1 Tuesday, 22 January 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.
5 JUDGE LIU: Call the case, please, Madam Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. This is case number IT-98-34-T,
7 the Prosecutor versus Naletilic and Martinovic.
8 JUDGE LIU: Where is Mr. Scott?
9 MR. STRINGER: Good afternoon, Mr. President and Your Honours.
10 Mr. Scott was just here with us and he disappeared inexplicably. I can't
11 tell the Trial Chamber where he's gone. I expect that he will -- I think
12 that he must be very close. In fact, he's ...
13 MR. SCOTT: Sorry. I apologise, Mr. President. I was here. I
14 did have to step back out for one moment. My apologies.
15 [The witness entered court]
16 JUDGE LIU: Good afternoon, Witness.
17 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE LIU: I just want to remind you that you are still under the
19 solemn declaration.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, understood.
21 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott. You may proceed.
22 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
23 WITNESS: MARTIN GARROD [Resumed]
24 Examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]
25 Q. Good afternoon, Sir Martin.
1 A. Good afternoon.
2 Q. Just a few more points of background before we move on with your
3 testimony in connection with the structure and operations of ECMM, a
4 couple of additional details which might come up in the Court's review of
5 evidence in the future, so I'll ask you a couple of explanations. In
6 addition to the monitors which made up the various monitoring teams and
7 the various coordinating centres or CCs, such as CC Mostar, did ECMM also
8 have liaison officers?
9 A. Yes, we did. We had liaison officers in certain UN headquarters.
10 For example, in particular, when we were in Zenica, we had a liaison
11 officer with the UN headquarters in Kiseljak, which was our closest UN
12 headquarters, and he was known as the ECLO, EC liaison officer.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel and witness please make pauses
14 between question and answers and speak more slowly?
15 MR. SCOTT:
16 Q. And as reflected in Exhibit 86.1, which we were looking at
17 yesterday, finally, in this regard, is it correct that in 1993, the ECMM
18 had a strength of approximately 350 personnel throughout the former
20 A. Yes. That is correct. The total strength was about 350, of which
21 some 160 were actually monitors on the ground, and the remainder were
22 headquarters staff, interpreters, drivers and so on.
23 Q. All right. Now, sir, I want to move forward with your testimony.
24 You told us yesterday that you arrived in the Mostar region at the end of
25 July -- excuse me, at the end of June or early July, 1993; is that
2 A. That is correct. In fact, it was the first few days in July.
3 Q. And where did you first report to, in terms of just the town or
5 A. When I arrived down in Mostar, we were --
6 JUDGE LIU: They have some difficulties in the French channel.
7 MR. SCOTT: We'll keep trying, Your Honour.
8 Q. Sir Martin, again we are going to both have to make, I think, a
9 further effort to slow down a bit. Please go ahead.
10 A. When I arrived in Mostar at the beginning of July, 1993, we were
11 not able actually to get into Mostar because the HVO had blocked entry to
12 all international organisations. The CC headquarters, of which I was to
13 be the head, was based in Siroki Brijeg, which was some 15 kilometres to
14 the west of Mostar.
15 Q. Did you spend some time in your first few days or weeks upon
16 arriving in the Siroki Brijeg area trying to gain access to Mostar?
17 A. Yes, that was my fundamental task on arrival. It was intensely
18 frustrating, having been posted to Mostar, not being able to get into
19 Mostar. So almost every day, I was seeking meetings with either the
20 Deputy Defence Minister of the Croats, whose name was Slobodan Bozic, or
21 the Defence Minister Bruno Stojic, arguing constantly for us to get into,
22 first of all, West Mostar, which is the Croat side, and then over into
23 East Mostar, the Bosniak side.
24 Q. Now, some weeks later, did you, in fact -- I direct your attention
25 first to West Mostar separately from East Mostar for the moment. Did you
1 first obtain access into West Mostar?
2 A. Yes, we succeeded in getting into West Mostar after
3 discussions including with Jadranko Prlic, who was the president of the
4 HVO and a political leader. And finally, we got the go-ahead to get into
5 West Mostar, which was sometime I think fairly early August. And then
6 about two weeks later, we managed to get agreement to enter --
7 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
8 MR. MEEK: Excuse me, Mr. President, Your Honours. On page 4,
9 line 2, apparently, I believe at line 2, the witness said, Yes, we
10 succeeded -- somebody who was the president of the HVO. The record did
11 not pick up that name.
12 A. I'm sorry. The name is Jadranko Prlic.
13 MR. MEEK: Also, apparently, the Minister of Defence's name is not
14 properly in the record either. It's not the witness's fault, I don't
15 believe. We just have many problems some days with translations.
16 A. I'm sorry.
17 JUDGE LIU: That's because of the speed.
18 A. I will try and go a little slower.
19 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Scott, would you please make clear for us those
20 two names.
21 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. Absolutely.
22 A. In fact, the name Bruno Stojic is correctly printed here.
23 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Mr. President. I think the witness is referring
24 up above --
25 A. Sorry, Slobodan Bozic.
1 Q. You're also correct, Witness. At line 21, page 3, Bruno Stojic is
2 also correctly stated. But I agree with counsel that didn't seem to
3 appear the second.
4 A. The line above, it's Slobodan Bozic.
5 Q. I see. You're correcting --
6 A. That's it. Absolutely.
7 Q. Very well. Briefly, when you arrived in West Mostar for the first
8 time, can you tell the Chamber what you saw, what the condition of that
9 part of Mostar was, what your initial observations were?
10 A. Well, there was certainly damage in West Mostar, but not nearly as
11 much as I had expected.
12 Q. Sometime after that -- approximately can you tell us how long
13 after that did you eventually gain access into East Mostar?
14 A. It was about two weeks later that we managed to get into East
16 Q. Can you tell the Chamber briefly whose approval or what steps did
17 you take to get access into East Mostar?
18 A. We had to get -- because the HVO controlled the entrances, it had
19 to be through the Defence Minister and Deputy Defence Minister. In other
20 words, my main link, Slobodan Bozic, to enable us to get through the HVO
21 checkpoints to get round the back of Mostar.
22 Q. Can you share with the Chamber in the next few moments just your
23 initial observations in East Mostar when you arrived there.
24 A. East Mostar was a scene of total, total devastation. I did not
25 see throughout my time there one building that was not damaged by fire.
1 There was constant shelling by the HVO, artillery, mortars, machine-guns,
2 and sniper fire. There were very few people out on the streets. And as
3 soon as the first shell landed, the streets would empty completely. And
4 people would dive to try to get down into cellars. There was no water and
5 no electricity in East Mostar. Many people lived down in cellars.
6 I can remember one particular cellar about 60 feet down, 20 metres
7 down, in darkness with a few guttering candles, people lying around on
8 damp mattresses with a few cans of maybe river water. They would come
9 once a day in the evening to a soup kitchen, and then down into the
10 cellars again. The hospital, well, it was a makeshift hospital because
11 the main hospital was in West Mostar.
12 The makeshift hospital which had been the institute of hygiene,
13 was a charnel house. There were blood-soaked sheets everywhere and
14 patients lying out in the corridors, with the exhausted doctors trying to
15 keep on operating as the injured people came in. I remember one in
16 particular, a young teenaged girl lying naked on a bed, blood-soaked bed,
17 having lost both her legs, at the top of her thighs, as a result of a
18 shell explosion. It was a terrible sight. And in fact, the whole
19 situation in East Mostar at that time was well-reflected in a film, a BBC
20 film, made by a man called Jeremy Bowen at the time that I was in Mostar.
21 Q. Could you briefly tell the Chamber the comparison between the
22 conditions that you had seen in West Mostar and what you encountered in
23 East Mostar?
24 A. Well, it was -- the situation between the two, the -- either side
25 of the river, the River Neretva, was totally different. Of course, there
1 had been damage done during the fighting with the Serbs, and the Serbs at
2 this stage were still shelling Mostar and mainly on the east side. But
3 the situation in East Mostar and West Mostar was as different as chalk and
4 cheese, if that will translate.
5 Q. All right. I'm trying to also listen to the French translation
6 and pace myself accordingly.
7 Sir, can you provide any observation to the Chamber in connection
8 with the damage that you saw, and the civilians injured -- that you saw
9 injured or killed? Did this appear to you to be what we might call today
10 collateral damage, or can you tell the Chamber whether you made an
11 assessment or had any assessment that civilian persons and civilian
12 properties were deliberately targeted?
13 A. I was confident myself that this was targeting, a blanket
14 targeting, of the whole of East Mostar, civilians and everyone, to enable
15 the Croats to obtain possession of the whole of Mostar.
16 Q. Did you know at that time, and come to know in the months ahead,
17 that that was indeed the HVO objective?
18 A. It was becoming more and more apparent to me as time -- you know,
19 as the days and the weeks went by, that they had a clear aim of having
20 Mostar as the capital of their so-called Croatian Republic of
22 Q. Now, you mentioned in passing a man named Slobodan Bozic, and I
23 believe you've said already that he was the Deputy Minister of Defence for
24 the HVO.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Was he one of your principal contacts throughout your time in
2 Mostar with ECMM?
3 A. In fact, he was one of my principal contacts on the Croat side
4 during that period in Mostar, but he also remained a very close contact
5 for the next five and a half years, but his role over those years
6 changed. He had different roles, but I had constant dealings with him
7 until the time I finally left Mostar.
8 Q. Now, on the ABiH side, did you meet and have dealings with an
9 officer named Arif Pasalic?
10 A. Yes. He was the commander of the 4th ABiH Corps, which was
11 responsible for that area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in particular Mostar.
12 Q. Can you share with the Chamber, please, what kind of man he was to
13 deal with, the nature of your relationship with General Pasalic?
14 A. He had been a former officer in the JNA, the Yugoslav National
15 Army. He was a professional soldier and I respected him. I had no reason
16 to doubt his integrity or sincerity. He was a man who was determined to
17 fight for the Bosniaks wherever in Bosnia and in Mostar.
18 Q. Can you tell the Chamber what the situation of the Bosniaks was in
19 East Mostar in terms of their ability, if any, to -- both to either enter
20 the city, if they were outside, or to exit the city?
21 A. Yes. Perhaps I should start off by saying that although it was
22 the Bosniaks in East Mostar and the Croats in West Mostar, there was an
23 enclave on the west bank, which was a Bosniak enclave, which remained
24 throughout the whole war. So as far as the movement of the Bosniaks or
25 Muslims was concerned, they could not go south because there was the Croat
1 Buna; they could not go east because the Serbs were just four kilometres
2 over the mountains; they could not go west because that was into West
3 Mostar, except into their small enclave; and they couldn't get north
4 because the bridges on the River Neretva were blown, and the only way they
5 could get up to Jablanica was by pack ponies over mountain tracks.
6 Q. Sir, it may have occurred to the Chamber throughout these
7 proceedings, and I want to give you the opportunity to provide an answer
8 if you can. Did you a gain any understanding as to why the Bosniaks,
9 under the terrible conditions that you've indicated this afternoon, why
10 they stayed in East Mostar and did not surrender?
11 A. Well, I think that they were, first of all, determined not to
12 surrender, and --
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Par?
14 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. President, I would like
15 to object to this question. The question as to why somebody else thought
16 or wanted to do something is not within the purview of this witness. I
17 don't think that he would be able to provide us with an answer as to what
18 these people had thought or what they had wanted to do.
19 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Par, we understand this witness spent a lot
20 of time in that area. We believe it's quite necessary to us to hear what
21 this witness is going to tell us about the situation at that time. We
22 understand it's just this witness's own recollections. Let me hear what
23 the witness is going to tell us.
24 You may proceed, sir.
25 THE WITNESS: Right, Mr. President. Although -- and although
1 Mostar was very important to the Croats, as I said they wanted it as their
2 capital of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, it was also very
3 important to the Muslims, because this was an original city built during
4 the Ottoman Empire. And in the 1991 census, the proportions were, in
5 Mostar: 35 per cent Muslim; 34 per cent Croat, almost exactly equal; 19
6 per cent Serb; and the remainder Jews and those who declared themselves on
7 the census as Yugoslavs. Therefore, it had been a totally multi-ethnic
8 city with the highest proportion of mixed marriages in the former
9 Yugoslavia. And the Muslims wanted to ensure that Mostar remained a
10 multi-ethnic city in the future.
11 Q. Sir, can you tell the Judges what role, if any, territory played
12 in the war between the Croats and Muslims, please.
13 A. I have always believed that the war throughout with the Serbs,
14 Croats, and the Bosniaks was essentially about territory, territory,
15 because they all knew that when the music stopped and negotiations
16 started, possession of territory was 9/10ths of the law.
17 Q. Could I also ask you, please, to make any observation you can
18 about the relationship between the military function and the political
19 functions as you saw them at work on all sides, Bosniak and HVO, during
20 the war?
21 A. Yes. In my view, in Bosnia, and it applied to all sides, the
22 political side and the military side was very closely intertwined.
23 Politicians, political leaders would deal with military matters, and
24 military commanders would deal with political matters.
25 Q. In the course of your involvement there, did you become acquainted
1 to one extent or another, with something called the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?
2 A. The Vance-Owen Peace Plan was more or less moribund by the time I
3 arrived at the end of June. But I think that one of the reasons why the
4 fighting started between the Croats and the Muslims and the Croats and the
5 Bosniaks was because of a -- perhaps a misunderstanding of the Vance-Owen
6 Peace Plan by the Croats. The plan divided Bosnia into ten provinces,
7 some which had a Croat majority, some which had a Bosniak majority, some
8 which had a Serb majority, but they were not Croat, Muslim, or Serb
9 provinces. In fact, Vance and Owen were particularly careful in not
10 calling them Croat, Muslim, and Serb provinces. They were just given
11 numbers. And the -- but the Croat majority provinces gave the Croats more
12 territory than their numbers actually warranted, so they were very pleased
13 with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and were the first to sign up to it.
14 Now, I think my understanding is that they -- they took these
15 majority provinces as Croat provinces. They were their provinces, and
16 then they started implementing action in the spring in Provinces 8 and 10,
17 which included Mostar, Gornji Vakuf, Vitez, Busovaca, and so on. Tensions
18 rose, and then the first shots were fired in, I think, Busovaca and Gornji
19 Vakuf, and then Mostar exploded on the 9th of May.
20 Q. In connection with what you said just now about the Vance-Owen
21 Plan granting or awarding, if you will, more property -- more territory of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Bosnian Croats than their percentage of the
23 population, if you recall, can you provide the Chamber with those numbers
24 in terms of what the percentage of the population the Croats represented
25 and what percentage of the territory did they obtain under Vance Owen?
