The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Case No.IT-96-21

  1. 1 Thursday 23rd October, 1997

    2 (10.00 am)

    3 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Morning, ladies and gentlemen.

    4 Mr. Niemann, how do we start? Do we start with your

    5 motion or...

    6 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour. Mr. Turone will argue the

    7 motion on behalf of the Prosecution, your Honours.

    8 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Can we have appearances, please?

    9 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honour pleases, my name is Niemann and

    10 I appear with my colleagues Mr. Turone and Mr. Khan for

    11 the Prosecution.

    12 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: And the appearances for the Defence,

    13 please.

    14 MS. RESIDOVIC: Good morning, your Honours. My name is

    15 Edina Residovic and I appear on behalf of Mr. Zejnil

    16 Delalic, together with my colleague Mr. Eugene

    17 O'Sullivan, professor from Canada.

    18 MR. OLUJIC: Good morning, your Honours. I am Zeljko Olujic,

    19 attorney from Croatia. I appear on behalf of Mr. Zdravko

    20 Mucic together with my colleague Michael Greaves,

    21 attorney from Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

    22 MR. KARABDIC: Good morning, I am Salih Karabdic appearing on

    23 behalf of Mr. Hazim Delic, together with my colleague,

    24 Tom Moran, attorney from Houston, Texas.

    25 MR. ACKERMAN: Good morning, your Honours. I am John

  2. 1 Ackerman, I appear here today on behalf of Esad Landzo,

    2 together with my co-counsel Ms. Cynthia McMurrey.

    3 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much.

    4 Yes, Mr. Turone?

    5 MR. TURONE: Thank you. Thank you, your Honour. Your

    6 Honours, the motion filed on October 1st by the

    7 Prosecution seeks leave to call as additional expert

    8 witnesses Dr. James Gow and Professor Constantin

    9 Economides, on the basis of paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 4

    10 of your Honours' order issued on 25th January. We can

    11 read in that subsection of the aforesaid order that for

    12 good cause shown the Trial Chamber will allow testimony

    13 of expert witnesses where notice of such expert

    14 testimony is given after the required date.

    15 So the original required date was in the early

    16 months of this year; at that time the Prosecution

    17 designated two expert witnesses, Dr. Calic and General de

    18 Vogel. Then in March, the first one, Dr. Calic, was

    19 examined and cross-examined in this courtroom. Then, on

    20 July 4th, in a previous motion, the Prosecution informed

    21 already the Trial Chamber and the team colleagues of the

    22 Defence that it may call additional witnesses to prove

    23 the international character of the armed conflict in

    24 Bosnia Herzegovina and to prove that the victims in

    25 this case were protected persons pursuant to Article 2

  3. 1 of the Statute, concerning the very narrow scope.

    2 As a matter of fact, the judgement in the Tadic

    3 case had been issued in the meantime, on 7th May,

    4 establishing some legal parameters for proving such

    5 circumstances. Now the new designation of expert

    6 witnesses is filed by the Prosecution for the following

    7 reasons, which in our submission constitute good cause

    8 according to paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 4, of the 25th

    9 January order.

    10 First of all, as I was saying, the elements of

    11 Article 2 offences were first established in the

    12 aforementioned opinion and judgement in the Tadic case on

    13 7th May, including the requirements for proving the

    14 existence of an international armed conflict and the

    15 quality of protected persons according to the Geneva

    16 Conventions.

    17 Although the Prosecutor has given notice of her

    18 intention to appeal that decision in this respect,

    19 however, the parameters established by the Tadic Trial

    20 Chamber anyway suggest a different focusing on these

    21 relevant issues. Moreover, subsequent to the testimony

    22 of Dr. Calic new facts, new information on the

    23 internationality of the armed conflict in the former

    24 Yugoslavia and the protected status of the victims have

    25 come to the knowledge of the Prosecution, again, on

  4. 1 these two very narrow subjects, and the Prosecution is

    2 now seeking to present this new information through

    3 Dr. Gow, a military expert to be called instead of

    4 General de Vogel, and Dr. Calic, as we know, was not a

    5 military expert, keeping in mind the parameters

    6 established in the Tadic decision as for

    7 internationality of conflict, an issue for which Dr. Gow

    8 is deemed to be a suitable expert witness.

    9 Finally, as far as the nationality issue is

    10 concerned, on 13th June this year the Trial Chamber,

    11 your Honours, have already granted leave to the Defence

    12 counsel of Mr. Delic to designate an expert witness on

    13 the law of citizenship of Bosnia. The Defence counsel

    14 wrote in his motion he had no objection to the

    15 designation of a similar expert witness by the

    16 Prosecution, and this is what the Prosecution intends

    17 now to do, through the designation of Professor

    18 Economides, again keeping in mind the parameters stated

    19 in the Tadic decision for protected persons status, with

    20 particular reference to Article 4 of Geneva Convention

    21 IV.

    22 The designation and the CV of Dr. Gow and Professor

    23 Economides were filed on October 1st, together with this

    24 motion, and in the following days the Prosecution

    25 provided all the esteemed colleagues of the Defence with

  5. 1 a statement of the areas of their testimonies. So this

    2 is my legal argument on the motion. Your Honours, thank

    3 you.

    4 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: May I have any reaction on the part of

    5 the Defence?

    6 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I will discuss the two witnesses

    7 separately, and in both cases rather briefly.

    8 With regard to Dr. Gow, the Prosecution has pointed

    9 out in its motion to seek leave to call additional

    10 expert witnesses, and Mr. Turone has pointed out this

    11 morning that subsequent to the testimony of Dr. Calic

    12 "new facts and information" -- and I am reading from

    13 their motion:

    14 "... new facts and information on the

    15 internationality of the armed conflict in the former

    16 Yugoslavia and the protected status of the victims have

    17 come to the knowledge of the Prosecution. The

    18 Prosecution seeks to present this new information to the

    19 Trial Chamber".

    20 It is not clear, from reading that paragraph, the

    21 nature of that new information. If it is in the form of

    22 documents, we have not been provided with those

    23 documents and under prior orders of this court should

    24 have been at least by this time, it seems to me. If it

    25 is not in the nature of documents, it could be quite

  6. 1 helpful, in terms of the preparation of

    2 cross-examination of this witness, to be informed by the

    3 Office of the Prosecutor what that new information is.

    4 Beyond that, with regard to Dr. Gow, I have no

    5 further comment.

    6 With regard to Professor Economides, the Trial

    7 Chamber should know that basically what we have been

    8 provided are two small paragraphs containing very sparse

    9 information about who this man is and what the nature of

    10 his expertise might be. We can only conclude from

    11 looking at those, at that information, those two small

    12 paragraphs -- I am holding it up so you can see, your

    13 Honours, the extent of what has been provided to us.

    14 You probably have a copy of it. It is about five and a

    15 half lines of typewritten material.

    16 It appears that Professor Economides is being

    17 offered to this Trial Chamber as a legal expert, being

    18 brought here to tell your Honours what the law is. In

    19 most places that would be an improper use of expert

    20 testimony, unless the legal expert was being called for

    21 the purpose of establishing foreign law. That is not my

    22 understanding of the purpose of Mr. Economides, but that

    23 he is being asked by the Prosecution to come here to

    24 tell your Honours what international law is. I believe

    25 that is the exclusive province of the Trial Chamber, to

  7. 1 determine what the law is, based upon the advice and

    2 arguments of counsel in the case, and is not a matter

    3 that is subject to expert testimony. Based upon that

    4 reasoning, I object to Mr. Economides being called.

    5 There is precious little before this Trial Chamber

    6 which would even permit you to conclude that he has any

    7 expertise at all and that he properly falls within the

    8 category of an expert witness. The Prosecution has

    9 presented virtually nothing. There is virtually no

    10 information about what it is that they expect his

    11 testimony will be; but the best we can conclude is they

    12 are offering him as an expert on international law,

    13 which I think is not an appropriate use of expertise.

    14 Thank you.

    15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much. Yes, Mr. Moran?

    16 MR. MORAN: Yes, your Honour. Very quickly, first,

    17 I mis-spoke something yesterday. I said Mr. Gow had

    18 published 15 articles in Jayne’s' publication; it turns

    19 out to be nine. I apologise for the factual mistake, to

    20 be right upfront.

    21 Secondly, let me limit my remarks as to Professor

    22 Economides. As the Prosecutors properly noted, we

    23 offered an expert in Bosnian law, because courts need

    24 expertise to know what the law of a foreign nation is.

    25 There is no showing, anywhere that I know of, that

  8. 1 Professor Economides is licensed to practice law in

    2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that he has ever practised law in

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that he has the slightest idea what

    4 the citizenship laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina are. Just,

    5 for instance, he would be just -- have the same kind of

    6 expertise speaking about British nationality law or

    7 American nationality law, or a nationality law of the

    8 People's Republic of China. Because he lacks this

    9 expertise in the area where I believe that the Trial

    10 Chamber probably needs some expert testimony, I do not

    11 think he will be helpful to the Trial Chamber.

    12 For that reason, until they get an expert in

    13 Bosnian law, I do not think that there is any need for

    14 an expert on this, and I would object to this particular

    15 witness testifying.

    16 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, on behalf of Mr. Delalic we

    17 would adopt the arguments put forward by our friends

    18 Mr. Ackerman and Mr. Moran.

    19 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Mr. Olujic, what is the situation for

    20 Mr. Mucic?

    21 MR. OLUJIC: Thank you, your Honours. First of all, to avoid

    22 unnecessary repetition, I fully endorse the elaboration

    23 of the reasons given by my learned friend Mr. Ackerman,

    24 but I would like to add the following: it is quite true

    25 what has been said regarding Professor Gow and his

  9. 1 literature, which is really minimal. But we also lack

    2 something important, when this witness was proposed to

    3 assist the Trial Chamber in dealing with all the

    4 problems required to pass a fair judgement, and that is

    5 that we do not know at all what the Doctor's

    6 dissertation, of this gentlemen, was, nor do we know the

    7 title of that dissertation.

    8 I have not been able to establish that he is an

    9 expert for the area of the former Yugoslavia, because

    10 the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina is linked in

    11 symbiotic connection with the former state, so anyone

    12 who is not really knowledgeable about the legal and

    13 constitutional affairs of the former Yugoslavia cannot

    14 know what is important for the territory of the former

    15 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was later

    16 recognised as an independent state. Therefore, I too

    17 would like to object, regarding the proposed expert

    18 witness; and I believe that we should bring before the

    19 Trial Chamber a person who would synthesise both the

    20 positions of the Prosecution and the Defence, so that

    21 there should be no doubts as to that person's expertise

    22 and all other credibility of that individual.

    23 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much. Let us hear you,

    24 Mr. Turone.

    25 MR. TURONE: Thank you, your Honour. About the information

  10. 1 which Dr. James Gow is supposed to give to this court,

    2 I would like to emphasise that the answer to the

    3 question raised by Mr. Ackerman is at least in part

    4 answered in the statement of the areas of the testimony

    5 of this expert witness, which we filed in due time. We

    6 said that Mr. Gow will describe the armed conflict that

    7 occurred on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    8 including the Konjic municipality, in 1992, between the

    9 Yugoslav People's Army and the Bosnian armed Serb forces

    10 on the one side and the BiH army on the other side, and

    11 so on.

    12 But more in General, we should say that the narrow

    13 scope of the expert testimony of Mr. Gow is anyway

    14 included in what was the area of testimony which was

    15 supposed to cover and which was many months ago given to

    16 the Defence lawyers, which was supposed to cover the

    17 other military witnesses we had designated in advance,

    18 which was General De Vogel. So in a way I would say

    19 that the new designation of the military expert James

    20 Gow is somehow a substitution of the previous military

    21 expert we had designated then, and the different

    22 focusing which is suggested by the new Tadic case law

    23 intervened in the meantime suggested to us to narrow the

    24 scope of the military testimony and file a new

    25 designation in the person of Mr. Gow.

  11. 1 On the other hand, we have to underline that all

    2 what Dr. Gow wrote on this issue can be easily found in

    3 his bibliography, and I would suggest that between

    4 October 1st and November 3rd, which is the date when

    5 Dr. Gow would probably be called to testify, the esteemed

    6 colleagues of the Defence have the time to read what

    7 this expert witness wrote on the narrow scope of

    8 internationality of the conflict and status of protected

    9 persons in the former Yugoslavia.

    10 About Professor Economides. I would say that in

    11 the CV of Professor Economides the main feature

    12 concerning this expert witness is the fact that he is a

    13 member of the European Commission for Democracy and Law

    14 of the European Union and in that capacity he was the

    15 reporter of this Commission on the issue of state

    16 succession, of state succession, which is the real issue

    17 coming out in this trial. On the issue of state

    18 succession and nationality. Whatever was prepared by

    19 Mr. Economides in the framework of this European

    20 Commission is easily to be found in Brussels in among

    21 the material of the European Commission.

    22 Furthermore, he is also a member of the United

    23 Nations International Law Commission. I would also add

    24 that in this case it is not really a matter of being

    25 expert witness exclusively on the law of Bosnia on

  12. 1 citizenship. This is certainly also one of the aspects,

    2 but the matter coming to our attention is the matter of

    3 nationality issue under the Geneva Conventions, and

    4 particularly with regard to the succession of states,

    5 the states' succession. So this, I think, is my answer

    6 to the objections of the Defence. Thank you, your

    7 Honour.

    8 MR. MORAN: Your Honour, just a couple of quick things.

    9 Firstly, the Tadic -- although the Tadic Trial Chamber

    10 issued its decision on 7th May, applying the law to the

    11 facts of that case, the law itself is nothing new. It

    12 is based on both the Tadic appellant decision from,

    13 I believe, October 1995, maybe November 1995, and the

    14 ICJ's opinion in Nicaragua v US, which is 1987, 1988

    15 case, things almost ten years old.

    16 Secondly, as I pointed out to the Trial Chamber

    17 yesterday, I have spent many hours trying to find things

    18 out about Mr. Economides on the Internet, which is a very

    19 good source of information, and this Commission that he

    20 is a member of. As I pointed out to the Trial Chamber

    21 yesterday, all I could find on Professor Economides was

    22 one reference to being a member on a European Commission

    23 Against Torture. I found absolutely no references to a

    24 European Commission for Democracy and Law. Clearly, he

    25 has written a substantial amount of information as a

  13. 1 Reporter of this Commission. I do not know that we can

    2 get our hands on it and digest it over the weekend.

    3 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, the first thing I want to respond

    4 to is the way in which Mr. Turone skilfully avoided

    5 responding to the major point that I was trying to

    6 make. That is the statement by the Office of the

    7 Prosecutor that there are new facts and information on

    8 the internationality of the armed conflict in the former

    9 Yugoslavia and the protected status of the victims that

    10 have come to the knowledge of the Prosecution.

    11 I specifically requested in my initial remarks that in

    12 order for this Trial Chamber to make a proper decision

    13 regarding this matter it would seem to me that the Trial

    14 Chamber would have to have some indication of what these

    15 new facts and information consist of. If they consist

    16 of documents they should have been turned over to us

    17 quite a long time ago. Mr. Turone did not respond

    18 directly to that whatsoever. I think that needs and

    19 requires a response.

    20 With regard to Professor Economides, the response

    21 was very much what I had suspected, and that was that he

    22 is going to be proffered to you as an expert on

    23 international law, which I think is improper and will

    24 not be of any help to such a learned Trial Chamber,

    25 which probably, with the experience that the three of

  14. 1 you have together, would outweigh anything

    2 Professor Economides could offer by several tongues,

    3 I would think, based upon looking on his CV and that of

    4 the Honourable Judges sitting on this Tribunal with

    5 regard to international law issues.

    6 I therefore suggest to the Tribunal that before

    7 you can make a decision regarding either of these

    8 matters, you need more information. Perhaps you have

    9 sufficient information now from which you could decide

    10 that you do not need to hear from Professor Economides.

    11 With regard to Professor Gow, I think you do need

    12 more information to make that decision which should be

    13 provided to you by the Office of the Prosecutor. If

    14 this Tribunal determines that they will permit

    15 Professor Economides to be called then I would like

    16 leave to make additional remarks to the Chamber. Thank

    17 you.

    18 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: It is possible, Economides' both

    19 publications are published, both sides will be satisfied

    20 with his Commission. I do not know.

    21 Do you have any contribution?

    22 MR. GREAVES: Your Honour, one short contribution to make.

    23 It concerns the position of Professor Economides, with

    24 respect to your Honours' position. The reason why

    25 evidence of what international law is not admissible in

  15. 1 this court might be taken from a useful publication

    2 which states pithily what the position is. That is

    3 Juberre's Law of South Africa, volume 9. This is the

    4 law of South Africa, but it applies, in my submission,

    5 equally here:

    6 "It is not permissible to lead expert evidence on

    7 a point law. The court notices it, not because it is a

    8 matter of common knowledge, but because the court the

    9 organ of state entrusted with the functions of declaring

    10 and applying the law."

    11 That short sentence identifies what your role is.

    12 If Mr. Economides comes along and gives expert evidence

    13 on what international law is, he is effectively becoming

    14 a member of the Trial Chamber. That is not

    15 permissible. Interestingly enough, in the law of South

    16 Africa international customary law is considered to be

    17 incorporated in that state's law. It should be

    18 judicially noticed and expert evidence to prove it is in

    19 fact inadmissible. It cites a number of authorities for

    20 that proposition.

    21 In my submission, if what Professor Economides is

    22 going to come to do is give evidence about what the

    23 international law of a succession of states is, as

    24 opposed to expert evidence of the law on citizenship in

    25 Bosnia, it is not admissible.

  16. 1 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, the court reporters' system,

    2 because of the way it is set up, seems to be

    3 substituting my name for Mr. Economides on occasion, and

    4 that could be confusing in the record as Mr. Greaves has

    5 just disparaged my expertise.

