1 Monday, 7 December 2015
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-09-92-T, The Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 No preliminaries. Is the Defence ready to call its next witness,
12 which will be Mr. Dodik, if I am well informed.
13 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. That's right.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted in the courtroom.
15 [The witness entered court]
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic, last warning, you'll be really removed
18 from the courtroom if the same happens again. You remain seated, and
19 there's no need to greet in the way you did. Apparently you think it to
20 be funny, in view of your smiling. Last warning. Let that be clear.
21 Good morning, Mr. Dodik, I presume. Mr. Dodik, before we start
22 hearing your evidence, you are required to make a solemn declaration.
23 The text is now handed out to you. May I invite you to make that solemn
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning. I solemnly declare
1 that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
2 WITNESS: MILORAD DODIK
3 [Witness answered through interpreter]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated.
5 Mr. Dodik, I noticed already that you are a fast speaker. If you
6 want your words to be interpreted in full, please slow down in your speed
7 of speech.
8 Mr. Dodik, you'll first be examined by Mr. Lukic. You find
9 Mr. Lukic to your left. Mr. Lukic is counsel for Mr. Mladic.
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Examination by Mr. Lukic:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, President. I will be examining
14 you now, and after your answers, I will make a short pause. It's not for
15 you to add anything. It's for the interpreters to be able to finish.
16 Would you please say, for the record, your full name.
17 A. Milorad Dodik.
18 Q. Father's name?
19 A. Bogoljub.
20 Q. Date and place of birth?
21 A. 12 March, 1959 in Banja Luka. 1959.
22 Q. [In English] In Banja Luka.
23 [Interpretation] Could you say again the year when you were born
24 and where.
25 A. 12 March 1959, in Banja Luka.
1 Q. What schools did you finish?
2 A. The faculty of political sciences in Belgrade.
3 Q. Just before the war, what were you doing?
4 A. I was president of the Executive Board for the municipality of
6 Q. Can you remember in which period?
7 A. The term of office was one year at the time. I was in that
8 position in 1989/1990.
9 Q. Did you run in the elections in 1990?
10 A. Yes, I did.
11 Q. For which party?
12 A. I was on the ticket for the election unit of Banja Luka for the
13 Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia. I was heading their ticket.
14 Q. Who was the founder of that party?
15 A. The founder was the federal prime minister, Ante Markovic.
16 Q. At those elections, were you elected to some position?
17 A. Yes. Deputy to the assembly of what was then Socialist Republic
18 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 Q. To conclude with your political career, after the war, did you
20 continue in politics?
21 A. Yes. I founded a separate party, Independent Social Democrats;
22 and in 1996, in the spring of 1996, while in 1998 in January, I was
23 elected prime minister of Republika Srpska until January 2001. In 2006,
24 in February, I was again elected prime minister, and at the elections
25 that year, my mandate was renewed as prime minister. 2010, I was elected
1 president of Republika Srpska. And in the October elections last year, I
2 was re-elected for a new term. And I'm the president of the party which
3 has the greatest support in all the elections in Republika Srpska since
5 Q. Thank you. Let us cast our minds back to the political scene in
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war in 1992. You said you ran in the
7 elections for the reformist party of Ante Markovic and you were elected
8 member of parliament. Of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
9 A. The Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
10 Q. Yes. What was the leader of the party by ethnicity?
11 A. Croat.
12 Q. What was the ethnic composition of that party?
13 A. It reflected the structure of Yugoslavia. The party was first
14 formed across the republics of Yugoslavia because there was no federal
15 law on multi-party organising, and only when that law was passed just a
16 few months before the elections, the party was established at the level
17 of Yugoslavia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the party was established and had
18 its representatives in the Presidency and in lower units. All
19 ethnicities of Yugoslavia were represented in the party, and our
20 electoral ticket was multi-ethnic. I was president of that party for
22 Q. Thank you. What was the platform of this multi-ethnic party?
23 A. The key political issue at the time was how to preserve our
24 common state of Yugoslavia, and representatives of that party wanted to
25 come into positions in various republics and provinces to promote that
1 issue and to prevent the breakup of the country, which actually happened
2 just before the elections. Of course, free market, joining what was then
3 the European community, democracy, multi-party system, a free market that
4 were the main points in our programme. National equality and no
5 discrimination on any grounds.
6 I can go on, if you wish.
7 Q. No, I'm waiting for the interpretation.
8 Did your party believe that some things have to remain joined in
9 that state?
10 A. That it should remain a joint state, that was the commitment of
11 everybody. At the time, we met members of our party from Slovenia and
12 from Macedonia and everybody wanted to preserve Yugoslavia as it was,
13 although reformed, and to promote the objectives that I just enumerated,
14 and no republic or provincial organisation of our party had any other
15 aims. Our first goal was to preserve the common state.
16 Q. Before these multi-party elections, what was the political scene
17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina like?
18 A. One year before, the SDA, the nationalist party of the Muslims,
19 was established, led by Alija Izetbegovic, a man who, for his promotion
20 of Islamic radicalism had served a sentence in prison for promoting the
21 idealogy of the Young Muslims, a man who authored the well-known book
22 "The Islamic Declaration" where he listed his main beliefs and goals,
23 that is to establish an Islamic order based on the sharia law and the
24 idea that minorities should adjust to that order and that as soon as
25 majority is achieved, the law of the sharia, in a way, it was a
1 predecessor of the Islamic radicalism that we are seeing everywhere in
2 the world now. He was surrounded by other members of the party who also
3 had belonged before to the Young Muslims. During the Second World War,
4 according to certain information, Alija Izetbegovic, who was born in
5 Bosanski Samac, had been a member of the Handzar Division, a nationalist
6 Ustasha organisation of that time.
7 Later, a couple of weeks later, the Croatian Democratic Union,
8 HDZ, was formed as the political organisation of the Croats, and that was
9 a direct branch of the Croatian Democratic Union of Croatia founded by
10 Franjo Tudjman, and only then was the Serbian Democratic Party formed,
11 led by Radovan Karadzic, as a party uniting the Serbs.
12 On the political arena there were several more parties, first of
13 all, the Social Democratic Party, which was, in fact, a transformed
14 League of Communists and the party I belonged to, the Alliance for Reform
15 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These five parties were the major political
16 players during the elections, although there were younger parties as
17 well, such as SPO, which had one seat in Parliament, a party that was
18 promoted by the youth and also had one seat, a liberal organisation, a
19 liberal party, however, the three political parties, the SDA, HDZ and
20 SDS, got the majority vote each from their own ethnic community and took
21 over power after the elections.
22 Q. What were the relations between the ethnic parties before and
23 after the elections?
24 A. There was general tension immediately after the SDA was formed.
25 They started a political drama. The HDZ was transferred to Bosnia, that
1 and the forming of the SDS seemed to be a reaction to the founding of an
2 ultra nationalist party among the Muslims which promoted the idea of
3 pan-Islamic unity and radical Islam, as we may better understand it from
4 the present time. There were individual incidents. The HDZ and the SDA
5 promoted partnership before the elections and within their ethnic
6 communities, the SDA, among the Muslims, and the HDZ, among the Croats,
7 and the SDS, among the Serbs, got between 80 and 90 per cent of the votes
8 from these ethnic groups. So very little votes remained for the other
9 parties. As a political party, we had won a total of 12 per cent of
10 votes in these elections.
11 After the election, relatively quickly, for the political
12 situation in the Balkans, in particular, when coalition agreements need
13 to be harmonised, these three parties established joint power in the
14 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They've established the leadership in
15 the Parliament and the then-Executive Council, which discharged the
16 duties of the republican government. So there was a distribution of
17 power within the coalition, depending on the number of votes they had
18 won. These three political parties, I mean. It seemed that they were
19 able to preserve peace. There were many Parliament sessions held and for
20 more than a year, we were trying to resolve various issues within Bosnia
21 and Herzegovina.
22 I would like to say that already at that time immediately after
23 the elections, the armed conflict had already broken out in Croatia. In
24 June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence that was
25 supported by Germany, its foreign minister, Genscher, and after him,
1 members of the European community, which were pressured by Germany to
2 recognise these two republics so that the framework of the EU could be
3 further developed. That's what we know now. In fact, that meant
4 breaking up Yugoslavia.
5 Q. What was the position of the leading Bosnian politicians in terms
6 of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and how was that reflected in
7 the work of the Parliament?
8 A. The SDS policy was the -- for Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain in
9 Yugoslavia. The HDZ, of course, as a party that was integrated with the
10 Croatian HDZ, supported independence. The independence of Croatia, I
11 mean. And that caused much turbulence within the Parliament and, of
12 course, Party for Democratic Action led by Alija Izetbegovic, also
13 supported the breakup of the country and the independence of Croatia and
14 Slovenia. Under such conditions, it was very difficult to work. The
15 party that I was a member of believed that the independence of Slovenia
16 and Croatia ought not to be acknowledged and that Yugoslavia ought to be
17 preserved. However, we were no longer a relevant political factor.
18 Q. Did you hold any talks or did you have any verbal duels with
19 Alija Izetbegovic with regard to this issue?
20 A. Yes. Concerning the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, Alija
21 Izetbegovic abused the Parliament as a member of the Presidency of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina which had several members. I believe it was nine. He
23 wasn't even the president of the Presidency -- or yes, he was. I'm
24 sorry, he was at that particular moment. So he came to the roster -- to
25 the rostrum in the Parliament and he said that he proposed for the
1 Parliament to recognise Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries. I
2 then asked him on what basis did he present that position. Was that the
3 position of the then-Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or was it the
4 position of his party and his own personal view? He said that it wasn't
5 a harmonised position of the Presidency but that it was the position of
6 his party and himself. I told him that he had abused the rostrum because
7 no one entitled him to speak as an individual or the president of his own
8 party and that he was not allowed to present views that had not been
9 harmonised within the Presidency and it hadn't been harmonised. But such
10 abuses were frequent. So it was no wonder that Alija Izetbegovic had
11 abused the Parliamentary rostrum, to promote his own ideas in such a
12 manner. And my duel with him ended there.
13 Q. How did SDS view the secession of Croatia and Slovenia from
15 A. The Serbian Democratic Party was in favour of the preservation of
16 Yugoslavia and in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining within
17 Yugoslavia. When it became obvious that that was practically impossible,
18 then they insisted that the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina be
19 recognised in terms of the status issues within Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 itself. Let me just say that the then-constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina
21 envisaged two-thirds majority for any change of status within the
22 framework of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Socialist Republic, as it then was,
23 protected the rights of the ethnic groups in a high degree. I have to
24 say - and you all know - that according to the constitution of the
25 then-Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the sovereignty was
1 invested in the peoples, that is to say, the ethnic communities and the
2 republics were political territorial organisational units of those
3 peoples. Bosnia-Herzegovina had, within its composition, three main
4 peoples or ethnic groups: The Serbs, the Bosniaks, or the Muslims as
5 they were officially called at the time; and the Croats. And there were
6 some nationalities or national minorities. They were called
7 nationalities at the time. Now, we would call them national minorities.
8 So in this regard, the SDS requested that the procedures provided
9 by the constitution be observed.
10 Q. How did these differences affect the co-operation between the
11 ethnic parties that were in power at the time?
12 A. It was already becoming difficult to hold Parliamentary sessions.
13 One could see that other institutions of the executive powers had
14 difficulties to function, but formally they were still in their place and
15 functioning. It was obvious to see that the political representatives of
16 the Croats and the Muslims co-operated and formed coalitions as to oppose
17 any initiative coming from the Serbian side. They always refused such
18 initiatives and there was a lot of animosity. The promotion of the
19 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina was already underway and specific
20 political moves were already being taken to that effect. An attempt to
21 convene the Parliament on several occasions were unsuccessful because
22 there were very long breaks and it was very difficult to finalise the
23 sessions even if they began. The sessions used to last day in and day
24 out at the time, so both during the day and then they would continue on
25 into the night.