1 A. Gosh, I may not be precise on this, but I think their numbers were
2 about 18 percent in numerical terms. And I think the territory of the
3 provinces gave them close on 25 percent of the land. And of course, I
4 should also add that the -- I said they were not Croat or Muslim
5 provinces. They were intended to be multi-ethnic provinces with the
6 government - the provincial government - based on the ethnic numbers of
7 the 1991 census.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Par.
9 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I must object once again
10 to this manner of examination. We now have the witness interpreting
11 Vance-Owen's plan. I do not think this is an expert witness, an expert on
12 international law, nor was the witness a party to this plan. Therefore, I
13 do not think that this testimony is relevant, and I do not think it can
14 really help us in this case. Thank you.
15 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Scott, would you please lead us to the incidents
16 that is more related to the indictment.
17 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, it's our submission that all of the
18 testimony that we expect of this witness are closely related to the
19 indictment. And I will say in that regard, and just so there is no
20 mystery about it, this witness will only have limited -- important but
21 limited direct dealings with the accused. And to be perfectly candid,
22 that is not the main purpose of his testimony.
23 The main purpose of his testimony is to provide this Chamber with
24 a final overview of the overall events at work in which the crimes alleged
25 occurred and in which these accused conducted themselves. And as you
1 know, the Prosecution is required to prove, one, the existence of
2 international armed conflict, and part of Sir Martin's testimony will
3 relate to that, and we will get to that eventually; about the role of
4 Croatia and the military forces of the Republic of Croatia. We are also
5 required to prove under Article 5 the crimes against humanity charges,
6 that the conduct of the accused took place as part of or in the midst of
7 widespread and systematic conduct of a similar type.
8 This man, who indeed, if not in a technical sense, certainly by
9 his life experience on the ground, is indeed an expert in that sense, not
10 in the sense that someone that the Prosecution has hired or retained to
11 give an opinion. But in a practical, common-sense view, this man has
12 tremendous knowledge of these events. He was a senior official
13 representing the European Union for more than five years on the ground.
14 And we submit, Your Honours, that the testimony that Sir Martin Garrod can
15 provide to this Chamber is extremely important to its overall
16 understanding of the case.
17 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott, I understand what you are saying. And
18 we appreciate the testimony by this witness. But in front of us, there
19 are a bundle of documents. I hope your question could be related to all
20 those documents.
21 MR. SCOTT: They will be, Your Honour. I intend to get to them.
22 And they are clearly in my outline, and I intend to get to them. The
23 nature of the examination, since, Mr. President, you've asked me, is going
24 to be - I propose it to be, and obviously you can give me direction if you
25 choose - to go through a number of these matters to let the witness give
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 you his observations and assessments, then to go through some number of
2 the documents, and then proceed with his testimony.
3 That's the way we would intend to proceed. I might say,
4 Mr. President, that I do think the testimony, this testimony, will take
5 sometime, although I can tell you that we are making substantial progress,
6 but I would not want to stand here and tell you, Mr. President, that I
7 thought this witness would be completed in the next hour or two hours. I
8 think his direct examination may take most of today's session.
9 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek?
10 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, Your Honours, after hearing Mr. Scott's
11 statement as to the purpose to have this witness testify today, my
12 objection is based on the fact that it's obviously duplicitous of other
13 testimony. He wants to give the Trial Chamber some final, overall view.
14 What I've listened to so far, this Trial Chamber, I believe, has heard
15 evidence from other witnesses saying the exact same things. I would also
16 like to point out that this witness has already testified that he was in
17 Mostar for approximately 90 days or three months, from the very first of
18 July, for a three-month period before he left again to Zenica, and his
19 testimony, in my opinion - and I will raise other objections if need be -
20 is that it is duplicitous, it's not relevant. If he wants to talk about
21 what he observed while he was in Mostar, which he's just testified about,
22 we raise no objection. I concur with the objection of Mr. Par and also
23 raise a further objection based on statement of Mr. Scott that, in fact,
24 this is nothing but duplicitous testimony. Thank you.
25 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Meek, we understand that this witness is --
1 this witness is not an expert, but he spent certain time in Mostar at that
2 time, and he has firsthand knowledge of the situation in Mostar at that
3 time. At least he's an independent observer. We would like to hear what
4 this witness is going to tell us on this very subject. But the issue is
5 that we have to go through with all those documents. That's why we
6 intervened, to send a warning to Mr. Scott. Let him be very cautious on
7 this very point.
8 Yes. You may proceed, Mr. Scott.
9 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. I can't scroll back on this
10 screen, and to be quite honest, I can't remember whether there was a
11 pending question or not.
12 JUDGE CLARK: Can I help you, Mr. Scott?
13 MR. SCOTT: Please, Judge Clark.
14 JUDGE CLARK: Sir Martin was explaining to the Chamber how the
15 intentions of the Vance-Owen Plan were that the provinces were to be
16 multi-ethnic, even though they had majorities of a certain characteristic,
17 and then he was dealing with something to do with provincial governments.
18 So the intention was that each of the divisions which had a majority of
19 either Serbs, Croats or Muslims were still intended to be multi-ethnic.
20 MR. SCOTT:
21 Q. Sir, did you hear Judge Clark's recitation of the evidence just --
22 A. Yes, I did, yes.
23 Q. And is that, in fact, the nature or thrust of the answer?
24 A. Absolutely, absolutely.
25 Q. Now, in light of counsel's objections, let me ask a couple of
1 other foundation questions. In the course of your mission in Bosnia, not
2 only the time when you were specifically head of CC Mostar, but then also
3 when you were head of RC Zenica, which continued to have Mostar in your
4 jurisdiction, if you will, did you meet with a number of senior Bosnian
5 Croat officials?
6 A. Yes. I met quite a large number of Bosnian Croat officials.
7 Q. Let me just name a couple or several to give the Chamber some
8 idea. Did you meet with Mate Boban?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did you meet with Jadranko Prlic?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Did you meet with Dario Kordic in central Bosnia?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Did you meet with a man named Anto Valenta?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You met with the Defence Minister Bruno Stojic?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. A few minutes ago, you said, in connection with the Vance-Owen
19 Plan, that the Croats, in your observation, had some misunderstanding
20 about that, and if you've not given a full answer to that at this moment,
21 up to the testimony you've given in the last few minutes, can you please
22 explain to the Chamber what you think that misunderstanding -- or what
23 your assessment of that misunderstanding was?
24 A. Perhaps could I answer -- perhaps I could answer the question by
25 saying the majority -- in fact, nearly all the Croat political leaders
1 that I met, to a greater or lesser extent, sang the same tune, and this
2 was, "We were the first to sign up to the Vance-Owen peace plan. Don't
3 you realise we had 800.000 people in Bosnia before the war, now we've got
4 less than 400.000? Look at those Muslims," they never called them
5 Bosniaks, "The Muslims, they've got all the big cities, Pisevo, Tuzla,
6 Zenica, Travnik, and so on. All we want is Mostar as the capital of our
7 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna." And further - and this was a constant
8 theme - they warned against the establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist
9 state in Bosnia for whom they blamed -- they said that Izetbegovic was
10 planning to do just that.
11 Those were the broad themes which I heard countless times to a
12 greater or lesser extent - indeed, even from the Roman Catholic church,
13 particularly about the Islamic fundamentalism - but this came from all
14 directions. Some, like Jadranko Prlic, were moderate in their language,
15 although they were very tough about perceived antiCroat bias of the west.
16 Others, I say, including the Roman Catholic church, were extremely
18 Q. Sir Martin, in light of the court's cautions, I'm going to skip
19 over some of your conversation with these officials, but let me direct you
20 to just a couple. You mentioned just now Jadranko Prlic. I'm going to
21 direct your attention to the 2nd of August, 1993. Can you tell the
22 Chamber about a conversation you had with Mr. Prlic around that time and
23 about the freedom of movement or the ability of the Muslims to live
24 wherever they wanted to live or not?
25 A. Yes. I always enjoyed my discussions with Prlic, because I
1 considered him a highly intelligent man and I assumed he was going to be
2 the successor to Mate Boban, but he wasn't. But on that occasion, we were
3 talking about freedom of movement and so on, and he said that -- amongst
4 other things, that people should be free to live where they wanted to
5 live. Well, of course, this was a fine statement, but it didn't help
6 those Bosniaks who were being expelled from West Mostar to East Mostar at
7 that time. They certainly couldn't live where they wanted to live.
8 Q. Again I'll pick one other conversation. Directing your attention
9 to about the 13th of August, 1993, did you have a meeting or a
10 conversation with a man named Danko Bilnovac? I may have said that wrong,
11 and forgive me if I did.
12 A. Yes. He was the chief of police in Siroki Brijeg. And I think --
13 I think the main point he made - it stuck in my mind at that meeting - was
14 his -- he said that Tito's decision to grant the Muslims the nationality
15 of Muslim by changing the constitution in 1974 had been a great mistake.
16 Because before then, that had been Croats or Serbs who had adopted the
17 Islamic faith, so it was a strong feeling against Tito's decision to
18 establish the nationality of Muslims.
19 Q. I want to direct your attention, please, to another Bosnian Croat
20 leader, a man named Anto Valenta. Did you have meetings and conversations
21 with Mr. Valenta?
22 A. Yes, I had a number of meetings with him. He was a vice-president
23 of the HDZ, but his -- he was an intellectual, a thinker, and he had his
24 main -- his main interest was demography. He had written books which he
25 was happy to show anyone. He showed me books on the whole -- how Bosnia
1 should be divided up into three entities which he said was the best
2 solution for the future. And on his map, he had a huge map with the whole
3 of Bosnia with marked -- all the ethnic divisions marked on it down to
4 tiny little pins. And on the pinheads were different colours showing the
5 minute variations of ethnic balance in a particular village. So he was
6 not a very powerful man, certainly when I knew him, but he certainly was a
7 thinker. And as I say, he was the Croats' expert on demography.
8 Q. Did you also have dealings on a number of occasions with this man
9 called Dario Kordic?
10 A. Yes, I had regular dealings with Dario Kordic who then was the
11 senior Croat political leader in Central Bosnia.
12 Q. And again, to move us forward as much as possible, with some
13 speed, can you tell us, were his views, as stated to you, and his policies
14 consistent with the ones you've told us about so far this afternoon?
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
16 MR. MEEK: Yes, Mr. President, Your Honours, I question and object
17 to the relevancy of what Dario Kordic's views may have been in regards to
18 Mostar -- in regards to Central Bosnia as it relates to Mostar. I think
19 it's irrelevant, and I object on those grounds.
20 JUDGE LIU: I guess that is the background information that this
21 witness is going to tell us. We understand that you have an objection
22 there, which is accurately recorded in the transcript. We'll hear what
23 this witness is going to tell us. When we evaluate this evidence, we will
24 take into consideration your objections on this very point.
25 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE LIU: You may answer the question, Witness.
2 A. Yes, Mr. President. Dario Kordic, although many of our
3 discussions were about immediate problems which were happening at the
4 time, such as the seizure of two BiH helicopters by the HDZ in Medjugorje,
5 the massacre at Stupni Do and so on, but the thrust when we were speaking
6 generally was almost identical to what I've already said was the general
7 theme of the Croat views. And of course, he had very, very close links
8 with Mate Boban, so he was no doubt also reflecting Mate Boban's views.
9 Q. So in summary, and this is my last question on that on this
10 particular group of -- this particular topic, did you find that the
11 political and ethnic views of the Bosnian Croat leadership, for instance,
12 in Central Bosnia was roughly the same or consistent with that which you
13 found in Herzegovina?
14 A. Yes, with exceptions. There were exceptions. And of course, I
15 said some were more extreme than others. If you talked to someone like
16 [Realtime transcript read in error "^"] Kresimir Zubak, one got a very
17 different slant than if one was talking to the real hard-liners. So there
18 were variations.
19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
20 MR. MEEK: No objection other than line 4 says -- the witness says
21 if you talk to others like -- one got a different slant. I just ask that
22 the witness could please tell that name again so it gets in the record.
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Witness. Would you please --
24 A. Yes, the name is Kresimir Zubak.
25 MR. SCOTT:
1 Q. Sir Martin, maybe one or two follow-up questions are warranted so
2 it perhaps leaves the Chamber wondering a bit less: When you ended your
3 last question, you said "if one was talking to the real hard-liners". Who
4 were some of the people you would put in that category, the real
6 A. Well, the leader for a start, Mate Boban. I mean, he was an
7 extremely hard-liner. There were others whom I got to know when I
8 returned from Zenica to Bosnia -- to Mostar, and I realised -- began to
9 realise who were the hard-liners and who were reasonable people. But I
10 mean, there were --
11 MR. MEEK: Your Honour, I object unless we know what the time
12 frame is. This witness just said he realised something after he
13 returned. And I would like to know the time frame for the purposes of
14 either objecting or sitting down in regards to how it relates to the --
15 this indictment, the time frame of this indictment in this case which
16 we're concerned with.
17 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Scott, you may ask some questions in this
19 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Mr. President.
20 Q. Sir Martin, I believe you indicated yesterday, and if I can assist
21 this way, in about mid-October you moved to become the head of RC Zenica
22 and remained in that position until approximately the 18th of April, 1994?
23 A. That's right. And then I returned to Mostar, I think it was the
24 19th of April, 1994.
25 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Krsnik.
1 MR. KRSNIK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I know what your ruling
2 is because Mr. Meek so far made objections because that is how we thought
3 to go about the cross-examination. But being the lead counsel, I'd like
4 to make an objection in principle to the cross-examination
5 [as interpreted]. This witness is covering a period of time - and we've
6 finally established it - three months in Mostar in 1993, then return from
7 Zenica, and that happened in April 1994. In April 1994, the Federation
8 was inaugurated by the Washington Accords and the beginning of the
9 political struggle parties and everything else, on the basis of the
10 Washington Accords.
11 These are two completely different settings, especially since the
12 former period was the period of war and covered by the indictment, and the
13 latter period is a period of peace, the establishment of the -- of a state
14 based on the Washington Accords, and these two things do not lend
15 themselves to any comparison. And besides, the latter also falls
16 completely out of the scope of the indictment. I apologise for having
17 taken the floor. And thank you, Mr. President.
