1 Friday, 10 November 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis. Mr. Hannis, we've decided that it is
7 in the interests of justice to allow the first part of the statement to be
8 admitted. That would be Exhibit P2480?
9 MR. HANNIS: Yes.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Paragraphs 1 to 45. But we're not satisfied it's
11 in the interests of justice to present the rest of the evidence this way,
12 and we are entirely satisfied - which is more important- that we need to
13 hear this evidence because of its potential importance. Now, that may not
14 be much consolation to you, but that is the way in which the evidence of
15 Tanic will have to be conducted.
16 If, of course, something happened along the way that changed the
17 complexion of the written material, then you could try again. But I don't
18 think that's likely, because it's so bitsy, as it were. You have so many
19 different episodes where the link between his knowledge and the original
20 source is not entirely clear. And I have little doubt it's in the general
21 interests of the presentation of a sound case that these links are
23 MR. HANNIS: I understand, Your Honour. I'll proceed accordingly.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: This isn't a criticism of the Defence. If we were
25 absolutely sure that cross-examination would pick it all out inadequately,
1 then we would leave it that way. But of course it's not necessarily in
2 the interests of the cross-examiner to clarify everything for your
3 purposes, so we would then have to spend a lot of time clarifying it. So
4 overall we've decided that the best way is to proceed live --.
5 MR. HANNIS: Okay.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: -- from paragraph 46 onwards.
7 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: From the contents of 46 onwards. We will, needless
9 to say, be ignoring the statement from paragraphs 1 to 45, and we would
10 welcome a statement that eliminate these paragraphs.
11 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. We'll do that.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Zyrapi.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: We will continue with your evidence and the
15 cross-examination by Mr. Lukic. Please remember, again, that the solemn
16 declaration continues to apply.
17 Mr. Lukic.
18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
19 WITNESS: BISLIM ZYRAPI [Resumed]
20 [Witness answered through interpreter]
21 Cross-examination by Mr. Lukic: [Continued]
22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Zyrapi.
23 A. Good morning.
24 Q. Are you rested?
25 A. I think so.
1 Q. Very well. In law, there is this one rule whereby nobody can
2 promise anything on behalf of another person without that another person
3 consenting to that. There is the exception whereby the Presiding Judge
4 may promise, on behalf of the Defence counsel, something and then that is
5 binding upon that particular counsel. Therefore, we will try to finish
6 this as soon as possible.
7 I would like to go back to the K brigades -- KLA brigades, sorry,
8 along the areas of responsibility. In Drenica, there was the 112th,
9 113th, and 114th Brigade. Is that right?
10 A. It was 111, 112, 113, and 114 in Drenica.
11 Q. Thank you. I don't want to make any mistakes anymore. In the
12 Operation Zone Pastrik, which brigades were present?
13 A. In the Operation Zone of Pashtrik, it was 121, 122, 123, 124, and
15 Q. In the Dukagjin Operation Zone, which brigades were there?
16 A. In the Dukagjin Operational Zone, there was Brigade 131, 132, 133,
17 134, and I don't remember other brigades.
18 Q. There was the 35th, 36th, 37th, and 38th as well. Is that right?
19 A. Yes. 136th, 137th, 138th, I think they came later.
20 Q. In the Operation Zone of Shala, which brigades were there, please?
22 A. In the Operational Zone of Shale, there was brigade 141 and 142.
23 Q. In the Lapi Operation Zone?
24 A. In the Operational Zone of Llap, there were brigades 151, 152, and
1 Q. In the Operation Zone of Nerodimlje?
2 A. In the Operational Zone of Nerodime, there was 161 and 162.
3 Q. And the Karadak Operation Zone, please?
4 A. There, there was Brigade 171.
5 Q. Only the brigades from the operation zone of Drenica and Pastrik
6 were in encirclement that you drew on the map. Is that right?
7 A. The ones I drew on the map, in the operational zone of Pashtrik,
8 were the brigades operating in that zone. In Drenice, there was the
9 brigade of the operational zone of Drenice and the brigades of the Shale
10 Operational Zone; 141 and 142 I think, in the G zone.
11 Q. Very well. Thank you. The other brigades, the remaining four
12 operational zones were mobilised and militarily active at the same time
13 within their combat areas. Is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you. At the operation zone staff, there was the security
16 service consisting of police units, both military and civilian police, and
17 special units. Is that right?
18 A. In the contexts of the zones, there were military police, that's a
19 fact; whereas the special units, rapid intervention units -- yes, but not
20 civilian police, at least not when I was there.
21 Q. Very well. Thank you. Within police, was there the traffic
22 police, prison police, and security police?
23 A. I don't remember to have separate sections in the police. I know
24 that there was military police.
25 Q. Thank you. Is it true that within the KLA military police, there
1 was the so-called Black Hand wearing black uniforms and participating in
2 the actions in the area of Kosovo?
3 A. As far as I know, not when I was serving.
4 Q. Very well. Thank you. Did the KLA have prisons?
5 A. Before I was in the staff, I don't know. When I was there, there
6 was a prison which was used for disciplinary measures given to various KLA
8 Q. Therefore, you are not aware that the KLA had at least 30 prisons
9 in at least 30 municipalities on Kosovo --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: At least 13
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have no information about what you
13 are putting to me; namely, about prisons in the territories where the KLA
14 was operating. I told you, I don't know about the time before my term of
16 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation].
17 Q. Very well. Thank you. I'm simply asking you to tell us what you
18 know. We also have information to the effect, or rather, we have the
19 document that the Operations Zone Pastrik, 125th Brigade, number 25-40,
20 where Fejzula Abdulah Ahmeti is being invited to report to Korisa on the
21 12th of March, 1999, in order to be mobilised into the branches of the
22 KLA. This is the document that says that failure to respond to the
23 summons would incur penalties based on the decree and military law.
