Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 1845

1 Tuesday, 23 November 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning. Mr. Registrar, could you call the

6 case, please.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Case number

8 IT-03-68-T, the Prosecutor versus Naser Oric.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

10 Mr. Oric, good morning to you. Could you tell me whether you

11 could receive interpretation in a language that you can understand?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours, ladies

13 and gentlemen. Yes, I am receiving interpretation and I understand the

14 proceedings fully.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Please be seated.

16 Appearances for the Prosecution.

17 MR. WUBBEN: Good morning, Your Honours. My name is Jan Wubben,

18 lead counsel for the Prosecution together with co-counsel Ms. Patricia

19 Sellers, and our case manager, Donnica Henry-Frijlink.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Wubben, and good morning to you and

21 your team.

22 Appearances for the Defence?

23 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours. I am

24 Vasvija Vidovic, together with Mr. John Jones. I appear on behalf of

25 Mr. Naser Oric. Joining us here today are our legal assistant,

Page 1846

1 Ms. Jasmina Cosic, and our case manager, Mr. Geoff Roberts.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Ms. Vidovic, and good morning to you and

3 your team.

4 Any preliminaries? I see none.

5 Usher, please. As I said, I'll try to brave it throughout this

6 sitting, but if at any given moment I cannot continue, then we

7 have agreed that we'll apply Rule 15 and Judge Brydensholt and Judge Eser

8 will continue in my absence, with Judge Brydensholt presiding. But in the

9 meantime I'll try and brave it. It's not the first time, and it will not

10 be the last time.

11 [The witness entered court]

12 WITNESS: Andrew James William Gow [Resumed]

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, Dr. Gow.

14 THE WITNESS: Good morning.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: You don't need to repeat the solemn declaration. It

16 continues to apply throughout your testimony.

17 Ms. Sellers, please.

18 MS. SELLERS: Good morning, Your Honours, learned friends.

19 Examined by Ms. Sellers: [Continued]

20 Q. Good morning, Dr. Gow.

21 A. Good morning.

22 Q. Dr. Gow, yesterday you testified to a document that was submitted;

23 it was Prosecution Exhibit 279E, I believe, and you testified that

24 Srebrenica was one of the territorial places in which the 2nd Corps -- I

25 would just like to ask you one final question about that document. In

Page 1847

1 your expert opinion, would you say that any of the armed conflict or

2 hostilities that occurred over the larger territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

3 those that occurred in Srebrenica were part of one and the same armed

4 conflict?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Thank you. I'd like to turn to what will be my next-to-last area

7 of questioning. I will keep to the time limit that I explained to

8 Your Honours yesterday.

9 Dr. Gow, I would like you to be precise as possible in explaining

10 whether the Bosnian Serb forces, in your expert opinion, acted as agents,

11 or were otherwise controlled by political forces within the Republic of

12 Serbia or otherwise. I would like you to give specific examples as

13 possible as to why you think, if you do, that the Bosnian Serb forces were

14 controlled by such political entities in Serbia.

15 A. It's certainly my view that the Bosnian Serb forces were part of

16 one integrated military/political framework, that they were, as far as

17 they were separate from the Belgrade command and control arrangements,

18 acting as proxies of Belgrade in that situation. And it was a case where,

19 distinct from others, where perhaps an outside agent gives some form of

20 support. Maybe financial, maybe arranging for facilitation of support.

21 In this case, there were direct links, there was direct involvement at

22 times.

23 Your Honour, the Presiding Judge Agius yesterday asked the

24 question about the command and control arrangements, I think, and then I

25 was trying to indicate that while the Bosnian Serb military commander was

Page 1848

1 given broad operational authority -- maybe I should explain the level

2 strategic. You have political command, strategic level, which is the

3 interaction/integration of the political and the military, and below that

4 you have operational which is then the conduct of the armed force

5 operations in pursuit of the political objectives, if that makes it clear.

6 And within that context, the VRS commander was given, in my view, broad

7 operational authority to conduct military part of the campaign without

8 necessarily reference to the political level, but at times, there was

9 still reference to the command level above in Belgrade, with the Chief of

10 Staff, General Perisic, and both Mladic and Perisic were not only reported

11 to be in communication with each other and meet each other at times, but

12 also with the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic.

13 Now, in that set of command-control arrangements, which is, at the

14 least, you could say, was a dotted line, and that dotted line, as I think

15 I tried to indicate through the Jovic diary entry was deliberately

16 arranged in order to try to disguise the political control, the command

17 and control arrangements for pursuing this objective, but it was an agenda

18 set by Belgrade, it was an agenda fostered by Belgrade, and was not one in

19 which Belgrade simply, on occasion, out of sympathy, gave some little bits

20 of support.

21 In concrete terms, not only were those arrangements in place so

22 that the forces were effectively part of one armed force but under a

23 different name. It's also the case -- and within that, I should say that

24 a large number of those in the officer corps of the VRS continued to have

25 the new -- old JNA and their new VJ passbooks. They continued to be

Page 1849

1 regarded as part of the same command-control structure for promotion and

2 pension purposes, yet they were seen as being part of one whole operation.

3 And that in that context, and despite that arrangement to try to disguise

4 the corps of political design and political command and control and

5 military command and control, there were still occasions where it was

6 judged to be necessary to introduce forces from the VJ, that is, those

7 supposedly of Serbia and Montenegro, supposedly separate from those of the

8 VRS. So you get the introduction of the 63rd Airborne Brigade in

9 operations around Sarajevo in 1992 and 1993, special forces from Nis and

10 Uzice involved in operations several times in Eastern Bosnia, particularly

11 in Gorazde in 1994, the support from Montenegro and from those same forces

12 for operations. Again in 1994, in southern Bosnia, at one point something

13 like 4.000 troops are brought in across the Drina from Serbia to bolster

14 the Posavina Corridor, in fact probably on two occasions one in 1993 and

15 one in 1994.

16 At the time of the initial international attention to Srebrenica

17 in 1993, there was clear engagement of the VJ, both firing artillery from

18 across the other side of the Drina and sending some forces over the river

19 to be part of those operations. And there were VJ elements present in the

20 initial parts, running up to the eventual taking over of Srebrenica in

21 1995.

22 So there's a pattern, and there are other examples we could go to

23 as well. The 9th Novi Sad Corps was involved both at Zvornik and

24 Bijeljina later further down at Vlasenica. Cases you can point to

25 throughout, where even despite this attempt to try and persuade the world

Page 1850

1 that Belgrade was not responsible, because the world, in some sense, was

2 regarding Belgrade as responsible, and that it -- the UN Security Council

3 had imposed sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro because of this

4 situation and because of its -- the perception in the Security Council

5 that Belgrade was responsible for this action. So despite the attempt to

6 pretend that that was not the case, to have this proxy force and say no,

7 it's not us, really, it's them, it was always part of one operation, one

8 whole integrated armed force. And despite the attempt to disguise,

9 sometimes they even had to take the step of sending forces that were

10 labelled as being from the neighbouring country and not being part of the

11 VRS.

12 Q. Thank you. I would also like you now to respond to the following

13 question: Was the Republika Srpska ever recognised as an independent

14 country by the international community?

15 A. No, Republika Srpska has never been recognised as having

16 independent international personality.

17 Q. From the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina's point of view during the

18 time period of the armed conflict, were they fighting an aggression for --

19 to stop the territorial disintegration of the territory that they

20 constitutionally considered Bosnia-Hercegovina?

21 A. Yes, that was their position. While the Bosnian government was

22 clearly also taking a position to protect, as far as it could, the

23 position of Slav Muslims within Bosnia-Herzegovina, given the situation,

24 its formal position and its overall position was to maintain the

25 territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, I might add, was

Page 1851

1 also the formal position of the international community expressed through

2 the UN Security Council resolutions and through the actions which were

3 get -- to which those gave rise, such as in the introduction of the peace

4 force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 Q. So was the Republika Srpska a non-recognised political state which

6 I'll refer to as an entity, was that the aggressor on the territory of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina from at least the point of view of Bosnia-Herzegovina

8 for its territorial integrity?

9 A. I think if you refer to the declaration of war, or the declaration

10 of a state of war, to which we made reference yesterday, you'll see that

11 the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina regarded various

12 outside-Belgrade elements as the aggressor. But within that also included

13 what they described in the document as the SDS terrorists. The SDS

14 terrorists, using the term they use, without any other connotations to be

15 attached to it, were the ones implementing the political part of the

16 strategy to separate parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina to become part of the Serbian construct that I described

18 yesterday. So in that sense, they clearly regarded Belgrade, Serbia --

19 Belgrade, Serbia and Montenegro, as the aggressor and the armed forces of

20 Belgrade, and saw the actors within -- from the Serb community within

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina as agents of that action.

22 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. I would now like to turn to Prosecution

23 exhibit document, the next document in the binder before you. Dr. Gow,

24 did there come a time period when the armed conflict or the armed

25 hostilities, as you described, came to an end, an end that was recognised

Page 1852

1 by the international community?

2 A. The phase --

3 JUDGE AGIUS: You can go direct if you want here. I mean, it's --

4 MS. SELLERS: Thank you.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Or just lead the witness, and he will then finish it

6 off.


8 Q. Dr. Gow, are you familiar with the Dayton Accords?

9 A. I am.

10 Q. Was the purpose of the Dayton Accords to formally end the

11 hostilities that we've described that occurred between 1991 and 1995 when

12 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 A. That's true.

14 Q. Yes. I would draw your attention to the document. I would ask

15 you to please look at the -- may I, for the record, just put the ERN of

16 the document in. That would be 03631869.

17 Dr. Gow, I'd ask you to look at the second page of that document

18 that ends in number 70. All right. The first paragraph, which starts

19 with the "The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," would that be an accurate

20 representation of who or what states were considered parties to the armed

21 conflict?

22 A. It would.

23 Q. Thank you. There we have Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

24 and Bosnia. I would now like to draw your attention to the fifth

25 paragraph down with begins with "Noting." Dr. Gow, you see in that

Page 1853

1 paragraph that the Republika Srpska is not -- having not been included in

2 the first paragraph as one of the parties, there is an explanation. Could

3 you please give the Trial Chamber your opinion, or does this - excuse me -

4 substantiate your opinion as to one of the reasons that the Republika

5 Srpska might not have been considered an independently recognised state?

6 A. I'm not sure that it's one of the explanations, but it's a

7 confirmation that Republika Srpska was not recognised as having

8 independent international personality. And in that context, the Federal

9 Republic of Yugoslavia was the agent of international personality signing

10 the agreement.

11 If I can go back, we should probably be clear that the parties to

12 the treaty, although that was designated at the beginning, that they are

13 also parties to the conflict is a distinction we should probably make

14 clear. And you could also add within that that the Croatian forces, and

15 Croatian political movement and Republika Srpska were also, in some sense,

16 agents to the party. Agents -- parties to the conflict within that.

17 Q. I thank you for that.

18 A. To be clear.

19 Q. Excuse me. I thank you for that clarification. I would now like

20 you to look at Article 1 on that page, and I think that if we could just

21 ask for your commentary on the part that has been highlighted in yellow.

22 Now, this refers to the territorial integrity and political independence

23 of Bosnia. Is that consistent with the explanation that you just gave the

24 Trial Chamber on one of the aspects of this armed conflict?

25 A. Yes, it is. It confirms that the parties to the conflict, in the

Page 1854

1 end, despite the intention of one of the parties to the conflict at least,

2 have agreed to respect and maintain the territorial integrity and

3 political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 A. That is supported by the international community.

6 Q. Thank you. I would now ask you to go to Article 2, the first

7 sentence in Article 2. And you would agree that there are certain

8 military aspects to this settlement that would be further highlighted in

9 an annex 1A of this document; is that correct?

10 A. Certainly I do.

11 Q. Thank you. I would now ask you to go to the page that has ER

12 number 73 on the end. I believe it's about two pages over. Looking at

13 the top of the page, Dr. Gow, would you please inform the Trial Chamber

14 of the date in which the armed conflict, according to the document,

15 ceased to exist.

16 A. This general framework for peace agreement was signed on the 21st

17 of November, 1995, in Paris, and it was signed, as you can see, by the

18 president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, the president of

19 Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, and the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic,

20 on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And I think we should

21 also probably take it as significant in the context of the discussions

22 we've had about the nature of the armed conflict and political authority

23 and command and control on the Serbian side, that it was the president of

24 Serbia, not the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who was

25 the party to the treaty signing on behalf of the Federal Republic of

Page 1855

1 Yugoslavia.

2 Q. When did the armed conflict officially cease, according to

3 international instruments?

4 A. There was --

5 Q. I'm sorry, this international document.

6 A. It certainly ceased on the 21st of November, 1995, in terms of the

7 document.

8 Q. Yes, thank you. I would ask you now to go to the following page

9 that ends in ERN 74. And do you agree that attached to this document were

10 several annexes, that annex 1A, that we referred to earlier, would look at

11 specific aspects of the military -- military aspects of the peace and

12 settlement?

13 A. I would agree.

14 Q. Thank you. I would now ask you to go to the page that ends in 76

15 and the ERN number, approximately two pages over, at the bottom of that

16 page, is Article 2. Your thoughts about the cessation of hostilities.

17 Dr. Gow, there's a reference to another date there. That's the date of

18 October 5th 1955. Would you please explain to the Trial Chamber the

19 importance of that date.

20 A. There was initially an agreement to cease-fire as a prelude to

21 going to the Wright-Patterson air force base in the United States to

22 conduct the negotiations for the general framework of peace agreement that

23 eventually was concluded, although I would point out that despite the

24 cessation of hostilities agreement, some armed hostilities continued after

25 that period on the ground.

Page 1856

1 Q. Right. Would you please turn the page over, and the first half of

2 the first paragraph, Dr. Gow, would you agree that forces within the

3 meaning of this document then included armed civilian groups, national

4 guards, army reserves, military police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs'

5 special police force?

6 A. Yes, I would.

7 Q. All right. And would they be considered the forces that we have

8 been discussing throughout your testimony?

9 A. They would.

10 Q. I would ask you to go to page number -- that ends in ER - I'm

11 sorry - 78. It's just, I believe, one page over. Article 3. Dr. Gow, I

12 would draw your attention to the first two paragraphs, and in paragraph 1,

13 would you agree, or would it be your opinion also, that there were foreign

14 forces that were on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina during this time

15 period of armed conflict? Is that consistent with your prior testimony?

16 A. It is.

17 Q. Yes. And if you would look at paragraph 2, would you agree that

18 some of the foreign forces would include advisors or trainers or

19 volunteers, personnel from neighbouring and other states, freedom

20 fighters?

21 A. I would.

22 Q. Yes. And so would you also agree, that is, with the cessation of

23 hostilities, that these other actors were covered by this agreement so

24 that the armed conflict could completely cease?

25 A. Yes, I would.

Page 1857

1 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Ms. Sellers and Dr. Gow. Let's make

2 this clear. The fact that this is stated in this international document,

3 or this document, does not prove that the situation was identical at any

4 time or throughout the entire conflict. It only means that at the time

5 this document was signed, this was considered to be the situation.

6 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, I was saying --

7 JUDGE AGIUS: But this doesn't prove that in 1992, the situation

8 was identical.

9 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, I agree. I would just state that this

10 seems to be the understandings of the parties at the time that they are

11 signing the document. I don't think we can go much further than that.

12 And that takes me to --

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, granted.

14 MS. SELLERS: -- my last page of this document that ends in ERN

15 number and number --

16 A. Before you move on, may I add something on this page.

17 Q. Certainly.

18 A. And also with reference to Your Honour's comment. That I think we

19 should also to some extent, if not entirely, see the Security Council

20 Resolution 752 from May the 18th, 1992, almost as one end of the

21 parenthesis and this is the other end of the parenthesis, both of which in

22 some way regard that external involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina as

23 part of this.