18 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Krsnik, you have to understand we already said
19 that we would like to hear some background information of those incidents
20 which happened in Mostar and which is charged in the indictment. We
21 understand there must be a consistent pattern of conduct concerning with
22 the beginning of that incident, the development, and the ending of that
23 kind of incident.
24 We believe that this witness has spent quite a long time in that
25 area, and he is very familiar with the situation during this part of
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina. So we allow this witness to continue for a while,
2 which means we will take what he said into consideration when we are
3 evaluating the evidence at a later stage. But we also will take in the
4 strong objections raised by the Defence counsel on this very issue.
5 MR. KRSNIK: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour. I
6 merely wanted to say that the information that this witness has covered
7 principally 1994, 1995, and 1996. And I do not think we should go into
8 that, not only because of the time frame covered by the indictment, and
9 because of the two different political situations in that area. We are
10 having here the period until February 1994 when the witness was not
11 there. The documents speak for themselves with regard to that period.
12 So thank you very much for warning my learned friend that we
13 should move on to documents because that concerns us and the indictment.
14 Things that began to happen after the adoption of the Washington Accords
15 and the establishment of the Federation, especially 1995, 1996, 1997, I
16 think it has nothing to do with this trial because it is not mentioned in
17 the indictment in any manner whatsoever. Thank you.
18 JUDGE LIU: Well, of course, we are not going to 1995 and 1996.
19 But we also understand all those background information is very important
20 for us to understand the international armed conflict, the situations in
21 that area.
22 So, Mr. Scott, would you please proceed in light of the objections
23 raised by Defence counsel.
24 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Mr. President. I will continue my examination.
25 And I have to comment for the record -- or note my objection for the
1 record: I appreciate counsel's testimony. I submit to you that the
2 witness's testimony might, in fact, be quite different than what counsel
3 was asserting.
4 Q. Now, directing your attention, Sir Martin, specifically to the
5 division of Mostar as you saw it, you've indicated -- can you tell the
6 Chamber again what the Bosnian Croats' view of Mostar was and what role it
7 would play in the Croatian -- first, the community, and then subsequently
8 called the Republic of Herceg-Bosna?
9 A. Yes. The Croats were frustrated. As I've said, they constantly
10 said that the Bosniaks, the Muslims, had all the big cities and they had
11 nothing. They just wanted Mostar as the capital of their national
12 identity, cultural identity, religious identity.
13 Q. And did you learn their position or policy towards what role, if
14 any, Muslims would have to play or to exist in Mostar?
15 A. That was never really discussed. That was never really discussed
16 until later on when we -- you know, a few years later when we started
17 getting down to a unified administration.
18 Q. All right. Let me direct your attention, please. I'll direct the
19 courtroom's attention to Exhibit -- and it will not be in the front of the
20 binder. The exhibits are placed basically numerically, but we will not
21 always follow at the beginning of the book. And this is one instance of
22 that. If I could direct your attention, please, to Exhibit 770.1, 770.1,
23 which is toward the back of the binder.
24 You have that, Sir Martin?
25 A. No, not yet, I'm sorry.
1 Q. No hurry.
2 A. 770.1.
3 Q. The number is in the lower left side, because of some margins on
4 the page.
5 MR. MEEK: Mr. President?
6 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek?
7 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, this document, 770.1, is objectionable,
8 and the Defence of Mladen Naletilic objects to this document completely
9 and entirely, based upon the fact that it talks about a time period
10 outside the scope of the indictment, and further, during a time period
11 that this witness was not even in the Mostar area. In all honesty, I'll
12 have to tell the Trial Chamber that there may be in this document some
13 borderline where the time frame of our indictment bleeds over, but much of
14 it is after the time frame of our indictment, so it can't be background,
15 it would be ante-ground -- or post-ground, and it's -- I object, strongly
16 object, to this document, even talking about it, let alone the admission
17 of it, based on it being outside the scope of our indictment that we are
18 concerned with in this case.
19 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Meek, let us hear what this document is
20 about. We understand that this is a kind of report dated 18th April,
21 1994, and we could read the first paragraph, and we want to know what are
22 the contents in it.
23 You may proceed, Mr. Scott.
24 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. Sir, can you tell us what this document is?
1 A. Yes, yes. This is -- on completing a particular posting, such as
2 head of the Regional Centre Zenica, we were required to make full
3 reports. Sorry. And this is my end-of-tour report, having handed over my
4 post as the head of the Regional Centre Zenica, written -- that was the
5 date I handed it over, on the 18th of April.
6 Q. And as stated -- I'm sorry, let me pause. And as stated, this
7 report specifically extends back to the 14th of October, 1993; is that
9 A. Yes. It goes from the 14th of October, when I took up the
10 appointment, until the 18th of April, when I handed it over.
11 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I note for the record that the
12 indictment itself goes into the first part at least of 1994.
13 Q. Now, I want to direct your attention first of all to page 4,
14 specifically item 22.
15 MR. SCOTT: And Mr. President, on some of these matters, I'll
16 simply give the courtroom a chance to see what's there. Since everyone
17 has the documents in front of them, I will not necessarily take the time
18 to put these on the ELMO, and I suspect that the Chamber does not
19 necessarily want me to read the documents, although in some occasions that
20 might be helpful. But I would proceed, if it pleases the Court, simply by
21 directing the witness to certain passages and then giving everyone a
22 chance to look at that, if that's agreeable, Mr. President.
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
24 MR. SCOTT:
25 Q. Sir Martin, have you had a chance to look at paragraph 22 in your
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 A. Twenty-two, yes, yes.
3 Q. And in that -- is that, in fact, a memorialisation, if you will,
4 of your observations of the policies and views of the Bosnian Croat
5 leadership that you've told us about in the last few minutes this
7 A. Yes. That is exactly -- those were my views at the time and they
8 haven't changed.
9 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I feel I must note for the record -
10 it's not a complaint but I do want to be clear - given the Court's
11 concern -- some concern about the time taken by this exam, we are having
12 significant lag in the French translation. And it's -- I'm having to wait
13 a considerable amount of time before continuing. And, again, please, I
14 want the translation to understand I'm not complaining, but I'm simply --
15 in terms of the speed of this examination, it may be substantially
17 Q. Now, Sir Martin, I'd like to direct your attention to page 6, and
18 the parts that began under the heading "EU Administration of Mostar." I'm
19 going to ask you some background questions about that.
20 MR. SCOTT: And again, Mr. President, I'm aware -- I'm well aware
21 of the objections that counsel have stated so far, but I submit, and I ask
22 the Chamber to be allowed -- to allow this witness to at least provide the
23 background for what that was about and how it relates to his observations
24 during this time period, that is during 1993 and early 1994 as well.
25 Q. Sir Martin, I want you to just take a moment -- we are not going
1 to cover this topic at any length. You've heard some of the concerns
2 expressed. Can you simply indicate how did the concept of the EU
3 administration of Mostar come about? And why was it felt that an EU
4 administrator had to be appointed for the city of Mostar?
5 A. Well, during the follow-up to the collapse of the Vance-Owen peace
6 plan and the various negotiations that took place thereafter, the
7 Washington Agreement was signed in March, 1994. This brought about the
8 end of the fighting between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia and the
9 establishment of the Federation between the Croats and the Muslims. Now,
10 because Mostar was the most divided city in the whole of Bosnia, and
11 because it was crucial to the Federation, it was decided - in fact, it was
12 a proposal originally made by David Owen, Lord Owen - that the EU would
13 administer Mostar for a period of two years, to attempt to unify it, to
14 bring in a unified administration, as I say, because it was fundamental to
15 the whole concept of the Federation. And of course, it was also in Mostar
16 where the fighting between the Croats and the Bosniaks had been the
17 fiercest, so the divisions were the deepest.
18 Q. Now, with that background, please, if I can direct your attention
19 specifically to paragraph 35, if you can take a moment to look at that,
21 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Par?
22 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I would like to object to
23 this line of questioning, because we are again proceeding in the same
24 manner. I have understood the points made by the Trial Chamber, and I
25 understand that the Trial Chamber is disposed to let this witness talk
1 about events that are outside the scope of the indictment, and I accept
2 that. But my objection is that if that is allowed, and if this testimony
3 continues along these lines, we will be in a position that we will not
4 know what kind of witness we have in front of us. Is this a witness who
5 will be presenting expert views, although we know that he is not an
6 expert? Or is this a witness who will be presenting his opinions, his
7 thoughts, his observations, regarding certain events? Or is this a
8 witness who is going to be testifying to the facts?
9 In this manner, the Defence finds itself in a position in which we
10 are unable to oppose these views, because if we are told that this is not
11 an expert, we cannot bring in an expert who would counter the views
12 presented by this witness. On the other hand, he is not testifying to the
13 facts, because we -- then we would have a witness saying, "Yes, I saw such
14 and such a thing happen on such and such a day." This is a witness
15 presenting his views. Will this Trial Chamber allow the Defence to bring
16 in a witness who would, in turn, be presenting his own views?
17 So my basic objection is that -- is that we do not want you to
18 allow to bring in a witness whose authority is unassailable and to allow
19 this witness to present his views under the shield of his authority. I do
20 not want to question the credibility or the authority with which this
21 witness speaks, and whether his opinions are founded or not. This is a
22 matter of principle. Do we allow a witness, who is not an expert, to
23 present his opinions? So this would be our basic objection.
24 I have another, very short objection. Now we have documents which
25 reiterate the opinions of the same witness, and this is yet another way in
1 which to put his opinions into the case file. So we are now in a
2 situation where the witness has presented his own opinion, and now we have
3 a document reiterating this opinion, and in the end, the Prosecution will
4 move these documents into evidence, and then we will, in the end, have a
5 situation where the Prosecutor will have both the testimony and the
6 document speaking to the same effect so that will be in a way
7 corroborated, and we object very strongly to this. Thank you very much.
8 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
9 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President. I concur 100 percent with my
10 learned colleague Mr. Par and would only direct the Trial Chamber's
11 attention to the very first line of paragraph 36 on this Document 770.1,
12 and that says "The EU fact-finding mission completed its visit to Mostar
13 in the last week of March." That's March of 1994. This case, since
14 September the 10th when this trial started, we have been dealing with an
15 indictment and then an amended indictment alleging certain war crimes
16 committed by these accused up through at least January 1994. Why are we
17 dealing with documents that concern a time period two months after the end
18 of whatever allegations have been levelled against my client in this
19 Honourable Tribunal. We are talking now two months after any allegations
20 of war crimes. It's not proper; it's not fair; it's bootlegging this
21 stuff in. And I object strongly on background. And also I agree with
22 everything Mr. Par my colleague said.
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott.
24 MR. SCOTT: With the Court's indulgence, I ask to be heard on
1 JUDGE LIU: Yes. You have to be very concise, because it's almost
2 the time for break.
3 MR. SCOTT: Very well, Your Honour. Mr. President, these
4 proceedings have gone on for some time. I think the Chamber, by its own
5 observations, knows the Prosecution has not complained about proper
6 cross-examination and proper objections, and it certainly expects the
7 Chamber to make the rulings that both sides will certainly abide by. I
8 object to the series of objections now that have gone on for some
9 minutes. This has risen to the level of obstruction, absolute
10 obstruction. It is full of false statement and characterisation. The
11 testimony of this witness is not outside the scope of the indictment,
12 which was said a few moments ago. It clearly goes to the heart of this
13 indictment, to the period covered in the indictment. Paragraph 26, as one
14 example, says, "... and the conduct continued until at least January
15 1994." It is not outside the scope of the indictment.
16 They complain first that they don't want to hear the witness's
17 testimony; they just want to see the documents. When we go to the
18 documents, they say they don't want to look at documents; they want to
19 hear from the witness. These series of objections are obstructionist, and
20 I object, Your Honour. I think this witness -- I submit respectfully this
21 witness is important to the Chamber's understanding of this case.
22 Obviously, you will ultimately decide that. But I submit that the Chamber
23 should be given a fair opportunity to receive this witness's evidence, and
24 that is not happening at this moment.
25 JUDGE LIU: We believe that this witness is background and
1 documentary foundation evidence, and he has already given us an
2 independent view and the findings of a very high-ranking independent
3 observer of what happened during that period. And as I pointed out in my
4 remarks just now, the first paragraph of this document says it very clear
5 that "... the appointment which I assumed on 14th October, 1993,
6 relinquished on the 18th April, 1994..." which we believe is covered by
7 the time frame in the indictment. So we are going to hear what this
8 witness is going to tell us on this very subject.
9 And we also remind the Prosecutor about the relations between the
10 testimony and the documents the Prosecutor is going to tender through this
11 witness. We believe that at last, we come back to the document, and we'll
12 concentrate on those documents when we resume.
13 We'll have a break. We'll resume at 4.00.
14 Mr. Usher, would you show the witness out of the room first,
16 For the last word, when this Trial Chamber makes a ruling on the
17 subject, the Defence counsel could reserve its view, but we don't want to
18 see any further objections in this direction.
19 We'll resume at 4.00.
20 --- Recess taken at 3.33 p.m.
21 --- On resuming at 4.00 p.m.
22 JUDGE LIU: Please bring in the witness, Mr. Usher.
23 Yes, Mr. Meek?
24 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, may I bring up one procedural matter
25 while we wait for the witness?
1 JUDGE LIU: Yes, please.
2 MR. MEEK: Last week, the Prosecution had delivered to us a motion
3 they had filed for the admission of the statements of two deceased
4 individuals, and I believe the Trial Chamber in the past has entered a
5 ruling that pursuant to the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, that we have
6 14 days to answer any motion. I want to tell the Court that we -- the
7 Trial Chamber, excuse me, that we intend to file this motion, hopefully
8 tomorrow, if not Wednesday, well within that time period, but I wanted to
9 make sure that we were clear on that 14-day rule. That's all.
10 JUDGE LIU: Yes. Thank you very much. We believe that this Trial
11 Chamber has already deliberated on this very issue.
12 MR. MEEK: Thank you.
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Scott?
14 MR. SCOTT:
15 Q. Sir Martin, if I could please direct your attention back to that
16 paragraph 35 of your end-of-tour report marked as Exhibit 770.1, and
17 perhaps the best way to proceed at the moment, before we go on to
18 additional documents, is: When you look at that paragraph, will you
19 simply affirm that that accurately stated your assessment concerning the
20 city of Mostar during the time of your duties as head of RC Zenica?
