Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11121

1 Friday, 23 June 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

5 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning. As you can see, Judge Thelin is not

6 able to sit this morning. Judge Van den Wyngaert and I will continue to

7 sit under the rule.

8 Ms. Regue.

9 MS. REGUE: Good morning, Your Honours. Just a brief procedural

10 matter. We actually like to request to the Trial Chamber to tender some

11 documents from the back table next week. There are some documents which

12 actually we have already seek leave to the Trial Chamber beginning of this

13 week, which are the indictment and the judgement of the Belgrade Ovcara

14 trial and there are just very few documents which have already been

15 disclosed and some of the 65 ter documents, and we think we might run

16 short of time this -- today, actually. So we would actually like to

17 clarify this issue next week, if possible --

18 JUDGE PARKER: I take it the Defence has not had adequate time to

19 be aware of these matters this morning?

20 MS. REGUE: We actually put that into the e-court system but ...

21 JUDGE PARKER: Well, then it would need, I would suggest, to be

22 Monday afternoon.

23 MS. REGUE: That's fine with us, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE PARKER: Is that a practical problem for anybody? Very

25 well. It will be Monday afternoon, and we would sit at 2.15. I assume --

Page 11122

1 yes, we have a court available.

2 MS. REGUE: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

4 No other matter then? The witness, please.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE PARKER: Good morning, General. Could I remind you of the

7 affirmation you made at the beginning of your evidence, which still

8 applies.

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.

10 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Borovic. An hour 20 remaining, I think.

11 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.


13 Cross-examination by Mr. Borovic: [Continued]

14 Q. Good morning, Witness.

15 A. Good morning.

16 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, before we begin, I

17 went through the transcript after the hearing and I saw that one word was

18 omitted. We received an answer from the witness to a question. It had to

19 do with berets. I asked whether it would be a blue, green, or a burgundy

20 beret. At that time, berets were part of the uniform. So the

21 word "burgundy" was omitted from the transcript, and we know why this is

22 important. So there's no need to perhaps go through the tapes right now.

23 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues] ...

24 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] I think that this would be

25 sufficient, and the witness has already answered that. Thank you.

Page 11123

1 Q. General, sir, yesterday, at the very end when I had already

2 stopped talking you said that Radic was evidently present when the

3 prisoners were beaten in front of the hospital. My question is: Would

4 you be kind enough to provide some proof of that assertion?

5 A. Thank you, Mr. Borovic. You're actually misquoting me, because I

6 didn't say that. I didn't say there was evidence that he was there when

7 the prisoners were beaten; I said that there was evidence that he was in

8 the hospital. Can I refer you, if you want an example, to four example.

9 Witness P030, which is my footnote 126, where at line 973215 the witness

10 said: "The officer occasionally addressed the person next to him,

11 addressing him with: 'Captain Radic, carry out this search.'" He then

12 goes on, referring to the activities of Major Sljivancanin, and he

13 concludes at line 9734:2: "You've told us that he was giving orders and

14 you used the name Captain Radic. Did you personally actually hear him use

15 the phrase 'Captain Radic,' or is it something you've been told?"

16 The witness answered: "He wasn't issuing orders to soldiers, but

17 rather to the men standing next to him. He addressed him as 'Captain

18 Radic.' He said that several times, four to five times, maybe even more,

19 and I could hear it clearly."

20 That is one example. If you wish to hear another --

21 Q. Thank you. Thank you. We know what that witness told the

22 Prosecution. My question is: When you were drafting the report, other

23 than the statement of that one single witness, did you try to check

24 through other witnesses who were together with witness P-030, information

25 relating to the presence of Captain Radic, from witnesses who were

Page 11124

1 captured, who were in front of the hospital, and who were searched? Did

2 you find any trace in order to prove, without a reasonable doubt, a

3 principle that applies to experts, to reach the conclusion that you

4 reached in paragraph 75 [as interpreted] of your report?

5 A. Your Honour, if I can refer you to paragraph 84 of my report, I

6 say: "It is apparent that Captain Miroslav Radic was" --

7 Q. I apologise just for a second. There's a mistake in the

8 transcript. It says paragraph 75 in the transcript, but the paragraph

9 that I am referring to is paragraph 84. 84.

10 [No interpretation]

11 A. I'm sorry, I'm not getting any translation.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please repeat his question.

13 JUDGE PARKER: Would you please repeat, Mr. Borovic. There seem

14 to have been a breakdown in the translation.

15 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] No problem.

16 Q. Sir, when you were working on your report, did you have access to

17 evidence in relation to this point -- or rather, the presence of

18 Captain Radic, as described by Witness 030? Any other witness who was

19 together with Witness 030, they were all detained and they were next to

20 this witness, and do any of these other witnesses describe this in a

21 similar way and do you have any references to any such witnesses in the

22 report that you drafted or was that the only statement that you used as

23 proof of that particular assertion?

24 A. Let me say, to begin with, that I looked at a whole host of

25 documents which are annexed in my report. I didn't reference every single

Page 11125

1 statement which appear -- which stated that Captain Radic was in the

2 hospital, but I took -- I merely plucked out examples. In my original

3 report, the example I actually quoted was see for exam -- see, for

4 example - this is footnote 126 - Witness 61, Borivoje Tesic. Now, for

5 reasons explained to the Court yesterday --

6 Q. Would you just stop for a moment, please, General, sir. This is

7 underlined in red. Yesterday I didn't want to interrupt you, so I allowed

8 you to deal with that, but then now today again you're talking about

9 Witness 61, Tesic. Actually, that witness did not testify before the

10 Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber doesn't know what you are talking about,

11 although it would suit me very well for you to quote the entire statement

12 by Tesic provided to the Prosecution, if you read it. And there are some

13 other points, but I don't want to go into -- and follow that line of

14 thought, although that would suit me very much.

15 But are there any other testimonies, other than the testimony of

16 Witness 030, and then we can finish with this topic?

17 A. I was simply answering your question. I'm sure there are. I

18 haven't referenced them. I took example references just to state the

19 point.

20 Q. Very well. Thank you. Since you cited only one example and not a

21 number of them, then it would still be your position then that that was

22 the only piece of evidence. My next question is --

23 A. No, that would not be my position. I did not say that.

24 Q. Very well. We will leave that up to the Trial Chamber.

25 Did you read what Witnesses Berghofer, Cakalic, (redacted),

Page 11126

1 Karlovic, (redacted) stated in their testimony before this Trial Chamber?

2 Did you read the statements of these witnesses given before this Trial

3 Chamber or not?

4 A. Berghofer appears in my annex; Cakalic appears in my annex;

5 (redacted) does not; Karlovic does; (redacted) does not. So it would appear

6 I have read some of them but not all of them.

7 Q. Thank you. And are they in this group of 16 witnesses that --

8 whose statements you analysed or not?

9 A. Well, I have answered to the effect that those named by me are in

10 my annex and they were, therefore, witness statements that I was given and

11 I would have read them, the ones I mentioned.

12 Q. Very well.

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 JUDGE PARKER: They will be redacted, Mr. Borovic.

22 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 Q. General, sir, could you please give me a quote of any of these

24 witnesses testifying to the fact that they were at the hospital on the

25 20th of November in front of the emergency entrance, and they were

Page 11127

1 searched and boarded buses. Could you please quote any statement by any

2 of these witnesses that would confirm what (redacted) said -- actually, I

3 apologise, it's Witness P-030?

4 JUDGE PARKER: That will be a redaction as well.

5 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. If you don't, it's fine, we can continue so as not to lose any

7 more time. I don't know if you referenced that in your footnotes.

8 A. I have -- the references in my footnotes are clear. I have not

9 referenced the other statements and I consider it unreasonable to ask me

10 to quote from their witness statements without having them on the screen

11 so I can comment on it.

12 Q. General, sir. You are defending your expert report and you should

13 be prepared so that everything that you are charging the accused with --

14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Borovic, I'd suggest you get on with your

15 cross-examination. The witness made it very clear he can't remember the

16 detail of every statement he's looked at. If you want him to comment on a

17 particular part, you need to put the statement to him. Otherwise, he has

18 indicated generally what he relied on, but is not been able to remember

19 the detail without refreshing his memory.

20 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Then, with the

21 permission of the Trial Chamber, I will do that. I didn't think that we

22 could do it that way with the witness but it's reference 5279, line 21 of

23 the transcript of March 1st, 2006. One of the witnesses stated the

24 following: "When they searched us, I heard Major Sljivancanin saying that

25 we had to board the buses.

Page 11128

1 "Q. Who did he order this to?

2 "A. To a person who looked as if he didn't have a rank. He was

3 about 40 years old."

4 Next question: "The situation in the barracks."

5 The witness said on page 5459, line 6, to the question: "Do you

6 recall anyone entering the buses and calling their names out," says:

7 "No, I don't recall. Nobody read out any names. There were no lists,

8 nothing."

9 Q. Did you read this statement by Witness Berghofer or not?

10 A. He's in my annex, so if that's in his witness statement, I almost

11 certainly would have read it, but it cuts against Witness P-030, who

12 describes Captain Radic quite clearly calling out names at the buses at

13 the JNA barracks, line 9739:20 of Witness P-030.

14 "I saw no officers until the same Captain Radic from the hospital

15 got on the bus carrying some kind of a list. Then he read out several

16 names of the list, then these people got off the bus. That's the same

17 Captain Radic from the hospital."

18 Q. Thank you. Since you stated this on a number of occasions, and we

19 know about this, I just wanted to refresh your memory, Witness P031,

20 transcript page 3240, line 4, of the 25th of January, 2006, stated in

21 response to these same questions: "At that time, the JNA major was in

22 charge of the whole operation. All of that was happening under his

23 control and his orders."

24 On page 3240, line 20:

25 "Q. Did you see any other officer in a JNA uniform at that time,

Page 11129

1 the 20th of November?

2 "A. At that time, I didn't see any other JNA officer, but later I

3 heard from prisoners who were together with me at the camp that there was

4 another officer there in the hospital compound. He was a lieutenant

5 and he participated in the searching of the people and escorted the

6 people to the buses." On page 3248, line 4 to 20 he states in response to

7 a question by my learned friend, the Prosecutor: "When you talked about

8 the gentleman or the officer who entered the bus I think you used the

9 word 'lieutenant.' Who was this lieutenant, did you see him before?

10 "A. I don't know who that man was and I wasn't able to see him.

11 He was standing at the front entrance of the bus, and that was the officer

12 who was in charge of lining everyone up, physical searches, and escorting

13 the prisoners to the buses."

14 The Prosecutor asks: "May I try to clarify the situation so that

15 there is no confusion or misunderstanding? You said that you encountered

16 a major. Did you find out that that major or lieutenant was at the

17 hospital? Now you're only talking about the lieutenant in the bus. The

18 lieutenant whom you saw in the bus, is that the same lieutenant whom you

19 saw at the hospital?

20 "A. 'Yes.'" And so on and so forth. This is a second statement

21 about that particular incident which does not correspond to the statement

22 of Witness P-030. Did you review this statement, and as an expert who has

23 to provide his expert opinion, check the differences in statements

24 relating to the same event in order to reach your conclusion? Or did you

25 think, because they don't confirm that statement, that that should not be

Page 11130

1 referenced or given any importance?

2 A. My expert opinion --

3 MR. MOORE: Your Honour, I'm sorry, I don't mean to interrupt. My

4 learned friend gave the pseudonym, but I think the witness himself does

5 not know the name. And I obviously don't want that to be given in open

6 court. But if the witness is to give a precise answer, it may well be

7 advisable for the name to be given discreetly, either in written form or

8 not.

9 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. Moore, the witness was quite

10 clear yesterday, and he quoted three names, the transcripts of whose

11 testimony he used. He did not mention that particular name. So perhaps

12 we don't need to mention the name and there would be no need for

13 redactions. I'm going to finish that here. I'm just waiting for the

14 response. I mentioned six names. I identified them, then we redacted

15 some of them, and the question to the witness is whether anyone else

16 confirms what Witness P-030 stated. I don't think the witness confirmed

17 that, but I think we have lost a lot of time here. Thank you.

18 Q. Sir, did you know that on Croatian television for a long time the

19 film titled --

20 A. May I interrupt. You've asked me a question, you've gone on at

21 length, you haven't allowed me to answer it. Can I comment on the

22 question you asked me, and the lengthy transcript-selected sections that

23 you have read out. There were no names in that. There is -- the

24 transcript you read out talks about "a major." From my reading, I read

25 that to be Major Sljivancanin, but he's not named. But I don't know. I'd

Page 11131

1 have to see the whole statement. It also goes on at length about a

2 lieutenant. Now, my immediate expert opinion question would be: Are you

3 sure it's a lieutenant or could it have been a captain? How expert are

4 you at telling the badges of rank? Because the only -- if it had

5 said "captain," then it would have pointed immediately, in my expert

6 opinion, because it ties up with P-030, to the captain being Radic. The

7 fact that it is termed "a lieutenant" in the testimony, does not

8 necessarily means it wasn't a captain. So I -- it doesn't prove that

9 either he was there or he wasn't there, in my opinion.

10 Q. General, sir -- actually, the answer was not convincing in this

11 case --

12 JUDGE PARKER: That's not a matter, Mr. Borovic. I've many times

13 had to comment to you about that, and our patience is getting short about

14 it. It's not for you to offer your personal opinions to a witness. This

15 witness will not be put off by them, but other witnesses can be and have

16 been and it's very improper for counsel to do it. Thank you.

17 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] All right. Thank you very much.

18 But I do believe that the witness should be impartial in answering --

19 experts should be impartial when answering questions. Of course, I'm not

20 obliged to respond to questions from the expert. But, Your Honour, I

21 think that you are right. And I'm not going to abuse your trust, so it

22 will just be question and answer.

23 Q. Sir, have you heard of the film "hundred days of Vukovar," which

24 was shown throughout Croatia after the fall of Vukovar?

25 A. I think I've heard it, but I haven't seen it.

Page 11132

1 Q. Thank you. If I were to tell you that in that film there is an

2 officer, a captain, with moustache and a helmet, and who utters the

3 following words: "Vukovar must fall tonight." And if I were to tell you

4 that in the announcement preceding the TV showing of the film it was

5 constantly said that this was Captain Radic, whereas in fact this is

6 Captain Sasa Bojkovski, would you tell me whether you saw that particular

7 excerpt from the movie where Sasa Bojkovski utters the words: "Vukovar

8 must fall."

