1 Monday, 5 December 2016
2 [Prosecution Closing Arguments]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.36 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
8 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And good morning, Your Honours. This
10 is case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 Could I have the appearances. Prosecution first.
13 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.
14 Alan Tieger, Peter McCloskey, Arthur Traldi, and Adam Weber, with
15 Case Manager Janet Stewart appearing for the Prosecution.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
17 Mr. Lukic, appearances for the Defence.
18 MR. LUKIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Branko Lukic,
19 Miodrag Stojanovic, Dan Ivetic, Jason Alarid, Radovan Djurdjevic, and
20 legal assistants, Kristina O'Young and Laura Brincus and
21 Alessia Gaultieri. Sorry.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's not only know your Judges; it's also know
23 your league team, Mr. Lukic. Thank you for that.
24 We're here today to hear the final arguments of the parties. The
25 Chamber, however, was informed that there was a preliminary matter to be
1 raised by the Defence.
2 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honours. We just wanted to bring to your
3 attention, since filing hasn't gone through the e-court -- the electronic
4 web mail system, but we did send a courtesy copy on Friday; and I believe
5 the Prosecution has sent a courtesy copy of that response to that filing
6 from Friday, that's our renewed urgent motion for stay of proceedings
7 pending the one appeal, interlocutory appeal, that is still pending and
8 it's based on Your Honours' 21 October 2016 decision on our first motion
9 for stay of proceedings which said that:
10 "No irreversible consequence for the trial or prejudice to the
11 accused would result that could not be remedied by an opportunity to
12 supplement the final brief or" --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic.
14 MR. IVETIC: Yeah.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Are you reading now? I think -- it sounds familiar
16 to me. Is that what you're reading is the content of your motion?
17 MR. IVETIC: Actually, I'm reading the content of your order,
18 which is recited in our motion, yeah.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes, that's what I thought. So the motion --
20 we indeed received a courtesy copy. We also received a courtesy copy of
21 the response the Prosecution intended to file. We do understand that
22 today at 9.16 the motion was formally filed. The Chamber also received
23 information -- Mr. Registrar, I hope you can confirm that meanwhile the
24 Prosecution response is officially filed now as well.
25 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
1 JUDGE ORIE: I can be not as precise as with the 9.16, but it was
2 a couple of minutes ago; that's the Chamber's understanding.
3 So that's where we stand. We have received courtesy copies. We
4 have received information that the motion and the response have been
6 Could the parties confirm - and otherwise I would have to check
7 it now right away - but that the motion as sent to us as a courtesy copy
8 is identical to the one which was filed at 9.16.
9 Mr. Ivetic.
10 MR. IVETIC: It should be since I forwarded the same PDF file, so
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So there was no intention in any way to divert
13 from what you sent us or what you sent to the Registry and we then later
14 received as your courtesy copy?
15 MR. IVETIC: That's correct.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Same question to the Prosecution.
17 MR. TIEGER: Also confirmed, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then, under those circumstances ...
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, there was a need to verify this because the
21 Chamber - having received the courtesy copies and expecting that
22 identical motion and the response would be filed - has deliberated on the
23 basis of the courtesy copies, which now turns out to be the motion and
24 the response.
25 Therefore, we can proceed on this matter, and the Chamber will
1 now issue its decision on the motion. The motion for -- the urgent
2 motion, renewed urgent Defence motion for the stay of the proceedings is
3 denied, reasons to follow, which means that we'll now proceed to hear the
4 final argument of the parties.
5 Prosecution first. Mr. Tieger.
6 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, Your Honours.
7 In 1993, after his forces had radically altered the demographic
8 picture in the portions of Bosnia claimed by the Bosnian Serbs,
9 Ratko Mladic took credit for what had been done under his command and for
10 the positive situation in which Bosnian Serb negotiators now found
12 "Mr. President, you have started from the most favourable
13 starting position in Geneva. You had the military result in your hands."
14 P2508, pages 32 through 33, and may the Court Officer be
15 instructed, please, to show the Sanction presentation on the large
17 That military result, Your Honours, was the realisation of a
18 strategy to create a factual situation that could not be reversed, a
19 reconfiguration of Bosnian demographics that the international
20 community - as well as Muslims and Croats - would have to accept as
22 It didn't happen secretly, as Karadzic quoted a Bosnian Serb
23 War Commissioner:
24 "We are skinning the cat alive before the whole world."
25 P4584, pages 13 and 15.
1 As the entire world was able to see, what had happened in
2 municipality after municipality was not an unintended effect of the
3 military campaign but its very purpose. UN Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki
4 reported in August 1992:
5 "Ethnic cleansing does not appear to be the consequence of the
6 war, but rather its goal. This goal, to a large extent, has already been
7 achieved through killings, beatings, rape, destruction of houses and
9 It's P2813, paragraph 6.
10 By the time that the Special Rapporteur made these observations,
11 General Mladic's VRS controlled approximately 70 per cent of the
12 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You can find that at P4581, pages 38,
13 48, and 55.
14 By the summer of 1992, they had enough to be thinking about
15 cease-fires and freezing their already advantageous positions. P3113,
16 pages 1, 3, and 5.
17 Offers of cease-fire, however, did not mean that their
18 territorial objectives had been fully satisfied, as reflected, for
19 example, in General Mladic's November 1992 Directive 4, which orders the
20 VRS to pursue an as-yet unfulfilled Strategic Objective, number 3, by
21 forcing the enemy "with the Muslim population" to leave Birac, Zepa, and
22 Gorazde areas. It's P2217, page 5.
23 Those Eastern Bosnia operations continued, in Karadzic's words
24 "packing Muslims in small areas." P4584, page 13, and culminated -
25 temporarily at any rate - when the international community prevented
1 their take-over of Srebrenica and established safe areas. As
2 General Mladic said:
3 "If the international community had not meddled, they," meaning
4 the Muslims, "would have paid the price for everything they had done up
5 to then to the Serb people."
6 P1973, page 5.
7 Despite this setback, the focus on Srebrenica and the remaining
8 enclaves persisted. As General Mladic communicated to the Drina Corps in
9 1994, which was captured in an information report to the Bratunac Brigade
10 and this is from the report:
11 "We must attain our final goal, an entirely Serbian Podrinje,"
12 and that report continued, "we must continue to arm, train, discipline,
13 and prepare the RS Army for the execution of this crucial task: The
14 expulsion of Muslims from the Srebrenica enclave."
15 That's P1505, page 3, also found at the transcript 111786 through
17 As General Mladic explained in 1994 to the Bosnian Serb Assembly,
18 the Bosnian Serbs had a historical opportunity to create "not any kind of
19 state, but an all-Serbian state ... with ... as little enemies as
20 possible, those who could be our potential enemies and raise against us
21 in a few years ..."
22 His concern, he told the Assembly was not that Muslims might
23 create a state. His concern "is to have them vanish completely."
24 P3076, pages 18 through 20.
25 By March 1995, General Mladic and Radovan Karadzic re-intensified
1 their focus on Srebrenica, issuing a directive to create conditions to
2 make the lives of Srebrenica's inhabitants "unbearable." That's
3 Directive 7.
4 By July 2nd a combat operation in furtherance of Directive 7 was
5 underway. On the 9th of July, General Mladic and Karadzic realised they
6 could take the enclave itself and changed the operations to do so. On
7 the 11th of July, General Mladic walked into Srebrenica and vowed that
8 the time had come to take revenge on the Turks. That's P1147, page 11.
9 Within a short time, over 7.000 Srebrenica men and boys, boys as
10 young as 12, had been systematically murdered and all of the remaining
11 inhabitants of Srebrenica expelled. The Srebrenica community had been
12 destroyed, had "vanished."
13 Meanwhile, Bosnia's capital had been held under what
14 General Mladic called "our hammer." P431, page 35.
15 Its civilian population subjected to a campaign of shelling and
16 sniping that was increased to place pressure on or retaliate against the
17 Muslim side or, conversely, reduced in response to pressures from the
18 international community. Internationals who arrived at different points
19 in the conflict came to the same conclusion, that the primary purpose of
20 the shelling and sniping was to induce terror in the civilian population.
21 The campaign was so pervasive and enduring that life itself in Sarajevo,
22 including even the behaviour of children, painfully adapted to it. The
23 effort to produce terror through shelling and sniping was also buttressed
24 by the simultaneous pressure of restrictions on humanitarian aid and
25 basic means of life: Water, heating, electricity.
1 These massive criminal efforts - municipalities, Sarajevo,
2 Srebrenica - along with the taking of UN personnel as hostages in
3 May 1995 in order to prevent NATO air-strikes, these efforts are
4 reflected in four separate but related JCEs charged in the indictment,
5 all distinct, although each broadly in service of the same goal of
6 achieving a Serbian state on vast territories within Bosnia-Herzegovina
7 with as few historical enemies as possible.
8 Your Honours, by way of presentation I will be discussing with
9 you aspects of the overarching JCE in the context of addressing claims
10 made in the Defence final trial brief. Mr. Traldi will then address
11 General Mladic's implementation of the common purpose, the overarching
12 common purpose. I will then return to speak about Count 1, genocide, in
13 the municipalities, specifically focussing as we did on our brief on the
14 municipality of Prijedor. Mr. Weber will then address the Sarajevo, the
15 terror JCE; followed by Mr. McCloskey on the elimination JCE in
16 Srebrenica in July 1995, the execution of over 7.000 men and boys and the
17 forceable transfer of the women, children, and elderly.
18 Finally, Your Honours, I will address you on sentencing.
19 More specifically with respect to my remarks this morning, I will
20 be addressing claims in the Defence brief related to the overarching JCE,
21 claims that the common purpose or General Mladic's contributions to it
22 are belied by such things as local autonomy in the municipalities, or no
23 plans by the leadership, or the alleged fact that those who left were
24 welcome to come back, or by General Mladic's alleged lack of control over
25 the VRS or his benevolent view of non-Serbs. As I will discuss, these
1 claims are false. Indeed, when their basis is more closely examined, the
2 evidence demonstrates the existence of the common purpose and
3 General Mladic's many contributions to it.
4 So I begin with some of the more extraordinary claims in the
5 Defence's final brief. Faced with a massive trial record revealing the
6 enormity of his crimes, crimes that he committed by using his authority
7 to control the entire army, the Defence attempts to transform
8 General Mladic into a benign but ineffectual officer, determined to
9 protect Muslims against people like Karadzic, but unfortunately only a
10 marginalised secondary figure, less important than the corps commanders.
11 The fundamental principle that a general can delegate authority but not
12 responsibility is turned on its head, as General Mladic now tries to pass
13 off his responsibility for what he once bragged about by blaming his
14 superior and his subordinates in an effort to exculpate himself.
15 The Defence claims that command and control principles in the VRS
16 meant that General Mladic could issue general instructions but was
17 thereafter relegated to an advisory role because "exclusive" [Realtime
18 transcript read in error "conclusive"] command was assumed by the corps
19 commanders, whom they want you to believe were the most powerful and
20 important people in the VRS. That's paragraphs 643 through 644 of the
21 Defence brief.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Can I just check with you. The draft, at least the
23 draft, reads "conclusive." Did I hear you say "exclusive"?
24 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, "exclusive." Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
1 MR. TIEGER: Thus, according to the Defence, Dragomir Milosevic
2 and Galic were the ones who really controlled the army in Sarajevo. In
3 Srebrenica - although the accused was physically present - command lay in
4 the hands of Krstic. Para 644 of the Defence brief.
5 That claim distorts the operative language by taking it out of
6 context. For example, the Defence pretends that the term "exclusive"
7 command in reference to a corps commander means that no one else can tell
8 him what to do. In fact, the term means that within the corps, it is the
9 commander who is at the top and no one else. At the same time, however,
10 military doctrine and VRS regulations covering corps commanders recognise
11 the existence of superior command. Indeed the Defence's conception of
12 command would render the very concept of chain of command - with which
13 have all become familiar during the course of this case - meaningless.
14 It is not only facially preposterous, but it is belied by the extensive
15 evidence you have heard from VRS and international witnesses that the
16 chain of command was the operative principle. And in that chain, General
17 Mladic carried out, fully carried out, his role as commander, issuing and
18 overseeing the implementation of his orders to the corps commanders on a
19 continuing basis. As General Milovanovic explained to you, the corps
20 commanders would send the Main Staff in their daily reports, their
21 decisions and plans for the following day's activities, which General
22 Mladic would then approve or reject. That's T1696 through 97.
23 But let's watch just half a minute from the war, 30 seconds which
24 embody what the evidence has repeatedly shown about General Mladic's
25 commanding role and which reflects the very absurdity of casting him as a
1 secondary and marginal figure, as a mere advisor.
2 Your Honours, this is the third Hotel Fontana meeting. The
3 Chamber will recall General Mladic's domineering presence in each of the
4 three meetings although one could be excused for forgetting the presence
5 of other officers in the face of that dominance. Here, with Krstic
6 sitting quietly by his side, this clip is a reminder of who was in
7 charge, of who called the shots.
8 [Video-clip played]
9 MR. TIEGER: It is General Mladic who makes clear what will
10 happen to "your husbands, your brothers, your neighbours."
11 This is just 30 seconds from a particular event, Your Honours,
12 but it captures what has been proven over and over in intercepts, in
13 written orders, in testimony about General Mladic's commanding presence
14 and commanding role over the army.
15 As you will hear in more detail from subsequent presentations,
16 witnesses from virtually every level of command made clear that in the
17 VRS you follow orders that come from the top and that move down the chain
18 of command and that General Mladic was a superior commander over each of
19 the corps commanders. And you can find that in the Prosecution final
20 brief at paragraphs 94 through 109, 121 through 152, 253 through 271, 714
21 through 759.
22 One of those witnesses put this reality in simple, concrete
23 terms. When asked about the principles of unity of command and
24 singleness of command, he said:
25 "There's a pyramid. On the top of this pyramid is the Supreme
1 Commander, the Chief of General Staff, and then it goes all the way down
2 to the level of corporal and private. Everyone has their own superior
3 and the superior has the right to issue orders and to supervise the
4 implementation of those orders and those who are subordinates are in
5 charge of carrying out those orders."
6 That's found at T 5018.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we have the name of the person being quoted?
8 MR. TIEGER: That's confidential, Mr. President, so I quote it
9 just by reference.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
11 MR. TIEGER: As Kralj said:
12 "The Army of Republika Srpska operates on the principle of
13 subordination. And orders of superior officers, especially
14 General Mladic, his orders were strictly adhered to and carried out."
15 That's T27436. And, as Milovanovic testified, General Mladic, as
16 commander of the Main Staff, had the right to issue orders to anyone in
17 the VRS. That's T16923.
18 Now, not content with claiming that it is his subordinate
19 officers who are responsible, not him, General Mladic also claims that he
20 was marginalised by Radovan Karadzic, with whom Mladic allegedly
21 disagreed on how to treat Muslims. Now let's set aside for the moment
22 such evidence as the fact that, as Karadzic put it, he and Mladic "talked
23 about things as brothers" and their aim was to "move together towards the
24 same goal." Set aside the fact that although Milovanovic heard talk of a
25 conflict between Mladic and Karadzic, "especially after the war," during
1 the entire course of the war he "never" saw them quarrel. That's T17107.
