Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 42204

 1                           Monday, 7 December 2015

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around this

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case

 9     IT-09-92-T, The Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11             No preliminaries.  Is the Defence ready to call its next witness,

12     which will be Mr. Dodik, if I am well informed.

13             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, Your Honour.  That's right.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Could the witness be escorted in the courtroom.

15                           [The witness entered court]

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Mladic, last warning, you'll be really removed

18     from the courtroom if the same happens again.  You remain seated, and

19     there's no need to greet in the way you did.  Apparently you think it to

20     be funny, in view of your smiling.  Last warning.  Let that be clear.

21             Good morning, Mr. Dodik, I presume.  Mr. Dodik, before we start

22     hearing your evidence, you are required to make a solemn declaration.

23     The text is now handed out to you.  May I invite you to make that solemn

24     declaration.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.  I solemnly declare

Page 42205

 1     that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 2                           WITNESS:  MILORAD DODIK

 3                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Please be seated.

 5             Mr. Dodik, I noticed already that you are a fast speaker.  If you

 6     want your words to be interpreted in full, please slow down in your speed

 7     of speech.

 8             Mr. Dodik, you'll first be examined by Mr. Lukic.  You find

 9     Mr. Lukic to your left.  Mr. Lukic is counsel for Mr. Mladic.

10             Please proceed.

11             MR. LUKIC:  Thank you, Your Honour.

12                           Examination by Mr. Lukic:

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, President.  I will be examining

14     you now, and after your answers, I will make a short pause.  It's not for

15     you to add anything.  It's for the interpreters to be able to finish.

16             Would you please say, for the record, your full name.

17        A.   Milorad Dodik.

18        Q.   Father's name?

19        A.   Bogoljub.

20        Q.   Date and place of birth?

21        A.   12 March, 1959 in Banja Luka.  1959.

22        Q.   [In English] In Banja Luka.

23             [Interpretation] Could you say again the year when you were born

24     and where.

25        A.   12 March 1959, in Banja Luka.

Page 42206

 1        Q.   What schools did you finish?

 2        A.   The faculty of political sciences in Belgrade.

 3        Q.   Just before the war, what were you doing?

 4        A.   I was president of the Executive Board for the municipality of

 5     Laktasi.

 6        Q.   Can you remember in which period?

 7        A.   The term of office was one year at the time.  I was in that

 8     position in 1989/1990.

 9        Q.   Did you run in the elections in 1990?

10        A.   Yes, I did.

11        Q.   For which party?

12        A.   I was on the ticket for the election unit of Banja Luka for the

13     Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia.  I was heading their ticket.

14        Q.   Who was the founder of that party?

15        A.   The founder was the federal prime minister, Ante Markovic.

16        Q.   At those elections, were you elected to some position?

17        A.   Yes.  Deputy to the assembly of what was then Socialist Republic

18     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19        Q.   To conclude with your political career, after the war, did you

20     continue in politics?

21        A.   Yes.  I founded a separate party, Independent Social Democrats;

22     and in 1996, in the spring of 1996, while in 1998 in January, I was

23     elected prime minister of Republika Srpska until January 2001.  In 2006,

24     in February, I was again elected prime minister, and at the elections

25     that year, my mandate was renewed as prime minister.  2010, I was elected

Page 42207

 1     president of Republika Srpska.  And in the October elections last year, I

 2     was re-elected for a new term.  And I'm the president of the party which

 3     has the greatest support in all the elections in Republika Srpska since

 4     2006.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Let us cast our minds back to the political scene in

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war in 1992.  You said you ran in the

 7     elections for the reformist party of Ante Markovic and you were elected

 8     member of parliament.  Of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 9        A.   The Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10        Q.   Yes.  What was the leader of the party by ethnicity?

11        A.   Croat.

12        Q.   What was the ethnic composition of that party?

13        A.   It reflected the structure of Yugoslavia.  The party was first

14     formed across the republics of Yugoslavia because there was no federal

15     law on multi-party organising, and only when that law was passed just a

16     few months before the elections, the party was established at the level

17     of Yugoslavia.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the party was established and had

18     its representatives in the Presidency and in lower units.  All

19     ethnicities of Yugoslavia were represented in the party, and our

20     electoral ticket was multi-ethnic.  I was president of that party for

21     Krajina.

22        Q.   Thank you.  What was the platform of this multi-ethnic party?

23        A.   The key political issue at the time was how to preserve our

24     common state of Yugoslavia, and representatives of that party wanted to

25     come into positions in various republics and provinces to promote that

Page 42208

 1     issue and to prevent the breakup of the country, which actually happened

 2     just before the elections.  Of course, free market, joining what was then

 3     the European community, democracy, multi-party system, a free market that

 4     were the main points in our programme.  National equality and no

 5     discrimination on any grounds.

 6             I can go on, if you wish.

 7        Q.   No, I'm waiting for the interpretation.

 8             Did your party believe that some things have to remain joined in

 9     that state?

10        A.   That it should remain a joint state, that was the commitment of

11     everybody.  At the time, we met members of our party from Slovenia and

12     from Macedonia and everybody wanted to preserve Yugoslavia as it was,

13     although reformed, and to promote the objectives that I just enumerated,

14     and no republic or provincial organisation of our party had any other

15     aims.  Our first goal was to preserve the common state.

16        Q.   Before these multi-party elections, what was the political scene

17     in Bosnia-Herzegovina like?

18        A.   One year before, the SDA, the nationalist party of the Muslims,

19     was established, led by Alija Izetbegovic, a man who, for his promotion

20     of Islamic radicalism had served a sentence in prison for promoting the

21     idealogy of the Young Muslims, a man who authored the well-known book

22     "The Islamic Declaration" where he listed his main beliefs and goals,

23     that is to establish an Islamic order based on the sharia law and the

24     idea that minorities should adjust to that order and that as soon as

25     majority is achieved, the law of the sharia, in a way, it was a

Page 42209

 1     predecessor of the Islamic radicalism that we are seeing everywhere in

 2     the world now.  He was surrounded by other members of the party who also

 3     had belonged before to the Young Muslims.  During the Second World War,

 4     according to certain information, Alija Izetbegovic, who was born in

 5     Bosanski Samac, had been a member of the Handzar Division, a nationalist

 6     Ustasha organisation of that time.

 7             Later, a couple of weeks later, the Croatian Democratic Union,

 8     HDZ, was formed as the political organisation of the Croats, and that was

 9     a direct branch of the Croatian Democratic Union of Croatia founded by

10     Franjo Tudjman, and only then was the Serbian Democratic Party formed,

11     led by Radovan Karadzic, as a party uniting the Serbs.

12             On the political arena there were several more parties, first of

13     all, the Social Democratic Party, which was, in fact, a transformed

14     League of Communists and the party I belonged to, the Alliance for Reform

15     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  These five parties were the major political

16     players during the elections, although there were younger parties as

17     well, such as SPO, which had one seat in Parliament, a party that was

18     promoted by the youth and also had one seat, a liberal organisation, a

19     liberal party, however, the three political parties, the SDA, HDZ and

20     SDS, got the majority vote each from their own ethnic community and took

21     over power after the elections.

22        Q.   What were the relations between the ethnic parties before and

23     after the elections?

24        A.   There was general tension immediately after the SDA was formed.

25     They started a political drama.  The HDZ was transferred to Bosnia, that

Page 42210

 1     and the forming of the SDS seemed to be a reaction to the founding of an

 2     ultra nationalist party among the Muslims which promoted the idea of

 3     pan-Islamic unity and radical Islam, as we may better understand it from

 4     the present time.  There were individual incidents.  The HDZ and the SDA

 5     promoted partnership before the elections and within their ethnic

 6     communities, the SDA, among the Muslims, and the HDZ, among the Croats,

 7     and the SDS, among the Serbs, got between 80 and 90 per cent of the votes

 8     from these ethnic groups.  So very little votes remained for the other

 9     parties.  As a political party, we had won a total of 12 per cent of

10     votes in these elections.

11             After the election, relatively quickly, for the political

12     situation in the Balkans, in particular, when coalition agreements need

13     to be harmonised, these three parties established joint power in the

14     territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They've established the leadership in

15     the Parliament and the then-Executive Council, which discharged the

16     duties of the republican government.  So there was a distribution of

17     power within the coalition, depending on the number of votes they had

18     won.  These three political parties, I mean.  It seemed that they were

19     able to preserve peace.  There were many Parliament sessions held and for

20     more than a year, we were trying to resolve various issues within Bosnia

21     and Herzegovina.

22             I would like to say that already at that time immediately after

23     the elections, the armed conflict had already broken out in Croatia.  In

24     June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence that was

25     supported by Germany, its foreign minister, Genscher, and after him,

Page 42211

 1     members of the European community, which were pressured by Germany to

 2     recognise these two republics so that the framework of the EU could be

 3     further developed.  That's what we know now.  In fact, that meant

 4     breaking up Yugoslavia.

 5        Q.   What was the position of the leading Bosnian politicians in terms

 6     of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and how was that reflected in

 7     the work of the Parliament?

 8        A.   The SDS policy was the -- for Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain in

 9     Yugoslavia.  The HDZ, of course, as a party that was integrated with the

10     Croatian HDZ, supported independence.  The independence of Croatia, I

11     mean.  And that caused much turbulence within the Parliament and, of

12     course, Party for Democratic Action led by Alija Izetbegovic, also

13     supported the breakup of the country and the independence of Croatia and

14     Slovenia.  Under such conditions, it was very difficult to work.  The

15     party that I was a member of believed that the independence of Slovenia

16     and Croatia ought not to be acknowledged and that Yugoslavia ought to be

17     preserved.  However, we were no longer a relevant political factor.

18        Q.   Did you hold any talks or did you have any verbal duels with

19     Alija Izetbegovic with regard to this issue?

20        A.   Yes.  Concerning the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, Alija

21     Izetbegovic abused the Parliament as a member of the Presidency of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina which had several members.  I believe it was nine.  He

23     wasn't even the president of the Presidency -- or yes, he was.  I'm

24     sorry, he was at that particular moment.  So he came to the roster -- to

25     the rostrum in the Parliament and he said that he proposed for the

Page 42212

 1     Parliament to recognise Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries.  I

 2     then asked him on what basis did he present that position.  Was that the

 3     position of the then-Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or was it the

 4     position of his party and his own personal view?  He said that it wasn't

 5     a harmonised position of the Presidency but that it was the position of

 6     his party and himself.  I told him that he had abused the rostrum because

 7     no one entitled him to speak as an individual or the president of his own

 8     party and that he was not allowed to present views that had not been

 9     harmonised within the Presidency and it hadn't been harmonised.  But such

10     abuses were frequent.  So it was no wonder that Alija Izetbegovic had

11     abused the Parliamentary rostrum, to promote his own ideas in such a

12     manner.  And my duel with him ended there.

13        Q.   How did SDS view the secession of Croatia and Slovenia from

14     Yugoslavia?

15        A.   The Serbian Democratic Party was in favour of the preservation of

16     Yugoslavia and in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining within

17     Yugoslavia.  When it became obvious that that was practically impossible,

18     then they insisted that the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina be

19     recognised in terms of the status issues within Bosnia-Herzegovina

20     itself.  Let me just say that the then-constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina

21     envisaged two-thirds majority for any change of status within the

22     framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Socialist Republic, as it then was,

23     protected the rights of the ethnic groups in a high degree.  I have to

24     say - and you all know - that according to the constitution of the

25     then-Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the sovereignty was

Page 42213

 1     invested in the peoples, that is to say, the ethnic communities and the

 2     republics were political territorial organisational units of those

 3     peoples.  Bosnia-Herzegovina had, within its composition, three main

 4     peoples or ethnic groups:  The Serbs, the Bosniaks, or the Muslims as

 5     they were officially called at the time; and the Croats.  And there were

 6     some nationalities or national minorities.  They were called

 7     nationalities at the time.  Now, we would call them national minorities.

 8             So in this regard, the SDS requested that the procedures provided

 9     by the constitution be observed.

10        Q.   How did these differences affect the co-operation between the

11     ethnic parties that were in power at the time?

12        A.   It was already becoming difficult to hold Parliamentary sessions.

13     One could see that other institutions of the executive powers had

14     difficulties to function, but formally they were still in their place and

15     functioning.  It was obvious to see that the political representatives of

16     the Croats and the Muslims co-operated and formed coalitions as to oppose

17     any initiative coming from the Serbian side.  They always refused such

18     initiatives and there was a lot of animosity.  The promotion of the

19     independent Bosnia-Herzegovina was already underway and specific

20     political moves were already being taken to that effect.  An attempt to

21     convene the Parliament on several occasions were unsuccessful because

22     there were very long breaks and it was very difficult to finalise the

23     sessions even if they began.  The sessions used to last day in and day

24     out at the time, so both during the day and then they would continue on

25     into the night.