    6 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I think we will grant the application.

    7 Let us hear Mr. Ackerman.

    8 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, with regard to

    9 Professor Economides, he was the Reporter to this

    10 Commission, the European Commission for Democracy and

    11 Law. We have -- my colleague, Ms. McMurrey, this

    12 morning has had a discussion with the Office of the

    13 Prosecutor regarding that report. It was learned that

    14 the Office of the Prosecutor in fact has a copy of that

    15 report. When Ms. McMurrey asked Mr. Niemann to please

    16 furnish us with a copy of it, he refused to have any

    17 conversation with her about it, refused to respond to

    18 her inquiry and basically ignored the request. I wish

    19 these matters could be worked out without bringing this

    20 to the Tribunal's attention, but if Mr. Niemann is going

    21 to refuse to even discuss such issues with us then we

    22 must bring it to your attention.

    23 Due to the short time between now and when he is

    24 likely to testify, rather than ask for an adjournment

    25 once we find this, it seems to me that in the interest

  17. 1 of making things move along with this Tribunal that it

    2 would be totally appropriate for the Tribunal to order

    3 the Officer of the Prosecutor to give us a copy of that

    4 report and any other writings they have of

    5 Professor Economides, otherwise we will have no choice

    6 but to seek an adjournment for the purpose of gathering

    7 up these documents and being prepared to cross-examine

    8 the Professor.

    9 We have somewhat the same problem with regard to

    10 Professor Gow; however, based upon your ruling this

    11 morning, we will endeavour now to start marshalling the

    12 documents necessary to prepare that cross-examination.

    13 We will hope that we can do that without requesting any

    14 kind of adjournment from the court.

    15 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, may I respond to that?

    16 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much.

    17 MR. NIEMANN: This is yet another example of misconstruction

    18 and accusing me of things which have not happened. When

    19 I was asked about this I said I do not have it and I do

    20 not know, but that I would make inquiries. At that

    21 moment, I then instructed Mr. Khan to send an e-mail

    22 message upstairs to see whether or not information could

    23 be obtained, because I did not know of it in relation to

    24 the report and I did not know the telephone number that

    25 I was also requested of. This is just a lie. They were

  18. 1 here, she heard it, now it is being totally

    2 misrepresented. This sort of behaviour is going on time

    3 and time again in this Chamber. It is most regrettable

    4 and most unethical. I will produce a copy of the

    5 e-mail, your Honour, as soon as I can have it produced

    6 by the printer.

    7 MS. McMURREY: Your Honour, if I might respond, since

    8 Mr. Niemann just called me a liar in court. What

    9 happened was I did ask Mr. Niemann for the telephone

    10 number and he did talk to Mr. Khan and said he would try

    11 to arrange for us to get the telephone number of the

    12 expert. When I asked for the report he did not respond

    13 to me that he would provide me with the report. Thank

    14 you.

    15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: This type of thing should not be

    16 continuing here. What has been told to the Trial

    17 Chamber is that he has refused to react to your

    18 request. That is what we have just been told. This is

    19 what he is trying to reject. That is not completely the

    20 position. Well, I think in the ordinary manner of

    21 co-operation I am sure they will try to give you the

    22 sources of the information; if you can get the reports

    23 and if they can find it for you they will do so. I do

    24 not think there is any difficulty in co-operating in

    25 matters of this nature. I think this is the end of this

  19. 1 application. We grant the application. Thank you.

    2 Next we go on with your witness.

    3 General ARIF PASALIC (continued)

    4 Examination-in-chief by MR. NIEMANN (continued)

    5 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes. You may sit. Morning, General.

    6 Remind him that he is still on his oath.

    7 THE REGISTRAR: Sir, I remind you that you are still under

    8 oath.

    9 A. Yes.

    10 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, Mr. Niemann, you may continue.

    11 MR. NIEMANN: Thank you, your Honour.

    12 General, yesterday we were speaking about Sefer

    13 Halilovic and his position of Chief of Staff during the

    14 period of 1992. In relation to his position, was he

    15 ultimately responsible for prisoners of war detained by

    16 members of the Bosnian Herzegovina army at that time?

    17 A. Sefer Halilovic is Chief of Staff of the Supreme

    18 Command, was my superior officer. All issues regarding

    19 action and combat and prisoners of war were linked to

    20 his orders.

    21 Q. And that would include dealings with prisoners of war,

    22 would it?

    23 A. I was responsible to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme

    24 Command in all regards, for all issues, including also

    25 the matters of dealing with prisoners of war.

  20. 1 Q. And would this apply to other immediate subordinates of

    2 Sefer Halilovic in the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, when

    3 it came to dealing with prisoners of war?

    4 A. I can tell my own opinion. I think they were all in the

    5 same position towards the superior officer, who was the

    6 Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command. They all had the

    7 responsibilities and their duties.

    8 Q. General, when it came to visitations at camps or

    9 prisoner of war facilities by the International

    10 Committee of the Red Cross who was it that was

    11 authorised to permit inspections in the hierarchy of the

    12 army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    13 A. In the period from April 1992 up until the establishing

    14 of the Crop, I did not have prisoners of war that were

    15 based in prisons or other premises. I did not have any

    16 camps. I turned over my prisoners of war to the

    17 headquarters of the Croatian Defence Council. But in

    18 order for the ICRC or any other international

    19 organisation to visit any of my institutions or

    20 establishments I had to have the accord of my superior

    21 officers; that was the staff of the Supreme Command. In

    22 that case I would be allowed to allow the visitation of

    23 any international organisation including, the

    24 International Red Cross.

    25 Q. Would that apply, so far as you know, to other

  21. 1 Commanders of such army groups as Tactical Groups?

    2 A. I can say my own opinion about that. I think that would

    3 go also for all the other subordinate groups and

    4 commands.

    5 Q. And in relation specifically to the Celebici complex,

    6 when that was being utilised as a prison facility, did

    7 that ever come under your responsibility, at any stage?

    8 A. As for Celebici, which is a complex where those people

    9 were isolated, I only learned about that towards the end

    10 of November. That is when I established a committee

    11 that would have to investigate the matter. I was never

    12 at Celebici or had any responsibility over that complex.

    13 Q. Why was it that you investigated it then, General?

    14 I mean, I know you were not there, but why did you cause

    15 the investigation into it, if it was not a matter under

    16 your responsibility?

    17 A. I started the investigation when I became the Commander

    18 of the 4th Corps with an order issued on 17th November,

    19 1992. As that case happened at Konjic somewhere from

    20 the 20th November onwards, I established, as I have

    21 already told you, a commission that had to investigate

    22 and find out the facts of what happened in Konjic. That

    23 commission informed me that at the warehouse of the

    24 former JNA at Celebici there was a certain number of

    25 people who were isolated there. By contacting those

  22. 1 people and by contacting the people who ensured the

    2 security of the place that there were persons who died

    3 for various reasons, people that were not alive.

    4 I decided that it should be found out what was happening

    5 and I was informed that investigations should be

    6 started, linked to the missing of those people or to

    7 their death. That is when I started proceedings against

    8 those people as it is stated in that Act for the

    9 starting of criminal proceedings.

    10 Q. Yes. General, I think there may have been some

    11 confusion in my question. What I was asking is: was

    12 there any time when the Celebici camp came under your

    13 responsibility? Specifically, did it come under your

    14 responsibility after 17th November, when the 4th Corps

    15 was established?

    16 A. After the establishing of the 4th Corps, because the

    17 facilities at Celebici were physically lying within the

    18 area of my responsibility, I decided to have a look into

    19 it and when I did so I wanted that the camp be disbanded

    20 and that those people be sent in the prisons which had

    21 such a purpose. I did not have time to look into the

    22 camp, as you call it, that is of Celebici. These were

    23 these isolated persons. I considered those people,

    24 persons were not combatants so I only asked for those

    25 people to be transferred to other centres, and for the

  23. 1 situation to be -- the matter to be investigated into.

    2 Q. General, during the period of 1992, did you know or come

    3 to know a person by the name of Esad Ramic?

    4 A. Yes, I did. I met Esad Ramic in the same period when

    5 I met Mr. Zejnil Delalic and the others. That is when

    6 I arrived to Konjic. I think that at that time Esad

    7 Ramic was in the staff of the Territorial Defence of the

    8 municipality of Konjic. I do not know whether he was

    9 just a legal officer, or the head of the staff. I do

    10 not know that.

    11 Q. And did he stay in Konjic for the whole period of 1992,

    12 or did he subsequently leave Konjic, in terms of the

    13 place where he was stationed in the army?

    14 A. During 1992, I found him in Konjic in the staff of the

    15 Territorial Defence and later on when the Corps was

    16 established he became part of that Corps as one of the

    17 operational officers of the command.

    18 Q. Your Honours, those are all the questions I have.

    19 I just wish to check with the Registrar, if I may,

    20 whether Exhibit 141 was -- I tendered it, but was it

    21 accepted into evidence for the truth of its contents?

    22 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, it was admitted yesterday into

    23 evidence.

    24 MR. NIEMANN: I have no further questions.

    25 MR. MORAN: Your Honour, I believe that the Trial Chamber did

  24. 1 not accept 141 for the truth of the matters therein but

    2 for the relationships. As I recall that distinction was

    3 made by Judge Jan.

    4 MR. NIEMANN: My friend is quite right, it was tendered for a

    5 limited basis. I do apologise.

    6 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you. That is all you have with

    7 this witness?

    8 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour.

    9 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Any cross-examination?

    10 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Yes, your Honours. We will proceed in this

    11 way. First counsel for Mr. Delic, second counsel for

    12 Mr. Mucic, third counsel for Mr. Delalic and fourth

    13 counsel for Mr. Landzo.

    14 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: If the Defence would not mind, because

    15 my colleague would want to put some questions before

    16 cross-examination starts.

    17 JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Thank you. I would like to ask, General

    18 Pasalic, if it is possible to assist the Tribunal in the

    19 following: General, when you talk about aggressors or

    20 aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, who are

    21 you referring to?

    22 A. In this case, I am primarily referring to aggression by

    23 the former Yugoslav People's Army, as we call them, the

    24 Serbian-Montenegrin aggressor. Later in 1992, in the

    25 second half of the year, there was aggression also by

  25. 1 the Croatian Defence Council. But in this case I was

    2 mostly referring to the aggression by the former JNA.

    3 JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: And could you explain to me if some

    4 paramilitary groups were also part of this aggression?

    5 A. For me as a citizen of Bosnian Herzegovina and an

    6 officer of the Territorial Defence, all those who were

    7 outside the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    8 outside the law and the armed forces were paramilitary

    9 formations. The only legal military formations,

    10 according to me, were the Territorial Defence and the

    11 HVO. The remnants of the former JNA, the army of

    12 Republika Srpska, which we did not recognise, were for

    13 me paramilitary units.

    14 JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: General, when you use the word

    15 "Chetnik", who are you referring to?

    16 A. Unfortunately I use the term Chetniks, members of the

    17 former JNA and the army of the so-called Republika

    18 Srpska, now an entity, have in certain designations the

    19 Chetnik prefix. Historically this dates back to the

    20 Chetnik movement in Serbia, Kosta Pecanac and onwards,

    21 whose ideology was a greater Serbian nation and the

    22 formation of a greater Serbia.

    23 JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: That means according to your opinion

    24 there were attacks coming from outside

    25 Bosnia-Herzegovina and coming from inside

  26. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina against the government in Sarajevo?

    2 A. The attacks were carried out by formations of the former

    3 Yugoslav People's Army and other paramilitary formations

    4 established in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    5 controlled by Serb nationalists. But there were units

    6 coming to Bosnia-Herzegovina from the territory of

    7 Serbia, such as the Uzice Corps, which was in the south

    8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and which was attacking Mostar

    9 and other formations from the former Yugoslav, that is

    10 from Serbia and Montenegro.

    11 JUDGE ODIO-BENITO: Thank you very much. You have been very

    12 useful.

    13 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Mr. Moran, you can continue.

    14 MR. MORAN: May it please the court.

    15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, you may proceed.

    16 Cross-examination by MR. TOM MORAN

    17 MR. MORAN: Thank you, your Honour.

    18 Good morning, General.

    19 A. Good morning.

    20 MR. MORAN: Sir, my name is Thomas Moran and I -- your

    21 Honour, I think I am on the wrong channel. Now I am

    22 hearing English rather than French.

    23 Let me introduce myself. I represent a man named

    24 Hazim Delic, and I am going to ask you some questions

    25 and they are going to be fairly general questions, and

  27. 1 maybe some of my colleagues will ask a little bit more

    2 specific things about this. But I am going to ask you

    3 questions about military organisation, command

    4 structures, military justice, things like that.

    5 As a little preface, just so you know where these

    6 questions are going to be coming from, I spent 21 years

    7 in the active duty in reserves in the United States army

    8 and I have recently retired, so I think we may be

    9 talking somewhat officer to officer.

    10 The first thing I would like to ask you about is

    11 the command relationship between the HVO and the TO in

    12 the period from, say, April of 1992 through about

    13 November of 1992, just in general terms. At any place

    14 in the command structure, did the HVO share a common

    15 commander with the TO or the army of BiH?

    16 A. At the beginning of the organisation of the defence and

    17 resistance against the aggressor, TO units were formed,

    18 led by the republican staff of Territorial Defence of

    19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Parallel with that and maybe a

    20 little earlier, I do not recall the date, units of the

    21 HVO were formed, learning a lesson from the war in

    22 Croatia. Those units, that is HVO units, and TO units

    23 at first acted in co-ordination against the aggressor,

    24 that is the former JNA and Serbian-Montenegrin

    25 aggressor.

  28. 1 However, the headquarters of the HVO was formed by

    2 Janko Bobetko as commander of the southern theatre of

    3 war in 1992. I think it was in March or April; and it

    4 was an independent command in relation to the municipal

    5 TO staff. The command of the TO was in Sarajevo and the

    6 command of the HVO was in Posusje and in Siroki Breg.

    7 The relations between these two commands, I am not

    8 competent to say, and I am not familiar with the way it

    9 functioned, but I know that in the field I was Battalion

    10 Commander. We did co-ordinate with the HVO in the

    11 territory of the Neretva River valley in Herzegovina,

    12 based in Mostar. That co-ordination consisted of mutual

    13 consultations, agreements, and conduct of combat

    14 operations against the aggressor.

    15 Q. So, General, when you were a Battalion Commander in

    16 early 1992, and there was an HVO unit operating in your

    17 area of operations, did you, for instance, have the

    18 authority to call in that HVO commander and say: "you

    19 work for me. Take that hill"?

    20 A. Before engaging in operations, we would agree on who

    21 would be the Commander of that particular operation. If

    22 I was Commander of a Battalion I had my own area which

    23 we had delineated between us and the HVO and if we were

    24 fighting an aggressor and an HVO unit was attached to me

    25 then it would come under my command. If I was

  29. 1 participating with a part of my unit in another area of

    2 the battlefield and the HVO unit was in charge, then my

    3 unit would be subordinated to the Commander of that HVO

    4 unit. That was the practice.

    5 Q. So the practice was that at some time before the battle

    6 the HVO Commander and the TO Commander and possibly

    7 their staffs, and possibly other people, would get

    8 together and decide who will be in charge of this

    9 operation, and another operation tomorrow it might be

    10 that someone else was in charge. Is that a fair

    11 assessment, General?

    12 A. Yes. In the case of a particular combat operation or

    13 task, but if talking about the territorial

    14 responsibility, the area was also decided, in some areas

    15 there were BiH army units or rather TO and in others

    16 HVO. So that it did occur that one could not have

    17 parallel Commanders, but certain areas of responsibility

    18 were designated and each one was in command of his

    19 subordinated units and received instructions from the

    20 HVO command in one case and in the other from the TO

    21 command. So it was a highly complicated system of

    22 control and command.

    23 Q. And I suspect that in your logistical operations,

    24 supplies, weapons, ammunition, gasoline, vehicles, it

    25 was the same kind of complicated relationship between

  30. 1 the TO and the HVO, is that a fair assessment, General?

    2 A. The logistics for subordinated units and command was set

    3 in very complicated conditions. There were no rules.

    4 It was the conditions that dictated the rules. We in

    5 the TO received supplies from our own logistics bases

    6 and some we had to obtain ourselves. We were assisted

    7 at first by the HVO, and this applied mostly to clothing

    8 and food. In some cases, we did assist one another with

    9 some equipment -- military equipment, but this was

    10 limited in scale.

    11 Q. Well, of course, at that time for both the HVO and the

    12 TO there were, I suspect, some severe shortages of

    13 everything, from weapons to combat boots. Is that a

    14 fair assessment?

    15 A. We were absolutely short of everything. We did not have

    16 uniforms, boots, clothing. We did not have sufficient

    17 weapons either. The HVO was quite well supplied, but

    18 I am not familiar with their sources of supply.

    19 Q. And I suspect that Commanders for both the HVO and the

    20 TO and the supply of logistical officers for both the

    21 HVO and the TO were rather jealous of what they had and

    22 they wanted to keep what they had for their units, so

    23 sharing things became a complicated system of

    24 negotiations. Is that fair?

    25 A. As Commanders of the TO and the HVO we did not have many

  31. 1 disputes amongst ourselves over that. We had logistics

    2 problems because we were short of things, and there was

    3 the question of supplies, was further complicated by the

    4 blockade. But naturally, each side kept what they had

    5 for themselves, and what they needed in the event of

    6 fresh operations against the aggressor and they took

    7 great care of that.

    8 Q. And between the headquarters of the HVO on one side and

    9 the TO on the other, would it be common for you, for

    10 instance, to have a liaison officer in the HVO

    11 headquarters to co-ordinate your activities, your

    12 logistical problems with the activities, operations and

    13 logistical problems of the HVO?