9 A. I've answered that question. I said I haven't seen the film.

10 Q. All right. I asked you this precisely because Witness P-030

11 stated here that he had seen this film and that he knew that a wrong name

12 was linked with this person, that of Captain Radic. This was a propaganda

13 carried out in the media, and this is something that the Prosecution ought

14 to have checked.

15 Witness P-002, do you know what this witness stated about whether

16 he was present on the 20th of November in front of the hospital?

17 A. Not without you refreshing my memory.

18 Q. Did you read his statement -- or rather, transcript of his

19 testimony here in the courtroom?

20 A. He appears as witness number 12 in my annex, so I think I probably

21 read him, yes.

22 Q. I apologise. Witness 002 --

23 A. He's referenced at footnote 12 -- my footnote 125, where I

24 said: "Moreover he had his command post," that's Captain Radic,

25 "collocated in the house of a local TO commander," and the witness

Page 11133

1 statement for that is: "See, for example Witness" --

2 Q. I apologise, that's not what I'm referring to. General, sir,

3 that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about the hospital on the

4 20th of November. I asked you: Witness P-002 testified about that here

5 in the courtroom. Have you read what he said to the Court and can you

6 quote his statement concerning this fact? Do you know what Witness P-002

7 stated?

8 A. I don't believe I've seen Witness P-002's testimony, but please

9 tell me what he did state.

10 Q. Thank you. I think that you should have seen this, but let me

11 tell you what the witness said. First a video excerpt was shown to him.

12 The witness confirmed that he was in that excerpt, which in turn confirmed

13 his presence on the 20th of November in front of the hospital, as this was

14 taking place.

15 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Reference for Your Honours - it's

16 a bit unusual for me to do this, but I see you are allowing it -

17 10494/18.

18 MR. MOORE: I'm sorry again. It depends exactly what my learned

19 friend means by that question because I don't wish to pre-empt my learned

20 friend, but my recollection is that that witness did not arrive until the

21 actual -- what I will call the Ovcara evacuation, had left. And that was

22 his evidence.

23 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] I think you spoke too soon, and I

24 think it was improper of you to do that. We should have heard first what

25 the witness had to say. I would like to kindly ask you not to suggest to

Page 11134

1 a witness what she should give in his answer.

2 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Borovic --

3 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, were you following

4 this?

5 JUDGE PARKER: -- may I say something? We've been quiet because we

6 want to give you every opportunity to proceed the way you think best, but

7 can I point out this. It's important, if you see the issue to be

8 important, that you clarify with the witness whether -- which statements

9 he has read of witnesses, which statements he specifically relied on,

10 which testimonies he has read in addition to the pre-trial written

11 statements, and which testimonies, if any, he's relied on. That's all

12 important. But what is not important is to attempt, as it were, to put to

13 this witness that there is evidence contrary from the evidence that he has

14 actually relied on. You see, this expert has relied on certain factual

15 matters and he's told you where he's got them from, a statement made by

16 witness X, a statement made by witness Y, a book written by so-and-so, or

17 whatever. Now, it's for this Chamber to weigh-up whether those sources

18 are sufficient to establish the fact that the witness is proceeding to

19 accept and to include in his expert opinion.

20 It is for us to look at all the evidence, and in this case on any

21 one fact there's bound to be a variety of evidence, some agreement, some

22 disagreement, something of putting a different position altogether. And

23 we have to weigh-up whether that is established or not. As long as we

24 know what the witness has relied on, once we come to look at all the facts

25 we can say: Was that proved or not? Were those witnesses reliable or

Page 11135

1 not? And we can then conclude whether the witness was relying on what has

2 proved to be reliable testimony or statements or something that we can no

3 longer accept as reliable.

4 Does that help you understand that you really don't need to go as

5 far as you're going in this cross-examination?

6 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you. I'm

7 encouraged by what you said about what the Trial Chamber would do. I

8 know that there would be a 98 Rule Conference, and I thought that I

9 needed to clarify everything today. But all right, I have commenced with

10 my question but I will not pursue it, except for wanting to wrap this up.

11 Q. This witness, whom I mentioned, who knows Captain Radic, said that

12 he didn't see him there on the 20th of November in front of the hospital,

13 nor did he see any other officer whom he could recognise there.

14 So to conclude with this topic, as recommended by the Trial

15 Chamber, if I were to tell you that there is a claim and that there is a

16 witness who says: I'm the officer who conducted the frisking of the

17 detainees and took them to the bus and I'm the officer who entered the bus

18 with a list of 15 people, selected some of them, and then returned them to

19 the hospital and, in a way, set them free, would that challenge your

20 finding about the presence of Captain Miroslav Radic? And, my apologies,

21 the witness also said: "I didn't see Captain Radic there."

22 A. No, that would not change my finding because my finding is based

23 on witness statements that I have quoted. I note what you have said, and

24 I assume there were more than one officer -- indeed, I know there were

25 more than one officer at the hospital. It was a complex operation. There

Page 11136

1 must have been a number of officers there and a lot of soldiers. So I

2 don't see that the statement that you've read out, other than the

3 statement that says he didn't -- he didn't see Captain Radic, maybe -- I

4 can't comment on that or not. Maybe he was there, maybe he wasn't, maybe

5 he was in a different part of the hospital when this particular witness

6 was observing. I don't know. It doesn't change --

7 Q. All right.

8 A. To answer your question, it does not change my statement at all.

9 Q. I don't know if I'm overstepping my authorities, but the OTP has

10 statements of these witnesses and I think that it should be a duty to ask

11 to look at them following this. My next question: Can you tell us, very

12 briefly, something about an attack at a populated settlement as a type of

13 a combat activity? Briefly.

14 A. Fighting in built-up areas, as I would describe it, is a dirty and

15 messy business. It is extremely dangerous. It is a high-casualty,

16 high-risk operation. It is difficult to command and control. Do you want

17 me to go on?

18 Q. All right. If that's all you have to tell me. My next question:

19 When you spoke of resubordination, you explained that from the command and

20 control aspect and you pointed out logistics as an important factor,

21 correct?

22 A. Now, that's correct. On your previous question, that's not all I

23 had to tell you. I gave you the opportunity of whether you would wish me

24 to go on or not. I take it you do not want me to go on.

25 To the last question: Correct.

Page 11137

1 Q. That's correct, thank you. Can you tell us how many levels down

2 from the operations group can the detachments of Territorial Defence be

3 resubordinated as well as detachments of volunteers in their entirety? Or

4 in other words, if a commander of an operations group in his combat

5 disposition has under his command the units that I mentioned, can such a

6 commander resubordinate such units in their entirety to a commander of an

7 assault detachment?

8 A. I think that's more properly a question for an expert on JNA

9 doctrine.

10 Q. Does it mean that you don't have the answer to this question?

11 A. It means that I couldn't be certain that the answer I gave you

12 would be correct.

13 Q. Thank you. In that case, I will skip several questions.

14 If I were to tell you that commander of the 1st Assault

15 Detachment, Major Borivoje Tesic, toured the combat disposition only once,

16 combat disposition of the 3rd Company where, except for Captain Radic,

17 there was not a single officer because he lost all three platoon

18 commanders, either to death or to illness, how would you then judge the

19 responsibility of such a commander?

20 A. Captain Radic's responsibility does not change because he has

21 suffered casualties in his command --

22 Q. I apologise. My apologies. I meant commander of battalion. It

23 wasn't recorded. It says just "commander" on the transcript. So how

24 would you judge the responsibility of such a battalion commander? My

25 apologies again.

Page 11138

1 A. Under those circumstances, I would assume that the battalion

2 commander or assault detachment commander would raise that issue with

3 Captain Radic, inquire as to whether his subordinate commands could still

4 be effectively commanded by the next in the command chain, and if

5 Captain Radic was content, that would be all right. But the commanding

6 officer -- the detachment commander would realise there is some

7 vulnerability in this command. If Captain Radic said no, he was in urgent

8 need of reinforcements, if they were available, to help command his

9 subordinate units or subunits, then there would be a responsibility, if it

10 was possible to achieve, for the detachment commander to try and put that

11 into effect.

12 Q. I apologise. I'm receiving translation indicating that you

13 said "detachment commander." Who are you speaking of if -- assuming that

14 the interpretation is correct? I didn't ask you about any detachment

15 commander.

16 A. Well, the battalion -- yes, I used "detachment commander," perhaps

17 instead of "battalion commander" because at this -- well, it depends on

18 what stage you're talking about. But I think at some stage, yes,

19 battalion commanders were the assault detachment commanders.

20 Q. All right. Thank you, if that's what you meant. My follow-up

21 question: Since I said that there were no other officers in that unit

22 except for Captain Radic because he had lost all three platoon commander,

23 he had three platoons, Tesic came only once. I asked you about how

24 responsible that was of Tesic, not of Radic. And in relation to the

25 command that you explained at length and that doctrine, was it a duty of a

Page 11139

1 battalion commander to tour his subordinate commanders and units and to

2 assess the climate and the situation? What would you say to that?

3 A. I'd say yes to that.

4 Q. Thank you. Can a company commander decide on his own to use TO

5 detachments and Leva Supoderica Detachment in this same way as commander

6 of Operations Group South or commander of an assault detachment of the

7 JNA?

8 A. If a company commander has had detachments such as you describe

9 placed under his command, then he would have the responsibility for

10 employing them in the manner that he thought fit --

11 Q. Excuse me. I feel I'm getting the wrong interpretation. You say

12 if a company commander has detachments under his command, a company

13 commander cannot possibly have assault detachments under his command. Did

14 you make a mistake or was it a case of wrong interpretation? Or are you

15 claiming that a company commander can have assault detachments under his

16 command? Would you please clarify.

17 A. I'm trying to answer your question at -- it's moving - line 49:18

18 when you said: "Can a company commander decide on his own to use TO

19 detachments and Leva Supoderica Detachment in the same way as a commander

20 of Operations Group South?"

21 I said if he has detachments of TO, of whatever size, under his

22 command, then he would use them in whatever way he thought fit. I'm not

23 talking about assault detachments.

24 Q. Can he, on his own, without authorisation of his battalion

25 commander and commander of the 1st Assault Detachment, can the company

Page 11140

1 detachment then decide on his own on using those units or is that decision

2 up to the battalion commander or commander of the 1st Assault Detachment?

3 It's a very simple question.

4 A. Again, it depends on the organisation and the orders that the

5 company commander has been given. If the company commander is, for

6 example, effectively and -- please let me finish answering your question.

7 If the company commander --

8 Q. I apologise. I have very little time. My question is: Can he

9 make such decision on his own without an order coming from his superior?

10 So without such an order, can he decide on his own to use TO detachments

11 and Leva Supoderica Detachment?

12 A. If a company commander has been given TO troops under his command,

13 he can use them as he likes.

14 Q. And if no orders were issued, can he do it then? That was my

15 question

16 A. If the TO troops have been placed under his command, it is up to

17 him when and how to use them.

18 Q. If there is no order that they were placed under his command, what

19 then? Can he still do it then?

20 A. I would expect him to refer that to his commanding -- to his

21 battalion commander because he would have a -- if he considered he had a

22 requirement to use those TO troops and for the battalion commander to

23 issue the appropriate instructions.

24 Q. Thank you. That's a correct answer. General --

25 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Could we see Exhibit 405, please,

Page 11141

1 first? Could we pull that up in the screen in the English version so that

2 the General can follow.

3 Q. General, this is an order of the commander of the Guards Motorised

4 Brigade concerning blockade and attack, which was conveyed to the

5 commanders within the Guards Motorised Brigade on the 1st of October,

6 1991. I'm going to read out to you the composition and tasks of the 1st

7 Assault Detachment under the command of Major Tesic. I'm going to read

8 paragraph 5. I already did that previously in this courtroom, but since

9 you're an expert I would like to hear your comment.

10 Paragraph 5 says: "1st Assault Detachment comprising 1st

11 Motorised Battalion with the 3rd Platoon of the 1st Armoured Battalion,

12 2nd Platoon of the 2nd Company of light self-propelled artillery and

13 rocket Battalion of the PVO, 1st to 3rd" -- I apologise, "the 1st Platoon

14 of the 3rd Company of the 2nd Battalion of military police and Pioneer

15 Squad, commander of the 1st Motorised Battalion. Task: Bring up the

16 infantry parts to the first sector to the achieved line during the night

17 before first line on the 2nd of October, 1991, with guides from the

18 Petrova Gora TO detachment.

19 "Tanks and other equipment will be brought up during artillery

20 preparations."

21 And then another sentence: "In the beginning of the attack, in

22 joint action with the 1st and 3rd Company of the TO, attack in the

23 following sector ..."

24 Have you seen this?

25 A. Yes, I'm following that.

Page 11142

1 Q. Did I read this out correctly?

2 A. I think so, yes.

3 Q. Thank you, thank you. Can we agree that it is mentioned here that

4 the 1st Assault Detachment is to act in joint action or in coordination as

5 well as the TO detachment? This is the last sentence that I read. Are

6 we -- can we agree on this?

7 A. Yes, it says: "At the beginning of the attack, in cooperation

8 with the 1st and 3rd TO," yeah.

9 Q. Thank you, thank you. The commander of the Operations Group

10 South, is he the person who has command over these tasks that I just read

11 out, namely Colonel Mrksic?

12 A. This was an order issued by OG South, commanded by Colonel Mrksic.

13 The particular tasks you read out were to assault detachment I think

14 number 1. Was it? You would have to scroll back up again. In which

15 case, the tasks you've read out are the tasks to be carried out by assault

16 detachment number 1 if that's the case. Could you scroll back up to the

17 top of paragraph 5.

18 Q. "Tasks for the 1st Assault Detachment," yes, "but in coordination

19 or joint action with Territorial Defence," which means that on that date

20 on the 1st of October, they were all under the command of Colonel Mrksic

21 at that point in time. Correct?

22 A. Yes, I assume that's correct, as Colonel Mrksic is giving this

23 order.