24 I should also point out two things for clarification. In the

25 second paragraph there, reference to foreign forces is not only those of

Page 1858

1 the Republic of Croatia and Serbia -- Serbia and Montenegro, but of course

2 so-called freedom fighters, because there were those that came from other

3 parts of the world and, in some cases, came to join an international

4 brigade as part of the Bosnia and Herzegovina defence forces.

5 And the other is that, I think if we look at paragraph 1, is just

6 to explain the reference where it says, "whether or not they were legally

7 and militarily subordinated to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

8 This is a clear reference to the fact that some of the armed forces,

9 namely, those of the VRS, were subordinated not to the army of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina but to the external agent.

11 Q. Thank you for the clarification, Dr. Gow.

12 JUDGE ESER: May I just have a question to this article. Could

13 you perhaps focus a little bit on paragraph 1. You would see the

14 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Republika Srpska. Now, here is

15 Republika Srpska put on the same level. Is this different from the --

16 what was it, from the original agreement or ...

17 A. If there was a doubt in Your Honour's mind, I'm glad -- I'm very

18 glad you asked it so we can clarify. The reference here is to the

19 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Republika Srpska. Under the term

20 -- de facto at the point of making this agreement, and under the terms of

21 the agreement, if you will - maybe in your own time to go and read annex 4

22 which embraces the constitution that comes into place under this -

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina is to comprise two entities, the Federation of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is internationalised, with a Z, and the

25 Republika Srpska. So these are the two entities within Bosnia and

Page 1859

1 Hercegovina, with a C, the country. So where there's reference to

2 Republika Srpska here, it's as one of the two entities, the federation of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is the -- you get preceding that immediately.

4 You get -- it is the reference there. Both of those are referring not to

5 the country but to the two entities within it.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Would the speakers kindly slow down for the

7 benefit of the interpreters. Thank you.



10 Q. Could I ask you now to go to the page that ends in ER number 93.

11 It's several pages over, and it's a signatory page. Page 25 of the

12 document.

13 Dr. Gow, I believe this is a signatory page to annex 1A. And

14 would you agree, is it your expert opinion, that the signatories to this

15 annex 1 represent here different signatories than we've had for the first

16 part of our document? And is there any explanation as to why the

17 Republika Srpska signs at this point?

18 A. There are two additional signatures, those of representatives of

19 the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Republika Srpska, the two

20 entities to which I just made reference within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 There are two explanations for that. One goes back to the same

22 explanation I gave with reference to your first question on this document,

23 and that is the initial parties to the treaty were not necessarily the

24 parties to the conflict, although they were also parties to the conflict.

25 This is making clear that even within that, whatever claims there are to

Page 1860

1 be -- to the divided character within Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it's

2 quite clear that the conflict was hybrid -- had a hybrid character, both

3 international and non-international, that the non-international parties to

4 the conflict also signed the agreement. So you have a Jadranka Prlic, the

5 prime minister of the federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Momcilo

6 Krajisnik, the president of the Republika Srpska, signing on behalf of the

7 authorities, as well as having Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Milosevic signing

8 on behalf of the three states.

9 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow.

10 MS. SELLERS: I would ask the registrar, could I please have a

11 number for this document.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be P416.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document is being admitted in evidence as a

14 Prosecution Exhibit P416.

15 MS. SELLERS: Thank you, Your Honours. That allows me to move to

16 the last area of my direct examination.

17 Q. Dr. Gow, I would ask you to inform the Trial Chamber, did you

18 write a report in regard to the testimony that you gave today, and give it

19 to the Office of the Prosecutor?

20 A. Yes, I did.

21 Q. Right. And I believe it might be the last document in your book.

22 I would just like to confirm that you then signed that report on the 5th

23 of September, 2004.

24 A. If that's what it says on the end, I'm sure it's true. Yes.

25 Q. And in that report contains your curriculum vitae, which has a

Page 1861

1 list of the different publications that you have written in addition to

2 your other professional activities.

3 A. It has a selection of those things. It has some publications and

4 it has a small bit of things that I've done.

5 Q. And is --

6 A. I can provide you with a much fuller one if you had the time to be

7 bored with it.

8 Q. And your testimony also has been based upon many of the subject

9 matters that you have raised in this report.

10 A. It has, although we've extended beyond the scope of this

11 statement.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 MS. SELLERS: I would ask that Dr. Gow's report be submitted into

14 evidence, if I could, and I would ask the registrar, could I have a P

15 number for that.

16 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be P417.

17 MS. SELLERS: Your Honours, I would ask to tender Dr. Gow's

18 report.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document is being admitted in evidence as

20 Prosecution Exhibit P417, together with its annexes and everything.

21 MS. SELLERS: Yes, please.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.


24 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow.

25 MS. SELLERS: Your Honours, this will conclude my direct

Page 1862

1 examination.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Ms. Sellers.

3 Who will be cross-examining? Madam Vidovic.

4 Cross-examined by Ms. Vidovic:

5 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Gow. I will mainly ask you

6 those sets of questions to which you will preferably provide short

7 answers. But whenever you believe there should be further clarification

8 on any of the questions, please do elaborate. Likewise, sometimes I will

9 have to touch upon subjects that you elaborated on yesterday during your

10 testimony. This only means that we believe some further clarifications

11 are required.

12 In your testimony yesterday, you talked about the Serbian project,

13 of a new state. This project, did it imply that all Serbs should live in

14 the same states, meaning both Serbs from Croatia and Serbs from

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

16 A. There was often a slogan that all Serbs should live in one state.

17 Of course, while they had the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and

18 the other versions of Yugoslavia before that, that was the case. So this

19 is not simply a matter that all Serbs should live in one state, but it's a

20 matter of creating a new state of territorial boundaries, with a new

21 demographic disposition within it that we're talking about. Not simply

22 whether all Serbs should live in one state, assuming that those Serbs

23 wished to live in that state.

24 Q. Thank you. Would that mean, then, that territories being taken

25 away from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were being annexed to Serbia and

Page 1863

1 Montenegro?

2 A. That was the intention of the project, yes.

3 Q. There were non-Serbs living in these areas, Croatian Catholics and

4 Bosnian Muslims, weren't they? What did this mean for them specifically?

5 A. To be clear, what did the project mean for them?

6 Q. Yes, indeed.

7 A. In the way I described yesterday, using the strategy of ethnic

8 cleansing, it meant that, for the most part, they were obliged one way or

9 another, either through death or physical evacuation, to move.

10 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow, for this clarification. A brief question now

11 about the memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences. In your previous

12 research, probably you have looked into this issue. Can you just please

13 tell the Trial Chamber what the principal ideas are contained in that

14 memorandum.

15 A. The memorandum which was prepared by the Serbian Academy of

16 Sciences and Arts in, I think it was, 1998 was questioning the

17 constitutional position of Serbia within the Socialist Federative Republic

18 of Yugoslavia. In particularly, there were concerns that the two

19 autonomous provinces within Serbia compromised Serbia's sovereignty; i.e.,

20 Serbia could not have the full exercise of sovereign rights over a

21 designated territory of the state of Serbia. That this meant that its

22 position within the overall federal construct was weakened, and that as a

23 result of this, it was felt that Serbia had, in some sense, and I'm

24 certainly paraphrasing here, become a victim of the Socialist Federative

25 Republic of Yugoslavia, and that something would need to be done to change

Page 1864

1 the position, to reassert sovereignty and to reassert the position of

2 Serbia within the Yugoslav construct.

3 Q. Would I be right in saying that this memorandum was an ideological

4 basis for what later unfolded throughout the territories of the former

5 SFRY, or at least in part?

6 A. I don't know if you would be right. I know that there are many

7 people who say that that's the case. I would hesitate to say it myself.

8 It was certainly an important document, an activity in the process of

9 changing the atmosphere and politics in Serbia, both reflecting some of

10 the pressures and, later, being a dynamo for them. Whether or not you can

11 say it's an ideological template, I would hesitate to say, but I know that

12 other people do.

13 Q. Can we please just have a correction in the transcript. The

14 transcript reflects 1998 as the date of the memorandum, whereas you

15 said -- yes, 1988, indeed.

16 A. I said 1988 but, a personal slip. It should be 1988, sorry, yes.

17 1998, a very different document.

18 Q. Thank you very much. Thank you. Do you agree that, following

19 Tito's death, there was an explosion of nationalism?

20 A. Immediately following Tito's death, it's remarkable that there

21 wasn't an explosion of nationalism, given the expectations that many

22 people had about Yugoslavia. But also it's quite clearly the case that

23 levels of nationalist pressure that were contained within Tito's communist

24 Yugoslavia, without Tito's influence, began to grow. And in the kinds of

25 discussions that I summarised yesterday, the arguments about the future of

Page 1865

1 the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, what you could describe

2 as nationalist politics was a dominant feature. So -- I'll just add. So

3 that affected the dynamic, again, through the 1980s and to the point where

4 Yugoslavia comes to break up.

5 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. You wrote an article in July 1994 titled

6 "Serbian Nationalism, A Hisssssing Ssssnake in International Order:

7 Whose Sovereignty? Which Nation?" I will not ask you anything specific

8 about this article. Everyone has access to it. But what, to your mind,

9 does the slogan mean, "only togetherness will save the Serbs"?

10 A. I'm not sure what I'm supposed to answer to that question. Am I

11 supposed to go beyond what literally does it mean, or am I supposed to

12 give some sense of further explanation?

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Perhaps you can be more specific. As I take it, as

14 I understand it, is you're being referred to an article that you wrote in

15 which, supposedly, you have also stated that "only togetherness will save

16 the Serbs." I think that is what you're being directed at.

17 A. No, I understand what I'm being directed at. Literally, it's

18 usually translated as only -- "samo sloga Srbina spasava", it's usually

19 translated as "only unity will save the Serbs." Talking to people, I

20 suspect that something like harmony is maybe a better translation of it.

21 But the implication, unless I'm trying to get at: Is it simply what does

22 it mean or is it the further implication. It's used as the four Ss of

23 traditional Serbian symbols around the cross -- in Serbian, these are Ss

24 -- and it's used to indicate that many of the Serbs believe there's great

25 disunity within the Serbian community, whatever that is, within Serbian

Page 1866

1 populations, that they are in some way threatened. This goes back to the

2 Fourteenth century history, and that only by pulling together will the

3 Serbs be able to protect and defend themselves. So that unity, or harmony

4 idea, only if the Serbs agree and then together will they be able to

5 protect themselves.

6 Q. Yes. Indeed, Dr. Gow. The question I wanted to ask was: Does

7 this point to the essence of the idea that Serbs are only safe if they

8 live in one state, their own state?

9 A. That could be one reading of it. It's not necessarily the

10 original sense of it, and it doesn't necessarily imply that Serbs living

11 in one ethnically homogeneous state is for that to be the case. But it

12 would be one reading of it.

13 Q. Is it true that fear was fermented among Serbs and that this

14 sphere was exploited by the Serbian National Party, the so-called Serbian

15 Democratic Party, which I will in future refer to as the SDS. In

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, of course.

17 A. That's certainly reported to be the case.

18 Q. Is it true that the SDS in Bosnia-Herzegovina followed the idea of

19 the project of creating a new state? Did it display any separatist

20 tendencies in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina?

21 A. Yes, it is, and yes, it did. And I think part of my testimony

22 yesterday went to that issue.

23 Q. In other words, is it not true that their intention was to

24 separate part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory by force and annex it to

25 Serbia Montenegro?

Page 1867

1 A. That's my judgement.

2 Q. Is it not true that, in order to achieve this, both military and

3 political preparations were carried out, both in Yugoslavia and among

4 Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

5 A. Again, that is the case, and I think again, my testimony yesterday

6 went to that issue.

7 Q. Yes. Let us first try to tackle the political preparations step

8 by step. Whenever you think necessary, please do elaborate, if there's

9 any issue that you believe needs further clarification.

10 Yesterday you explained that in October 1991, a decision was made

11 on the setting up of an assembly of the Serbian people in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dr. Gow, there was a legally elected assembly of the

13 peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so this would have constituted a parallel

14 organ of government, would it not?

15 A. First, if I may correct you, I didn't testify to that yesterday.

16 I don't believe that I mentioned it. But I would acknowledge that that

17 took place. And I would also acknowledge that it was a parallel -- a

18 parallel structure being set up outside the normal framework.

19 Q. Therefore, throughout 1991, after establishing an Assembly of the

20 Serbian People, they went on to create other parallel structures of

21 government; is that not true?

22 A. That is true, and I did testify to that yesterday; and also that

23 they began to set up some other structures prior to October as well.

24 Q. By setting up these parallel bodies of government, they displayed

25 clearly their desire to fully separate, entirely separate, the Serbian

Page 1868

1 people from the other peoples living in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time.

2 A. Yes, the intention was to separate these territories covered from

3 the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 Q. In your testimony, you explained that the SDS leaders, through the

5 assembly, proclaimed the establishment of the autonomous provinces in

6 Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1991, the provinces that we usually

7 refer to as SAO, S-A-O?

8 A. That's right. Although the last of them was in January '92,

9 Birac.

10 Q. Yes, you did say that too, that two more provinces were eventually

11 established. Is it not true that the Birac SAO was also at that time,

12 which includes the Bratunac and Srebrenica area --

13 A. -- Was in January 1992. That's not in -- sorry, I was just being

14 clear when you said 1991 that Birac was in January 1992. But, yeah, it is

15 true that Birac was established as a certain autonomous province.

16 Q. Very well.

17 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I have the usher's assistance

18 now, please. I would like to show the witness a document.

19 Q. Witness, I will now show you a transcript of the meeting of the

20 Bratunac SDS.

21 THE WITNESS: Can I ask if we're likely to need this again?

22 MS. VIDOVIC: Oh, no.

23 Q. [Interpretation] Can you please look at these minutes of the

24 Bratunac SDS meeting held on the 25th of October, 1991. Can you please

25 look at item 4. In the English version, it should be on a page 9. There

Page 1869

1 is a total of 119 pages, and this is on page 9. Can you please have a

2 look. I'm quoting:

3 "The committee accepts the decision on the establishment of the

4 Birac SAO."

5 Can you see that?

6 A. That's what it says on the document, yes.

7 Q. Dr. Gow, does this confirm that the Bratunac municipality, in

8 fact, accepted the establishment of the Birac SAO, as you've told us

9 previously?

10 A. I'm sorry, can you repeat the question, please? Did you say the

11 municipality?

12 Q. Does this mean that the Bratunac SDS accepted the establishment of

13 the Birac SAO?

14 A. I think originally you said the opstina, but it's the SDS

15 committee, yes.

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. It certainly indicates that they recognised that that's happened,

18 although I think, if I may add, paragraph 3 above it -- this handwritten

19 document, I'm not sure anything else about it, but taking it at face value

20 is also about the crisis staff in the Bratunac municipality, as I said

21 yesterday about this process of preparing for takeover.

22 Q. Yes, thank you.

23 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this document

24 into evidence, and may it please be assigned a number as a Defence

25 exhibit.

Page 1870

1 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be D61.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document is being tendered and admitted in

3 evidence and marked as Defence Exhibit D61. Thank you.

4 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Yesterday, in your testimony, you stated that the Assembly of the

6 Serbian Peoples, on the 28th of February, 1992, adopted a decision to

7 proclaim the constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

8 describing the Serbian state as the state of the Serbian people and other

9 peoples. You also said that the constitution was eventually amended, and

10 that the Republika Srpska virtually identified itself as a state of the

11 Serbian people. What would that have implied for non-Serbs in this sort

12 of parastate?

