Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 44497

 1                           Wednesday, 7 December 2016

 2                           [Prosecution Closing Argument]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.33 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone in and around this

 7     courtroom.

 8             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you and good morning, Your Honours.  This

10     is case number IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12             No preliminaries were announced; therefore, we will continue to

13     hear the final arguments.

14             Mr. Weber, you may proceed.

15             MR. WEBER:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Good morning.

16             Yesterday we left off discussing the campaign and its impact on

17     children in Sarajevo.  This is where I will pick up today.

18             By 1994, UNICEF reported that at least 40 per cent of the

19     children in the city had been directly shot at by snipers; 39 per cent

20     had seen one or more family members killed; and 73 per cent had their

21     homes attacked or shelled.  That is Exhibit P7171, page 9.

22             In addition to the sniping, the SRK attacked civilians in a

23     shelling campaign that took many forms, including massive bombardments

24    that blanketed the city; sporadic, intentional targeting of civilian areas

25     with just a few shells; and the deployment of modified air bombs.  The

Page 44498

 1     SRK shells spared no virtually no civilian part of the city.  The

 2     Prosecution has provided representative examples of each of these forms

 3     of shelling in paragraphs 922 to 1002 of its final brief.  The SRK shells

 4     often targeted residential or commercial areas.  The shelling stuck

 5     hospitals and people attending funerals, SRK mortars hit civilians during

 6     everyday day activities, while collecting or queueing for water, shopping

 7     in market-places, or lining up for food or other humanitarian aid.

 8             Residential houses, mosques, and cultural landmarks were not

 9     spared; instead, they were extensively damaged through VRS bombardments.

10     Examples can be found in Exhibits P1888, P6682, and P7683.

11             After years of shelling with mortars, artilleries, and rockets,

12     General Mladic actually increased the destructive capacity of the SRK in

13     1994 and 1995 through his deployment of modified air bombs that were

14     indiscriminately launched into residential areas of the city.  Mladic and

15     Perisic conceived of these contraptions and it was Mladic's personal

16     approval that was necessary to launch them.  The Prosecution would

17     further refer the Chamber to paragraphs 749 to 753 of its brief for a

18     more detailed discussion.

19             Even some of the Defence witnesses acknowledged the terrifying

20     impact of the VRS shelling and sniping directed at the population.

21     Kecmanovic at page 23881 confirmed that it was living with that sense

22     that your city was being randomly showered with shells that terrified

23     you.  GRM097, at page 40160, agreed that General Mladic wasn't above

24     using terror as a weapon and targeting civilians.  Even Defence expert

25     Kovic admitted to the Chamber at page 41986 that the effect of the

Page 44499

 1     campaign in Sarajevo was terrorising.

 2             Turning to the Defence brief and its take on the campaign.

 3             In its brief, specifically at paragraphs 1327, 1741, and 1800 to

 4     1848, the Defence denies that the SRK did any of this and provides a

 5     fictional narrative of the accused's involvement in the events in

 6     Sarajevo, one where he is actually the heroic saviour who made consistent

 7     attempts to ensure the safety of those in Sarajevo, going as far as to

 8     say he ensured "the well-being/welfare" of them.

 9             These statements could not be further from the truth.

10             In support of this, the Defence points to a few examples of

11     Mladic's kindness during the campaign.  Taking these in turn:

12             The Defence claims in paragraphs 1803 and 1804 that

13     General Mladic offered the airport as a "gesture of goodwill" to ensure

14     the passage of humanitarian aid to the civilians and - in the same

15     paragraph - that he ordered not a single bullet was to be fired at the

16     airport.  These submissions are impossible to square with the evidence in

17     this case that shows Mladic and Karadzic continually used humanitarian

18     aid as a tool for leverage.  Even after surrendering control of the

19     airport to UNPROFOR, Karadzic threatened UN officials in September 1994

20     and said that:

21             "In the event the arms embargo was lifted, the Serbs would take

22     UN Blue Helmets hostage, shoot down a lot of planes" --

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry, Mr. -- in the event the embargo was lifted?

24             MR. WEBER:  Correct.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

Page 44500

 1             MR. WEBER:  The arms embargo at the time.

 2             "Shoot down a lot of planes and arrest all foreigners."

 3             That is Exhibit P840.

 4             Later that same month, while Mladic was present in Lukavica

 5     UNPROFOR reported the VRS had received orders to open fire on all

 6     aircraft because Mladic wanted "to show his determination to close the

 7     airport and restrain freedom of movement."  That's P629.

 8             And then, there's evidence of the SRK actually firing on planes,

 9     like the occasion in March 1995 where Akashi's plane landed in the

10     airport and the VRS fired on it.  That is P872, paragraph 99, and

11     Exhibit P880.

12             This portrayal is also impossible to square with Mladic's own SRK

13     commander's response to protests about the deliberate sniping of

14     civilians crossing the airport.  In one such response, Galic expressly

15     told Abdel-Razek that if civilians continued to cross the airport, his

16     side would continue shooting at them.  This can be found in P293,

17     paragraphs 91 and 104.

18             That is exactly what happened.  When desperate conditions caused

19     more civilians to attempt night-time crossings of the airport in early

20     1993, anywhere between five to 30 civilians a night were shot by Galic's

21     forces over a two- to three-month period.  The shooting of civilians

22     crossing the airport is discussed in greater detail in paragraph 689 of

23     the Prosecution's final brief.

24             This evidence also runs counter to Defence claims in

25     paragraph 1836 regarding the freedom of movement of civilians where they

Page 44501

 1     say the civilians of Sarajevo were "always permitted" freedom of movement

 2     into and out of SRK-held territory and they were "never blockaded" by the

 3     SRK.  The reality, of course, was different.  General Mladic took pride

 4     in this fact, as demonstrated in the intercept mentioned earlier where he

 5     stated that he had blocked Sarajevo from four corners, that the city was

 6     trapped, and that there was no way out.

 7             The reality is that the SRK blocked all the roads into and out of

 8     Sarajevo.  As already mentioned, civilians ran across the airport in

 9     droves, in desperate dashes for freedom, and the SRK shot at them with

10     machine-guns as they did.  Access to the narrow tunnel eventually built

11     under the airport was limited and crossing through it was difficult, as

12     Defence witness Radojcic himself acknowledged at page 23112.

13             The lack of freedom of movement for the civilians of Sarajevo is

14     also contradicted by numerous VRS orders, including, Mladic's own

15     directives, which repeatedly ordered the SRK to prevent the de-blockade

16     of the city and to tighten the circle.  There are other examples, like

17     the one now appearing before you on the slide.

18             This is Exhibit P6523, an SRK tasking order from April 1994,

19     where Galic instructed SRK units to "fortify positions around Sarajevo by

20     erecting wire and concrete barriers, which would in turn strengthen the

21     belief that they really are blocked (in a camp)."

22             This task obviously applied to both military and civilians within

23     the SRK encirclement.  As Colonel Dragicevic acknowledged, it was

24     impossible for the SRK to surround ABiH forces in the city without also

25     surrounding civilians and instilling this camp-like feeling with the use

Page 44502

 1     of concrete barriers and wire.  This is at pages 23776 to 78.

 2             The Defence makes a similarly outlandish claim in paragraph 1817

 3     that Mladic "did not support" or give any orders that obstructed the

 4     passage of humanitarian convoys.  This Chamber has received overwhelming

 5     evidence to the contrary.  Mladic controlled and deliberately manipulated

 6     the supply of humanitarian aid and utilities throughout the campaign.  He

 7     did this in order to restrict the flow of humanitarian aid within the

 8     city.

 9             According to Banbury, the VRS exercised total control over UN

10     convoys, and General Mladic was very obstructive when it came to the

11     delivery of humanitarian assistance.  Fraser indicated that Mladic

12     regularly restricted convoys and described how Mladic would sometimes use

13     those convoys as pawns, as he "would run you down to your last day of

14     food, water, fuel, then show you who was in control by allowing a convoy

15     in."  That's P576, paragraph 137.

16             Another example Fraser provided was when Mladic threatened to

17     restrict convoys into Sarajevo if there was no apology for recent NATO

18     air-strikes.  When no apology came, Mladic closed all check-points into

19     Sarajevo.  This is at transcript page 5774.

20             The Defence next claims in paragraphs 1827 to 1829 of its brief

21     that General Mladic took "every action" to ensure the supply of water,

22     gas, and electricity to Sarajevo; and that "no orders were ever given"

23     for the supply of services into the ABiH areas of Sarajevo to be severed.

24     These Defence claims are flatly contradicted by the voluminous evidence

25     in this case.

Page 44503

 1             Mladic himself even issued such orders.  On the slide before you

 2     is now one such order.  In Exhibit P7406, General Mladic unambiguously

 3     orders "immediately stop supplying water, electricity, and gas to the

 4     Muslim part of Sarajevo."  So orders were, in fact, given and they came

 5     from the accused.

 6             Also, everyone understood how the VRS was using the utilities in

 7     Sarajevo, even local Bosnian Serb officials.  For example, in P6714, the

 8     Serbian City Assembly of Sarajevo complained to RS officials about the

 9     damage caused to local Serbian households from "the most recent using of

10     Sarajevo for the purpose of raising and lowering tensions in the whole of

11     former Bosnia and Herzegovina (the cutting-off of electricity, water, and

12     gas)."

13             Likewise, the Defence's contention in paragraph 1809 that Mladic

14     repeatedly offered to demilitarise Sarajevo and place all heavy weapons

15     under the control of UNPROFOR is not accurate.  This contention is

16     invalidated by the circumstances, which include orders that subverted the

17     relocation of weapons and show the offers were not made in good faith.

18             The evidence shows that the Main Staff only agreed to the Total

19     Exclusion Zone, or TEZ, as part of a number of military and humanitarian

20     concessions to avoid threatened NATO attacks following Markale I.  The

21     evidence also shows that the SRK had no intent to actually implement the

22     TEZ.  As internal orders reveal, they planned to remove inoperative

23     weapons while hiding the operative ones.  Orders from the Main Staff and

24     SRK expressly refer to the relocation of weapons in 1994 as a

25     "diversionary tactic" and also state the inoperative weapons were removed

Page 44504

 1     "in order to give the Military Observers the impression that they were

 2     withdrawing our heavy weapons."  Theses are references to P730 and P4428.

 3     Another example is P2249.

 4             Moreover, the reduction of shelling after Markale 1 was

 5     accompanied by a spike in sniping.  By 19 March 1994, the level of

 6     sniping in the city was increasing.  Both Thomas and RM164 testified that

 7     after the creation of the TEZ sniping became a more pronounced component

 8     of the campaign.  The SRK resorted to this increased sniping against the

 9     civilian position, because at that time they temporarily lost their

10     advantage of their heavy weapons.

11             Now the Defence also cites VRS orders at various points in its

12     brief and argues that these orders somehow show some type of reduced

13     culpability or exculpatory behaviour by the accused.  For example, in

14     paragraph 2437 of its brief, the Defence states that Mladic "strictly

15     prohibited any offensive fire and implemented an absolute ban on the

16     targeting of civilians."  They then refer he to a few of Mladic's own

17     orders.  We will now look at one of them.

18             This is Exhibit P812 on the screen before you.  It is one of the

19     orders the Defence relies upon in its brief to say that Mladic instituted

20     an absolute ban on offensive fire and targeting civilians.  Looking at

21     the text of this order, under item 2, it states that offensive actions

22     cannot be undertaken without the approval of the Main Staff.  And under

23     item 3, Mladic states that fire is forbidden on civilians "without my

24     approval."

25             As General Smith at page 7462 succinctly stated, when things are

Page 44505

 1     based on the approval of the superior command "that is not the same as

 2     banned."

 3             These are not complete prohibitions or even remotely exculpatory

 4     orders.  What they do show is that Mladic's approval was necessary for

 5     firing on the civilians of Sarajevo, which is how the VRS worked.

 6             These kind of orders are addressed in greater detail from

 7     paragraphs 637 to 644 and 646 to 650 of the Prosecution's final brief.

 8     As can be seen from these sections of our brief, the documents the

 9     Defence relies upon either represent Mladic's modulation of the campaign

10     or his attempts to deny or deflect international criticism.  Although the

11     Defence tries to paint the picture of the accused as a kind man who cared

12     about civilians, as the Prosecution has shown, the evidence in this case

13     tells an entirely different story.  As Mladic himself bragged during the

14     interview mentioned by Mr. Tieger earlier:

15             "Whenever I come by Sarajevo, I kill someone in passing.  That's

16     why the traffic for Sarajevo was disrupted ... snipers.  I go, kick the

17     hell out of the Turks, who gives a fuck for them!"

18             That's P1974.

19             As Mladic's own words made clear, he didn't care about the

20     well-being of Muslims in Sarajevo.  Also, as Harland explained at pages

21     724 to 725, there was a direct connection between General Mladic's

22     statements and the effects on the ground.  So given Mladic's own words

23     and his actions where he directed attacks on the civilian parts of

24     Sarajevo, there is no wonder that life for civilians in the city was, in

25     the words of Banbury, almost unbearable.

Page 44506

 1             While describing the accused as a benevolent commander who

 2     constantly controlled SRK fire by restricting it and who ensured the

 3     freedom and well-being of everyone, the Defence shifts at times to a

 4     depiction of the SRK as a reactionary force with little or no means

 5     available to it.  These arguments taken together are basically asking you

 6     to find that Good Samaritan Mladic was doing all he could with what

 7     little he had in the SRK.  This depiction of the SRK doesn't hold up

 8     either.

 9             In fact, the Defence's false narrative about the SRK falls flat

10     on its face from the outset.  In paragraph 1714, as part of its attempt

11     to say the SRK was at a distinct disadvantage to the ABiH, the defence

12     mistakenly argues that the formation of the SRK came in response to the

13     ABiH's establishment in Sarajevo.  They rely on expert Kovac for this

14     proposition; however, Kovac - their military expert - couldn't even get

15     incredibly basic information on the formation of the opposing forces

16     correct and he was confronted at page 41605 with Exhibit P7676, an order

17     showing that the ABiH was actually formed after the SRK, not the other

18     way around.

19             Contrary to the Defence's claims in paragraphs 1711 to 1712 and

20     1717 to 1725, the SRK was not an under-manned, under-trained, and

21     under-equipped force compared to the ABiH.  General Wilson said at pages

22     4008 to 4011 that the SRK was well-equipped, very well organised, and

23     fought professionally.  This was also the SRK's own view of itself, as

24     illustrated in P6543, where in January 1995, General Milosevic commended

25     the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade for being a highly organised and

Page 44507

 1     effective force throughout its long history of military successes.