24 Do you recall whether the KLA also carried out mobilisations of
25 people and, therefore, did not merely rely on volunteers?
1 A. During the period I was in office, I don't remember any
2 mobilisation, per se. I know that at a later phase, yes. People were
3 mobilised both within and outside Kosova.
4 Q. Thank you. On the 13th of March, 1999, at the markets in Kosovska
5 Mitrovica in Podujevo, explosives were activated by the KLA, resulting in
6 the deaths of civilians only; both Serbs, Albanians, and the Roma. In
7 Kosovska Mitrovica, three women were killed and 39 people injured. At
8 Podujevo, three people were killed, 26 injured. Were these actions
9 ordered by the KLA General Staff?
10 A. To my recollection, there was no order by the KLA staff to use
12 Q. Therefore, the action wasn't even approved at a later date by the
13 General Staff?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Did you ever learn of this action?
16 A. I learned of it, yes. But I don't remember the details of that
17 incident because a long time has passed ever since.
18 Q. Thank you. Shaban Shala was one of the commanders of the KLA. At
19 the same time, he was vice-president of the Committee for the Protection
20 of Human Rights and Freedoms in Kosovo. Do you know in what way the KLA
21 and the Committee For the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in
22 Kosovo cooperated?
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Marcussen.
24 MR. MARCUSSEN: Is there a basis for the premise for the question,
25 which is that Shaban Shala was both a commander of the KLA and the
2 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour, there is a document disclosed to the
3 Defence by the OTP, Operational Zone Drenica. It's ERN number 00100164 --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. I think, nevertheless, there Lukic, you
5 should first of all establish the extent of the witness's knowledge of the
6 positions held by Shaban Shala.
7 MR. LUKIC: Yes. I'm caught between a hard place and a hammer
8 trying to speed up.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but when there's an objection to
10 it, you can appreciate we have to do it more carefully.
11 MR. LUKIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I will try to do that.
12 Q. [Interpretation] Sir, Mr. Zyrapi, did you know that Mr. Shaban
13 Shala was one of the KLA commanders?
14 A. Shaban Shala was in the Pashtrik Operational Zone.
15 Q. Do you know that at the same time he was vice-president of the
16 Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in Kosovo?
17 A. I know that he worked with such issues in the past. But during
18 the period you are putting to me, I have no information about that.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: There are two -- well, are you continuing with the
22 MR. LUKIC: Yes.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please.
24 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Do you know whether the Committee for the Protection of Human
1 Rights and Freedoms in Kosovo and KLA cooperated; and if so, in what way?
2 A. I have no information on their cooperation.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zyrapi, what position in the Pastrik
4 Operational Zone did Shaban Shala hold?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Shaban Shala was not in the
6 Pashtrik zone, but in Drenice operational zone --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Just hold on. A moment ago you said specifically
8 he was in the Pastrik Operational Zone. You want to change that, do you?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I want to change that.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Probably I misspoke.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: So what position did he hold?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He held the position -- he was
14 responsible for civilian and military relations; then after the changes
15 that occurred in March, he held the task of deputy commander of Drenica
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
18 Mr. Lukic.
19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
20 Q. You've told us that in the opinion of many Albanians, the war
21 started with the incident at the Jashari homestead. One can look at
22 matters from different angles and see them differently. In our
23 investigations and discussions, conversations, with the other side, we
24 came to the conclusion that the Serbs believed the war to have started
25 with the attack on Orahovac and the surrounding villages.
1 I will not be mentioning names at this time. I know, and I
2 believe, that you do not have any direct knowledge. Nevertheless, I would
3 like to ask you the following: When you came to Kosovo, and especially
4 when you came to be the head of the KLA staff, did you hear from other
5 people that an attack had been carried out on Orahovac and that, in the
6 process, around 80 civilians were abducted and subsequently killed?
7 A. In April, you asked me when I was Chief of Staff, I heard through
8 the media and then during the period of the trial. But when I asked, when
9 I inquired about that, I didn't receive any accurate information,
10 especially with the Serbs of Rahovec.
11 Q. This incident took place in the summer of 1998. Is that right?
12 A. The fighting in Rahovec took place during summer of 1998; July, I
14 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions on this topic. I would
15 like to elicit a geographical explanation from you. There's something
16 that remained unclear. Is the village of Klecka upon the Berisa mount?
17 A. Klecke village is found in the Berisha mountains.
18 Q. And I believe this is my last question. The KLA had members not
19 only in villages but also in towns. Isn't that right?
20 A. I don't know about the earlier period. I'm talking about the time
21 I was Chief of Staff. I don't think there were KLA units in the towns. I
22 don't know about 1998, maybe there were.
23 Q. When you became the Chief of Staff and earlier, did you hear that
24 certain towns and parts of towns such as Orahovac and Suva Reka were even
25 held by the KLA and - let me ask you right away - that there were parts of
1 KLA units in Djakovica definitely?
2 A. To my recollection, during the time I was Chief of Staff, inside
3 Rahovec there were no KLA units, but there were in the periphery, in
4 Suhareke, too. There were KLA units in the villages of Suhareke
5 municipality; in Gjakova municipality, yes, in the villages around
6 Gjakova, but not inside the town. There were no KLA units that operated
7 as such, at least not during the time that I was Chief of Staff.
8 Q. Mr. Zyrapi, thank you. And I apologise for the fact that you had
9 to come to the hearing today because of my cross-examination. I have no
10 further questions for you. Thank you very much.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Lukic.
12 Mr. Marcussen.
13 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you.
14 I take it that no things we are aware of yet have arisen from the
15 document we disclosed yesterday? I thought I should maybe clarify that,
16 before I begin.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Aleksic, do you know the answer to that
19 MR. ALEKSIC: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.
20 Unfortunately, no, I don't, because Mr. Ackerman has been dealing with
21 that, and for time being I don't think we have any further questions to
22 raise. I simply didn't have sufficient time to have a look at that.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic.