    14 A. In Mostar as Battalion and Brigade Commander I did have

    15 a liaison officer in the HVO command in Mostar. That

    16 officer co-ordinated in a sense our common interests.

    17 Also in the area of logistics, but in other areas as

    18 well, between these two components, that is TO units and

    19 HVO units, I do not know how the Republican staff and

    20 the main headquarters of the HVO co-ordinated.

    21 My task, assigned to me in September 1992, was

    22 with Jasmin Jaganjac and Anto Prkacin, as HOS Commander,

    23 to go to central Bosnia to prepare the ground for the

    24 establishment of a joint command. We were in the

    25 territory of the Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca and Zenica,

  32. 1 but unfortunately we did not ever establish that joint

    2 command.

    3 Q. I know you are not familiar with the operations and the

    4 co-ordination between the two in the Konjic area because

    5 you were -- in the spring and summer of 1992 -- because

    6 that was outside of your area of responsibility. But

    7 would it be unreasonable for the civilian authorities in

    8 the municipality to appoint someone of some stature in

    9 the community to act as a mediator between the TO and

    10 the HVO, so that they could work out their differences

    11 and work together in a smoother way?

    12 A. As regards the Konjic municipality, visiting Mr. Zejnil

    13 Delalic once on the front, I dropped by with Jasmin

    14 Jaganjac to the headquarters of the HVO of the Konjic

    15 municipality. We then discussed our mutual

    16 relationships and our co-operation. I saw we were

    17 co-operating. There were cases that the President of the

    18 municipality would appoint somebody to co-ordinate with

    19 the HVO and the HVO would also send people to co-ordinate

    20 with us, to have negotiations and discussions with us.

    21 Q. And just because that person who acts as a mediator or

    22 liaison between the HVO and the TO that does not

    23 necessarily give him any command responsibility in and

    24 of itself does it, General?

    25 A. I do not know what kind of responsibility he would

  33. 1 have. It depended on what the responsibility was

    2 assigned to him by the person who appointed him. I had

    3 my own representative in the headquarters of the HVO,

    4 Adem Zulovic. I was the one who gave him assignments as

    5 to what he should do in the HVO command, and which are

    6 the areas in which we can co-ordinate with the HVO. This

    7 co-ordinator of mine was responsible for military

    8 matters. We were a military organisation, as was the

    9 HVO command.

    10 Q. And your representative in the HVO command, your liaison

    11 officer, was not a commander, was he? He was a liaison

    12 officer to, a staff officer to help you co-ordinate your

    13 activities with an adjacent unit?

    14 A. Yes. He had no authority to command. He had the

    15 authority to represent us, the TO, in the HVO command,

    16 and to work on the co-ordination. He did not have any

    17 executive command functions.

    18 Q. General, since you have mentioned executive command

    19 functions, I would like to talk about that and the

    20 theory of command if we could, just in general terms; as

    21 a Commander and a former Commander I am sure that you

    22 are familiar with it; but is it not true that in any

    23 army in the world, any military organisation in the

    24 world, a Commander, simply because he is a Commander,

    25 has special responsibilities and special authorities

  34. 1 that some other person even of equal rank who was not a

    2 Commander would not have, would lack? That was a poorly

    3 framed question, General; if you do not understand it,

    4 I will be happy to break it up.

    5 A. Both in the former JNA and the TO and in the army of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina the Commander is the most responsible

    7 individual for the overall situation in the subordinate

    8 units, and not only for the situation, but also the

    9 consequences and the directions of future activities.

    10 But the term of "executive command" applies to officers

    11 who directly issue orders to perform specific tasks.

    12 Q. Okay. For instance, in armies that I am familiar with a

    13 Commander is responsible for everything his unit does or

    14 fails to do. He is responsible for making sure that his

    15 men are fed, that they are equipped, that they get their

    16 mail, that -- he is responsible for promotions,

    17 demotions. That would be the same in the former JNA and

    18 the TO, and the current army of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    19 would it not, General?

    20 A. Yes. When you are talking about a Commander, he has the

    21 right to command. The other persons in his command have

    22 specific responsibilities, assistants, officers, et

    23 cetera. But they have no right to issue orders. Every

    24 order has to be verified by the Commander. There is the

    25 right to execute a task, that is one right, and the

  35. 1 right to issue orders is another right.

    2 Q. And sometimes, General -- and this is going to tie in,

    3 I think, to the concept of a Tactical Group. Now, a

    4 Tactical Group is something that I have very little

    5 familiarity with. But let me -- I would like to discuss

    6 it a little bit, and as a preface I may draw some

    7 parallels to the organisations that would be used in a

    8 NATO army. As part of your training as an officer, did

    9 you become familiar with the organisations of NATO

    10 armies?

    11 A. Yes, we did study the NATO alliance.

    12 Q. Good, because I now think we can talk on the same sheet

    13 of music, General. As I understand what a Tactical

    14 Group is, it is a unit that is formed either based on an

    15 existing unit, or units are added to it, or just out of

    16 the whole to perform a specific task, is that correct?

    17 A. In general terms, Tactical Groups are temporary military

    18 formations, formed to carry out specific tasks.

    19 Q. So, for instance, in the military that I would be

    20 familiar with, we might form a task force, where there

    21 might be an armoured Battalion that would need an

    22 infantry company to perform a mission, so that infantry

    23 company would be sent to the armoured battalion for this

    24 one mission. Is that generally what we are talking

    25 about?

  36. 1 A. If talking in general terms about Tactical Groups, they

    2 may be of mixed composition, various units, of various

    3 sizes and various purposes. In NATO, one of the largest

    4 groups that was ever formed was in the Middle East in

    5 Kuwait. You had armed forces from all NATO members, an

    6 enormous Tactical Group that was assigned the task of

    7 Kuwait. It was enormous -- you did not call it a

    8 Tactical Group, it was an Operative Strategic Group.

    9 But "Tactical Group" is at the left of tactics where you

    10 have companies, platoons, detachments which are grouped

    11 under a single command to carry out a specific task; in

    12 this case, the defence of the municipality of Konjic,

    13 Jablanica, Prozor, Vakuf from the aggression of the

    14 remnants of the former JNA and the Serbian and

    15 Montenegrin aggressors.

    16 Q. One of the things I am familiar with, and I would like

    17 to know if both the current BiH army, the TO and the

    18 former JNA would operate this way, if I were to send an

    19 unit to another -- to aid another unit, to set up a task

    20 force or Tactical Group, just because that unit is

    21 assigned to a Tactical Group, does not mean -- in and of

    22 itself does not tell you the authority of the Tactical

    23 Group Commander over that individual unit, would it?

    24 Let me give you an example. I will tell you what

    25 I am looking for, General. It might be possible, for

  37. 1 instance, to just give a Commander operational control

    2 of another unit, so that he could say "take that hill"

    3 or "hold that road junction". But that Commander may

    4 not have any other responsibility for that unit. That

    5 Commander who has operational control may not be

    6 responsible for feeding the troops, or for their --

    7 making sure they got their pay. Would that kind of

    8 thing be possible under a Tactical Group?

    9 A. You are using other terms now. You are talking about

    10 subordination and attachment. It all depends on how it

    11 was regulated by the person giving the orders. If he

    12 has given you a unit to watch over a particular facility

    13 then he will tell you what your responsibilities and

    14 competencies are in relation to that group. Do you have

    15 to feed them and supply them, or will somebody else feed

    16 and supply them. We are talking now very generally. If

    17 we are talking about Tactical Group 1 the Commander of

    18 the Tactical Group 1 and whoever appointed him must know

    19 the competencies and the responsibilities he assigned to

    20 the Commander of the Tactical Group.

    21 MR. MORAN: Your Honour, it is 11.30 and I have quite a bit

    22 more to do. This is our traditional time to take a

    23 break. Would it be appropriate to do it now, your

    24 Honour.

    25 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, I think we will break for 30

  38. 1 minutes.

    2 MR. MORAN: Thank you, General, see you in a few minutes.

    3 (11.30 am)

    4 (Short break)

    5 (12.00 pm)

    6 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, just before the witness is

    7 brought in, there are a couple of matters I wish to

    8 raise, if I may. Your Honours, an order was issued by

    9 subpoena for General Ramic to attend. He has arrived

    10 and been here since Tuesday night -- Monday night,

    11 I should say. We do not expect that we will be in a

    12 position to call him today, which would mean either he

    13 has to go back -- and if he stayed I think he would

    14 probably be here for a very long time. So our position

    15 on it now is that we have decided that, with your

    16 Honour's leave, if your Honours are disposed to release

    17 him from the subpoena, we would envisage that he goes

    18 back, and I do not think it will be necessary for us to

    19 call him.

    20 I should say, however, that he has agreed to speak

    21 to the Defence on the same conditions that General

    22 Pasalic agreed to speak to the Defence, namely as long

    23 as a representative of the Office of the Prosecutor was

    24 present. If he goes back and if your Honours are

    25 disposed to release him, the Victims and Witnesses Unit

  39. 1 would like to organise travelling for tomorrow morning.

    2 I raise it at this stage, if the Defence are anxious to

    3 speak to him, then could it possibly be organised for

    4 this afternoon, after court, and he can be made

    5 available then with a representative of the Office of

    6 the Prosecutor. I raise that for the information of

    7 counsel.

    8 That being so, and if your Honours were disposed

    9 to release him from the subpoena, we -- General Divjak

    10 -- we understand that it is not going to create a

    11 difficulty for him to stay over, and there is the

    12 custodian of records. If there is time this afternoon,

    13 we would like to call the custodian of records, because

    14 from the point of view of the evidence-in-chief it is

    15 not anticipated he will be a long witness. He may -- it

    16 may be that he goes over to the next stage, to next

    17 week, but if that is so, I do not think the compass of

    18 his evidence is that broad.

    19 So if I just may mention those matters, your

    20 Honours.

    21 MR. MORAN: Your Honour, I have been informed, I do not know

    22 how good the information is, that we were to meet with

    23 the General today at the lunch break. Is that correct?

    24 That is General Divjak, I am sorry. I was misinformed,

    25 misunderstood what was being said. I am sure we can

  40. 1 arrange to meet General Ramic after court tonight.

    2 MR. NIEMANN: Finally, your Honours, I did undertake to

    3 obtain copies of the e-mail that was sent this morning.

    4 I hand up those three copies.

    5 Finally, your Honours, I have to say that the

    6 information that sought by the Defence by Mr. Ackerman in

    7 relation to Professor Economides is still being sought

    8 and as soon as we obtain it we will make it available.

    9 I hand those to your Honours.

    10 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: If I understand you correctly, you

    11 intend to apply to withdraw the subpoena against General

    12 Ramic?

    13 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honour, yes, on the basis I think the

    14 evidence we have taken so far is sufficiently broad

    15 enough. It does not look as though we can get to him

    16 towards, at the earliest, the end of next week, and

    17 possibly the week after. It is so long down the track

    18 we do not think it is fair to hold him over here for

    19 that period of time. We believe we can proceed without

    20 his evidence, your Honours.

    21 JUDGE JAN: Do we have to call him to say we are withdrawing

    22 the subpoena?

    23 MR. NIEMANN: I can undertake to convey that, or, if you

    24 want, I can call him. It is a matter for your Honours

    25 how you wish me to deal with it. I thought it was

  41. 1 inappropriate for me --

    2 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: If you think it is sufficient, although

    3 I would have thought the proper thing would have been a

    4 proper motion. I think it is sufficient for an oral

    5 application.

    6 MR. NIEMANN: If your Honours would prefer a motion to be

    7 filed, I can undertake to form one.

    8 JUDGE JAN: You can inform him that if you decide to call

    9 him he should be available on those dates.

    10 MR. NIEMANN: If your Honours please.

    11 JUDGE JAN: Issued at the subpoena. Now you are supporting

    12 his request that the subpoena be withdrawn, so ...

    13 MR. NIEMANN: If your Honours please. That is the

    14 submission.

    15 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: You are indicating that we withdraw the

    16 subpoena against him -- has been withdrawn formally.

    17 MR. NIEMANN: We will provide a draft of that, your Honours.

    18 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, if I may, I would like to

    19 ask, first of all, if my learned friend Mr. Niemann could

    20 give us the precise order of the persons that will be

    21 heard as witnesses next week so that we could prepare

    22 ourselves for it.

    23 The second point is that I know that I am not

    24 authorised to discuss the subpoena, whether it should be

    25 annulled or not, but since these past days I am not only

  42. 1 in the media, which my colleague has commented upon, but

    2 also in front of this Trial Chamber we have heard lots

    3 of things related to the subpoena, so if you will allow

    4 me, if I can, as an attorney from Sarajevo, and these

    5 people come from Sarajevo, may I ask you to annul the

    6 subpoena towards those persons regardless of the fact

    7 that some of them have already testified, and the others

    8 will testify. I think that this would be a correct and

    9 very honourable decision of this court.

    10 JUDGE JAN: I am not sure after they have appeared and given

    11 the evidence there is any point in withdrawing the

    12 subpoena. You already asked them and they have said

    13 they were prepared to come voluntarily. So I --

    14 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: For those who have given evidence their

    15 subpoena is spent. There is no need for it. Actually

    16 I do not know how to decide the argument about which of

    17 them is telling the truth; at the time we order the

    18 subpoena we had certain facts which we relied upon;

    19 contrary facts have appeared. So be it. The subpoena

    20 is spent, they have given the evidence. We do not have

    21 to bother about that. It is not any offence against

    22 them that they answered the subpoena. We have not gone

    23 into the issues to know the type of information which

    24 the Prosecution had before these subpoenas were issued,

    25 and I do not think we need bother about that at this

  43. 1 stage. But for those who normally would now give

    2 evidence, if there is sufficient evidence, as Mr. Niemann

    3 has withdrawn this, I suppose he would withdraw the

    4 subpoena with respect to anyone who he believes does not

    5 really require a subpoena to be here. So, I do not see

    6 why you should bother so much about it.

    7 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, I would only like to say a

    8 few words. We have discussed many times about the legal

    9 knowledge, the legal culture, in our areas, and also in

    10 the countries where you have been judges for many years,

    11 and subpoena is considered, is perceived to be some kind

    12 of a punishment towards those people. Maybe some kind

    13 of a statement made by the Trial Chamber, something like

    14 you have just said, maybe or would have the effect of

    15 clearing those people, because they have got some kind

    16 of, like a negative effect, the subpoena that remains on

    17 them. Because all those people consider it will be an

    18 honour to come and testify in front of this Tribunal,

    19 and not how it is perceived now, as some kind of a stain

    20 in the reputation that it is perceived in

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina now.

    22 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much. I think we will

    23 discuss with the Prosecutor and see how it could

    24 ameliorate whatever effect it might have had on those on

    25 who subpoenas are still outstanding.

  44. 1 Yes, Mr. Ackerman?

    2 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honours, Mr. Niemann has presented a

    3 memorandum or an e-mail, or something, to the court just

    4 now. I cannot imagine why. It seems to reopen a matter

    5 that I thought that this court had put to rest, and

    6 I think it is inappropriate for him to have done so; but

    7 in as much as he has done so, I now feel a need to point

    8 out to the court that the e-mail request for six copies

    9 of the requested document was only transmitted

    10 apparently from this courtroom after the issue had been

    11 raised with the Tribunal.

    12 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Mr. Niemann, have you any response to

    13 that?

    14 MR. NIEMANN: I presented it because I said to your Honours

    15 I would. The relevant time is not the one where the six

    16 copies are asked to be brought into court it is the one

    17 beneath it, which shows the time 10.13.

    18 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, I see that.

    19 MR. ACKERMAN: The 10.13 time is absolutely consistent with

    20 what Ms. McMurrey informed me, that he said he would

    21 try to provide the telephone number. The 10.54 time

    22 when the copies are requested is consistent with that

    23 not having been done until it was brought to your

    24 attention that he had refused to discuss that matter

    25 with us.

  45. 1 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: It is all right. I think we hear. Let

    2 us lay it to rest at that point.

    3 MR. ACKERMAN: It was my belief it had been laid to rest

    4 earlier. I did not want to raise it at this issue;

    5 Mr. Niemann raised it again, so I felt I had a need to

    6 respond.

    7 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you. Can we get the witness in?

    8 (Witness enters court)

    9 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Kindly inform the witness that he is

    10 still on his oath.

    11 THE REGISTRAR: Sir, I remind you that you are still under

    12 oath.

    13 MR. MORAN: May it please the court.

    14 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, you may proceed.

    15 MR. MORAN: Thank you very much, your Honour.

    16 General, something I forgot to mention when

    17 I first started asking you questions, I will just do it

    18 now on behalf of myself and the rest of the Defence

    19 lawyers, we would like to express our condolences for

    20 the death of your brother.

    21 Sir, that having been said, let me go back to

    22 where I think we were at the time of the break. I would

    23 like to chat with you a little bit, because frankly, the

    24 situation, the military situation that you were involved

    25 in, is something that happens very, very rarely in

  46. 1 history, which is where a country has to try to form a

    2 country and an army and a military and a defence

    3 structure, while, at the same time, it is conducting

    4 military operations, actual operations. I suspect that

    5 in the period from, say, April 1992, through probably

    6 November, when you formed the Corps, that the military

    7 situation was a very confusing situation; that lines of

    8 command and control were unclear, missions were unclear,

    9 it was -- who was in charge of what was unclear, that it

    10 was probably a pretty confusing situation militarily.

    11 Is that a fair assessment, General?

    12 A. I agree with you.

    13 Q. And, in fact, based on the military situation, you had

    14 to probably put people in positions of authority and

    15 responsibility who lacked experience and training to

    16 normally be in those positions. Would that be a fair

    17 assessment?