2 But apart from these matters, according to the Defence, the "best
3 illustration" of Mladic's claim is Directive 7. The Defence asserts that
4 Karadzic bypassed General Mladic by sending Directive 7 directly on to
5 the corps and that when General Mladic found out, he issued a superseding
6 directive, Directive 7.1, that omitted the illegal order to create "an
7 unbearable situation of total insecurity," to force Muslim civilians out.
8 That's found at paragraphs 571 through 72 of the Defence brief.
9 Directive 7 and 7/1 together, the Defence claims, "shows the
10 disparity" between the criminally minded Karadzic, who wanted to
11 illegally put pressure on the civilian population, and General Mladic who
12 "took it upon himself" not to do that. That's at paragraphs 572 through
14 Now that is an epic story of moral bravery, and it is as false as
15 it is dramatic. It rests on General Milovanovic's testimony that, A,
16 Karadzic improperly sent Directive 7 directly to the corps, that's T16993
17 and 995; and that General Mladic omitted the illegal order from his
18 directive to protect the civilian population, that's at transcript 16996.
19 What the evidence actually reveals, however - what
20 General Milovanovic was forced to admit when confronted with documents -
21 is that Milovanovic forwarded Directive 7 to all the corps, not just to
22 the 1 KK which he initially was forced to admit, but also to the
23 Drina Corps, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, the Herzegovina Corps, all of
24 which also belie General Milovanovic's preposterous claim that he saw the
25 directive for the first time long after the war. That's at transcript
1 16996 through 99.
2 As for the claim that the omission of the illegal order to make
3 life unbearable reflected General Mladic's effort to protect civilians,
4 that was exposed as false when Milovanovic admitted that details were
5 omitted from 7/1 because they were "already contained in Directive 7,"
6 and that, in fact, Directive 7 remained operative. That's transcript
7 17126 through 27. And that is further in confirmed by the fact that in
8 Directive 7/1 itself, General Mladic twice references Directive 7 as
9 authority: On the basis of Directive number 7 -- or "in accordance with
10 Directive number 7." That's P1470, page 2 and page 4.
11 Beyond that, Directive 7 bears General Mladic's mark, echoing his
12 intentions and indeed his words. As mentioned, Mladic's July 1994
13 meeting at the corps command was reflected in a Bratunac brigade
14 information report which said:
15 "The enemy's life has to be made unbearable and their temporary
16 stay in the enclave impossible so that they leave the enclave en masse as
17 soon as possible, realising that they cannot survive there."
18 That's P1505, page 3, "unbearable."
19 And on 8 March 1995, the day Karadzic signed Directive 7,
20 General Mladic held a meeting at the Main Staff which was reflected in
21 General Zivanovic's notebooks as "make life impossible." That's P5274,
22 page 27. And you can find a detailed discussion at the Prosecution brief
23 at paragraphs 426 through 452.
24 This is just one of many examples, Your Honours, a portion of
25 which you'll hear about over the next few days, of claims made in the
1 Defence brief that crumble upon scrutiny.
2 In contrast to the depiction of Karadzic, Mladic is cast as a
3 beneficent protector of Muslims. Now, that is grounded on scattered
4 examples, none of which supports the proposition such as the alleged
5 protection of Muslim villages at paragraphs 685 through 690 of the
6 Defence brief; the protection of Bosnian Croat civilians, 696 through
7 699; or that he issued orders or made pronouncements to protect civilians
8 and obey international humanitarian law, for example, paragraphs 795
9 through 796, paragraph 414 of the Defence final brief.
10 These references, however, do not support these assertions which
11 in any event, Your Honours, are belied by the vast volume of evidence
12 demonstrating General Mladic's commitment to the contrary. For example,
13 Mladic's alleged protection of Bosnian Croat civilians is addressed at
14 paragraph 459 of our brief, and that outlines the evidence demonstrating
15 that this transfer was not altruistic, but arranged in order to advance
16 Bosnia's division, to obtain military advantage for the Bosnian Serbs,
17 for public relations purposes, and indeed for money.
18 Similarly the claim that the Main Staff protected non-Serb
19 villages relies on the testimony of General Sokanovic, that life in
20 Muslim Podzeplje near the Main Staff continued unhindered. That claim is
21 belied by the evidence that Podzeplje was burned to the ground in
22 August 1992 following threats by Salapura to set on fire all Muslim
23 villages in the area up to the Drina. That's at P3306, paragraphs 7
24 through 8. And also found at the Prosecution final brief at
25 paragraph 305.
1 As for orders to protect civilians and the alleged protection of
2 Muslim villages -- Muslim and Croat victims, you will hear in subsequent
3 presentations about the superficially cosmetic nature of General Mladic's
4 toothless orders to obey international humanitarian law; and also
5 about the cover-ups, systemic failures to prosecute, promotions and
6 praise for perpetrators of those crimes - which more accurately reflected
7 General Mladic's position on crimes against Muslims and Croats which fell
8 within the common purpose. For that see Prosecution final brief
9 paragraphs 490 through 491. And you will also hear, Your Honours, about
10 how non-Serbs were treated, treated in the municipalities, in Sarajevo
11 and in Srebrenica. And I will address you a bit later on the claim
12 related to paragraph 414 of the Defence final brief and the 16th Session.
13 More generally, the broad claim that General Mladic was a
14 benefactor and protector of Muslims and Croats whose only ethnic
15 distinctions were made for benevolent purposes simply cannot withstand
16 the totality of the evidence. One candid moment caught on video of
17 General Mladic on a short trip with a Serbian-Canadian supporter of the
18 RS encapsulates what we have all learned and what the evidence shows
19 about General Mladic's view of Muslims. Now that clip begins, you may
20 recall, Your Honours, shortly after General Mladic has just explained
22 "... whenever I come by Sarajevo, I kill someone in passing ... I
23 go kick the hell out of the Turks. Who gives a fuck for them?"
24 And now let's watch a short clip from the rest of that video.
25 [Video-clip played]
1 MR. TIEGER: "Look what a house this Turkish motherfucker had."
2 Showing off destroyed Muslim villages, Mladic exhibits pride and deep
3 satisfaction at what he and his forces had achieved and nothing but
4 contempt for the victims. These attitudes were also reflected in
5 Mladic's conversation with Van Duijn, during which he crudely mimicked
6 Muslims and told Van Duijn that the presence of a Nigerian in Van Duijn's
7 unit was an indication that Mladic would be obliged to come to Holland in
8 ten years to protect the Dutch from other races and from Muslims. You
9 can find that at the Prosecution final brief paragraph 1201.
10 The brazenly false attempt to depict himself as a Muslim
11 benefactor and to blame his superior and his subordinates merely exposes
12 General Mladic's awareness of the criminal nature of the plan to which he
13 once boasted about contributing. That plan - which was formed before
14 General Mladic was recruited to join - had its roots in events that took
15 place before he returned to his birth republic in 1992, and that
16 background will take us to some of the other Defence claims about the
17 common purpose.
18 In 1990, national elections were held in Bosnia in the wake of
19 Communism's declining hold on political power. The three nationalist
20 parties were overwhelming winners, essentially corresponding to their
21 demographic ratio in Bosnia. Elated by the fall of Communism and what
22 they saw as the re-awakening of Serbian consciousness, Bosnian Serb
23 leaders nevertheless were concerned about the increasing risk of
24 Yugoslavia's dissolution and the prospect that Bosnia would become a
25 sovereign and independent nation. Even before the election, the SDS
1 leadership expressed its categorical opposition to the possibility of
2 Bosnia becoming sovereign and independent. As Karadzic said in an
3 interview in July 1990:
4 "The Serbs will not allow to live in some new NDH nor in some
5 state which is without their matrix, Serbia."
6 That's P7759, page 6.
7 In the summer and fall of 1991, the SDS strongly supported JNA
8 efforts in response to Croatia's independence and meanwhile attempted
9 unsuccessfully to reach a negotiated solution with Muslims and Croats
10 that would keep Bosnia in Yugoslavia, such as the Belgrade Initiative or
11 the so-called historic agreement. In the face of the unsuccessful
12 negotiations, however, by September 1991 the SDS had established several
13 Serbian autonomous regions, the purpose of which was to "destroy" the
14 unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's P7000 page 4 and page 6.
15 When the Bosnian Muslims and Croats approved a memorandum of
16 independence at the controversial 8th Session of the joint parliament on
17 the 14th and 15th of October 1991, the Bosnian Serb leadership - in
18 Karadzic's words to Milosevic - decided to "move on." As detailed in
19 paragraphs 175 through 190 of the Prosecution brief, they established
20 parallel institutions aimed at the creation of a Bosnian Serb state and
21 organised the means to do so by force, if necessary. At the republic
22 level, a parallel Bosnian Serb Assembly and a shadow government, the
23 Council of Ministers, were established. At the municipal level, Karadzic
24 issued instructions - the Variant A and B instructions - for the creation
25 of Bosnian Serb Crisis Staffs that would spear-head the eventual
1 take-over of the claimed areas.
2 Karadzic began to emphasise during this period - as he would
3 continue to do throughout the conflict - that Muslims and Croats were
4 historical enemies whose inherent incompatibility with Serbs precluded
5 co-existence. You find that at paragraphs 161 through 163 of the
6 Prosecution brief.
7 "Muslims and Serbs," he claimed, "were like a dog and a cat" or
8 "plants that cannot grow side by side." See the Prosecution final brief
9 footnote 603. Karadzic stressed the alleged demographic threat resulting
10 from the Muslim birth-rate, his words casting them as an unstoppable
11 demographic threat.
12 "They'll overwhelm you with their birth-rate and tricks."
13 That's P3900, page 36.
14 Thus, even a minority of Muslims were a threat, much less the
15 majority communities in eastern or north-west Bosnia ultimately claimed
16 by the Bosnian Serbs. As Karadzic would tell the Assembly, explaining
17 why smaller but ethnically pure territories were preferable to
18 controlling all of Bosnia, with the Muslims the "23 per cent would rise
19 to 24 per cent the day after, and the day after that one, it would be
20 25 per cent, because that is how it is with them."
21 P3076, page 23 and 25.
22 At the same time, however, the Bosnian Serb leadership claimed
23 vast territories where Serbs and non-Serbs were intermingled, indeed
24 where non-Serbs were the majority. Now, they attempted to justify these
25 claims in various ways. For example, that Serbs were entitled to
1 territory where they had been a majority before World War II; or that the
2 plebiscite meant entitlement to any territory where a majority of Serbs -
3 no matter how small a percentage of the actual population - had voted to
4 stay in Yugoslavia; or justified simply on the basis that the area was
5 deemed strategically significant to the Bosnian Serbs. You'll find that
6 at paragraphs 1644 through 66.
7 As Karadzic reminisced in 1995:
8 "To tell the truth, there are towns that we've grabbed for
9 ourselves and there were only 30 per cent of us. I can name as many of
10 those as you want, but we cannot give up the towns where we made up
11 70 per cent. Don't let this get around, but remember how many of us
12 there were in Bratunac, how many in Srebrenica, how many in Visegrad, how
13 many in Rogatica, how many in Vlasenica, in Zvornik, et cetera. Due to
14 strategic importance, they had to become ours and no one is practically
15 questioning it anymore."
16 That's P4584, pages 17 through 18.
17 As one witness observed, these undesired people on desired
18 territory weren't going to disappear by magic. And separating them "is
19 what ethnic cleansing was designed to do." That's P3103, transcript
21 By late March 1992, as Bosnian independence loomed, Karadzic
22 advised his officials that they could be confident that the number of
23 Bosnian Serb police was sufficient and that soon the Bosnian Serbs would
24 "literally assume control of the entire territory" of their
25 municipalities, citing Zvornik as one example. That's P406, page 22.
1 The take-over the Bijeljina a week later signalled the
2 commencement of that process, sometimes accompanied by attacks on
3 non-Serb villages and forcible removal of non-Serbs, sometimes by more
4 slowly escalating forms of persecution. Serb authorities, including
5 Slobodan Milosevic, helped implement the beginnings of the ethnic
6 cleansing campaign through the JNA and the "strong support" the Bosnian
7 Serbs had received from the DB, from State Security. That's P353, page
8 133. This included the deployment of Arkan's Men to Bijeljina and
9 Zvornik. As Bell reported contemporaneously, Serb forces, including
10 Arkan's Men, were "redrawing" the "ethnic map of Bosnia." That's P1874
11 and P832, page [sic] 24.
12 Thus, by the time that General Mladic assumed command of the
13 newly formed Army of Republika Srpska, the process of removing Muslims
14 and Croats through a variety of crimes was under way, as he was duly
15 informed. That's paragraphs 200 through 203.
16 Indeed, by 12 May - when he was formally appointed Chief of the
17 Main Staff - the nature of the cleansing campaign was obvious to the
18 world. As the UN Secretary-General reported that day:
19 "All international observers agree that what is happening is a
20 concerted effort by the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the
21 acquiescence of and at least some support from the JNA, to create
22 ethnically pure regions ... the techniques used are the seizure of
23 territory by military force and intimidation of the non-Serb population."
24 That's at P2814, paragraph 5.
25 And when we return from our break, Your Honours, I would like to
1 pick up on some of the Defence claims in respect of this evidence.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. We'll take a break. We
3 return at ten minutes to 11.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.
7 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Before we recessed, I had addressed some of the backdrop and
9 development ...
10 JUDGE ORIE: I wasn't --
11 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, I've been told the B/C/S channel is
12 not coming through. I noted my own headset needed to be reset after
13 coming in from the break. I don't know if that's the issue.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I don't know what Mr. Ivetic says because his voice,
15 as mine, apparently is not reaching ... I still ...
16 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Ivetic, can you say something again?
17 MR. IVETIC: Can you hear me?
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I now can hear you. Can you hear me meanwhile?
19 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President, I can.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then all the technical problems apparently have
21 been resolved. Mr. Mladic receives interpretation. Then we'll re-start
22 and I'll repeat my first words.
23 Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.
24 MR. TIEGER: Thank you.
25 As I mentioned before we recessed, I had addressed some of the
1 backdrop and development of the joint criminal enterprise which
2 General Mladic joined in May of 1992. Now, in its brief, the Defence
3 picks unsuccessfully at various aspects of this reality. And a closer
4 examination of those claims will reveal - rather than disprove - the
5 existence of the common purpose, and I'd like to take some of those at
6 this point.
7 The Defence argues, for example, that there is no evidence that
8 anyone from the republic level "enforced" Variant A and B or monitored
9 compliance with it. That's found at paragraph 462 of the Defence brief.
10 Contrary to that claim, however, immediately after Variant A and
11 B was issued, Karadzic assigned an emissary - Cizmovic - to "visit all
12 our municipalities" to implement the Variant A and B papers that had just
13 been issued. That's P4112, pages 2 and 3; and P2672, pages 3 through 4.
14 And accordingly, on the 16th of January 1992, Cizmovic advised
15 Karadzic that Bijeljina was "prepared for full co-operation with the
16 instructions." That's P4115. And on the 22nd of January from a Krajina
17 municipality, Cizmovic advised that things were "working," that a
18 Crisis Staff would be created that night because "the objective must be
19 carried out, instructions must be carried out." And that Cizmovic would
20 be seeing about Birac, Romanija, and Herzegovina in due course. P6971,
21 page 7.
22 At the Assembly session on the 26th of January, 1992, Cizmovic
23 called for the Variant A and B instructions to be carried out. That's
24 P379, page 12. And on the 14th of February, Karadzic activated the
25 second level of Variant A and B, telling a large extended group of his
1 officials to introduce the "second level" and to intensify the
2 functioning of the government at any cost and on every single millimetre
3 of our territory." That's P3774, page 24.
