1 Tuesday, 14 June 2016
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
6 courtroom. It has been a while since we were in court.
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. Good morning, Your Honours. This is
9 case number IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 Is the Defence ready to call its witness?
12 MR. IVETIC: We are, Your Honours. We do also have a preliminary
13 matter that I forgot to bring to the attention of the court officer.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 MR. IVETIC: It's in relation to the e-mails I sent last week and
16 yesterday as to some additional documents. So I did want to put on the
17 record that the statement taken by the Karadzic Defence, which is our
18 1D3876, has several documents that are referenced and used in the
19 statement which have not been previously identified or assigned 65 ter
21 Thus, I take the opportunity to update that the document that is
22 identified in footnote 52 of Witness Demurenko's statement, and in the
23 footnote that's Karadzic P150, is already on our list for this witness
24 and it is Exhibit D138 in the Mladic case.
25 Further --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic is speaking aloud, which he is supposed
2 not to do.
3 MR. IVETIC: Further, ERN R014-8176, cited in paragraph 24 of the
4 statement, has been uploaded as 65 ter number 1D5967, and we would seek
5 leave of the Court to add that to the 65 ter list of exhibits and the
6 list for this witness.
7 Additionally, Karadzic Exhibit P1960, cited in paragraph 50 of
8 the Demurenko statement, was not identified on our table of concordance.
9 That is already in evidence in our case as Exhibit D139.
10 And we have Karadzic 65 ter number 1D26663, cited in paragraph 58
11 of the Demurenko statement, that also did not have a 65 ter number on our
12 list. It has been uploaded as 1D5968, and we would seek leave of the
13 Court to add that to the 65 ter list and for the witness.
14 And then we have another Karadzic 65 ter number, 21618, cited in
15 paragraph 70 of the Demurenko statement. That is already in our case
16 Mladic 65 ter number 19020, and we put that on the record.
17 And then we have ERN 07050079, referenced in paragraph 135 of the
18 Demurenko statement, and that one did not have a 65 ter number. It has
19 now been uploaded under Mladic 65 ter number 1D5969, and we would ask for
20 that also -- to have leave to add that to the 65 ter exhibit list and for
21 the list for this witness.
22 And then we have two items that were sent along with the proofing
23 note. They are 1D5970, which is the ICRC Martens reading, and 1D5971,
24 which was a photograph, and we would likewise seek leave of the Chamber
25 to add those to the list and to use with the witness.
1 And I thank you.
2 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Ivetic, you referred to paragraph 50 of the
3 statement of Witness Demurenko. I don't find any number in paragraph 50.
4 Can you check that again or help me to find it? Are you referring to the
5 footnote 54?
6 MR. IVETIC: No, Your Honours. I believe I'm referring to -- let
7 me just double-check. It will appear that it is the footnote 54, which
8 is then in relation to the tail-end of paragraph 50, which is found on
9 the top of page 20 of the statement.
10 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Therefore, you should have said, yes, it is
11 footnote 54.
12 MR. IVETIC: I should have, yes.
13 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Only there the number appears.
14 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, several requests for adding documents to
17 the 65 ter list. Any objection?
18 MR. TIEGER: With respect only to the issue of adding, leave to
19 add, no, we have no objection.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Then leave is granted to add them.
21 Mr. Ivetic, apart from these matters are you ready to call the
23 MR. IVETIC: We are ready to call the witness, Your Honours.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Could the witness be escorted into the courtroom.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 JUDGE ORIE: When the witness will join us, this gives me an
2 opportunity to welcome the Russian interpreters. I do understand that
3 the witness does speak English, but that if he speaks Russian, that at
4 least we have the assistance, the highly appreciated assistance of
5 Russian interpreters.
6 Just for me to know, the Russian interpretation will be on what
8 THE INTERPRETER: The Russian interpretation will be on channel
9 7, into Russian. The interpretation into English will be on channel 4 as
11 JUDGE ORIE: And interpretation, if the witness would like to
12 hear Russian interpretation of the questions, it would be on?
13 THE INTERPRETER: It will be channel 7, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, so we should read Dutch -- "Russian" for Dutch
15 on our screens.
16 Good morning, Mr. Demurenko, I assume.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Before you give evidence, the Rules require that you
19 make a solemn declaration. The text is now handed out to you. May I
20 invite you to make that solemn declaration.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
22 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
23 WITNESS: ANDREY DEMURENKO
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated, Mr. Demurenko.
1 Mr. Demurenko, before we start I'd like to ask you what language
2 you preferably would use. Is that your own language, Russian, because we
3 have Russian interpretation, or would you, since we know that you
4 understand and speak English, or would you rather use the English
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would prefer to speak Russian,
7 because there are important details and I could miss them if I spoke
9 JUDGE ORIE: You're perfectly free to choose your own language.
10 Then you will give your testimony in Russian and the questions will be
11 translated to you, interpreted into Russian.
12 You'll now first be examined by Mr. Ivetic. One second.
13 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I haven't introduced you yet. That's
16 what I'll now do.
17 Mr. Demurenko, you'll first be examined by Mr. Ivetic. You find
18 Mr. Ivetic to your left, standing. Mr. Ivetic is a member of the Defence
19 team of Mr. Mladic. And could I also ask you, because we have read your
20 statement, which will soon be tendered, I take it, Mr. Ivetic, to focus
21 very much on what the question is. If any further details are needed,
22 then you'll be asked to give such details, but could you please start
23 with focusing on exactly the question that's put to you.
24 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
25 Examination by Mr. Ivetic:
1 Q. Good morning, Colonel.
2 A. Good morning.
3 Q. Sir, I would first ask that you introduce yourself by giving your
4 full name and surname so that it can be recorded in the record.
5 A. My name is Andrey Vladimovic [phoen] Demurenko, reserve colonel
6 of the Russian army.
7 MR. IVETIC: And if I can ask that we take a look at 1D03876 in
8 e-court, and I have a paper copy of the same, with the assistance of the
9 usher, that we can show to opposing counsel and then to the witness.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Lukic, I think Mr. Mladic is seeking your
12 MR. IVETIC: I'm still waiting for the document on the screen,
13 Your Honours. I hope I'm not the only one that is dark.
14 Q. Now we have it on everyone's screens. And, sir, looking at the
15 first page of this amalgamated witnesses statement, do you remember
16 giving a statement to Marko Sladojevic of the Karadzic Defence team as is
17 set out in the first paragraph?
18 A. Yes, I remember.
19 Q. And if we can turn to the last page both in e-court and in the
20 hard copy, on this page we see a signature and a handwritten date of
21 13 October 2012. First of all, sir, do you recognise whose signature
22 appears on this page?
23 A. I do. It's my signature.
24 Q. And does the date that is written on here correspond with your
25 recollection of when this statement was signed by you?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Have you had a chance to review with me in the past few days this
3 whole statement to check if everything is accurate?
4 A. I have.
5 Q. I would propose that we go to page 2 of the statement and look at
6 paragraph 3 of the same, which appears at the top of the page or -- the
7 second half of paragraph 3 appears at the top of the page.
8 And here, beginning on the second line down from the top -- or
9 actually, let's start from the beginning. It says:
10 "Naturally I am familiar with the entire arsenal that was at the
11 disposal of the units that I just enumerated in my previous answer. All
12 the infantry weaponry, including, 155-millimetre howitzers and
13 machine-guns of all calibres, 62 -- sorry, 60, 82, 120-millimetre."
14 Sir, are you talking about machine-gun calibres here or something
16 A. Is that a question?
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. In this specific case, it's an enumeration of calibres of
19 machine-guns and the first figure refers to a howitzer. That's not a
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Ivetic, I note that you left out the words
22 "all the artillery" in your quote.
23 MR. IVETIC: I apologise. You are correct. You are correct.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Could we cut -- try to cut this short.
25 When you talked about 60-, 82-, and 120-millimetres, what kind of
1 weaponry were you referring to? Machine-guns or anything else?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, in my answer I was enumerating
3 the weapons that I'm familiar with in the unit that I commanded, and
4 these calibres were for mortars. The first one, 150, is a howitzer.
5 MR. IVETIC:
6 Q. Okay. And now if we could turn to page 46 of the statement in
7 both the e-court and hard copy, and I'll ask that we look at
8 paragraph 107 of the same. And, sir, here it says, and I will just the
9 quote part that is your answer, which is the fourth line down from the
10 beginning of that paragraph:
11 "A. I don't see where the problem is. You just draw a line from
12 a possible firing location, or, rather - interpreter's correction - from
13 a possible site of explosion and then you draw a line to a possible
14 firing location. We have in the military very precise instruments, such
15 as GPS and some other instruments, which can calculate down to a
16 millimetre the location, instruments such as laser devices, and so on."
17 First of all, when you say that in the military you have very
18 precise instruments, such as GPS and other instruments which can
19 calculate down to a millimetre, what other instruments did you have in
21 A. I had in mind an artillery compass.
22 Q. And if we can look at the continuation of that paragraph, and
23 it's the last line on this page, that reads:
24 "Q. And at that time you had a GPS?"
25 And if we could turn to the next page, it reads:
1 "A. We have always had such a device for orientation, ever since
2 the Americans put it in use. It's a universal military system."
3 Sir, could you clarify for us if in relation to the investigation
4 for Markale, in doing that investigation did you and your staff use GPS
5 or some other instrument.
6 A. No, at that time neither I nor my subordinates had any GPS
7 systems or the Russian variant. We used what we had.
8 Q. And could identify what it was that you used that you had?
9 A. Yes, I can. The artillery compass, as I said before.
10 Q. And if we could turn to page 72 of the statement in both the hard
11 copy and in e-court, and in relation to the part on the bottom half of
12 the page that relates to the sitrep that is in the document 1D28136,
13 5 June 1995. And at the bottom of the page, you have a comment about
14 this document, and you say:
15 "I completely agree that various national units within the
16 UNPROFOR fought together against the Bosnian Serbs."
17 And what I'd like to ask you, is it national units within
18 UNPROFOR fighting together with themselves or with somebody else against
19 the Bosnian Serbs?
20 A. I meant the units making part of the peacekeeping contingent,
21 such as the Pakistani units.
22 Q. And with whom were they fighting together, these units that you
23 identify against the Serbs?
24 A. Well, fighting is perhaps not the right word, but it was often
25 obvious that the efforts made against Bosnian Serbs were made not only on
1 the part of the Bosniaks but also some UNPROFOR units jointly with the
3 Q. Okay. And, sir, apart from these corrections and clarifications
4 that we have just gone through, do you stand by the remainder of the
5 written statement as being true and correct to the best of your
7 A. Yes, I believe it was accurate. It's a different matter that
8 sometimes I have to spell out my various answers.
9 Q. And, sir, if I were to ask you today the same questions as in the
10 statement, would your answers be the same as in the statement?
11 A. Absolutely the same.
12 Q. And, sir, today you have taken a solemn declaration to tell the
13 truth. Does that mean that we can consider what is contained in the
14 statement to be truthful in nature?
15 A. Yes, yes.
16 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, the Defence would tender the statement
17 1D3876 into evidence along with the associated exhibits that I have sent
18 an e-mail about with a list to all parties last night. I think the
19 number is approximately 44, if I'm doing the math correctly.
20 JUDGE ORIE: First of all, let's first focus on the statement
22 MR. TIEGER: No objection.
23 JUDGE ORIE: The statement, Mr. Registrar, will receive number.
24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D2120, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
1 We'll deal with the associated exhibit later, Mr. Ivetic.
2 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours. At this time I would read
3 a summary of the statement, a copy which the booths should have.
4 Andrey Demurenko is a retired Russian army colonel. In addition
5 to the Frunze Military Academy, he also attended American US staff
7 He was deployed as a member of the UNPROFOR mission in
8 January 1995 and flew to Zagreb where the General Staff of UN
9 peacekeeping forces was located. Thereafter, he went to Sarajevo where
10 he was the Chief of Staff or first deputy for the commander of
11 Sector Sarajevo until December 1995. He served under three French
12 generals: Generals Gobilliard, de Lapresle, and Bachelet.
13 He found that some 60 per cent of the UN personnel supported the
14 idea that the Serbs were the aggressors because they were presented this
15 by their commanders and the media based on selected facts and were not
16 shown what the Bosnian side was doing. Forty per cent of the UN
17 personnel had their own private opinions but kept quiet about them.
18 French officers would frequently tell Colonel Demurenko in private that
19 they have a different opinion about the war in Bosnia but cannot express
20 it because their orders differ from their private opinions. The French
21 officers thought the main engine for the war was the Bosnian Muslim
22 religious fanaticism and lack of preparedness to accept the Serb
23 position, as well as the illusion of the Bosnian Muslims that they would
24 achieve military support.
25 He found that many UNMO observers were really partial in favour
1 of the Bosnian Muslim side and they informed only about the incoming fire
2 and not the outgoing fire from the Bosnian Muslims, thereby portraying
3 the shelling in Sarajevo as Serb aggression. Also, Pakistani officers
4 would not even collect their own information independently but used what
5 they received from the Bosnian Muslim side. UNPROFOR in Sarajevo had the
6 impression that the Bosnian Muslims were shooting at their own population
7 with snipers, but it was difficult to prove this because the higher
8 command told them to stop such investigations. The ABiH also repeatedly
9 attacked UNPROFOR units.
10 It was clear to Colonel Demurenko that the VRS did not want to
11 destroy either the town of Sarajevo or even the enemy troops in Sarajevo
12 although there was a clear possibility to do so. The life in the Serb
13 side of Sarajevo was exactly the same as in the Muslim part of the city.