13 A. There is a possibility that you could make argument that -- to say

14 it was a would-be state of the Serb people, but that would still leave

15 space for other people to be citizens. But it is significant that the

16 reference to "other citizens" is removed. And I think that by the time

17 the Republika Srpska constitution was promulgated at the end of 1992, to

18 some extent, it's also a reflection of the de facto reality on the ground,

19 which is that the overwhelming majority of the non-Serb population as

20 being one way or another removed from that territory and is laying claim

21 to a purely ethnonational of it, ethnonational definition of it, or

22 ethnocultural. I said "ethnonational." Apologies.

23 Q. Can I just add another question. This constitution, can it be

24 considered as one of the foundations on which the policy of ethnic

25 cleansing of non-Serbs from the area was later based, namely, from those

Page 1871

1 areas that the Serbs, for one reason or another, considered their own?

2 A. As I understand the question, I'm not certain you can say that

3 it's a base for it, but it's certainly part of that programme of activity,

4 and it's consistent with it.

5 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. On the 12th of May, 1992, the Assembly of the

6 Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a decision on the strategic

7 objectives of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did it not?

8 A. I'm prepared to take your word for the date.

9 Q. I will now show you the document.

10 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I have the usher's assistance,

11 please. I would like to show Dr. Gow, the Chamber, and the Prosecutor

12 this document, the decision on the strategic objectives of the Serbian

13 People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, adopted on the 12th of May, 1992.

14 Q. Dr. Gow, can you please pay close attention to the strategic

15 objectives number 1 and number 3. Can you please tell us whether it is

16 true that the strategic objective number 1 is about the territorial

17 separation from the two remaining ethnic communities. You can read it for

18 yourself. You can look at both of these objectives, and the strategic

19 objective number 3 about the setting up a corridor in the Drina river

20 valley, or, rather, about eliminating the Drina river as a border between

21 the two Serbian states.

22 Also, can you please tell the Chamber, in relation to this, please

23 explain: What did this mean for non-Serbs living in the Drina river

24 valley and other border areas of east Bosnia?

25 A. First, I can confirm that the document in front of us says the

Page 1872

1 things that you said.

2 The second thing is that, indeed, intention to have control of the

3 western side of the Drina, as part of the overall project that we've been

4 discussing now over these past two days, implied the removal of non-Serb

5 or non-loyal, in case anybody decided they wanted to be part of -- stay

6 there in these situations, population.

7 If I could add, if it's not indulgent, if I could add a third

8 thing, which would be ideally with reference to a map. But there was the

9 intention to occupy this territory and also to form another corridor along

10 the river Klivaj, between Olovo running up towards Tuzla. I've forgotten

11 the name of the town at the top end of it, which would then be part of

12 encircling Tuzla to make broad corridor across the whole of the northern

13 top. So when this makes reference to a corridor -- makes reference to the

14 established corridor between Semberija and Krajina, that can refer to the

15 now Pasavia corridor, which is already there, but I think it's also

16 implicit that it's meaning to, if possible, to establish this broader

17 corridor. The reality was that Serbian forces were never strong enough to

18 be able to complete that. But they did occupy the western side of the

19 Drina to take control of it.

20 Q. Very well. Thank you. Can this exhibit please be assigned a

21 number as a Defence Exhibit.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be D62.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. This document is being admitted in evidence

24 and marked as Defence Exhibit D62.

25 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 1873

1 Q. The first strategic objective indicated in this document spoke

2 about the drawing up of state borders, separating them from the remaining

3 two ethnic communities, those two being Muslims and Croats; is that not

4 true?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Is it true that at the time in east Bosnia, there were mainly

7 Muslims, that they were the predominant ethnic community, in addition to

8 the Serbs living there, of course.

9 A. I have to say, off the top of my head, I couldn't say whether or

10 not that was accurate in terms of numbers. I'd make reference to the map

11 we have here, which shows that certainly it was a very mixed area, with

12 large numbers of Muslims in the population, but also significant -- some

13 significant Serbian populations. I mean, my recollection would be that it

14 was predominantly Muslim. But without specific information, either in my

15 head or to hand, I'd say that. But there were significant number of

16 Muslims in that region, I think would be the main point.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Vidovic, do you have at your disposal.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the president.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Vidovic, if you have at your disposal a

20 demographic map that you can refer the witness to, I would suggest you do

21 that, as that will economise on time.

22 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. At this moment, I don't have a map with me, but I have another map

24 that will assist us as we go on.

25 May I ask you, Dr. Gow, to look at this map of this particular

Page 1874

1 part of Eastern Bosnia made up by the National Bureau of Statistics of the

2 Republic of Croatia as a study of the population of Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina. May the map also be placed on the ELMO, please.

4 Dr. Gow, I will kindly ask you to look at the map and maybe also

5 use the pointer there. Could you point to us at the river Drina on this

6 map. It's merely an excerpt from this larger scale map that you used

7 yesterday. Could you please point at the river Drina.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. I am having a problem. Although I see

9 that the document has been placed on the ELMO, I don't think that the ELMO

10 is switched on, or at least I am not seeing anything on the video mode.

11 No, no, no. Oh, I see, I see. So you have to go on the video mode, the

12 first button, in order to be able to follow. No, no, no, it's gone now.

13 But it will come again. But that's where you have to be.

14 Yes. Dr. Gow, sorry for having interrupted you like this. You

15 were asked if you could be kind enough at the river Drina on the map -- on

16 the map. That's all.

17 A. You'll see the Drina is marked there. The Drina more or less runs

18 consistently, the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, so the

19 outside edge of this map as it runs down, almost all points is the river

20 Drina.

21 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Now, Dr. Gow, I would like to refer you back to the strategic

23 objective number 3 from the document we mentioned earlier on, and in

24 relation to this map. This objective said that the Drina should be erased

25 as a state border. Would that mean that the territory around the Drina

Page 1875

1 river should be annexed to Serbia? Was that the plan, to annex that area

2 to Serbia?

3 A. The plan was to annex that area to Serbia, or to create a border

4 between Serbia and the Republika Srpska, whatever this new construction

5 was going to be. But as I recall -- I don't have the document at hand

6 anymore, but as I recall, it didn't say that that was the intention, to

7 erase the border. That was just the implication of what it said.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, just to help you, the translation that I have

9 of the third strategic goal of the 12th of May is to "establish a corridor

10 in the river Drina valley, that is, to abolish the Drina as a border

11 between the Serbian states."

12 A. I remember the first part of it, or the second. That's fine.

13 Then in that case, then, absolutely, yes. Thank you.

14 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Yes. Very well. Do you agree that this particular region is

16 known as the Drina valley or, as they call it Podrinje?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Does this mean that the plan was for the entire region to become a

19 part of Serbia, the entire region of Podrinje. That's what we're talking

20 about?

21 A. To become part of the new state, whatever the new state would be

22 called.

23 Q. Of the new state. Very well. Thank you, Dr. Gow.

24 Could you please point to us the town of Zvornik on the Drina

25 river, on this particular map. Can you perhaps circle it in some way,

Page 1876

1 circle the town, and then place your initials.

2 MS. VIDOVIC: Could you use the highlighter, please.

3 A. To be clear, you wish me to mark on this map.

4 Q. [Interpretation] Yes, Dr. Gow?

5 A. [Marks].

6 Q. Could you also mark the town of Bratunac.

7 A. [Marks].

8 Q. Next, please mark the town of Srebrenica.

9 A. [Marks].

10 Q. Would you agree that these towns are near the Drina river and the

11 border with Serbia?

12 A. Of course, yes.

13 Q. Would you also please mark two more towns in this part of Eastern

14 Bosnia, namely, Vlasenica. I will ask you some matters concerning its

15 importance later on.

16 A. [Marks].

17 Q. And Han Pijesak, that you mentioned yesterday, and I believe you

18 can see it here.

19 A. [Marks].

20 Q. Dr. Gow, yesterday you said that the town of Han Pijesak was,

21 throughout the war, the main headquarters of the Serbian army, was it not?

22 A. I said that -- not even so much that. But in the Socialist

23 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, this was where the main operational

24 headquarters for wartime was located, and that this remained part of and,

25 indeed, as I understand it, remains to this day part of an integrated

Page 1877

1 operational command-control setup, yes. And so therefore it was a vital,

2 as a command and control point, in the war, and as a point in integration.

3 Q. Therefore, it is true that in this small town in Bosnia, there was

4 the headquarters of the Serbian army during the war, and that significant

5 military forces were stationed there.

6 A. Yes. That it was -- that it was the command-control point, and

7 "significant" in the sense that command and control is significant and

8 important, yes.

9 Q. Very well. Thank you. Can you tell me what's the distance

10 between this particular point and the towns of Srebrenica and Bratunac, if

11 you know?

12 A. I don't know, but it's a few kilometres, 10, 15. I don't know

13 exactly. I don't know what the scale of the map is. It's not very far.

14 Q. Thank you very much. Dr. Gow, let us now turn to the context of

15 the military preparations that followed for a war in Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina. Yesterday you said that the armed forces of the SFRY

17 consisted of two elements, the Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial

18 Defence, and that the Yugoslav People's Army was reorganised in order to

19 prepare for the war.

20 Is it true that, during 1991, the process of the Serb dominance in

21 the JNA dramatically shot up? Within a very short period of time, the 40

22 per cent of Serbs in the JNA went up to some 90 per cent; is that true?

23 A. That is true, that somewhere between the summer of 1991 and March

24 1992, the proportion had become about 90 per cent, and of the other 10 per

25 cent, you take into account Montenegrins and so forth.

Page 1878

1 Q. Very well. You also said that this process was accompanied by the

2 withdrawal of the JNA units, their equipment, and weapons, the MTS, that

3 is, the materiel and technical equipment, from Croatia to

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?

5 A. You also said Slovenia. The translation didn't. Was I correct?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. From Slovenia and from the non-Serbian-controlled parts of

8 Croatia, that's true, that's the case.

9 Q. Throughout 1991, there were organisational changes made to the

10 Yugoslav People's Army where the second military district was formed in

11 Sarajevo. Is it true that the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was thereby

12 covered by two military districts, namely the mentioned military district

13 in Sarajevo and the fourth military district in Titograd?

14 A. My recollection was also that the fifth military district from

15 Zagreb covered northwestern Bosnia. But without going back to check any

16 of that, I would affirm those three things with caution.

17 Q. Right. It is true that the second military district was, indeed,

18 established in Sarajevo; is it not true?

19 A. That is true.

20 Q. In 1990, 1991.

21 A. Going back to what I said yesterday, also, that the 2nd military

22 district was then converted into the VRS.

23 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. Is it not true that, as part of this process

24 and of the strategy of the Serbian JNA, the policy of assuming control

25 over the communication centres was also something that took place?

Page 1879

1 A. Yes, it was. And again, my testimony yesterday went to that

2 point. Excuse me, could I just ask, are we going to be using this again,

3 because I would rather move this away because it's quite difficult -- I'm

4 kind of peering --

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Are you finished with that map, Madam Vidovic?

6 THE WITNESS: We can move it back later.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Usher, in the meantime, perhaps you could move the

8 ELMO back, because I understand the witness -- it's standing right in

9 the -- I agree with you, Dr. Gow.

10 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

11 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Actually, I minded it as well.

12 Thank you very much.

13 Q. Does this mean that, by doing so, by taking over control, the

14 Serbs gained advantage, because the other side was left without these

15 significant military resources? And I'm referring to the Muslims.

16 A. [No audible response].

17 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could I ask for the answer to be

18 entered in the transcript. He said yes.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: I didn't hear it.

20 THE WITNESS: I shall repeat it. Yes.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay, thank you.

22 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Did the takeovers include repeaters, other important facilities,

24 as well as some issues, like the ones you mentioned yesterday, some

25 important sections of roads? But could you please tell me, did this also

Page 1880

1 include the takeover of repeaters and some other important facilities?

2 A. It included the takeover of all facilities -- of all military

3 means and materiel that were under the control of the VRS of the 2nd

4 military district. There were some areas, such as Konjic, where there was

5 fights over control of some of the assets. But in most places where the

6 then-JNA, transformed -- about to be transformed into VRS, couldn't

7 establish control, as with Slovenia and Macedonia and the

8 non-Serbian-controlled parts of Croatia, the tendency was to raze things,

9 to destroy, not to leave anything behind.

10 Q. Yes. We will come to that later when talking about the context of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you confirm that the military and political

12 leadership from Belgrade, through the reorganisation and transformation of

13 the armed forces, in effect, weakened the Territorial Defence of Bosnia

14 and Herzegovina?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Is it not true that the entire weaponry was taken out of the

17 control of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina and placed under

18 the control of the Yugoslav People's Army?

19 A. I'm not certain it was the entire arsenal, but it was, by far and

20 away, the overall majority of it. The Bosnian forces did keep -- were

21 left with something, they had something as it started. But most of what

22 they had was gone.

23 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. Is it correct, is it true, that the weapons

24 and materiel that had been taken over were then transferred to the areas

25 predominantly populated by the Serbs?

Page 1881

1 A. Yes. They were redistributed to Serbian Territorial Defence,

2 Serbian-controlled Territorial Defence.

3 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I kindly ask the usher to show the

4 witness --

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Are we finished with this then?

6 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Could the map

7 please be assigned a number. I've forgotten all about it. And could we

8 tender that document into evidence.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be D63.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. So the map on which the witness -- Dr. Gow,

11 marked several places and put his initials next to the markings is being

12 admitted into evidence and marked as Defence Exhibit D63.

13 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Could the witness please look at the document by the Federal

15 Secretariat For National Defence of the General Staff of the armed forces

16 of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, addressed to the commander or chief of staff,

17 that is, by -- to the second military district, signed by

18 Lieutenant General Ljubomir Simonovic. It says it is a note from the

19 meeting of the Federal Secretariat for National Defence regarding the

20 situation in the second district in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a proposal

21 to pull -- to relocate units of the JNA and the VMR. This is a note of

22 the meeting of the secretaries for National Defence concerning the second

23 military district in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the proposal to relocate

24 the JNA units and the VMR. The document is a long one. Please look at

25 item number 1, and then we'll look at item number 4. I can quote item

Page 1882

1 number 1. The note orders that:

2 "As soon as possible, staffs should be established, detachments

3 and brigades of volunteers of smaller numbers, and that they be reinforced

4 by officers of the JNA with weapons and equipment."

5 Could you please look at item number 4. It says:

6 "To plan and secure mobilisation call-ups in the areas

7 predominantly populated by the Serbs, whereas in the other levels, a high

8 level of combat-readiness should be ensured for the JNA units."

9 Dr. Gow, I believe that in your studies you had occasion to see

10 this document. Does this, in fact, not mean that the JNA has started

11 forming volunteer units? And is it not true that the JNA did, in fact,

12 establish volunteer units?

13 A. Well, I was actually hoping -- going to ask if I could make a

14 comment on the document. But as you say --

15 Q. By all means, doctor.

16 A. As you say, I might have seen this document in my studies, I would

17 say I haven't seen this document. And I'm prepared for the discussion

18 now, to talk about it and take it at face value.

19 I would raise a question about it, if I may, which is simply that

20 the typeface is -- it's consistent with my understanding of situation and

21 events, but the typeface is different than any other I have seen of

22 documents, which means that it looks different and inconsistent, and

23 therefore I just raise that question about it. I have no way of verifying

24 its provenance and authenticity. I don't want to raise questions about

25 it. I'm prepared to take it, and it's consistently my understanding, but

Page 1883

1 it doesn't look like other documents from the JNA, especially because of

2 the -- the typeface is very different.