    18 A. Yes, it would.

    19 Q. And that the relationship between the civilian

    20 authorities and the municipalities and the military

    21 authorities in the same area would probably also have

    22 been quite confused during that period of time, would it

    23 not?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. So, basically, what you were doing was trying to form a

  47. 1 defence structure while you were actually defending your

    2 country?

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Let me jump back, for just a second, sir, to the

    5 Tactical Groups. I was thinking about it over the break

    6 and there were a couple of things I was a little

    7 confused about; if I am confused, I suspect I am not the

    8 only person in the courtroom that is. Again, as

    9 I understand a Tactical Group, it is a temporary

    10 headquarters that is set up to carry out a particular

    11 mission. It is to do one thing?

    12 A. I have said that the general term "Tactical Group", we

    13 understand to be a temporary formation of certain units

    14 at the left of tactical units which are platoons,

    15 companies and battalions, in order for them to perform

    16 specific tasks.

    17 Q. When you say "task", I am saying "mission". I think we

    18 are saying the same thing, are we not, to do one thing?

    19 General, if you would look, there is a lady in

    20 front of you; that is a court reporter, and there is

    21 another lady over there; that is a court reporter. She

    22 has to write down everything we say. She cannot write

    23 down a nod, so I am afraid, sir, you have to say "yes"

    24 or "no"?

    25 A. Yes, I understand that.

  48. 1 Q. So the record is clear, the answer to the last question

    2 -- you nodded in the affirmative, a yes, is that

    3 correct, General?

    4 A. Yes, it is.

    5 Q. Thank you very much.

    6 So, for instance, if a Tactical Group had the

    7 mission of breaking the siege of Sarajevo, that would be

    8 all that that Commander would be worried about. He

    9 would not be worried about, you know, commanding

    10 logistical units in Mostar, is that fair?

    11 A. Not necessarily. It depends in what sense he was

    12 appointed Commander. If the commander of a Tactical

    13 Group was appointed to break the siege of Sarajevo, then

    14 one should state clearly who is to supply him, who has

    15 to co-ordinate, who acts in operations with him, and so

    16 on. That means that the duties of the Commander of the

    17 Tactical Group have to be spelled out. The term

    18 "breaking the siege", is a sentence that in fact

    19 encompasses a series of actions, and procedures. Is the

    20 breaking of the siege going to last one day, 10 days, 20

    21 days? So time has to be spelled out. How long the

    22 mission will last, in what way they are going to perform

    23 that mission, and what are they going to do after the

    24 mission has been completed.

    25 Q. So without looking at the order, and without knowing

  49. 1 exactly what the mission and the parameters of that

    2 Tactical Group were, you, as a general officer, would

    3 not have, would not have the knowledge to say who was in

    4 charge of supplying these troops or who was in charge of

    5 making sure they got paid, or got their mail, or

    6 whatever. Is that correct?

    7 A. Could you please repeat that question?

    8 Q. Sure I can. I would be happy to. As an outsider,

    9 someone who is not directly involved with either the

    10 Tactical Group or the higher headquarters which created

    11 the Tactical Group, even as an experienced general

    12 officer, without knowing the exact orders that were

    13 given, creating the Tactical Group, setting up its

    14 mission, defining which units are in it, defining which

    15 tasks every one has. You, as an experienced officer,

    16 would not know what that Commander's responsibilities

    17 were, would you?

    18 A. If I issue the orders, I would have to know that; and if

    19 somebody else was issuing these orders to him, in that

    20 case, I do not necessarily need to know that. So the

    21 one who establishes the Tactical Group knows which

    22 orders and tasks were issued to the Commander of the

    23 Tactical Group and to the whole Tactical Group. I do

    24 not know whether you are satisfied with my answer.

    25 Q. Basically I am saying that someone that is not the

  50. 1 Commander establishing the Tactical Group or the

    2 Commander of the Tactical Group itself, someone who is

    3 outside of that chain of command, would not necessarily

    4 know the parameters of the authority given to the

    5 Tactical Group Commander, would he? Because they can be

    6 different for each Tactical Group?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. General, I am going to, with your permission, slip to

    9 another subject. I am going to refer to it, as I am

    10 frankly trained to refer to it, as military justice.

    11 When I refer to military justice, I am referring to the

    12 ways that the military imposes punishment on people for

    13 various crimes, associated with or committed while in

    14 the military. Anything from desertion and absence

    15 without leave to murder.

    16 Okay. General --

    17 A. I understand.

    18 Q. In the military that I am familiar with, and frankly

    19 they are the western militaries, there are some wide

    20 differences in how different armies handle military

    21 justice. For instance, the German army has a very

    22 narrow scope of its military justice, while the American

    23 army has a very broad scope. One thing that is

    24 generally consistent that I have seen is that military

    25 justice and the authority to do those kinds of things

  51. 1 rests with Commanders and no one else. Is that the same

    2 way in the Bosnian army and the former JNA?

    3 A. Yes, it is.

    4 Q. And one other thing that is very common in the western

    5 armies, and I am curious whether it was that way in the

    6 former JNA and the TO and the current army of

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that different levels of Commander

    8 would have different responsibilities and different

    9 amounts of authority to discipline troops. That would

    10 be the same; for instance, a Company Commander would not

    11 have the same authority to discipline the troops and

    12 apply military justice as, say, a Division Commander.

    13 Is that fair?

    14 A. Yes, I agree.

    15 Q. And another thing that is very, very common, specially

    16 in the American army, and I guess I can do it best by

    17 example, I think all armies have a thing that they would

    18 call "Company punishment", where some minor infraction

    19 of the rules -- a Company Commander would deal with a

    20 minor punishment. In the British army I believe they

    21 call it "Company punishment". In the American navy it

    22 is called "Captain's mast"; in the American army it we

    23 call it Article 15, because it is from Article 15 of our

    24 Uniform Code of Military Practice.

    25 For example, a military Commander under the law

  52. 1 has the authority to take away half a month's pay for

    2 two months from a person. He can fine that, he can give

    3 him so much extra duty. I am sure that kind of thing

    4 exists in the Yugoslav army and the former JNA army and

    5 the Bosnian army as it is set up today?

    6 A. In the former JNA, there was the competence, the

    7 authority one had in issuing a military justice. The

    8 Commander of a platoon would undertake disciplinary

    9 measures for the breaches of discipline of his

    10 soldiers. The same was true for the Commander of a

    11 Company or a Battalion or of a Regiment. But if a

    12 soldier makes a criminal offence, something that needs

    13 criminal proceedings, then lower ranking officers cannot

    14 deal with it. In that case, the courts have to deal

    15 with it, of higher instance. I agree that all the

    16 officers, the Commanders and the leaders had specified

    17 duties which they had to do or measures they had to

    18 undertake in case of breaches of discipline.

    19 Q. One of the things that I have seen, again, and mainly in

    20 western militaries, I want to know if you have this in

    21 either the BiH or the TO or in the former JNA, is that

    22 in some cases a higher Commander has the -- in fact, in

    23 all cases, a higher Commander has the right to hold to

    24 himself authority that would normally be given to a

    25 lower ranking officer.

  53. 1 Again, let me give you an example. We were

    2 talking about Article 15s, Company punishment.

    3 Uniformly in my army, the post Commander, who was

    4 probably -- who was a general officer in almost all

    5 cases, withholds from his subordinates the right to give

    6 Company punishment to commissioned officers, Lieutenants

    7 and Captains and higher ranking officers.

    8 We are not going into specifics; did that kind of

    9 thing occur in the former JNA also, and the TO and the

    10 BiH army? Again, for instance, you as a Brigade

    11 Commander could say, "I will be the only person who is

    12 authorised to punish people, no one else can"?

    13 A. If that was prescribed in your duties, then you have

    14 that right. But if it is not prescribed in that way,

    15 you will be usurping those rights. For each level of

    16 Commander, it is clearly defined what their competencies

    17 are, so you cannot assume any responsibilities which are

    18 not prescribed. I am saying this based on the

    19 experience of the former army. In the TO, these

    20 regulations were not fully established, and I could not

    21 punish my subordinates unless I had the authority to do

    22 that.

    23 MR. MORAN: So again this --

    24 JUDGE JAN: Mr. Moran, you are talking about these

    25 punishments in peacetime. I think the level of

  54. 1 punishment changes when the army is engaged in defending

    2 or -- during hostilities.

    3 MR. MORAN: I can tell you how both would work. The two I am

    4 familiar with is the Bundeswehr, the German army, and my

    5 army. In the Bundeswehr there are a lot of changes when

    6 hostilities break out; in the American army there are

    7 very few changes. It remains pretty much the same.

    8 I think the one difference is, off the top of my head --

    9 some of the maximum punishments go up. Espionage in

    10 time of war is different from spying during peacetime.

    11 But for the power of the Commander, as I recall the only

    12 additional power that an American Commander would have

    13 in wartime is that he can put a soldier in irons and

    14 feed him bread and water for seven days. Does that

    15 answer your question, your Honour?

    16 JUDGE JAN: That does.

    17 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I am not sure that the witness quite

    18 grasped your question. If I understand you, are you

    19 suggesting that a higher Commander can stop other

    20 officers under him exercising their powers of

    21 punishment?

    22 MR. MORAN: That is -- your Honours, I was trained to say

    23 exactly the thing you are in a different way.

    24 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: That is what perhaps you wanted.

    25 Whether that practice exists in his own army, is that

  55. 1 not what I ...

    2 MR. MORAN: I think that is absolutely correct, your Honour.

    3 I think Judge Karibi-Whyte probably phrased the

    4 question a bit better than I did; as a higher Commander,

    5 can you tell your Company Commanders, "I am going to

    6 punish people; if you want someone punished, I have to

    7 do it"?

    8 A. I could do that, but I would have to tell my subordinate

    9 officer that, that I would be the one to punish and that

    10 that is within my terms of reference and I would have to

    11 report my superior that it was I who had punished the

    12 offender.

    13 Q. And had the authority to do it. The big thing I was

    14 getting at --

    15 A. If that authority is prescribed. If my superior gave me

    16 permission to do that.

    17 Q. That is fine. So your superior, as a Brigade Commander,

    18 was a Corps Commander. Your superior was the general

    19 staff in Sarajevo, the Supreme Headquarters?

    20 A. Yes. Yes.

    21 Q. And the Supreme Headquarters in Sarajevo could give to

    22 you the power -- they could -- all the power you had,

    23 all the authority you had, in all forms of command, from

    24 manoeuvre to training your troops, to military justice,

    25 came from the Supreme Headquarters in Sarajevo?

  56. 1 A. It was the staff of the army, or the Supreme Command, as

    2 it was later called, headed by the Chief of Staff. They

    3 would, by written and oral orders, regulate my

    4 competencies. If I wanted to take any disciplinary

    5 measures, or institute criminal proceedings, then

    6 I would have to inform those responsible of the same, or

    7 ask for permission. I did not have to ask permission

    8 for a minor infraction, but if it was a major offence

    9 I would have to ask for an explanation from my superior

    10 as to what I should do and what the procedure should be

    11 that I should follow.

    12 Q. So in all areas of command, you were regulated -- you

    13 had no more authority than what the Supreme Command gave

    14 you?

    15 A. I have to repeat that the rules of conduct were not

    16 regulated and published before 1993 for the armed forces

    17 of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and these prescribed the general

    18 principles and rules of conduct. In those rules, issued

    19 in 1993, the general responsibilities of Commanders,

    20 leaders and officers were specified. Until then, we did

    21 not have such a document, but the Supreme Command would

    22 occasionally, through written orders and oral

    23 instructions, indicate how we should behave in certain

    24 situations, just as they gave us assignments. So they

    25 instructed us how to treat military equipment, captured

  57. 1 equipment, how to treat captured persons, deserters, how

    2 to behave in various conditions that we found ourselves

    3 in, in that period.

    4 Q. And so, without knowing, either from you directly or

    5 from your Commander, what orders were given to you,

    6 I would not know what authority you had as a Brigade

    7 Commander. Is that fair? Again, this is in the period

    8 of confusion in 1992, that time.

    9 A. Yes.

    10 Q. General, one last area, if the usher could be good

    11 enough to show the General Prosecution Exhibit 137.

    12 I believe that is an order detaining certain

    13 individuals. General, I do not want to talk about this

    14 in detail, I am just using this as an example, okay.

    15 I will be right upfront with you why it is that I am

    16 asking. My client and three of the other -- three of

    17 the four defendants are charged with illegally detaining

    18 people. I want to ask you a series of fairly short,

    19 fairly specific questions about the authority of people

    20 in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, and some of it is going

    21 to have to do with the law. I know you are not a

    22 lawyer, but -- if you do not feel competent to answer,

    23 that is fine.

    24 In Prosecution Exhibit 137, you signed an order

    25 detaining 13 people for 30 days, so that an

  58. 1 investigation could be carried out. Was that a legal

    2 order under the law in effect in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    3 from, say, April 1992 through the time you issued this

    4 order?

    5 A. This document is the report that I sent to the Supreme

    6 Command of the army of the Republic of

    7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is not an order. In this

    8 report, I inform my superior that I have decided to

    9 detain a certain number of people for up to 30 days.

    10 Those were my legal powers at that time, as a Corps

    11 Commander.

    12 Q. So, General, it was within the authority of the -- I was

    13 about to say in the authority of the authorities; that

    14 is a horrible sentence. But it was within the power of

    15 people in authority to detain persons suspected of

    16 crimes while the crime was being investigated?

    17 A. As the Commander of a Corps, I was entitled to detain,

    18 from one to 30 days, persons, in order to investigate

    19 matters, because those people could have abandoned the

    20 territory, they could have deserted, something could

    21 have happened to them and the like. I was within my

    22 rights as Corps Commander.

    23 Q. Sure. I agree that I think in almost every legal system

    24 in the world where there is evidence to believe that a

    25 person has committed a crime, the competent authority

  59. 1 can order them detained for some period while it is

    2 investigated. And when these people, these 13 people,

    3 were arrested, they were delivered to a confinement

    4 facility of some kind. I will give you an example; my

    5 client was actually imprisoned in the Celebici camp,

    6 pursuant to your order. You would expect the people

    7 that were running the confinement facility to hold those

    8 people in custody until such time as you ordered them

    9 released, would you not?

    10 A. It says here "up to 30 days". The commission conducting

    11 the investigation could have released any one of these

    12 persons when they assessed that the investigating

    13 procedure has been completed. All of them were not

    14 detained for 30 days; some three, five, 15, I cannot say

    15 now.

    16 Q. What I am getting at is the commission that was set up

    17 to investigate had the authority to order these people

    18 released, but you would expect the people in charge of

    19 the jail, prison, whatever other confinement facility,

    20 to hold them in custody either until the end of the 30

    21 days or until the commission ordered them released,

    22 would you not?

    23 A. The commission proposed for how long people would be

    24 held in custody, and as these were professionals,

    25 lawyers, in the commission. They would propose to me

  60. 1 whether the proceedings would be started against

    2 somebody and when, continued legal proceedings.

    3 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Mr. Moran, I am not sure whether

    4 I understand what you are putting. I remember you

    5 started with questioning whether he had the powers to do

    6 what he did; is that what you are still putting?

    7 MR. MORAN: Yes, your Honour. Now where I am going is

    8 whether the people who were actually confining these

    9 people had the duty to do that or whether or not they

    10 had some responsibility to go behind his order and to

    11 determine whether or not the General's order was a legal

    12 order, a wise order, or whether they are just to follow

    13 the orders of the General and the commission.

    14 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Why not put that straight to him?

    15 MR. MORAN: General, do you understand what I was asking?

    16 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: That is whether the persons who were

    17 complying with his orders can use their discretion to

    18 disobey. That is what you are saying?

    19 MR. MORAN: Yes. Would you expect them, presuming it was a

    20 lawful order, as you say it was, would the people

    21 actually confining these prisoners have the discretion

    22 to disobey your orders?

    23 A. I am afraid I have not fully understood. He cannot have

    24 the discretion not to obey orders. I was the one who

    25 formed the commission and who assigned its tasks, so

  61. 1 I am also the one who controls the commission. If they

    2 do not follow my orders I will find a substitute, I will

    3 have somebody dismissed from the commission. And

    4 I determined this detention on the basis of the decision

    5 of the Supreme Command. This is a report. I reported

    6 to the Supreme Command. The Supreme Command confirmed

    7 it.

    8 Q. I agree with you that that is the way it should work.

    9 One last question, I think, and then I am done. The

    10 commission that you set up, you said was run by

    11 professionals who knew what they were doing and were

    12 investigating -- had a pretty broad scope of

    13 investigation, did they not? Their competence, the

    14 mission that you gave your commission, was to

    15 investigate everything that happened in the Celebici

    16 camp, right?

    17 A. My commission consisted of my assistant for legal

    18 affairs, and the other assistants who were professional

    19 to a degree, and, taking into account what you also

    20 said, they were not always absolutely qualified, but we

    21 had what we had. Because I confirmed that point that

    22 you made before. The task of this commission was not to

    23 fully investigate everything that had happened in

    24 Celebici. Its task was to elucidate what Celebici was,

    25 and then it is the next stage of the criminal

  62. 1 proceedings, which is up to the judiciary to carry it

    2 further.

    3 Q. And your commission, while it was investigating what

    4 Celebici was and the disappearance of some people, did a

    5 good job, did they not?

    6 A. It did the job it did. If it was not a good job, one

    7 might talk about it. But I think that it accomplished

    8 its task to the extent to which they could in view of

    9 the conditions under which they were operating.

    10 MR. MORAN: General, I thank you very much and I hope you

    11 have a good trip back to Sarajevo.

    12 Your Honour, I pass the witness.

    13 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much. Any other

    14 cross-examination?