14 There were problems with food, water, et cetera.
15 Colonel Demurenko is 100 per cent sure that humanitarian aid to
16 the Muslim side was ending up in black markets. He heard about smuggling
17 of weapons to the Bosnian Muslim side by the humanitarian organisations
18 and UN forces, but these were only rumours and he did not get official
19 information about same.
20 The biggest part of ABiH forces was located in civilian
21 buildings. They had some 20 tanks, five to six mortar batteries, each
22 battery some five to six mortars, both 82-millimetre and 120-millimetre.
23 He saw ABiH units provoke the Serb forces to respond by opening fire and
24 then moving to other locations. The ABiH also had a tunnel under
25 Mount Igman, which was used for transport of troops, humanitarian aid and
2 After the Markale II explosion in August 1995, the witness went
3 to the scene two hours after the reports of the incident. The
4 investigation was still ongoing when he returned to find that a UN
5 spokesperson, a British colonel, had held a press conference blaming the
6 Serbs for the explosion. There were absolutely no grounds for this as
7 the investigation was ongoing.
8 Colonel Demurenko approached the Sector Sarajevo commander to
9 propose an investigative group headed by himself to investigate the
10 Markale shelling and received approval to do so. Colonel Demurenko and
11 his team went into the field and investigated the source of the shell
12 indicated. The result of the investigation indicated that the Serbs
13 could not have fired the shell in that incident. When he returned with
14 the completed report and photos, he was told by an aide to
15 Commander Bachelet that it was impossible to publish, announce, or give
16 the report to the commander because it differed from the version
17 announced by the UN spokesperson.
18 Colonel Demurenko then organised a press interview where he made
19 public the results of his investigation. Thereafter, he was visited by
20 the BiH army liaison officer, a captain who was the nephew of the Bosnian
21 prime minister, who advised Demurenko that an order had been issued to
22 kill him and that he only had one day do live. He later disagreed with
23 the UNPROFOR BH command G2 officer's report as to the interpretation of
24 Cymbeline radar evidence, saying that it is important to bear in mind
25 that this conclusion is wrong because mortars fired from a middle to long
1 range would have a higher trajectory, not lower, and that the US
2 intelligence officer's conclusion was contradicting the laws of physics
3 when it comes to mortars.
4 In relation to the detention of UN personnel in May to June 1995,
5 Colonel Demurenko stated that the word "hostages" was placed in inverted
6 commas in UN reports because POW could not be used because the UN was
7 supposed to be impair. There was no proper term for the situation so
8 they used hostages, but they weren't really hostages. The ABiH started
9 an offensive, the Serbs responded and were bombed, which was an unjust
10 and partial action by impartial third parties. The Serbs as a result
11 took UNPROFOR soldiers from countries participating in the bombing as
12 POWs. It was a critical point in the war at which point the Muslim side
13 got help from the bombing countries, so it was an adequate response from
14 the Serb side to respond in this way. The term "hostages" is
16 And that completes the public summary.
17 Colonel, I would like to now ask you some additional questions.
18 First if we could turn to page 1 of the written statement, which has now
19 been admitted as D2120. And in paragraph 2, I'd like to look four lines
20 down from the start of that paragraph where it is written, among other
21 things, that you attended a US Staff College. Could you please identify
22 for us which particular American US Staff College you attended and where
23 it is located?
24 A. It was my third stint in higher military education. It's called
25 Command Staff College of the US. The place is Fort Levenworth, the state
1 of Kansas.
2 Q. And how long did that programme last?
3 A. The standard course is one year. I took a bit longer because two
4 months before the beginning of the course, all the officers from other
5 countries had supplementary training, individual training.
6 Q. And who was among your instructors?
7 A. American trainers, instructors, generals.
8 Q. Okay. And in this paragraph of your statement, you mention a
9 Ph.D. in military science. Do you have any other advanced degrees in any
10 other field; if so, tell us?
11 A. First of all, the Russian name for a Ph.D. is a candidate for a
12 doctorate in political science, and I completed my education in the team
13 serving the presidential office. I'm a professor of military science of
14 the Russian Federation, and I have occasionally been invited as expert to
15 take part in different scientific seminars and work-shops.
16 Q. And, sir, here the interpretation we've received is that you
17 received a candidate for doctorate in political science. Can you tell us
18 the specific field? Is it military science we're talking about or
19 something else?
20 A. In Russian, it's called candidate in political science, and the
21 chair where I did my training was the chair of national security. It's
22 actually politics in the interests of military science.
23 Q. And in this statement -- pardon me. This statement was taken in
24 2012. Have you been invited to participate in any lectures or speaking
25 engagements on the topics that you are -- that you have a Ph.D. in or
1 that you are professor in since 2012?
2 A. Yes, yes. All these years, as I've said before, occasionally
3 I've received invitations from Russian or international organisations to
4 take part in work-shops or expert teams or hold lectures on subjects that
5 are interesting to the inviting party, and mainly those have been either
6 peace enforcement operations that actually enforce peace in coercive ways
7 or --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness repeat the last -- hybrid,
9 hybrid wars.
10 MR. IVETIC: If we can call up in e-court 1D5970. And again, I
11 have a hard copy for the usher to show the opposing counsel and then give
12 to the witness if it assists them.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, is it the intention of the Prosecution
14 to challenge the qualifications in terms of education and professional
15 experience of this witness.
16 MR. TIEGER: Well, not in the terms that are being implicated by
17 this particular document, and I'll certainly get into the details of the
18 investigation that was purportedly conducted. But, no, I'm not
19 suggesting he wasn't a candidate for a Ph.D. I'm not suggesting that he
20 hasn't been occasionally invited to participate in various forms. So,
21 no. And I actually was -- I wanted to allow Mr. Ivetic to complete his
22 process, but I was going to object to this as pretty far afield from the
23 relevance of the witness's appearance here.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, there seems to be perhaps quite a lot of
25 discussion about the findings this witness made but apparently not on how
1 he was educated, where, and now we know exactly in which fort he was
2 educated, and there he was -- let's try to focus on the matters which are
3 in this dispute.
4 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honours, Mr. Tieger cross-examined the
5 witness in the Karadzic case, and I respectfully submit that Mr. Tieger
6 attacked the credibility and the impartiality of the witness and
7 therefore --
8 JUDGE ORIE: But not -- I do understand not on the basis of being
9 trained well and being educated well but on the content of his expertise.
10 MR. TIEGER: Well, in some aspects of his training but not with
11 respect to his education in political science or military science such
12 that it got him invited to discussions about the Martens Clause.
13 JUDGE ORIE: That's clear. And then about the Martens readings,
14 I think that we did read in the briefing note that Mr. Demurenko spoke at
15 the Martens reading and that Judge Pocar also did. Just for full
16 transparency, many of the Judges of the ICTY were present at this
17 occasion, and I can clarify that my colleagues, Moloto and Fluegge, were
18 not there but I was there, so that there is no uncertainty about that.
19 Please proceed.
20 MR. IVETIC:
21 Q. And if we could turn to page 3 of this document. And here at the
22 top, sir, it is reflected that:
23 "Andrey Demurenko is a former colonel and a veteran of UN
24 peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. He suggested looking
25 at the problem of access for humanitarian personnel from the point of
1 view of the armed forces.
2 "'Commanders have doubts as to the impartiality of humanitarian
3 workers and we are often unsure about the control exercised over aid,' he
4 explained. 'The ICRC must be the main co-ordinator for all humanitarian
5 organisations providing assistance in armed conflict.'"
6 Is this an accurate summary of what you presented at this Martens
7 reading conference by the ICRC?
8 A. I cannot understand the point of your question. But generally
9 speaking, I stand behind everything I've said before. Everything I've
10 said up to now is absolutely true.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, the question was whether what was read to
12 you, whether that's an adequate, although very short, summary of what you
13 told when you spoke at the Martens reading. Is it or is it not?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you go into details -- perhaps
15 it's a matter of interpretation. In the interpretation I've heard, it
16 sounded a bit equivocal, as if the Red Cross had humanitarian aid
17 delivered to Sarajevo under its control, and on the other hand, as if I
18 had some information and memories that humanitarian convoys actually
19 delivered also some illegal things, such as weapons for the Bosniaks.
20 You could play this and accuse me of --
21 JUDGE ORIE: Witness, no one is accusing you of anything. I read
22 again how your contribution to the Martens reading was summarised.
23 Please tell us whether that is an adequate summary.
24 It's written that you, a former colonel and a veteran of UN
25 peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, that you suggested
1 looking at the problem of access for humanitarian personnel from the
2 point of view of the armed forces. And then, in quotation marks:
3 "'Commanders have doubts as to the impartiality of humanitarian
4 workers and we are often unsure about the control exercised over aid,' he
6 And then again quotation mark:
7 "'The ICRC must be the main co-ordinator for all humanitarian
8 organisations providing assistance in armed conflict.'"
9 Is that a fair though short summary of what you contributed to
10 the Martens readings?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I confirm that.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Next question please, Mr. Ivetic.
13 MR. IVETIC: We would tender this document at this time.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
15 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 1D5970 will be Exhibit D2121,
16 Your Honours.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
18 MR. IVETIC:
19 Q. If we can return to your witness statement, which is D2120, and
20 if we could turn to page 4 of the statement and look at paragraph number
21 8 together. And again, we need page 4 and focusing on paragraph 8 in the
23 And, sir, in paragraph 8, you describe the duties of a Chief of
24 Staff. And the question I have for you: Did you have any other position
25 or role while deployed in Sarajevo in 1995 in addition to these duties
1 enumerated here as Chief of Staff to Sector Sarajevo.
2 A. Yes. My second position given me by the Russian staff was the
3 commander of the Russian contingent in the former Yugoslavia. That was a
4 small force consisting of the Croatian battalion, the battalion in Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina, one air force squadron, and one smaller unit. Anyway, I
6 was the senior officer of the Russian contingent there.
7 Q. And later in your statement, it's at page 33, and it will be the
8 last part of paragraph 80 that appears on the top of that page. And the
9 last line of that answer says that:
10 "There were 5.000 people under my command and it's impossible to
11 remember all of their names."
12 With respect to these 5.000 people, who were these 5.000 people
13 under your command? Are you talking about the Russian battalion or
14 something else?
15 A. No. This is a reference to the Sector Sarajevo. That unit was
16 over 5.000 strong. That included the French contingent, the Pakistani
17 contingent, and many others. I, as Chief of Staff, was their senior.
18 Q. Thank you. If we could turn to page 7 of the statement and focus
19 on paragraph 14 of the same at the top of the page. And, sir, if we go
20 down four lines from the top, and I can then read the answer that you
21 have given there:
22 "A. Generally speaking, the primary task of any Chief of Staff
23 is to maintain combat readiness of subordinate troops, their preparedness
24 to efficiently operate. That was tactical operation, intelligence,
25 although the word 'intelligence' wasn't used. In Yugoslavia, it was
1 called collection of information ..."
2 Now, I want to ask you, Colonel, when you say in your statement
3 that "intelligence" was not used in Yugoslavia, did anyone ever explain
4 why the word "intelligence" was not used?
5 A. Well, it was understandable. We were not a warring party. It
6 was not diplomatic. It was not delicate to use the word "intelligence,"
7 and "collecting information" most accurately described the activity that
8 we carried out as a western-type military force.
9 Q. And, Colonel, within the UNPROFOR structure, who did the
10 collection of intelligence or, as we have now called it, information?
11 A. I just said that. There was a unit or a department or a subunit,
12 G2, that carried out collection of information necessary for UNPROFOR to
13 efficiently function.
14 Q. Apart from the G2 officers within UNPROFOR, was there anyone who
15 was in an unofficial capacity gathering information or intelligence.
16 A. No, it's not intelligence. It's collection of information.
17 Practically all units of the staff particularly were involved in a way in
18 collecting information, especially military observers. That's natural.
19 They were the eyes and the ears of the contingent, apart from the G2.
20 In addition, there was a department in G3 to -- tactics and
21 operational; G4, logistics; and G5, humanitarian aid. All of them made
22 their small contributions into the general information collection effort
23 that helped manage the process of peacekeeping.
24 Q. And apart from the personnel of Sector Sarajevo, was there any
25 knowledge of any other military personnel conducting information
2 A. Yes, I did. But many things were not written on paper and
3 couldn't be written on paper, by definition. For instance, we were aware
4 of the activities of some British special forces, the SAS and others, who
5 were involved in in-depth investigation, or G2 units of the US attached
6 to the BH command. I had contacts and friendly relations with them, but
7 I knew that they were not part of the peacekeeping force.
8 Q. Thank you. And when you say "we were aware of the activities of
9 some British special forces," who is the "we" in that sentence?
10 A. I mean myself and the staff officers of the Sarajevo Sector;
11 mainly Russian and Ukrainian officers. It was more comfortable between
12 us to share some information that we had.
13 Q. Thank you, Colonel.
14 MR. IVETIC: I see we're at the time for the break, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE ORIE: We are, Mr. Ivetic.
16 Mr. Demurenko, we'll take a break of 20 minutes. We'd like to
17 see you back after that.
18 [The witness stands down]
19 JUDGE ORIE: We will resume at ten minutes to 11.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.
22 [The witness takes the stand]
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, you may proceed.