3 But given your questions, and that I take it on that basis at face

4 value, certainly it's consistent with my understanding, and it certainly

5 indicates military preparations underway. It would refer to the action

6 for coordination with war -- opstina, municipality, war presidencies,

7 crisis headquarters, and local security services to be working in

8 conjunction with the JNA and in the process of mobilising Territorial

9 Defence to prepare the armed forces there.

10 I might also add that paragraph 5, you made reference to Han

11 Pijesak before, I made reference to it yesterday, indicates clearly, if

12 the document is being taken at face value, that the preparations to

13 relocate the second military district headquarters from Sarajevo to Han

14 Pijesak for the wartime command and control.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Before we break, perhaps -- there seems to be the

16 signature on this document, what purports to be the signature of Dragoljub

17 Simonovic. Have you ever seen the signature of this person before in your

18 life, Dr. Gow.

19 A. Have I seen the signature?

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Have you seen the signature of Dragoljub

21 Simonovic.

22 A. I'm not sure if I have. I don't have a specific recollection of

23 it.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's have the break now, if it's convenient for

25 you. In the meantime, do you want to have a further look at this document

Page 1884

1 during the break, Dr. Gow, or not?

2 THE WITNESS: It can do no harm.

3 JUDGE AGIUS: Because I could make it available, and then we'll

4 reconvene in 25 minutes from now. That's basically ten -- between ten and

5 five to 11.

6 --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.

7 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I suppose we can proceed.

9 MS. SELLERS: Excuse me, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Sellers.

11 MS. SELLERS: Apologies to my learned friend. I just wanted to

12 return to the Trial Chamber the inquiry that was made. We asked that two

13 Prosecution exhibits be tendered. They were tendered. They were tendered

14 only in English. We now have the B/C/S translation for those exhibits.

15 And that's Exhibit 410 and Exhibit 411. I wanted to place that on the

16 record and have these handed out.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: They are already in the record because you have just

18 stated it.

19 MS. SELLERS: Thank you.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: So we don't need to do anything more about it.

21 MS. SELLERS: Okay.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Those were the two documents that were

23 tendered yesterday, Mr. Registrar.

24 Yes, Madam Vidovic, you may proceed. In the meantime, if the

25 witness, having gone through -- having had the opportunity to go through

Page 1885

1 this document once more, would like to add anything else to what he stated

2 before, before answering any further questions, you're free to do so.

3 Otherwise, you can wait for the question and answer the question.

4 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I, just before the

5 witness answers, provide a clarification. The witness is actually right.

6 This is not a document of the JNA, this is a document of the Federal

7 Secretariat for National Defence. This is something that the witness, I

8 believe, should bear in mind for any further clarifications, should he

9 deem that any are necessary.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Are there further comments, either from the

11 witness -- you may remain silent on it, if you refer to do so, or any

12 further questions, for that matter.

13 THE WITNESS: If I may, it would probably be better to remain

14 silent. I just wanted to confirm that what I was -- what I was intending

15 to do before was simply to indicate that I have -- I would have a question

16 about the document. I don't want to dispute the document as such. But

17 just because either from Federal Defence Ministry or JNA, it looks

18 different to other documents I've seen in terms of the typeface. I

19 haven't -- I can't say for sure even that I haven't seen another document

20 that has a similar typeface. But just it looked unfamiliar.

21 Certainly, the information within it is consistent with my

22 understanding of what was happening, and it could well be that -- you

23 know, it can be taken that it's not for me to decide what the document is.

24 But I wanted to raise that question simply to say that I look at it and I

25 think that probably the -- in assisting the Trial Chamber, the Trial

Page 1886

1 Chamber might want to be aware that it looks different to other things.

2 I could also suggest that in pursuing this, in handwriting on the

3 original, it says "Annex Expert Drina Corps." I don't know where the

4 document came from, but that might also help, if anybody does want to

5 pursue it at a later stage. And also, while I have the document, and

6 taking it again at face value, would add also, consistent with both some

7 of the things I said yesterday and with response to some of

8 Madam Vidovic's questions, and I hope I'm not preempting Madam Vidovic in

9 saying this, I should also point out a couple of other things.

10 The first is that if you look under -- I think it's Article 2,

11 item 2, and you go to the third indentation -- sorry, I've got the

12 original. This is on page 3 of the translation. Both that and the

13 following indentation confirm about destroying and disabling all equipment

14 that cannot be transferred to Serbian control.

15 There was another thing which is -- oh, and I understand why

16 Madam Vidovic was asking about the 2nd and 4th military districts, because

17 under the JNA I also mentioned the 5th covering northwestern Bosnia, but

18 by the you come to this document, of course, the 5th is no longer

19 functioning. So now I understand why you asked that before. Thank you.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Madam Vidovic, do you have any further questions on

21 this document?

22 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. No further questions in

23 relation to this document. Just another clarification. It may happen in

24 other cases too, to the Trial Chamber and the Prosecutor. Sometimes we

25 receive documents bearing certain markings, documents that we receive

Page 1887

1 directly from a source. This document is from the seized documents in the

2 2nd military district in Sarajevo. The source then hands this document

3 over to us, and the document bears a mark. There is nothing I can do

4 about this sign or mark. Thank you very much, Your Honours. I would like

5 to tender this document into evidence as a Defence exhibit.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the exhibit number will be P64.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: D. This document is being tendered in evidence and

8 is being admitted and marked as Defence Exhibit D64. Thank you.

9 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. In relation to this, we'll no longer be requiring this document.

11 You've elaborated on this sufficiently.

12 Just one question. The destruction of military structures in this

13 way, did it affect the military ability of the Bosnian army at a later

14 stage in terms of the equipment that it had? Later, at the beginning of

15 the war, and throughout 1992.

16 A. Yes, of course it did. It meant that materiel which might have --

17 if left behind untouched, could have been available to the Bosnian army.

18 Sorry, materiel that could have been available to the Bosnian army was

19 not.

20 Q. I understand. Thank you, Dr. Gow. Now I will show you a

21 different document.

22 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I have the usher's assistance,

23 please.

24 Q. I would like to show Dr. Gow, the Chamber, and the Prosecutor a

25 document of the Serbian Assembly of Foca municipality.

Page 1888

1 JUDGE AGIUS: I take it, Madam, that you no longer require these

2 two documents? No?

3 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] These are OTP translations, if I

4 may. These are not Defence documents. But my eyesight is not what it

5 used to be, Your Honours.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Oh, I see, I see, I see. So these -- can you

7 indicate to me which is 410 and which is 411?


9 JUDGE AGIUS: P410, and this is P411. Okay, thank you.

10 Sorry about that, Madam Vidovic.

11 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. I hope that Dr. Gow, by now, has received this document of the

13 Serbian Assembly of Foca municipality, a document that was sent to the JNA

14 general staff in Belgrade personally to General Colonel Blagoje Adzic.

15 The title is "A Request for Stationing in Foca," dated the 17th of March,

16 1992.

17 Can you please look at the very last sentence of the first section

18 or paragraph of this document. It reads:

19 "The building is some 2 kilometres away from the town, and it is

20 located in an area populated by Serbs only."

21 MS. VIDOVIC: Do you have translation? [Interpretation] Does the

22 Chamber have this document?


24 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Then if you could please look at the following paragraph of this

Page 1889

1 document, which says:

2 "Pursuant to our request, we have made some previous arrangements

3 and submitted the necessary documentation to the Bilaca Corps HQ. You can

4 now make all the necessary consultations in this regard with the

5 above-mentioned corps HQ."

6 Dr. Gow, Foca is a town in east Bosnia, is it not?

7 A. It is.

8 Q. Is it not true that there was a degree of close cooperation

9 between the SDS and the JNA in terms of these preparations that were

10 carried out? Does this document not demonstrate that this was, indeed,

11 the case?

12 A. It does, again, consistent with things that I said yesterday.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I please have the usher's

15 assistance yet again.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Dr. Gow?

17 THE WITNESS: Just why we have -- one other thing about the

18 previous document that I intended to say. This is addressed personally to

19 General Colonel Blagoje Adzic who was referred to in the previous

20 document. Just for clarity on the record, the translation said that he was

21 a representative of the Defence Ministry. He was actually acting defence

22 minister, which is reflected in the original, just so it's clear.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

24 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Thank you for this clarification, Dr. Gow.

Page 1890

1 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can this document please be assigned

2 a number as a Defence exhibit.

3 THE REGISTRAR: It will be D65 --

4 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document is being tendered -- yes.

5 MS. SELLERS: Excuse me, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: -- yes.

7 MS. SELLERS: I know it's going to be tendered. I just want to

8 ask learned counsel would she please just clarify the origin of this

9 document. I see that on the top it says "Institute For War Crimes." Is

10 this the origin of the document that we're looking at just now, or does it

11 come from a collection? We note it has no ERN number.

12 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

13 MS. SELLERS: Is that the Dutch Institute for War Crimes?

14 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] No. I was about to shed some light

15 on this. This is the institute for researching war crimes, an archive

16 with documents that were seized from the 2nd military district based in

17 Sarajevo. This is a document that the Prosecutor has already used in a

18 number of other cases, if that can be of any assistance. I, however,

19 obtained my copy directly from the institute.

20 MS. SELLERS: Thank you for the clarification. We'd have no

21 objection therefore, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. So this document is being tendered and

23 entered in evidence as Defence Exhibit D65.

24 Please proceed.

25 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 1891

1 Q. I asked Dr. Gow to look at this document, a document of the

2 Serbian Assembly of Foca municipality, a document that was sent to the

3 General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade. Actually, we finished with that.

4 But now I want him to look at the Serbian Assembly of Ilidza document,

5 dated the 3rd of January 1992, signed by Assembly President Radomir

6 Kezunovic. There's a reference to it here as draft decision. If he can

7 please look at item 1, item 1 reads:

8 "Start an initiative to regulate the status of Serbian volunteers,

9 members of their families and members of territorial units."

10 Dr. Gow, in relation to this document, can you please explain the

11 following: The cooperation between the SDS and the JNA, was it not

12 material in terms of preparing volunteers, and did it not cut both ways?

13 Do you not believe that that is precisely what this document shows?

14 A. I certainly agree that it was important. I didn't catch the

15 original, and the translation says "cuts both ways," and I'm not sure what

16 is meant by that, just to be -- just -- just to clarify the question.

17 Q. What I wish to ask is, was there a correspondence, mutual

18 reporting, from the SDS to --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And vice versa.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Dr. Gow, could you explain the meaning of this

23 cooperation between the SDS and the JNA in terms of arming the population

24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

25 A. If I may be brief, I think I did that yesterday. But it was part

Page 1892

1 of the military/political plans to pursue the project about which we've

2 been talking.

3 Q. And to a high degree, this project was being implemented by and

4 through the SDS.

5 A. If it wasn't explicit yesterday, let me draw it out and make it

6 explicit. The SDS was pursuing the political dimension with the strategy

7 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in doing so, was relating to those

8 preparing the military dimension.

9 Q. That's precisely what I was about to ask.

10 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can this document for the Serbian

11 Assembly of Ilidza, dated the 3rd of January, 1992, be assigned a number

12 as a Defence exhibit, and I would like to then tender it into evidence.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the exhibit number will be D66.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. This document is being tendered and received

15 in evidence and being marked as Defence Exhibit D66.

16 One moment. My attention is being drawn, very rightly so, by

17 Judge Eser, that this purports to be a draft decision. Do you have any

18 information at all, Madam Vidovic, whether at any given point this -- what

19 purports to be a draft eventually was adopted and became a decision? Do

20 you have any information on that, or not?

21 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The Serbian

22 municipality is here making a proposal to start an initiative on

23 regulating the status of Serbian soldiers, which indeed was regulated at a

24 later date, as will be clearly indicated by further documents that we are

25 about to produce. What I wanted to speak about was that there was a

Page 1893

1 degree of cooperation in terms of making proposals and decisions. That

2 was my intention. I wanted to get our expert witness to explain what

3 communication there was mutually between the SDS and --

4 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't think we are on the same wavelength here.

5 Although this document says the Ilidza municipality at its first session

6 on the 3rd of January, 1992, adopted the following," then it says "draft

7 decision." Either it has been adopted, or this is a draft decision

8 presented for adoption and this is the document which was presented for

9 adoption, taking it for granted that it would be adopted on the 3rd of

10 January. But what we'd like to know is whether it was, indeed, adopted,

11 in which case it would have been followed by another document without the

12 use of the word "draft." So, I don't know, I mean, this is not the first

13 time I have seen documents like this. To be honest, in Brdjanin, we had

14 hundreds of such documents, and most of the time you never know whether

15 they became decisions or whether they remained as drafts.

16 Yes, Dr. Gow.

17 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I hope this helps. To

18 situate in context, I made reference to an instruction from the SDS

19 leadership yesterday which was sent out in December to the local SDS

20 parties to begin these kinds of operations -- this kind of procedure. So

21 I would situate this is part of a process begun in December. The date of

22 this in early January seems to me to indicate they are taking part of an

23 initiative. And whilst we can assume nothing, I would take it as read

24 from later events that this process was continued and completed.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.

Page 1894

1 Do you have anything to add, Madam Vidovic?

2 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Just this: What we have here

3 is a situation where different bodies in the area were authorised to do

4 different things. This is a low level of government making a proposal to

5 a higher level of government to adopt this particular decision, which was

6 adopted on this very day. The proposal to submit this to the assembly was

7 adopted on that day. You can see that based on this decision. It says:

8 "The decision is hereby being submitted to the Serbian Assembly of

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina for further realisation." So as far as this particular

10 body of government is concerned, the Assembly of the Serbian municipality

11 of Ilidza, this is the final document.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

13 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Can I have

14 the usher's assistance, please. I would like to show the witness a

15 different document. And the document is -- my apologies. Before we start

16 with that, can we please have this document assigned a number.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be D66.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: I think I had already said that.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Oh, sorry.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know. But I seem to remember that I had

21 already said that. It's okay. No problem. It's D66 anyway.

22 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Dr. Gow, can you please have a look on the conclusions based on

24 the assessment of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the area of

25 responsibility of the 2nd military district, dated March 1992, signed by

Page 1895

1 Commander General Milutin Kukanjac.

2 Can you please look at page 5 of the B/C/S version, which should

3 be page 6 of the English. Page 6 of the English, the section which reads:

4 "The JNA has distributed 51.900 pieces of weapons (75 per cent),

5 and the SDS, 72.298 pieces."

6 Dr. Gow, does this document not confirm what you spoke about

7 yesterday, namely, that there was a very high degree of cooperation

8 between the SDS and the JNA in arming the local Serbian population?

9 A. It does. And if I may add, with reference to that earlier

10 document yet again, that made reference to the report from the 2nd

11 military district command, and from the date, I would assume that this

12 is -- taking the other document at face value, this is the report to which

13 it makes reference.

14 Q. That's correct. Dr. Gow, does this document not indicate that the

15 JNA was, in fact, receiving accurate information from the SDS as to the

16 exact amount of weapons that had been delivered and distributed by the

17 SDS?

18 A. Plausibly it could do that. It could also indicate the number --

19 the pieces of weaponry which the JNA had given to the SDS to distribute,

20 without necessarily confirming whether or not and how they had been

21 distributed. But I think that would make a big difference to the point

22 you wish to address.

23 Q. Yes, thank you. Therefore, the JNA and the SDS were obviously

24 distributing tens of thousands of weapons to the Serbian population while

25 they were carrying out preparations for the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 1896

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Yesterday you explained that an important role in implementing the

3 policies of the Serbian leadership was played by paramilitary formations

4 set up by security services in Serbia itself. Is it not true that there

5 were special camps back in Serbia used for the training of these units?

6 A. Yes, it's certainly true that there was at least one camp, yes,

7 and that they were coordinated at the air force base at Batajnica.

8 Q. Does a camp of Arkan's units in Erdut mean anything to you?

9 A. That's the one camp to which I made reference when I said there

10 was at least one camp.