24 MR. LUKIC: I read the document, and indirectly I covered what I
25 had to cover from this document. So our Defence does not have any
1 questions arising from this document anymore.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
3 I think you should proceed on the assumption, Mr. Marcussen, that
4 there is no issue arising that has so far been identified.
5 MR. MARCUSSEN: I will do that.
6 Re-examination by Mr. Marcussen:
7 Q. Mr. Zyrapi, I would like to ask you for clarification on just a
8 few points of the issues that have come up during your testimony. First,
9 just to --
10 MR. MARCUSSEN: I think we should maybe call up exhibit 4D38, if
11 we could, please.
12 Q. Mr. Zyrapi, this is a document - we will get it up on the screen
13 or maybe we have it - it's a document from the 18th of January, 1999,
14 regarding increase of readiness and placing KLA forces on the highest
15 level of alert. There, we have the document. Maybe I'll just give you a
16 second to look at that. Do you remember this document?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Was there any particular reason why this order was issued at this
19 point in time?
20 A. As far as I remember, I already explained this yesterday. There
21 were combat activities going on in Nerodime Operational Zone during this
22 time; and to my recollection, it was the Recak incident that happened.
23 Q. Thank you. Another point I'd like to clarify is something in
24 relation to your function as Chief of Staff. While you were Chief of
25 Staff, who was the head of G3 or operations directorate?
1 A. As I've stated it in my statement, this directorate, the
2 operational directorate, I had exercised this function earlier until March
3 1999, but my deputy was the one who was carrying the duties in this
5 Q. So you were Chief of Staff and also the director of operations.
6 Is that a correct description?
7 A. Yes. For a certain period of time until it was determined because
8 there was a lack of officers.
9 Q. Could you describe the -- the difference between your functions as
10 Chief of Staff and your functions during the relevant period as director
11 of operations, just very briefly maybe so we understand what the two
12 functions are.
13 A. Two different functions: The operational directorate, in fact,
14 was run by the deputy, and I was running the Chief of Staff. The
15 operational directorate dealt with the operational part, starting with
16 training, development of the KLA structure and operations. So during this
17 period, I mainly focused on the duty of the Chief of Staff, while my
18 deputy was carrying out the duty of the operational directorate. Until
19 the issue of officers was solved, new officers were found appropriate to
20 carry out this function.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: That answers one-half of that question, really.
22 MR. MARCUSSEN: Yes, I think thinking --
23 JUDGE BONOMY: It might be helpful just to have a general
24 statement of the role of the Chief of Staff.
25 MR. MARCUSSEN:
1 Q. Could you describe -- well, the Judge's question: What is -- what
2 was the function of the Chief of Staff?
3 A. The function of the Chief of Staff was to manage and lead the
4 General Staff and the directorates within the General Staff.
5 Q. If we were going to be a little bit more concrete, what would
6 those tasks consist in, direct and manage?
7 A. Well, as Chief of Staff, concrete duties would include
8 preparations to raise the level of training of the staff and the KLA in
9 general operations, disciplinary measures, as well as logistic and
10 procurement issues, high-level of readiness of the staff and the entire
11 KLA personnel. This was, in short, the duty.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Would it be fair also to describe you as head of
13 the administration of the headquarters?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It includes, partly, the
15 administration of the General Staff as well.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
17 Mr. Marcussen.
18 MR. MARCUSSEN:
19 Q. I think things have been fairly cleared, but there's just one
20 thing I would like to touch here on the end, and that is the issue that
21 came up yesterday as to the local staffs. Let me summarise the evidence
22 as I understand it. There were local staffs prior to you becoming Chief
23 of Staff, then the local staffs were incorporated into the structure you
24 put in place with brigade, companies, platoons, and so on. Is that a
25 correct understanding?
1 A. Yes. The staffs existed earlier before I assumed this position,
2 then these staffs were re-organised and incorporated in the frames of
3 companies, brigades, platoons, and other structures in the period
5 Q. And you talked about training activities. Did all platoons, did
6 they manage to receive training during the period up to the beginning of
7 the NATO bombings?
8 A. I would say that the majority of them were prepared and trained.
9 Q. And so after -- after the local staffs had been turned into -- had
10 been incorporated into a more military-like structure, would the people
11 who had earlier been in the local staff, would they remain in their
12 villages or would they lodge in other places?
13 A. Depending on the tasks of the units, platoons, brigades, or
14 companies, part of them would remain, as I said, depending on their tasks.
15 Q. If a platoon was stationed in a village, to your knowledge, would
16 such a platoon have put up some sort of defence line for the village or
17 would that not be the case?
18 A. Every unit had its defence line and defence positions depending on
19 the configuration of the terrain that would be in the outskirts of the
20 village or outside the village.
21 Q. And then you also explained that during this period of organising
22 the KLA, you also got more equipment and uniforms and things like that.
23 Were there -- how big a percentage of the ordinary soldiers do you think
24 had uniforms in, say, March 1999?
25 A. In March 1999, I would say that 85 to 90 percent had military
1 uniforms. The remaining part had sort of improvised uniform, which was
2 not a standard uniform, but which could have been used as uniform.
3 Q. Those who didn't have -- those who used the improvised uniforms,
4 did they wear the KLA emblem on their improvised uniforms?
5 A. Yes. They all had KLA emblem, regardless of whether it was a
6 standard uniform or improvised one.
7 Q. Thank you.
8 MR. MARCUSSEN: That concludes my questions to the witness.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Marcussen.
10 [Trial Chamber confers].
11 JUDGE BONOMY: That completes your evidence, Mr. Zyrapi. Thank
12 you for coming to the Tribunal to give evidence and for assisting us. You
13 are now free to leave.
