Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 638

1 (10.15am)

2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Will you kindly invite the witness,

3 please?

4 MR OSTBERG: Your Honour, Mrs McHenry has one issue

5 pertaining to yesterday's hearing to take up just for a

6 few seconds.

7 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Let us get the appearances of counsel.

8 MR OSTBERG: You will have them, your Honour.

9 MR OSTBERG: I am Eric Ostberg. I appear today with my

10 learned friend Mrs Teresa McHenry and Miss Elles van

11 Dusschoten and support assistant Mr Rod Dixon.

12 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: The appearances for the defence,

13 please.

14 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Good morning, your

15 Honours. I am Edina Residovic, defence counsel of

16 Zejnil Delalic being together with Mr Eugene O'Sullivan,

17 Professor of criminal law.

18 MR GREAVES: I am Michael Greaves, counsel on behalf of

19 Mr Mucic.

20 MR KARABDIC (in interpretation): I am Salih Karabdic,

21 counsel of the accused Mr Hazim Delic, and with me in

22 the team is Mr Thomas Moran, lawyer from Houston, Texas.

23 MR BRACKOVIC (in interpretation): Good morning, your

24 Honours. I am Mustafa Brackovic, defence counsel of the

25 fourth accused, Esad Landzo, and with me in the defence

Page 639

1 team is Mrs Cynthia McMurrey, who probably was not

2 informed of the earlier start of this morning's

3 sessions. She is late.

4 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Thank you very much. We appreciate

5 the fact that she is unable to be here now because of

6 the change in the time. We mentioned 10.30 but for

7 other reasons we had to start a little earlier. So I am

8 sorry about that.

9 Can we now have the witness?

10 MS McMURREY: Your Honour, with your permission, I would

11 just like to bring up one matter from yesterday, and I

12 apologise for not handling it yesterday but I must

13 confess I was a little confused by the whole manner in

14 which the impeachment process was being handled. We

15 would like to offer into evidence at this time the prior

16 statement of Mrs Cecez, which were referred to by the

17 defence and shown to the witness yesterday.

18 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: How do you introduce it now? How do

19 you put it in.

20 MS McHENRY: Well, your Honour, I believe they were shown

21 and identified to the witness yesterday and I do not

22 believe there will be any dispute with counsel that the

23 witness statements they were referring to, although they

24 did not themselves mark them, are the witness statements

25 of Mrs Cecez, but ...

Page 640

1 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I do not quite understand this. Which

2 of the defence counsel was trying to put it in then?

3 MS McHENRY: Your Honour, they were not trying to put it

4 in, but we referred to it several times and showed it to

5 the witness, and certainly we should have objected more

6 vigorously at the time and made sure they were marked

7 and introduced into evidence, but given that I do not

8 believe that there is any dispute that these are her

9 prior statements that the defence counsel referred to,

10 and indeed showed the witness, we believe that they may

11 be introduced into evidence.

12 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Did it not occur to you during

13 re-examination to put it to her?

14 MS McHENRY: Your Honour, I apologise for my defects in not

15 raising this issue earlier, and I realise it is a

16 problem.

17 JUDGE JAN: In fact, I had pointed out yesterday that these

18 documents should be brought into the evidence and it was

19 not done at that stage. I thought you were quite happy

20 they should not be brought into the record.

21 MS McHENRY: No, your Honour. I thought after you brought

22 it up the defence would do it, and then, because I must

23 admit I was confused by the whole manner in which the

24 defence was doing it, I neglected to do it, which is why

25 on the theory better late than never I am attempting to

Page 641

1 offer them into evidence now.

2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: It is a little awkward. Can I hear

3 the defence on this?

4 MR MORAN: Your Honour, Tom Moran for Hasim Delic. A

5 couple of thoughts, your Honour. First, there are some

6 questions based on the witness's testimony as to the

7 authenticity of one of the documents. There was a

8 document -- there was a record of a court proceeding in

9 the former Yugoslavia, and there was some corrections

10 made to that record in handwriting, and the witness said

11 she did not recall anything at all about those

12 corrections, but, more importantly, your Honour, if the

13 court wishes to have those introduced into evidence, we

14 wish they be admitted solely for the limited purpose of

15 impeachment rather than for all purposes.

16 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Actually, that is the only basis on

17 which it could be admitted in the first instance, but if

18 it was not so done then ... since Mr Moran is not

19 objecting to that you can tender is at least for

20 impeachment purposes if it has any such effect.

21 MR MORAN: Except the document with the corrections on it

22 because there is some question based on the witness's

23 testimony as to the authenticity of the corrections. It

24 is the court record from a proceeding before an

25 administrative -- an investigating magistrate in the

Page 642

1 former Yugoslavia. There are two versions of it. One

2 of them is the original version and the other is the

3 version with corrections, and, as the court will recall,

4 I asked the witness will the corrections and she said

5 she did not recall anything about them.

6 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: What I remember is, as she said, she

7 came to The Hague only once, only once, and that she did

8 not remember any of the corrections made in the second

9 version.

10 MR MORAN: That is correct, your Honour.

11 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: That is what she said.

12 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honour.

13 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Yes?

14 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Mr President, I do not

15 know in what way the witness could now authenticate one

16 of the documents of which she said that she had not even

17 given it. Therefore, there are several statements we

18 are talking about, incorrect statements, statements

19 given elsewhere in a different place and statements that

20 the witness claims never to have made. Therefore, the

21 only basis for accepting this in evidence could be to

22 impeach the witness and to impeach the procedure by

23 which the witness testified.

24 JUDGE JAN: We are talking about the document which

25 admittedly bore her signatures and admittedly contained

Page 643

1 corrections in her own handwriting.

2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Actually there is no doubt about what

3 is being discussed. Mr Moran, who started it, put that

4 document to her. She denied knowing about how the

5 mistakes were corrected. This is what the prosecution

6 now wants tendered, at least for impeachment purposes

7 and for no other thing. I think that is sufficient for

8 that purpose.

9 MR BRACKOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honours, as defence

10 counsel of Esad Landzo, I should like to support what

11 has been said by counsel Edina Residovic. I also

12 support all the reasons she has given, so I do not feel

13 it necessary to elaborate on them. The authenticity of

14 the statement may be called in question, and especially

15 of the corrections made subsequently, and the witness in

16 her statement gave a wrong location, and she also could

17 not remember having made that statement, and therefore

18 we are absolutely against the acceptance of this

19 statement as evidence.

20 MR GREAVES: Your Honour, as far as Mr Mucic is concerned,

21 the position is this, that I am content to adopt the

22 arguments advanced by each of my friends who appear for

23 the defence.

24 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I think after listening to all that

25 has been said I am content to admitting for the purposes

Page 644

1 of impeaching whatever has been said on the opposing

2 statements, because there are two statements which

3 Mr Moran did consider, and I think that is the only

4 purpose for which that document is being tendered. I

5 think it is admissible for that purpose.

6 MR MORAN: Excuse me, your Honour. I believe there were a

7 total of three separate statements, plus the one with

8 corrections. Are all four being admitted for

9 impeachment purposes.

10 JUDGE JAN: The one relating to the -- we are talking about

11 the document which she admitted bore her signatures.

12 MR MORAN: That is the one. We would ask if one be

13 admitted, they all be admitted for the purposes of

14 impeachment.

15 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: That was not what was in issue

16 yesterday.

17 JUDGE JAN: There is an objection to it because you have to

18 confront the witness with the omissions or

19 contradictions. You referred the witness only to that

20 particular document which bore her signatures.

21 MR MORAN: I understand, your Honour.

22 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: So that is the only one that is in

23 issue, not all the others.

24 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Mr President, I asked

25 the witness to recognise the statement, which she did

Page 645

1 not recognise as having made. Therefore, we would ask

2 that all the statements be tendered together.

3 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: You are raising quite fresh issues

4 different from what the prosecution has related to us,

5 and I think I am only considering the issue the

6 prosecution raised as compared with the evidence which

7 Mr Moran was concerned with. All that is new and I do

8 not think anybody is thinking about that now. We do not

9 use this opportunity to raise new things other than what

10 the prosecution has said.

11 MS McMURREY: Your Honours, if I may apologise to the court

12 for being tardy this morning. I would also like to add

13 that, because we had discussed our strategy and because

14 we had assumed that this document would not have been

15 introduced into evidence, Esad Landzo waived questioning

16 of that witness completely. Now, if this document is

17 admitted into evidence, then we would like to ask the

18 court's indulgence to reopen cross-examination just for

19 the limited purpose of that document only, nothing

20 further.

21 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I do not remember the document being

22 in issue at any time. All it was used at that time was

23 for the purposes of cross-examining the witness. That

24 was what was done. So its admission was never an issue.

25 JUDGE JAN: The defence itself introduced that document by

Page 646

1 referring to it in the cross-examination of the

2 witness. It was not the prosecution which has done it.

3 MS McMURREY: I understand that is correct but our defence

4 agreement was basically the document would not be

5 admitted into evidence, but I can see our hands are tied

6 at this point. I wanted to express to the court that if

7 it is allowed into evidence, defence or prosecution,

8 Esad Landzo has a few questions to clear up on that one

9 statement, and we would like to have just a tiny bit of

10 cross limited to five questions.

11 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: It might be impossible to allow you

12 that indulgence, because it is merely being tendered for

13 the purposes of impeaching that document. So it has

14 nothing to do with your opportunity of cross-examining.

15 Yes?

16 MS McHENRY: Your Honour, I will now tender them into

17 evidence.

18 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Only one. I do not remember more than

19 that.

20 MS McHENRY: Okay. Your Honour, I believe it is the

21 document that was -- she said had taken place in Borci.

22 I will tender both the document and the translation of

23 it. It is the document that was given to defence

24 counsel yesterday morning. If I understand correctly.

25 Thank you. I have anything else if anyone wants it.

Page 647

1 Thank you.

2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Will you kindly invite the witness?

3 (Witness enters court)

4 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Kindly take your seat. Please remind

5 her she is still on her oath.

6 THE REGISTRAR: I wish to remind you that you are still

7 under oath.

8 MR OSTBERG: Thank you, your Honour.

9 Dr Marie-Janine Calic (continued)

10 Examined by Mr Ostberg

11 MR OSTBERG: Good morning, Dr Calic.

12 A. Good morning.

13 Q. Yesterday we went so far as to document number 7 in your

14 file of documents. I hope today that all the counsel

15 have their files with them. The court has them before

16 them, I can see. So we do not have to take up time

17 putting documents on the ELMO except for maybe maps or

18 things like that. May I ask you, Dr Calic, to take up

19 the thread where you left it yesterday afternoon?

20 A. Let me briefly summarise what I was trying to explain

21 yesterday. Basically there were two subjects of debate

22 among the leaderships of the people in Bosnia. One was

23 the question of independence of Bosnia and the second

24 was the future constitutional set-up of Bosnia. Both

25 questions were, of course, interlinked and this is what

Page 648

1 made it difficult for the leaderships to agree on a

2 common view.

3 As far as the question of independence, there was

4 an alliance between the Croat leadership and the Muslim

5 leadership. Both did not want to stay in a Yugoslav

6 state which would have probably been dominated by the

7 Serbs. That is why they were in favour of independence,

8 but as for the second question there was a different

9 coalition. There was a coalition between the Croat and

10 the Serb leadership. As for the question of the future

11 constitution, both were in favour of having a

12 constitution on the basis of ethnic principles,

13 cantonisation. Instead the Muslim leadership was in

14 favour of having a unitarian state. This is what I was

15 trying to explain yesterday.

16 The Bosnian Serbs continued to contest the

17 legitimacy of the Sarajevo Assembly, having decided to

18 become -- Bosnia to become an independent and sovereign

19 state, and from September onwards they made a number of

20 decisions. They were trying to establish their own

21 state.

22 I have included in this file a number of documents

23 showing how the Serbs were then trying to establish

24 their own state, the government, the constitution.

25 These are the documents number 7 -- from number 7 to 15,

Page 649

1 and if you allow me, your Honours, I would prefer not to

2 show each document but just two of them.

3 These documents seem for me important for two

4 reasons. One is document number 10. It indicates the

5 territories which the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted to

6 include in the Serb state of Bosnia. It's just a bit

7 difficult here.

8 We can see from this document, which numbers all

9 the municipalities who were supposed to become part of

10 the Bosnian Serb republic. Can we switch on the ELMO?

11 Q. Yes. Can I have some help from any technician with the

12 ELMO? . Now we see the model on the screen and not the

13 document. There we are. Are you directing our interest

14 to paragraph --

15 A. Paragraph 1.

16 Q. In this Decision?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Thank you?

19 A. In this document you find all the municipalities which

20 were supposed to become part of the Serbian Republic,

21 Serb Republic of Bosnia, and we can see from this

22 document that Konjic was not supposed to be part of this

23 republic.

24 So the Serbs proclaimed in January the republic of

25 the Serbian people. They declared a constitution in

Page 650

1 February and they declared independence from Bosnia in

2 April 1992.

3 Let me emphasise that in many of these documents

4 the Serbs expressed their wish to stay in Yugoslavia, so

5 they considered themselves as being part of what

6 remained of Yugoslavia. The constitutional court of

7 Bosnia instead made two decisions declaring these

8 unconstitutional, and I have also included the decisions

9 of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia in this file.

10 Q. Will you tell us under what number?

11 A. It's number 16 and 17. The Bosnian Serbs were not the

12 only group challenging the territorial integrity of

13 Bosnia. Also the Bosnian Croats were moving towards

14 independence. In November 1991 the Croatian Community

15 of the Bosnian Sava Valley was established and in

16 November Croat leaders decided to form the so-called

17 Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna. This community of

18 Herceg-Bosnia was defined as a political, cultural,

19 economic and regional entity, and on 3rd July 1992 it

20 was officially proclaimed.

21 Q. Is that what we find under number 18?

22 A. This is what you find under number 18 and in this

23 document, which I also will show you a bit in detail we

24 can recognise under Article -- I cannot see it on my

25 screen -- under Article 2 we can read:

Page 651

1 "The Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna shall

2 consist of the following municipalities..."

3 We can see here that Konjic was supposed to become

4 part of this republic -- not republic. It was called

5 "community", but in fact it was perceived as a separate

6 state and this is also exactly how the constitutional

7 court in Sarajevo perceived this declaration of the

8 Croat -- proclamation of the Croat Community of

9 Herceg-Bosna. They also made a Decision against this

10 declaring Herceg-Bosna unconstitutional. This is

11 document number 19 in my folder.

12 Let us go back to what happened in autumn 1991.

13 In October I was explaining yesterday there was a

14 proclamation, declaration of sovereignty by the Bosnian

15 Assembly. There was Serb opposition against this

16 declaration. There was a break-up of all state

17 institutions in Bosnia and there was a letter by the

18 Bosnian government to the European Community in December

19 1991. Bosnia should be recognised as an independent

20 republic.

21 In view of these facts tensions in Bosnia

22 increased constantly throughout the winter of 1991/1992

23 reaching a peak after the referendum on 29th February

24 and 1st March 1992 on the republic's independence. The

25 European Community had made independence -- had made

Page 652

1 recognition of Bosnia conditional on holding a

2 referendum to determine whether the population of Bosnia

3 was really in favour of independence.

4 This brings me back to the Badinter Commission,

5 which I mentioned yesterday. This time it is Opinion

6 Number 4, document number 20 in our file. Can we have

7 it on the screen? So the European Community Arbitration

8 Commission under Badinter was aware of the fact that a

9 part of the Bosnian population was opposing

10 independence. You can see this in the last page which

11 is on the screen, paragraph 4:

12 "It was therefore of the opinion that the will of

13 the people of Bosnia to constitute an independent

14 republic, an independent state, cannot be held to have

15 been fully established."

16 This is what they were assessing.

17 In the referendum, it was the condition of the

18 European Community to recognise independence. 66 per

19 cent of the Bosnian citizens participated. The Serbs

20 boycotted this referendum and the overwhelming majority

21 of those who took part -- this is nearly 66 per cent of

22 the Bosnian population -- expressed their will that

23 Bosnia should become indeed an independent state.

24 The European Community then took the decision to

25 recognise Bosnia and from 7th April 1992 Bosnia was a

Page 653

1 sovereign independent republic recognised by the

2 European Community, by the United States, and other

3 states followed.

4 Even before the official recognition of Bosnia

5 around the referendum the first violent incidents

6 occurred in Bosnia, and the European Community was very

7 concerned about this fact. The first barricades were

8 set up in Sarajevo. There were violent incidents, and

9 you can see these events from a declaration, document

10 number 22, a statement of the European Union. I will

11 not put it on the screen. It is just to support what I

12 am saying. So the referendum maybe was the turning

13 point towards a more violent state in this republic.

14 Bigger, more violent conflicts erupted after

15 Bosnia became independent, and the Presidency of Bosnia

16 had to declare the state of imminent war danger on 8th

17 April 1992, which meant that all power was now

18 concentrated in the Presidency. The Parliament did not

19 work any more. First efforts to mobilise soldiers were

20 undertaken. The state of war was proclaimed by the

21 state Presidency as late as June 1992, nearly three

22 months after the break-out of armed hostility. There

23 was a certain period in which -- during which the

24 Bosnian Presidency was acting under immediate danger of

25 war but not under a state of war.

Page 654

1 Q. Any explanation to why it took more than two months to

2 come up with the decision of a state of war?