4 As Karadzic reminisced in 1995:
5 "At the moment the war began, in the municipalities where we were
6 the majority, we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled
7 everything. In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set
8 up secret government, Municipal Boards, Municipal Assemblies, presidents
9 of Executive Boards. You will remember the A and B Variants."
10 That's P4583, page 323.
11 So - contrary to the Defence claim - there is not only some
12 evidence but overwhelming evidence that Variant A and B was part of the
13 plan. This is another of the many examples of assertions in the Defence
14 final brief that are ostensibly demonstrated by evidence that does not,
15 in fact, support the claim, or grounded on an assertion by a witness who
16 revealed his lack of credibility or reliability, or indeed by a witness
17 who recanted the point on cross-examination, or claims that are simply
18 contradicted by the totality of the evidence.
19 Now by way of another example, let's take Prijedor Crisis Staff
20 member Mandic. Now, he's the Defence witness whose statement is cited
21 more times than any other in relation to the overarching JCE, 42 times,
22 and his statement is the sole support, for example, for propositions such
23 as the Muslims in Hambarine put up a "strong resistance." That's at
24 paragraph 930, footnote 2085 of the Defence brief. Or that people were
25 released from Omarska when evidence showed that they had not broken the
1 law. That's at paragraph 960, footnote 2158 of the Defence brief.
2 Those assertions ignore the witness's acknowledgment in
3 cross-examination that he no basis to make those claims, in fact, had
4 contrary information; and you can find that at T28902 and 28909 through
6 And beyond those specific examples, this witness attested, under
7 oath, to the accuracy of portions of his statement that he had recanted
8 or qualified when he testified in Karadzic, under oath, prompting the
9 Chamber to ask him to consider his attestation over a break. That's
10 T28916 through 27. And beyond all that are the multiple contradictions
11 that emerge when his claims are weighed against the totality of the
12 evidence in this case.
13 More generally, Your Honours, section 8 of the Prosecution final
14 brief, beginning at page 689, discusses in detail witness credibility and
15 evaluation of evidence. Over the course of the following days, we will
16 continue to look beneath many of the Defence claims, exposing similar
17 examples of assertions that are contradicted by a closer look of the
18 evidence ostensibly supporting them and by the totality of evidence
19 related to that point.
20 But returning now to some of those claims in relation to the
21 overarching JCE, the Defence also claims that the Crisis Staffs, led by
22 local personalities who were allegedly focussed on only local interests,
23 had "tremendous autonomy." That's found at paragraph 464 of the Defence
24 brief. Now, this claim, too, unravels on examination. The claim that
25 Crisis Staffs were autonomous is based on the testimony of Trifka Komad,
1 a witness who told you under oath that Serbian -- that SAO did not mean
2 Serbian Autonomous Regions, but claimed instead that the "S" stood for
3 "independent." And he claimed that the Serb and non-Serb ballots for the
4 November 1991 plebiscite had the same wording and that the differing
5 colours were merely the result of a technical issue. Propositions so
6 manifestly untrue that the Defence stipulated that - contrary to what he
7 had said - it was Serbian Autonomous Regions and withdrew reliance on his
8 testimony about the plebiscite ballot. That's found at transcript 28131
9 through 33.
10 The examples of municipalities where the allegedly outsized
11 personalities and narrow focus of local leaders supposedly distanced them
12 from any republic-level plan are Rasula from Sanski Most and Stanic from
13 Foca. Yet, in Sanski Most the Crisis Staff assigned its deputy president
14 to be responsible for implementing "the ideas of the SDS leadership at
15 the level of the republic, region, and municipality."
16 That's P404, page 1.
17 And in Foca, Crisis Staff President Stanic was forthright that:
18 "We, the Serbs living to the west of the Drina river, know very
19 well that our leaders are Dr. Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic."
20 That's P7753.
21 And Stanic's Crisis Staff informed Karadzic shortly before the
22 conflict that:
23 "We are ready to carry out any order you order."
25 Once again, tug at the citation and it unravels, revealing a
1 reality - instead - consistent with the Prosecution case.
2 Now, the Defence also asserts that "some" Crisis Staffs displayed
3 concern for how non-Serbs were treated, citing as two of its primary
4 examples Sanski Most and the ARK Crisis Staff. That's at Defence brief
5 paragraphs 450 through 451.
6 Sanski Most. That's where the SDS newspaper the "Informator"
7 informed Serbs that in pursuit of the "goal of creating a Serbian state,"
8 the SDS had organised and prepared Serbs for the "Bitter battle with the
9 other two peoples, the Muslims if indeed are a people (they are not) and
10 the Croats, who have forever carried in their genes a sick, a
11 pathological desire and urge to kill those better, more honest and - do
12 we need to say this? - stronger than they are."
13 And the "Informator" continued that Serbs had finally abandoned
14 the mistaken view that those people were anything other than
15 "bloodthirsty villains who have never stopped in their religiously
16 inspired drive to go for the blood of Serbhood."
17 That's P705, page 6.
18 Sanski Most, where the Crisis Staff concluded that captured
19 civilians were to be used for exchange and where the VRS brutally
20 cleansed Muslim villages in pretextual disarming operations after threats
21 were issued to non-Serbs to "destroy and devastate your villages."
22 That's P3302, page 7.
23 Another prime example of alleged concern for Muslims by
24 Crisis Staff was the ARK Crisis Staff which was headed by - indeed
25 personified by - Radislav Brdjanin, whose philosophy was, as we learned,
1 obedience to Karadzic above him and obedience from those beneath him in
2 the hierarchy. That's P6997 and transcript T29759. Radislav Brdjanin,
3 who relayed the orders from Karadzic to form the ARK Crisis Staff.
4 That's T33986 through 87. And whose shared goals with Karadzic brought him
5 to that position. P7757, page 7, and T34040 through 41.
6 This leader whose "horns," as one witness put it, could have been
7 "shortened" by Karadzic at any time. That's P6994, page 11; and T29785
8 through 86. This leader repeatedly called for Muslims to leave
9 Banja Luka, stating that only a small percentage of Muslims could remain.
10 That's P3989, pages 1 through 2; and P6994, page 8.
11 Told a huge rally on the same podium with Karadzic that it was
12 the obligation of Serbs to wipe their feet from the "foul non-Christians"
13 befouling their soil. Page 6976, page 2.
14 And who praised Omarska as "a job well done." P3959.
15 Scratch the surface and the evidence exposes as false the
16 suggestion that the ARK Crisis Staff was a kindly force, whose benevolent
17 view of Muslims contradicts the common purpose.
18 Now this failed attempt to depict Crisis Staffs as belying the
19 common purpose is echoed by Defence efforts to suggest that other organs
20 similarly reflected an absence of indications of the common purpose.
21 Thus, in their discussion of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Defence cites
22 the testimony of one of the Assembly's former members that he was not
23 aware of a common plan to permanently remove other ethnicities. That's
24 at paragraph 348 of the Defence brief.
25 Now, that former member, Dodik, denied indeed that he had ever
1 heard at Assembly sessions any indications, any hints of an intention, of
2 a goal, or a process of moving or expelling Muslims. That's at T42299.
3 That denial, however, did not square with the reality of what was said at
4 various Assembly sessions. For example, the president of the SDS
5 Executive Board and the co-ordinator of the Birac SAO, Rajko Dukic,
6 talking about Eastern Bosnia in July 1992 said:
7 "If we move further, there is Birac which is 100 to 108
8 kilometres away and has 120.000 Muslims. That is how many there were,
9 but I hope that has at least been halved."
10 P4581, page 73; see also P7082 and P7081, page 3, item number 4.
11 Or these remarks at an Assembly session expressing concern that
12 the language of a proposed law on citizenship suggests that:
13 "The citizenship of Republika Srpska shall be acquired, among
14 other things, by birth in the territory of Republika Srpska. This refers
15 to all the Muslims and Croats we expelled; in reality they are citizens
16 of Republika Srpska."
17 That's P7196, page 10. And by the way, Your Honours, the bill
18 was sent back for "improvement." And that's at P7196, page 11.
19 Or this forthright acknowledgment of the goal of ethnic
20 homogeneity and the resulting need for relocation:
21 "Gentlemen, there is no Serbian state in Bosnian pot without
22 gradual depopulation and relocating. If we want ethnically pure Serbian
23 state - and we do, don't we? - if we all know and emphasise that we
24 cannot live with them, then we have to realise that these draft maps are
25 offering exactly that and that there has to be relocation."
1 P2508, page 27.
2 Or another statement in an Assembly session, expressing the
3 concern that a proposed peace plan would mean that "everyone will be able
4 to go back to their own territory," and "we will have to compensate
5 everything we destroyed and burned and 17 mosques that we flattened" in
6 that particular representative's municipality. That's P2508, page 22.
7 Or any of the other similar Assembly references found in the
8 final brief or to which we will be referring today.
9 Again, when we peel back the assertion and examine the evidence
10 on which it purportedly relies as well as the totality of the evidence
11 that bears on that issue, the evidence reveals the common purpose.
12 The Defence has also attempted to paint a picture of a Bosnian
13 Serbs leadership whose passivity belies the existence or possibility of
14 any common plan. They claim that the Bosnian Serbs were not preparing
15 for war. Indeed "did not foresee war as a possible outcome," as
16 evidenced by the "reactive decisions" made by the SDS. And that's at
17 paragraph 312 of the Defence brief.
18 These claims, first, founder on the evidence of Karadzic's
19 repeated position that he and the SDS leadership knew far in advance the
20 steps that they wanted to implement but waited for a politically
21 expedient moment to do so. For example, Karadzic told members of the
22 SFRY Presidency in December 1991:
23 "We have made a list of moves, but we don't do anything -- we
24 won't do anything until Alija messes something up. When Alija messes
25 something up, we will make move number 5 and then we wait. When Alija
1 messes something else up, we make move number 6."
2 P4927, page 4.
3 Or as he explained to the RS Assembly in 1994, there were nine to
4 ten actions that the leadership had brain-stormed and then carried out.
5 "Not all nine moves straight away" but "after Alija made a mistake." And
6 that these pre-planned moves included the Serbian Autonomous Regions.
7 That's P7762, pages 2 through 3.
8 And in January 1995, Karadzic explained that his pre-planned
9 steps included not only the regions, but bodies such as the Assembly.
10 "We had a list of the actions and steps to take, but we always
11 waited for the Muslims to make a mistake; and after they made one, we
12 created a union of municipalities and the Serbian Autonomous areas next,
13 followed by the regions, and eventually our Assembly and finally
15 P6999, page 3.
16 Karadzic made clear to his officials as events were unfolding
17 that "we have all the moves in the envelopes" and "we have plans for
18 everything." That's D857, pages 6 through 7.
19 He instructed them to conform to that time-table, advising SDS
20 operative Stevandic to tell Brdjanin and Kupresanin "not to do anything
21 stupid. We'll do everything Vojo and Brdjo think, but after the failure
22 of the agreements that Alija will bring about. We'll accuse Alija for
23 this failure." P7763.
24 And make no mistake, those plans included territory. Babic
25 recalled Karadzic and Jovica Stanisic long before the war clandestinely
1 poring over maps of Bosnia with municipalities depicted in differing
2 colours. That's P4166, T3406 through 08.
3 Karadzic reminisced to the Assembly in 1994 about "making plans"
4 before the war.
5 "We were thinking then," he explained, about capturing certain
6 features "so that the distance between Sarajevo and Banja Luka could be
7 covered on a good road in 1.5. That is a state. That is a
8 well-integrated nation. That was our plan back before the war."
9 D639, page 9.
10 But what about the Defence's claim that the Bosnian Serbs "did
11 not foresee war as a possible outcome." That's again paragraph 312.
12 Now, that claim would come, for example, as a great surprise to
13 Cyrus Vance and Ambassador Okun, to whom Karadzic stated that if the
14 Bosnian Serbs don't get what they want, they would get it through war.
15 That's P3103, T4164, and pages 38 and 39.
16 It would come as a surprise to Gojko Djogo, to whom Karadzic said
17 that the Muslims would "disappear if there was a war. It will be a real
18 bloodbath," Karadzic said. And he continued: "It will be said to
19 Europe: 'Go fuck yourselves and do not come back before we finish the
21 P4109, page 3, page 9, and page 24.
22 The claim that the Bosnian Serb leadership did not foresee the
23 possibility of war would come as a surprise to the Muslim and Croat
24 members of the Joint Assembly, who Karadzic threatened in October 1991
25 that their moves toward independence would result in "the same highway of
1 hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia went through. Don't think
2 you won't take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and the Muslim people in
3 possible extinction, because the Muslim people will not be able to defend
4 itself if it comes to war here."
5 P2004, page 3.
6 And the claim that the Bosnian Serb leadership did not foresee
7 war as a possibility would come as a surprise to Momcilo Krajisnik, who
8 told the Assembly in February 1992:
9 "We have two options: To fight by political means or to break
10 off talks and go for what we have done over the centuries: Win our
11 territories by force ... you know what our profession has always been:
12 To wage war."
13 P7005, pages 11 and 18.
14 Momcilo Krajisnik, to whom Karadzic angrily said in January,
15 talking about Izetbegovic:
16 "Now he's talking openly of a sovereign and independent Bosnia.
17 Does he want someone to destroy Sarajevo ... fuck him. We will release
18 our Tigers and let them do their job."
19 P2676, page 5.
20 And the claim that the Bosnian Serb leadership did not foresee
21 war as a possible outcome would come as a surprise to General Kukanjac,
22 Mladic predecessor as head of the 2nd Military District, who reported in
23 March 1992 that "the Serbian leadership and the Serbian people are fully
24 prepared to wage war should the confederal option not be accepted." And
25 that the SDS leadership in the Serbian population have "embraced the
1 army," including that the JNA had "distributed 51.900 weapons
2 (75 per cent) and the SDS 17.298" to Bosnian Serbs in various
4 That's P3030, pages 4 through 6.
5 In short, contrary to the Defence claim, the Bosnian Serbs
6 unmistakably "foresaw" the possibility of war, prepared for it, and
7 indeed used the threat of their military and their military force to
8 pressure their political opponents into abandoning moves toward
9 independence. Once again, scratch the surface of the Defence brief, and
10 it is the common purpose instead which is revealed.
11 The Defence also claims that the Bosnian Serbs' involvement in
12 negotiations - and that's found at paragraphs 292, 293, 298, 360 through
13 368 of the Defence brief - and particularly their involvement in the
14 Cutileiro discussions: "Contradicts the Prosecution's allegation of the
15 overarching JCE." That's at paragraph 364 -- 374.
16 Again, contrary to this claim, the Bosnian Serb participation in
17 negotiations was wholly compatible with the common purpose. First, of
18 course, the pursuit of a negotiated dissolution does not gain, say, the
19 attempt to achieve maximum objectives by force if a comprise is not
20 reached. But beyond that, the Bosnian Serbs were not engaged in the
21 Cutileiro negotiations out of some Gandhi-esque commitment to peace, but
22 because it was clear to them that it could be used to destroy the
23 possibility of a unitary Bosnia and to secure an ethnically defined
25 Contrary to the representations made to Cutileiro at the time,
1 the Bosnian Serb leadership did not actually accept the fundamental terms
2 of the Statement of Principles. Now, perhaps the single key principle
3 within the Statement of Principles was that Bosnia would be a state.
