1 Thursday, 15 December 2016
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.34 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you and good morning, Your Honours. This
9 is case IT-09-92-T, the Prosecutor versus Ratko Mladic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
11 This is the last day of final argument. I would first like to
12 give the floor to the Prosecution for their one and a half hours of
13 remaining time to address the Court.
14 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
15 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, Your Honours, throughout the course
16 of our closing submissions, we have explained with many examples the
17 Defence's reliance in its final brief on mischaracterised, unreliable,
18 out-of-context or even non-existent evidence in support of inaccurate
19 representations about the case. Their closing submissions saw no
20 departure from that approach, which was instead augmented by faulty
21 lessons in evidence analysis, transparent attempts to misuse procedural
22 safe-guards like the burden of proof as weapons of attack, and flailing
23 attacks against the Prosecution, the Trial Chamber, and indeed the world,
24 the accuracy of which was inversely proportional to the stridency.
25 Ignoring four and a half years of trial and a voluminous
1 evidential record replete with one damning document or contemporaneous
2 witness observation after another, they claim that General Mladic is on
3 trial simply because he is a Serb and attempt to justify this baseless
4 accusation in a variety of ways.
5 They accuse the Prosecution of turning the burden of proof
6 "upside down." Why? Because the Prosecution in the first of its
7 submissions "was talking about a lot of things that they said we didn't
8 prove in our final brief." And the Defence claims: "We don't have to
9 prove the things in our final brief."
10 But no one said that they have to prove or even say anything.
11 Unfortunately for them, however, once they choose to do so, it is
12 permissible, even obligatory, to explore the evidence that supposedly
13 supports it. And as we demonstrated over and again in our final brief
14 and again during submissions, the Defence relies on evidence that does
15 not support what they claim or that has been mischaracterised or that
16 comes from unreliable witnesses or that otherwise upon closer examination
17 does not support the proposition.
18 Having falsely claimed that their misrepresentations -- or,
19 excuse me, falsely claimed that exposing their misrepresentations is
20 improper, they Defence doubles down by claiming that the very act of
21 doing so creates reasonable doubt. "Why are they talking about our case
22 instead of theirs? That means that they've lost."
23 For the Defence, the more times their arguments are exposed as
24 false, even misleading, the weaker the Prosecution case becomes. The
25 absurdity of that proposition is made even more clear by the fact that
1 demonstration of the false Defence propositions invariably led, as we
2 repeatedly underscored, to the confirmation of the Prosecution's case and
3 the proof of the allegations in the indictment.
4 For example, the Defence accuses the Prosecution of a clear
5 effort, they say, to manipulate court staff by referring to Karadzic in a
6 case against Mladic. It's an attempt, they say, at guilt by association,
7 playing on emotions. This is again a transparent attempt to deflect from
8 damning evidence.
9 References to Karadzic, Mladic's only superior in the chain of
10 command and key partner in implementing all four JCEs, began with a
11 debunking of Mladic's attempt to place the exclusive blame for the
12 illegal Directive 7 on Karadzic. And those references moved on to the
13 many ways in which Karadzic's statements and conduct so clearly illuminate
14 Mladic's guilt, including the fact that it was Karadzic, already
15 committed to and implementing the ethnic cleansing campaign in Bosnia,
16 who asked for Mladic in order to implement his objectives on the basis of
17 Mladic's efforts in Croatia; that even before General Mladic formally
18 assumed the position of chief of the Main Staff he worked with Karadzic
19 to come up with the strategic objectives, that is, ethnic separation and
20 where they would create it; that Karadzic and Mladic agreed that this was
21 an historical opportunity to create a state with few internal enemies;
22 agreed that achieving the factual situation was crucial; agreed that "all
23 means" or "reciprocal" means were justified in the face of a genocidal
24 struggle; and worked in tandem throughout the war to achieve the goals as
25 the men who were, in the words of the Foca Crisis Staff president, "our
2 And yet the Defence claims or pretends that mentioning Karadzic
3 is an act of manipulation.
4 Another straw man argument was the repeated claim that the
5 Prosecution on the first day asked you to accept what it considers the
6 "better" conclusion or "better" version, which to the Defence ipso facto
7 raises reasonable doubt.
8 Now, as an initial matter, the word "better" was used only three
9 times that day: Once to quote General Mladic using that word at the
10 time; once to quote an SDS newspaper about the genetically murderous
11 Croat desire to kill the "better" Serbs, and once to quote an SRK
12 assistant commander's message to the troops that Serbs were genetically
13 superior to Muslims - "stronger, better, more handsome and cleverer."
14 The single alleged example the Defence cited was the Prosecution
15 challenge to the Defence claim that the word "liberate" meant only
16 "fighting against aggression," when we noted that a more accurate
17 understanding of the word, belying the Defence claim of a benign and
18 exclusive meaning, could be found in its use in a meeting of locals with
19 Mladic and Karadzic, where it was reported that: "There are no Muslims
20 now in Bratunac municipality. It is a fully liberated town."
21 We did not suggest that while the Defence position was reasonable
22 there was another possibility. We addressed the supposed alternative
23 views offered by the Defence and explained that it was not reasonable and
24 that when closely examined, in fact, proved the Prosecution case. Again,
25 that claim is a transparent effort by the Defence to deflect attention
1 from exposure of the misrepresentations upon which they relied and the
2 evidence which demonstrates Mladic's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
3 The Defence made clear what they need you to do in order to avoid
4 the otherwise inevitable conclusion. They need to you look at the
5 evidence unreasonably, by isolating only the evidence they want you to
6 consider or by accepting fanciful interpretations of evidence. They made
7 that apparent with the first example. The video reflecting
8 General Mladic entering Srebrenica and saying the time has come to take
9 revenge on the Turks, tossing out increasingly imaginative
10 interpretations, including that a glowering Mladic was suggesting killing
11 Muslims with kindness, that is, "taking the moral high ground" and thus
12 making the enemy forces irate. Seriously, that was the argument. This
13 is not only unreasonable on its face, particularly given the reference to
14 bitter history - the rebellion of the Dahis - but completely ignores the
15 weight of the evidence which must inform any attempt to interpret this
16 video and thus give it proper weight and understanding.
17 Other examples of the effort to spin meaningless or even invented
18 arguments into threads of reasonable doubt include:
19 The claim that the RS did not declare a legal state of war,
20 essentially an irrelevancy.
21 First, many RS laws invoked the same emergency provisions in a
22 state of imminent threat of war as in a state of war. And the RS
23 declared a state of imminent threat of war in April 1992. As Karadzic
24 explained at the 50th Assembly, all the laws that would be invoked if a
25 state of war were declared were already "fully in place." Except one:
1 Court-martials with summary executions. That's at P4583 at pages 104 and
3 The absence of a declared state of war was not the result of its
4 marginal to non-existent impact on the army but the perceived impact on
5 the common purpose. As one VRS officer explained, the JCE members'
6 motivation for not declaring a state of war: "It was their opinion at
7 the time that if you are not in a war, then the laws of war do not
8 apply." And making clear what he meant by referring to forced Muslim
9 departures. That's P439, paragraph 5.
10 The Defence also claimed that the Prosecution argued last week
11 that Mladic and Drljaca, the Prijedor SJB chief, were "best buddies."
12 The reality is that we mentioned Drljaca twice and cited his
13 statement about exceptional co-operation between the VRS and the RS MUP.
14 That doesn't mean we claim or rely on some sort of bromance between
15 Drljaca and Mladic, but it is, of course, one of many reflections of the
16 co-operation between the Prijedor SJB and the 43rd Brigade during the
17 cleansing campaign. And for others, see P2432 and P4062, a note from
18 Drljaca thanking 1 KK commander Talic for his "wholehearted help" during
19 1992. Despite the attempt by the Defence to create a straw man issue and
20 knock it down, the VRS and the RS MUP are very much in it together.
21 The Defence also suggested that we tried to recast some MUP
22 perpetrators in Prijedor as VRS soldiers.
23 The first example they gave was the unsuccessful attempt to
24 prepare the camps for a visit by journalists, and they cited the alleged
25 difference between our reference to Mladic's order to clean up camps and
1 a question that, as it happened, I had asked a witness in the Brdjanin
2 case about whether Zupljanin, the regional head of the MUP in the ARK,
3 was involved. The next day of submissions, however, the Defence, with a
4 straight face, showed the Court Mladic's order, P2879, and observed that
5 Mladic was ordering Talic to take orders including through the MUP to get
6 ready for the visits. Through the MUP in the ARK means through
7 Zupljanin. So the VRS and the police again are just working together and
8 there is no inconsistency in those questions. Mr. Ivetic's argument
9 falls under its own weight.
10 Now, the Defence next tried the same meritless claim about
11 Omarska and Keraterm. And we are clear in our brief that Prijedor MUP
12 officers commanded Omarska and Keraterm. See that at paragraph 537,
13 paragraphs 33, 34, and 37 of the Prijedor narrative and in the Prijedor
14 incident chart. We explain the VRS co-operated in running the camps,
15 including providing security and interrogators and rounding up the people
16 detained and abused there, but the MUP had primary responsibility and the
17 commanders were MUP staff. We're clear about it and there is no
18 inconsistency there.
19 On Monday, the Defence cited a document that isn't in evidence,
20 Security Council Resolution 752, which they claimed a reasonable person
21 might find Zeljaja was "poorly effectuating," when he threatened to burn
22 down Kozarac. But what is in evidence clearly exposes that this
23 explanation is not capable of belief. P2052 shows that in Resolution 752
24 the Security Council had "demanded that all units of the JNA and elements
25 of the Croatian army now in BiH must either withdraw, or be subject to
1 the authority of the government of BiH, or be disbanded and disarmed with
2 their weapons placed under effective international monitoring."
3 And also see adjudicated fact 291.
4 So the Security Council was not empowering Zeljaja to disarm
5 anyone, let alone burn their villages to the ground if they did not obey
6 him. It was saying he had to disarm, leave or put himself under the
7 Bosnian Presidency's command.
8 The evidence also shows in respect of that issue Zeljaja's demand
9 that the residents of Kozarac surrender 7.000 weapons was just a pretext.
10 Drljaca concluded at the same time that between Kozarac and Kozarusa all
11 there was was a unit of "company strength"; P2869. And so accordingly,
12 the 43rd Brigade, by that time part of the VRS, quickly and brutally
13 cleansed the village, killing or removing civilians as well as soldiers,
14 including women, children, and elderly.
15 Incidentally, in addition to the Security Council resolution, the
16 Defence has cited a number of documents in its brief and argument that
17 simply are not in evidence. We identified those documents to them a few
18 weeks ago but they haven't yet made those corrections. I presume they
19 will so during surrebuttal.
20 And in similar spirit, with respect to the citation to P7441 in
21 footnote 304 of our Prijedor narrative, consistent with the Trial
22 Chamber's decisions we do not rely on pages 15 through 20 of that
24 Now, in contrast to the evidence outlined in our submissions
25 concerning the JCE members' concerns about the prospect of Bosnian
1 independence and their preparation to divide Bosnia by force, if
2 necessary, the Defence in its submissions painted a picture of Bosnian
3 Serbs threatened by a "monster"; the Islamic war machine, essentially the
4 same as modern-day ISIS, led by the author of the "The Islamic
5 Declaration," Izetbegovic, who sought Serb destruction, exemplified by
6 the SDA mouthpiece magazine Vox and their purported calls for beheadings
7 of Serbs and their welcoming of the Fourth Reich.
8 Now although we know all far too well that there were many
9 victims on all sides and perpetrators of all ethnicities, this
10 apocalyptic depiction of the circumstances simply does not square with
11 the evidence and cannot serve to insulate General Mladic from
12 responsibility for his crimes.
13 And by way of some examples, the evidence shows that:
14 First, the supposedly galvanizing threat of the Islamic
15 Declaration wasn't even mentioned at the Bosnian Serb Assembly until late
16 1993 and then in a manner that made it clear the Speaker wasn't sure
17 anyone knew what he was talking about.