3 A. There are many speculations. I am personally not sure

4 about the real reasons for this. It is, on the other

5 hand, a fact that the difference between having

6 immediate -- a state of immediate war danger and having

7 a state of war danger are not too big in terms of

8 mobilising all forces against the perceived enemy. So

9 the real reason I cannot know this or I cannot support

10 with any document this -- I mean it is just speculation,

11 but it was a matter of criticism. It has been

12 criticised from various sides that it took so long to

13 organise all forces against this perceived enemy.

14 Q. What happened during this period in shaping a Bosnian

15 army? You are coming to this?

16 A. I am coming now and I am moving to the main military

17 forces in the Republic of Bosnia. I am also explaining

18 how the Bosnian army was formed.

19 Q. Yes, please.

20 A. The main military forces which were active in Bosnia in

21 1992 need to be described in the context of the Yugoslav

22 defence doctrine of all people's defence, also known as

23 total national defence. It is just a question how to

24 translate this Yugoslav term. So all people's defence.

25 Q. Is that what is called TO?

Page 655

1 A. No. The doctrine is all -- I will explain what is TO,

2 but all people's defence meant the Yugoslav defence

3 doctrine, which was introduced in 1968, and it was meant

4 and aimed to mobilise all possible means and resources

5 from the bottom up of the society upwards to the purpose

6 of defence in the event of war. It meant also that

7 practically all citizens were expected to participate in

8 armed struggle wherever they could.

9 This doctrine was implemented in the defence law

10 of 1969 and later on in the defence law of 1974, and we

11 can also find it in the constitutions of Bosnia and of

12 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

13 In its Article 254 the constitution of Bosnia

14 referred explicitly to the principle of all people's

15 defence. I quote:

16 "It is the right of the working people and

17 citizens to actively participate in the formulation of

18 defence policy and preparations for the defence of the

19 country, and to ensure themselves within the framework

20 of the system and plans for national defence, the

21 conditions necessary for training to protect and defend

22 the country, and to participate in its defence."

23 The Yugoslav system of all people's defence had

24 basically three main components. One component was

25 civil protection, the Civil Protection Organisation, as

Page 656

1 it was called. This was an organisation aimed to

2 provide relief in the case of war for civilians, but

3 also in the case of natural disasters. I am not going

4 too far and not explaining too much on this. More

5 interesting for us are the other two elements, the armed

6 forces of Yugoslavia.

7 The Yugoslav people's army was one part of the

8 armed forces and the so-called territorial defence

9 organisation, TO, was the second element of this defence

10 of the armed forces of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav

11 people's army known under the name of JNA was the

12 regular standing army of Yugoslavia. It was the federal

13 army. It was also financed by the federal budget and it

14 existed since 1945. The Territorial Defence

15 Organisation, on the other hand, was under the

16 authority, control and jurisdiction of the republic as a

17 second pillar of the Yugoslav defence system.

18 So since 1968 the armed forces of Yugoslavia were

19 composed of JNA as a federal army and of the territorial

20 defence organisations as the armies of the republics.

21 Each republic had its own headquarters of the

22 territorial defence, TO, which was responsible to the

23 respective republican presidency in a military sense,

24 but in a political sense there was also a certain

25 responsibility towards Belgrade, towards the federal

Page 657

1 army, because this system of defence was conceived as a

2 unified system, and this is how it should have worked in

3 the case of war.

4 I would like to show you my document 28 just to

5 make visible how the armed forces of Yugoslavia were

6 structured. This comes from Zivkovic on the Territorial

7 Defence of Yugoslavia printed in Belgrade in 1985. You

8 can here see forces of Yugoslavia. First pillar: the

9 Yugoslav people's army, JNA; second pillar: Territorial

10 Defence Organisation under the jurisdiction of the

11 republic.

12 The Federal Army of Yugoslavia, JNA was the

13 largest and best equipped armed force in the armed

14 conflicts that began in Yugoslavia in 1991. The JNA was

15 a real pan-Yugoslavian institution deriving from Second

16 World War partition and struggle against German and

17 Italian occupation. So it was the one army which was

18 aiming at, let us say, at least in this early part of

19 the war -- aiming at keeping Yugoslavia together as a

20 state.

21 However, as the first armed conflicts erupted, the

22 JNA turned more and more -- it became more and more a

23 Serb-dominated force. Many of non-Serb officers left

24 the army. They were joining the local territorial

25 defence units and you have to see that the JNA as early

Page 658

1 as the autumn of 1991 started mobilising also in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially Bosnian Serbs, and they

3 started also distributing weapons to Bosnian Serb

4 volunteers. So as early as the autumn of 1991 we can

5 conclude that the JNA was becoming more and more a

6 Serb-dominated army.

7 All parties to the conflict were arming their

8 respective populations, and this was again a matter of

9 concern. On the international level the United Nations

10 Security Council passed a resolution in September 1991

11 imposing an arms embargo on the whole territory of

12 Yugoslavia.

13 I included the Security Council resolution, but it

14 is a well-known fact. I think there is no need that I

15 put it here on the ELMO.

16 Q. We can find it in your binder.

17 A. Yes, we can find it in the binder.

18 Q. Under number 29.

19 A. The JNA was openly present and it was also involved in

20 the armed struggles in Bosnia-Herzegovina at least until

21 May 1992. On 4th May the Federal Republic of

22 Yugoslavia, which consisted at that time of Serbia and

23 Montenegro decided to withdraw JNA troops from Bosnia,

24 withdraw the troops from Bosnia by 19th May 1992.

25 During this formal withdrawal, however, the JNA

Page 659

1 left behind many of their troops and also equipment and

2 arms. These former JNA forces, armed with heavy

3 weaponry, were integrated in the newly-established

4 Bosnian Serb Army, which was later to become the army of

5 the Republika Srpska. This is a process which General

6 Veljko Kadijevic of JNA described in his book "Moje

7 Vidjenje Raspada", "My View on the Collapse", as

8 follows. You have this document 31 in the binder.

9 Let me put it on the ELMO. It is such an

10 interesting quote can we see it on the screen, please?

11 It is this paragraph basically, in which he openly

12 admits that:

13 "The units and headquarters of the JNA formed the

14 backbone of the army of the Serb Republic with complete

15 weaponry and equipment".

16 Q. May I put a question to you in this context?

17 A. Of course.

18 Q. What you just said about JNA, what they left in the

19 territory of Bosnia, would that mean that after the

20 international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina

21 hostile forces belonging to another republic was

22 fighting on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23 A. This is indeed true, and there is much evidence that the

24 JNA remained involved in the struggles in Bosnia even

25 after May 1992. We have quite a lot of evidence for

Page 660

1 this. I included one document, which is a report of the

2 UN Secretary General of 3rd December 1992, document 32,

3 again expressing concern about the fact that, despite

4 the decision to withdraw the JNA, JNA troops were still

5 present and at least actively supporting the Bosnian

6 Serb army in this armed conflict.

7 Q. On the territory of --

8 A. On the territory of Bosnia. The idea to recognise

9 Bosnia as an independent state and to recognise also

10 Croatia was originally to transform the conflict into an

11 international conflict. This was aimed to deter the

12 Yugoslav army to be involved in the two republics, but

13 it did not work, as we can see from these documents and

14 from any other documents. See also report of UN

15 Secretary General of 3rd December 1992, document 32 in

16 this binder.

17 Q. Thank you very much.

18 A. So how many were the Bosnian Serb troops? Difficult to

19 say. There are very different assessments. Most

20 scholars estimated at that time there were about 60,000,

21 but it could easily be more or less. During the

22 conflict they were mobilising more troops, reaching then

23 during 1993 maybe up to 100,000 troops, reserve troops

24 included, but there is no reliable -- not really one

25 document showing how many they really were. So far to

Page 661

1 the Bosnian Serb army.

2 What we are doing now, the Bosnian Muslims,

3 respectively the Bosnian government.

4 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I think we might rise now, have a

5 break and reassemble at 11.30.

6 MR OSTBERG: Thank you.

7 (11.07 am)

8 (Short break)

9 (11.30 am)

10 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Please remind the witness she is still

11 under oath.

12 THE REGISTRAR: You are still under oath.

13 MR OSTBERG: Thank you, your Honour. Well, Dr Calic, I

14 just ask you to continue before you stopped before the

15 break.

16 A. I started to describe how the unified system of all

17 people's defence started to disintegrate when the first

18 armed conflict erupted in the Republic of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. I also identified two

20 main military actors on the republican level. One was

21 the JNA on its way out of Bosnia and the second one was

22 the Bosnian Serb Army, which was formed in May 1992,

23 and, as I was explaining, they included part of the JNA

24 troops, personnel, arms, equipment and so on. So the

25 third important actor in this war is the Bosnian Army

Page 662

1 itself.

2 The Bosnian Army was created in April 1992. The

3 basic organisation was the Territorial Defence

4 Organisation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

5 the so-called second pillar of the former unified former

6 system of Yugoslavia. The Bosnian presidency announced

7 mobilisation of the Territorial Defence Organisation in

8 April 1992. Territorial defence units were mobilised in

9 many municipalities throughout BH including Konjic

10 municipality.

11 The Presidency of Bosnia set up a Supreme Command

12 in Sarajevo, and they were also trying to set up

13 regional headquarters. These headquarters were

14 situated, among others, in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica,

15 Doboj and in Bihac. The formal date of establishment of

16 the Bosnian Army is 15th April 1992. There was also a

17 decree on the armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia

18 passed in May. It is also included in this binder. The

19 Bosnian Army was conceived as the common armed forces of

20 all three constitutive peoples of the Republic of Bosnia

21 and it was under the command and control of the Bosnian

22 Presidency. However, as I was trying to describe

23 earlier on, many members of other -- of non-Muslim

24 nationalities did not follow this order. They did not

25 become part of this Bosnian Army, but they were trying

Page 663

1 to establish their own order forces.

2 Q. I would like to put the question to you in this

3 context. What you have just said about the forming of

4 the Bosnian Army, would that mean that when the attacks

5 against the villages surrounding Konjic took place in

6 May 1992 there was also a Bosnian Army formed?

7 A. On paper, yes. There was a Bosnian Army formed, but I

8 will explain later on that many of the regulations which

9 were passed in April and in May 1992 by the Bosnian

10 Presidency and by the Bosnian government were not

11 implemented in practice. So there were many parts of

12 Bosnia -- in many parts of Bosnia the local units were

13 acting practically independently from their supposed

14 superior command, but I will explain this later on in

15 more detail, when I come to what happened in Konjic

16 during this early period of the war.

17 Q. Thank you very much.

18 A. So how many were now the troops of the Bosnian Army?

19 Again we have the problem in this early period. There

20 were different sources. Different sources say different

21 things. Between 50,000 and 80,000 and then during the

22 war up to 100,000 personnel. Anyway, we have to

23 acknowledge that even maybe if the Bosnian Army were

24 more in personnel in numbers, they were for sure not

25 sufficiently armed and they were unequipped. This was

Page 664

1 maybe one of the main problems of the newly-established

2 Bosnian Army.

3 Another problem was, as I was already pointing out

4 before, that not all troops were actually following the

5 orders given by the Bosnian Presidency to build up the

6 new Bosnian Army, but they were creating their own armed

7 forces. The Bosnian Serb Army was one, but also the

8 Croats established their own armed forces. This brings

9 me to the next important actor, the Croatian Defence

10 Council, HVO.

11 The Croatian armed forces were established in

12 April 1992 together with separate headquarters, and they

13 were conceived to be the armed forces of the Bosnian

14 Croats. From the very beginning the armed forces of the

15 Bosnian Croats, the HVO, had quite good relations with

16 the Bosnian army. The HVO comprised of some 30,000

17 troops, most of them trained and armed by the government

18 of Croatia, and this brings me to a second external

19 actor in the Bosnian war.

20 We have also many reports from the international

21 organisations, showing how the Croatian army from

22 Croatia was involved actively and took part in the

23 Bosnian war. This is, for instance, my document number

24 37, the report of the UN Secretary-General of 24th

25 November 1992.

Page 665

1 Q. Did you mention from which time the Croat influence was

2 to be observed on the Bosnian territory?

3 A. It was practically to be observed from when the HVO was

4 established. We can say there were some signs already

5 in late 1991 but there were many more signs in 1992,

6 when the conflict actually erupted, the armed conflict.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 A. So let us summarise the main actors on the republican

9 level, the JNA, the Bosnian Serb Army, the HVO, the

10 Croatian armed forces, and of course the Bosnian Army

11 established in April 1992.

12 Let me now come to the micro level and look in

13 more detail at what happened then in the municipalities,

14 as Konjic was one of the Yugoslav -- the Bosnian

15 municipalities.

16 I prepared a map showing 109 municipalities of

17 Bosnia. Can we have it on the screen, please?

18 Q. Do we have this in the bundle also?

19 A. We have it in the binder, number 38. Can it be

20 reduced? ? So 109 municipalities. Konjic is located

21 here. We can see the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo. Here

22 is the coast. Here lies Croatia and here the Federal

23 Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia in socialist times

24 granted the municipalities quite a high level of

25 autonomy, and this was to prevent the emergence of

Page 666

1 political and ethnic tensions. The aim was to provide

2 self-government, of course always in the framework of

3 the federal and of the republican supervision.

4 Article 116 of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974

5 stated:

6 "A commune" of the municipality "is a

7 self-managing community and the basic socio-political

8 community based on the power of and self-management by

9 the working class and all working people."

10 According to the Yugoslav constitution, the

11 municipalities had, among others, the rights and the

12 duties to take care of economic, cultural, social and

13 other common needs of the Yugoslav citizens. They were

14 also allowed to set up organs of self-management and

15 organs of power for the conduct of such affairs, and

16 they were also enabled to regulate and to organise

17 national defence and, of course, self-protection, and

18 this brings me to the very essence of our case here.

19 Before I come to what happened in Konjic, let me

20 just show another diagram. This is the diagram number

21 40. I will not explain it in too much detail. It is

22 the former Yugoslavian organisation of the

23 municipalities. Just briefly to mention which bodies on

24 the political side were set up in the Bosnian

25 municipalities to organise self-administration, and who

Page 667

1 "the authorities" were at that time. So we can find an

2 Assembly, Municipal Assembly, which was elected. In the

3 municipality there was an Executive Council, which

4 functioned more or less as a kind of local government,

5 so it was the council, but there was also a President of

6 the Municipal Assembly, and this President performed

7 maybe the highest function in a municipality. He was in

8 charge of organisational questions related to the work

9 of the Assembly and related to the work of the council,

10 and he held at the same time the position of

11 co-ordinator and supervisor of the different

12 institutions of the municipality.

13 So this was basically how municipality was

14 functioning before the war. Assembly with different

15 chambers, self-management, quasi-government and not seen

16 here on this graph but this high position of President

17 of the Municipal Assembly.

18 Q. This organogram, Dr Calic, is taken from a book?

19 A. It is taken from a book by Aleksandar Ivic and a

20 co-author. It is named "Political and Constitutional

21 System of the SFRY" published in Belgrade in 1988. It

22 is a book on administration and constitution.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 A. What interests us here is that the municipalities played

25 an important role in implementing the doctrine of all

Page 668

1 people's defence, all people's defence, which meant to

2 mobilise all possible persons, means and resources from

3 the local level upwards in case of a war.

4 The municipality was conceived as an autonomous

5 community of defence; in other words, a kind of nucleus

6 of national resistance against foreign invasion. This

7 is how it was meant, but then during the war in Bosnia

8 it changed this meaning, and it became a completely

9 different thing.

10 In terms of the 1974 Bosnian constitution, the

11 municipalities were able to make certain decisions in

12 the event of a war or an imminence of war. Article 273

13 of the Bosnian constitution stated and I quote:

14 "In time of war or in case of an immediate threat

15 of war the Presidency of the Municipal Assembly shall be

16 formed, will decide questions within the competence of

17 the Assembly if it is impossible for the Assembly to

18 meet.2.

19 We have the exact articles of the Bosnian

20 constitution in document 25, which explains the

21 functions of the War Presidency in times of war. It was

22 Article 273. I will come back later to this in more

23 detail, when I explain exactly what happened in Konjic,

24 but at this stage it is enough to bear in mind that

25 municipalities played indeed a very important role in

Page 669

1 self-defence, and that they were allowed under the

2 constitution of Yugoslavia and under the constitution of

3 Bosnia to perform certain war-related tasks.

4 So how was this now implemented in Konjic? Let me

5 show first some basic data on the municipality of

6 Konjic. First, a diagram of the ethnic composition of

7 Konjic municipalities in 1991, document number 42. I

8 will put it on the screen on the ELMO. I cannot see it

9 on the screen. Maybe you can. Do we have it on the

10 screen? Okay. Can you reduce it a bit? Thank you.

11 In 1991 the population of Konjic municipality was

12 composed of 54 per cent Muslims, 26 per cent Croats, 15

13 per cent were Serbs and 3 per cent were Yugoslavs, and

14 then there were also 1 per cent of population of other

15 nationalities. The population was 43,000 altogether

16 approximately. So this is how it was in 1991. I will

17 at the end of my statement show another diagram. This

18 diagram will then show the ethnic composition of today.

19 So we have about 15 per cent Serbs in this

20 municipalities, 6,620 people.

21 Let us look how these people were distributed.

22 Another map, document 41.

23 Q. 41.

24 A. Based on the population census of 1991. We can see that

25 also the municipality of Konjic was mixed and you can

Page 670

1 see majority villages of the Muslims nearly all over

2 this municipalities. The red ones are the Serbs. So

3 there is no clear division within this municipality.