 2             By comparison, it was the ABiH 1st Corps in Sarajevo that was

 3     ill-equipped and disorganised.  General Wilson described the ABiH forces

 4     at page 3922 to 26 as a rag-tag bunch at the beginning of the war and far

 5     from a competent force.  Although the ABiH improved over time, Konings

 6     said that, even in 1995, the ABiH was not a professional army.  That's

 7     P1741, paragraph 28.

 8             And contrary to the Defence submissions, the SRK and the RS MUP

 9     were well aware during the conflict that the ABiH was inferior.  For

10     example, in 1993, 1st Smbr member Desimir Sarenac reported in P6790 that

11     discipline in the ABiH was non-existent.  The men were unruly and they

12     had no uniforms.  In P6769, the RS MUP reported that same year that the

13     ABiH forces were "in disarray, MTS provisions are very poor, and they

14     have nothing to offer in resistance to the far better armed VRS units."

15             And lastly, in 1995, SRK Colonel Marko Lugonja reported in D1273

16     that the ABiH was unreliable and weak in combat.

17             Also contrary to the Defence assertions, the SRK possessed

18     superior weaponry over the ABiH, a fact that even Defence witnesses

19     confirmed.  In both his statement and at pages 23868 and 23872 Kecmanovic

20     stated that Serb artillery was superior to the ABiH artillery.

21     General Milovanovic, the accused's immediate subordinate, indicated at

22     pages 17101 to 02 that the SRK had the advantage in heavy weapons.  And

23     again even Defence expert Kovic stated in his report at page 62 of D1369

24     that the Serbs maintained their heavy weapon advantage in Sarajevo until

25     the end of the war.  Finally, the aforementioned Desimir Sarenac admitted

Page 44508

 1     at page 26179 that it was "widely known" that the ABiH had a shortage of

 2     ammunition and weapons.

 3             The discrepancy between the limited weaponry in the city and the

 4     SRK heavy weapons in the surrounding hills was aptly described by

 5     volunteer fire-fighter John Jordan, who said:

 6             "The violence in and around Sarajevo was basically shovelled

 7     downhill and spooned uphill."

 8             Transcript page 1824.

 9             One of the more blatantly false statements about the SRK comes in

10     paragraph 2098, where the Defence states "at no stage during the

11     conflict" did the SRK have trained snipers or use them.  The SRK had

12     snipers, and the evidence shows that the SRK sniping was actually part of

13     an organised and centralised effort to target the civilian population.

14     For example, the VRS prominently discussed its snipers in the 1992 VRS

15     combat-readiness report, Exhibit P338.  On page 10, in the section on

16     command and control, the organised training of scouts and snipers is

17     described as one of the most important elements for the combat-readiness

18     of the army.  Another is Exhibit P677, which is now coming onto the

19     screen before you.

20             This is the 1995 VRS Main Staff programme for snipers, and it

21     shows just how central the Main Staff was to their instruction.  Right at

22     the beginning of the document, the Main Staff states that sniper courses

23     are organised at the corps command level, and they were held several

24     times a year.  This regular sniper training provided "high-grade

25     professional training," and snipers received instruction on seven

Page 44509

 1     subjects, including the effect of a sniper in a populated area.  As these

 2     materials demonstrate, not only was there training of snipers, but it was

 3     the Main Staff who oversaw and ensured SRK snipers maintained their

 4     lethal capabilities.

 5             The fact that SRK brigades possessed trained snipers and kept

 6     training them throughout the campaign is something you can also see in

 7     the documents from the individual SRK brigades.  For instance, the

 8     1st Romanija Brigade possessed and trained snipers from the beginning of

 9     the war.  This can be found in P6543.  And this same brigade specifically

10     reported on 29 October 1993 that "over the spring period we trained all

11     snipers from the lower units."  That is P676.

12             Defence witness Vlade Lucic, a former member of the 1st Romanija

13     Brigade, even admitted his brigade had snipers "per establishment."  This

14     is in D658, paragraph 25.

15             The Defence also makes claims in paragraph 2100 of its final

16     brief that "no orders were ever given" to snipe civilians; and that no

17     orders were ever received by any member of the SRK to this effect.

18             These arguments make no sense in the context of Mladic's own

19     acknowledgment in March 1995 to General Smith that the SRK's increase of

20     sniping of civilians was in response to Serb casualties from an ABiH

21     attack.  That is Exhibit P876, page 4, and transcript page 8222.

22             Also during March 1995, in P7809, a UNMO patrol was present when

23     a 1st Romanija Battalion commander ordered his subordinate to fire on

24     anything that moved, whether they were soldiers or civilians.  In P7810,

25     the same UNMO patrol confirmed this battalion commander's order when it

Page 44510

 1     was echoed by SRK soldiers on the front line, who told the UNMOs that

 2     they will open fire on anybody who moves, including women and children.

 3             At the end of the day, the Defence has to run away from

 4     acknowledging the existence of SRK snipers during the campaign because

 5     there is no justification for how the SRK used them.  As Banbury stated,

 6     "there was no reason for the Serbs to be sniping in Sarajevo.  There were

 7     no military targets suitable for sniping."

 8             He then emphasised the fact that civilians, including women,

 9     children, and the elderly, were regularly victims of sniping.

10             Van der Weijden explained the effect of snipers and stated:

11             "A victim killed by a sniper only affects the victim and the

12     people in the direct vicinity, but the thought of never being safe from

13     the enemy affects everybody.  Apart from being shot at, the anxiety

14     mainly comes from not knowing where or how or exactly when the sniper

15     will strike."

16             In other words, the only explanation for SRK sniping civilians

17     was that it was intended to inflict terror amongst the population.

18             The Prosecution at this time is going to address one unscheduled

19     shelling that the Defence raises on a number of occasions in its brief.

20     It's the Vase Miskina shelling on 27 May 1992.

21            Like many other instances, the Defence theory on this shelling is

22     not clear, vacillating between unsupported conspiracy theories, involving

23     staged explosions with a planted device and unfounded accusations that

24     the ABiH were the ones who fired the mortar.  Contrary to the Defence

25     assertions in paragraphs 1885 to 1905 of its brief, the shelling of the

Page 44511

 1     bread line on Vase Miskina Street is not part of Scheduled Incident G1.

 2     This was acknowledged by the Defence at transcript page 39134.

 3             For this shelling, the Defence relies on former SRK member Bukva

 4     in paragraph 1869, whose claims about the Vase Miskina shelling were

 5     based on intelligence from some unknown source that the BiH authorities

 6     staged the event by planting an explosive device.  This planted device

 7     theory, which has no support, is then contradicted and not relied upon

 8     five pages later in the Defence brief where the Defence states in

 9     paragraph 1891 that the explosion "could only have been" caused by an

10     incoming projectile.  In this later discussion, the Defence abandons its

11     previous explosive device theory.  They instead rely on the content of

12     Zorica Subotic's report and her twisted attempt to place almost all of

13     the firing positions within ABiH territory based upon an almost vertical

14     angle of descent of 83 or 84 degrees.

15             This discussion completely ignores what happened during her

16     testimony in court.  With respect to the Vase Miskina shelling, Subotic's

17     opinion was exposed at pages 39597 to 39602 through her admission that

18     her co-author intentionally altered a photo from the investigative file.

19     This was done in order to make the crater appear like an almost perfectly

20     spherical shape, consistent with a high incoming angle.

21             Her claim that there was no on-site investigation at the time,

22     which was repeated in paragraph 1899 of the Defence brief, was wrong.

23     The official investigation report admitted as part of D1243 unmistakably

24     states that an on-site investigation of the crater was done shortly after

25     the shelling.  This same investigation report, which Subotic indicated

Page 44512

 1     she knew about but nevertheless did not reference as part of her opinion

 2     in D2117, undermined her vertical firing theory and showed that the

 3     firing points came from a greater distance.  Eventually, at page 39609,

 4     Subotic conceded that the angle of descent was much lower than the

 5     83 degrees she tried to initially sell to this Chamber.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You should slow down a bit.

 7             MR. WEBER:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  The court reporter can't follow.

 9             MR. WEBER:  Thank you.

10             The Defence brief relies on Subotic's report as if none of this

11     ever happened --

12             JUDGE ORIE:  I think since you provided the text in advance to

13     the --

14             MR. WEBER:  Yes.

15             JUDGE ORIE:  -- transcriber, let's take it up from Subotic

16     indicated she knew about but nevertheless did not reference as part of

17     her opinion.  If you restart from there, perhaps then there's lesser

18     chance that either things appear in the transcript which are have not

19     read yet or that things are left out.

20             MR. WEBER:  Thank you very much, Your Honours.

21             In reference to D1243, the same investigation report, which

22     Subotic indicated she knew about but nevertheless did not reference as

23     part of her opinion in D2117, undermined her vertical theory and showed

24     that the firing points came from a greater distance.  Eventually at page

25     39609, Subotic conceded that the angle of descent was much lower than the

Page 44513

 1     83 degrees that she originally presented to this Chamber.  The Defence

 2     brief relies on Subotic's report as if none of this ever happened.

 3             Subotic's vertical firing theory, which would have also required

 4     the shot to have been fired in close proximity to the point of impact, is

 5     also undermined by the fact that the surviving witnesses who were waiting

 6     in the bread queue did not hear an outgoing round before the shell

 7     impacted.  This can also be found in Exhibit D1243.

 8             In paragraph 1897 of its brief, the Defence discusses the

 9     intercept related to the Vase Miskina shelling and how it was against

10     Mladic's orders, but they fail to mention the part where Gagovic is

11     informed of the shelling coming from his own SRK forces on Trebevic and

12     where he states in response:  "Who the fuck is firing from up there?"

13             They also do not mention Exhibit P4359, Mladic's 27 May order

14     telling all units to be ready to open fire but giving no order to fire

15     during ongoing negotiations related to the barracks evacuations that day.

16     As further detailed in paragraphs 925 to 932 of the Prosecution's brief,

17     Mladic then did order the SRK to carry out a city-wide bombardment of

18     Sarajevo the next day.  If anything, this intercept demonstrates how

19     Mladic was central for the approval of all aspects of SRK's mortar use,

20     all the way down to the firing of 82-millimetre mortars.

21             Anyway, with respect to the Vase Miskina shelling, the shell that

22     landed on Vase Miskina Street on 27 May came from the SRK and it was not

23     part of some grand conspiracy or the ABiH launching a shell straight into

24     the air so it could fall on themselves.

25             Lastly, in paragraph 1898 the Defence brief relies on Mladic's

Page 44514

 1     denial of the Vase Miskina shelling and his attempt to deflect

 2     responsibility through his own self-motivated claims about an

 3     investigation.  There are no records of investigations into shellings at

 4     the end of May and early June 1992; and if there had been investigations

 5     at the time, General Mladic would have had to look no further than

 6     himself to find someone who was responsible for the bombardments of the

 7     city.

 8             This brings us to our next topic.  Underlying many of the Defence

 9     claims are overstated assertions that seek to vilify the ABiH for

10     everything that happened in Sarajevo.  These attempts are not new.

11             For example, from paragraphs 1827 to 1835 of its brief, the

12     Defence's attempt to blame utility cut-offs on the Muslims perfectly

13     replicates Mladic's own strategy for hiding his forces' responsibility,

14     as outlined at the 16th Assembly Session.  During that speech, he stated

15     that his forces would shut down the electricity, gas, and water in

16     Sarajevo, as he had previously done in Croatia, while wisely telling the

17     world that the Muslims had done it and the Bosnian Serbs were doing the

18     best to repair it.  That's P431, pages 38 to 39.

19             As we have seen, the truth was far different and Mladic actually

20     determined whether and how Sarajevo would receive the supply of

21     utilities.  The Defence does not stop there.  Starting at paragraph 1853

22     of its brief, the Defence goes as far as to assert that the Bosnian

23     leadership and the ABiH were the true perpetrators of the shelling and

24     sniping campaign conducted against the civilians of Sarajevo, as if the

25     entire three and a half years of SRK shelling and sniping can be

Page 44515

 1     justified or explained entirely by the Bosnians firing on their own

 2     population.

 3             Even the Defence evidence doesn't tell you this.  For example,

 4     D1425, an Independent newspaper article which the Defence relies upon, in

 5     paragraph 1856.  This article discusses views expressed by some unnamed

 6     UN officials, who emphasised that the suspicions of BiH attacks "were a

 7     tiny minority among the regular city bombardments by Serbian forces."

 8             As this article also demonstrates, the Defence relies on

 9     speculative claims that have routinely been shown throughout this case to

10     be either generic, unsupported, or based on a witness's knowledge of

11     media reports.  Ultimately, these speculative claims have proved to be

12     unfounded when exposed to any kind of scrutiny.

13             In many instances, central parts of the Defence narrative are

14     based on non-existent evidence.  Take the evidence of VRS propagandist

15     Milovan Milutinovic.  In paragraph 1862 of the Defence brief, they rely

16     on Milutinovic's recitation of a direct quote of Martin Bell, who

17     supposedly stated:

18             "I felt like a poor foot soldier in an army whose entire Muslim

19     command lost their mind and terrorised their own people."

20             The problem is Bell never said this.

21             On the slide before you, Milutinovic's quotation of Bell is on

22     the top and the actual quote of Bell is on the bottom.  What Bell

23     actually said was:

24             "I felt like a humble foot soldier in an army whose high command

25     had taken leave of their collective senses - and I told them so."

Page 44516

 1             On pages 30056 to 58, Milutinovic was confronted with Bell's

 2     actual quote, which shows that Bell was actually discussing the actions

 3     of his own government, not the Muslim command, and he did not mention any

 4     ABiH terrorising of their own people.  When asked how on earth he got

 5     Bell's quote so wrong, Milutinovic stated he did not speak English and

 6     tried to blame the error on a local paper he read in Serbian, ignoring

 7     the fact that in his statement he had very misleadingly attributed the

 8     direct quote to an English-language newspaper and not to any other

 9     source.

10             The Defence also tries to point to specific instances where the

11     ABiH supposedly fired on themselves.  The first of these supposed events

12     that the Defence points to can be found in paragraph 1855, where they

13     assert that Captain Hansen told Bosnian officials to stop firing at their

14     own people after the shelling of the RTV building on 28 June 1995.  This

15     claim is solely based on the testimony of UNMO Oien.  When directly asked

16     about this specific event at page 43196, Oien stated he couldn't tell us

17     about it and:

18             "I don't remember.  I was not there and I can't confirm anything

19     of this."

20             In addition to not exactly having an inspiring basis for their

21     assertion, there is ample evidence which the Defence ignores that it was,

22     in fact, the SRK who fired the modified air bomb that impacted the RTV

23     building on 28 June 1995.  This is supported by the evidence of witness

24     Brennskag, who saw that modified air bomb launched from the VRS side of

25     the confrontation lines; and also Harland, Banbury, and RM110, and

Page 44517

 1     Exhibit P966, P991, P752, P6711, the complete investigative filed

 2     admitted as P7572, D203, and D165.