21 A. Yes, correct.
22 Q. Sir, can you tell the Chamber, when you -- the views you express
23 in a number of your documents and the reports that you made, were you
24 making those in your role as a senior official of the European Community
25 Monitoring Mission?
1 A. Yes, based on my experience and the knowledge that I had gained.
2 Q. Is it fair to say, sir, that the views you state are not simply
3 your personal views, but this represents the assessment at various levels
4 of ECMM as an organisation?
5 A. Yes. Inevitably, there were minor variations of opinion, but I
6 would say that I was reflecting the views of the ECMM.
7 Q. Let me ask you this, Sir Martin, in light of some of the
8 objections earlier today: Did you ever find your views or assessments to
9 be substantially out of line with, if I can put it that way, the views of
10 either ECMM people below you or above you?
11 A. No. I don't think I can ever recall a significant difference of
12 opinion, no.
13 Q. And before we leave this document, sir, can I direct you back to
14 page 2, and your paragraph 12? The end of that paragraph starts with the
15 sentence, "In the Mostar region," and I ask you again, was that
16 observation true throughout the time of your association, if you will,
17 with Mostar, even from July of 1993 and continuing to April of 1994?
18 A. Yes. The territory held did not change at all. I put this down
19 to the fact that neither side were prepared, for various reasons, to
20 engage in what we call house-to-house fighting, which is costly in
21 manpower, and therefore nearly all the fighting was done with guns,
22 artillery, mortars, machine-guns and so on. And so no territory,
23 throughout my time in Mostar, changed hands.
24 Q. All right. Sir, we'll come back to that exhibit in the future as
25 to other topics but in another part of your examination. So let me now
1 turn, again especially in light of the guidance the Chamber has provided,
2 for which I am grateful, if you go back to the beginning of the binder, if
3 you can find your way, please, to Exhibit P359.
4 A. Yes, I have it.
5 Q. Now, just to set the scene, if you will, of this document, is this
6 a report, in fact, titled "Special Report" dated the 1st of May, 1993,
7 from the head of RC Zenica to the headquarters of the ECMM in Zagreb?
8 A. Yes, it was written by my predecessor as the head of the regional
9 centre in Zenica.
10 Q. I want to direct your attention, first of all, to the second full
11 paragraph of that first page. It seems to be marked as number 1, although
12 the format of the document is not always completely clear. But it's the
13 paragraph that has the "1/" in front of it. And again, as I explained
14 earlier, if you'll just look at that paragraph for a moment, I'll ask you
15 a question or two.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Did your assessment of the conditions as reflected -- the ones
18 that are addressed in this paragraph, did that assessment continue to be
19 true throughout the time of your involvement both at CC Mostar and at RC
21 A. Yes. In particular, I note the aggressive checkpoints, the
22 restriction of freedom of movement, and harassment of civilians. Yes.
23 Q. In a similar way, let me now direct your attention to the next
24 page, toward the middle of the page -- at the end of I guess what would be
25 a full paragraph, the sentence that says "The Muslims are systematically
1 pushed ..." Do you see that?
2 A. The first paragraph starts off with "volunteer withdrawal".
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. The second paragraph starts "last but not least".
5 Q. It's right above "last but not least".
6 A. Yes. Yes.
7 Q. Again, did that continue to be your observation and assessment
8 throughout your tour in ECMM from July through -- July 1993 to April 1994?
9 A. Certainly. Yes, the Croats were still very anxious to achieve
10 their Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna. Correct.
11 Q. Can you tell the Chamber some of the means that the Croats used to
12 accomplish that?
13 A. Well, there was -- almost from the time of the start of the
14 fighting, parallel structures emerged. Although both the Croats and the
15 Muslims were fighting the Serbs, they then developed separate armies,
16 separate police forces, separate administrations, separate money. And
17 indeed, they claimed a separate language. So everything, everything was
19 Q. If you can direct your attention to the next paragraph and look at
20 that for a moment, I'll ask you the next question.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Can you explain, please, or give us assistance on the way in
23 which, in your experience, the Vance-Owen plan was used as a
24 "justification" for the seizing of territory?
25 A. Well, the Croats were delighted with their provinces 8 and 10,
1 which stretched from Mostar all the way up to Vitez, Busovaca and so on.
2 As they clearly considered them to be Croat provinces as opposed to
3 multi-ethnic provinces, it was clear to me what they were attempting to do
4 was to draw a line between cantons -- provinces 8 and 10, and 9, which was
5 the Muslim majority province. And then there was undoubtedly an attempt,
6 such as in Mostar, to make the areas more ethnically clean; in other
7 words, to make it really a Croat province.
8 Q. May I ask you, then, to turn to page 5. There appear to be some
9 handwritten numbers up toward the upper right corner, so if you can make
10 reference to those. If you turn to page 5, the last paragraph beginning
11 on that page, and again I'll ask you just to review that for a moment.
12 A. The paragraph which reads -- starts "This analysis ..."
13 Q. Yes, and following.
14 A. And following.
16 Q. Can you tell the Judges, Sir Martin, whether the conduct and views
17 expressed here, again, continued to be what you saw and observed and heard
18 from senior Croat officials during your tour in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
19 A. Yes. They had already seen that the Serbs had virtually, by force
20 of arms, achieved their Republika Srpska.
21 And they wanted their own Croat entity, the Croatian Republic of
23 Q. Thank you, sir. If we could then go on to the next exhibit,
24 hopefully this will be a bit easier because we will simply go through the
25 pages. The English documents are followed by a B/C/S translation, so if
1 you'll proceed down, please, through the binder until you get to P373? It
2 would be very close to the -- Mr. Usher, it's this far down the stack. It
3 should be very close to the --
4 A. To the front?
5 Q. To the front.
6 A. That's the one we've dealt with.
7 Q. P373, marked in the lower, right corner.
8 A. Here we are. Fine.
9 Q. Sir, when you arrived in Mostar in early July, 1993, and
10 continuing thereafter, were you, at various times, briefed and we might
11 say brought up to speed on the events of the last -- of the previous
12 several weeks and months preceding your arrival there?
13 A. Yes, to a certain extent, but because we were moving so fast, we
14 were thinking of what was going to happen as opposed to more than what had
15 happened, but of course I had a pretty good idea of what had happened.
16 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, there are some references in this
17 document to the HV, on the top of page 4, but I would prefer -- or page 3,
18 I'm sorry, which was a different topic I'd like to come back to in the
19 future. So I think with that, I'm not going to ask Sir Martin to comment
20 further on the document at this time.
21 Q. Can I ask you, please, to turn down to the next exhibit? It
22 should be just a few pages down, if you follow -- if you pass through the
23 B/C/S translation, there should then be a divider page and then the next
24 exhibit, 386?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Just by way of background, turning to the second page of this
2 exhibit, can you just explain to the Chamber, please, who Ole Brix
3 Andersen was and what his position was in ECMM at that time?
4 A. Yes. The head of the mission would be an EC from the country
5 which at the time held the presidency. At this period, it was Denmark.
6 So in Zagreb, there was the head of the EC Monitor Mission, and his
7 deputy. The deputy was nearly always a political from the political --
8 from the foreign office, foreign ministry, of the nation concerned.
9 Q. All right.
10 A. It was he who did the detailed political work.
11 Q. Now, directing your attention to the text of the document that
12 Mr. Brix Andersen's memo seems to be essentially a covering letter for, to
13 the third page of the exhibit, did you come to know, sir, that in the
14 spring, in May of 1993, that a high level ECMM mission had been sent into
15 Bosnia for the purpose of addressing some of the trouble which had started
16 to break out at that time?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And can you confirm to the Chamber that this is a copy of the
19 report of that fact-finding mission?
20 A. That is correct. And the three individuals concerned would have
21 been the heads of their national delegations of the ECMM.
22 Q. And so if we direct -- if we go to the last page of the English
23 page of this exhibit, the fact-finding mission was headed up by Guy Hart
24 for the British, Pierre Cornee for the French, and Antonio Sanchez for the
25 Spanish delegation?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. Let me ask you to look at paragraph number 3, about the middle of
3 that paragraph, there are references to Mr. Anto Valenta?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. If you can just look at that for a moment, please, is that the
6 same Anto Valenta, as far as you know, as the Anto Valenta who you dealt
7 with and you testified about earlier today?
8 A. Yes, it certainly would have been, yes.
9 Q. And in terms of the comments, for instance, that are attributed to
10 Mr. Valenta here, do those appear to you to be consistent with the kinds
11 of comments and statements that he made to you?
12 A. Well, of course, it was a very stupid response, because there were
13 no Serbs anywhere in the area, and of course, the HVO were a very short
14 distance from Ahmici, which was situated in between Croat Vitez and Croat
15 Vucje Vas.
16 MR. MEEK: Mr. President?
17 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek?
18 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, my objection goes to the
19 non-responsiveness of the answer. The question was very clear, requiring
20 a yes-or-no answer, and I think that this is very non-responsive, and I
21 object to that. He was merely asked did these appear to be consistent
22 comments that this individual may have made to him, and now we've got to a
23 non-responsive answer, and that's my objection.
24 JUDGE LIU: Well, I think the witness answered this question with
25 "well, of course." Then he explained his answer, which was clearly
1 stated in that paragraph. You may proceed, Mr. Scott.
2 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. Sir, can I then direct your attention to the third page of the
4 report itself, to paragraph numbered 10. Can you please, in looking at
5 that -- can you confirm that that is consistent with what your
6 understanding of what had happened during that time period and the demands
7 and ultimatums that had been made by the Bosnian Croat side?
8 A. Yes, I would say that it would be very much in Mate Boban's
9 character to issue ultimatums. I'm not certain precisely what that letter
10 consisted of, but I'm sure it would have been in connection with taking
11 action on the Vance-Owen plan.
12 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I'll say that that letter is in the
13 record, but I won't ask this witness to comment on it further. But it
14 will be available to the Chamber.
15 Q. Can I next ask you, please, to go to the next page, Item
16 Number 13. Once again, if you'll just focus for a moment on that
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. The sentence at the end of that paragraph which states: "This is
20 not so much as a result of the actions of uncontrolled elements, but
21 rather as a result of the application of deliberate HDZ/HVO policy."
22 Based on your experience and observations, would you share that
23 assessment, and again, throughout the time of your involvement in Bosnia
24 between July 1993 and April 1994?
25 A. Yes. There was a close political control of military activities.
1 Both sides often used as an excuse, if some atrocity happened, that there
2 was uncontrolled elements. But I never accepted that because as far as I
3 was concerned, it was the political leaders who made decisions and laid
4 down the policy.
5 Q. Perhaps you could give the Judges some additional assistance as to
6 why you felt that, why you concluded that the statement that these were --
7 these actions were the result of uncontrolled elements, why you rejected
8 that explanation?
9 A. Well, to say atrocities or whatever have been conducted by
10 uncontrolled elements is an easy excuse for shedding responsibility. But
11 in my view, it's the political leaders who must take the responsibilities,
12 and then their military commanders under them. And if they make a
13 mistake, they get sacked. But they cannot complain about uncontrolled
15 Q. I'll ask you, then, to go on, please, to Exhibit 386, which again
16 should be the document following the Serbo-Croatian translation.
17 A. 386 or 396?
18 Q. I'm sorry. You're absolutely right. 396. If you have that,
19 please, I'll focus your attention -- the only questions I think I will ask
20 you about this will be on paragraphs number 1 and 2.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Now, to use the words of Mr. Thebault in paragraph number 2, he
23 makes reference to a deliberate policy. And I simply ask you to state to
24 the Chamber your assessment. Did that policy, as described here in
25 connection with freedom of movement, continue to be the practice and
1 policy of the HVO throughout your time?
2 A. Yes, both generally throughout Bosnia and locally in Mostar. And
3 I think maybe by the winter, it was beginning to ease a bit. But I,
4 myself, can remember being blocked for four nights in Gornji Vakuf trying
5 to get down south from Zenica because the HVO had blocked the road. And
6 that was in November. Things gradually eased a little bit towards the
8 Q. What was the effect -- Mr. Thebault uses the terminology here in
9 the first paragraph. He refers to it as "the economic weapon." Can you
10 tell the Chamber your observations: What was the effect of this
11 restriction on movement by the HVO?
12 A. Well, first of all, there was effect upon food, food convoys. And
13 as far as economy was concerned, for example, from Sarajevo, because the
14 trains were no longer working, any -- and Zenica and so on, any
15 manufacturing, what little manufacturing work that was going on couldn't
16 be brought down south because it was -- the roads were blocked. So it was
17 a complete stifling of the whole system.
18 Q. How did that restriction on movement affect the work of the
19 international organisations?
20 A. We certainly had a lot of difficulties, and I gave you a personal
21 example of being blocked for four nights. And it happened to be the
22 coldest week of the whole winter, but that's another matter. But it was a
23 constant problem, and we very often had to use alternative routes. We
24 started discovering that there were alternative routes, narrow little
25 tracks, which we could use. And if necessary, if we were blocked in one
1 direction, sometimes we were able to get round by using another route.
2 But it was a constant problem.
3 Q. Sir, it may come up in one of the other documents we'll get to in
4 the course of your examination - and at the moment I don't recall for
5 sure, but maybe you can tell us - approximately how long was entry into
6 Mostar blocked from approximately the end of June 1993 until a
7 humanitarian convoy was first allowed in East Mostar?
8 A. The first convoy -- UNHCR convoy went in, I think it was the end
9 of August. That was -- and from then on, it became not too difficult for
10 UNHCR to get food into Mostar, but there was a long, long period when they
11 just couldn't get in at all. So it was really -- I think the end of
12 August was the first convoy in.
13 Q. I'll ask you to proceed on, please, to Exhibit 397.
14 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, a number of these things have now
15 become covered in the course of the testimony, but the Court will see that
16 in terms of reference to Mostar being the capital of Herceg-Bosna, et
17 cetera, so I won't go back to those topics at this point.
18 Q. Sir Martin, let me direct your attention, please, to the second
19 paragraph in what might be described as paragraph numbered 2. There is a
20 2/ and a paragraph, and then there is another paragraph that appears to
21 start "even if."
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. If you could look at that for a moment?