14 [The witness withdrew]
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour. Our next witness is Ratomir
17 Tanic. We have protective measures of image distortion and voice
18 distortion, so I understand we need to take a break for that.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: How long do we need for that?
20 MR. HANNIS: I've been told 20 minutes in the past.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let's recalculate.
22 Well, what I think we'll do, Mr. Hannis, is we'll break for 20
23 minutes. We'll resume at ten past 10.00, that's 10.10, and sit until
24 11.40. And we'll have a half-hour break and resume at 12.10 and sit until
25 13.40, and I think that would reduce the loss of time as far as possible
1 in the circumstances. So we'll adjourn now until 10.10.
2 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
3 --- Recess taken at 9.48 a.m.
4 [Closed session]
12 [Open session]
13 Mr. Tanic, could you stand, please, and could you please make the
14 solemn declaration to speak the truth by reading aloud the words before
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
17 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated.
19 We'll begin your evidence in the hands of the Prosecution. You'll
20 be examined by Mr. Hannis.
21 Mr. Hannis.
22 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours. I should indicate that this
23 witness is testifying as a live witness, but also a portion of his
24 statement will be coming in under Rule 92 ter. And he gives evidence
25 pertinent to paragraphs 17 to 69, 77, and 79 to 101.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: The Exhibit P2480 will be admitted up to paragraph
3 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honour, it's my understanding that that
4 version that we've discussed, with the paragraphs that we have deemed can
5 come in under that rule, have now been put in e-court, a version. I would
6 like to hand the defendant -- the witness a copy, the hard copy of the
7 B/C/S version of his statement, so I can ask him the questions under 92
8 ter requiring him to attest to the fact that he will give the same
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, yes. And this is the one that's now been
11 entered into the system?
12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I don't have had a copy of that in B/C/S
13 -- my assistant tells me that I do have a copy of that in B/C/S. If I
14 could ask the usher to switch copies with the witness. My mistake.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: And does this have a different number?
16 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour, we propose to submit it under the
17 previous number.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: That's fine. Thank you.
19 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, can I --
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. O'Sullivan.
21 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Can I ask that all other documents be removed
22 from the witness's table, other than the statement that Mr. Hannis gave
23 him, please.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: I wasn't aware that there were other documents
1 What other documents are there, Mr. Hannis, do you know?
2 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I don't know. That may be something the
3 witness brought with him.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, in court -- just give me a second.
5 Mr. Tanic, in court we will deal only with documents which are
6 presented to you in the course of the examination. If there's a need for
7 you to refer to any other document, then that matter will be raised and
8 dealt with as it arises. So could you please remove from the table in
9 front of you anything other than the document you were handed by the
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was my statement in Serbo-Croat,
12 but that's fine.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Hannis, I think we can get started.
14 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 WITNESS: RATOMIR TANIC
16 [Witness answered through interpreter]
17 Examination by Mr. Hannis:
18 Q. Mr. Tanic, what you have in front of you on the table now is a
19 copy of the B/C/S version of your statement containing paragraphs 1 to 47
20 I believe, the first 11 pages or so of the statement you've seen in a
21 fuller version. Could you have a quick look at that and tell us if you
22 recognise it.
23 A. Yes, I do recognise it.
24 Q. And for the record, I think I misspoke. I believe it's paragraphs
25 1 to 45. Before you came to court today, earlier this week, did you have
1 a chance to review your statement?
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 Q. And having had that opportunity and noting a couple of minor
4 changes, were you satisfied that the information in there was true and
5 accurate, and you would attest to the Court that you would give the same
6 answers to those questions if you were asked them today?
7 A. Yes.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, can I clarify with you whether you need
9 to switch your microphone off every time you complete a question, or have
10 we a different system?
11 MR. HANNIS: It was my understanding that when we have voice
12 distortion I need to do that. I don't know if that's correct or not.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: It was just that it hadn't been done, but I
14 wondered if we can establish a routine for establishing that it happens.
15 MR. HANNIS: That's what I understand is required, and I will be
16 doing that as often as I remember.
17 Q. One of the two changes I think you mentioned in regard to the
18 first 11 pages, one had to do with the names of the persons present during
19 those interviews that took place I think beginning in June of 1999 and
20 ended in July of 2000. You indicated that there was one additional person
21 that was present at one or two of the first sessions. Is that correct?
22 A. Yes. But the interviews were held or the conversations were held
23 from June 1999. Yes, another individual was present.
24 Q. And without naming that individual, can you tell us what agency or
25 organisation he or she represented.
1 A. Well, that individual represented the British Secret Service, but
2 the individual was there only for the sake of confirming the identity of
3 people from The Hague Tribunal, on the one side, and my identity, on the
4 other side, because we had not previously met. We didn't know each other.
5 And that was the only reason for which that individual was present, since
6 this individual did not participate in any other conversations.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you help me with an example of a paragraph
8 where this sort of issue arises?
9 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, it's only on the first page. There's no
10 paragraph number. It's just at the bottom of the first page. There's a
11 list of persons, all persons attending at the interview. It names Tim
12 Kelly, Dennis Milner, and Alexandra Milenov.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 MR. HANNIS:
15 Q. The other one you pointed out, Mr. Tanic, relates to I believe
16 paragraph 10; and in your statement it says: "I reported," and you had
17 weekly meetings with the SDB. I think you wanted to indicate the name of
18 your primary contact. Can you tell us who that person was at SDB?
19 A. I could only say that in private session. As far as I know this
20 person is still in active service, and the identity of the person isn't
21 known. But I was thinking of the deputy chief of the security service
22 Mijatovic and Jovica Stanisic, well, these individuals are well-known
23 individuals. I suggest that this person be named in private session in
24 order to protect the security, the safety, of that individual.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tanic?
1 MR. HANNIS: May we do that, Your Honour, for the purpose of
2 naming this primary contact at SDB?
