respect of the presence or

25     absence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia.

Page 41796

 1             MR. TIEGER:  And in that connection, I wanted to call up

 2     65 ter 02934.  This is an interview with "Der Spiegel" that Dr. Karadzic

 3     gave on 29th of August, 1994.  And if we turn to the second column in

 4     English and page 2 of the B/C/S translation ...

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Now we have two times -- I think we now have the

 6     English translation and the B/C/S translation of what is originally in

 7     German and perhaps we might have a look at the German ourselves at this

 8     moment but ...

 9             MR. TIEGER:

10        Q.   Now, the following passage in which Dr. Karadzic refers to, and

11     again that's the beginning of the second half of the second column, where

12     Dr. Karadzic refers to weapons that have not yet been used in the war, he

13     ask is asked:

14             "Now are you boasting, the UN commanders, above all the French,

15     plan to withdraw from Bosnia if the latest peace initiative fails.  Do

16     you expect an escalation of the war in this case?"

17             MR. IVETIC:  If we could scroll down.  The English is actually

18     not on the screen.

19             MR. TIEGER:

20        Q.   And Dr. Karadzic responds:

21             "Then the Muslims will disappear, and we will split Bosnia up

22     between ourselves and the Croats, because they are in great danger

23     without us.  The Muslims would devour them, and the Croats know that very

24     well.  A Croatian-Serbian pact would be the ideal solution."

25             Dr. Karadzic is then asked:

Page 41797

 1             "Do you want to kill the remaining Muslims or keep them on

 2     reservations, like the American Indians?"

 3             And Dr. Karadzic responds:

 4             "We Serbs will grant them a certain autonomy around Tuzla, the

 5     Croats will do so around Zenica.  But that is it."

 6             Mr. Ambassador, were you concerned that the withdrawal or

 7     neutralisation of UNPROFOR could have such dire [Realtime transcript read

 8     in error "diver"] consequences for the Muslims?

 9        A.   Without any attempt on my part to exaggerate, the role UNPROFOR

10     was playing in this most unfortunate conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

11     I think, despite all our shortcomings, UNPROFOR nevertheless played an

12     essential role of impartial buffer and our humanitarian tasks were quite

13     significant.  We were not always given necessary means to fulfil our

14     objectives, but we tried our best.  And we were misunderstood by one --

15     by one party or another, or by both times -- by both parties, but I think

16     we were not, of course, instrument in the hands of one party or another.

17     We cannot be.

18             And so we did our very best, and I would not pay too much

19     attention to what Dr. Karadzic might have said at one time or another.

20     He was sometimes quite flamboyant and sometimes quite even fanciful and

21     boastful, and so you have to carefully balance the situation in which he

22     spoke with the words he spoke.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Tieger --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm sorry.

25             Mr. Akashi, however, the question was whether you had concerns

Page 41798

 1     that the withdrawal of the --or the neutralisation of UNPROFOR would have

 2     such consequences.  I don't know whether you gave that any thought --

 3             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, what do you mean by "neutralisation"?

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, that's -- let's just start with the withdrawal

 5     perhaps, whether the withdrawal would have consequences, whether you were

 6     concerned that it would -- a withdrawal would have such diverse

 7     consequences for the Muslims.

 8             THE WITNESS:  I think the answer to that question would vary

 9     according to the specific time when that question would have been raised.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Then I leave it in Mr. Tieger's hands whether

11     he wants to follow up and ask for specific times or -- and.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Tieger, if you can please look at page 35,

13     line 10, and ascertain whether the word you used was "diver" or "dire."

14             MR. TIEGER:  The word was "dire," Your Honour.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

16             MR. TIEGER:  And thanks for that clarification.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I leave it further in your hands, Mr. Tieger,

18     whether have you any follow-up questions.

19             MR. TIEGER:

20        Q.   Do I understand you, Mr. Ambassador, to -- that you're indicating

21     that you would measure the language used with what was happening -- the

22     information you were getting about what was happening on the ground, with

23     related comments, with the totality of the factors involved; is that

24     right?

25        A.   That's right.  That's correct.

Page 41799

 1             MR. TIEGER:  I tender this document, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 02934 receives Exhibit Number P7710,

 4     Your Honours.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted into evidence.

 6             MR. TIEGER:

 7        Q.   Finally, Mr. Ambassador, we had earlier discussed one aspect of

 8     your booklet referring to an assessment of Dr. Karadzic.  I'd like to

 9     turn your attention now to a portion of your booklet which refers to

10     Mr. Mladic, and that is found under -- in -- at page 43 in e-court under

11     the heading -- the subchapter --

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can you give the document number?

13             MR. TIEGER:  Oh, I'm sorry.  1D04654.  If we turn to page 43,

14     please.

15             We see this is found in a sub -- in a portion of a chapter which

16     is entitled:  "A world tinged by deep-seated grudges and revenge."

17     Begins:  "Another emotional nationalist was Ratko Mladic, Supreme

18     Commander of Bosnian Serb forces."

19             If I could continue on to page 44, please.

20             MR. IVETIC:  I don't think the text continues on to page 44.

21     There's parts that are being skipped.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Page -- page 4 -- I'm sorry?

23             JUDGE ORIE:  E-court pages are not corresponding --

24             MR. TIEGER:  Yes --

25             JUDGE ORIE:  -- with the hard copy pages --

Page 41800

 1             MR. TIEGER:  The hard copy pages --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  E-court pages are not corresponding with the hard

 3     copy pages because there are two hard copy pages on one e-court page.

 4             Mr. Tieger, could you clearly explain from what page are you

 5     reading in e-court.  Or from the hard copy.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Or both, of course.  We began --

 7             MR. IVETIC:  In both there's more text, that's what I'm saying.

 8     In both the hard copy and the e-court there's more text.  So it's

 9     incorrect to say it goes on to the next page if you don't read that text.

10     It's not accurate.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I think it's clear that Mr. Tieger read the

12     beginning of that paragraph.  There's more on that page but he has chosen

13     to continue to read a little bit further on the next page.

14             Please proceed.

15             MR. TIEGER:  I'm happy to tender the pages I refer to in their

16     totality, of course.

17        Q.   Now, that began on page 81 of the hard copy and page 43 of

18     e-court.  On page 83 of the hard copy, page 44 in e-court, your booklet

19     states:

20             "One could sense from Mladic's conversations his blind love for

21     Serbs.  The death of one Serbian soldier was the source of greatest

22     sorrow to him.  At one time he cited the population figure of a certain

23     area which seemed too large.  On inspection, we found out that he was

24     counting war dead as if they were still alive.  His strong feelings for

25     the lives of Serbs did not seem to extend to the lives of other ethnic

Page 41801

 1     peoples in the same country."