 3             Finally the SRK report admitted by the Defence truly underscores

 4     the disingenuous nature of these submissions.  The SRK in its own report,

 5     admitted as Defence Exhibit D147, acknowledged that the SRK were the ones

 6     who fired and hit the RTV building on 28 June.  They leave mention of

 7     this out of their discussion of the shelling.

 8             In a related effort with respect to the tram snipings, the

 9     Defence tries to rely on D1810.  This is that single cherry-picked

10     document from an October 1994 BiH MUP investigative file.  The

11     Prosecution tendered the whole file in rebuttal as P7852.  This file

12     clearly shows that the information relied upon by the Defence was

13     mistaken and the fire actually came from the SRK positions in Grbavica.

14     In addition to the ballistics evidence in the complete file, the

15     materials reveal that witnesses even heard multiple bursts of fire coming

16     from the SRK positions on this occasion.

17             Then there is Scheduled Incident G4, the shelling of the football

18     match on 1 June 1993 in Dobrinja.  On this one, the Defence also claims

19     the ABiH fired the shell.  And at paragraph 1946 states:

20             "A number of ABiH artillery positions were located upon the

21     estimated bearing of the projectile, including those within the Toplik

22     area; and it is possible that the projectile could have originated from

23     one of those positions."

24             In support of this, the only witness they cite is John Hamill.

25     The problem is, is that John Hamill was an UNMO on the Lima side, not the

Page 44518

 1     Papa side, and the artillery positions in Toplik that he is describing in

 2     the referenced part of the testimony belong to the SRK and not to the

 3     ABiH.  The fact that these were SRK mortar positions in the area of

 4     Toplik was also confirmed by SRK Artillery Commander Savo Simic, who even

 5     indicated his mortars in the area were pointed towards Dobrinja.  The

 6     only evidence in the record is that it was the SRK who possessed mortars

 7     in the Toplik area.

 8             In addition to the false Toplik assertion, the Defence then

 9     throws out in the next sentences of the same paragraph the possibility

10     that a mobile mortar was used to launch a shell originating from the same

11     direction.  This time they rely on a completely unrelated part of

12     Hamill's testimony that has nothing to do with G4.  This whole theory is

13     absurd, but if we could look at a map anyway just to see the supposed

14     route that the ABiH mortar crew would have had to have travelled.

15             This is an annotated cut out of the map marked by John Hamill and

16     admitted as P539.  On this map, the road between Dobrinja and Toplik is

17     marked in red.  Based on this route, this mobile mortar crew would have

18     had to have driven out of Dobrinja and into SRK territory.  They then

19     would have had to have passed through Lukavica, where the SRK command is

20     located, and then continue on to the vicinity of Toplik.  This entire

21     area is littered with SRK artillery and mortar positions according to the

22     evidence of Savo Simic.  You would think that an ABiH mobile mortar crew

23     pulling up to SRK positions and firing off a couple of shots would have

24     gotten at least a mention in their daily combat report.  The combat

25     report from that day has been admitted as D1778.  And no, that report

Page 44519

 1     states there were no unusual incidents that day.  In reality, there is

 2     absolute zero evidence that any of this ever took place.

 3             For G4, the evidence in this case conclusively shows that the

 4     minimum firing distance of the shell places the origin of fire within SRK

 5     territory, and this is just a desperate attempt to try to say otherwise.

 6             Your Honours, I see that we're at the time for a break and I'm

 7     about to head into a new section.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  We are, Mr. Weber.  We'll take a break.  We'll

 9     resume at five minutes to 11.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Weber, I invite you to proceed.  But it would

13     assist us - and I know that the failure is entirely with us, our old

14     ears - that if you would pronounce your words more explicitly, that we

15     would not have to check again and again in the transcript whether we

16     really heard what we thought we may have heard.

17             MR. WEBER:  That is very kind, Your Honours, but I think the

18     responsibility lies with me.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Okay.  Please proceed.

20             MR. WEBER:  Turning to the Scheduled Incidents.

21             The Chamber has received detailed evidence on the snipings and

22     shellings that constitute the scheduled F and G incidents and how these

23     events are representative of what happened throughout the campaign.  In

24     its brief, the Defence heavily relies on the reports of its two

25     ballistics experts in its discussion of the Scheduled Incidents.  The

Page 44520

 1     Prosecution addressed these two witnesses in paragraphs 1049 to 1057 of

 2     its brief.  At this time, the Prosecution will provide some additional

 3     submissions on the unreliability of these witnesses in the context of the

 4     Defence brief.

 5             Zorica Subotic and Mile Poparic have provided evidence that is

 6     not credible in this case.  It's particularly telling that the Defence

 7     brief has offered numerous citations, hundreds of them, to the written

 8     reports of these experts but cited comparatively little to the witness's

 9     in-court testimony.  The reason is simple:  The Defence experts and their

10     opinions did not hold up to scrutiny on the witness-stand.  The

11     cross-examination of these experts repeatedly demonstrated that Subotic's

12     and Poparic's theories have no sound basis.  When it comes to the

13     Defence's shelling expert, the failings of Subotic stem partly from her

14     lack of experience.  As she admitted, she has never analysed a freshly

15     formed crater in person.  She has never been to the scene of a mortar

16     explosion immediately after a detonation.  In fact, her only experience

17     with crater analysis occurred in 2010, when she prepared her excerpt

18     report for the Karadzic case.  This is the same visit that she used as a

19     basis for her opinions in this case.

20             With her limited experience in crater analysis, Subotic decided

21     to then engage in methods that were filled with errors.  She analysed

22     craters that had been physically eroded or repaired in the years after

23     the shellings.  If the craters had been paved over, she relied on videos

24     and photographs even though that practice could lead to different

25     results, which she admitted at page 39630.

Page 44521

 1             Even though Subotic agreed that the best time to conduct a

 2     reliable crater analysis was immediately after an impact, she rejected

 3     the mortar analyses that ballistics investigators had conducted

 4     immediately after the shelling events, disregarding their findings in

 5     favour of her own exceptionally belated analysis in 2010, over 15 years

 6     after the conflict ended.

 7             To reach her discussions, Subotic sometimes even manipulated the

 8     evidence in order to absolve the SRK.  For example, when she evaluated

 9     Scheduled Incident G4, the shelling by the SRK of a football match that

10     was mentioned earlier, Subotic used the grid co-ordinates provided by the

11     UNPROFOR investigation and then plotted those co-ordinates on a different

12     map that she knew used a different grid scale.  And the consequences of

13     such a manipulation should be immediately apparent, plotting the same

14     co-ordinates on a different map that uses a different grid scale will

15     lead to a plotting of the event in a new location.

16             Instead of acknowledging that plotting the same co-ordinates on

17     different map with different scales might lead to different results,

18     Subotic claimed that her new plotting discredited UNPROFOR's original

19     investigation.  In fact, the result is the opposite.  This shows just how

20     much Subotic was willing to manipulate the available evidence to reach

21     the conclusions she sought to achieve.  The Defence nevertheless relies

22     on Subotic's manipulation in its brief, asserting the same flawed point

23     in paragraph 1938.

24             Subotic also offered a number of wholly unsupported conspiracy

25     theories to explain the Markale shellings.  For example, on Scheduled

Page 44522

 1     Incident G8, Markale I, Subotic claimed that a stationary device was set

 2     in the market.  The Defence brief similarly relies on Subotic's claims in

 3     their brief, but Subotic's static explosion theory required a vast

 4     conspiracy.  Her theory required a professional sabotage team to dig a

 5     hole, with the precise measurements needed to make the mortar appear like

 6     it came from SRK territory.  It required conspirators to plant a

 7     stabiliser prior to the static explosion.  Her grand theory also required

 8     conspirators who brought in bodies to the market after the explosion in

 9     order to mimic victims.  When asked who was part of this vast conspiracy,

10     Subotic couldn't even name one single person.  It was something she just

11     made up.

12             There's also no physical evidence to support her theory of a

13     static explosion; even Subotic acknowledged that.  As Gauthier - a

14     Defence witness and head of the UN investigation into the shelling -

15     testified, the Markale I shelling was not caused by a stationary device,

16     but was the result of a 120-millimetre mortar fire.  Similarly, GRM065

17     agreed in D1442 that the incident was not the result of a static

18     explosion.  This static explosion theory is also ruled out in the UN

19     investigation file on page 21 of Exhibit P538.

20             Other times, Subotic continued to hold on to specific opinions,

21     even in the face of overwhelming evidence that her opinion was wrong.

22     One example of this was her testimony in relation to Scheduled

23     Incident G10; this is the SRK's modified air bomb attack on Hrasnica on 7

24     April 1995.  Subotic refused to acknowledge the fact that a

25     250-kilogramme modified air bomb was used in this attack.  As a supposed

Page 44523

 1     ballistics expert, she refused to acknowledge it even though the

 2     ballistics report in the investigative file stated that a fuse from a

 3     250-kilogramme air bomb was found at the scene.  She still refused to

 4     admit that it was a 250-kilogramme air bomb when informed that the VRS's

 5     own documents confirmed that it was a 250-kilogramme air bomb.

 6             As if the ballistics information and the contemporaneous

 7     documents were not enough, she then continued to deny it was a

 8     250-kilogramme air bomb even after being informed that the Ilidza Brigade

 9     Commander Radojcic testified before this Chamber that it was his brigade

10     who indeed fired a 250-kilogramme air bomb at Hrasnica.  When it came to

11     Radojcic's testimony, Subotic actually suggested that he wasn't telling

12     the truth, that she knew better than the brigade commander who fired the

13     thing.

14             Subotic held fast to her theory in the face of overwhelming

15     evidence for a very specific reason:  She wanted to minimise the

16     destructive capacity of the modified air bomb used from a 250-kilogramme

17     one to that of 100 kilogrammes.  Her evidence was an ploy to say that the

18     SRK used a more proportional amount of force against some supposed

19     target.  Due to her extraordinary bias and utter lack of credibility, she

20     held on to an entirely unsupported opinion.  Her evidence should be

21     rejected.

22             Similar failings and evidence manipulations undermine Poparic,

23     who testified as the Defence's sniping expert on the Scheduled Sniping

24     Incidents.  As an initial matter, Poparic admitted that he constructed

25     his line-of-sight arguments without a GPS and he ignored the OTP GPS

Page 44524

 1     co-ordinates where victims were sniped because he found the information

 2     was not necessary.

 3             Consistent with the efforts of Subotic, Poparic also engaged in

 4     fabrications and contorted reasoning in his attempts to exculpate the

 5     accused.  For example, in order to lay blame on the ABiH, Poparic

 6     intentionally plotted the location of Scheduled Incident F16 in a

 7     different location from where the victim, Tarik Zunic, said he was shot.

 8     Instead of relying on Zunic's testimony about the location of the

 9     incident, Poparic placed the sniping in another location which was less

10     visible from Spicaste Stijena.

11             The Defence's brief similarly relies on Poparic's manipulation,

12     even though he admitted - that being Poparic - that Zunic's testimony was

13     consistent with other evidence.  Poparic instead chose to believe an

14     unnamed couple that he encountered on a visit in 2010, who allegedly told

15     him that the sniping occurred in a different location.  There is nothing

16     in evidence supporting Poparic's opinion and the evidence on all points

17     indicate that the shot came from the SRK.

18             Poparic also denied well-known facts.  A simple example:  In

19     paragraph 2170 of the Defence's brief regarding Scheduled Incident F9,

20     the Defence solely relies on Poparic's unsupported assumption to claim

21     that "the Prosecution failed to prove there was a VRS firing position at

22     the window of the institute for the blind."

23             The Defence's claim is contradicted by its own witness.

24     1st Battalion commander of the Ilidza Brigade Guzina admitted that the

25     SRK held a position at the school for the blind.  This is can be found at

Page 44525

 1     transcript page 22548 and D514, paragraph 37.

 2             The Defence criticises the ABiH investigators in paragraphs 1876

 3     to 1883 of its brief; however, in contrast to Subotic and Poparic, the

 4     BiH investigators - such as Sabljica, Suljevic, Turkusic, Sokolar, Besic,

 5     and Miokovic - were experienced investigators who conducted hundreds of

 6     investigations during the conflict.  More importantly, for all the

 7     Defence's claims of bias, the findings of the BiH investigators in the

 8     Scheduled Incidents were often corroborated by UNPROFOR investigations.

 9     For example, the Scheduled Incident G7, the shelling of humanitarian aid

10     queue in Dobrinja.  The BiH investigation determined that the shells came

11     from the east, toward Lukavica; the UNPROFOR investigation likewise

12     corroborated the BiH investigation and found the shells came from the

13     direction of Lukavica.

14             The BiH investigations represent just one part in a mountain of

15     evidence that the Prosecution has presented regarding the terror campaign

16     in Sarajevo.  The testimony of witnesses the Chamber heard from

17     throughout this case and the exhibits admitted into evidence lead to only

18     one conclusion:  For over three years, General Mladic and the other

19     members of the Sarajevo terror JCE led a campaign of terror against the

20     civilians of Sarajevo.  And as a result of that campaign, General Mladic

21     is responsible for the charged crimes of terror, unlawful attacks, and

22     murder.

23             Your Honours, at this time, this concludes my remarks and I turn

24     the podium over to Mr. McCloskey.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Weber.

Page 44526

 1             Mr. McCloskey, before you proceed, risk management requires

 2     analysis, analysis of the past, talking about speed of speech.  I think

 3     that I should - even before you have started - already ask you to have

 4     compassion with our transcriber and with our ears.

 5             Please proceed.

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It's nice to be remembered, Mr. President,

 7     Your Honours.  Good morning.

 8             Srebrenica.  Srebrenica has been a catastrophe for the Muslim

 9     community of Eastern Bosnia, a tragedy of such proportion that my words

10     here today cannot begin to convey to you the suffering experienced by the

11     people of Srebrenica.

12             But the greatest tragedy is no longer found in the dead, for

13     their suffering is over.  We must also remember the families left behind,

14     those people who have been condemned to live their lives without their

15     fathers, without their husbands, their brothers, their sons, their

16     neighbours, their community.  There's too much pain, there's too much

17     loss for any of us to truly comprehend the nature and scope of the shared

18     misery of the women and survivors of the Srebrenica community.

19             We can, however, strike back, as mandated by the Security Council

20     with the creation of this Tribunal, to expose the horrific crimes of this

21     war and try those most responsible for them.  Through the comprehensive

22     evidence presented in this case, we have revealed the nature and scope of

23     this crime, this genocide.  We have identified the key men responsible

24     for it.  We have Mladic in the dock answering for his crimes.