24 Q. Thank you, thank you. General, sir, please look at the screen.

25 We will pull up Exhibit 408. This is a decision of the commander of the

Page 11143

1 Operations Group South on the 15th of October, 1991. I will read out to

2 you paragraph 2, which pertains to the 1st Assault Detachment. It says

3 here: "1st assault attachment comprising 1st Motorised Battalion, 3rd

4 Platoon of the 1st Company of the Armoured Battalion, 1st Platoon of the

5 2nd Company of the Military Police Battalion, and one volunteer company

6 from the current combat disposition are to continue the attack in

7 coordination with the 2nd Assault Detachment and 3rd/211 of the Armoured

8 Brigade and Petrova Gora units," and so on.

9 Is that what it says in paragraph 2?

10 A. Yes, it does.

11 Q. Can we agree that at that point in time Colonel Mrksic, that is to

12 say on the 15th of October, was the commander of these units and that he

13 was issuing assignments to them; correct?

14 A. I agree with that.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Could we now look at on the screen

17 Exhibit 410, and this is a decision by the commander of Operations Group

18 South of the 29th of October, 1991. I'm going to read item 2, paragraph

19 1, about the composition and the tasks of the 1st Assault Detachment under

20 the command of Major Tesic.

21 Q. Item 2, paragraph 1, it states: "The assault detachment one

22 composition of the 1st Motorised Battalion, 1st Platoon of the 3rd Company

23 of the 2nd Battalion of the military police, detachment Leva

24 Supoderica" --

25 A. Can I stop you. Can we get the right paragraph up on the screen.

Page 11144

1 It's item 2, paragraph 1. That's item 1.

2 Q. Underneath there are assignments to units, this is under item 2,

3 and then there is paragraph 1 of item 2. Do you have it on the screen

4 now?

5 A. Now we've got it. Unit tasks: 1st Assault Detachment, yes.

6 Q. Very well.

7 The assault detachment 1 comprising: "1st Motorised Battalion,

8 1st Platoon of the 3rd Company of the 2nd Battalion of the military the

9 Leva Supoderica detachment, the Petrova Gora detachment, volunteers

10 company of Novi Sad, and one M-84 tank," and so on and so forth, is tasked

11 with the assignment that you see on the monitor. Did I read that out

12 correctly?

13 A. You did.

14 Q. Thank you. Can we agree that the commander -- now that we're

15 talking about Assault Detachment 1, whose composition I've read out to you

16 is Major Borivoje Tesic, that he is now, for the first time, taking over

17 these powers from Colonel Mrksic in the sense of direct command. Do we

18 agree?

19 A. Well, the commander of the 1st Assault Detachment has got these

20 units that you've read out in paragraph 1 under his command. I -- if

21 that's what you're saying, I agree with that.

22 Q. That's right. Thank you, Sir.

23 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Now could we look at Exhibit 430 on

24 the screen. It's a decision by the commander of OG South of the 14th of

25 November, 1991. Can we now look at item 2, assignments to the units, and

Page 11145

1 I'm going to read paragraphs 4 and 5 under that heading.

2 Q. Item 4 of paragraph 2: Tasks to the units, it says: "Assault

3 Detachment 1 (minus the 1st Motorised Battalion) from the current region

4 of combat disposition transferred to be the Dalmatinska-Alijagica and

5 water-tower sector."

6 Is that what it says in item 2, paragraph 4?

7 A. Is it -- should it read minus or is that assault detachment 1 1st

8 Motorised Battalion. Or does it mean minus the 1st Motorised Battalion

9 which is what it says? I'm not sure, but I agree with what you've read

10 out.

11 Q. That is correct, yes. In the original order it says "minus the

12 1st Motorised Battalion." You read it correctly.

13 Now I'm going to read out to you item 5.

14 "1st Motorised Battalion from the present region of combat

15 disposition, secure the reached line, establish full control over the

16 captured area, and engage in coordinated action with the attacking forces

17 along the Sundarciceva Street and Marsala Tita Street. Be on stand-by for

18 active combat along the Milovo Brdo bridge's axis."

19 General, can we agree that Major Borivoje Tesic, to whom OG South

20 commander assigned this task at the point in time when Assault Detachment

21 1 -- or actually, transferred the 1st Motorised Battalion of the 1st

22 Assault Detachment to a different axis, which I read to you from paragraph

23 5, can we agree that Borivoje Tesic is still the commander of the Assault

24 Detachment 1 and at the same time is responsible for his own basic unit,

25 the 1st Motorised Battalion, regardless of the fact that they were in two

Page 11146

1 different sectors or along two different axes of operation? Is he

2 responsible, both for the 1st Assault Detachment and for the 1st Motorised

3 Battalion, even though they were on different axes?

4 A. It's not clear to me from what we've seen in this order on the

5 screen so far what the remainder of the 1st Assault Detachment is tasked

6 with. You've shown me what 1st Motorised Battalion is tasked with and

7 then there's 2nd Motorised Battalion. I'm not quite sure -- is there a

8 task for Assault Detachment 1 remnants? We'd have to screen on -- we'd

9 have to roll-on --

10 Q. Thank you. Sir, paragraph 4 is important. This is why I read

11 both 4 and 5 to you. In paragraph 4: "The main strength of Assault

12 Detachment 1 without the 1st Motorised Battalion is being transferred from

13 the current area of combat disposition to the Dalmatinska Street,

14 Alijagiceva Street, and the water-tower axis." And the 1st Motorised

15 Battalion is on this other access, which I read out to you from the

16 water-tower access. Is that in order?

17 A. Yes, that is in order. I'm starting to feel sorry for Major

18 Tesic because he is not only -- as I understand it, he is not only the

19 commander of the -- he's the commander of the all-arms mix of the

20 assault detachment. There seem to be two different taskings here. When

21 it says the assault detachment relocate to the -- if that's just a move of

22 location rather than an attacking task, maybe he can put his assault

23 detachment remainder to one side and get on with commanding his 1st

24 Motorised Battalion in his combat operation on that axis, but I haven't

25 got the whole order in front of me. But it would appear that he is

Page 11147

1 commanding the assault detachment and his motorised battalion at the same

2 time doing different tasks; quite difficult.

3 Q. Thank you. Yes, you are right. It is not easy to answer. Can we

4 look at Exhibit 431.

5 Sir, this is a decision by OG South commander dated the 16th.

6 This is two days later, the 16th of November, 1991. I'm going to read

7 paragraph 1, and then in paragraph 1, item 2. Do you have that on your

8 screen? There is also item 1. You can see that. It's not so important

9 for my question where it says: "I hereby decide." What is important for

10 my question is: "Task it is to the units: 1."

11 "1st Motorised Battalion in line with the task of 14th November,

12 1991," and that is actually item 5, General, from the decision of the 14th

13 of November, 1991, "with support of part of the forces of the armoured

14 battalion of the Guards Motorised Brigade continue the attack on the

15 Sundarciceva Street - Rade Koncara estate bridges over the Vuka river and

16 by 1600 hours on 17 November seize the area surrounding the bridges

17 over the Vuka river, Marsal Tito Street.

18 From which location. Be ready to continue the attack over the Trg

19 Republike towards the Danube, Marsal Tito Street and Stjepana Radica

20 Street."

21 My question for you is: What is this fact in accordance with --

22 or in line with the task of the 14th of November, 1991, mean? Is it

23 correct what I submitted to you that the 1st Motorised Battalion should

24 act in line with the task of the 14th of November, 1991, from paragraph 5

25 which I read to you? Is that right?

Page 11148

1 A. Yes, that's correct. Reinforced further by elements of the

2 armoured battalion of the Guards Motorised Brigade, correct.

3 Q. Thank you, General. Could you please now tell us, according to

4 your best knowledge, and I think that you make quick analysis. On the

5 16th of November, under whose control were the Petrova Gora and Leva

6 Supoderica TO detachments?

7 A. I believe that order put them under control of the 1st Assault

8 Detachment, did it not? Is that correct?

9 Q. Thank you, General. You are quite correct. And now my question:

10 Did you have access, as an expert, to any documents in the course of your

11 analysis, any decision or command at the OG South operational command

12 after the 16th of November which significantly changed the situation in

13 terms of responsibility over the TO Petrova Gora and Leva Supoderica

14 detachments until the combat operations were over or not?

15 A. Well, one that immediately comes to mind is the resubordination

16 order of I think the -- I think it was the 21st of November.

17 Q. Thinking of the 21st, this is why I'm asking the question. During

18 the combat operations, this is where we stop, and then about the rest we

19 already know about that. The combat operations were until the 18th of

20 November, 1991. Did you come across any such documents or not?

21 A. Well, I may have done. The orders, 1st Military District OG South

22 documents are at paragraph 2 of my annex. If there are any in there that

23 you're referring to, I will have seen them. But if you want me to be

24 specific, please put up on the screen what you want me to specifically

25 comment on.

Page 11149

1 Q. Thank you. And specifically, these things that I asked you about,

2 there is no document on any of that but I wanted to be absolutely thorough

3 and I wanted to be sure that perhaps you didn't have access to any

4 document that I didn't really come across. So I don't have anything to

5 put on the monitor and I'm sure you might have something more to say.

6 Well, all I have is five minutes, so perhaps we can proceed quickly. Very

7 well.

8 Quoting paragraph 25 of your report as confirmation of your

9 assertion that there were assault detachments, you cited the testimony of

10 Witness Trifunovic and Witness P-022. Witness Trifunovic mostly speaks

11 theoretically about the assault groups and I'm not going to go into these

12 theoretical remarks because that testimony from the standpoint of

13 Mr. Radic's Defence was quite correct and we're not going to go into any

14 other things.

15 What I'm interested in is the following: Based on the testimony

16 of Witness P-022 and citing that witness in your footnote you confirmed

17 the existence of assault groups. You did not read a statement by a

18 witness who appeared in this trial, before this Trial Chamber, and the

19 reference for the Tribunal is transcript page 5077, line 20, where this

20 witness you, because it is only one example --

21 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, should I present this

22 excerpt to the witness or should we just leave it at the reference for the

23 Tribunal?

24 Q. When he talks about the assault detachments and the joining of the

25 volunteers and the TO to the companies, you discussed that and you relied

Page 11150

1 on the testimony of Witness P-022.

2 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] I beg the Court's indulgence. I

3 just need a little bit more time. I just have two or three more

4 questions, so I would like to ask the witness to respond this question.

5 Q. So page 5077, line 20, I asked the Witness: "What does the word

6 'incorporate' mean?"

7 And the witness said: "No." He didn't know.

8 The question is: "Is this the first time you heard this word

9 being used?"

10 The witness said: "Yes.

11 The lawyer's question: "The Prosecutor investigator asked you

12 whether Territorial Defence people were incorporated into Captain Radic's

13 unit and your answer was yes. How could you affirmatively answered that

14 question if you did not know what the word 'incorporate' means or was that

15 not your answer?"

16 The witness said: "I said we were together."

17 "This is a different question. My question was specific."

18 Witness answers: "I told you what I meant then when I said that.

19 That's what I said."

20 Q. "Does that mean that they were not incorporated in Miroslav

21 Radic's company, the people from the TO?"

22 A. "They were together, i.e. we were together, the people of the

23 Territorial Defence, the volunteers, we were all together on the same

24 axis," and I underline this, General, "as well as the 3rd Company.

25 "Do we agree that they were together only for as long as the

Page 11151

1 combat operations lasted on the same axis?"

2 Witness responded: "Yes."

3 General, sir, based on what I have just read out to you, can we

4 agree and can you conclude that the witness asserts that the TO and the

5 volunteers were not incorporated into the 3rd Company, but they were

6 together in -- during the combat operations, along the combat axis only

7 during the combat operations?

8 A. Let me make an initial comment because you've put up various tasks

9 to the assault detachments, and you've laid out in these orders what the

10 assault detachments consisted of. These are sizeable organisations that

11 cannot be commanded as an entity. They would have to be subdivided into

12 subunits in accordance with the assault detachment commander's wishes.

13 And therefore, I would expect those subunits to be a mixture of whatever

14 all-arms groupings he wanted, infantry, armour, engineers, TO, volunteers,

15 in accordance with his orders. Therefore, it doesn't come as any surprise

16 to me that the 3rd Company is operating together with TO under its command

17 to achieve a specific objective.

18 Now, you -- in my opinion, you could call that an assault group,

19 and indeed Witness P-022 describes Captain Radic as commanding TO or

20 volunteers in exactly that way. Does that answer your question?

21 Q. You have absolutely given the wrong answer because what I have

22 read out does not say anywhere that Miroslav Radic was the commander of

23 that group. What it says is that Territorial Defence was not incorporated

24 into his 3rd Company and that they just were along the same axis of

25 operations. I was very specific. All the more because the Territorial

Page 11152

1 Defence has its own commander. Are you aware of that?

2 A. I think it says: We were all together on the same axis. My

3 immediate question would be: Under whose command?

4 Q. Axis of operation.

5 A. I understand that. If we're all together on the same axis, unity

6 of command, that command and control principle, they must have been under

7 someone.

8 Q. There's a commander of the 3rd Company, and there's a commander of

9 the Territorial Defence. The position of the Defence of Miroslav Radic

10 was that they were not under the command but in coordinated action, and

11 this is already in the evidence that we have presented so far. I have ten

12 seconds left. You quoted Witness P-022 --

13 THE INTERPRETER: 002, interpreter's correction.

14 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. You said that this witness said that Miroslav Radic found out what

16 happened at Ovcara because the witness, P-002, spoke with the TO commander

17 about the crime at Ovcara, and that this was sufficient information for

18 him to know and not to have done anything. I'm talking of

19 Miroslav Radic. Since you say you did not review the transcript of the

20 testimony of the Witness P-002 in this trial, we reviewed a number of

21 incidents relating to this witness and we never found any instance of him

22 talking with the commander of the Vukovar TO in the presence of

23 Miroslav Radic. He even said that he asked what happened, that he had

24 just waved his hand and said: Excuse me, it's a bloody mess. But he

25 never said that he spoke with Radic on that evening and not in the morning

Page 11153

1 when he was together with the TO commander. And in some places he even

2 said that this happened a few days later.

3 I am finished, so I am presenting this to you and I am telling you

4 of the position of the Defence of my client, as this is a requirement on

5 the part of the Prosecution. There is no order after the 14th of

6 November, 1991, from which it could be seen that the Territorial Defence

7 and the Leva Supoderica detachments were in any kind of contact or even in

8 the combat disposition with the company of Captain Miroslav Radic. I'm

9 also asserting to you that after the 18th of November, the assault

10 detachment of one -- Assault Detachment 1, the TO volunteers, and the Leva

11 Supoderica detachment were no longer even under the command of

12 Borivoje Tesic, under whose command they were, you know in which period.

13 But as of the 18th of November they were no longer under his command, and

14 this is something you can find in the statement of his you read, provided

15 to [as interpreted] the Prosecution, where he clearly talks about the oral

16 order of General Mrksic of the 18th of -- as of the 18th of November, the

17 TO and the Leva Supoderica detachments were no longer under his command.

18 He did not take part in any kind of evacuations of the hospital on the

19 20th of November, 1991, and Miroslav Radic --

20 MR. MOORE: This apparently is supposed to be a question. I see

21 it has "Q" at the start at 32:2. My learned friend has attempted to make

22 a statement to try and get into evidence material that he knows the

23 Prosecution do not rely upon for very good reason. If my learned friend

24 has a question, he can put the question, but he shouldn't make the

25 statement for his own purpose.