 2             And one more passage found at page 85 of the hard copy and page

 3     44 in e-court --

 4             MR. IVETIC:  If I could just for the record note that this was on

 5     page 82 and not page 83 as counsel has indicated.  We're having a very

 6     hard time following him reading sections when he gives wrong citations.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  I fully agree with that, and I'm sorry about that.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Whenever you need assistance, Mr. Ivetic, we will be

 9     glad to help you.

10             Please proceed.

11             MR. TIEGER:  And in this instance I'm confident it's page 85 of

12     the hard copy and page 44 of e-court at the first full paragraph.

13             And there's a passage which provides:

14             "At any rate, the world of General Mladic seemed to be tinged

15     with the notion of Serb supremacy and full of deep-seated grudge and

16     vengeance.  The atrocities of Srebrenica in July 1995 may have been

17     partly a revenge of the massacre of Serbs by Muslim soldiers in the

18     vicinity in December 1992.  The nationalist Mladic brought up in

19     traditional Balkan culture might have acted out in the spirit of the

20     feudal ages, characterised by endless violence and revenge."

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, you're on your feet.

22             MR. IVETIC:  I'm waiting for the question but ...

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay, then we'll wait for the question as well.

24             Mr. Tieger.

25             MR. TIEGER:

Page 41802

 1        Q.   Is that an accurate reflection of the passages in your book and

 2     did that accurately reflect your view of General Mladic?

 3             MR. IVETIC:  I have an objection to the second part of the

 4     two-pronged question.  The second part gives cause for speculation that

 5     we don't have the basis for.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Here --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, Mr. --

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  The second part of the question was whether it

10     accurately reflects the view of the witness and I have difficulties to

11     understand how that could be --

12             MR. IVETIC:  It asks for the witness --

13             JUDGE ORIE:  -- asking for speculation.  It may be that the views

14     of the witness, and that's apparently what he wants to draw our attention

15     to, may be speculative.  But whether or not -- the question was whether

16     it reflects the views, speculative or not, and the answer to that

17     question is not a matter of speculation.

18             MR. IVETIC: [Microphone not activated].

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Therefore, the objection is denied.  And the witness

20     is invited to answer the two-pronged question.  If you want to hear it

21     again, Mr. Tieger will put the question to you again.

22             MR. TIEGER:  I'll eliminate the first prong since I think there

23     is probably a consensus about the first in the courtroom.

24        Q.   Did that accurately reflect your views, Mr. Ambassador?

25        A.   Here you can see that these are my views, but these are

Page 41803

 1     speculative views on my part.  I'm not a historian by profession.  So I

 2     was just thinking aloud here by saying that the world of General Mladic

 3     seems -- seemed to be tinged with a notion of Serb supremacy.  The

 4     atrocities of Srebrenica may have been partly a revenge, and the last

 5     sentence of that paragraph, the nationalist Mladic might have acted out

 6     in the spirit of the feudal ages.  So these are all subjectives.  So I'm

 7     not speaking with 100 per cent accuracy but I'm -- sort of was thinking

 8     aloud in these sentences.

 9        Q.   I understand, Mr. Ambassador, but just to clarify further, do I

10     understand correctly that those views, that is, your thinking aloud in

11     the booklet, was based upon your experiences in Bosnia and particularly

12     your exchanges and meetings and discussions with General Mladic?

13        A.   I think this -- these passages, yes, reflected, indeed, my

14     thoughts created partly by my actual experiences of my encounters in the

15     discussions.

16        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

17             MR. TIEGER:  One moment, Mr. President.

18                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

19             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Nothing further.

20        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

21             THE WITNESS:  May I put additional few words on my part,

22     Excellency?

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, you'll be reexamined by Mr. Ivetic.  If you

24     think that it should be at this point in time, then I'll give you an

25     opportunity to do so.  If you would say:  I'd rather add anything at the

Page 41804

 1     end of my testimony, then we'll wait until Mr. Ivetic has -- I leave it

 2     to you whether you think this is the right moment to add something to

 3     what you said before.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Just, Your Honour, to dispel any doubts, I am not

 5     expressing a deterministic view in this passage or in any other passages.

 6     And in connection with Srebrenica, I'm not saying here that what happened

 7     in a sense should have happened because of a certain historical viewpoint

 8     on the part of certain people.  The point is that the Srebrenica tragedy

 9     may have happened sort of on the basis of opportunistic viewpoint on the

10     part of the Bosnian Serb military leadership.  They may not have planned

11     to conquer the entire area, but having seen the relative weakness of the

12     opposing side and relative mildness of the firmness with which the

13     enclave was held by the UN troops, the -- the Bosnian Serb party may have

14     been emboldened on the basis of evolving situation to do more than they

15     had initially attempted.

16             Am I clear?

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I think you are expressing, which you did you

18     before, that you have not determined or established anything with

19     certainty but, as you wrote in your book, that you have given it some

20     thoughts of what may have happened, and you're now further explaining

21     what may have been the case.  Now, this Chamber is tasked with

22     establishing, to the extent relevant for our judgement, to establish what

23     did happen.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, excuse me, as I indicated I would do

Page 41805

 1     when I was asking the questions in respect of that portion of the

 2     booklet, I would tender or ask that pages 43 through 45 be added --

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Will be added to the --

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that's clear.

 6             Mr. Ivetic, when you were consulting with Mr. Mladic, Mr. Tieger

 7     said to the Chamber that he would like to add the portions he just dealt

 8     with to the excerpts he intends to tender -- he wants to tender.  I'm

 9     just drawing your attention to it, that that's what happened.

10             Do you have any questions in re-examination?

11             MR. IVETIC:  I do.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

13             Mr. Akashi, Mr. Ivetic will now put further questions to you in

14     re-examination.

15                           Re-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

16        Q.   Good day, Mr. Ambassador.  During cross-examination, you were

17     asked about P631, which I'd like to call up in e-court, and this was at

18     transcript page 41746 where Mr. Tieger asked you about the language about

19     inter-disposition of UNPROFOR.  So I want to take a look at that document

20     which we have on our screens.  And I'd like to focus on the third

21     paragraph, the second half of that paragraph, which reads as follows:

22             "Rather than entering into any written agreement, UNPROFOR only

23     noted their concerns and gave assurances that UNPROFOR units would be

24     interpositioned between the two sides along confrontation lines.  The

25     Bosnian Serb side nevertheless reserved its right to take adequate

Page 41806

 1     measures of self-defence in case of attack by the other side.  We did not

 2     endorse their position."