1 Q. This discord among the political parties, how did that affect the
2 three peoples living in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
3 A. Well, the people were already homogenised around their political
4 parties, that had happened before the elections already and as a rule,
5 they followed their leaderships. And when the -- the armed conflict in
6 Croatia is added as an additional factor, where the Serbs and the Croats
7 were the main participants, then it's easy to imagine what sort of
8 relations the Serbs and the Croats had between themselves within
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The territory most populated by Serbs in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina borders directly Croatia, so most of the Serbian
11 population from northern Bosnia were psychologically already involved in
12 the conflict and they felt a solidarity with the Serbs in Croatia. Of
13 course, on the basis of negative perception from the Second World War.
14 Living along the Sava river during the Second World War, they were the
15 victims of -- the then-independent state of Croatia --
16 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker kindly be asked to slow down.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, could you please slow down. The
18 interpreters have difficulties in following you.
19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. I apologise. You stopped where you said that during the Second
21 World War ...
22 A. Yes. The Jasenovac camp. According to the information that I
23 came across in several places and also at Yad Vashem centre in Jerusalem,
24 the information is that 700.000 people were murdered, of which 500.000
25 were Serbs.
1 Among the Serbs living in those areas, the memory of that
2 suffering was very strong and affected their mentality and also was a
3 cause of fear that something similar might happen again. And that was
4 the atmosphere of the social and public life in the early 1990s.
5 It is a fact that the Communist regime, because of its own
6 ideological needs, had practically blocked the truth about Jasenovac to
7 be published and the results were various speculations.
8 Q. Thank you. Did all politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina observe the
9 constitution and the concept of the constitutionality of peoples at the
11 A. According to the charter of the UN, the right of the people for
12 self-determination belonged to the peoples rather than to the republics.
13 That was how it was defined in the constitution of the SFRY at the time.
14 The right to self-determination was not a matter to be decided by the
15 republics but, rather by the peoples. It is easy to establish that;
16 practically all republics were mono-ethnic. Slovenia comprised the
17 Slovenes; Croatia, Croats as absolute majority; in Serbia, it was the
18 Serbs; in Macedonia, the Macedonians, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina, matters
19 stood differently. There were three constituent peoples; that is to say,
20 the Serb, the Muslims and the Croats. According to the constitution of
21 SFRY and the UN charter, they had the right to self-determination. The
22 Serbs decided to remain within Yugoslavia; the Croats supported the
23 independence of Croatia, believing that a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina
24 would be joined to Croatia. And the Muslims wanted to impose their will
25 both on the Serbs and the Croats and form an independent state of
2 Q. What did this principle of the constituency of the peoples mean
3 in terms of the consensus of the three peoples? Where did this consensus
4 have to exist? Could two peoples outvote the third in that sense? Can
5 you just briefly tell us that.
6 A. The constituency meant that you were invested with sovereignty.
7 According to the constitution of SFRY from 1974. Consensus was the only
8 possible way to decide. It was the prescribed manner of taking
9 decisions, up until the moment when the Party for Democratic Action, led
10 by Alija Izetbegovic, and the Croatian Democratic Union had not decided
11 to decide by a simple majority and end this whole story about
12 constituency and consensus. Their policy was to abolish the constituency
13 principle invested in the peoples because they had the absolute majority
14 in the organs that made all the relevant decisions. But the majority was
15 not qualified to make decisions. The majority had to include
16 representatives of all three constituent peoples, but Alija Izetbegovic
17 decided that that would no longer be so, and that, of course, caused a
18 number of problems.
19 Q. After the war, what was Alija Izetbegovic's attitude to this
20 principle of the constituent status of peoples?
21 A. He demolished that principle just before the war and that could
22 have been the main reason for the war. Because if that principle had
23 continued to be honoured, I'm convinced that the war wouldn't have
24 happened. Political solutions would have been sought instead, as the
25 Serbian Democratic Party wanted. I must say that I, myself, was never a
1 member of the SDS. But Muslims and Croats at the time felt triumphant
2 and ignored Serbian representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alija
3 Izetbegovic put a very dubious signature on the Dayton Accords, as the
4 president of a Bosnia-Herzegovina that did not exist at all, nor was he
5 its president. However, the countries that sponsored these accords
6 believed that that's the way it should be. Even at the time
7 Alija Izetbegovic continued to misrepresent himself, because he neither
8 had Bosnia nor was he the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina when he put his
9 signature on the Dayton Accords.
10 Very soon after the Dayton Accords, which envisaged a
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina as made up of two entities and three peoples, in its
12 Article 3, one entity being a Federation of Muslims and Croats in the
13 beginning, and, later it became the BH Federation, whereas, the other
14 entity was mono-ethnic, Alija Izetbegovic decided to reform the
15 Dayton Accords from inside. He asked the constitutional court of
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness slow down and repeat --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, you're invited to slow down and to -- could
19 you please resume from where you said: "Alija Izetbegovic decided to
20 reform the Dayton Accords from inside," and could you resume from there.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's what he decided. And he
22 applied to the constitutional court of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the court
23 to proclaim the constituent character of all the three people, Serb,
24 Croats, and Muslims; that is to say, Bosniaks in the whole territory of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The constitutional court did that when it was made
1 up of nine judges, out of which six domestic judges and three foreign
2 ones, whereas, four domestic judges were against and two Bosniak judges
3 plus three foreigners, made this decision and proclaimed the constituent
4 character of these peoples in the whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 That was the beginning of the erosion of the Dayton Accords and
6 the disturbance of the balance established by those accords with the
7 mechanisms of protection given to these peoples on a joint level and
8 within the Federation.
9 Alija Izetbegovic, when he had to abolish that constitutional
10 character, did that and war ensued. And when he had to continue on the
11 path of war by political means, he asked for and obtained the
12 constitutional status for three peoples in the whole territory of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina in the conviction that, in that way, he would achieve
14 the domination of Bosniak Muslims in the whole territory of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, as a result of that policy by Izetbegovic, we
16 have across the board outvoting against the Croats in the Federation of
17 Muslims and Croats, and the same thing is being imposed on the Serbs.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, when you said "and war ensued," which war
19 did you have on your mind? Because were talking about what happened
20 after Dayton, and then war ensued. Which war did you have on your mind?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it is well known in theory
22 and even in practice that the war objectives of Alija Izetbegovic --
23 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... witness, if you
24 just tell me what war you had in mind. You said "war ensued," and that
25 was after --
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Political war.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Political war. Thank you.
3 Please proceed.
4 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. How did the Serb politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina react to the
6 erosion of this -- these constitutional principles?
7 A. They demanded that these constitutional principles, the first of
8 them being the constituent character of peoples, be honoured. But they
9 were ignored. And the Serbs decided that within the Parliament of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, among their own representatives, they should organise
11 themselves in order to be able to carry on the political struggle against
12 the political representatives of Muslims and Croats who were, by that
13 time, united, allied. I believe everyone knows - and the Court knows -
14 that until 1993, the ethnic group which, under the constitution of
15 Yugoslavia, was called Muslims changed its name to Bosniaks, and that is
16 the sense in which I use the term "Muslims" until 1993.
17 So, the Serbs decided that their deputies to the Parliament of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina should organise themselves into a deputies club of the
19 Serbs and to try to ensure that the constitution continued to be
21 I want to add that Communism recognised the fact that the
22 constituent character of peoples is an important thing for peace in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this constituent status was abolished by
24 Izetbegovic, not because he was promoting universal human rights and
25 civil society, but because he was reckoning that he had the majority and
1 that the Muslims, which in the last census before the war, made up 46
2 per cent of the population - that is to say, the majority - were able to
3 impose their will.
4 Q. How did the opposition parties view this idea of the cessation of
6 A. You mean parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
7 Q. Yes. Including your party.
8 A. The party that I belonged to split because the Muslim and Croat
9 members of that party supported the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
10 whereas, I personally did not support that policy. And the party
12 As a rule, Bosniak members of that party continued to promote the
13 policies of the SDA, the Croat members went on to support secession,
14 whereas we Serbs continued to work for the preservation of Yugoslavia.
15 SDP, formerly the Communist party, split in the same way, along ethnic
16 lines, and there was practically no opposition from then on to ethnic
17 rifts. Everybody believed, and I was a witness to that, that it was
18 impossible to achieve consensus and respect for everyone and that under
19 such extraordinary circumstances it was quite natural to promote the
20 protection of the people that one belongs to, especially since I was able
21 to see that others do not wish to respect others. They only want
22 majority rule. Therefore, I had no hesitation in joining the Assembly of
23 the Serbian People that was organised in November 1991 as a member of an
24 opposition party, but I did not join the SDS. Throughout the war, I
25 remained an independent MP and I was convinced that, in that way, I was
1 meeting my obligation to the people I belonged to and that it was only
2 fair. I still believe that today.
3 Apart from very few people whose voices were not heard, everybody
4 in all ethnic groups thought the same.
5 Q. During this trial, we heard a lot about the referendum on the
6 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What were the consequences of taking
7 this decision on the referendum?
8 A. I must say that before that, on the 25th of January, 1992 --
9 Q. I meant the decision to organise the referendum in the October of
10 the previous year.
11 A. When the Serbian people turned out for --
12 Q. No. I meant taking the decision to organise the referendum that
13 would be held in February 1992, the declaration of the SDA.
14 A. Oh, the declaration of the SDA. That complicated everything in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina to the maximum. But I believe in January 1992, the
16 decision was taken to organise the referendum and that decision was taken
17 without the participation of the Serbs. Not only the Serbs from the SDS,
18 but without also the Serbs who were independent deputies.
19 In November, when the Assembly of the Serbian People of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina was formed, the main purpose of that assembly was to
21 fight for equality in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was ignored, of
22 course. And, thus, we reached the point of that illegal referendum
23 because it did not respect the constitutional decisions on respect for
24 all peoples. It was instead a manifestation of the political will and
25 the arrogance of the Muslims and Croats. Today, when I speak to Croats
1 from that time - and I know many of them - many of them say that, at that
2 time, they were going to the referendum in the belief that it was a way
3 of supporting the independence of Croatia; but in hindsight, today, they
4 think they would never have turned out for the referendum otherwise.
5 Because it was not only a referendum on the unilateral secession, but it
6 was also the beginning of the majority rule of Muslims over Croats.
7 That referendum was organised on the basis of an invalid decision
8 of the Parliament at the time when the Badinter Commission had already
9 been established to deal with the issues of Yugoslavia, and that
10 commission pronounced that this decision on the referendum was not valid
11 because it did not reflect the will of the people, and that's why
12 Izetbegovic was forced to push on with the referendum and it was carried
13 by the Muslims. The referendum took place on the last day of
14 February and the first day of March. Only Croats and Muslims turned out.
15 As far as I know, the turnout was 64 per cent, which is exactly the share
16 of Muslims and Croats in the population, and the majority of them, of
17 course, voted for the proclamation of independence.
18 That decision did not take into account the constitutional
19 principle that any change of status in the country must be supported by
20 more than two-third majority, and the Croats and Muslims did not have a
21 two-third majority that was necessary to proclaim an independent state.
22 Q. Let me ask one more thing before the break.
23 Under what conditions were the Muslim and Croat political leaders
24 prepared to insist on the secession of Bosnia from the Federation of
1 A. Alija Izetbegovic stated in Parliament that he was prepared to
2 sacrifice peace for an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina and thus ushered
3 the people into war. In other words, war could begin, because he called
4 for it.
5 Q. It's time for the break. We'll continue after the break.
6 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take a break of 20 minutes, Mr. Dodik. You
7 may follow the usher. We'd like to see you back after 20 minutes.
8 [The witness stands down]
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, you are putting very broad questions to
10 the witness which results in a mixture of facts and a lot of opinion as
11 well. Could you please try to be as focussed as possible.
12 We take a break, and we resume at five minutes to 11.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: While we're waiting for the witness to be escorted
16 into the courtroom, Mr. Lukic, could you tell us whether we have a fully
17 booked schedule this week? Because, if not, one would, I think, for next
18 week we have only one witness scheduled. And could it be considered to
19 add that witness to the -- to this week so that we could already start
20 because that would accommodate very much one of us who has to do a lot
21 of --
22 MR. LUKIC: We will definitely check that, Your Honour. I cannot
23 answer you with the information that I have.