11 Q. Thank you very much. Were people who were trained in this way

12 being sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina to fight there, at the beginning of the

13 war? And later as well, throughout 1992.

14 A. Certainly.

15 Q. Dr. Gow, paramilitary units were, in fact, involved in taking

16 control of Srebrenica, expelling its population, looting property,

17 torching houses, and killing Muslims in the first half of April 1992. Are

18 you familiar with that?

19 A. You mentioned Srebrenica. The translation did not say Srebrenica.

20 You have to be cautious about having tactical knowledge about the level at

21 Srebrenica. I have information from some places. I wouldn't commit to

22 any specific statement on Srebrenica, but that was happening generally

23 throughout parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including those regions in Eastern

24 Bosnia. It's certainly the case. And that paramilitary were playing a

25 central -- a key role in that process.

Page 1897

1 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I forgot a moment ago

2 about this document, a conclusion based on the assessment of the

3 situation. May that document please be assigned a number.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, D67.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. This document is being tendered and accepted

6 in evidence and marked as Defence Exhibit D67.

7 Ms. Sellers, it also doesn't show provenance, or this doesn't have

8 an ERN number. Like the previous document, it says "Institute For War

9 Crimes." Maybe at this stage, Madam Vidovic, you can give us the

10 information as regards provenance, even though the Prosecution hasn't

11 objected.

12 MS. SELLERS: I thank Your Honour for raising it. I'm just going

13 with the policy of the Trial Chamber.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

15 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. We received this document from

16 the institute for researching war crimes, the Bosnia-Herzegovina

17 Institute. It was taken from the archives of the 2nd military district in

18 Sarajevo where documents were seized. Likewise, this is a document that

19 has been used by the Prosecutor in other cases here. However, it was much

20 simpler for me to simply obtain it back in Sarajevo from the institute. I

21 hope that is sufficient.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: When you say "seized," seized by whom?

23 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Following the withdrawal of the 2nd

24 military district that used to be based in Sarajevo, the documents were

25 left behind and were seized by the police forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

Page 1898

1 police and military forces.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: That's clear, not to give the impression that they

3 may have been seized by some officer of the Prosecution.

4 All right. So that's D67, I repeat.

5 Madam Vidovic, you may proceed. Thank you.

6 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could I have the usher's assistance

7 now to place the document by the military post of Zvornik or, rather, that

8 it be shown to the witness.

9 Q. This is a document by the military post of Zvornik, dated 13th

10 October of 1992, entitled "From the Commands of the Soldiers from Zvornik

11 Brigade to the Birac Brigade."

12 I will quote one part of the order, which says:

13 "Temporarily dispatch the unit from the 6th Infantry Battalion,

14 called Beli Orlovi, from our brigade to the Birac Brigade, to carry out

15 combat assignments."

16 Dr. Gow, Beli Orlovi, White Eagles, are known as the paramilitary

17 unit of Vojislav Seselj from Serbia; is that not so?

18 A. It's certainly the case that there was a paramilitary organisation

19 called Beli Orlovi that was organised by Vojislav Seselj, and it's

20 possible that this makes reference to it. But I don't think we could

21 entirely exclude the possibility that there was some other infantry

22 battalion called Beli Orlovi, and that it might make reference to that as

23 well. But certainly there was a paramilitary force called Beli Orlovi.

24 Q. Do you have any knowledge of the Beli Orlovi being active in the

25 area of Eastern Bosnia?

Page 1899

1 A. To my recollection, it was active in Eastern Bosnia. I have to

2 say that I have -- I'm getting old and I don't remember things

3 specifically. But I seem to recall introducing evidence to that effect 10

4 years ago, when I was assisting the Tribunal in a previous instance.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: That doesn't help.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Your Honour, please.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Telling us that you're old doesn't help us much.

8 THE WITNESS: Forgive me, Your Honours. I wasn't meaning anything

9 else.

10 A. Yes. Seselj's units were active, and as I recall in the specific

11 evidence I introduced at that stage, we also had some videotape of Seselj

12 saying directly that he discussed this with Slobodan Milosevic, and about

13 how it would be deployed and used in places in Bosnia.

14 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I have a question in relation to this. Is it not true that, in

16 fact, there was a high degree of coordination between the State Security

17 Service in Belgrade and the local Serb military units with regard to the

18 engagement of these units? I'm not referring here merely to Seselj's

19 units but to paramilitary units in general.

20 A. If by "local units" you mean the paramilitary units, and I don't

21 see them as local because they're coming from outside, but if by that you

22 mean the paramilitary units, then yes, they were -- they were planned --

23 they were initiated and/or planned and coordinated through the Serbian

24 security service, through the control of General Frenki Simatovic within

25 the command structure within the Ministry of the Interior and the security

Page 1900

1 service in Belgrade.

2 Q. Thank you very much. Is it not true that in the spring of 1992,

3 the Serbs provoked different incidents and situations as a motive to break

4 out with the conflicts between the Serbs and the rest?

5 A. That's certainly my understanding in a number of areas. One part

6 of the pattern of takeover was acts of provocation. I think I said

7 yesterday that part of the pattern was having a particular place, town,

8 village, surrounded with JNA units and artillery and armour. What very

9 often would happen was also that within that community, there would be an

10 incident which would be an act of provocation which would then lead to

11 some -- a Serb, a group of Serbs within the place calling for assistance,

12 at which point the operation would go into plan -- would go -- the plan

13 would go into operation. Sorry, not the operation would go into plan.

14 Q. Thank you very much, Dr. Gow.

15 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Before I turn to my next question,

16 could this document be assigned a number as a Defence exhibit.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, it will be D68.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, thank you, Mr. Registrar. This document is

19 being tendered and admitted in evidence, being marked as Defence Exhibit

20 D68.

21 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Dr. Gow, is it not true that the Serbian authorities established

23 by the SDS had planned to take control over the municipalities where there

24 were Serbs, regardless of whether they were majority or a minority?

25 A. Yes, it is, with the qualification that it was not necessarily all

Page 1901

1 places where there were Serbs. But certainly places where the Serbs were

2 not in a majority were part of the framework.

3 Q. Thank you. Is it not true that even some Serb municipalities were

4 established that had not existed previously, namely, Skelani and Milici?

5 A. I don't think any Serb municipalities existed prior to this

6 process of beginning to declare places as Serbian municipalities. Before,

7 they were simply municipalities. I don't know if that helps.

8 Q. Yes, it does. Thank you. But were these municipalities, to your

9 knowledge, in fact, established, namely, Milici and Skelani, which were

10 not on a list of municipalities in the previous time, earlier on? If you

11 know.

12 A. I have -- not being an expert on local government in Bosnia, if

13 those were new names, I wasn't aware of it. But I have seen the names

14 Milici and Skelani. So if they didn't exist before, then I would presume

15 that they have been established in the way you describe.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Well, I take it --

17 A. Not being an expert on the local government --

18 JUDGE AGIUS: That's fair enough, Dr. Gow. In fact, when you see

19 that it's beyond your territory, then tell us so.

20 But I take it you mean to suggest to the witness, to Dr. Gow, that

21 Milici and Skelani, supposedly before becoming Serbian municipalities,

22 formed part of some other municipalities. But they were not

23 municipalities on their own score. Is that correct?

24 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's be more specific. Milici formed part of which

Page 1902

1 municipality before becoming a Serbian municipality itself?

2 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] The municipality of Srebrenica, Your

3 Honour.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: And Skelani?

5 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] To the municipality of Vlasenica; I

6 apologise. Skelani was part of the municipality of Srebrenica, whereas

7 Milici, that town was part of the municipality of Vlasenica.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: And then at a certain point in time, you maintain

9 that they became Serbian municipality of Skelani, Serbian municipality of

10 Milici.

11 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. They therefore became

12 separated and were turned into Serb municipalities.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right.

14 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] If you have any knowledge about

15 this.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Judge Eser would like to add something.

17 JUDGE ESER: Ms. Vidovic, as I said, I still have some problems to

18 understand what you mean with Serbian municipalities. Does it mean that

19 these municipalities have been different before a certain point, and then

20 that Serbian people would come?

21 JUDGE AGIUS: It's something historical to be explained. Let it

22 come out. It will be explained.

23 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Perhaps the expert could help us.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Dr. Gow, taking also into consideration the point

Page 1903

1 raised by Judge Eser, Judge Eser --

2 A. Yes, Your Honour, that's precisely what I wanted to make clear.

3 It's possible, especially given some of the questions you asked yesterday

4 about demographics and ethnicity, that we need to make a distinction

5 between areas that might have been, in a casual sense, described as

6 Serbian, because the majority within the municipality happened to be

7 self-describing ethnic Serbs. And those which were part of a process

8 which began in April of 1991 of -- by the SDS or local activists of

9 describing the term of "Serbian opstina," Serbian municipality, to certain

10 of the municipalities.

11 And I'm taking it from the interchange between Judge Agius and

12 Madam Vidovic now, that within that process, of which I wasn't aware, that

13 part of this was also declaring certain parts of some existing

14 municipalities also to have this label. So it's not about -- necessarily

15 about the casual description of Serbian representing the population, but

16 about this additional process of adding the label "Serbian" to the names

17 of municipalities.

18 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Very well. Thank you, Dr. Gow. I would now like to show you a

20 document, which is the Defence Exhibit D30.

21 This document is entitled "The Guidelines for Work," by President

22 Radovan Karadzic, dated 15 August 1991, sent to the SDS municipal boards

23 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Correction: "The Guidelines for the Work of the

25 SDS."

Page 1904

1 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. I would kindly ask you to look at point 4,"Binding Guidelines for

3 Work", which says:

4 "Every member of the local board must be tasked with some 10 to

5 20 homes that he has to keep in contact with."

6 In relation to this issue, Dr. Gow, my question is as follows: Is

7 it not true that the SDS organised the Serbian/Bosnian population,

8 including the lowest level, the grassroots, going as far as the Serbian

9 homes? Does this document not point to this?

10 A. Yes, it does, including the lowest level, the grassroots, going as

11 far as the Serbian homes? Does this document not point to this?

12 A. Yes, it does.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: For the benefit of the public that may be following

14 the proceedings, can we have the English translation -- yes, probably, on

15 the back side -- put on the ELMO as well. Please. Thank you.

16 Yes, go ahead. Sorry to interrupt you like this, but usually we

17 have it the other way around.

18 A. If I may, Your Honour, just to clarify, I think it is clear that,

19 although this is about the -- the document refers to the opstina, just to

20 be made clear that items 3 and 4 are working -- are talking about local

21 committees, so the organisation there is talking about at a neighbourhood

22 level.

23 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow, for your explanation. My question is the

25 following one: Does it not mean that the entire Serbian people, or at

Page 1905

1 least the better part of it that lived in the territory of Republika

2 Srpska, were mobilised for the war, or at least was being prepared for the

3 war?

4 A. Sorry. "Prepared" is the better word. I'm not -- in the context,

5 assuming that this document -- assuming certain things about this

6 document, I think we can see that it's consistent with an explanation for

7 the way in which there was a phenomena at the time of takeover operations,

8 where very often, in the 24 to 48 hours preceding, many of the -- if not

9 all the Serbian inhabitants of certain places would move out. Certainly

10 large numbers. I don't know that this necessarily implies that. But the

11 idea of this connection with local arrangements, people in neighbourhoods

12 being responsible for communicating informally without documents verbally,

13 with people in houses would be consistent with that. But it doesn't

14 necessarily say that that's what it is.

15 Q. Thank you. Is it not true that the SDS boards, in the beginning

16 of the war, were, for the most part, transformed into crisis staffs.

17 A. It's true that crisis headquarters were formed as part of the

18 takeover process, yes. Whether that's necessarily to say that they're

19 transformations of the -- of the SDS boards is not something to which I

20 would be able to testify. But that the crisis headquarters were prepared

21 and took over, and that, again, would be consistent seems to be

22 reasonable, or seems to be a reasonable inference, sorry.

23 Q. Dr. Gow, could you please explain to the Trial Chamber the role of

24 the Serbian crisis staffs, in brief, both in the preparatory stage and in

25 the beginning of the war; in general, to state whatever you deem was

Page 1906

1 significant concerning the crisis staffs in order for the entire issue to

2 be understandable.

3 A. This is something, again, to which I made reference yesterday, but

4 I think to be clear, crisis headquarters were part of the structures for

5 preparing for takeover. The aim of the crisis headquarters, through the

6 instructions, was to prepare to form a government to identify those who

7 would be potential opponents or significant leadership figures to make

8 sure that they were identified and detained or otherwise dealt with at an

9 early stage, to ensure that there would be coordination with the security

10 services and local police, to ensure there would be coordination with the

11 JNA. As part of the -- that was the preparation. And in the

12 implementation, the role was to execute those tasks and to make sure that,

13 in a particular area, any potential opposition was removed or sidelined,

14 that the new Serbian authority government, self-claiming, self-purported,

15 was put in place to replace any existing municipal authority, and from

16 that point, to begin political leadership in line with the programme that

17 we've been discussing in that particular area. So that would include

18 removing, would include further coordination, and, in that case, political

19 direction to any elements of security forces at the coordination with the

20 military.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness speak in the microphone,

22 please.

23 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, I thought I was.

24 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Thank you very much, Dr. Gow. Could you please look at the

Page 1907

1 following document.

2 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Could I have the usher's assistance.

3 Could you please place the document on the ELMO. This is a document by

4 the MUP of the Serbian Republic -- the MUP of the Serbian Republic of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6 Before we turn to the substance of the document, this document was

7 obtained on the basis of a subpoena by the Ministry of the Interior of

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this was on the request of the Defence, not the

9 OTP. Therefore, the MUP of Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 31st

10 of March, 1992, signed by the assistant minister of the interior,

11 Mr. Momcilo Mandic. It was addressed to all, as you can see in the

12 heading, the CSBs, State Security Services, all, and so on.

13 Q. Could you please look at the second line, which is pretty long.

14 It says:

15 "In addition to this, the assembly of the Serbian of the Serbian

16 Republic adopted a number of laws and regulations necessary for the

17 functioning of the Republic of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

18 In this context, a law on the interior was passed, which would

19 be -- be in application as of the 1st of April, 1992, in the territory of

20 the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and appointed

21 Mico Stanisic as the minister.

22 Dr. Gow, in some of the statements that you made so far, at the

23 request of the Tribunal, for instance, in your statement relating to

24 Vlasenica of the 25th of October, 1994 [Realtime transcript read in error

25 "2004"], you studied the role of the Serbian police. First of all, I

Page 1908

1 will ask you the following: You are aware of the fact that the Serbian

2 police was established, as this document indicates.

3 A. Yes.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: For the record, I see in the transcript the 25th of

5 October, 2004. But I think you said 25th of October, 1994. Which one is

6 the correct one?

7 THE WITNESS: 1994.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Because the transcript says 2004. But I'm sure I

9 heard you say 1994. Okay.

10 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: That will be changed in the transcript. Thank you.

12 Dr. Gow, please proceed.

13 A. By "Serbian police," if you mean police by the self-declared

14 Republic -- Serbian Republic of -- Republic of the Serbian People of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, then yes, if that's what we understand by Serbian

16 police in this context.

17 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Yes, yes, that's what I mean. Could you please explain to the

19 Trial Chamber the role that the Serb police had in the preparation of the

20 and at the outset of the conflict.

21 A. Well, first of all, if I may, I'd expand it a little bit, because

22 you're saying police, but the Ministry of the Interior was responsible for

23 the police but, as designated here, Stanisic is being appointed as the

24 Interior Minister. But it's pointing out also the role of the security

25 service. So we're looking at two elements here. The MUP generally was

Page 1909

1 given a role in setting up the institutions -- as one of the institutions

2 of the newly declared political entities in setting up and taking part in

3 the takeover, including designating and identifying those who would be

4 potential opposition, and securing public order in their terms, which

5 would also include meaning providing information and securing the

6 detention of those people. They would also be involved with armed units,

7 coordinating with military, with the JNA, as part of the armed forces

8 operating on behalf of those pursuing the Serbian campaign.