18 Karadzic acknowledged during the election campaign that Muslims
19 were Europeanized Slavs, not fundamentalist fanatics, with whom Serbs
20 would always live. And after the elections, the three nationalist
21 parties formed a coalition government. You can find those at P7759,
22 pages 8 through 9; and P6921, page 13.
23 Izetbegovic's intentions as seen by the Bosnian Serbs were also
24 evidenced in a discussion between Koljevic and Tudjman in January 1992,
25 P6727, which reveal Koljevic promoting ethnic homogeneity through
1 population transfers in response to Izetbegovic's interest in a "civil
3 Another example: Vox magazine was not advocating what was shown
4 on the cover, dramatically shown on the cover, beheadings and the
5 Fourth Reich -- and the welcoming of the Fourth Reich. They were
6 denouncing it and condemning efforts to pit one people against another.
7 After this monumental fuss made by the Defence, please read the
8 introduction to the article, which shows just the opposite of what they
9 claimed. That's D580, page 2.
10 As for the Defence portrayal of the VRS as a ragtag army fighting
11 a "monster," the "Islamic war machine," 1st Krajina Corps commander Talic
12 before the VRS was established declared: "The Banja Luka Corps has such
13 a large force and such an organisation that there is no risk of the corps
14 or the people of Krajina being endangered," P7464, an assessment his
15 Chief of Staff Kelecevic concurred with in testimony here, T37174.
16 On the 23rd of May, 1992, the 1st Krajina Corps reported to
17 Mladic that it was at 128 per cent of its establishment strength. P3987.
18 Muslim forces in the charged municipalities by comparison were
19 ill-equipped to contend with this powerful force as Defence witness
20 Kupresanin acknowledged at the time, telling the Assembly in
21 September 1992:
22 "We had aviation, Howitzers, tanks, cannons, but what did the
23 Muslims have? Some gun, some machine-guns they bought from Serbs, and
24 homemade guns. We could have gone through Bosnia like a knife through
1 Page 6291, page 10.
2 That was because the Bosnian Serbs got the JNA's equipment at the
3 transformation. So General Mladic wasn't a superman, as they claim. He
4 was just a guy on a mission who had sufficient forces under his command
5 to go through Bosnia like a knife through cheese and who used those
6 forces to commit massive crimes and destroy communities.
7 Internationals knew Bosnian government forces were no war
8 machine. Wilson explained that as of May and June 1992, BiH forces were
9 "not yet a complete fighting force. They were lightly equipped and had
10 limited training. They had a way to go before they would be a competent
11 military force." The SRK, on the other hand, was well equipped, well
12 organised, and fought professionally. You find that at transcript 4008
13 through 4011. Mr. Weber cited last week the evidence that the SRK
14 continued to be better-armed and equipped throughout the war.
15 But let me simply refer to two days in the summer of 1992 which
16 reflected the reality at the time.
17 First a meeting of June 20, 1992, of the Bosnian Presidency,
18 that's P7692, which reflects the Presidency members discussing what to do
19 about Muslims being forcibly transferred by those "whose intention it is
20 to create some ethnic territories, move the population, and to create
21 clean national units."
22 And reflects Izetbegovic noting their dilemma:
23 "If we don't accept the ultimatum, these people really could be
24 hurt. If we accept it, we're legalizing ethnic division; that is, the
25 alteration of the demographic picture of Bosnia, the creation of
1 ethnically clean territories."
2 And then further noting that in any event:
3 "Regarding all those agreements, I think they later simply point
4 their cannons and kill all those people. Wherever they surrendered their
5 weapons, et cetera, they ended up getting hurt."
6 And that's at page 4 of the document.
7 And another day in the summer of 1992, in July, at the Bosnian
8 Serb Assembly, they are not discussing -- this is at the 17th Session,
9 which is P4581. They're not discussing there the dilemma of accepting
10 forcible transfer to avoid worse things happening. They are instead
11 discussing things like Karadzic explaining how well the creation of the
12 factual situation by Mladic is proceeding:
13 "We have liberated almost everything that is ours in final talks,
14 we could even return some territories, villages that do not belong to
16 Other speakers chime in to praise Karadzic for visiting and
17 inspiring them in driving the Muslims out of territories where they had
18 actually been majority; that's page 65. Or expressing the hope that at
19 least half the Muslims in Birac were gone; page 73. And Karadzic,
20 referring to an earlier speaker who said that the Muslims had been
21 planted to Serbs as a people whose executioners Serbs were to be,
22 Karadzic agreeing that Europe drove them into the conflict "in order to
23 eliminate the Muslims." Pages 41 and 86.
24 The Defence also exaggerates the number of Muslims and Croats
25 serving in the VRS, asking rhetorically whether Muslim and Croat VRS
1 soldiers were committing genocide against their own people. Well, that's
2 exactly why Muslim conscripts remaining in the VRS at that time asked to
3 be released or deserted from their military units. They were
4 "dissatisfied" with the massive destruction of their towns by VRS forces.
5 That's P151.
6 In order to hype the supposed number of non-Serbs in the VRS, the
7 Defence cites data which includes Muslims and Croats who moved out of the
8 area, who served in the JNA but never served in the VRS, and who served
9 only after the war, while ignoring evidence of non-Serbs purged from the
10 VRS. For that see paragraph 36 of our brief.
11 In any event, Your Honours, the limited number of ethnic Muslim
12 or -- Muslims or Croats who remained in or joined the VRS for whatever
13 personal reasons does not gainsay the crimes or Mladic's responsibility.
14 The Defence also claims that without the "shroud of a JCE"
15 Mladic's meetings were "just the normal discussions between organs of a
16 government ... engaged in a conflict."
17 That might be true if one assumes that it is merely normal
18 government business to discuss the fact that the army has fulfilled some,
19 but not all, of the strategic objectives, and that it was time to
20 ciscenje the Drina and achieve strategic objective number 3, a meeting
21 that was followed by Mladic's Directive 4 to force the Muslim population
22 out of the Drina area together with Muslim forces; that's P358, pages 146
23 through 147. Or assuming that it is normal government business when
24 local authorities gather with their top leadership, including Mladic and
25 Karadzic, to brag about the reductions of Muslim populations in places
1 like Foca, Kljuc, Bratunac, Zvornik, and elsewhere. And that's cited in
2 our brief, paragraph 290, for example.
3 But beyond that, this is an example of how the Defence would
4 like you to look at evidence in isolation. If Mladic and Mico Stanisic
5 meet in July 1992 about co-operation between the VRS and the RS MUP, when
6 you know from the totality of the evidence that the VRS and the MUP are --
7 doing together at the time includes running camps where non-Serb
8 civilians are detained and abused and jointly conducting ethnic cleansing
9 operations, then it isn't just a normal government meeting. It's a
10 meeting between two people whose organisations are committing massive
11 crimes together in order to fine-tune their co-operation. Because that
12 is what the evidence in its totality tells you.
13 The Defence's assertions that it isn't clear what the Prosecution
14 case is about is grounded on obviously pretextual claims; for example,
15 that we dropped the charges about Kalinovik municipality in closing
16 argument by noting that Mladic had used Kalinovik's servile Muslims as an
17 example of some Muslims who might not have to be removed while also
18 pointing out that Mladic's subordinates later ethnically cleansed the
19 municipality. General Mladic is charged with that cleansing as he has
20 been throughout the trial.
21 And in a similarly preposterous fashion, the Defence claim that
22 because the first quote cited during our submissions was from 1993 when
23 Mladic took credit for the cleansing his forces had led since 1992, they
24 are somehow confused about the commencement date of the JCE, which is
25 spelled out clearly in the indictment and no less clearly stated in our
1 brief and in our submissions. Mladic is only charged with crimes after
2 12 May - see, for example, paragraph 191 of our brief - but evidence of
3 what he and other JCE members did before that is relevant to the
4 existence of the JCE and its objectives.
5 He isn't charged for crimes in Croatia, but what he did there, as
6 I explained earlier, helps to show his intent for the crimes he's charged
7 with, Karadzic's intent, and the intent of other JCE members, like
8 Milosevic, who oversaw the campaign in Croatia. This is no surprise, as
9 you can see, for instance, in paragraph 15 of the Chamber's decision
10 admitting the evidence of Milan Babic.
11 The Defence also claims that they can't tell what specific
12 criminal acts Mladic is charged with. But that ignores, for example,
13 Annex B of the Prosecution's brief which identifies for the
14 municipalities part of the case the evidence proving beyond a reasonable
15 doubt the murders, destruction of cultural sites, detention and cruel
16 treatment with which General Mladic is charged and for which we seek
18 The crimes we refer to by name in Annex B are the same ones we
19 charged in the indictment with one exception. Annex B shows we only seek
20 convictions on two mosques in Kalinovik. We do not seek convictions on
21 the mosques Mr. Riedlmayer did not conclude were destroyed during the war
22 and which Mr. Ivetic referred to on Friday and we didn't include them in
23 Annex B.
24 Other persecutory acts, like dismissals and destruction of
25 property are cited in Annex A.
1 The Defence also referred to uncharged and dropped crimes,
2 suggesting that their inclusion in the evidence can only reflect an
3 intention to convict General Mladic for those crimes. Now this claim
4 ignores the pleadings, the jurisprudence, and is not grounded on any
5 position to that effect by the Prosecution. Simply put, the Chamber can
6 and should consider such crimes helped prove the widespread and
7 systematic attack on non-Serb civilians and the pattern of crimes Mladic
8 and other JCE members used to ethnically cleanse the territories they
9 claimed and their intent.
10 We've given notice we would use pattern evidence this way
11 throughout the trial. For instance, the Defence claimed we did not
12 fulfil our obligation to give notice that we would lead evidence about
13 dropped camps in Sanski Most, Sokolac, and Kotor Varos which formed part
14 of the pattern of crimes against non-Serbs in those municipalities and
15 which we cite in our brief.
16 Well, first, we did give notice in our 65 ter list - see pages 90
17 through 95, 99 through 100, 124 through 125, 129 through 130, 171, 176 -
18 that we would lead evidence about the camps in those municipalities, and,
19 in any event, it wasn't an obligation. See transcript 9770 through 71.
20 There are no surprises here. Just evidence so overwhelming that the
21 Defence feigns confusion rather than engage with the case.
22 The Defence suggested that our focus on Prijedor meant that we
23 abandoned Count 1 for other municipalities. Now, in fact, we provided
24 the analytical framework that the Chamber should apply to the facts of
25 each charged municipality and said precisely that. But by way of
1 example, as a result of a similar ethnic cleansing campaign conducted in
2 Foca --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, you're on your feet.
4 MR. IVETIC: Yes, Your Honour. Mr. Tieger is not referring to
5 our closing argument because we did not say that they had abandoned
6 Count 1. We addressed Prijedor as Your Honours will recall.
7 MR. TIEGER: The suggestion was, Mr. President, that the other
8 charged municipalities -- that it was a concession by the Prosecution
9 with respect to other charged municipalities. That's what I was
10 referring to and that's what I'm addressing.
11 So by way of an example of how to apply the analytical framework
12 to the other charged municipalities as a result of a similar ethnic
13 cleansing campaign to Prijedor that was conducted in Foca, which was
14 geographically the largest municipality in Bosnia and a symbol to Serbs
15 of Islam, General Mladic himself noted that Foca was 99 per cent Serb by
16 September 1992. And using the facts detailed in the municipality
17 summary, the Trial Chamber would consider the thousands of acts falling
18 within Articles 4(2)(a) through (c), hundreds killed in KP Dom and others
19 in the massacre at Trosanj. Serb forces rounded up Foca's Muslims and
20 detained them in facilities where detainees were constantly subjected to
21 prohibited acts falling within 4(2)(a) through (c). Routine beatings,
22 detention in terrible and terrifying conditions, deprivation of food,
23 heat, medical care. The detainees' vulnerability from detention and the
24 crimes against them before they were rounded up exacerbating the
25 destructive impact of the conditions in those camps. As one survivor of
1 KP Dom put it:
2 "The conditions at KP Dom were well calculated to cause fear and
3 demoralisation; in my opinion, everything was planned systematically to
4 destroy us both mentally and physically."