24 A. Yeah. Yes.
25 Q. In connection with the two communities -- and I'm specifically
1 addressing your attention to the -- to Mostar, East and West Mostar, from
2 July of 1993 -- actually, according to this document, from May of 1993 to
3 the end of 1993 at least, between the two communities, can you tell the
4 Chamber, please -- give your assessment of who the aggressor was between
5 those two communities?
6 A. The aggression was almost entirely on the Croat side. It was the
7 HVO who was pounding East Mostar into rubble throughout that period.
8 Q. That paragraph makes reference to Mr. Thebault's assessment is
9 that it was -- this attack on Mostar was, quote, "planned, precisely
10 organised and conducted." And he says, "Two proofs" --
11 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek?
12 MR. MEEK: I object, Mr. President and Your Honours. This
13 document speaks for itself. The practice of putting the document and then
14 reading directly from it is, I feel, inappropriate. The document speaks
15 for itself. That's my objection.
16 JUDGE LIU: Well, I believe that the Prosecutor is asking some
17 questions and asking this witness to verify the facts in those documents,
18 in those statements. We haven't heard the end of the question put forward
19 by the Prosecutor. Let him continue.
20 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour I was laying the foundation for this
22 Q. Sir, as a professional military soldier in the Royal Marines for
23 37 years, when Mr. Thebault makes -- says one of the proofs for concluding
24 this was a planned, precisely organised attack, and he gives his one
25 reason for that, the systematic displacement of more than 1800 Muslims,
1 can you tell us, sir, as a military man, what sort of planning and
2 organisation would be required to coordinate the arrest of 1800 people in
3 a short time?
4 A. I would say very considerable planning, and of course, the numbers
5 were very much in excess of 1800 later on, but you cannot just decide, on
6 a moment, to pick up 1800 people and transport them to some form of
7 detention centre. This requires very careful planning and very
8 considerable logistics.
9 Q. Approximately - and it's just an approximation, sir - in your
10 military experience, how long would it take to plan and organise an
11 operation on that scale?
12 A. In my view, it would be weeks.
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Par?
14 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] I'd like to object again to the form of
15 these questions. The witness is again placed in a position of an expert -
16 now as a military expert - to provide us with some explanation. We see
17 that this witness had all sorts of qualifications, all sorts of knowledge,
18 that he has a very broad experience, and we are reacting to -- we did not
19 react earlier when the Prosecution asked him, "On the basis of your
20 experience" and so on and so forth, but now, this time, to ask for some
21 expertise, it seems that the Prosecutor is now inducing the witness to
22 testify in a third manner, and I object to further examination in this
24 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Prosecutor, we don't believe there is any
25 comparison between the two different operations. You may skip that
2 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I would submit that the witness has
3 answered the question, and I think it is a fair question and a fair answer
4 to assist this Chamber to make a judgement on what would have been
5 required to organise and carry out that kind of conduct. But I believe
6 that the witness did give his answer.
7 JUDGE LIU: You have to move on.
8 MR. SCOTT:
9 Q. Can I direct your attention, Witness, to the -- page 4? There are
10 some page numbers at the top corner of the document, top, right corner of
11 the document, if you could look at page 4? And I just direct your
12 attention to the bottom of that page, the part that's been added by hand,
13 and the statement that, "The planned provinces are not the property of one
14 community or another." Again, is that a reflection of what you saw to be
15 the view of the HVO, again, as you've said this afternoon, and as
16 Mr. Thebault seems to be indicating here, that, for instance, Mostar was a
17 Croat province?
18 A. Yes. Of course, by now the Vance-Owen Plan was virtually dead,
19 but the principle of having Mostar as their capital remained.
20 Q. Let me ask you to go, please, to Exhibit 458. And can you just
21 look at that for a moment and I'll ask you a few background questions.
22 The cover memo is again from Mr. Brix Andersen, if you will, not the cover
23 cover, not the fax page, so to speak, but there is a memo dated the 15th
24 of June, 1993; is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Now, to orient the Chamber to the next enclosed document, it's
2 titled, "Croat Muslim Relations in Central Bosnia, June, 1993"?
3 A. Right.
4 Q. And just in terms of directing your attention to the first
5 paragraph, can you confirm that this was in fact an ECMM paper prepared
6 for the purpose as stated here of briefing the German government?
7 A. Yes, yeah.
8 Q. Again, so this is an official assessment of the ECMM prepared
9 specifically for so serious a function as briefing the German government?
10 A. Correct, correct. Yes.
11 Q. I direct your attention, please, to the paragraph under
12 "Situation," if you can look at that, please. Can you compare, please,
13 or comment whether the statement here about what was happening here in
14 Mostar is consistent with what you saw and observed throughout your time,
15 either directly in Mostar, or as head of RC Zenica. Specifically,
16 paragraph 2 under "Situation."
17 A. Yes, that is certainly how I saw the situation myself.
18 Q. I'm going to direct your attention down to paragraph -- excuse me,
19 Section Number 3 titled "Summary of Aims," and I want you to look, please,
20 at the HVO aims. Appears to be a., b., c., d..
21 A. Yes, I would say I would agree with that assessment.
22 Q. Nothing in your experience, sir, your own personal observations,
23 would be contrary to points a., b., c., and d.
24 A. No.
25 Q. Directing your attention to Section Number 5 of the next page, and
1 if you can just read through quickly a., b., c., d., and e.
2 A. Sorry, which a., b., c., d., and e. Yes, indeed. Yes, I would
3 agree with all those proposals, although the only point I would make is
4 that certainly by the time I returned to Mostar in April 1994, Demirovic
5 had been released from custody, from detention. But I'm not sure when he
6 was released.
7 Q. For the record, when you refer to Demirovic, this is the person
8 identified in paragraph e. Is that right?
9 A. That is right.
10 Q. Now, as you just indicated, these are -- you said you would agree
11 with all these proposals. Can you tell the Chamber as to these five
12 proposals for action, what if any progress did the HVO make in
13 compliance -- any compliance with these five items by the end of 1993?
14 A. By the end of 1993, there was a marginal improvement in a. and b.
15 The HV military activity was still in progress, and there certainly was
16 not unrestricted access to all areas. So I would say marginal
17 improvements by the end of 1993 in a. and b. c. continued, and d. still
19 Q. Let me ask you not -- in the same exhibit, we're not changing
20 exhibits. If you'll page down several pages, it will be the last page in
21 English, there's an enclosed memo titled "From EHRC Zenica" dated the 3rd
22 of June, 1993, subject "HV involvement in BH" --
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
24 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, Your Honours, this is not so much an
25 objection as an observation. I believe -- and I'd like to ask my
1 colleague, Mr. Scott, we've only been provided with one -- two of three
2 pages, the first and the third, and we don't have page 2. At least it's
3 not in my binder. I don't know about Your Honours' binders.
4 JUDGE LIU: We found that document already.
5 MR. MEEK: Are you missing page 2 also?
6 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, if I can respond, counsel is absolutely
7 correct. And this is an example of evidence the -- the Prosecution, of
8 course, takes the evidence as it finds it. Counsel is correct. There
9 seems to be two copies of page A1 of 3, no A2, and then A3. And I can
10 simply represent to the Chamber that in my various attempts to find that
11 missing page, I have not been able to do so.
12 JUDGE LIU: Thank you.
13 MR. MEEK: Thank you.
14 MR. SCOTT:
15 Q. If I can direct your attention to that last page, right before
16 the -- including --
17 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Par.
18 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] I'm not sure whether we can analyse this
19 document at all if this document is not complete. It is my view that if
20 we are to refer to a document, and if we want to tender a document into
21 evidence, one of the basic prerequisites is for the document to be
22 complete. If this document does not contain all that its original
23 contained, I do not think that we can even take it into consideration.
24 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, the only thing I can say is what I've
25 said already. Obviously if I had that page I would be most happy -- I
1 think the Chamber knows by now I would have provided it. But it's simply
2 the state of the evidence. I can't change that.
3 You'll note that on the fax page at the top of the page, just to
4 indicate that this is consistently what happened, and obviously happened
5 at the time, if you look at the original fax information that some fax
6 machines put on the top of the page, you'll see the fax itself. Starting
7 with the page starting -- "Croat Muslim relations in Central Bosnia", the
8 first page of the report itself. It's fax page 4. Fax page 5. Fax page
9 6. Fax page 7. Fax page 8. Nothing has been removed. It's just
10 apparently when it was faxed, that's what happened. And I submit,
11 Mr. President, those things happened. Should not be a reason for the
12 Chamber not to receive the evidence.
13 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
14 MR. MEEK: These things do happen, but in -- not faulting the
15 Prosecutor in this case, it still begs the question that you have a
16 document with one full page missing, and we don't know what the context of
17 that missing page is. And no matter where the fault lies, if it lies
18 nowhere in this courtroom, it's still a basic right of the accused to know
19 the documents and the evidence that are being used against him in this
20 case. We don't know on this document. And I concur on Mr. Par's
21 objection on those grounds.
22 JUDGE LIU: We understand that you have an objection on this very
23 issue. And we'll bear it in mind when we -- when the time comes for us to
24 decide whether to admit those documents into evidence or not. But let the
25 Prosecutor proceed at this moment.
1 MR. SCOTT:
2 Q. Sir Martin, I just direct your attention to that last page, and if
3 you could assist us -- perhaps you can; if you cannot assist us,
4 certainly, of course, we'll move on. There is a statement -- you have
5 talked about being -- access and movement of the international
6 organisations being regularly limited or blocked by the HVO. Now, is that
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Do you recall whether one of the areas from which the
10 international organisations were excluded for a long period of time was an
11 area around Sovici and Doljani?
12 A. Yes, this was -- although when this 3rd of June, at this stage, at
13 this stage -- in fact, we did have a team up in Jablanica. But
14 subsequently, we had to withdraw it because the vehicle was hijacked by
15 the mujahedin. But at this stage, we did have a team up in Jablanica.
16 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I'll simply ask the Chamber to take
17 judicial notice of a calendar. If you work back seven weeks, as stated
18 here, seven weeks from the 3rd of June, that would take you back to the
19 15th of April, 1993 at which time the blockage of the international
20 organisations around Sovici and Doljani started.
21 A. I cannot -- I cannot say -- I'm afraid I just cannot say what the
22 situation was at that particular time.
23 Q. Precisely, sir. That's my next question. Were there a number of
24 occasions during your tour when access into certain areas was completely
25 blocked by the HVO?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Yes, indeed. Absolutely. And some very serious ones, too,
2 including the massacre in Stupni Dol.
3 Q. All right. If we can continue on then, please, down to the next
4 exhibit, which I think will be 460, this is a report or document titled
5 "The Way Ahead in Bosnia-Herzegovina" indicating in the upper left corner
6 Ole Brix Andersen, deputy head of mission, 16 June, 1993.
7 If I can direct your attention please, to paragraph number 10 on
8 page 2, and if you'll just look at paragraph 10 and continuing over to the
9 top of the following page, to the end of paragraph 10, can you tell the
10 Judges, please, do you share that assessment, and was that true, during
11 your tour in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
12 A. Yes, absolutely.
13 Q. In a similar fashion, can I ask you to look for a moment at
14 paragraph number 12? And again I'll simply ask you, based on your
15 experience, your personal observation, were those conditions true, and did
16 they continue to be true, during your time in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 A. Yes, correct.
18 Q. Directing your attention particularly to the second sentence of
19 paragraph 12, is that consistent with what you saw in West Mostar as you
20 told the Chamber several hours ago today?
21 A. Yes. It was clear in my mind that that was the intention.
22 Q. And with reference to that second -- and forgive me, perhaps I
23 wasn't clear enough. When it says, "In Croat parts of the city, life has
24 returned to normal," is that consistent with what you saw in West Mostar?
25 A. Yes. Life was pretty normal. There were cafes, shops, and so on,
1 whereas in East Mostar, there was not one single shop of any description
2 whatsoever. Very different.
3 Q. Directing your attention to paragraph number 18 on the next page,
4 under the section titled "Muslims," I just want to direct your attention
5 to one sentence, reflecting on or connected to something you said earlier
6 today about the amount of property -- or excuse me, territory given to the
7 Bosnian Croats under the Vance-Owen Plan, there is a sentence about
8 halfway down through item 18 which says, "The original map gave areas of
9 Muslim majority, in Jablanica and Konjic, for example, to the Croats." Do
10 you see that?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And was that true, to the best of your knowledge?
13 A. That, to the best of my knowledge, was true, but I think it was
14 subsequently changed in the revised map.
15 Q. Because of the relatively advantageous way -- treatment that the
16 Bosnian Croats received under the Vance-Owen Plan, did you ever hear the
17 initials VOPP interpreted to mean something else?
18 A. Well, yes. There certainly was a joke which was that the initials
19 HVO, standing for the Croat Defence Force, stood for "Hvala, Vance-Owen,"
20 "Thank you, Vance-Owen," because they were very pleased with the
21 proposals in the plan.
22 Q. If I can direct your attention to page 7, I think the last
23 question on this document, page 7, on the upper part of the page, a
24 subparagraph F, this begins to take us a bit into another -- somewhat of a
25 different topic, but I suppose we will just go ahead and cover it now.
1 One of the recommendations being made by ECMM at this time is -- included
2 sanctions, "restrictive measures (sanctions) on the actors in power,
3 (Bosnian Croats as well as Croatians.)" Can you explain to the Chamber
4 why it would be that sanctions would be brought on Croatians or people of
5 the Republic of Croatia and not simply Bosnian Croats?
6 A. This was -- just one minute. This will undoubtedly be because of
7 the Croatian army's involvement in Bosnia, and also because there was an
8 extremely close link between the Croats of Bosnia and the Croatians of
9 Croatia. Indeed, if I could add that the Croats in Bosnia, they all
10 carried Croatian passports. They referred to "our president," meaning
11 President Tudjman. They were able to vote in the Croatian elections and
12 they shared the same national anthem.
13 Q. I'd like to send you on, please, to Exhibit P465. And I'm afraid
14 it's going to take a bit more than a moment to -- for to you look at this
15 document, the first page and a half or so, first page and two-thirds, in
16 order to, I think, probably orient yourself sufficiently for me to ask you
17 a couple of questions about it. So if you could just --
18 A. The first two pages?
19 Q. Yes, basically, yes.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Mr. Thebault is referring to something -- this something called --
22 which he refers to in the second paragraph as the Travnik case.