24 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. If we could scroll down a bit on the page and look at
1 paragraph number 16 of your statement, and here, in paragraph 16, you
3 "All mass media, journalists, reporters, and my western, (above
4 all English, French, Dutch, and US) colleagues from UNPROFOR and UNMO
5 were spreading rumours that the Serbs were aggressors and that they
6 wanted to destroy the whole of Bosnia. The [sic] idea was unrealistic
7 when I compared it with the situation in the field. Some 60 per cent of
8 the UN personnel supported the idea that the Serbs were the aggressors
9 because they were presented by their commanders and media with only
10 selected facts, but they were not shown what the other, Bosnian Muslim,
11 side was doing. The remaining 40 per cent of the UN personnel had their
12 own opinion but kept quiet about it, and only privately dared to express
13 their differing opinions."
14 That's what's listed here. Now I want to ask you, sir, as to
15 this 60 per cent and 40 per cent statistics, how did you come to this
17 A. Of course, you have to make a mental balance. I had neither
18 authority nor the possibility to poll anyone, but it was some kind of
19 psychological balance, and I believe it's still true. The balance of
20 opinions that existed.
21 Q. And how did you reach this psychological balance? What
22 information did you rely upon?
23 A. I took all -- into the account all of the information that I had,
24 the reports, the official conversations, the unofficial conversations,
25 the discussions we had between us. To put it briefly, it was the feeling
1 that the majority thought that the Serbs were the aggressors and the rest
2 did not believe that and instead thought it was a civil war where there
3 could be no side that is always right or a side that is always wrong.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Let me stop you there. The question was on what
5 basis you made that assessment. What you're now doing is to repeat what
6 you felt that was the case. So you moved away from the question.
7 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
8 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
9 Q. And if we look at the second part of the paragraph, and it will
10 be the last three lines of the paragraph, that we see -- that start off:
11 "It was clear that the opinion of the west was imposed on the UN
12 and was only in one direction - that the Serbs were guilty for
13 everything. This 'correct' opinion was always expressed in UNPROFOR
14 reports that tended to blame the Serbs for the situation in Sarajevo."
15 Can you explain for us what you mean here.
16 A. I can. Reading daily reports and sitreps, weekly reports,
17 monthly reports, and comparing that and the details that came in from
18 observation points and other positions of the UNPROFOR, there was an
19 evident disbalance between what was actually going on the ground in the
20 Sector Sarajevo and what was reflected in the documents.
21 For example, what was absolutely unclear was the high amount of
22 shellings or shootings in the column called unknown. For instance, over
23 24 hours, the Serb side would have shot ten times, the Bosniak side
24 twice, and eight times was unknown. And I asked what makes us unable to
25 establish these unknown sources of shootings or shellings, and the answer
1 was silence.
2 Q. And now looking at the very next paragraph, which is number 17,
3 and it starts on this page and goes onto the next page. But in this
4 paragraph, if I can summarise it, you say that French officers frequently
5 told you privately that they had different opinions about the Bosnian war
6 and that the orders they had were differing from their personal opinions.
7 Could you give us an idea of what rank or level of French
8 officers you are talking about here.
9 A. Yes. They would be my rank or a bit lower, colonels,
10 lieutenant-colonels, majors, captains. By the nature of my official
11 duties, I worked with them often and inspected French battalions. That
12 was one of my duties as Chief of Staff, and I had discussions with them.
13 It was not my purpose in doing the inspection to find out their opinion
14 about this balance between Serbs and Bosniaks. That was not my task.
15 But sometimes I came across such opinions, and that's why I reflected it
16 in the statement.
17 Q. Okay. And if we could turn to page 8. In paragraph 18, you say:
18 "The French officers thought that the main engine for the war was
19 the Bosnian Muslim religious fanaticism and lack of preparedness to
20 understand and September the other (Serb) ethnic/national opinion and
21 position. The other main reason for the war was the military support to
22 the Bosnian Muslims, or, rather, the Bosnian Muslim illusion that they
23 would get support for their war."
24 My question to you, Colonel: According to the French officers,
25 in relation to these illusions of the Bosnian Muslims that they were
1 going to get military support, from whom did they expect such support to
3 A. Well, they were not actually illusions. It was quite obvious
4 from the documents, from the facts, and the general course of events that
5 such support was coming in to Bosnian Muslims from the West. It was not
6 my duty to collect information from which parties, France, the US,
7 England. It was not necessary. But the fact that support was being
8 given was completely obvious.
9 Q. Okay. And now if we could skip to page 9 and paragraph 22 of the
10 statement. In this paragraph, you talk of a French colonel who was very
11 aggressive, and was -- was against you as a Russian and against the
12 passive policy of General Gobilliard. And in the last three lines of
13 this paragraph, you say:
14 "Every time when he participated in meetings and when the
15 reporting was about the Bosnian Muslim activities, he would deny the
16 Muslim illegal activities. He even silenced some officers when they
17 tried to tell the truth about the fighting in Sarajevo."
18 My first question to you: Do you remember anything else about
19 this particular French colonel? For instance, the exact position that he
22 (redacted). I remember his face and his
23 behaviour very well. And in passing, I came across information that he
24 appeared before the ICTY as a witness. You can find it in your records,
25 I think. But it's absolutely certain that from the very start, this man
1 was anti-Russian, anti-Serbian, and too aggressive to be present in the
2 US -- in the UN contingent at all. His position was far from impartial.
3 Q. You have identified him as a deputy commander. Where in the
4 hierarchy did he sit in relation to yourself?
5 A. I was also a deputy commander, so he was on the same level as me.
6 Q. Did anyone ever --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Could we --
8 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just --
10 You said that we can find in our records that the person involved
11 appeared before the ICTY as a witness. Can you tell us how did you find
12 out that he appeared as a witness? And was he a protected witness, was
13 he not a protected witness, do you know?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't know about his status.
15 I came across his last name.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you tell us from whom you received the
17 information that the person you had on your mind was a witness in this
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm afraid to make a mistake now.
20 It could be that I learned from the newspapers or I heard it from my US
21 colleagues with whom I have been keeping in touch about peacekeeping
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
24 Mr. Ivetic, I'm addressing you. Is there any way that this
25 Chamber -- of course, saying a "French officer," that might not be enough
1 for us to finds out. And where the witness says quite a few things about
2 his attitude, that might be a possibility to verify that on the basis of
3 the evidence of that witness, but we are empty-handed at this moment.
4 Could you assist in any way?
5 MR. IVETIC: We'll try to do the leg work, but I'm limited by
6 what the witness remembers. Obviously if he cannot give me a name, I
7 can't search for a name. That's why I tried to focus in on his position
8 so that we can then try to see if based upon that information we can find
9 something. But, you know, a lot of people have testified in a lot of
10 cases at this Tribunal, and so it's a rather difficult task to locate
11 someone with just a position.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see that, but I would see our problems are
13 bigger than yours because you can start searching, which we cannot do and
14 do not wish to do. But if you know when he was serving who was the
15 commander, who were the subcommanders, then you might have a clue, and
16 compare that with a list of witnesses and you are aware of. And there
17 are not that many French officers that testified.
18 The Chamber would be assisted by having that information.
19 If the Prosecution would have any clue for us to be better able
20 to understand this portion of the testimony, it would be appreciated as
22 Please proceed.
23 JUDGE FLUEGGE: May I ask the witness.
24 Mr. Demurenko, according to your knowledge and the information
25 you have, did he testify in this case in the Tribunal or just in the
1 Tribunal in any case?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I thought it was quite a long time
3 ago. I think it was in the Slobodan Milosevic case. One of the first
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
6 Mr. Ivetic.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I ask questions on a slightly different topic,
8 Mr. Ivetic.
9 Sir, you say this gentleman was a deputy commander like yourself.
10 Now, you were the deputy commander for Sector Sarajevo, and you were the
11 Chief of Staff which meant you were the first deputy. Was one of the
12 other deputies after you for Sector Sarajevo?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. He wasn't lower than me. He
14 was on the same level. It's like in the US army, in the western armies,
15 even in the Russian army. Under the commander, there are several
16 deputies for different lines of work and a Chief of Staff.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: I understand that.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There, it was the same thing.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's what I wanted to understand. He was also a
20 deputy for -- in Sector Sarajevo? Okay. Thank you so much.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
22 MR. IVETIC:
23 Q. Sir, did anyone ever reprimand or punish this French colonel for
24 his behaviour or otherwise bring it up?
25 A. I don't know anything about that. But our conduct is governed by
1 our professional ethical code. That's way it should be. It didn't seem
2 to apply to him, and he wasn't reprimanded.
3 Q. Now if we could turn back to page 8 and look at paragraph 20 in
4 the middle of the page.
5 MR. IVETIC: If we could scroll down a bit. There we go.
6 Q. After --
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Before you ask this question, Mr. Ivetic.
8 Mr. Demurenko, you said "I don't know anything about that," and
9 at the end of your answer you said he wasn't reprimanded. How do you
10 know that he wasn't reprimanded if you don't know anything about it?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I meant to say is that in my
12 presence at meetings when he made such inadmissible remarks he wasn't
13 reprimanded. But it's quite possible that within the French group after
14 the meeting was over and after I left and after the Pakistanis and
15 Ukrainians left and when the French were left alone, maybe his commander
16 reproached him. But I don't know about that.
17 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you for that clarification.
18 Mr. Ivetic.
19 MR. IVETIC:
20 Q. In the first part of paragraph 20 you talk of a Russian major
21 that you had to send back to Russia because he could not act impartially
22 as to Muslims. Then in the middle of the paragraph, and this will be the
23 fifth line from the beginning of that paragraph, you say:
24 "But on the other hand, many UNMO observers were really partial
25 in favour of the Bosnian Muslim side and they informed only about the
1 incoming fire but not about the outgoing fire by the Bosnian Muslims,
2 thereby portraying the fighting in Sarajevo as a Serb aggression and
4 And -- so that's what it says. And now I would like to ask you:
5 Could you tell us, first, how did you know about this failure to report
6 the outgoing fire?
7 A. As I said before, by comparing different sources of information,
8 you could see how partial or impartial certain units were. In other
9 words, if we know that there was an artillery shelling in one
10 neighbourhood of Sarajevo and the UNMO report gave a certain figure,
11 whereas the personnel from the check-point gave another figure, and you
12 got a third set of figures from the unit stationed in that neighbourhood,
13 that told you something. You could compare and see how truthful these
14 figures were and how impartial the sources were.
15 I frequently came across such situations that gave me the
16 impression that Bosniak aggression was often kept quiet, under wraps,
17 whereas Serb instances of aggression were put forward.
18 Q. And, sir, did anyone in the UN structure undertake steps to try
19 to correct this failure of reporting?
20 A. I don't know that any radical steps were taken in that direction.
21 All the commanders that I served under at that time, the French generals,
22 did try to enforce the principle of impartiality. They often emphasised
23 that this should be the guiding principles, that the force should be
24 impartial. But these were appeals. But in actual work with the
25 documents, it was not quite clear that it was applied. Documents were
1 used to prove the rightness or wrongness of one of the parties.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Could you be more precise? You give sweeping
3 statements on all these kinds of things. Do you have a few examples of
4 that, of that documents were used to prove the rightness or wrongness of
5 one of the parties?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I could answer that
7 question, I would probably have three denunciations on paper. However,
8 you know that in everyday operations you have reports from three
9 different units and you only need to compare them.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you can establish if the reports are different
11 that there's an inconsistency in the findings, which is not yet an
12 explanation as to what causes this inconsistencies or discrepancies.
13 There may be a logical explanation; it may be bias, it may be anything.
14 And that's the reason why I asked you whether you have an example or a
15 few examples for us so that we could focus on what the differences are
16 and what may or may not explain them.
17 And, again, irrespective of -- you talked about the rightness or
18 wrongness of one of the parties, so I do not mind which party is treated
19 in a right or in a wrong way. Do you have examples? Do you have such
20 documents which you could show us and say: Look, here you can draw this
21 conclusion; or these three documents, when comparing, show this and this
22 and this?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. You've answered my -- no --
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I knew would you have asked me
1 that question --
2 JUDGE ORIE: Well, fine.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- I would have brought such
5 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I leave it to that.
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. IVETIC: I could perhaps assist Your Honours. One of the
8 paragraphs I wasn't going ask questions about is paragraph 24 of the
9 statement where there is a document that is referenced with an ERN
10 number, which I think is now one of the associated exhibits we have
11 tendered, and we have the witness's description and conclusions in the
12 paragraph and we have the document, and I believe there are several
13 others among the 40-odd that we've tendered that are dealt with in the
14 statement where there are comparisons made of certain language in those
15 documents and the conclusions of the witness.
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Just for your information, Mr. Ivetic, this
17 document is not uploaded into e-court by now.
18 MR. IVETIC: It is. I did it personally yesterday, so I know it
19 was uploaded.
20 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It was not this morning at 8.30.
21 MR. IVETIC: Well, it was at 8.30 in the evening, so I don't
22 know. But I checked again this morning when I came to the Tribunal at
23 7.45 and it was. At least on our computers. I don't know if there is a
24 delay between us releasing it and it getting sent because we do have to
25 go through the IT department, but I'll look into that and I'll make sure
1 all documents that I've tendered are released. I did see there was an
2 e-mail about this document and other one from Chambers staff and that's
3 what made me have check and --
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
5 MR. IVETIC: -- that's all I can offer at this point on my feet.
6 Q. If we can turn together to page 13 of the statement and look at
7 paragraph 36, and in that paragraph you say:
8 "I heard about the smuggling of weapons to the Bosnian Muslim
9 side by the humanitarian organisations and UN forces but they were only
10 rumours and I did not get official information about it."