 3             And the question I wanted to ask you:  If I am understanding this

 4     document and your testimony yesterday correctly, these assurances of

 5     interpositioning forces by UNPROFOR were meant to address the Serb

 6     concerns about being attacked.  Am I right in that understanding?

 7        A.   I think you are right.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Then the question I have is what was supposed to happen if

 9     UNPROFOR could not succeed in interpositioning itself between the ABiH

10     and the VRS at the confrontation line as had been assured?

11        A.   Could you reiterate your question?

12        Q.   Yes.  What was supposed to happen if UNPROFOR could not succeed

13     in interpositioning itself between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian

14     Serb side at the confrontation lines.

15        A.   But UNPROFOR was interpositioned.  What -- what was disputed

16     between the parties, two parties, was how many UNPROFOR troops should be

17     interpositioned at weapons collection points.  And we wanted the number

18     of troops sufficient to do the job of interpositioning, but if these

19     points under the control of UNPROFOR troops were attacked by one of the

20     two parties with a strength beyond UNPROFOR's capability, then we would

21     not be able to do the job.

22             Am I -- do you follow me?

23        Q.   I do, sir, and I'd like now to look at D112 again, which was the

24     16 August 1994 cable from yourself to Mr. Annan that we looked at earlier

25     that initially had sent a copy of the protocol which the document we just

Page 41807

 1     looked at said had not been signed.  And in relation to this document,

 2     I'd like to turn to page 2 and focus on item number 4, which states:

 3             "The fundamental question, however, revolves around the potential

 4     demand by the BSA to use weapons from the WCP in the Sarajevo EZ, under

 5     the right of self-defence.  While the UNPROFOR reaction in general would

 6     be to deal with the Serb's concerns [sic] by negotiating and

 7     interpositioning, this may not dissuade BSA action.  Moreover, the BiH

 8     has repeatedly opposed the interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops,

 9     particularly on the Visoko-Olovo front."

10             The first question I have for you, sir:  Does this document

11     accurately reflect the condition on the ground that during the

12     time-period in August of 1994 during this fighting the BiH was opposing

13     the interpositioning of UNPROFOR between itself and the Serb side?

14        A.   Mr. Ivetic, I'm afraid I will not be able to give you a clear-cut

15     answer because the notion of self-defence can be interpreted by different

16     parties differently.  There are innumerable instances in all kinds of

17     other conflicts in which one party or another has interpreted its right

18     of self-defence in a distorted or exaggerated manner.  In other cases,

19     maybe exercise of the right of self-defence, it is entirely justifiable.

20     So as to which interpretation applies to this particular case is beyond

21     my capacity and it --

22        Q.   I appreciate that.  And, sir, that's why I'm asking you about the

23     text in your cable which claims that the BiH has repeatedly opposed the

24     interpositioning of UNPROFOR troops and asking you if this was, in fact,

25     the situation during this time-period, that interpositioning was not made

Page 41808

 1     possible by the BiH side, that is, the Bosnian government side?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  That builds something into the question that is

 3     clearly not contained in the document that the -- the documents referred

 4     to opposition by the BiH and now Mr. Ivetic has transformed that to

 5     making it impossible.  Seems like quite different things.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Also I --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  One second, please.

 8             Mr. Ivetic, rephrase the questioning with a question because

 9     there are a few things implied in your question which do not appear from

10     the text.  And as a re-examining party, I think the first thing we'd have

11     to do is to find out what is really said here.

12             MR. IVETIC:  I would then go back to my original question which I

13     asked at page 44, line 23, which was:  Does this document accurately

14     reflect the condition on the ground that during the time-period in

15     August of 1994 during this fighting the BiH was opposing the

16     interpositioning of UNPROFOR between itself and the Serb side?

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that's -- that's more or less what the text

18     says.  But if -- yes, please.

19             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I'd like to bring the attention of

20     this Chamber to paragraph 6 of the document in question, in which I, in

21     this case, myself, have brought the concerns expressed in your Z-2571 to

22     General Rose's attention, with my own personal request for restraint in

23     his public statements.  And I may encourage -- I also encourage him to

24     seek political advice in the drafting of sensitive written

25     communications.

Page 41809

 1             This kind of admonition is quite rare.  And so I think these

 2     matters should be -- should be considered in the context of the

 3     conditions of discussion taking place in Sarajevo at that time.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  I do understand that.  I nevertheless would still

 5     have a question.  And now focusing again on paragraph 4, where it reads:

 6             "Moreover, the BiH has repeatedly opposed the interpositioning of

 7     UNPROFOR troops, particularly on the Visoko-Olovo front."

 8             If you know, could you tell us whether UNPROFOR troops were

 9     already interpositioned when BiH opposed to that or were they not yet

10     interpositioned?  If you know.

11             THE WITNESS:  In this case, I do not know.  But UNPROFOR normally

12     negotiates in good faith with the two parties, and when we felt

13     interpositioning is indeed justified, then we interposed ourselves.  And

14     if not, no interposition would take place.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Just a little point of clarification.  Do you

17     interpose yourselves notwithstanding any opposition from either or both

18     parties?

19             THE WITNESS:  Could you repeat your question.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You said:  In this case, I do not know.  But

21     UNPROFOR normally interpositioned is indeed justified, then the inter --

22     then we interpose ourselves.

23             Now when you interpose yourself, my question is:  Do you do that

24     notwithstanding any opposition from either party or both?

25             THE WITNESS:  Usually we do interpose ourselves on the basis of

Page 41810

 1     agreement or consent by two parties.  In that case, only minimum presence

 2     of UNPROFOR will be needed.  But I think we interpose when we honestly

 3     feel that it is required to assuage the tension and obviate the

 4     possibility of military confrontation.  In case we do it, in the

 5     circumstances of one or the other party having serious reservation or

 6     objection, then our strength has to be greater than otherwise.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.

 9             MR. IVETIC:

10        Q.   Ambassador, you have raised paragraph 6 of this same document

11     calling for restraint on the part of General Rose in his public

12     statements.  What were the concerns as to General Rose's public

13     statements such that he needed restraint?