23 MR. SCOTT: And I will note for the Chamber, and for counsel, that
24 this -- a certain additional report goes on, that's actually part of this
25 same document, that's titled on the bottom of the second page, "Travnik
1 Special Report," but again I will not dwell on that particularly.
2 Q. But are you familiar with what it is that Mr. Thebault is making
3 reference here and making his comments about when he refers to the Travnik
4 case and being a marvellous propaganda operation?
5 A. Yes. There was fighting in Travnik in central Bosnia between the
6 Croats and the Bosniaks. A very large number of Croats moved out of
7 Travnik and the surrounding areas, and the question hinged around how much
8 of it was ethnic cleansing by the Bosniaks and how much they had been
9 instructed to leave, even though they may well have been in fear of the
10 mujahedin forces. The -- looking at the following report -- and I have
11 considerable respect for the author or one of the authors of the report
12 whom I know very well --
13 Q. And who is that, sir?
14 A. Watkins, Philip Watkins, whose name appears right at the very end.
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. And he had been in that area for a long time, then. I would
17 certainly believe what he has said, particularly in his paragraph 5 where
18 he is talking about population moves.
19 Q. All right. I'll pause for a moment just so that the Judges can
20 see what you're referring to.
21 A. This is paragraph 5 of the special report.
22 Q. Yes.
23 Let me direct your attention, please, based on that, back to the
24 first page of the exhibit itself, in the lower part of that page, there's
25 a discussion of population or demography, if you will. I want to put this
1 question to you: During your involvement in these issues from
2 approximately early July 1993, at least until April 1994, did you observe
3 that the Croat positions or assessment of the demographics changed in the
4 sense of whether they thought this was to their advantage or disadvantage?
5 A. When I was in Central Bosnia, it was said to me on a number of
6 occasions by Croats, including men of the church, that they felt deserted
7 by their colleagues down in the south who, they said, were only interested
8 in the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and not in them, the Croats in
9 Central Bosnia. If I could go a stage further and say that there was a
10 schism in the high ranks of the HDZ and the Croats. There were some who
11 believed that their whole future lay in concentrating in the south of
12 Bosnia; in other words, in the old Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna
13 stretching from Drvar to Mostar. There were others, including people like
14 Kresimir Zubak and, indeed, people like Ivan Bender and Valentin Zuric who
15 said to me that the future of the Croats lies in Central Bosnia.
16 There was this split. Those who wanted to concentrate in the
17 south. And indeed, another example of that is that -- it's outside the
18 time scale of this trial, but if I might just mention that in 1997, I,
19 with the head of UNHCR in Mostar, had a meeting with the head of the Croat
20 association for displaced people --
21 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
22 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, Your Honours, the Defence for Mladen
23 Naletilic certainly, strongly, and vigorously objects to this witness
24 testifying to what happened in 1997.
25 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Prosecutor, we are not interested in that
1 case unless you show the relevance to this very case.
2 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I think I can do that, and I think there
3 may be some additional questions to put to the witness. But I think what
4 the witness -- before I put the additional questions, I think, in fairness
5 to the witness, he was citing something as an illustration that
6 illustrated something that was true in 1993 as well. But let me put some
7 additional questions.
8 Q. Before you give us this story that you were about to, and
9 depending on whether the Chamber will then allow you to address it or not,
10 perhaps before you get to that point, given these two schools among the
11 Bosnian Croat leadership that you've described, can you explain to the
12 Chamber how it would be to the advantage of one of those groups or the
13 other to consolidate as much Bosnian Croat population, for instance, in
14 Herzegovina at the expense of Central Bosnia?
15 A. Shall I complete answering --
16 Q. If you can answer my question first, and then perhaps the Judges
17 will allow you to relate to that -- to illustrate that by your subsequent
19 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Krsnik.
20 MR. KRSNIK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your kind
21 permission, although Mr. Meek is constantly objecting and although you
22 have ruled that only one counsel is allowed to stand up and make
23 objections, but I as the lead counsel need to make a number of objections
24 to the manner in which our witness is questioned today.
25 Mr. President, Your Honours, we cannot allow -- the Defence of
1 Mladen Naletilic cannot allow this questioning to go on in this manner.
2 We're dealing with issues pertaining to Central Bosnia, issues that do not
3 pertain even remotely to my client. We are now talking about some
4 political opinions, observations that have nothing to do with our
5 indictment. We have now gone so far from the original time period; we are
6 now in 1997.
7 Our esteemed witness, for whom we all hold in high esteem, has
8 spoken about many things today; yet, he spoke the least about the period
9 of 1993 and about Mostar and his stay in Mostar. In the period while our
10 esteemed witness was in Zenica, from October to April 1994, we have no
11 reports for that period, yet this witness should confirm the opinions of
12 his predecessors, and we do not know when he was briefed about them and
13 how is then he able to confirm that these opinions that are not his own
14 are true. And also, he speaks about some events in which he never
16 So we strongly object to this line of questioning. And I also
17 thank you for your indulgence for letting me voice my objection.
18 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Prosecutor, we already mentioned that we only want
19 to hear the evidence which is related to our case.
20 MR. SCOTT: Which is what you have been hearing, Your Honour, for
21 the vast majority of which -- the witness just now made one reference. He
22 wanted to give an illustration of something from a subsequent time. It is
23 not fair, in my view, respectfully, to say that this witness has been
24 going on and on and on about everything other than 1993. In almost all of
25 this testimony he's talked about 1993.
1 JUDGE LIU: We understand that report is dated on the 19th June,
3 MR. SCOTT: Yes.
4 JUDGE LIU: And we'll allow you to go for a while to see whether
5 there's any relevance to this very case. If not, we have to strike this
6 paragraph out of the transcript.
7 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
8 Q. Sir Martin, I don't know if you recall my last question or not.
9 Let me see if I can phrase it again. Can you explain to the Chamber,
10 based on your observations and your experience in the region, what the
11 advantage would be to one school or the other of the -- what you just
12 described a few moments ago as the Bosnian Croat leadership of moving or
13 consolidating Bosnian Croat population in Herzegovina as opposed to
14 leaving it around Travnik?
15 A. For those idealists, shall we call them, who wished to see the
16 Croats remaining in their historical areas of -- in Central Bosnia, there
17 would be a great sadness to vacate Central Bosnia completely, and they
18 would wish to return to those areas where they had large numbers. To
19 others, there are advantages, including military advantages, in
20 consolidating in a smaller area in the south, in other words, Croatian
21 Republic of Herceg-Bosna, particularly as that area is entirely contiguous
22 with the mainland of the Republic of Croatia. So there are practical
23 advantages and military advantages to consolidate in the south.
24 But as I say, to others, to people like Zubak, there would be an
25 athema, and he would believe that the future of the Croats would lie in
1 the old lands of Central Bosnia.
2 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, if I can be allowed to finish this
3 document, please, just one or two questions.
4 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
5 MR. SCOTT:
6 Q. To conclude on this document, sir, if I could just direct your
7 attention to the second page, not quite halfway down the page, simply
8 there's a paragraph that starts out with the words "it seems Machiavelic,
9 but it is only Balkan." And there are a number of individuals listed
11 MR. SCOTT: Judge Clark, I see you looking a bit perplexed, and if
12 I can assist, if that's not being too presumptuous, on the second page of
13 the -- not the report from Mr. -- not the report from Mr. Watkins, but the
14 second page overall of the exhibit.
15 Q. Sir, if you look at that paragraph for a moment, and it makes
16 reference to individuals. And most of these individuals -- in fact, all
17 of the individuals you've named today, would you agree with Mr. Thebault's
18 assessment that these Bosnian Croat leaders have what you would consider
19 to be extreme views?
20 A. I would tend to use the word "hard-line." Those were all
21 hard-liners - Boban, Stojic, Kordic and Valenta - absolutely.
22 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I can see that we are past the time.
23 We can stop there. Thank you.
24 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Usher, would you please show the witness out of
25 the room first?
1 We will resume at quarter to 6.00.
2 --- Recess taken at 5.16 p.m.
3 --- On resuming at 5.47 p.m.
4 JUDGE LIU: Before the witness is coming, there is a question I
5 would like to ask the Defence counsel. As we all know that the
6 Prosecution's case is approaching its end, so at this moment, would you
7 like to have a Status Conference or some time especially allocated to
8 procedural matters of this case? I would like to hear the initial
9 response from Defence counsel.
10 MR. KRSNIK: But not now.
11 JUDGE LIU: Sorry, I didn't get you.
12 MR. KRSNIK: [Interpretation] We shall go into all these matters,
13 but not right now, isn't it, once we finished with this witness? Yes, of
14 course, Your Honour, thank you.
15 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Seric?
16 MR. SERIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, very briefly, we have
17 agreed a meeting with our friends from the Prosecution, early afternoon
18 tomorrow, and then we shall be -- after that we shall be better prepared
19 for the Status Conference. So with your indulgence, let us talk about it
20 tomorrow or when we finish with this witness. Thank you very much.
21 JUDGE LIU: Thank you. Thank you very much.
22 Yes, Mr. Scott, you may proceed.
23 MR. SCOTT:
24 Q. Sir Martin, I'd like to direct your attention now to one more
25 exhibit before we -- we will end with exhibits, at least for a few
1 minutes, and talk about other things, but if I could ask you to look,
2 please, at 532, which should be the next exhibit in the binder? And I
3 apologise that in some of the copies, part of the exhibit number has been
4 cut off at the bottom of the page, but it is a page that up in the
5 upper -- excuse me, it's a document that in the upper left-hand corner
6 bears the date 23 July, 1993?
7 A. Yes. I've got it, 22 July.
8 Q. The actual date of the document is 22 July.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Sir, in the interests of time, I just want to direct your
11 attention to the first two paragraphs of that document, and I'll ask you a
12 question or two about that.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Scott, we are getting the French
14 interpretation too strong. Could you please either put the volume down or
15 do something about your headset?
16 A. Yes, I've read it.
17 Q. Now, this is dated the 23rd of July, 1993 -- or excuse me, 22nd.
18 Of course, by now you were actually there on the ground yourself, and my
19 question is, again, did the problem with the blockade of roads and this
20 practice or strategy of the HVO, did that continue at least through the
21 year 1993?
22 A. Yes, yes. As I mentioned, there was a -- it was definitely
23 slightly easier at the end of the year, but it did continue.
24 Q. Did you have, yourself, meetings with senior Bosnian Croat
25 officials to attempt to address this issue of movement, both in terms of
1 the monitoring groups, UNPROFOR, ECMM, but also on behalf of the
2 humanitarian organisations?
3 A. My main concern then was movement in and out of Mostar, so I was
4 not -- I wasn't concerning myself directly with movements into central
5 Bosnia. I was more focused on Mostar and the immediate area.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Scott, could you please put down the volume
7 of your French channel. It is interfering with you.
8 MR. SCOTT:
9 Q. All right. Now, let me direct your attention to another topic,
10 and putting aside the documents for a moment, did you have any discussions
11 with General Pasalic of the ABiH about the expulsion of Bosniaks in Mostar
12 during the summer and fall of 1993?
13 A. Yes, I used to meet him quite regularly, as I did meet the HVO
14 leadership regularly or the Croat leadership regularly. And I think it
15 was about the 22nd of September that he told me that -- if we're talking
16 about expelling.
17 Q. Expulsions.
18 A. He told me then that he was having about --
19 JUDGE LIU: Well, Witness.
20 Mr. Meek.
21 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours. For the
22 record, I must enter an objection. The General Pasalic is deceased.
23 There is absolutely no way that we can subpoena him to this Court for any
24 kind of cross-examination or to test the reliability of what this witness
25 is about to say he heard General Pasalic say to him. And that's my
1 objection. He is deceased, and we have no right to confront whatsoever
2 this witness, who will be a witness against my client, should this
3 testimony come into the record.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Meek, we believe that the testimony of this
6 witness on this very issue is relevant to the indictment. And we
7 understand that something happened to one of the persons involved in this
8 conversation. Since this incident is relevant to this issue, we are going
9 to hear what the witness is going to tell us. And of course, we'll not
10 rely entirely on this piece of the evidence, taking into account your
12 MR. MEEK: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE LIU: Witness, you may continue to answer the question.
14 A. Thank you, Mr. President.
15 And General Pasalic told me on that occasion that -- well, between
16 20 or 90 people being expelled from West Mostar over to the east every
17 night. And indeed, a lot of that, those expulsions, were captured on film
18 in that film that I mentioned earlier on, the Jeremy Bowen film in the BBC
19 series "Assignment". So I don't think there's any doubt about it.
20 MR. SCOTT:
21 Q. Can you confirm, Sir Martin, that the issue or problem of
22 expulsions continued throughout the time of your association with Mostar?
23 A. The expellings continued until the end of 1996, three and a half
24 years later.
25 Q. And did they, in fact -- thank you for your answer. But just to
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 confirm, within the time period you indicated, they did indeed continue
2 until the end of 1993 and the early part of 1994?
3 A. Correct.
4 Q. I direct your attention, please, to the 15th of August, 1993. Did
5 you have lunch -- attend a luncheon on that day?
6 A. Yes, I was invited by the mayor of Siroki Brijeg - his name was
7 Ivo Culjak - to lunch at his house. It was a fine house, and we had a
8 fine barbecue lunch around his swimming pool.
9 Q. Did you meet anyone in particular that you recall at that luncheon
10 at the mayor of Siroki Brijeg's house?
11 A. Yes. The guest who came and sat down on my right was dressed in
12 camouflage uniform, grey hair, little beard, and introduced himself as
13 "Tuta." He seemed a little bit disappointed when I asked him to repeat
14 his name, assuming that I would know who he was. But at that stage, it
15 did not mean anything to me. We then had an interesting conversation
16 during lunch. He told me that he had been out of Bosnia for 23 years in
17 South America, Germany, Italy, and Holland. He had been running casinos.
18 He told me that his favorite pastimes were poker and backgammon. The
19 subject of our lunch was mainly his concerns and warnings about the
20 establishment of an Islamic fundamentalist state in Bosnia, which he said
21 Izetbegovic was aiming for. I told him that the -- all the Bosnian
22 generals whom I had met in Central Bosnia and raised this specific subject
23 with all insisted, as they downed their glasses of slivovitz, that they
24 certainly did not want to see an Islamic fundamentalist state in Bosnia.
25 But I don't think I convinced Mladen Naletilic on that occasion.
1 I remember remarking at the time, or afterwards, that although
2 Mladen Naletilic certainly had charisma, I would not trust him.
3 Q. Did you learn during that conversation that this Tuta had any
4 particular views or attitude toward the man Mate Boban?