Page 42214

 1        Q.   This discord among the political parties, how did that affect the

 2     three peoples living in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 3        A.   Well, the people were already homogenised around their political

 4     parties, that had happened before the elections already and as a rule,

 5     they followed their leaderships.  And when the -- the armed conflict in

 6     Croatia is added as an additional factor, where the Serbs and the Croats

 7     were the main participants, then it's easy to imagine what sort of

 8     relations the Serbs and the Croats had between themselves within

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The territory most populated by Serbs in

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina borders directly Croatia, so most of the Serbian

11     population from northern Bosnia were psychologically already involved in

12     the conflict and they felt a solidarity with the Serbs in Croatia.  Of

13     course, on the basis of negative perception from the Second World War.

14     Living along the Sava river during the Second World War, they were the

15     victims of -- the then-independent state of Croatia --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speaker kindly be asked to slow down.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, could you please slow down.  The

18     interpreters have difficulties in following you.

19             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   I apologise.  You stopped where you said that during the Second

21     World War ...

22        A.   Yes.  The Jasenovac camp.  According to the information that I

23     came across in several places and also at Yad Vashem centre in Jerusalem,

24     the information is that 700.000 people were murdered, of which 500.000

25     were Serbs.

Page 42215

 1             Among the Serbs living in those areas, the memory of that

 2     suffering was very strong and affected their mentality and also was a

 3     cause of fear that something similar might happen again.  And that was

 4     the atmosphere of the social and public life in the early 1990s.

 5             It is a fact that the Communist regime, because of its own

 6     ideological needs, had practically blocked the truth about Jasenovac to

 7     be published and the results were various speculations.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did all politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina observe the

 9     constitution and the concept of the constitutionality of peoples at the

10     time?

11        A.   According to the charter of the UN, the right of the people for

12     self-determination belonged to the peoples rather than to the republics.

13     That was how it was defined in the constitution of the SFRY at the time.

14     The right to self-determination was not a matter to be decided by the

15     republics but, rather by the peoples.  It is easy to establish that;

16     practically all republics were mono-ethnic.  Slovenia comprised the

17     Slovenes; Croatia, Croats as absolute majority; in Serbia, it was the

18     Serbs; in Macedonia, the Macedonians, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina, matters

19     stood differently.  There were three constituent peoples; that is to say,

20     the Serb, the Muslims and the Croats.  According to the constitution of

21     SFRY and the UN charter, they had the right to self-determination.  The

22     Serbs decided to remain within Yugoslavia; the Croats supported the

23     independence of Croatia, believing that a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina

24     would be joined to Croatia.  And the Muslims wanted to impose their will

25     both on the Serbs and the Croats and form an independent state of

Page 42216

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 2        Q.   What did this principle of the constituency of the peoples mean

 3     in terms of the consensus of the three peoples?  Where did this consensus

 4     have to exist?  Could two peoples outvote the third in that sense?  Can

 5     you just briefly tell us that.

 6        A.   The constituency meant that you were invested with sovereignty.

 7     According to the constitution of SFRY from 1974.  Consensus was the only

 8     possible way to decide.  It was the prescribed manner of taking

 9     decisions, up until the moment when the Party for Democratic Action, led

10     by Alija Izetbegovic, and the Croatian Democratic Union had not decided

11     to decide by a simple majority and end this whole story about

12     constituency and consensus.  Their policy was to abolish the constituency

13     principle invested in the peoples because they had the absolute majority

14     in the organs that made all the relevant decisions.  But the majority was

15     not qualified to make decisions.  The majority had to include

16     representatives of all three constituent peoples, but Alija Izetbegovic

17     decided that that would no longer be so, and that, of course, caused a

18     number of problems.

19        Q.   After the war, what was Alija Izetbegovic's attitude to this

20     principle of the constituent status of peoples?

21        A.   He demolished that principle just before the war and that could

22     have been the main reason for the war.  Because if that principle had

23     continued to be honoured, I'm convinced that the war wouldn't have

24     happened.  Political solutions would have been sought instead, as the

25     Serbian Democratic Party wanted.  I must say that I, myself, was never a

Page 42217

 1     member of the SDS.  But Muslims and Croats at the time felt triumphant

 2     and ignored Serbian representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Alija

 3     Izetbegovic put a very dubious signature on the Dayton Accords, as the

 4     president of a Bosnia-Herzegovina that did not exist at all, nor was he

 5     its president.  However, the countries that sponsored these accords

 6     believed that that's the way it should be.  Even at the time

 7     Alija Izetbegovic continued to misrepresent himself, because he neither

 8     had Bosnia nor was he the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina when he put his

 9     signature on the Dayton Accords.

10             Very soon after the Dayton Accords, which envisaged a

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina as made up of two entities and three peoples, in its

12     Article 3, one entity being a Federation of Muslims and Croats in the

13     beginning, and, later it became the BH Federation, whereas, the other

14     entity was mono-ethnic, Alija Izetbegovic decided to reform the

15     Dayton Accords from inside.  He asked the constitutional court of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness slow down and repeat --

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, you're invited to slow down and to -- could

19     you please resume from where you said:  "Alija Izetbegovic decided to

20     reform the Dayton Accords from inside," and could you resume from there.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's what he decided.  And he

22     applied to the constitutional court of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the court

23     to proclaim the constituent character of all the three people, Serb,

24     Croats, and Muslims; that is to say, Bosniaks in the whole territory of

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The constitutional court did that when it was made

Page 42218

 1     up of nine judges, out of which six domestic judges and three foreign

 2     ones, whereas, four domestic judges were against and two Bosniak judges

 3     plus three foreigners, made this decision and proclaimed the constituent

 4     character of these peoples in the whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 5             That was the beginning of the erosion of the Dayton Accords and

 6     the disturbance of the balance established by those accords with the

 7     mechanisms of protection given to these peoples on a joint level and

 8     within the Federation.

 9             Alija Izetbegovic, when he had to abolish that constitutional

10     character, did that and war ensued.  And when he had to continue on the

11     path of war by political means, he asked for and obtained the

12     constitutional status for three peoples in the whole territory of

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina in the conviction that, in that way, he would achieve

14     the domination of Bosniak Muslims in the whole territory of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Today, as a result of that policy by Izetbegovic, we

16     have across the board outvoting against the Croats in the Federation of

17     Muslims and Croats, and the same thing is being imposed on the Serbs.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, when you said "and war ensued," which war

19     did you have on your mind?  Because were talking about what happened

20     after Dayton, and then war ensued.  Which war did you have on your mind?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it is well known in theory

22     and even in practice that the war objectives of Alija Izetbegovic --

23             JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... witness, if you

24     just tell me what war you had in mind.  You said "war ensued," and that

25     was after --

Page 42219

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Political war.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Political war.  Thank you.

 3             Please proceed.

 4             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   How did the Serb politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina react to the

 6     erosion of this -- these constitutional principles?

 7        A.   They demanded that these constitutional principles, the first of

 8     them being the constituent character of peoples, be honoured.  But they

 9     were ignored.  And the Serbs decided that within the Parliament of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina, among their own representatives, they should organise

11     themselves in order to be able to carry on the political struggle against

12     the political representatives of Muslims and Croats who were, by that

13     time, united, allied.  I believe everyone knows - and the Court knows -

14     that until 1993, the ethnic group which, under the constitution of

15     Yugoslavia, was called Muslims changed its name to Bosniaks, and that is

16     the sense in which I use the term "Muslims" until 1993.

17             So, the Serbs decided that their deputies to the Parliament of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina should organise themselves into a deputies club of the

19     Serbs and to try to ensure that the constitution continued to be

20     honoured.

21             I want to add that Communism recognised the fact that the

22     constituent character of peoples is an important thing for peace in

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this constituent status was abolished by

24     Izetbegovic, not because he was promoting universal human rights and

25     civil society, but because he was reckoning that he had the majority and

Page 42220

 1     that the Muslims, which in the last census before the war, made up 46

 2     per cent of the population - that is to say, the majority - were able to

 3     impose their will.

 4        Q.   How did the opposition parties view this idea of the cessation of

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 6        A.   You mean parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 7        Q.   Yes.  Including your party.

 8        A.   The party that I belonged to split because the Muslim and Croat

 9     members of that party supported the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

10     whereas, I personally did not support that policy.  And the party

11     disintegrated.

12             As a rule, Bosniak members of that party continued to promote the

13     policies of the SDA, the Croat members went on to support secession,

14     whereas we Serbs continued to work for the preservation of Yugoslavia.

15     SDP, formerly the Communist party, split in the same way, along ethnic

16     lines, and there was practically no opposition from then on to ethnic

17     rifts.  Everybody believed, and I was a witness to that, that it was

18     impossible to achieve consensus and respect for everyone and that under

19     such extraordinary circumstances it was quite natural to promote the

20     protection of the people that one belongs to, especially since I was able

21     to see that others do not wish to respect others.  They only want

22     majority rule.  Therefore, I had no hesitation in joining the Assembly of

23     the Serbian People that was organised in November 1991 as a member of an

24     opposition party, but I did not join the SDS.  Throughout the war, I

25     remained an independent MP and I was convinced that, in that way, I was

Page 42221

 1     meeting my obligation to the people I belonged to and that it was only

 2     fair.  I still believe that today.

 3             Apart from very few people whose voices were not heard, everybody

 4     in all ethnic groups thought the same.

 5        Q.   During this trial, we heard a lot about the referendum on the

 6     independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  What were the consequences of taking

 7     this decision on the referendum?

 8        A.   I must say that before that, on the 25th of January, 1992 --

 9        Q.   I meant the decision to organise the referendum in the October of

10     the previous year.

11        A.   When the Serbian people turned out for --

12        Q.   No.  I meant taking the decision to organise the referendum that

13     would be held in February 1992, the declaration of the SDA.

14        A.   Oh, the declaration of the SDA.  That complicated everything in

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina to the maximum.  But I believe in January 1992, the

16     decision was taken to organise the referendum and that decision was taken

17     without the participation of the Serbs.  Not only the Serbs from the SDS,

18     but without also the Serbs who were independent deputies.

19             In November, when the Assembly of the Serbian People of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina was formed, the main purpose of that assembly was to

21     fight for equality in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was ignored, of

22     course.  And, thus, we reached the point of that illegal referendum

23     because it did not respect the constitutional decisions on respect for

24     all peoples.  It was instead a manifestation of the political will and

25     the arrogance of the Muslims and Croats.  Today, when I speak to Croats

Page 42222

 1     from that time - and I know many of them - many of them say that, at that

 2     time, they were going to the referendum in the belief that it was a way

 3     of supporting the independence of Croatia; but in hindsight, today, they

 4     think they would never have turned out for the referendum otherwise.

 5     Because it was not only a referendum on the unilateral secession, but it

 6     was also the beginning of the majority rule of Muslims over Croats.

 7             That referendum was organised on the basis of an invalid decision

 8     of the Parliament at the time when the Badinter Commission had already

 9     been established to deal with the issues of Yugoslavia, and that

10     commission pronounced that this decision on the referendum was not valid

11     because it did not reflect the will of the people, and that's why

12     Izetbegovic was forced to push on with the referendum and it was carried

13     by the Muslims.  The referendum took place on the last day of

14     February and the first day of March.  Only Croats and Muslims turned out.

15     As far as I know, the turnout was 64 per cent, which is exactly the share

16     of Muslims and Croats in the population, and the majority of them, of

17     course, voted for the proclamation of independence.

18             That decision did not take into account the constitutional

19     principle that any change of status in the country must be supported by

20     more than two-third majority, and the Croats and Muslims did not have a

21     two-third majority that was necessary to proclaim an independent state.

22        Q.   Let me ask one more thing before the break.

23             Under what conditions were the Muslim and Croat political leaders

24     prepared to insist on the secession of Bosnia from the Federation of

25     Yugoslavia?

Page 42223

 1        A.   Alija Izetbegovic stated in Parliament that he was prepared to

 2     sacrifice peace for an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina and thus ushered

 3     the people into war.  In other words, war could begin, because he called

 4     for it.

 5        Q.   It's time for the break.  We'll continue after the break.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll take a break of 20 minutes, Mr. Dodik.  You

 7     may follow the usher.  We'd like to see you back after 20 minutes.

 8                           [The witness stands down]

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Lukic, you are putting very broad questions to

10     the witness which results in a mixture of facts and a lot of opinion as

11     well.  Could you please try to be as focussed as possible.