Page 11154

1 JUDGE PARKER: Well, the statement has been made, Mr. Moore.

2 We've allowed Mr. Borovic to do so. It's one upon which the witness can

3 hardly comment, given the variety and length of subject matter, and it's

4 one upon which it has no force other than that of submission.

5 Thank you, Mr. Borovic.

6 MR. BOROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. And thank

7 you for allowing me to exceed my time a little bit.

8 JUDGE PARKER: We'll now have the morning break, and because of

9 the redaction we will resume at five minutes to 11.00.

10 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

11 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

12 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Lukic.

13 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. Good

14 morning to everyone in the courtroom.

15 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic:

16 Q. I'm the last of the last. I'm the last Defence counsel to examine

17 the last witness here. General Pringle, I'm Novak Lukic. I'm Defence

18 counsel of Veselin Sljivancanin. I will be putting questions to you on

19 behalf of his team. Let's clarify this to see if it's a technical error.

20 On page 12 it says that you retired in 1991, page 12 of your report, and

21 yesterday you said to Mr. Moore that you retired in 2001. So can we

22 clarify this, please?

23 A. Yes, yesterday Mr. Moore corrected that. That is a typing error.

24 It should read "2001."

25 Q. In your biography I found certain references that I think will be

Page 11155

1 very useful in relation to the topics that I'm interested in. I see that

2 you worked at high-level posts, including counter-intelligence duties.

3 And I think that you will be especially competent to clarify this portion

4 of your report. First of all, let's look at some of the aspects of

5 command and control. I already have some linguistic complaints to make,

6 but I will leave that for later. There are many definitions of the

7 command and control concept. I went over a lot of documents that were

8 introduced into evidence here, but except for the common definition of

9 command and control as a doctrine, I didn't find a separate definition for

10 the control portion. And I see that you did define that in your report.

11 Command and control are certainly not the same notion, correct?

12 A. Before I answer that, can I just correct a statement you've made.

13 I have never worked in counter-intelligence duties.

14 To answer your question, command and control are intricately

15 linked together, but they are not the same notion. Command encompasses

16 the authority and responsibility and duty to act. Control is much more

17 about the coordination of activities required, usually by the staff, in

18 order that -- in order to facilitate the execution of the commander's

19 orders or commands.

20 Q. We seem to be on the similar wavelength. You defined that in

21 article 16 of your report, where you said that control is a means through

22 which a commander implements orders. But would you agree with me that

23 it's not exactly a means but a process aimed at preparing the unit, making

24 a decision, and later on implementing this decision. I see control as an

25 activity, active implementation.

Page 11156

1 A. Yes, Mr. Lukic. I can see you've read my report where I

2 say: "Control is the process through which a commander, assisted by his

3 staff, organises, directs, and coordinates the activities of the forces

4 allocated to him," paragraph 16.

5 MR. MOORE: [Microphone not activated]

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 MR. MOORE: In 34, 24, there is an error. You'll see it only

8 relates to encompasses. That should also have command in front of it. It

9 hasn't been altered, but it better be altered now because it is important.

10 There --

11 JUDGE PARKER: I see the line reference, unfortunately, is always

12 different from yours. I've found the reference now. 34, 24, it actually

13 did have a word there that was incorrect, and I suspect the stenographer

14 has removed it. But it should read, "Command encompasses the

15 authority" --

16 MR. MOORE: Yes.

17 JUDGE PARKER: -- and responsibility and duty to act, which is what

18 I think --

19 MR. MOORE: Correct.

20 JUDGE PARKER: -- the witness said and is what Mr. Lukic also

21 understood.

22 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Let us move on. This clearly stems from the report of the witness

24 and how he understands the doctrine of command and control. Would you

25 please take tab 96 bis, please, General. I think that you have -- or

Page 11157

1 rather, this tab related to your footnote 96 bis?

2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we're interested in

3 Exhibit 107. I think we all have the tabs in front of us. No need to

4 pull them up on the screen.

5 Q. Would you please look at article 7, 7 (d). Based on the

6 terminology of security organs, I'm clarifying this because the

7 term "control" in B/C/S language is used in the command and control

8 doctrine, but there is also the term called control in the technical,

9 professional sense, especially since where it is used for military police

10 purposes. If you look at 7 (d), you will see that it says there

11 that: "The security organ participates in specialist control of military"

12 I'm quite happy with this English translation.

13 A. Can you give me the page number of that? That's not what it says

14 in my 7 (d).

15 Q. The very beginning. I will give you the English version. Page 8,

16 it begins on page 7 and then goes on on page 8. It's subparagraph (d).

17 [In English] "Performing special administration services for

18 military police unit."

19 A. I have that.

20 Q. [Interpretation] I saw in the annex that you also studied the

21 rules of service of the military police. It's not included in the

22 reference, and maybe you'll remember it. And do you remember that there

23 is this same definition in that document when regulating the relations

24 between the military police and the security organ?

25 A. Yes, I did study the rules of service of the military police.

Page 11158

1 Unfortunately, I haven't got them in the tabs. 7 (d) is taken from the

2 rules of service of the security organs, and from reading those documents

3 I'm aware of a fairly intimate relationship - shall we put it like that -

4 between the security organs and the military police, with the security

5 organs tasked with specific responsibilities for, in particular, training

6 and advice and employment of the military police.

7 Q. Since this is a special section in your report, we will get to

8 that. I'm now interested in the command and control aspect, and later on

9 we will get to the special nature of that relation.

10 I studied the textbook for military academies for 1983 where there

11 is a definition of command that seems quite interesting to me. I will

12 thus ask you whether you will agree with my definition that the command

13 includes the decision-making right and right to assign tasks?

14 A. Yes, I agree with that. And indeed at paragraph 16 of my report I

15 say: "Thus leadership and decision-making are his" -- where I'm talking

16 about a commander, "are his primary responsibilities."

17 Q. The doctrine of singleness of command is something that you

18 discussed, as did Mr. Theunens. That means that there is just one

19 superior officer in command. You said that yesterday on page 15, correct?

20 A. That's what unity of command describes, yes.

21 Q. And the subordinate is responsible only to him, correct?

22 A. The subordinate is responsible to his immediate commander, but he

23 also carries responsibilities for those he commands.

24 Q. Yes, that's quite clear. I wasn't going to debate the notion of

25 responsibility -- rather, the links.

Page 11159

1 So this control, be it in the specialist terms or the one

2 concerning the security organs, does not also include decision-making and

3 task assigning, correct? In your report you said that the security organ

4 is subordinated only to his commander. So I'm asking you now: Under your

5 definition of command, the principle of singleness of command and

6 subordination, the control in the specialist sense doesn't include any of

7 these other aspects of command that I just asked you about?

8 A. Well, the rules for security organs describe all these functions.

9 Would agree entirely that the security organ is directly subordinate to

10 the commanding officer, command unit, institution or staff of the armed

11 forces and whose strength it is placed in the establishment, see paragraph

12 16, chapter 2.

13 Q. Thank you. Now please look at article 18; it has to do with my

14 next question. The security organ of the superior establishment command,

15 can it and is it authorised to issue an order to security organ from a

16 lower establishment unit or can it only give some specialist guidance?

17 A. Yes. Here you enter into an interesting command and control arena

18 or one that I found particularly interesting in exploring the functions of

19 security organs. It is quite clear that a security organ is responsible

20 to the commander in whose formation it sits, but it is also quite clear to

21 me that there is a web of links amongst security organs, both upwards,

22 downwards, and sideways, in addition to that. Now, that does not, in my

23 reading of this, assume that a superior security organ has the right to

24 give orders to a subordinate -- or to a security organ in a subordinate

25 formation. It does, as paragraph 18 describes, provide specialist

Page 11160

1 administrative services for security organs in subordinate commands. And

2 I've come to that conclusion because JNA doctrine is very firm on unity of

3 command. And you would end up with confusion if the security organs were

4 taking orders from their immediate superior commander and down some

5 parallel security organ chain. So I don't think that is what happens.

6 But there is a security organ cobweb of information that is flowing in all

7 directions.

8 Q. I'm quite satisfied with this answer. I fully agree with you.

9 I'm going to ask you something that you put in your report under the

10 command and control principle in OG South. You received documents from

11 the Prosecution, and you spoke of that from paragraph 22 onwards in your

12 report. I'll ask you this: Did you see any documents -- were there any

13 documents which you used as a source to write about the relations between

14 security organs and OG South? Simply speaking, did you see any document

15 which would lead you to conclude about the relations between security

16 organs of OG South and OG South?

17 A. My primary sources of research on security organs were the rules

18 for security organs and also the rules for military police, from which I

19 drew deductions about the command and control relationship and the sort of

20 relationship that the head of a security organ would have with his

21 immediate commander.

22 Q. Thank you. Would you agree with me, although we already heard

23 this answer, though I will repeat it through a line of my questions.

24 Within an operations group, each unit has its own area of responsibility,

25 which is clearly defined through the orders of the operations group

Page 11161

1 commander, correct?

2 A. I agree.

3 Q. Yesterday we heard the position of the Prosecution, namely that on

4 the 20th of November, 1991, Ovcara was within the area of responsibility

5 of the 80th Motorised Brigade, correct?

6 A. Ovcara was within the zone of responsibility of OG South, and in

7 subdividing that zone of responsibility the commander had delineated

8 particular areas to subordinate formations. And Ovcara lay in that

9 subdivided area of responsibility that was the responsibility, I believe

10 you're correct, of the 80th Motorised Brigade.

11 Q. Yesterday you said to Mr. Vasic, and we were able to see that

12 based on the annex, that when writing your report you did not have

13 available to you a single document on the 80th Motorised Brigade. I'm

14 asking you this: As you were writing your report and when you read

15 statements of Vojnovic and Vezmarovic, did you ask the Prosecution whether

16 they had any document of that unit? In other words, in your research did

17 you ask for certain documents to be provided to you by the Prosecution, if

18 they had them?

19 A. The documents I was using for my research were provided by the

20 Office of the Prosecution. I didn't ask for extra documents. I didn't

21 what documents existed.

22 Q. I suppose that you will agree with me that yesterday when you saw

23 the log-book of the 80th Brigade and all the facts stated therein, you

24 concluded that that would have been useful for you, helpful for your

25 report. But I'll ask you this: Based on the statements that you used

Page 11162

1 pertaining to the 80th motorised brigade and based on the documentation of

2 the Operations Group South that you used, can we conclude that the 80th

3 Motorised Brigade and its commander, that commander, Vojnovic, had command

4 and control over that brigade pursuant to all principles in force in the

5 JNA at the time?

6 A. Well, it's a statement of the obvious that the commander of the

7 80th Motorised Brigade had full command and control over the 80th

8 Motorised Brigade. If that's what you're saying, I agree with that.

9 Q. Precisely that. Precisely that. Naturally, this brigade carried

10 out the assignments given to it by the commander of OG South.

11 A. I'm sorry, is that a question or a statement?

12 Q. You could take it as both. I suppose you agree with me?

13 A. I thought you were making a statement. I -- either way I agree,

14 Your Honour.

15 Q. Perhaps we rely too much on leading questions and the form

16 prescribed. In paragraph 35 of your finding you said that what happened

17 in the end was almost fully foreseeable in view of the brutal conduct of

18 TO units and given the well-documented ill discipline of them. I'll say

19 this: Based on the questions that were put to you yesterday, I took it

20 that you, in your report, after studying documentation and witness

21 statements, did not conclude that on the 18th of November, in Mitnica,

22 which is a suburb of Vukovar, there were negotiations held and then a

23 large number of Croatian defenders, if I may call them that, soldiers,

24 surrendered to the JNA. After spending one day -- or rather, one night at

25 Ovcara, all of them to the last one, I think that 187 of them were

Page 11163

1 transferred to a prison in Sremska Mitrovica. Did you know this fact when

2 writing your report?

3 A. Yes. I'm generally aware that some successful and well-conducted

4 evacuation operations had been executed before the 20th of November, but I

5 remind you again, my report is based on answering some very specific

6 questions. But I agree, yeah.

7 Q. This is how I, as a layman, am thinking. Do you fully uphold your

8 finding, this conclusion -- or rather, would it change your conclusion had

9 you known that just two days prior to that there was an activity related

10 to surrender, escort, and further escort of detained persons, and that all

11 of this was carried out successfully in that same area of Vukovar?

12 A. It's precisely of that that I find it so surprising what happened

13 on the 20th of November. What happened on the 20th of November was

14 conducted in a different way, I believe by different people, apparently in

15 a very much more confused command and control situation. And perhaps that

16 is why -- perhaps that contributed to what happened. But the fact that

17 there was some successful evacuation operations on the 18th does not mean

18 that -- well, it makes it more surprising that the operation on the 20th

19 was conducted in the rather shambolic way that it was.

20 Q. I agree here with what you used, "surprising"; that's the term you

21 used in your answer. But in your report you used the word that it was

22 predictable. So these are two completely different terms. Let me just

23 check the term that you used in English.

24 A. No, I'm happy to take that as a question. I'm talking about in

25 paragraph 35 the events of the 20th of November. The events of the 20th

Page 11164

1 of November, in my view, were entirely predictable by an experienced

2 commander who knew that the evacuation of the hospital comprising a

3 mixture of combatants, noncombatants, women, children, wounded,

4 non-wounded, a very complex event, would have had to have been very

5 carefully controlled and specific orders given. And in particular any

6 involvement of TO forces and irregulars would immediately spark warning

7 signs in an experienced commander's mind. The fact that those people were

8 used as part of that operation I think means, in my opinion that what

9 happened was predictable.

10 Q. All right. Let us move on. Let us not spend too much time on

11 this topic. Let us just clarify one thing. I will skip over something,

12 but it is in the same context. In paragraph 74 of your report you say

13 that the members of local TO may assist in identification of residents and

14 that they could be helpful for security organs in the process of triage.