11 Now, Colonel, I understand that you did not get official
12 information on the topic of smuggling of weapons, but can you tell us or
13 give us any idea about who or what was the source of the rumours that you
14 are relying upon in this paragraph?
15 A. Again, I don't have a document. And rumours are rumours. That's
16 what remains in my memory. I have nothing to add.
17 Q. Were the rumours from one person or multiple sources?
18 A. Certainly not one person. It's dozens of people.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Okay. I mean, I thought the witness's clarification
21 was exactly right. There is a difference between sources and rumours and
22 he is indicating, in his earlier response, these are rumours. Now, the
23 question may be aimed at something else, but I think the distinction
24 should be made --
25 JUDGE ORIE: I see you had an objection but the answer of the
1 witness satisfied your concerns, if I understand you well. Not about the
2 question but about possible confusion.
3 MR. TIEGER: I would say at this point it's more prophylactic
4 than dealing with an upcoming answer, right?
5 JUDGE ORIE: Let's proceed.
6 MR. IVETIC:
7 Q. And in relation to the rumours, can you provide us with any
8 information about the nature of the sources?
9 A. Honestly, I'm a military man. And it's not mine to talk about
10 rumours. It's not the kind of person I am. But briefly, I lived there.
11 I heard about me, what people talked. I heard -- I -- I saw weapons held
12 by civilians that they obviously got illegally. It was quite evident
13 that among the people, among civilians, there were a lot of weapons in
14 circulations, but it's not possible now for me to show you a document.
15 Q. That's fair. If we could turn to page 11 of your statement and
16 look at paragraph 30 of the same, and this paragraph starts on this page
17 but goes onto the next page. And here you're talking about the tunnel
18 under Mount Igman. And if you could go through -- go to the top of the
19 next page, the question I want to focus on is the part at the end of this
20 paragraph at the top, which says that:
21 "Yes, it was possible and one could move 500 to 600 troops
22 overnight through the tunnel. So, yes, it was a case of siege but with
23 certain qualifications [sic]?"
24 What was the basis of your information about the tunnel and the
25 number of troops that could be moved through it overnight as in this
2 A. As for the tunnel, that question came up many times at our
3 meetings. It was discussed a lot. It's quite obvious the tunnel
4 existed. And it still exists, by the way. It's a museum now in
5 Sarajevo. And the interpretation is not quite correct. It's not under
6 Mount Igman. Its exit was under the airport and the entrance was next to
7 a normal residential house and the exit was next to the airport.
8 Everybody knew. The entire population of Sarajevo knew that the tunnel
9 was being used for different purposes, both for the rotation of troops
10 and for supplies, water, goods, all sorts of things. We even knew the
11 price range for transports during the night, to rent the tunnel for one
12 night. There was a kind of Sarajevo mafia, if you wish, that ran it.
13 But it's obvious that two parties had to be in contact: One at entry
14 points, and the other one at the exit. In my reports, I tried to
15 describe it, but I was not successful. My commanders told me: "Shut up,
16 there is no tunnel. Orders are orders." So there was no tunnel.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Ivetic, if I may just ask a question.
18 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
19 JUDGE MOLOTO: Sir, at page 34, starting from line 6, you were
20 asked about this illegal weapons. You said:
21 "Honestly, I'm a military man. And it's not mine to talk about
22 rumours. It's not the kind of person I am. But briefly, I lived there.
23 I heard about me, what people talked. I heard -- I -- I saw weapons held
24 by civilians that they obviously got illegally."
25 Were you able to determine the ethnicity of these civilians who
1 were carrying these allegedly illegal weapons.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, certainly not. All the more so
3 because I knew there were both Serbs and Muslims in Sarajevo. And
4 Croats. It was a multi-ethnic city.
5 JUDGE MOLOTO: So any of those could have had those illegal
6 weapons. You're not suggesting that they were carried by a specific side
7 only to the war?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Certainly not.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Ivetic, I'm trying to follow your
11 suggestions. The documents you uploaded was under what 65 ter number
12 where you said it's -- it was -- I have -- and that's the -- I think the
13 document you referred to which appears in paragraph 24 of the statement.
14 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honours. If I can -- my suspicion is that
15 it should be 1D5967.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Could we check with Mr. Registrar whether that's up
17 uploaded. I tried it under this number. I also tried it 1D05967 and I
18 have no results. Apparently it's unknown in the -- you checked it this
19 morning. Could you perhaps check again?
20 THE REGISTRAR: Not released, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: It's not released. It's uploaded but not released?
22 MR. TIEGER: I don't know if this assists or not. But this
23 document is on Defence list twice, once as 1D05967 and also as 1D03900,
24 and it may be it may have been uploaded as the latter.
25 MR. IVETIC: That may assist. I'm pulling it up, but I can't
1 from here.
2 JUDGE ORIE: You can't confirm from there that it is uploaded
3 under the number you -- and released under the number you gave,
4 Mr. Ivetic?
5 MR. IVETIC: I can confirm it is uploaded, and now it's not
6 showing up as released. But I can't release it from here. I don't have
7 the privileges on this computer to release documents, but I will get that
8 released at the next break.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Apparently it's uploaded twice. Perhaps you could
10 release the --
11 MR. TIEGER: 3900 has been released. We have it.
12 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic is not supposed to speak aloud.
14 Okay. Please proceed.
15 MR. IVETIC:
16 Q. Colonel, in relation to the tunnel, you said it was discussed a
17 lot and came up in your meetings. And you said:
18 "My commanders told me: 'Shut up, there is no tunnel. Orders are
20 When you say "commanders," to whom are you referring to?
21 A. All the three of them: General Gobilliard, General Bachelet, and
22 de Lapresle. With each of them I raised this issue, and each of them
23 told me to shut up.
24 Q. Okay. Now if we can turn to page 13 of your statement and look
25 at paragraph 37 of the same.
1 In this paragraph, you talk about the ABiH forces in Sarajevo and
2 you identify that they had some 20 tanks, five to six mortar battery,
3 each battery some five to six mortars, 82-millimetre and 120-millimetre.
4 What was the source for this information on the number of tanks and
5 mortars that the ABiH had in Sarajevo?
6 A. It was our job. We had to know the number of troops in different
7 parties. The department G2 principally collected that information, but
8 also it was kept under control by -- it was monitored by all the units,
9 all the monitors, all the observation points, and it was reflected in all
10 the documents in the reports made daily and weekly. There was no secret
11 about it.
12 Q. And now to switch topics. If with we could turn to page 9 in
13 your statement and look at paragraph 23. And that will be the second
14 paragraph from the top. And here you say:
15 "I met twice with the CNN journalist Christiane Amanpour at the
16 Holiday Inn Hotel and I asked her why she was always propagated against
17 the Serbs, and she told me that it wasn't my business. Many times we in
18 the UNPROFOR had impressions that the Bosnian Muslims were sniping their
19 own population but it was difficult to prove this, because the higher
20 command told us that we should stop this kind of investigation. In
21 addition, in cases of sniper activity it is very difficult to prove the
22 origin of fire, almost impossible to prove whether it was one or the
23 other side who shot from snipers."
24 And so I want to ask you, sir, in relation to UNPROFOR's
25 impression that the Bosnian Muslims were sniping their own population and
1 that the higher command told you to stop investigations, can you identify
2 for us whom you are referring to when you say "higher command"?
3 A. I mean my superior officer and mainly the BH Force Commander who
4 is higher than the Sarajevo Sector. They restricted this information.
5 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can you provide us with names?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, General Smith.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And the BH Force Commander?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I met the BH Force Commander
9 only in the framework of official negotiations. I didn't meet BH Army
10 generals. It was contrary to the principle of impartiality. I'm only
11 talking about the UNPROFOR.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Yes, I'm talking about the UNPROFOR as well. You
14 "I mean my superior officer and mainly the BH Force Commander who
15 is higher than the Sarajevo Sector."
16 I understand your answer that BH Force Commander of UNPROFOR is
17 the person you are referring to. What is his name?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I meant Sarajevo Sector.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And who is higher than the Sector Sarajevo? You
20 were referring to a person or a unit higher than the Sarajevo Sector.
21 Who was that?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Once again, above our sector
23 was the UNPROFOR BH command. General Smith was the Force Commander.
24 That's who I mean.
25 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Was he the commander of Sector Sarajevo or of BH
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Was he the commander of Sector Sarajevo or was he
4 the commander of -- the higher command, BH command of UNPROFOR?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, there is a sector.
6 Above that was the BH force command, and then the UNPROFOR command in
7 Zagreb. Those were the three levels of UNPROFOR Command in the former
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: And this is exactly why I asked you for names.
10 You provided me with a name of General Smith. Did he hold all these
11 positions, or can you provide me with other names higher than
12 General Smith?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I already gave you an example. The
14 commander of my sector was General Gobilliard.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: What was your sector?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm repeating. In my sector,
17 Sector Sarajevo, the commanders were General Gobilliard,
18 General de Lapresle, General Bachelet.
19 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Do I understand your answer that General Smith
20 was higher than the three French generals?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely, yes.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you. Now we understood each other.
23 Mr. Ivetic.
24 MR. IVETIC:
25 Q. Did -- strike that.
1 Was there any reason ever given as to why these type of
2 investigations should be stopped?
3 A. Maybe there were reasons in their heads, but they were never
4 voiced at official meetings, and they were never written black on white.
5 What was reflected was the idea of impartiality and that was it.
6 Q. Now, can you give us an idea of why UNPROFOR had the impression
7 that Bosnian Muslims were sniping their own population?
8 A. To us it was obvious with certain incidents in the streets of
9 Sarajevo. When you saw injured and killed people, it was obvious that
10 they were shot not by the Serbs from the surrounding hills, because by
11 investigating the site of the incident, you saw that there was no area on
12 the Serb side that was a clearing from which you could have shot. There
13 was no clear line of fire for a sniper. They must have been shot by
14 somebody inside the city. However, nobody was going to look for the
15 person who shot. If you want to discuss anti-sniper activity, we can do
16 that later.
17 Q. Okay.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Again, I have a question here. If you say -- if you
19 looked at it, if you investigate it, is there any document that would
20 demonstrate that on the basis of an incident that it was, as you say,
21 obvious, that the sniping could not have come from the Serb side but must
22 have come from the BiH side?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course, certainly. In most of
24 the sitreps on shooting incidents, the column source was filled with
25 "unknown." But, at the same time, it was clear that nobody could have
1 shot from the Serbian side -- or, rather, they could have shot but they
2 couldn't have hit because the line of fire was obstructed. But the
3 sitrep showed "unknown," so whoever read that report would think, well,
4 then, who could have shot it? Who could have fired this shot?
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But if you look at sitreps it may not usually
6 be that clear what line of sight or what line of fire would be possible.
7 So if you say it is reported as unknown source, that you concluded - and
8 it's not clear to me entirely on the basis of what - that it could not
9 have been from the Serb side.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I meant to say that the formats
11 of sitreps were different. From military observers, we didn't ask a
12 textual description. We wanted a schematic. And it showed the site, the
13 slopes of hills, the depressions, et cetera. From the schematic it was
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but I would like to have a look at such a
16 document which would allow for such a conclusion so that that might
17 support and corroborate your evidence. Are you aware or could you
18 produce any such sitrep which would assist us in understanding what you
19 are describing?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At this minute, I can't. But it's
21 simple, I think. In the archive you have all the reports from
22 military observers including the sketches.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Just for your information, this Chamber is not
24 dwelling in the archives to find on its own initiative evidence. That's
25 not how it works.
1 Please proceed, Mr. Ivetic.
2 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours. Page 75 of the witness's
3 statement deals with the sitrep that gives grid references for the source
4 of a sniper that wounded a Bosnian civilian coming from Bosnian-held
5 territory. If that assists, Your Honours.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I'll have a closer look to it.
7 MR. IVETIC:
8 Q. Mentioned anti-sniping, Colonel. Did UNPROFOR forces in Sector
9 Sarajevo undertake any anti-sniping activities aimed against such Bosnian
10 Muslim snipers operating in Sarajevo?
11 A. Yes. I remember when the patients of the Sarajevo Sector Command
12 Staff ran out, I was able to persuade the commander to establish an
13 anti-sniping group or anti-sniping groups. The French army has a
14 fantastic weapon, a sniping weapon, that is much better and stronger than
15 the SVD rifle used by the warring parties. It is stronger than 7.62
16 millimetres that the warring parties used, and this weapon was perfectly
17 able to counter the snipers that were nested inside Sarajevo buildings.
18 These groups were established. They efficiently fought with the snipers.
19 And I'm sorry now, but I don't remember the exact number of the
20 targets that we neutralized because it's not mostly about the snipers
21 that we killed but it was about a demonstration of the resolve of the
22 Sarajevo Sector command to fight sniping. And in the area at least where
23 I was the initiator, we managed to reduce sniping activities many times
24 by Autumn 1995.
25 Q. I would like to show you a document that is marked 1D7014, and I
1 have a hard copy again for the usher to show opposing counsel and then
2 provide to the witness if it assists.
3 And while you wait for the hard copy, perhaps we can work with
4 what is on the screen. We have before us a document and it is from the
5 foreign military studies office and its author is LTC John E. Sray,
6 US army. First of all, are you familiar with either the author or the
7 foreign military studies office that is identified in this document?