5 That's RM046, P738, page 9.
6 Serb forces, particularly TG Foca soldiers under Mladic's
7 command, perpetrated brutal crimes of sexual violence against women and
8 girls they were detaining in camps or enslaving in soldiers' homes where
9 they repeatedly raped or sexually assaulted these victims, some over a
10 period of many months. One survivor of the cleansing campaign in the
11 camps observed:
12 "I will not recover. My life was destroyed. My family was
13 destroyed. The dearest to me were killed. All that I had in life, they
14 took my happiness."
15 RM070, T11752 through 753.
16 And the Chamber will also assess the totality of the attack,
17 including the traumatic forcible transfer and destruction of mosques, in
18 assessing the destructive intent which is illuminated by the means chosen
19 to achieve the objectives of the common purpose in Foca. The scale,
20 level, brutality of the crimes illuminate Mladic's intent and the intent
21 of other JCE members as do the repeated expressions of satisfaction by
22 the Bosnian Serb leadership in the results of the cleansing campaign in
23 Foca that we set out in paragraph 2 of the municipality summary. And all
24 those factors and the totality of the evidence bearing on the assessment
25 of destructive intent within the meaning of genocide convention in
1 Article 4. The same analysis for each of the municipalities.
2 Turning to Sarajevo for a moment, the Defence criticised the
3 Prosecution for failing to mention Fadila Tarcin's testimony about where
4 one of the shells came from during the G1 bombardment. They pointed to a
5 limited portion of her testimony where she supposedly stated:
6 "The shell came from the city, not from up the hill where the
7 Serbs were."
8 The Defence has yet again twisted the evidence.
9 First, Tarcin testified that the shell impacted on the side of
10 the house that faced the city. She did not say that the shell came from
11 the city. That's T3447 through 48. More importantly, she testified at
12 transcript 3424, and in her statement at P282, paragraph 3, that the
13 shell came from Borije from the east of Sirokaca. The Chamber has ample
14 evidence about the location of Borije which is located to the north-east
15 and faces Sirokaca on the other side of the Miljacka river. In fact, SRK
16 witnesses Veljovic - D532, paragraph 32, and T23002 through 23003, and
17 23013 - Dzida at D489, paragraph 17, and D490, paragraph 1 -- or page 1 -
18 and Gengo, at transcript 21619, all confirmed that there were SRK
19 positions, artillery positions in Borije.
20 In addition to Sirokaca, the Stari Grad log-book, P549, page 72,
21 also indicates other areas in Sarajevo, Vratnik and Kovaci, were targeted
22 during G1 with projectiles coming from Borije.
23 The Defence cited witness Oien to suggest the 28 June 1995
24 modified air bomb attack on the RTV building was fired by the ABiH and
25 then cited Segers as having "confirmed that he knew of another instance
1 where the same thing happened."
2 The ABiH did not have modified air bombs. And the SRK boasted in
3 an internal report about how they had hit the RTV building that day.
4 That's D147. And UN reports confirmed the same thing; D165, pages 1, 6,
5 and 12. And UNMO Brennskag even saw the modified air bomb fired from VRS
6 territory fly through the air and strike the RTV building. That's P992,
7 paragraph 52.
8 Segers and Oien were clearly wrong. The Defence effort to
9 convert Segers' testimony into a second event founders on the fact that
10 Segers was talking about something he had only heard from a colleague in
11 Zagreb a year later. Indeed, the Defence's extensive reliance on Segers'
12 evidence collapses in the face of Segers' admission of serious memory
13 issues and blackouts, and that he couldn't, in his own words, "really
14 correctly even represent when I was in Sarajevo."
15 That's T43803 through 04.
16 At transcript 44745, the Defence argued that the ABiH was driven
17 to shell and snipe their own people in order to perpetuate a myth that
18 the SRK was doing this. In support they pointed to evidence of
19 General Rose and Edin Garaplija.
20 Rose, however, clearly acknowledged that while he was aware of
21 such allegations in the media, he had no idea whether they were well
22 founded or not; P736, paragraph 213.
23 And other internationals such as Fraser were not even aware of
24 such allegations, much less of evidence indicating that they had any
1 In any event, the insinuation that Rose was suggesting that the
2 crimes for which Mladic stands accused were actually committed by the
3 Muslim side inverts reality. Rose stated, in P736, paragraph 217, that
4 "with respect to sniping, the level of sniping was definitely greater on
5 the part of the Serbs" and "the greater number of civilians killed were
6 obviously the Bosnians within the city of Sarajevo."
7 The Prosecution addressed the widespread shelling of Sarajevo by
8 the SRK in T44497 and 98 of its closing arguments and paragraphs 915
9 through 1002 in its final brief.
10 As for Garaplija's claims, all based on the supposed confession
11 of Nedzad Herenda. But Garaplija beat and tortured Herenda's confession
12 out of him. Garaplija was sentenced to prison for the abduction of
13 Herenda and the beating and shooting that occurred during this
14 interrogation. Further, Garaplija's extravagant tales to justify his
15 crimes as emerged on cross-examination have been repeatedly rejected
16 through the years. No weight should be accorded his evidence.
17 The Defence also claimed that modified air bombs were designed by
18 experts with a detailed firing table which they claim the Prosecution
19 denies in a "desperate attempt" to substantiate the allegations against
20 Mladic. So let's scratch the surface a bit and see who's desperate.
21 Although the Defence contends that the modified air bomb was not
22 "amateurly designed," Milovanovic described it as a contraption that was
23 "put together in a makeshift way," as was almost comically confirmed by
24 Radojcic's admission that his own brigade, not a manufacturer, put
25 together the rocket-launcher based on sketches from the superior command;
1 T23044. And Radojcic's initial claim that there was a "firing table"
2 turned out to be nothing more than his characterisation of a "temporary"
3 or "provisional" piece of A4 paper with who knows - not him - what was on
4 it; T23170.
5 The only firing tables produced in connection with this issue
6 which are not in evidence are for a Kosava rocket-launcher. In a
7 3 August 1995 order, P4282, General Mladic stated that the VRS "has a
8 certain number of Kosava launchers from various manufacturers whose
9 quality mostly does not ensure the necessary precision against
10 FAB 105s [sic] or FAB 250s."
11 In view of Mladic's contemporaneous acknowledgment of the
12 imprecision, the development of firing tables that may have somehow
13 improved the situation after the Scheduled Incidents does nothing to
14 change the totality of evidence that the modified air bombs were a
15 grossly imprecise weapon.
16 And finally Veljovic, the Assistant Chief of Staff for operations
17 and training for the SRK, testified that modified air bombs did not have
18 firing tables and were widely known among the VRS as grotesquely
19 inaccurate. That's T22949 to 53. Given the inherent inaccuracy and
20 destructive capabilities of this weapon, it was a terrifying weapon for
21 the Sarajevo population as Fraser, Konings, Radojcic, and Brennskag
23 At transcript page 44757, the Defence claim:
24 "In fact, in accordance with their right to use force in
25 self-defence, it was legitimate that the SRK would return fire in the
1 face of an assault of [sic] their positions. Indeed, Witness Jordan
2 confirmed such practice as standard operating procedure at transcript
3 page 1818."
4 In fact, Jordan did not confirm this. He said he didn't see a
5 lot of it. But what he did say was that sniping civilians was part of
6 "daily life," and that he "firmly believed" on the basis of observations
7 from 1992 to 1995 that there was a deliberate attempt to terrorise the
8 civilians of Sarajevo through shelling and sniping, recalling, among
9 other things, how Serb shooters would go after the youngest person in a
10 group; P126, paragraph 42.
11 The Defence closing relied on Witnesses Segers and Mole to claim
12 that the shelling of hospitals was really "return fire" that was
13 "targeted technically at" mobile mortars but not the hospitals
14 themselves; T44759. In fact, on the only occasion he saw a mobile mortar
15 firing from somewhere on the Kosevo Hospital grounds, Segers saw that
16 Serb artillery retaliated against the hospital building itself after the
17 mobile mortar was gone; T43760 through 61. That is not "technically"
18 targeting a mobile mortar. That is targeting a hospital.
19 Apart from this one incident, Segers testified that he was
20 regularly notified that the Kosevo Hospital was repeatedly and heavily
21 shelled by VRS mortars and artillery. T43765.
22 And Mole was explicit that the fire on the hospital was
23 "retaliation, rather than a military response." P421, paragraph 126.
24 You can find at paragraph 1042 of our brief references to the
25 many reports and protests of the shelling of the hospital. See also
1 paragraphs 1038 to 1041 regarding mobile mortars.
2 Retaliation against civilian areas or objects is not a
3 permissible response to attacks by mobile mortars.
4 The Defence claimed during their submissions that the Prosecution
5 "have seemed abjectly afraid" to talk about proportionality, suggesting
6 that it is based on our "lack of any basic understanding of the
7 principle." T44755.
8 The Defence knows full well why proportionality is not the focus
9 of discussion about the terror campaign, and that is because
10 proportionality assumes an effort to hit a legitimate military target
11 which then requires an assessment of the military value against the risk
12 of collateral damage.
13 That is not what happened. Instead, the SRK repeatedly fired at
14 civilian areas or objects or included them in indiscriminate attacks.
15 These are direct attacks on civilians that do not implicate
17 The Appeals Chamber in Dragomir Milosevic, paragraph 53, and
18 Galic, paragraph 190, has emphasised that "it is well established that
19 the principle of distinction requires parties to distinguish at all times
20 'between the civilian population and combatants, between civilian and
21 military objectives, and accordingly direct attacks only against military
22 objectives.'" Adding that: "There is an absolute prohibition against the
23 targeting of civilians in customary international law, encompassing
24 indiscriminate attacks."
25 The existence of the proportionality principle does not save the
1 SRK's campaign of sniping civilians and civilian objects, including women
2 and children, buses and trams, from its abject illegality. It cannot
3 justify single shells landing randomly across residential areas in the
4 city centre where no military activity was occurring. It cannot justify
5 treating the entire city as a target as the SRK did with massive
6 bombardments like G1 and G2. It cannot justify repeated shellings of
7 residential neighbourhoods.
8 The Defence claims that indiscriminate bombardments such as G1
9 and G2 "are evidence of the SRK acting pursuant to their objective to
10 bring a permanent resolution to the conflict in Sarajevo." Those claims
11 are misguided. Setting aside the perversity of the suggestion that
12 Mladic's retaliatory attempts to "drive them out of their minds," that's
13 P105, is a benevolent and laudable act, it is once again a reflection of
14 Mladic's disdain for the principle of distinction. And for the same
15 reason, the frankly chilling Defence argument that "the city of Sarajevo
16 itself consisted a valid military target in its entirety," must be
17 decisively rejected. As the Milosevic Appeals Chamber held at
18 paragraph 54, when considering a similar argument, "a general assertion
19 that the attacks were legitimate because they allegedly targeted
20 'military zones' throughout the city is bound to fail."
21 Can we move into private session very quickly, Mr. President.
22 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
23 [Private session]
14 [Open session]
15 THE REGISTRAR: We're in private session, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
17 MR. TIEGER: Further, Your Honours, the evidence just discussed
18 also dispatches the Defence claim that no VRS officer ever testified
19 about an illegal Mladic order.
20 That no proportionality analysis informed the G1 bombardment is
21 also reflected in the discussion at paragraph 932 of our brief,
22 reflecting the distancing from this manifestly indefensible attack by JNA
23 authorities who "wanted nothing to do with any responsibility for the
24 attack on that night." T3971.
25 Defence efforts at deflection reach another low point with their
1 claim that Sarajevo was not an undefended city. And they make the same
2 assertion for Srebrenica and for Kozarac. The Prosecution never asserted
3 that Sarajevo was an undefended city and that consequently any shelling
4 was illegal. But the Defence relies on twisted logic. If it was not
5 prohibited to fire at all, then any and all attacks on Sarajevo are
6 permitted. The Prosecution never asserted that the SRK could not use
7 appropriate force against military targets in Sarajevo. But it was not
8 permitted to engage in a sniping and shelling campaign against civilians.