14        A.   I did not know in this particular instance what were the remarks

15     on the part of General Michael Rose which occasioned this comment.  But

16     General Rose was always very quick in action, which I appreciated, and,

17     you know, he had experiences of special forces in the Falkland/Malvinas

18     situation, and I appreciated his very assertive, quick action, with a few

19     exceptions in which I would have preferred more cautious, more meditated

20     action based on consultation with us at UNPROFOR headquarters.

21             So I already referred yesterday to confusion between close air

22     support and air-strike on the part of military senior staff.  That's one

23     instance in which the military people may not be at all instances

24     cognizant of political implications of the words, terms, used.  So all

25     these -- the UNPROFOR was always based on a collective decision combining

Page 41811

 1     the civilian judgement with military advice.  So always we tried to stand

 2     on our collective judgement.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now you were asked about the claim that this protocol

 4     which is an attached to this cable was drafted by the Serb side, and that

 5     was at transcript page 41746.  I'd like to turn to page 4 with you and to

 6     look at that document, and I think you will note here that the Serb side

 7     is constantly referred to by the acronym BSA.  What was the official way

 8     that the Serb side referred to their army in other documents they

 9     drafted?  Was it BSA or something else?

10        A.   I cannot answer that question.

11        Q.   Okay.  When documents from the Serb side were received by the UN,

12     would they normally be written in English or in Serbo-Croatian?

13        A.   Generally in English for our perusal by the top leadership.

14        Q.   And would those communications be signed or unsigned?

15        A.   It varies.

16        Q.   Okay.  And if we could go back to page 1 of the cable, so page 1

17     of this document, and we see here that the cable uses the acronym BSA to

18     refer to the Serb side.  Was that typical for how UN documents referred

19     to the Bosnian Serb side?

20        A.   I think in our communication in the theatre as such or in our

21     communication between -- between Zagreb and New York, we may use this

22     terminology, including BSA.  But if it becomes a document to be sent to

23     the Security Council, we have to be much more formal and the terminology

24     has to be based on the common diplomatic usage.

25        Q.   Okay.  And now if we just briefly go back to P631 for one more

Page 41812

 1     thing which is to be found on page 3 of the same and this will be the

 2     analysis of the legal advisor as to the protocol.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  And it's paragraph 7 on that page.  I think we

 4     have ... is this P631?  In both languages?  I see on the B/C/S it appears

 5     to be.  The English appears to be a different document.  And if we can go

 6     to page 3 and focus on part 7 in both languages.  There we go.

 7        Q.   And the first part says:

 8             "That, in a particular scenario, the BSA forces might or might

 9     not have a right of self-defence."

10             And the footnote says:

11             "I point out that such a right could not flow from Article 51 of

12     the Charter since the Bosnian Serb party is not a state or a member of

13     the United Nations."

14             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can we scroll down.

15             MR. IVETIC:  I apologise.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  To see the footnote.  Thank you.

17             MR. IVETIC:  "Such a right would therefore have to arise from

18     some other source, e.g., customary law."

19             And the question I have for you, sir:  Am I to understand that

20     the UN legal advisor is espousing the view that the right to self-defence

21     only applies to members of the UN?

22             JUDGE ORIE:  That's certainly not what the footnotes says or even

23     suggests.  It -- Mr. Ivetic, so where if you asked this question, could

24     you please then pay better attention to footnote 1.

25             MR. IVETIC:  I am, Your Honours.  And I'm paying to the text of

Page 41813

 1     paragraph 7 which says "might not."  So I believe the question is

 2     appropriate.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  It says:

 4             "It could not flow from Article 51 of the Charter," so that's one

 5     source, whereas further down it refers to possible other sources.  And

 6     that's, I think, the issue which in your question was neglected.

 7             THE WITNESS:  I'm not a jurist, but Article 51 of the UN Charter

 8     refers to the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence

 9     and I think it's couched in a specific context, and I think for us to

10     extract any words out of Article 51 is rather precarious.

11             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  But I interrupted Mr. Ivetic when he was phrasing a

13     question.  Now, you've given an answer without even knowing exactly what

14     the question would be.

15             Mr. Ivetic, I don't want to deprive you of your right to question

16     the witness.

17             MR. IVETIC:

18        Q.   We've had some evidence in this courtroom by at least two

19     witnesses citing to Article 60 of the Geneva Conventions and the right of

20     self-defence in that instance.  Do you believe that that would apply to

21     the situation as discussed in this document?

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  I'm not sure that's very fair -- I mean, I leave it

24     to the witness, but he just got finished saying he is not a jurist and he

25     seems to be asked for that type of opinion.

Page 41814

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I leave it to the witness to -- to ask

 2     you to present to him any text which is part of your question or whether

 3     he can answer the question without consulting such a text.  And ...

 4             Mr. Akashi, therefore, you're invited to answer the question as

 5     you deem fit.  Or let me just see ... it's ...

 6             MR. IVETIC:  I think I can rephrase the question, if that

 7     assists.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Please do so, Mr. Ivetic.

 9             MR. IVETIC:

10        Q.   Was Article 60 of the Geneva Conventions an item discussed within

11     the UN prior to the drafting of this document that was then sent by

12     yourself to the UN in New York?

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, Article 60 of all the

14     Geneva Conventions, is that the same?  I mean, I know of at least the

15     four major conventions of Geneva, and if Article 60 of all of them is the

16     same, then -- but I would have to check that.  Have you checked it?

17             MR. IVETIC:  I haven't.  And I think depending on the answer of

18     the witness, was the right of self-defence under the Geneva Conventions

19     discussed and taken into account prior to the drafting of this document,

20     the witness can either say it was.  I don't know what article it was or

21     he doesn't --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  The witness is certainly able to phrase an answer,

23     so what he could say, we leave that in his --

24             MR. IVETIC:  Agreed.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  -- we leave that to him and --

Page 41815

 1             THE WITNESS:  I do not have a recollection whether the discussion

 2     of Geneva Conventions, et cetera, took place in preparation of this

 3     cable.

 4             MR. IVETIC:

 5        Q.   Okay.  Fair enough.  Then I'll move on.

 6             MR. IVETIC:  I'd like to call up 1D3055 in e-court.

 7        Q.   What we have is dated 21st of February, 1994, from yourself to

 8     Mr. Annan and it references meetings with Dr. Karadzic and

 9     President Izetbegovic.  And I'd like to turn to page 3 and look at

10     paragraph number 6:

11             "On the issue of self-defence, General Rose noted that it would

12     not be possible for the Muslims to attack Serb regrouping centres due to

13     the presence of UNPROFOR at such sites.  However, in the event of such an

14     action, UNPROFOR would provide the first line of defence, but it was also

15     understood that if the Serbs wished to withdraw their weapons, for

16     example, in the face of a massive attack, there was nothing UNPROFOR

17     could do to stop them.  It was hoped that such an eventuality would not

18     occur as it would indicate a total breakdown of the peace process in

19     Sarajevo."

20             Does this document accurately reflect the negotiations as to the

21     exercise of self-defence in relation to the weapon collection points?