8 Colonel? I don't know if you've received translation. Are you
9 familiar with the author, Colonel Sray, or the foreign military studies
10 office? That was the question.
11 A. No, I don't know him personally. I came across this article much
12 later, one or two years after the completion of my mission.
13 Q. And if we could turn to page 3 of this document, and I would like
14 to focus on the second-to-last paragraph on that page.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, do you want Mr. Ivetic to first phrase
16 his question or would you already intervene now?
17 MR. TIEGER: No, I think I would like a chance to intervene
18 before the question is asked in part I think because I think this is -- I
19 can't imagine how under the circumstances that have unfolded, and I was
20 waiting to see how the document might be used, I think at a minimum this
21 is going to be a leading question, look at what somebody else said, and
22 is that consistent with whatever. That's a leading process.
23 Secondly, I think the nature of this document, which is sort of
24 an opinion piece, it had nothing to do with this witness. And that is,
25 as we can see from the sources for the piece, relatively -- I mean, this
1 particular section is sourced on one newspaper article. I don't think it
2 assists this process at all. Not with a fact witness.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, when phrasing your question, would you
4 please keep in mind to refrain from leading because Mr. Tieger has some
5 concerns about that. And I further notice that also in earlier
6 questions, you sometimes ask the witness to give comment on the opinion
7 of others. Now it's already problematic now and then to hear a witness
8 of fact expressing opinions, but it sometimes becomes even more
9 problematic if he is opining on opinions of others.
10 Would you please keep all this in mind when you phrase your
12 MR. IVETIC: I will, Your Honour. Although, I think that we've
13 been dealing with the witness's statement --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Well, please do it -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
15 MR. IVETIC: -- so I don't know how other opinions of others has
16 come into the direct thus far since -- [Overlapping speakers] ...
17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I can find it for you if you insist. I'll do
18 that during the break. But I'd first like to hear how you phrase your
20 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
21 Q. You've told us about the anti-sniping activities that you
22 undertook in Sector Sarajevo. In the second-to-last paragraph of this
23 document, the author has written as follows about the anti-sniping
24 activities. And my question to you, after I read that selection, would
25 be simply to ask you if this comports with what you have been talking
1 about the anti-sniping activities and your experiences in Sarajevo or
3 And the part that I'm focusing on is the part that reads:
4 "Anti-sniping activities conducted by the UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR,
5 in Sarajevo, in fact, constitute quite impressive operations. Teams
6 which perform this duty receive exceptional training from their armies
7 and possess state-of-the-art optical aids and equipment. Employing these
8 capabilities, the French recently decided to test over three years' worth
9 of UN hunches pertaining to this issue. Their investigation
10 'definitively' (their words) established the validity of UN suppositions
11 that 'some' gun-fire came from Bosniak government soldiers deliberately
12 shooting at their own civilians."
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.
14 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, again I object. This is a leading question.
15 Instead of eliciting what this witness knows or purports to have known at
16 the time, now we present him with something said by somebody else, who as
17 far as I can tell wasn't there but is simply writing an opinion piece
18 based solely on a newspaper article that he read, and now we're asked --
19 is -- presented to this witness to affirm that and is fed this
20 information to affirm. That's a leading question, I'm afraid.
21 It's a little different when we're talking about contemporaneous
22 documents relating to what this witness was involved with at the time, so
23 this process I fear has the -- sort of the converging flaws of both
24 leading and delving into irrelevant information.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, the transcript -- the transcript stops
1 at the quote Mr. Ivetic gave. Not yet a question is on the transcript.
2 MR. IVETIC: I -- for transparency, I gave my question before I
3 read the quote, Your Honour, and that should be --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see that. That's at the beginning the page
6 MR. IVETIC: And it's in relation to the evidence that I led,
7 that rather significant evidence that the witness himself told us about
8 the anti-sniping of the French that he organised, and I'm simply asking
9 for this contemporaneous document written shortly after the events in
10 question, written by somebody who was in Bosnia, as Mr. Tieger knows,
11 since that was in the submissions that this is a former aide of
12 General Rose.
13 So the submissions of the Prosecution have been incorrect and I
14 would say false as to those points, because this is a contemporaneous
15 document and I'm testing the reliability of this document based upon what
16 the witness just told us about to see if we can find more information.
17 The Prosecution has been permitted time and again, particularly
18 in the last few months of witnesses, to provide documents to witnesses
19 that the witness says I know nothing about this document and they have
20 been introduced into evidence. One example was the bullet that was
21 introduced through Dr. Stankovic where --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic --
23 MR. IVETIC: -- it's just shown to the witness and it's
24 introduced into evidence.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, the witness may answer the question.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry, I forgot the question by
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, a portion was read to you of an article and the
4 question -- let me just check because I have a little bit of a problem
5 with my computer. One second, please.
6 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Can I take over?
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
8 JUDGE FLUEGGE: The question of Mr. Ivetic was, for you,
9 Mr. Demurenko, after he had read the selection, he wanted to ask you:
10 "... if this comports with what you have been talking about, the
11 anti-sniping activities and your experiences in Sarajevo or not?"
12 That was the question. Can you answer that question.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Generally speaking, I agree
14 concerning the efficiency of the anti-sniping activities, but I don't
15 know the details of the research done by the French side. But it was
16 important and I'm proud of taking part in it.
17 MR. IVETIC: Can I continue?
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: It was your question.
19 MR. IVETIC: Yes, I know. I know. I wasn't sure if there was
21 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Please continue.
22 JUDGE ORIE: It's approximately time for the break. I don't know
23 whether this would be a suitable moment or whether you'd like to --
24 MR. IVETIC: It would be suitable. It will save time.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we'll take the break now.
1 Mr. Demurenko, you may follow the usher. We'll take a break of
2 20 minutes.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 JUDGE ORIE: We resume at quarter past 12.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 11.56 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 12.17 p.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I do understand that you wanted to raise a
8 preliminary matter, Mr. Tieger.
9 MR. TIEGER: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. And for this
10 matter, may we go into private session.
11 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
12 [Private session]
11 Pages 44069-44070 redacted. Private session.
3 [Open session]
4 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
6 Mr. Ivetic, I think you earlier referred me to page 75 of the
7 witness statement for an example which I asked for. There are a few
8 documents. Was it -- no, it was -- I think at the first occasion when I
9 asked for an example you referred me to paragraph 24, and I think later
10 referred to me to most likely, I would say, page 75 of the report.
11 MR. IVETIC: That's correct.
12 JUDGE ORIE: But there are a few documents on that page. Could
13 you --
14 [The witness takes the stand]
15 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honours. If you look at the first
16 document that is registered in a statement as 1D28133, a 8 June 1995
17 sitrep. And if you look at the reference for page 5 of that sitrep, the
18 last three lines of the -- of page 5 say. On the same page the sitrep
19 also cites, and it gives a time a Bosnian civilian was wounded at grid
20 point by sniping from grid point near the parliament. And then the
21 witness has said that the BiH controlled the city centre and that the BiH
22 was responsible for the sniping of this particular civilian.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I don't know what's -- whether that's the --
24 the type of document I asked for, but I'll have a look at it. And as a
25 matter of fact, I had a look at it already but I'll now further consider
1 your observation at this very moment.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. IVETIC: Thank you. Your Honours, we would tender 1D7014 at
4 this time.
5 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry. No, I mean, I would object to that,
6 Mr. President. I would note that this is the second time this article
7 has been tendered. Once was through the bar table submissions, it was
8 rejected as speculative. The dealing with one paragraph in this lengthy
9 opinion piece doesn't render and should not render the entire article
10 admissible, and it doesn't resolve the concerns expressed earlier in the
11 original decision when it was initially tendered.
12 JUDGE ORIE: For the purposes elicited from -- for the purposes
13 of the evidence elicited from this witness, Mr. Ivetic, is it wrongly
14 understood if I think that reading the relevant portion would fulfil that
16 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I think I did read the relevant
17 portion already. But our concern is that the Prosecution has been
18 allowed to show witnesses one paragraph and then admit documents of
19 multiple pages which are beyond the witnesses' knowledge and this Chamber
20 has permitted it, and so we're just looking to have a fair application of
21 the rules to the Defence as well.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Have we always admitted and for what reasons and did
23 you object? Because that's bit of a problem we -- it's my recollection
24 that the Chamber always tried to keep it limited and that we often asked
25 a party whether having read the relevant portion of a document, whether
1 that would be -- have been sufficient. That's -- but that's my
2 recollection that we did that very often. And whether that would be any
3 different from what we're doing now. And to say that I don't have any
4 recollection of other instances where we -- upon an objection, without
5 giving specific reasons, would have allowed the whole of the document in.
6 MR. IVETIC: Well, I can think of one. I just can't think of the
7 number. And it was with Witness Moroz where we objected to a document
8 that was purporting to be records of the utility. And the objection was
9 to parts that the witness could not confirm. He talked about the
10 authenticity of the document and in which the Chamber invited the
11 Prosecution to give provenance information. We expected to receive such
12 provenance information, we never did. And now that document has been
13 admitted by this Chamber and we have a pending motion seeking --
14 objecting to that admission of that document.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think it was a quite incomparable situation.
16 I do remember the -- I think there were two documents even with numbers,
17 et cetera. I have a clear recollection. It does not -- in my view, it
18 does not compare well with the present situation.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber considers that it's in line with our
21 earlier decisions to -- where a specific portion of a document is
22 relevant and is read to the witness in its entirety, that that means that
23 we -- that the remainder of the document - unless there are good reasons
24 to do so - should not be admitted into evidence.
25 Therefore, the admission is denied.
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
3 Q. Now I want to -- Colonel, now I want to move to the so-called
4 Markale II incident, and I'd like to look at page 14 of your statement,
5 which is D2120. And if we can look at paragraph -- well, at the bottom
6 of the page in paragraph 42, you start talking about the incident. And
7 I'd like to turn to the next page and look at the eighth line from the
8 top as to that incident. And are you are asked as follows:
9 "Q. Do you remember anything about the time. What were you told
10 about when that had happened? What did they tell you? Approximately,
12 "A. This was not a verbal report. As I told you, we had a
13 written report, hard copy report on the desks. Just after taking a
14 glance at the report, it became clear to me that this was not an ordinary
15 case of shelling because there was a large number of casualties. A
16 figure of several tens of casualties was mentioned. This number was such
17 that it required immediate attention [sic]."
18 JUDGE FLUEGGE: "Immediate action."
19 MR. IVETIC: "Action." "Action."
20 Q. Colonel, can you please explain to us what it was about this
21 number of casualties that made it clear to you that this was not an
22 ordinary case of shelling?
23 A. First of all, my experience of combat, and not only mine, tells
24 us the approximate number of shrapnel in an ordinary shelling. And when
25 I read in the report that four or five shells exploded - let me remind
1 you, there was no exact figure the first time - and out of three of them
2 there were no casualties and one of them produced 88 killed, then
3 naturally you ask yourself the question: Who is deceiving us or is this
4 person just making an honest mistake? That was one of the reasons to
5 look into this incident more carefully. And there were more reasons.
6 Q. Now at the bottom of the page in paragraph 43, you talk -- you
7 describe going to the Markale II site two hours later.
8 MR. IVETIC: And if we could turn the page to the next page. At
9 the top is the continuation of this paragraph.
10 Q. And you talk about how when you returned to the headquarters, you
11 learned that a spokesperson of UNPROFOR and Bosnia and Herzegovina, who
12 you think was a British lieutenant-colonel, had organised a press
13 conference and he said something that was unacceptable, that the crime
14 had been committed by the Serbian army.
15 Do you remember perhaps the name or position of this British
17 A. I remember his rank, lieutenant-colonel. His position was at the
18 level of assistant or PR officer for the BH Force Commander. I can't
19 remember the last name, but I can remember his face.
20 Q. Okay. You have now identified that he was the -- under the BH
21 Force Commander, so I think that suffices.
22 So then I would move to paragraph 44 of the statement, which is
23 at the bottom of the page. And here you mention two reports, one being
24 the expertise of a Croat or Bosnian expert, and then the last seven lines
25 on the page are what I would like to ask you about.
1 Here -- and I'll read it:
2 "Q. Please, tell me, under the circumstances, upon receiving
3 these two reports, did you speak to anyone who was your superior? At the
4 time who was your superior?"
5 And you answered:
6 "At the time, General Bachelet was my commander. He replaced
7 General Gobilliard there, some month and a half earlier. I went to see
8 him with a briefing, where I proposed to head myself an investigation
9 group, because it was absolutely inappropriate not to do anything
10 similar, given what a tragic event had taken place, and he gave me his
11 consent. He okayed it."
12 And so, Colonel, I'd like to ask you, first of all, to give us
13 any more details you can about your meeting with General Bachelet when
14 you say he okayed your plan to head an investigative group to look into
15 the Markale II incident.
16 A. Right. It's one of the most difficult cases -- it was one of the
17 most difficult cases at the time. I came to the commander with a
18 suggestion to make a more in-depth investigation of that incident, all
19 the more so because according to standard UN procedure, we were meant to
20 investigate and only then publish some sort of conclusions, which is not
21 something the lieutenant-colonel had done. That's one.
22 Two, to the question why do you need to do that, asked by
23 General Bachelet, I answered, and I emphasise: I am fed up with the
24 lies. I'm fed up with this situation where we are being considered as
25 passive idiots who just go along with everything. And after that, I
1 asked him for permission to investigate, and he just nodded yes.