9 The Defence trots out the manifestly irrelevant undefended city argument
10 because the evidence overwhelmingly shows that that is how General Mladic
11 and the VRS conducted themselves, in Sarajevo and elsewhere, treating
12 entire cities, villages, and hamlets as if they were military targets.
13 Moreover, while the Defence tries to shift the blame to the ABiH,
14 claiming that it failed to separate civilians from military objects and
15 was using civilians as human shields, even if this were true in some
16 instances, the law is clear and well settled. The failure of one party
17 to discharge obligations to remove civilians to the maximum extent
18 feasible from the vicinity of military objectives and to avoid locating
19 military objectives within or near densely populated areas does not
20 relieve the other party of its proportionality duties when launching an
21 attack in response.
22 Galic Appeals Judgement, 194; Trial Judgement, 61; and Milosevic
23 Trial Judgement paragraph 949.
24 Now as part of its attack, the Defence claim that "the tenacious
25 efforts of the Prosecution to continually manipulate the evidence to
1 prejudice Your Honours with misleading assertions of proof, that's
2 reasonable doubt. And that was based on two examples. The first was
3 that RM147's testimony on the SRK's use of snipers in Sarajevo had
4 "fizzled and disappeared" because he was not a member of a sniper squad.
5 No, first of all, in fact it was the Prosecution that clarified the
6 witness's status and further -- once again in private session, please.
7 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
8 [Private session]
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
24 MR. TIEGER: So in fact, Your Honours, RM147 presented evidence
25 that clearly supported and advanced the Prosecution's case, Defence
1 hyperbole to the contrary. Further, his evidence on the SRK's use of
2 snipers in the Grbavica area of Sarajevo was corroborated by the
3 Defence's own witness, Maletic, who confirmed that there was a sniper
4 squad in the SRK "battalion command, directly subordinated to the
6 That's D482, paragraph 31, and T21758.
7 In fact, Maletic recognised the name of one of the snipers
8 appearing on the list of SRK snipers in P6517 and confirmed that this
9 individual attended morning meetings with battalion commanders and
10 deputy commanders; T21756. Witnesses RM147 and 141 identified some of
11 these same snipers appearing in P6517. Also, as stated in P2624,
12 paragraph 93, "everybody in Grbavica knew who the snipers were, nobody
13 tried to conceal that."
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, could you repeat the number where you
15 were talking about some of these snipers appearing in P --
16 MR. TIEGER: 6517.
17 JUDGE ORIE: 6517. Thank you.
18 MR. TIEGER: And for more detailed evidence on this issue, I
19 refer Your Honours to footnote 3601 in paragraph 838 of the Prosecution
21 Now the other Defence example of so-called tenacious efforts to
22 continually manipulate, et cetera, et cetera, brings us to Srebrenica.
23 The Defence pointed to P1500, Mladic's authorisation of five tonnes of
24 diesel fuel for the Zvornik brigade to carry out "engineering works"
25 which the evidence shows was the reburial operation. The Defence does
1 not contest the document authorised fuel for the reburial operation - see
2 paragraphs 3293 through 3304 of their brief, and in particular 3298 - but
3 claim that the Prosecution conceded that the numbering 03/4 reveals that
4 the document came from the operations administration and "did not have to
5 come from Mladic."
6 But there is no inconsistency here. First the Defence agrees
7 that SR which we see in the document means in his own hand - that's
8 T16302 and see also T34887 - and that documents from Mladic personally
9 are frequently drafted by operations, since the Defence itself tendered
10 documents they say came from Mladic that had the 03/4 operations
11 administration number; see D187. And for other examples of operations
12 drafting, see P4562, 1557 and 1677.
13 In any event, in this example, P1500, it is clear that it came
14 from Mladic. Look at P2131, a follow-up order to issue the five tonnes
15 of fuel ordered in P1500, which expressly acknowledges that P1500 was
16 "pursuant to the order of the commander of the Main Staff of the Army of
17 Republika Srpska."
18 Scratching the surface of these two examples, among others, show
19 just who is tenaciously misleading.
20 On the basis of a few words by Major Franken to the Dutch
21 Ministry of Defence, the Defence asserted that Franken concluded that the
22 transportation process of the Muslim population from Potocari was
23 "benign" and "not the deportation nor forcible transfer."
24 But the Defence did not provide with you Major Franken's further
25 description when asked if he believed the population had a realistic
1 choice to stay in Srebrenica:
2 "There was theoretically a choice. The choice is in being
3 crowded in weather like that with no supplies, with no food, with no
4 medical care, comes to the fact then die slowly or get out. If you call
5 that a choice, they had a choice."
6 And then asked whether -- "was the choice that you just outlined
7 between dying slowly or getting out, was that what you meant?"
8 Franken said: "That's what I meant, yes."
9 Contrary to the Defence suggestion, Franken actually concluded
10 what the totality of the evidence makes clear: There was no voluntary
11 departure, no choice. Precisely as intended by Karadzic and Mladic in
12 Directive 7.
13 The Defence stated three times in their closing that Prosecution
14 military expert Butler did not find "a single order of General Mladic
15 ordering the Srebrenica killings."
16 What Butler actually testified to was the following:
17 "I have not come across a document by General Mladic specifically
18 ordering the execution of prisoners."
19 We would not expect Mladic or his Main Staff to be so bold as to
20 write up orders to Krstic, Tolimir, Beara and others specifically
21 ordering prisoners to be murdered, particularly given Mladic's presence
22 on the ground. Those would be done orally.
23 We do have clear evidence of some of his individual orders in
24 furtherance of the murder operations.
25 For example, his order to his men to separate able-bodied men in
1 Potocari which he announced at the Hotel Fontana on 12 July. See our
2 brief at paragraph 1172.
3 The order on 13 July to Furtula to provide a unit to work for
4 Beara. Paragraphs 1289 through 96.
5 The 13 July oral order to Malinic to stop registering the many
6 hundreds of prisoners at Nova Kasaba. Paragraph 1261 of our brief.
7 The 16 July oral order to Keserovic to command the sweep
8 operation and its written counterpart dated 17 July, in effect an order
9 to kill any prisoners captured during the sweep operation.
10 Paragraphs 1337 through 1340. And, as discussed, his 14 September order
11 for fuel for the reburials. Paragraph 1384.
12 The Defence also claimed that in paragraph 1116 of our final
13 brief we presented a "new theory" on the meaning of the Krivaja 95 attack
14 plan. That paragraph observes that the objective to reduce the
15 Srebrenica enclave to its urban area was designed to force the population
16 into the urban area of Srebrenica and thereby create impossibly
17 overcrowded conditions, replicating the 1993 humanitarian disaster in
18 Srebrenica. This so-called new theory has always been the Prosecution's
19 position about the Krivaja 95 attack plan. It was first noted in our
20 pre-trial brief at paragraph 208, stated in our opening statement at
21 page 486 and again in our 92 bis submission at T20835 through 36.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, rather than to draw your attention to
23 the clock at the very end of the one and a half hours, I do it some 15 to
24 17 minutes before that, so that --
25 MR. TIEGER: Ms. Stewart is apprising me of the time,
1 Your Honour. Thank you.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I should have known that.
3 Please proceed.
4 MR. TIEGER: Falsely portraying this Prosecution position as new
5 is a misleading way to attack a conclusion the Defence is otherwise
6 unable to challenge.
7 The Defence also claimed that the Prosecution assertion that
8 Mladic and Krstic had dinner together at the Hotel Fontana on
9 11 July after the meetings with DutchBat was made up by the Prosecution
10 for the first time in closing and was "not referenced in their final
11 brief nor in the evidence."
12 That's incorrect. Please find reference to the evidence of the
13 dinner in our final closing brief in paragraphs 1174 and 1219.
14 Mladic and Krstic were together at the Hotel Fontana that night
15 as can be seen on the video of the second Hotel Fontana meeting. They
16 were both staying at the Hotel Fontana and had dinner at the hotel
17 together in the same place where the meeting was held. See transcript
18 11160 through 62.
19 And this is where Mladic made the decision to "separate the
20 able-bodied men," either that very night or the next morning, prior to
21 Mladic's announcement of that decision at the 10.00 a.m. Hotel Fontana
22 meeting on the 12th of July.
23 Your Honours, I began these submissions this morning with
24 reference to the Defence accusations against Prosecution and others which
25 went so far as Mr. Lukic's insinuation about a trial process that brought
1 to mind the "Fourth Reich." So let's look for just moment at the
2 Fourth Reich trial that the Defence claims General Mladic received.
3 We're now four and a half years past opening statements. In that
4 time, the Chamber has heard almost 400 live witnesses, more than half
5 called by the Defence. The Defence has spent almost 700 hours
6 questioning witnesses in court. More time than the Prosecution, more
7 time than the Chamber. They've admitted more than 2.000 exhibits into
8 evidence, including three which the Chamber admitted this Monday, months
9 after the deadline, just to make sure that Mladic had every chance to be
10 heard on sentencing. And the trial stalled for half a year to allow them
11 to call their last six witnesses, and when briefs were filed it was ten
12 months after we'd regularly been in court. And until last Monday, we'd
13 only spent 18 days in court, a lavish amount of time and opportunity for
14 preparation of briefs and submissions.
15 With that time, all those witnesses, all that evidence, they're
16 left with hyperbolic arguments because the evidence of guilt is
18 And while we're discussing Defence complaints about trial, recall
19 that Mr. Ivetic argued - just one page before claiming that
20 General Mladic felt sorry for the victims of the war - that "the
21 Prosecution was allowed to eavesdrop on his communications with counsel."
22 That's at T44832. A listener could have been forgiven for thinking that
23 this related to trial strategy, what witness to call, what question to
24 ask, some hushed conversation with counsel.
25 Instead what Mr. Ivetic was referring to was Mladic during a
1 court break, with Prosecution members in their normal place on the other
2 side of the courtroom, loudly expressing ugly and ethnically charged
3 insults about a Muslim woman witness who had survived terrible crimes of
4 sexual violence. This wasn't about eavesdropping, this wasn't about
5 trial strategy, and it wasn't about remorse.
6 Finally --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Mladic should not speak aloud.
8 Mr. Mladic, if you continue to speak aloud, you know what the
9 consequences will be.
10 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.
11 MR. TIEGER: The Defence has argued repeatedly that
12 General Mladic is on trial just because he is a Serb, asking why we did
13 not charge international negotiators such as Akashi, Cutileiro, Owen,
14 Stoltenberg, who at times reluctantly considered separation a solution,
15 or the United Nations forces, some of them Dutch, who requested his
16 permission to transport Muslims out of the Srebrenica enclave.
17 Now, first, we set out for in paragraph 283 of our brief how the
18 ethnic cleansing campaign presented internationals with an agonizing
19 choice because they recognised that saving people from the persecution
20 they were facing in their homes by evacuating them would in fact advance
21 the Bosnian Serb policy of ethnic cleansing, but sometimes circumstances
22 were so desperate that they had no choice. Srebrenica is a particularly
23 chilling example.
24 But more fundamentally, Ratko Mladic is not charged with thinking
25 that ethnic separation is the best solution in a bad situation. He is
1 charged with using the VRS to achieve it through the commission of brutal
3 Ambassador Akashi did not lead an army which burned, raped,
4 murdered, and pillaged its way through Serb-claimed territory, destroying
5 Muslim and Croat villages and killing or expelling their residents.
6 Ratko Mladic did.
7 Ambassador Cutileiro did not order his subordinates to force
8 Muslim civilians out of Eastern Bosnia. Ratko Mladic did.
9 Ambassador Hurd did not order a subordinate to shell civilian
10 areas in Sarajevo until its residents were driven out of their minds.