9 Q. When you gave the statement on the 25th of October, 1994, you

10 stated that a significant role in the preparation and the start of the

11 conflict was played by the police in Vlasenica; is that correct?

12 A. I'm taking it that you have the statement in front of you and that

13 I made that statement within it. By now, I have no recollection of the

14 statement per se. But I don't have a question if that's what's there.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: That's fair enough. That's fair enough. Usually

16 the practice is if you have the transcript, you show the -- or read out

17 the relevant part of the transcript, and also indicate the part from the

18 transcript to the Prosecution as well.

19 A. If I may add also --


21 A. -- if we're to discuss Vlasenica, going back to something I said

22 before about local government. If I'd prepared -- in preparing a

23 statement on Vlasenica, whatever I looked at at that time specifically

24 relating to Vlasenica does not mean that I have specific expertise on

25 Vlasenica and the situation there, and I necessarily recall any of what I

Page 1910

1 might have looked at at that time. But if you have things and you wish to

2 confirm that as far as -- and a whether you mean the same, I'm happy to do

3 that.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Fair enough.

5 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Very well, Dr. Gow. Do you believe that the police played a

7 significant role -- I apologise. Do you believe that the police played a

8 significant role in the very origins of the conflicts in central Bosnia,

9 including Vlasenica?

10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Eastern Bosnia.

11 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I was a bit confused there.

12 A. Yes. The MUP was one of the elements of the security operations

13 and was a key to it. It was one part of the formation in the process of

14 taking over, as indeed, seeing as we discussed some other things

15 yesterday, it would have been in the old Territorial Defence system under

16 the general people's defence doctrine. I would expect and anticipated

17 that the MUP and the JNA as well as the Territorial Defence forces would

18 be integral parts of whatever operations there would be. So I think,

19 yeah -- I think we can always take it as read that the MUP, in both its

20 police and security service dimensions, would be part of -- a key part of

21 whatever was taking place.

22 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow.

24 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Before I turn to my next question,

25 could, please, this document by the MUP of the Serbian Republic, of the

Page 1911

1 31st of March, '92, be admitted into evidence as a Defence exhibit, and

2 assigned a number.

3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the number will be D69.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. This document is being tendered and

5 admitted in evidence and marked as Defence Exhibit D69.

6 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Dr. Gow, before I move on to my next question about the war

8 itself, I will ask you a series of questions on the role of propaganda in

9 provoking the war. Is it not correct that the Bosnia-Herzegovina TV, the

10 Sarajevo-based one, was not being received in Eastern Bosnia, that there

11 was no reception of the Sarajevo-based programme? Or, rather, is it not

12 true that people could watch TV Serbia only in Eastern Bosnia prior to the

13 outbreak of hostilities?

14 A. I'd have to preface anything, again, with the caveat that this is

15 beyond specific expertise. I am aware that it's generally said that

16 people in Eastern Bosnia generally watched RTS. I'm also aware that at

17 later stages, the broadcasting by RTS or by Serbian authorities, through

18 special transmitters, was interrupted and blocked by NATO action,

19 because -- in that context. But really, in terms of the -- you know,

20 broadcasting ranges and rights, for what I can see here and now, I'm not

21 certain that I'm the right person to be talking about it. But I'm happy

22 to talk about it as far as I can.

23 Q. Very well. Very well. Is it not correct, in as far as you know,

24 is it not correct, then, that TV Belgrade kept broadcasting disquieting

25 reports of an anti-Muslim character/nature in order to get the Serbs to

Page 1912

1 stand up against the Muslim population?

2 A. In that summary form, something like that, again, is what's

3 reported by the -- by those who've looked into these matters, and also

4 perhaps even in the press as well.

5 JUDGE AGIUS: So basically you don't have firsthand or even

6 secondhand information, personal information about it. You're just

7 relying on --

8 A. I have secondhand information in that I've read studies about

9 these things over the years. I don't think it's particularly my place, my

10 expertise, to be commenting on these things, although I know something

11 about them and about the situation. But I ...

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

13 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Fair enough. Dr. Gow, I will now show you an excerpt from a book

15 which I will ask you to comment upon.

16 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] If I can have the usher's

17 assistance, please, I wish to place on the ELMO afternoon an excerpt from

18 Dragan Jovanovic's book, another author is Gordana Bundalo, and yet

19 another, Milos Govedarica. The book is called "The Eradication of Serbs

20 in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 and 1993."

21 Can you please look at page 91 showing cuttings from the Serbian

22 press at the outset of hostilities in 1992 and 1993. Can you please have

23 a look at that page. I'll quote:

24 "An unheard of massacring in Gorazde, bodies floating on the

25 Drina, new testimonies, a Serb impaled, the river Sutjeska running blood,

Page 1913

1 and hostages on a stake."

2 Dr. Gow, in connection with what you told us yesterday and today,

3 is it not correct that in Eastern Bosnia and Foca, mentioned here

4 specifically, there were crimes that were perpetrated against the Muslim

5 population and not against the Serbian population, as these newspaper

6 cuttings seem to suggest.

7 A. It's true that there was extensive commission of actions that have

8 been alleged to be, and, in Trial Chambers here, confirmed as crimes

9 against Muslim communities -- Muslims in Muslim communities in Eastern

10 Bosnia. I don't think that it necessarily follows from that that that

11 means that there cannot be crimes against non-Muslims. It seems to me the

12 logic there is crimes against one does not necessarily imply that there

13 cannot be crimes against another.

14 And just to be clear, I'm not sure if there's meant to be a direct

15 connection between the previous two questions about the preparations and

16 the broadcasting of RTS, and my comments about the press in the run-up to

17 hostilities and the preparation and these two -- and these extracts here,

18 because these are clearly from 19 -- post-1992/1993. So we're no longer

19 talking -- just to be clear, if we all understand, we're no longer talking

20 about the preparations, we're talking about events after the onset of

21 armed hostilities. Just to make sure that that -- that we're clear and we

22 understand that. Is that clear?

23 Q. Thank you very much.

24 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] May I just ask technicians, we're

25 not receiving any interpretation. The last portion, the B/C/S

Page 1914

1 interpretation, the last portion, we have not received it, myself or

2 Mr. Oric.

3 Q. But please, Dr. Gow, can you repeat your answer to my last

4 question, simply because Mr. Oric failed to hear the interpretation. It

5 is for his sake that I will now ask you to repeat your answer, if you can,

6 if you would be so kind.

7 A. Gladly, as best I can. Should I see the transcript and repeat

8 what I said or try to approximate?

9 JUDGE AGIUS: If you have the transcript in front of you, you can

10 actually read out from the transcript. In the meantime, I want to make

11 sure that Mr. Oric is receiving interpretation of what I am saying,

12 myself.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: So I suppose you can go straight to the text that

15 you have and read it out.

16 THE WITNESS: Could we ask whoever controls this to go up a little

17 bit?

18 JUDGE AGIUS: No, you can't do that. I will do that, but I have

19 to go -- I'm one page up. It's 67. So this is -- the question to you was

20 as follows:

21 "Q. Dr. Gow, in connection with what you told us yesterday and

22 today, is it that in Eastern Bosnia and Foca, mentioned here specifically,

23 there were crimes that were perpetrated against the Muslim population and

24 not against the Serbian population, as these newspaper cuttings seem to

25 suggest."

Page 1915

1 And the following was your answer:

2 "A. It's true that there was an extensive commission of actions

3 that have been alleged to be, and in Trial Chambers here confirmed, as

4 crimes against Muslim communities, Muslims in Muslim communities in

5 Eastern Bosnia. I don't think that it necessarily follows from that that

6 that means that there cannot be crimes against the Muslims. It seems to

7 me the logic there is crimes against one does not necessarily imply that

8 there cannot be crimes against the another. And just to be clear, I am

9 not sure if there is meant to be a direct connection between the previous

10 two questions about the preparations and the broadcasting of RTS, and my

11 comments about the press in the run-up to hostilities and the preparation

12 and these two -- and these extracts here, because these are clearly from

13 19 -- post-1992/1993, so we are no longer talking, just to be clear, we're

14 no longer talking about the preparations, we're talking about the events

15 after the onset of the armed hostilities. Just to make sure that we're

16 clear and we understand that. Is that clear?"

17 And then we were stopped because we had this problem with the

18 interpretation.

19 Mr. Oric, have you now been able to follow completely the answer

20 given by the --

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I have.

22 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you.

23 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Dr. Gow, are these examples of inflammatory Serb propaganda

25 designed to show that Serbs were, in fact, the victims, and designed in

Page 1916

1 order to perpetuate the crimes against the non-Serb population?

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Sellers?

3 MS. SELLERS: Yes, Your Honour. I would say that calls for

4 speculation in an area of expertise that Dr. Gow has tried to caution the

5 Trial Chamber is not specifically his. I'm certain that he could

6 speculate and answer, but I did want to reflect that I think we've already

7 reached a bit of the limits in terms of his expertise as it relates to

8 propaganda.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I think so. Perhaps you can rephrase the

10 question, basically, Madam Vidovic. I don't know whether it is needed or

11 not. Because these -- at least what we have here is part of a book. That

12 is what it is. The book is not written in defence of the Muslims, it's

13 written in defence of the Serbs. And this is the eradication of the Serbs

14 in Bosnia. So, I mean, the two go together, but there is no other way of

15 explaining it.

16 Yes, Dr. Gow?

17 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I'm aware of this book, and

18 I'm aware that it was part of a concerted propaganda act by the Serb -- by

19 Serbian authorities, including from Belgrade. Indeed, I was given a copy

20 of this book directly by a member of the Serbian Diplomatic Service as

21 part of the efforts to draw awareness to this issue. Knowledge of the

22 specifics of the television, broadcasting and press activities in Bosnia

23 is not something that I have as a kind of primary concern. I do have

24 primary interests in issues of propaganda and media. And one thing I

25 would always want to get clear is that propaganda is simply about using

Page 1917

1 information for your own purposes. It's not necessarily either untruthful

2 or invented. It might be selective in its use of the truth. It might

3 colour things in certain ways. But one of the things always to be clear

4 about is that propaganda is simply about the use of information and the

5 dissemination of information for a purpose, and it's the intent that makes

6 it the propaganda. And in that context, the fact that this book was

7 produced in response to alleged atrocities against Serbs in eastern

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think, is simply that the Serbs was trying to

9 maximise whatever there in this context, and getting somebody from the

10 Belgrade embassy in London to give me a copy of that and others was a part

11 of that activity.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Judge Eser?

13 JUDGE ESER: Madam Vidovic, could you give us the year of the

14 publication of this book, and could you give us the dates of these

15 subtitles, the newspapers? At what time was this newspaper report -- did

16 appear?

17 THE WITNESS: If I may. Sorry.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, let's start with Madam Vidovic first. I

19 suppose the year of publication, you can easily give us? Yes,

20 Madam Vidovic?

21 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] This book was published in early

22 1994. I will come back to the Chamber with the exact date.

23 As for the newspaper articles, I really cannot say. I simply made

24 a photocopy of exactly as much as was published was in the book itself,

25 and the book did not contain any date in relation to these cuttings. The

Page 1918

1 reference, however, is to events at the very beginning of the war, and

2 that's as much as I can conclude based on the substance of these articles.

3 However, if Your Honour so wishes, I may as well move on now.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Are you satisfied with that?


6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Are you tendering this document into evidence?

7 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: So this document is being tendered and admitted in

9 evidence and marked as Defence Exhibit D70.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Dr. Gow.

11 THE WITNESS: I'm sure that the Defence will bring all the dates,

12 but if I can point out that the one -- the one item that's marked

13 "Sutjeska Teka Kerovovo" [phoen] is from Novosti on Saturday, the 12th of

14 September. The year is missing, but because of the references to JNA and

15 UNPROFOR, I suggest that that probably has to be September 1992.

16 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you for that. It actually shows the print

17 there as well.

18 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will certainly check

19 this, and I will submit to the Chamber the exact date of publication of

20 this book. I do for a fact that this was in 1994. Maybe it was late in

21 1994. I do have to keep my reservations concerning the date.

22 Q. Dr. Gow, what I gather from your answer to my last question a

23 moment ago is that you were interested in propaganda as a field of study,

24 and media, too. What I will now show you is a report by Renaud De La

25 Brosse, a report submitted to this Tribunal. I will merely read a handful

Page 1919

1 of excerpts and ask you to comment on those specifically just to see if

2 you agree with certain portions of the report.

3 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now please have this report

4 given to the witness. We have as many copies as we need to distribute to

5 all the parties.

6 Q. Dr. Gow, could you please look at page 93 of this report. I will

7 now read to you 93. It is the last sentence of paragraph 110. I will

8 read it out to you. It reads:

9 "Questioned by the RTS on the reasons which had led her to

10 volunteer to fight at Vukovar, a young Serbian woman in uniform, mother of

11 two children, said, 'Well, when I watch television, I see what's going on

12 and I want to help. And I understood that it was worth sacrificing my

13 life for our Serbia.'"

14 Is it true, or do you agree, that the Serb-based Belgrade media

15 were used in this way in order to get as many volunteers as possible to

16 volunteer for military service in order to be sent to Croatia, and later

17 to Bosnia-Herzegovina, to take part in combat?

18 A. First of all, I'm grateful to you for helping me in my research by

19 bringing the specifics of this to light. I think -- was this report

20 prepared for the Milosevic trial? I think I've seen reference to it

21 there, although --

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. -- I haven't seen the report itself.

24 A. I think -- I can confirm that this is what it says on the page

25 here. If I'm going to go beyond the page, I'd have to go to research that

Page 1920

1 I've been involved in now, not relating to the case of the former

2 Yugoslavia, but I'm actually in the process of part of a research project

3 which, since 1991, has been looking at the media and use of the media in

4 the context of current conflicts. And I'd have to say one thing from the

5 research there, and I'm sorry if this is not very helpful, but generally

6 it's helpful, and that is that there's no necessary way of saying how

7 people will receive a message. Quite clearly those putting out messages

8 have intentions in hope that the messages will be received in certain

9 ways. But audiences tend to receive in different ways. If you have a

10 predisposition to receive a piece of information, you will tend to react

11 to it affirmatively; and if you have a predisposition against a piece of

12 information, or an item, you will tend to react against it, people will

13 tend to react against it. And in that context, I don't think we can

14 draw -- we certainly cannot draw any necessary and linear connection

15 between the transmission of a piece of information, or transmission of a

16 television report or something in the press, and the way in which it will

17 be received, because it will be received differently by different people,

18 probably according to their predisposition in the first place.

19 So in that context, I look at this and I would say I think it's

20 very likely that the Serbian woman identified here, in taking this, would

21 probably also have had a predisposition already to receive that

22 information in a certain way, while somebody else, perhaps a Muslim from

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina or from Sandzak in Serbia, or even a Serb who was not

24 thinking in the same ways within Serbia, would react -- they might react

25 differently.

Page 1921

1 So I think we have to be very cautious in trying to draw

2 inferences in linear connections between transmission and reception, and

3 that's an area where I think I can speak with a limited degree of

4 authority, because I have been working specifically on those areas in the

5 context of the current so-called war on terror.

6 Again, I confirm that I don't have that specific expertise

7 relating to broadcasting, and so forth, in the former Yugoslavia.