2 That's it.
3 Q. And now if we could turn to the next page of your statement, at
4 the top, it reads:
5 "A. I proceeded to investigate, to organise an investigation. I
6 had to gather a working group of experts who were to assist me in my
7 work. I was to collect all existing documents, including those reports
8 that I have mentioned. The investigation itself -- or, rather, the work
9 of the investigation itself was not a complicated one. This is something
10 that had been done many times in the past."
11 And the question I have for you, Colonel, is in relation to this
12 group of experts that you organised to assist you, what kind of experts
13 were they? In what fields?
14 A. They were my officers, both from the staff of the Sector
15 Sarajevo, majors and lieutenant-colonels, and officers from the Russian
16 battalion, specialists in surface artillery and the land services.
17 Q. And if we go to paragraph 51 of your statement, and that is on
18 page 20. And here it describes the work that was done as follows. This
19 will be the third line down from the beginning of 51:
20 "A. I gather a group of experts. Those were my closest aides.
21 I set a task, I defined the task, namely, to make ballistic calculations
22 in order to either confirm or deny the information given by the first
23 expert on the angle of impact of the shell upon the surface. Second, to
24 calculate the angle of the shell, to show it on the map, to, rather, draw
25 the line of descent on the map. Further, the investigation was supposed
1 to include personal inspection of all possible fire positions of that
2 particular shell, including photo documentation of those locations. The
3 task was defined. On the following day, we started implementing it. The
4 experts used charts or tables, firing tables for 120-millimetre mortars.
5 They also prepared drawings of the angle of descent, and then on the
6 following day we made -- we made a site visit where I made photographs,
7 which became part of the investigative [sic] file. That's what I did."
8 And, Colonel, I'd like to ask you about these photographs that
9 were made. Approximately how many total photographs were taken and what
10 were they depicting?
11 A. In the course of the investigation, several hundred photographs
12 were made in order to make the report well founded.
13 Q. Okay. And in the continuation of paragraph 51 of your report,
14 and I think this is -- let's scroll down just a little bit. And here in
15 the last part, you talk about a Canadian officer that you encountered, an
16 assistant of the commander, when you were going to turn in your report,
17 and it is said here as follows:
18 "When I came with the results of the investigation and I showed
19 the conclusions to the assistant and the assistant realised that our
20 conclusions differed from those prepared by the public and UNPROFOR
21 spokesperson, this Canadian officer told me, 'There will be no publishing
22 of your report, it will be impossible to publish it, announce it, or to
23 give this report to the commander.' When I heard this, I took my report
24 and the photographs and I left."
25 And the question I have for you, Colonel, apart from the
1 nationality, Canadian officer and knowing he is an assistant, can we be
2 any more specific as to the identity, rank, or position of this Canadian
3 officer that you spoke with?
4 A. I remember everything but the last name, but you can find it in
5 the lists. He was an assistant of the commander. From Canada.
6 Q. And if we turn to page 22 of your statement and look at
7 paragraph 56, and that's now on our screen. In this paragraph, you
8 describe what you did after talking to the Canadian. And it says that
9 you -- let me just read it:
10 "I had two avenues open to me. The first avenue was to cease any
11 activity and not do anything else in order to promote the investigation.
12 The second avenue was not quite a proper one from the point of view of
13 military ethics and subordination but I had to resort it. Through the
14 liaison officer for public relations, I got in touch with a media company
15 in order that to publicise the reports. This liaison officer agreed to
16 have an interview."
17 Can you provide anymore information as to the liaison officer
18 that is being referenced here?
19 A. Yes, I remember him. It was a major, the major who served as a
20 PR officer, our liaison with the media. I can't remember his last name.
21 I remember his face, and I remember what he did. Attempting to get a
22 connection with the media, he called a correspondent named
23 Nariskin [phoen] in Zagreb who, in his turn, called the Associated Press,
24 and a crew flew in from the Associated Press. That's what I remember.
25 Q. Now, Colonel, I propose to watch a video with you. It's 65 ter
1 number 1D00607. It is just over 13 minutes long. We have provided to
2 the booths transcripts that we've verified yesterday via CLSS, and
3 hopefully both should be in e-court now. The English was in e-court this
4 morning, the B/C/S just arrived before the start of this court session
5 and hopefully it's there.
6 I'll first play it and then we'll stop and have some questions
7 about portions of it. If I have -- so --
8 JUDGE ORIE: It's appreciated that you have done the work before
9 we came to court so that we can avoid playing it twice.
10 MR. IVETIC: Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
12 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
13 And now I'll begin.
14 [Video-clip played]
15 "First of all, I want to introduce myself. I'm
16 Colonel Demurenko, Chief of Staff of Sector Sarajevo. But really today
17 it's not important because I am like -- only not like Chief of Staff but
18 like citizen of my country and like a professional military man, colonel.
19 "I want to explain any details of investigation which was
20 provided UN, so-called UN expertise about very terrible events which were
21 a few days ago. As you know, it was a massacre in down-town when, after
22 explosion of mortar, mortar shell, on one of the central street of the
23 city that afterwards was approximately 35 people died and more than 80,
24 in accordance with report, wounded.
25 "And as professional man, I cannot agree with argument of UN
1 specialist about reasons and sources of this shelling. It is absolutely
2 unacceptable for me and for my military friends in this area consent of
3 this argument. And therefore, I will try and explain any new details
4 which I know.
5 "Firstly, if you" --
6 MR. IVETIC: And we'll stop here for the moment. It's at 1
7 minute and 49 seconds of the video.
8 Q. And, Colonel, the first question I want to ask you, is this the
9 interview that we just talked about in paragraph 56 of your statement?
10 A. Yes, I gave only one interview. I never gave another.
11 Q. And you make reference to it being unacceptable to you and to
12 your military friends. To whom did you have in mind when you referred to
13 "military friends"?
14 A. Well, first of all, I meant the artillery experts from the
15 Russian battalion, the battalion staff, and the officers of the Sector
16 Sarajevo staff who agreed with me, who shared my opinion.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, could I ask one additional question.
18 Could you tell us where was this interview recorded? Where were
19 you located at the time?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can. It's a location on the
21 northern slope of the hills overlooking the city of Sarajevo. It's an
22 observation point. You can see the sandbags. And this observation post
23 was chosen in order for the crew to be able to see part of the view.
24 They didn't want to make it in a basement. They wanted to make it plain
25 that it was a real city and what it looked like, Sarajevo. And I
1 suggested, "We have an observation post. You can put your camera there.
2 You can see what I'm showing you on this picture, and you can also see it
3 as a view of the city."
4 JUDGE ORIE: Was it on the Serb-controlled side or was it on the
5 BiH-controlled side?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it wasn't on the Serb side. It
7 was controlled by the BH army.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
9 Please proceed.
10 MR. IVETIC: I would now then continue with the video from where
11 we left off.
12 [Video-clip played]
13 "No, the main serious facts for us is following. This is a
14 material -- maybe one portion of whole material of UN specialist about
15 the shelling. This is a short report with, is centred on French language
16 but with a strange conclusion. This is a conclusion include idea about
17 this shelling was from Serbian side. I mean, Bosnian Serbs. This is a
18 small picture which explained angle on the street, Marsal Tito, and angle
19 which was between ground and shell, mortar shell. It's very important
20 for us. I will explain it following, afterwards.
21 "This is a copy of photo pictures of this place; this is the
22 street, this is a place where is exploded of this shell. This is a very
23 important for us -- a picture. As can you see, this is a direction of
24 fire, this is place of explosion. And in accordance with investigation,
25 direction of fire was 176 degrees, or in accordance with French custom
1 2976 mils. Really, this is the south-east area. It's very important for
2 us also. This is a picture about -- it's very interesting, this material
3 of Bosnian police, I mean -- I mean, government Bosnian police. It's
4 about angle between ground and shell. As can you see, 70 degrees. And
5 the last paper is really, this is a small slice of copy from map. And
6 this is my idea which I can explain on this paper
7 "In accordance with this material, I believe the specialist which
8 was participated in this investigation was very professional and honest
9 people. And, therefore" --
10 MR. IVETIC: I will stop we stop there, and let the record
11 reflect we stopped at 4 minutes and 35 seconds of the video.
12 Q. And, Colonel, I'd ask you to please explain to whom you were
13 referring and what you meant when you said that the investigators were
14 honest and professional?
15 A. I meant all of them because I didn't know in person the people,
16 the French specialists who did the first investigation and the BH experts
17 who presented their report. I presumed and took it as a premise in my
18 investigation that they were honest professionals who knew their job
19 well. But I also meant that my own investigation team had absolutely no
20 reason to distort facts.
21 MR. IVETIC: And if we can now continue the video.
22 [Video-clip played]
23 "In accordance once again with this official investigation and
24 material, we have any picture. It's a symbolic. You know, this is
25 Sarajevo, this is a confrontation line, green. This is the two building
1 and the place where is explosed this shelling. In accordance with this
2 material, direction of fire was 100, 106 degrees. In accordance with
3 another material, it's once again very interesting question why in UN we
4 have two different material of investigation but not different and one
5 conclusion. But in accordance with another material of investigation,
6 they said about another angle. About first" --
7 MR. IVETIC: I've stopped it here at 5 minutes and 35 seconds of
8 the video.
9 Q. And we have on the paper in front of you, it looks like a 176
10 degrees, but I thought I heard the audio say 106 or 106. Could you
11 clarify, sir, which is the --
12 JUDGE ORIE: Could we first go back to the audio so that we can
13 listen to it again.
14 MR. IVETIC: Yeah. I can try to. Okay.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 [Video-clip played]
17 "... direction of fire was 100, 106 degrees. In accordance with
18 another material" --
19 MR. IVETIC: Is that the -- sufficient, Your Honour?
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes I --
21 Please proceed.
22 MR. IVETIC:
23 Q. And so, Colonel, would you agree with me that while you were
24 writing 176 on the board you said 106 in the -- in the video.
25 A. Could be, could be. It doesn't really matter. I will later
1 explain why.
2 Q. Of course. Let me then continue playing from -- well, let's go
3 from this point. Actually, we stopped at 5:35 was the last point we were
4 at. And we'll start from 5:36, which is the closest I can get the file
5 to come to.
6 [Video-clip played]
7 "Once again we know what was used, it's a 120-millimetre mortar
8 shell. It's really former Yugoslavia weapon and before it it was Soviet
9 system. I know it very well because I'm field commander, like a
10 professional soldier. Many times I participated in real practical
11 shelling and manage them, I mean my artillery officers.
12 "In accordance with the main documents for this system, this is a
13 table with whole data about characteristics of this system. We can see
14 that for this system normally used six standard charge -- charges,
15 charges. And in accordance with this angle 70 degrees, and this is a
16 direction 176, we can, after comparison with standard data, see on the
17 following map. First explosion, it could be in accordance with this,
18 once again, with this degrees and this degrees. In this area,
19 900 metres, next in this area, this is a really 1400, next one 2.000.
20 Really, this is on confrontation line.
21 "Theoretically it could be from Serbian. Theoretically. I will
22 once again explain it. And next three on the 2700, 3400, and the last
23 charge they can use for 3600. Today personally with my special -- not
24 special, very small investigation group, including artillery officers, we
25 was on this place, this place, this, this, and this. Really by my foot.
1 And I can affirm absolutely without or beyond any doubts: This is place
2 unacceptable or unsuitable for firing position mortar shell. No
3 perspective stay on this position and shell to this area."
4 MR. IVETIC: I'd pause now at 8 minutes 15 seconds of the video.
5 Q. And when you say that you were at these places, places you marked
6 on the map with the marker, can you explain to us did you visit only
7 those places or did you visit any other areas when you went on site in
8 that direction?
9 A. We went out into the field and I went on my own two feet with my
10 officers with our cameras not only along this route and along this line
11 shown here. We made sure to inspect the whole direction where it was
12 possible to place a mortar, paying special attention to these points
13 indicated here. But we walked every metre along both these lines with
14 our own feet, and we made photographs of each location to be able to have
16 Those were all -- that is to say, we walked every place where
17 there were no trees and no rocks where you could actually stand. So
18 everything that was said about Serbian aggression was pure trickery and
19 deceit, and the truth was supposed to be established by other
20 investigations group that were supposed to be appointed by the UN later.
21 Our purpose was only to say that the initial published conclusions were a
22 lie, and we proved it.
23 Q. And in the video in the segment just before this we saw you
24 referring to a firing table, and it -- the cover of that indicated it was
25 for the M52, 120-millimetre mortar. Now in the Karadzic case, the
1 Prosecution asked you about other 120-millimetre mortars, like the M74.
2 In your opinion, does the specific type of mortar used matter to the
3 conclusions that you reached as to the investigation you did?
4 A. No. In that other case, the prosecuting side put forward the
5 argument that there were modernised mortars in the Yugoslav Army that do
6 not use the same tables, and I replied that the modernisation of the
7 tripod makes no difference, or even modernisation of the platform on
8 which you place a mortar. The mortar, the way it was made by the Soviet
9 Union, has not changed. They didn't make a new mortar type in
10 Yugoslavia. It didn't matter what tables were used. I used the table
11 only as an example to show that we know everything there is to know about
12 that weapon and it was no use trying to deceive us.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask one question in relation to this.
14 Does that mean that the tables for the other suggested mortar
15 would give exactly the same data as the one you used?