25             The evidence of genocide presented in this courtroom for the last

Page 44527

 1     four and a half years - as promised in my opening - was clear,

 2     comprehensive, and unassailable.  From the myriad of evidence presented,

 3     we see Mladic commanding his forces in an organised and systematic

 4     capture, detention, transportation, execution, and burial of over 7.000

 5     able-bodied men and boys of Srebrenica and the expulsion of women and

 6     children and elderly actually on the ground in Potocari on film from 11

 7     July throughout 13 July, Potocari, Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Nova Kasaba.

 8             For the next two sessions, I will take us back to 1995 and

 9     highlight for you the most important evidence proving Ratko Mladic's

10     individual criminal responsibility and how that evidence has completely

11     undone the Defence effort to deny it.

12             In this case, the indictment has charged two related JCEs that

13     pertain to Eastern Bosnia:  The JCE to eliminate the Muslim population

14     from Srebrenica; and the overarching JCE to ethnically cleanse the

15     non-Serb population from Serb-controlled areas.  I will focus my

16     presentation on the JCE to eliminate, which - as you know - is defined as

17     the forcible transfer of the women, children, and some elderly men of

18     Srebrenica from 11 through 13 July, and the murder of the able-bodied men

19     and boys of Srebrenica.

20             In the months leading up to the fall of the enclave, the

21     Srebrenica population had suffered systematic deprivation of food and

22     other necessities of life, from deliberate restrictions of the aid to the

23     population and supplies to UNPROFOR, to the planned assaults upon the

24     civilian population, all resulting by 11 July in an unbearable situation

25     of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the

Page 44528

 1     inhabitants of Srebrenica.

 2             These lasts words, as you know, are not mine.  They are the words

 3     of Karadzic and Mladic as ordered in Directive 7 on 8 March 1995, P1469.

 4             I can think of no better description of the condition of the

 5     Srebrenica population on 11 July.  Directive 7, when successfully turned

 6     into action, resulted in precisely what Mladic and Karadzic sought:  A

 7     situation where the Muslim population, for their very survival, would

 8     have to leave Srebrenica.  The women and children of Srebrenica were

 9     particularly vulnerable from 11 July because on that day the vast

10     majority of their men were forced to flee their homes and families in

11     fear for their lives.  The Defence argue the population left voluntarily

12     or were required to leave by UNPROFOR.  However, by 11 July free will had

13     been crushed by Mladic, replaced only with the will to survive.  The

14     hopeless condition of the population and the disabling of UNPROFOR were

15     the result of Directive 7 and follow-up assaults, actions, and

16     deprivations designed by Mladic and Karadzic to create this horrendous,

17     inhuman situation for roughly 45.000 people in Srebrenica.  The

18     condition of the Muslim population on 11 July was a direct result of the

19     policy of the VRS and Bosnian Serb leadership from the beginning of the

20     war to remove non-Serbs, a policy that has been written down and spoken

21     repeatedly by the Bosnian Serb leadership in official and unofficial

22     documents, during meetings, and in private.

23             Mr. Tieger and Mr. Traldi have reminded you of Strategic

24     Objective 1 of May 1992, to separate the national communities; and

25     Mladic's Directive 4 in November 1992, which ordered the removal of the

Page 44529

 1     Muslim population from the Srebrenica area.

 2             As you will recall from Mr. Traldi's presentation of that

 3     evidence, this is exactly what happened in early 1993, with the VRS

 4     successfully removing thousands of the people from Eastern Bosnia.

 5     However, the UN finally intervened in April 1993 with the creation of the

 6     protected areas through Security Council Resolution 819, which stalled

 7     further actions by the VRS.  The intention to remove the Muslims from

 8     Srebrenica however remained and is clearly evident in the July 1994

 9     report of the commander of the Bratunac Brigade, Colonel Ognjenovic,

10     shortly after a meeting he had with Generals Mladic and Zivanovic known

11     to you now and discussed previously by Mr. Tieger.  These words - life

12     has to be made unbearable - their temporary stay in the enclave

13     impossible so that they leave the enclave en masse, realising they cannot

14     survive there.  These words foreshadowing the criminal order in

15     Directive 7 were, of course, not invented by Ognjenovic, but reflect what

16     he learned from the meeting he had with Mladic and Zivanovic a few days

17     earlier.  We know this because some of the words on the same theme was

18     noted down by General Zivanovic in his notebook.  As Mr. Tieger pointed

19     out, clear evidence that Ognjenovic based his report to his troops on the

20     words of General Mladic and the discussion and the meeting he'd had.

21     That's P5273.

22             The enclave not so that they survive but so they disappear.

23             And then in August 1994, we have Mladic's comments on videotape

24     played to you by Mr. Tieger, where Mladic not only revelled in the

25     destruction of Muslim homes, but exclaimed:

Page 44530

 1             "If the Americans and English, the Ukrainians, and the Canadians

 2     in Srebrenica - in the meantime it's the Dutch - would not protect them,

 3     they would have disappeared from this area long ago."

 4             Again, we see the use of the word "disappear," as we saw in

 5     Zivanovic's notes, a word Mladic will use again and again, revealing his

 6     intentions towards the Muslim community.

 7             Mladic's statement here reflects his frustrations with the UN

 8     enclaves and the international forces there, which prevented him from

 9     removing the Muslims from the area altogether at a time when he was yet

10     unwilling to attack the UN forces.  With the spring of 1995, we have

11     Directive 7, on 8 March 1995.  The same day Directive 7 was issued,

12     Zivanovic had a meeting with Mladic and again made notes about

13     Srebrenica, P5274.

14             "Make life impossible."  These words, of course, echo the theme

15     of Directive 7 and are Mladic's words, as expressed by Miletic in

16     Directive 7 or words to that effect.

17             In addition to the order to complete unbearable conditions

18     creating no hope of survival, Directive 7 sets out, as I mention, an

19     insidious order to restrict aid to the enclaves, obviously in furtherance

20     to create unbearable conditions.

21             "The relevant state and military organs responsible for work with

22     UNPROFOR and humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and

23     unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the

24     logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material

25     resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our goodwill

Page 44531

 1     while, at the same time, avoiding condemnation by the international

 2     community and international public opinion."

 3             And, of course, this order in Directive 7 was followed and

 4     implemented, in many cases by Mladic himself who personally reviewed the

 5     convoy requests and initialled his decision to refuse crucially needed

 6     supplies.

 7             In one example found in P1788, page 16, Mladic denied an UNPROFOR

 8     request for fuel on 30 March, initialling the request with a big "no" on

 9     the top.  Obradovic identified for us Mladic's initials here on

10     transcript 14537 to 38.

11             By carefully examining the rest of the exhibit, as well as

12     Exhibits P2145, P2159, and P2146, you will see Mladic personally

13     restricting materials and troops to UNPROFOR approximately 29 times.

14             The Main Staff effort in restricting material to the enclaves is

15     also evident from General Miletic's correspondence to the corps and

16     brigades, instructing them regarding various restrictions.  See

17     paragraphs 435 to 447 of our brief.

18             The next significant document recording the objective to remove

19     the Muslims from Srebrenica is Mladic's order of 12 May 1995, instructing

20     the Drina Corps to prepare battle plans against Zepa and Srebrenica.

21     That's Exhibit P2097.

22             However, on 16 May General Krstic informed the Main Staff in

23     P2098 that while he was making preparation to follow Mladic's order, he

24     states and I quote:

25             "We are currently unable to implement your order to fully close

Page 44532

 1     off the enclaves and carry out attacks against them because we do not

 2     have sufficient forces ..."

 3             So unable to muster the troops available in May, the Drina Corps

 4     plans and conducts a successful sabotage action in June designed to

 5     instill fear and panic in the Srebrenica population.

 6             You will recall a small unit of the 10th Sabotage Detachment and

 7     Bratunac Brigade soldiers who secretly entered Srebrenica through a

 8     tunnel and fired several hand-held rockets in the fog towards the town.

 9     They also killed a woman they came across outside the tunnel.  See our

10     brief at paragraph 449.

11             Milorad Pelemis, the commander of the unit, testified about this

12     and tried to say that they were aiming at a police station with their

13  RPGs, transcript 33812.  I trust you will recall his incredible testimony in

14     Pelemisi and the mass graves of 1992 which I will not get into.  Needless

15     to say, his testimony was not credible and the actual successful,

16     objective of the attack was set out in his notes that we amazingly had,

17     P7272.  Coming into town and causing panic and disarray.  This operation

18     designed to instill fear and panic is perfectly consistent with

19     Directive 7's objective, to make life unbearable.

20             Next, later that month, the Drina Corps planned and executed a

21     combat operation against DutchBat OP at Zeleni Jadar, removing that

22     OP and paving the way for future assaults on Srebrenica from that area.

23     This evidence is set out fully in our brief in paragraph 1107 and is

24     based principally on VRS documents and DutchBat reports.

25             So now on July 2nd the Drina Corps prepares an attack plan on the

Page 44533

 1     enclave itself, which I would like to show you and discuss briefly.  It

 2     is P1465.

 3             First we can see that the attack plan is based on Directive 7 and

 4     7/1.  This, of course, totally undercuts the defence that Mladic withdrew

 5     the criminal order of Directive 7, replacing it with 7/1.  This defence

 6     was thoroughly demolished by Mr. Tieger on Monday at transcript

 7     pages 44335 through 44336 and in our closing brief at paragraph 432.  In

 8     addition, I refer you to Mr. Groome's questioning of General Milovanovic

 9     on this point, exposing the falsehoods underlying this defence document

10     by document, question by question.  In particular, see transcript pages

11     17123 to 17132.  We see here the attack plan to divide Srebrenica and

12     Zepa as I've mentioned to you before, a legitimate objective against the

13     ABiH efforts to join the enclaves militarily and the order to reduce the

14     enclaves to their urban areas, which, as we have shown, was designed to

15     drive the civilian population from the rural parts of the enclave into

16     the tiny urban area of Srebrenica, creating a humanitarian disaster like

17     1993.  This, of course, was anything but legal.  All thus, and I quote,

18     "creating conditions for the elimination of the enclaves," which in this

19     document meant creating the situation that would allow for the attack to

20     now include taking the entire enclave and the removal of the population.

21     This reference to elimination in the attack plan should not be confused

22     with our use of the term "eliminate" in the JCE to eliminate.  In the JCE

23     to eliminate, we are referring to both the removal of the population and

24     the murder of the able-bodied men, the murder to reveal itself a few days

25     later.

Page 44534

 1             Accompanying the Krivaja 95 attack order was the operations map

 2     for the attack which shows Mladic's signature approving that order,

 3     P1087, page 25.

 4             The Defence suggests that Mladic approved the operation after the

 5     fact; however, there is no evidence of this whatsoever, and it makes no

 6     military sense for Mladic to approve such a critical operation post

 7     facto.  The attack plan has also been sent to the Main Staff when it was

 8     issued on 2 July, of course.

 9             The next key document implementing the eventual removal of the

10     population is the 9 July communique from Tolimir to Gvero and Krstic at

11     the Pribicevac IKM, passing on Karadzic's approval to change the

12     long-held strategy to create conditions for the elimination of the

13     enclave to actually taking the entire enclave and expelling the Muslims.

14             The president of the republic is satisfied with the results of

15     combat operations around Srebrenica and has agreed with the continuation

16     of operations for the take-over of Srebrenica.  This document reflects

17     Karadzic's approval of Mladic's proposal to take the entire enclave.

18     This is the chain of command in action.  While Mladic is not mentioned in

19     this document, no one else was authorised to make such an important

20     proposal to Karadzic, a proposal changing the two-year policy from

21     creating conditions for the fall of the enclave to actually taking it,

22     with a specific purpose of conquering the enclave and removing the

23     population.

24             The next day, the 10th of July, Mladic issued an order - based on

25     the successes of 9 July - to begin preparations for the attack on Zepa,

Page 44535

 1     P2106.  This document shows that Mladic had been fully informed of the

 2     events of 9 July and the crucial decision that was made.  These are some

 3     of the amazing documents that form the historical record identifying the

 4     objective and intent behind the crime to remove the Muslim population

 5     from Srebrenica and setting the scene for the murder of the Srebrenica

 6     men and boys.  With these documents, of course, the actions on the ground

 7     implementing them in furtherance of the criminal objective - to expel the

 8     Muslim population - occurred.

 9             After the delivery of Directive 7 to the Drina Corps, we see

10     direct evidence of extreme convoy restrictions on DutchBat and the

11     population; in short, DutchBat was barely able to function.  This is

12     described in detail by several Dutch witnesses and set out in our closing

13     brief in paragraphs 435 to 447.

14             The deprivations of the civilian population were so extreme,

15     people were starving and beyond hope.  See paragraphs 445 and 446 of our

16     brief.

17             Creating unbearable conditions was also accomplished by VRS

18     attacks on the civilian population with the attack beginning 6 July as

19     explained in detail in our brief.  These assaults as planned by the VRS

20     resulted in the movement of the population from the rural parts of the

21     enclave, including the Swedish shelter project of roughly 3.000

22     inhabitants, into the urban area of Srebrenica, reaching critical mass on

23  10 and 11 July when the population surrounded the DutchBat base in Srebrenica

24     known as the Bravo compound.

25             You will recall the testimony of DutchBat witnesses Rave and

Page 44536

 1     Boering, describing how they were present the morning of 11 July when the

 2     VRS dropped a shell right in the middle of that crowd.  We can only

 3     imagine the carnage that created.

 4             I want to show you one short clip to help remind us of the

 5     unbearable situation created by Karadzic and Mladic on 11 July in

 6     Srebrenica town.  The images show the situation on 11 July, as Muslim

 7     civilians gather in total panic at the Bravo company compound, desperately

 8     trying to climb on UN vehicles to safety to Potocari.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Those images speak for themselves.  As the

11     terrified crowd fled Srebrenica towards Potocari, Rave described shells

12     falling on both sides of the road all around the fleeing people, in what

13     he thought was an effort to herd the people northward.  You see that on

14     transcript page 10171.

15             By the evening of 11 July, the population was completely

16     displaced from their homes, in terrible condition, many with babies and

17     young children, without their men, with no means to survive for more than

18     a few days at the most.  Flight was their only option, as DutchBat had

19     neither the manpower, facilities, or supplies to keep them alive and NATO

20     air power proved worthless as the VRS now had several Dutch hostages.

21             That evening, in his first meeting with Mladic, DutchBat

22     Commander Karremans acknowledged the enclave was lost and requested

23     Mladic's permission to allow DutchBat to leave along with the Muslim

24     population.  You will hear more about that later.  That night Mladic

25     personally ordered buses for their removal, which we know as you may

Page 44537

 1     remember from General Skrbic when he testified, transcript pages

 2     13984 to 13985.