24 JUDGE ORIE: To push forward the witness who is scheduled for
25 next week and see whether he can start or even complete his testimony
1 this week.
2 MR. LUKIC: Hold on. I don't know which witness. I know one we
3 cannot shift around at all --
4 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know which one, but the one who is schedule
5 at this moment for next week. I think it is Mr. Pavlovic.
6 MR. LUKIC: That witness, I think you are talking about, is a
7 protected witness and -- no?
8 JUDGE ORIE: No. I'm thinking it is --
9 MR. LUKIC: He is. If it's the first witness for the next week,
10 it's protected witness.
11 JUDGE ORIE: I think we have a --
12 MR. LUKIC: And he should be escorted by the lawyer.
13 [The witness takes the stand]
14 JUDGE ORIE: One -- one second, please. One second, please.
15 I have at this moment -- I have two witnesses for next week, one
16 of them is Mr. Pavlovic, viva voce expert witness.
17 MR. LUKIC: Yes. But we do not have the decision for
18 Mr. Pavlovic yet, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: No. I know that. You get that very soon. If that
20 assists you, we'll certainly accommodate you as quickly as we can. But,
21 meanwhile, let's proceed with the examination-in-chief of Mr. Dodik.
22 Mr. Dodik, apologies for dealing with administrative matters when
23 you entered the courtroom.
24 And, Mr. Lukic, please keep in mind what I said before the break.
25 MR. LUKIC: I will. Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Towards the end of our previous session,
2 Judge Orie observed that some of my questions were rather general. Let
3 me ask you whether you are telling us what you told us from personal
4 experience or was it somebody else who told you what was happening in the
5 joint Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
6 A. I was present there for days and nights practically on end, and I
7 listened to people. I was a witness of talks.
8 Q. Did you participate in voting?
9 A. Yes, of course, whenever it was on the agenda.
10 Q. We mentioned the SDA memorandum. It is called, "The act on
11 reconfirmation of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina." That's the
12 official title, and the other one is the colloquial. The representatives
13 of Croatian and Bosnian people withdrew from the federal organs of SFRY
14 after that. It all took place on the 15th of October, 1991. How did
15 that event, how did the 15th of October, 1991 affect you and your party?
16 A. Well, it was --
17 Q. Did you remain in the Parliament, did you remain a member of your
18 party? Can you explain the situation for us, please.
19 A. That was an act of unilateral secession that was unlawful, which
20 did not observe the procedure that was envisaged for the changes of
21 status in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unilateral secession is not envisaged by
22 international law either. And the declaration itself was completely
23 false. It requested the reconfirmation of the sovereignty of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina was never a sovereign country,
25 never in history, and the territory --
1 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... would you mind
2 to focus on the question. Because this Chamber has heard a lot about
3 what has happened on the 15th of October. So the facts are, to that
4 extent, presented to us by both parties, and the question specifically
5 focussed on did you remain a member of your party, did you explain --
6 whether you could explain that.
7 So could you please focus your answer on that question.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will, but I understood that the
9 question was how I felt. In order to explain how I felt, I had to say
10 what I previously stated. But specifically: Of course, it was contrary
11 to my own views and it was contrary to what I knew about the procedures
12 about legality and the legitimacy. I was disappointed, I was embarrassed
13 and I previously explained that the party that I had been a member of had
14 already ceased to exist. Its members including us, the deputies, could
15 not get together and adopt our positions any longer.
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Talking with your colleagues of other ethnicities in the
18 Parliament, the Croat, the Muslims, and the Serbs too, could you see
19 whether they were aware of the dangers that might result from this issue
20 of secession?
21 A. The Muslims were in euphoria. They believed that they were one
22 step from forming a country in which they would be the dominant
23 decision-making majority by abolishing the principles of constituency,
24 they believed that together with the Croats this would have a sufficient
25 majority to make decisions in Bosnia-Herzegovina as the majority.
1 However, that was not sufficient. So the Bosniaks were convinced that
2 they were doing a good thing, regardless of the fact that they outvoting
3 others and violating procedures and doing that a continuous manner. The
4 Croats, on the other hand, believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina was
5 unimportant for them. It was important to legalize and accept the
6 declaration and establishing of independent state of Croatia and most of
7 them represented it like that. So joint actions with the Bosnians and
8 making decisions jointly at the time, it was done only as a way of
9 supporting the independence of Croatia rather than true support for the
10 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 Q. How did the Serbs react after this, and after being
12 systematically outvoted in the joint Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
13 A. Well, of course, we continued with the attempts to work in the
14 parliamentary bodies and the Parliament itself but that was very
15 difficult and unsuccessful. I already said that, on 21st of November in
16 1991, practically all MPs or all MPs for the SDS and us who were already
17 independent at the time got together in the Parliament building in
18 Sarajevo and declared the founding of the Parliament of the Serbian
19 people, or the Assembly of the Serbian People, meaning to formulate joint
20 proposals that we would later present in talks with the Muslims and the
21 Croats. That was all it was. Because the Muslims and the Croats had
22 already been homogenised and this only seemed like a logical and
23 legitimate step. Personally, regardless of the fact that I wasn't a
24 member of the SDS then or ever after that, I believed that it was
25 necessary for me to be there. Any policy outside the representation of
1 my people was practically impossible.
2 Q. The SDA, except for being organised politically, was it organised
3 in any other sense?
4 A. Yes. That was one of the key moments in the preparations for
5 war. The so-called Patriotic League was formed. It was the military
6 wing of the political party of democratic action that brought together
7 the Bosniaks. In addition to the fact that, formally and legally, the
8 Yugoslav People's Army was still the only legal army at the time,
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a socialist republic had the right to organise its
10 own Territorial Defence so it was the only entity that could do that.
11 There was also the Ministry of Interior of the Bosnia-Herzegovina, that
12 is to say, the police. In spite of all that, the SDA decided to form the
13 Patriotic League, the armed wing of the party, whose role could be seen
14 later in many of the events that followed.
15 Q. Could you just briefly tell us whether history had affected the
16 way people think in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 A. History is being lived there. It was so at the time and it
18 continues to be like that. The historical context, the historical
19 developments in the area, affect the thought process of Bosniaks, Serbs,
20 and Croats as the dominant factor. It's a country in which consensus was
21 ever hard to achieve. The three peoples were never on one and the same
22 side in any important historical events. They were always on different
23 positions as a rule, and antagonistic and inimical, not just in 1990s but
24 throughout history. The fact that shows that best that, is for example,
25 in Bosnia-Herzegovina even today or at the time either, it was not
1 possible to harmonise anything. So that Bosnia-Herzegovina today has
2 only two holidays that have been harmonised, the new year and Victory
3 Day. Not a single historical event that would be celebrated jointly. If
4 it is celebrated, then the peoples are on opposite sides.
5 Q. Let me now return to the forming of the Assembly of the Serbian
7 Before it was formed, did the Serb side attempt to make any
8 agreements that was mentioned, but can you tell us anything specifically
9 about such attempts.
10 A. It's a fact that the Executive Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina or
11 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time still had the Serbian
12 representatives. They were not withdrawn and it tells you all. Momcilo
13 Krajisnik as the Parliament Speaker regularly convened Parliament
14 sessions in an attempt to observe the procedures and to -- have the
15 issues resolved by putting them on the agenda of the Parliament. I know
16 that there were attempts to hold talks between Karadzic and Izetbegovic.
17 At the time, I think that Kljuic was the president of the HDZ. We waited
18 long for them in the various rooms in the Parliament, waiting to see if
19 they would reach an agreement. So I used to sit there with others
20 waiting for them to come out with some proposals. What I could hear was
21 that the Serbs proposed the mechanism of protection of peoples when
22 making decisions. They requested that there should be no outvoting when
23 major issues were discussed but that was, of course, refused as we know
25 Q. How did conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina begin?
1 A. I already said --
2 Q. I mean the armed conflict.
3 A. In the neighbouring Croatia, which was still one and the same
4 country, certainly mentally and also formally, that was where the armed
5 conflict started, but the first casualties fell far from the areas where
6 Serbs were dominant in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was in the Krajina, the
7 Bosnian Krajina as it was called at the time, and there were also victims
8 in Sarajevo, when at a Serbian wedding the bridegroom's father was killed
9 which upset the entire Serbian community at the time. But it was
10 considered to be a terrorist act, something that was unacceptable as it
11 was a wedding, and that for ethnic reason, hatred of the Serbs, someone
12 believed himself motivated enough to kill the bridegroom's father who was
13 a member of the wedding party. Of course, after that, the activities of
14 the previously mentioned Patriotic League took place in Bosanski Brod
15 area and in some other places, practically as a series of events.
16 Perhaps I should draw everyone's attention to another thing.
17 Then, in those first months, the death of one person was a very
18 disturbing fact. Unfortunately, later during the war, numbers of victims
19 would cause less media attention than this one single death caused at the
20 beginning of the war. So, of course, then the conflicts followed.
21 Q. You mentioned Bosanski Brod. Did Bosnian politicians go to the
22 place of that incident in the village of Sijekovac in the municipality of
23 Bosanski Brod?
24 A. Yes, some of the politicians were there. I think Fikret Abdic
25 was there; Biljana Plavsic was there. What we knew then, and it was
1 noted at the time, that the victims were civilians. However, the events
2 that were catching up overshadowed that visually and mentally so the
3 incident was never investigated sufficiently. Only after the war was
4 that matter looked into further but it was known that the Patriotic
5 League committed crimes against the Serbian civilians in that village,
6 and that was not something that was disputed by anyone.
7 Q. Immediately before the war, before the conflicts broke out, did
8 you attend meetings where key political topics were discussed as well as
9 the strategy of the Serbian side?
10 A. I've already stated that I was a member of the Assembly of the
11 Serbian People which was later the Assembly of Republika Srpska, the
12 National Assembly of Republika Srpska. I did take part in most of the
13 meetings whenever I was able to attend them then and, of course, later
14 during the war as well. I know that the assembly was adopting all the
15 important constitutive laws for the establishment of Republika Srpska. I
16 voted in favour of many of those documents. I considered them to be
17 legal and legitimate. As I said, the SFRY constitution envisaged that
18 the sovereignty should rest with the peoples, that the Serbian people had
19 the right to their sovereignty and to their own decisions. So
20 practically in all the constituent documents, I was present when they
21 were being adopted. This was on the 21st of November and then later at
22 an assembly sessions that were held in Sarajevo and then later in Pale.
23 All the assembly sessions during the war. It's possible that I was
24 absent from some of them due to combat, that's possible.
25 Q. Did you attend the assembly session at which the six strategic
1 goals were discussed of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
2 A. That topic about the goals was something that appeared for a
3 while, and it required the input of people from out in the field. It
4 required definitions, setting up a certain framework relating to the
5 political goals of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of
6 course, the basis of that was the strengthening of the constitutive
7 aspect of the actual republic.
8 Q. Taking part in these numerous assembly sessions and other kinds
9 of meetings, did you ever see any kind of plan, oral or written, for
10 Muslims and Croats to be expelled from territories under Serbian control?
11 A. No. No, it wasn't even a goal. Not even an unwritten one.
12 Actually, there were attempts in the National Assembly of
13 Republika Srpska to include representatives of Bosnians from the
14 territory of Krajina who were there. I took part in conversation with
15 one of those Bosniaks who agreed to something like that, but probably
16 later, because of combat, he did not appear again. He left that area.
17 The term "ethnic cleansing" is something that I heard only later,
18 primarily from the media. It was something that appeared in the media
19 while reporting on the situation from the region. The policy at the time
20 was not a policy of ethnic cleansing.
21 Q. Were there any discussions at the assembly that would encourage
23 A. Were deputies who were casualties already at the beginning of the
24 war. There was a Serb deputy who was killed on his way back from an
25 assembly session while the joint assembly session was still working. It
1 was the deputy from Srebrenica, Zekic, he was killed. Of course, that
2 gave rise to emotions and in the throe of emotions it was very difficult
3 to control the situation. However, we took into account decisions. That
4 was important. Not just the discussions.
5 Q. You mentioned a little bit earlier that you spoke with a
6 representative of the Muslim people. Do you remember what his name was?