16 THE WITNESS: Sorry. Where is translation?
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, well, apparently there is -- do you now receive
19 THE WITNESS: Da.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I'll repeat my question.
21 My question was whether the tables for the other mortars
22 suggested by the Prosecution, I think reference was made to M74, that
23 those tables would give exactly the same information as the tables for
24 the M52?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Any manual for something that
1 can be modified in a weapon does not affect the ballistics. The
2 possibility of manoeuvre, the placing on a platform, the tripod, the
3 weight of the plate under the mortar, it doesn't affect the action of the
4 weapon itself.
5 But that's not the most important thing. I showed the table only
6 as an indicator that we have mastery of this weapon.
7 JUDGE ORIE: So if I understand you well, the M74 and the M52
8 have exact the same properties. It means, weight, charges, content.
9 It's all really the same. And therefore if only the tube or what is
10 around the tube is changed, then it does not affect in any way the
11 trajectory of the mortar projectile, irrespective of whether we're
12 talking about an M52 or an M74.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Once again, the tube never changes.
14 It is not subject to modernisation. The tube is not subject to
15 modernisation. What changes is the ability to manoeuvre the wheels, the
16 plate under the tube, et cetera. Nothing can affect the ballistics.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And the ammunition is exactly the same? I
18 mean, the shell, the projectile, that's exactly the same, and, therefore,
19 the trajectory, irrespective of whether we're talking about the M74 or
20 the M52, it's all exactly the same.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, the charge does not change and
22 the powder doesn't change and the trajectory is the same.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. IVETIC: If we can then continue with the video.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 "Therefore, conclusion of material of investigation was wrong.
3 Now, I said only about terrain where is located Serbian troops, and
4 special without my proposals about this area. This is not my job. I am
5 soldier, I am colonel, and this is a business for special group, like
6 maybe for this necessary include criminal prosecutors, members of court
7 marshall, I don't know, maybe it's a ballistic person, and so on and so
8 on. But really for us it's necessary understand it, that it was wrong.
9 "About another direction. This is a distance between place of
10 explosion and place of fire position was 2.100 metres. Say, I was here
11 today. Absolutely no prospective locate firing battery or platoon or
12 even one mortar for this area, because this was really a rock, slope, and
13 forest, and no prospective fire from this position. I can affirm it and
14 I will have today a photo picture about each of these places.
15 "I can show for you also map with exactly direction, one this
16 direction and another alternative direction, and I think the most problem
17 for official investigation group was following. They investigate only
18 angles and directions and automatically thinking about Serbian so-called
19 aggressions against civilian population in Sarajevo. But I think it's
20 not correct, you agree with me. It's necessary more deep investigation.
21 We can organise ballistic expertise, for example, from this place or from
22 all place from this area, and we can use the smoke shell for
23 identification place where is exactly can locate this fire position. And
24 maybe now not necessary more detailed explanation because I have not time
25 enough for this. But once again, I want statement that it was wrong
1 material, it was absolutely bad conclusion, not correct. And the
2 subsequences or consequences of this events is very bad because this is
3 Sarajevo. Around Sarajevo you can listen sound of shelling. And
4 yesterday we had air-strikes around this area. Every hour civilian
5 people and military personnel is wounded and died. I think it's
6 absolutely unacceptable, especially unacceptable for professional
7 military personnel. We cannot agree when we following after the -- any
8 strong group and no chance explain our separate point of view. We have
9 it. Separate point of view.
10 "And once again, I am not -- like a citizen of my country. I
11 must said, let's stop them, stop false and falsehood and lie about
12 Serbian aggressions in this area, and especially - special, I stressed on
13 that - I don't speak about Bosnian terrain. It's not my business. I
14 don't want accuse against somebody or anybody. This is a problem for
15 professional criminalists, not for us. But for us necessary every time
16 repeat: Please all investigate it absolutely correctly with full
17 argumentation, or stop it and stop all type of faction, I mean UN, NATO,
18 and so on, against this country.
19 "And also I want to speak a few words on my native language
20 because I think it's necessary explain more preferable for me American
21 mass media and mass media of Russia. In USA, I had a few years ago my
22 military education. I love really this country, and I believe that this
23 country can support all type of activity and activity military
24 peacekeeping in this country."
25 MR. IVETIC: And that's the end of the video.
1 Q. Colonel, do you still stand by the conclusions that you presented
2 in this video that we just watched?
3 A. I do. I do stand by them. Moreover, over the past few years we
4 have seen a number of other provocations that were done following exactly
5 the same plan, exactly the same scheme: Setting up a bomb, then without
6 any investigation accusing a certain side and publicising it. That's
7 exactly the same thing as happened here.
8 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, the Defence would tender the video as
9 next exhibit.
10 MR. TIEGER: No objection.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
12 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 1D607 will be Exhibit D2122, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
14 Mr. Ivetic, I'm looking at the clock. But first I'd invite the
15 usher to escort the witness out of the courtroom.
16 We'd like to see you back in 20 minutes, Mr. Demurenko.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, the Chamber has expressed some concern
19 about an approximately 100-page statement and then to cross-examine for
20 so many hours and invited you, urged you, to see whether you could limit
21 it, and I noticed that there is a lot of repetition in it. Much of what
22 I have read in the report is subject of your examination. Could you tell
23 us how you think you would be able to conclude and when?
24 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honours, based upon the questions that I
25 have remaining, it is more likely that I'll need just a little bit after
1 the last session. I may -- it's possible that I could conclude in the
2 next session, but it's more likely that it will be just after, with a
3 little bit more time after, and --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And your latest estimate was, could you please
5 remind me?
6 MR. IVETIC: Two and a half to three hours, and I believe I'm on
7 track too.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Two and a half to three hours. You're at this
9 moment at two hours and 20 minutes. That's at least what Mr. Registrar,
10 who is usually very accurate in this matters, tells me.
11 So therefore if you say you're on track, you're urged to see
12 whether you could finish today. And that on from 1.30, another 45
13 minutes would bring you to three hours and 5 minutes. That's above your
15 We take a break, and we resume at -- I made a mistake, by the way
16 of five minutes, so you would exactly stay within your three hours.
17 We resume at 25 minutes to 2.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 1.18 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 1.36 p.m.
20 JUDGE ORIE: I think that when we looked at the video, you
21 tendered it, Mr. Ivetic. A number was given. Then I asked you to look
22 at the clock, but what I should have done is to first decide on
24 D2122 is admitted into evidence.
25 [The witness takes the stand]
1 MR. IVETIC:
2 Q. Colonel, before we continue talking about the Markale incident,
3 during this break I was able to review some documents and I'd like to
4 look at one with you. It's P757. And if we could -- I don't know if
5 there's a B/C/S as well. But the English is fine for our purposes.
6 If we can look at page 3 of the same. Again, this is a UN
7 document or sitrep from -- and on this page, we have an individual who
8 has signed at the bottom of the page as the acting sector commander on
9 June 30th, 1995. Are you familiar with the officer who has signed the
10 bottom of the English version?
11 MR. IVETIC: I see now that there's a --
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: These are two different documents.
13 MR. IVETIC: Yeah, we need the next page, I believe, in the
14 B/C/S. Yeah. There we go.
15 Q. Are you a familiar with this individual named in this document,
17 A. I think it's the same colonel that I referred to before who was
18 overly aggressive at meetings. M. That's the first letter of his name.
19 That's -- that's him, I think. And, of course, I knew him, from meeting
21 Q. Okay. Thank you. Now we can return to the Markale
22 investigation. After you gave the interview that we just watched in the
23 last session, did you have occasion to talk with General Bachelet about
24 the interview and what had happened?
25 A. Yes, yes. Well, inwardsly I wasn't feeling comfortable because I
1 was aware that I went against the chain of co-ordination and
2 subordination which exists in every army. I did not follow orders. I
3 did something off my own bat without the orders of my superiors, but I
4 had no choice. That's why I went to General Bachelet thinking that I
5 would try to explain. Do you want me to tell you about it?
6 Q. Yes, please. Tell us about what happened when you went to speak
7 with Commander Bachelet.
8 A. I said: "I'm very sorry, General. I know that I disrupted the
9 chain of subordination, and I let you down." And that was true; I did
10 let him down. And then I was prepared to listen to what General Bachelet
11 had to say, and he said: "Colonel, there is no doubt that you will have
12 serious problems in the future, probably in the nearest future. In the
13 next few days, there will be attempts to remove you or to do something
14 about you, and in the future, generally speaking, what you have done will
15 not be met well or looked upon kindly by the BH command and in some other
16 quarters," and that was the end of the conversation.
17 Q. Did you make any suggestions to General Bachelet about what he
18 should tell BH command?
19 A. I tried to repeat what I had said before, that a true
20 investigation should be carried out to shed real light on the incident,
21 its reasons and its authors. I couldn't make any other recommendations
22 because it was quite clear that tensions were rising around me, and the
23 more I try to talk to the general, whom I respected very much, the harder
24 time he will have of it. That's why I tried to take my distance from
25 him. Most of the blame was definitely upon me.
1 Q. And did you ever learn what the reaction was of General Smith at
2 the BH command to the interview that you gave to the media?
3 A. Yes. The man who served as a PR assistant, maybe he was called
4 press attache of General Smith, told me later, subsequently, a month
5 ago -- a month later, approximately, that when General Smith found out
6 about my interview, he immediately ordered that an order be prepared to
7 dismiss me from UNPROFOR. And this press attache, in reply, advised him
8 not to do that because in that case I would look like a hero, whereas
9 General Smith would come out looking as if he were trying to suppress
10 justice and criticism. That's why he said, "Leave Demurenko alone. At
11 any rate, he will soon be killed and we will both save face Demurenko
12 will be gone." That's what Aleksandar Ivankov [phoen] told me himself,
13 the man who then served as the press attache.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, it's very much covering the same ground
15 as in the statement pretty clear, abundantly clear, I would say, that the
16 way in which Bachelet reacted, Smith. All that -- and that's, of course,
17 not the core of it. We are primarily interested in what the findings of
18 this witness were. Again, it's repetitious.
19 Please proceed.
20 MR. IVETIC: And, Your Honours, the findings of the witness are
21 in the document. You refer to it as a report but it's a statement of a
22 witness. And we have presented evidence of bias within the UN. I, in
23 cross-examining Mr. Smith, posited that he was biased and was reaching a
24 decision without looking at the facts, and this evidence we believe goes
25 toward establishing the ulterior motives of General Smith and those
1 others that were presented on the Prosecution case as to this incident,
2 and so that's why we're stressing this. And I actually don't think that
3 the information of Aleksandar Ivankov is in the statement, not with his
4 name, in the source, which is why I elicited it. And I don't think that
5 the reaction of General Bachelet is in the statement. It's in the
6 proofing note that I sent. It's not in the statement, which is why I led
8 JUDGE ORIE: I think the response of Bachelet is extensively in
9 the statement, but I do agree that some of it is in the proofing note.
10 And, of course, there would have been perhaps other ways of introducing
11 that. It's abundantly clear that the basis for the bias is to be found
12 in all of what this witness said, bias by UNPROFOR. That's abundantly
13 clear from the hundred pages which were presented to us.
14 Please proceed.
15 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours. I would only just -- I --
16 when I say "bias," I'm talking about bias of individuals in UNPROFOR.
17 Not necessarily UNPROFOR as an organisation. I think that's what I meant
18 and I think that --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Sometimes the statement talks about UNPROFOR and
20 what UNPROFOR intended apart from what an organisation can intend, and
21 sometimes it extensively deals with individuals within UNPROFOR.
22 MR. IVETIC: Okay.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
24 MR. IVETIC: If we can return to the witness's statement, which
25 is D2120. And upon doing so, if we could look at page 25 of the
1 statement and focus on paragraph 64 of the same.
2 Q. Sir, in this paragraph of your statement you talk about the
3 encounter of Captain Salajdzic, the liaison officer from the BH army, and
4 what he told you, basically that there was an order issued to kill you.
5 And I would like to ask you, could you describe for us with what type of
6 attitude or demeanour did Captain Salajdzic convey this message to you?
7 A. We had regular normal relations. Salajdzic was the liaison
8 officer with our staff, from the BH army. A tall, young captain. He
9 looked a bit lost talking to me because he did not expect to come up
10 against such counter-arguments or -- which stuck out from the general
11 tone of the UNPROFOR; and, on the on the other hand, he was letting me
12 know something like you've got one day left to live.
13 Q. Okay. Was he conveying that message to you in a -- out of
14 concern? Is that how you took the message? Or did you take it in some
15 other fashion?
16 A. Nobody really communicated anything to me. Salajdzic was telling
17 me face to face. It was not a communication. We were just talking.
18 Q. And what was his mood while talking to you?
19 A. I've already said. On the one hand, he looked rather lost
20 because he hadn't expected resistance; and on the other hand, he looked
21 triumphant because he was representing an environment that could easily
22 do away with me and count me as a casualty. There would be no
24 Q. Okay. If we could turn to page 58 of your statement and look at
25 paragraph 132. And here you are being shown the final and comprehensive
1 Markale report that was issued by the BH command. And in relation to the
2 G2 report about the Cymbeline radar information you say here as follows,
3 and it's the last four lines of the -- this part of your statement:
4 "I see that the third investigation was done by G2 officer. G2
5 position was always held by the US army intelligence officer. The
6 relationship between the G2 officer and me after the Markale II incident
7 became bad and he even called me an enemy and never allowed me to use his
8 satellite telephone to call Russia, as before."