4 There are no clear Muslim or no clear only Serb areas in

5 this municipality.

6 Let us look, however, where the Serbs, Serb

7 villages, the Serb majority villages were located. Let

8 me put document number 43, a map of the Serb towns of

9 the municipality of Konjic. So these are the

10 settlements with Serbs as an absolute majority. We can

11 see --

12 Q. Exactly how do I read this? The blue dots?

13 A. The blue points, dots, they are the settlements with

14 Serbs as absolute majority. Interestingly these

15 villages were located along the main road running from

16 Sarajevo down to the coast and along the railway,

17 running also along mainly the same way.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. In document 44, which I will also put on the screen, we

20 can see a bit better where Konjic was located, mainly in

21 the northern part of Herzegovina. Here in the northern

22 part is Sarajevo. Here is the coast. Much of its area

23 is heavily wooded. It is rocky, it is mountainous and

24 this makes it difficult to carry out any land

25 operation. Konjic is located on the Neretva river in

Page 671

1 the valley of the Neretva but it has high mountains

2 around. The whole area is important as a transit region

3 for several reasons. There are important communication

4 lines. I also mentioned the road and the railway from

5 Sarajevo down to the coast, but there were also other

6 important communication lines very close to the

7 municipality of Konjic: the road here from Jablanica

8 going up to Gorni Vakuf, Central Bosnia, and other roads

9 leading from this main road through Herzegovina to the

10 eastern part of Bosnia.

11 Q. Central Bosnia, which starts -- Konjic is also something

12 like the border between the two historical areas of

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina. It's the most important

14 municipality of Herzegovina and it is so very close to

15 an area which we call Central Bosnia, and which then

16 starts from here up.

17 During the Second World War Bosnia, especially

18 Central and eastern Bosnia, witnessed very bitter ethnic

19 struggles. During the Second World War Bosnia formed

20 part of the Croat fascist state. Under the so-called

21 Ustasha the fascist state was established by the German

22 regime.

23 It had the name of an independent state but it was

24 not an independent state. It was occupied territory.

25 So Bosnia was part of this state and so was Konjic. The

Page 672

1 Croat fascists during this time conducted an extremely

2 brutal war against the Serbs. Hundreds of thousands of

3 Serbs were killed in this time and, of course, this

4 history is still in the minds of the people in this

5 area. There were also Serb nationalists conducting

6 aggressions against non-Serbs, and this Cetnik, the

7 national movement of Cetniks, of course, massacred

8 thousands of Muslims and Croats in this area.

9 There is a whole debate over how many people were

10 really killed during this struggle. It is a matter of

11 debate among historians in the countries of the former

12 Yugoslavia. It is a highly politicised debate. All

13 sides claim to have more victims on their side. Being a

14 historian looking from the outside, having seen many

15 sources, I would conclude that there were altogether 1

16 million Yugoslavs who died, Yugoslavs all over

17 Yugoslavia who died during the Second World War and

18 Bosnia lost about 10 per cent of its population. So

19 this is just to give a --

20 Q. When you say "Bosnian population", do you mean all three

21 nationalities?

22 A. All three nationalities.

23 Q. 10 per cent of the total population?

24 A. Population, yes. Historically Konjic and also the

25 Neretva River marks the border-line between two historic

Page 673

1 spheres of influence. For historical reasons the

2 Bosnian Croats and also the Croatian Croats have laid

3 claim to Herzegovina, which they consider as the real

4 heartland of Croatian. Herzegovina goes up to here, the

5 Mt Ivan saddle, which marks the border between

6 Herzegovina and Bosnia. They have laid claim to this

7 territory for historical reasons, even though there are

8 many, many municipalities and areas where Croats are not

9 in the majority but where the Muslims are in a majority.

10 The Serb leadership, on the other hand, apparently

11 had territorial aspirations on the eastern side of the

12 Neretva Valley. It was reported in the press that since

13 the beginning of the war, the Serb leadership considered

14 territory east of this Neretva Valley as being Serb

15 territory. There is no document evidence. This is just

16 press reports. There were also many, many speculations

17 that the Serb and the Croat Presidents and the local

18 leaders of the Croats and the Serbs had made an

19 agreement to divide Bosnia between themselves, and we

20 find the municipality of Konjic in the middle of this.

21 So on the one side the Serb aspiration and the Croats,

22 and nothing left for the Bosnian Muslims.

23 So for all these reasons, as well as for others,

24 which I will discuss now, the Konjic municipality has

25 been of high strategic importance for all the warring

Page 674

1 factions.

2 I mentioned the strategically very important road

3 running from Sarajevo down to the coast. It was a major

4 line of supply for the Bosnian troops. I have also to

5 mention that Sarajevo was besieged from the very

6 beginning of the conflict, and this was the way through

7 which -- this was the way from Central Bosnia and from

8 Herzegovina to reach Sarajevo from the western side. So

9 it was very important to have this road and railway

10 under control.

11 This area forms at the same time the link to the

12 coast, and it was a major weapons supply line. I

13 mentioned earlier on that there was an arms embargo on

14 the countries of the former Yugoslavia and -- but, of

15 course, the arms embargo was broken. Many parts and

16 weapons usually came from Croatian and then they were

17 transported on this line. So this was another reason to

18 get weapons from Croatian through this line, why this

19 road was very important, especially when it came to the

20 first military attempts to lift the siege of Sarajevo

21 and get access to the Bosnian capital.

22 Konjic itself was also an important military

23 centre. About 55 per cent of the Bosnian military

24 industry, defence industry, was located in the Republic

25 of Bosnia, and most of this in its central part. The

Page 675

1 largest military industrial enterprise was the so-called

2 united specific purpose industry in Sarajevo. This huge

3 defence industry had about 60 large and small plants

4 located throughout the former Yugoslavia, and one of

5 them was the Igman factory of arms and ammunition in

6 Konjic town.

7 There were other military industrial centres in

8 other parts of Bosnia but Igman was one of the largest

9 armaments plants in Bosnia, and it produced ammunition

10 up to 20 mm. It produced mines and other things. It

11 was built underground, and it covers about 20,000 square

12 metres. Control over this factory was, of course, a

13 pre-condition to control over the local defence

14 production, and it was of paramount importance for the

15 Bosnian Army that was under-equipped.

16 I took this information from an article which I

17 have also included in this binder, an article by Milan

18 Vego. He is a specialist in military developments in

19 the former Yugoslavia. This is from the Jane's

20 Intelligence Review. It is published and it is document

21 number 45. There are some more details. I have not

22 time to explain on this here.

23 There were also other objects of military interest

24 in this area. This is my document 44, which I am

25 showing here. So I mentioned Konjic as a town where

Page 676

1 important defence industry was located. Other objects

2 of high interest to the warring factions were the

3 weapons storage. According to TO's strategy of all

4 people's defence, weapons were stored at the local level

5 in the country and they were supposed to be used by the

6 territorial defence organisation of the republics in the

7 case of a war.

8 So the weapons of the territorial defence of

9 Konjic and of the municipalities of Prozor and Jablanica

10 were stored in the Ljuta Barracks. The Ljuta Barracks

11 are here. It had a similar underground structure as the

12 Igman factory, and this can also be seen in the document

13 by Milan Vego. We find other military facilities in

14 this area like the JNA barracks of Celebici.

15 Konjic municipality is located in the mountainous

16 part of Herzegovina and it is sparsely populated and let

17 us say maybe even economically a weak area with the

18 exception of Konjic town. There are reserves, even rich

19 reserves, of iron ore and several other important goods

20 located in this area.

21 I just would like to mention that Yugoslavia --

22 in Yugoslavia was a very, very serious economic crisis,

23 that aggravated throughout 1991 and 1992. Bosnia's

24 national product was down 45 per cent from its 1990

25 level in 1991, so it had reduced by nearly one half.

Page 677

1 The inflation rate in 1991 was above 1000 per cent, and

2 30 per cent of people were registered as being

3 unemployed. So the economic crisis was, in fact,

4 deepening. There were many people that did not earn

5 enough money to -- enough money for subsistence. There

6 was a rapid drop in the standards of living in the

7 income. There was growing unemployment and so on.

8 In Konjic there were about 10,000 people employed,

9 most in factories, but these factories had not enough

10 contracts any more, so the economic crisis was also very

11 present in this municipality. About half of the

12 employed in Konjic municipality were employed in

13 factories, and these factories, as I was indicating, did

14 not function any more as they were supposed to do. I

15 believe that the fact that more and more Bosnians found

16 themselves living below the poverty level contributed

17 very negatively to the tension and also to the

18 hostilities that had emerged at this time in the

19 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20 Now what happened on the political side in this

21 municipality? Diagram document number 46 shows us

22 composition of the Municipal Assembly in 1990 after the

23 elections. It is in a way similar to the results of

24 elections on the republican level. People tended to

25 vote according to their ethnic affiliation. So we can

Page 678

1 see that out of 60 seats in the Assembly, the Muslim SDA

2 -- can we see this? -- 60 seats: 28 for the SDA; 14

3 for the HDZ; and 9 for the Serbs. There were, of

4 course, nine other seats for the three parties

5 altogether: the former Communist, the Alliance of the

6 Reformed Forces, and one to the Union of Socialist

7 Youth.

8 All over Bosnia and also in Konjic municipalities the

9 administrative structures started to disintegrate in

10 1991. This was a process that happened also in the

11 administrative bodies of this municipality. It happened

12 also within the territorial defence organisation. The

13 territorial defence organisation, together with other

14 forces, became, as I was pointing out, the Bosnian Army,

15 but many local TO commanders of Serb origin did not join

16 this territorial defence and later the Bosnian Army, but

17 they refused to do so, and many Bosnian Croats also

18 refused to do so and the Bosnian Croats joined then the

19 HVO.

20 From March 1992 throughout BH local authorities

21 formed so-called crisis staffs or war staffs. They were

22 already expecting that conflicts might erupt. So I

23 would say after the referendum marked such a critical

24 moment in the history, political history, of this

25 country. These bodies -- let me say what local

Page 679

1 authorities were at that time.

2 Local authorities meant members of the local

3 administration for higher level. It meant

4 representatives of the political parties, but it meant

5 also chiefs of factories, of the water supply system, of

6 the police and it meant sometimes also military

7 representatives.

8 These crisis staffs, bodies, if you want, were

9 established to control all levels of municipal life,

10 including the police, finance, communications and so on,

11 and they were preparing to take control as soon as

12 hostilities erupted.

13 We can see this in many municipalities throughout

14 Bosnia. There were marked differences as to how these

15 crisis staffs were functioning, as to how they were

16 composed, but this was, in fact, the case in many

17 municipalities, that these kind of underground

18 structures were emerging.

19 Q. May I understand it in the way that all the three

20 groups, the three parties had their own crisis staff?

21 A. They had more or less their own.

22 Q. So the one who then took control had a crisis staff

23 ready and the others on the losing side could not use

24 their crisis staff any more, at least in that

25 municipality?

Page 680

1 A. Yes. It depended, of course, which group was in

2 majority. It was easier in regions where one or two

3 groups had a clear majority, and they were -- as maybe

4 in Konjic already, they hold already the majority of

5 positions and of seats in the Assembly. Then it was

6 clear that they were the most important members to

7 participate then in these crisis staffs, and of course

8 there were other examples, especially in communities

9 which were taken by military action, how these staffs

10 came into being.

11 Q. So the member of a crisis staff in Konjic, for instance,

12 could also be sitting working on the existing

13 municipality levels?

14 A. Exactly. I now elaborate a bit more on this.

15 Especially on the civilian side of these war

16 preparations which started in March and then were

17 intensified, of course, in April when the state of

18 imminent war danger was declared, proclaimed by the

19 Bosnian Presidency.

20 By March 1992 administrative bodies of Konjic had

21 ceased to function. The Serb representatives had

22 withdrawn from the Executive Council, and also from the

23 Municipal Assembly. In April 1992 this mentioned crisis

24 staff was formalised into a local government. It was

25 called "War Presidency". This institution of a War

Page 681

1 Presidency, which was then at the time the most

2 important civilian authority at the time, was an

3 institution which was already invented in the system of

4 all people's defence, so it was in a way a heritage

5 coming from the old Yugoslav times.

6 Let me show the law on all people's defence of

7 Bosnia of 1983, my document number 47, and I will put it

8 on the ELMO.

9 JUDGE JAN: Just a minute. After Bosnia-Herzegovina

10 declared independence, did it immediately have a

11 constitution of its own?

12 A. Sorry? No, it did not have a constitution. It had the

13 old Bosnian constitution of 1974 but the constitution

14 was constantly amended through this time.

15 JUDGE JAN: I thought the most relevant would be the

16 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself but did it

17 have the constitution of 1974?

18 A. Yes. Then the Bosnian government was constantly adding

19 new Articles to this constitution and there was a period

20 of time in 1992 where, in fact, there was a kind of

21 chaotic situation from the legal point of view and also

22 from the point of view how these laws and how the

23 Articles of the constitution were, in fact, implemented,

24 because it was just so much confusion about which law

25 was still there and which law should not be applicable

Page 682

1 any more. This also creates now a lot of confusion for

2 persons who have to analyse what was really going on

3 from the legal point of view during this time.

4 So we have to consider, I think, as well the old

5 Yugoslav legislation and the old constitution but we

6 have also to consider what was then new from the legal

7 point of view are and I will show you both.

8 Let me start now with how the old legislation

9 perceived the War Presidency in times of -- immediate

10 threat of war in times of war. I refer here to the law

11 on all people's defence for the Republic of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina published in the Official Gazette of the

13 Republic of Bosnia in 1983, document number 47.

14 We see here in Article 66:

15 "The Presidency of the Municipal Assembly", which

16 is the War Presidency, "shall be established in time of

17 war or in the event of an immediate threat of war."

18 This War Presidency, as we can see from the same

19 Article:

20 "... shall lead all people's resistance in the

21 territory of the municipality.

22 It shall make decisions about issues which fall

23 within the sphere of competence of the Municipal

24 Assembly, should the Assembly not be able to convene."

25 This was in many municipalities of Bosnia the

Page 683

1 case, especially in the ethnically mixed area. So it

2 could not meet any more. War Presidencies were

3 established and also in Konjic this kind of War

4 Presidency was established. So who was now supposed to

5 be a member of this? Article 67, which is -- 67 starts

6 on this page -- tells us that the Presidency is composed

7 of the Presidency of the Municipal Assembly and a

8 certain number of members. A certain number of members

9 says the Article.

10 Q. It sounds a bit unprecise to me?

11 A. It sounds a bit unprecise. I will explain later on a

12 bit more that it was, in fact, not too unprecise. It

13 was flexible but not unprecise. Let us see here. There

14 are more members named in the same Article. For

15 instance, the President of the Municipal Assembly; the

16 President of the Council; the President of the Committee

17 of the League of Communists. At this time that was the

18 only party, the main party. Then we have

19 representatives of labour unions. We have war veterans

20 and again we have other members of the Presidency, and

21 interestingly under this Article we have also the

22 Commander of the local territorial defence.

23 So under this old Yugoslavian law the War

24 Presidency, which was, in fact, meant to be a civilian

25 body, was composed of all relevant persons in a certain

Page 684

1 local environment, starting from administration,

2 including also people coming from the factories or water

3 supply or whatever, and also representatives from the

4 military.

5 Q. The last sentence in this matter is:

6 "Other members of the Presidency shall appointed

7 by ..."

8 A. Exactly. So there was a possibility to appoint members

9 according to local conditions.

10 Q. Yes. Was this Municipal Assembly functioning at this

11 time?

12 A. It was not -- you mean in Konjic?

13 Q. In Konjic in the Spring of 1992?

14 A. It was not functioning.

15 Q. The Assembly was not functioning?

16 A. It was not functioning. So this was the old law. The

17 Bosnian government in May 1992 passed a new Defence Law,

18 and this Defence Law had also an Article on War

19 Presidencies and it was a bit different from the old

20 Yugoslavia, the old Bosnian socialist law. This was, of

21 course, normal, because the conditions had changed

22 completely, and the needs and also the composition of

23 this War Presidency had to be changed.

24 I, therefore, present the new Defence Law of May,

25 especially the Article 40.

Page 685

1 Q. We are now under number?

2 A. We are number 48, Article 40, telling us the composition

3 according to the new law. It was again the Chairman of

4 the Municipal Assembly, the Executive Council,

5 representative of the Ministry of Defence, the Chief of

6 Police and the Commander of the Civil Defence, and also

7 the Chairman of the political party factions. To make

8 it a bit more clear, I produced a diagram, which is

9 document number 49. So this is the composition of the

10 War Presidency according to the Defence Law of Bosnia in

11 May 1992. Just a little bit more to be reduced, please,

12 otherwise you cannot see it. Okay.

13 So, interesting under this new law, the

14 representative of the territorial defence, which means

15 the representative of the armed forces, was not any

16 longer supposed to be a member of this War Presidency.

17 So it formally on paper became a pure civilian body,

18 with the President, so the highest authority of the

19 municipality, representative of the civil defence staff,

20 the President of the government, named Executive

21 Council, the Head of Police, Head of Public Security

22 Service, representative of the Defence Ministry coming

23 from Sarajevo, and the representatives of the political

24 parties in specific municipalities.

25 Let me just --

Page 686

1 Q. May I just ask you, before we leave this, the law is of

2 20th May 1992?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Did it enter into force immediately?