7 A. Perhaps you can help me.
8 Q. Mevludin Sejmenovic [phoen].
9 A. Ah, yes, yes. He was from Kozarac. He had relatives in Banja
11 Q. Could you just briefly tell us what that conversation was like,
12 what that meeting was like?
13 A. He had relatives in Banja Luka, so he was in Banja Luka. Deputy
14 Vojo Kupresanin asked me if I would go with him and speak with this man
15 and include him in our work. So I went to that house in the outskirts of
16 Banja Luka in the Vrbanja settlement and we talked with him. Of course,
17 at the time he was not quite clear on everything but he did not reject
18 outright the possibility of becoming a member of the assembly with the
19 other ethnic groups and to fight to preserve the peace which, at the time
20 was still possible. I didn't see him after that, however, and I don't
21 know what happened to him.
22 Q. We will finish a little bit earlier. I just wanted to give a
23 heads up to my colleague so he could get ready for his cross-examination.
24 Talking about the six strategic goals of the Serbian people. One
25 of those goals was the separation from the other two ethnic groups. How
1 did you understand that and how was this discussed at the assembly? What
2 does that mean?
3 A. Croats and Muslims had already separated politically and
4 institutionally. It had already happened. So it was just a matter of
5 legalising the existing situation. So I understood that as an
6 institutional political establishment and affirmation of national
7 interests. It was never stated outright nor is it stated in any document
8 that the Serbian people did not wish to agree and have a consensus with
9 the other two peoples. So I know what the discussions are about that and
10 all the back and forth. So as somebody who was politically engaged at
11 the time I would not wish to be part of a structure that was in favour of
12 divisions on the basis of ethnic cleansing, killings and so on. That was
13 not the intention. I'm not saying that perhaps in view of some events
14 that occurred later they did not contain some elements of that. However,
15 but there was no evidence that the political decisions at that time were
16 motivated by the -- the desire for physical divisions. We could explain
17 it most easily by saying that, to date, we had all lived together and
18 from now we would life side by side with each other, and that was how I
19 viewed that in the political sense, not in any other way.
20 Q. President Dodik, thank you very much. These are all the
21 questions that the Defence of General Mladic had for you. And thank you
22 very much for answering our questions.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Mr. Lukic, in your 65 ter summary other
24 subjects are mentioned but you leave them out, such as -- okay.
1 MR. LUKIC: If you want explanation I can --
2 JUDGE ORIE: No, it's up to you. But I take it that if you tell
3 us in advance what is there to be expected, that if it's different that
4 you --
5 MR. LUKIC: The first conversation actually I had with Mr. Dodik
6 last night and he had a severe migraine so I covered only topics he was
7 able to discuss and I tried to cut this examination as short as possible
8 to spare him from further suffering.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, Mr. Dodik, you'll now be cross-examined
10 by Mr. Tieger. You find Mr. Tieger to your right. Mr. Tieger is counsel
11 for the Prosecution.
12 Mr. Tieger.
13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:
15 Q. Good morning, President Dodik.
16 A. Good morning to you as well, sir.
17 Q. I'd like to begin by focussing, at least the initial part of the
18 examination, on information you have been able to provide the Court
19 previously. And just to clarify it's correct that you testified in the
20 Brdjanin case at the end of July, beginning of August 2003; correct?
21 A. That is correct, yes. We were there together, you and I. Yes.
22 Q. Well, not -- I think not in the Brdjanin case, Mr. Dodik. But we
23 were there together when you testified in the Karadzic case in 2013.
24 That's correct.
25 A. That's correct, yes.
1 Q. And in addition --
2 A. But if I may explain. I think that before I testified in the
3 Brdjanin case, you and I had several meetings, I think. I think that's
4 right, isn't it?
5 Q. That is correct, Mr. Dodik. And in addition to the meetings that
6 you and I had, just a couple of weeks before the Brdjanin testimony, you
7 also gave an interview to OTP representatives about the upcoming Brdjanin
8 issues and that interview was tape-recorded. That's also correct; yes?
9 A. Yes, probably it was. You were recording it. I -- I wasn't.
10 Q. Well, I think we may have occasion to refer to that. I can show
11 you the beginning of that interview and who was present at the time.
12 A. All right.
13 Q. As I mentioned, I wanted to -- in the interests of efficiency,
14 ask you whether you stood by some of those -- some of that information
15 you provided previously. Again, I appreciate that in the Karadzic case,
16 you indicated that whatever you said in the Brdjanin case and whatever
17 was recorded you would stand by. But the nature of our process is such
18 that I will be asking you about the specific portions and asking you to
19 confirm those. So it may seem a little tedious but that's the nature of
20 the process.
21 So, first, I'd like to ask you -- you -- you provided information
22 today -- sorry, go ahead.
23 A. May I? I am going to tell you again that I stand by what I
24 officially said before this Tribunal in the Karadzic and the Brdjanin
25 case and what I was telling you in informal meetings was perhaps part of
1 an impression or something, but in any case, I can always stand behind my
2 publicly expressed positions here before this Tribunal. So I can
3 understand your attempt now to look for inconsistencies, but I would not
4 wish to change anything I said in the Plavsic case, in the Brdjanin case,
5 and in the Karadzic case. I would not wish to change any word, line,
6 sentence. I stand by all of that.
7 Q. Thank you for that, sir. Earlier today you were asked about the
8 three national parties. You provided some focussed information about
9 what you considered to be aspects of the SDA, and were relatively brief
10 about the SDS, so I wanted to ask you more about the SDS, particularly in
11 light of what you said before.
12 So when you testified in the Brdjanin case, and I'm going to call
13 up the particular transcripts so the parties and the Court can see it and
14 well. That's 65 ter 33545. And that was on the first day of your
15 testimony. E-court page 25, please.
16 A. If I may assist, it's all right. What I said. It's okay. I --
17 I don't know what you're trying to say.
18 Q. Maybe --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, let Mr. Tieger just ask his questions and
20 there's no need also for us to understand what you are still standing by.
21 We would have to know what it was. So, therefore, wait for Mr. Tieger's
23 THE WITNESS: Okay.
24 MR. TIEGER:
25 Q. And I appreciate the effort at moving us along.
1 You were asked at transcript page 20468 of that case: "Was the
2 party controlled from the top?"
3 Referring to the SDS and you answered:
4 "Yes, absolutely. Mr. Karadzic was the president of that party,
5 which had its Main Board."
6 And later in that -- on that same page, you were asked and then
7 continuing, I think -- yeah, later on the same page: "Now, if the
8 Main Board issued instructions, were the Municipal Boards and regional
9 boards obliged to carry out those instructions?"
10 And you answered: "Yes, that was quite clear. This was a firmly
11 organised political party with clear-cut hierarchy and superior --
13 So I just want to ask if you stand by that particular portion of
14 what you said in the Brdjanin case.
15 A. Of course, I do. And it's absolutely correct. Just as it
16 applied to all the political parties at that time, there was a
17 hierarchical structure, a common policy, the president, the Main Board,
18 which runs that party. I said that I wasn't a member of it but it was
19 evident that the Municipal Boards and the lower-ranking organisational
20 units, those forms of organisation, were in keeping with the policy that
21 prevailed at the time. And this was something that was confirmed by the
22 Main Board of that party.
23 Is it possible for me to have the transcript in Serbian before
25 Q. Unfortunately, Mr. Dodik, we don't have Serbian translations of
1 the document which is why I'm reading very slowly and also ensuring that
2 Mr. Lukic is aware of what page I'm referring to so he can follow it as
4 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue dealing with all the testimony,
5 Mr. Lukic, I saw in the Defence exhibit list, reference to testimony in
6 the Karadzic case 2nd of February, 2011. Whereas I'm now hearing that it
7 was 2013. And any explanation for ...
8 MR. LUKIC: It says on the document it's 2013.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I have got a copy which says 2011, but
10 perhaps -- and that says Defence exhibits for Witness Dodik, Milorad,
11 viva voce. That gives one exhibit number; that's "The Islamic
12 Declaration" and then prior testimony, one, two, three and there it says
14 MR. LUKIC: Yes, that's our mistake, our typo. But I don't think
15 that the Prosecution had a problem with locating the previous testimony
16 of ...
17 JUDGE ORIE: I just wondering whether I'm missing something and
18 so where you earlier said it says 2013, you say it may be a mistake that
19 the document says 2011.
20 MR. LUKIC: No the document says '13, the transcript. The
21 transcript says '13. It's typo on our information report on our table.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. So the information report is not
24 MR. LUKIC: That's right, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. Turning to the next page, e-court page 26, you were asked how
4 strong was the control and discipline that was exercised by the SDS over
5 these bodies where they were the controlling party. And you answered:
6 "I think that this party was internally highly homogenised and it
7 functioned in a highly disciplined fashion."
8 And you confirm that today as well?
9 A. Of course, I think it should be noted that I said I think; I
10 wasn't in the party. Of course, this also applied to the HDZ and the
11 SDA. They were the same.
12 Q. On the next page, e-court page 27, you were asked what happened
13 to members of the SDS who didn't agree with some of the decisions that
14 were made.
15 And you responded: "Well, I think that they were minimised then,
16 and that they turned passive."
17 I take it you confirm that as well, sir?
18 A. That happens still today. In my own party. I do confirm it.
19 Yes, of course, I do.
20 Q. At page 50 of the e-court, and that's transcript page 20493,
21 continuing onto your testimony on July 31st, 2003, you were asked: "So
22 as far as the authorities in Banja Luka during this period May of 1992
23 until around September, the decision-making was that being made by the
24 SDS? Is that what you're saying?"
25 And you answered: "Well, the SDS was the party in power, and at
1 that time it certainly conceived of the policy that was pursued at the
2 time by the organs that functioned as state organs."
3 And I presume you confirm that?
4 A. That is very logical. My party today also sets policy and does
5 that in the government, so that's how it was there too. I -- I confirm
6 what is there, and I'm just adding what I have said now.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Tieger, it would be very helpful for
8 everybody in the courtroom, especially for the interpreters and
9 transcriber, to indicate from which line you are reading.
10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. I will do that.
11 Q. Let's turn back to page 26 of the e-court. That's 20469 and on
12 this occasion lines 9 through 15. The question was asked: "Now, we've
13 spoken about the community of municipalities and then the Autonomous
14 Region of Krajina and the Assembly. You were not a member of the
15 assembly, I think you've already told us. What sort of authority did
16 that regional assembly have in respect of the municipal assemblies of the
17 various municipalities that made up the autonomous region."
18 And you answered the: "The assembly and the executive organ that
19 was formed later, regulated all of life, political, economic, cultural,
20 all segments of life. Decisions were passed and these decisions were
21 observed by the municipalities that were members of these regional
22 committees [sic]."
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Communities.
24 MR. TIEGER: Communities. Excuse me, misspoke.
25 Q. I take it you confirm that, Mr. Dodik?
1 A. Yes, that's how it was. May I just ask something about this?
2 What is the document that you are presenting to me? It's my -- was that
3 my testimony in the Brdjanin case or is that my conversation or my
4 interview with you before that?
5 Q. Yeah, so you won't -- there's no risk of confusion, Mr. Dodik,
6 I'm talking it one step at a time. This is the transcript of your
7 testimony from the first day in the -- you testified in the Brdjanin
8 case. When I move to the second day, I will move you. And when I move
9 to the tape-recorded interview, I will also advise you explicitly.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. If we turn to page 47 of the e-court which would be 20490 in the
12 paginated version. Lines 13 through 17.
13 You were asked: "Now you've told us that the regional assembly
14 because of the hierarchies established within the SDS had power over the
15 municipal assemblies. Did the regional Crisis Staff, when it was set up,
16 have the same powers as the assembly?"
17 And you answered: "I think so."
18 You confirm that?
19 A. I think so, yes. But I did not have sufficient insight into all
20 of that.
21 Q. Turning to e-court page 77, transcript page 20520, lines 13
22 through 19, no excuse me. Let me -- turn to e-court page... 78. At
23 line -- transcript page 20521, and beginning at lines 3, you were asked:
24 "How about a gentleman named Ljuban Ecim? How powerful was he?"