12             We take a break, and we resume at five minutes to 11.00.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  While we're waiting for the witness to be escorted

16     into the courtroom, Mr. Lukic, could you tell us whether we have a fully

17     booked schedule this week?  Because, if not, one would, I think, for next

18     week we have only one witness scheduled.  And could it be considered to

19     add that witness to the -- to this week so that we could already start

20     because that would accommodate very much one of us who has to do a lot

21     of --

22             MR. LUKIC:  We will definitely check that, Your Honour.  I cannot

23     answer you with the information that I have.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  To push forward the witness who is scheduled for

25     next week and see whether he can start or even complete his testimony

Page 42224

 1     this week.

 2             MR. LUKIC:  Hold on.  I don't know which witness.  I know one we

 3     cannot shift around at all --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  I don't know which one, but the one who is schedule

 5     at this moment for next week.  I think it is Mr. Pavlovic.

 6             MR. LUKIC:  That witness, I think you are talking about, is a

 7     protected witness and -- no?

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  I'm thinking it is --

 9             MR. LUKIC:  He is.  If it's the first witness for the next week,

10     it's protected witness.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  I think we have a --

12             MR. LUKIC:  And he should be escorted by the lawyer.

13                           [The witness takes the stand]

14             JUDGE ORIE:  One -- one second, please.  One second, please.

15             I have at this moment -- I have two witnesses for next week, one

16     of them is Mr. Pavlovic, viva voce expert witness.

17             MR. LUKIC:  Yes.  But we do not have the decision for

18     Mr. Pavlovic yet, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  I know that.  You get that very soon.  If that

20     assists you, we'll certainly accommodate you as quickly as we can.  But,

21     meanwhile, let's proceed with the examination-in-chief of Mr. Dodik.

22             Mr. Dodik, apologies for dealing with administrative matters when

23     you entered the courtroom.

24             And, Mr. Lukic, please keep in mind what I said before the break.

25             MR. LUKIC:  I will.  Thank you, Your Honour.

Page 42225

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] Towards the end of our previous session,

 2     Judge Orie observed that some of my questions were rather general.  Let

 3     me ask you whether you are telling us what you told us from personal

 4     experience or was it somebody else who told you what was happening in the

 5     joint Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 6        A.   I was present there for days and nights practically on end, and I

 7     listened to people.  I was a witness of talks.

 8        Q.   Did you participate in voting?

 9        A.   Yes, of course, whenever it was on the agenda.

10        Q.   We mentioned the SDA memorandum.  It is called, "The act on

11     reconfirmation of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina."  That's the

12     official title, and the other one is the colloquial.  The representatives

13     of Croatian and Bosnian people withdrew from the federal organs of SFRY

14     after that.  It all took place on the 15th of October, 1991.  How did

15     that event, how did the 15th of October, 1991 affect you and your party?

16        A.   Well, it was --

17        Q.   Did you remain in the Parliament, did you remain a member of your

18     party?  Can you explain the situation for us, please.

19        A.   That was an act of unilateral secession that was unlawful, which

20     did not observe the procedure that was envisaged for the changes of

21     status in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Unilateral secession is not envisaged by

22     international law either.  And the declaration itself was completely

23     false.  It requested the reconfirmation of the sovereignty of

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Bosnia-Herzegovina was never a sovereign country,

25     never in history, and the territory --

Page 42226

 1             JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... would you mind

 2     to focus on the question.  Because this Chamber has heard a lot about

 3     what has happened on the 15th of October.  So the facts are, to that

 4     extent, presented to us by both parties, and the question specifically

 5     focussed on did you remain a member of your party, did you explain --

 6     whether you could explain that.

 7             So could you please focus your answer on that question.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will, but I understood that the

 9     question was how I felt.  In order to explain how I felt, I had to say

10     what I previously stated.  But specifically:  Of course, it was contrary

11     to my own views and it was contrary to what I knew about the procedures

12     about legality and the legitimacy.  I was disappointed, I was embarrassed

13     and I previously explained that the party that I had been a member of had

14     already ceased to exist.  Its members including us, the deputies, could

15     not get together and adopt our positions any longer.

16             MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Talking with your colleagues of other ethnicities in the

18     Parliament, the Croat, the Muslims, and the Serbs too, could you see

19     whether they were aware of the dangers that might result from this issue

20     of secession?

21        A.   The Muslims were in euphoria.  They believed that they were one

22     step from forming a country in which they would be the dominant

23     decision-making majority by abolishing the principles of constituency,

24     they believed that together with the Croats this would have a sufficient

25     majority to make decisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina as the majority.

Page 42227

 1     However, that was not sufficient.  So the Bosniaks were convinced that

 2     they were doing a good thing, regardless of the fact that they outvoting

 3     others and violating procedures and doing that a continuous manner.  The

 4     Croats, on the other hand, believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina was

 5     unimportant for them.  It was important to legalize and accept the

 6     declaration and establishing of independent state of Croatia and most of

 7     them represented it like that.  So joint actions with the Bosnians and

 8     making decisions jointly at the time, it was done only as a way of

 9     supporting the independence of Croatia rather than true support for the

10     independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11        Q.   How did the Serbs react after this, and after being

12     systematically outvoted in the joint Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

13        A.   Well, of course, we continued with the attempts to work in the

14     parliamentary bodies and the Parliament itself but that was very

15     difficult and unsuccessful.  I already said that, on 21st of November in

16     1991, practically all MPs or all MPs for the SDS and us who were already

17     independent at the time got together in the Parliament building in

18     Sarajevo and declared the founding of the Parliament of the Serbian

19     people, or the Assembly of the Serbian People, meaning to formulate joint

20     proposals that we would later present in talks with the Muslims and the

21     Croats.  That was all it was.  Because the Muslims and the Croats had

22     already been homogenised and this only seemed like a logical and

23     legitimate step.  Personally, regardless of the fact that I wasn't a

24     member of the SDS then or ever after that, I believed that it was

25     necessary for me to be there.  Any policy outside the representation of

Page 42228

 1     my people was practically impossible.

 2        Q.   The SDA, except for being organised politically, was it organised

 3     in any other sense?

 4        A.   Yes.  That was one of the key moments in the preparations for

 5     war.  The so-called Patriotic League was formed.  It was the military

 6     wing of the political party of democratic action that brought together

 7     the Bosniaks.  In addition to the fact that, formally and legally, the

 8     Yugoslav People's Army was still the only legal army at the time,

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina as a socialist republic had the right to organise its

10     own Territorial Defence so it was the only entity that could do that.

11     There was also the Ministry of Interior of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, that

12     is to say, the police.  In spite of all that, the SDA decided to form the

13     Patriotic League, the armed wing of the party, whose role could be seen

14     later in many of the events that followed.

15        Q.   Could you just briefly tell us whether history had affected the

16     way people think in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

17        A.   History is being lived there.  It was so at the time and it

18     continues to be like that.  The historical context, the historical

19     developments in the area, affect the thought process of Bosniaks, Serbs,

20     and Croats as the dominant factor.  It's a country in which consensus was

21     ever hard to achieve.  The three peoples were never on one and the same

22     side in any important historical events.  They were always on different

23     positions as a rule, and antagonistic and inimical, not just in 1990s but

24     throughout history.  The fact that shows that best that, is for example,

25     in Bosnia-Herzegovina even today or at the time either, it was not

Page 42229

 1     possible to harmonise anything.  So that Bosnia-Herzegovina today has

 2     only two holidays that have been harmonised, the new year and Victory

 3     Day.  Not a single historical event that would be celebrated jointly.  If

 4     it is celebrated, then the peoples are on opposite sides.

 5        Q.   Let me now return to the forming of the Assembly of the Serbian

 6     People.

 7             Before it was formed, did the Serb side attempt to make any

 8     agreements that was mentioned, but can you tell us anything specifically

 9     about such attempts.

10        A.   It's a fact that the Executive Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina or

11     the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time still had the Serbian

12     representatives.  They were not withdrawn and it tells you all.  Momcilo

13     Krajisnik as the Parliament Speaker regularly convened Parliament

14     sessions in an attempt to observe the procedures and to -- have the

15     issues resolved by putting them on the agenda of the Parliament.  I know

16     that there were attempts to hold talks between Karadzic and Izetbegovic.

17     At the time, I think that Kljuic was the president of the HDZ.  We waited

18     long for them in the various rooms in the Parliament, waiting to see if

19     they would reach an agreement.  So I used to sit there with others

20     waiting for them to come out with some proposals.  What I could hear was

21     that the Serbs proposed the mechanism of protection of peoples when

22     making decisions.  They requested that there should be no outvoting when

23     major issues were discussed but that was, of course, refused as we know

24     today.

25        Q.   How did conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina begin?

Page 42230

 1        A.   I already said --

 2        Q.   I mean the armed conflict.

 3        A.   In the neighbouring Croatia, which was still one and the same

 4     country, certainly mentally and also formally, that was where the armed

 5     conflict started, but the first casualties fell far from the areas where

 6     Serbs were dominant in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That was in the Krajina, the

 7     Bosnian Krajina as it was called at the time, and there were also victims

 8     in Sarajevo, when at a Serbian wedding the bridegroom's father was killed

 9     which upset the entire Serbian community at the time.  But it was

10     considered to be a terrorist act, something that was unacceptable as it

11     was a wedding, and that for ethnic reason, hatred of the Serbs, someone

12     believed himself motivated enough to kill the bridegroom's father who was

13     a member of the wedding party.  Of course, after that, the activities of

14     the previously mentioned Patriotic League took place in Bosanski Brod

15     area and in some other places, practically as a series of events.

16             Perhaps I should draw everyone's attention to another thing.

17     Then, in those first months, the death of one person was a very

18     disturbing fact.  Unfortunately, later during the war, numbers of victims

19     would cause less media attention than this one single death caused at the

20     beginning of the war.  So, of course, then the conflicts followed.

21        Q.   You mentioned Bosanski Brod.  Did Bosnian politicians go to the

22     place of that incident in the village of Sijekovac in the municipality of

23     Bosanski Brod?

24        A.   Yes, some of the politicians were there.  I think Fikret Abdic

25     was there; Biljana Plavsic was there.  What we knew then, and it was

Page 42231

 1     noted at the time, that the victims were civilians.  However, the events

 2     that were catching up overshadowed that visually and mentally so the

 3     incident was never investigated sufficiently.  Only after the war was

 4     that matter looked into further but it was known that the Patriotic

 5     League committed crimes against the Serbian civilians in that village,

 6     and that was not something that was disputed by anyone.

 7        Q.   Immediately before the war, before the conflicts broke out, did

 8     you attend meetings where key political topics were discussed as well as

 9     the strategy of the Serbian side?

10        A.   I've already stated that I was a member of the Assembly of the

11     Serbian People which was later the Assembly of Republika Srpska, the

12     National Assembly of Republika Srpska.  I did take part in most of the

13     meetings whenever I was able to attend them then and, of course, later

14     during the war as well.  I know that the assembly was adopting all the

15     important constitutive laws for the establishment of Republika Srpska.  I

16     voted in favour of many of those documents.  I considered them to be

17     legal and legitimate.  As I said, the SFRY constitution envisaged that

18     the sovereignty should rest with the peoples, that the Serbian people had

19     the right to their sovereignty and to their own decisions.  So

20     practically in all the constituent documents, I was present when they

21     were being adopted.  This was on the 21st of November and then later at

22     an assembly sessions that were held in Sarajevo and then later in Pale.

23     All the assembly sessions during the war.  It's possible that I was

24     absent from some of them due to combat, that's possible.

25        Q.   Did you attend the assembly session at which the six strategic

Page 42232

 1     goals were discussed of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 2        A.   That topic about the goals was something that appeared for a

 3     while, and it required the input of people from out in the field.  It

 4     required definitions, setting up a certain framework relating to the

 5     political goals of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Of

 6     course, the basis of that was the strengthening of the constitutive

 7     aspect of the actual republic.

 8        Q.   Taking part in these numerous assembly sessions and other kinds

 9     of meetings, did you ever see any kind of plan, oral or written, for

10     Muslims and Croats to be expelled from territories under Serbian control?

11        A.   No.  No, it wasn't even a goal.  Not even an unwritten one.

12     Actually, there were attempts in the National Assembly of

13     Republika Srpska to include representatives of Bosnians from the

14     territory of Krajina who were there.  I took part in conversation with

15     one of those Bosniaks who agreed to something like that, but probably

16     later, because of combat, he did not appear again.  He left that area.

17             The term "ethnic cleansing" is something that I heard only later,

18     primarily from the media.  It was something that appeared in the media

19     while reporting on the situation from the region.  The policy at the time

20     was not a policy of ethnic cleansing.

21        Q.   Were there any discussions at the assembly that would encourage

22     warmongering?

23        A.   Were deputies who were casualties already at the beginning of the

24     war.  There was a Serb deputy who was killed on his way back from an

25     assembly session while the joint assembly session was still working.  It

Page 42233

 1     was the deputy from Srebrenica, Zekic, he was killed.  Of course, that

 2     gave rise to emotions and in the throe of emotions it was very difficult

 3     to control the situation.  However, we took into account decisions.  That

 4     was important.  Not just the discussions.