5 A. It did enter into force immediately. However, it was

6 not implemented in most of the municipalities, and it

7 was not implemented in Konjic until September 1992. So

8 I cannot really conclude who exactly the members of this

9 civilian, highest civilian body, were, and I assume it

10 was a very flexible system of composition. I cannot

11 confirm that the composition was according to the old

12 law, and I can neither confirm that it was according to

13 this law. What I know is this law was implemented in

14 September 1992. There was a period of like a vacuum and

15 maybe changing persons participating in the work of the

16 War Presidency.

17 What was the War Presidency supposed to do?

18 Organise the local defence logistically according to the

19 doctrine of all people's defence. They were, of course,

20 involved in many, many security-related matters, for

21 instance, arms supply; for instance, recruitment of

22 soldiers; and other war or defence-related tasks.

23 So this was the civilian organisation under the

24 law of the Bosnian constitution and under the law of the

25 -- Defence Law of 20th May 1992. So what happened now

Page 687

1 on the military side?

2 I just wanted to mention one thing. I was saying

3 under the new law the Territorial Defence was not

4 supposed to be represented in this War Presidency.

5 However, we have here the Head of the Security Service,

6 the Head of police, and under the same Defence Law the

7 police in times of war was supposed to become a part of

8 the armed forces. So this person, Head of Security,

9 Head of Police, was in a way the link, the institutional

10 link between the civilian and the military side, and

11 again I cannot -- I do not know who exactly the members

12 at this time were.

13 So on the military side let us remember that the

14 Bosnian government was trying to build up the new army,

15 the Bosnian Army, and they were trying to streamline the

16 organisation all over the territory of Bosnia, and of

17 course in some areas this was easier and in some areas

18 it was completely impossible. The armed forces

19 consisted -- included also the police and other security

20 forces. This is what I was just explaining before.

21 So what was the situation in April and May 1992?

22 The situation was difficult, of course, for the Bosnian

23 government. Sarajevo was besieged by Serb troops. The

24 communications were interrupted with much of the rest of

25 the territory and the local armed forces, the former TO,

Page 688

1 which was to become the Bosnian Army often operated

2 under the command of local officers.

3 I show you another diagram, the diagram 51, the

4 organisational structure of the army of the Republic of

5 Bosnia in Spring 1992. This is how it should have

6 looked like, but it does not work, of course in that

7 way. According to the already mentioned law on all

8 people's defence, and according also to the new Defence

9 Law there were three levels within the organisation of

10 the Bosnian army.

11 There was, of course, the republican level, so the

12 headquarters in Sarajevo; there was then a district

13 level; and there was a municipal level. So we have

14 three levels. So at this time the HQ in Sarajevo, of

15 course, was effectively working. However, they did not

16 manage to establish headquarters in all the cities where

17 they wanted. The headquarters in Mostar would not be

18 established at that early time for different reasons.

19 There were internal problems going on in this

20 municipality. Croats and Muslims are not in agreement.

21 The armed forces were not in agreement on establishing

22 such a headquarters. So in a way we should just bear in

23 mind that this did not function as it should. It was in

24 the mind of the commanders but not in reality. The HQ

25 in Konjic, which was established at this time, was more

Page 689

1 or less acting independently, and there remains a

2 question mark as to whether they had a direct line, of

3 course, to the headquarters in Sarajevo, which may have

4 been the case, but I also can imagine there were many

5 decisions taken autonomously in this area.

6 So what I was trying to say is in this early

7 period, the first months after the outbreak of

8 hostilities in Bosnia, the normal chain of command,

9 supreme command -- supreme command, district

10 headquarters, municipal headquarters, and then the units

11 which came under them was interrupted and they were

12 interrupted here on the district level, and I guess they

13 were often interrupted even here on this level, as I was

14 saying. The capital was besieged and it was not easy

15 often to get communications through from here to the

16 different levels.

17 From April 1992 onwards the Konjic Territorial

18 Defence Organisation, which was later to become the

19 Bosnian Army, formed a joint command with the HVO. The

20 Croats had established their own headquarters in the

21 municipality of Konjic. Croats and the TO forces formed

22 at that time a joint staff. The TO Commander was the

23 Commander of the joint staff and the HVO Commander was

24 the Deputy Commander of the staff. This structure,

25 however, did not result always in an integrated command

Page 690

1 structure. In reality it often happened that decisions

2 were taken jointly by the commanders of each military

3 formation, and also the police forces participated

4 somehow in this military structure.

5 Let me come to a very important document from the

6 Yugoslav army from before the war. It is a document on

7 the strategy of all people's defence.

8 Q. Under number 52?

9 A. Under number 52. It explains how leadership should

10 function in times of war. It shows us in reality how

11 flexible this system was.

12 "Leadership is organised so that the transition to

13 operations during emergencies and in a war requires

14 minor structural and organisational changes. All

15 leadership structures must make their decisions within

16 their jurisdiction and in their field and area according

17 to general aims and specific circumstances, with the

18 purpose of finding appropriate solutions, even when no

19 orders have been received from higher authorities."

20 This document on all people's defence is a secret

21 document where the statutory of all people's defence was

22 established in 1987, and it explains to us de facto

23 local commanders should have a relatively high level of

24 competence and of independence and in this situation

25 they just could not get the orders from their

Page 691

1 superiors. So it continues in the same sense:

2 "Leadership of all people's defence in peacetime,

3 emergencies and in wartime is arranged organisationally

4 and functionally so that it enables the leadership to

5 take the initiative in organising and performing various

6 forms and means of defence activity. Acting according to

7 the directions of higher authorities ... is the basic

8 principle of the functioning and the leadership system

9 ... But", and now I think it is gets very important,

10 "since the activities of all people's defence are

11 distributed throughout society, the leadership of those

12 activities establishes not only relations of

13 subordination, but also those of cooperation and

14 coordination. Within that framework all sub-systems,

15 elements and parts of systems which are positioned lower

16 in the hierarchy of leadership have to seek

17 opportunities to demonstrate their own initiative and

18 their own contribution to the efficiency of the system

19 as a whole."

20 So really this document really places a high

21 degree of responsibility to the local commanders, and it

22 was perceived in a way that many of the local commanders

23 and persons should contribute to make this system

24 function, all people's defence, in fact.

25 Q. It looks to me as if it is a very open mandate?

Page 692

1 A. It is like a very open mandate, especially then as

2 summarised in the last paragraph of this document:

3 "Leadership is decentralised to the extent which

4 allows the required degree of unity. The decentralised

5 system of leadership creates a division of

6 responsibility."

7 So a division of responsibility:

8 "But neither the responsibility of the parts for

9 their own activity nor their responsibility for the

10 activity of the whole system is thus diminished or

11 questioned."

12 So very interesting document from old Yugoslavia.

13 It was this strategy of all people's defence and self

14 protection of the SFRY and I think it explains then what

15 happened throughout Bosnia.

16 It was very flexible, it was very open, and this

17 also included in many instances that personal

18 relationships, informal contacts based on friendship,

19 kinship and so on -- and similar were often maybe more

20 important than holding an official appointment, having

21 rank or following a formal chain of command.

22 It was also, in fact -- it was also the fact that

23 in many parts of Bosnia and also in many other parts of

24 Yugoslavia new personalities, new elites emerged in this

25 situation of total social, political and also economic

Page 693

1 change. Persons with influence, with credibility,

2 skills and of course economic power could assume

3 responsibility in the civilian structure, but also often

4 in the military hierarchy persons were often appointed

5 positions on an ad hoc basis according to local needs

6 and conditions. For example it was also common and

7 regulated by a decree with force of law for civilians to

8 be appointed to specific positions within the military

9 structure. This statement is supported by document

10 number 53: "Decree on Service in the Army of the

11 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1992". There we

12 can have this regulated, that also. If need be,

13 non-military persons could perform functions in this

14 system.

15 Q. The thing you now stated on people with influence or

16 money or strong personality or whatever it might be --

17 have you made these observations not only at Konjic but

18 also in other municipalities?

19 A. Yes. In many municipalities in many parts not only of

20 Bosnia but also Croatia and Serbia. I mean, there were

21 persons like leaders of paramilitary formations. Arkan

22 is a prominent example. It might also refer to even

23 prominent persons like Fikret Abdic, who was a member

24 even of the State Presidency, but he was also

25 economically in a very strong position in the area of

Page 694

1 Bihac. He was often described as a person who had much

2 influence and power, at least in this area, due to

3 economic achievements, to good relations, to his

4 personal capabilities. So there are really many

5 examples, and also on all sides.

6 Q. What you now say pertains to all the three parties?

7 A. It pertains to all the three parties.

8 Q. Serbians, Muslims --

9 A. It pertains to all the three parties. This also means

10 in reality the composition and also the competence of

11 many institutions. The civilian but also the military

12 institutions were highly unclear, and they are

13 especially -- from looking from outside they were often

14 unclear, and there were big differences from one

15 municipality to the next.

16 It is, to summarise, not always entirely clear

17 from the existing legislation which functions were being

18 performed by different organs or by individuals at the

19 local level, especially during the early period of

20 1991/1992, and we have always to bear in mind that the

21 conditions for which the defence system had been

22 invented were now no longer in place, that they were

23 changing dramatically, especially during the first

24 months. All institutions had split along ethnic lines

25 and the idea to have a unified defence system was

Page 695

1 completely out of reality during that time.

2 So what happened in the early months of 1992? I

3 am, of course, not a fact witness, so I cannot testify

4 on the military events happening, but apparently there

5 were during April and May 1992 armed conflicts between

6 the Territorial Defence Organisation, later the Bosnian

7 Army, on the one hand, conducted together with the Croat

8 HVO, together with paramilitary forces coming from

9 Croatia, coming also from the Muslim side, and JNA

10 forces on the other side. The JNA had, prior to those

11 conflicts, mobilised volunteers in this area. They had

12 also distributed weapons among them. I have got a

13 document number 54 elaborating on this, explaining

14 this. This is a document by the JNA of Bosnia to the

15 General Staff of the Army of Bosnia in Belgrade in March

16 1992. This is the evidence for what I was saying. JNA

17 mobilised Serbs, distributed weapons.

18 However, we have to have in mind that the JNA had

19 no specific interest in this area of Konjic. They had

20 specific interest in many other parts of Bosnia in the

21 North and in the eastern part, but not so much in this

22 Central part, and we can also read this from the very

23 same documents. We can understand from these documents

24 that in Konjic JNA was preparing to withdraw and they

25 were even trying to take on the arms they had stored

Page 696

1 there to parts of Bosnia where the Serbs were in

2 majority, and which were under Serb control, but they

3 apparently did not manage.

4 I could conclude that during April 1992 and May

5 1992 the Croat and the Muslim forces managed to take

6 over most of the significant points and installations in

7 the municipality, parts of them by military action, and

8 we know about this by two reports by the United Nations'

9 commissions of experts established pursuant to Security

10 Council Resolution 780, a very basic document on what

11 was going on in the former Yugoslavia. So the two

12 annexes, annex 3A and annex 8, here included as document

13 number 33 and document number 55, explain some of the

14 military events going on in the early -- in this early

15 time, so that we have at least an independent body

16 testifying on these events.

17 If I had to characterise the first months, April,

18 May 1992 and maybe part of June, the first months -- if

19 I had to characterise them, I would say there was a

20 power vacuum on the republican level, a power vacuum

21 that allowed the local authorities in the municipality,

22 the civilian authorities as well as the military

23 authorities, to act nearly independently from the rest.

24 There was also a certain continuity of power structures

25 from before the war. For instance, this institution of

Page 697

1 War Presidency was introduced earlier on, but it still

2 existed as an institution. However, this whole system

3 was highly flexible. It adapted to the changing

4 circumstances, and it allowed to integrate new elements

5 and persons wherever needed, and this fitted completely

6 perfectly in the idea in the doctrine of the Yugoslav

7 all people's defence.

8 From the summer onwards, from the early summer

9 onwards, the focus of military interest of the Bosnian

10 Army shifted away from the Konjic municipality. The

11 Bosnian Presidency planned to lift the Serb siege of

12 Sarajevo, which required major support from other areas,

13 and it required also support from Konjic. Konjic, as I

14 was saying, at this time was nearly completely under

15 control of the Muslim and of the Croat authorities in a

16 civilian and military sense. So there was certain room

17 for manoeuvre to supply or to contribute to the effort,

18 to the military effort in other areas.

19 The army of Bosnia at this time established a

20 tactical group to lift the siege of Sarajevo. I am

21 again not a fact witness on tactical groups or who was a

22 member or a commander, or how it was composed. I can

23 just explain in general what a tactical group was.

24 I have got two documents and I will use here only

25 one. They are saying basically the same things. I use

Page 698

1 document number 36. This is the Military Lexicon

2 published in Belgrade in 1991. It has a short paragraph

3 on tactical groups.

4 Q. Number?

5 A. 36.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. Tactical groups, in our file number 36.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. "Tactical group: Temporary combined unit intended for

10 combat activities in a separate tactical direction when

11 a certain combat task cannot be carried out in the zone

12 or direction of the activities with a formation unit".

13 So it is first formed just to fulfil a very

14 specific, a clearly defined task. It can be a military

15 task; it can also be support, supply. It can be maybe a

16 tactical group. So they had a specific purpose,

17 specific task:

18 "It is formed within combined tactical units and

19 it acts independently as a part of the combat structure

20 of the unit. It is assigned separate command or it is

21 commanded by the command that set it up. The strength

22 and composition of the tactical group depends on the

23 strength and the composition of the unit that is setting

24 it up, the task, as well as on the characteristics of

25 the terrain, the site of the zone and strength and

Page 699

1 composition of the enemy".

2 So this tactical group at this time, Tactical

3 Group Number 1, was established to take military action

4 to lift the siege of Sarajevo. It was not successful at

5 this time, but again I am not a fact witness.

6 Q. Have you studied in any way how tactical groups function

7 in other parts of Bosnia?

8 A. Well, I am not an expert in military things. I know

9 that there were other tactical groups. I know

10 especially about one in eastern Bosnia in this early

11 period, eastern parts of Bosnia, but I cannot testify or

12 I cannot give any expertise on how they were composed,

13 which tasks they were exactly performing, what their aim

14 was.

15 Q. How they functioned in general, etc. Thank you.

16 A. So this period between April and maybe June, let us say,

17 marked a new phase in the country.

18 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I think it is a convenient time to

19 break for lunch.

20 A. Okay.

21 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: The Trial Chamber will rise and

22 reassemble at 2.30.

23 (Luncheon Adjournment)

24

25

Page 700

1 (2.30 pm)

2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: The witness is continuing on oath.

3 MR OSTBERG: Thank you, your Honour. Please, Dr Calic,

4 will you pick up your statement again and conclude your

5 statement for us?

6 A. Thank you. To continue, I would like briefly to

7 summarise what I was saying before the break about the

8 political and military structures in Konjic in April,

9 May 1992. I prepared a diagram. This is document

10 number 50. Just to make it a bit clearer, can we have

11 it on the screen, please? It should be reduced a bit.

12 It has to be reduced. We cannot see it.

13 MR OSTBERG: Will you please reduce it a bit, if possible.

14 There we are?

15 A. Okay. This diagram was made by myself. It shows

16 defence planning or military planning, security planning

17 in Konjic municipality as of May 1992. I mentioned the

18 War Presidency as the highest administrative, highest

19 political body in this municipality and I mentioned on

20 the military side the two main military actors. HVO,

21 the Croat military, and the Bosnian Army speaks for

22 itself. The two were related. They had a joint

23 command. They were acting together.

24 We are not completely sure whether or not the

25 members of the two structures participated in the War

Page 701

1 Presidency. If they were official members under the old

2 Bosnian law there was a representative from the HVO

3 participating in the War Presidency; under the new law

4 he was not, but maybe we can assume close contacts,

5 frequent meetings and maybe even joint decisions

6 because, of course, the work of the War Presidency and

7 the work of the military was interrelated and defence

8 could not function otherwise. In the middle we have the

9 very wide position of the co-ordinator, trying to

10 coordinate the civilian military sides. Again I do not

11 know exactly what his functions were but there was

12 certainly a necessity to coordinate the different

13 activities at this stage.

14 The relationship between the Bosnian Army and the

15 Croat army, the HVO actually, were a bit disturbed by

16 some disputes. I mentioned earlier this morning the

17 fact that the Croats were trying to establish their own

18 community the Herceg-Bosna community as a political

19 community but also having their own army, the HVO.

20 There were disputes arising around this, coming to

21 a head in July 1992. This led, in fact, to a split of

22 this joint command. Completely separate structures were

23 then established by July 1992. There was then de facto

24 a period where parallel power structures existed, Croat

25 and Muslim power structures in the same municipalities,

Page 702

1 and again they were formally allied and they were

2 continuing to act together, as they were doing in other

3 areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4 In the summer of 1992 also the Bosnian government

5 was more successful in establishing state structures and

6 also in streamlining the military, and this led to the

7 establishment of a new administrative structure on the

8 republican level, and it led to a reorganisation of the

9 Bosnian Army.

10 Q. Before, Dr Calic, we leave this organogram you made with

11 the co-ordinator, in the middle, we know in this case

12 there was indeed a co-ordinator in Konjic. Can you say

13 something if this was usual in other municipalities that

14 also have a similar structure that they also have a

15 co-ordinator?