25 You answered: "I think that he was a highly positioned member of
1 the state security ... in Banja Luka, in that region. I think that he
2 was deputy chief of that service."
3 Question again was: "You mentioned in some conversations that
4 you had with another Prosecutor, Mr. Tieger, that you saw him as being
5 Karadzic's protege, a person who was close to Arkan, and you said that
6 nothing could be done in Banja Luka without passing it through state
7 security, through him. Do you still believe that to be the case?"
8 And you answered: "In a certain period of time, yes."
9 The question was asked --
10 A. It's common knowledge that Mr. Ecim was in the state security and
11 that this State Security Department was under the influence of the state
12 authorities. That's quite logical.
13 As for the rest, it's a matter of perception that can be accurate
14 or not. In any case, at the time, that's what it appeared to me.
15 Q. And the conversation -- the -- the questioning on the subject
17 So you were asked: "You said, this on page 3 of those notes:
18 The fame and notoriety called of Ljuban's group was very strong
19 everywhere in Banja Luka and everyone lived in fear of that group. He
20 was, on the one hand, Karadzic's protege in Banja Luka, and on the other
21 hand, he was very close to Arkan and his people. He managed to create
22 the impression that he was Karadzic's person there and that he was
24 And you answered: "Yes."
25 A. Yes. I have already said that was my perception, that's what it
1 looked like. Whether it was accurate, time has shown.
2 Q. And if we could turn to page 84 of the e-court, transcript page
4 JUDGE ORIE: May I seek clarification of the last answer.
5 You said whether it was accurate, time has shown.
6 Now, that's ambiguous because time could have shown that it was
7 or that it was not accurate. Did you intend to say that time has shown
8 that it was accurate?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've already said that that was the
10 general perception. And to the question whether he was close to Karadzic
11 and Arkan, I said yes. In the time since then, I believe various studies
12 have shown that. I did not express any views of mine.
13 JUDGE ORIE: No, I see that. But when you said time has shown,
14 you were referring to studies which confirm what your impression was at
15 the time.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't know whether it was
17 confirmed or proven wrong. I didn't go into that, but the perception was
18 as reflected in the transcript.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I'm informed that if you move to page 84
24 in - I take it that's the e-court page - there's private session.
25 MR. TIEGER: Yes. And it was based on Mr. Dodik's request at the
1 time and the Karadzic case this very same issue was raised and Mr. Dodik
2 indicated he didn't consider that necessary so this discussion took place
3 in public and I -- I assumed that for essentially if they could be
4 considered protective measures previously they had been varied by the
5 Karadzic Chamber in light of the witness's request. We can redact it and
6 move into private session if you think that's best.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I'm not -- I'm just informed. Was it
8 officially, was the confidentiality officially lifted or do you just say
9 that the way in which they dealt with it in the Karadzic case shows that
10 confidentiality was ...
11 MR. TIEGER: I can read the precise line to you and maybe better
12 to go into private session for the moment and I can do that.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course, we want to be rather precise on the
14 procedural aspects of lifting confidentiality.
15 We move into private session for a second.
16 [Private session]
11 Pages 42246-42248 redacted. Private session.
20 [Open session]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Witness -- Mr. ... what's -- Mr. Lukic, could you
22 check with Mr. Mladic what is of his concern.
23 MR. LUKIC: The break is here so I will check it.
24 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
1 We'll take a break, and we'll resume at 20 minutes past 12.00,
2 but not until after the witness has followed the usher.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
5 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take the break.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.00 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 12.23 p.m.
8 [The witness takes the stand]
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dodik, we'll continue.
11 Mr. Tieger.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. Let me ask you this: Karadzic, Krajisnik, Stanisic, Mandic,
14 Zupljanin and Ecim were part of one small compact team and they were the
15 most powerful people on their respective levels at the time. Even later,
16 regardless of where they went, they still cling together.
17 Can you confirm the accuracy of that, Mr. Dodik?
18 A. Well, their appointments to various positions at that time
19 enabled them to be in power. Just as I now today have the powers of the
20 president of the republic, they had certain powers at that time, and they
21 were in a position to co-operate with each other. So they had these
22 formal positions. They got a lot of media coverage, regardless of the
23 situation. The security situation was grave at the time, and, of course,
24 people wanted the opinion of the minister of the interior. How else?
25 You can also interpret it in the way you did, in the way you formulated
2 Q. All right. May I -- I'm going to this at that case I think is
3 best to tender the excerpt from case previously identified, in the
4 transcript reference previously identified.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Only this page, then.
6 Mr. Lukic, any problem with that?
7 MR. LUKIC: No, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: And earlier I think the -- we heard the witness say
9 something about the accuracy of what he testified about before in this
11 You have not uploaded that one page. Then, Mr. Registrar, could
12 we reserve a number for the one page still to be uploaded and to be --
13 sought to be admitted under seal.
14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P7756, under seal, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that number is reserved.
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Q. Mr. Dodik, I'm going to move on to the second day of your
19 testimony in the Brdjanin case. That was August 1st, 2003. That is
20 reflected at 65 ter 33546, and I'd like to turn, first, to e-court page 9
21 which is transcript 20542, lines 2 through 9.
22 And you were asked: "You talked yesterday in response to some
23 questions from Ms. Korner about discipline within the ranks of the SDS,
24 and you told us that someone who openly disagreed with SDS policy would
25 be punished and termed a traitor and disciplined in some way. Can you
1 name anyone and specifically from the Krajina area, who was disciplined
2 because of their disagreement with SDS policy? "
3 And you answered: "In those days, or generally speaking for the
4 whole period?"
5 And the response came back: "In those days, I'm talking about
6 translate 1991 and through the fall of 1992."
7 And you answered: "I can confirm that the SDS was a compact,
8 well-structured organisation in which the hierarchy was respected. And I
9 do know that differing views, even though they wanted to present
10 themselves as a democratic party, were not really tolerated, especially
11 not at that time. And still less was their tolerance for behaviour that
12 could be interpreted as not being in conformity with the policy of the
13 party. I can't remember a single name, but there were many people in the
14 past who were in the SDS and because they acted differently, they left
15 the party. I think that Mr. Brdjanin himself left the SDS later on."
16 And can you confirm that transcript reference, Mr. Dodik?
17 A. Even now in my party I have many people from the former SDS.
18 What am I supposed to confirm? What I said or can I comment.
19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... accuracy of what you said.
20 I'm not looking for an expansion, in particular, and so I'm not inviting
21 it, but if you feel one is necessary for some reason, I'm not precluding
23 So essentially as I indicated before, I just am asking you to
24 whether you stand by that testimony in the Brdjanin case?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 A. Yes, I stand by it, and I've said before I stand by everything
3 I've ever said before this court.
4 Perhaps there's one thing that should be added. At least it
5 seems to me now that the question was formulated in such a way as to
6 require someone to say that somebody had a -- ruled the SDS with an iron
7 hand. I had not noticed that before, but now I would like to say this.
8 The SDS was a voluntary organisation, and there was self-discipline at
9 lower levels and the higher level was respected in its decisions. It was
10 rather compact, but nobody was physically forced to comply. There was no
11 repression. There was just acceptance of that policy.
12 So, if somebody later on came into conflict, they would either
13 leave the party or would be disciplined by the party, according to their
14 rules. I don't see any problem with that because that's the way it still
16 Q. I'd like to move next to e-court page 10 and 11 from the same day
17 of testimony. And at transcript page 20543, you were asked to look at an
18 interview dated 27 February 1992. That's found at about lines 9 and 10
19 of that page. An interview conducted of Mr. Brdjanin and Mr. Krajisnik.
20 Then you were asked: "Krajisnik at the time was probably one of the top
21 three most powerful people in the SDS. Would you agree with that?"
22 Your answer was: "Yes. He was a strong man of the SDS."
23 And then moving on to -- you were then asked if there was a
24 disagreement or if that interview reflected a disagreement between
25 Brdjanin and Krajina about two or three matters. You said: "Yes, it's
1 visible their views differed."
2 Then asked: "Was Brdjanin, in effect, in this public interview
3 diverging from the SDS line and the SDS policy?"
4 You said: "Yes, that can be seen in the positions that are
5 reviewed here."
6 And then on the next page you stated: "Later on, Karadzic came
7 to Banja Luka to discipline the Banja Luka organisation, and after that,
8 the organisation came under the direct control of the top leadership in
10 And do you stand by that testimony, Mr. Dodik?
11 A. I don't see any difference with what I've said here earlier
12 today. But in any case, it is quite customary for political parties at
13 lower levels to have to comply with decisions of the higher level, and
14 when there is a problem or a conflict, higher level has to deal with it.
15 I think that it is quite proper and I have no proper in confirming that
16 such things happened. I will say again I was not a member of the SDS,
17 and I could only draw inferences based on things I saw or the perception
18 that was created at that time.
19 Q. Well, just to be fair, those inferences that you drew and
20 explained in the Brdjanin case were based on not only what you saw, but
21 discussions you had with members of various parties at various times,
22 including those which confirmed your impressions; right?
23 A. A lot of time has passed, but I confirm what is written there.
24 Q. I'd like to turn next to the interview, the tape-recorded
25 interview, you gave to representatives of the Office of the Prosecutor a
1 couple of weeks before you testified in the Brdjanin case. That's 65 ter
2 24921 -- 33531, excuse me. An interview conducted in Banja Luka on the
3 17th of July, 2003.
4 A. Did I know that it was being tape-recorded?
5 Q. Yeah, let's turn to the -- and the -- let's turn to the first
6 page of that interview. In both Serbian and English. Mr. Grady
7 introduces himself as an investigator working for the ICTY and for the
8 Office of the Prosecutor. He identifies the certified interpreter with
9 him and the very first thing he asks is: "Now, Mr. Dodik, are you aware
10 that this conversation is being tape-recorded.
11 Your response is: "Yes, I am."
12 And Mr. Grady asks then: "And we have your permission?"
13 And you respond: "Yes, you do."
14 I'd like to turn then to page 3 of the interview in English and
15 page 3 in Serbian.
16 Mr. Grady asks you: "What do you feel was the purpose of this
17 community of Bosanska Krajina municipalities? Why put these
18 municipalities together."
19 And you responded: "The SDS that presented itself at the time as
20 the protector of the Serbian people publicly said and spoke that the
21 Serbian people had to be protected from the Ustasha and other massacres
22 as they used to say. Very often, they would go back to the stories from
23 the Second World War, although factually, and in, in essence, the idea
24 was to gain power and to gain control over the whole area and to
25 rule through the social institutions."
1 Do you stand by that answer given on July 17th, 2003, Mr. Dodik?
2 A. I don't confirm anything that I've said to you outside of this
4 MR. TIEGER: Then I would tender this excerpt, Mr. President.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P7757, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
8 How many pages is it, Mr. Tieger?
9 MR. TIEGER: This is one page, Mr. President. I'll have a few
10 more -- potentially a few more excerpts from the same interview.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And would that all then be separate
12 exhibits or would you join --
13 MR. TIEGER: I think they can be joined.
14 JUDGE ORIE: So you later indicate what pages they are and I take
15 it this one-page upload will then be replaced by a multi-page upload.
16 MR. TIEGER: That sounds more efficient.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
18 Witness, perhaps needless to say, the fact that you say I don't
19 confirm anything doesn't change the evidence, that that is what you have
20 said at the time and is recorded. Therefore, if you say that's not what
21 I said, I contest that the recording is accurate, we'd like to know so
22 that we can verify that, listen to the recording and ask for confirmation
23 of the accuracy both of the recording and the translation. If, however,
24 you say, Well, I don't want to confirm it, then, of course, the Chamber
25 may consider what the reason is that you, as a general statement say, I'm
1 not going to confirm anything which I didn't say in court, because why
2 not? Is there any reason? If you have changed your mind since then,
3 please let us know. Perhaps also explain to us why you have changed your
4 mind. Because then we can include that in our considerations. If,
5 however, you say, Whatever I said out of court, I -- I'm not willing to
6 confirm that without any further explanation, of course, we'll then
7 consider that situation.