 3             Mladic was present in Potocari on the 12th and 13th, commanding

 4     his troops as they separated men and boys from their families, moved the

 5     women and children towards Kladanj, placed the men in detention prior to

 6     summary execution.  The testimony and video accounts of these two

 7     horrific days have exposed this expulsion.  The fear is palpable on the

 8     faces of Muslims caught on video.  Nothing put forward by the Defence has

 9     undercut this in any way, shape, or form.

10             I want to show you a video from our Srebrenica trial video that

11     shows the massive numbers of people in Potocari on 12 July.  And if you

12     look carefully, you'll see the many able-bodied men scattered throughout,

13     the same men the Bosnian Serbs would have seen the night before.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I wish I could bring you the heat and the smells

16     and the sweat and everything that you can imagine that the -- the horror

17     that that must have been.  The idea that these people voluntarily left is

18     insulting.

19             Next, also from our trial video, we have a clip where you will

20     see women, children, and elderly actually being expelled and forced to

21     walk across the front lines, 5 kilometres in 35-degree heat, towards

22     Kladanj.

23                           [Video-clip played]

24             MR. McCLOSKEY:  The subtitling was a little hard to read, but the

25     last woman said:

Page 44538

 1             "What am I going to do?  I have four children.  I'm left to

 2     suffer with them."

 3             And then:

 4             "How can we ... how are we supposed to live now? "

 5             We have seen the documents underlying this crime of forcible

 6     transfer and recalled the conduct of Mladic's forces implementing the

 7     policy and the orders for expulsion.  However, that's not all that you

 8     have seen in this courtroom.  I'm sure you remember we have Mladic's own

 9     words ordering the expulsion of the population.  On 12 July, Mladic gets

10     on the radio and it gets intercepted.  I'll show you the transcript.

11             "Mladic:  Have these buses and trucks left?

12             "Mladic:  Good, excellent.  Continue to monitor the situation.

13     Don't let small groups of them sneak in.  They have all capitulated and

14     surrendered and we'll evacuate them all -- those who want to and those

15     who don't want to."

16             That's at P1235.

17             Lastly, you heard a tape-recording of Mladic, where sometime

18     after the war Mladic is bragging about how he accomplished his victory

19     over the Srebrenica people.  I won't play that today, but let's read what

20     he said.

21             "I would not have taken Srebrenica or Zepa, if I had not starved

22     them in the winter, since February, I let through only one or two

23     convoys."

24             You remember when I played that tape for General Obradovic and he

25     had the integrity to identify Mladic's voice and thus authenticate the

Page 44539

 1     tape.  The evidence is unambiguous and undeniable.  The Muslim population

 2     of Srebrenica was expelled on 11 through 13 July by Mladic and his

 3     forces, acting under the long-time policy and orders to remove them.

 4     Mladic gave the population no choice:  For their very survival, they had

 5     to leave Srebrenica.

 6             That would be a good time, I think, to take the break before I go

 7     to the murder operation.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  We are -- I leave it in your hands.  I mean, there's

 9     some flexibility.  We are five minutes off from one hour, but if you

10     think this would be a better moment, there is no problem whatsoever.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we will take a break.  We will resume at ten

13     minutes past midday.

14                           --- Recess taken at 11.50 a.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 12.12 p.m.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, please proceed.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

19             The murder operation.  The summary execution of over 7.000 Muslim

20     men and boys and the operation to expel the women and children 11 to 13

21     July were fundamentally one major undertaking, with two interconnected

22     operations, what I refer to as the forcible transfer operation and the

23     murder operation, both designed to dispose the entire Srebrenica

24     population, which we have defined in the indictment as the JCE to

25     eliminate.  Now, we speak about these operations separately, but - as you

Page 44540

 1     know from all the evidence - they are so intertwined and together,

 2     especially on the 12th and 13th of July that they must be viewed as one.

 3     That is the foundation of the JCE to eliminate.

 4             For the purpose of my argument today, I've divided the

 5     Prosecution case into four chapters:  The first, the mass executions of

 6     over 7.000 able-bodied men from 13 through 23 July and beyond; the

 7     second, the evidence identifying the perpetrators of these crimes,

 8     exclusively VRS and MUP officers acting under the command of

 9     Ratko Mladic; and third, the presence, conduct, and actions of

10     General Mladic from 11 July through 17 July, commanding the units both

11     from the ground and from Belgrade.  These three chapters themselves form

12     the foundation of proving Mladic's criminal responsibility but there's

13     more, and what is largely part of chapter 3, I call chapter 4.  It's

14     where I take you through some of the most compelling evidence

15     specifically identifying Mladic's involvement in the planning, ordering,

16     and overseeing the mass murders.

17             The Defence appear to acknowledge, to some degree, that

18     large-scale murders occurred during the key time-frame.  They, however,

19     suggest that our murder victims' numbers are inflated, that they are

20     battle casualties in the mass graves, but for the most part there is no

21     serious defence challenging the mass murders.   The Defence agree with

22     the Prosecution to some extent that Beara and Popovic and other security

23     officers were significantly involved in those murders.  They seem to

24     suggest in their closing brief that Krstic was also involved, which we

25     agree.  Krstic played a major role in these crimes.

Page 44541

 1             Also, I understand the Defence fundamentally agree with the

 2     Prosecution regarding Mladic's whereabouts from 11 July through the

 3     evening of 6 [sic] July and I believe --

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  6 July?

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  To the evening of 16th July, excuse me.  And I

 6     believe they agree that Mladic was on duty in Bosnia on 11 July through

 7     the afternoon of 14 July, when he crossed over the border into Serbia.

 8     However, the Defence impossibly leave Mladic and his troops out of the

 9     crimes, arguing that he had no knowledge and no involvement in the mass

10     murders and neither did his VRS or police forces, except for a few

11     security officers.

12             Thus, the most significant issues of disagreement are the

13     identities of the perpetrators of the murder operation and Mladic's

14     command of the murder operation and his links and connection to it.

15             The Defence military expert concluded the murders were committed

16     by, and I quote:

17             "Self-organised paramilitary groups from Podrinje coming from

18     pre-was criminal milieus, as well as by groups of avengers ... probably

19     committed in co-operation with some officers from security structures."

20             That's D1661, page 232 and with no other involvement from the VRS

21     or MUP forces under Mladic's command, despite our prodding on

22     cross-examination of:  Who are these people?  Who did it?  And that,

23     despite being on duty in and around the places where the crimes were

24     committed, Mladic was unaware and uninvolved in any of these

25     forces and the crimes they supposedly committed.

Page 44542

 1             So first the mass executions.  The evidence of the crimes is

 2     overwhelming.  It came to you first-hand in most cases from the survivors

 3     themselves and in many cases executioners who shared the same ground as

 4     those they murdered.   This was backed up by forensic crime scene

 5     investigation, aerial imagery, vehicle records, witnesses, exhumations of

 6     all the known mass graves from Srebrenica connecting all the primary

 7     graves -- primary disturbed mass graves to all the secondary graves.  As

 8     of today, we have identified almost 6.000 murder victims from mass

 9     graves; and with so many people still missing, we expect the final number

10     of murdered is over 7.000 people.

11             I saw no significant Defence challenge to our major executions and

12     mass grave evidence, as I mentioned, challenging only the Jadar River and

13     Cerska executions, the murder of the Milici patients, and arguing the

14     Kravica mass murders were merely revenge-based on killing of a MUP

15     soldier by a Muslim prisoner.  I will rely on our brief for the detailed

16     analysis of those cases, but I do want to remind you of some of the key

17     points.

18             You will remember the evidence of the Jadar River murders.  We've

19     spent a fair amount of time with them and the witnesses and in the 98 bis

20     arguments.  I thus refer to you our closing brief paragraphs 1426 to

21     1435.  But remember the survivor RM314, his testimony, his demeanour,

22     all the corroborating and supporting evidence where he was captured,

23     taken to a river, shot, fell in the river, washed downstream, and

24     escaped.  The Defence twists the meaning of the Latin term used in his

25     medical report, the term "vulna explosiva."  They try to argue that it

Page 44543

 1     means it's a shrapnel wound; however, the evidence at trial has clearly

 2     shown that that's not the case.  The term describes the victim's wound

 3     and does not refer to the cause of the wound.  We hear that from the

 4     doctors in their reports.

 5             Regarding Cerska, the murder of 150 men from Srebrenica, though

 6     we don't have a survivor of that execution, the witnesses, forensic

 7     evidence, and evidence of the 17 July sweep operation ordered by Mladic

 8     to Keserovic proves that the 150 Muslims captured in the sweep operation

 9     on 17 July were executed at Cerska on 17 or 18 July.  See our brief at

10     paragraphs 1341 to 1347 and 1540 to 1545.

11             The crux of the Cerska issue lies in determining the date

12     Keserovic received the order from Mladic to conduct the sweep operation.

13     We've proven that Mladic gave Keserovic this order on the night of

14     16 July, after Mladic returned from Belgrade; as such, the murders of the

15     150 victims at Cerska was the direct result of Mladic's order.

16             While Keserovic resisted confirming his previous testimony that

17     he received the order on 16 July, he did not waiver from his account that

18     he received that order personally from Mladic the night before he

19     departed to Bratunac.  We have proven Keserovic travelled to Bratunac on

20     the 17th of July, thus proving he received the order from Mladic in

21     Crna Rijeka the night of the 16th, all of which ties Mladic directly to

22     the murders at Cerska.

23             Remember the young boy that was gathered up in the sweep

24     operation on the 17th.  He identified people he knew that were later

25     found among the 150 at Cerska, and those people were killed as a result

Page 44544

 1     of the order of the sweep operation, which happened right in the centre

 2     of the murder operation time-period.

 3             As for Kravica, this is a complex situation with several

 4     different forms of interlocking evidence.  You remember the mass murder

 5     of some 800 to 1.000 people in the Kravica warehouse not long after

 6     Mladic had left the Sandici meadow, maybe an hour or two.  The evidence is

 7     from survivors, MUP witnesses, video, video transcripts, a careful

 8     re-creation by Mr. Blaszczyk, and more.  We have thoroughly analysed this

 9     and due to its complexity I can't get into it with you today, but please

10     take a look at the break -- at the brief.  I do want you to consider two

11     or three things, though.  You should note that both the Defence and the

12     Prosecution appear to agree that a Muslim prisoner took a rifle from a

13     MUP guard and killed him, whereupon another MUP soldier grabbed the

14     barrel of the Muslim's rifle, burning his hands as he took it away.  The

15     basic difference is that the Defence argue that the shooting of the MUP

16     soldier started the killing spree, whereas it's the Prosecution's case

17     that this incident was an organised execution pursuant to orders, with

18     the burned hands incident happening well after the executions had begun

19     and it was a desperate response by a Muslim man to the executions around

20     him, not how they started.

21             So the key to unlocking Kravica is understand the evidence that

22     shows burned hands could only have happened around the east side of the

23     warehouse, many minutes after the killings started at the west side of

24     the warehouse.  This can been seen from evaluating the two survivor

25     witnesses, RM256, who was in the west room; and RM274 who was in the east

Page 44545

 1     room and a careful review of the video of Borovcanin arriving at the

 2     scene, remembering he wasn't too far away when he hurried there straight

 3     after getting the report about burned hands.

 4             Now, like all survivors in this situation, their accounts have

 5     differences, but the similarities and connections are much stronger than

 6     those few differences; and when combined with all the evidence, it's

 7     obvious that burned hands did not start this execution.  For our analysis

 8     of the murders of the Milici patients, please refer to our brief 1375 to

 9     1378, where we carefully explain the evidence that shows Popovic removed

10     ten seriously injured Muslims from the Zvornik Brigade on 23 July and

11     they have never been seen since.  And we had their names and their

12     medical documents clearly identifying who those people are.  There's no

13     question that once Popovic had them in his hands on the 23rd, the man

14     that authored the Bisina executions that same day, that they were taken

15     out and killed.

16             Back to the overall case.  As I said, aside from the crimes I've

17     just mentioned above, the Defence and their experts have not

18     significantly challenged the major execution sites, as far as I can

19     tell - perhaps we'll hear something new next week - suggesting only that

20     some of the people exhumed from the mass graves were battle casualties.

21     There is, in fact, no evidence that anyone but murder victims were placed

22     in the graves at Branjevo Farm, Kozluk, Petkovci Dam, Orahovac, and all

23     the secondary graves coming from those enormous graves.  Only the grave

24     at Glogova contained the victims who died in unknown circumstances, such

25     as combat, murder, or other means that we don't know about.  As you know,

Page 44546

 1     Glogova was used, it was along the road, and it is impossible to know how

 2     many bodies were along that road and died in ways that we don't know.

 3             We do know that Glogova contained all the bodies of the 800 to

 4     some 1.000 murder victims from Kravica warehouse and those murdered in

 5     the schools in Bratunac - well, over 50, though the precise numbers in

 6     the circumstances, as I mentioned, are impossible to determine.  We did

 7     our best in the brief to lay this out for you.

 8             So not only is there no evidence supporting the Defence claim of

 9     battle casualties in the graves, there is really no reason whatsoever the

10     VRS would have used the valuable men and resources to undertake such a

11     project.  The areas of conflict were remote, densely wooded, largely

12     inaccessible areas which, of course, reflects the route the column took

13     to avoid Serb forces.  Bodies in these remote areas posed no significant

14     threat or health hazard worth risking men and materials for.

15             The woods were not only dense and inaccessible but contained

16     desperate Muslims trapped there after the fall of Srebrenica, some of

17     them were armed, there were also mines in those woods.  There was a

18     terrible threat for anyone going there.

19             Finally, the mass graves were far away from the conflict area.

20     Orahovac was the closest, some 5 kilometres but even then the terrain was

21     very difficult.  There is no reason on earth you would go look for

22     harmless bodies and pull them with masses -- trucks and resources all the

23     way out to these places.  I won't show you the map.  You know the places,

24     the distance.  It's absurd.  This defence is unsupported, completely

25     unreasonable, and should be rejected.

Page 44547

 1             Okay, Chapter 2, the forces committing these crimes.  Throughout

 2     the Srebrenica section of their brief, the Defence conclude

 3     Colonel Beara, Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic, Momir Nikolic, and

 4     Drago Nikolic played major roles in organising and implementing the

 5     murder operation.  On this point, we fundamentally agree.  However, after

 6     somewhat acknowledging Beara's and Popovic's involvement, the Defence

 7     goes completely off the rails and state that the murders, as I had said,

 8     were not conducted by Mladic's forces but self-organised paramilitary

 9     groups and groups of avengers whose family members had been killed.

10     These words from the expert Kovac are more words of desperation and

11     defensiveness than anything resembling credible evidence or argument.