16 A. I can say on the diagram I showed before lunchtime that

17 coordination was necessary and also coordination was

18 needed in many instances, and also the statutory of all

19 people's defence had in mind to have these coordinating

20 functions. If there was a position of only one

21 co-ordinator or if there were several, this was, of

22 course, then up to the authorities or to the actors on

23 the ground. It depended also on the real needs, on the

24 concrete circumstances.

25 Q. You have seen it also in other municipalities or

Page 703

1 structures?

2 A. I have not seen it in exactly the same way.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 A. In August 1997, seven regional administrators of

5 districts within Bosnia and Herzegovina were formed by

6 the BH government. Konjic was designated to form part

7 of the regional district of Mostar. Just to remind you

8 of where Mostar is located, so we have the municipality

9 of Konjic, Mostar is kind of the capital of the region

10 of Herzegovina. So Konjic was supposed to be a part of

11 the district of the -- of the Mostar district. I have

12 got a document about this. This is document number 56,

13 the decree on the establishment and the functioning of

14 districts. These districts were authorised to organise

15 and to prepare citizens for defence, for armed struggle

16 on the territory of the distinct.

17 This included also that many duties that were

18 formally fulfilled by the War Presidencies in the

19 municipalities moved to these regional centres. The new

20 district structures were, therefore, in a position to

21 potentially reduce the local powers of the

22 municipalities and again we do not know whether or not

23 or when this law was implemented. It was published in

24 August, but if they managed to efficiently implement

25 this law is not known to me.

Page 704

1 As for the military reorganisation of the army, I

2 have another diagram, document 57. It shows the

3 composition of the Bosnian Army at the end of 1992, when

4 this was produced by UN sources. Five corps were

5 established. You can see them on this diagram. The

6 military of Konjic was subordinated to the fourth corps

7 with an HQ in Mostar.

8 I was showing earlier this day how the Bosnian

9 government was trying to establish this HQ in Mostar but

10 it did not work at this time but later in 1992 they were

11 then successful in establishing this HQ and the fourth

12 corps was established with its headquarters in Mostar.

13 This fourth corps commanded all army units of Mostar of

14 Jablinica and other areas, Prozor, including also parts

15 of the formerly-mentioned tactical group 1, which had

16 dissolved by this stage.

17 What happened after the end of 1992? The

18 relations between the Croats and the Muslims or between

19 the HVO and the Bosnian Army got worse and worse. There

20 arose conflicts between the BH armed forces and the

21 HVO. Already in the autumn of 1992 in some parts of

22 Central Bosnia including Konjic, and they intensified

23 during 1993, and they were ended as late as early 1994.

24 They thus created a kind of second war. The people call

25 it second war between Muslim and Croat armed forces,

Page 705

1 between the BH army and the HVO.

2 To conclude, I wish to show you how Konjic -- the

3 ethnic composition of Konjic looks like today exactly in

4 September -- how it looked like in September 1996. This

5 is based on data from the UNHCR in this area. The

6 respective report of UNHCR is also included in this

7 binder. It is document 58.

8 Konjic municipality today belongs to the

9 federation of Bosnia, under the Dayton Agreement has two

10 parts. The Serb republic on the one hand and the

11 federation on the other hand, so Konjic municipality

12 today forms part of the federation. The composition as

13 of September 1996 is the following. We have 88 per cent

14 Muslims; we have 4 per cent Croats; 2 per cent Serbs;

15 and 6 per cent others. More than 18,000 people left the

16 municipality during the war, but there were coming new

17 people, refugees and displaced persons, so this also, of

18 course, changed the ethnic structure of this

19 municipality, and very few persons have managed to

20 return. There are only 270 Muslims returned and only 14

21 Serbs have managed to return to their homes.

22 Q. Only how many?

23 A. 14.

24 Q. 14 persons?

25 A. 14 Serbs have returned by September 1996. I would like

Page 706

1 to conclude with this diagram showing how much the

2 ethnic structure changed.

3 Q. Thank you very much, Dr Calic, for this comprehensive

4 and also very detailed and fact-filled presentation of

5 yours. I have no questions to ask and I have concluded

6 my examination of Dr Calic. Thank you.

7 JUDGE JAN: Excuse me. I want to ask a question. I do not

8 know whether it is really relevant or not. You are

9 talking about ethnic compositions?

10 A. Uh-huh.

11 JUDGE JAN: You have Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs. Do

12 they come from different stocks or is it just a

13 difference in religion that is important?

14 A. They are basically of the same ethnic stock. They are

15 all south Slavs. They had historically -- historically

16 they belonged to different religions. The Serbs are

17 Orthodox religion, Muslims, Islam and both Croats were

18 Catholic. During the 1970s these religious communities

19 were transformed into nations. People got national

20 consciousness and they perceived themselves as being

21 nations. So we have the fact that the religious

22 communities were effectively transformed into people,

23 into nations. People perceived themselves as belonging

24 to a nation more than belonging to a religious

25 community. Many persons are not religious at all. So

Page 707

1 we have to recognise that these people are now nations

2 and not religious communities any more.

3 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: I am sorry. In the same line I would

4 like to know if the same happened with the Jews, because

5 in the list of the ethnic composition you gave to us,

6 the same that the Muslims, you also -- not you -- the

7 document listed Jews among the Turks, Italians,

8 Slovenians and so it is the same. They are a

9 nationality; they are not a religious group.

10 A. This is again a matter of debate, whether the Jews form

11 a nation or whether they belong to a religious

12 community. In Yugoslavia the law was that they formed

13 an ethnic group, a minority. They were not recognised

14 as a constituent people of Yugoslavia. As constituent

15 nations of Yugoslavia were recognised only six nations.

16 The Slovenians, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Serbs,

17 Montenegrans and Macedonians. All other peoples were

18 considered as minorities. They had certain rights but

19 they were not considered as constituent nations of

20 Yugoslavia.

21 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: It is a little complex?

22 A. It is very complex.

23 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Actually your interpretation gives me

24 some anxiety. You start with a general concentration of

25 Bosnia as the nation?

Page 708

1 A. Yes.

2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: But within it you come up with Muslims

3 and Serbs. From your explanation you say they all come

4 from the same stock?

5 A. Historically.

6 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Yes.

7 A. In 6th century --

8 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: How do you now get other nations which

9 are within that general umbrella of Bosnia?

10 A. Sorry. I did not get the question.

11 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: How do you get other nations within

12 the general umbrella of Bosnia, which is the main stock?

13 A. They are historically belonging to the same South Slavic

14 stock, tribes coming to the Balkans in about the 6th

15 century. They were then dividing, because they got

16 different religions. By getting different religions,

17 they were also getting different nationalities. They

18 speak basically the same language. They can understand

19 each other easily. There are, of course, different

20 variants and different dialects, but they perceived

21 themselves as belonging to different nations. Again it

22 is very complex and a difficult thing to explain, but I

23 think we should accept that these persons perceived

24 themselves as belonging to a nation. Even if they all

25 live together in the same country, in Bosnia, but they

Page 709

1 are different nations.

2 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I do not know. I think I do not

3 rationalise, because it does not appear those who have

4 considered religion as a binding tie have considered

5 themselves a different nation?

6 A. It is a specific historical development in South-eastern

7 Europe. It is very specific to this area. One reason

8 for this is that this area was for quite a long time,

9 for many centuries, under foreign rule, and these people

10 had practically no rights to participate in the rule of

11 the foreigners, but shed certain cultural rights, and

12 these cultural rights were concentrated in the religious

13 communities and the churches. So the churches became

14 maybe the most important agent of forming national

15 consciousness, and this is how they developed. In the

16 19th century they were aware that they were different

17 and this is how was created then this perception of

18 being a nation, forming a nation.

19 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Any questions from the defence? Any

20 cross-examination?

21 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honours, the defence

22 would like to inform you that the cross-examination of

23 this witness will be conducted in the following way.

24 First, the defence counsel for Zejnil Delalic will

25 question, followed by Hazim Delic's defence counsel.

Page 710

1 Following that the defence counsel for Esad Landzo and

2 as a fourth the witness will be questioned by the

3 defence counsel for Zdravko Mucic.

4 Mr President, since I am starting

5 cross-examination and I have some documents here, would

6 you allow me to move over to that lectern?

7 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: You can do so, please.

8 Cross-examination by MS RESIDOVIC

9 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Ms Calic, first I would

10 like to ask you which pronunciation is correct: Calic

11 not Calick, since I have heard both variants of your

12 name?

13 A. You can call me Calic, because this is my father's name

14 because this is my father's name but I was born in

15 Germany and the Germans for some mysterious reasons

16 eliminated the diacritics. Maybe it is difficult for

17 them to pronounce. You can of course call me Calic.

18 Q. Thank you. I would not want to mispronounce your name,

19 so I will call you Ms Calic. Before we received your

20 report with the voluminous binder, the defence counsel

21 also received information from the prosecution regarding

22 experts that they will use for expert witnesses in these

23 proceedings. In this information it was indicated that

24 you were to present a historical, political and military

25 context and circumstances surrounding the violations of

Page 711

1 the international humanitarian law as stipulated in the

2 indictment and the national, municipal and historical

3 circumstances in the Konjic region.

4 Given that in your presentation there is no

5 chapter addressing the historical context, I would like

6 to request that you answer several questions, that is to

7 confirm possibly some facts on which the introductory

8 parts of the indictment are based. So these are my

9 questions: is it true, Ms Calic, that Bosnia-Herzegovina

10 as a state has roots in history of over 1,000 years?

11 A. Bosnia as a state existed in the Middle Ages, but then

12 in 1463 it was conquered by the Turks, and I would not

13 say that there is a continuity of state from the Middle

14 Ages until today, because there are many centuries in

15 between. Bosnia has, of course, a long history, but it

16 has also a history of foreign rule.

17 Q. Could you agree that other states that existed in the

18 Middle Ages in the Balkans shared the same fate, that

19 for a significant historical period of time they were

20 also occupied by other foreign rules? Turning to

21 Bosnia, could you testify before this Trial Chamber

22 that, except for the period during the kingdom of

23 Yugoslavia, when there were certain districts called

24 banjabina and during the fascist state of Croatia during

25 World War II, the territorial form of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Page 712

1 existed, regardless of the foreign rule in that region?

2 A. It's difficult to say "yes" in this case, because the

3 administrative borders were changing, and you mentioned

4 the Croat state of the Second World War and you

5 mentioned the first Yugoslavia. I mean, these are also

6 historical periods to be taken into consideration, and I

7 just would not like, being a historian myself, to draw

8 this line of continuity from the Middle Ages until

9 today, because then we have to do the same with other

10 nations, with the Serbs and the Croats, and the borders

11 were overlapping, and we really getting into big

12 troubles. I think we should accept that Bosnia was

13 recognised as an independent state in the borders of the

14 Republic of Bosnia, one of the republics of the former

15 Yugoslavia. It was a recognised state and I think this

16 is also enough to know for this case.

17 Q. But, Ms Calic, I think you will agree if I say that the

18 specific historical events after 1990 cannot be properly

19 understood without knowledge of a preceding period? Can

20 I bring you back to more recent history. The Zavnobih

21 conference in 1942, Bosnia was defined as one

22 constituent part of the new Yugoslavia?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Did you -- have you answered that, just for the record,

25 please? These decisions were also confirmed by Abnoj,

Page 713

1 which was the top legislative body during World War II.

2 Can you confirm that these borders are the borders of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina just prior to the outbreak of the

4 war? Taking into account certain historical facts, I

5 would like to ask whether you know that in

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina different populations have lived

7 there with a large amount of tolerance for centuries?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can you also confirm to me, Ms Calic, that in the

10 document of 1463, which is an edict on religious

11 freedoms and one of the oldest documents on religious

12 freedom in Europe issued by Mehmed Fatih and entitled

13 "Ahdnama" which was directed to the Franciscan monks in

14 Bosnia and is still kept in Fojnica in a Franciscan

15 monastery, it has been unequivocally determined that

16 Jewish, Orthodox, Catholic members within

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina can work freely and --

18 A. I would like to look at this document before I confirm.

19 Q. In other words, you are not familiar with this document?

20 A. I would like to see the document right now.

21 Q. I am not in a position -- I just wanted to know whether

22 I knew of this document?

23 A. I would like to verify it before I confirm.

24 Q. I am not in a position to show it to you today but I

25 will be in a position to show it to the tribunal, but

Page 714

1 the point is that you were not able to see it today and

2 so you cannot speak to it. However, your knowledge of

3 Bosnia should point to the significant religious

4 tolerance within Bosnia-Herzegovina?

5 A. Yes, that is true.

6 Q. Ms Calic, in your presentation you said that a large

7 part of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is mixed in

8 ethnic terms. Is it true if I said that there is no

9 municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina and there are 109 of

10 them in which there are no -- there are -- in which all

11 constituent populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not

12 represented including Jewish and other minorities?

13 A. I don't know. I have to verify it. We have all the

14 statistical documentation in this book, and I think if

15 this is necessary for the case, you just mention the

16 municipalities, and we verify.

17 Q. I can show you an official document indicating that

18 there is no such municipality. However, I would like

19 you to turn to your document number 3 --

20 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Will counsel kindly take into

21 consideration the interpreters and go a little slowly so

22 that they can interpret perfectly.

23 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Can we please show

24 document number 3, representing the ethnic map of the

25 former SFRY and which -- it comes from a source from the

Page 715

1 -- Republic of Croatia according to you. If I can show

2 the green colour in your map is the territory where --

3 populated by the Serbs; is that correct? Ms Calic, do

4 you believe that this could be a correct ethnic map of

5 Bosnia and Herzegovina?

6 A. It cannot be a complete correct map of Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina because nobody would understand it any

8 more. The ethnic make-up of this republic is so complex

9 and the nations are settled so intermixed you would

10 simply not understand any more where the majority areas

11 are. So in this sense you are right. This is not a

12 correct map of the ethnic composition of Bosnia before

13 the war. It is a reduction of facts. It is just to

14 make visible that there were certain areas where certain

15 people were in a majority.

16 Q. Ms Calic, does that mean that this map represents -- is

17 a misrepresentation of the ethnic distribution of the

18 population of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

19 A. No, it's not a false description. It is just a

20 reduction of facts, of very complex facts, and I agree

21 on that, that each reduction -- wherever you try to

22 reduce very complex facts, you try to make them visible,

23 they, of course, may contain some incorrectness. It is

24 just to make it visible to help us to understand.

25 Q. Ms Calic, this reduction of the ethnic map of Bosnia and

Page 716

1 Herzegovina to a person who is not familiar with

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina would entitle a people that its

3 ethnic division was actually possible. Would you please

4 show me on this map where Banja Luka is situated?

5 A. I have a map of Banja Luka.

6 Q. On this map?

7 A. It will be wrong. I prefer to use the map where we can

8 all see where Banja Luka is situated. It is document

9 38. We have Banja Luka here and Konjic is here.

10 Q. Yes, I am interested in Banja Luka, because in your map

11 it is in the green area, where it would show that it is

12 Serb populated?

13 A. All these colours, of course, indicate kind of majority

14 areas. There were, of course, settling other people.

15 This is just a way of presenting. Of course, there are

16 other ways of presenting. We have also then other

17 mistakes, as you would call it. I would agree that you

18 show another map which is more correct or which is able

19 to show us all how the ethnic composition of Bosnia was

20 at that time. I would very much agree on this.

21 Q. Ms Calic, you offered this map as proof of the ethnic

22 composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Please if the Banja

23 Luka municipality has 195,000 population and over 51 per

24 cent of them are non-Serbs, is it not then incorrect to

25 show the area --

Page 717

1 MR OSTBERG: Dr Calic, may I ask you not to answer the

2 question until the translation of Madam Residovic's

3 question is over to here.

4 A. I am sorry. I use the translation maybe.

5 MR OSTBERG: So we are able to understand you. We know you

6 understand Serbo-Croat. We others do not.

7 MS RESIDOVIC (in translation): I apologise, your Honour. I

8 will only bring up two more examples to prove that this

9 document, however accurately it depicts the reduced

10 picture it is an absolutely inaccurate picture of the

11 ethnic population of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12 Ms Calic, could you show us on this map where the Bijeljina

13 municipality is located? It is also in the green area

14 and the official data say in this area there is no Serb

15 majority living. Is that correct?

16 A. I would like to stress again that this is a very

17 simplified way of showing the very complex ethnic mix-up

18 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I would encourage you to

19 present a map which would be able to show us in a more

20 correct way how people were living together. I was

21 unfortunately unable on an A4 paper to provide a better

22 map. I agree if we could have a big map and then we

23 could also go in more details.

24 Q. Ms Calic, I would only like to ask whether this map can

25 represent the ethnic map of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it

Page 718

1 is a correct map?

2 A. It is a simplified map made to help us understand how

3 the situation was.

4 Q. It is incorrect. Ms Calic, this map does not give an

5 opportunity to see the complexity of the situation; is

6 that correct?

7 A. There were many villages in Bosnia, ethnically mixed.

8 If we would try to show each of these villages in its

9 concrete mixture by colours, I think it would be very

10 difficult. I think it is impossible to show this. It

11 is a simplified way of showing a very complex situation.

12 Q. But that would be the only true representation, would it

13 not?

14 A. Which one?

15 Q. If you would have indicated the accurate precise data in

16 each municipality and in each village, that would be the

17 accurate representation of the ethnic composition?