11 Ratko Mladic did.
12 Ambassador Owen did not order the use as hostages of hundreds of
13 peacekeepers. Ratko Mladic did.
14 Ambassador Stoltenberg did not order and oversee an operation in
15 which 7.000 men and boys were executed. Ratko Mladic did.
16 General Mladic is not on trial because he is a Serb. He is not
17 on trial because he's a military officer. He's on trial because the
18 evidence shows - and proves beyond a reasonable doubt - that he is guilty
19 of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.
20 Thank you, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.
22 Mr. Lukic, would you, during the break, make clear to Mr. Mladic
23 that we'll not allow any further loud speaking under the present
24 circumstances. And, as Mr. Mladic knows, the ultimate consequences would
25 be that he will be removed from the courtroom.
1 We'll take a break. We'll take a break of half an hour, which we
2 usually do if we have sessions of one hour and a half, and we'll resume
3 at 11.30.
4 --- Recess taken at 10.59 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 11.33 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: We resume. Mr. Ivetic, your one and a half hour
7 will start in a second.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
10 I will try to address as much as possible that which we have just
11 heard from the Prosecution but I may not get to everything. I may not
12 cover every little point, and I may not go into every little detail
13 because we had a short time to process and prepare a response.
14 But I will begin by addressing what Mr. Tieger called hyperbolic
15 arguments. Your Honours, I don't think I need to remind you, but I will
16 anyway, we have filed a final trial brief which is in excess of
17 900 pages. Within those 900-plus pages, we have gone through
18 considerable detail making our arguments, addressing the Prosecution
19 evidence, and giving citations to the evidence which we believe
20 demonstrate reasonable doubt. It took Mr. Tieger one and a half hours to
21 get to the point of just stating that the Prosecution had proven their
22 case beyond a reasonable doubt, but they haven't demonstrated how they
23 have done so.
24 I would stress that Your Honours keep in mind what I said the
25 other day when we went through the examination of the burden of proof and
1 the appropriate standard. It's not just beyond a reasonable doubt, for
2 we also have to keep in mind in dubio pro reo, which means that all
3 inferences available under the evidence must be taken in favour of the
4 accused. What the Prosecution would have you do is at all times take the
5 inference in favour of the Prosecution by viewing the evidence in a
6 vacuum. Your Honours, you cannot do that.
7 Your Honours, the Defence has always asked you to look at the
8 totality of the evidence and we stand behind that. The totality of the
9 evidence, we submit, demonstrates that the Prosecution has failed to meet
10 their burden when viewed under in dubio pro reo and all the other
11 applicable legal principles.
12 Now let me start off talking about JCE for a bit. Mr. Tieger
13 mentioned today that 1991 in Croatia are not part of the case. Indeed
14 they are not part of the indictment, that's for sure. But this
15 Prosecution has led considerable evidence relating to 1991, relating to
16 Croatia, and wants you to draw from that inferences and conclusions as to
17 intent, wants you to draw from that evidence as to the existence of a
18 JCE. And although Mr. Tieger was clear today for the first time that the
19 criminal responsibility of the accused starts on 12 May 1992, we still
20 didn't hear from them when it is alleged that this JCE came into
21 existence and wherein Mr. Mladic agreed to join or participate in any
23 In relation to 1991 in Croatia, which they've asked you to take
24 into account and consider, the Prosecution have cited evidence from
25 Ambassador Okun which was submitted under Rule 92 quater. We counted
1 12 citations within their final brief for which Okun's evidence is
2 uncorroborated: Footnotes 632, 635, 642, 643, 1125, 1455, 1575, 1583,
3 1913, 1914, 1953, and 2847. They further referenced the testimony of
4 Mr. Okun five times during closing arguments the other day; at transcript
5 pages 44354, 44366, 44368, 44369, and 4470. Uncorroborated evidence
6 admitted pursuant to Rule 92 quater in accordance with the jurisprudence
7 of this Tribunal, such as the Milosevic [sic] case in volume 3,
8 paragraph 276 of the Trial Judgement --
9 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Mr. Ivetic, the last reference to a page number,
10 you said 4470. I assumed you meant 44370; correct?
11 MR. IVETIC: 44470, I omitted a 4.
12 JUDGE FLUEGGE: Thank you.
13 MR. IVETIC: And I see the transcript has referenced the
14 Milosevic case. I'm referencing the Milutinovic case, so I must have
16 In the Milutinovic case, it has been held that uncorroborated
17 evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 92 quater is such that it's unable to
18 rely upon that type of evidence to determine the acts and conduct of the
19 accused. But that's what Mr. Tieger asked you to do just today. Why?
20 Why didn't they bring more evidence? Why didn't they identify 1991 in
21 Croatia in the indictment and have a fair and full adjudicated trial on
22 that? They choose to do it this way.
23 Now, while addressing the alleged overarching JCE, both in these
24 past few days and in their final brief, the Prosecution has relied
25 heavily on statements of politicians at the Assembly sessions which are
1 taken out of context. An example is P4580, where General Mladic is not
2 even present. In fact, for many of the items where the Prosecution is
3 referencing other people, usually politicians, talking about things,
4 General Mladic is not present, and yet they wish to attribute those words
5 and derive intent from those words against General Mladic. I ask you,
6 Your Honours, as I ask the world: Is that fair?
7 At transcript page 44358, the Prosecution said:
8 "The leadership considered that they had achieved the quality
9 that is ethnic division and the destruction of Bosnia and so all that was
10 left was a question of quantity," and they cited P4580.
11 But if you look at the totality of the context, the discussion in
12 question is a conference on solutions for the crisis in BiH; page 16 of
13 that document indeed reflects as follows:
14 "The value of this document is that it reflects what we have
15 accomplished but is not final or complete. We believe that we shall
16 achieve what was contested the most and that is a quality issue. The
17 quality we want to achieve is having three BHs. What remains is a
18 question of quantity which includes the issues of federation and
19 confederation. How many functions will belong to the constituent state
20 and how many to joint services."
21 Your Honours, what the politicians were discussing was a
22 continuation of how to bring about what existed in Bosnia-Herzegovina
23 before the outbreak of hostilities, where all three ethnic parties had
24 representative equal say in the governing of that republic per the
25 constitution. And so even in the very document that the Prosecution
1 cites that the Serb side wanted separation, they're still talking about
2 how the three ethnic parties can live and work together in some sort of
3 federation or confederation. They're just trying to restore the
4 existing -- pre-existing constitutional order.
5 Now, other examples where the OTP has relied upon statements of
6 others taken out of context and tries to attribute them to Mladic are
7 P3076, in relation to Karadzic; P406, also in relation to Karadzic;
8 P6997, in relation to Brdjanin; P6994, in relation to Brdjanin; P3959, in
9 relation to Brdjanin; and P4581, in relation to Plavsic and Koljevic.
10 Now, today we heard Mr. Tieger talk about Karadzic and how -- how
11 we were trying to deflect from damaging evidence and the reason that they
12 cite to Karadzic is because he is a key partner of Mr. Mladic.
13 Your Honours, we heard scarcely a word from Mr. Tieger addressing the
14 arguments that we made that there wasn't a good relationship between
15 Karadzic and Mladic at times, so how could they be working together as
16 key partners in a criminal endeavour when they don't share similar views
17 and had various conflicts?
18 P2471, a Prosecution exhibit, it's alleged to be a conversation
19 between Mladic, Karadzic, and Milovanovic, and this exhibit contains a
20 conversation between Mladic and Karadzic which is quite argumentive,
21 mainly at the end of page 1 and page 2 of that document. We have P1052,
22 another Prosecution exhibit, extracts from an interview of an individual,
23 and it specifies that:
24 "There were personal misunderstandings between Karadzic and
25 Mladic. The former represented the supreme authority and the latter did
1 not like superiors, especially when they were not professionals but prone
2 to meddling in his profession."
3 We also have P736 at paragraphs 211 to 212, General Rose:
4 "The relationship between General Mladic and Dr. Karadzic was as
5 one would expect in a confused and brutal situation of varying intensity.
6 At times, Mladic would appear to dominate the discussions and determine
7 the course of events. On other occasions, Karadzic would be able to hold
8 his political position and Mladic would then conform to that, depending
9 very much on how pressed they felt, either politically or militarily on
10 the ground."
11 D862, the sworn statement of Witness Milutinovic, paragraph 130:
12 "As I recall, the first disagreements and conflicts between
13 General Mladic and President Karadzic as the supreme commander occurred
14 in August 1993, when the supreme commander ordered the army to withdraw
15 from Mount Igman and to hand over the position it had taken to UNPROFOR."
16 Paragraph 132:
17 "The conflict between General Mladic and President Karadzic
18 emerged, inter alia, because the army personnel were hungry while there
19 were war profiteers around them who used the war to become rich."
20 Paragraph 138:
21 "Bearing in mind the increasing divisions of the VRS between the
22 supporters of Mladic and the supporters of Karadzic."
23 We will stress yet again that in relation to our submissions if
24 they were key partners, why did President Karadzic try to remove
25 General Mladic on multiple occasions? Surely the evidence does not
1 support the assertion of the Prosecution that they were key partners.
2 As to JCE, the Prosecution has alleged that Alija Izetbegovic's
3 the Islamic Declaration was not known, I guess they mean to say that
4 people didn't really care about it, but we had evidence to the contrary.
5 The Bosnian Serb leaders were very aware of the Islamic Declaration and
6 were quite concerned about what it meant.
7 We had Witness Dodik testify at transcript page 42267, when
8 questioned whether the declaration was discussed at Assembly sessions:
9 "We had in mind what was Alija Izetbegovic's policy in 'The
10 Islamic Declaration,' which I, myself, read several times ... and I think
11 that any man who was involved in any degree in politics at the time was
12 aware of the contents of this declaration ... and it was nothing secret.
13 It was a published document ... it became more popular than ever among
14 his supporters."
15 We have other evidence indicating the prominence of the Islamic
16 Declaration and the fears generated by the same. We have transcript
17 page 29633 to 29639, Witness Kupresanin; transcript page 23904,
18 Witness Kecmanovic. We even have a Prosecution exhibit from a
19 Prosecution witness, P3265. That was Witnesses MacLeod. And we also
20 have a Defence Witness, Tadic, talking about that in his Defence
21 statement, D661, paragraph 17.
22 So to say that the Islamic Declaration was not in the minds of
23 everyone, that's not -- that's not in accord with the evidence.
24 Also, we have to take into account what happened afterwards
25 because the book was published, the book called for a Jihad, it called
1 for Bosnian Muslim dominance over others, non-believers. But that wasn't
2 the end of it, and let's talk about this Vox article that Mr. Tieger
3 references. And, yes, the authors of that article in Vox did a very
4 clever thing by trying to say, Oh, we're going to publish this but we
5 don't know where it comes from, it might have come from the Serbs. Well,
6 that position is nothing more than them covering for their own deeds.
7 And here's why.
8 Tongue in cheek they could say that, but in addition to the
9 pamphlet that's published, Vox made its own cover. Its own cover had a
10 Bosnian Muslim Handzar Division soldier standing over the severed heads
11 of Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic, and other Serb leaders dressed up with
12 Chetnik hats. The Serbs didn't make that up.
13 There was the other article from Vox which was obituaries for the
14 prominent Bosnian Serb political leaders at that time, all of whom were
15 alive. The Serbs didn't make that up either. It is more likely under
16 the evidence that the Bosnian Muslim leadership through Vox -- and we
17 heard Vox was closely connected to the SDA and to the mayor of Sarajevo
18 and to Alija Izetbegovic.
19 What kind of message, as a Serb in Bosnia-Herzegovina, can you
20 infer from the fact that all of a sudden you wake up and you no longer
21 have your constitutional right as an equal partner in Bosnia and the
22 other two parties can declare independence and address your fate? How do
23 you feel when you read Alija Izetbegovic call for a Jihad? How do you
24 feel when obituaries are published for Serbs before they are even dead?