8 The text is, however, then admitted into evidence.
9 THE WITNESS: Okay.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
11 MR. TIEGER: Then I'd like to turn --
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Please.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, well, if I may just -- and
15 thank you for your clarification. I could talk based on my perception
16 and, of course, my perception then and now is different. I think it
17 would be good and I'm reading what's recorded here, I don't see any
18 problems in the statement itself, especially as it's evident later that I
19 said quite clearly that I was not a member of this assembly, so I was
20 able to comment on it as someone who was an outsider. And earlier at the
21 beginning of my testimony I also talked about my perception in view of
22 the massacres of the Ustashas against the Serbs during the World War II,
23 that this was something present in the people's emotions. So it's not a
24 problem for me to confirm it, but I have to tell that you the definite
25 reason is that I used to trust earlier what the Prosecution did and I
1 trusted them more before than I do today. So that's probably the reason.
2 I'm not so certain of the objectivity of everything that the Prosecution
3 is doing. So though I respect you, having this in mind --
4 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... first of all, I
5 thought it was fair to inform you about the legal situation.
6 Second, if you say, I don't trust the Prosecution as I did
7 before, then, of course, what we primarily look at is at your answers so
8 as long as you trust yourself, that, I think, may be more important
9 because it's -- it's the statement you gave. But if you say, well, some
10 matters I could confirm; others may be a perception which has changed,
11 then, of course, perhaps sometimes you wouldn't know exactly on what a
12 perception at that time was base, what new facts there are now available
13 to you which may change your perception of the situation. So therefore,
14 I leave it to some extent to yourself, but since you gave a rather
15 sweeping statement that you're not going to confirm anything that you
16 didn't say in court, that's the reason why I raised the matter.
17 Let's move on and you now know what your options are.
18 Please proceed.
19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. And I --
21 MR. TIEGER:
22 Q. I wanted to turn next to pages 4 and 5 of the English and page 5
23 of the Serbian. You were asked: "Do you recall speeches that he made
24 within the assembly when you were a delegate with him."
25 You asked: "You mean Brdjanin?"
1 Answer was: "Yes."
2 You said: "He said what the majority of the people from the SDS
3 used to say at the time and he was active in many" --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Should we move to the next page.
5 MR. TIEGER: "Public debates."
6 JUDGE ORIE: In English.
7 MR. TIEGER: Now, in English we're moving to -- about to move to
8 the next page. This is at the very bottom.
9 "And I think with hindsight, I think that he was more active
10 verbally than actively participating in many things. There were many
11 discussions at the time about the preservations, which the SDS advocated
12 that Yugoslavia should be preserved. And I can tell you I think that his
13 nature, his personality, made him participate a great deal in that. I
14 can't remember specific things but --"
15 And then you were asked: "What do you mean by his nature and
17 And you answered: "How shall I explain. He was ... he was very
18 exposed when it came to expressing certain standpoints but if you would
19 like me to give you a psychological opinion, he was some form of a
20 choleric temper. And people like that were used very well by the SDS at
21 the local level. And when I look now it seems to me, seems to me that
22 there was a group of people that the SDS used to use and when I say the
23 SDS, I mean the leadership from Pale. And there was another line which
24 was in charge of the party obedience and they were in charge of things
25 that were happening in the field."
1 Do you stand by those answers given in July 2003, Mr. Dodik?
2 A. As I have occasion to say that I have no problem with myself or
3 my previous statements. I see no purpose in this reading out. I can
4 confirm this if that's what you need and I think this does reflect my
5 views at the time and how I saw those matters. But without intending to
6 show a lack of respect to anyone, I think that what I say should also be
8 JUDGE ORIE: Well, Mr. Dodik, you are here -- you're called by a
9 party. You have to answer questions. That's simply so. If -- if you
10 say I'd rather not answer some questions, that's not what this Court will
11 respect because you are under a duty to do so.
12 You have now said that that is how you perceived the matter at
13 the time, certainly when you gave the statement. Is your
14 nowadays-perception different from then? And if so, tell us in what
15 respect it is different, and also tell us what made you change your
17 So let's take it one by one. Is your nowadays-perception
18 different from the previous one?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As for these statements, I don't
20 have specific different perception but I'm just saying that time is also
21 a factor in all of this.
22 And as for the statements given outside the Tribunal and the
23 courtroom, let me just tell you one thing. In my political career, I
24 have given around 6.000 various political statements. I remember some of
25 them; others, I don't know. Some were politically motivated, which was
1 quite logical because that -- politics is what I do. So with regard to
2 the statements given here at the Tribunal, I stand by all the transcripts
3 and everything that was said.
4 As for something that I said outside of the courtroom, there may
5 be differences because I have not authorised the form of this statement.
6 This is the first time I see it. Or at least I don't remember that I
8 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... Witness, let's
9 try to get things straight.
10 First of all, you said your perception is not different now but
11 you say time plays a role. Then, that's still a bit ambiguous because if
12 it's the same then apparently time in this respect has not played a role.
13 But if you think that there are any difference over time that you changed
14 your perception, please tell us and we'll consider that.
15 Second, I hope that when you're interviewed as a witness or a
16 potential witness, that if you compare that with political statements
17 that you have stuck as much to the facts as any political person would do
18 if he is interviewed as a witness and not as a politician.
19 I leave it to that.
20 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
22 Q. I'd like to turn next to page 6 of the English and 6 of the
24 And in the Serbian, it's toward the bottom of the page. And in
25 the English, it's in the middle, beginning around line 14 or so. You
1 were asked -- still talking about Brdjanin in that context, of course.
2 You state -- you then refer to a very -- well, I'll read the
3 start: "Formally Brdjanin was the president, but as I said before, I
4 think there were people in this Crisis Staff that far more powerful than
5 him and all the decisions that were brought there were basically, prior
6 to that, discussed and agreed to in the SDS. Because they had
7 established a very strict party, as you say, discipline and whoever -
8 even once - didn't fit into one of their arrangements, he was eliminated
10 And then you were asked: "That was my question. How, how
11 members were chosen for this very important body, this ARK Crisis Staff
12 which certainly had influence on all the other municipal Crisis Staffs,
13 how did they, how did they choose these members?"
14 And you answered: "As I said before, it was arranged prior to
15 anything in the SDS, the party that was in power at the time, and then
16 they would appoint the people into the Crisis Staff. Because in, within
17 their party structures, they decided which people those were ..."
18 Okay. And I think... okay. Then there's a cough. Someone says
19 excuse me, and then you continue: "... and simply, the -- those people
20 were then just appointed later on" --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could we please move to the next page in the
23 MR. TIEGER:
24 Q. "And sometimes those people were those who they really didn't
25 want to be there and didn't even belong to that party. But to refuse
1 participation in this, for some people it was the same thing as
2 execution. Nobody offered me though."
3 Then you were asked: "Okay, could Brdjanin --"
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Next page in English, please.
5 MR. TIEGER: Okay. Next page, please.
6 Q. "Could Brdjanin have become president of the ARK Crisis Staff
7 without the blessing or, or authorisation of Radovan Karadzic? "
8 And you answered: "I don't think so."
9 And then moving a couple of lines down, you were asked: "And
10 these other members of the Crisis Staff, Dr. Vukic, president of the SDS
11 in Banja Luka."
12 And you answered: "Yes, he was the president of the SDS. I
13 think that, as the practical side was concerned, he was the most
14 important person in all of this. He had to have full support and
15 absolute support of the, approval of Karadzic, because without it he
16 couldn't have been the president, which also gave him power at the local
18 And then you were asked: "And are you aware of the, of the
19 co-ordination that -- that took place between the ARK Crisis Staff and
20 the various municipal Crisis Staffs within the region?"
21 And you answered: "I think that they functioned jointly and that
22 the orders that the regional Crisis Staff gave to the local Crisis Staffs
23 were respected."
24 Now, Mr. Dodik, do you stand by those answers in July 2003?
25 A. Just add at the beginning what you skipped deliberately and that
1 was that I was not a member and that I was able to say this based on my
2 conversation with certain people. As for everything else, I agree. But
3 you intentionally skipped that on the previous page. Before you started
4 reading out all this.
5 JUDGE ORIE: That is a kind of accusation. You may answer the
6 question. Whether Mr. Tieger did that deliberately or not, we'll
7 consider that. If you say you left out this and this and that's
8 important, you have an opportunity to do so. But we're not here in a
9 courtroom to say that someone is trying to mislead you or mislead this
10 Court because Mr. Tieger, first of all, we have the page there, we'll
11 read the whole of the page if it's in evidence so, therefore, there's no
12 need to make these kind of observations. Please refrain from it.
13 These two pages which are pages 6 and 7 in the hard copy will be
14 added to the excerpt that will be later uploaded under the number
16 Please proceed.
17 MR. TIEGER: And can we turn to page 15 in the English and page
18 17 -- 16, excuse me, in the Serbian. Okay.
19 Q. There, Mr. Dodik, you were asked: "Can you give me other, any
20 other sense of the, of the real hierarchy that went on within the SDS?"
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: We have to move to the next page in English.
22 MR. TIEGER: Okay.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Where are we on the B/C/S page?
24 MR. TIEGER: We should be where it begins [B/C/S spoken] it's --
25 the problem I have, there's a different pagination in this printed
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That is the --
3 MR. TIEGER: So the bottom like the bottom third, bottom second
4 third of the ...
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes.
6 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Dodik, I think you found that, where it begins
7 [B/C/S spoken] and I believe the Court has it now.
8 "Can you give me any other sense of the -- of the real hierarchy
9 that went on within the SDS and how it controlled these regions and then
10 the locally municipalities?"
11 And you answered: "Well, it's quite clear. They had their own
12 people in the municipalities, that is the Municipal Board ... presidents
13 of the Municipal Boards and the leadership of these boards and they were
14 elected with full approval of Karadzic and the leadership from Pale,
15 otherwise, they couldn't have been elected. Then, a very important part
16 was played by the delegates from that area, from his party ..."
17 And then after going briefly off tape because someone is
18 sneezing. Turn the page, please, in Serbian, you continue: "Then there
19 was their people who were posted in the media, in the police and other
20 structures and at one point, the commissioners of the SDS Main Board, of
21 the top of the SDS, were appointed, so these are the people from the core
22 leadership, who were placed in charge of a certain region."
23 Mr. Dodik, do you stand by those answers again in July of 2003.
24 A. That was the factual situation.
25 If I may add, today you cannot elect a representative of a local
1 organisation without the approval of the president of the party. That's
2 the situation today in the Balkans even today and even in my own party
3 the one of which I am the president. So that was just normal.
4 Q. Okay.
5 MR. TIEGER: I'd tender that excerpt.
6 JUDGE ORIE: That would then be at least English text on pages 15
7 and 16. And the corresponding B/C/S pages, Mr. Tieger, I take it that
8 you'll carefully select them.
9 MR. TIEGER: We will. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ORIE: They will be added to the excerpts for which a
11 number has already been assigned.
12 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
13 Q. Now, I'd like to move away for the moment from the information
14 you provided previously, Mr. Dodik, and focus a bit on some of the
15 information you provided today.
16 With regard to "The Islamic Declaration," in view of all the
17 things you've said about it, was it the case or I presume it's the case
18 that this Islamic Declaration was a hot topic at the Bosnian Serb
19 Assembly and must have been raised repeatedly by the delegates. Is that
20 accurate? Do you recall the extent to which "The Islamic Declaration"
21 was addressed by members of the Bosnian Serb Assembly or the Assembly of
22 the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 A. We were not some lunatics who were just addressing the
24 declaration. It's a fact that it was written and so we were free to
25 examine it. We adopted some constitutive acts there and we dealt with
1 issues relating to the constitution. We had in mind what was Alija
2 Izetbegovic's policy in "The Islamic Declaration" which I, myself, read
3 several times, which promotes the things it does promote. And I think
4 that any man who was involved in any degree in politics at the time was
5 aware of the contents of this declaration, not only among the Serbs but
6 among other peoples as well. And it was nothing secret. It was a
7 published document. And when Alija Izetbegovic came to the top of his
8 party, became its leader, it became more popular than ever among his
10 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... first seek to
11 clarify the question. Did you mean whether the matter was addressed in
12 assembly sessions, Mr. Tieger? Is that what you had in mind?