12     There is no evidence whatsoever that people resembling this description

13     played any role in the murder operation or were even present in the area.

14             When asked in cross-examination to identify such a group, Kovac

15     could only identify the Skorpions.  That's at transcript 41855.  However,

16     remember how much time we spent with the material there.  You have seen

17     the VRS documents, map graphics, and other evidence showing the Skorpions

18     were a Serbian MUP unit engaged in combat in the SRK zone of

19     responsibility, resubordinated to the VRS and under the command of the

20     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  There's a key document and its number has

21     escaped me in my brief, but I remember Dragomir Milosevic says "our

22     forces" in the top of it and he lists the wounding of Skorpions.  I think

23     some even were killed that day in July.  That is in our brief.

24             And the Skorpions, I'm not going to show you that awful video,

25     but please take care here.  Sometimes because that video is so clear and

Page 44548

 1     the Muslims are so obviously from Srebrenica, we have not laid out the

 2     facts and the details of that crime as much as we should have.  We have

 3     now.  But this needs to be done to fully understand that this was part of

 4     the murder operation, part of the JCE to eliminate.

 5             The evidence of the actual officers, units, and troops taking

 6     part in the murder operation from 13 July onwards is clearly set out in

 7     our closing brief, so I'm going to summarise for you here and even that

 8     gets a little tedious because there are so many VRS people, but I need to

 9     remind you of them.

10             In and around Potocari commanding the forces were Mladic, Krstic,

11     Borovcanin, with Popovic, Momir Nikolic, Petar Salapura,

12     Radoslav Jankovic, Kosoric implementing the operation, using soldiers and

13     officers of the Bratunac Brigade including military police, RS MUP,

14     special police officers of the 65th Protection Regiment, members of the

15     10th Sabotage Detachment, and others.

16             In Bratunac from 11 through 13 July, Mladic was present, together

17     with Krstic, Zivanovic, Popovic, Borovcanin, Radislav Jankovic, and all

18     of the Drina Corps brigade commanders taking part in the attack on

19     Srebrenica, including Pandurevic, Blagojevic, Furtula, Trivic, and

20     others.

21             In the Zvornik area, deputy commander of the Zvornik Brigade,

22     Dragan Obrenovic, played a key role in the events, as did

23     Vinko Pandurevic when he returned from the Zepa battle on 15 July.  The

24     brigade duty officers from 14 through 17 July were heavily involved in

25     organising the executions with the commands of the 4th Battalion in

Page 44549

 1     Orahovac, the 6th Battalion in Petkovci, the 2nd Battalion in Rocevic,

 2     and the 1st Battalion in Pilica, the officers, soldiers, and units

 3     involved in the Zvornik-area murders are too numerous to name here.

 4             The Defence failure to acknowledge this enormous body of evidence

 5     of direct VRS and MUP involvement highlight how desperate and

 6     unreasonable the Defence case truly is.  Perhaps they will come up with

 7     something that we'll hear next week.

 8             Okay, Chapter 3.  The presence of Mladic in and around Srebrenica

 9     Bratunac and Zvornik areas at various times between 11 July and the

10     afternoon of 14 July is not contested by the Defence.  The evidence is,

11     of course, overwhelming from witnesses, documents, intercepts, and

12     especially video of Mladic in Srebrenica on the 11th of July, at the

13     Hotel Fontana on the 11th and 12th of July, and in Potocari on the 12th

14     of July to name some of the sources.  All of this evidence clearly shows

15     Mladic in uniform, on duty, in command, exercising command.  The idea

16     that Krstic was in command was thoroughly debunked by Mr. Tieger and I

17     won't go over that in specifics.

18             The Defence suggest in their brief at paragraph 643, when present

19     at the corps command post, Mladic could only offer advice to corps

20     commander and could not overrule the corps commander's authority.  That's

21     what Mr. Tieger was speaking to when he debunked it and outlined well how

22     the chain of command worked and Mladic's role into it.  I won't go any

23     further into it.

24             So Chapter 4.  And now this takes me to the evidence linking

25     Mladic to the creation, ordering, and implementation of the murder

Page 44550

 1     operation.

 2             We begin, as we have before, with Mladic's now-famous words

 3     uttered at about 5.30 p.m. on 11 July during his walk through Srebrenica

 4     town.  This is P1147.

 5                           [Video-clip played]

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  "The time has come to take revenge upon the Turks

 7     in this region."  These words must be taken seriously, for within six

 8     days of their utterance Mladic's officers and men murdered over 7.000

 9     Muslim able-bodied men and boys.

10             Now let's go to the evening of 11 July and the first meeting with

11     the DutchBat at the Hotel Fontana.  I want to draw your attention to

12     significant moments at the Hotel Fontana that should help reveal Mladic's

13     intentions and strategies and his decision to murder the able-bodied men

14     of Srebrenica on the evening of 11 July or the morning of 12 July.

15             During the first meeting at the Hotel Fontana on 11 July, Mladic

16     intimidated Karremans and his officers and threatened them with

17     references to death and other vulgarities.  You've seen that.  I won't

18     play that for you again.  Previously, we've asked you to consider this

19     evidence to show that there was no negotiation at the Hotel Fontana and

20     that Mladic was in complete control, intimidating everyone.  This remains

21     the case, but I would also like to focus you this time on the words of

22     Colonel Karremans in response to Mladic.  So after screaming and

23     threatening the Dutch officers, Mladic finally and deliberately calms

24     down and asks Karremans, and I quote:

25             "What do you want?  You asked for the meeting!  Speak up."

Page 44551

 1             This is – I’ll show you the transcript of what the colonel said.

 2             "I had a talk with General Nikolai two hours ago ... and also

 3     with the national authorities about the request on behalf of the

 4     population.  It's a request because I'm not in a position to demand

 5     anything.  We ... the command in Sarajevo has said that the enclave has

 6     been lost."

 7             He goes on to say:

 8             "And the request of the BH command is to ... let's say, to

 9     negotiate or ask for the withdrawal of the battalion and the withdrawal

10     of those refugees and if there are possibilities to assist that

11     withdrawal."

12             That's from our trial video, P1147, transcript page 17.

13             As you can see, Karremans tells Mladic that the UN command has

14     concluded that the enclave has been lost and he requested Mladic's

15     approval for the withdrawal of DutchBat and thousands of refugees in

16     Potocari.  Well, this is what I call a water-shed moment for Mladic and

17     Karadzic, after years of efforts to remove the Muslims from Eastern

18     Bosnia, only to be prevented in 1993 through 11 July by UNPROFOR, but now

19     UNPROFOR has given up and is requesting Mladic to allow them and the

20     Muslim population to leave Srebrenica.

21             Of course, Mladic has not given UNPROFOR any real choice.  He had

22     thousands of Muslim hostages, Dutch hostages, Muslims struggling to

23     survive, no longer any military option and no NATO.  But the point I want

24     to make to you is:  With the complete surrender, Mladic is now able to

25     focus his decision-making and resources on removing the population and

Page 44552

 1     dealing with the able-bodied men in Potocari and elsewhere in the

 2     enclave.  We know from Mladic's Main Staff assistant commander for

 3     personnel, Skrbic, as I mentioned, that Mladic himself ordered buses late

 4     that night.  Skrbic testified about this, 13984 to 13985.

 5             Also that evening, Mladic ordered Borovcanin to make the final

 6     assault on Potocari first thing in the morning of 12 July.  See

 7     Borovcanin's report, P72 [sic].  And as you will recall -- P724, excuse

 8     me.

 9             As you will recall, Borovcanin and elements of the Bratunac

10     Brigade did make an unopposed assault on Potocari the morning of the 12th

11     and soon controlled the Muslim population.  So with no obstacles from the

12     UN or NATO on the evening of July, Mladic can now look squarely at the

13     able-bodied men that he knows are in his -- that will soon be in his

14     control.  You recall the evidence.  The VRS had observed those men the

15     night of the 11th and reported it to Mladic.  See paragraph 1159 of our

16     brief.

17             At the second Hotel Fontana meeting with a Muslim school teacher,

18     Nesib Mandzic, we see Mladic now focus on the Bosnian army, repeatedly

19     insisting on meeting the next day with a representative of the Muslim

20     army.  After that meeting, Mladic and Krstic had dinner together at the

21     Hotel Fontana where they were both staying.  See paragraphs 1174 and 1219

22     of our brief.  Mladic's intel officers Jankovic and Kosoric were also

23     seen on the video at the hotel.

24             So this is decision-making time.  In the quiet, comfortable

25     surroundings of a hotel at the end of the day with his key people to

Page 44553

 1     advise him, the Muslims of Potocari had to be the main focus of

 2     discussion.  Mladic had ordered the buses that night to remove the

 3     population.  And his other major -- immediate decision was what to do

 4     with the able-bodied men who would be in his control the next day.

 5             The next morning, at the third Hotel Fontana meeting, Mladic

 6     announced his decision to screen the able-bodied men in Potocari from 16

 7     to 60, thus we know he made his decision between the late evening of 11

 8     and the morning of 12 July he had made a decision about those able-bodied

 9     men, to screen them.  We know that from his announcement.

10             Next, you will recall the testimony of Momir Nikolic, explaining

11     how that morning, before the Hotel Fontana meeting, Popovic and Kosoric

12     approached him and informed him that all the able-bodied men would be

13     killed and they needed his assistance.  See paragraph 1176 of our brief

14     and his testimony at 11820 and 11827.

15             Thus, the decision Mladic had made to screen the men in Potocari

16     was, in fact, the decision to separate and murder them.  This soon became

17     evident when the separations began.  There was never any significant

18     screening of the men.  There was a rough and sometimes violent division

19     of males from the population, including many times boys 13 to 15 and

20     younger and older men well over 60.  The men were crowded together in

21     inhuman conditions, in extreme heat, with no food or medicine, and only

22     enough water to sustain them.  Identification documents were discarded

23     and burned in the process, showing Mladic had no concern for these people

24     as prisoners of war and wanted no record of who they were.  You may

25     recall the photos of a large pile of Muslim belongings, including IDs,

Page 44554

 1     being burned in Potocari after 13 July.  That's Exhibit P1423.

 2             In their detention in nearby Bratunac, the separated men were

 3     routinely beaten and many were killed by the troops guarding them.

 4             The separations and detentions in Potocari and Bratunac confirm

 5     Mladic's decision to screen the men was actually a decision to murder

 6     them.

 7             Before I go any further I want to play to you Mladic's words at

 8     the second Hotel Fontana meeting because, again, I think his words give

 9     away his intent.  This is to Nesib Mandzic.

10                           [Video-clip played]

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Destruction, salvation, fear.  Mr. Tieger has

12     already played for you part of the 12 July meeting where we see similar

13     words.  I won't do that again, but I will remind you of what those

14     words ...

15             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. -- is there any interpretation problem?

16             MR. LUKIC:  I'm sorry, yes.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  If there is, let's check whether ... I'll

18     speak a few words again.  Nothing yet.  I see that some action was taken.

19     I don't know whether it resolves it.  It does.

20             Please proceed, Mr. McCloskey.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  So what you should be seeing on the screen is the

22     transcript of the video Mr. Tieger showed you on Monday.

23             "There is no need for your people to get killed ... your husband,

24     your brothers, or your neighbours ... as I have told this gentleman last

25     night, you can either survive or disappear.  For your survival, I demand

Page 44555

 1     that all your armed men, even those who committed crimes - and many did -

 2     against our people, surrender their weapons to the VRS."

 3             Again, survive, disappear.  Given the next -- what Mladic and his

 4     troops did the next few days, these words have to be taken deadly

 5     seriously.  The Muslim man Mladic was speaking to on this video is

 6     Ibro Nuhanovic.  After this meeting, he stayed with his adult son Muhamed

 7     and his wife Nasiha, all of whom were murdered.  Their remains have been

 8     recovered.  See P1982 and paragraph 1197 of our final brief.

 9             Also remember the evidence in this case that the commander of the

10     Zepa Brigade, Avdo Palic, was also murdered in the custody of the VRS.

11             Throughout the day on 12 July, Mladic oversaw the horrendous

12     separation process going on in Potocari, making propaganda films for his

13     public, and falsely comforting the people with hollow promises and

14     outright lies.  On the evening of 12 July, Mladic held a meeting and

15     dinner at the Bratunac Brigade HQ to celebrate the taking of the enclave.

16     During this meeting, Mladic announced the assembled troops would move to

17     Zepa the following morning, 13 July, against the advice - if you recall -

18     of Commanders Pandurevic and Trivic, and ordered Krstic to prepare an

19     attack plan for the next day.  This is a classic example of Mladic

20     exercising command and control over his subordinate commanders, as Krstic

21     duly drafted the plan, D290; and the assembled Drina Corps troops did

22     March to Zepa area the next day as ordered, even though that left Zvornik

23     undefended, where a few days later many, many Serb soldiers were killed

24     when the Muslim column and the forces of the 2nd Corps met them on the

25     16th of July.

Page 44556

 1             The Defence argues this meeting took place on 11 July but that is

 2     absolutely wrong, and the evidence clearly establishes the dinner meeting

 3     was held on the evening of 12 July.  We cover this evidence thoroughly in

 4     our brief at paragraphs 1215 to 1226, conclusively proving that this

 5     meeting occurred on the evening of 12 July.  This is an important

 6     historical meeting and a key to understanding the sequence of events.  On

 7     the evening of 11 July, Mladic and Krstic were together at the

 8     Hotel Fontana for dinner after their meetings with DutchBat, as we've

 9     discussed, where the fate of the Muslim men was decided.  On the 12 July,

10     Mladic is at the meeting with the brigade commanders to celebrate where

11     the decision is made to go to Zepa.

12             13 July.  The events of 13 July, more than any other day, expose

13     the depth of Mladic's involvement in the murder operation.  The 13th is

14     the climax of the expulsions, where the final push is made to transport

15     thousands of remaining women and children towards Zepa [sic] while

16     continuing the separations of hundreds of able-bodied men in Potocari.

17                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Sorry, towards Kladanj and not towards Zepa.

19             This is an enormous undertaking, thus Mladic is there in the area

20     most of the day overseeing this work.  He is right in the middle of this.

21     Bratunac in the morning at meetings, a trip near Srebrenica to inspire

22     the troops, and then back to Potocari where the separations and

23     expulsions continue.