18 A. I provided statistical data for every village in the

19 Konjic municipality. They are included in this file. I

20 did not provide them for all the municipalities of

21 Bosnia. I did not consider that it would be relevant to

22 this case, but, of course, we can provide the

23 statistics, the population census of 1991, and then we

24 will also have the exact numbers, figures of people, of

25 nations in any village, but as for Konjic, all villages

Page 719

1 are included here. We have exact figures of 1991.

2 Q. I apologise, Ms Calic, but could you answer me on the

3 situation in Bjeljina?

4 A. I would like to verify the data before.

5 Q. Does that mean, Ms Calic, that for Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina to which you are testifying, you do not have

7 accurate data at this time and you cannot speak to that?

8 A. I have accurate data upstairs, and I, of course, can

9 provide them, if you give me the time, but there were 20

10 nations and nationalities, and if you ask me how many of

11 each of these nationalities were living in a certain

12 municipality, I have to verify it before, I am afraid,

13 and yes -- yes, this is what I want to say.

14 Q. Ms Calic, is it 20 nationalities who lived in every

15 municipality and every part?

16 A. No, they did not.

17 Q. Do you know a single municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina

18 in which -- where at least one member of one of the

19 nationalities was not also part of the inhabitants?

20 A. I did not understand the question. I was listening to

21 the English translation. I did not understand. Can you

22 repeat, please.

23 Q. Please could you indicate a single municipality in the

24 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina where members of any of

25 the nationalities did not live or the reverse, where

Page 720

1 only a single population lived?

2 A. Municipalities? No, I could not.

3 Q. Municipality?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. I have a document here which is an official document,

6 not verified. It is a statistical document. May I show

7 this to Ms Calic, please?

8 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: You can show it to her.

9 JUDGE JAN: You will have to exhibit it then.

10 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Yes. That is the purpose.

11 JUDGE JAN: Mr Ostberg, you will have to exhibit this

12 document.

13 MR OSTBERG: After the cross-examination, your Honour, I

14 will introduce all of it.

15 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Show it to the witness.

16 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): I would like to show the

17 document just for the cross-examination purposes, and as

18 we are going to call our own expert witnesses, they will

19 offer their own documents in the proceedings later.

20 Ms Calic, have you had a chance to look at this

21 document?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Have you seen a similar statistical report before?

24 A. No, I have not, and I do not know from where it comes.

25 It is a fax, the numbers, figures. I don't know on

Page 721

1 which basis it has been made.

2 Q. On the basis of a population census of 1991 by the

3 official institution, that is the Statistical Institute

4 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but if you have not seen it, I

5 cannot expect you to comment on it. Therefore, you

6 cannot answer my question and that is: is there a

7 single municipality in Bosnia-Herzegovina inhabited by

8 members of a single nation?

9 A. I rely on the population census of 1991. I have never

10 seen it in this form. I have never seen it in a faxed

11 form. I have seen it in a form of a book. This is why

12 I have just to compare the figures. This comes from a

13 different institution. This comes from the Obernistic

14 Institute of Sarajevo. I got the figures from the

15 statistic office in Sarajevo. Please give me the

16 opportunity just to compare these figures.

17 Q. Very well. Thank you. I should like to go back now, Ms

18 Calic, to the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I

19 would like to ask you kindly to confirm once again that

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in accordance with the decisions of

21 Zabnobih and Avnoj was constituted as an equal republic

22 of first the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and later

23 SFRY; is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Can you confirm that the constitution of 1974, Article 3

Page 722

1 of the constitution of 1974, stipulates the republics as

2 "states"?

3 A. I cannot recall the exact term, if it was "state".

4 Q. May I read the text for you as it is in your

5 documentation:

6 "Article 3. The socialist -- a socialist republic

7 is a state based on the sovereignty of the nations and

8 the authority and self-management of the working class

9 and all working people."

10 A. But the word "state" is not mentioned in this? The word

11 state is not mentioned in this Article.

12 Q. The socialist republic is a state?

13 A. Okay. I did not get those words.

14 Q. Can you also confirm that this constitution in Article 5

15 stipulates that the territory of the republic cannot be

16 changed without the agreement of the republic?

17 A. Yes. Yes, I can confirm.

18 Q. Is it your view that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a state

19 like all the other republics within the SFRY?

20 A. Yes. It had an equal status and it was recognised as an

21 independent republic in April 1992 in the existing

22 borders.

23 Q. Ms Calic, in your testimony you said, and I quote:

24 "The Muslim leadership aspired towards preserving

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a unified, multi-ethnic unit Aryan

Page 723

1 state."

2 Did you make this assessment on the basis of a

3 document of some kind?

4 A. I did make this statement on the basis of many Articles,

5 of many speeches which were made by Bosnian leaders, by

6 party leaders, by the President Izetbegovic himself, and

7 if you wish, I can also provide these documents.

8 Q. Ms Calic, is Mr Izetbegovic the President of the state

9 of Bosnia-Herzegovina or is he the leader of the Muslim

10 majority, as you put it?

11 A. He was elected President of the 7-member Presidency of

12 Bosnia and Herzegovina and he was perceived by many

13 people as a leader before he was elected President of

14 this republic.

15 Q. Ms Calic, you are testifying here as a scholar, and

16 therefore I think it would be advisable if we should not

17 rely on views of people who saw Izetbegovic as a leader

18 or something else but on the legal documents of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would you agree with me?

20 A. I agree with you on this, but, of course, Alija

21 Izetbegovic existed before he was elected President.

22 How can we then deal with him? How can we take into

23 consideration his writings, his thinking, if we have to

24 call him always President.

25 Q. Ms Calic, I wish to discuss with you the position of

Page 724

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state regardless of who is its

2 President. Therefore, in connection with your last

3 statement I would like to ask you whether the

4 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 1974

5 constitution, with the amendments that you have

6 provided, those of 1989 included, which you have not

7 submitted, nor have you reviewed them -- did it

8 stipulate Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did that state, both before and after the elections,

11 have its legally-elected bodies?

12 A. It had, yes.

13 Q. Did the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina exist as the

14 highest organ of authority in the republic?

15 A. It existed as a body but it cannot be compared to what

16 it became after 1990 when the first free and multi-party

17 elections were held. You cannot compare these two

18 bodies.

19 Q. I did not hear the translation. Can you please repeat

20 your answer?

21 A. My answer was that in 1990, when the first free and

22 multi-party elections were held, the institutions of

23 Bosnia were transformed. You cannot compare the

24 institutions after 1990 with the bodies existing

25 before. It's a different thing.

Page 725

1 Q. Ms Calic, that is why I wish to remind you of

2 constitutional amendments of 1989. Were those new

3 bodies constituted in accordance with the constitution

4 of Bosnia Herzegovina and the 1989 amendments?

5 A. I am not sure if I understand your question. Can you

6 please repeat it?

7 Q. In 1989 the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted

8 amendments to the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina

9 enabling multi party elections and a multi party

10 system. My question is: since we are talking about the

11 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina whether the bodies

12 elected in 1990 were constitutionally elected state

13 bodies?

14 A. The elections in 1990 were multi-party elections, as you

15 were saying, and those were the first free elections

16 held in Bosnia.

17 Q. Carried out in accordance with the constitution and the

18 elections law?

19 A. It was in accordance with the elections law.

20 Q. There was no legal discontinuity in the functioning of

21 the institutions of the state?

22 A. This is maybe a legal question, a very specific legal

23 question, and I am not a lawyer. I am a historian.

24 Maybe we can pass this question to a lawyer.

25 Q. But, Ms Calic, today you claimed that after that certain

Page 726

1 changes occurred in the constitution, certain

2 amendments, which created a confusing situation. Can

3 you explain to us whether you can allege that those

4 legal changes of the constitution in the way envisaged

5 by the constitution could create confusion in a normal

6 state?

7 A. I was referring in my statement to the situation after

8 April 1992. This was after the outbreak of armed

9 conflicts. This was a state of imminent war danger.

10 The Parliament of Bosnia did not function any more. It

11 could not pass any laws any more. These functions were

12 assumed by the state presidency. So the laws were

13 passed by the presidency. It was a different situation,

14 and going through the official gazettes of Bosnia and

15 Herzegovina in 1992 I got indeed the impression that

16 many of these regulations were made or were decided on

17 an ad hoc basis. They were reactions to what was

18 happening on the ground.

19 Q. In view of the fact that you are familiar with the

20 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina you can probably confirm

21 that the constitution and the laws envisage the

22 procedure for passing laws in conditions of an imminent

23 threat of war and conditions of war?

24 A. These were decrees made by the state Presidency with the

25 effect of laws.

Page 727

1 Q. Such decrees were authorised by the constitution in the

2 event of war?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Therefore we cannot claim that these decisions could

5 create confusion, because they had legal continuity and

6 a legal basis, do you not think?

7 A. I am sorry if you understood that they created

8 confusion. I did not intend to say these laws or

9 decrees were creating confusion, but they were made in

10 the middle of a very confusing situation, where many

11 state organs, in fact, did not function any more, and as

12 I was saying before, going through these decrees which

13 were not laws but decrees, going through many of them I

14 got the impression that they were reactions to what was

15 happening on the ground.

16 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Actually if counsel will spare us a

17 little bit, you might avoid conclusions of law in

18 cross-examinations. These are conclusions of law.

19 JUDGE JAN: Actually you have been talking about two

20 different things. You have been talking about the

21 sanction behind the decrees. A sanction is of course a

22 constitution. She is talking about the effect of these

23 laws in the situation, which was very confused at that

24 time. We are talking really about two different matters

25 altogether.

Page 728

1 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): The situation in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina I agree is extremely complicated, but

3 I think that Ms Calic can understand me. We are not

4 talking about different things after all.

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina consists in continuity to the

6 present. That is my conclusion. I do not wish to talk

7 about it. I just wish to clarify the conclusions made

8 by Ms Calic in this court. I am not going into

9 constitutional questions any more.

10 Ms Calic, in your paper you claim that the Serb

11 and Croat leaderships wishing to unite their ethnic

12 groups with their motherlands supported the plan for the

13 cantonisation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is

14 that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. But the Muslim leadership did not support it?

17 A. Yes. Only for the very short time to be precise.

18 JUDGE JAN: I thought the impression you gave to us was

19 this: the Muslim Bosnians wanted to keep the state as a

20 whole?

21 A. Yes.

22 JUDGE JAN: While the Serbians wanted to split it up and

23 join the rest of Serbia?

24 A. Yes.

25 JUDGE JAN: But you said for a short while?

Page 729

1 A. I am saying this because in September 1991 the European

2 Union, the European Community, was trying to reconcile

3 these views. They set up this Arbitration Commission

4 and they set up a peace conference, and the situation

5 was very difficult at that time. There were two parties

6 in favour of having ethnic cantons, a federalised state

7 of Bosnia and one party, and the Bosnian government

8 saying: "No, we want to keep it as a unitarian state".

9 So this was a very difficult situation and for a very

10 short moment there appeared to have been agreement

11 between the three parties that -- this was in March 1992

12 -- that Bosnia could be restructured on the basis of

13 ethnic criteria. This were the so-called "cotilles" or

14 principles, the Foreign Ministry of Portugal mediating

15 between the parties on behalf of the European Community,

16 but immediately afterwards -- this was on 18th March

17 1992 -- immediately afterwards the Muslim leadership and

18 the Croat leadership seemed to have rejected this plan

19 again, and, in fact, the proposal to create ethnic

20 entries within Bosnia came up again and again in the

21 peace conferences, and, as you can see, today the Dayton

22 Agreement and the constitution of Bosnia of today is

23 also based on ethnic principles. So this was a proposal

24 that was going around since the end of 1991, and some

25 certain moments there was more pressure also from the

Page 730

1 side of the international community to have these ethnic

2 criteria implemented just to get the situation calm and

3 to come to an agreement.

4 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Ms Calic, in your

5 testimony and the written report you frequently mention

6 the ethnic sides and ethnic leaderships. That is why I

7 am asking you once again: can you confirm that

8 throughout that period there were legally-elected

9 bodies: the Assembly, the Presidency and the

10 Government; regardless of who were members of those

11 bodies and what their percentage share was in those

12 bodies?

13 A. I can confirm that there were such bodies, but I have

14 also to stress that these bodies did not function as

15 they should have functioned, as they were meant to

16 function, because in October 1991 the Serbs left most of

17 these bodies. So they were just something like rump

18 bodies. All the debate was exactly over this.

19 Q. Ms Calic, can you confirm that all Serbs or members of

20 SDS and SPO walked out of the Assembly?

21 A. If all members walked out of the Assembly, the SDS

22 members walked out of the Assembly.

23 Q. Did all Serbs or only members, deputies of SDS and SPO?

24 A. No. I was actually talking about political parties, not

25 of nationals, and I also would not intend to consider

Page 731

1 all Serbs being members of these parties or supporting

2 these parties. Of course not there were many Serbs who

3 did not support these parties and who did not elect

4 them. The same is true for the other parties to the

5 conflict.

6 Q. Can you confirm that the President of the Assembly of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina until Dayton was a Serb, Miro

8 Lazovic?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. The two members of the Presidency throughout the war

11 were Serbs?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. That the national composition of the Presidency did not

14 change, 3, 2, 1, 2, 2?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Why then are you talking of the Muslim leadership all

17 the time then and not referring to the legal authorities

18 of the statement of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

19 A. This may be again a legal question, and I may be again

20 not be the right person to answer. This legal question

21 was -- I was trying to explain that there was, in fact,

22 legally elected bodies existing in Bosnia-Herzegovina at

23 this time, but on the other hand these bodies were not

24 functioning any more as they were meant to function, and

25 it is maybe just -- you know, there is a difference

Page 732

1 between what was on paper and what was on the legal

2 side, and then what was in reality, and the reality was

3 that the members of the SDS party which got the majority

4 of Serb votes then left the Assembly and they have left

5 the Presidency, and they did not want to participate any

6 more in the work of this, and unfortunately because of

7 the war there was no possibility to have new elections.

8 We had them as late as September last year.

9 Q. Ms Calic, you were introduced as an expert for political

10 matters. These are not legal; these are political

11 matters. There are legal regulations stipulating how

12 deputies are substituted, those who leave the assembly,

13 those who resign or give up. With the withdrawal of a

14 certain number of deputies from the legal bodies of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina at least according to the view of the

16 United Nations they did not lose the status of

17 legitimate bodies of authority?

18 A. I did not intend to say this.

19 Q. Yes, but in the course of your testimony and in your

20 written report you constantly repeatedly used the term

21 "Muslim leadership" but, in fact, you were referring to

22 the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of which the

23 President throughout the war was a Serb, and many

24 deputies were both Serb and Croat in the Assembly?

25 A. If I remember correctly, I did not use Muslim leadership

Page 733

1 when I was talking about the Presidency, but I used the

2 term "President", "Presidency" many times. However, I

3 used also the term "Muslim leadership" because there

4 were more Muslim leaders than were represented in the

5 presidency. There were local Muslim leaders. I have

6 maybe a problem with language, but I would not like to

7 contest the legitimacy of the Bosnian Presidency. It

8 was a recognised state. I was showing this many times,

9 and I -- yes, it was a recognised state and the

10 President of Bosnia was a recognised President. It was

11 not my intention and I apologise if you got this

12 impression.

13 Q. I am not talking about an impression. I quoted from

14 your report, and you can confirm what I am saying, and

15 that is the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina had 7

16 members, of which 3 were Muslim, 2 Serb and 2 Croat; is

17 that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. In view of the legality of the highest bodies of

20 authority, can you confirm that they did have the

21 opportunity to lawfully pass decisions?

22 A. Well, they passed decisions under the circumstances of

23 an immediate threat of war, at least after April 1992,

24 and then from June 1992 onwards under the state of war.

25 These were very specific conditions of this -- yes, very

Page 734

1 specific conditions.

2 Q. Yes, but the state of immediate threat of war is also

3 envisaged by the constitution and other regulations?

4 A. Yes, of course.

5 Q. Since you said today that one period was a period that

6 could be called a short break or a vacuum in the legal

7 system, are you aware that already in April a decree was

8 passed to take over the regulations of the former SFRY

9 to be implemented in the territory of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Does that mean that legal

11 continuity was ensured without interruption?

12 A. In a certain way, because there were all these

13 amendments coming after this. The Bosnian government

14 had to change, for instance, names. They had to adapt

15 many laws and Articles of the constitution to the

16 changing situation. So there was a basic stock of

17 constitutional Articles, which were continuing to exist

18 but there were also some new, and I was trying to show

19 some of these new decrees, and I was also trying to show

20 some of the old elements or how old elements of the

21 former Yugoslav systems were still existing and how new

22 were introduced. I did not intend to give the

23 impression that this was illegally done. I was just

24 trying to show how the government was trying to adapt to

25 the new conditions and to react to the changing

Page 735

1 circumstances.

2 Q. Certainly we are not talking about the substance of

3 those acts. We are just saying that this was a legal

4 state that was in existence in continuity as a sovereign

5 and independent state, and as such it passed certain

6 documents in accordance with its own laws and

7 regulations; is that correct?

8 A. Bosnia was indeed recognised on 6th April 1992 by the

9 European Community and afterwards by many other

10 countries and states.