15 This is what we call as triage.

16 Based on this conclusion I would like to ask you this: Did you

17 find any other document or any other statement indicating that the TO

18 members acted differently in the hospital itself on the 20th of November,

19 so the day of evacuation? We know that all of this was taking place

20 between 7.00 a.m. and 10.30 a.m., so within that time-frame. Did you find

21 any evidence that the TO members acted in a different manner, acted

22 differently than what you wrote in paragraph 74?

23 A. Yes, I did. If I recall correctly, there were witness statements

24 to the effect that TO and/or irregulars were behaving in a brutal manner

25 towards prisoners. I believe there was a statement to the effect that a

Page 11165

1 number of prisoners were being kept in a cell who were apparently badly

2 beaten up, and they were denying access to regular JNA officers. So I

3 think there's plenty of witness statements to the effect that the

4 TO/irregular troops were acting in an ill disciplined way. And I quote

5 from my report: "Given their reputation for ill discipline and a

6 consequent very ill risk of revenge," they would have to be very

7 controlled and organised. They would have their uses, particularly in

8 terms of identifying people, because they were local troops. But any

9 experienced commander would realise that that also carried with it

10 dangers.

11 Q. Perhaps we didn't understand each other and perhaps we did and

12 that was your answer. What you mentioned about the testimony, I link that

13 to the previous evening. I asked you about a specific time period. That

14 is the moment of evacuation, as it is termed by the Prosecution in the

15 indictment, meaning taking out the persons who happened to be at the

16 hospital after triage -- well, we don't have to use that term. But

17 anyway, taking out the persons and then later taking the same people to

18 the barracks or Ovcara. Do you have a statement by any witnesses for that

19 period that members of the TO behaved differently from the way you

20 described in paragraph 74? And if you do, could you please give us an

21 example?

22 A. Just bear with me one moment. I don't think I have a statement to

23 hand to that effect, but my recollection from the thousands and thousands

24 of pages of witnesses' testimony that I have looked at and scanned was

25 that there was indeed evidence -- or statements, not evidence, statements

Page 11166

1 to the effect that the TO and irregular troops were acting in a brutal

2 manner. But I'm unable to lay my -- to point to a specific witness

3 statement straight from the top of my memory I'm afraid.

4 Q. I tried in formulating this question - and I do understand that

5 the materials were vast in quantities, but I did want to have a clear

6 position on this. I, other than what you mentioned in paragraph 74, did

7 not find that they were behaving brutally and in an undisciplined way in

8 the hospital or the hospital courtyard at that time. And I did not find

9 that there were volunteer units there at that point in time. But very

10 well, you gave me the answer that you have given at this point, and we can

11 continue.

12 A. You asked me a question with a very -- you asked me a question

13 with a very specific time-frame, a bracket of two hours I think you gave

14 me. I can't -- generally in the hospital I have read statements to the

15 effect that the TO and irregulars were there acting in a brutal manner.

16 Whether that was in that two-hour time-frame, I can't say.

17 Q. And what you assert in your conclusion -- actually, in your

18 findings it relates to the general conduct and general events in the

19 hospital. It does not only encompass that very brief time period. Is

20 that correct?

21 A. Yes, that would be correct.

22 Q. [In English] Thank you.

23 [Interpretation] A couple of questions regarding the command

24 climate. When you talk about the command climate in paragraph 37 you say

25 that - and I am interested in this in relation to my client - that: "On

Page 11167

1 the basis of documents made available to me by the Prosecution," you

2 concluded that "Major Veselin Sljivancanin had temporary authority or

3 command function."

4 Well, can you please tell me now -- you do not provide a reference

5 for this in your footnotes or your annex. So can you tell me what was the

6 basis for your assertion that that Major Sljivancanin had temporary

7 [Realtime transcript read in error "primary"] command responsibility?

8 Which documents did you use, provided to you by the Prosecution, to reach

9 such a conclusion?

10 A. Yes, can I refer you to paragraph 62, footnote 106, where I say

11 that: "Major Sljivancanin had a responsibility to direct and advise the

12 military police in their actions." That comes straight out of the

13 security organ's rules, and "he had a responsibility in accordance with

14 those rules to advise his commander on the correct and proper use of the

15 military police." But I go on to say: "Major Sljivancanin had a

16 responsibility -- it would appear that he took this responsibility further

17 and appears to have effectively assumed command of the military police or

18 at least several witness statements refer to him giving orders directly to

19 the military police rather than through the military police unit

20 commander." And I've quoted there: "See two examples from many, Witness

21 78, Zlatko Zlogedja, and Witness 70, Milorad Vojnovic," to which I could

22 also add P030, who says -- P030 from line 9732:18.

23 "Q. I want to deal with a tall officer with the moustache. How

24 close were you to the tall officer with the moustache?

25 "A. I was quite close facing him. I don't know whether at that

Page 11168

1 moment I knew him to be Sljivancanin. I believe I learned that later on

2 from the media. In any case, at that moment, we were vis-a-vis perhaps

3 two to three metres apart."

4 He then goes on to describe Sljivancanin's behaviour --

5 "Q. How do you describe his manner?

6 "A. He stood upright, had a soldier-like posture as -- and he --

7 as he gave the speech and issued orders."

8 He then goes on.

9 "He had an authority of attitude issuing orders and letting us

10 know that he was the main person there. Nobody dared interrupt him. He

11 was the main figure there in that area standing in front of those people."

12 So there are three statements from which I've drawn such a

13 conclusion.

14 Q. Thank you. And before my next question I wanted to correct my

15 previous question, page 46, line 18, it should be "temporary command

16 responsibility."

17 But in relation to what you have just said now I can draw the

18 conclusion that you in this paragraph 37 concluded that Veselin

19 Sljivancanin had temporary command responsibility on the basis of

20 statements of persons that you mentioned or on the basis of statements by

21 persons asserting that he issued commands. So that would be the source or

22 the basis for your conclusions. Is that correct?

23 A. Well, my observation from reading the security organ rules is that

24 Major Sljivancanin is not in a command position. He is the security organ

25 staff advisor to the commander with specific responsibilities for advising

Page 11169

1 on the use of, amongst other things, the military police. Therefore, when

2 I read several witness statements to the effect that he was -- he was, for

3 all intents and purposes, in command, at least giving orders and everybody

4 was obeying his orders at the hospital, I concluded that therefore he must

5 have been authorised to be in command. I took the judgement that that

6 would have been authorised by his commander because it could be authorised

7 by no other, that is to say Colonel Mrksic. And I drew that conclusion

8 also from the witness statements that were quite clear that everybody was

9 obeying his command, so they accepted his authority. So it was clear that

10 that was the case. What was surprising to me is that I have not read any

11 order describing how the evacuation of the hospital would be conducted, in

12 which I would expect to find the commander of that operation designated.

13 Q. Very well. Mr. Pringle, I would just like to ask you to provide

14 shorter answers because my time is limited, because the answer you gave us

15 now, we already have that in your study. My question is: The statements

16 that you read by persons saying that they heard and saw him giving orders

17 and that they formed the impression that he was the person in charge, I'm

18 talking about their observations during that time in the hospital, did you

19 find anything else to substantiate that assertion? Did you see any

20 document, any kind of document, a written order, a report based on which

21 you could confirm this conclusion or assertion of yours, yes or no,

22 please?

23 A. As I stated, I was surprised that I could not find any orders

24 pertaining to the evacuation of the hospital.

25 Q. Very well. Thank you. Let us continue. You said in your

Page 11170

1 testimony yesterday that you had received a transcript of the testimony of

2 Mr. Trifunovic from the Prosecution and that you read it. First I'm going

3 to ask you: What was your expert assessment after having read the

4 transcript of Mr. Trifunovic's testimony? Practically he was the only

5 officer who was in the guards brigade command to be heard before this

6 Trial Chamber. What would be your expert opinion about his testimony?

7 I'm not asking you to assess the testimony of this witness, but I'm asking

8 you to give your opinion as to the professional aspect of his testimony

9 before this Tribunal.

10 A. Yes. I have Trifunovic, day one to four here. The answer to your

11 question is: I was impressed by his sound professional knowledge and the

12 answers he was giving to some very detailed doctrinal questions. He

13 appeared to be -- he appeared to me to be a well-trained, good example of

14 a JNA officer.

15 Q. Then you probably read that he said in his testimony, one, that he

16 was not aware that Sljivancanin had any kind of command function in the

17 evacuation, that he was not aware of that fact, whether he did or not have

18 that kind of command function; and then on page 8182, that he didn't know

19 that Sljivancanin had any kind of command function in relation to his

20 security capacity. Then on page 8348 that he didn't have any command

21 functions in relation to the Territorial Defence. And finally what I

22 would like to ask you particularly about, and that is his testimony on

23 page 8350 and all of this took place on the 8th of May, that the public

24 appearance of Veselin Sljivancanin created the impression that he had

25 greater authority than he actually did. These are the facts that he

Page 11171

1 stated during his testimony, and you probably read them.

2 So in relation to this testimony of an insider, let's say, does

3 that in any sense leave any impression on you in relation to this

4 conclusion of yours about the temporary command function or responsibility

5 Sljivancanin?

6 A. Yes, that leads me to several conclusions. First of all, it

7 doesn't surprise me at all that Trifunovic says that. Trifunovic was

8 the -- one of the officers at the OG South headquarters and, amongst other

9 things, he was keeping the war journal. The fact that there were no

10 written orders and no log of any, what I would describe as an, orders

11 group conference by the commander delineating responsibilities and

12 evacuation of the hospital would naturally leave Trifunovic, sitting in

13 that headquarters, to say that he was not aware of how it came to be that

14 Sljivancanin appeared to be in command. But de facto, the witness

15 statements all point to the fact that nevertheless he was in command.

16 Q. Based on what they heard and based on their impression; is that

17 right?

18 A. The witnesses describe the -- Major Trifunovic [sic] giving

19 orders, giving speeches, describing how the evacuation would be conducted,

20 people complying with his orders. Those are not observations and

21 impressions; those are facts, if you accept the facts -- if you accept the

22 witness statements. That's for the Court to decide.

23 Q. That's correct. And you also said "Major Trifunovic," but you

24 meant Major Sljivancanin probably, but let us continue.

25 A. Quite correct, yeah, in line 41:28, that's Major Sljivancanin

Page 11172

1 should be.

2 Q. In your testimony yesterday, during the examination-in-chief by

3 Mr. Moore, you said that in the evacuation operation - and we will discuss

4 it later - you said that the separation of people should, as a rule, be

5 something that is carried out by the security organs. An evaluation of

6 the medical condition of a person is something that, according to you,

7 should be done by a doctor - is that correct? - in deciding whether a

8 person could be sent to a different institution or whether they should

9 remain at the hospital?

10 A. There are various issues wrapped up in your question. First of

11 all, there was an issue of who was a combatant, who wasn't, who was a

12 danger, who was an intelligence risk. That would appear to be in the

13 purview of the security organs. The actual searching of people and making

14 sure that they were not carrying weapons, et cetera, and separating them,

15 I would expect to be carried out by the military police, perhaps as

16 advised by the head of the security organ. Medical triage -- I'm not sure

17 we're using the word "triage" the same there. The medical inspection of

18 wounded people or people claiming to be wounded or suspected of being

19 wounded I would suspect to be done by, yeah, medical -- medical personnel.

20 Q. Are you familiar with the fact that Vesna Bosanac, who is a doctor

21 by professional and a woman was subject to criminal proceedings, that she

22 was arrested and brought to trial?

23 A. I think I'm familiar with that, yes. She was the doctor at the

24 hospital.

25 Q. I don't want to read so that we save time, but if you could please

Page 11173

1 look at the rules of service of the security organs, and this is tab 96

2 bis, rule 52 and 53, which says what the security organs do in criminal

3 proceedings. So I don't want to read it out aloud, but you can tell me

4 when you look at articles 52 and 53, are the rules similar to army rules?

5 I mean, is this something that is similar to the rules, the military rules

6 and regulations that you are familiar with?

7 A. Yes, and it was in reading these sorts of articles in the security

8 organs that I concluded that it might have been a perfectly reasonable

9 appointment by command of OG South to put Major Sljivancanin in charge of

10 the operation because a lot of the issues being dealt with in the process

11 of that clearance and evacuation of the hospital were issues that lay

12 within his security organ responsibilities.

13 Q. That's clear when it comes to security matters, but yesterday you

14 spoke about the fact that there were many factors in the evacuation

15 operation. I personally think that the security of such a large operation

16 hinges on something that needs to be done previously and also on control

17 and monitoring of the evacuation to ensure that it is conducted correctly,

18 but that this is not the essence of the operation. The essence of the

19 operation is to transport the wounded and the ill.

20 A. Yes, I agree with that. What I still find difficult to understand

21 two successful operations carried out by the 80th Motorised Brigade, why

22 wasn't commander 80th Motorised Brigade putting clear operational -- with

23 Major Sljivancanin as his security advisor? That would have been in

24 command and control terms pretty clear to me. What actually appears to

25 have happened is nothing like that. And we ended up, it would appear to

Page 11174

1 me in my opinion, with Major Sljivancanin in command of the operation.

2 Q. Thank you. You've said that.

3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask the registry to pull up

4 Exhibit 559, English page 7 on the screen. Could we see the English text

5 on the screen? We could cover the ground quicker then and we wouldn't

6 trouble the interpreters as much. I will be using the B/C/S version

7 myself.

8 Q. I saw that in your report you analysed in paragraph 58 the

9 testimony of Mr. Zlogedja as to the procedure and interrogation of a

10 suspect. This is the judgement in the case against Zlatko Zlogledja that

11 was introduced in Belgrade which was introduced into evidence.

12 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Could we scroll down, please. I will

13 read this portion out. I will go a bit faster - I apologise in advance to

14 the interpreters, but you have the translation in front of you.

15 "Based on the widely known data relating to the still ongoing

16 Yugoslav crisis, all of this clearly and undoubtedly point to the fact

17 that in 1991, but also long before that, before the accused Dodaj and

18 Zlogledja had joined the MUP reserve forces, the Republic of Croatia took

19 measures and procedures in order to change the constitutional status of

20 that republic in relation to the Yugoslav state."

21 I will now skip over several sentences, although each sentence is

22 important.

23 "... while it did so against and contrary to the SFRY

24 constitutional regulations, which was ultimately determined at a procedure

25 held before the constitutional court of Yugoslavia."