4 That's found at T42409.
5 As Karadzic told the Assembly, however:
6 "The first position in all Cutileiro's principles, if you
7 remember, was that Bosnia was a state consisting of this and that, but it
8 was always said that Bosnia was a state and we never accepted that."
9 P7023, page 2.
10 As Cutileiro himself acknowledged in this Court, Karadzic
11 withheld this position from Cutileiro and instead feigned agreement with
12 the Statement of Principles. T42410 through 11.
13 Similarly, the Statement of Principles did not envision that the
14 Bosnian Serb entity would unite with Serbia. That's T42411.
15 The Bosnian Serb leadership's goal, however, was to have the
16 Bosnian Serbs "become part of the Serbian empire." P7005, page 18.
17 And as Cutileiro acknowledged, if this view had actually been
18 expressed, they wouldn't have had agreement. P7005 and T42411 through
20 Furthermore, the maps were "totally unacceptable to the Bosnian
21 Serb leadership. That's P4582, page 4. The Bosnian Serbs - as Karadzic
22 later explained - weren't satisfied with Eastern Bosnia, with Sarajevo,
23 with the Neretva River Valley, or with what he called the "green stain,"
24 meaning Muslim areas in north-west Bosnia. P7294.
25 So in the face of such fundamental disagreement, why did the
1 Bosnian Serbs indicate agreement? They did so because they considered
2 that they had "pulled" the Muslims into accepting that there would be a
3 division, that it "would be based on ethnicity."
4 D639, page 7.
5 As Karadzic explained, that was "fatal" for Izetbegovic and
6 Bosnia, and a "grave mistake" by the international community. The
7 Bosnian Serbs had "led them" to believe that the process would be
8 successful, but at that instant "Bosnia was finished. That's P4582, page
10 And as for the unacceptable maps, well those would be taken care
11 of in a different way. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership
12 considered that they had achieved the "quality," that is, ethnic
13 division, and the destruction of Bosnia. And so all that was left was "a
14 question of quantity." That's P4580.
15 So what, Karadzic explained, if Bosnia remained within the
16 current borders. "What matters is that the ones within Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina become as wide as possible." P7005, page 10.
18 So provided they made their borders with Bosnia sufficiently
19 wide, this would be as good as staying in Yugoslavia. "As the popular
20 saying goes," Karadzic told his officials, "if kicked out the door, go
21 back through the window. You will still be in the same place."
22 That's P7005, page 10.
23 And that would be determined by the principle of the factual or
24 de facto situation. As Karadzic told his SDS officials at the Assembly
25 on the very day that the agreement in principle was at least temporarily
1 reached, the quantity "will happen according to the actual conditions
2 which are up to you to create."
3 And Krajisnik told the Assembly at the very same session:
4 "... it would be good if we could do one thing for strategic
5 reasons, if we could start implementing what we have agreed upon, the
6 ethnic division on the ground."
7 P4580, pages 44 and 13.
8 And then once it became clear that Izetbegovic, who - like
9 international negotiators such as Darwin and Carrington - had from the
10 outset doubts about the feasibility of ethnic divisions in an ethnically
11 intermixed republic - and that's at T42393 and P7770, pages 3 and 4 -
12 once it became clear that he had backed away, the Bosnian Serbs in
13 Cutileiro's own words "went brutally on the offensive." P771 and T42446
14 through 47.
15 Went on the offensive and took by brutal force those areas denied them in
16 the original Cutileiro map, such as Eastern Bosnia, Sarajevo, Neretva,
17 and the green stain that Karadzic referred to in north-west Bosnia.
18 Contrary to the claims of the Defence, again, following the trail of the
19 evidence leads inexorably to the common purpose.
20 But while that was purposefully obscured in the context of the
21 negotiations, those aims were repeatedly exposed - exposed in the cruel
22 logic of policies that claimed vast territories inhabited by people with
23 whom it was ostensibly to live, exposed in the pattern of cleansing in
24 municipality after municipality, and also exposed in what the Bosnian
25 Serb leaders revealed to internationals, what they conveyed to their
1 subordinates, and what they said to each other.
2 It was "obvious," crystal clear, to UN sector commander
3 Abdel-Razek that there was a consensus among the Serb leaders and
4 military commanders regarding cleansing. Karadzic, Krajisnik, and
5 Plavsic acknowledged their plan for removal of Muslims from Serb
6 territories, and Karadzic and Mladic once told him: "Muslims will be
7 transferred out of Serb territory because we can't live together." And
8 told him if we "miss this chance, we will not have it again." That's
9 P293, paragraph 33.
10 The Bosnian Serb leaders also explained to UN Representative
11 Harland that historical circumstances required the removal of very large
12 numbers of Bosnian Muslims, particularly in Eastern Bosnia and were open
13 and wanting non-Serbs out of their territories. That's P1,
14 paragraphs 270 and 274.
15 Similarly, it was apparent to Anthony Banbury from his repeated
16 meetings with the Bosnian Serbs leadership that: "Ethnic cleansing was a
17 policy of the Bosnian Serbs. They wanted only Serbs living on the
18 territory they controlled." That's P874, paragraph 63.
19 As Ambassador Okun explained it:
20 The position of the Bosnian Serb leadership throughout the whole
21 period was that the people had to be separated, that they could not live
22 together. Even though the populations were thoroughly intermixed, the
23 Bosnian Serb leadership position was that they had to be taken apart.
24 And that," Okun explained, "is of course what ethnic cleansing was
25 designed to do. The leadership told him that Republika Srpska was to be
1 as homogeneous ethnically, that is, ethnically 'pure' was the word that
2 was often used by the Bosnian Serbs, ethnically pure as it could be."
3 P3103, page 4169.
4 And all Bosnian Serbs leaders were very consistent in their
5 position that physical separation was needed and that the communities
6 could not live together. P3103, T4205 and 4220.
7 The policy was exposed to and known to Serbian and Croatian Serb
8 leaders. For example, in July 1991, in a meeting in Slobodan Milosevic's
9 office, Karadzic insisted that Babic not move forward with a proposed
10 Krajina unification because it would interfere with the Bosnian Serb
11 plans to form a Bosnian Serb entity that included territories where Serbs
12 were a minority. Karadzic explained that they would wait for Alija to
13 make a wrong political move and then link up the Serb territories by
14 expelling Muslims. That's P4167, T13054 through 56, and P4166, T3401
15 through 04.
16 It was known in the municipalities where local leaders
17 implemented it. As Ilidza Crisis Staff President Prstojevic acknowledged
18 in July 1992 when Karadzic "visited us in Ilidza and encouraged us, the
19 Serbs from Sarajevo retained control over the territory and even extended
20 their territory in some areas, driving the Muslims out of the territories
21 where they had actually been a majority."
22 That's P4581, page 66.
23 On the 30th of June, 1992, Mladic and Karadzic met in Zvornik
24 with military and civilian authorities from Zvornik, Vlasenica,
25 Srebrenica, Bratunac, and other local areas, at which Zvornik TO
1 Commander Pavlovic bragged to Karadzic: "We were most active in evicting
2 the Muslims." And Crisis Staff President Grujic reported: "We have
3 successfully implemented the president's decision to settle Divic and
4 Kozluk with our children."
5 The policy found expression in the selection by local leaders of
6 particular percentages of Muslims and Croats allowed to leave [sic]. In
7 Sanski Most 2 per cent, in Bijeljina 2 per cent, 5 to 6 per cent in
8 Kljuc, and in Banja Luka and the ARK generally a small percentage. And
9 you can find those respectively at P365; T6771 through 73; at P1054,
10 paragraphs 11, 31 through 32; adjudicated fact 750; transcript 2050 through
11 51; and P3989, pages 1 through 3; P6994, page 8.
12 And local leaders also acknowledged the common plan without
13 reference to particular percentages, for example, the Rogatica Crisis
14 Staff president and brigade commander referred on one instance to running
15 late with the cleansing. P309, paragraphs 90 through 91.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger would you please look at page 36, line
17 18, whether that is -- I don't remember what I heard, but whether that is
18 what you --
19 MR. TIEGER: Yes, that's correct, Mr. President. I had said:
20 "Successfully implemented the president's decision to settle Divic and
21 Kozluk with our children."
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but I'm looking two lines further down.
23 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps I'm looking at the other -- allowed to,
25 Muslims and Croats allowed to ...
1 MR. TIEGER: Oh, I'm sorry. Thank you. I appreciate that. It
2 should say "allowed to remain."
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 MR. TIEGER: Thank you very much.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
6 MR. TIEGER: When this policy was not fulfilled, the Bosnian
7 Serbs leadership followed up. In personal meetings, Karadzic admonished
8 Banja Luka mayor, Predrag Radic, for not having expelled non-Serbs or
9 destroyed mosques, in contrast to other municipalities. You find that at
10 the Prosecution brief paragraph 284, footnotes 1145 through 46.
11 That was confirmed by Defence witness Solaja who testified about
12 the constant pressure Radic was under from people at the political top
13 and criticism of him because mosques were not [sic] standing. You can
14 find that at T32751 through 52. Mosques were still standing. I think I
15 said "not standing." So the criticism of Radic was for the fact that
16 mosques remained and had not been destroyed.
17 The common purpose was also acknowledged by Karadzic at various
18 times, including when he explained to the Assembly his concern earlier in
19 the war that Muslims might agree to peace proposals. Now why concerned?
20 Because "we had some unfinished tasks related to military actions. I
21 just prayed to God that nothing would be accepted because we had some
22 tasks to complete."
23 And what were those military tasks? Well, in Doboj, he said the
24 Muslims had been in the relative majority, but "nowadays, Doboj is almost
25 100 per cent Serbian. The people from mountains moved into town, and so
1 on. Thus, we can consider ourselves as winners after occupying this land
2 since the land is 100 per cent Serbian now."
3 That's P3076, pages 23, 25, and 26.
4 The policy was acknowledged during a January 1993 meeting of
5 Bosnian Serb and Serbian leaders, including Mladic, Karadzic, and
6 Milosevic. When Serbian Foreign Minister Jovanovic urged Mladic and
7 Karadzic to pursue the objective of making Bosnian Serb territory
8 "nationally homogeneous as soon as possible" by more subtle means than
9 ethnic cleansing because the international community was looking to catch
10 them at the ethnic cleansings. Jovanovic also warned that freedom of
11 movement might lead to mixing of the populations with the result that
12 "what had been gained would gradually erode."
13 Karadzic assured him that national homogenisation had already
14 happened "to a huge extent," citing with pride Zvornik where there was
15 50/50 of us and now "the number of inhabitants of Zvornik is the same,
16 approximately 50.000, and they are all Serbs."
17 That's P7746, pages 14 through 16.
18 The adoption of more subtle and deniable forms of purifying the
19 territories was reflected in the Bosnian Serb leadership's use of Vojkan,
20 who cleansed Bijeljina of thousands of remaining Muslims in 1994,
21 prompting international complaints and false promises by the Bosnian
22 Serbs leadership to investigate. See P7699, page 2, paragraph 7. As
23 Karadzic reminded Mladic and others at a session of the Supreme Command,
24 having Muslims remain is "disastrous for us."
25 Vojkan's cleansing, however, under the guise of a private agency,
1 permitted the leadership deniability, by "turning a blind eye" they could
2 further our policy of "separation of peoples, of cultures, of worlds, and
3 no one can accuse us." That's P6723, pages 6 through 7.
4 In the face of such overwhelming evidence, the Defence suggests
5 that an alleged republic-level policy that all citizens would be allowed
6 to return belies the existence of the common purpose to permanently
7 remove, and that's found at paragraph 459 of the Defence brief. What
8 would be the point, they argue, of forcibly removing people only to let
9 them back in? Well, as it happens, it is that very logic that explains
10 why the Bosnian Serb leadership repeatedly made clear that it would
11 ensure against the return of those they had expelled. From the very
12 outset, the Bosnian Serb leadership had banked on the establishment of a
13 factual situation to their advantage. As Karadzic explained to a
14 gathering of top Serbian and Bosnian Serb officials at a meeting of the
15 SFRY Presidency in December 1991, Serbs had to prepare to press their
16 case on not only a legal basis but on "the factual basis." That's P4927.
17 In the immediate aftermath of the Joint Assembly session at which
18 Karadzic warned Muslims that moves toward independence threatened their
19 very existence, Karadzic explained to Milosevic that the Bosnian Serbs
20 were "moving on" to establish a "de facto situation ..." on 65 per cent
21 of Bosnia which the Muslims will break their teeth on. That's P2659,
22 pages 1 and 7.
23 In mid-February 1992 when Karadzic activated the second level of
24 Variant A and B, he told his officials that "now it would be more
25 important to gain the real situation, the factual situation on the
1 ground," which would allow Serbs to say to negotiators that maybe the
2 Muslims are right but the factual situation controls. That's P3774,
3 page 5.
4 And as noted a few moments ago, a month after that, shortly
5 before the take-overs began, Karadzic told his SDS officials at the
6 Assembly that the quantity of their state "will happen according to the
7 actual conditions which are up to you to create." P4580, page 44 through
9 And General Mladic and the VRS continued to implement the policy
10 of creating a new factual situation and using it to control the ultimate
11 territorial resolution. As General Mladic said:
12 "Whoever holds the territory also draws the maps," and it was
13 "the people and its army" who had drawn those maps."
14 P1974, page 5.
15 And like Okun, UNPROFOR recognised that General Mladic wanted
16 them to "authenticate the new lines of ethnic division."
17 That's P2810, paragraph 2.
18 Karadzic underscored to General Mladic in 1992 that "the European
19 community will accept the factual state of affairs and that is why we
20 should not make a single concession in military terms." P354, page 22.
21 And General Mladic conveyed the importance of that policy to his
22 troops, reminding his corps command in Directive 2:
23 "We liberated the territories we considered ours and created
24 conditions for political and military leadership of the Serbian Republic
25 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that they could perform all activities and
1 negotiations regarding the future state of BiH from the position of the
2 stronger one in this territory."
3 That's D99, page 1.
4 And that message was indeed heard after the 1 KK had conducted
5 ethnic cleansing operations throughout the ARK. 1 KK Commander Talic
6 noted to Mladic the importance of insisting on "the factual situation."
7 That's P360, page 54.
8 "We liberated the territories." That's the language from the
9 Directive 2 that we saw a moment ago in the previous slide. The Defence
10 defends the terms "liberated" as meaning only "fighting against
11 aggression." And that's found at the Defence final brief at
12 paragraph 704. A more accurate understanding of its meaning, however,
13 may be gleaned from a 6 June 1992 meeting at which a Bratunac municipal
14 leader reported to Karadzic and Mladic, among others, that:
15 "There are no Muslims now in Bratunac municipality. It is a
16 fully liberated town."
17 That's P353, page 101.
18 The success of VRS operations meant that General Mladic would be
19 able to report that the de facto approach had been successfully
20 implemented. It 1993, General Mladic expressed the Main Staff's
21 appreciation that "our negotiating team have done everything to change
22 the factual state into permanent ..." and reminded Karadzic - as I noted
23 earlier - "Mr. President, you have started from the most favourable
24 starting position in Geneva. You had the military result in your hands."
25 That's again P2508, page 33.
1 I think it's time for a break, Your Honour, and we can continue
2 in 20 minutes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: It is, indeed, Mr. Tieger.