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, that seems appropriate. Let's go into private
4 session for that purpose.
5 [Private session]
11 [Open session]
12 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
14 MR. HANNIS:
15 Q. Now, sir, could I -- with those changes, are you willing to attest
16 to the Court that your statement in those 10 or 11 pages, paragraphs 1 to
17 45, is true and accurate, to the best of your knowledge and information?
18 A. Yes, absolutely.
19 Q. Thank you. Sir, could you give us a little of your background
20 information. Could you tell us where you were born?
21 A. I was born in 1956 in Belgrade.
22 Q. What is your ethnicity?
23 A. I'm a Yugoslav. I was born in Yugoslavia, but naturally I'm a
24 Serb, thanks to the unfortunate events that transpired in my country.
25 Q. Did you attend high school in Belgrade?
1 A. Well, yes. I can summarise my educational background since I
2 completed part of my education in my own country, part abroad. In my own
3 country I completed secondary economics school, secondary school for
4 economy. I studied sociology, economy, and philosophy, and I passed a
5 significant number of exams.
6 Abroad, I completed the gymnasium and I also graduated, or rather,
7 I obtained an MA in political science. I have an BA and an MA in
8 political science, and I also graduated from a college for police science.
9 So my educational background is quite broad and has a dual nature, since I
10 completed a significant part of my education abroad, in the west.
11 Q. And with regard to your degrees in political science, did you
12 obtain those since the end of the war and being relocated?
13 A. Yes. I started my MA in political science, and I obtained my
14 diploma for police science under a different name, once I had been
15 relocated and once I was able to focus a little on my education.
16 Q. When you were in Serbia, did you perform your national service, as
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. When was that?
20 A. Well, when I was 27. I was born in 1956, so I was 26 or 27 years
21 old. It was at the beginning of the 1980s. It was in 1980 or 1981,
22 something like that. I was 25 or 26 when I went to serve in the military.
23 Q. And between approximately the mid-1970s and the early 1990s, apart
24 from your year of mandatory service, what kind of work did you engage in,
25 or what was your occupation?
1 A. I worked as a tradesman in some sort of federal institution. I
2 was involved in commercial affairs.
3 Q. During this period, did you also begin doing some work or having
4 some operational relationship with the SDB?
5 A. Yes. At the time I already had a relationship with the Serbian
6 SDB. Since the age of 22 or 23, I did have a relationship with them, a
7 working relationship, exclusively. I slowly started performing such
8 duties at a fairly insignificant level, at least initially.
9 Q. Can you explain the acronym for me. Sometimes we have used the
10 term "SDB" and sometimes the term "RDB." Can you give us the expansion
11 for both of those and explain the difference, if any, between those two?
12 A. Well, none of the acronyms are quite correct, since the official
13 name of the service is the Sector of the State Security Service, so the
14 correct acronym would be the RSDB; however, the SDB acronym was widely
15 used, although the official name of the body was as I've just relayed to
16 you. This -- because the service was part of the MUP, of the police,
17 system, and that's why it was called the Sector for State Security or the
18 Sector of the State Security Service.
19 Q. And was the SDB that you were associated with, was that a body
20 that was under the Republic of Serbia or the FRY or which?
21 A. Under the Republic of Serbia. We had, or rather, I had very rare
22 work contacts with the Federal State Security Service, so the service at
23 hand is the Serbian service. And let me tell you at once that this was no
24 espionage; it was just a normal process of recruitment and training of
1 Q. Let me ask, how long did your working relationship with the SDB
2 last, from when to when?
3 A. Let us clarify working relationship, as a term. I was not
4 employed with the State Security Service. I was their external associate,
5 and afterwards I was upgraded within cooperation. Our work contacts,
6 however, lasted ever since I turned 22 or 23, although intermittently,
7 whenever there was nothing to do, there would be an interruption in our
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Would it be wrong to have formed the impression
10 that you would be a source of intelligence for them?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It wouldn't be wrong. The only
12 difference being that the -- this was a two-way information flow. I also
13 received a sort of practical training from them, and very often we
14 assessed information and -- rather than just exchange information. But
15 your impression would be quite true, that they also received information
16 from me.
17 MR. HANNIS:
18 Q. I take it from your current circumstances that your relationship
19 with them ended at some point in time. Can you tell us when that
21 A. Are you referring to the break in late 1980s or the one in 1999?
22 Q. Please tell me about both.
23 A. In late 1980s and in early 1990s, as you know, the multi-party
24 system was introduced to Yugoslavia, and I wanted to make sure that my
25 cooperation with the State Security Service would not be used against my
1 friends in my political life. There was a pause there, after which I
2 received guarantees that my contacts, which had to do with the
3 international sphere and Kosovo, would never be used against my friends
4 and that I would never be sought to give them information to that effect,
5 even after the introduction of the multi-party system.
6 After I received this piece of information we continued
7 cooperation. The break in 1999 took place after my wife and I were
8 kidnapped off the street. We were tortured; and in my assessment, this
9 was the preparation for my murder. Fortunately, this happened at the same
10 time when -- fortunately for me, this happened at the same time when there
11 was the attempted assassination on Draskovic; and after that, we used the
12 situation to leave the country. We had a terrible misunderstanding on the
13 Kosovo issue and this was the reason.
14 Q. Let me stop you there. We'll come back and ask you some more
15 about that later on. Some time then after that initial break in your
16 contacts, did you become politically active after the multi-party system
17 was established?
18 A. Yes. I taught the subject of the multi-party system; and because
19 I became politically active, I asked that I receive guarantee --
20 guarantees that my work, my intelligence work, would not be used against
21 me in my political work. But however, they were not really interested in
22 that bit at all.
23 Q. So what was your first involvement in? Did you join a particular
24 political party or group?