5 A. No, but I subsequently discovered that he was a great admirer of
6 Mate Boban.
7 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Meek.
8 MR. MEEK: I object to the nonresponsiveness of that answer. He
9 answers it simply "no", and then he went ahead and kept speaking. I ask
10 that it be stricken from the record.
11 JUDGE LIU: Mr. Meek, I think the Prosecution asked about the
12 contents of the conversation this witness conducted with your client.
13 There's no problem about it.
14 Yes, Mr. Scott. You may proceed.
15 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, if it makes the record any better, I'll
16 just ask what would have been the next question.
17 Q. If you didn't learn it at that time, did you subsequently learn
18 about any view or attitude that this Tuta had toward Mate Boban?
19 A. I learned that he was very close to Mate Boban and a great
20 supporter of him, and he himself confirmed it in an interview which he
21 gave with the "Nacional", Croatian newspaper, in which he expressed his
22 tremendous admiration for Mate Boban.
23 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
24 MR. MEEK: For the record, could we have a time frame on this
25 supposed interview.
1 JUDGE LIU: That's a legitimate request.
2 MR. SCOTT:
3 Q. Sir Martin, can you help us with that, in terms of the particular
4 reference to the article, I think you said in Nacional, approximately when
5 you saw that?
6 A. Yes. That was -- I remember it well. It was November, 1995.
7 Q. Did you ever come across a man named Ivan Andabak during your time
8 in Herzegovina?
9 A. Yes. I was aware that Mladen Naletilic was the commander of the
10 so-called Siroki Brijegska Kaznjenicka Bojna, the Siroki Brijeg Convicts
11 Brigade. I was aware that Ivan Andabak was his deputy in that brigade,
12 and I was aware that Vinko Martinovic held a lower position in that
14 Q. Did you ever meet this Mr. Andabak?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. What was the circumstances of meeting Mr. Andabak?
17 A. I met him at a reception in the officers' mess of the Spanish
18 Battalion in Medjugorje. He was a fluent Spanish speaker and had close
19 links with a number of the Spanish officers.
20 Q. Before moving on, Sir Martin, just so there is no mystery about
21 it, you mentioned you had information about this Vinko Martinovic known as
22 Stela. Is it accurate to say that you did not ever meet this Stela in
24 A. No. He asked to come and meet me, but -- I could explain it. But
25 then at the last minute, he didn't appear.
1 Q. Now, moving on, this has come up to some extent in your prior
2 testimony, but can you explain to the Chamber your observations about the
3 relationship or role in the republic -- of the Republic of Croatia in the
4 events that you saw taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
5 A. Well, there was, of course, extremely close links between the
6 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. As I've already mentioned, they
7 referred to President Tudjman as "our president," and I mentioned the
8 other close connections. But the one other key person was the Defence
9 Minister of Croatia, Gojko Susak, who was actually from Herzegovina, and
10 in fact from Siroki Brijeg. And there were others, Herzegovinians, who
11 were in the government of Croatia, including amongst others, Ivica
13 Q. Can you tell the Chamber, in your observation, whether the -- some
14 of the people that were in Siroki Brijeg at that time, did they seem to
15 have any -- play any particular role in what was happening, in your
16 experience, in Mostar?
17 A. I always felt that Siroki Brijeg, which was a very strong Croat
18 area of Bosnia, some 15 or 20 kilometres west of Mostar, had a strong
19 bearing on what went on in Mostar, because some key people lived there,
20 including Susak, the Croatian Consul General Grubisic, Mladen Naletilic,
21 Vladimir Soljic, Defence Minister and later became Defence Minister and
22 then President of the Federation. So there were a lot of key players
23 living in Siroki Brijeg. So I always felt that that had a strong bearing
24 on what went on in Mostar.
25 Q. Sir Martin, my colleague has alerted me that you made reference to
1 the Croatian Consul General, which we didn't seem to pick up in the
2 transcript at this point. Can you repeat that name, please?
3 A. His name was Ciro Grubisic. Shall I correct the spelling of
5 Q. Please, if you can.
6 A. C-i-r-o, G-r-u-b-i-s-i-c. That's right.
7 Q. Sir, can you relate to the Chamber, did you ever observe times
8 when actually someone from the Republic of Croatia, an official from the
9 Republic of Croatia, would lead, if you will, a Bosnian Croat delegation?
10 A. Yes, certainly. In fact, Susak himself led a -- led a Mostar
11 Croat delegation in talks. This was during the time of the EU
12 administration. But he was leading for the Croats and Seljagic was
13 leading for the Bosniaks.
14 Q. And was that the only time you recall that happening or did it
15 happen on a number of occasions?
16 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek?
17 MR. MEEK: For the record, I would request a time frame on this
18 last meeting that the witness spoke about.
19 JUDGE LIU: Yes. I trust Mr. Prosecutor will clear it up for us,
20 about that time frame.
21 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Mr. President.
22 Q. The reference to Gojko Susak leading the delegation you mentioned
23 a moment ago, can you tell us approximately when that was?
24 A. Yes, that actually was in January. January, 1996.
25 Q. Did you ever have conversations within these delegations as to why
1 the Bosnian Croat delegation was led by an official from the Republic of
3 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek?
4 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, Your Honours, now we are talking about
5 1996, and it was my understanding from Your Honour's ruling earlier this
6 afternoon that dealing with 1995 and 1996 was not acceptable. And I
7 object on these grounds.
8 JUDGE LIU: Well, we will take your objections into
10 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
11 MR. SCOTT:
12 Q. You can continue, sir, if you remember the question. I'll repeat
13 it from the transcript. Did you ever have conversations within these --
14 with these delegations as to why the Bosnian Croat delegation was led by
15 an official from the Republic of Croatia?
16 A. This was really because the government of Croatia had such a
17 powerful influence on what was going on with the Croats in
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina that it was understood that President Tudjman, Susak
19 and others would involve themselves in the matters, Croat matters, in
21 Q. All right. Now -- sorry, I'll pause. Now, a moment ago, I asked
22 you if the one instance with Susak was the only occasion. Did you ever --
23 do you remember an occasion with someone named Mate Granic led a Bosnian
24 Croat delegation?
25 A. Yes, indeed. I had quite a lot of dealings with Mate Granic, who
1 was the Foreign Minister of Croatia. The first time I really met him was
2 a meeting we had, I think on the 20th of September, 1993, after an
3 agreement on humanitarian matters between President Tudjman and President
4 Izetbegovic. And it was to do -- this particular meeting was to do with
5 the Dretelj detention camp. We met at Grude, and Mate Granic was
6 accompanied by Jadranko Prlic and Vladislav Pogarcic, who was the foreign
7 adviser -- foreign affairs adviser to Mate Boban and also dealt with
8 humanitarian matters. Following the meeting in Grude, we went to the
9 detention camp at Dretelj.
10 Q. What was the purpose of going to Dretelj at that time?
11 A. Well, it was to do with closing down the Dretelj detention camp.
12 And on arrival, Mate Granic, who is a man for whom I have a lot of
13 respect, spoke to the detainees and told them that they were going to be
14 released, for which he received much applause.
15 A week later, I had confirmation from Vladislav Pogarcic that 500
16 had been moved from Dretelj to the island of Korcula just off the coast in
17 Croatia. And I received confirmation of that from Claudio Baranzan, the
18 head of the ICRC in Mostar, who confirmed that 500 of been moved
19 temporarily to Korcula before being dispersed, and he -- ICRC was in close
20 touch on all the remaining detainees in Dretelj who were then going to be
21 subsequently released.
22 Q. Sir, the island of Korcula --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel and witness please make pauses
24 between question and answer.
25 MR. SCOTT:
1 Q. Sorry, we have been asked to slow down. I'll go back to repeat my
2 question. Can you simply tell -- and certainly some people may know. But
3 for the record, can you say to what country does the island of Korcula --
4 JUDGE DIARRA: [No interpretation]
5 JUDGE LIU: Well, I'm sorry, we didn't get the interpretation this
7 MR. SCOTT: Judge Diarra, my apology. Sorry.
8 Q. Sir Martin, let's go back to the answer you were giving us a
9 moment ago about the visit to Dretelj, if you could just go through that
10 again briefly. You went to Dretelj with people such as Mate Granic. And
11 will you just -- can you take us back through that, please.
12 A. Yes. Mate Granic, as I say, the foreign minister of the
13 Government of Croatia, was leading the delegation, and he had come down
14 following discussions and an agreement on humanitarian matters between
15 President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic. After the meeting in Grude,
16 we all went to the Dretelj detention camp where Mate Granic spoke to the
17 detainees and told them that they were going to be released, for which he
18 received applause.
19 A week later, I heard from Vladislav Pogarcic that 500 had been
20 moved temporarily to the island of Korcula off the Croatian coast, and
21 this was confirmed to me by Claudio Baranzan, the head of the ICRC in
22 Mostar. And he said that the ICRC was monitoring events in Dretelj very
23 closely and was monitoring the release of the remaining detainees.
24 Q. All right. Sir Martin, to follow up on that, was there any
25 indication given to you that -- why these 500 detainees were moved to the
1 Republic of Croatia?
2 A. No. I cannot answer that. Perhaps there were just not suitable
3 facilities in and around Mostar. I do not know. Maybe the Croatian
4 government was attempting to try and resolve this -- what was by now a
5 political hot potato, the subject of the detainees.
6 Q. Tell us about that, how did that subject become a political hot
8 A. Well, after the fighting in Mostar started, thousands of Muslim
9 men from 16 to 60 were detained and held in camps, the Heliodrom in
10 Mostar, Dretelj, Gabela, Ljubuski, and others. It was exceedingly
11 difficult for us to get inside these detention camps, although we heard
12 warring stories. Only the ICRC were able to gain access, and clearly
13 there was a lot of concern about why these men were being held for all
14 this time and a determination to have them released. Because these were
15 not criminals; they were detained because they were of military age.
16 Q. And how did -- if you can take us a step further, then, how did
17 this become a political hot potato?
18 A. Clearly because the international community was concerned about
19 these camps. We did not know enough about them. We knew that -- we were
20 concerned whether there was activities going on inside those camps, which
21 would be unacceptable. And in any case, why were they still being held?
22 Q. Had you heard of any decision to close any of these camps until
23 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mate Granic from the Republic of Croatia
24 came to Bosnia and said so?
25 A. No. No, that was the first indication we had of an intention to
1 start closing the camps.
2 Q. In connection with these detainees being moved to Korcula, did you
3 have any conversation with this Pogarcic about where they would then go
4 after Korcula?
5 A. I think as far as I can remember, he said that they would be
6 gradually released, but there was -- I'm afraid I cannot remember. I just
7 cannot remember what he said what would happen to them afterwards. And
8 because I moved up to Zenica, I'm afraid my eye went off that particular
10 Q. Did you ever hear anything -- either that group of detainees or
11 other detainees that were being released would be released as long as they
12 did not return to Bosnia?
13 A. I had heard that, but I did not see whether that necessarily could
14 be effected.
15 Q. Could you state to the Chamber - and again, this has been touched
16 on in the course of the afternoon - but your observations and assessment
17 about the presence and involvement of HV, that is Republic of Croatia
18 armed forces, in Bosnia-Herzegovina during that time period?
19 A. It was quite clear that there was a very considerable Croatian
20 army presence in Bosnia. We had many, many, many reports, and I believed
21 these reports. But then finally, I, myself, on two separate occasions,
22 coming down from Zenica to the south and travelling down the mountain road
23 between Prozor and Tomislavgrad, passed on two separate occasions large
24 Croatian army convoys coming up towards Prozor.
25 Q. Can you tell us approximately when you observed these convoys?
1 A. This was in January and in February 1994. In fact, Prlic
2 subsequently said, "Yes" -- he said, there were HV troops in Bosnia, but
3 he said there were only some 2.600, and these were Croatian army troops
4 who had been born in Bosnia and were returning to fight for their country,
5 volunteers returning to fight for their country. But I'm afraid I took
6 that with a pinch of salt.
7 Q. Why was that?
8 A. Because the numbers involved. And the large number of vehicles
9 and weaponry coming up, these were not volunteers. This was serious
10 military operations.
11 MR. SCOTT: Mr. Usher, I need your assistance for a moment. There
12 are two documents that are outside the binder, not in the binder,
13 Mr. President. They are two documents that came up with the Court before,
14 Exhibits IAC-52 and IAC-46. I don't have them. I don't have extra copies
15 here, but if I can ask the registrar's assistance. IAC-46, IAC-52.
16 Mr. President, these were two ECMM documents that some many weeks ago the
17 Chamber indicated that it wanted more information about.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Excuse me, Mr. Prosecutor, what binder?
19 MR. SCOTT: They should be in the IAC sets, not the chronological
20 set, but IAC-46 and 52.
21 Q. Sir Martin, if I can first ask you to look at, please, IAC-46.
22 And do you recognise -- you recognise this document? I mean, generally by
23 the format and content of the document.
24 A. Can I just... Yes.
25 Q. Of course.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, sir, are you able to confirm that this is an ECMM report from
3 the headquarters of ECMM to RC Zenica, and then below that the CCs in
4 Bosnia, Tuzla, Mostar and Travnik?
5 A. Yes.
6 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Par?
7 MR. PAR: [Interpretation] I would like to propose that this
8 document be placed on the ELMO because we don't have it here with us, and
9 without seeing it, we won't be able to ascertain what it actually is.
10 JUDGE LIU: That document is under seal?
11 MR. SCOTT: I don't believe so, Your Honour. I'd have to check
12 but no, I don't think so. I'm happy to have it shown to them.
13 JUDGE LIU: So it could be put on the ELMO?
14 MR. SCOTT: Let me just double-check, please. Mr. President, I
15 have no reason to think that either of these documents are under seal. We
16 can put them on the ELMO, I believe. For present purposes, perhaps if the
17 technical booth can just close in as much as possible on the very top,
18 upper left corner, the "from" and "to" information, and the subject and
20 THE REGISTRAR: Excuse me, according to the list that you
21 provided, along with the IAC documents, Exhibit number IAC-46 is under
22 seal, according to this list.
23 MR. SCOTT: All right. Then I think that's --
24 THE REGISTRAR: I don't have it in my official list, so ...
25 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I have reason to think -- not because
1 of the Registry, but I think that information is probably wrong, but we
2 should remove it obviously -- take it from the ELMO quickly. And again,
3 I'm not quarrelling with the Registrar. I think it relates to
4 something -- I have a feeling it relates to something else. But in any
5 event, we won't put it on the ELMO at this time.