4 We'll take a break, and we'll resume at ten minutes past midday.
5 --- Recess taken at 11.51 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 12.12 p.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, please proceed.
8 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.
9 Before we recessed, I had been discussing the creation of the
10 factual situation. We broke with General Mladic reporting his
11 satisfaction and pride about having presented the military result and the
12 factual situation to the negotiators.
13 Having thus made the factual situation a key part of their
14 strategy for creating the state and defining its territory, the Bosnian
15 Serb leadership was not about to relinquish it once achieved; instead,
16 maintaining the homogeneity or areas remained a keystone so that, as
17 Jovanovic had urged, what had been gained would not be eroded.
18 Now, you recall that the Bosnian Serb leadership acknowledged to
19 Harland their pressure on the Bosnian government to accept the ethnic
20 cleansing, the redistribution of the populations. That's P1, para 270.
21 Ambassador Okun also recognised that the Bosnian Serbs were
22 attempting to cement the cleansing, in contrast to undoing it, as the
23 Defence claims, noting that "their whole claim, for example, for the
24 Drina River Valley, that is to say for the left bank of the Drina, was
25 based on ethnic cleansing. I mean, they knew it; we knew it."
1 P3103, transcript 4192.
2 Okun also recalled the Bosnian Serb leadership's call "to
3 accommodate ethnic realities," which Okun explained was a "very clear,
4 not so subtle" reference to ethnic cleansing. P3103, T4215 through 16.
5 One transparent strategem for cementing the cleansing was their
6 call for referendums in which the inhabitants of territory would vote on
7 which entity they wished to be in. And as Okun explained: "Holding a
8 referendum in areas that you've ethnically cleansed looks like a pretty
9 good deal to the cleanser." And that's P3103, T4245.
10 Karadzic made crystal clear to his officials that Bosnian Serb
11 negotiators would insist that the allocation of territory in any peace
12 process would be governed by the factual situation they had created, that
13 is, by what the VRS had achieved. They would explain, for example, that
14 while Zvornik was once 60/40 to the advantage of Muslims, as he said:
15 "We request Zvornik based on the right which comes out of the new
16 reality ... this war has created the new reality. There are now the
17 Serbs from Zenica here. If you want to give Zvornik to the Muslims, then
18 you have to wage a new war in order to expel these Serbs back to Zenica.
19 We request Zvornik according to this right."
20 P7357, page 5.
21 May I ask the Court Officer, please, to display the -- thank you.
22 Further, the Bosnian Serb leadership was equally clear that it
23 would not allow the results of the ethnic cleansing to be undone by a
24 right of return. So when a representative complained to Karadzic that a
25 proposed peace agreement meant that "everyone will be able to go back to
1 their own territory," Karadzic assured him that the Bosnian Serbs would
2 control their borders and "we will have barbed wire for ten years."
3 P2508, pages 22 through 23.
4 And that was regardless of what they might have to promise the
5 international community. So when Deputies Club President Maksimovic
6 insisted that not even "500 or more Muslims" should be allowed back,
7 that's P3076, page 36, Karadzic elucidated one of his ploys to frustrate
8 international efforts to ensure return. He agreed that "what
9 Mr. Maksimovic has said is correct," but explained that under
10 international law, they would not be permitted to ban return. That is
11 why, Karadzic noted, he had insisted on a "two-way process." That's
12 P3076, page 38. And this meant - as he elaborated at a subsequent
13 Assembly session - that "Muslims from Kozluk can return to Kozluk if the
14 Serbs from Kozluk return to Zenica." And Serbs from Zvornik weren't
15 going anywhere. As Karadzic explained:
16 "We can act the Serbian Cyrillic way and tell it all to their
17 face, or we can be a bit cunning. We do have to be a bit cunning."
18 P4584, page 8.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, may I urge you to here and there slow
20 down a bit because sometimes part of what you are telling us are missing
21 in the provisional transcripts, and we'd like to be able to read
23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
25 MR. TIEGER: Will do.
1 The Bosnian Serb leadership also established a demographic
2 programme to resettle Serbian refugees into areas successfully targeted
3 by the Strategic Objectives in order to cement the forcible displacement
4 of non-Serbs. And see paragraphs 475 through 77 of the Prosecution
6 The objective of that programme was epitomised by its co-chair
7 Radislav Brdjanin, a man devoted to homogenous territories. Brdjanin
8 once defended a housing law against criticism that it might invite the
9 return of Muslims by saying:
10 "Gentlemen, you cannot fool me that you believe in the greatest
11 wonder of the world, such as that Brdjanin could participate in a process
12 of return of Croats and Muslims."
13 That's P6742, page 11.
14 Once again, peel back the Defence allegation - in this instance
15 the claim that expelled refugees were "free to return," that's
16 paragraph 459 of their brief; and the evidence exposes not only the
17 inaccuracy of the claim but the existence of the common purpose.
18 Now, as discussed to some extent earlier, the Defence attempts to
19 paint General Mladic as a protector of Muslims and Croats. And in part,
20 this rests on repeated claims throughout their brief that
21 General Mladic's remarks at the Assembly session at which he was formally
22 appointed Chief of the Main Staff reflect his protective and benevolent
23 views toward non-Serbs, and that's found at various parts of the Defence
24 brief, 559, 115, 568, 412 through 415, 788, and so on.
25 Now, first it is surprising to find this speech cited in support
1 of Mladic's alleged good intentions toward the non-Serbs, in view of such
2 things as his criticism for simply "spitting" on Sarajevo with a few
3 mortars, his call for it to be ringed with 300 mortars, his statement
4 that he would make Sarajevo "even less" than useless to anyone, and his
5 call to deprive it of utilities while blaming Muslims. That's found at
6 Prosecution brief 617 through 623.
7 But beyond that, taking the Defence citations in context and in
8 light of the totality of evidence, the 16th Session including
9 General Mladic's speech is, again, further corroboration of the common
10 purpose. Now by the date of that session, May 12th, the existing Bosnian
11 Serb forces and authorities had taken control of nearly all of the claimed
12 territories -- the claimed municipalities at any rate. While non-Serbs
13 have been forced out of some areas, the bulk of the cleansing to
14 sufficiently homogenise those municipalities and those territories had
15 not yet taken place. And during this period, while the seizures were
16 taking place and before General Mladic's accession, Dr. Karadzic and the
17 Bosnian Serb leadership intensified efforts that had begun months earlier
18 to create a Bosnian Serb army and, in particular, to find the right
19 person to successfully lead that army and the implementation of Bosnian
20 Serb goals.
21 Unsurprisingly, Karadzic looked to events in Croatia where Serb
22 forces had forcibly displaced ethnic Croats from Serb-claimed areas to
23 create a Serbian state - for that see paragraphs 204 through 208 of the
24 Prosecution brief - an effort that was strongly supported by the Bosnian
25 Serb leadership. For example, P2668 and P2671. Indeed, Karadzic
1 considered the RSK as an example and inspiration. That's P3978, page 11.
2 And he used Croatia's fate as an example, that is, "the same highway of
3 hell and suffering," when he warned the Bosnian parliament that an
4 independence initiative would result in the possible extinction of the
5 Muslim people. Again, that's P2004, page 3.
6 And as detailed in paragraphs 204 through 208 of our brief,
7 General Mladic was a key figure on that highway of hell. Upon arrival in
8 Croatia, he changed the role of the JNA from one of buffer between the
9 two sides to one of siding with the Serbs. That's P7638.
10 And in that new capacity, General Mladic led attacks on towns and
11 villages, including Kijevo, Drnis, Sibenik, Sinj, Srbinje, advancing
12 Serbian territorial objectives through destruction of towns, killings,
13 and expulsion of inhabitants. He used previous attacks as threats of
14 what lay in store for others, for example, telling an interlocutor that
15 "Kijevo will be a garden of flowers compared to what you will experience
16 if you should touch me."
17 His view of how to achieve his objectives was further captured in
18 these comments:
19 "Nothing will get out the of Dalmatia except children under the
20 age of 10 if they carry on like this, all that is older than 10 and
21 younger than 75 will come to harm in Sibenik and we will not leave a
22 single house standing, unless they finish the job like it was done in
24 That's P1959, also P7052 which duplicates at page 8.
25 Karadzic had heard of Mladic and "took an interest in him."
1 P4583, page 324.
2 He and Krajisnik went to General Kukanjac's office and listened
3 to Mladic "issuing orders and commanding around Kupres and Knin." And
4 thereafter, as he told the Assembly:
5 "Gentlemen, we got the officers we asked for. I asked for
6 Mladic." That's P4583, page 324. General Mladic, the man Karadzic once
7 referred to as "the glorious fighter from Krajina." P2001, page 118.
8 As discussed as paragraph 20 of the Prosecution brief. On April
9 30th, 1992, at a meeting with Milosevic and other Serbian and SFRY
10 leaders, the Bosnian Serbs "got their own military," including the
11 agreement that General Mladic would become commander of the soon-to-be
12 Bosnian Serb army. Within days General Mladic was meeting with the
13 Bosnian Serb leadership and others to formulate the strategic objectives
14 that would guide the nascent army. And that's found at Prosecution
15 brief, paragraph 209.
16 Days later, at the 16th Session, Karadzic reported on political
17 conditions and the war, in the course of which he enunciated the six
18 Strategic Objectives. The achievement of all six goals, he said, would
19 "finally finish the job of the freedom struggle of the Serbian people."
20 That's P431, page 10.
21 After Karadzic spoke, a number of officials took the floor and
22 some of whom suggested that geographic areas not embraced by the
23 objectives, for example, Tuzla and Bihac, should be included. Brdjanin,
24 for example, on his part expressed dismay that a Muslim colonel was
25 teaching political education for the Banja Luka Corps.
1 "How can anyone still believe it is all right that we have a
2 Muslim doing political education in the Banja Luka Corps?"
3 That's at P431, pages 13, 23 and 25.
4 And although General Mladic had not been on the agenda to speak
5 at that point, he "asked for the floor" after listening to these remarks.
6 That's at page 31 of P431.
7 And he conveyed what would one would expect from a man who had
8 been selected to lead the army on the basis of his Croatia credentials.
9 "I know what I'm doing. Let's stick to the goals that the other
10 leaders and I have come up and not make things harder for ourselves by
11 trying to do too much or by revealing our secret plan."
12 General Mladic immediately and repeatedly cited his experiences
13 in Croatia as validation of his expertise and reflections of what he
14 intended to do, including an anecdote about shelling a hotel housing
15 European community monitors to enforce his demands, prompting response at
16 the time: "Mladic are you sane?" P431, page 37.
17 General Mladic explained: "We have only made our first move in
18 the war." And that they had to be realistic and stated: "The goals that
19 I've heard here and the demands, please, even if we had an army like the
20 Chinese, it is doubtful that we could fulfil them." And then he
21 explained: People are not simply keys in a pocket that can be shifted
22 from here to there. "It is something easily said but difficult to
23 achieve." P431 all of pages 32 to 34.
24 And he reminded the Assembly that: "The thing that we are doing
25 needs to be guarded as our deepest secret."
1 Than their representatives needed to present their goals in a way
2 that will sound appealing to the international community while at the
3 same time "our people must know how to read between the lines." That's
4 page 34 of that P431.
5 And he also blasted Brdjanin for his criticism of the Muslim
6 teaching within the Banja Luka Corps.
7 "I know to whom it referred," General Mladic said. It refers to
8 Colonel Hasotic. And he explained that it was better to have Hasotic
9 who had served in Croatia and who "knows better how to neutralise me,"
10 with them than fighting against them. And so he explained: You can't
11 have a sieve to get rid of everyone, that would include guys like
12 Hasotic. And beyond that, how would that square with the concerns he had
13 just expressed about appeasing the international community? How would
14 Karadzic and Krajisnik explain that? And that's at page 35.
15 And similarly he referred to his recent visit to Kalinovik, where
16 frightened Muslim villagers "fear, might prays to no God" met with him in a
17 scene which brought to mind - as Minister of Information Ostojic who was
18 with him explained - a master-servant relationship. And that's found at
19 P431, page 7. And so those cowed, subservient Muslims in
20 General Mladic's Serbian majority hometown with whom he just met were,
21 like Hasotic, among those who might not have to be explained to the
22 international community and might not have to be expelled or drowned.
23 That was the context of General Mladic's remarks. And thereafter, he
24 oversaw - before the month was out - the beginning of the VRS's brutal
25 implementation of the Strategic Objectives in Muslim and Croat villages,
1 towns, and communities.
2 As Defence expert Kovic acknowledged: One should look to what
3 happened on the ground when determining what someone intended. And
4 that's at T42007.
5 The Defence, however, seeks to distance Mladic from the Strategic
6 Objectives and to neutralise them. They claim, first, that the Strategic
7 Objectives had nothing to do with the common plan to permanently remove,
8 arguing that the Prosecution ignores that Karadzic defined the first goal
9 as "separation of states." That's para 410.
10 What the Defence fails to mention is that after mentioning
11 states, Karadzic immediately went on to make clear that the separation
12 was about people.
13 "Separation from those who are our enemies and who have used
14 every opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us and who would
15 continue with such practices if we were to stay together in the same
17 That's P431, page 9.
18 General Mladic certainly knew what he meant. Only a few days
19 before, on 6 May in one of their meetings about the Strategic Objectives,
20 Karadzic had enthused:
21 "We are on the threshold of achieving our centuries'-old dream of
22 creating our own state without many internal enemies."
23 That's P352, pages 257 through 258.
24 Similarly General Gvero - also in attendance at the 16th
25 Session - understood that: "Everybody has to live on his own territory,
1 Muslim on Muslim territory, Serbs on Serbian." P7394, page 3.
2 The Defence also claims that at the 16th Session: "There is a
3 notable absence of discussions on separating or moving Muslims." That's
4 found at paragraph 413 of their brief.
5 This claim simply disregards such comments as Radic's on the
6 process of "resettlement." Or Milojevic's references to the fact that
7 the borders relating to the Strategic Objectives "intrinsically implies
8 moving a contingent of the population," or the reference to the "happy
9 news" that the Strategic Objectives meant that Muslims who had been
10 relocated across the Una River would not be returning. And those are
11 found at P431, pages 15, 33, and 20 respectively.
12 The Defence further contends that while General Mladic may have
13 heard of the Strategic Objectives he "provides no insight" into their
14 formulation or implementation and the evidence does not support the claim
15 that he formulated or implemented them. That's at paragraphs 419 through
16 20. Now this false claim ignores such evidence as --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, may I again ask you to slow down a bit.
18 It's not only transcription but also French translation, which easily is
19 a few lines behind.
20 So please slowly proceed.
21 MR. TIEGER: I was addressing the Defence claim that the evidence
22 doesn't support the assertion that he formulated - that is,
23 General Mladic formulated or implemented the Strategic Objectives. This
24 claim ignores such facts as the following:
25 1. That General Mladic expressly said at the 16th that: "I have
1 read, mulled over for a long time and discussed within the most select
2 circle of comrades whom we convened the strategic goals that are of
3 substance." P431, page 32.
4 2. That Milovanovic said: "So far our army has achieved four
5 strategic goals, that is, the tasks." Adding: "And that is the basis
6 from which we embark on the negotiations." P7764, page 2.
7 That Mladic told the Assembly: "The tasks in the army in this
8 war stem from the known six Strategic Objectives adopted by our
9 Assembly." P4583, page 22.
10 Or that the combat-readiness report stated that the -- states
11 that: "The Strategic Objectives served as the guide-lines for planning
12 the actual operations and concerted battles." Page 338, page 159.