24             Also that morning and through the rest of the day, Mladic and his

25     people are totally swamped by the surrender and capture of roughly 6.000

Page 44557

 1     Muslims from the column fleeing Srebrenica, and it is here dealing with

 2     these thousands of people where Mladic and his people get sloppy and

 3     begin to reveal the murder operation.  The organised murders begin that

 4     morning, first seen by the investigation with the Jadar River executions

 5     at about 11.00 a.m. where - as I mention - the killers fail to kill

 6     RM314, who was washed down to safety to tell his story.

 7             Also, and this is very significant, Beara is first heard in an

 8     intercept speaking on an open line issuing orders organising the hundreds

 9     of Muslims who had been captured around Konjevic Polje.  So Beara has now

10     clearly been brought in to deal with these prisoners.  At this time,

11     Mladic is close by, down the road in Srebrenica or Bratunac.  And

12     remember, Beara's only work from 13 through 16 July was to implement the

13     murder operation.

14             Let me show you some of Beara's comments that morning in speaking

15     to Lieutenant Lucic of the 65th Protection Regiment, Zoran Malinic's

16     deputy.  This is an intercept, Exhibit P1415.

17             "Beara:  Do you know that 400 balijas have shown up in Konjevic

18     Polje?

19             "And they have been rounded up disarmed, everything.

20             "Beara:  Excellent, excellent, great.

21             "And there is someone to guard them.

22             "Beara:  Shove them all on the playground.

23             "Who gives a fuck about them?

24             "Beara:  Well, line them up in four to five rows."

25             Then Beara is told by Zoka, which is Malinic's nickname, that

Page 44558

 1     some of the Muslims are killing themselves and his response is:

 2             "Well, excellent.  Just let them continue.  Fuck it."

 3             The Defence agree Beara is involved in the murder operation.  As

 4     I'd mentioned, Mladic is in the area with Krstic, Salapura, Popovic,

 5     Nikolic, and others, all able to provide him information.  To suggest

 6     Mladic doesn't know Beara is involved or what he is doing is absolutely

 7     absurd.

 8             The next example of sloppy communication revealing the murder

 9     operation and Mladic's role in it comes from a Tolimir proposal drafted

10     and sent to Mladic on the afternoon of 13 July by the commander of the

11     65th Protection Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Savcic.  The number of

12     captured prisoners increased so dramatically that day that Tolimir got

13     involved, even though he was in Rogatica and busy with the impending

14     attack on the Zepa enclave.  But the security breach - or sloppiness -

15     appears to be Savcic's, as he is the one that actually drafted the

16     Tolimir proposal.

17            Now, we had spent a fair amount of time with this, so I – I’ll just

18     make some conclusions for you.  The document reveals that the top VRS

19     commanders and staff are all involved with the many hundreds of Muslims

20     captured along the road.  We can see from the document the proposal is

21     from Tolimir, it's to Mladic, copied to Gvero, and mentioning and

22     involving Miletic, Malinic, and drafted by Savcic.  Where Savcic gets

23     sloppy is in item 3, where in referring to the Muslim prisoners in

24     Nova Kasaba in this proposal is to put them out of sight from the ground

25     and the air.  At that time the international forces were the only ones

Page 44559

 1     with free access to the skies, thus this proposal is designed to hide the

 2     prisoners from NATO or UNPROFOR.  This is a clear indication that the

 3     intention at the time was to kill the prisoners.  Any doubt regarding

 4     their intent to kill in this document was dispelled by Savcic himself,

 5     the author of the document.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, you read "ground and the air," where

 7     the text you were reading states "ground or the air."

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you for that correction.

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Savcic testified here and provided statements

11     where he acknowledged that the proposal was meant to hide prisoners from

12     NATO and was asked simply:  Why?  And he opined the reason for this was

13     the VRS concern that NATO would mistake the Muslims for Serbs and bomb

14     them.  See transcript pages 33680-33682.  That is so beyond absurd that

15     it can only lead to the fair inference that he knew what the truth was

16     and lied to our face.

17             Now, let's see, I want to show you Mladic's response to Tolimir's

18     proposal.  This is Mladic's order, adopting Tolimir's proposal, written

19     with much more discretion, failing to mention hiding prisoners from NATO,

20     but you will recall that on the 13th all the prisoners were held either

21     in vehicles or indoors, where they could not be seen from the air.

22             By the evening of the 13th, there are up to 6.000 prisoners

23     captured along the road and the decision is made to move them to Zvornik,

24     away from the international organisations present in Bratunac and

25     Potocari.  You may recall that Karadzic is intercepted at 8.10 p.m. that

Page 44560

 1     night, telling Deronjic to make sure "goods" are in the warehouse by the

 2     next day, a reference to the prisoners in Bratunac being sent to schools

 3     around Zvornik.  That intercept is at Exhibit P1290.

 4             Also that night, Drago Nikolic informed Major Obrenovic -

 5     deputy commander at the time - that Mladic and his superior commanders

 6     had ordered the murder of the Srebrenica prisoners and that Popovic

 7     needed Drago to help assist in the operation.  That's in paragraph 1271

 8     of our brief.

 9             In another proposal late that night, Tolimir proposes to Gvero at

10     the Main Staff in a written document that 800 prisoners could be moved in

11     secret to Rogatica to carry out agricultural work, maintaining a horse,

12     pig, and a sheep farm.  There was no work to maintain the farm according

13     to Djoko Razdoljac, a Rogatica Brigade logistics officer whose testimony

14     is part of this trial.  Tolimir's proposal was P2121.

15             At the same time, Tolimir, Karadzic, and many others are dealing

16     with issues related to detaining, transporting, and killing prisoners.

17     Beara is in Bratunac dealing with the prisoners held at the schools, with

18     Bratunac Brigade MP lawyer Celanovic.  He's also dealing with the

19     transport to Zvornik of prisoners with Nikolic.  And together with the

20     civilian authorities, he's dealing with the burial of the hundreds and

21     hundreds of victims from the Kravica warehouse.  And finally, in the

22     afternoon, Mladic travels the road where now thousands of prisoners are

23     being held and he stops and gives speeches to them at Sandici meadow and

24     Nova Kasaba.  While there, Mladic has personally ordered Major Malinic,

25     commander of the MP battalion there, to stop noting down names of

Page 44561

 1     prisoners and to escort the prisoners to Bratunac.  Mladic again is

 2     trying to hide the prisoners.  His specific involvement in stopping the

 3     list-taking is a critical piece of evidence for you and it's clearly

 4     established by Keserovic.  Also, it's amazing Mladic has the -- he's so

 5     familiar with the details of this.  He tells Malinic that buses will soon

 6     be arriving and they do, and he orders them to send them to Bratunac.

 7     See our brief at paragraphs 1260 to 1261.

 8             From there, Mladic travels on to the Drina Corps command in

 9     Vlasenica where he held a ceremony promoting Krstic to commander of the

10     Drina Corps that evening.  And remember everything that Beara is doing

11     right down the road in Bratunac with the prisoners, the burials, the

12     movements, prisoners actually got transported that night to Zvornik.

13             I show you this document, the personnel document, showing

14     Krstic's appointment to corps commander because we can see that it's

15     pursuant to decree of the President of Republika Srpska.  So we see that

16     Karadzic and Mladic are together on this critical appointment.  Of

17     course, they are.  They're within communications, it's a major decision.

18     Again, this is the chain of command in action.  This is Exhibit P7056.

19             After this, Mladic went to his command post at Crna Rijeka where

20     he spent the night, another place where the information is waiting for

21     him; he can get everything he needs to know.  So during all the activity

22     I've outlined for you happening pursuant to the murder operation, Mladic

23     is right there in the thick of it, with the masses of condemned

24     prisoners, with his key officers at the command post, which are all

25     communications hubs and sources of the latest intel.  The Defence argues

Page 44562

 1     he knows nothing and is not involved.  Absolutely unthinkable.  Mladic is

 2     a criminal but he is no fool.

 3             I think it's break time.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, before we take the break, how much time would

 5     you need?  You said two sessions.  I think you used two sessions, and how

 6     much time would Mr. Tieger need after that?

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think I didn't use quite two sessions.

 8     Mr. Weber --

 9             JUDGE ORIE:  Minus five minutes.

10             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I hope I can get done in 20 or 30 minutes.

11             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Tieger, how much would you need?

12             MR. TIEGER:  No more than ten minutes, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  No more than ten minutes.  That would then fit, if

14     Mr. McCloskey sticks to his estimate, then that would still fit into the

15     time we have available until a quarter past 2.00.

16             We take a break and we'll resume at 1.30.

17                           --- Recess taken at 1.10 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.

19             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. McCloskey, if you take until 2.00, then

20     Mr. Tieger has some time to go beyond his assessment as well.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Now we're at 14th of July.

24             So Mladic he is at the Main Staff command on the morning of the

25     14th as the massive work pursuant to murder operation continues, most

Page 44563

 1     clearly in the enormous convoy and buses and trucks from Bratunac taking

 2     men to the schools in the Zvornik area, led by Popovic, men that would be

 3     killed at Orahovac that day, Petkovci that night, and onward.

 4             Mladic travels the same route as the convoy early in the

 5     afternoon of the 14th.  As he is going by Zvornik, it's roughly the same

 6     time people are being murdered at Orahovac, not far away.  It's

 7     inconceivable that Mladic's forces are engaged in this massive murder

 8     operation with him in the area and him not fully informed, involved, and

 9     in command.   Mladic remained in command and control of the VRS while he

10     was in Belgrade with no other officer standing in for him.  I refer you

11     to that, to our brief 1325 to 1327, but I'll remind you of the testimony

12     of Colonel Obradovic, his chief of operation, who was asked by Mr. Lukic

13     about the issue of Mladic's absence and standing in at transcript pages

14     14543 to 44.

15             Mr. Lukic asked:

16             "Would going to Serbia be considered absent."

17             Colonel Obradovic answered, and I quote:

18             "It doesn't depend on the whereabouts of the commander, but it

19     depends on the duration of absence."

20             The Trial Chamber then queried the witness on what time-period

21     this would be, and Obradovic answered:

22             "A week or so to my mind."

23             As you know, even by the Defence count Mladic would only have

24     been in Belgrade a bit more than three days.

25             In any event, Mladic could have been in a coma from the late

Page 44564

 1     afternoon of the 14 July and he would have still been criminally

 2     responsible for his involvement in the developing and implementing the

 3     JCE to eliminate from 11 July through 14 July, and there's no real issue

 4     of alibi here.

 5             Finally, I would like to finish my discussion of the evidence

 6     with three intercepts, but first I want to tell you the story that these

 7     intercepts reveal and then we'll go over them.

 8             On the 13th of July when the massive numbers of Muslims were

 9     being captured along the road and Beara was so involved, he needed help

10     to execute people and he received an order from Mladic to brigade

11     commander of the Visegrad Brigade, Radomir Furtula.  Mladic ordered

12     Furtula to provide him with 30 men from his unit to assist Beara.  That

13     day the men were loaded on a bus in Visegrad, headed up, and soon after

14     that their bus broke down.  And by the evening of 13 July they still

15     hadn't been retrieved and nobody knows what they did after that, but

16     Beara never got them.  So by 15 July, after the men in Orahovac had been

17     killed, the men in Petkovci had been killed, there were still over 800

18     men needing to be killed at Kozluk, at the Rocevic school, and over

19     1700 [Realtime transcript read in error "17"] people that are backed up

20     at the Pilica school and the Pilica Dom.  And as you will remember, the

21     Muslim column is now approaching Zvornik and is a real threat to Zvornik.

22     Vinko Pandurevic gets called back to help defend Zvornik.  Other troops

23     are going in to fight the column.  At the same time, the murder operation

24     is occurring taking tremendous resources and Beara is very frustrated.  He

25     has got all of these well over 2.000 people that he needs to kill and he is

Page 44565

 1     pulling his hair out.  So he gets on the phone looking for Zivanovic who

 2     he thinks is still the corps commander.  He is calling from Drago

 3     Nikolic's office at the Zvornik Brigade.  Zivanovic tells him he can't do

 4     that anymore and he refers him to Krstic's extension, 385.  And Beara

 5     gets on the line with Krstic and says the same thing he said to

 6     Zivanovic, that Furtula did not follow the boss's order, referring the

 7     boss is to be Mladic, as Zivanovic had referred to him before.  They go

 8     back and forth and back and forth.  Krstic tells him to check with

 9     various brigade commanders, the Zvornik Brigade, Bratunac Brigade, Milici

10     Brigade.  Beara says, no, they won't do it, they can't do it.  He says,

11     Well, talk to those guys at the MUP.  They can't do it either and they

12     are very frustrated.  Finally it ends with Beara saying, Look, I have

13     3500 parcels to deliver and I have no solution.  These are the men in

14     Kozluk and the men in Pilica.  Krstic ends it with:  "Well, now I'm going

15     to be the one to blame" - worried about being blamed by Mladic - and

16     says:  "I'll see what I can do."

17             The next day, 16 July, the Main Staff 10th Sabotage Unit comes

18     and assists at Branjevo Farm.  That was the information fundamentally

19     provided by Mr. Butler in some of the evidence, but let's now take a look

20     at the intercepts.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Before we do, can you please look at page 65, line

22     16, and the number 17 there; is that what you had said?

23             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I'm sorry, when I said over 800 men needing

24     to be killed, I was speaking in the context of Beara, who felt he needed

25     to kill --

Page 44566

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The 800 is there.  Look at "17."

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Oh, it should be 1700.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  That's what I thought I heard.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you very much.  And you'll recall that

 5     number from the number of people exhumed from the Branjevo Farm mass

 6     grave.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  Let's move on.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.  Let's go to the slide of the first -- this

 9     is just a short reference that shows that at 9.52 hours Beara is looking

10     for Zivanovic and wants him to call him at 139.  139 is Drago Nikolic's

11     extension at the Zvornik Brigade and there's other evidence that that's

12     where Beara is at the time.  So let's go to the next slide.  I won't go

13     over all of it, but you can see Beara saying:

14             "You know that day, I informed the commander about it, Furtula

15     didn't send Lukic's intervention platoon."

16             Furtula, that's Dragomir Furtula, the commander of the

17     Visegrad Brigade.  Lukic is Milan Lukic, an infamous person from

18     Visegrad, and Lukic is waiting at Blagojevic's.  That would be Blagojevic

19     of the Bratunac Brigade.

20             Beara says:

21             "Lukic is here with me and his driver and we urged that."

22             A bit more complaining about Furtula and then Beara says:

23             "He simply doesn't give a damn about what the commander ordered

24     him to do.  Well, now, that platoon has 60 men."

25             That is it a reference to Mladic's order to Furtula to give Beara

Page 44567

 1     60 men.

 2             And then Beara goes down and says:

 3             "Have him send me at least half."

 4             And then finally Zivanovic says:

 5             "I can't decide that anymore.

 6             Now you remember, this is 15 July.  Zivanovic was removed from

 7     commander on the night of the 13th July, so he can't make decisions for

 8     Beara anymore.  And also this is a -- fundamentally exposes the

 9     appropriate and proper chain of command, not like anything else.  This is

10     a Main Staff security officer.  He is having to go to the corps commander

11     to get the corps commander to issue orders to his brigades.  Beara, the

12     colonel, can't do it himself; the commander is the one that's in charge.