9 I'd like to ask you to describe for us what your relationship was
10 like prior to the Markale incident with this G2 officer in the BH
12 A. I understand. In the BH command, I had only one comrade, an
13 American lieutenant-colonel who headed one sector within the G2
14 department. What the two of us had in common was that we both knew
15 Kansas and Fort Levenworth where both of us had received training. Later
16 on after that training, I occasionally travelled to see him and he was
17 very, very helpful to me. His satellite phone was my only way of calling
18 my family to say that I'm alive and well. It was a rare and very
19 precious opportunity. I didn't have such a chance anywhere else. And we
20 had that relationship all the way up to the end of August. But then the
21 next time I showed up in their unit, in the beginning of September, he
22 looked offended, disappointed, and he said in future he would be unable
23 to have any contact with me.
24 It was not on a personal level. He was just unwilling to be
25 associated with somebody who was, quote/unquote, an enemy. I understood.
1 I shrugged and left.
2 Q. Colonel, did you ever have any occasion to discuss with this G2
3 officer either his findings as to Markale or your own findings as to
4 Markale and the Cymbeline radar?
5 A. Honestly, I had no other abilities to investigate. What I showed
6 in the interview, that was not the real investigation. It was only bits
7 and pieces. Everything else was kept concealed from me, and I was just
8 waiting and waiting, when they would perform a real investigation and
9 tell the truth. However, that time didn't come. My attempt, however, to
10 explain to him why I did what I did and to prove that I'm right ended
11 with him being afraid for his job and his rank, saying I cannot go on
12 seeing you, this is the end.
13 Q. Okay. Now if we could move to another section of your statement,
14 and it's page 37 of the same, and it will be paragraph 90.
15 And in that paragraph, in the middle you talk about the fact that
16 you did not have a GPS device but you were able to use the traditional
17 old -fashioned instruments to determine the location in doing your
19 Could you tell us what traditional old-fashioned instruments you
20 are referring to in this paragraph that were used?
21 A. Everyone who had anything to do with the surface-to-surface
22 artillery of smaller calibre knows about the existence of something
23 called artillery compass, and we used it to calculate co-ordinates and
25 MR. IVETIC: I'd like to call up in e-court 1D5971.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Could you please repeat the number?
2 MR. IVETIC: 1D5971.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
4 MR. IVETIC:
5 Q. We have a photograph on our screen. Are you familiar with what
6 is depicted on the screen; and if so, can you tell us what it is?
7 A. It's the same thing, artillery compass.
8 Q. Could you describe for us how your team employed such a device in
9 relation to the Markale investigation?
10 A. I can. Well, generally speaking, it was necessary to see on site
11 and later walk the line shown in the initial report on the map. Let me
12 draw your attention to the fact that it was not us who drew that line.
13 It was done by the French with the help of other experts. So we chose a
14 point on lower ground in the city that allowed for this imaginary line,
15 imaginary at that point, we marked on the map the landmarks that we
16 needed to follow as we went up that line, and then emerging from the
17 point of the crater, we physically, on our feet, went along that line in
18 order to either confirm or refute the presence of possible firing
19 positions, so the compass played the main part in charting that line
20 through the slopes of the hill.
21 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, the Defence would tender this
22 photograph into evidence.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.
24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D2123, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Admitted into evidence.
1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.
2 Q. Now I would like to return to your statement D2120 and page 26 of
3 the same and paragraph 66.
4 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Paragraph 66 is on page 27.
5 MR. IVETIC: Then I apologise. This -- this is the
6 paragraph we're looking for.
7 Q. Since time is short, I will only focus on the last three lines of
8 paragraph 66, where you say:
9 "If you take a shell and fix it using screws or whatever else and
10 explode it with a different detonator, the crater will look the same.
11 There are factors that make me believe it couldn't have been a mortar
13 And so, Colonel, I want to hear from you what are the factors
14 that led you to believe that this Markale explosion couldn't have been a
15 mortar shell?
16 A. There were several factors.
17 First of all, when I came there and looked around me, I could see
18 it was a very narrow street, and it was difficult for a shell to fall
19 from a hill down. It was like a one in a million chance.
20 Second, on the photograph that I showed, it was clear that half
21 of the shell had not exploded. It was lying on the asphalt on the
22 pavement together with the stabiliser. The first had dispersed
23 fragments. So if -- even if the second half was fragmented, the second
24 half could not look that way.
25 And, third, it couldn't have hit 100 people.
1 So I started thinking what was possible. It was possible to
2 imitate an artillery shell, put in something that would fake the
3 fragments of an exploded mine, and blame it on the Serbs. But what was
4 important was that it showed us as stupid dumbos who were able to believe
5 such a transparent provocation.
6 Q. You earlier talked about a team of experts who assisted you,
7 including some artillery experts. What did they tell you about whether
8 this appeared to be a normal mortar shelling or not?
9 A. I have to repeat, that in the conclusions by artillery people it
10 was said that the likelihood of hitting from a hill a piece of a narrow
11 street was the same as the likelihood of hitting the head of one person
12 with a stone. One in a million. And the conclusion was obvious -- from
13 space, hitting a person in the head with a stone from space. One in a
14 million chance. So it was near impossible.
15 Q. I'd like to move to my final topic. During the course of your
16 deployment in UNPROFOR, did you ever meet with General Mladic in person?
17 A. Yes, several times. I was part of delegations that met with
18 General Mladic.
19 Q. And I'd like to look at one such event that was shown to you in
20 the Karadzic case. In our case, it's P364 in e-court. It will be, if my
21 numbers are right, page 108 in both the English and the typed B/C/S as
22 opposed to the handwritten B/C/S. This has been entered into evidence as
23 a notebook attributed to General Mladic.
24 And while we wait for the English the date of this meeting is
25 recorded as the 21st of October, 1995. And if you look at the document
1 for the participants, it has "meeting with Colonel Demurenko."
2 Could you tell us, sir, first, were you alone at this meeting
3 with Serb officers as one might conclude from the notation of this
5 A. I don't remember all the details of the meetings with
6 General Mladic, but I remember one thing clearly: I never had any
7 personal meetings with General Mladic. It was always as part of an
8 official delegation, smaller or bigger, and the meeting, as the one here,
9 was probably as part of a delegation headed by a civilian. I believe at
10 that time it was the foreign minister of Russia, Sergei [sic] Ivanov, and
11 I was part of his working group. He was later Russia's foreign minister.
12 At that time, he was an envoy for foreign affairs. So I worked as part
13 of his working group. I was not alone.
14 Q. And now looking at the words that are attributed to you. In the
15 first two bullet points, you are inquiring of the Serbs for their
16 position on accepting multinational forces in the former BH, and you are
17 talking about a Russian delegation in Brussels headed by
18 Colonel General -- and then the name looks like Shavtsov. Are you
19 familiar with the general whose name is written here and what was going
20 on in Brussels at that time?
21 A. Yes. General Shavtsov had been appointed head of the group for
22 co-ordination between Russia and NATO. There was, therefore, the foreign
23 minister, and I was part of the group as a specialist with knowledge of
24 western standards in combat, military training, peacetime, military
25 activities, et cetera. And in Brussels, we organised some contacts with
1 NATO leaders. And later on in Mons, in a NATO military headquarters,
2 these contacts continued, and I headed the Russian side.
3 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Demurenko, you were asked if you remember the
4 meeting with General Mladic talking about these matters in Brussels. Do
5 you remember that?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember perhaps not in the
7 smallest detail as you would wish me to, but I remember all the meetings
8 that had to do with demilitarisation.
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: That was not my question. Looking at the
10 document before us, it says that you met Mr. Mladic, General Tolimir,
11 Colonel Salapura, and others and talking about the Russian delegation you
12 just mentioned in Brussels. Do you remember such a meeting where you
13 talked about the events in Brussels?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
15 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
16 MR. IVETIC:
17 Q. And looking further, it looks as if there was a discussion of
18 sending 7.500 men if -- troops -- pardon me, men. If Yeltsin accepts it
19 and if the UN finances it, it will be the most optimal option.
20 Do you have a recollection of what this discussion of 7500 men
21 was in relation to?
22 JUDGE ORIE: No speaking aloud, Mr. --
23 Mr. Lukic, could you ...
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. IVETIC:
1 Q. Colonel, do you remember what the 7500 men that would be financed
2 by the UN, what that was in relation to?
3 A. I remember. The decision was made to reinforce the Russian group
4 in Yugoslavia, specifically using the air-borne assault force, one
5 brigade, and I took part in developing decisions concerning that brigade
6 and the place of its deployment. If I remember well, it was Ugljevik.
7 And one of the duties assigned to me was to liaise with the Serbian side,
8 specifically with General Mladic, and with other parties taking part in
9 this effort, the UN, the BiH, et cetera, to inform them that we have this
10 plan and how we mean to implement it. I was doing that on the orders of
11 my Russian superior command.
12 Q. And if we could turn to the next page of the document in both
13 languages, and the part that's now in the approximate middle of our
14 screen, the question is in the middle of the section. It says:
15 "The Russian are considering two to four sectors with a balance
16 between NATO and Russia. At the top there would be some kind of
17 headquarters (R-NATO) and at the top some sort of political commission.
18 There would be some control of the regularity of the implementation of
19 the mandate. We didn't discuss details in the planning. I would like to
20 hear your opinion regarding the presentation in Brussels. The
21 possibility of dispatching special troops of the Russian army to the GS."
22 Could you tell me if you -- could you tell me, sir, if you
23 remember what is this in relation to, this discussion, again, of Brussels
24 and the sending of special troops of the Russian army to the Main Staff
25 as part of this Russian-NATO mandate that is being discussed? What is
1 going on at this time?
2 A. Yes, I remember it was a very tense time. It was Autumn, late
3 Autumn, 1998 [as interpreted]. It was the peak of tensions between the
4 BiH army and the VRS was in the past [as interpreted]. But activities
5 were on the rise, and the Russian delegation didn't want to be
6 marginalised and it proposed different possibilities for its
7 participation both in peacekeeping and in peacemaking.
8 The term "special forces" in the meaning "commando" is wrongly
9 used. It's completely different forces that were planned to be used. It
10 was to be a contingent from the air bone assault and landing units.
11 There were two battalions under me. And the Russian Federation, in
12 co-operation with NATO and having received NATO's consent to deploy this
13 brigade, was preparing the next brigade for deployment in the former
15 As you know, later on it led to a situation where a company from
16 that brigade participated in the conquest, quote/unquote, of the Pristina
17 airport, and then later that brigade was transferred to Kosovo and you
18 know all the events that followed. All that happened, all the planning
19 was with my participation. And then the whole effort lasted for another
20 five years.
21 JUDGE ORIE: The answer is moving away from the question.
22 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Demurenko, are you talking about Autumn 1995
23 or Autumn 1998?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was autumn 1995. I just went --
25 jumped a bit ahead to explain how the brigade was later used.
1 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Because on page 85, line 3 and 4, you say:
2 "Yes, I remember it was a very tense time. It was Autumn, late
3 Autumn, 1998."
4 Should that be corrected into 1995?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely. In 1998, I had already
6 been dismissed.
7 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
9 MR. IVETIC: I have two questions.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Two questions. Then with the indulgence of those
11 assisting us, please put them to the witness.
12 MR. IVETIC:
13 Q. First question: How would you describe the attitude or
14 disposition of General Mladic towards Russia and yourself in the course
15 of this meeting? The emotional disposition.
16 A. I can only tell you my personal opinion. I don't know if it
17 coincides with the opinion of General Mladic.
18 On the one hand, it was perfectly obvious that he had a positive
19 view of the Russian officer, that is to say, me, and it wasn't the first
20 time we were meeting, and he was very willing and ready to hear my ideas
21 and proposals of solutions. And on the other hand, as I was increasingly
22 beginning to understand, he expected Colonel Demurenko as a
23 representative of Russia to take a more active part and to make a greater
24 contribution to the cause of peace and the cause of the Serbian people.
25 But in that way, I could do nothing for him.
1 Q. Okay. And just the last question. This particular meeting --
2 actually, hold on one moment. Let me just ask you to clarify for this
3 particular meeting, who else you believe was part of the delegation that
4 you were -- that you said that you were a part of?
5 A. You mean from the Russian side? Or you mean the UN? I saw Serb
6 officers, most of whom I didn't know. I knew General Mladic; I knew
7 General Tolimir from seeing him once. On the Russian side, the head of
8 the delegation was a civilian, a diplomat. Now, I'm afraid to get it
9 wrong, and I cannot remember the last name, but it was perfectly clear
10 that it was a politician, a civilian. The rest, I don't remember many
11 other UN -- I don't remember any UN officers present there. I only
12 remember the small Russian delegation and the Serb officers.
13 Q. Colonel, I thank you for your patience today and the last few
14 days with me.
15 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, that's my last of my questions.
16 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Demurenko, we'll adjourn for the day. We would
18 like to see you back tomorrow. But before you leave this courtroom, I
19 want to instruct you that you should not speak or communicate in whatever
20 way with whomever about your testimony, whether that's testimony you've
21 given today or whether that's testimony still to be given tomorrow,
22 perhaps even the day after tomorrow, but we still hope that we'll be able
23 to conclude your testimony tomorrow.
24 If that's clear to you, you may follow the usher, and we'd like
25 to see you back tomorrow morning, 9.30, in this same courtroom.
1 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 JUDGE ORIE: We adjourn for the day, and we'll resume tomorrow,
4 the 15th of June, 9.30 in the morning, in this same courtroom, I.
5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.22 p.m.,
6 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 15th day of
7 June, 2016, at 9.30 a.m.