13 Or just one more example, that at a meeting on the 8th of
14 November, 1992, a meeting including General Mladic, Karadzic, Krajisnik,
15 and corps commanders, a meeting that focussed on the importance of the
16 Drina, Krajisnik noted that the army had achieved some of the Strategic
17 Objectives but not all, including Strategic Objective number 3.
18 Therefore, he said, the most important task was the mopping up - the
19 "ciscenje" - of the Drina by the Drina Corps; and Directive 4, ordering
20 the Drina Corps to force the Muslim population in the Podrinje to leave
21 was issued two weeks later. That's P356, pages 146 through 147; and
22 P976, page 5.
23 Once again, Your Honours, scratch the surface and the common
24 purpose is revealed.
25 Now, I have mentioned throughout my remarks this morning and
1 early this afternoon the disparity between the propositions made by the
2 Defence and the citations supporting them. The caution required in
3 considering those assertions extends to the legal propositions in the
4 Defence brief.
5 For example, the Defence proffers a sweeping but wholly
6 uninformed attack on JCE liability, which is grounded throughout on a
7 disregard for Appeals Chamber jurisprudence, claiming that Tadic -- the
8 Tadic case should be limited to small-scale cases. They disregard
9 Krajisnik at para 469, Brdjanin at paragraphs 422 through 425, and
10 Djordjevic at para 40.
11 Challenging whether JCE liability exists as a matter -- as a part
12 of customary law, they disregard Djordjevic's confirmation at
13 paragraphs 43 through 44 of the validity of the Tadic approach. In a
14 similar manner, Popovic at paragraph 1674; and Djordjevic at para 50 and
15 52 make clear that findings of other courts outside the Tribunal are not
16 binding. Sainovic para 611 and Kvocka at 115 through 119 hold that a
17 common plan or design may be inferred from the facts and don't require
18 proof of any additional agreement between the accused and other JCE
20 Similarly, contrary to Defence arguments, Brdjanin at paragraphs
21 413 through 414 holds that a JCE member can be held accountable for acts
22 of physical perpetration of non-JCE members. You can also see
23 Stanisic/Zupljanin at paragraphs 994 through 96. The Defence claims that
24 General Mladic is not responsible for crimes at detention facilities he
25 allegedly did not control ignore the Martic judgement at paragraphs 187
1 through 89, 195, 215 and 210; and the Stanisic/Zupljanin judgement at
2 paragraph 96 and Brdjanin at paragraph 410.
3 Similarly, the Defence attempt to import new requirements for
4 JCE 3 liability, have been rejected already by Stanisic/Zupljanin at
5 paragraphs 963 through 966; and the Appeals Chamber has repeatedly
6 affirmed the standards set out by the Prosecution, for example,
7 Stanisic/Zupljanin at 595 and 614; Sainovic, 1061, 1557; Brdjanin, 365
8 and 411.
9 And with respect to the fact that JCE liability applies to all
10 crimes, including specific-intent crimes, see Stanisic/Zupljanin
11 paragraph 599; the Brdjanin interlocutory appeal on the 19th of March,
12 2004; and Djordjevic at paragraph 919. These same mischaracterisations
13 of law, coupled with misstatements of fact, are applied by the Defence to
14 Count 11, hostages. So, for example, the Defence asserts in
15 paragraphs 165 through 169 of its brief that Count 11 is "procedurally
16 defective" because Common Article 3 lays down the minimum criterion that
17 the parties must respect during an internal conflict and the conflict in
18 BiH was international in 1995.
19 Contrary to the Defence claim, the Tribunal has held, including
20 in the context of hostage-taking, that Common Article 3 of the
21 Geneva Conventions applies to both international and non-international
22 armed conflicts. That's the Karadzic Trial Chamber, 28 April 2009,
23 paragraph 59, referring to the Appeals Chamber decision in Tadic on the
24 2nd of October, 1995. You can also see Delalic on 20 February 2001 at
25 paragraph 150. The Delalic Appeals Chamber, in fact, called it "legally
1 and morally untenable" to interpret the protections under Common
2 Article 3 as inapplicable to an international conflict. The Defence
3 claim that Count 11 is procedurally defective is baseless and contrary to
4 settled law.
5 Similarly, the Defence asserts at paragraph 3313 of its brief
6 that although certain courts have held that detained peacekeepers enjoy
7 the protections of Common Article 3, the UN detainees in this case gave
8 up such protection by actively participating in the conflict.
9 Now, this claim chooses, first, to disregard the very language of
10 Common Article 3, which expressly applies "to persons taking no active
11 part in the hostilities including members of armed forces placed hors de
12 combat by, inter alia, detention."
13 It also ignores Tribunal jurisprudence
14 confirming that the prohibition on hostage-taking is
15 "absolute and without exception" and that it applies to UN personnel,
16 irrespective of their status prior to detention. And for that, see the
17 Karadzic Appeals Chamber 98 bis decision on 11 December 2012,
18 paragraph 16.
19 These mischaracterisations of law in respect of the hostage count
20 are matched by Defence mischaracterisations of fact. They claim, for
21 example, that around 28 May 1995, General Mladic had a conversation with
22 Smith in which he was calm, threatened no one, and said that no threats
23 had been made against detainees. That's at paragraph 3382. Now, apart
24 from the fact that in that very conversation, General Mladic acknowledged
25 that some of the detained personnel were held at potential targets for
1 NATO - that's P2558 - this claim ignores such evidence as the following.
2 First, it ignores General Mladic's conversation with Smith two days
3 earlier, during which Mladic told Smith that if there were further
4 air-strikes, UNMOs would be killed and that the fate of the hostages was
5 in Smith's hands. That's P7540, page 2; and P2557 page 4; P791.
6 It ignores that Kalabrcyk was handcuffed and filmed at the
7 Jahorina radar site because Mladic wanted UN people filmed at that
8 location. 2554, page 13.
9 It ignores that General Milovanovic issued a Main Staff order -
10 approved by the Supreme Commander - to distribute 103 detainees to
11 various corps and deploy them at warehouses in the corps "in order to
12 prevent NATO leaders from carrying out their intentions." And it ignores
13 that on 30th of May, 1995, General Mladic ordered the SRK to "complete
14 the disarming of the captured UNPROFOR members and their deployment to
15 the facilities which have been assessed as possible NATO air-strike
16 targets." That's P5230, paragraph 7, page 3.
17 And one further legal matter, two additional legal matters. One,
18 the Defence also asserts the Prosecution is required to prove that the
19 physical perpetrators or the tools of the JCE possessed the specific
20 intent required for genocide. That's at paragraph 251. The intent of
21 the physical perpetrator, of course, is relevant only to the extent that
22 the Trial Chamber could find that neither Mladic nor any member of the
23 JCE had the requisite mens rea and genocidal intent. That's found at
24 Krajisnik Appeals Judgement para 226; Brdjanin appeals judgement,
25 para 410. And were that to happen in this instance, the Chamber would
1 then consider, pursuant to JCE 3, the destructive intent of such persons
2 as Drljaca or Zeljaja according to the elements of Article 4 that I will
3 be discussing tomorrow.
4 And finally, Mr. President, Your Honours, let me quickly address
5 the 73 bis argument, another Defence claim that is frankly untethered to
6 reality. The reduction pursuant to 73 bis in this case was clearly about
7 Scheduled Incidents, as reflected in the very first paragraph of the
8 Prosecution's submission. After explaining in paragraph 1 which of the
9 "crimes enumerated in the schedules" it would present evidence on, it
10 noted again in paragraph 7 that it had identified "the scheduled crimes"
11 upon which it would present evidence and that it would not present
12 evidence on the remainder of the previously scheduled crimes, resulting
13 in a reduction of the case. Thereafter, the Trial Chamber adopted the
14 proposal and ordered the Prosecution to file an amended indictment in
15 accordance with the decision, which the Prosecution did. The
16 Amended Indictment crossed out the identified Scheduled Incidents and -
17 unsurprisingly - all the counts remained. No objection was made to this
18 indictment with all 11 counts. Thereafter, the Prosecution led evidence
19 on forcible transfer and deportation. No objections were made to that
20 evidence on the basis of a claim that counts -- the counts related to
21 forcible transfer and deportation had been dropped.
22 At 98 bis, the Chamber found a case to answer on all 11 counts,
23 and the Defence did not object that Counts 7 and 8 had been dropped. The
24 Defence then called extensive evidence related to forcible transfer and
25 deportation, and there is no evidence -- there is no suggestion that
1 these were superfluous because the counts had been dropped. In short,
2 the preposterous interpretation proffered now by the Defence is belied by
3 the fact that no one interpreted the 73 bis decision in that patently
4 unreasonable manner during the entire course of the subsequent five
6 Mr. President, Your Honours, that concludes my presentation this
7 morning. Mr. Traldi will now address aspects of the implementation of
8 the overarching JCE.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger. I take it that the stage has
10 to be changed slightly.
11 Mr. Traldi, since you were present, you certainly have heard my
12 observations as to the speed of speech which I addressed to Mr. Tieger,
13 but which equally apply to you.
14 MR. TRALDI: At least equally, I'm sure, Your Honour. And I will
15 do my best.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
17 MR. TRALDI: Thank you, Mr. President.
18 Beginning immediately after the 16th Assembly, General Mladic led
19 the ethnic cleansing campaign which implemented the common criminal
20 purpose Mr. Tieger just described. In carrying out the cleansing
21 campaign, his VRS and other Bosnian Serb forces committed a constant
22 pattern of crimes throughout Serb-claimed territory, particularly in the
23 charged municipalities. Mladic used his command and control over the
24 VRS to lead this campaign. Indeed, he escalated the cleansing campaign
25 immediately after the VRS began to function under its own name on 19
1 May 1992. In the first two weeks of its existence, the VRS led ethnic
2 cleansing operations in six different indictment municipalities. These
3 operations included eight of the massacres General Mladic is charged
4 with; and during that same period, VRS units and other Bosnian Serb
5 forces established camps at which they detained and abused non-Serb
6 civilians at Manjaca, in Banja Luka; Susica, in Vlasenica; the Veljko
7 Vlahovic school in Rogatica; and Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje in
9 Mladic used his control of his subordinates to achieve the
10 cleansing he had told the 16th Assembly would be difficult through a
11 pattern of terrible crimes. In municipality after municipality, the
12 cleansing campaign tore apart non-Serb families and communities and left
13 behind destroyed mosques and Catholic churches, the burned-out and empty
14 shells of Muslim and Croat villages, and mass graves full of victims,
15 while many of those who had not been killed or fled huddled in terror in
16 camps, waiting to see which detainees would be the next to be brutalised.
17 I will first be discussing General Mladic's command and control,
18 then his use of that command and control to operationalise the common
19 purpose, and then his knowledge and approval of the cleansing campaign.
20 And finally I'll address some issues related to several of the specific
22 The evidence shows what witnesses told you they saw from the
23 beginning of the war: Mladic had firm command and control over the VRS
24 and subordinated Bosnian Serb forces throughout this campaign.
25 Brigade General Wilson, who was present in Bosnia from the
1 establishment of the VRS, testified its operations were sophisticated,
2 well-organised, requiring good command and control. And Colonel Tucker
3 explained nothing of any military significance could happen in
4 Republika Srpska without Mladic's specific approval:
5 "It was very apparent that he made all the practical military
6 decisions that mattered."
7 At the 16th Assembly, Mladic made clear he insisted on single
8 command, telling the Assembly:
9 "I do how to command an army but to be able to command, I need to
10 have an army, and we cannot have 100 masters in one home. The army must
11 have a unified command."
12 He took immediate measures to ensure that single command
13 beginning, in fact, even before the 16th Assembly. The day afterwards,
14 Ilidza Crisis Staff member Unkovic asked Mladic if Arkan's men in Ilidza
15 were under Mladic's command, and this was Mladic's response.
16 [Audiotape played]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Traldi, I do not hear anything on the English
19 MR. TRALDI: I didn't either, Your Honour, and I'm told it's
20 because I neglected to tell the booths that it's P403, which -- the
21 transcript of which they have.
22 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... portion of it.
23 MR. TRALDI: It's a portion which has been identified in what
24 we've given them.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Then let's re-start if everyone is
2 [Audiotape played]
3 INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
4 "U: One more question.
5 "M: Yes.
6 "U: We have some Arkan's Men here.
7 "M: Yes.
8 "U: Are they under our command?
9 "M: All of them, all under arms are under my command if they
10 want to stay alive."
11 MR. TRALDI: By this point, Mladic was already issuing orders,
12 still formally on the letterhead of the JNA 2nd Military District and
13 through its chain of command, like P3056 and 3057. As Milovanovic
14 testified, then JNA corps were sending combat reports in to Main Staff
15 headquarters and Mladic was on the phone exercising command, as you've
16 just heard, and, for instance, over the Kalinovik Tactical Group in
18 On 19 May, General Gvero informed subordinate VRS units that
19 Mladic was the VRS's commander and: "All the other important elements
20 of a united organisation and leadership and command have also been
22 And that's P7325, page 2.
23 So the Main Staff concluded it had effective control over Bosnian
24 Serb military forces as of the 19th of May. The VRS inherited much of
25 this command structure, including its personnel, weapons, and Mladic
1 himself from the JNA. As we set out in our brief, paragraphs 11 to 32,
2 this was the culmination of a plan to create a Bosnian Serb army, which
3 the JCE members had shared beginning in December 1991 and which
4 Slobodan Milosevic had initiated.
5 And you'll see on the next two slides Borislav Jovic's notes of
6 meetings with Milosevic, first reflecting his decision to transfer JNA
7 personnel so that the Serb leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina could "assume
8 command over the Serb part of the JNA." And Jovic's notes show
9 soldiers were quickly redeployed consistent with this plan.
10 And then, on 30th of April, 1992, the need to "withdraw the
11 remainder of the soldiers who are FRY citizens from Bosnia-Herzegovina so
12 that the remaining 90.000 JNA soldiers in that republic, mostly of Serb
13 nationality, could be placed under the command of the Bosnian Serb
15 And that's P3084, pages 29 to 32.
16 Because of this plan and the preparations the JCE members made,
17 Mladic took over a well-functioning army established to implement the
18 common purpose. And the Defence argues the JNA in Bosnia was ill
19 organised and a neutral force. Both arguments fail on close scrutiny.
20 In fact, when Mladic took command, the JNA 2nd Military District was a
21 well-functioning military that was part of the JCE in Bosnia. Under the
22 control of JCE member Slobodan Milosevic, the JNA had worked in concert
23 with the Bosnian Serb leadership to begin implementing the common
24 purpose. We lay the evidence for that out in our brief, particularly in
25 paragraphs 17 to 23, 193, and 546 to 547. And you see various JNA corps
1 transform into VRS corps, for instance, in Defence witness
2 Kelecevic's testimony at transcript page 37138; and in 4th Corps officer
3 Gagovic's order, P6534.
4 And the Defence attempts to deny even that the VRS acquired JNA
5 weapons, but Mladic himself had stated during the war: "Our army is one
6 of the rare ones in history to have started a liberation war with a very
7 solid material base." P1966, page 5.
8 And his predecessor as 2nd Military District Commander Kukanjac
9 explained after the war: "The Muslim-Croat horde never got hold of a
10 single plane, helicopter, tank, armoured personnel carrier, gun, mortar,
11 or motor vehicle."