13 MR. TIEGER: That is a timely intervention, Mr. President. Let
14 me clarify.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and could you please focus your answer very
16 much on the question that's put to you.
17 MR. TIEGER:
18 Q. Mr. Dodik, I'm asking you how often, if at all, "The Islamic
19 Declaration" was specifically raised by members of the assembly in
20 assembly meetings. Every session, every other session, every fourth
21 session, once in a blue moon? How -- what's the answer?
22 A. It was never on the agenda of our assembly as an official item on
23 the agenda, but often various MPs referred to the contents of "The
24 Islamic Declaration" when they explained various positions. So if I may
25 say so now it was quite frequently, of course. But we never had an item
1 on the agenda that would be called Islamic Declaration. Never. At least
2 as far as I remember. Perhaps if I was absent it may have figured on the
3 agenda. Otherwise not.
4 Q. Well, we searched through every available transcript --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I'm afraid that there may be some
7 Witness, you were asked how often "The Islamic Declaration" was
8 addressed in the assembly meetings. Your answer was: "Often various MPs
9 referred to the contents of 'The Islamic Declaration' when they explained
10 their various positions."
11 Now, did they refer to the content without saying this is to be
12 found in "The Islamic Declaration," or did they refer to the content of
13 "The Islamic Declaration" by mentioning that it was to be found in "The
14 Islamic Declaration."
15 You can implicitly refer to, you can explicitly refer to it as
16 being found in "The Islamic Declaration." Could you tell us when you
17 said they often referred to it, were those explicit references to "The
18 Islamic Declaration" or implicit references.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Most frequently it was discussed as
20 written and stated in Alija Izetbegovic's "The Islamic Declaration", et
21 cetera, et cetera.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Specifically mentioning that document ...
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm talking about people who
24 participated in the discussion and who, when explaining their positions,
25 talked about various dangers and then they would say that such-and-such a
1 thing was written in Alija Izetbegovic's "The Islamic Declaration."
2 That's what I heard quite often.
3 JUDGE ORIE: That's clarified now.
4 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
5 MR. TIEGER:
6 Q. Well, Mr. Dodik, we searched through the transcripts of the
7 Bosnian Serb Assembly sessions, beginning with the first, and going on
8 though all those in our possession which are basically the chronological
9 versions, and we found that the first reference to "The Islamic
10 Declaration" explicitly did not occur until the 35th Session of the
11 Bosnian Serb Assembly held on the 2nd of October, 1993, and that --
12 that's found at 65 ter 02384, at e-court page 93 and B/C/S -- or Serbian
13 page 69.
14 And that was -- waiting for the English to come up.
15 And for your benefit, Mr. Dodik, that can be found at the bottom
16 third part of Mr. Goljanin's discussion where he said:
17 "Mr. President" -- that's the third line from the bottom in English.
18 "Mr. President, I was to remind you of the declaration that was
19 in circulation three to four years ago. On one occasion at a session of
20 our earlier assembly, I even spoke about that declaration. It was "The
21 Islamic Declaration" about proclaiming an Islamic republic of BiH. There
22 were plans there, and Sokolac, Nevesinje, et cetera, were clearly
23 mentioned in the context of inhabiting Muslims. Okay, those were some
24 vague formulations, which were being spread by someone, maybe even by the
25 yellow press. But I'm getting an impression that their goal started
1 slowly to be accomplished by those concessions that were made last time,
2 because almost one-third of free Nevesinje was given to Turks ..."
3 Now, Mr. Dodik, in fact, you have no reason to contest that this
4 was the first explicit reference to "The Islamic Declaration" in the
5 Bosnian Serb Assembly, not until October 1993?
6 A. I have reasons to contest it. This declaration was mentioned
7 very often in our discussions in the discussions in the assembly as well
8 in the way that I described. Sometimes the synonym "Alija's policy" was
9 used but we were well aware of what the "The Islamic Declaration" was and
10 what it meant. But in terms of the form, I don't remember this
11 particular transcript or this particular speech.
12 MR. TIEGER: And I'd tender that excerpt, Mr. President.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. They will be added to the -- no, no, this is a
14 different transcript, yes. I'm -- I apologise.
15 Mr. Registrar.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Number reserved will be P7758, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE ORIE: And how many pages do we have here, Mr. Tieger?
18 MR. TIEGER: It's two in English, I believe and one in Serbian.
19 JUDGE ORIE: If that's all, then admitted into evidence.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Mr. Dodik, the reason - and I'm putting this to you - that "The
22 Islamic Declaration" didn't find its way into the Bosnian Serb Assembly
23 session discussions until then, was because, setting aside for the moment
24 the -- whatever views were attributed to Izetbegovic on the basis of
25 something he wrote back in the 1970s, it was widely known that Bosnian
1 Muslims were highly Europeanised and not particularly religious, much
2 less radical fundamentalists. Isn't that the case?
3 A. It's possible that you see it that way, but how come that so many
4 people rallied around Alija Izetbegovic knowing what he stands for and
5 what he had written? I am tempted to conclude that you, so many years
6 later, you are trying to justify Alija Izetbegovic and his writing of
7 "The Islamic Declaration." I'm not saying that all Muslims were radical
8 but the policies that were promoted by Alija Izetbegovic were supported
9 by almost all Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And they knew that
10 Alija Izetbegovic had served a long sentence for his religious views, to
11 put it that way.
12 Q. Well, let me look at a couple of contemporaneous statements from
13 that time, not from now.
14 MR. TIEGER: If we could turn to 65 ter 07499, page 9 of the
15 English, page 3 of the Serbian. And perhaps we could ...
16 Q. You're welcome to see the first page, if you want, but I can tell
17 you, Mr. Dodik, that this is an interview with Dr. Karadzic conducted in
18 1990. The portion I'm going to direct your attention to is found at the
19 very top of the middle column in Serbian, and in the middle of the page,
20 page 9, in English, where Dr. Karadzic says: "The Islamic fundamentalism
21 arrives to Europe with people of other race and language that makes the
22 Europe panic. Here, the Muslims are Slavs, people with our blood and
23 language who, for the most part, opt for the European quality of life and
24 preservation of the Islamic faith. There is no room for panic, either
25 among the Serbs nor among the Muslims."
1 Mr. Dodik, that's a further reflection of the widely known fact
2 that Bosnian Muslims were, as a rule, very Europeanised people; right?
3 A. You want to say that the Serbs were not; right? I did not see
4 this interview of Radovan Karadzic. At the time I wasn't reading his
5 interviews, so I'm not aware of it. But you said this was from 1990,
6 right before the war, if I understood this correctly. And this reflects
7 his political stance at that time. I can neither confirm nor deny what
8 he said.
9 As you know and as I said at the beginning, I was a member of a
10 different political party which does not mean that I have a bad opinion
11 of Muslims. I have said here that Alija Izetbegovic was a convicted
12 religious radical and that his policy was supported by an overwhelming
13 majority of Muslims, almost all of them, except for a very small minority
14 which remained in a marginalised different party like mine.
15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
16 A. We lived in the former Yugoslavia.
17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... you've discussed that at
18 length during your examination-in-chief. I'm asking you about a
19 different aspect of the broader issue you raised. And before I go on,
20 while I am reluctant to ever respond to comments or questions by a
21 witness, I want to explicitly reject your comment that by pointing out
22 that Radovan Karadzic was describing the Bosnian Muslims as Europeanised,
23 I was somehow saying that Serbs were not.
24 Now, let's move on to page 4 of the English in this interview and
25 B/C/S page 1.
1 In the third column in Serbian, one sentence of the third and the
2 third and fourth paragraph, we see a reference to Jovo Raskovic and that
3 reference is: "There is in the first place the high reputation of Jovo
4 Raskovic, who is in BiH equally respected by the Serb, Croats and
5 Muslims, since he acts as a peacemaker."
6 And this part of the interview is Dr. Karadzic speaking also.
7 Mr. Dodik, Jovo - or Jovan - Raskovic was the founder of the SDS
8 party in Croatia; right?
9 A. Yes, that's commonly known.
10 Q. And do you accept Dr. Karadzic's characterisation of his
11 reputation and the respect in which he was held in Bosnia?
12 A. At that time when these parties were just founded, we were
13 political opponents, not sympathizers. I said before I haven't read this
14 interview, but I can't help thinking why did you seek to indict him if he
15 are justifying now his words?
16 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, you're not here to put questions to
17 Mr. Tieger. You're here to answer his questions. Could you please stick
18 to that principle. And could you please answer the question now.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I heard of Jovan Raskovic, but I
20 cannot talk about him.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Is that because you don't know anything about him?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know who he is. He ... acted
23 quietly without violence. He was active, but I could see him only on TV
24 and in the media. I've never met him.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. TIEGER: I see it's time for the break, Mr. President. I
3 tender the interview.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
5 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 07499 will be Exhibit P7759, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
7 Mr. Dodik, we'd like to see you back in 20 minutes. You may
8 follow the usher.
9 [The witness stands down]
10 JUDGE ORIE: We resume at a quarter to 2.00.
11 --- Recess taken at 1.22 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, one question came to the mind of the
14 Judges in this Chamber. That is, as far as the interview is concerned,
15 do we need that interview into evidence or -- because you read out, I
16 think, all the portions you wanted to draw our attention to literally.
17 MR. TIEGER: No, I think it does need to be in evidence,
18 Mr. President, because when a witness simply, unequivocally adopts it,
19 then you have the equivalent of the document. When there is something
20 else, then I think you need the document in.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Then for truth of the content or ...?
22 MR. TIEGER: As is the case with everything we do here, sure. I
23 don't think we've ever made that distinction.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. We'll further consider that.
25 [The witness takes the stand]
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please, meanwhile, proceed.
2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. Can we turn, please, to 65 ter 11723.
3 Q. Mr. Dodik, I can tell you while this is coming onto the screen
4 that had will be an interview for YUTEL of Jovan Raskovic. And in
5 January 1992, I believe, as it says at the top of the page, this appeared
6 in Svijet. And the portion I wanted to direct your attention to is found
7 in the Serbian in the third column from the left, top half of that, and
8 is found in the English at page 2 in the middle part of the page.
9 And, there --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Could we first enlarge the --
11 MR. TIEGER: And no doubt we need to help -- for Mr. Dodik, the
12 bottom part of the page, third column from the left. The bottom --
13 that's right now go to the third column, that's it, and if you could
14 enlarge the top half of that.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: [Microphone not activated]
16 MR. TIEGER:
17 Q. There, Dr. Raskovic states: "I believe that there is no fear of
18 Bosnian sovereignty for the Serbian people in BiH. It would not be
19 genocide. Maybe it would not be Serbophile, and it would be Srbophobe
20 but it wouldn't be Srbocide either. I talked about that with Karadzic.
21 He is not inclined to accept my opinion. He thinks it is necessary to
22 react in a different way if the Bosnian sovereignty is formed. According
23 to him, the Serbs must adopt a different political stand and a diverse
24 political procedure in that case, even though it seems to me that it
25 pushes people into a war."
1 Mr. Dodik, were you aware of such differing views about the risks
2 of sovereignty or Muslim rule generally, if it came to that, among
3 Serbian politicians?
4 A. To the extent I was able to understand, this is from January 1991
5 or 1992? When?
6 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... 1992.
7 A. 1992. Of course, I didn't see before and I don't know anything
8 about this view of Mr. Raskovic but if it matters I don't agree with his
9 position. I don't know what views Karadzic presented in that
10 conversation, but if it matters, I can tell you what I think and what I
11 thought then.
12 I was convinced --
13 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... and I really don't like to
14 interrupt you, but you have provided an answer to the question, and I'd
15 like to move to the next question.
16 MR. TIEGER: I tender 11723, Mr. President.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P7760, Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
20 Mr. Tieger, I still have some difficulties in understanding that
21 the witness has answered the question. The question was whether he was
22 aware of differing views on the matter. I --
23 MR. TIEGER: I take your point, Mr. President. I was actually
24 trying to forestall a move into areas even farther away from my question.
25 JUDGE ORIE: No. I can imagine that you wanted the witness to
1 come back to your question but then also, perhaps, to answer it.