25 Well, one way that can be read and interpreted is fear. And we had a lot
1 of evidence of fear felt by ordinary Serbs as a result of what was being
2 published, what was being seen, and their memories of what had happened
3 to them in the Second World War.
4 In relation to JCE, and we had a reference to that today when
5 Mr. Tieger talked about how the intent can be drawn from various
6 documents talking about ciscenje of the Drina, and, again, the
7 Prosecution likes to use a term that has a very specific, non-criminal,
8 military meaning and tries to give it some sort of nefarious alternative
9 meaning which fits their story. But we've had clear evidence of military
10 expert Kovac at transcript page 41924 giving the definition of ciscenje
11 in military terminology. Clearing or cleansing as is a concept that
12 means searching the terrain for armed enemy formations in the area of
13 responsibility or in the area of actions or the area of employment of
14 forces, so within one's own disposition or in the area of use of forces,
15 and it pertains to armed units. When asked about if there's any
16 difference between ciscenje and ciscenje terena, or clearing of the
17 terrain, Witness Kovac said "ciscenje" is a general term, whereas
18 clearing the terrain means in fact pertaining to armed elements, armed
19 unit, terrorists, sabotage groups, et cetera. That's what cleansing or
20 clearing the terrain would mean.
21 And in that regard, Your Honours, I would also point out that
22 RM097 clearly distinguished between JNA orders for ciscenje and the
23 forced removal of civilians or mistreatment of civilians. And thus, the
24 use of ciscenje in military documents cannot be misinterpreted and given
25 this nefarious meaning the Prosecution would like to give it.
1 Now, the Prosecution spent some time talking about Foca, and, in
2 particular, they focused upon the destruction of mosques in Foca. And,
3 again, Your Honours, bearing in mind the burden of proof, bearing in mind
4 that all inferences must be made in favour of the accused, we urge you to
5 look at that evidence in its totality. Read it, analyse, and look for
6 alternative explanations why or how those mosques in Foca might have been
8 Recall that we had a photograph of a military gun near the roof
9 of a mosque. Recall that we had evidence of various witnesses talking
10 about combat activities being undertaken by armed units of the ABiH from
11 mosques. D706, Witness Trivko Pljevalcic, paragraph 8:
12 "I was wounded on 14 July 1992. Concerning the fighting in the
13 town of Foca itself, it lasted for some ten days. Ever since the
14 conflict broke out, all our activity focused on defending or reacting to
15 the Muslim forces' attacks. Our first casualty happened on the first day
16 of the fighting, and he was killed by fire opened from the minaret of the
17 Aladza mosque. I know the Muslim forces used their religious facilities
18 for military purposes. They carried out training and stored weapons in
20 And then paragraph 9:
21 "As far as I know, the first fighter to be killed in Foca was
22 Radoljub Trifkovic. He was the one who was shot from the Aladza mosque.
23 I was some 10 metres from him when it happened. Dragan Nikolic was
24 killed on that occasion as well."
25 Then we had the testimony of Witness Vujicic. First at page 2420
1 of the transcript:
2 "So when the Muslims procured arms and imported weapons into
3 Foca, they predominantly put them in some places of worship. Some, not
4 all. This is where they stored their weapons, the explosive substances
5 and such-like. Furthermore, in parallel, in some of those facilities,
6 such as the Pilav mosque in Gornje Polje, they trained the Green Berets
7 and their armed forces and the Patriotic League."
8 Transcript page 24201.
9 Judge Orie asked the question at line 4:
10 "Yes, because now you're explaining to us that activities took
11 place in those mosques but the question was: When and in what manner
12 were the mosques destroyed or damaged? That was the question. Can you
13 please focus on that.
14 "The Witness: [Interpretation] These mosques were demolished for
15 the most part in conflicts, in combat activities, precisely because the
16 Muslims opened fire from the minarets of some of these mosques.
17 Personally, I personally could see Muslims shelling Serb positions and
18 Serb houses from some mosques. And then, on the other hand, later,
19 sometime in 1995, after the NATO forces fired several projectiles on
20 Foca, these mosques, as very old buildings, were damaged considerably and
21 demolished. This is how these places of worship came to be destroyed."
22 Again, Your Honours, you have to look at the totality of the
23 evidence. When an alternative explanation for a fact is seen, you have
24 to take the one that is giving credit to the accused. And as to these
25 mosques in Foca -- which is not to say that this is what happened to
1 mosques elsewhere, you have to look at every municipality based upon its
2 evidence and what was presented. But as to Foca, we have this evidence
3 which the Prosecution has not addressed and which provides an alternative
4 explanation under which General Mladic is not responsible and, therefore,
5 cannot be criminally responsible for the same.
6 In relation to something that Mr. Tieger brought up near the end
7 of his presentation today, he seemed to take offence at my use of the
8 term "eavesdropping" to describe what his staff did when they testified
9 about statements made between General Mladic and his attorneys, and he
10 claimed that it occurred because Prosecution staff just happened to be
11 where they were supposed to be and they heard things. But he didn't
12 address how Prosecution staff came to that position that they were at,
13 and I take great offence at his representations in that regard because he
14 is hiding that the Prosecution counsel instructed that staff to be there
15 and instructed them to be able to listen in precisely on the privileged
16 communications of the accused and his counsel. For a fellow lawyer to
17 stand up and say what Mr. Tieger said makes me sick.
18 Similarly, at transcript page 18174, one of those Prosecution
19 staff members, Witness Sokola, specifically identified that Prosecution
20 counsel in this case tasked them with noting down everything that Mladic
21 said, even private affairs. That's at transcript page 18174. At
22 transcript page 18180, that same witness confirmed that all of the
23 communications were between Mladic and his Defence attorneys, not with
24 anyone else. When asked about how they came to be there, at 18172 the
25 witness identified that they were specifically tasked with staying in the
1 courtroom with the express purpose of listening in on the conversations.
2 And when asked if it was pointed out to them by Prosecution counsel that
3 communications between a defendant and their counsel is privileged, the
4 witness stated it was not pointed out to her at that time. So we have a
5 Prosecution office that sees no problem with destroying attorney/client
7 I ask you, Your Honours, I ask the world: Is that fair? Is that
8 how we want trials to be run by a Prosecution?
9 Now I'd like to move to Sarajevo. To begin with, it appears
10 based upon today's presentation that the Prosecution has conceded
11 proportionality and now focuses only on selectively. At temporary
12 transcript page 23, lines 6 through 9, Mr. Tieger said:
13 "The Defence knows full well why proportionality is not the focus
14 of the discussion of the terror campaign, and that is because it assumes
15 an effort to hit a legitimate military target which then requires an
16 assessment of the military value against the risk of collateral damage."
17 Well, Your Honours, we submit proportionality must be and is
18 required by law to be viewed to assess military action such as shelling.
19 We talk about -- or they talked about G1, a shelling campaign, which, by
20 the way, apart from Ms. Fadila Tarcin, I ask you have they identified and
21 brought any other alleged casualty from G1? They keep talking about a
22 lot of casualties but where's the evidence of that? How can we defend
23 against unknown casualties, unsubstantiated claims of casualties?
24 But let's talk about the evidence that exists of military targets
25 of the ABiH side, legitimate military targets, that were the target of
1 the selective fire that was engaged in G1. As to Bascarsija, we have
2 D802. As to Velesici, we have D653. As to Vratnik, we have P549. And
3 as to Sirokaca, D524. So if their claim is that there were no military
4 targets, that isn't supported by the evidence. There is an alternative
6 Now, furthermore, as to Sirokaca we have something more and I
7 want to address that next. Ms. Fadila Tarcin, is it really the Defence
8 that is misrepresenting her testimony? Rather than have you stand on my
9 words, I will read to you from the transcript of Witness Fadila Tarcin's
10 words and you can assess for yourselves, as the whole world can assess,
11 whether I am being faithful to those words or whether, as Mr. Tieger
12 said, we're the ones misrepresenting them. And again this is a
13 Prosecution witness. Transcript page 3424 [Realtime transcript read in
14 error "3242"]:
15 "Q. Thank you, madam, and I appreciate that. Now, in this
16 paragraph, you also state:
17 "'According to the locals, the shell came from Borije to the east
18 of us.'
19 "First of all, these locals -- are these locals the same
20 neighbours that we're talking about?
21 "A. Yes, the neighbours."
22 And I pause here. So was it Fadila Tarcin that said that the
23 shell came from Borije? No. Sorry, Mr. Tieger, she didn't.
24 Now I continue:
25 "Q. And this site that they had mentioned, Borije, could you
1 tell us how far away Borije is from that location, from the site where
2 you were injured?
3 "A. I really have no idea. One can see them, but I really have
4 no clue as to how many kilometres was distance.
5 "Q. What about in relation to the front lines? Where would
6 Borije be situated in regard to the front lines you earlier indicated as
7 being located as -- as being somewhere located above your houses?
8 "A. Opposite of us, due east. If you view it from Sirokaca, it
9 would be opposite, to the right."
10 And then at transcript page 3425, this examination continues --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for the interpreters when
12 reading. Thank you.
13 JUDGE ORIE: And, Mr. Ivetic, your earlier reference was to
14 transcript page 3242 which seems to be perhaps a mistake.
15 MR. IVETIC: It is, Your Honours. I meant to say 3424, and
16 that's why we are now at 3425, where Witness Tarcin was asked the
17 following question:
18 "Q. Thank you. And am I correct that this area of Borije was
19 held mainly by the forces loyal to the Izetbegovic government?
20 "A. I honestly don't know that."
21 Now, we move on to the other part of Ms. Fadila Tarcin's
22 testimony at transcript page 3447. And again Your Honours, this was
23 Judge Orie questioning the witness.
24 "Judge Orie: Before I give an opportunity to re-examine the
25 witness, Ms. Hochhauser, I would have one question for you. I do
1 understand from your statement that you were wounded by shrapnel when a
2 neighbouring house was hit by a projectile. Is that correctly
4 "The Witness: [Interpretation] That's correct.
5 "Judge Orie: Now, have you later seen the impact on that house
6 of your neighbour's, the impact of that shell, if it did hit the house
8 "The Witness: [Interpretation] Yes, it hit the house itself and,
9 yes, I did see that.
10 "Judge Orie: Now, could you tell us was the impact on the side
11 of the house facing the hill, uphill therefore; or was the impact from
12 downhill? Or neither of the two, that's also a possibility.
13 "The Witness: [Interpretation] It was facing downhill, that is to
14 say, facing town.
15 "Judge Orie: Facing town. Which means that the impact -- if I
16 would take the house and look from the impact, that it would be rather
17 the -- from the direction of the river, from the valley, rather than from
18 uphill. Is that correctly understood?
19 "The Witness: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
20 "Judge Orie: Thank you."
21 Your Honours, there is no linkage between this shell and
22 General Mladic. The Prosecution has not provided that. They've provided
23 evidence that is possible of multiple interpretations and conclusions,
24 some of which exonerate General Mladic and under operation of law those
25 are the ones that you must accept.
1 Now, turning to Sarajevo -- I guess I have to now go into private
2 session for just a brief moment.
3 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
4 [Private session]
3 [Open session]
4 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
6 MR. IVETIC: In relation to Sarajevo, the Prosecution claimed
7 that you don't need to look at defended city because the Prosecution
8 never once talked about Sarajevo being an undefended city. Well, on the
9 one hand, that's Mr. Tieger's way of admitting that Sarajevo was a
10 defended city but trying to wiggle away from what that means under the
11 law and it is very critical.
12 But before we get there, I'm surprised that Mr. Tieger does not
13 know what his very own indictment alleges because it is very clear as to
14 Counts 9 and 10 as to Sarajevo, Count 6 as to murder, that these charges
15 are brought pursuant to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute. And,
16 Your Honours, if you remember when I read the other day and when
17 Mr. Tieger asked what Statute, what Statute, I read from the ICTY
18 Statute, which in Article 3, which the Prosecution cites in their
19 indictment, clearly says that the violations that are being prosecuted
20 against relate to attacks or bombardments by whatever means of undefended
21 towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings. Hence, the Prosecution did
22 explicitly indicate for Counts 9 and 10 and 6 that those localities were
23 undefended which they have now conceded is not the case.