22        A.   The 18th of February was a rather crucial date.  This is two days

23     prior to the deadline for the NATO ultimatum for air-strike over the

24     Sarajevo safe area in the event of no withdrawal of Bosnian Serb weapons

25     from the exclusion zone of 20 kilometres from the centre of Sarajevo.

Page 41816

 1     And I remember we were anxiously watching every step which each of the

 2     two parties take in fulfilment of the requirements for not activating a

 3     NATO air-strike.  And we were mostly in --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Could Mr. Mladic reduce the volume of his voice when

 5     he consults with counsel.

 6             THE WITNESS:  So we were watching the situation mostly from

 7     Zagreb but in close consultation with our -- also Sarajevo headquarters.

 8     And so in that sense, we were watching everything we ourselves do as well

 9     as what the parties do, and we were also consulting closely with NATO

10     and, of course, with the UN headquarters.

11             MR. IVETIC:

12        Q.   Okay.  And if we could turn to the next page, and if we can look

13     at paragraph 15 at the bottom of the page which will then go on to the

14     next page, it says:

15             "The meeting ended with UNPROFOR presenting an oral draft

16     protocol on the agreements reached at the meeting.  The protocol

17     contained the following three points ..."

18             And then we have the points that I think were the Weapons

19     Collection Agreement.  And then in item number 1, in the meeting with

20     President Izetbegovic, it said:

21             "Mr. Akashi briefed President Izetbegovic on his meeting with

22     Dr. Karadzic, noting that the main emphasis of his talks had been on the

23     need to take full advantage of the momentum for peace in Sarajevo.  While

24     a lot of details still remained to be discussed, Dr. Karadzic had agreed

25     that verification and control procedures by UNPROFOR should start at noon

Page 41817

 1     the following day.  He had also agreed to try to withdraw and regroup

 2     Serb weapons by 2400 hours of 19 February 1994."

 3             Ambassador, the -- a lot of details that remained to be

 4     discussed, was the right to self-defence and a response to an ABiH attack

 5     that could not be stopped one of those details remaining to be discussed

 6     after the Serbs had agreed to the weapon collection points?

 7        A.   My recollection of discussions around 18th and 19th of February,

 8     1994, what concerned me most was a question of remaining weapons within

 9     the 20-kilometre exclusion zone.  And I was very happy, I remember, that

10     general -- the Admiral Boorda of NATO southern command and our generals,

11     General de Lapresle, at my headquarters in Zagreb, and -- were of the

12     same opinion, that because of the heavy snow, not all Serb weapons were

13     withdrawn from that exclusion zone but we had our troops controlling

14     those remaining weapons within the zone.  And Admiral Boorda was in

15     agreement with us.  Therefore we were satisfied that substantial party of

16     those weapons had been withdrawn.  The remaining weapons were under our

17     supervision and control.  Therefore there was no reason to think that

18     NATO ultimatum was still unfulfilled.  I like that pragmatic approach

19     taken by our military with full consent of NATO southern command.  So on

20     both sides there's not total insistence on every letter of the ultimatum,

21     and so UNPROFOR had obligation to make sure that even those weapons which

22     are yet to be withdrawn should be under our full control.

23             So there was a degree of good faith involved, and under the

24     circumstances, there was a good sense of pragmatism on all parties

25     engaged in the negotiations.

Page 41818

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I would tender the document, 1D3055.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Madam Registrar.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  It receives Exhibit Number D1364, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted into evidence.

 5             MR. IVETIC:

 6        Q.   Now, you were cross-examined extensively about Gorazde so I will

 7     have some questions for you on that topic.  And I'd like to first call up

 8     D1362 of which I believe page 3 was shown to you during the

 9     cross-examination at transcript page 41758.  And so I'd like to turn to

10     page 3 of that document and I'd like to focus on the middle of

11     paragraph number 4 which starts off:

12             "Continuing, Mr. Akashi said that there should be no illusions on

13     any side of the seriousness of the present situation and of the

14     international community's revulsion towards it.  Thus, while the general

15     issue of safe areas could and would be addressed in the near future, the

16     immediate concern was the human and humanitarian tragedy in Gorazde, a

17     tragedy out of proportion to any provocation that the BSA may have

18     initially had from the BiH."

19             And then reference is also made to the unacceptably high civilian

20     casualties of the previous day, 100.

21             The question I have:  This promise that the general issue of the

22     safe areas would be addressed in the near future, was it addressed in the

23     near future, following this document dated 23 April 1994 resulting from

24     the marathon negotiations you had, I believe, in Belgrade?

25        A.   I recall that UN Secretary-General presented to the Security

Page 41819

 1     Council at certain frequency his review and his reflections on how the

 2     safe area regime should be revised or rectified or improved.  And I

 3     think -- I cannot say when specifically, but soon after this Gorazde

 4     crisis, one such review was sent to the Security Council.

 5        Q.   Now, in relation to the casualties from Gorazde, I think in

 6     yesterday's transcript at 41754 you said you had relied upon UNMOs and

 7     others as to information about Gorazde.  Were you aware of any complaints

 8     as to the unreliability of reporting from Gorazde, specifically the

 9     Bosnian government and UNMOs?

10        A.   Certainly I think there was a high degree of reliability on the

11     reports which we received from UNMOs in the Gorazde area.

12        Q.   Okay.  And I'd like to first take a look at --

13             MR. IVETIC:  Well, actually, if we could go into private session

14     briefly.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  We move into private session.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 41820











11  Pages 41820-41823 redacted.  Private session.















Page 41824

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12                           [Open session]

13             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

15             MR. IVETIC:  If we could now turn to P --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I'm also looking at the clock.  I think

17     the time you announced you'd still need, you went beyond that.  We have

18     to stop at 3.30.  I don't know whether Mr. Tieger has any further

19     questions for the witness.  Not at this moment.  So please keep in mind

20     that we have to stop.