6 Perhaps, Mr. Usher - the witness has identified the document; I'm
7 in the Chamber's hands - but perhaps you can just show that copy to
8 Defence counsel and they can look at it in the next few minutes.
9 Q. While that's taking place, Sir Martin, if you have in front of you
10 there, I think I can say it lying in front of you, IAC-52, can you simply
11 look at that document and just tell us what that is?
12 THE REGISTRAR: That's under seal also.
13 MR. SCOTT: Again, I won't put it on the ELMO.
14 A. Yes, right.
15 Q. Sir Martin, I'd just simply again ask you, can you confirm that
16 this is a report from CC Mostar to RC Zenica, a daily summary for the 15th
17 of July, 1993, and being signed by Jesus, acting as head of the CC?
18 A. That's right. I must have been away at the time. It's a daily
19 report sent by my deputy, yes.
20 MR. SCOTT: All right. And Mr. Usher, if you could please again
21 show IAC-52 to counsel?
22 JUDGE CLARK: Judge Diarra is not aware that there is a French
23 translation at the back.
24 MR. SCOTT: Thank you. Thank you, Judge Clark, for assisting on
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Mr. President, I'm going to let the documents speak for themselves
2 but again because of the inquiries the Chamber made previously, I was just
3 asking this witness to identify them further for the record.
4 Q. Now, before we leave this topic, Sir Martin, if I could ask you to
5 go in the binder back again to your end-of-tour report, which is Exhibit
6 770.1? Again, it's getting more toward the back of your binder.
7 A. Yes, I've located it.
8 Q. All right. If I can direct your particular attention in this
9 regard to your paragraphs 14 and 15, starting on the bottom of page 2 of
10 your end-of-tour report, and when you've had a moment to look at that,
11 I'll just have a question or two for you.
12 A. Yes, yes.
13 Q. Do those two paragraphs essentially serve as a summary of your
14 assessment and observations about the HV involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 in that approximate six-month period from October, 1993 to April, 1994?
16 A. Yes, in particular, I was never able to establish whether this
17 large movement of HV forces was offensive or defensive. They were heading
18 up towards Prozor. If the Croats had lost Prozor, the Bosniaks would have
19 been down to Mostar, and so Prozor was absolutely crucial. But it could
20 have been offensive, as I've indicated in paragraph 15.
21 Q. And at the end of paragraph 15 on page 3 of your report, is it
22 correct that you and your teams also had observed a, quote, "Build-up of
23 HVO/HV in the Buna area south of Mostar"?
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. All right. Sir, I think that takes us then back to a final set of
1 documents that I'd like to take you through, starting with Exhibit 553.1
2 in your binder. Approximately -- very roughly about in the middle of the
3 binder, if that helps at all. I think, sir, in watching you, I think it's
4 going to be further -- not back that way but further the other way.
5 A. Further the other way.
6 Q. Right about perhaps where you are, somewhere in that vicinity.
7 A. 553.1?
8 Q. 553.1. It is a daily summary for the 1st of August, 1993.
9 JUDGE LIU: Yes, Mr. Meek.
10 MR. MEEK: Mr. President, while the witness is looking for that
11 document, 553.1, I believe that Mr. Scott, my friend from the Prosecution
12 side, had asked a question -- the last question was whether this witness
13 or his teams had "observed" a build-up in the area of Mostar as based on
14 the previous document. The record ought to reflect that the previous
15 document did not say "observed" whatsoever, but only said "aware of". And
16 there's a big difference between observation and being aware by some third
17 or fourth sources.
18 JUDGE LIU: Well, Mr. Scott, would you please make it clear for
20 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Mr. President. I accept that that is a
21 difference, and I appreciate what counsel has said. Perhaps I can come
22 back to that.
23 Q. Have you found that document?
24 A. I found 553.1, yes.
25 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, we will come back to that document, if
1 the Court will allow, rather than lose our place.
2 JUDGE LIU: Yes.
3 MR. SCOTT:
4 Q. Now, 553.1, simply, sir, can you confirm that this is a daily
5 summary that is, in fact, over your name or signature?
6 A. Yes, yes.
7 Q. And the reference under Item 3 about the middle of the page
8 approximately, is this a reference, to your knowledge, of the
9 Colonel Andabak that you've mentioned earlier today as someone you knew to
10 be associated with the HVO special forces?
11 A. Correct, but the spelling is incorrect.
12 Q. And how do you understand it should be corrected?
13 A. It should be A-N-D-A-B-A-K.
14 Q. And just in reference, the things you've told us about in the
15 course of your testimony at the bottom of that page, you make a reference,
16 in fact, to a scheduled meeting with Mr. Prlic, the president of the HVO,
17 on the 2nd of August, 1993?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. All right. If we can go, then, to Exhibit 555.2. Simply --
20 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, a number of these documents are now
21 simply going to be, to some extent, memorialised or a record some of the
22 items that the witness has told us about. And I'll just take him through,
23 to some extent, his own records.
24 Q. On 555.2, you've told us, sir, on several occasions about a
25 meeting with this Mr. Prlic. And if I direct your attention to
1 paragraph 2, and carrying over to the second page, just look at that for a
3 A. Yes. Yes.
4 Q. Does this report memorialise, to some extent at least, the
5 conversation that you told us about earlier today with Mr. Prlic where he
6 said something to the effect that people should be allowed to live
7 wherever they want to live, but it appeared to you the reality on the
8 ground was something different?
9 A. Yes, indeed. Of course, it was much longer than that. This is
10 just a very short summary of what was said, But that is essentially the
11 point he was making.
12 Q. All right. We can go on, please, then to Exhibit 559. Is this a
13 report from HRC Zenica to the headquarters of ECMM dated 4th of August,
15 A. Correct, yes.
16 Q. I think that I will skip over the first part of the document; let
17 it speak for itself. If I can direct your attention to paragraph number 2
18 on the middle of the second page, sir.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. If you could once again just scan down that next couple of
21 paragraphs about the situation in Mostar, I'll have a question or two for
23 A. Right, yes.
24 Q. Again I'll just simply ask you, sir, especially given the hour,
25 can you confirm that, in fact, those observations were consistent with
1 your own and was an accurate assessment of the conditions in Mostar that
2 you saw throughout 1993?
3 A. Yes, that is a good and fair assessment indeed.
4 Q. Directing your attention down to subitem B, as in "boy", does that
5 make a reference to the various mass arrests or at least some of the mass
6 arrests that you had made reference to earlier in your testimony?
7 A. Yes. Yeah.
8 Q. Can I ask you to look over on the next page, skipping down to the
9 first -- well, it's hard -- skipping down to the paragraph that starts
10 with "Hints".
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Can you assist the Chamber in any way with any discussions or
13 proposals that were put forward by the HVO around August of 1993 about
14 something called a transit camp?
15 A. I was aware of it, but I'm afraid I just cannot remember the
16 details of this transit camp in Ljubuski. I regret I cannot.
17 Q. Do you recall anything about -- in the next paragraph -- about,
18 again, putting approximately 1.000 Muslim males on another Croatia island
19 called Obenjan [phoen]?
20 A. Again, I have got a vague recollection but not a precise
22 Q. If you can assist. I don't want you -- Sir, no one in the
23 courtroom I'm sure wants you to guess, but if you can assist us, can you
24 please do so. Any other information you can provide in that regard.
25 A. No, I'm very sorry. I'm afraid I really don't think I can produce
1 anything concrete on this particular subject.
2 Q. Very well.
3 All right. I think we can move on, then, to Exhibit 559. Is this
4 a report from CC Mostar to RC Zenica, a daily summary of 7 August, 1993?
5 A. I've got one, 561. 559, did you say?
6 Q. If I made a mistake, I apologise.
7 You're absolutely right. My apology. 561.1.
8 A. Right. Yes.
9 Q. And just to confirm, if you can, please, is that a report from
10 CC Mostar to RC Zenica?
11 A. Yes, indeed.
12 Q. Now, direct your attention, well, to the last page for a moment
13 just to further orient you, was this a report that went out over your name
14 or at least your signature --
15 A. Yes, indeed.
16 Q. -- well, your signature or your name?
17 A. Indeed.
18 Q. Directing your attention back to paragraph number 3 --
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. -- can you recall anything more -- can you add anything more that
21 you recall about this person called Juka?
22 A. Juka was someone who was not known to me.
23 I'd heard the name but I did not know anything about him. And
24 then, of course, when I left for central Bosnia, when I returned, his name
25 was never ever mentioned again. So I did not know -- I'd heard the name,
1 I'd heard that he was a leader, but I did not know anything about him.
2 Q. Very well. And going, moving up to paragraph number 2, just
3 simply makes a reference to the "BIH war president in Jablanica welcoming
4 ECMM presence back in Jablanica." Now, when you say the "BIH war
5 president," would that be for - perhaps, again, it's obvious, but for the
6 record we can't assume - is that for the HVO side or the Bosniak side?
7 A. That is the Bosniak side, the Bosniak side in Jablanica.
8 Q. Can you help the Chamber with any distinction you saw between the
9 Bosniak side wanting the presence of the ECMM and granting access to areas
10 under their control in contrast to the policy of the HVO?
11 A. Jablanica was an interesting case in point. This was a Bosniak
12 town which the Croats very much wanted to seize, because -- largely
13 because of the hydroelectric power plants. We had a -- and there were
14 small pockets of Croats up around the Konjic area. So they were -- both
15 sides were interested in the Jablanica, Konjic area. We had one of our
16 teams, as I mentioned yesterday, up in Jablanica. It was based in
17 Jablanica. But right at the end of June, they were hijacked by the
18 mujahedin and their very expensive Mercedes four-while-drive car was
19 stolen. Therefore the team had to come out because they had no
20 transport. It took us some two or three months to get a team established
21 back in Jablanica again. The Bosniaks -- clearly from here -- Cibo wanted
22 us back in Jablanica, and funnily enough, the Croats, for their own
23 reasons, said they would welcome a presence. In fact, people like Prlic
24 and so on said they would like us to get back to Jablanica so that our
25 teams could report on the condition of the Croats in the Konjic area. So
1 there were mixed -- mixed emotions about us returning, getting back into
2 Jablanica. I hope that's answered the question.
3 Q. Well, I think perhaps in part. When you say "mixed feelings" just
4 now, mixed feelings on whose part? On ECMM's part or somebody else?
5 A. Oh, no. We were very anxious -- we were very anxious to get back
6 into Jablanica because it was a big gap in our knowledge, information. We
7 had no information coming in from that area at all, and it was a key, key
8 area. But when I say "mixed feelings," it was unusual for both the
9 Bosniaks and the Croats, for different reasons, to be quite keen that we
10 were back in Jablanica.
11 Q. Very well. Now, before leaving this document, if I can ask you to
12 look at the last entry under item 9, you mentioned, sir, much earlier
13 today, that one of the persons you dealt with frequently was Mr. Bozic,
14 the Deputy Minister of Defence. You see that?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You say, "Pursue entry into Mostar." So can we take it from that,
17 sir, that as of the date of this document, the 7th of August, 1993, Mostar
18 was still blocked to --
19 A. Yes, they must have been because I'm using the words "pursue
20 entry," and I was doing that on an almost daily basis, trying to convince
21 Slobodan Bozic and others that it was in everyone's interest for us to get
22 back in as soon as possible. So on this date, we clearly had not been
23 able to get back into Mostar yet.
24 Q. Can I ask you, then, to go, please, to Exhibit 565.2?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And can you confirm, please, this is a copy of a daily summary for
2 the 15th of August, 1993, over your name, to RC Zenica?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, sir, if you look at the content of this document starting on
5 the lower part of the first page and continuing on over to the second
6 page, can you confirm to the Chamber, sir, that this was a report in part
7 that discusses your lunch meeting with Tuta?
8 A. That is correct, yes.
9 Q. On the top of the second page, there is a reference to some
10 comment about "though he was currently serving in Gornji Vakuf." Was that
11 based on something that Tuta told you at the time -- during the luncheon?
12 A. It must have been, it must have been, because I had no knowledge
13 of Mladen Naletilic before that meeting, and so it must have been he who
14 told me that he was currently based in Gornji Vakuf and complained that
15 the British had fired on him. So it could only have come from him because
16 I certainly didn't get the information from anyone else.
17 Q. Now, the next paragraph, does that memorialise, at least, again,
18 in part, the conversation you told us about earlier today with Mr. Tuta
19 concerning his views about the Islamic fundamentalist state?
20 A. That is correct, absolutely.
21 Q. And is it accurate to say he was reflected here that in the course
22 of your conversations here with Mr. Tuta during that lunch that he made
23 analogies or references to -- analogies of gambling to the conduct of
25 A. Yes. And that will have been correct because I will have written
1 this within an hour or two. I would have probably written this as soon as
2 I got back from that lunch, so it would have been very fresh in my mind.
3 Q. And again directing your attention to item 9, you say that again
4 on the 15th of August, 1993, "Attempt once more to enter Mostar"?
5 A. Yes. I think it must have been just about this time that we
6 succeeded in getting in, but I can't guarantee that.
7 Q. And if I can next ask to you look at Exhibit 600? And the only
8 thing I'm going to ask you to do, sir, on that one, is, again, can you
9 confirm that that is a monitor report, in fact, from one of the Mostar
10 teams, M-2, to the regional -- I'm sorry, not to the regional centre
11 initially but to the coordination centre in Mostar?
12 A. That is correct, yes, one Spanish and one Dutch monitor.
13 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I'm going to suggest, if we can, that
14 this might be a good place to stop. I can tell the Chamber that I'm very
15 close to, I think, concluding. I think I have approximately, looking at
16 my outline, about four more documents to put to the witness, none of which
17 should take, I think, a long amount of time, so we should be able to
18 finish in the first two minutes tomorrow -- well, I was going to say
19 morning but tomorrow afternoon.
20 JUDGE LIU: Yes. We will stop here.
21 Mr. Usher, would you please show the witness out of the room?
22 Tomorrow morning, this courtroom will be used for another case, so
23 I advise all of you to take all your documents out of this courtroom.
24 We will resume at 2.15 tomorrow afternoon.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
1 6.59 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday,
2 the 23rd day of January, 2002, at 2.15 p.m.