11 Q. Yes, at the ministerial meeting in Luxembourg, and the

12 following day it was recognised by the United States and

13 Croatia, and on the 8th the first diplomatic relations

14 were established. That is without doubt and you did not

15 dispute that fact, but, Ms Calic, you spoke here about

16 the intentions of the Serb and Croat leaderships from

17 Bosnia and their wish to link up with their

18 motherlands. Are you aware, Ms Calic, that in the

19 former SFRY and in the Socialist Republic of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina there was a law on citizenship?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you know that in accordance with that law all

23 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who were born there or

24 who belonged to it by origin are citizens of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you consider all citizens of

Page 736

1 Konjic who, in accordance with this law, were born there

2 or come there by descent are also citizens of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

4 A. You see, it is not up to me to decide these legal

5 questions. I was just trying to explain that part of

6 the Bosnian population, namely a bigger part of the

7 Bosnian Serb population did, in fact, not intend to be

8 considered only as citizens of Bosnia, but they wanted

9 to be considered citizens of Yugoslavia, and whether or

10 not this is a illegal, I cannot say. I am not a legal

11 expert, and also the members of the European Community

12 were a bit confused about this fact, and they had to

13 establish a commission. So I am afraid I cannot answer

14 this question.

15 Q. In other words, you agree that there is a citizenship

16 based on laws of the former SRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina

17 and that they regulate this issue?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Ms Calic, I will move on to another set of questions.

20 In your presentation and today's testimony you did not

21 speak about other political aspects relating to the

22 aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you know that over

23 a longer historical -- period of time in history that

24 there are tendencies working towards the destruction of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina and coming from outside

Page 737

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

2 A. I have no such document available showing a plan to

3 destroy Bosnia as a state. I have indicated that forces

4 from outside Bosnia were involved in the struggle over

5 Bosnia, and this is what I was trying to show in my

6 statement.

7 Q. Do you, as a historian, know about Garasanin and his

8 work "Natje Tanja?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Are you familiar with the concept of the independent

11 state of Croatian of World War II?

12 A. Yes, I am.

13 Q. Do both of these concepts negate Bosnia-Herzegovina as a

14 state and Bosnia as a nation?

15 A. As far the first concept, the Serb,"Natje Tanja" was

16 made at this time and Bosnia did not exist as an

17 independent state. As for the second one, Bosnia did

18 not exist yet as an independent state before the Second

19 World War.

20 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Now I think the Trial Chamber will

21 rise for 20 minutes. We will assemble at 4.15.

22 (3.55 pm)

23 (Short break)

24 (4.15pm)

25 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: The witness is still on oath. I think

Page 738

1 you can carry on with your cross-examination.

2 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Thank you, your Honour.

3 Thank you, Ms Calic. I have a number of questions that

4 I need to ask of you.

5 You were talking about the historical continuity.

6 Please can you answer the following questions. Is the

7 geo-political context of Bosnia-Herzegovina also very

8 important for understanding the recent past?

9 A. You mean the actual or before the war historically?

10 Q. The historical context before the war relating to the

11 causes of the war. I asked you earlier and I would like

12 a response: do you know the political treatise of

13 Garasanin, a Serbian politician, called "Natje Tanja"?

14 A. Yes, I know this document.

15 Q. Are you familiar with the political project and

16 territorial framework of the Croatian fascist creation

17 during World War II?

18 A. Yes, I am.

19 Q. Are you also familiar with Memorandum of the Serbian

20 Academy of Sciences?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you know that there was a military plan by the former

23 JNA called Ram and its political underpinnings?

24 A. This was reported in the press. I never seen any

25 document plan Ram.

Page 739

1 Q. Are you familiar with the names of Greater Serbia and

2 Greater Croatia?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Among the documents that I quoted earlier can you

5 identify those that are the political foundation for the

6 Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia?

7 A. I have not seen this plan Ram, so I cannot really

8 speak. I saw a press report on it, but I have never

9 seen this plan, so I cannot comment on this.

10 As for the Memorandum of the Serb Academy of

11 Science it is quite unprecise on the territorial side,

12 so I am unable to compare the territorial aspirations of

13 the Natje Tanja document with any assumed territorial

14 aspirations elaborated in this SANU Memorandum. They

15 are not so explicitly formulated.

16 Q. The motto "All Serbs in a single state", is that motto

17 directly or indirectly relating to the security of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

19 A. Not necessarily, because in Yugoslavia the Serbs were

20 living in one state and it was a state where Serbs

21 believed to live together and Bosnia still existed as a

22 republic, had institutions, had its territorial

23 borders. So it is just a matter of interpretation and

24 it is a matter of politics in which concrete shape you

25 then realise the aim: "All Serbs have to live in one

Page 740

1 state".

2 Q. Since you quoted a document speaking about dissolution

3 of Yugoslavia, such a motto can also mean something else

4 with respect to the security of the Republic of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6 A. What can it mean? You mean after the dissolution of

7 Yugoslavia? I cannot understand your question.

8 Q. If there is still insistence on all Serbs living in a

9 single state, does that affect directly

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, which is populated by 30 per

11 cent of Serbs, given its ethnic distribution?

12 A. It affects, of course, Bosnia, but the Serbs, on the

13 other hand, were insisting on the fact that they wanted

14 to remain in Yugoslavia, and the way Yugoslavia

15 dissolved was not correct according to their views. So

16 this is what the Serb position was on this fact, but it

17 affected, of course, the territorial integrity of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state once it was recognised.

19 Q. Is it your opinion that part of the strategy to create a

20 Greater Serbia is also the quick pull-out of the JNA

21 from Slovenia and Croatia?

22 A. I cannot -- I do not wish to argue in terms of a plan of

23 Greater Serbia. In Slovenia there were nearly no Serbs

24 living and I would assume also there were no territorial

25 aspirations on the side of the JNA and on the side of

Page 741

1 Belgrade.

2 Q. In other words, keeping the armed forces was only

3 limited to the areas where there were territorial

4 aspirations; is that not what you are stating?

5 A. I am stating that I do not like to argue in terms of

6 plan to create Greater Serbia.

7 Q. I can appreciate your desire not to speak of that. We

8 accepted you as an impartial expert with knowledge of

9 political and historical issues, but I am not going to

10 insist on this question.

11 However, I have following questions for you, since

12 you are an expert in this field. Based on your

13 expertise rather than your desires to answer these

14 questions or not, you chose not to answer them. You

15 said that Bosnia was recognised on 6th April 1992?

16 A. The decision was taken on 6th April 1992. It came into

17 effect one day later.

18 Q. Tell me: as of that moment was the former JNA a foreign

19 military force in the territory of that state?

20 A. The JNA was after this time still present on the

21 territory of Bosnia. It was then partially withdrawn.

22 Some troops remained, and there remained also support

23 from Belgrade, and I was trying to explain this morning

24 that the bigger part of this JNA was, in fact,

25 transformed into the Bosnian Serb Army, leaving behind

Page 742

1 troops, leaving behind weaponry and equipment.

2 JUDGE JAN: She said that already.

3 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: She was just asking a simple

4 question: was JNA on foreign territory? That is all

5 she asked.

6 A. JNA was on Bosnian territory and it was under the

7 command of Belgrade, superior command of Belgrade.

8 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Does that mean that as

9 of that moment there was an aggression on

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina and it was an international armed

11 conflict from there on?

12 A. On 27th April the new Yugoslavia was created, and I

13 think that from this moment onwards we can consider for

14 sure the JNA as a foreign force being present on the

15 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 Q. Do you know that in early May the Security Council

17 brought a Resolution ordering all forces of the JNA to

18 leave Bosnia-Herzegovina?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you know that this was not done within the deadline

21 of 19th May?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Do you know that, following that, on 30th May the

24 Security Council introduced sanctions against Federal

25 Republic of Yugoslavia?

Page 743

1 A. Of course.

2 Q. Do you know that JNA, the Army of the Federal Republic

3 of Yugoslavia, through its officer corps, logistics and

4 other ways was continually present in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Can you tell me if you have the data on the JNA

8 preparing for this aggression over a longer period of

9 time? Do you know that in May of 1991 under the

10 pretence of military exercises all major centres of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina were blocked with heavy weaponry?

12 A. I know that many important strategic points were blocked

13 or controlled by the JNA at this time.

14 Q. Sarajevo, Bihac, Konjic?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. Do you also know that from 1990 on the

17 weapons legally belonging to the Territorial Defence was

18 kept, guarded by the JNA?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you know that these weapons were distributed to the

21 Serbian population of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the SDS

22 and JNA?

23 A. I know of this. I know that this happened in certain

24 parts, in certain areas in Bosnia, and I also submitted

25 a document to support this view.

Page 744

1 Q. In other words, the JNA behaved as an aggressor in large

2 portions of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that

3 correct?

4 A. It is probably not correct for the time before Bosnia

5 was recognised as an independent state, and the JNA

6 started distributing weapons a month ago, so I think we

7 have to distinguish between the period before the

8 international recognition of Bosnia and the period

9 after.

10 Q. Yes. I am thinking of the period after. Is the fact

11 that Yugoslavia played this role in Bosnia-Herzegovina

12 one of the reasons why it was not recognised by the

13 United Nations?

14 A. Yes. This is correct.

15 Q. Miss Chalic, I would like to go into the questions

16 relating to the Konjic area. Before that, just one more

17 question relating to the general political issues. In

18 your written report you stated that there were whispers

19 about speculations that the President of Serbia,

20 Milosevic, and President of Croatia, Tudjman, as well as

21 the leader of Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, and

22 Bosnian Croats, Mate Boban, had agreed on the partition

23 of Bosnia. Please answer whether there was a meeting

24 between Tudjman and Milosevic in Karageorgevic or not?

25 A. I heard about this meeting. However, I have never seen

Page 745

1 any document coming out of this meeting. I included

2 this actually in this paragraph on the speculations on

3 what might have been agreed. So I am aware of this

4 fact, that there was a meeting in Karageorgevic, but I

5 am not aware of the exact outcome.

6 Q. Do you know that in 1990, in June, Mate Boban and

7 Radovan Karadzic met in Graz?

8 A. It was the same. It was reported in the press they met,

9 but we have never seen any documents, any result coming

10 out of these meetings.

11 Q. We are expecting precise data from you as an expert. I

12 think that such an answer based on speculation cannot be

13 part of an expert opinion.

14 A. I presented what I believed and was reported in the

15 press and I want to make clear I have no exact

16 information of the outcome of these meetings, and these

17 meetings were also behind closed doors.

18 Q. Ms Calic, you offered documents that are results of such

19 agreements. The decisions on creation of the Assembly

20 of Republika Srpska, of the Croatian community

21 Herceg-Bosna, division of the territory, do they not

22 speak about the realisation and results of these

23 agreements, if we disregard all the victims that have

24 come as a result of these agreements?

25 A. In none of the documents that I have submitted we can

Page 746

1 find any agreement between Croat -- Croatian and Serbian

2 or Croat and Serb leaders or Presidents or authorities.

3 These documents show how the Serb leaders, on the one

4 hand, and the Croat leaders, on the other hand, were

5 trying to establish autonomous areas, how they were

6 trying to establish quasi-structures, but they cannot

7 show us how the two communities were trying to divide

8 Bosnia between themselves.

9 Q. In your opinion could these states that you have

10 mentioned have been states based on the laws in

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina or were they just para-states?

12 A. They were para-states, and the Constitutional Court made

13 several decisions that are all included in my file. The

14 Constitutional Court considered the creation of these

15 para-states as unconstitutional in several Decisions.

16 Q. Ms Calic, before I move on to the Konjic region, I will

17 only say a couple of things. I recognise that you did

18 your doctorate on the social issues in Serbia, that you

19 have been employed in the Institute in Munich, and that

20 you have worked for the German Government, and this is

21 the basis of your knowledge, and the number of documents

22 that you have also submitted. Please if you could tell

23 me what is the basis of your knowledge of the

24 historical, geo-political and military circumstances of

25 the Konjic region?

Page 747

1 A. Excuse me. Can you repeat, because I am parallelly

2 listening to the original and the translation and in the

3 middle I lost the connection. Maybe just the translator

4 to repeat the question, if you can.

5 Q. Please what documents did you use for -- as a basis for

6 forming your opinion on the Konjic region, and who made

7 these documents available to you?

8 A. I used many documents. I started with the Encyclopedia

9 Yugoslavia. They have a separate volume on Bosnia and

10 there are several pages, several parts also referring to

11 Konjic, especially the parts on the geography, on

12 economy and others. I used then statistical data from

13 the official statistical yearbooks of Yugoslavia, the

14 last one from 1991. I used to a lesser extent press

15 reports. I also used some documents made available to

16 me by the Office of the Prosecutor, and what did I use?

17 I also used some books. I also used books actually,

18 yes. I used the books by Cekic and I used -- yes, this

19 is what I used basically.

20 Q. So you had no specific personal research, nor did you

21 have insight into documents that would refer

22 specifically to that region except for these indirect

23 documents, indirect sources?

24 A. Well, there were the quoted sources which I was using.

25 There were many references to Konjic directly.

Page 748

1 Q. Allow me to say that in your written report you say

2 that:

3 "During the Second World War the region of Konjic

4 witnessed the fiercest ethnic conflicts in Bosnia."

5 A. Yes. I already know the question.

6 Q. Do you know that in this region the forces of the

7 National Liberation Army, led by Marshall Tito,

8 conducted their Fourth Offensive against the Germans and

9 Italians, together with domestic traitors, the Ustashas

10 and the Cetniks. This was known as "The Battle on the

11 Neretva". A film of that name was nominated for the

12 Oscar award.

13 A. I know it.

14 Q. Were you thinking of those events and battles,

15 especially against the Cetniks at Prenj, after crossing

16 the Neretva River when you made this statement?

17 A. I was also thinking of these battles, but not only, but

18 also of these partisan struggles, of course.

19 Q. Can you say then that this part of your report is not

20 quite correct when talking about the events during the

21 Second World War in the territory of the municipality of

22 Konjic?

23 A. In the area, in the broader area. I was referring to

24 the area. I cannot understand why it is not correct to

25 explain how history developed in this area, and Konjic

Page 749

1 was part of the Neretva area. I don't know.

2 Q. Yes, Ms Calic. You said that these were the fiercest

3 ethnic conflicts, but, in fact, it was a liberation,

4 anti-Fascist movement, against occupation by Fascism.

5 As far as I know, these are quite different legal,

6 historical and political categories.

7 A. Unfortunately on the side of the German occupation,

8 troops were also fighting troops consisting of Croats

9 and Muslims. These were mainly special forces created

10 by the German SS. The SS was a special force kind of

11 elite troop of the Germans. They were well-known for

12 committing many crimes unfortunately, especially in the

13 second half of this cruel war. Also Croats and Muslims

14 participated in this struggle, some of them voluntarily

15 and some of them were forced, and it remained

16 unfortunately in the memory of many people, and many

17 people perceive it today also as an ethnic struggle,

18 even if the partisan movement as such was a

19 multi-ethnic, pan-Yugoslav movement.

20 Q. What you have just said, Ms Calic, is something that you

21 have not written in your report. I accept the

22 explanation, but a host of documentation can be found in

23 the museum in Jablanica. Obviously you have not had

24 occasion to consult that documentation.

25 A. I went to this area when I was a student, so this is ten

Page 750

1 years ago, but I know the monument. I know also much of

2 the history of the partisan struggles. I was a bit

3 brief, but there are many parts in my statement, which

4 was only 13 pages long, in which I could not elaborate

5 all interesting, all relevant information. I confess it

6 is very brief.

7 Q. I apologise for insisting, but you made no mention of

8 the anti-Fascist struggle in this part of your report,

9 but I think we have cleared things up now and I will not

10 insist on further answers to my questions.

11 Can you tell me whether the overall situation in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina was reflected upon the situation in

13 Konjic?

14 A. Yes, yes, I would agree on that, yes.

15 Q. Can you confirm that an event in October 1991 decisively

16 affected and influenced the further course of events in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Let me remind you, and to remind

18 you I would like to show you a brief tape of that

19 event. It maybe takes fifteen seconds. If I may, I

20 would like to call on the Technical Department.

21 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Yes, you are permitted. You can show

22 your tape.

23 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Will you please give the

24 text of the translation?

25 (Videotape played)

Page 751

1 Q. Can we please have the text? I cannot hear my sound.

2 There is no sound. Could you repeat the insert, please?

3 A. And I have no pictures. I have nothing.

4 Q. Perhaps this text could be given to the interpreters, so

5 that they can read it. This would avoid having two

6 pictures on the monitor. There is no sound. Will you

7 please read the text if there is an error on the

8 videotape? Will the technicians please try to reproduce

9 the tone? Will you please read the text of this speech

10 in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

11 JUDGE JAN: How is it relevant?

12 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): It is important that an

13 expert witness who is dealing with historical events in

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina should identify this man and this

15 Assembly and the words which significantly determined

16 developments, including in the territory of the

17 municipality of Konjic; in the whole state and, of

18 course, also in Konjic.

19 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Let us hear the interpretation, so

20 that you will get what he said.

21 JUDGE JAN: How do we know that this statement was made by

22 this gentleman on the screen?

23 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Please let us hear the

24 interpretation.

25 THE INTERPRETER: The text reads:

Page 752

1 "You want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina down the same

2 highway to hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia

3 are suffering? You do not think that you will lead

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina into hell and do not think that you

5 will not perhaps make the Muslim people disappear

6 because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is

7 a war. How will you prevent everyone from being killed

8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

9 Underneath it says:

10 "Radovan Karadzic, Leader of the Bosnian Serbs

11 before the Bosnian-Herzegovina Assembly, October 14,

12 1991".

13 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I gather you can now hear the

14 videotape. Let us hear it from the words of the speaker

15 himself.