21             MR. IVETIC:  I know, and we took half an hour instead of five

22     minutes at the beginning for the Prosecution's questions.  I have

23     approximately 13 more questions.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, then we have a -- we'll check.  I think, as a

25     matter of fact, that Mr. Tieger stayed well within his time, even took

Page 41825

 1     shorter time than he asked for and what was granted and that it's -- I

 2     said in view of Mr. Tieger's answer I would even grant two additional

 3     minutes before we would resume after the break.  Mr. Tieger, I think,

 4     stayed well within his half-hour and it's you who took far more than the

 5     40 minutes you announced --

 6             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, Mr. Tieger announced five minutes --

 7     ten minutes, closer to five minutes.  That was just before the last

 8     break.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  He was entitled to another half an hour, Mr. Ivetic.

11     And he may have taken a little bit more than his reduced assessment, but

12     you're invited to finish within the next ten minutes.

13             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.  If we could turn to P736, page 25, in the

14     English.  I think for our purposes, since it is a large document, we can

15     look at the English and since I'll be reading it we'll get the

16     translation.  This is the statement of General Rose to the Prosecutor of

17     the Tribunal introduced as evidence and if we could look at

18     paragraph number 103:

19             "On 12 May 1994, I visited Gorazde.  I met with the chief UNMO

20     who had been responsible for some of the inaccurate reporting from

21     Gorazde.  I told him that misleading reports had done great damage to the

22     credibility of the UN mission.  The inaccuracy of the UNMO reports was

23     demonstrated by my visit to the hospital.  The UNMOs had specifically

24     stated that the hospital had been targeted throughout the day with tanks,

25     wire-guided missiles, and indirect fire with the aim of destroying it.

Page 41826

 1     Yet the director of the hospital, Dr. Begovic, told me that although a

 2     shell had landed in a house nearby, killing a number of patients

 3     sheltering there, the hospital itself had only been hit twice:  Once in a

 4     stairwell and once in an empty room on the top floor."

 5        Q.   Does this accord with your information that was available to you

 6     as to Gorazde?

 7        A.   As I already told the Chamber, there was a shortage or distortion

 8     in some of the information we were receiving from Gorazde, and we were

 9     trying our best to have access to accurate and up-to-date information.

10        Q.   Okay.  And looking at the last part of paragraph 102 of

11     General Rose's statement, he says:

12             "Yet neither the final casualty list, heavy though it was, nor

13     the relatively undamaged state of the buildings in the town suggested

14     that the Serbs had systematically targeted civilians."

15             Would you agree that the situation encountered by the UN when

16     entering Gorazde was less dire than had been proclaimed in the

17     time-period leading up to the actions to be taken against the Serb side?

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

19             MR. TIEGER:  That conflates a lot of information, I'm afraid, and

20     Mr. Ivetic indicated that himself.  There is information coming from

21     different sources.  So when you say the information that was proclaimed,

22     it is impossible to know whether he's talking about information from one

23     source or the other, or the sources the witness relied or -- et cetera.

24     It -- it creates a potentially -- or asks for a potentially misleading

25     response.

Page 41827

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic.

 2             MR. IVETIC:  I believe in the cross-examination Mr. Tieger used a

 3     document that described the situation as dire.  I can't find the

 4     reference right now obviously on my feet, but it was today, after I gave

 5     my estimate of time, when we had another hour and a half of

 6     cross-examination.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Actually, my reference to "dire" was in connection

 8     with the last document in the Karadzic interview and what would happen

 9     with -- if UNPROFOR left.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  At least it's a ...

11             If the witness an is able to answer the question, he may do so.

12             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, it was read to you part of the statement

14     and the question was whether you agree that situation encountered by the

15     UN, I think, entering Gorazde was -- perhaps you rephrase it, because it

16     doesn't appear that clearly in the transcript, Mr. Ivetic.

17             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

18        Q.   Would you agree with -- let me rephrase it entirely.

19             Would you agree with General Rose that the situation encountered

20     by the UN when entering Gorazde did not suggest that the Serbs had

21     systematically targeted civilians?

22        A.   I don't think I would agree with every word used by General Rose,

23     because I know some other sources felt that General Rose was

24     underestimating, while he may have been right that the other side was

25     exaggerating.  So like so many instances, maybe the truth is somewhere in

Page 41828

 1     the middle, among these confusing figures and assessments.

 2        Q.   Okay.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  If we can look at D186 in e-court.

 4        Q.   While we wait for that, it is dated the 18th of April, 1994, and

 5     is addressed to yourself and it comes from Viktor Andreev who I believe

 6     was your deputy.  And if we can go to page 2 --

 7        A.   Excuse me, no, he was not my deputy but deputy to Sergio

 8     de Mello.

 9        Q.   Yes, yes, I apologise.  And if we could turn to the second page

10     and paragraph 10, this is imploring that the Security Council must

11     clarify the concept of safe areas as soon as possible.  And I think the

12     same type of complaints that you discussed yesterday are listed in here.

13     And I would like to then turn to the next page, which is the last page in

14     this document and it states at 11:

15             "UNPROFOR's mandate has pushed it into low-level conflict with

16     the Serbs.  As a result, Sarajevo is blockaded, its airport is closed,

17     food stocks are declining.  Our mandate must either be one within which

18     we are able to have a co-operative relationship with the Serbs, or it

19     must be one in which we have the force to impose our will.  It cannot

20     be - as it is now - somewhere in between."

21             First of all, do you agree that by this point in time UNPROFOR

22     was in a low-level conflict with the Serbs?

23        A.   I'm not sure whether I -- I agree with every word used by my

24     former colleague, Viktor Andreev, because sometimes our relationship with

25     the Bosnian Serbs was lower than lower level and sometimes higher.  It

Page 41829

 1     varied from situation to situation, and changed from location to

 2     location.  It was a dynamic, changing relationship.

 3        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to look at D1356, which is dated August 10, 1995,

 4     from General Janvier to Mr. Annan, and if we could turn to page 7 of the

 5     same we have a letter from General Janvier to Admiral and on the last

 6     page we see it's Admiral Layton Smith.  And if we look at the third

 7     paragraph:

 8             "An intervention as contemplated will lead to perception by the

 9     party affected that NATO and the UN have declared war on it.  Freedom of

10     movement through the territory controlled by that party will end.  UN

11     troops will have become a party to the conflict, and enclaves as well as

12     other isolated locations will be neither resupplied nor rotated using

13     land routes.  Resupply and rotation will have to be by air, which will be

14     subjected to hostile fire.  Hostages will be taken again, are likely to

15     be treated as prisoners of war and used as human shields.  Most UNPROFOR

16     camps are within range of mortar and artillery fire, and are likely to be

17     targeted by the party concerned."