24 Acquittal, Your Honours.
25 Defended city applies not just to Sarajevo. It applies to
1 Srebrenica. It applies to every single locality in the municipalities
2 wherein there was an armed military force that was posing a defence of
3 that locale and refused to render the city an open city.
4 Now, let's look at the law. What is an undefended city?
5 Article 59(2), Additional Protocol I, says an undefended city is an
6 inhabited place near or in a zone where armed forces are in contact which
7 is open for occupation by an adverse party. If there is no agreement in
8 place, the following four conditions must also be met. All combatants,
9 mobile weapons, and mobile military equipment have been evacuated.
10 Was that Sarajevo? No. Was that Srebrenica? No. Was that
11 those villages in the municipalities that had ABiH units situated within
12 them or armed Bosnian Muslim paramilitaries within them? No.
13 The second condition is no hostile use is made of fixed military
14 installations or establishments.
15 Was that Sarajevo? No. Was that Srebrenica? No.
16 No acts of hostility are committed by the authorities or by the
18 And, 4: No activities in support of military operations are
20 Commentary to AP I, Article 59, states roads and railways passing
21 through the non-defended locality must not be used for the movement of
22 combatants or military equipment, not even for transit purposes.
23 Recall the tunnel in Sarajevo. Recall the existence of ABiH
24 forces in Sarajevo.
25 And Article 59(6), Additional Protocol I, there must be signs in
1 place for the undefended city.
2 You will recall the testimony as to Srebrenica, for instance,
3 that there was not any signs marking the alleged demilitarised zone.
4 Now, if we look at the BiH military instructions of 1992, even
5 they concede for a locale to be undefended it has to either be recognised
6 by the parties or fulfil certain conditions, including lack of a defence
7 or armed forces, lack of military units for the purpose of transporting
8 military material, lack of activities of a military importance, lack of a
9 liaison with local armed forces and allied armed forces.
10 The SFRY military manual from 1988 says that an undefended locale
11 must be in accord with the New Delhi draft rules of 1956. When a
12 locality is declared to be an open town, the adverse party shall be
13 notified. "The latter is bound to reply, and if it agrees to recognise
14 the locality ... as an open town ... in the absence of special conditions
15 which may, in any particular case, be agreed upon with the adverse party,
16 a locality, in order to be declared an 'open town,' must satisfy the
17 following conditions: It must not be defended or contain any armed
18 force; it must discontinue all relations with any national or allied
19 armed forces; it must stop all activities of a military nature or for a
20 military purpose ... it must stop all military transit through the town."
21 Now, Your Honours, we have at various times in the case talked
22 about defended city. We've presented military manuals of the UK and the
23 United States that show this vision of what is an undefended city and
24 therefore not a legitimate target and what is a defended city and is a
25 legitimate target, under SFRY law complies with what all armies in the
1 world likewise agree with.
2 So, in our submissions, Sarajevo, for instance, is not an
3 undefended locale. It is a defended locale. We have multiple military
4 targets that are in Sarajevo that are legitimate to be selected for fire.
5 We have, for instance, significant ABiH deployment through the
6 neighbourhood of Hrasnica, including the forward command post of the
7 104th Brigade at Hrasnicki Stan; D559, paragraph 2. We also have the
8 ABiH special forces training centre at Alekse Santic school; D559,
9 paragraph 21. Two sky-scrapers, and there were machine-guns in place in
10 one flat a couple of stories under that or above that were families
11 living. Colonel Sekovac testified as to that, transcript page 24036.
12 And D559, paragraph 19, talks about the post office in Hrasnica being
13 used for military purposes.
14 As to Sokolje, two trailer-trucks loaded with dynamite were
15 located at Sokolje; D2015, page 2.
16 As to Alipasino Polje, we have information that a very large
17 number of Green Berets are inside the Sarajevo RTV building every day.
18 There are 50 to 70 of them at a given time. D2015, D453, Witness
20 We heard that the agricultural complex also had military
21 activities; T21067.
22 Dolac-Malta near the Geodetski Zavod, the Geodesic Institute,
23 P468, paragraph 9; the Unis sky-scraper, D647; the ZIS, D647; the Sibica
24 sky-scraper, D647; and the Vaso Miskina school, D489, paragraph 13.
25 In Dobrinja, there were mortars positioned in the park
1 approximately 500 to 700 metres from the front line; D559, paragraph 20.
2 In Nedzarici, the Oslobodjenje newspaper building was used by the ABiH.
3 We have that at D453. In Otoka, the Miljacka building was used; P647.
4 In Kosevo, the home for deaf and impaired of hearing children at
5 Fuada Midzica Street, a major communications centre was placed there on
6 purpose by the ABiH; D647, page 2. The special unit of the CSB Laste was
7 stationed in a catering establishment just opposite to the Olympic
8 museum; D647, page 2. The psychiatry clinic was used; D647, page 3. The
9 faculty of physical education was used; Witness Rasevic, D551. Kosevo
10 stadium, Kosevo Hospital, Kosevo Brdo tunnel, and the Nemanja Vlatkovic
11 school were likewise used by the ABiH; D551. In Bjelave, the trade
12 school as well as the students' hostel compound were used; D647. In
13 Cengic Vila, the Silvije Strahimira Kranjcevic elementary school was used
14 by HVO members; D647, page 2. We had the Zrak factory in Buca Potok;
15 D647. The Jewish cemetery in Kovacici and Soukbunari; D4849.
16 We have several maps in evidence, D469 and D470, for instance,
17 which talk about military targets that were positioned therein.
18 I could read a very long list but we have evidence all over the
19 place talking about military targets that are in Sarajevo that are
20 actively firing upon the Serbs. No, Your Honours. Sarajevo is the
21 textbook example of a defended city which becomes a legitimate target
22 because the ABiH has taken actions to place its forces near civilians to
23 use them as civilian shields. Therefore, proportionality must be a part
24 of our discussions, unlike what the Prosecution said in their
1 I remind Your Honours that the SRK was careful not to engage
2 civilians or civilian targets which had been confirmed as such by visual
3 observations or information gathered from informants and persons who had
4 fled Sarajevo. Witness Tusevljak testified about that at transcript
5 page 38460. We further have D535, paragraph 136; D824; D825; D643; D540;
6 D468; D658.
7 [Defence counsel confer]
8 MR. IVETIC: Your Honours, selectivity was at the forefront of
9 the targeting of the SRK. We heard Mr. Tieger say that General Mladic
10 had an army that could cut through Bosnia like a knife through cheese.
11 But it didn't. It didn't take Sarajevo. It didn't try to take Sarajevo.
12 It fought a defensive war, defending against attacks of the ABiH from the
13 city itself.
14 Now, commentary as to Article 52(2) of the Additional Protocols
15 of the Geneva Conventions at 2024 talks about definite military advantage
16 that can come from the destruction, capture or neutralisation. 2025
17 talks about a specific area can constitute a legitimate military
18 objective in view of its location and the circumstances. This is
19 commentary from Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and
20 the United States. And the United Kingdom made a similar statement in a
21 plenary meeting and repeated this in a written declaration when signing
22 the Additional Protocols.
23 Proportionality in the context of an attack on a defended town or
24 locale must be considered in the context of the conflict as a whole.
25 Bombardments are acceptable. See our information in the closing
1 arguments in relation to this heavy shelling. I would also point out
2 that several witnesses talked about this in court. Go look back at Piers
3 Tucker, General Fraser, Witness Butler, and Witness Kovac, who talked
4 about the defended city doctrine in very clear terms and, for instance,
5 discussed overwhelming force doctrine, which it was argued by I believe
6 it was Mr. Tucker that the NATO commanders who were in charge of doing
7 the bombings against the Serbs were so tied up in their vision of
8 overwhelming force as taught under NATO doctrine that they didn't want to
9 use restraint against the Serbs. There's no discussion of that by the
10 Prosecution. They would say that that doesn't exist. You have to always
11 use restraint. Well, if NATO can do something, the Serbs do less than
12 NATO does and they show restraint, why are they guilty? Again, it's the
13 Serbs not NATO doing it. That's the Prosecution's case.
14 There is a military strategy called shock and awe. It's tied to
15 overwhelming force. It's based on achieving rapid dominance over the
16 adversary by an initial imposition of overwhelming force and fire-power.
17 Rather than focusing solely on defeating the military capability of an
18 adversary, shock and awe or rapid dominance has the goal of affecting the
19 adversary's will beyond boundaries traditionally defined by military
20 capability and does not rely on military superiority.
21 Did the Serbs try to end the war early and therefore limit
22 casualties on all sides with G1? Let's recall the evidence also shows
23 that when G1 was started it was -- it was then cancelled as they saw that
24 too much of a risk of civilian damage existed, and then Karadzic said to
25 stop that activity. So selectivity was at the forefront of the minds of
1 the SRK as they were doing their activities around Sarajevo.
2 Article 3 of the Statute says you can't bomb an undefended town,
3 village, dwelling or building. It must be interpreted in light of
4 customary international law which arguably says you can bomb a defended
5 town, village, dwelling or building. Manual -- military manuals around
6 the world distinguish between each of these features or use the word
7 "locality." The importance of this is that each distinguishes between
8 buildings, villages, towns, and dwellings. And bombardments against
9 these towns and localities is therefore subject only to the normal
10 criteria for engaging a target. It must be a valid military target and
11 the attack must be proportionate.
12 The mere fact there were civilians in Sarajevo doesn't mean it
13 wasn't a valid military target. It just means it has to be treated as a
14 military target with the civilians taken into account and given
15 consideration as to proportionality, and this was done. Prosecution has
16 not shown that attacks on Sarajevo were disproportionate in these regard.
17 Other reasons why -- strike that.
18 As to Sarajevo, we have to stress again that under the Gotovina
19 case law, the Appeals Chamber at paragraph 66, we stress that the very
20 presence of mobile mortars in Sarajevo calls in question the
21 Prosecution's allegation that the SRK fired indiscriminately, and again
22 the Gotovina Appeals Chamber at paragraph 66 said that the presence of
23 mobile mortars "raises reasonable doubt whether even artillery impact
24 sites particularly distant from fixed artillery targets considered
25 legitimate ... demonstrate that unlawful shelling took place."
1 Given the biases of international witnesses who were not in a
2 position to judge the fire of the SRK as indiscriminate, this undermines
3 their assertions about both the origin and impact of the artillery and
4 small-arms fire in Sarajevo.
5 At paragraph 79 of the Gotovina Appeals Judgement, it was
6 effectively held that the observations of witnesses with no artillery
7 experience and whose vantage points made it difficult to determine where
8 the shells were directed at or actually landed was not sufficient to base
9 a finding that the shelling was indiscriminate.
10 Your Honours, the same applies to this Prosecution's evidence as
11 to Sarajevo.
12 The Gotovina and Markac Appeals Judgement says that you can't
13 apply strict liability. You can't say that any shell that lands more
14 than 200 metres from a military target was indiscriminate because that
15 doesn't take into account such things as wind, temperature, and distance.
16 That's at paragraph 60 to 61 of that Judgement.
17 Now let's talk about what I said before, where is the evidence of
18 any victims of G1 proven beyond a reasonable doubt? The Prosecution has
19 presented P7171, a report which is a list of people that died on a day,
20 15 November 1993. There's no evidence as to how they died. No evidence
21 linking them to G1. No evidence that they were in civilian locations as
22 opposed to being unfortunate civilians held hostage by the ABiH who would
23 have put their positions in their midst. There is no evidence that these
24 victims are even civilians. They could be combatants.
25 Another Prosecution Exhibit, P7731, says six people died in the
1 latest barrage. Again, no identification for these six victims of any of
2 these factors.