 5        Q.   You mentioned a little bit earlier that you spoke with a

 6     representative of the Muslim people.  Do you remember what his name was?

 7        A.   Perhaps you can help me.

 8        Q.   Mevludin Sejmenovic [phoen].

 9        A.   Ah, yes, yes.  He was from Kozarac.  He had relatives in Banja

10     Luka.

11        Q.   Could you just briefly tell us what that conversation was like,

12     what that meeting was like?

13        A.   He had relatives in Banja Luka, so he was in Banja Luka.  Deputy

14     Vojo Kupresanin asked me if I would go with him and speak with this man

15     and include him in our work.  So I went to that house in the outskirts of

16     Banja Luka in the Vrbanja settlement and we talked with him.  Of course,

17     at the time he was not quite clear on everything but he did not reject

18     outright the possibility of becoming a member of the assembly with the

19     other ethnic groups and to fight to preserve the peace which, at the time

20     was still possible.  I didn't see him after that, however, and I don't

21     know what happened to him.

22        Q.   We will finish a little bit earlier.  I just wanted to give a

23     heads up to my colleague so he could get ready for his cross-examination.

24             Talking about the six strategic goals of the Serbian people.  One

25     of those goals was the separation from the other two ethnic groups.  How

Page 42234

 1     did you understand that and how was this discussed at the assembly?  What

 2     does that mean?

 3        A.   Croats and Muslims had already separated politically and

 4     institutionally.  It had already happened.  So it was just a matter of

 5     legalising the existing situation.  So I understood that as an

 6     institutional political establishment and affirmation of national

 7     interests.  It was never stated outright nor is it stated in any document

 8     that the Serbian people did not wish to agree and have a consensus with

 9     the other two peoples.  So I know what the discussions are about that and

10     all the back and forth.  So as somebody who was politically engaged at

11     the time I would not wish to be part of a structure that was in favour of

12     divisions on the basis of ethnic cleansing, killings and so on.  That was

13     not the intention.  I'm not saying that perhaps in view of some events

14     that occurred later they did not contain some elements of that.  However,

15     but there was no evidence that the political decisions at that time were

16     motivated by the -- the desire for physical divisions.  We could explain

17     it most easily by saying that, to date, we had all lived together and

18     from now we would life side by side with each other, and that was how I

19     viewed that in the political sense, not in any other way.

20        Q.   President Dodik, thank you very much.  These are all the

21     questions that the Defence of General Mladic had for you.  And thank you

22     very much for answering our questions.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Mr. Lukic, in your 65 ter summary other

24     subjects are mentioned but you leave them out, such as -- okay.

25             Then.

Page 42235

 1             MR. LUKIC:  If you want explanation I can --

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  No, it's up to you.  But I take it that if you tell

 3     us in advance what is there to be expected, that if it's different that

 4     you --

 5             MR. LUKIC:  The first conversation actually I had with Mr. Dodik

 6     last night and he had a severe migraine so I covered only topics he was

 7     able to discuss and I tried to cut this examination as short as possible

 8     to spare him from further suffering.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Then, Mr. Dodik, you'll now be cross-examined

10     by Mr. Tieger.  You find Mr. Tieger to your right.  Mr. Tieger is counsel

11     for the Prosecution.

12             Mr. Tieger.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

15        Q.   Good morning, President Dodik.

16        A.   Good morning to you as well, sir.

17        Q.   I'd like to begin by focussing, at least the initial part of the

18     examination, on information you have been able to provide the Court

19     previously.  And just to clarify it's correct that you testified in the

20     Brdjanin case at the end of July, beginning of August 2003; correct?

21        A.   That is correct, yes.  We were there together, you and I.  Yes.

22        Q.   Well, not -- I think not in the Brdjanin case, Mr. Dodik.  But we

23     were there together when you testified in the Karadzic case in 2013.

24     That's correct.

25        A.   That's correct, yes.

Page 42236

 1        Q.   And in addition --

 2        A.   But if I may explain.  I think that before I testified in the

 3     Brdjanin case, you and I had several meetings, I think.  I think that's

 4     right, isn't it?

 5        Q.   That is correct, Mr. Dodik.  And in addition to the meetings that

 6     you and I had, just a couple of weeks before the Brdjanin testimony, you

 7     also gave an interview to OTP representatives about the upcoming Brdjanin

 8     issues and that interview was tape-recorded.  That's also correct; yes?

 9        A.   Yes, probably it was.  You were recording it.  I -- I wasn't.

10        Q.   Well, I think we may have occasion to refer to that.  I can show

11     you the beginning of that interview and who was present at the time.

12        A.   All right.

13        Q.   As I mentioned, I wanted to -- in the interests of efficiency,

14     ask you whether you stood by some of those -- some of that information

15     you provided previously.  Again, I appreciate that in the Karadzic case,

16     you indicated that whatever you said in the Brdjanin case and whatever

17     was recorded you would stand by.  But the nature of our process is such

18     that I will be asking you about the specific portions and asking you to

19     confirm those.  So it may seem a little tedious but that's the nature of

20     the process.

21             So, first, I'd like to ask you -- you -- you provided information

22     today -- sorry, go ahead.

23        A.   May I?  I am going to tell you again that I stand by what I

24     officially said before this Tribunal in the Karadzic and the Brdjanin

25     case and what I was telling you in informal meetings was perhaps part of

Page 42237

 1     an impression or something, but in any case, I can always stand behind my

 2     publicly expressed positions here before this Tribunal.  So I can

 3     understand your attempt now to look for inconsistencies, but I would not

 4     wish to change anything I said in the Plavsic case, in the Brdjanin case,

 5     and in the Karadzic case.  I would not wish to change any word, line,

 6     sentence.  I stand by all of that.

 7        Q.   Thank you for that, sir.  Earlier today you were asked about the

 8     three national parties.  You provided some focussed information about

 9     what you considered to be aspects of the SDA, and were relatively brief

10     about the SDS, so I wanted to ask you more about the SDS, particularly in

11     light of what you said before.

12             So when you testified in the Brdjanin case, and I'm going to call

13     up the particular transcripts so the parties and the Court can see it and

14     well.  That's 65 ter 33545.  And that was on the first day of your

15     testimony.  E-court page 25, please.

16        A.   If I may assist, it's all right.  What I said.  It's okay.  I --

17     I don't know what you're trying to say.

18        Q.   Maybe --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, let Mr. Tieger just ask his questions and

20     there's no need also for us to understand what you are still standing by.

21     We would have to know what it was.  So, therefore, wait for Mr. Tieger's

22     questions.

23             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

24             MR. TIEGER:

25        Q.   And I appreciate the effort at moving us along.

Page 42238

 1             You were asked at transcript page 20468 of that case:  "Was the

 2     party controlled from the top?"

 3             Referring to the SDS and you answered:

 4             "Yes, absolutely.  Mr. Karadzic was the president of that party,

 5     which had its Main Board."

 6             And later in that -- on that same page, you were asked and then

 7     continuing, I think -- yeah, later on the same page:  "Now, if the

 8     Main Board issued instructions, were the Municipal Boards and regional

 9     boards obliged to carry out those instructions?"

10             And you answered:  "Yes, that was quite clear.  This was a firmly

11     organised political party with clear-cut hierarchy and superior --

12     superiority."

13             So I just want to ask if you stand by that particular portion of

14     what you said in the Brdjanin case.

15        A.   Of course, I do.  And it's absolutely correct.  Just as it

16     applied to all the political parties at that time, there was a

17     hierarchical structure, a common policy, the president, the Main Board,

18     which runs that party.  I said that I wasn't a member of it but it was

19     evident that the Municipal Boards and the lower-ranking organisational

20     units, those forms of organisation, were in keeping with the policy that

21     prevailed at the time.  And this was something that was confirmed by the

22     Main Board of that party.

23             Is it possible for me to have the transcript in Serbian before

24     me?

25        Q.   Unfortunately, Mr. Dodik, we don't have Serbian translations of

Page 42239

 1     the document which is why I'm reading very slowly and also ensuring that

 2     Mr. Lukic is aware of what page I'm referring to so he can follow it as

 3     well.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Before we continue dealing with all the testimony,

 5     Mr. Lukic, I saw in the Defence exhibit list, reference to testimony in

 6     the Karadzic case 2nd of February, 2011.  Whereas I'm now hearing that it

 7     was 2013.  And any explanation for ...

 8             MR. LUKIC:  It says on the document it's 2013.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I have got a copy which says 2011, but

10     perhaps -- and that says Defence exhibits for Witness Dodik, Milorad,

11     viva voce.  That gives one exhibit number; that's "The Islamic

12     Declaration" and then prior testimony, one, two, three and there it says

13     2011.

14             MR. LUKIC:  Yes, that's our mistake, our typo.  But I don't think

15     that the Prosecution had a problem with locating the previous testimony

16     of ...

17             JUDGE ORIE:  I just wondering whether I'm missing something and

18     so where you earlier said it says 2013, you say it may be a mistake that

19     the document says 2011.

20             MR. LUKIC:  No the document says '13, the transcript.  The

21     transcript says '13.  It's typo on our information report on our table.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Okay.  So the information report is not

23     accurate.

24             MR. LUKIC:  That's right, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

Page 42240

 1             Please proceed.

 2             MR. TIEGER:

 3        Q.   Turning to the next page, e-court page 26, you were asked how

 4     strong was the control and discipline that was exercised by the SDS over

 5     these bodies where they were the controlling party.  And you answered:

 6     "I think that this party was internally highly homogenised and it

 7     functioned in a highly disciplined fashion."

 8             And you confirm that today as well?

 9        A.   Of course, I think it should be noted that I said I think; I

10     wasn't in the party.  Of course, this also applied to the HDZ and the

11     SDA.  They were the same.

12        Q.   On the next page, e-court page 27, you were asked what happened

13     to members of the SDS who didn't agree with some of the decisions that

14     were made.

15             And you responded:  "Well, I think that they were minimised then,

16     and that they turned passive."

17             I take it you confirm that as well, sir?

18        A.   That happens still today.  In my own party.  I do confirm it.

19     Yes, of course, I do.

20        Q.   At page 50 of the e-court, and that's transcript page 20493,

21     continuing onto your testimony on July 31st, 2003, you were asked:  "So

22     as far as the authorities in Banja Luka during this period May of 1992

23     until around September, the decision-making was that being made by the

24     SDS?  Is that what you're saying?"

25             And you answered:  "Well, the SDS was the party in power, and at

Page 42241

 1     that time it certainly conceived of the policy that was pursued at the

 2     time by the organs that functioned as state organs."

 3             And I presume you confirm that?

 4        A.   That is very logical.  My party today also sets policy and does

 5     that in the government, so that's how it was there too.  I -- I confirm

 6     what is there, and I'm just adding what I have said now.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tieger, it would be very helpful for

 8     everybody in the courtroom, especially for the interpreters and

 9     transcriber, to indicate from which line you are reading.

10             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I will do that.

11        Q.   Let's turn back to page 26 of the e-court.  That's 20469 and on

12     this occasion lines 9 through 15.  The question was asked:  "Now, we've

13     spoken about the community of municipalities and then the Autonomous

14     Region of Krajina and the Assembly.  You were not a member of the

15     assembly, I think you've already told us.  What sort of authority did

16     that regional assembly have in respect of the municipal assemblies of the

17     various municipalities that made up the autonomous region."

18             And you answered the:  "The assembly and the executive organ that

19     was formed later, regulated all of life, political, economic, cultural,

20     all segments of life.  Decisions were passed and these decisions were

21     observed by the municipalities that were members of these regional

22     committees [sic]."

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Communities.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Communities.  Excuse me, misspoke.

25        Q.   I take it you confirm that, Mr. Dodik?

Page 42242

 1        A.   Yes, that's how it was.  May I just ask something about this?

 2     What is the document that you are presenting to me?  It's my -- was that

 3     my testimony in the Brdjanin case or is that my conversation or my

 4     interview with you before that?

 5        Q.   Yeah, so you won't -- there's no risk of confusion, Mr. Dodik,

 6     I'm talking it one step at a time.  This is the transcript of your

 7     testimony from the first day in the -- you testified in the Brdjanin

 8     case.  When I move to the second day, I will move you.  And when I move

 9     to the tape-recorded interview, I will also advise you explicitly.

10        A.   Okay.

11        Q.   If we turn to page 47 of the e-court which would be 20490 in the

12     paginated version.  Lines 13 through 17.

13             You were asked:  "Now you've told us that the regional assembly

14     because of the hierarchies established within the SDS had power over the

15     municipal assemblies.  Did the regional Crisis Staff, when it was set up,

16     have the same powers as the assembly?"