18             Ambassador, is General Janvier describing the situation ...

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             MR. IVETIC:

21        Q.   Is General Janvier accurately describing the effect of initiating

22     air action against the Serb side in your understanding of the situation

23     at the time?

24        A.   You said General Janvier?

25        Q.   Yes.  If we scroll up, we'll see that this is on the letterhead

Page 41830

 1     of Lieutenant-General Bernard Janvier --

 2        A.   1995.

 3        Q.   1995, yeah.

 4        A.   Janvier, yes.  Not de Lapresle, yeah.

 5        Q.   Correct.  So now do you agree, is General Janvier accurately

 6     describing the effect of initiating air action against the Serb side in

 7     your understanding of the situation at the time?

 8        A.   General Janvier was in full agreement with me with regard to the

 9     two air-strikes in the month of May 1995.  Now he's confronting another

10     situation of a much more dramatic, much more massive air-strike

11     possibility, which actually took place in the latter part of August.  And

12     I think it was a dramatic situation.  I don't think General Janvier was

13     exaggerating.  It -- that air-strike was a sustained one for the first

14     time.  It lasted for about a week and then suspended briefly, then

15     resumed a few more days, but eventually it led to the sustained period of

16     truce.  So one has to weigh the dire possibility of worsening of the

17     situation involving our own position in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the --

18     the diplomatic stake which was considered worth while to take.

19             So I think in hindsight, maybe it was a risk one had to take.

20     But we were very apprehensive of dire consequences.

21        Q.   And do you believe that the --

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, I said you have until 25 minutes to

23     4.00.  It's now 20 minutes to 4.00 so I -- you have to finish.

24             MR. IVETIC:  Well, then I want it on the record that the Defence

25     has not been permitted to finish its redirect examination due to the

Page 41831

 1     technical problems that were beyond the control of the Defence that did

 2     not enable this Court to sit the entire session today.  And that we're

 3     not being entitled to a full opportunity given that my estimate was given

 4     before listening to one hour and 50 minutes of additional

 5     cross-examination by the Prosecution.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  I'll consult with my colleagues.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic, didn't you ask earlier for 40 minutes

10     today?

11             MR. IVETIC:  No Your Honours, I estimated approximately

12     40 minutes before Mr. Tieger started one hour and 50 minutes of

13     additional cross-examination.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Oh, you gave your assessment in saying that it would

15     then -- that you would need more.  Usually we always invite the parties

16     to give an assessment of what they need at the end of the other party

17     having concluded its testimony [sic].  Because you've now taken -- if it

18     is -- I think, as a matter of fact, Mr. Ivetic, Mr. Mladic makes a sign

19     that he wants to consult with you.  Could you please -- Mr. Ivetic.

20                           [Defence counsel and accused confer]

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Ivetic.

23             MR. IVETIC:  My client has communicated that he is agreeable to

24     continue so long as he is given approximately ten minutes to take a

25     bathroom break in the quest of completing this witness, and I would --

Page 41832

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  We have a problem there.  Because, first of all,

 2     those who are assisting us cannot go on forever.  That's one.  We have

 3     asked for an extended session.  As a matter of fact, to say that today we

 4     couldn't finish because of the technical difficulties, everyone expected

 5     this morning that we would conclude to hear the testimony of Mr. Akashi

 6     and then continue with Mr. Kovac.  So I don't think that the Chamber can

 7     agree with your position in that respect.

 8             How much time actually you would still need -- and apart from

 9     that, there are other commitments as well.  I already postponed some of

10     them.  And the tapes also do not allow us to continue forever.  They have

11     to be changed anyhow.  How much time would you still need, Mr. Ivetic?

12             MR. IVETIC:  Ten minutes at a minimum.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Well --

14             MR. IVETIC:  I mean, ten minutes.  Ten minutes.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  At a minimum, Mr. Ivetic, is --

16             MR. IVETIC:  I meant to say ten minutes I'll make use of.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  At a maximum?

18             MR. IVETIC:  Yes.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE ORIE:  If interpreters and all others assisting us would be

21     willing to work on for another ten minutes, it couldn't be very much

22     beyond that because the tape is ending anyhow in two hours.

23             Mr. Tieger, any problem?  As matters stand now any questions?

24             MR. TIEGER:  No, still no more questions, Mr. President.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Still no more questions.

Page 41833

 1             Mr. Ivetic, it is exactly now quarter to 4.00.  You may continue

 2     until five minutes to 4.00.

 3             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.  I'd like to look at P7708 which was shown by

 4     the Prosecution in cross-examination today, and I'd like to turn to

 5     paragraph number 3 which should be on page 3 -- or page 2, I apologise.

 6     And ...

 7                           [Defence counsel confer]

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, if we can have General Mladic attend

 9     to the bathroom, we have his consent to proceed in his absence to comply

10     with the ten minutes.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  If Mr. Mladic, if he waives his right to be present

12     for those few minutes, then we'll continue.  And, of course, you are

13     allowed to go to the bathroom, Mr. Mladic.  Yes, you may follow the --

14     yes.

15             MR. IVETIC:  And for the record, Mr. Mladic waved his head "yes"

16     in waiving.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  That's hereby on the record.  You have until

18     four minutes to 4.00.

19                           [The accused withdrew]

20             MR. IVETIC:

21        Q.   At paragraph 3, it says that:

22             "Karadzic cited UN impotence in Western Slavonia and warned that

23     UNPROFOR would be treated as an enemy if Serb positions were attacked

24     from the air."

25             Isn't that consistent with all the communications with the Serb

Page 41834

 1     side as to how they regarded the enforcement of both close air support

 2     and NATO strikes at the request of the UN?

 3        A.   I do not share the view of Mr. Ivetic [sic] with regard to the

 4     air action by NATO, which usually is co-ordinated with UNPROFOR, and

 5     although Bosnian Serbs sometimes confused close air support with the

 6     air-strikes, I think in truth they were aware of very significant

 7     difference between the two kinds of air action.  And it is only

 8     air-strike which could be massive in scale and quite far-reaching in

 9     consequence, which created a lot of concern on the part of Bosnian Serbs.

10        Q.   Was the message conveyed by Bosnian Serb negotiators consistent

11     with what is written on the screen in a UN report that Karadzic warned:

12     We will consider you the enemy?

13        A.   I think Dr. Karadzic excelled in dramatic words, and so we did

14     not always believe in face value what his careful expressions might in

15     fact mean.