25 A. At the very outset, I became one of the junior co-founders - if I
1 can put it that way - or perhaps I could just say that I joined them.
2 This was the Association for the Yugoslav Democratic Initiative, and then
3 I became a junior co-founder of one of the political parties. However, my
4 first engagement was in the Association for the Yugoslav Democratic
5 Initiative. This was a non-nationalist opposition party, the first of the
6 sort in Yugoslavia.
7 Q. And when was that? How long did you stay with them?
8 A. This took place toward the very end of, or rather, no, to -- at
9 the very start of the 1990s, in early 1990s. I can't really recall the
10 year, and I don't think it's -- well, perhaps in 1991, but not later than
11 1991. I spent some two years working also on international relations; and
12 then together with a group of prominent opposition members, I took part in
13 the establishment of the Civic Alliance of Serbia. And I can safely say
14 that I am one of the junior co-founders of that party.
15 Q. Briefly, what was the Civic Alliance?
16 A. Another non-nationalist opposition party, highly respectable,
17 gathering people, many of whom in 2000, later on in 2000 took part in the
18 toppling of the government in Serbia. Some of them were my political
19 students, and not only mine of course.
20 Q. How long did you stay with the Civic Alliance?
21 A. I was vice-president of the Civic Alliance of Serbia, one of the
22 two or three vice-presidents in charge of international relations, and I
23 held that position until 1994/1995, when I accepted the position of the
24 special advisor to the president of New Democracy.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: You have described the two parties that you were
1 associated with as non-nationalist opposition parties. Did you never
2 envisage being in power?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. This was done with New
4 Democracy. When I went over to New Democracy, they became part of the
5 ruling coalition with Milosevic's party and JUL. Therefore, from
6 1994/1995, I was no longer part of the opposition, rather, I was special
7 advisor to the president of one of the three ruling parties in Serbia.
8 MR. HANNIS:
9 Q. Thank you. Who was your boss, sir, who was the head of the New
11 A. Dusan Mihajlovic.
12 Q. And what was the position of the ND, the New Democracy, in the
14 A. Just as JUL, the Yugoslav United Left, we were the junior partners
15 in the tripartite coalition. Milosevic's party, the SBS, was the main
16 force in the coalition; whereas we formed -- we were actually junior
17 partners in the coalition, that's to say New Democracy and JUL. We had
18 our deputy prime ministers, our own men in international relations and
19 Kosovo affairs, but of course the balance of power or the division of
20 powers wasn't really on equal terms because a large share was in the hands
21 of Milosevic's party. However, it was a veritable coalition because we
22 had won seats at the elections.
23 Q. With regard to the coalition, who was the head of the JUL party,
24 the Yugoslav Left party?
25 A. Milosevic's wife, Mira Markovic.
1 Q. Do you recall now the relative size of the three parties in the
2 coalition, in terms of numbers of seats in the parliament?
3 A. Well, you know how it is. Matters are not that simple in Serbia.
4 If we look at the number of seats in the parliament, it was pretty low,
5 the number of seats we had. We had I think only six or seven deputy
6 seats. They were, of course, important in order to have the majority.
7 But absolutely speaking, we had a small number of seats, although one
8 always has to look at the power that the individual parties enjoyed on the
9 ground, because the power in Serbia is always different from -- has to be
10 distinguished from institutional powers, at least this is how the matters
11 stood in Milosevic's Era.
12 Q. What was the relative size of JUL versus the SPS?
13 A. JUL was -- I think you ought to switch off your --
14 Q. Sorry.
15 A. JUL was the junior partner, as we were. In home affairs and in
16 business, they had disproportionately high powers, given their political
17 weight. Because in political weight, you first have the SPS, then New
18 Democracy carried more political weight than JUL. But in economic
19 affairs, as I said, JUL dominated in Serbia, though our weight was quite
20 prominent in terms of the Kosovo affairs -- well, in terms of us being
21 able to exert certain influence.
22 Q. In terms of that division of power within the coalition, what did
23 New Democracy get? Was there a particular area that you had
24 responsibility for?
25 A. Except for the seats in the republican and federal parliaments,
1 New Democracy and JUL were working hard toward the turning point in the
2 peace process, because Milosevic and some of his associates, like
3 Milutinovic, promised -- but primarily Milosevic, that there would not be
4 a war, that he didn't want to cause any more wars, that he realised that
5 one could achieve with peaceful means much more for Serbia.
6 And he wanted to make this turning point toward peace and that he
7 needed political advisors who would slowly prepare the transition of
8 Serbia's policies from war toward peace. In Serbia, the greatest problem
9 was Kosovo. This is something that Milosevic's associates repeated later
10 on. He specifically engaged New Democracy and, partly, JUL to prepare the
11 political settlement for the Kosovo issue and engaged us in some
12 international areas, such as our rapprochement with the Council of Europe,
13 our relations, and establishing of understanding with western partners.
14 I myself was engaged on a number of activities, together with the
15 president of my party, of course. Therefore, these were our duties
16 strictly authorised by Milosevic. Of course, they overlapped with our
17 convictions because New Democracy also advocated the peaceful policies, as
18 did the Civic Alliance of Serbia.
19 Q. You previously testified in the Milosevic case; correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Do you recall that Mr. Milosevic challenged whether or not you
22 were a member of New Democracy or only a sympathiser. Do you recall that?
23 A. Yes, but this was just a fantasy.
24 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I object to the leading form of the question.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry?
1 MR. O'SULLIVAN: I object to the leading form of the question, and
2 I -- this is very close to challenging this witness's evidence as opposed
3 to leading it.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE BONOMY: We disagree with that, Mr. O'Sullivan. We do not
6 consider this to be an inappropriate question and we'll allow it.