17             And you answered:  "I think so."

18             You confirm that?

19        A.   I think so, yes.  But I did not have sufficient insight into all

20     of that.

21        Q.   Turning to e-court page 77, transcript page 20520, lines 13

22     through 19, no excuse me.  Let me -- turn to e-court page... 78.  At

23     line -- transcript page 20521, and beginning at lines 3, you were asked:

24     "How about a gentleman named Ljuban Ecim?  How powerful was he?"

25             You answered:  "I think that he was a highly positioned member of

Page 42243

 1     the state security ... in Banja Luka, in that region.  I think that he

 2     was deputy chief of that service."

 3             Question again was:  "You mentioned in some conversations that

 4     you had with another Prosecutor, Mr. Tieger, that you saw him as being

 5     Karadzic's protege, a person who was close to Arkan, and you said that

 6     nothing could be done in Banja Luka without passing it through state

 7     security, through him.  Do you still believe that to be the case?"

 8             And you answered:  "In a certain period of time, yes."

 9             The question was asked --

10        A.   It's common knowledge that Mr. Ecim was in the state security and

11     that this State Security Department was under the influence of the state

12     authorities.  That's quite logical.

13             As for the rest, it's a matter of perception that can be accurate

14     or not.  In any case, at the time, that's what it appeared to me.

15        Q.   And the conversation -- the -- the questioning on the subject

16     continues.

17             So you were asked:  "You said, this on page 3 of those notes:

18     The fame and notoriety called of Ljuban's group was very strong

19     everywhere in Banja Luka and everyone lived in fear of that group.  He

20     was, on the one hand, Karadzic's protege in Banja Luka, and on the other

21     hand, he was very close to Arkan and his people.  He managed to create

22     the impression that he was Karadzic's person there and that he was

23     untouchable."

24             And you answered:  "Yes."

25        A.   Yes.  I have already said that was my perception, that's what it

Page 42244

 1     looked like.  Whether it was accurate, time has shown.

 2        Q.   And if we could turn to page 84 of the e-court, transcript page

 3     20527.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  May I seek clarification of the last answer.

 5             You said whether it was accurate, time has shown.

 6             Now, that's ambiguous because time could have shown that it was

 7     or that it was not accurate.  Did you intend to say that time has shown

 8     that it was accurate?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said that that was the

10     general perception.  And to the question whether he was close to Karadzic

11     and Arkan, I said yes.  In the time since then, I believe various studies

12     have shown that.  I did not express any views of mine.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  No, I see that.  But when you said time has shown,

14     you were referring to studies which confirm what your impression was at

15     the time.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't know whether it was

17     confirmed or proven wrong.  I didn't go into that, but the perception was

18     as reflected in the transcript.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, I'm informed that if you move to page 84

24     in - I take it that's the e-court page - there's private session.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.  And it was based on Mr. Dodik's request at the

Page 42245

 1     time and the Karadzic case this very same issue was raised and Mr. Dodik

 2     indicated he didn't consider that necessary so this discussion took place

 3     in public and I -- I assumed that for essentially if they could be

 4     considered protective measures previously they had been varied by the

 5     Karadzic Chamber in light of the witness's request.  We can redact it and

 6     move into private session if you think that's best.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, I'm not -- I'm just informed.  Was it

 8     officially, was the confidentiality officially lifted or do you just say

 9     that the way in which they dealt with it in the Karadzic case shows that

10     confidentiality was ...

11             MR. TIEGER:  I can read the precise line to you and maybe better

12     to go into private session for the moment and I can do that.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Of course, we want to be rather precise on the

14     procedural aspects of lifting confidentiality.

15             We move into private session for a second.

16                           [Private session]

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 42246











11  Pages 42246-42248 redacted.  Private session.















Page 42249

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20                           [Open session]

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness -- Mr. ... what's -- Mr. Lukic, could you

22     check with Mr. Mladic what is of his concern.

23             MR. LUKIC:  The break is here so I will check it.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

Page 42250

 1             We'll take a break, and we'll resume at 20 minutes past 12.00,

 2     but not until after the witness has followed the usher.

 3                           [The witness stands down]

 4                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll take the break.

 6                           --- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.

 7                           --- On resuming at 12.23 p.m.

 8                           [The witness takes the stand]

 9                           [Trial Chamber confers]

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Dodik, we'll continue.

11             Mr. Tieger.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13        Q.   Let me ask you this:  Karadzic, Krajisnik, Stanisic, Mandic,

14     Zupljanin and Ecim were part of one small compact team and they were the

15     most powerful people on their respective levels at the time.  Even later,

16     regardless of where they went, they still cling together.

17             Can you confirm the accuracy of that, Mr. Dodik?

18        A.   Well, their appointments to various positions at that time

19     enabled them to be in power.  Just as I now today have the powers of the

20     president of the republic, they had certain powers at that time, and they

21     were in a position to co-operate with each other.  So they had these

22     formal positions.  They got a lot of media coverage, regardless of the

23     situation.  The security situation was grave at the time, and, of course,

24     people wanted the opinion of the minister of the interior.  How else?

25     You can also interpret it in the way you did, in the way you formulated

Page 42251

 1     it.

 2        Q.   All right.  May I -- I'm going to this at that case I think is

 3     best to tender the excerpt from case previously identified, in the

 4     transcript reference previously identified.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Only this page, then.

 6             Mr. Lukic, any problem with that?

 7             MR. LUKIC:  No, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  And earlier I think the -- we heard the witness say

 9     something about the accuracy of what he testified about before in this

10     Tribunal.

11             You have not uploaded that one page.  Then, Mr. Registrar, could

12     we reserve a number for the one page still to be uploaded and to be --

13     sought to be admitted under seal.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be P7756, under seal, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, that number is reserved.

16             Please proceed.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

18        Q.   Mr. Dodik, I'm going to move on to the second day of your

19     testimony in the Brdjanin case.  That was August 1st, 2003.  That is

20     reflected at 65 ter 33546, and I'd like to turn, first, to e-court page 9

21     which is transcript 20542, lines 2 through 9.

22             And you were asked:  "You talked yesterday in response to some

23     questions from Ms. Korner about discipline within the ranks of the SDS,

24     and you told us that someone who openly disagreed with SDS policy would

25     be punished and termed a traitor and disciplined in some way.  Can you

Page 42252

 1     name anyone and specifically from the Krajina area, who was disciplined

 2     because of their disagreement with SDS policy? "

 3             And you answered:  "In those days, or generally speaking for the

 4     whole period?"

 5             And the response came back:  "In those days, I'm talking about

 6     translate 1991 and through the fall of 1992."

 7             And you answered:  "I can confirm that the SDS was a compact,

 8     well-structured organisation in which the hierarchy was respected.  And I

 9     do know that differing views, even though they wanted to present

10     themselves as a democratic party, were not really tolerated, especially

11     not at that time.  And still less was their tolerance for behaviour that

12     could be interpreted as not being in conformity with the policy of the

13     party.  I can't remember a single name, but there were many people in the

14     past who were in the SDS and because they acted differently, they left

15     the party.  I think that Mr. Brdjanin himself left the SDS later on."

16             And can you confirm that transcript reference, Mr. Dodik?

17        A.   Even now in my party I have many people from the former SDS.

18     What am I supposed to confirm?  What I said or can I comment.

19        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... accuracy of what you said.

20     I'm not looking for an expansion, in particular, and so I'm not inviting

21     it, but if you feel one is necessary for some reason, I'm not precluding

22     it.

23             So essentially as I indicated before, I just am asking you to

24     whether you stand by that testimony in the Brdjanin case?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 42253

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2        A.   Yes, I stand by it, and I've said before I stand by everything

 3     I've ever said before this court.

 4             Perhaps there's one thing that should be added.  At least it

 5     seems to me now that the question was formulated in such a way as to

 6     require someone to say that somebody had a -- ruled the SDS with an iron

 7     hand.  I had not noticed that before, but now I would like to say this.

 8     The SDS was a voluntary organisation, and there was self-discipline at

 9     lower levels and the higher level was respected in its decisions.  It was

10     rather compact, but nobody was physically forced to comply.  There was no

11     repression.  There was just acceptance of that policy.

12             So, if somebody later on came into conflict, they would either

13     leave the party or would be disciplined by the party, according to their

14     rules.  I don't see any problem with that because that's the way it still

15     functions.

16        Q.   I'd like to move next to e-court page 10 and 11 from the same day

17     of testimony.  And at transcript page 20543, you were asked to look at an

18     interview dated 27 February 1992.  That's found at about lines 9 and 10

19     of that page.  An interview conducted of Mr. Brdjanin and Mr. Krajisnik.

20     Then you were asked:  "Krajisnik at the time was probably one of the top

21     three most powerful people in the SDS.  Would you agree with that?"

22             Your answer was:  "Yes.  He was a strong man of the SDS."

23             And then moving on to -- you were then asked if there was a

24     disagreement or if that interview reflected a disagreement between

25     Brdjanin and Krajina about two or three matters.  You said:  "Yes, it's

Page 42254

 1     visible their views differed."

 2             Then asked:  "Was Brdjanin, in effect, in this public interview

 3     diverging from the SDS line and the SDS policy?"

 4             You said:  "Yes, that can be seen in the positions that are

 5     reviewed here."

 6             And then on the next page you stated:  "Later on, Karadzic came

 7     to Banja Luka to discipline the Banja Luka organisation, and after that,

 8     the organisation came under the direct control of the top leadership in

 9     Pale."

10             And do you stand by that testimony, Mr. Dodik?

11        A.   I don't see any difference with what I've said here earlier

12     today.  But in any case, it is quite customary for political parties at

13     lower levels to have to comply with decisions of the higher level, and

14     when there is a problem or a conflict, higher level has to deal with it.

15     I think that it is quite proper and I have no proper in confirming that

16     such things happened.  I will say again I was not a member of the SDS,

17     and I could only draw inferences based on things I saw or the perception

18     that was created at that time.

19        Q.   Well, just to be fair, those inferences that you drew and

20     explained in the Brdjanin case were based on not only what you saw, but

21     discussions you had with members of various parties at various times,

22     including those which confirmed your impressions; right?

23        A.   A lot of time has passed, but I confirm what is written there.

24        Q.   I'd like to turn next to the interview, the tape-recorded

25     interview, you gave to representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor a

Page 42255

 1     couple of weeks before you testified in the Brdjanin case.  That's 65 ter

 2     24921 -- 33531, excuse me.  An interview conducted in Banja Luka on the

 3     17th of July, 2003.

 4        A.   Did I know that it was being tape-recorded?

 5        Q.   Yeah, let's turn to the -- and the -- let's turn to the first

 6     page of that interview.  In both Serbian and English.  Mr. Grady

 7     introduces himself as an investigator working for the ICTY and for the

 8     Office of the Prosecutor.  He identifies the certified interpreter with

 9     him and the very first thing he asks is:  "Now, Mr. Dodik, are you aware

10     that this conversation is being tape-recorded.

11             Your response is:  "Yes, I am."

12             And Mr. Grady asks then:  "And we have your permission?"

13             And you respond:  "Yes, you do."

14             I'd like to turn then to page 3 of the interview in English and

15     page 3 in Serbian.

16             Mr. Grady asks you:  "What do you feel was the purpose of this

17     community of Bosanska Krajina municipalities?  Why put these

18     municipalities together."

19             And you responded:  "The SDS that presented itself at the time as

20     the protector of the Serbian people publicly said and spoke that the

21     Serbian people had to be protected from the Ustasha and other massacres

22     as they used to say.  Very often, they would go back to the stories from

23     the Second World War, although factually, and in, in essence, the idea

24     was to gain power and to gain control over the whole area and to

25     rule through the social institutions."

Page 42256

 1             Do you stand by that answer given on July 17th, 2003, Mr. Dodik?

 2        A.   I don't confirm anything that I've said to you outside of this

 3     courtroom.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Then I would tender this excerpt, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P7757, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 8             How many pages is it, Mr. Tieger?

 9             MR. TIEGER:  This is one page, Mr. President.  I'll have a few

10     more -- potentially a few more excerpts from the same interview.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And would that all then be separate

12     exhibits or would you join --

13             MR. TIEGER:  I think they can be joined.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  So you later indicate what pages they are and I take

15     it this one-page upload will then be replaced by a multi-page upload.