16        Q.   Yesterday at transcript page 41741, you were asked about a

17     portion of your book -- booklet, pardon me, 1D4654, page 15, which is

18     pages 26 and 27 of the underlying booklet, where you cited

19     General Michael Rose saying:

20             "Although all three sides were to some extent guilty of war

21     crimes, genocide did not form part of official Bosnian government policy

22     in the way that it clearly did with the Serbs.  Nevertheless, the Bosnian

23     Serbs were not the sole perpetrators of atrocities and this fact was

24     difficult to communicate to the members of the international community."

25             Do you happen to know when General Rose made those comments?

Page 41835

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And do you agree 100 per cent with his comments?

 3        A.   No.

 4        Q.   Okay.  That's what I thought, but I wanted to make it clear.

 5             We have had at this trial evidence that the ABiH side -- and this

 6     is from transcript page 32394 and through 32396.  It was in open session.

 7     It was a member of the Commission for Exchange of Prisoners of War,

 8     Mr. Krcmar, talking about a situation where Mujahedin in Maglic, Teslic,

 9     and Tesanj had decapitated several captured Bosnian Serb prisoners and

10     were displaying their severed heads in a videotape.  Did you have

11     knowledge of the actions of Mujahedin within the ABiH of that nature?

12        A.   The specific instance which you yourself, Mr. Ivetic, cited was

13     entire news to me.

14                           [The accused entered court]

15        Q.   And if we can turn --

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  I don't believe I raised that and I'm curious about

18     the -- the pleading for time and then turning to a subject that does not

19     seem to have been addressed in cross-examination.

20             MR. IVETIC:  Look at the part that you cited from General Rose.

21     That's precisely the same topic.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, whether it is or not, the witness has answered

23     the question.  Let's move on.

24             MR. IVETIC:  Okay.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Five minutes left.

Page 41836

 1             MR. IVETIC:  Thank you, Your Honours.

 2             If we can look at P7700, which was used by Mr. Tieger earlier

 3     today.  P7700.  Or if it is easier that was 65 ter 31392.  If we can look

 4     at page 2 in the English, page 1 in the B/C/S.

 5        Q.   And we're looking at paragraph 1.5 which was shown to you by

 6     Mr. Tieger.  And it talks about soldiers who had fled Smoluca, Potpec,

 7     and Tinja.  Do you know what happened to these villages listed here,

 8     Smoluca, Potpec, and Tinja, prior to October 1994, the date of this

 9     document?

10        A.   Are you addressing me?

11        Q.   Yes, sir.

12        A.   No, I did not know.

13        Q.   And lastly, as to General Mladic, on how many occasions did you

14     have occasion to meet with General Mladic so as to form the -- just how

15     many times did you meet with General Mladic, if you remember?

16        A.   I met with General Mladic usually and in most instances together

17     with the other leaders of Bosnian Serbs, Dr. Karadzic and some others,

18     Koljevic, Krajisnik, et cetera --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Akashi, sorry to interrupt you, but Mr. Ivetic

20     is under a time restraint.  Could you tell us approximately how many

21     times you met?

22             THE WITNESS:  I did not count, but probably 15 times to 20 times.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Next question, please.

24             MR. IVETIC:

25        Q.   And on those times were you primarily talking with General Mladic

Page 41837

 1     or with other persons present for the negotiations?

 2        A.   I spoke mostly with Dr. Karadzic.

 3        Q.   And so what portion of that time during those ten, 15, 20

 4     meetings was spent talking directly with General Mladic, 50 per cent, 25

 5     percent, 90 per cent, any approximation?

 6        A.   Maybe 25 per cent.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Ambassador, I thank you for answering my questions.

 8             MR. IVETIC:  Your Honours, I thank everyone for the additional

 9     time.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, you even stayed one minute within the time

11     because we moved it from five minutes to 4.00 to four minutes to 4.00.

12     Mr. Tieger -- I mean, within the time granted.

13             Mr. Tieger, any further questions?

14             MR. TIEGER:  I think I have one question in clarification,

15     Mr. President.  Just one.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Very shortly.

17                           Further Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

18        Q.   Mr. Ambassador, today you were re-directed to the passage in your

19     booklet about General Rose's comments, so you talked about that before.

20     Today you told Mr. Ivetic you didn't agree - let me see where I find

21     that - 100 per cent with General Rose's comments.  Yesterday the Court

22     directed your attention to that particular passage that you included in

23     your book about General Rose's reference to the Bosnian Serb policy and

24     you noted that although you didn't agree with General Rose on all

25     matters, and more frequently were in accord with Mr. Owen, that with

Page 41838

 1     respect to that paragraph you were in agreement.

 2             So I just wanted to clarify.  Is it the case that with respect to

 3     that particular paragraph, that is, that although all three sides were to

 4     some extent guilty of war crimes, war crimes, genocide, those did not

 5     form part of official Bosnian government policy in the way that it

 6     clearly did with the Serbs?

 7        A.   I think in that particular paragraph General went -- General Rose

 8     went a little bit beyond his depth and -- but I said I'm in general

 9     agreement on the rather wide distribution of instances of crimes or

10     atrocities between the two parties in the -- in conflict.  And I think

11     Lord Owen was perhaps more precise than General Rose, although they are

12     jumbled together in the same paragraph.  But as I indicated, I do not

13     agree with every word which is said in this paragraph.

14        Q.   Okay.

15             MR. TIEGER:  That's about all the time I have.

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, Mr. Akashi, this concludes your evidence in

17     this court.  I'd like to thank you very much for coming a long way to

18     The Hague and for having answered all the questions that were put to you

19     by the parties and questions put to you by the Bench.

20             THE WITNESS: [ Thank you very much, Mr. President.  You were very

21     generous and gracious, and I hope that my remarks have been of some use

22     for your difficult task.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Thank you for those words.  I wish you a safe

24     return home again.  You may now follow the usher.

25                           [The witness withdrew]

Page 41839

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll deal with all technicalities at a later stage

 2     including any redaction of associated exhibits, Mr. Ivetic.  As far as if

 3     you could ever assist the Chamber in pointing at an Article 60 which

 4     deals with self-defence, then that might add to the sources the Chamber

 5     can rely upon because paragraph 51 of the UN Charter deals exclusively

 6     with attacks on member states and the right of self-defence of member

 7     states.

 8             Apart from all that, we adjourn for the day.  And I thank all

 9     those who have about been so flexible, including Mr. Mladic, for enabling

10     us to conclude the testimony of this witness today.  And we resume

11     tomorrow, the 25th of November, 9.30 in the morning, in this same

12     courtroom, I.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.00 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 25th day of

15                           November, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.