    15 Cross-examination by MR. OLUJIC

    16 MR. OLUJIC: Yes, your Honours, may it please the court. May

    17 I proceed?

    18 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, you may.

    19 MR. OLUJIC: Thank you. Good afternoon, General.

    20 A. Good afternoon.

    21 Q. My name is Zeljko Olujic. I am Defence counsel for

    22 Mr. Zdravko Mucic. Before I put a number of questions to

    23 you which are important for the Defence of my client, as

    24 opposed to my previous learned friends, Mr. Moran,

    25 I would like to ask you to answer my questions a little

  63. 1 more slowly, or rather to wait for my question to be

    2 interpreted into one of the official languages of this

    3 court, and those are English and French, and to only

    4 then proceed to answer my question, so that all the

    5 parties in the proceedings and also for the benefit of

    6 the record, we are able to follow the questions and

    7 answers properly. Have you understood me?

    8 A. I have.

    9 Q. Thank you. General, allow me to put a number of

    10 questions which you will find easy to answer, but which

    11 certainly need to be put in order to elucidate certain

    12 points. In the course of the examination-in-chief, by

    13 my learned friend Mr. Niemann, you said that you were a

    14 career officer, as the saying goes. In other words, you

    15 went through all the different levels of training in the

    16 former JNA in order to, in a more mature period of your

    17 life, to enrol at the military academy, which you

    18 graduated from successfully, and began to serve. Is

    19 that correct?

    20 A. I do not remember describing myself as a "career

    21 officer". I called myself a professional officer.

    22 I think that was the term I used, that my profession was

    23 an officer.

    24 Q. I am satisfied with your answer, yes, a professional

    25 officer.

  64. 1 Will you please tell me whether you are familiar

    2 with the situation in Konjic in the spring of 1992?

    3 A. I know that it was difficult and complicated, rather

    4 like it was in Mostar.

    5 Q. Tell me, General, according to the constitution of the

    6 former state, the SFRY, did anyone have the right to

    7 sign capitulation?

    8 A. No.

    9 Q. As a professional officer, do you know that the death

    10 penalty threatened anyone who might dare to do that?

    11 A. You mean according to the constitution?

    12 Q. Yes.

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. In the teaching of political education, were troops

    15 taught that no one may sign the capitulation in the JNA,

    16 and other things like that?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. General, was this studied at the military academy as

    19 well?

    20 A. Yes.

    21 Q. Were there also interpretations given at the military

    22 academy between the Yugoslav laws and the international

    23 conventions signed by Yugoslavia, or rather did you

    24 study the fact that Yugoslav laws have greater

    25 importance than the international conventions to which

  65. 1 Yugoslav was a signatory? In other words, that the

    2 Yugoslav laws were applicable to every one in

    3 Yugoslavia?

    4 A. In military institutions, both in the secondary school

    5 and in the military academy and other military schools

    6 of the former JNA, we studied the constitution and the

    7 laws that were in effect in Yugoslavia at the time. We

    8 studied those laws, and approached them as positive

    9 laws. Those were laws of our country, at that time. We

    10 also studied the provisions and charters and conventions

    11 applicable to international law in wartime and the

    12 like. I did not make any conclusions which would mean

    13 that the Yugoslav laws at the time were in conflict with

    14 international laws. If I did identify any

    15 contradictions, I was not in a position to be able to

    16 correct them.

    17 Q. Of course. But would you allow for the possibility that

    18 that may have existed, that you could have identified

    19 such cases?

    20 A. To the extent that any other officer or citizen may have

    21 been able to do that.

    22 Q. Thank you. Tell me, General, you spent many years in

    23 the JNA. As a Muslim, did you frequently feel that you

    24 were in an unequal position in the JNA as a Muslim, and

    25 did you have occasion to hear terrible things about

  66. 1 Muslims, jokes at their expense, and things like that?

    2 A. When I joined the Yugoslav People's Army, I noticed that

    3 we were not treated on an equal footing. At first,

    4 I reviewed my own opinions and positions. I tried to

    5 understand what the differences were and why they

    6 existed. True, there were differences. I personally

    7 attributed them to personal qualities of individuals,

    8 and not to policies or the system, at least at the

    9 time. I did not feel I was in any kind of threat as a

    10 Muslim, up to somewhere around 1970. From 1968/70

    11 onwards, those relationships were crystallised in the

    12 sense of increasingly pronounced contradictions, based

    13 on ethnic origin.

    14 This was particularly pronounced after the

    15 adoption of the constitution in Bosnia-Herzegovina in

    16 1974. It is true that at the time the command pyramid

    17 began to be ethnically cleansed, unfortunately to the

    18 benefit of people of Serbian ethnicity. I had all the

    19 qualities to become Commander of the airport and the

    20 airforce base. I had the highest marks in the previous

    21 five periods of assessment, that is a period of 20

    22 years, but I was told that they were not counting on me

    23 in the command structure, because I was a

    24 fundamentalist, because I expressed my congratulations

    25 to my mother on the occasion of Bajram; unfortunately,

  67. 1 that is the truth.

    2 MR. OLUJIC: Thank you, General.

    3 Your Honours, in view of the fact that it is 1

    4 o'clock, would this be a convenient time to break and

    5 resume after the break?

    6 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Thank you very much. I think we will

    7 do that. We will break and reassemble at 2.30.

    8 (1.00 pm)

    9 (Luncheon adjournment)

















  68. 1 (2.30 pm)

    2 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: You may remind the witness that he is

    3 still on oath.

    4 THE REGISTRAR: I remind you, sir, that you are still under

    5 oath.

    6 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, you may proceed, Mr. Olujic.

    7 MR. OLUJIC: If your Honour pleases.

    8 General, before the break we started, I have

    9 started with a series of questions and you have said and

    10 described, on your own example, how you were unequal in

    11 the JNA, and also that being a Muslim you were very

    12 often in a position to hear all the worst about

    13 Muslims. On the contrary, again in the period after

    14 1970 were there, on the other side, so to speak, amongst

    15 Serb officers, boasting with Serb courage and military

    16 valour?

    17 A. In the context with the officers I worked with, those

    18 were the officers from various ethnic groups. Among

    19 them were quite a few, maybe the majority of them were

    20 Serbs. It is true those officers always had a certain

    21 amount of boasting, starting from Kosovo and onwards,

    22 throughout the history, about the military tradition,

    23 about the Serb ethnicity and saying how good soldiers

    24 they were, how they were one of the major actors in the

    25 fighting against fascism. But I did not consider that

  69. 1 to be such a direct attack towards the others, although

    2 it was evidence, and it is true that they have made such

    3 statements.

    4 Q. When one is in the army there is also some kinds of

    5 socialising. I would like to ask you whether there were

    6 unpleasant, humiliating jokes about Muslims, whereas

    7 jokes about Serbs were not allowed to be told; that is,

    8 when those jokes were told one could be even prosecuted

    9 and disciplined, because that is -- is my allegation

    10 true?

    11 A. I could not give you a typical example of anybody being

    12 punished because of a joke based on ethnicity, but we

    13 were very cautious in telling any political jokes. It

    14 is true that there were very well known jokes about

    15 Muslims, two Muslims, Mujo and Suljo. I myself laughed

    16 about the jokes about my own people, but, however, it is

    17 true that there were mostly jokes about, more about

    18 other ethnic groups than about the Serbs.

    19 Q. Tell me, General, who were the officials in Konjic

    20 before the war? Do you know who was the President of

    21 the municipality?

    22 A. I do not know who was the mayor of Konjic before the

    23 war. I do not know his name.

    24 Q. Were you aware of the situation in Konjic and the

    25 structure of power, who took part in the power in

  70. 1 Konjic, before the fall of communism?

    2 A. I was not aware of that structure in Konjic. I was

    3 aware of that structure in Mostar where I live and

    4 worked.

    5 Q. What was the situation there? Who was the President of

    6 the municipality?

    7 A. While I was in Mostar the President of the

    8 municipalities were Serbs, there were Muslims, there

    9 were also Croats. These were all positions where people

    10 would change. Somebody was the President of one body

    11 and then of the other and so on.

    12 Q. Were the Serbs predominant by number?

    13 A. I could not tell you exactly. I cannot give you the

    14 figures, but people always used to say that the Serbs

    15 had more power because they were also more numerous.

    16 Q. Tell me, General, how about the companies? Were they

    17 also subject of the All People's Defence and Social

    18 Protection?

    19 A. According to the constitution of the former Socialist

    20 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by the constitution of

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina and also the law in People's Defence,

    22 there were companies that were declared to be of utmost

    23 importance for the People's Defence, so that some

    24 companies also in Herzegovina, in the Neretva River

    25 valley were of utmost importance for People's Defence.

  71. 1 Q. So they were also by that fact the subjects of this All

    2 People's Defence and Social Protection, as it was

    3 called?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. Did these companies also buy arms and organise exercises

    6 just as it was done by some political structures? Here

    7 I mean the companies of the very -- of utmost importance

    8 from that point of view that were in the Neretva River

    9 valley?

    10 A. Those companies that were of utmost or special

    11 importance for the All People's Defence had to be able

    12 to organise the defence of their own facilities,

    13 according to the law on All People's Defence. For

    14 example, the aluminium factory in Mostar, which was very

    15 important, had its own unit both for the defence of the

    16 facilities -- that means the defending of the territory

    17 -- and they also had a unit for anti-aircraft unit.

    18 Other companies in the Neretva River valleys had also

    19 the same type of organisation.

    20 One of them was very important, the factory Igman,

    21 which manufactured ammunition. It also needed its own

    22 units for defence in case of aggression.

    23 Q. In the former state which had been called the Socialist

    24 Republic of Yugoslavia did there exist a cult of

    25 partisans?

  72. 1 A. I do not know what you mean by the "cult of partisans".

    2 Q. What I mean is whatever the word partisan would mean;

    3 very shrewd, very quick in fighting, in the partisan

    4 type of fighting, and specially linked to the Second

    5 World War and the organisation led by the Communist

    6 Party that existed between 1941 and 1945. Did that cult

    7 exist in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and also

    8 in the JNA, being its army?

    9 A. In the former JNA we studied the experiences from the

    10 Second World War, that is the period from 1941 to 1945.

    11 While we studied it, we studied in our textbooks what a

    12 special way of fighting and carrying out war operations,

    13 which was the partisan way of fighting. It is true that

    14 way of conducting military operations could be found in

    15 other types of literature in the former Yugoslavia; and

    16 that partisan type of warfare was our primary type of

    17 warfare and maybe through that the partisan warfare did

    18 have a certain cult.

    19 Q. Was determination to liquidate and to exterminate the

    20 enemy something that was praised, because that is one of

    21 the characteristics of the partisan type of warfare?

    22 A. The then concept of the All People's Defence as a party

    23 of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia was

    24 adopted because it was considered that such a way of

    25 defending the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

  73. 1 would be efficient against any type of aggressor.

    2 Q. Was the influence or the impact of intelligence very

    3 important in the former SFRY?

    4 A. I could not speak about intelligence services and their

    5 impact on the SFRY as a state, but I know that within

    6 the military our intelligence and our security services

    7 had very prominent place. That was in the former JNA.

    8 Q. Was the system of monitoring and alerting very

    9 developed?

    10 A. I do not think whether you think -- what you think here

    11 --

    12 Q. Reconnaissance, or specially air reconnaissance, both on

    13 land and sea and in the air?

    14 A. Yes, that was something that had prominent place and it

    15 was developed in the army and through the All People's

    16 Defence.

    17 Q. Tell me, in the SFRY and in the JNA, was the Communist

    18 Party the dominant force?

    19 A. When I was in the JNA there was the League of

    20 Communists. The League of Communists as a political

    21 party in power was in -- was the only party that led all

    22 the activities, personnel, selection and all other

    23 activities in the JNA; specially in the most recent

    24 period, it was specially important for the warfare and

    25 the command system.

  74. 1 Q. Tell me whether, according to the number of its members,

    2 were there mostly Serbs and Montenegrins?

    3 A. You mean the command structure? The officer at the top

    4 of the hierarchy, and also in the units where I worked,

    5 Serbs were the officers that were there in highest

    6 numbers.

    7 Q. Was this majority of Serbs in Konjic in the -- power

    8 structure in Konjic only relative or absolute?

    9 A. I said that I do not know anything about the structure

    10 of authority in Konjic before the war, so I cannot

    11 answer this question.

    12 Q. General, can we agree that the conflict between the

    13 Croats and Muslims took place after the period we speak

    14 about here at this trial?

    15 A. I do not agree with the term "the conflict between the

    16 Muslims and the Croats". And I am a man who can state

    17 that the extremist section of the HVO performed an

    18 aggression against the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    19 Unfortunately this transformed itself into conflict

    20 between two nations. I have warned against this between

    21 the 18th and 20th July when I was with Imre Agotic, who

    22 is today a General of the Croatian army and who I knew

    23 very well from the former JNA.

    24 My duty is to tell you, if you will allow me, your

    25 Honours, that at that time I had said that on the

  75. 1 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, "the very existence of

    2 the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being denied"; that

    3 the Muslim -- the existence of Muslims as people is

    4 denied, and that one is stating that these are Croats of

    5 Muslim religion. Also the existence of the Territorial

    6 Defence is denied, stating that it is associated with

    7 the communist system of All People's Defence. What

    8 I said at that time is unless something is done

    9 conflicts will appear between the individuals from the

    10 HVO and the Territorial Defence, that is the army, and

    11 that from a conflict between individuals we will have

    12 afterwards a conflict between two nations, nationalities

    13 and that is unfortunately what happened.

    14 On 18th July, I signed the record, the minutes of

    15 what I said, and after my discussion, and I left it with

    16 General Agotic and General Tusk, who was also the head

    17 of staff in Croatia, and President Izetbegovic was

    18 informed about that, but unfortunately nothing was done

    19 about it.

    20 Q. Let us go back to the situation. Could one say,

    21 General, that after all these events that the Serbs have

    22 restructured themselves and united in the Serb

    23 Democratic Party which was operational at that time both

    24 in the area of Konjic, although you cannot directly

    25 answer to my question, but can that be said for those

  76. 1 areas you were familiar with, so that they restructured

    2 and then linked up with the SDS?

    3 A. Before the start of the immediate aggression I was in

    4 Sarajevo. My family lived in Mostar, my wife and my

    5 daughter, and my son was a student in Sarajevo. So

    6 I know both the situation in Sarajevo and in Mostar.

    7 The truth is that in these political differences that

    8 appeared that various people started to structure into

    9 their own ethnic political parties, specially the Serbs,

    10 which joined the Serb Democratic Party.

    11 Q. Can one say that they were angry because they lost power

    12 and that the -- that is how this homogeneous situation

    13 you are talking of was brought about?

    14 A. In the conflict, in the discussions which I had with my

    15 colleagues in the JNA at that time and when I said to my

    16 colleagues and mates in the army that I could not stay

    17 in that army any more and I was going to leave it, they

    18 told me that we will be the culprits in case Yugoslavia

    19 would fall apart. They were obviously angry because

    20 higher ranking officials of other nationalities were

    21 leaving the army, because at that time that army had

    22 lost the features I liked and I believed in, in a

    23 certain way.

    24 Q. General, you are a professional officer, as you say, and

    25 you were able to observe, and can one say, that on the

  77. 1 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina where Serbs, Croats and

    2 Muslims lived, that the Serbs were those who were armed

    3 in the moment of aggression. Can you agree with that

    4 statement?

    5 A. Yes, I can agree with it in a certain way.

    6 Q. Has the JNA distributed the weapons to them?

    7 A. Yes, it had. I even know officers who were distributing

    8 weapons in Sarajevo to Serbs, in Rajlovac and other

    9 villages.

    10 Q. Has JNA distributed to Muslims and Croats as well?

    11 A. I was not aware of such cases.

    12 Q. Do you agree with the statement that already in the

    13 spring of 1992 that reserves from Serbia arrived to

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    15 A. I do know, because I came across the reservists in

    16 Mostar over the weekend when I was going home for

    17 weekends. There were reservists from Serbia and

    18 Montenegro and the last time when I arrived to Mostar in

    19 a helicopter I saw people with a -- the cockade, with

    20 long hair, with fur hats and these cockades which

    21 simply, to me, was saying that these were formations

    22 that had great Serb aspirations.

    23 Q. So apart from the reservists from Serbia that you could

    24 see in the spring of 1992, you also saw some Chetniks,

    25 if I understood you well?

  78. 1 A. Yes, there were special formations within the

    2 reservists.

    3 Q. And how about the White Eagles, have you seen them, or

    4 heard of them being there?

    5 A. I heard about the White Eagles, but I never came across

    6 them.

    7 Q. And Captain Dragan?

    8 A. I heard of him, from the media.

    9 Q. But he was passing through Bosnia, was he not?

    10 A. Yes, a part of Bosnia, the western part of Bosnia, the

    11 Krana region.

    12 Q. General, the Serbian reservists that you saw in the

    13 surroundings of Mostar in the spring of 1992, do you

    14 know whether they had -- that they were implementing the

    15 doctrine of All People's Defence and Social Self

    16 Protection, a doctrine developed in the former state?

    17 A. I am not aware what their doctrine was. I did not talk

    18 to them. Their behaviour was under the guise of

    19 territorial units, units intended to defend the people;

    20 but in practice it turned out to be something quite

    21 different.

    22 Q. Did you know that they too subscribed to the principle

    23 that no one was allowed to sign capitulation?

    24 A. I do not know; probably.

    25 Q. Do you know, General, that the Serbs could be executed?

  79. 1 If they were to co-operate with the authorities in

    2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, they were threatened by the death

    3 penalty?

    4 A. I am not aware of the type of punishment, but I know

    5 that they were not allowed to co-operate.