7 Mr. Hannis.
8 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
9 Q. I have an answer.
10 MR. HANNIS: I would like to show the witness next Exhibit P695.
11 Q. Mr. Tanic, at the time that you left the Civic Alliance and went
12 to New Democracy, was there a -- was there an article about that in a
13 local paper?
14 A. This event was widely reported on in the domestic press. There
15 wasn't just one article, there were at least 30 or 40 articles on that
16 because I had by that time become a prominent member of Civic Alliance and
17 a person advocating the Dayton peace. They thought it a big deal that I
18 had moved from Civic Alliance to New Democracy. In fact, it wasn't a big
19 deal. It was just a technical issue, but still, there were 30 to 40
20 articles reporting on that. At the same time, this was the only transfer
21 from one political party to another, which wasn't accompanied by
22 mudslinging or offences, because I did not speak negatively about my
23 previous party, nor were there any particular affairs related to that.
24 Q. Mr. Tanic, do you see that article on the screen in front of you,
25 or do we have to scroll down? I can't read the Cyrillic.
1 A. Yes, it's a bit further down. Yes.
2 [In English] Yeah, it's okay.
3 [Interpretation] Yes. I can see it.
4 MR. HANNIS: Could we put the English version on.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there some significance in this point, Mr.
7 MR. HANNIS: There is, Your Honour. I hope it will become
9 Q. Mr. Tanic, which newspaper was this reported?
10 A. Yes. This is Politika, the official newspaper that was under --
11 fully controlled under Milosevic's or by Milosevic's regime. It wasn't
13 Q. And as reported herein, did you join the Executive Council of New
15 A. Well, yes. Right from the start, I was a member of the core
16 leadership. I was a member of the Executive Council and a special
17 advisor. It's a bit immodest of me to say that, but I have to say that I
18 was a big political star who transferred from one political party to
19 another. And this was done on clear grounds. The advocating of the
20 Dayton peace and the pursuing of a peaceful policy by Serbia on the basis
21 of the Dayton peace. I did not make this transfer because of money or
22 anything of the sort, but because the survival of Serbia was at stake.
23 Q. Thank you. I'll try and ask you to do your best to confine your
24 answers to my questions.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, it would be very difficult to regard
1 this as authentic in any way. It doesn't look like a newspaper report.
2 It's not in the language in which it was published. I don't know if
3 you're relying on it. The witness's answers deal with the matter. The
4 document itself seems to me, at least, to be neither here nor there,
5 unless you claim it's something different from what the witness was
6 suggesting it was.
7 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, did you see the Cyrillic version of --
8 JUDGE BONOMY: That normally comes on the screen, but I haven't
9 got that, no. That's my -- sorry. That should have been on the screen,
10 I'm sorry.
11 MR. HANNIS: That was up initially, Your Honour, and then I asked
12 for the English so I could --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: My apologies. The position is now clear.
14 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
15 Q. Now, Mr. Tanic, if I may, I just want to go through the portions
16 of your statement Exhibit 2480, which are in just to ask for clarification
17 on a couple of matters. In paragraph 2 of your statement, you make
18 mention to the fact that in late 1999, you were preparing a book on
19 Yugoslav politics related to the Kosovo crisis. Did you ever complete
21 A. About the Serbian role in the Kosovo issue and the provoking of
22 the war there. I didn't complete anything, because the collecting of the
23 documentation for the book and my intention to write the book was the
24 immediate cause of my subsequent kidnapping. I didn't manage to finish
25 it, and now I'm not in the position to do that because I'm under the
1 witness protection programme and I'm not entitled to publish anything.
2 Q. Paragraph 4, you talk about how you got authorisation to
3 participate in what you refer to as discreet negotiations regarding
4 Kosovo. And you say you received this authorisation from Milosevic in a
5 meeting that you and Dusan Mihajlovic had with him. Can you tell us where
6 that meeting took place?
7 A. In Mr. Milosevic's office. Mihajlovic and I introduced Milosevic
8 to our plan for the settlement of the Kosovo issue. The plan was one of
9 the basis for -- was the basis for all the subsequent peacemaking plans,
10 and, as always happened at such meetings, Milosevic approved that. This
11 was a three-phased plan which appeared elsewhere on several occasions on
12 some other bases. The main point was to try and solve the Kosovo issue by
13 political means before a war breaks out.
14 Q. In that same paragraph, you mentioned that this proposal for you
15 to participate in these negotiations was accepted by the SDB from a
16 security perspective. When and how was that done, that they accepted it?
17 A. This happened right away in 1995. The SDB was headed by Jovica
18 Stanisic at the time, and they were very much interested in finding a
19 political settlement that would avert a war in Kosovo. And they were
20 quite content with having me in the company of people who would be
21 conducting these negotiations.
22 There wasn't just me, just to make this clear, there were five or
23 six other people involved in the negotiations as well. They authorised it
24 through the service leadership in 1995; of course in security terms,
25 because they were interested in the security aspect of the political
1 negotiations. Most, or rather, in preventing armed conflicts in Kosovo.
2 So of course they wanted to have a political settlement that would avert
4 Q. In the next paragraph, paragraph 5, you mentioned that other Serb
5 participants in the negotiations included Mr. Ratko Markovic, who was the
6 deputy prime minister of the Republic of Serbia, and Mr. Dojcilo
7 Maslovaric, who was the Yugoslav envoy to the Vatican, yet you describe
8 yourself as the principal negotiators. Your position was more junior to
9 theirs, why do you call yourself the principal negotiator in these
10 discreet negotiations?
11 A. Well, this is just the terminological difference between Serbian
12 and English. Of course, the principal negotiator was Ratko Markovic;
13 however, he was completely unsuccessful. He didn't take the negotiations
14 seriously and merely carried out the orders given by Milosevic and his
15 associates. Maslovaric, was, for instance, much more successful than him.