16             MR. TIEGER:  That sounds more efficient.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

18             Witness, perhaps needless to say, the fact that you say I don't

19     confirm anything doesn't change the evidence, that that is what you have

20     said at the time and is recorded.  Therefore, if you say that's not what

21     I said, I contest that the recording is accurate, we'd like to know so

22     that we can verify that, listen to the recording and ask for confirmation

23     of the accuracy both of the recording and the translation.  If, however,

24     you say, Well, I don't want to confirm it, then, of course, the Chamber

25     may consider what the reason is that you, as a general statement say, I'm

Page 42257

 1     not going to confirm anything which I didn't say in court, because why

 2     not?  Is there any reason?  If you have changed your mind since then,

 3     please let us know.  Perhaps also explain to us why you have changed your

 4     mind.  Because then we can include that in our considerations.  If,

 5     however, you say, Whatever I said out of court, I -- I'm not willing to

 6     confirm that without any further explanation, of course, we'll then

 7     consider that situation.

 8             The text is, however, then admitted into evidence.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Then I'd like to turn --

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Please.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, well, if I may just -- and

15     thank you for your clarification.  I could talk based on my perception

16     and, of course, my perception then and now is different.  I think it

17     would be good and I'm reading what's recorded here, I don't see any

18     problems in the statement itself, especially as it's evident later that I

19     said quite clearly that I was not a member of this assembly, so I was

20     able to comment on it as someone who was an outsider.  And earlier at the

21     beginning of my testimony I also talked about my perception in view of

22     the massacres of the Ustashas against the Serbs during the World War II,

23     that this was something present in the people's emotions.  So it's not a

24     problem for me to confirm it, but I have to tell that you the definite

25     reason is that I used to trust earlier what the Prosecution did and I

Page 42258

 1     trusted them more before than I do today.  So that's probably the reason.

 2     I'm not so certain of the objectivity of everything that the Prosecution

 3     is doing.  So though I respect you, having this in mind --

 4             JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... first of all, I

 5     thought it was fair to inform you about the legal situation.

 6             Second, if you say, I don't trust the Prosecution as I did

 7     before, then, of course, what we primarily look at is at your answers so

 8     as long as you trust yourself, that, I think, may be more important

 9     because it's -- it's the statement you gave.  But if you say, well, some

10     matters I could confirm; others may be a perception which has changed,

11     then, of course, perhaps sometimes you wouldn't know exactly on what a

12     perception at that time was base, what new facts there are now available

13     to you which may change your perception of the situation.  So therefore,

14     I leave it to some extent to yourself, but since you gave a rather

15     sweeping statement that you're not going to confirm anything that you

16     didn't say in court, that's the reason why I raised the matter.

17             Let's move on and you now know what your options are.

18             Please proceed.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  And I --

21             MR. TIEGER:

22        Q.   I wanted to turn next to pages 4 and 5 of the English and page 5

23     of the Serbian.  You were asked:  "Do you recall speeches that he made

24     within the assembly when you were a delegate with him."

25             You asked:  "You mean Brdjanin?"

Page 42259

 1             Answer was:  "Yes."

 2             You said:  "He said what the majority of the people from the SDS

 3     used to say at the time and he was active in many" --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Should we move to the next page.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  "Public debates."

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  In English.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Now, in English we're moving to -- about to move to

 8     the next page.  This is at the very bottom.

 9             "And I think with hindsight, I think that he was more active

10     verbally than actively participating in many things.  There were many

11     discussions at the time about the preservations, which the SDS advocated

12     that Yugoslavia should be preserved.  And I can tell you I think that his

13     nature, his personality, made him participate a great deal in that.  I

14     can't remember specific things but --"

15             And then you were asked:  "What do you mean by his nature and

16     personality?"

17             And you answered:  "How shall I explain.  He was ... he was very

18     exposed when it came to expressing certain standpoints but if you would

19     like me to give you a psychological opinion, he was some form of a

20     choleric temper.  And people like that were used very well by the SDS at

21     the local level.  And when I look now it seems to me, seems to me that

22     there was a group of people that the SDS used to use and when I say the

23     SDS, I mean the leadership from Pale.  And there was another line which

24     was in charge of the party obedience and they were in charge of things

25     that were happening in the field."

Page 42260

 1             Do you stand by those answers given in July 2003, Mr. Dodik?

 2        A.   As I have occasion to say that I have no problem with myself or

 3     my previous statements.  I see no purpose in this reading out.  I can

 4     confirm this if that's what you need and I think this does reflect my

 5     views at the time and how I saw those matters.  But without intending to

 6     show a lack of respect to anyone, I think that what I say should also be

 7     respected.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, Mr. Dodik, you are here -- you're called by a

 9     party.  You have to answer questions.  That's simply so.  If -- if you

10     say I'd rather not answer some questions, that's not what this Court will

11     respect because you are under a duty to do so.

12             You have now said that that is how you perceived the matter at

13     the time, certainly when you gave the statement.  Is your

14     nowadays-perception different from then?  And if so, tell us in what

15     respect it is different, and also tell us what made you change your

16     perception.

17             So let's take it one by one.  Is your nowadays-perception

18     different from the previous one?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for these statements, I don't

20     have specific different perception but I'm just saying that time is also

21     a factor in all of this.

22             And as for the statements given outside the Tribunal and the

23     courtroom, let me just tell you one thing.  In my political career, I

24     have given around 6.000 various political statements.  I remember some of

25     them; others, I don't know.  Some were politically motivated, which was

Page 42261

 1     quite logical because that -- politics is what I do.  So with regard to

 2     the statements given here at the Tribunal, I stand by all the transcripts

 3     and everything that was said.

 4             As for something that I said outside of the courtroom, there may

 5     be differences because I have not authorised the form of this statement.

 6     This is the first time I see it.  Or at least I don't remember that I

 7     did.

 8             JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... Witness, let's

 9     try to get things straight.

10             First of all, you said your perception is not different now but

11     you say time plays a role.  Then, that's still a bit ambiguous because if

12     it's the same then apparently time in this respect has not played a role.

13     But if you think that there are any difference over time that you changed

14     your perception, please tell us and we'll consider that.

15             Second, I hope that when you're interviewed as a witness or a

16     potential witness, that if you compare that with political statements

17     that you have stuck as much to the facts as any political person would do

18     if he is interviewed as a witness and not as a politician.

19             I leave it to that.

20             Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

22        Q.   I'd like to turn next to page 6 of the English and 6 of the

23     Serbian.

24             And in the Serbian, it's toward the bottom of the page.  And in

25     the English, it's in the middle, beginning around line 14 or so.  You

Page 42262

 1     were asked -- still talking about Brdjanin in that context, of course.

 2             You state -- you then refer to a very -- well, I'll read the

 3     start:  "Formally Brdjanin was the president, but as I said before, I

 4     think there were people in this Crisis Staff that far more powerful than

 5     him and all the decisions that were brought there were basically, prior

 6     to that, discussed and agreed to in the SDS.  Because they had

 7     established a very strict party, as you say, discipline and whoever -

 8     even once - didn't fit into one of their arrangements, he was eliminated

 9     permanently."

10             And then you were asked:  "That was my question.  How, how

11     members were chosen for this very important body, this ARK Crisis Staff

12     which certainly had influence on all the other municipal Crisis Staffs,

13     how did they, how did they choose these members?"

14             And you answered:  "As I said before, it was arranged prior to

15     anything in the SDS, the party that was in power at the time, and then

16     they would appoint the people into the Crisis Staff.  Because in, within

17     their party structures, they decided which people those were ..."

18             Okay.  And I think... okay.  Then there's a cough.  Someone says

19     excuse me, and then you continue:  "... and simply, the -- those people

20     were then just appointed later on" --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Could we please move to the next page in the

22     Serbian.

23             MR. TIEGER:

24        Q.   "And sometimes those people were those who they really didn't

25     want to be there and didn't even belong to that party.  But to refuse

Page 42263

 1     participation in this, for some people it was the same thing as

 2     execution.  Nobody offered me though."

 3             Then you were asked:  "Okay, could Brdjanin --"

 4             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Next page in English, please.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  Next page, please.

 6        Q.   "Could Brdjanin have become president of the ARK Crisis Staff

 7     without the blessing or, or authorisation of Radovan Karadzic? "

 8             And you answered:  "I don't think so."

 9             And then moving a couple of lines down, you were asked:  "And

10     these other members of the Crisis Staff, Dr. Vukic, president of the SDS

11     in Banja Luka."

12             And you answered:  "Yes, he was the president of the SDS.  I

13     think that, as the practical side was concerned, he was the most

14     important person in all of this.  He had to have full support and

15     absolute support of the, approval of Karadzic, because without it he

16     couldn't have been the president, which also gave him power at the local

17     level."

18             And then you were asked:  "And are you aware of the, of the

19     co-ordination that -- that took place between the ARK Crisis Staff and

20     the various municipal Crisis Staffs within the region?"

21             And you answered:  "I think that they functioned jointly and that

22     the orders that the regional Crisis Staff gave to the local Crisis Staffs

23     were respected."

24             Now, Mr. Dodik, do you stand by those answers in July 2003?

25        A.   Just add at the beginning what you skipped deliberately and that

Page 42264

 1     was that I was not a member and that I was able to say this based on my

 2     conversation with certain people.  As for everything else, I agree.  But

 3     you intentionally skipped that on the previous page.  Before you started

 4     reading out all this.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  That is a kind of accusation.  You may answer the

 6     question.  Whether Mr. Tieger did that deliberately or not, we'll

 7     consider that.  If you say you left out this and this and that's

 8     important, you have an opportunity to do so.  But we're not here in a

 9     courtroom to say that someone is trying to mislead you or mislead this

10     Court because Mr. Tieger, first of all, we have the page there, we'll

11     read the whole of the page if it's in evidence so, therefore, there's no

12     need to make these kind of observations.  Please refrain from it.

13             These two pages which are pages 6 and 7 in the hard copy will be

14     added to the excerpt that will be later uploaded under the number

15     reserved.

16             Please proceed.

17             MR. TIEGER:  And can we turn to page 15 in the English and page

18     17 -- 16, excuse me, in the Serbian.  Okay.

19        Q.   There, Mr. Dodik, you were asked:  "Can you give me other, any

20     other sense of the, of the real hierarchy that went on within the SDS?"

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We have to move to the next page in English.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Where are we on the B/C/S page?

24             MR. TIEGER:  We should be where it begins [B/C/S spoken] it's --

25     the problem I have, there's a different pagination in this printed

Page 42265

 1     version.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That is the --

 3             MR. TIEGER:  So the bottom like the bottom third, bottom second

 4     third of the ...

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. Dodik, I think you found that, where it begins

 7     [B/C/S spoken] and I believe the Court has it now.

 8             "Can you give me any other sense of the -- of the real hierarchy

 9     that went on within the SDS and how it controlled these regions and then

10     the locally municipalities?"

11             And you answered:  "Well, it's quite clear.  They had their own

12     people in the municipalities, that is the Municipal Board ... presidents

13     of the Municipal Boards and the leadership of these boards and they were

14     elected with full approval of Karadzic and the leadership from Pale,

15     otherwise, they couldn't have been elected.  Then, a very important part

16     was played by the delegates from that area, from his party ..."

17             And then after going briefly off tape because someone is

18     sneezing.  Turn the page, please, in Serbian, you continue:  "Then there

19     was their people who were posted in the media, in the police and other

20     structures and at one point, the commissioners of the SDS Main Board, of

21     the top of the SDS, were appointed, so these are the people from the core

22     leadership, who were placed in charge of a certain region."

23             Mr. Dodik, do you stand by those answers again in July of 2003.

24        A.   That was the factual situation.

25             If I may add, today you cannot elect a representative of a local

Page 42266

 1     organisation without the approval of the president of the party.  That's

 2     the situation today in the Balkans even today and even in my own party

 3     the one of which I am the president.  So that was just normal.

 4        Q.   Okay.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  I'd tender that excerpt.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  That would then be at least English text on pages 15

 7     and 16.  And the corresponding B/C/S pages, Mr. Tieger, I take it that

 8     you'll carefully select them.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  We will.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  They will be added to the excerpts for which a

11     number has already been assigned.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

13        Q.   Now, I'd like to move away for the moment from the information

14     you provided previously, Mr. Dodik, and focus a bit on some of the

15     information you provided today.

16             With regard to "The Islamic Declaration," in view of all the

17     things you've said about it, was it the case or I presume it's the case

18     that this Islamic Declaration was a hot topic at the Bosnian Serb

19     Assembly and must have been raised repeatedly by the delegates.  Is that

20     accurate?  Do you recall the extent to which "The Islamic Declaration"

21     was addressed by members of the Bosnian Serb Assembly or the Assembly of

22     the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23        A.   We were not some lunatics who were just addressing the

24     declaration.  It's a fact that it was written and so we were free to

25     examine it.  We adopted some constitutive acts there and we dealt with

Page 42267

 1     issues relating to the constitution.  We had in mind what was Alija

 2     Izetbegovic's policy in "The Islamic Declaration" which I, myself, read

 3     several times, which promotes the things it does promote.  And I think

 4     that any man who was involved in any degree in politics at the time was

 5     aware of the contents of this declaration, not only among the Serbs but

 6     among other peoples as well.  And it was nothing secret.  It was a

 7     published document.  And when Alija Izetbegovic came to the top of his

 8     party, became its leader, it became more popular than ever among his

 9     supporters.