8 Q. Then I will try asking you a simpler question in this regard. Is

9 it true that in media reports, the Muslims were always referred to as

10 Turks, Croats as Ustashas, and the Muslims, again, as Mujahedin? Was it

11 not being suggested all the time to the Serbian people that they were the

12 victims of attacks by non-Serbs, thereby underestimating the real danger

13 posed at the time by these self-same Serbs to the other ethnic

14 communities?

15 A. It's certainly the case that -- I don't think we can say always,

16 but we can say that fairly consistently the Serbian news media, and indeed

17 probably some cultural media, in the phase of the run-up to the war -- to

18 the onset of armed hostilities, and continuing beyond that, certainly used

19 language in the press, such as Ustasha, referring to Croatians, the

20 implication being that -- to make a link with the fascist Croatian regime

21 in the Second World War and therefore Serbs were being threatened in the

22 same way. And I say that without any implications for whether or not the

23 Serbs were being threatened, but simply to say that was the intent in the

24 Serbian printing. And similarly the constant references to Turks, which

25 you'll also see coming up in cultural reflections in films such as "Lepa

Page 1922

1 Sela Lepo Gore." I can't be towards -- it's a way of expressing and

2 dealing with these things, with historic references and the implication

3 that historic references being both that people might tend to do that, but

4 also to have implications to try and draw on forms of historical memory.

5 But those references, a part of the cultural pattern, I think, but

6 also was going to be -- depend on the disposition of people in the first

7 place of how they're going to react to it. Whether they're going to say,

8 you know, that's wrong, or whether they're going to say, yes, that fits

9 with what I think already.

10 In that context, I can confirm that that language was being used.

11 So I think the evidence from some of the research, for example, by Mark

12 Thompson on the press indicates that probably the reception of it within

13 the relevant communities, because propaganda is usually aimed at a

14 particular community, and in that case, it was that -- the Serb community

15 that was receptive, so it would be taken in that way.

16 I should also point out the same study also indicated the ways in

17 which Croatian press, Bosnian press, and others also shaped information

18 and agenda to their interests as well. It's a normal thing to do in a

19 conflict situation.

20 Q. Fair enough. Thank you very much, Dr. Gow, for this elucidation.

21 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Before we move on to further

22 questions, can this report please be assigned a number as a Defence

23 exhibit.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: I don't know whether the Prosecution wishes to take

25 a position on this. But this would be trying to admit in evidence an

Page 1923

1 expert report in its entirety.

2 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, again, I do acknowledge the Rules of

3 Evidence that you set forth at the beginning of this trial, and that we

4 tend to admit more than --

5 JUDGE AGIUS: But this is something different, Ms. Sellers. This

6 is admitting into evidence an expert report taken from another -- from

7 another case, without bringing and making available the person who drew up

8 this report, and without presenting him as a witness.

9 MS. SELLERS: But, Your Honour --

10 JUDGE AGIUS: So if anything --

11 MS. SELLERS: -- in addition to that, I would like to raise the

12 point that I believe our expert has not necessarily rejected, nor assumed

13 the correctness of this report. So I would just add, in addition to -- I

14 think it's not the best evidence because it's not the best witness, that

15 now our witness really has no relationship to the document in saying that

16 its conclusions are -- necessarily agree with how he looks at an area that

17 he claims himself not to be an expert in. My objection is one of

18 relevancy.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: That is another issue. That is another issue, and

20 it will be taken into consideration later on when we evaluate the various

21 bits and pieces of the expert witness. But this is -- what I'm saying is

22 something completely different. I mean, I don't think that your intention

23 is to pass through the window what you cannot pass through the door, you

24 know. I mean, it's ...

25 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in relation to this

Page 1924

1 report, there was a number of other questions that I wish to ask in order

2 to expand. However, the expert witness himself, having expressed certain

3 reservations on his own competence in this field, I wish to proceed no

4 further. Therefore, I would like to have the specific section of the

5 report, the one that has been discussed, admitted as a Defence exhibit.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: That's page 93.

7 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Which means page 93 specifically,

8 yes.

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Yes, that is -- I have no problems with that.

10 Judge Eser, do you have any problems?

11 Judge Brydensholt, no?

12 Yes, Dr. Gow.

13 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour. I would like to do two

14 things. The first is just to underline that while I say I've done no

15 primary research and have specific expertise on this kind of material in

16 this area, I did suggest that I do believe myself to have a degree of

17 authority and expertise on some of the issues associated with propaganda

18 and use of the media in security terms, and I've been doing very specific

19 work and research on that. But just not relating to the former

20 Yugoslavia, although I'm aware of some -- the inferences that would be

21 drawn from work like this.

22 I would also point out that I do have specific knowledge of

23 certain kinds, and if this page is being entered rather than the document,

24 we can also note that footnote 234 on this page mentions Dusan Mitevic,

25 who was head of the RTS, the Radio-Television Serbia, described here as an

Page 1925

1 eye-opener of Milosevic, and there is evidence significantly of the way in

2 which he specifically worked to a Milosevic agenda in deciding which

3 things to select for broadcast and which not, and how to manage that. So

4 the intention was certainly there within RTS, and if we'd prepared this in

5 a different way, I could bring different examples, video extracts and

6 examples, to go with that.

7 So there is clear evidence that that was the intention. But I

8 think have to be very careful when making the distinction between

9 intention broadcast on one side and reception on the other.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: For purposes of this part of the discussion, what I

11 suggest is that the following pages from this report be entered into

12 evidence, be admitted into evidence, and that's the first page of the

13 report, and then pages 93 and 94, these two being the two pages that

14 reference was made to during the testimony. And that would become Defence

15 document D71.

16 Yes, and I'm returning back ...

17 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think this may be a

18 convenient time to have a break.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: I agree. So we'll have a 25-minute break, starting

20 from now. Thank you.

21 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

22 --- On resuming at 1.02 p.m.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Madam Vidovic.

24 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Dr. Gow, you mentioned the UN embargo on arms of the former

Page 1926

1 Yugoslavia yesterday, and you said that the Serbs found themselves at a

2 great advantage, in fact. Is it not true that the UN embargo on the arms

3 of the former Yugoslavia contributed significantly to bringing the Bosnian

4 Muslims into a situation which was highly unfavourable compared to that of

5 the Bosnian Serbs?

6 A. Yesterday I said it cemented the imbalance, to a large extent.

7 Q. Thank you. On the other hand, you said that the Serbian forces

8 that were armed and prepared for the war continued receiving significant

9 military aid from Belgrade after the outbreak of hostilities.

10 A. I said specifically that -- not that they continued -- I would not

11 say that they continued to receive military aid. That, to me, would be a

12 very different proposition. That the United Kingdom might give military

13 aid to Kuwait, that's a very different proposition from what I was saying,

14 which was that they continued to operate as part of one integrated

15 operation.

16 Q. Thank you. Was this not particularly felt in the border areas

17 with Serbia, specifically in Podrinje, in the Drina valley, where the

18 following towns lie: Zvornik, Bratunac, Srebrenica, in view of their

19 proximity to Serbia?

20 A. I think we can say that the proximity of those places, and others,

21 we could also say the same for northeastern Bosnia through to the Posavina

22 Corridor, meant that where those instances where I make reference to

23 forces of the VJ, those designated as VJ coming onto the territory of

24 Bosnia-Hercegovina tended to be in eastern and northeastern Bosnia because

25 the proximity across the border made it easier for that to happen. It

Page 1927

1 being far harder, but not impossible, to get those forces across to

2 northwestern Bosnia, and indeed sometimes forces did go to northwestern

3 Bosnia. There was one air operation in 1994 that took pilots from

4 Podgorica in Montenegro to the Republika Srpska Krajina where they --

5 where the planes were, and then they flew action for the VRS in Bosnia,

6 again, parts of this integrated whole.

7 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. Yesterday you stated that it was true that

8 even prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Eastern Bosnia, the Serbs had

9 heavy weaponry, including tanks, heavy artillery, even some aviation and

10 an adequate military structure as well.

11 Is it not true that this particular military structure made it

12 possible for the Serbs to ethnically cleanse, in only the first two months

13 of the war, a large number of the territories that they controlled of the

14 non-Serb population, including the towns of Zvornik, Bratunac, and

15 Vlasenica?

16 A. If I've got all of that together, yes. Again, that's consistent

17 with what I was saying most of the time yesterday.

18 Q. Thank you. Can you confirm that ethnic cleansing that you spoke

19 of yesterday was carried out on the basis of the same principle? And I'm

20 referring particularly to the ethnic cleansing of Eastern Bosnia and the

21 towns I mentioned, but in general, referring also to the ethnic cleansing

22 carried out by the Serbs.

23 A. I'm sorry, could you clarify what you mean by "the same

24 principle," please.

25 Q. Was there the same pattern of ethnic cleansing?

Page 1928

1 A. In that case, yes, the same pattern was used throughout the

2 territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yeah.

3 Q. Very well. Can you briefly explain what it was that actually took

4 place?

5 A. Do you mean can I describe events, or do you mean can I summarise

6 what the outcome was? Or I can do both. Maybe if I do both. The outcome

7 was that territories --

8 Q. Dr. Gow, if you may, could you explain the pattern itself.

9 A. The pattern. The elements of the pattern involved preparation,

10 about which we've said quite a bit. They involve the preparation

11 politically and militarily for takeover. They involve acts of

12 provocation, usually coming from somewhere within the other town, which is

13 -- becomes the pretext, then, for military action. The -- they involve,

14 then, the sorting and designation of people -- of non-Serbs and

15 non-desirables within the community, some of which would then be removed

16 to detention centres, some of which would be processed to be evacuated,

17 some of which would -- were, or, by that stage, might already have been

18 killed, or in some other cases, were, then, at a later stage, killed.

19 This is the so-called ethnic cleansing, which means removing those of a

20 different ethnicity to ensure that there is an ethnically pure and secure,

21 controllable framework in that particular area.

22 The killing -- in some cases, there was demonstrative killing to

23 induce others to cooperate in the whole process. In some cases, there

24 appears to have been larger-scale killing. In other cases, it's been a

25 matter more or less purely of democratic processing, either through

Page 1929

1 temporary detention centres or, in some cases, even through organised

2 arrangements to transport out. So that would include documentation,

3 pieces of paper being signed, money being transferred to pay for a one-way

4 ticket, to pay for a one-way visa, and so forth.

5 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow. In relation to this, you stated yesterday

6 that this principle of ethnic cleansing applied --

7 MS. SELLERS: I need to interrupt. I'm sorry, the transcriber's

8 asked Dr. Gow to please move closer to the microphone because she's unable

9 to pick up all of your testimony.

10 THE WITNESS: Forgive me. I'm sorry.

11 JUDGE AGIUS: If you can move the microphones.

12 MS. SELLERS: I'm sorry.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: It's no problem.

14 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. When you were talking about ethnic cleansing yesterday, you stated

16 that the principle of ethnic cleansing was applied by the Serb authorities

17 and forces, and you went on to say that the same was later on copied by

18 others. Could you please explain in more detail to the Chamber what it

19 was that you meant by the latter part.

20 A. I think it's, by now, fairly well accepted that Croatian forces

21 and those operating on behalf of the Bosnian government at times also

22 practiced some similar pattern of activity, and indeed the Bosnian

23 authorities, in some cases relating to northwest of Sarajevo, have taken

24 responsibility themselves and have investigated and launched cases because

25 of what was said there to have happened. So I think what I was indicating

Page 1930

1 was that the incidents of atrocity and the removal of populations, while

2 the key part of the Serbian strategy which was the core of defining the

3 war and essentially stop -- bringing on hostilities to the region, wasn't

4 used exclusively by those Serbian forces.

5 Q. Doctor, this is my following question: Can you tell the Trial

6 Chamber whether the Bosnian Muslims from Visegrad, Srebrenica, Bratunac,

7 Zvornik carried out an ethnic cleansing of the Serbs in 1992 and in the

8 beginning of 1993, or were they themselves victims of such an ethnic

9 cleansing?

10 A. First, I'd wish to caution, again, about levels of expertise. My

11 expertise principally lies with what I've referred to before as the

12 strategic level, that military/political access overall. That means at

13 times I have awareness also of the technical -- tactical level. That's

14 part of building up the overall picture. I want to make clear that I

15 don't come here as somebody with expertise on Srebrenica, or indeed

16 Visegrad specifically and locally, at that tactical level. However, I can

17 say that the evidence is fairly clear that Serbian campaigns of ethnic

18 cleansing were implemented in those places, and I can also say, and this

19 relates perhaps to the press cuttings that you showed to us before, that

20 there were significant reports that those acting on behalf of the Bosnian

21 government, or the Muslims, had been responsible for what were described

22 as acts of atrocity in those parts.

23 Now, I say this based on the evidence used by others in the

24 reports, not because it's something that I specifically have been to that

25 region to investigate, or have ever looked into in a very close and

Page 1931

1 specific way. I point out, if you wish to have expertise on this, I have

2 a colleague who did.

3 Q. I was not referring to the war crimes. What I had in mind was the

4 ethnic cleansing policy that was applied.

5 A. In that case, I should say it's probably better for me to reserve

6 judgement that there were accusations of people being killed and removed

7 from the territory. That is what I can say. Whether or not we should or

8 would call that as ethnic cleansing as part of the strategy at this stage,

9 I think, would be stretching what I can say about this situation a little

10 bit too far.

11 Q. Fine. Thank you, Dr. Gow. Could you look once more at the map of

12 Eastern Bosnia that we gave to you earlier on. In your -- yesterday's

13 testimony, you said that the first attacks were a part a coordinated Serb

14 JNA programme, designed in order to establish a control framework to all

15 the strategic points within Bosnia and Herzegovina and outside. When

16 talking specifically about Podrinje, the Drina area, did that also imply

17 the takeover of the bridges leading across to Serbia?

18 A. Yes, it did. And if I may interrupt that just for a second to go

19 back to the previous answer, it occurs to me it might be relevant also to

20 add that while I said the Bosnian authorities have investigated some

21 cases, I'm not aware they have investigated cases in this part of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I don't say for sure that they haven't, but I just --

23 that -- an additional bit to the previous answer.

24 On this question, yes, absolutely, the point was that those key,

25 main communication lines into Bosnia-Herzegovina, including obviously

Page 1932

1 bridges, were to be secured. Zvornik was one of those points; Visegrad

2 was another.

3 Q. Thank you. Is it not true that in these towns of Zvornik,

4 Visegrad, Bratunac, Vlasenica, a terrible atrocity was committed over the

5 Bosnian Muslim population, such as killing, rape, torching, looting,

6 expulsions, which caused a flood of refugees leaving the area?

7 A. Yes, I think that's fairly well established, and also consistent

8 with the evidence I was giving yesterday.

9 Q. Is it not true that an enormous number of refugees flocked to the

10 Srebrenica area, especially at this point in time?

11 A. Yes, it is.

12 Q. In your testimony, you also mentioned Vlasenica. Is it not true

13 that Vlasenica was a significant place, having been placed on the main

14 logistics route between Serbia and the units that held Sarajevo under

15 siege at that time?

16 A. Yes, I should say that's the case, and also key in getting access

17 over land to Han Pijesak as well, the command and control centre.

18 Q. Thank you, Dr. Gow, for your additional explanation. I will now

19 show you a video featuring a part of the speech of the commander of the

20 Drina Corps, General Milenko Zivanovic, on the establishment of the

21 Bratunac Brigade, on the 14th of November, 1992, and it has to do with the

22 line of questioning so far and the questions that will follow.

23 Could you please now look at this video clip, and I kindly ask the

24 video booth to show video 1.

25 [Video played]

Page 1933

1 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I think we've seen enough. Thanks

2 to the video booth.

3 THE INTERPRETER: The microphone is off. The interpreter cannot

4 hear.