13     This idea that Mladic is out of the loop and that the security branch can

14     run the whole show is absurd.

15             So finally at the end we see that Zivanovic refers him to 385,

16     Zlatar that's the Drina Corps extension, and to ask for 385.  We know

17     from other evidence that that's where Krstic can be reached.  Okay.  So

18     now let's --

19             JUDGE ORIE:  When you said have him sent at least half you added

20     the word "me" whether it makes any difference, but if you quote, if you

21     read literally, I would like you to do that very precisely.  At least

22     that's what I heard you say.  Sent me, that's what you said, whereas the

23     text says let him send --

24             It may be the same.  I'm just -- if you read --

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yeah, I'm working in my argument throughout this --

Page 44568

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- and I don't mean to be -- to mislead you like

 3     that.  What I think he meant by that --

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  No, it's fine --

 5             MR. McCLOSKEY:  -- was --

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Please proceed.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  So now naturally we see him, Beara,

 8     get connected to Krstic.  So let's go to the next, which is P2126.  And

 9     this is at 1000 hours on the 15th.  And Beara tells Krstic:

10             "General Furtula didn't carry out the boss's order.

11             Again, this is referring to Mladic's order to Furtula.

12             Krstic says:

13             "Listen, he ordered him to lead out a tank not a train."

14             This is an indication Krstic is fully aware of Mladic's order to

15     Furtula.  It appears that Krstic is making a veiled reference about the

16     number or the size of what was ordered.

17             And then Beara -- and I say he's frustrated and pulling his hair

18     out because then he just boldly says:

19             "But I need 30 men, just like it was ordered."

20             And then Krstic says:

21             "Take from Nastic or Blagojevic."

22             And you remember Nastic is the commander of the Milici Brigade;

23     Blagojevic is the commander of the Bratunac Brigade.

24             Krstic says:

25             "I can't pull anything out of here for you."

Page 44569

 1             This is day two of the attack on Zepa where Krstic had to send

 2     his best unit, Pandurevic, back to Zvornik, so Krstic isn't being really

 3     generous with his troops at this point for Beara and the murder

 4     operation.

 5             Then Beara responds:

 6             "But I don't have any here.  I need them today and I'll give them

 7     back tonight, Krle."

 8             That's Krstic's nickname.  These guys know each other.

 9             "You have to understand.  I can't explain it to you like this.

10             Krstic:

11             "I'll disturb everything on his axis if I pull them out and a lot

12     depends on him."

13             So axis, if you know, axis of attack.  Krstic is concerned about

14     his attack on Zepa.

15             And then Beara says openly:

16             "I can't resolve anything without 15 to 30 men and Boban Indzic."

17             Now, we've learned from Butler and other evidence in this case,

18     Boban Indzic is an officer from Visegrad.  And then Krstic says:

19             "Ljubo, this is not protected."

20             Clearly they both know this is an unprotected line and they're

21     arrogant officers and they just can't help themselves.  I don't know why

22     they're doing it but they do.

23             Beara says:

24             "I know, I know."

25             And then Krstic goes on, talks more about Nastic and Blagojevic.

Page 44570

 1     And then interestingly Beara says:

 2             "But I don't have any.  If I did, I wouldn't still be asking for

 3     the third day."

 4             Now, I'm not great with arithmetic, but if he's asking for this

 5     on the 15th and it's the third day, the 13th would be the day that he

 6     originally asked for these troops and, of course, that's the day we know

 7     that thousands of Muslim prisoners are arriving and need to be dealt

 8     with.  Then Krstic goes back to Blagojevic and his Red Berets and go to

 9     the MUP, the Ministry of Interior.  Beara responds:

10             "No, they won't do anything.  I talked to them.  There's no other

11     solution but for 15 to 30 men."

12             Now Beara is negotiating.  He's gone from 60.  Now he needs 15 to

13     30.  And then he says:

14             "The thing that was supposed to arrive on the 13th but didn't."

15             Okay, boom, that confirms that's when he was asking, that's when

16     he got the order, that's when they were supposed to arrive.

17             And then Krstic:

18             "Ljubo you have to understand me, you've done fucking all sorts

19     to me."

20             Something like that.

21             And Beara:

22             "I understand, but have you to understand me too.  Had this been

23     done, we wouldn't be arguing -- had this been done then, we wouldn't be

24     arguing over it now.

25             Beara can't argue with Krstic either.

Page 44571

 1             Krstic:

 2             "Fuck it, now I'll be the one to blame."

 3             They're both scared of Mladic that they're going to blame them

 4     for not taking part in the murder operation.

 5             Beara:  "I don't know what to do.  I mean it, Krle.  There are

 6     still 3500 parcels that I have to distribute and I have no solution.

 7             "Fuck it, I'll see what I can do."

 8             After that, over 800 men were killed that afternoon at Kozluk by

 9     elements of the Rocevic Battalion.  But then on 16th, over 1700 men were

10     killed at Branjevo Farm by the 10th Sabotage Detachment and people from

11     Bratunac.

12             Now, lastly, so there's no concern that Furtula didn't carry out

13     Mladic's orders, we'll see the last -- the last intercept, P1285.

14     Importantly at 1919 hours.  We don't know who these guys are, but you can

15     see that someone is looking for a bus and to send the bus towards

16     Visegrad, Podromanija, Rogatica, and further on.  That is way down if you

17     look at a map, well beyond down past these areas, a long distance from

18     Bratunac.  When he comes across a bus with a group of soldiers, those are

19     the ones from Visegrad, Boban is their commander:

20             "Say again?

21             "Here they are again.

22             "Boban Indzic, and then bring them to the command in Bratunac."

23     Now, those guys, evening's coming, sitting by a broken bus in the

24     afternoon, soldiers, just -- who knows where they went, but they didn't

25     see Beara.

Page 44572

 1             Those compelling intercepts leave no doubt whatsoever, Mladic is

 2     issuing orders pursuant to the murder operation.

 3             Now, finally, I would like to conclude my remarks with some words

 4     to the women of Srebrenica and others that have suffered and continue to

 5     suffer from Mladic's crimes.

 6             But it is the Srebrenica and Zepa women where my team have for

 7     over 20 years spoken to you, listened to you, and learned from you, and

 8     we've been privileged to bring some of you here to The Hague to share

 9     with this Tribunal your experience, your pain, and your incredible

10     courage, facing down the people that committed this genocide.

11             We have also spoken to your precious few men and boys who

12     survived the killing fields from Kravica to Branjevo.  From all of you,

13     we have learned so much.  One thing we've learned about your husbands and

14     your sons was their fear of not being able to say good-bye to you, and we

15     know you felt and still feel that terrible pain.  So I looked and looked

16     for someone who may have been able to put something down on a scrap of

17   paper or something for you; but, of course, they were never given a chance to

18     even hold a pencil.

19             I did find something though.  I had to go to another place,

20     another time, another terrible war, but I found a letter from a husband,

21     a soldier, who was able to say good-bye to his wife, and I believe his

22     words and feelings are those your husbands and sons and brothers would

23     have sent to you had they had a chance.

24             I'll read you parts of this letter that was written on the 14th

25     of July, 1861.

Page 44573

 1             "My very dear Sarah,

 2             "The indications are very strong that we shall move in a few

 3     days, perhaps tomorrow.  Lest I should not be able to write you again, I

 4     feel impelled to write lines that may fall under your eye when I

 5     shall be no more.

 6             ...

 7             "If it is necessary that I should fall on the battle-field, I am

 8     ready.  I have no misgivings about, or lack of confidence in, the cause

 9     in which I am engaged, and my courage does not halt or falter.

10             ...

11             "But, my dear wife, when I know that with my own joys I lay down

12     nearly all of yours and replace them in this life with cares and sorrows.

13     As for our little boys, they will grow up as I have done, and never know

14     a father's love and care.  God's blessing upon them.

15             "Sarah, my love for you is deathless, it seems to bind me to you

16     with mighty cables that nothing but omnipotence could break.  The

17     memories of the blissful moments I have spent with you come creeping over

18     me, and I feel most gratified to God and to you that I have enjoyed them

19     so long.  And hard it is for me to give them up and burn to ashes the

20     hopes of future years, when God willing, we might still have lived and

21     loved together and seen our sons grow up to honourable manhood around

22     us... My dear Sarah, never forget how much I love you, and when my last

23     breath escapes me on the battle-field, it will whisper your name.

24             "Forgive my many faults, and the many pains I have caused you.

25     How thoughtless and foolish I have oftentimes been.  How gladly would I

Page 44574

 1     wash out with my tears every little spot upon your happiness and struggle

 2     with all the misfortunes of this world, to shield you and my children

 3     from harm.  But I cannot.  I must watch you from the spirit land and

 4     hover near you, while you buffet the storms with your precious little

 5     freight, and wait with sad patience till we meet to part no more.

 6             "But, oh, Sarah, if the dead can come back to this earth and flit

 7     unseen around those they loved, I shall always be near you; in the garish

 8     day and in the darkest night, amidst your happiest scenes and gloomiest

 9     hours - always, always; and if there be a soft breeze upon your cheek, it

10     shall be my breath, or the cool air fans your throbbing temple, it shall

11     be my spirit passing by.  Sarah, do not mourn me dead; think I am gone

12     and wait for me, for we shall meet again."

13      Sullivan Ballou died one week later in a place called Bull Run. Thank you.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.

15             Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:  No one can fathom the extent of the individual

17     tragedies of the victims in this case.  The children torn from mother's

18     arms to be killed, the starving prisoners beaten to death over a period

19     of days with rifle-butts, clubs, boots, the women and girls raped,

20     sexually abused over and over, the daily terror of waiting for a bullet

21     or a shell, those who survived physically intact but struggle with the

22     memories of lost loves ones, lost homes, lost communities.  The litany of

23     tragedies goes on and on and on.

24             No one can fathom the extent of the sufferings for which

25     Ratko Mladic is responsible.

Page 44575

 1             So in the face of that, what does one say and what must one

 2     ignore to argue that Mladic should receive less than the most severe

 3     sentence?  You say, as we see at paragraph 3394 of the Defence brief,

 4     that Mladic's sentence should be reduced because of his "benevolent

 5     treatment" of victims; for example, he "facilitated the achievement of

 6     an agreement on the demilitarization of the areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, thus

 7     reaffirming his will to establish peace and the applicability of the

 8     Geneva Conventions."

 9             And you ignore that this was forced on him, as he complained in

10     P1793:  "If the international community had not meddled, they," that is

11     Muslims, "would have paid the price."

12             And you ignore that he chafed under this restraint, as he told

13     his companion on the tour of destroyed Muslim villages that we saw in the

14     video on Monday morning, if the international forces, now the Dutch,

15     "would not protect them, they," Muslims, "would have disappeared from

16     this area long ago."

17             And you ignore his relish at finally overcoming the restraint

18     when he entered Srebrenica.  "Now the time has come to take revenge on

19     the Turks."

20             Or you claim, Your Honours, that his sentence should be reduced

21     because he purchased candy for children in Potocari.  That's at

22     paragraph 3397.  And you ignore that this alleged purchase of candy was

23     for the kids whose fathers, uncles and brothers he was about to murder.

24             Or you assert that his sentence should be limited because of

25     alleged SFRY sentencing practices, and you ignore that four of Mladic's

Page 44576

 1     subordinates - Popovic, Beara, Tolimir, Galic - received life sentences

 2     for executing his orders for only a fraction of the crimes for which he

 3     is responsible for; sentences that were affirmed on appeal.

 4             You try to paint Mladic as a man who "never intended to cause

 5     suffering" but instead "took concrete steps to avoid suffering where

 6     possible" and that the conduct of the accused has saved many lives and,

 7     therefore, a reduction of sentence is warranted.  That's at paragraphs 3395

 8     and 3398.

 9            And you ignore that this is not the first time that Mladic has tried

10     to depict himself as a saver of lives.  Recall P1147, that's a video,

11     V000-9268, at 7:41 through 8:42, that's video footage from Zepa in 1995

12     of General Mladic ostentatiously boarding buses to advise the petrified

13     occupants, in the process of being expelled, that "now I am giving you

14     your life as a gift.  I forgive you all and am giving you your life as a

15     present."

16             Ratko Mladic, the master of life and death, basking in

17     self-praise and demanding gratitude from those whose lives he decided to

18     spare.

19             And now here in court, denying responsibility for those he did

20     kill, blaming the subordinates who executed his orders and deservedly

21     received the most severe sentence for doing so.  Because the magnitude of

22     these crimes admit of nothing more than the most severe penalty available

23     under law, the only thing one can really argue in support of a sentence

24     less than that most severe is that he didn't commit the crimes.  And so

25     that is what the Defence does in its sentencing submissions, arguing at

Page 44577

 1     paragraphs 3393 and 3401 that "... any crimes that may have been

 2     committed were the result of disobeying individuals acting outside of

 3     their duties."

 4             Or that General Mladic was a "professional with knowledge of the

 5     laws of war that he always sought to apply in the most ethical manner."

 6             But these crimes did occur.  They happened to one person after

 7     another, one person at a time, one father, one wife, one grandmother, one

 8     tradesman, one student, one doctor.  One after another after another

 9     after another.  And at paragraph 1743 of our brief, you can find just the

10     tiniest fraction, representative fraction, of illustrations reflecting

11     both the vulnerability of these victims and the depths of the suffering

12     they endured and continue to suffer.

13             The time has come for General Mladic to be held accountable for

14     those crimes against each of his victims and the communities he

15     destroyed.  It would be incompatible with Tribunal sentencing practice,

16     an insult to the victims, living and dead, and an affront to justice to

17     impose any sentence other than the most severe available under law:  A

18     life sentence.

19             Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.  That concludes the

20     Prosecution's submissions.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

22             We'll in a second adjourn for the day.  Is there any chance that

23     a response to the latest sentencing-related motion of the Defence would

24     be received before Friday?

25             MR. TIEGER:  Certainly before Friday.  That has been our

Page 44578

 1     objective.  We'll try to get it out today, and if not, first thing

 2     tomorrow morning, I would think that we can achieve that.  Is that --

 3     would that be sufficient time for the Court?

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, I think most important is that if we have

 5     received a response, we can consider it.  And I have got no idea what the

 6     response will be, but it may have an impact on what the Defence wants to

 7     use in their final argument.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  As I say, if at all possible, we'll get it out,

 9     filed today and, if not, first thing tomorrow morning.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Then we'll adjourn for the day, and we'll resume on

11     Friday, the 9th of December, 9.30 in the morning, in this same

12     courtroom, I.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.08 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 9th day of

15                           December, 2016, at 9.30 a.m.