    6 Q. General, do you know that the Republika Srpska adopted

    7 the laws of the SFRY in the area of defence?

    8 A. I know that they accepted everything from the former

    9 JNA, except the insignia, also the law on All People's

    10 Defence, yes.

    11 Q. Do you know that Republika Srpska claimed that the

    12 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the aggressor against

    13 Republika Srpska within the state?

    14 A. I heard via the media that they were claiming that

    15 Muslim units were attacking, but I think this was a pure

    16 propaganda ploy.

    17 Q. Tell me, General, in the spring of 1992, you described

    18 the situation as it was in terms of armament and

    19 equipment. Would it be fair to say that in the spring

    20 of 1992 there was not really time to arm the armies,

    21 because there were no weapons?

    22 A. Yes, one could say that.

    23 Q. In that period I am talking about, the first half of

    24 1992, were unified uniforms prescribed for the troops?

    25 The ranks did not come before the end of 1993 and the

  80. 1 beginning of 1994, as you have told us?

    2 A. We did not have any prescribed uniforms. We wore what

    3 we had. We did not have ranks either in 1992. It was

    4 only at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 that

    5 we began to give ranks to officers and non-commissioned

    6 officers.

    7 Q. Can it be said, General, that it was the people who

    8 carried most of the defence on their shoulders?

    9 A. Yes, it could be said. They had no other force except

    10 their own.

    11 Q. Were there many spies?

    12 A. Probably there were.

    13 Q. General, when were the uniforms of the army of Bosnian

    14 Herzegovina actually prescribed? Do you have a date, or

    15 a period when this was determined?

    16 A. When the rules of conduct were published we defined the

    17 uniform as a camouflage uniform, but we only defined it

    18 in legislative terms, but we did not have the resources

    19 to supply all units with those uniforms until somewhere

    20 around 1995.

    21 MR. OLUJIC: General, in the course of your

    22 examination-in-chief you described how you acquired

    23 weapons, and that you found various ways and means to do

    24 that. In 1992 when the aggression started, did the

    25 international community assist you in arming you, or

  81. 1 were you left to your own resources?

    2 A. You are all familiar with the position taken by the

    3 international community, I think it is not up to me to

    4 answer that. As the Commander of a Battalion, later a

    5 Brigade and a Corps, I knew of the embargo and that the

    6 state cannot procure weapons.

    7 Q. As a high ranking officer, in 1992, with respect to

    8 Celebici, would you say that Celebici was a prison, in

    9 which case, they would come under the Ministry of

    10 Justice, or were they a camp, in which case they would

    11 come under the Ministry of Defence, or was it something

    12 in between, something undefined, neither one nor the

    13 other? I am talking of the period between May and

    14 November 1992.

    15 A. I cannot talk about this period from May to November

    16 1992. I can only speak of the period as from the moment

    17 I received a report that in Celebici, as a warehouse,

    18 people were being held. I never called this a prison or

    19 a camp. According to me, they were people who were

    20 contained there and how they were treated there, I am

    21 not personally aware of.

    22 Q. At that time, were you authorised to command, to issue

    23 commands to the civilian police?

    24 A. In my area of responsibility as a Commander of a

    25 Battalion Brigade and Corps I did not have any authority

  82. 1 to issue commands to units and forces of the security

    2 centre, security services centre in Mostar. If any of

    3 those forces were needed in combat, we would have to get

    4 the appropriate permission from the Chief of Staff of

    5 the Supreme Command and the Minister of the Interior.

    6 Q. You said that in the course of 1992 you had no rules of

    7 conduct in the BiH army, is that correct?

    8 A. Yes, that is what I said. We did not have it in 1992

    9 but at the beginning of 1993 it was published. I do not

    10 exactly recall the date.

    11 Q. Yes, that is what I was referring to, to 1992.

    12 A. We did not have any rules of conduct.

    13 Q. And in 1992 did you have any military inspection

    14 service, or did that come with the rules; that is, the

    15 beginning of 1993 onwards?

    16 A. We did not have any kind of inspections or controls in

    17 1992.

    18 Q. Tell me, General, in defending oneself from a far

    19 superior enemy, was there any chance or time to

    20 establish any system of supervision over camps, if any

    21 existed until November 1992?

    22 A. Could you please repeat the question?

    23 Q. Yes, of course. When the aggression against

    24 Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred, because it was attacked by

    25 a far superior enemy, and the people were those who

  83. 1 organised the defence, was there any chance or enough

    2 time to create a system of supervision over camps, if

    3 any such were formed, and I am referring to the period

    4 until November 1992?

    5 A. In the period of 1992, I had no camps or prisons in my

    6 area of responsibility. I learned about those persons

    7 in November, in Celebici. In view of the complexity of

    8 the situation, in the Neretva River valley, which in my

    9 opinion was the most singular in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    10 perhaps the most complicated, it was extremely difficult

    11 to have full control over the situation, and I agree

    12 with you that it was difficult.

    13 Q. In that period, the period of establishment and

    14 structuring of the army, could you, General, for

    15 instance, give orders to a group of troops to follow

    16 you?

    17 A. It all depended on the personal authority an individual

    18 had. I had units under my command in that period who

    19 did carry out my orders. True, there were individual

    20 cases of orders not being carried out; but one could

    21 encounter certain formations which refused to

    22 subordinate themselves to a unity of command.

    23 Q. But, General, we have already established as fact that

    24 there were no ranks at the time. So when I am asking

    25 you this question, what I am implying is that if there

  84. 1 were no ranks there must have been a problem when --

    2 I was giving this example -- when, if you were to order

    3 a group of soldiers to follow you or give them any other

    4 orders, it must have been difficult. Was it

    5 complicated?

    6 A. The system of control and command is complicated even in

    7 peacetime, let alone in wartime. Ranks are only visual

    8 signs of an officer, be he commissioned or

    9 non-commissioned, and the problems in command were

    10 extremely grave. We were creating an army under quite

    11 unique conditions. In a sense, I agree that there were

    12 difficulties in having troops carry out combat

    13 assignments.

    14 Q. When you took over command of Celebici, to put it that

    15 way, did you hear that there had been a conflict between

    16 Jasmin Guska and Hadzihuseinovic; and if you are aware

    17 of the conflict, was the problem in a conflict of

    18 competencies between them?

    19 A. I knew that they did not get on, but what the particular

    20 -- what the specific reasons for that were, I did not

    21 know. I had a very difficult situation in Mostar, as

    22 they did in Konjic, and I had to find solutions to

    23 establish relations between the civilian authorities,

    24 the police and other structures. It is a fact that

    25 I had heard of the existence of disagreement, and

  85. 1 difference of views between those people, the President

    2 of the municipality, the chief of police.

    3 Q. Did you investigate those differences? What was the

    4 reason behind them, apart from this question of

    5 competence?

    6 A. That was not my responsibility. Those were civilian

    7 bodies of authority, and the police. I was responsible

    8 for the military aspect, for the units.

    9 Q. Did you go to Celebici, to that warehouse?

    10 A. I did afterwards when the people who were held there

    11 were evacuated, but I was not there before that.

    12 Q. Did anybody report to you there on the part of the

    13 detainees or the guards or anyone else?

    14 A. I told you, I did not visit while people were being

    15 detained there. Later when we established the warehouse

    16 as a logistics base, then I did go there.

    17 Q. You said, General, that you took command of a Corps at

    18 the end of 1992, is that correct?

    19 A. I was given the order to form a Corps on 17th November,

    20 1992, and the process of forming a Corps and a command

    21 took some time, and it went on perhaps until somewhere

    22 in mid-January 1993.

    23 Q. And for how long did you hold that post?

    24 A. Until November 1993.

    25 Q. When you said that the rules of conduct were introduced

  86. 1 regarding responsibilities of various functions, was

    2 disciplinary responsibility also regulated by those

    3 rules?

    4 A. The general principles of disciplinary responsibility

    5 were regulated as far as the rules of conduct of the

    6 armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina needed to go into

    7 that area, but we had still not received any specific

    8 rules regarding discipline and other mechanisms linked

    9 to that yet.

    10 Q. So that came later?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. When?

    13 A. I think it was in 1994 that we started working on that.

    14 Q. Can it be said, General, that in mid-1992 there were

    15 very many paramilitary formations in the field?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. Tell me, General, do you know when the aggression

    18 against Slovenia was committed?

    19 A. I cannot remember the exact date, but I am aware of when

    20 the aggression took place.

    21 Q. Will you tell me, General, when you deserted the JNA

    22 exactly?

    23 A. I left it at the end of March 1992.

    24 Q. Was that -- did you go to Mostar immediately after

    25 abandoning the JNA?

  87. 1 A. Yes, I went to Mostar immediately.

    2 Q. Tell me, General, what was the relationship in Mostar in

    3 May 1992 between the Territorial Defence and the HVO?

    4 A. The relationship as far as the units that the TO and the

    5 HVO had at the time was still such that it was still

    6 possible to wage a joint battle against the aggressor.

    7 But it was burdened by elements of the situation that I

    8 have already described.

    9 Q. Did you know Tihomir Misic, one of the organisers and

    10 instigators of the resistance against the aggressor?

    11 A. I did know Tihomir Misic. He was killed. He was with

    12 us when we were doing reconnaissance in Mostar, some

    13 time in May, I cannot recall the date.

    14 Q. Was anybody accused of his death?

    15 A. Proceedings were instituted. I do not know what the

    16 outcome was, because we made an error in the course of

    17 our reconnaissance.

    18 Q. But you do not know the outcome of the proceedings?

    19 A. I do not.

    20 Q. Your Honours, I have no further questions. Thank you.

    21 Cross-examination by MS. RESIDOVIC

    22 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, may it please the court.

    23 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: You may proceed.

    24 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you. Good afternoon, General.

    25 A. Good afternoon.

  88. 1 Q. As you know, I am Edina Residovic, Defence counsel for

    2 Mr. Zejnil Delalic. My colleague Mr. Olujic has already

    3 drawn your attention to the fact that you should wait

    4 for my question to be interpreted, and you can hear the

    5 interpretation on the headphones on the table, so that

    6 everyone in the courtroom, and their Honours in

    7 particular, can follow our conversation; otherwise the

    8 two of us could quickly conduct this interview. Have

    9 you understood me?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. Thank you, General. General, I should now like to ask

    12 you something that may not be related to the rest of our

    13 conversation. Would you tell us whether it is true that

    14 somewhere in the summer of last year you told my

    15 investigator Senka Nozica that you made a brief

    16 statement for the defence of Zejnil Delalic in

    17 connection with the publication of the ID card which you

    18 spoke about in court, and after that, after I had used

    19 that statement in court, and since that statement was

    20 incorrectly interpreted in the mass media, you thought

    21 that I had used that statement incorrectly and since

    22 that date to the present you have had no contact with

    23 me. Is that true, General?

    24 A. It is true that I reacted, but you did not try to get in

    25 touch with me either.

  89. 1 Q. Thank you. Regardless of that short misunderstanding

    2 between us, I am confident, General, that you will

    3 answer all my questions. Let me start by apologising

    4 and saying that my military knowledge is not as good as

    5 that of my learned colleague Mr. Moran, but having lived

    6 under wartime conditions for four years and in view of

    7 everything else we have experienced I have learned that

    8 it is very important that we and the court have to know

    9 many things that are very familiar to you as a

    10 professional soldier. You will be ready to answer those

    11 questions as well, General, will you not?

    12 A. Yes.

    13 Q. General, since you are a General in the army of

    14 Bosnia-Herzegovina and many of my questions will be

    15 linked to Bosnia-Herzegovina, I should first like to ask

    16 the usher for his assistance for an exhibit to be

    17 identified.

    18 THE REGISTRAR: D74/1.

    19 MS. RESIDOVIC: General, do you know -- can you tell me

    20 what this is? Do you recognise this? Please stand up,

    21 if you want to. Please stand up, you can have a look at

    22 it. Maybe I can help you and ask you: is that a map of

    23 the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    24 A. Should be.

    25 Q. Do you recognise that map?

  90. 1 A. I did not look at all the details, but all the borders

    2 are rightly marked.

    3 Q. But you think it is the map of Bosnia? Maybe you cannot

    4 see every single line, but this is a map of

    5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, is it not?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, as the witness has identified

    8 this map, I tender it as a Defence exhibit and later on

    9 we will come back to some explanations which the General

    10 should give us. Is this map admitted as evidence as a

    11 Defence exhibit?

    12 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes. There is nothing to object about

    13 this.

    14 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you very much. Please could I have

    15 the number of the exhibit?

    16 THE REGISTRAR: It is Defence Exhibit D74/1.

    17 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you.

    18 General, I would like to go back to certain

    19 questions you discussed yesterday during the

    20 examination-in-chief, when you gave your answers, gave

    21 your opinions and your knowledge as a person who

    22 participated in those events, and also as a soldier who

    23 has certain knowledge from his professional experience.

    24 General, during your examination-in-chief, you indicated

    25 what, according to you, means co-ordinator?

  91. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Could you confirm, General, that the term "co-ordinator"

    3 and the term "commander" represent two different

    4 notions?

    5 A. Yes.

    6 Q. Is it true, General, that the term "co-ordinator" implies

    7 a certain activity of mediation by a person between the

    8 body that appointed him and a third party, is that true?

    9 A. "Co-ordinator" can be what you have described; but a

    10 co-ordinator can also co-ordinate between other bodies,

    11 not necessarily only persons.

    12 Q. Yes. There are various types of person, physical person

    13 and moral person, maybe that is why my question was not

    14 completely clear. So it is simply somebody who

    15 co-ordinates between various persons?

    16 A. Yes. It is somebody who co-ordinates and does activities

    17 which are given to him in the form of a task.

    18 Q. Is it true, General, that a person who a body had

    19 appointed for such a mediating role has no function of

    20 superiority to that body which had appointed him. Is

    21 that true?

    22 A. In a general sense, yes, but in a specific case I do not

    23 know.

    24 Q. General, you have just said that you were yourself in a

    25 position to appoint co-ordinators, for example, Mr. Adem

  92. 1 Zubovic. Did that gentlemen, after you had appointed

    2 him, have some superiority, a superior function, to you,

    3 over you?

    4 A. Sorry, it is not Adem Zubovic but Adam Zulovic, with an

    5 L.

    6 Q. So he could not have any superiority over you, is that

    7 true?

    8 A. I appointed Adem Zulovic co-ordinator between the units

    9 of the Territorial Defence in Mostar and the municipal

    10 staff, municipal headquarters of TO in Mostar.

    11 Q. So he was not your superior but you were his superior

    12 body, is that true?

    13 A. Yes, it is.

    14 MS. RESIDOVIC: I would now like to ask that the General be

    15 shown Prosecution exhibit identified, marked as 67. So

    16 I would like the General to be shown the Prosecution

    17 Exhibit 67. This is a special authorisation issued on

    18 2nd May, 1992.

    19 JUDGE JAN: Authorisation giving Delalic the authority to

    20 enter into contracts, is that the document you are

    21 referring to?

    22 MS. RESIDOVIC: Yes, it is.

    23 General, yesterday you looked at this

    24 authorisation and upon a remark made by Judge Jan you

    25 said that there was a date of the 2nd May on this

  93. 1 authorisation and after that you were shown the decision

    2 of the War Presidency, dated 18th May, by which

    3 Mr. Zejnil Delalic was appointed co-ordinator. General,

    4 from that fact alone, that this document is done 16 days

    5 earlier, could you confirm that this document has

    6 nothing to do with the co-ordinator mentioned in the

    7 decision dated 18th May?

    8 A. I cannot answer this question. I can answer about this

    9 document.

    10 Q. Can I ask you maybe in a different way? If you,

    11 General, gave a particular duty to your soldier today,

    12 for example, to be a messenger and he became something

    13 else two weeks later, for example went into the

    14 artillery, and if that letter appointment or

    15 authorisation cannot be retroactive and cannot influence

    16 something that was done before?

    17 A. You are now putting me in a position where I have to

    18 speak about documents I was not in charge of at the

    19 moment those documents were issued.

    20 Q. All right, General, I will not insist upon that. I will

    21 only ask you whether it is true that on the document

    22 that you were shown as a decision by the War Presidency

    23 -- and I would like to ask you to have a look at it

    24 again, not at this document but the next document which

    25 I have here. It is a Prosecution exhibit, but I do not

  94. 1 know under what number it was marked.

    2 Could you please show this document to the

    3 witness?

    4 THE REGISTRAR: This is Prosecution Exhibit 68.

    5 MS. RESIDOVIC: General, once you will read this document,

    6 will you be able to tell us on what date was this

    7 decision made?

    8 A. What is written here is the 18th May, 1992.

    9 Q. Thank you. Could you please look at the previous

    10 document, the document dated 2nd May? The heading of

    11 this document, can you tell us whether in the heading

    12 you -- it is stated that this decision is made according

    13 to the decision made on 2nd May, and that is written in

    14 the preamble?

    15 A. This authorisation is the authorisation by the commander

    16 of the -- by the staff commander of the municipality of

    17 Konjic, dated 2nd May 1992. The staff commander, the

    18 military staff, probably they -- what is meant here is

    19 the commander of the municipal staff.

    20 Q. And what else?

    21 A. There is on the right-hand side a stamp here, and a

    22 signature. On such a document the President of the War

    23 Presidency is the one who affixes his signature. In the

    24 heading of this document it says, "War Presidency of the

    25 municipality of Konjic", and a number.

  95. 1 Q. Is this then a document of the War Presidency?

    2 A. According to what is written here, it should be.

    3 Q. General, please, in the preamble above the words

    4 "special authorisation", does this document make

    5 reference to the document from 18th May?

    6 A. It refers to a decision by the War Presidency which is

    7 not dated.

    8 Q. Could you please read this heading and say whether it

    9 says what it refers to?