3 And, again, despite all this talk of casualties, the Prosecution
4 brought Fadila Tarcin and insists on using Fadila Tarcin to try to meet
5 the onerous burden of proof. They can't get to the top of the pyramid,
6 Your Honours. Not with that evidence.
7 Now with regard to modified aerial bombs, Mr. Tieger pointed to
8 various evidence and he mentioned Witness Radojcic. Let's recall that
9 Witness Radojcic appraised the modified aerial bombs as being quite
10 accurate. As Mr. Tieger even conceded, the testimony of Mr. Radojcic
11 says that his unit prepared the launcher based upon schematics, drawings.
12 They didn't just put something together without expertise. They had a
13 document how to use it.
14 Mr. Tieger focused on Mr. Radojcic as to the firing tables but
15 let's recall Colonel Radojcic is the commander of the brigade. Let's
16 recall his testimony that he had a professional officer, in fact, it was
17 the only professional officer apart from him in that brigade, who
18 happened to be the artillery commander, who therefore would be in charge
19 of using the modified aerial bomb launching system with other artillery
20 in the course of actions and would know how to use the firing tables,
21 would know how to use the equipment. And let's recall Colonel Radojcic
22 who stated that he fired -- that his units fired three modified aerial
23 bombs and all three were on target. So to use Colonel Radojcic as some
24 sort of example of these weapons being imprecise, no, they can't do that.
25 That's not what Colonel Radojcic said. That's not what their evidence
1 says. So you have to look at that when reaching your ultimate
3 Similarly, Your Honours, as the Prosecution has tried to do this
4 entire case, they're scared of and they run away from the firing tables
5 from the modified aerial bomb launchers, to the point now where even
6 Mr. Tieger claims they're not in evidence. They are in evidence,
7 Your Honours. Multiple witnesses talked about them. Defence experts
8 referenced them and provided an excerpt. Later we got the official
9 documents and Your Honours do have all that. And so to say they're not
10 in evidence, really? The Prosecution's case is based upon the belief
11 that they didn't exist but they do exist.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: What's the exhibit number, Mr. Ivetic?
13 MR. IVETIC: Mr. Lukic is trying to assist me and is having some
14 difficulty, so I'll move on and I'll try to get back to that once he
15 locates the exhibit numbers. But you will recall with Witness Subotic,
16 there was an extract from the 1995, I believe, firing tables for the
17 Kosava rocket-launcher system.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Before we have further confusion, it was my
19 understanding that when Mr. Tieger was referring to firing tables, he
20 meant the A4 firing tables one of the witnesses referred to, whereas
21 firing tables which were produced I think at a later stage is mainly what
22 you may be talking about. I'm --
23 MR. IVETIC: I'm talking --
24 JUDGE ORIE: I know that when we're talking about firing tables
25 that it might not be exactly the same that you are talking about.
1 MR. IVETIC: I believe I'm talking about the same thing that
2 Mr. Tieger is talking about since he mentioned Kosava, which is the name
3 of the system, for which we have firing tables from 1995 and then later
4 years as well. But we do have ones from 1995. And again, let's recall
5 the evidence that the modified aerial bomb were not used until 1995. We
6 also have evidence of other witnesses of how they were tested, including
7 at the artillery grounds at Kalinovik.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, can you confirm we are talking about the
9 same -- not to further explain, but are we talking about the same, when
10 you said firing tables not in evidence?
11 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Mr. President, I'm not sure who's -- if you
12 mean we are talking about the same -- I was not referring to the firing
13 table on the -- the alleged firing table on the A4 that I spoke about in
14 connection with Witness Radojcic. I was referring to a later production,
15 temporary production of documents that were submitted once but not -- but
16 ultimately not tendered into evidence.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's then clear that we know what the
18 parties are talking about when referring to firing tables in this
20 Please proceed.
21 [Defence counsel confer]
22 MR. IVETIC: I'll now move onto Srebrenica. And again, let's
23 look at this meeting that is the genesis of everything because we saw the
24 other day the Prosecution concedes there was no JCE to eliminate, no JCE
25 to kill prior to this meeting. And we went through the other day the
1 Prosecution's own paragraphs of their final brief which talk about how
2 they don't know when this meeting happened. Your Honours, how can
3 something be proven beyond a reasonable doubt if the Prosecution admits
4 they don't know?
5 And then Mr. Tieger talked about the dinner being discussed at
6 paragraph 1174 and thereafter in the final brief of the Prosecution. But
7 what do they say about that? And I'd like to read that to you because
8 they only mention that there was a dinner, and then 1175 talks about the
9 decision by Mladic and other members of the JCE to separate and murder
10 the Muslim men and boys must have been discussed and decided upon
11 sometime between the evening of 11 July when Mladic became aware of the
12 large --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, could I meanwhile ask you to check
14 whether you referred to 1175 or --
15 MR. IVETIC: That's correct, Your Honours. I'm talking about
16 paragraph number 1175 of the Prosecution's final brief.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
18 MR. IVETIC: Became aware of a number of Muslim men in Potocari
19 who would soon come under the SF's control and the third Hotel Fontana
20 meeting at 10.00 hours on 12 July, where he announced that the SF would
21 be screening or inspecting the Muslim men at Potocari.
22 So again they have presented you a wide range and said sometime
23 they must have had a meeting and they must have agreed to a crime because
24 he mentioned that there would be screening or inspecting. So they're
25 linking the screening or inspecting to the crime. Mr. Tieger said that
1 today as well.
2 Well, Your Honours, we've had testimony in this case of a Colonel
3 Pieter Boering, a Dutch officer, not a Serb, and here's what he said
4 about screening. This is at transcript page 10080:
5 "Q. Will you agree with me that according to military
6 regulations it is fully legitimate when you have POWs to make a
7 selection, conduct a triage, and to check whether such a group of people
8 contains persons who might be suspected of having committed war crimes?
9 "A. Yes, that seems like a standard procedure if you're -- that
10 you interrogate POWs."
11 So, Your Honours, you cannot take any announcement of plans to do
12 a triage as evidencing criminal intent. Because their witness told you
13 that's standard operating procedure in every military.
14 Now let's continue with 1175 because this mysterious meeting that
15 has been recast as a dinner that still they're not sure when the dinner
16 happened, it could have been even on the 12th. Who has dinner on the
17 morning of the 12th? No, Your Honours, they're making up the dinner.
18 Let's continue reading what it says in 1175 --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please slow down, Mr. Ivetic.
20 MR. IVETIC: I will. I'm conscious of the time that I have.
21 In deciding to kill the able-bodied men in Potocari, Mladic would
22 have consulted with Krstic and his senior intelligence and security
23 officers present in Bratunac, Popovic, Kosoric, and Jankovic. And then
24 they have footnote 5077 of their final brief for which the sole
25 supporting evidence is General Milovanovic and several citations from the
1 transcript. I repeat again: None of those citations say what the
2 Prosecution claims, which is the heart of the Prosecution's case. They
3 don't have evidence supporting it. Let's go through those citations.
4 The first one is transcript page 16937. What did General
5 Milovanovic say? He said at that point Mladic had regular daily meetings
6 when he was at the Main Staff. Does that evidence a crime? No. Is
7 Mladic at the Main Staff between the 11th and 12th of July? No. That
8 reference has nothing to do with what the Prosecution has cited it for.
9 The next reference, transcript page 16946 to 7. In that section
10 Milovanovic explains that in his or Mladic's absence, the most senior
11 chief of sector who would be in charge of the meeting would chair the
12 meeting. Again, does that relate to anything that they're alleging as to
13 Hotel Fontana? No, it does not.
14 The next cited reference by the Prosecution is to transcript page
15 16949 to 16952, wherein General Milovanovic is explaining briefings,
16 attendees, agendas, monthly report meetings, et cetera. He is not
17 talking about Fontana. He is not presenting any affirmative evidence
18 upon which had Prosecution can rely upon to claim that there was a
19 meeting, at dinner or otherwise, with persons to create a JCE.
20 The last citation that they cite to is transcript page 16955 to
21 16957, where Milovanovic is talking about so-called collegiums of the
22 commander and how decisions are made during the collegiums. Again,
23 nothing to do with Hotel Fontana. Nothing to do with this alleged dinner
24 that they're now making up out of thin air. Out of the thin air. Look
25 at their brief. They have no evidence of any illegal activities
1 discussed or agreed to by my client General Lukic -- General Mladic, I'm
2 sorry, as to the alleged JCE to eliminate in Srebrenica. Nothing at all,
3 Your Honours. Is that how one reaches the top of the pyramid and removes
4 all reasonable doubt? No, Your Honours. Their case it fraught with
5 reasonable doubt.
6 As to the fuel order, what the Prosecution ignores is what we
7 have detailed at paragraphs 3293 through 32 -- pardon me, 3302 of our
8 final brief which is not only that the document P1500 comes from the
9 operations department but, rather, that there's other information, namely
10 from other witnesses talking about how other people could sign the
11 general's name to things and that the initials SR did not always mean
12 that the individual was aware of the document or that they had actually
13 signed it. I refer you to Witness Stevanovic at transcript page 35250.
14 He was the communications officer at the Main Staff, he would know. He
15 stressed that people could have used the accused's signature to get an
16 order executed even if the accused was unaware of it. That's at
17 transcript page 35266.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Ivetic, I'm just -- I know that you're not
19 assisted by someone who looks at timing perhaps or perhaps you are.
20 Could you tell us where we are in terms of time?
21 MR. IVETIC: Seven to ten minutes.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Seven to ten minutes. Then could you just give me
23 one moment.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
1 [Defence counsel confer]
2 MR. IVETIC: Stevanovic affirmed that it was possible for people
3 to send orders under accused's name even if they did not believe this
4 aligned with the accused's wishes. That's at transcript page 35266 of
6 Now, we have other documents in evidence that show where Mladic
7 is during this time-period and it's not at the Main Staff.
8 We have P364, a Prosecution document, that indicates that
9 Mr. Mladic met with a US delegation in Dobanovci. Again, he is in
10 Belgrade. On 13 September 1995, that's the day before the order in
11 question at 1800 hours. Thus, we also have a document issued under
12 General Mladic as SR signature emanating from a different number, not the
13 operations unit, which announces the cease-fire agreement that has been
14 reached with the Americans. So again what is General Mladic doing? Is
15 he dealing with fuel orders? Is he dealing with Momir Nikolic's
16 asanacija campaign? No. He is trying to negotiate peace.
17 And let's recall Momir Nikolic's own testimony that he gave the
18 name "asanacija" to his operation and he never once said it was from
19 General Mladic's orders. He said from the Main Staff. It was -- if it
20 was General Mladic, why would be he so vague?
21 Your Honours, reasonable doubt exists as to all facets of the
22 Prosecution's case. And rather than relying on hyperbole, I again urge
23 you to look at our very detailed final brief which lists all of our
24 arguments, is supported by citations to evidence, and demonstrates that
25 for all aspects of the case, General Mladic cannot be held criminally
1 responsible because this Prosecution has not brought you to the top of
2 the pyramid. They've not eliminated reasonable doubt as was their burden
3 and now they're trying to run away from that.
4 Your Honours, I thank you for the time, and I see that I've gone
5 over. I thank you for that indulgence. And again, I have nothing at
6 this time to state on behalf of General Mladic.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Ivetic.
8 This, then, is the end of a trial which lasted for a couple of
9 years. Before we adjourn, sine die, I wanted to -- and that's clear to
10 you all, I think - I wanted to tell that you where a trial which is
11 mainly oriented to the adversarial tradition, that the role of the
12 parties is very important, and the Chamber expresses its appreciation for
13 the parties for assisting the Chamber in performing the task which is
14 still before us; that is, to deliver a Judgement in this case.
15 But apart from thanking the parties, I would also like to thank
16 the Registry and the various departments of the Registry, including
17 Victims and Witness Section, the technicians who are assisting us, the
18 security, all those in the Registry which have assisted us, also
19 interpreters, translators, court reporters, all others who have made it
20 possible to conduct this trial. The Chamber would express its
21 appreciation for that support.
22 We will adjourn, sine die. We stand adjourned.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.07 p.m.,
24 sine die.