5 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Dr. Gow, you've said a moment ago that people were expelled. Is

7 it not true that some of those people arrived in Srebrenica from the

8 Vlasenica area, meaning from the north, from Vlasenica, from Bratunac,

9 from Drina, from Skelani, therefore, from the south, thereby creating an

10 enormous number of refugees in Srebrenica, Cerska, and in particularly in

11 Zepce and Gorazde.

12 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter missed one town.

13 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Is this not confirmed by this speech by General Milanovic --

15 Zivanovic? General Zivanovic, commander of the Drina Corps?

16 A. Where he makes reference a 80.000 Turks, I think we can take it

17 that that means 80.000 Slav Muslims from the area, whether or not the

18 figure is accurate. I suspect from UN figures this figure was actually

19 less than that. But it was still tens of thousands. And yes, it confirms

20 that that was happening, and the film also confirms, going back to one of

21 the maps yesterday and your colleague's sound questioning of it, in line

22 with my comment, that the three places, Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde, were

23 not linked. And that was a key conclusion in terms of the Drina Corps

24 commander, General Zivanovic.

25 Q. Very well. Thank you, Dr. Gow. This speech by the commander of

Page 1934

1 the Drina Corps that we've just listened to in the video, does it not show

2 that the Serb army had very well worked out strategy to isolate, wear out,

3 and cause hunger amongst the Bosnian Muslim population in the area?

4 A. Consistent with many of the other things that I've already said,

5 it indicates that there was an approach which -- which -- which meant

6 isolating and surrounding places, leaving them cut off, and eventually

7 moving in to mop them up when the opportunity was there. I think we can

8 also point out that at this stage, I don't think that significant forces

9 from the VRS were deployed in this area precisely because it was held in

10 one position, with no immediately significant targets, and the main

11 emphasis was elsewhere.

12 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. Before I move on to my

13 next question, could this video clip be assigned a number, as a Defence

14 exhibit?

15 JUDGE AGIUS: We Have seen it before this video. So I would

16 imagine that it has already been assigned a number, no?

17 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] No. Your Honour, if I may explain,

18 we saw it as part of our opening statement, but not during the

19 presentation of evidence.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. That's okay. So this video will be

21 assigned -- is admitted into evidence, and it's being given 72.

22 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour --

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Defence Exhibit D72.

24 MS. SELLERS: Excuse me, I have no objection to the video. I just

25 like would my learned friends to clarify what was the date of the video,

Page 1935

1 when was it taken, and what does it refer to.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: Which is D71, registrar? Okay, all right.

3 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] This footage was made -- the video

4 that was forwarded to us by the OTP bears the number V000-3937, and the

5 date is the 14th of November, 1992. The establishment of the Bratunac

6 Brigade, that was the occasion.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Let's proceed.

8 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Dr. Gow, you were asked by my colleagues from the OTP yesterday

10 about a decision to establish the army corps of the army of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and your attention was drawn to the fact that

12 Srebrenica fell under the area of responsibility of the 2nd Corps, or,

13 rather, was part of the 2nd Corps. Is it not true, then, in actual fact,

14 that Srebrenica, as well as the two other small enclaves, Cerska and

15 Konjevic Polje, was entirely cut off from the headquarters of the 2nd

16 Corps, based in Tuzla?

17 A. It's certainly the case that it was physically separated, and I

18 would also say that it was the case of an evolving situation. To say that

19 was completely cut off, I think, would be wrong, because there were

20 communications, including some people crossing Serbian-controlled

21 territory to go between them throughout the whole of the period. And that

22 includes the kind of awful moment in 1995 when the events of which we all

23 know at Srebrenica occurred, that those in command in the area, including

24 the defendant, had been withdrawn for a meeting just prior to those

25 events, so that there was no -- yeah, it was physically cut off. It was

Page 1936

1 not in an easy situation. But to say that there was no communication at

2 all, I think, no -- is cut off entirely in every sense, wouldn't be

3 accurate. If that's okay.

4 Q. Fair enough. Thank you, Dr. Gow. I will now show you a document.

5 It's a Defence exhibit, D4. This is a document by the Serbian

6 municipality of Bratunac Crisis Staff, dated the 16th of April, 1992,

7 signed by Mr. Miroslav Deronjic. This is an order for general

8 mobilisation. If you could please have a closer look -- if you could

9 please look at the first paragraph, it reads: "Pursuant to a decision of

10 the Presidency of the Assembly of the Republic of the Serbian People, the

11 Crisis Staff is hereby promulgating general mobilisation for all adults.

12 Therefore, a decision of the Assembly of the Serbian People Crisis Staff

13 of the Serbian municipality proclaiming general mobilisation in relation

14 to all adults."

15 Can you please just comment on the substance of this document. Is

16 it not correct that this order for mobilisation has no age limit

17 indicated? Would that not mean that even elderly people could have been

18 mobilised, as well as women, in this specific case? Is that not what it

19 seems to imply?

20 A. It has no age limit, if you mean that there's no upper age limit.

21 It does say "who have come of age," so presumably we're talking about

22 those of 18 or above. But there's certainly no upper limit, and the

23 implication would be that -- or could be that certain -- that all citizens

24 over that age, no matter who they were or which gender, could be

25 mobilised. Whether or not citizens would also include those of Slav

Page 1937

1 Muslim ethnicity as well, I don't know. But, again, theoretically, I

2 suppose could be.

3 Q. Very well. Thank you, Dr. Gow.

4 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can I have the usher's assistance,

5 please. I would like to show the witness Defence Exhibit D20. This is a

6 document from Bratunac municipality, the Birac SAO, Bratunac municipality,

7 dated the 21st of October, 1992.

8 Q. This is a list of women who are due salaries for the month of

9 August 1992. Can you please have a look. Dr. Gow, it appears that there

10 were women's platoons in the Serb army. Are you aware of the fact that

11 women, too, were being mobilised at the time to join Serb units?

12 A. I'm not aware that women were being mobilised at that time. And I

13 have to say that I can't be sure that what we're looking at here -- it's a

14 municipality document about paying the named women on the list. It

15 doesn't indicate at all what they're to be paid for, so I'm not sure

16 whether or not this is linked to the idea of being mobilised or not. But

17 I'm a little bit at a loss.

18 Q. Dr. Gow, if you could please just look carefully at this document,

19 and there is a page with names, women, and next to the first name on the

20 next page, it says "Platoon Commander," and next to the second name on the

21 list, it says "Deputy Commander."

22 A. That certainly indicates -- I presume that we can assume that the

23 abbreviation "Komanda voda" would be consistent, yeah.

24 Q. Very well. Thank you. The following document may be of

25 assistance to you.

Page 1938

1 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I believe we have already had a

2 number assigned to this document. Therefore, can we now please show the

3 witness a document of the garrison command, Zvornik, a list of officers.

4 This is a new document.

5 THE WITNESS: If it pleases Your Honour, could I add something?

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Go ahead.

7 THE WITNESS: Thank you. Where it says "Komanda voda" assuming

8 that does mean commander of the platoon -- the commander of the platoon to

9 hold the rank of lieutenant, which isn't designated. And I don't know if

10 that has any bearing. Otherwise, it's not clear that it would necessarily

11 have a military connotation. Maybe there could be some other way of

12 understanding the use of "voda" as a group working. But that's a

13 reflection on that.

14 Are we finished with this one?

15 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, we have. Thank you

16 very much, Dr. Gow.

17 Q. Can you please look at the next document now. Garrison command,

18 Zvornik, and its name is: "List of senior officers and soldiers engaged

19 in the sniper division in the month of October 1992."

20 Can you now please look at the names under the numbers 1, 3, 4, 5,

21 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

22 A. So not 2?

23 Q. Number 2 is Bogdan. No, I didn't mean him.

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. Between 3 and 10, please.

Page 1939

1 A. Okay. Can I also point out for the record, that the translation

2 said "senior officers," though it says on here, but the word "officer," it

3 only says "officer" on the original. Not that it will make a big

4 difference, but I think accuracy ... Thanks.

5 Sorry, Madam Vidovic, your question?

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Do you agree, Madam Vidovic, do you agree that the

7 inclusion of the word "senior" in the English translation is out of place,

8 that it does not reflect the original, in other words?

9 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] I do agree, Your Honours. Indeed, I

10 do. "Starjesina" is just an officer. The word we use is "Starjesina."


12 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Very well. In relation to this question, it appears that the

14 document contains the names of eight women who were paid salaries for that

15 month, and we are speaking about Zvornik now. Do you have any knowledge

16 of this; namely, that the women living in the Podrinje area were mobilised

17 and were, in fact, actively involved in a number of different military

18 units? Can you shed any light on this document?

19 A. I can confirm that the document has the list of female names, that

20 it indicates them as being ordinary -- of having -- of ranking -- of being

21 ordinary ranking soldiers, and that it indicates that they are all snipers

22 as well, in the translation. I think what I can shed light on beyond that

23 is that, at face value, that's what it appears to confirm. And again, in

24 answer to the previous question, when you said at that time, I can't

25 confirm anything I know about mobilisation of women in these areas at that

Page 1940

1 time. This would appear to confirm it; that women were mobilised, I don't

2 think that anybody would dispute, and that that's part of a tradition in

3 the region, certainly going back to the Second World War, of women being

4 mobilised and taking part in the military activity, as relevant. Does

5 that ...

6 Q. Thank you very much, Dr. Gow.

7 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please assign a number to

8 this document before I move on?

9 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. This document is being tendered and admitted

10 in evidence and marked as Defence document D73. Yes, Judge Eser would

11 like to put a question.

12 JUDGE ESER: Ms. Vidovic, in this document there's a column called

13 employment, organisation, probably, or institution, but there's nothing

14 marked, is there? Now, if you take the front line, you have here the

15 rank, duty, place of residence, and then employment, organisation,

16 probably, or institution, and there's nothing listed here as an

17 explanation for this empty place. Or could the expert give an

18 interpretation for this?

19 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] As the expert has indicated, but I

20 might as well answer your question, Your Honour. The place of residence,

21 as indicated, si where those women actually resided. As for the empty

22 boxes under employment, organisation or institution, what this means is

23 that they were not in their usual jobs but rather had received a war

24 assignment, as indicated by this document.

25 Q. Furthermore, I would like to draw your attention to something

Page 1941

1 else. I believe the expert witness has the document in front of him. He

2 can see the following, columns 2, drafted in the unit from -- you do

3 agree, Dr. Gow, in case you still have the document before you, that's

4 indeed what it states, drafted in the unit from the 1st of September to

5 the 17th of September, and the number of days that they spent working

6 as --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: October.

8 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. -- and the number of days working as snipers, from, to, the dates

10 of engagement.

11 A. If you're asking me to confirm that those dates are on the

12 document, I can do that. I was about to point that out, that these

13 engagements were for limited periods, amounting to no more than 17 days on

14 this basis here.

15 I was going to seek to assist Your Honour in terms of the empty

16 column. I suspect that because it's -- this document relates to a draft,

17 that column, and this is only -- it's a form of speculation, trying to

18 interpret the empty column, would refer to the institution in which the

19 drafted person was based or the place of employment, but I suspect that in

20 this situation at that time, in these contexts, either they had no

21 employment to register or it was unknown, would be the most likely

22 explanation of the empty column.

23 JUDGE ESER: Okay.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you.

25 Yes, Madam Vidovic.

Page 1942

1 MS. VIDOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe this would

2 be a convenient place to break my cross-examination. If not, I have

3 another document to show, but that may take a little time, and I'd prefer

4 to do it tomorrow, if that's all right.


6 MS. SELLERS: Your Honour, if I might take the floor just for a

7 moment, since Madam Vidovic has stopped her cross-examination at this

8 point. The Prosecution would like to note that, in our opinion, the

9 cross-examination of our expert witness, Dr. Gow, appears to be more of an

10 eliciting of evidence that certainly doesn't contradict anything that's in

11 Dr. Gow's statement. I do understand that in the very beginning, our

12 learned friend did say that she would like to clarify some things, but I

13 think we have reached the point, after the two sessions of

14 cross-examination, where we have either clarified, but we certainly are

15 not cross-examining.

16 The Prosecution would like to renew its request of the Defence,

17 according to their eliciting of this evidence, to stipulate to certain

18 facts that we've asked them to stipulate for -- in prior correspondence.

19 And I would just like to note our correspondence included in the pre-trial

20 brief of the 30th of September, we asked them to stipulate to certain

21 things, and among the issues they at that time period did not stipulate to

22 was that, at all times relevant to this indictment, the indictment against

23 Mr. Oric, a state of international armed conflict existed on the territory

24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are under the distinct impression today that

25 they certainly seem to support that evidence that we elicited, and that

Page 1943

1 they clarified through elicitation. We would like to know at this point,

2 would they stipulate.

3 Another fact that they informed us that they could not stipulate

4 to that pertains to the indictment against Mr. Oric is, with the

5 disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a cadre

6 staff consisting of former JNA officers began to prepare the defence of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it appears to me today that their evidence

8 supports it, elicits possibly even more evidence on it.

9 And then I would say the last fact that they indicated to us they

10 would not be able to stipulate to at that time, but it seems today that

11 they do stipulate to, that the JNA provided critical combat, financial,

12 and logistical support to military organisations carried out by the VRS

13 against the non-Serb population in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14 These are part of our general allegations. We would like to renew

15 our request to have the Defence stipulate as opposed to continuing to

16 elicit this evidence.

17 And then lastly, I might add, Your Honours, that possibly in the

18 interests of judicial economy, while we are quite pleased with the

19 presence of Dr. Gow, I'm certain our learned friends are also, but if they

20 would like to further elicit evidence on this point, then I believe that

21 might be something that they could incorporate into the Defence case. And

22 to use Dr. Gow's time here possibly to cross-examine him on something that

23 they disagree with, either in his report or in his testimony. Thank you.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I think this debate should not be continued in

25 the presence of Dr. Gow, in any case, so that's the first thing.

Page 1944

1 I'm going to adjourn the sitting. I would like to have -- at this

2 point, he should not be involved in the discussion for sure.

3 THE WITNESS: Not in the discussion, no.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: So, registrar, please, could we have this part of

5 the debate copied for us, to have it available tomorrow morning? We'll

6 start with these points. You will have time to think about what has been

7 raised by Ms. Sellers and to give us your point of view tomorrow.

8 You're not in this -- you do not come into this debate. You're

9 there to answer questions that are put to you in direct or in cross, and

10 don't worry about the rest, Dr. Gow.

11 THE WITNESS: May I say something, not about this?


13 THE WITNESS: With your indulgence. I wanted to say two things

14 relating to the earlier part of the morning, if I may.

15 The first is, I raised a question about the Federal Secretariat

16 for Defence document I was shown, simply because of the different

17 typography. While I was sitting on my own in the room in the last break,

18 I was looking through a bundle of things that had been passed to me on

19 Sunday night by the Prosecutor from the -- I understand from the Defence,

20 which I had flipped then but didn't know what to make of it. I saw that

21 document was included in there and appeared to have one of these ERN

22 numbers on it already. So I assume from that that it's been admitted and

23 used somewhere else, and I just want to note that I -- that that was in

24 that bundle. I have seen that in a version which has an ERN on it.

25 And another thing, if you permit me 30 seconds more, goes back to

Page 1945

1 the media propaganda question. I think it's also important to understand

2 in that context that those who are successful with propaganda, with

3 information for a particular intent and purpose, do so by understanding

4 the audience. And there are things called tropes or particularly images

5 and ideas. So the more you use those and reinforce them, the more likely

6 you are to be to mobilise the support. And I think that's important to

7 understand.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: Of course. Thank you, Dr. Gow.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: You will return tomorrow morning to continue and

11 finish with your cross-examination, tomorrow morning at 9.00, okay? Thank

12 you.

13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

14 to be reconvened on Wednesday, 24 November 2004, at

15 9.00 a.m.