    10 A. What it says is:

    11 "On the basis of the decision of the War

    12 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on equipping

    13 obtaining and distributing war equipment the War

    14 Presidency of Konjic municipality issues the following."

    15 Q. Thank you very much. So now you have read, and so I ask

    16 you, is it true that in the heading of this

    17 authorisation it is clearly stated, clearly states the

    18 decision on the basis of which this authorisation was

    19 issued?

    20 A. Yes, this decision is mentioned.

    21 Q. Thank you. Since this precisely mentioned authorisation

    22 is the one about purchasing and acquiring war equipment,

    23 are these duties that were given only the duties

    24 previously established about the matters of logistics

    25 that are the responsibility of the War Presidency?

  96. 1 A. The body that issued this authorisation refers to the

    2 decision of the War Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

    3 then gives its authorisation. The authorisations only

    4 -- concern only the three points that are mentioned

    5 here, and the decision of the War Presidency of

    6 Bosnia-Herzegovina is something of a much wider scope.

    7 Q. So we can agree, General, that these three points that

    8 are mentioned in this authorisation, that they result

    9 from a much broader decision of the War Presidency,

    10 regarding the same issues?

    11 A. Yes, if that was done along those lines, that is how it

    12 should have been.

    13 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you very much. Now I know what you

    14 meant by your clarification yesterday.

    15 General, you said that according to the very

    16 nature of appointment and its title, the co-ordinator has

    17 no superiority but is subordinated to the body which had

    18 appointed him, is that correct?

    19 JUDGE JAN: This question has already been asked.

    20 MS. RESIDOVIC: Yes, your Honour, I will continue now.

    21 Maybe I have already asked this question without

    22 noticing that. I could not hear.

    23 JUDGE JAN: You can ask this question for him.

    24 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: If it is necessary for your other

    25 subsequent ones you can still ask it.

  97. 1 MS. RESIDOVIC: General, as the situation you spoke to us

    2 was complex, is it true that the civilian structures of

    3 authority also sometimes had the need for appointing

    4 certain persons, co-ordinators, mediators in order for

    5 certain issues to be more easily solved, in view of the

    6 complex situation?

    7 A. It is possible that they had such needs and that had

    8 appointed co-ordinators but I am not aware of such

    9 activities of co-ordinators.

    10 Q. General, is it also true that when a civilian body

    11 appointed somebody co-ordinator that co-ordinator could

    12 not have higher functions or commanding instructions

    13 over that body which had appointed him?

    14 A. I know the military hierarchy and the military

    15 structure. What was the civilian system, I do not know.

    16 Q. But you can agree with me that in general terms a

    17 co-ordinator both in civilian and military structures

    18 should mean the same thing, a mediator?

    19 A. Yes, in a general sense.

    20 Q. Yesterday you spoke, General, about the difficulties in

    21 overall supplying of our army after the aggression. Is

    22 it true, General, that at that point whoever was ready

    23 to acquire whatever was needed for the defence would

    24 receive certain authority, authorisations in order to do

    25 so and help defend the country. Is that correct?

  98. 1 A. It is.

    2 Q. So you can agree that in 1992 many persons received

    3 authorisations to -- for the acquiring or purchase of

    4 certain goods for the civilians or for the army?

    5 A. Yes, I also issued such authorisations.

    6 Q. General, I would now like to show you a certificate

    7 issued by the general staff of the army which in

    8 disclosure I gave to the Prosecution last year. So

    9 could you, please, look at it and after that I will ask

    10 you certain questions. I have copies for the Chamber,

    11 and before that I would like to ask that the original

    12 copy is given by the Registry to the General. Could you

    13 please mark this copy here (indicates), because this is

    14 the original? There are also copies for the

    15 Prosecution.

    16 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit D75/1.

    17 MS. RESIDOVIC: I would like to ask that as I see that

    18 there is one copy -- that you have got -- a

    19 supplementary copy in Bosnian, could you please give me

    20 one back, because I have given away all the copies that

    21 I had.

    22 THE REGISTRAR: I only have three copies and I need them for

    23 the judges.

    24 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you.

    25 General, did you have the chance to read it now?

  99. 1 A. Yes, I have read it now.

    2 Q. Yes, that is what I meant, now.

    3 A. Yes.

    4 Q. Could you please tell me which body is mentioned in the

    5 heading of the document?

    6 A. The general staff of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    7 Q. At the bottom of the document, do you recognise the

    8 stamp?

    9 A. Yes, I do.

    10 Q. What stamp is it?

    11 A. Of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The general

    12 staff of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo,

    13 stamp number 3.

    14 Q. Is there a signature affixed to this document?

    15 A. Yes, there is.

    16 Q. Do you recognise the signature, whose signature it is?

    17 A. I do.

    18 Q. Could you tell me who signed this document?

    19 A. The Commander, army General Rasim Delic.

    20 Q. Your Honours, as the witness has identified the document

    21 as a document coming from the general staff of the army,

    22 I would like to tender it as a Defence exhibit?

    23 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I admit it.

    24 MS. RESIDOVIC: General, in this certificate the role of

    25 the co-ordinator is clarified. Do you agree with the

  100. 1 assessment that the role of the co-ordinator did not

    2 interfere with the hierarchical subordination role of

    3 any subject?

    4 A. Your Honours, I would like to have a question that

    5 I would like to ask before the Defence counsel has asked

    6 it, because I did not identify the authenticity of this

    7 document. I merely read what was written on this

    8 document. I am not competent to determine whether the

    9 signature and the stamps are authentic, neither the

    10 number which the document has. I only read and

    11 recognised the stamp and a signature.

    12 MS. RESIDOVIC: General, do you see any indication on this

    13 document that would say that this document is not an

    14 authentic one?

    15 A. I am an officer of the army of the Federation and I am

    16 not competent to analyse the authenticity that my

    17 Commander had signed. There is an institution, the

    18 records, and a custodian of the records who needed to do

    19 so.

    20 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you, General. I think that I can ask

    21 the same question to the custodian of the records, but

    22 I think the General has given enough elements about the

    23 authenticity of this document.

    24 Could I ask the question to this?

    25 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: He was making a pertinent observation,

  101. 1 that it does not lie on him to authenticate this

    2 document. This is what he is saying, not that he does

    3 not know the author of the letter or the signature, but

    4 it is not for him to authenticate it. There is no

    5 objection to its admissibility. So it has been

    6 accepted.

    7 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you, your Honours. You will

    8 certainly be able to assess that and also we will have

    9 the custodian of the records as a witness here who will

    10 be able to recognise the document.

    11 General, I would like to ask you now: is it

    12 correct, do you agree with what is spelt out in this

    13 statement; that is, that the role of the co-ordinator has

    14 got no function of authority of issuing orders?

    15 A. Could you please repeat your question?

    16 Q. I will try to simplify this question. Do you agree,

    17 General, with this way of explaining the role of

    18 co-ordinator given by the army General Rasim Delic?

    19 A. I have no right to agree with the statements made by the

    20 commander. My right is either to execute his order or

    21 to agree -- this is a text, I cannot say whether it is

    22 authentic. This is a text coming from the general

    23 staff. The number here on it is the Commander's number.

    24 Q. I hope that we will not need to ask the Commander to

    25 come, but as if you -- as you have answered, exactly, in

  102. 1 an identical way, what is a co-ordinator, identical to

    2 what is said in this certificate I will not insist upon

    3 that.

    4 Your Honours, as it is 4 o'clock now do you think

    5 this would be an appropriate moment for our afternoon

    6 break? Thank you.

    7 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: The Trial Chamber will rise for 30

    8 minutes.

    9 (4.00 pm)

    10 (Short break)

    11 (4.30 pm)

    12 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, may I proceed?


    14 You may warn the witness that he is still on his

    15 oath.

    16 THE REGISTRAR: I remind you, sir, that you are still under

    17 oath.

    18 MS. RESIDOVIC: General, it is quite late in the afternoon

    19 by now and you are probably tired, just as I am, so

    20 I will try to ask very simple questions. It was

    21 slightly tense before the break, but this has probably

    22 disappeared now. I will try to proceed in the same way

    23 as my colleague Mr. Niemann did. I will show you a

    24 document and I do not ask you to authenticate a

    25 particular document.

  103. 1 General, you have answered several questions asked

    2 by the Prosecutor concerning the competencies of a

    3 Tactical Group. If you allow me to say, all my

    4 knowledge in that area is very modest but I would

    5 nevertheless like to ask you several questions. In

    6 answer to questions put by the Prosecutor and by my

    7 colleagues you have confirmed that a Tactical Group is a

    8 temporary military formation with a particular military

    9 mission, is that correct?

    10 A. Yes, it is.

    11 Q. General, before the war you also taught at the military

    12 academy, is that correct?

    13 A. Yes, I did.

    14 Q. So, General, you are certainly aware of the fact that in

    15 the Yugoslav People's Army there were Brigades, the

    16 rules of the Brigade and there was a definition of a

    17 Tactical Group which is also to be found in the military

    18 encyclopaedia of the former Yugoslavia, do you know of

    19 that?

    20 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honours, would you allow Ms. McMurrey to

    21 be excused from the courtroom for a few minutes? She

    22 has an urgent matter to take care of outside.

    23 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: She is excused.

    24 MS. RESIDOVIC: I would now like to ask the usher to show

    25 you, General, the excerpts from the rules of Brigades

  104. 1 from the military encyclopaedia so that you can look at

    2 them and so that I could ask you certain questions about

    3 the contents. You can identify that, but the for the

    4 moment the Defence do not intend to tender it as

    5 evidence, but within disclosure the Defence has given

    6 these documents to the Prosecution.

    7 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked D76/1.

    8 MS. RESIDOVIC: There is probably also a French translation

    9 here, but please look at just the paragraph on the top

    10 of the page, page 606, where the heading is "Tactical

    11 Group".

    12 Did you have a chance to look at the top

    13 paragraph?

    14 A. Yes, I did, on page 606.

    15 Q. Apart from what you had already confirmed when speaking

    16 about a Tactical Group, I would like to ask you, is it

    17 true that a Tactical Group, as it is written, here

    18 operates along special tactical lines. Is that one of

    19 the characteristics of a Tactical Group?

    20 A. It is, in a general sense.

    21 Q. Thank you. This general assertion -- you can, both as a

    22 teacher and as a professional soldier, you can confirm

    23 that this is a generally accepted notion in the armies

    24 in Europe?

    25 A. Yes, it is.

  105. 1 Q. You can also confirm, General, that these general rules

    2 were also applied in our army, since its very beginning,

    3 and together with a structure of the army it was also

    4 accepted as -- they were also accepted as special

    5 document of the army?

    6 A. Could you please repeat your question?

    7 Q. Are these general rules which were applied in the JNA,

    8 were they also accepted as rules for behaviour of our

    9 army, in making?

    10 A. As we were all trained in the former JNA we used that

    11 knowledge also in this war and applied these principles

    12 regarding to procedures.

    13 Q. General, as temporary and provisional formations for a

    14 specified military mission, is it true that Tactical

    15 Groups have precisely those competencies that are given

    16 to them when they are established?

    17 A. In the definition here and all the general definitions

    18 of Tactical Groups, it is clearly stated when in general

    19 a Tactical Group is formed, but the competencies and the

    20 responsibilities of the Tactical Group are determined by

    21 the one who establishes that Group.

    22 Q. Thank you very much. This is a full answer. But before

    23 going on about Tactical Groups, allow me to ask you a

    24 different question. Territorial Defence was organised

    25 before the war in companies, in municipalities, regions

  106. 1 and in republic, is that correct?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Regional headquarters were the bodies which were

    4 superior to municipals, to municipal headquarters, is

    5 that correct?

    6 A. It is.

    7 Q. Can you confirm, General, the Tactical Groups, according

    8 to their basic purpose, their definition and the way of

    9 performing their missions, have not the same duties as

    10 the municipal headquarters, is that correct?

    11 A. It is.

    12 Q. Also Tactical Groups that act along certain lines have

    13 not the same functions as a Corps does?

    14 A. No, they have not.

    15 Q. Do you know, General, that a Tactical Group 1 was formed

    16 already in May 1992 with the mission of trying to lift

    17 the siege of Sarajevo?

    18 A. I knew that Tactical Group 1 was formed. I knew which

    19 were the units and what areas that became part of

    20 Tactical Group 1, but I am not aware of the duties and

    21 mission that the Tactical Group 1 was given.

    22 Q. Thank you. General, do you know that the first

    23 Commander of the Tactical Group 1 was Mr. Mustafa

    24 Polutak?

    25 A. Yes, I know that.

  107. 1 Q. Do you know that Mr. Mustafa Polutak was replaced as

    2 Commander of the Tactical Group by Mr. Zejnil Delalic?

    3 A. Yes, I am aware of that.

    4 Q. Are you aware of the fact that they were all appointed

    5 according to an order of appointment by the armed

    6 forces?

    7 A. I think they were appointed by the staff of the Supreme

    8 Command.

    9 Q. General, do you know that the headquarters of the

    10 Tactical Group 1 were at Pazaric?

    11 A. Yes, at the beginning.

    12 Q. Do you know that the lines of action of this Tactical

    13 Group, this line, was Dreznica, Jablanica, Konjic,

    14 Prozor, Hadzici, Igman?

    15 A. I recall the order by which the Tactical Group was

    16 established, its Commander was appointed and also the

    17 units which were to become parts of the Tactical Group.

    18 These were the units from Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor and

    19 I also think the unit from Gornji Vakuf. As for the

    20 missions and the lines of actions, I did not know of

    21 those, about their specific missions and lines of

    22 action.

    23 Q. Do you know, General, that the mission of this Tactical

    24 Group and of other Tactical Groups that were formed in

    25 the siege of Sarajevo, that their basic mission was to

  108. 1 plan and to carry out war operations for lifting the

    2 siege of Sarajevo in breaching the blockade?

    3 A. As a Commander of the 1st Mostar Brigade I also gave a

    4 number of my troops for trying to break the blockade of

    5 Sarajevo in 1992, probably a Tactical Group 1 also

    6 probably had a role to play in breaking the -- blockade

    7 around Sarajevo.

    8 Q. Although you had very intense war action going on in

    9 Sarajevo -- in Mostar at that time, could you confirm

    10 that the first time it was tried to break the siege of

    11 Sarajevo from Pazaric and Hadzici was carried out in

    12 June 1992 when the Commander of the 1st Tactical Group

    13 was Mr. Polutak?

    14 A. I heard about it, but I do not know the details.

    15 I think it was called JUD, but I never knew the details,

    16 the line of action, the way they were conducting the

    17 operation. I only know that Polutak was the head of the

    18 group.

    19 Q. General, yesterday, as an answer to the question of my

    20 learned colleague Mr. Niemann, you said that a part of

    21 the unit from a certain line is included into a Tactical

    22 Group?

    23 A. Could you please repeat what I said?

    24 Q. You have confirmed that into Tactical Groups parts of

    25 units from a given line, that is from a given area,

  109. 1 becomes part of a Tactical Group, for example

    2 detachments and so on?

    3 A. Yes, if we establish a Tactical Group along certain

    4 lines in a certain area then all the units that are on

    5 those lines take part in it and maybe some other units

    6 are there to it. It really depends on the forces we

    7 need for it.

    8 Q. Is it then true, General, that these -- the composition

    9 of these units, be it Brigades or platoons or

    10 detachments, which are added from municipal staffs to

    11 municipal headquarters to a Tactical Group that they are

    12 subordinate to the Commander of a Tactical Group for the

    13 performing of a particular mission?

    14 A. It should be so.

    15 Q. Is it then true, General, that the Commander of a

    16 Tactical Group has the responsibility towards these

    17 units which are subordinate to him?

    18 A. If certain units become part of a Tactical Group, those

    19 units with their Commanders need to be subordinate to

    20 the Tactical Group and the Commander of that Tactical

    21 Group, otherwise he would not lead the Group. He could

    22 not lead the Group.

    23 Q. General, all the other units in that area that are not

    24 subordinate to the Commander of the Tactical Group

    25 remain normally under the command of the municipal

  110. 1 headquarters?

    2 A. If they have not made, become part of a Tactical Group

    3 then they are not part of a Tactical Group.

    4 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me a moment, I do not know if it is

    5 appropriate each time to point out these problems, maybe

    6 somebody could advise me. It is line 8, page 114 it

    7 says "sub board nature"; the actual word was

    8 "subordinate". I do not know whether these get caught

    9 later in the process, or whether it is necessary for us

    10 to rise and point them out. But the word is

    11 "subordinate". What was actually said was

    12 "subordinate".

    13 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: That does not mean anything. I am sure

    14 that anybody reading it will know. Perhaps by the time

    15 we rise most of these things have been corrected.

    16 MR. ACKERMAN: Should we continue to point these out? Is

    17 that important or appropriate? I am a bit uncertain

    18 about whether I need to do that or not.

    19 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I do not think it is -- most of yours

    20 were good, but some of these irregularities are not as

    21 damaging as one would say, because I think "sub board

    22 nature" will mean nothing to anybody reading it. You

    23 will know it is "subordinate".

    24 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you.

    25 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you.

  111. 1 General, you have said that somewhere in the

    2 second half of the summer, together with General Agotic,

    3 somewhere on the front-line, you met Mr. Zejnil Delalic.

    4 Could you please tell me whether it is true that

    5 operational missions concerning lifting the siege of

    6 Sarajevo were done in the areas of Igman, Pasarici and

    7 other places which are surrounding Sarajevo and which

    8 are at a considerable distance from Konjic?