12 And once the VRS was formed, Mladic had strong command and
13 control. As Milovanovic explained:
14 "Command is centralised first and foremost and it goes top to
15 bottom from the Supreme Command across the Main Staff, corps commands,
16 and down the chain to squads."
17 That's at transcript page 16932.
18 And he goes on to explain how the Main Staff monitored the
19 implementation of its orders and the activities of corps commands. And
20 General Wilson, among others, gave evidence that Mladic's effective
21 control over VRS units was visible to him. And that's P320,
22 paragraph 127.
23 The combat-readiness report of the Main Staff explained that it
24 had translated objectives and tasks set by the political leadership into
25 "missions of the Army of RS, with the goals of every individual combat
1 action, operation, or battle being specifically defined." It concluded
2 decisions on the engagement of the forces of the VRS were taken at
3 meetings of bodies of the Main Staff headed as a rule by the commander --
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Slow down, Mr. Traldi, please.
5 MR. TRALDI: That is, by General Mladic. That's P338, page 8.
6 And after the war, Mladic explained the most complicated and difficult
7 decisions he often made alone or with his Chief of Staff. That's P1147,
8 page 124.
9 In paragraph 636 of its brief, the Defence suggests that the
10 military police may have carried out tasks from the security organ
11 without Mladic's knowledge, in an effort to separate him from the crimes
12 the military police were committing, but the security organ was run by
13 General Tolimir - one of Mladic's trusted subordinates from Croatia as
14 can you see in P5007. Mladic described him as part of the inner core of
15 the Main Staff. The presence of a lieutenant like Tolimir under Mladic's
16 command and supervising the professional work of the military police
17 supported Mladic's command and control over them, but Mladic was the one
18 with command, as Skrbic explained. Mladic's various assistant commanders
19 would make proposals to him in their areas of responsibility and if
20 Mladic agreed, they were responsible for implementing those proposals.
21 And Mladic kept firm control over even his most trusted
22 subordinates. For instance, he made clear to Tolimir in May 1992 that
23 Tolimir had on one occasion gone beyond his remit telling him: "Don't
24 exceed your powers and competencies anymore." Amd Tolimir replied: "I
25 understand, Comrade General." Mladic added: "And don't bow to pressure
1 anymore." And Tolimir again replied: "I understand, Comrade General."
2 The next day when Mandic notified Tolimir of an order from Mladic,
3 Tolimir simply replied: "Well, that's clear." And that's P2752 and
5 Mladic also exercised firm control over corps commanders. SRK
6 commander Dragomir Milosevic was described by international as "merely
7 adhering to the orders/directions that were issued to him by
8 General Mladic. And Milosevic's assistant commander for legal, morale,
9 and religious affairs, Luka Dragovic, testified that as far as he knew,
10 Milosevic abided by Main Staff decisions and "never issued an order that
11 was in contravention of orders from the superior command."
12 As Mr. Tieger mentioned, corps commanders would seek approval for
13 the next day's decisions in their daily reports, and you see that process
14 illustrated, for instance, in P3663, P3672, P4045, and P4450. And East
15 Bosnia Corps commander Simic testified he had the right to call Mladic
16 urgently "to ask for approval of some of our decisions." And that's
17 P4325, transcript page 28494.
18 And corps commanders passed Mladic's orders down the chain to the
19 units. Defence witness Milivoje Simic acknowledged 1st Krajina Corps
20 Commander Talic's orders were "received from the Main Staff ... he sent
21 it down to me and I sent to down to my units. That's how it went."
22 And orders were unquestionable. When asked if he supported
23 Mladic's decision that no man, woman, or child could leave besieged
24 Vecici until those remaining there had surrendered their weapons, 22nd
25 Brigade Battalion Commander Slobodan Zupljanin explained: "It wasn't up
1 to me to support. It was up to me to implement the decisions --
2 implement the orders of my superior command."
3 In paragraph 644 of its brief, the Defence claims Prosecution
4 expert Butler gave evidence that the most important position in the VRS
5 was corps commander. What Butler actually wrote at P2200, paragraph 2.0,
6 was that corps commander was the most important position in a given VRS
7 corps. The evidence shows the most important position in the VRS, the
8 man responsible, was General Mladic.
9 And, Your Honour, I see we're at the time for a break.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Traldi. We'll take a break and we'll
11 resume at 1.30 p.m.
13 --- Recess taken at 1.10 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 1.31 p.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Traldi, please proceed.
16 MR. TRALDI: Thank you, Mr. President.
17 The Defence claims in paragraph 646 that Mladic could not appoint
18 corps or brigade commanders who it suggests were under Karadzic's
19 control. And initially you can see Mladic appoint brigade commanders in
20 P4985 and in his meeting with Svetozar Andric in Vlasenica on the 18th
21 of May, 1992. And as Skrbic testified, VRS personnel decisions were
22 drafted by the Main Staff's personnel sector based on Mladic's orders,
23 even when they were for Karadzic to sign.
24 But more fundamentally, Karadzic and Mladic worked together to
25 implement the common purpose. Both repeatedly underscored the importance
1 of unity between the military and political branches; what Gvero called
2 the VRS's greatest value. That's P7391, page 3.
3 And Karadzic, as Supreme Commander, recognised and relied on
4 Mladic's essential role in the army's efforts. Milovanovic explained,
5 for instance, that municipality President Dusko Kornjaca in Cajnice, a
6 non-indictment municipality, had been the original brigade commander
7 there and wanted to replace the commander who had been subsequently
8 appointed pursuant to a Main Staff decision. When Milovanovic and
9 then-Colonel Milenko Zivanovic complained to Karadzic, Karadzic called
10 Kornjaca and he said: "Dusko, we are physicians. We don't know how to
11 command in war. Let the professionals command."
12 And that's how you see it working throughout the cleansing
13 campaign. Karadzic meeting with Mladic, giving strategic direction, but
14 letting the professionals command the army. As Karadzic put it in
15 January 1994, he had "accepted entirely the decisions of all the officers
16 and General Mladic." That's P4094, page 2. While Karadzic issued some
17 specific orders, primarily later in the war, that was the exception, and
18 there's certainly no evidence that Karadzic went around Mladic and the
19 Main Staff to order VRS units to commit crimes without Mladic's
21 The Defence relies on Milovanovic's testimony that Karadzic
22 issued him orders directly in August 1995 after the VRS had suffered a
23 number of serious defeats in the Krajina. Now, Milovanovic says during
24 that period, Karadzic gave him direct orders, and then Milovanovic
25 explained: "All the orders that I received from him were forwarded by
1 myself to General Mladic. And I waited for his position because Mladic
2 was my immediate superior ..." At the very at least, he always Mladic
3 informed. And that's at transcript page 16972 to 16973.
4 Now this came long after Mladic and Karadzic had together used
5 the VRS to ethnically cleanse most of BiH. And looking closer, this
6 period shows the strength of Mladic's command. Even though Karadzic had
7 attempted to reassign Mladic, Milovanovic ran Karadzic's orders by
8 Mladic, his immediate superior, and five corps commanders signed a letter
9 supporting Mladic; P4284. Mladic continued exercising command, and
10 eventually Karadzic formally withdrew his decision, and they continued
11 working together. Indeed, when the Defence discusses this in
12 paragraph 3287 of their brief, they cite orders Mladic subsequently issued
13 as Main Staff commander in the very next paragraph. This strong command
14 and control was the way Mladic made his primary contribution to
15 implementing the overarching JCE in this case. We set out his other
16 contributions in paragraph 290 of our final brief.
17 Now one of the messages Mladic ensured was disseminated down the
18 chain of command was the JCE members' view that Bosnian Muslim and Croats
19 generally were their enemies. Here we see Mladic instructing his
20 subordinates what to do with their enemies.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Traldi, could you please slow down.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Traldi, you are invited to slow down.
23 MR. TRALDI: I'll try to accept, Mr. President.
24 Mladic writes: "Keep pushing energetically onwards, pay no
25 attention to what is going on around us. The Turks must disappear from
1 these areas."
2 And you see here the desire to expel being operationalized. And
3 in an interview in the same year, 1994, Mladic explained many of the
4 Bosnian Muslims were, as we'll see on the next slide, "not even Turks
5 they are converts." The B/C/S word you see bolded is "Poturice" which
6 you've heard is derogatory. And he calls them "the worst scum who had
7 betrayed the Serb people."
8 And this message was replayed down the VRS's ranks you see here
9 P6647 and Defence witness Dragicevic, then the SRK's assistant commander
10 for legal, morale and religious affairs, writing that Serbs were
11 genetically superior to Muslims, stronger, better, more handsome and
12 cleverer, and referring to them again as "Poturice." And we set out in
13 paragraphs 72 through 82 of our brief the key role that Dragicevic's
14 sector played in the propaganda campaign and disseminating the JCE
15 members' message to soldiers on the ground.
16 You see that this message throughout the VRS corps being repeated
17 and operationalized. In 1st Krajina Corps chief of security Bogojevic's
18 report on the removal of "the enemy," that is, the Muslim and Croat
19 population of Kotor Varos. That's P3815. In 17th Brigade officer
20 Marko Samardzija's reference to "the internal enemy, the Muslim
21 population in our villages," that's P519. And in SRK commander Galic's
22 exhortation to his soldiers that "the value of each individual and each
23 unit is the measure to which they have safe-guarded the Serbs and Serbian
24 territory and how many Poturice they have liquidated and how much of
25 their territory they have seized."
1 The VRS seized and ethnically cleansed the territory the JCE
2 members had claimed. And, indeed, you see here how the Main Staff
3 characterised the goals of its 1992 campaign in the combat readiness
4 report. "Liberation of territories which are ours and which belong to us
5 by historical birthright." The charged municipalities were all among
6 those territories. And here we see again, P7325, page 2, Gvero's
7 19 May order. It reflects the Main Staff's view that the "state-building
8 Serbian people living on around 65 per cent of the territory and
9 representing around 35 per cent of the population of Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina must fight for a total partition from the Muslim and Croatian
11 people and must create their own state."
12 And you've heard from various Defence witnesses that this order
13 implemented strategic objective 1 and told the soldiers the purpose of
14 the war. That includes witness Barasin from the 1st Krajina Corps and
15 Defence historic expert Kovic.
16 And illustrated throughout our brief, Mladic knew very well how
17 VRS units were pursuing "total partition." Indeed, he had to know in
18 order to exercise command. The Chamber received the evidence of Mladic's
19 detailed knowledge of VRS activities. 2nd Krajina Corps commander Boric
20 explained Mladic "would know what the situation was like on the front
21 line of the 2nd Krajina Corps without me having to report to him." And
22 those reports meant Mladic "knew what was occurring in the entire AOR of
23 the VRS."
24 And that second reference is from P439.
25 Now, the Defence attempts to undermine Mladic's knowledge of the
1 notorious cleansing campaign by claiming in paragraph `665 that unless
2 Mladic actively inquired about daily combat reports, he was not informed
3 about them. This preposterous claim ignores that he chaired the
4 Main Staff meetings at which such reports were discussed. It's from
5 Milovanovic's testimony. It ignores East Bosnia Corps commander Simic's
6 evidence that he spoke with Mladic almost every day to follow up on the
7 daily combat report whether Mladic was in Crna Rijeka or out in the
8 field. And that's P4325, transcript page 28494, and it ignores that even
9 the witness they cite, Banduka, testified that -- testified not that the
10 report didn't reach Mladic but that it went to the operative centre and
11 as long as Mladic was present at Crna Rijeka "he would be conveyed that
12 information from the operative centre of the Main Staff or the Chief of
13 Staff himself."
14 Consistent with Mladic's detailed knowledge about what his units
15 were doing, he knew they were implementing his orders through the
16 commission of widespread crimes.
17 We noted in our brief, particularly at paragraphs 283 and 479,
18 the international notoriety of the cleansing campaign.
19 Many of the charged crimes were also individually notorious in
20 Bosnia or outside it, and for the charged municipalities we set some of
21 the evidence set out in the knowledge and approval sections of our
22 municipality narratives. But, in short, the world was well aware of the
23 nature of the cleansing campaign. Mladic must have known it too. He
24 knew it from the international negotiators he met with, he knew it from
25 the media, he knew it from meetings he recorded in his notebooks, and he
1 knew it from daily combat reports that he received. Mladic received
2 direct reports of crimes in some of those reports. The Defence notes
3 this in paragraph 736 of its brief without giving any examples, but they
4 claim that he received reports from the military justice system that
5 those crimes were being prosecuted. I will get to the military justice
6 system in a little while; but, for now, I want to make clear that there
7 is nothing in its reports that suggests on even a cursory read that it
8 was successfully prosecuting the perpetrators of crimes against
9 non-Serbs. We set out a number of direct reports of crimes in our brief
10 but just, for instance, you see Mladic's knowledge in P3733 where the
11 1 KK noted its "attempt to expel" Muslim and Croat refugees to
12 Central Bosnia; or D418, where the 1 KK reported that "the Muslim
13 population of the area of Lisnja village has been expelled."
14 These reports documented just a few examples of how the VRS
15 operationalized the JCE members' common purpose. The evidence shows that
16 the VRS and other Bosnian Serb forces engaged in the same pattern of
17 crimes throughout Serb-claimed territories. That pattern was present
18 throughout the charged municipalities, in most of which the evidence we
19 cited in our narratives and in our Scheduled Incident charts reflects
20 that the cleansing campaign encompassed not just all the charged crimes
21 but all the various persecutory acts charged in Count 3 of the
22 indictment. And you also saw the pattern in evidence of
23 Unscheduled Incidents which reinforce and corroborate the pattern of
24 crimes, and the pattern reflects the organisation, preparation and
25 planning that preceded these crimes. It reveals the common purpose
1 behind them. The only reasonable inference from the pattern of grave and
2 brutal crimes committed by Mladic's subordinates is that the crimes were
3 part of the cleansing campaign's purpose.
4 And you now see on your screen, or are about to, an order from
5 General Mladic, a portion of Directive 4 reflecting the task he assigned
6 to Drina Corps: "Exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible losses
7 on them and force them to leave the Birac, Zepa and Gorazde
8 areas with the Muslim population." This is an unambiguous order to expel
9 the Muslim population, an order for ethnic cleansing. That clear
10 interpretation is confirmed by, among other things, the fact that the VRS
11 implemented Directive 4 by expelling thousands of Bosnian Muslims from
12 Eastern Bosnia. The history of Directive 4 which, as Mr. Tieger told
13 you, arose from a meeting between Mladic and other high-level Bosnian
14 Serb leaders where they discussed the need to "ciscenje" Eastern Bosnia.
15 The implementing order Drina Corps commander Zivanovic issued, which
16 explicitly orders Drina Corps units to expel the Muslim population and,
17 finally, Mladic and other JCE members' goal of establishing a homogenous
18 Serb Eastern Bosnia which had already been implemented through
19 large-scale ethnic cleansing before Directive 4 was issued. You've heard
20 evidence about how Directive 4 was implemented, and we address it
21 particularly in paragraphs 401 through 412 of our brief. Systematic
22 operations, ethnically cleansing one village at a time; P7361. Wanton
23 destruction of Muslim hamlets around the Cerska enclave; P2193, P4093.
24 And Drina Corps commander Zivanovic's call to his subordinates to do so:
25 "Are the Turks' houses burning."