Page 11175

1 And then -- I'm skipping over some things, but you can see the

2 context.

3 "It established, contrary to the constitution of the SFRY,

4 certain formations, which," as this court established, "were paramilitary

5 formations. And then finally it says in the next paragraph, can we scroll

6 down, further down. Next paragraph.

7 "In view of the above," and then it says that the weapons were

8 used and the court find that the activities and behaviour of the

9 above-described paramilitary formations constitute an armed rebellion

10 against the state of the SFRY and that the described participation of the

11 accused Dodaj and Zlogledja of the reserve forces in the Republic of

12 Croatia constitute their participation in the armed rebellion, which was

13 aimed at threatening the constitutionally established order and system of

14 the SFRY by changing the constitutional status of the said republic."

15 The judgement is quite lengthy. I paraphrased its context, but I

16 think that it is clear. My question is: Do you agree with me that a

17 security organ were based on rule 6 of the rules of service where they

18 carrying out a task are duty-bound to act in accordance with the doctrine

19 as set by the military prosecutor and not in accordance with the legal

20 understanding of the Republic of Croatia and Badinter's commission. In

21 simple terms: If we do have judicial organs that are there to establish

22 what constitutes an armed rebellion, does such a legal framework, given

23 the duties and tasks of the work of security organs, constitute something

24 that is binding for such security organs?

25 A. Yes. I touch on this subject in my report. Sadly, I can't put my

Page 11176

1 finger on it. I mentioned yesterday that in 1991 the former republic of

2 Yugoslavia was in the process of disillusion and therefore the situation

3 was extremely confused. I also mentioned what it -- I also touched on

4 what it's like to operate in a climate of strategic muddle. Now, whether

5 you describe what was going on in 1991 as an armed rebellion -- you could

6 describe it in those terms. It has been described in those terms, or you

7 could describe it as an armed conflict between two entities, and in that

8 lies the dilemma. But out of all that I would conclude, therefore - if

9 this is where you're going I'm not sure - I would that -- and I touched on

10 it earlier in my statement just now, that the issues being addressed at

11 the evacuation of the hospital fell into the purview of Major

12 Sljivancanin's security organ responsibilities. I can see that. What I

13 don't see is any formal authorisation that he is the commander, although

14 he appears to have been the commander --

15 Q. I really don't wish to interrupt you, but you're not answering my

16 questions. We're now on a totally different topic, and you're going back

17 to what you have already told me. Let me put a simple example to you. If

18 an organ of British intelligence service has, based on the regulations of

19 its country and laws of its country, a legal understanding that IRA is a

20 terrorist organisation, whereas IRA displays itself as a liberation

21 movement, what constitutes the basis for action for this intelligence

22 organ? Is it the -- is it what IRA portrays itself as or is it the actual

23 legal basis? My question was that in this judgement we saw that the court

24 found this to be an armed rebellion. Now, do you think that this has a

25 binding effect for those who take action or not? Very simple question.

Page 11177

1 A. It's not a simple question because you do not -- it's not as

2 simple as the -- an IRA terrorist organisation carrying out terrorist acts

3 against the United Kingdom. It -- at no time, was Northern Ireland

4 dissolving. The state of Yugoslavia was dissolving. You could call it an

5 armed rebellion on the on the other hand, or you could call it interstate

6 conflict between Croatia and Serbia on the other hand. It's a very

7 confused, stratospheric legal issue --

8 Q. Once again you're not answering my question.

9 A. Well, put your question to me very simply, then.

10 Q. I don't want to delve into difficult legal interpretation and so

11 on. You are a security organ. You have a public instruction coming from

12 your own military prosecutor, where it says quite clearly what a person

13 who is supposed to arrest represents. So based on the instruction of the

14 military prosecutor, this person whom you are supposed to arrest is a

15 person who needs to be taken into custody; therefore, is security organ

16 going to follow that instruction or not?

17 A. Yes, I suspect he would.

18 Q. All right. That was all I wanted. Thank you.

19 Let us move on. You said, I believe in paragraph 57 - I'm not

20 entirely sure, though - that the leading role of the security organ is to

21 gather intelligence facts. Isn't that a regular duty envisioned in

22 article 6 of the rules of service?

23 A. That is certainly one of their -- one of their roles. Maybe just

24 turn up paragraph 6. "Security organs are responsible for," and there is

25 (a) to (g), describing their responsibilities, including, of interest,

Page 11178

1 "control of the preparation of the military police in war."

2 Q. Very well. We're now going to move to the issue of military

3 police and the relations between military police and security organs. I

4 think that you already gave an answer to Mr. Borovic today. Let me just

5 check. Among the evidence supplied to you, testimonies and so on, did you

6 see anything about the brutality of military police when frisking people

7 and boarding them on buses at the hospital?

8 A. I can't say for certain yes or no whether brutality was being

9 meted out by the military police at the hospital; it may have been, it may

10 not have been. Without any witness statement in front of me to refer to,

11 I find it hard to answer that question specifically.

12 Q. All right. Paragraph 60, 61. You express some of your

13 conclusions here, even dilemmas. In paragraph 60 you say that the

14 security organ is subordinate to the commander for the acts of military

15 police based on Rule 63 of the rules of service. And then in your report

16 in paragraph 61, when you described the relations between Sljivancanin and

17 the military police, you say that there are some unclear matters there.

18 And then in your comment at the very end of paragraph 61, page 22 of your

19 report, towards the end you say:

20 [In English] "I consider 'being responsible for the performance of

21 their tasks' to be somewhat unclear. It is not clear whether this is a

22 command responsibility or a supervisory responsibility."

23 [Interpretation] That's what you said, right? My question is

24 this: When writing [as interpreted] your report, I wasn't able to see

25 that among the documentation used by you was also the instruction on the

Page 11179

1 application of the military police rule from 1986, and not the rules of

2 service, but rather the instruction on methods used by the military

3 police.

4 A. I did refer to the rules of service of the military police, but I

5 haven't got it -- I'm afraid I haven't got it here. But I was interested

6 in the connection between the security organs and the military police.

7 And in the rules for the security organs there are several quotes:

8 "Performing special and administrative service for military police

9 units." Paragraph 23, "An officer of a security organ command unit,

10 institutional staff of the armed forces provides specialist management for

11 a military police unit, he recommends the use of the military police unit

12 to the senior officer of the command unit." Note, he does not command the

13 military police. "The deployment of units or individual members of the

14 military police to perform tasks within the security organ's competence is

15 determined by the security organ officer with the approval of his superior

16 military officer is an advisory staff branch with responsibilities for the

17 military police."

18 Nowhere can I find that it has a command responsibility for the

19 military police.

20 Q. That's correct. But here when you say that he's responsible to

21 the military police commander, I have to ask you this -- but first I'll

22 read something to you. The military police commander has to bear some

23 responsibility, too, right? In this instruction -- not in the rules of

24 service, but in the instruction on the work of military police which you

25 did not use, it says that a commander of a military police unit who has

Page 11180

1 command of his unit is also responsible for the entire combat readiness

2 for his unit, and for that he is responsible to the commander directly or

3 indirectly via security organs in whose composition he is, or the unit

4 is. Based on the documents you had, combat reports and so on, did you

5 conclude that within the Guards Motorised Brigade, the commander of

6 military police unit was responsible to the commander directly? Is that

7 the system that existed within the Guards Motorised Brigade? I will

8 remind you, because I'd rather not go back to the documents you looked at,

9 the documents on the orders on how to use military police, so I think that

10 you should be familiar with this, especially given the statement of

11 Mr. Trifunovic.

12 A. Well, I can answer that quite simply. The commander -- the

13 commanding officers of the two military police battalions in the Guards

14 Motorised Brigade answered directly to the -- their superior commander,

15 who was a commander of the Guards Motorised Brigade/OG South,

16 Colonel Mrksic.

17 Q. Thank you. Can you recall a witness statement or a document about

18 soldiers or military policemen - and we have a lot of documents about

19 that, that it was the military police that escorted the persons from the

20 hospital to the barracks - that the military policemen who secured the

21 buses on the way to the barracks and at the barracks, did anything

22 contrary to their security tasks or that they enabled people to come in or

23 to leave or take anyone out, which was unauthorised. So did you see any

24 failings in the execution of the duty of those who were carrying out the

25 security functions at the hospital, on the way there, or at the barracks?

Page 11181

1 A. I believe I recall statements to the effect that those being

2 loaded onto and off the buses were being treated in a brutal manner, and I

3 think, if I recall correctly, in particular at the JNA barracks.

4 Q. Very well. We do have testimony about incidents or what was going

5 on outside of the buses and at the barracks, but I was asking about the

6 actual persons in the buses. Very well. I have the answer from you that

7 you gave.

8 Would you agree with me that in relation to the escort service and

9 the service of security or guarding persons who are to be detained, this

10 is not something that is a part of the security organ's duties, but the

11 task of just regular military police?

12 A. Well, advising on security and advising on the employment of the

13 military police are definitely tasks that fall to the security organs in

14 accordance with their rules. The actual carrying out of the guarding

15 function is not really a security organ function because we're talking

16 about individual staff officers. But I would assume that the security

17 organ would advise on the appropriate use of the military police to carry

18 out that function.

19 Q. Thank you. I agree, absolutely. In searching persons who were

20 arrested, is that a regular and simple task of the regular military

21 police?

22 A. That's a regular and simple task that could be conducted by any

23 soldier, but you -- some might say in -- for specific operations like this

24 one, it's tailor-made for the military police.

25 Q. Reminding, advising, or telling a police officer to perform his

Page 11182

1 duties, is that part of the regular duty or would that be a kind of expert

2 function or advice to a person to remind them to adhere to rules and

3 regulations?

4 A. I would expect orders to the military police to stem from military

5 police officers and military police commanders. That is why I expressed

6 surprise that from the witness statements and testimonies that I have

7 quoted, these orders do not seem to have been passed through the military

8 police commanders; they seem to have been given by Major Sljivancanin

9 direct, not in an advisory role but in an executive role.

10 Q. Very well. If you were to have a statement by a senior officer of

11 the military police who was in charge at the hospital and who -- if he

12 were to say that he were issuing the orders for searches, would that have

13 any effect on you in terms of changing your conclusions?

14 A. Well, I would expect him to issue the orders for searches, but he

15 himself may well and indeed appears to have been taking orders from and

16 directing Major Sljivancanin in an executive command role.

17 Q. You didn't answer, but perhaps you did. Let us do it simply. Yes

18 or no, if you had such a statement by a brigade commander -- or actually,

19 of a battalion of the military police and his subordinate officers, a

20 commander of a military police company, who were directly participating in

21 the searches, and if that person or those persons were to say it was not

22 Sljivancanin who issued the orders but it was me, would then in those

23 terms your conclusions here be modified or corrected? And please, if you

24 can answer that with a yes or no.

25 A. I can't answer it with a yes or no I'm afraid, because it depends

Page 11183

1 on the level of person that you are quoting. If it is a level below the

2 senior commander of the military police, then I would expect them to

3 naturally be receiving orders from their superior military police

4 officers. If it is the most senior military police officer there who is

5 saying that he was not, under any circumstances, receiving orders from

6 Major Sljivancanin, that would be another matter.

7 Q. In your terminology a senior military police officer, would that

8 be the highest-ranking military policeman or a commander of a battalion of

9 the military police?

10 A. It would be the senior -- in this specific instance, it would be

11 the senior military police officer conducting military police activities

12 at the hospital. I don't know whether that was a military police company

13 or a military police battalion.

14 Q. Very well. And could you also please tell us what I think you

15 also talked about with Mr. Borovic. You did not get a statement from the

16 Prosecution of Mr. Paunovic. You don't have that on your list, do you?

17 A. I think that's correct, unless he's hiding under a P number, in

18 which case I won't know whether he's there or not.

19 Q. In that case, I'm not going to mention his name just like that.

20 Let us continue.

21 In paragraph 62 you draw the conclusion - and we already talked

22 about your answers to my questions about temporary command

23 responsibility. You said that he took command over the military police -

24 or at least that several witnesses' statements indicated that - according

25 to which he directly issued orders at the military -- at the hospital and

Page 11184

1 not through the military police unit commander. Next we have the

2 testimony of Zlatko Zlogledja and Milorad Vojnovic -- actually not the

3 testimonies but the statements. First I'm going to give you the statement

4 of Zlatko Zlogledja so that you could tell me where you found in the

5 statement of Zlatko Zlogledja the basis for your conclusion that he issued

6 direct orders to the military police. This is the OTP statement.

7 A. Could I just intervene there because I actually quoted

8 Zlatko Zlogledja, Witness 78, to indicate that there was a perfectly

9 functioning system of back-loading suspected -- back-loading prisoners or

10 even suspected war criminals back down the chain of command all the way

11 back to Belgrade. That's what actually I was using Witness 78 for.

12 Q. Very well. All right. I'm going to tell you, Mr. Pringle, that

13 nowhere in that statement is it mentioned what you just said. Zlogledja

14 is mentioned in a different context, in the context of the chain of

15 command, and not that Sljivancanin direct -- issued direct orders to the

16 military police. That is the difference. I think that we will agree on

17 that.

18 A. I don't think I've used - oh dear - Zlatko Zlogledja, or whatever

19 his name is, to indicate that Major Sljivancanin was giving direct orders

20 to the military police. I've used other witness statements for that,

21 including P33 I think it is -- P030.

22 Q. Well, let's continue. I think you've already said that, but we

23 will press on. In the same reference in that footnote you said that

24 Milorad Vojnovic said that in the statement that you read, and I will

25 agree with you really that Milorad Vojnovic stated the following. Just

Page 11185

1 one moment, please, it's paragraph 9. I can give you the whole statement,

2 but -- yes, I do keep looking at the clock. I assume that this reference

3 to Mr. Vojnovic was actually when you cited him or relied on that in your

4 decision --

5 [In English] " -- and OG South. He had no other duty in

6 connection with my brigade. I do not know if my security officer,

7 Dragi Vukasavljevic, was in contact with Sljivancanin, but I presumed they

8 were because they would have been a logical -- that will be -- that will

9 have been a logical procedure. My brigade" --

10 [Interpretation] This is actually the part that I want to read to

11 you.

12 [In English] " -- consisting of about 30 men, they were all

13 reservists. The military police were given orders, either by the security

14 officer or by the Chief of Staff, and an exceptional situation by the duty

15 officer."