10             JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... first seek to

11     clarify the question.  Did you mean whether the matter was addressed in

12     assembly sessions, Mr. Tieger?  Is that what you had in mind?

13             MR. TIEGER:  That is a timely intervention, Mr. President.  Let

14     me clarify.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, and could you please focus your answer very

16     much on the question that's put to you.

17             MR. TIEGER:

18        Q.   Mr. Dodik, I'm asking you how often, if at all, "The Islamic

19     Declaration" was specifically raised by members of the assembly in

20     assembly meetings.  Every session, every other session, every fourth

21     session, once in a blue moon?  How -- what's the answer?

22        A.   It was never on the agenda of our assembly as an official item on

23     the agenda, but often various MPs referred to the contents of "The

24     Islamic Declaration" when they explained various positions.  So if I may

25     say so now it was quite frequently, of course.  But we never had an item

Page 42268

 1     on the agenda that would be called Islamic Declaration.  Never.  At least

 2     as far as I remember.  Perhaps if I was absent it may have figured on the

 3     agenda.  Otherwise not.

 4        Q.   Well, we searched through every available transcript --

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, I'm afraid that there may be some

 6     misunderstanding.

 7             Witness, you were asked how often "The Islamic Declaration" was

 8     addressed in the assembly meetings.  Your answer was:  "Often various MPs

 9     referred to the contents of 'The Islamic Declaration' when they explained

10     their various positions."

11             Now, did they refer to the content without saying this is to be

12     found in "The Islamic Declaration," or did they refer to the content of

13     "The Islamic Declaration" by mentioning that it was to be found in "The

14     Islamic Declaration."

15             You can implicitly refer to, you can explicitly refer to it as

16     being found in "The Islamic Declaration."  Could you tell us when you

17     said they often referred to it, were those explicit references to "The

18     Islamic Declaration" or implicit references.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Most frequently it was discussed as

20     written and stated in Alija Izetbegovic's "The Islamic Declaration", et

21     cetera, et cetera.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Specifically mentioning that document ...

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm talking about people who

24     participated in the discussion and who, when explaining their positions,

25     talked about various dangers and then they would say that such-and-such a

Page 42269

 1     thing was written in Alija Izetbegovic's "The Islamic Declaration."

 2     That's what I heard quite often.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  That's clarified now.

 4             Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   Well, Mr. Dodik, we searched through the transcripts of the

 7     Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions, beginning with the first, and going on

 8     though all those in our possession which are basically the chronological

 9     versions, and we found that the first reference to "The Islamic

10     Declaration" explicitly did not occur until the 35th Session of the

11     Bosnian Serb Assembly held on the 2nd of October, 1993, and that --

12     that's found at 65 ter 02384, at e-court page 93 and B/C/S -- or Serbian

13     page 69.

14             And that was -- waiting for the English to come up.

15             And for your benefit, Mr. Dodik, that can be found at the bottom

16     third part of Mr. Goljanin's discussion where he said:

17     "Mr. President" -- that's the third line from the bottom in English.

18             "Mr. President, I was to remind you of the declaration that was

19     in circulation three to four years ago.  On one occasion at a session of

20     our earlier assembly, I even spoke about that declaration.  It was "The

21     Islamic Declaration" about proclaiming an Islamic republic of BiH.  There

22     were plans there, and Sokolac, Nevesinje, et cetera, were clearly

23     mentioned in the context of inhabiting Muslims.  Okay, those were some

24     vague formulations, which were being spread by someone, maybe even by the

25     yellow press.  But I'm getting an impression that their goal started

Page 42270

 1     slowly to be accomplished by those concessions that were made last time,

 2     because almost one-third of free Nevesinje was given to Turks ..."

 3             Now, Mr. Dodik, in fact, you have no reason to contest that this

 4     was the first explicit reference to "The Islamic Declaration" in the

 5     Bosnian Serb Assembly, not until October 1993?

 6        A.   I have reasons to contest it.  This declaration was mentioned

 7     very often in our discussions in the discussions in the assembly as well

 8     in the way that I described.  Sometimes the synonym "Alija's policy" was

 9     used but we were well aware of what the "The Islamic Declaration" was and

10     what it meant.  But in terms of the form, I don't remember this

11     particular transcript or this particular speech.

12             MR. TIEGER:  And I'd tender that excerpt, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  They will be added to the -- no, no, this is a

14     different transcript, yes.  I'm -- I apologise.

15             Mr. Registrar.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Number reserved will be P7758, Your Honours.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  And how many pages do we have here, Mr. Tieger?

18             MR. TIEGER:  It's two in English, I believe and one in Serbian.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  If that's all, then admitted into evidence.

20             MR. TIEGER:

21        Q.   Mr. Dodik, the reason - and I'm putting this to you - that "The

22     Islamic Declaration" didn't find its way into the Bosnian Serb Assembly

23     session discussions until then, was because, setting aside for the moment

24     the -- whatever views were attributed to Izetbegovic on the basis of

25     something he wrote back in the 1970s, it was widely known that Bosnian

Page 42271

 1     Muslims were highly Europeanised and not particularly religious, much

 2     less radical fundamentalists.  Isn't that the case?

 3        A.   It's possible that you see it that way, but how come that so many

 4     people rallied around Alija Izetbegovic knowing what he stands for and

 5     what he had written?  I am tempted to conclude that you, so many years

 6     later, you are trying to justify Alija Izetbegovic and his writing of

 7     "The Islamic Declaration."  I'm not saying that all Muslims were radical

 8     but the policies that were promoted by Alija Izetbegovic were supported

 9     by almost all Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And they knew that

10     Alija Izetbegovic had served a long sentence for his religious views, to

11     put it that way.

12        Q.   Well, let me look at a couple of contemporaneous statements from

13     that time, not from now.

14             MR. TIEGER:  If we could turn to 65 ter 07499, page 9 of the

15     English, page 3 of the Serbian.  And perhaps we could ...

16        Q.   You're welcome to see the first page, if you want, but I can tell

17     you, Mr. Dodik, that this is an interview with Dr. Karadzic conducted in

18     1990.  The portion I'm going to direct your attention to is found at the

19     very top of the middle column in Serbian, and in the middle of the page,

20     page 9, in English, where Dr. Karadzic says:  "The Islamic fundamentalism

21     arrives to Europe with people of other race and language that makes the

22     Europe panic.  Here, the Muslims are Slavs, people with our blood and

23     language who, for the most part, opt for the European quality of life and

24     preservation of the Islamic faith.  There is no room for panic, either

25     among the Serbs nor among the Muslims."

Page 42272

 1             Mr. Dodik, that's a further reflection of the widely known fact

 2     that Bosnian Muslims were, as a rule, very Europeanised people; right?

 3        A.   You want to say that the Serbs were not; right?  I did not see

 4     this interview of Radovan Karadzic.  At the time I wasn't reading his

 5     interviews, so I'm not aware of it.  But you said this was from 1990,

 6     right before the war, if I understood this correctly.  And this reflects

 7     his political stance at that time.  I can neither confirm nor deny what

 8     he said.

 9             As you know and as I said at the beginning, I was a member of a

10     different political party which does not mean that I have a bad opinion

11     of Muslims.  I have said here that Alija Izetbegovic was a convicted

12     religious radical and that his policy was supported by an overwhelming

13     majority of Muslims, almost all of them, except for a very small minority

14     which remained in a marginalised different party like mine.

15        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ...

16        A.   We lived in the former Yugoslavia.

17        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... you've discussed that at

18     length during your examination-in-chief.  I'm asking you about a

19     different aspect of the broader issue you raised.  And before I go on,

20     while I am reluctant to ever respond to comments or questions by a

21     witness, I want to explicitly reject your comment that by pointing out

22     that Radovan Karadzic was describing the Bosnian Muslims as Europeanised,

23     I was somehow saying that Serbs were not.

24             Now, let's move on to page 4 of the English in this interview and

25     B/C/S page 1.

Page 42273

 1             In the third column in Serbian, one sentence of the third and the

 2     third and fourth paragraph, we see a reference to Jovo Raskovic and that

 3     reference is:  "There is in the first place the high reputation of Jovo

 4     Raskovic, who is in BiH equally respected by the Serb, Croats and

 5     Muslims, since he acts as a peacemaker."

 6             And this part of the interview is Dr. Karadzic speaking also.

 7             Mr. Dodik, Jovo - or Jovan - Raskovic was the founder of the SDS

 8     party in Croatia; right?

 9        A.   Yes, that's commonly known.

10        Q.   And do you accept Dr. Karadzic's characterisation of his

11     reputation and the respect in which he was held in Bosnia?

12        A.   At that time when these parties were just founded, we were

13     political opponents, not sympathizers.  I said before I haven't read this

14     interview, but I can't help thinking why did you seek to indict him if he

15     are justifying now his words?

16             JUDGE ORIE:  Witness, you're not here to put questions to

17     Mr. Tieger.  You're here to answer his questions.  Could you please stick

18     to that principle.  And could you please answer the question now.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard of Jovan Raskovic, but I

20     cannot talk about him.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Is that because you don't know anything about him?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know who he is.  He ... acted

23     quietly without violence.  He was active, but I could see him only on TV

24     and in the media.  I've never met him.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

Page 42274

 1             Please proceed.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I see it's time for the break, Mr. President.  I

 3     tender the interview.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter 07499 will be Exhibit P7759, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  And is admitted into evidence.

 7             Mr. Dodik, we'd like to see you back in 20 minutes.  You may

 8     follow the usher.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10             JUDGE ORIE:  We resume at a quarter to 2.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 1.22 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, one question came to the mind of the

14     Judges in this Chamber.  That is, as far as the interview is concerned,

15     do we need that interview into evidence or -- because you read out, I

16     think, all the portions you wanted to draw our attention to literally.

17             MR. TIEGER:  No, I think it does need to be in evidence,

18     Mr. President, because when a witness simply, unequivocally adopts it,

19     then you have the equivalent of the document.  When there is something

20     else, then I think you need the document in.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Then for truth of the content or ...?

22             MR. TIEGER:  As is the case with everything we do here, sure.  I

23     don't think we've ever made that distinction.

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  We'll further consider that.

25                           [The witness takes the stand]

Page 42275

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Please, meanwhile, proceed.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.  Can we turn, please, to 65 ter 11723.

 3        Q.   Mr. Dodik, I can tell you while this is coming onto the screen

 4     that had will be an interview for YUTEL of Jovan Raskovic.  And in

 5     January 1992, I believe, as it says at the top of the page, this appeared

 6     in Svijet.  And the portion I wanted to direct your attention to is found

 7     in the Serbian in the third column from the left, top half of that, and

 8     is found in the English at page 2 in the middle part of the page.

 9             And, there --

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Could we first enlarge the --

11             MR. TIEGER:  And no doubt we need to help -- for Mr. Dodik, the

12     bottom part of the page, third column from the left.  The bottom --

13     that's right now go to the third column, that's it, and if you could

14     enlarge the top half of that.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]

16             MR. TIEGER:

17        Q.   There, Dr. Raskovic states:  "I believe that there is no fear of

18     Bosnian sovereignty for the Serbian people in BiH.  It would not be

19     genocide.  Maybe it would not be Serbophile, and it would be Srbophobe

20     but it wouldn't be Srbocide either.  I talked about that with Karadzic.

21     He is not inclined to accept my opinion.  He thinks it is necessary to

22     react in a different way if the Bosnian sovereignty is formed.  According

23     to him, the Serbs must adopt a different political stand and a diverse

24     political procedure in that case, even though it seems to me that it

25     pushes people into a war."

Page 42276

 1             Mr. Dodik, were you aware of such differing views about the risks

 2     of sovereignty or Muslim rule generally, if it came to that, among

 3     Serbian politicians?

 4        A.   To the extent I was able to understand, this is from January 1991

 5     or 1992?  When?

 6        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... 1992.

 7        A.   1992.  Of course, I didn't see before and I don't know anything

 8     about this view of Mr. Raskovic but if it matters I don't agree with his

 9     position.  I don't know what views Karadzic presented in that

10     conversation, but if it matters, I can tell you what I think and what I

11     thought then.

12             I was convinced --

13        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... and I really don't like to

14     interrupt you, but you have provided an answer to the question, and I'd

15     like to move to the next question.

16             MR. TIEGER:  I tender 11723, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P7760, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Admitted into evidence.