1 Response: "They are burning, they are burning."
2 And Zivanovic's: "Way to go, as many as possible."
3 That's P2192.
4 As Ibro Osmanovic's family reflects, many of those expelled had
5 already been pushed from their homes to the remaining Muslim enclaves in
6 Vlasenica and Bratunac, Cerska and Konjevic Polje. He testified: "My
7 mother had been expelled from Vlasenica to Cerska. My sister was in
8 Cerska. They were there until February 1993. From there, they passed
9 through," and he mentions a number of other villages and then explains:
10 "And they arrived Tuzla. The others, the remainder of the population
11 went to Srebrenica. So Cerska was empty. It remained empty."
12 And you see next Drina Corps commander Zivanovic's order
13 implementing Directive 4, P2095, and he tells the Drina Corps he has
14 decided pursuant to directive 4 to "inflict on the enemy the highest
15 possible losses, exhaust them, break them up or force them to surrender,
16 and force the Muslim local population to abandon the area of Cerska,
17 Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde."
18 So Zivanovic understood he was implementing an order to expel, to
19 expel the population.
20 The Defence relies in paragraph 2856 on General Milovanovic's
21 self-serving claim that Directive 4 simply anticipated the Muslim
22 population would flee. If that was the case, of course, Zivanovic
23 wouldn't have needed to order them forced out and the conduct of the
24 operations reflects, as you'd seen throughout the cleansing campaign, the
25 goal was to expel them, the goal was to cleanse the territory.
1 The Defence also claims in paragraph 2854 of its brief that
2 Butler testified Directive 4 legitimately targeted a portion of the
3 population which was assisting the Bosnian military. In fact, Butler
4 testified that Directive 4 was unlawful and the VRS implemented it
5 through targeting "the civilian population at large." And that's
6 transcript pages 16135 to 16136 and 16144 to 16145.
7 Directive 4 just put on paper the way the VRS conducted its
8 operations from the time it was established. The systematic ethnic
9 cleansing conducted in its implementation reflected what the VRS had
10 already done throughout Serb-claimed territory. And so what it tells you
11 is that the way the VRS fought the war - burning entire villages,
12 expelling non-Serb civilians, and leaving them nothing to which return -
13 was no accident. The directive merely codified long-term VRS practice
14 under the name and signature of the man who had led the VRS in
15 implementing the cleansing campaign from the establishment of the army,
16 General Mladic.
17 For instance, you see here P7086, an order by Birac Brigade
18 commander Svetozar Andric on 26 May 1992 to "move women and children out
19 of the Muslim villages to Kalesija and Gracanica, whereas the men are to
20 be taken away to collection centres."
21 Andric admitted that this meant women and children from Muslim
22 villages had to move to Muslim-held territory. That's transcript
23 page 34773. And you see here he was ordering his subordinates to move
24 them. Realising the obvious implications of this order for ethnic
25 cleansing, he attempted in testimony to claim this reference to women and
1 children in Muslim villages was, in fact, a reference to women and
2 children of all ethnicities before admitting at transcript page 34775
3 that the order specifically focused on moving out Muslim women and
5 And you see here P7380 just over a month after Andric's cleansing
6 order, Mladic promoting him to lieutenant-colonel. As you've heard and
7 read, he ended the war a general and the Drina Corps Chief of Staff.
8 Andric's order reflects that the cleansing operations and the
9 roundup of non-Serbs during them created a need to warehouse huge numbers
10 of prisoners, and the JCE members systemically detained them in terrible
11 conditions, in camps where they were exposed to beatings, to sexual
12 violence and where many were murdered.
13 Now the camp system was a joint enterprise between the VRS, the
14 RS MUP and Bosnian Serb civilian authorities. You see in P3801, Mico
15 Stanisic's 17 July 1992 report that those institutions all shared
16 responsibility for the system.
17 He writes: "The army, Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies have
18 requested that the army round up or capture as many Muslim civilians as
19 possible, and they leave such undefined camps to internal affairs organs.
20 The conditions in some of these camps are poor; there is no food,
21 individuals sometimes do not observe international norms, et cetera."
22 The evidence shows many of these camps were run by internal
23 affairs organs, as Stanisic said, but many of the charged camps were run
24 by VRS units. And we set out in paragraphs 312 to 313 of our brief the
25 evidence of the camp system was one single system, and following that the
1 evidence of the terrible conditions throughout it.
2 The VRS played a critical role in the system aside from leading
3 the cleansing operations in which, as Stanisic noted, Muslim civilians
4 were rounded up and captured, the VRS operated camps including the
5 charged camps in Bijeljina, Banja Luka, Foca, Kalinovik, Rogatica and
6 Trnopolje camp in Prijedor. Like in the rest of the system, the
7 conditions in those camps were terrible. For the moment, I'm going to
8 focus on two where the Defence concede the VRS ran the camps but claim
9 conditions were humane.
10 First, Batkovic was established in Bijeljina municipality at
11 Mladic's order and operated by the East Bosnia Corps. The evidence shows
12 it held thousands of non-Serb detainees in overcrowded and unsanitary
13 conditions. Guards beat detainees, singled some out for particularly
14 harsh treatment, killed several, and detainees were forced to beat and
15 abuse each other. That's all in our Scheduled Incident chart.
16 Just to look at one example, one witness was transferred from the
17 Vlasenica prison to Batkovic on 13 August 1992 and held there until the
18 11 September 1992. He was one of ten detainees known as the special unit
19 who were subjected to particularly cruel beatings and torture, beaten at
20 least three times a day, ordered to beat each other and have sexual
21 intercourse with each other. Often they were beaten in front of other
22 prisoners. When journalists or Red Cross representatives came, the
23 special unit members were hidden. And the injuries inflicted on this
24 witness included a fractured skull, stab wounds in both hands and his
25 left foot, cigarette burns, damage to his nervous system, fractures to
1 his upper right arm, nose and jaw, broken ribs and damaged kidneys. So
2 he had lasting physical injuries and post-traumatic stress. That's P2521
3 and P2522.
4 Now, the Defence claims in paragraph 1629 of its brief that
5 Batkovic legitimately held POWs and prisoners for whom there were
6 suspicions that they committed criminal acts or war crimes. The very
7 evidence they cite refutes this. They cite first P3806, which refers to
8 the transfer of prisoners from Manjaca. As I'll get to in a moment, the
9 prisoners held there were known mostly to be simple civilians.
10 And for the second discussion, can we briefly go into private
12 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
13 [Private session]
8 [Open session]
9 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 MR. TRALDI: And Defence witness and military judge Bojanovic
12 admitted he visited Muslim civilians detained at Batkovic. That's
13 transcript page 27975. And Defence witness Andan admitted a Croat he
14 knew was being detained at Batkovic only because he was a Croat. "I
15 couldn't find any other reason or explanation."
16 The Defence claim that transferring prisoners to Batkovic for
17 exchange "proves the VRS had no criminal intent" - that's in
18 paragraph 1641 of their brief is unsubstantial - is unsustainable. Those
19 people being held to be exchanged out of Serb territory because of their
20 ethnicity were held by the VRS in criminal, disgraceful conditions, were
21 primarily civilians who had been rounded up to be detained and eventually
22 removed and were abused and some killed in detention.
23 Turning to Manjaca, the 1st Krajina Corps held thousands of
24 detainees there, almost all non-Serbs. They were held with insufficient
25 food and water, in crowded stables, many were severely beaten and
1 otherwise abused and at least ten killed. For instance, a judge from
2 Sanski Most who was transferred from Manjaca on 17 June 1992. He was
3 beaten regularly, beginning as soon as he arrived. He fainted several
4 times during beatings by soldiers and military police, lost a tooth, lost
5 approximately one-third of his body weight due to the lack of food in the
6 camp before being transferred to Germany in December 1992. He was still
7 suffering pain from the beatings when he gave a statement in 2000.
8 That's P3293.
9 The Defence claim that the VRS released detainees who were found
10 not to have participated in combat is also based on Manjaca evidence.
11 That evidence, P241, shows 700 Manjaca detainees being transferred to
12 Croatia in November 1992, thus completing their permanent removal from
13 Serb-claimed territory. The Defence witness Solaja admitted the Bosnian
14 Serb leadership had made a condition of closing the camp. The other
15 evidence they rely on, P219, simply refers to the intention to "discuss
16 the possibility" of some detainees' returning home, but they cite no
17 examples of anyone who did, perhaps because the VRS had destroyed many of
18 the Muslim homes and villages in Sanski Most during its cleansing
19 operations as we set out in our municipality narrative.
20 Here, too, the evidence shows the prisoners being held by the VRS
21 at Manjaca were civilians. In the main, I'd refer you to P220, P221, and
22 the evidence of Adil Medic that 1st Krajina Corps officer Vukelic had
23 told him very few of the detainees at Manjaca had anything to do with the
24 armed conflict.
25 In paragraph 62 of its brief, the Defence dispute what they call
1 Pyers Tucker's "hearsay evidence" that Mladic controlled detention
2 facilities, including Batkovic, KP Dom Foca and Kula prison. First, the
3 evidence is that Mladic himself told Tucker that he controlled those
4 facilities. That's not hearsay evidence; it's an admission. Second, in
5 Kula, the Defence also ignore the testimony of their own witness,
6 Main Staff officer Savo Sokanovic, that Kula prison was "under the
7 control of the army."
8 As we set out in our Ilidza narrative, VRS officers, including
9 members of the SRK command, exercised such control, in part, by approving
10 the use of Kula prison detainees for forced labour on the front lines
11 where some were killed. The Defence claims that this was done by
12 individuals acting against orders, but the very documents that they cite
13 in footnote 3058 of their brief reflect VRS officers, including SRK chief
14 of security Marko Lugonja, approving these forced labour assignments.
15 And Kula was one of the hubs of the detention camp system, like Batkovic
16 and Foca and Manjaca. The Defence argues in paragraph 1324 that "a 156
17 people" were accommodated at Kula, only combatants when Bosnian Serb
18 documentation, for instance, P3808 reflects that thousands of non-Serb
19 civilians had passed through Kula by October 1994.
20 We set out in paragraphs 322 through 332 of our brief just some
21 of the evidence that huge numbers of civilians were detained throughout
22 the camp system, consistent with the practice at Batkovic, Manjaca, and
23 Kula and with the Andric order that you saw earlier.
24 Now, one of the places the intentional detention of civilians is
25 most apparent is in the processing of Manjaca prisoners in late
1 August 1992, after international condemnation of the Bosnian Serb camps.
2 Mladic met with the Presidency and then the Main Staff tasked the Manjaca
3 camp staff with processing detainees. The camp identified 92 who did not
4 participate in combat activities, also had serious health problems, and
5 were attracting the attention of journalists and representatives of
6 humanitarian organisations. You see that in P4288 and you see the
7 criteria at page 1. You can see in this still from a BBC broadcast,
8 P243, that such prisoners were attracting international attention. But
9 three weeks later, only three of the 92 prisoners the camp staff had
10 identified were released pursuant to pardons from President Karadzic, and
11 you see other evidence that the 1 KK was detaining known civilians there,
12 for instance, in paragraph 341 of our brief.
13 Finally, for today I want to turn to the Defence attempt to undermine the
14 evidence of the individual charged crimes. The Defence suggests for
15 various crimes that crimes were committed by drunk soldiers acting on
16 their own or that civilians wearing military uniforms on the same day the
17 VRS attacked a village committed crimes in that village during the attack
18 and somehow the VRS didn't notice.
19 Now, we set out in the Scheduled Incident charts in our brief the
20 evidence which, considered in its totality, conclusively identifies
21 perpetrators. In various incidents, that evidence includes VRS reports
22 showing units attacking villages on the date of the charged crime,
23 includes witnesses familiarity with their tormentors which enabled them
24 to identify perpetrators by name or unit, includes the use of heavy
25 military weaponry, like tanks, and is supported by the ability of
1 witnesses from a society with compulsory military service to distinguish
2 between different types of uniforms.
3 I want to look at one such incident specifically, the cleansing
4 of Novoseoci village in Sokolac municipality, Scheduled Incident A8.1
5 Crisis Staff president Milan Tupajic explained that the 2nd
6 Romanija Brigade surrounded and blocked Novoseoci on the evening of
7 21 September 1992. That's P3170, transcript page 15428. This followed
8 brigade commander Radislav Krstic's order the day before to attack areas
9 in Sokolac municipality, P6641, which itself implemented SRK commander
10 Galic's order, P7408.
11 Now survivor, Munira Selmanovic explained on 22 September 1992
12 she saw soldiers dressed in olive-drab and camouflage uniforms in
13 Novoseoci who rounded up the Muslim villagers and brought them to
14 Metaljka field. That's P717, paragraph 8. And she recognised
15 Momcilo Pajic, a Serb she knew very well, was in charge of the soldiers.
16 That's paragraphs 11 and 12.
17 Your Honours see who Pajic was on this document: A captain and
18 military police commander in the 2nd Romanija Brigade, the same unit
19 Tupajic mentioned until he was promoted here to major in 1995. Pajic
20 told Selmanovic --
21 And, Your Honour, I have about two minutes on this point if it
22 would all right for everyone to finish the topic for continuity.
23 JUDGE ORIE: If you would limit it to two minutes, it's okay.
24 MR. TRALDI: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Pajic told Selmanovic and the others gathered at the field to
1 wait while he went to Sokolac for orders. When he returned, at his
2 order, the soldiers separated men from women, children and elderly
3 people. Selmanovic and the other women, children, and elderly people
4 were taken to the confrontation lines and dropped off, then walked into
5 besieged Sarajevo. She begged to take her teenage son with her, but he
6 was kept at Metaljka field.
7 The 2nd Romanija Brigade, you will see on the next slide,
8 reported to the Main Staff that evening at 1800 hours that it had
9 "ciscenje" the village of Novoseoci that day. By the evening, Tupajic
10 knew the men had been murdered. That's P3170, transcript pages 15427 and
11 15428. He, Selmanovic, P727, and P7529 reflect that the victims were
12 then buried in a garbage dump at a place called Ivan Polje, and the
13 exhumation report for the site, P727, shows you the victims were the same
14 people Selmanovic saw surrounded and detained by soldiers, left behind at
15 the field. Tupajic's evidence that the men were murdered is borne out by
16 the forensic evidence, P2262, which shows the people in the grave site
17 died of gunshot wounds mostly multiple times from behind with
18 high-velocity rifles. And you can see here the remains of the Novoseoci
19 mosque blown up the same day by 2nd Romanija Brigade engineers found in
20 the garbage pile on top of the mass grave, and the slide is P2512,
21 page 18, and the same information is in P727 and at transcript page 6818.
22 So the evidence fits together like a mosaic to prove the crime and the
23 identify of the perpetrators.
24 I thank Your Honours for your indulgence, and I'll pick up
25 tomorrow morning.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Traldi.
2 Just four practical purposes, is the Prosecution on schedule
3 until now?
4 MR. TIEGER: We are, Mr. President, notwithstanding a slight --
5 an understanding that the timing of the commencement of this morning, but
6 we're still on schedule, I believe.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, well, if it is only about those ten minutes,
8 then there seem to be no major problems, at least not yet.
9 We will adjourn for the day and we'll resume tomorrow, Tuesday,
10 the 6th of December, 9.30 in the morning, in this same courtroom, I.
11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.18 p.m.,
12 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 6th day of
13 December, 2016, at 9.30 a.m.