16 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Mr President, I would

17 ask the witness to look at the text and to say whether

18 she can recognise the man and is she aware of the words

19 written on this piece of paper as being the words

20 uttered by this man.

21 A. I actually had no -- I had only the picture. I had no

22 words, but I am familiar with this document. It is

23 published in the same Cekic book which I was also

24 using. So it is familiar to me.

25 Q. Can you testify before this court who we are talking

Page 753

1 about and what he said on that occasion?

2 A. I could not hear the tone. I know the document from the

3 book, but I had no words. I could not -- maybe you can

4 repeat. If I had to translate ... I still have nothing.

5 Q. You can use the text you have before you as a

6 translation.

7 A. What should I -- what did you ask me?

8 Q. I am asking: can you recognise the picture of the man

9 and whether this is what he said at that Assembly

10 meeting, who he is and what he said?

11 A. I recognised Karadzic on the screen, but I did not get

12 his words because they simply were not in my earphones,

13 I am afraid, but I know this document from the Cekic

14 book.

15 Q. And on the BBC programme too?

16 A. Maybe. I have it in my mind that I have read it in this

17 Cekic book. This is where I ...

18 Q. I apologise. Did the court hear the words spoken by the

19 person?

20 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I did not hear it. I heard the

21 interpretation.

22 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): I would like to ask the

23 witness to testify, having said that she knows that it

24 was Radovan Karadzic in the Assembly of Herzegovina and

25 that she is aware of the words he spoke on that

Page 754

1 occasion, can she testify that those words had a

2 decisive effect on the further course of events in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

4 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I do not think she can testify to

5 that. She was not a member of the Assembly. She had

6 nothing other than what any other person observed. So

7 how do you expect her to testify to that? If you have

8 other questions, more valid questions, please try and

9 put them to her.

10 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honour, she is not

11 a factual witness. She is Ms Calic, an expert, and we

12 are asking to testify to a document from the Assembly of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina which was shown before this court on

14 several occasions, and if she can confirm that document,

15 I would like to ask her to do so. If not, I would be

16 grateful if she looked at it.

17 A. I cannot confirm this, because I have not seen this tape

18 before, not here in the court. I know this document

19 from publication, from the Cekic book, as I was saying,

20 but I am not a fact witness. I did not attend this

21 meeting, and I could unfortunately not understand from

22 my earphones what Karadzic was saying here on this tape.

23 Q. Can you testify what the document in Cekic's book says

24 that you are familiar with?

25 A. I have a big problem with translating and I had it

Page 755

1 already when I read it for the first time in this book.

2 It concerns the word "disappear". I cannot exactly

3 remember the Bosnian word, so I am afraid I have not the

4 original text and I am not a fact witness, but if this

5 is important, we can provide the book. We can find the

6 book or we can make the screen work.

7 Q. Did this word "disappear" apply to the Muslim people?

8 A. I cannot testify on this, I am afraid.

9 Q. When was the book written, please, so that defence could

10 perhaps submit it as evidence?

11 A. In 1993. We have it here. I think I brought a copy,

12 but I am not sure.

13 Q. Ms Calic, can you tell us please whether you know that

14 the town of Konjic after these events was blocked as an

15 important strategic point along the line from Sarajevo

16 to the sea?

17 A. I'm again not a fact witness. I read in some of the

18 witnesses' reports that the road was blocked, but I

19 personally am not capable of confirming or not

20 confirming this fact. I'm not a fact witness.

21 Q. Can you confirm that already on 29th April an air raid

22 was announced and actually carried out at the point of

23 Glavicine, Konjic?

24 A. Again I am not a fact witness, and I personally did not

25 witness any of these attacks, so it would be maybe

Page 756

1 better to ask these questions to the fact witnesses and

2 not to me.

3 Q. Ms Calic, I am still asking you a question as an

4 expert. You said that you could testify on events in

5 the region of Konjic. In answer to each of my questions

6 you say that you are not a fact witness. I am not

7 expecting you to say that you lived in Konjic, but as an

8 expert you could have had the opportunity to study

9 documents relating to these events.

10 A. Yes, I had the opportunity to study documents on these

11 events, but I am not sure to which extent I can rely on

12 each of these documents, and I really would prefer that

13 you asked these questions to the fact witnesses and not

14 to me, because I was asked to give a general background

15 to help the court to place into context what was going

16 on, but I was not asked to testify on these facts, and I

17 am afraid that I am incapable of doing this, because I

18 was not present in the area at that time.

19 Q. The war, the bombing raids and all the other events that

20 I am mentioning are historical events, and you are an

21 expert on history. Can you confirm that from May 4th

22 Konjic was daily exposed to terrible raids?

23 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Please can I advise counsel: you

24 started very well by outlining what the witness came to

25 say, historical, geographic context in which the whole

Page 757

1 event occurred, but specific events or daily happenings

2 might be something of history, but it is not a history

3 preceding what has happened. I do not think the witness

4 is in a position to be answering specific questions of

5 bombing raids. That is not the reason why the expert

6 was asked to come and testify. It has nothing to do

7 with this case. In fact, that is not even a question of

8 expertise. There is no expertise in knowing there was a

9 bomb raid, whether a place was bombed.

10 JUDGE JAN: Perhaps you can ask her was the area generally

11 bombarded. Maybe about that she might be knowing, but

12 not specific raids, or blockades. She said earlier many

13 places were blockaded. Maybe Konjic was also one.

14 A. Yes. In this general way I can confirm. I also

15 submitted a report by the UNHCR, which gives evidence of

16 this. Many, many houses and other buildings were

17 destroyed during the war. I, of course, cannot say

18 which specific raid or which specific bombing or

19 shooting was then the real event, because there was, of

20 course, also afterwards fighting in this area, fighting

21 between also Croat and Muslim forces. So in the general

22 way I can confirm there were many attacks on Konjic.

23 JUDGE JAN: Bombing raids?

24 A. Also bombing raids.

25 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honours, I

Page 758

1 apologise, but in the announcement to the defence it was

2 indicated to us that Ms Calic would be speaking about

3 concrete historic, political, economic and military

4 questions of importance for the region of Konjic, and I

5 am really confused if I cannot ask Ms Calic questions

6 about the subjects that I was told she would be

7 testifying to. I did not ask about any particular

8 building. The month of May was an important historical

9 period, when within half an hour there were 44 air

10 raids. I am not asking her that, but whether Konjic was

11 exposed to heavy shelling. In our view and from the

12 standpoint of that region it is a political and military

13 and historical fact. So, if possible, I would like her

14 to answer this question. If she is aware of it, then

15 let her tell me so, and if she does not know, she does

16 not know.

17 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I am sorry if you are getting a little

18 worried, and I do not want to be tedious about such

19 things. Now when an expert comes to give evidence about

20 historical incidents or things leading towards anything,

21 the expert is not a participant observer and is not

22 expected to give evidence of what happened during the

23 conflict. So I do not see how you can go as far as

24 that. I suppose if the Prosecution does not object, I

25 think you can go ahead asking whatever questions you

Page 759

1 like, but I think that is not the way to conduct a

2 cross-examination of an expert. I am not talking about

3 somebody who was a participant. When you are asking an

4 expert questions, you know your limits.

5 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Thank you, your

6 Honours. The expert has just told us that she had many

7 sources of the United Nations and other agencies about

8 the heavy shelling of Konjic, so she could have said

9 that at the beginning.

10 I wish to ask the following question: do you know

11 that from April 1991 there was a significant movement of

12 the population from Eastern Bosnia and Eastern

13 Herzegovina after a terrible crime of ethnic cleansing

14 was committed against the Borciac people?

15 A. Sorry. Did you say 1991 or 1990?

16 Q. 1992.

17 A. 1992. There are many reports again by international

18 experts, like the final report of the UN Commission of

19 Experts, that give evidence on population movements, and

20 I think there can be now no doubt about this fact.

21 Q. Do you know that tens of thousands of people from those

22 regions were moving over the Bosnian mountains towards

23 Konjic?

24 A. Yes, I know that.

25 Q. As an expert, is it your opinion that this situation

Page 760

1 affected significantly the political and other situation

2 in the Konjic municipality?

3 A. Yes, indeed, and we could see this also afterwards in

4 the following years, when masses of refugees and

5 displaced persons were moving to Central Bosnia, which

6 was a matter of concern, of course, with the local

7 authorities, and it created conflicts between Muslims

8 and Croats over the division of resources and everything

9 else. I agree this was a real matter of concern. I

10 mentioned it actually at the end of my report, that

11 there were about 8,000 people coming to Konjic, new

12 people coming to Konjic, displaced persons from other

13 areas, mainly from Eastern Bosnia.

14 Q. Can you confirm that this number of 8,000 could also be

15 much higher, or do you allow that possibility?

16 A. I really don't know. I rely here on a report by UNHCR,

17 which is in my opinion a reliable source, and I

18 personally cannot speculate whether there was a higher

19 number or not.

20 Q. As a social scientist, can you confirm that such events

21 and such movements of people were creating enormous

22 difficulties to the authorities in that region?

23 A. Of course I can confirm that.

24 Q. Moving to the last group of questions that I would like

25 to ask you, and I thank you for your patience in

Page 761

1 answering what you are able to answer, as far as the

2 structures of authorities in the Konjic area are

3 concerned, I would like to know whether you had access

4 to the documents relating to the local government in

5 Konjic, the document relating to the Assembly of Konjic

6 and then the decisions that were taken later, and if you

7 can give me the sources of your information in that

8 area?

9 A. I had unfortunately only some of these documents

10 available. I was -- I requested them and, as I

11 understand, the Office of the Prosecutor was also trying

12 to get them, but unfortunately the Bosnian institutions

13 -- I do not know which institution it was -- were not

14 able to provide them in time, but we are trying -- keep

15 on trying to get these documents. I don't know for

16 which reason it was not possible to get them from

17 Bosnia.

18 Q. You submitted a document on the all people's defence

19 strategy issued by the Federal Ministry for Defence of

20 SFRY. Do you know that on 10th April the Presidency of

21 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina issued a Directive

22 regarding organising and operating of the staffs of

23 Territorial Defence?

24 A. Can you please repeat the date?

25 Q. 10th April.

Page 762

1 JUDGE JAN: Also the year. 10th April 1992? Please repeat

2 the year also.

3 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): 1992.

4 A. Sorry. Can you please repeat?

5 Q. Do you know that on 10th April a Provisional Directive

6 was issued, in which a reorganisation of the local

7 headquarters were put in a new hierarchical order

8 towards the General Command?

9 A. If this is the one published in the Official Gazette,

10 yes. If it's a secret one, no.

11 Q. That is not the Directive that you submitted in your

12 documents. Were you in a position to see another

13 document?

14 A. I submitted two documents relating to the Bosnian Army

15 and the Territorial Defence Organisation. Both were

16 passed in May 1992. One is the Defence Law of Bosnia.

17 The other one is the law on the armed forces, and both

18 laws are included in this binder.

19 Q. In other words, you did not see other documents?

20 A. I saw the whole Official Gazette. If you are referring

21 to documents published in this Gazette related to

22 defence, I have seen them. If you are speaking about

23 whatever secret decisions internally made, I have not

24 seen them.

25 Q. You saw the Decree in the Official Gazette taking over

Page 763

1 the laws from the former SFRY?

2 A. Yes. I think so, yes.

3 Q. You saw that a number of documents were taken over, but

4 not documents relating to the defence matters?

5 A. No, the Bosnian Government was passing new documents,

6 but they were, in my view, very similar to the former

7 ones in essence.

8 Q. The Bosnian government did not adopt this strategy of

9 all people's defence and self-protection of the people,

10 did it?

11 A. This strategy was in effect on the Republics of the

12 former Yugoslavia, and I actually did get it from the

13 Republic of the former Yugoslavia, whose name is not

14 Serbia or Montenegro, and I was advised by former

15 Attorney-General that it was still valid at this time

16 and that many military persons were still behaving

17 according to this defence doctrine, and my general

18 impression from what was going on on the ground is

19 indeed that many people still behaved in accordance with

20 this document.

21 Q. You did not personally verify the actions or behaviour

22 of the people in the Konjic municipality, did you?

23 A. No, I did not. I was saying it before, that I am not a

24 fact witness. I cannot confirm or not confirm any

25 concrete behaviour of any person at this time in the

Page 764

1 area of Konjic.

2 Q. However, you have confirmed certain things in your

3 written report. You stated that there was a rule or

4 frequent cases that people of some standing, people who

5 had money, people who were businessmen, were coming to

6 help their people, and you stated examples in Croatia

7 and Bosnia. Do you think you can cite five such

8 persons?

9 A. I would not like to cite five such persons. I cited two

10 prominent persons and I think, if you give me a bit more

11 time, I will find other adequate examples. I quoted a

12 bit earlier the case of Arkan and I quoted the case of

13 Fikret Abdic. I think I can also maybe find some more,

14 but I would need a bit more time.

15 Q. I apologise. Arkan is not a citizen of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am not sure that I know in what

17 context you used him here, and Fikret Abdic did not come

18 from abroad. Based on these two individuals I don't

19 know how you arrived at the conclusion that you arrived

20 at in your written report.

21 A. Well, both persons were acting on the territory of

22 Bosnia and both persons were also relying on financial

23 resourcing coming from outside of Bosnia. I, of course,

24 have no documents here, and I am, of course, again not a

25 witness, a fact witness for this, but this is what was

Page 765

1 generally assumed at the time, and I think many still

2 believe in this, and they were powerful persons just

3 because they had a lot of economic power in certain

4 areas, one in Western Bosnia and the other one in

5 Eastern Slovenia. They had the bases and they had good

6 contacts outside of the Republic of Bosnia and outside

7 of also Croatia and they had connections to foreign

8 countries.

9 Q. However, those are not individuals who are the members

10 of the legal armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

11 A. No, they are not.

12 Q. In other words, what you testified to in your written

13 report does not refer to the members of the legal armed

14 forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, does it?

15 A. I did not mention the armed forces of Bosnia in this

16 context, if I remember well. If you understand this,

17 then I apologise. It was not my intention to put it in

18 such a way. I wanted just to say that in a situation

19 where really everything was changing, it was a normal

20 thing that new elites were emerging, persons of

21 influence were coming in. Immigrants were coming back

22 from foreign countries. This was not only the case in

23 Bosnia, but also in Serbia and Croatia and maybe also in

24 the other republics. It was maybe part of this --

25 excuse me again -- confused situation, which is, I was

Page 766

1 trying to explain, this confused situation which

2 characterised the first months after the outbreak of the

3 war.

4 Q. Ms Calic, a little while ago you correctly pointed to

5 the fact that you were not a fact witness. I would like

6 to ask you: is this your assumption or is it a

7 historical fact that you got based on the information

8 available to you?

9 A. Which fact are you referring to, please?

10 Q. The fact about influential persons who were coming?

11 A. I believe it has become already a historical fact, and

12 there are scholars who have written about this. I have

13 a chapter of a book by a French scholar. His name is

14 Xavier Bugarel. The article is not included in this

15 file, because I thought it would not be relevant for

16 this case, but I can provide you with this book and with

17 this article. So there are already scholars writing

18 about this fact, and I think we should also take notice

19 of this.

20 Q. Yes, Ms Calic, but you are testifying about the Konjic

21 area, and you testified that these people were business

22 people, cafe owners, who were supporting certain

23 political parties, who provided financial resources to

24 them, and who also had influence on political and

25 military structures, especially in the area of

Page 767

1 1992/1992. This is what is in the indictment, that

2 period, and in the beginning of this paragraph we are

3 talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Konjic

4 area, and I am asking you whether you have facts that

5 are -- information that is based on facts or are you

6 just referring to general books and other general

7 documents when stating this?

8 A. If I recall correctly, then I did not mention in this

9 report Konjic specifically. I was mentioning Bosnia as

10 a part of the former Yugoslavia, and I would like to

11 stress here again that this is also true for many other

12 parts of the former Yugoslavia. It was a general fact.

13 It happened in many parts. It happened on all sides, I

14 would assume, and there are already scholars writing on

15 these facts, and this is what I wanted to make clear

16 here. I was not, of course, as I am not a fact witness,

17 referring to a concrete person or concrete -- yes, a

18 concrete person in Konjic.

19 Q. So it was an assumption on your part that it also was

20 referring to the Konjic area; can we put it that way?

21 MR OSTBERG: Your Honour, I object to this question. You

22 are putting something else in the mouth of the witness.

23 The witness just said that it was not in the Konjic

24 area. It was a general observation. The question is

25 answered already.

Page 768

1 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: Well, the witness actually said that

2 she had no such experience with the facts surrounding

3 the Konjic area. Is that what you are saying?

4 A. Yes. I have no facts or evidence personally.

5 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Your Honour, but the

6 paragraph that I just quoted starts with the words:

7 "In all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina including

8 Konjic ...".

9 So I could not understand it in any other way but

10 the way it is written.

11 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: If she has now made that exception of

12 the place which you have in mind, you ought to accept

13 that.

14 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Thank you. The next

15 group of short questions is in reference to your

16 knowledge of the structures in the Konjic municipality.

17 JUDGE KARIBI WHYTE: I am sorry. You might not have enough

18 time for these short questions, because we have to rise

19 at 5.30. So you might continue tomorrow morning at

20 10.00 am.

21 MS RESIDOVIC (in interpretation): Thank you very much.

22 Thank you, Ms Calic.

23 (Court adjourned until 10.30 tomorrow morning)

24 --ooOoo--

25