    9 A. With Mr. Imre Agotic, who was the Chief of Staff of the

    10 HVO, we went to Konjic and we went to the front where

    11 Mr. Delalic was and that was to the east of Konjic.

    12 These were, I think, artillery positions. It is

    13 possible that in breaking the blockade of Sarajevo

    14 participate also units from a broader area, because they

    15 can try to draw the enemy's attention away from the

    16 town. So we met Zejnil Delalic and we discussed general

    17 issues of defence needed in that period of time.

    18 Q. Thank you very much. General, as we are not going to

    19 look at the map now, could you nevertheless, as a

    20 soldier who spent the whole war in the areas of most

    21 intense fighting, could you say in front of this Trial

    22 Chamber that the areas around Sarajevo from where it was

    23 tried to break the blockade of Sarajevo, that means the

    24 areas to the south like Igman and Pazaric that are more

    25 than 60 kilometres away from the town of Konjic, is that

  112. 1 correct?

    2 A. I do not know the exact distance, but they should be

    3 somewhere at that distance, both Pasarici and Igman from

    4 Konjic.

    5 Q. Thank you. General, I would now like to ask you

    6 something different. I am not aware whether I can ask

    7 general military questions, but nevertheless I will try

    8 to be as clear as possible.

    9 Can you tell me, General, whether it is true that

    10 every superior officer in the army who has very concrete

    11 specified duties that are linked to his function, be

    12 they as the function of the leader or the function of a

    13 Commander, he can from his superior officer receive an

    14 order to perform another military mission not directly

    15 linked to his function?

    16 A. Yes, such a duty can be ordered, but I do not know how

    17 that person can carry that out.

    18 Q. You know Mr. Asim Dzambasovic?

    19 A. Yes, I do.

    20 Q. I would like to give you one example. Mr. Asim

    21 Dzambasovic had a very concrete duty and very concrete

    22 task, but at a certain moment from his superior officer,

    23 let us say the Chief of Staff, he received the order to

    24 be the staff Commander. For example, if he was in

    25 charge of the headquarters of the JNA, can he perform

  113. 1 such supplementary duty without being detrimental to his

    2 basic duties?

    3 A. As a Commander if I give an order to my subordinate I

    4 have to think whether he would be able to carry out that

    5 particular mission whilst carrying out his regular

    6 duties. You always know which are the basic duties, and

    7 you can give additional duties if those additional

    8 duties are not detrimental to the performing of the

    9 basic duties. In this concrete case, I could not assess

    10 whether that was detrimental to Dzambasovic's basic

    11 functions.

    12 Q. You know well that I have brought up this example

    13 because you are familiar with it and I know that it is

    14 true, but I would not like to discuss here the duties of

    15 Mr. Dzambasovic. I would like to ask you certain

    16 questions concerning Mr. Zejnil Delalic. I would like to

    17 ask you now to look at certain decisions and at certain

    18 appointments. I do not expect from you to check the

    19 contents of the documents, but I would like to ask you

    20 later on about the contents of these documents. So

    21 I would like to ask that these decisions be distributed

    22 to the Trial Chamber and to the General. I have also

    23 got the translations here. These are the documents that

    24 we received as part of disclosure from the Prosecution

    25 as documents of the government of Bosnia and

  114. 1 Herzegovina.

    2 THE REGISTRAR: The decision is marked 76/1 and the second

    3 one D78/1.

    4 MS. RESIDOVIC: General, have you looked at these

    5 documents? These are two documents. The first is a

    6 decision and the other is an appointment.

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Will you, please, look first at the decision? Do you

    9 see that it is a decision issued by the Supreme Command

    10 of the armed forces, Sarajevo?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. The indication is in the top left corner of this

    13 decision. Do you recognise, General, the stamp on this

    14 decision?

    15 A. Yes.

    16 Q. Is it the stamp of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

    17 the Defence Ministry of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. Is this decision -- has this decision been signed by the

    20 Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, Sefer Halilovic,

    21 and the President of the Presidency of the Republic of

    22 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic?

    23 A. That is what it is stated here, that they signed it.

    24 Q. General, does this decision refer to the temporary

    25 organisation and formation of units of the army of

  115. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Is it a decision on the formation of the temporary

    4 command of JUD, "South", based in the broader area of

    5 Igman?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Will you please now look at the second document,

    8 General? The date of the second document is identical

    9 to the date on the previous document, that is the 20th

    10 August, 1992. Is that not so?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. The body issuing this appointment is the staff of the

    13 Supreme Command of the armed forces Sarajevo?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. On this document too we see the stamp of the Republic of

    16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is

    17 that not so?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. This document too has been signed by the Chief of Staff

    20 of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the

    21 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and by the President of

    22 the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Is it true, General, that this document appoints the

    25 temporary command, consisting of 11 persons as indicated

  116. 1 in this document?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. Is it true that under point 3 of this document it is

    4 stated that Delalic Zejnil has been appointed "Assistant

    5 Commander for Logistics"?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. Could the General now be shown document 187 and 190 of

    8 the Prosecution, which were shown to the General

    9 yesterday?

    10 General, have you had time to look at these

    11 documents that you were shown yesterday when you were

    12 asked questions by my learned colleague?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. Let us first look at the document dated 28th August

    15 1992. It is a request for saving meals for the needs of

    16 the Igman units. This document was issued by the

    17 Commander of the Tactical Group 1, Zejnil Delalic, is

    18 that not so?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Is it true, General, that in view of the fact that on

    21 August 20th, 1992, by special appointment, Mr. Zejnil

    22 Delalic was appointed assistant commander for logistics,

    23 that this authorisation for meals for the army in Group

    24 JUD emanated from his responsibilities stemming from

    25 this appointment?

  117. 1 A. That is what is stated in the heading of the request for

    2 operation codename "South".

    3 Q. So, General, if in answer to the question of my learned

    4 colleague you said that this could be something that

    5 conveys the contents of the duties of the Commander,

    6 then that would not be quite precise, because at the

    7 time you did not know that Mr. Delalic had been appointed

    8 precisely as assistant for logistics for the operation

    9 "South"?

    10 A. Yes, but maybe he had not been relieved of the duty of

    11 command of the Tactical Group. He may have still been

    12 Commander of the Tactical Group; and in that case he may

    13 also act as a Commander, as well as a logistics

    14 Commander in the group.

    15 Q. Yes, that is precisely why I have put to you certain

    16 questions. Therefore, continuing to perform the duties

    17 of Commander of the Tactical Group, he was given

    18 additional assignments on the basis of this appointment

    19 to the temporary command of the Group "South"?

    20 A. It emerges as such from the documents and Mr. Delalic

    21 himself knows best.

    22 Q. Thank you, General. Now look at the second document

    23 that you reviewed yesterday too, and which is dated 13th

    24 September, 1992. This document too was issued by

    25 Mr. Zejnil Delalic, was it not?

  118. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. In view of the authorisations given to Mr. Delalic as

    3 assistant commander for logistics of the temporary

    4 command of the Group "South", is it normal for

    5 Mr. Delalic to concern himself and to deal with problems

    6 that arose in the logistics area in all areas, not just

    7 meals, but also armaments, which this document refers to

    8 when he addresses the municipal staff. Was that within

    9 his responsibilities?

    10 A. All I can say is what is stated in the documents. If

    11 you want an expert opinion from me as a soldier, then

    12 that is something else. In this case, we do not have a

    13 document showing that Commander Delalic was relieved of

    14 the duty of Commander of the Tactical Group; and he was

    15 appointed to the Group JUD as assistant for logistics.

    16 Therefore, his Tactical Group is -- has become part of

    17 the Group JUD, at least a part of it, and within that

    18 Group he is assistant for logistics. Therefore -- but

    19 his command -- his role of Commander of Tactical Group,

    20 he has to regulate other matters within his area of

    21 responsibility, such as the question of the passage of

    22 these resources and equipment.

    23 Q. Thank you, General, that is precisely what I am trying

    24 to say. Mr. Delalic is the Commander of the Tactical

    25 Group at that time, but by this appointment he was given

  119. 1 additional assignments within the temporary command of

    2 Group JUD?

    3 A. Exactly so.

    4 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you. I should now like to propose,

    5 your Honours, since the witness has interpreted the

    6 contents of these documents and recognised them too,

    7 identified them, I should like to tender these documents

    8 as evidence for the Defence.

    9 MR. NIEMANN: No objections, your Honour.

    10 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: It is admitted.

    11 MS. RESIDOVIC: Thank you.

    12 Mr. Pasalic -- I apologise -- General, yesterday,

    13 in the course of your examination-in-chief, we saw a

    14 part of the interview that you granted in December 1992

    15 to the local Jablanica TV station?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. Also yesterday you identified the warrant for the arrest

    18 of a certain number of persons with the possibility of

    19 holding them in custody up to 30 days, and you also

    20 identified the criminal charges against Zejnil Delalic

    21 and Zdravko Mucic, did you not?

    22 A. Yes.

    23 Q. Also yesterday you testified in this courtroom that you

    24 did so on the basis of the knowledge you had at the

    25 time, and that you were not prejudging things, because,

  120. 1 if I may add to what you said, like any serious and

    2 responsible person you felt that the truth should be

    3 established by the court. Is that not so?

    4 A. Yes, it is.

    5 Q. You confirmed in this Trial Chamber that when you had

    6 learned about certain problems in Konjic immediately

    7 after being appointed Commander of the 4th Corps, you set

    8 up a commission to investigate those rumours, is that

    9 not so?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. To the best of your knowledge and ability you elected to

    12 the commission people who had capabilities that

    13 corresponded to the tasks assigned to them, did you not?

    14 A. Yes.

    15 Q. All your knowledge about the findings of the commission

    16 is based on the information given to you by that

    17 commission, is that not so?

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. You personally did not conduct the investigations?

    20 A. No, I did not. Personally, no, I did not.

    21 Q. Everything that you investigated at the time, you

    22 combined that all and compiled criminal charges and you

    23 conveyed all that you knew to the public -- to the

    24 military prosecutor in Mostar, did you not?

    25 A. The whole case, the whole file was compiled, which was

  121. 1 quite a lengthy one, and from that file we concluded

    2 that criminal charges should be brought and warrants

    3 issued for the arrest of these people who had left the

    4 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    5 Q. Therefore the competent bodies, and I assume that the

    6 criminal charges were written also by persons from the

    7 commission and not you personally, they did so on the

    8 basis of all the findings of the commission that was

    9 acting on your orders?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. As you told us yesterday, you signed those criminal

    12 charges?

    13 A. I did not say that I had signed them. It was signed by

    14 my deputy in my absence, but my name is there.

    15 Q. Attached to the criminal charges was evidence in support

    16 of those criminal charges?

    17 A. That was submitted to the district military prosecutor's

    18 office in Mostar.

    19 Q. General, you personally did not examine the documents

    20 which the commission had insight into while performing

    21 its task, did you?

    22 A. I reviewed the entire file, together with the assistant

    23 for legal affairs, who headed the commission in the

    24 investigations. When I say that I reviewed it, it does

    25 not mean that I studied it in detail, and upon his

  122. 1 proposal that criminal charges should be brought,

    2 I approved those charges and addressed them to the

    3 district military public prosecutor's office, with the

    4 approval of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command.

    5 Q. Thank you.

    6 Could the General be shown, again, exhibit D137,

    7 which was shown to this witness by the Prosecution

    8 yesterday?

    9 While waiting for the document, I know, General,

    10 that this assignment too was carried out under very

    11 difficult conditions of wartime and that you did

    12 everything you could at the time to clear up things

    13 there, and that in addition to the numerous other tasks

    14 that you had as the Corps Commander you relied on what,

    15 on the proposals made to you by the members of the

    16 commission, is that not so?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Yesterday, in answer to a question by my learned

    19 colleague Mr. Niemann, you said that for some persons you

    20 had indicated their positions, for others you did not.

    21 I should now like to ask you, in addition to this

    22 document, to see another document which the Defence

    23 received from the Prosecution, under the disclosure

    24 procedure, and which, according to the allegations of

    25 the Prosecutor, they obtained from the government of

  123. 1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have a sufficient number of

    2 copies, both for the court and for you. They have been

    3 translated into English, so could they be, please, shown

    4 to the General after being identified?

    5 THE REGISTRAR: Defence document D81/1.

    6 MS. RESIDOVIC: General, this document, which is a document

    7 of the Supreme Command staff, do you recognise it by its

    8 contents as appointments for persons to Tactical Group

    9 2?

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. This document is dated 14th August and does it say that

    12 Edib Saric has been appointed to Tactical Group 2?

    13 A. Yes.

    14 Q. When a moment ago we looked at the appointment for the

    15 temporary command of Group JUD, "South", under point 4

    16 it was stated that the temporary command of Group JUD

    17 includes also Edib Saric for chief of security, did you

    18 notice that?

    19 A. Yes, I did.

    20 Q. In December 1992, General, you probably did not have

    21 occasion to see these documents?

    22 A. I did not have occasion to see them.

    23 Q. Therefore, you accepted the position of Edib Saric as

    24 you were informed of it by the members of the

    25 commission, is that not so?

  124. 1 A. Yes.

    2 Q. Thank you, General. Yesterday, General, you were shown

    3 the criminal charges signed by your deputy on your

    4 behalf.

    5 Could the General now be shown, once again, the

    6 criminal charges brought against Zejnil Delalic and

    7 Zdravko Mucic of 22nd December, 1992?

    8 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 141.

    9 MS. RESIDOVIC: Is that the criminal charges that you saw

    10 yesterday, and that you identified yesterday?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Is it true, General, that these criminal charges were

    13 submitted on 22nd December, 1992?

    14 A. That is the date indicated.

    15 Q. Is it true that these criminal charges were submitted

    16 against Zejnil Delalic and Zdravko Mucic?

    17 A. Yes.

    18 Q. Is it true, General, that attached to these criminal

    19 charges was supporting evidence indicated in the charges

    20 and which the commission had at its disposal?

    21 A. That was the task for the assistant for legal affairs

    22 and I think he carried out that task.

    23 Q. Will you please look at page 2 of these criminal

    24 charges, where you will see proof in connection with the

    25 killing of Esad Bubalo, and we have the statement of

  125. 1 Hazim Delic, deputy commander of the camp?

    2 A. That is the description of the act.

    3 Q. No, before that, below the description, it says "proof"?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. And it says, "statement of Hazim Delic, deputy commander

    6 of the Celebici prison"?

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Is it true that there is absolutely no other proof

    9 mentioned here, except that one?

    10 A. There is no other here.

    11 Q. Is it true also that on page 3 under the heading "proof"

    12 and in relation to the offence by Zdravko Mucic we also

    13 find, "statement by the deputy commander of the Celebici

    14 prison, Hazim Delic"; is it correct that that is what it

    15 says?

    16 A. Yes.

    17 Q. Is it true, General, that under the heading "proof"

    18 there is no other proof listed?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. Is it true, General, that on page 2, where it says

    21 "description of the offence", there is a date that is

    22 on 31st February, 1992, Zejnil Delalic issued by

    23 telephone the order to liquidate this person?

    24 A. It says here the date here is 31st May.

    25 Q. Is it true that there is no position indicated for

  126. 1 Mr. Zejnil Delalic here?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, I do not believe this is really a

    4 form of objection, it is just a matter I wish to raise.

    5 That is that at all stages I have made it clear that the

    6 issue of the charges and the criminal proceedings is not

    7 a matter that the Prosecution had intended in any way to

    8 go into, and we were merely seeking to tender the

    9 evidence on the basis of the description of the titles

    10 that were contained in it. I wish to raise the issue

    11 that if counsel in cross-examination does, however, open

    12 up this subject then the approach that we have taken on

    13 this may well change, and I just wish to inform the

    14 Chamber that the basis upon which we sought to tender

    15 and the basis upon which we sought to proceed was

    16 predicated on an assumption that the Defence would not

    17 want to open up this issue for consideration by this

    18 Trial Chamber.

    19 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, the basis on which I am

    20 putting these questions in the cross-examination is

    21 precisely the position that my learned colleague has

    22 referred to. The General has just confirmed that in the

    23 description of the offence of Mr. Zejnil Delalic on 31st

    24 May, 1992, there is no indication of position.

    25 MR. ACKERMAN: Excuse me, your Honour, with regard to what

  127. 1 Mr. Niemann has just said I want to make it very clear

    2 for the record that Mr. Esad Landzo objects to any

    3 inquiry regarding this matter. We believe it is

    4 irrelevant to this proceeding and we therefore object to

    5 it. I also notice that it is 5.30.

    6 MR. MORAN: Mr. Delic would also join that, would also say if

    7 substantive evidence is brought in we will be asking for

    8 a severance, a mid-trial severance.

    9 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: I suppose the Prosecution has made its

    10 position very clear. It now depends on the Defence to

    11 define its own position. Actually I did not think it

    12 was necessary to cross-examine along those lines,

    13 because it is completely irrelevant to what is being

    14 done here.

    15 MS. RESIDOVIC: Your Honours, the Prosecutor is charging my

    16 client of being Commander of the Tactical Group from the

    17 beginning of May, and he has indicated for what purpose

    18 he has questioned the witness in connection with this

    19 document. I just wanted to clarify, and the witness has

    20 confirmed, that in this document the position of Zejnil

    21 Delalic is not indicated. That is on the 31st May.

    22 Second, and my last question in connection with

    23 this document, is the position of Mr. Delalic was

    24 indicated as of the date 24th November, when as

    25 Commander of the Tactical Group he left Konjic, is that

  128. 1 correct?

    2 A. Yes.

    3 Q. I have no further questions in connection with this, and

    4 in view of the time I would ask the court to instruct us

    5 as to whether we can continue on Monday?

    6 JUDGE KARIBI-WHYTE: Yes, it is obvious as long as you are

    7 still cross-examining you will continue on Monday when

    8 we resume at 10 o'clock. The Trial Chamber will rise.

    9 (5.35 pm)

    10 (Adjourned until Monday 17th October 1997)