16 [Interpretation] This is the only reference where Witness

17 Vojnovic, in the statement that you reviewed, speaks about the

18 relationship between the security organs and the military police; and the

19 way I interpret it it's more on a -- on the basis of the principle. He

20 never talks about Sljivancanin as a person who issued any kind of order to

21 the military police. Now I'm going to put my next question to you.

22 You said that the Prosecution gave you Mr. Vojnovic's testimony

23 before this Tribunal in May and that you reviewed this testimony. Is that

24 correct?

25 A. That's correct. And in relation to your last statement, I have

Page 11186

1 quoted Witness 70, Milorad Vojnovic, in support of my statement that he

2 took responsibility further and appears to effectively have assumed

3 command of the military police -- or at least several witness statements

4 referring to him giving orders to the military police rather than through

5 the military police unit commander. So I cannot accept that because you

6 have just quoted a tiny bit of his total statement, that that nullifies

7 what I said. I would have to refer back to the complete testimony or

8 complete witness statement and find my reference again.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, for the purposes of

11 economy and also for -- to assist the witness, I suggest that we go on a

12 break now, and then perhaps he can review the Vojnovic statement and then

13 he can tell us exactly where he found this reference. And then perhaps

14 after that we can continue. I think that this would also be the most

15 useful way to go, also from the point of view of the proceedings.

16 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]... break and

17 resume then.

18 --- Recess taken at 12.21 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 12.43 p.m.

20 JUDGE PARKER: 30 minutes, Mr. Lukic.

21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Maybe there'll be five more. I --

22 according to my math, it should be 40 minutes.

23 Q. Mr. Pringle, would you please answer briefly.

24 JUDGE PARKER: [Microphone not activated]

25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour, please.

Page 11187

1 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Would you please say -- would you please tell us: Where did you

3 find this in Mr. Vojnovic's statement, just in which paragraph, what you

4 referred to in the footnote in your report?

5 A. [Previous translation continues]... My first question would be:

6 Assuming this is the statement I reviewed -- and I do not know whether

7 Vojnovic made more than one statement. Assuming this is the statement I

8 reviewed, then I -- I cannot testify to anything in this report that backs

9 up footnote 106. So it's either a footnoting error, or I reviewed a

10 separate witness statement; and I don't know which of those are true.

11 Either way, the assertion made in footnote 106 is backed up both by

12 Witness P030 and Witness 78 --

13 Q. That's okay. You already said that, sir.

14 My questions are of a different nature now. You told us earlier

15 about 030; that wasn't my question now. Mr. Moore can confirm that this

16 is the only statement that Mr. Vojnovic ever gave. I don't think that you

17 received some other statement of his. Another question: You read the

18 transcript of Vojnovic's evidence, and most likely you also read that

19 Mr. Vojnovic on page 0 -- 9072, line 17, on the 17th of May said

20 explicitly that military police is only under the command of an officer,

21 not of a security organ. He said that explicitly, and you should have

22 read this when reading his evidence, right? This confirms, in fact, your

23 thesis on the chain of command within the military police, correct?

24 A. Yes, that's what I read in the security organ's rules, and that's

25 what I would expect, which is why I find it surprising to find witness

Page 11188

1 statements to the effect that Major Sljivancanin appeared to be in

2 command.

3 Q. All right. Just one more question about Mr. Vojnovic's

4 testimony. Yesterday I was surprised by what you said to Mr. Borovic.

5 You said that either in the statement or in the evidence of Vojnovic you

6 read that he had stated that he had seen Sljivancanin at Ovcara. You just

7 read his statement now, and you saw that in the end he quite explicitly

8 said this when photographs were shown to him under (b), and then in

9 testimony, it's on page 9067 when I asked and he said that he explicitly

10 said that he had never seen Sljivancanin at Ovcara. Therefore, in light

11 of this, do you think that what you stated yesterday is a mistake or do

12 you still believe that you have read this somewhere?

13 A. I definitely believe I have read this in various witness

14 statements that Major Sljivancanin was present at Ovcara.

15 Q. But not in Vojnovic's statement, right?

16 A. That may or may not be the case.

17 Q. All right. Now we'll turn to the evacuation. You described the

18 importance of the evacuation operation in paragraph 69. My first question

19 to you: On the day of the evacuation of the hospital, was there a state

20 of armed conflict in the territory of the Republic of Croatia or, shall I

21 say, in the territory of Yugoslavia?

22 A. In general terms I believe we can agree that, yes.

23 Q. In the documents analysed by you -- and I will remind you that you

24 read document 457-1, which is the report of OG South on the 19th -- or

25 rather, on the 20th. Did you see in the documents that even after the end

Page 11189

1 of hostilities, after the end of armed conflict - which we believe was on

2 the 18th - there still were additional conflicts and people were still

3 getting killed and wounded? In that report it says specifically - we

4 don't need to put it on the screen - that on the 19th three members of

5 OG South were killed, four wounded gravely, and nine wounded lightly. So

6 would you agree with me that even though the armed combat had ceased, not

7 everything was peaceful?

8 A. I would agree with that, and that was the subject of an order from

9 1st Military District commander, General Panic, saying: Although the

10 fight for Vukovar is over, the hostilities have not ended. So what you

11 say to me is not surprising. I agree with that. I mean, there may have

12 been individual -- individual soldiers trying to escape. There was mines

13 littered all over the place. The fact that Ovcara -- Vukovar had

14 technically fallen did not mean that combat was over.

15 Q. Reading the war diary, you said that you used it in your report.

16 And by -- when reading it, you must have read the entry saying that on the

17 6th of October a scout group, English page 12, scouts from the 1st Assault

18 Detachment reported that the hospital - both the old building and the new

19 building - were used as the command headquarters of Ustasha forces. I'm

20 now paraphrasing this, but you must have read something to that effect,

21 perhaps not verbatim as I put it, but that's the gist of it.

22 My question: How does that affect the security assessment of such

23 an important operation as the hospital evacuation? You termed it

24 important yourself.

25 A. Yes, I have that entry in the war diary. "The reconnaissance

Page 11190

1 organ of the 1st Motorised Battalion has reported that the Ustasha

2 headquarters is underground in the old and new hospitals." That would

3 indicate to me that any following operation involving the hospital, be it

4 an evacuation after the fall of Vukovar or otherwise, would be an

5 extremely complicated operation that one would certainly expect to be the

6 subject of a formal operation order.

7 Q. I agree. Mr. Pringle, our position is that at the hospital, on

8 the 20th of November there were at least three categories of persons:

9 One being the wounded and the ill, those who were explicitly mentioned in

10 articles 1 and 4 of the Zagreb agreement; second category being civilians

11 and other persons, including the medical personnel and other workers of

12 the hospital and their families - we heard a lot of testimony about that;

13 and the third category being the persons who, in the view of the security

14 organs, are the persons for whom there is reasonable grounds to believe

15 that they had committed crimes or have knowledge about the crimes

16 committed, that is to say persons who had to be isolated and not included

17 in the evacuation. Would you agree with my perception?

18 A. I would not agree with it in the words you put it. I would agree

19 that it would be perfectly reasonable to assume that the hospital would,

20 as you say, have in it workers of the hospital, the wounded, and a

21 mixture of combatants and noncombatants. And the entry in the war diary,

22 for example, would indicate, if that reconnaissance report was true, that

23 there were combatants there. Whether that means they are criminals or

24 have committed crimes is another statement. I don't agree with that.

25 Q. We don't need to go into the legal analysis and qualification.

Page 11191

1 This is why I read earlier how military judiciary viewed

2 Zlatko Zlogledja. That doesn't need to be necessarily your opinion. You

3 must have read a number of statements of persons claiming that at the

4 hospital there were also individuals who, until that time, had actively

5 participated in combat on the Croatian side. And you also must have read

6 that some of them tried to pass themselves off as the medical personnel or

7 as the wounded. You must have read a lot about this, and I don't think

8 that this is in dispute. If you, as a security officer, have information

9 that in that facility there are disguised members of enemy forces or

10 persons whom I have reason to believe participated in armed rebellion, who

11 refused to surrender, who are disguised or who are concealed, you don't

12 know exactly how many weapons there are in the facility and you also have

13 some assessment indicating that the presence of the observers could be

14 used in order to provoke an incident. Faced with such a situation, what

15 would you do? Or shall I suggest it to you? Would you first ensure that

16 there are safe conditions for the operation that you are supposed to carry

17 out, which is the evacuation of the wounded and the ill?

18 A. The first thing I would do is to give extremely clear orders on

19 how the operation, a complex operation, given all its different parts,

20 would be carried out and --

21 Q. What would you do as a security organ --

22 A. [Previous translation continues]... in charge. I'm sorry, I

23 can't answer your question whilst you talk over me.

24 Q. I apologise. I really don't want to interrupt you, but I have the

25 watch to bear in mind. What would you do as a security organ in charge of

Page 11192

1 security assessment? So don't look at it from the point of view of the

2 commander, rather from the point of view of security organ. What would

3 you do in his shoes in that situation?

4 A. If I was the security organ of the 20th Guards Motorised Brigade,

5 I would go to my commander and discuss this operation in detail. I would

6 discuss with him my concerns that there were a mixture of combatants and

7 non-combatants. I might even, if I was that sort of security, say there

8 may even be war criminals in there. In other words, I would be suggesting

9 that a lot of the purview of the security organs was of interest in this

10 operation. Having had that discussion with the commander, it may be that

11 the commander might have said to me: Right, well we need one commander

12 for this operation and you, Major Sljivancanin, are tailor-made to do it.

13 So you take command of this operation because so much of it falls into

14 your bailiwick, and you take command of the troops. That's rather what

15 I've concluded from reading all the evidence because the security organ in

16 the normal course of events is an advisor, not a commander.

17 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 83 of your report you wrote that in your

18 view Sljivancanin played the key role in not allowing the ICRC

19 representatives and ECMM representatives to be present during the

20 evacuation, as agreed in the agreement. This was elaborated in

21 paragraph 76, and what I just quoted is more of a conclusion. Please tell

22 me, as briefly as possible, based on which documents did you reach this

23 conclusion that he played a key role?

24 A. And here I'm in heavy recall mode again. I recall that the ICRC

25 and international organisations that were trying to get into Vukovar were

Page 11193

1 held at the bridge whilst the first part of the evacuation from the

2 hospital was conducted. I cannot give you a specific reference to the

3 fact -- as to why I have said that, unless it's footnoted here. But I --

4 on the assumption that Major Sljivancanin was in charge, I have probably

5 drawn the conclusion that the holding-up of the international agencies

6 would have stemmed from a direction from him in order for him to carry out

7 the evacuation in the way that he wanted to, I assume not under the public

8 gaze.

9 Q. This question is going to be a bit lengthy, but I'm going to say

10 this: Would it change your conclusion if I were to tell you that there

11 are statements and evidence stating that on the previous day the ICRC

12 representative received the lists of the wounded and the six -- page 687

13 of transcript, Your Honours - that the ECMM representatives in their

14 reports stated that the ICRC representative wasn't overly active, that he

15 didn't want to remain in the negotiations during the previous day, and

16 that he was in conflict with everyone?

17 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Exhibit 333, testimony

18 of Mr. Schou, page 7 --

19 MR. MOORE: I object to the way the question is formulated. It's

20 extremely tendentious. It does not give any objective analysis of the

21 evidence, and in my submission the witness is being asked to comment in

22 relation to a very partial reading of what the evidence was.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Lukic, I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask you

24 to change the tone of what you foresaw to be a difficult and lengthy

25 question. It is too vague, too wide-sweeping, too generalised. You'll

Page 11194

1 have to break it up, I'm afraid.

2 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have so little time.

3 I'm trying not to put any documents to the witness. What I quoted I

4 quoted from the document, so it is the same as if I put a document in

5 front of Mr. Pringle. I will try to be brief.

6 Q. Mr. Pringle, there are documents coming from the European

7 Monitoring Mission, there are reports of ECMM, stating what I just told

8 you, and also stating that Sljivancanin didn't prevent them, ECMM members,

9 to enter the hospital on the 19th, but rather that there was an order of

10 Admiral Brovet, assistant minister of defence, and that here we saw some

11 video footage. I have no time to show it to you again. We saw video

12 footage clearly showing that Mr. Borsinger talked to Colonel Pavkovic

13 about the possibility of going to the hospital directly.

14 So my question is: If you had these type of documents in front of

15 you, would they affect this conclusion of yours, namely that Sljivancanin

16 played a key role? Because it's obvious that you didn't have these

17 documents available to you. The Prosecution did not provide them to you,

18 and now they are objecting to me pointing out to you what was led in

19 evidence here.

20 MR. MOORE: I'm not objecting to the sense of a question being

21 posed; I have no problems in relation to that. What I do object to is

22 really only a small -- well, not a small part, a part of the evidence that

23 points in one direction. And what I'm submitting is: If an expert is to

24 give an informed judgement, he should be informed of all the relevant

25 documents and all the relevant evidence as best he can so he can give an

Page 11195

1 impartial and objective reply, and that is not being done, in my

2 submission.

3 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I have to reply. Your Honours -- Your

4 Honours, I'm now in a situation where I'm denied something that should

5 have been done by Mr. Moore. He was supposed to provide this to the

6 witness so that the witness could give us his competent analysis, but from

7 every angle available to the Prosecution. Now Mr. Moore is denying me the

8 opportunity to inform the witness of the Prosecution evidence. I believe

9 it's not fair. If this right is denied to me, then no problem, but I'm

10 asking that the witness provide a brief answer.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Lukic, firstly, to give you an illustration,

12 you mentioned a conversation at the bridge; you say it was with a

13 colonel. If it is what I am remembering, you omit to mention that your

14 client was present as well, right?

15 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] No, no, I have to say that you're not

16 right. This is exhibit --

17 JUDGE PARKER: This is --

18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I apologise for having to say this to

19 you --

20 JUDGE PARKER: [Previous translation continues]... the first

21 problem with what you're doing. Now neither the witness nor the Chamber

22 can know exactly what it is you are putting to the witness. But can I

23 come back to what I said to Mr. Borovic, and I think you're into the same

24 field, right? You're trying to get this witness to become the finder of

25 fact; he can't. He's an expert upon facts that have been given to him.