20             Mr. Tieger, I still have some difficulties in understanding that

21     the witness has answered the question.  The question was whether he was

22     aware of differing views on the matter.  I --

23             MR. TIEGER:  I take your point, Mr. President.  I was actually

24     trying to forestall a move into areas even farther away from my question.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  No.  I can imagine that you wanted the witness to

Page 42277

 1     come back to your question but then also, perhaps, to answer it.

 2             Were you aware of views among politicians differing in a way as

 3     described in this article between the different views of Mr. Karadzic and

 4     Mr. Raskovic?  I'm not specifically asking about these two but are there

 5     different views?  Were you aware of that?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.

 8             Please proceed.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.  Can we turn next to 65 ter 02366

10     beginning at page 95 in the English and page 64 in the Serbian.

11        Q.   Mr. Dodik, I had asked you earlier about the -- what I termed the

12     well-known understanding that Bosnian Muslims were Europeanised and not

13     particularly religious.  In that connection I earlier directed you to a

14     comment by Dr. Karadzic.  Now I want to direct your attention to a

15     comment by Mr. Krajisnik.  And this is a session of the Bosnian Serb

16     Assembly, I believe, held in January 1993, the 24th Session of the

17     Bosnian Serb Assembly, and if we look at the beginning in the middle of

18     the page in English, and similarly situated on the page in front of you

19     in B/C/S, we see Mr. Kupresanin speaking.

20             He says:  "We stumbled over some ideas several times in the past.

21     Gentlemen, is the Muslim nation a nation at all?"

22             He continues talking about the -- it was created in Tito

23     conception in 1994.  "Should we deny this --"

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  1974.

25             MR. TIEGER:  1974.  Thank you, Your Honour.  "Should we deny this

Page 42278

 1     nation as a nation."

 2             He continues a couple of lines down:  "It was since the time

 3     remembered a Serb country.  It is true that Turks were here for sometime,

 4     for 500 years.  We threw out the Turks, we threw out the Austrians and we

 5     threw out the Germans, and yet Bosnia isn't Serb but Muslim of the

 6     non-existent nation.  Are these not Serb stupidities again?"

 7             And he then notes:  "I propose that we deny the Muslims as a

 8     nation on the next session of the assembly."

 9             And then we see Mr. Krajisnik speak on the next page in the

10     English, and still on the same page in Serbian, although it will continue

11     and he says:  "I think that Mr. Kupresanin is right, and I was wrong when

12     I once said:  Don't put them together with us.  Because, if you push them

13     together with us, we do not know what to do with them.  I think this

14     should be corrected a little.  We should really take a stand concerning

15     whether the Muslims are a nation.  Here, we had one suggestion that we

16     say they are a Muslim sect of Turkish orientation because it would then

17     create a discord in the Muslim world.  Namely, Saudi Arabia and other

18     Muslim countries believe that the Turks are fake Muslims, who eat and

19     drink like the others.  It is known that they are not so religious."

20             So here, too, Mr. Dodik, Mr. Krajisnik is acknowledging the

21     well-known fact that the Bosnian Muslims were not considered particularly

22     religious, much less radical fundamentalists; correct?

23        A.   That's Krajisnik's opinion.  I was talking about Izetbegovic and

24     his radical orientation and faith.  I said there was a general perception

25     that Bosnian Muslims were the most secular in Europe, certainly.  But

Page 42279

 1     they still supported the policy of Alija Izetbegovic.

 2             I don't know what I'm supposed to do here.  I would like to make

 3     a correction, if I may.  We were not the Assembly of Bosnian Serbs.  We

 4     were the Assembly of Republika Srpska, and I would appreciate it if you

 5     would use that name, which is proper.

 6        Q.   Of course, and --

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, in your last question, you've woven in

 8     that it's a well-known fact.  Could you always please clearly distinguish

 9     between what someone says is his opinion and whether that's a well-known

10     fact or not.  These are two separate issues and I'd like -- witness may

11     be confused by such an interwoven element in your question.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I can answer it -- ask it again but I see -- based

13     on the answer, I don't see a confusion here.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm just --

15             MR. TIEGER:  As a general matter of course.  Thank you.

16        Q.   Let me just continue on this point, as long as we're on this

17     issue, with what happened at that assembly session after Mr. Krajisnik

18     announced that he agreed with Mr. Kupresanin.  He continues and says:

19     "Here, Vojo, you were right and I wasn't."

20             And he asks at the end of this intervention:  "Does anyone have

21     anything against that the Muslims are not a nation?"

22             Then we hear from Mr. Corda, or the Assembly hears from Mr.

23     Corda, and on the next page in English and I believe the next page in --

24     page 65 of the e-court in Serbian, Krajisnik, again, responds:  "Well,

25     all right, people, if we accept that they are some kind of a group,

Page 42280

 1     Turkish or I don't know whose, then we simply give them aces to their

 2     hands to be an independent nation."

 3             And then a line later, he says:  "Why, we should tell them what

 4     they really are.  They are unbelievers, a nation that is not a nation,

 5     that is to say, a nation that would like to be a nation but has no

 6     arguments for a nation."

 7             Savo Knezevic then speaks and he continues the discussion about

 8     four lines after he begins:  "May God give that they never again be part

 9     of our nation.  We don't need him who once betrayed anymore.  They are

10     Mohamedans of Turkish provenance and nothing else.  They are not even the

11     real members of Islam because they are more of a sect than real members

12     of Islam.  And a Muslim is some sort of the member of Islam.  They are

13     some kind of a lower category."

14             And then on the next page in English --

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, in all fairness to the witness, would

16     you allow him to read at least this paragraph, because you pick out just

17     a sentence here, a sentence there.

18             MR. TIEGER:  By all means.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  And I think it is fair to the witness that he has an

20     opportunity to read what Mr. Knezevic said, and I think -- are we still

21     on the right page, 4.

22             If we go back, then we could also read the whole of the ...

23             Witness, once you've read the portion of which elements were read

24     out to you by Mr. Tieger, please let us know.

25             Well, Witness, you are given an opportunity to read the whole of

Page 42281

 1     what Mr. Knezevic said, but then you would have to look at your screen.

 2             MR. TIEGER:

 3        Q.   And I'll now turn to what Mr. Krajisnik says to conclude it.  At

 4     the bottom of page 97 in English and on page 66 of the Serbian.

 5             "Shall we then now take the Muslims out of Serbism forever?  All

 6     right, gentlemen, can we now make up our mind and take a position that

 7     the Muslims as a nation are the Communistic creation.  We do not accept

 8     this artificial nation.  We believe that the Muslims are a sect, a group

 9     or a party of Turkish provenance.

10             "Does anyone have anything else to add?  No?  I put these

11     conclusions to a vote.  Who is for" --

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Can we go to the next page in English.

13             MR. TIEGER:  "Is there anyone against, abstaining?  Gentlemen,

14     thank you, we adopted the conclusions unanimously."

15        Q.   So I wanted to put Mr. Krajisnik's comments about the relative

16     religious nature of the Muslim community in context and we see the full

17     context, I believe, from what I've just read out.  I wanted to ask you,

18     Mr. Dodik, were you among the assembly delegates at that session who

19     voted for the proposal?

20        A.   I believe you have that information.  I myself don't remember.

21     Where was this session held?  You probably have it noted somewhere who

22     attended.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  The document itself says, I think it's in Bijeljina

24     on page 2 if -- if it's the 24th Session, then the document states on

25     page 2 that it was held on the 8th, 1993 in Bijeljina.  That must be a

Page 42282

 1     small mistake.  But on the cover page, it says the 8th of January of

 2     1993, Bijeljina.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Were you present there?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember, but there is a

 6     record.  Records of attendance.  I don't remember.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  I'd tender that excerpt and ask that it be added to

 9     any that exists for that session.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Do we need -- let me just check.  You have already

11     made an excerpt, and we add it to any that exist.  Does there exist any?

12     There does.  And then this can be added to the excerpt already in the

13     system.  Under what number?

14             MR. TIEGER:  P6921.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  This may be added to P6921 and it has been uploaded

16     already.  No, it has not uploaded already.  It will be uploaded.  And

17     Mr. Registrar is hereby instructed to add it to the excerpts already

18     known under P6921.

19             Please proceed.

20             MR. TIEGER:

21        Q.   Mr. Dodik, during the course of your examination-in-chief, there

22     was considerable emphasis on not only "The Islamic Declaration" but on

23     general activities by Mr. Izetbegovic or the SDA or the Muslims

24     generally.  And in -- in -- in respect of actions taken or not taken by

25     the Bosnian Serbs, I wanted to put this to you and that is that

Page 42283

 1     Mr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership for quite some time, and

 2     certainly beginning in 1991, knew what they wanted to do but simply

 3     waited for a -- some form of pretext to act and that steps taken or that

 4     actions taken following anything done by the Muslim side reflected

 5     pre-planned steps to be implemented at opportune moments.

 6             That's the reality of the developments in 1991 through 1992;

 7     isn't that right?

 8        A.   That's your hypothesis which underlies your entire work.  They

 9     did not tell me what they intended, and I did not have the impression

10     that what was done by the Serbs was action.  It was, rather, reaction.  I

11     don't think you are right when you say it was pre-planned.  I don't know

12     about any such plan.  I never saw it, and I didn't hear about it even

13     later.  All I know is that when we discussed these objectives that the

14     assembly adopted in 1992, there was a lot of pressure for this topic to

15     be discussed which, in my view, denies the existence of any pre-planning.

16     I didn't know about any plans at the time, and since then, I haven't seen

17     any evidence that it existed.  It was reaction to the developments.  And

18     you can see, if you look at it chronologically, which events preceded

19     other events.

20        Q.   Let's turn to tab -- the tab to 65 ter 07704.

21             Mr. Dodik, what will come up on the screen is a transcript from a

22     SFRY Presidency meeting held in December of 1991.  And I'd like to turn

23     to page 78 of the English and page 105 of the Serbian.  The portion I'll

24     direct your attention is found at approximately the fourth sentence from

25     the top and, in English, in the middle of the page.

Page 42284

 1             And there, Dr. Karadzic is speaking and is explaining to the

 2     members of the SFRY Presidency the following:  "We have made a list of

 3     moves.  Ten moves in the direction we want, so that there are results.

 4     Bosnia remains in Yugoslavia, either as a whole or our areas.  But we

 5     won't do anything until Alija messes something up.  When Alija messes

 6     something up, we make move number 5 and then we wait.  When Alija messes

 7     something else up - we make move number 6."

 8             So, Mr. Dodik, I know you indicated earlier that Mr. Karadzic

 9     wasn't necessarily telling you his plans, but here we see a reflection of

10     what he was telling others at the time about what he had planned and how

11     he intended to implement it; correct?

12        A.   I did not attend that Presidency session.  I'm not aware of this.

13     I had no chance to familiarize myself with this, and it turns out that

14     Alija really messed things up many times, as there was so much need to

15     emphasise this.  I mean, I cannot either deny this or confirm it.

16     Obviously, if it was said at the Presidency session, then it was.  I am

17     not aware of any plan that had been prepared beforehand.  I didn't know

18     about it and I think it's more hypothetical.  If he messes things up, we

19     do thing number 5; if he does it again, we do thing number 6.  I think

20     it's more a hypothesis than a serious plan.  But I cannot really either

21     confirm or deny it, I can only say once again that I'm not aware of any

22     precise or specific plan that existed previously in the period that you

23     have in mind.

24             MR. TIEGER:  It's 2.15, Mr. President.  I tender that and I think

25     it's time to end the session.

Page 42285

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Registrar.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P7761, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Is admitted into evidence.

 4             We'll adjourn for the day, Witness, but I'd -- before I instruct

 5     you, give you further instructions, I notice that you at various times

 6     look in the direction of the Defence, seeking eye contact with them.  I

 7     would advise you to refrain from doing that.  It's Mr. Tieger who is

 8     examining you.  Your answers are given to this Chamber, and I think

 9     that's, for the time being, enough.  If you are examined by the Defence,

10     then, of course, you look at the Defence.

11             Then, I instruct you that you should not speak or communicate in

12     any way about your testimony, with whomever it may be, that is, testimony

13     given today or testimony still to be given tomorrow.  If that's clear to

14     you, you may now follow the usher, and we'd like to see you back tomorrow

15     morning at 9.30.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And how long mustn't I communicate?

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Until the end of your testimony and that is,

18     therefore, that is, the instruction now goes until tomorrow.  And as long

19     as you're still --

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  -- testifying.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, I think you've one hour and 50 minutes

25     left from your three and a half hours you claimed.  Do you think you

Page 42286

 1     would stay within that?

 2             MR. TIEGER:  I believe so.  I'll double-check and let the Court

 3     know as soon as possible.  I think -- I think we'll be within the limits.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume

 5     tomorrow, Tuesday, the 8th of December, 9.30 in the morning, in this same

 6     courtroom, I.

 7                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.18 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 8th day of

 9                           December, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.