2 Were you aware of views among politicians differing in a way as
3 described in this article between the different views of Mr. Karadzic and
4 Mr. Raskovic? I'm not specifically asking about these two but are there
5 different views? Were you aware of that?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. TIEGER: Thank you. Can we turn next to 65 ter 02366
10 beginning at page 95 in the English and page 64 in the Serbian.
11 Q. Mr. Dodik, I had asked you earlier about the -- what I termed the
12 well-known understanding that Bosnian Muslims were Europeanised and not
13 particularly religious. In that connection I earlier directed you to a
14 comment by Dr. Karadzic. Now I want to direct your attention to a
15 comment by Mr. Krajisnik. And this is a session of the Bosnian Serb
16 Assembly, I believe, held in January 1993, the 24th Session of the
17 Bosnian Serb Assembly, and if we look at the beginning in the middle of
18 the page in English, and similarly situated on the page in front of you
19 in B/C/S, we see Mr. Kupresanin speaking.
20 He says: "We stumbled over some ideas several times in the past.
21 Gentlemen, is the Muslim nation a nation at all?"
22 He continues talking about the -- it was created in Tito
23 conception in 1994. "Should we deny this --"
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: 1974.
25 MR. TIEGER: 1974. Thank you, Your Honour. "Should we deny this
1 nation as a nation."
2 He continues a couple of lines down: "It was since the time
3 remembered a Serb country. It is true that Turks were here for sometime,
4 for 500 years. We threw out the Turks, we threw out the Austrians and we
5 threw out the Germans, and yet Bosnia isn't Serb but Muslim of the
6 non-existent nation. Are these not Serb stupidities again?"
7 And he then notes: "I propose that we deny the Muslims as a
8 nation on the next session of the assembly."
9 And then we see Mr. Krajisnik speak on the next page in the
10 English, and still on the same page in Serbian, although it will continue
11 and he says: "I think that Mr. Kupresanin is right, and I was wrong when
12 I once said: Don't put them together with us. Because, if you push them
13 together with us, we do not know what to do with them. I think this
14 should be corrected a little. We should really take a stand concerning
15 whether the Muslims are a nation. Here, we had one suggestion that we
16 say they are a Muslim sect of Turkish orientation because it would then
17 create a discord in the Muslim world. Namely, Saudi Arabia and other
18 Muslim countries believe that the Turks are fake Muslims, who eat and
19 drink like the others. It is known that they are not so religious."
20 So here, too, Mr. Dodik, Mr. Krajisnik is acknowledging the
21 well-known fact that the Bosnian Muslims were not considered particularly
22 religious, much less radical fundamentalists; correct?
23 A. That's Krajisnik's opinion. I was talking about Izetbegovic and
24 his radical orientation and faith. I said there was a general perception
25 that Bosnian Muslims were the most secular in Europe, certainly. But
1 they still supported the policy of Alija Izetbegovic.
2 I don't know what I'm supposed to do here. I would like to make
3 a correction, if I may. We were not the Assembly of Bosnian Serbs. We
4 were the Assembly of Republika Srpska, and I would appreciate it if you
5 would use that name, which is proper.
6 Q. Of course, and --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, in your last question, you've woven in
8 that it's a well-known fact. Could you always please clearly distinguish
9 between what someone says is his opinion and whether that's a well-known
10 fact or not. These are two separate issues and I'd like -- witness may
11 be confused by such an interwoven element in your question.
12 MR. TIEGER: I can answer it -- ask it again but I see -- based
13 on the answer, I don't see a confusion here.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just --
15 MR. TIEGER: As a general matter of course. Thank you.
16 Q. Let me just continue on this point, as long as we're on this
17 issue, with what happened at that assembly session after Mr. Krajisnik
18 announced that he agreed with Mr. Kupresanin. He continues and says:
19 "Here, Vojo, you were right and I wasn't."
20 And he asks at the end of this intervention: "Does anyone have
21 anything against that the Muslims are not a nation?"
22 Then we hear from Mr. Corda, or the Assembly hears from Mr.
23 Corda, and on the next page in English and I believe the next page in --
24 page 65 of the e-court in Serbian, Krajisnik, again, responds: "Well,
25 all right, people, if we accept that they are some kind of a group,
1 Turkish or I don't know whose, then we simply give them aces to their
2 hands to be an independent nation."
3 And then a line later, he says: "Why, we should tell them what
4 they really are. They are unbelievers, a nation that is not a nation,
5 that is to say, a nation that would like to be a nation but has no
6 arguments for a nation."
7 Savo Knezevic then speaks and he continues the discussion about
8 four lines after he begins: "May God give that they never again be part
9 of our nation. We don't need him who once betrayed anymore. They are
10 Mohamedans of Turkish provenance and nothing else. They are not even the
11 real members of Islam because they are more of a sect than real members
12 of Islam. And a Muslim is some sort of the member of Islam. They are
13 some kind of a lower category."
14 And then on the next page in English --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, in all fairness to the witness, would
16 you allow him to read at least this paragraph, because you pick out just
17 a sentence here, a sentence there.
18 MR. TIEGER: By all means.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And I think it is fair to the witness that he has an
20 opportunity to read what Mr. Knezevic said, and I think -- are we still
21 on the right page, 4.
22 If we go back, then we could also read the whole of the ...
23 Witness, once you've read the portion of which elements were read
24 out to you by Mr. Tieger, please let us know.
25 Well, Witness, you are given an opportunity to read the whole of
1 what Mr. Knezevic said, but then you would have to look at your screen.
2 MR. TIEGER:
3 Q. And I'll now turn to what Mr. Krajisnik says to conclude it. At
4 the bottom of page 97 in English and on page 66 of the Serbian.
5 "Shall we then now take the Muslims out of Serbism forever? All
6 right, gentlemen, can we now make up our mind and take a position that
7 the Muslims as a nation are the Communistic creation. We do not accept
8 this artificial nation. We believe that the Muslims are a sect, a group
9 or a party of Turkish provenance.
10 "Does anyone have anything else to add? No? I put these
11 conclusions to a vote. Who is for" --
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can we go to the next page in English.
13 MR. TIEGER: "Is there anyone against, abstaining? Gentlemen,
14 thank you, we adopted the conclusions unanimously."
15 Q. So I wanted to put Mr. Krajisnik's comments about the relative
16 religious nature of the Muslim community in context and we see the full
17 context, I believe, from what I've just read out. I wanted to ask you,
18 Mr. Dodik, were you among the assembly delegates at that session who
19 voted for the proposal?
20 A. I believe you have that information. I myself don't remember.
21 Where was this session held? You probably have it noted somewhere who
23 JUDGE ORIE: The document itself says, I think it's in Bijeljina
24 on page 2 if -- if it's the 24th Session, then the document states on
25 page 2 that it was held on the 8th, 1993 in Bijeljina. That must be a
1 small mistake. But on the cover page, it says the 8th of January of
2 1993, Bijeljina.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Were you present there?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember, but there is a
6 record. Records of attendance. I don't remember.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: I'd tender that excerpt and ask that it be added to
9 any that exists for that session.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Do we need -- let me just check. You have already
11 made an excerpt, and we add it to any that exist. Does there exist any?
12 There does. And then this can be added to the excerpt already in the
13 system. Under what number?
14 MR. TIEGER: P6921.
15 JUDGE ORIE: This may be added to P6921 and it has been uploaded
16 already. No, it has not uploaded already. It will be uploaded. And
17 Mr. Registrar is hereby instructed to add it to the excerpts already
18 known under P6921.
19 Please proceed.
20 MR. TIEGER:
21 Q. Mr. Dodik, during the course of your examination-in-chief, there
22 was considerable emphasis on not only "The Islamic Declaration" but on
23 general activities by Mr. Izetbegovic or the SDA or the Muslims
24 generally. And in -- in -- in respect of actions taken or not taken by
25 the Bosnian Serbs, I wanted to put this to you and that is that
1 Mr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership for quite some time, and
2 certainly beginning in 1991, knew what they wanted to do but simply
3 waited for a -- some form of pretext to act and that steps taken or that
4 actions taken following anything done by the Muslim side reflected
5 pre-planned steps to be implemented at opportune moments.
6 That's the reality of the developments in 1991 through 1992;
7 isn't that right?
8 A. That's your hypothesis which underlies your entire work. They
9 did not tell me what they intended, and I did not have the impression
10 that what was done by the Serbs was action. It was, rather, reaction. I
11 don't think you are right when you say it was pre-planned. I don't know
12 about any such plan. I never saw it, and I didn't hear about it even
13 later. All I know is that when we discussed these objectives that the
14 assembly adopted in 1992, there was a lot of pressure for this topic to
15 be discussed which, in my view, denies the existence of any pre-planning.
16 I didn't know about any plans at the time, and since then, I haven't seen
17 any evidence that it existed. It was reaction to the developments. And
18 you can see, if you look at it chronologically, which events preceded
19 other events.
20 Q. Let's turn to tab -- the tab to 65 ter 07704.
21 Mr. Dodik, what will come up on the screen is a transcript from a
22 SFRY Presidency meeting held in December of 1991. And I'd like to turn
23 to page 78 of the English and page 105 of the Serbian. The portion I'll
24 direct your attention is found at approximately the fourth sentence from
25 the top and, in English, in the middle of the page.
1 And there, Dr. Karadzic is speaking and is explaining to the
2 members of the SFRY Presidency the following: "We have made a list of
3 moves. Ten moves in the direction we want, so that there are results.
4 Bosnia remains in Yugoslavia, either as a whole or our areas. But we
5 won't do anything until Alija messes something up. When Alija messes
6 something up, we make move number 5 and then we wait. When Alija messes
7 something else up - we make move number 6."
8 So, Mr. Dodik, I know you indicated earlier that Mr. Karadzic
9 wasn't necessarily telling you his plans, but here we see a reflection of
10 what he was telling others at the time about what he had planned and how
11 he intended to implement it; correct?
12 A. I did not attend that Presidency session. I'm not aware of this.
13 I had no chance to familiarize myself with this, and it turns out that
14 Alija really messed things up many times, as there was so much need to
15 emphasise this. I mean, I cannot either deny this or confirm it.
16 Obviously, if it was said at the Presidency session, then it was. I am
17 not aware of any plan that had been prepared beforehand. I didn't know
18 about it and I think it's more hypothetical. If he messes things up, we
19 do thing number 5; if he does it again, we do thing number 6. I think
20 it's more a hypothesis than a serious plan. But I cannot really either
21 confirm or deny it, I can only say once again that I'm not aware of any
22 precise or specific plan that existed previously in the period that you
23 have in mind.
24 MR. TIEGER: It's 2.15, Mr. President. I tender that and I think
25 it's time to end the session.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P7761, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Is admitted into evidence.
4 We'll adjourn for the day, Witness, but I'd -- before I instruct
5 you, give you further instructions, I notice that you at various times
6 look in the direction of the Defence, seeking eye contact with them. I
7 would advise you to refrain from doing that. It's Mr. Tieger who is
8 examining you. Your answers are given to this Chamber, and I think
9 that's, for the time being, enough. If you are examined by the Defence,
10 then, of course, you look at the Defence.
11 Then, I instruct you that you should not speak or communicate in
12 any way about your testimony, with whomever it may be, that is, testimony
13 given today or testimony still to be given tomorrow. If that's clear to
14 you, you may now follow the usher, and we'd like to see you back tomorrow
15 morning at 9.30.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And how long mustn't I communicate?
17 JUDGE ORIE: Until the end of your testimony and that is,
18 therefore, that is, the instruction now goes until tomorrow. And as long
19 as you're still --
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 JUDGE ORIE: -- testifying.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I think you've one hour and 50 minutes
25 left from your three and a half hours you claimed. Do you think you
1 would stay within that?
2 MR. TIEGER: I believe so. I'll double-check and let the Court
3 know as soon as possible. I think -- I think we'll be within the limits.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume
5 tomorrow, Tuesday, the 8th of December, 9.30 in the morning, in this same
6 courtroom, I.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.18 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 8th day of
9 December, 2015, at 9.30 a.m.