Page 11196

1 If you can show that the facts show to us that the facts that he's relied

2 on are not the right ones, well then his opinion, based on those wrong

3 facts, loses its force. So instead of spending time trying to persuade

4 the witness that he should take a different view of the facts, once you've

5 got clear what he's relied on, and I think that is clear, you can move on

6 and deal with the consequences later in this case.

7 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Your Honour, I will press

8 on, and now I have lost a little bit of my time, too. I actually wanted

9 to present this piece of evidence to him in a different way than I

10 presented all the rest, but all right, very well. We will continue.

11 Q. You speak in your report that Mrksic and his subordinates did not

12 try to do anything in relation to discipline violations and so on.

13 According to you, in view of the situation and the information that you

14 have about Vukovar for that day, would we be able to agree that at that

15 time the securest facility in Vukovar for an action of transferring

16 persons deprived of their liberty from facility A to facility B, would the

17 most secure place be the barracks, according to a security estimate?

18 A. Well, I'm not conversant with the exact security situation

19 pertaining on the day. There were - as you've already mentioned - a

20 number of other evacuations carried out over the last two days, which I

21 believe went to Ovcara. Whether the barracks was the best place to take

22 this particular convoy I can't comment on.

23 Q. In the professional sense, in a town where combat activities had

24 stopped the day before, what would be the securest building or facility,

25 simply said? All right. Very well. If you abide by what you assert,

Page 11197

1 then we can press on.

2 A. No, let me try and give you an answer. I mean, if the barracks

3 had been designated the secure prisoner-of-war camp that prisoners of war

4 would be held in, then it's perfectly logical that they go there. If

5 Ovcara had been designated the prisoner-of-war camp, it's logical that

6 they go there. That's a commander's decision, and it is part of the plan

7 for which, as I keep saying, I have seen no orders.

8 Q. You also read the statement of Bogdan Vujic, you cited it, and

9 that's where you read that he said that Sljivancanin told them that the

10 persons should be transferred to the barracks for security reasons, but I

11 will continue. You didn't analyse that, and I believe, according to me,

12 that this is an important issue in terms of this statement that nobody did

13 anything in relation to the security assessment. But tell me the

14 following --

15 A. No, I can't let that go, I'm afraid. You're mixing up all sorts

16 of things. When I talked about Colonel Mrksic being made aware of

17 irregular behaviour, to put it mildly, at Ovcara and doing nothing about

18 it, it's got nothing to do with what you're currently talking about, I'm

19 afraid.

20 Q. Thank you. In paragraph 83 you assert or you conclude that

21 Sljivancanin was present during the beatings at Ovcara. You didn't

22 provide a reference for that conclusion, but I assume that you do have a

23 reference for that in the statement of a witness in relation to these

24 severe beatings. And could you please tell us what that reference is.

25 A. I can't give you that reference off the top of my head, but I have

Page 11198

1 read several witness statements, I believe, to the effect that

2 Major Sljivancanin was at Ovcara. One, for example, if I recall describes

3 him as being in the middle of the doorway; one describes him as observing

4 the prisoners being made to run the gauntlet, being badly beaten; and

5 there are others. So with -- I can't give you a specific reference, but

6 I'm quite content in my own mind I've read several statements to the

7 effect he was there observing what was going on.

8 Q. When you were drafting your report and when you had the annex in

9 front of you, did you also read statements of Witness 19, 82, 77, 59, 35,

10 84, 25, 68, 18, 69, 70, and 71? These are witnesses that you rely on and

11 they talk about the events at Ovcara. Did you read parts of their

12 statements that Sljivancanin was not at Ovcara, and did you use those

13 parts when you were working on your report?

14 A. If you're quoting those numbers from my annex of witness

15 documents, 19 is certainly there, 22 is not, 77 is, but let's -- let's

16 assume I have read those documents. Where they have mentioned that

17 Major Sljivancanin was there, that was a notable fact; if they have not

18 mentioned that Major Sljivancanin was there, that is an unnotable fact. I

19 don't -- I do not recall anybody absolutely stating when asked: Was

20 Major Sljivancanin there or not? No he wasn't. They may not have -- they

21 may just have not mentioned him. I don't know, but there are several

22 that, as you will know, indicate that he was there.

23 Q. At -- you took that into account. If you saw that someone said

24 that he wasn't there, you would have taken that into account, all right,

25 but let us continue. Are you aware of the testimonies here, the

Page 11199

1 transcript and the statements, that some colonels, lieutenant-colonels

2 were seen at Ovcara and that some high-ranking officers from the security

3 administration were at Ovcara that day? Do you recall reading anything

4 like that anywhere?

5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. Very well. We've heard your testimony on the areas of

7 responsibility and the duties and obligations and rights of the commander

8 in the area of responsibility and who this commander is responsible to.

9 The commander in the area of his responsibility, can anyone issue an order

10 to such a commander, other than his immediate superior?

11 A. The commander of an area of responsibility would take orders from

12 his superior commander; that is correct. If he was receiving orders from

13 outside that direct chain of command, he would immediate query that with

14 his superior commander to clarify that modelled situation of lack of unity

15 of command.

16 Q. He would not act upon such an order until this was something that

17 was clarified with the commander? I'm talking in terms of the regulations

18 now.

19 A. Yes, in general terms I agree with that.

20 Q. And this subordinate commander who has an area of responsibility,

21 can that officer - to whom the person is subordinated to and happens to be

22 the commander of an area of responsibility - receive an order from someone

23 else without previous permission by his own commander?

24 A. Well, you're describing an extremely modelled command and control

25 atmosphere; the complexities of your questions would indicate that. Can a

Page 11200

1 subordinate commander who has an area of responsibility, can that officer

2 to whom the person is subordinated --

3 Q. No, no, no. All right then. That translation is not good. Let

4 us put it to you this way: Can Vojnovic, in relation to the area of his

5 responsibility, receive a command from anyone else, other than his direct

6 superior commander, Mrksic?

7 A. That would not be normal, but in the events we're describing

8 you've got to bear in mind -- you've got to bear in mind that Colonel --

9 that Vojnovic, commander 80 mtbr, had, as I described I think yesterday,

10 this operation superimposed upon him without any knowledge of it. So

11 you've got to take that into account in the background and context of your

12 questions.

13 Q. Can the commander of the military police company subordinated to

14 Vojnovic in his area of responsibility receive an order from anyone else,

15 other than Vojnovic, without Vojnovic giving his permission for that

16 first?

17 A. That would be irregular, but according to Vojnovic's testimony

18 that is exactly what happened because elements of his military police were

19 involved in the operation of evacuating the hospital without his

20 knowledge.

21 Q. I did not want to ask you to interpret who said what, but I'm just

22 putting a theoretical question to you of how things should be.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that I have

24 about two minutes left, and perhaps for the first time I'm going to exceed

25 that, if you permit me.

Page 11201

1 Q. And this will just be one topic we have not touched upon yet. We

2 talked about the implementation of the laws of -- international laws of

3 war, and this is paragraph 27 -- actually, this is tab 27. Could you

4 please look at tab 27. Would we agree, if we look at article 4 of this

5 document, it's a very voluminous document, of which the military

6 establishment was very proud of because it was the only rule establishing

7 the command responsibility. So article 4 states --

8 A. [Previous translation continues]... protecting power, is that what

9 you're looking at? Paragraph 5 --

10 Q. It's paragraph 4. In the beginning, paragraph 4, at the very

11 beginning.

12 A. [Previous translation continues]...

13 Q. States: "For the purpose of acquainting the armed forces with the

14 international laws of war, regular -- the rules of international law of

15 war can be -- shall be applicable to all armed conflicts of an

16 international nature, irrespective of whether the conflict in question has

17 been formally designated as war."

18 I don't know if you have read that. Have you found this

19 paragraph? And I'm going to now ask you to look at paragraph 42, please.

20 A. I've found both the paragraph 4's you were referring to, the one

21 about regular training and the other one about war armed conflict, warring

22 party, party to the conflict, on page 9 -- what was the next page?

23 Q. Paragraph 42: Armed conflict, states in paragraph 2 -- paragraph

24 1 is also interesting, but I'm going to read paragraph 2.

25 "Upon the proclamation of a state of war, special Yugoslav

Page 11202

1 regulations applicable to such situations and international laws of war

2 shall come into force."

3 Have you found that? I'm going to just give you enough time to

4 find it, sir.

5 A. Yeah, I've got that.

6 Q. I read a part of article 42 or rule 42 that: "Upon the

7 proclamation of a state of war, special international laws of war come

8 into force." The paragraph 39 talks about the beginning of armed

9 conflict.

10 So the question is: Do you know in the relevant time that we're

11 talking about, this is the autumn of 1991, was a state of war declared on

12 the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? Do you know whether

13 this was done or not?

14 A. Now, whether a state of war was declared or not does not preclude

15 the requirement to abide by the Geneva Conventions in any state of armed

16 conflict.

17 Q. I absolutely agree with you there about the Geneva Conventions;

18 they are clear. I think this rule is also clear when it is applied.

19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you very much. I

20 have now completed my last cross-examination in this case.

21 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Lukic. Oh my goodness, look at the

22 time. I think you overran.

23 MR. MOORE: Could I possibly have the lectern? Is that possible?

24 JUDGE PARKER: And, Mr. Moore, I think with the grace and

25 indulgence of the supporting people, you have a full 30 minutes, if you

Page 11203

1 need them.

2 Re-examination by Mr. Moore:

3 Q. General, you've been asked about the barracks, the suggestion

4 being that that was the most secure place for the evacuation to use as a

5 stopping post or staging post. Can I ask the following: In the

6 organisation of the evacuation, if it was known to the person who was in

7 charge of the evacuation that the TO/irregulars had not only access to the

8 barracks but also were inside the barracks when the Ovcara prisoners

9 arrived, would you consider that to be a suitable location for the

10 prisoners' detention?

11 A. As I have commented many times already, a commander would have to

12 take very careful attention to TO and irregulars because of their state of

13 training, their reputation, and, indeed, their recorded acts so far

14 conducted, not to mention orders coming down the superior chain of command

15 to watch out for exactly these things. Therefore, any involvement of the

16 TO or irregulars in this sort of evacuation operation would need to be

17 very carefully considered. To answer your question specifically: To

18 bring a vulnerable collection of prisoners of war as part of an evacuation

19 operation to a locality in which there are a large number of TO or

20 irregulars would, in my opinion, be asking for trouble.

21 Q. May I extend that with the following question. If it was shown

22 that within 36 hours previously atrocities had occurred within 500 metres

23 of that location by those same TO volunteers, would that either strengthen

24 or weaken your previous conclusion?

25 A. Unless those TO and volunteers had been arrested or removed, that

Page 11204

1 would strengthen my view that it was asking for trouble considerably.

2 Q. Thank you. May I move on to different topic. You were asked the

3 following question. I've taken down in longhand; I hope I did it

4 correctly. Can the commander of the military police company subordinated

5 to Vojnovic receive an order from anyone else without Vojnovic giving his

6 permission?

7 The question that I would ask -- wish to ask is this: What if the

8 person who gave the order to the commander of the military police company

9 was an officer from the superior command, namely OG South, would that be

10 acceptable?

11 A. Well, it would be irregular in that it is transgressing the

12 principle of unity of command. In that case, if a commander of a military

13 police company was given an order by an officer from the superior command,

14 one would expect that company commander to say politely to the officer of

15 the superior command: I hear what you say, but I must check that out with

16 my immediate commander in case I'm being -- about to be tasked to do

17 something else. And he would have brought that to the attention of his

18 immediate commander, in which case his immediate commander would have said

19 either: Okay, I'm happy with that, get on and do it; or: Do not do that

20 because ... And then he would have taken it up, the military police

21 commander, with the OG South headquarters. So I've described

22 hypothetically what could or should have happened in that event.

23 Q. But if at the same time the commander of the military police

24 company was also informed by the security organ of Vojnovic that he had to

25 withdraw from that particular location, as it were confirmatory, would

Page 11205

1 that be irregular in any way?

2 A. Now you're changing the question a bit. So now we've got the

3 80 Motorised Brigade security organ which has advisory responsibilities to

4 the commander of 80 Motorised Brigade on the use of the military police,

5 advising the military police company that this is an order. Under those

6 circumstances I can quite see why the military police company commander

7 would take that as the okay from his superior brigade.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 MR. MOORE: I have no further questions. Thank you very much.

10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much, Mr. Moore.

11 General, you'll be very pleased to know that concludes the

12 questioning and, to my surprise, ahead of time. We would like to thank

13 you very much for your time here and for the assistance that you have

14 given us, and of course you will now be able to return to your other

15 affairs.

16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE PARKER: If it's what I think it is, Mr. Lukic, no.

18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] I don't know if there is a telepathy

19 between us --

20 JUDGE PARKER: No, your face. You wanted further time?

21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] No, no. Absolutely not. I -- it's

22 about what Mr. Moore raised this morning, based on which you decided that

23 we should meet on Monday. I would like to know now what documents this

24 involves, the ones that the Prosecution is interested in, outside of those

25 that we agreed to relating to Mr. Theunens' testimony. We just want to be

Page 11206

1 as efficient as possible for Monday because right now we're in the dark.

2 JUDGE PARKER: I am going to ask Mr. Moore to be sure to speak to

3 counsel for each Defence team before he leaves the court now and, either

4 then or by arrangement discuss then, ensure that Defence counsel are aware

5 of the documents to be discussed for Monday.

6 Is that feasible, Mr. Moore?

7 MR. MOORE: Two things, Your Honour: One, I am always pleased to

8 talk to my learned friends; and secondly, I think that the documents

9 themselves, we have sent an indication of those documents but --

10 JUDGE PARKER: Well, if you would do it again --

11 MR. MOORE: I will --

12 JUDGE PARKER: -- your colleagues would be delighted to hear it

13 from you.

14 MR. MOORE: Certainly.

15 JUDGE PARKER: If it's not too much of an embarrassment for you,

16 the Chamber would be pleased if its legal office could also learn what it

17 is that you have in mind.

18 MR. MOORE: Of course we will.

19 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.

20 Do I take it then that that is your case?

21 MR. MOORE: With the exception of those documents, the answer is

22 yes. Thank you very much.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you very much.

24 [Microphone not activated]

25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone please.

Page 11207

1 JUDGE PARKER: I beg your pardon. I pressed once too often.

2 We have noticed that subject to the outstanding issues of the

3 admissibility of certain documents, the Prosecution has closed its case.

4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.33 p.m.,

5 to be reconvened on Monday, the 26th day of

6 June, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.