16 I called myself the principal negotiator -- well, I wasn't the main
17 negotiator, officially. But together with the president of my party,
18 Dusan Mihajlovic, I was the most successful because we brought about the
19 most important results in trying to find a political settlement in Kosovo
20 which was satisfactory to Serb. Now I'm speaking about myself. I had
21 enough freedom to openly speak with the western factors and Russians. I
22 also had the support of the State Security Service, which other members of
23 the negotiating team lacked.
24 Therefore, judging by our performance, my performance was the
25 best, mine and President Dusan Mihajlovic's. In those terms, you could
1 say that I was the best negotiator. Eventually, such a balance of powers
2 was set up that whenever a problem needed to be issued with Milosevic,
3 Milosevic would either solve it on his own with Milutinovic or he would
4 address Mihajlovic and myself. The other negotiators were not that
5 successful. They served as couriers mostly, although they did achieve
6 something. So formally and legally speaking, up until 1997, it was Ratko
8 Q. Regarding your efforts in these negotiations in paragraph 11, you
9 indicate that your progress and any difficulties you had were presented to
10 Milosevic in three different ways, one of them being through regular SDB
11 reports. Do you know how often those reports about your progress went to
12 Mr. Milosevic?
13 A. As far as I'm concerned, in my rough assessment, every two or
14 three months -- or every three or four months such reports would be
15 forwarded to him. Several times a year, in any event, because I worked
16 quite intensively. On the issue, I obtained significant results. The SDB
17 was very satisfied, and I had direct contact via Mijatovic and Stanisic,
18 or rather, Mijatovic would forward the report to Stanisic and Stanisic to
19 Milosevic. And I know for sure that Milosevic would make use of what he
20 received as well as his associates, because I received feedback
21 information through my service and through the leader of my party, Dusan
23 Q. And you said you received feedback information. What was the
24 feedback you were getting about the progress you were making in these
1 A. Well, there was much praise of myself and Mihajlovic. But I'm
2 testifying on my own behalf, that's why I'm only mentioning myself now.
3 But we had advanced three or four five years, in fact. Milosevic himself
4 didn't believe that certain things could be obtained but we were
5 successful nevertheless. So I had carte blanche to examine any possible
7 That's the amount of success we had. Naturally, later on the
8 price we had to pay for this was very high. Mihajlovic also received
9 feedback information. Under different circumstances, we wouldn't have
10 been able to work in this way for three years. If we hadn't been
11 authorised to work in such a way and if things hadn't been functioning
12 properly, we wouldn't managed to do this work.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you give me an example of something that you
14 achieved in the negotiations?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, above all, we introduced a
16 third party in the negotiations. This was a very complicated problem
17 because Milosevic did not want the third party in the negotiations to be
18 represented by a state or group of states. As a result, Mihajlovic and I
19 - and again, I'm just speaking about myself right now - I tried to find
20 influential NGOs or other groups that had ties to the government but were
21 nevertheless not governmental bodies.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: I've read about that in your statement. I was
23 wondering if there was actually any success you could identify in the
24 actual conduct of the negotiations, rather than in the setting up of the
25 parties for negotiating purposes.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as for specific successes, our
2 greatest success for our party was the fact that in the course of the
3 negotiations the Albanian side engaged in a minimum of terrorist activity.
4 That can be seen from the relevant documents. There were only sporadic
5 incidents. And then secondly, the Albanian side, although they never gave
6 up the idea of independence, they in fact agreed to postpone this issue
7 and to create the conditions for some sort of a 15-year transition stage.
8 So finally the agreement itself was our greatest success, this
9 draft agreement, which was similar to the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement,
10 an agreement that they signed. So everything had been prepared for that
11 solution, but it wasn't implemented. These are some examples of political
12 success, but, Your Honours, you should bear in mind the fact we were doing
13 all we could to avoid a war. So we believe that we are successful if we
14 manage to find political ways of avoiding war at the time.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps I've missed this, but are you saying
16 there's a document that was signed by the Albanian side agreeing to a
17 15-year transition stage?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No, there is no such
19 documents. But there are documents that quite clearly show the intention
20 of the Albanian side to accept temporary political agreement, transition
21 political agreement, and that wouldn't cover just a three-month period,
22 that's for sure. This could be seen from a number of their documents.
23 MR. HANNIS: May I show the witness a document that pertains to
24 Your Honour's question, I hope. Exhibit P2481.
25 Q. While that's coming up, Mr. Tanic, I wanted to ask you, you
1 mentioned the importance of introducing a third party into the
2 negotiations between yourselves and the Kosovo Albanians. At the start of
3 your assignment in this area, I think you indicated in your statement
4 there were two things that Milosevic insisted on with regard to these
5 discreet negotiations. Can you tell us what those two terms were?
6 A. The first condition was that the political solution should not
7 directly lead to the secession of Kosovo, rather its independence or its
8 full state independence. And the second condition was that a third party
9 should participate, and that would be an NGO. But according to what
10 Milosevic and his associates said, anything else was possible, and that
11 included substantial autonomy, et cetera, et cetera. Later we saw that
12 all of this was in fact not true, but that's another story.
13 Q. With regard to the issue of a third party, what was the position
14 of the Kosovo Albanians about having a third party in the negotiations?
15 A. Well, they accepted this, reluctantly, but they accepted it. What
16 were they to do? Negotiations are always difficult when such issues are
17 at stake. I don't believe that they were always satisfied with the way we
18 moved ahead, but they had to accept certain things. So they accepted a
19 third party. They would rather have governments involved, but they
20 accepted the participation of influential NGOs in the negotiation process.
21 Q. Do you know why they would have preferred to have a government
22 rather than an NGO?
23 A. Well, they wanted firmer guarantees for the political
24 negotiations, and governments can provide better guarantees. On the other
25 hand, as I have already explained -- or as I explained to the western
1 elements that I've discussed matters with, to find a peaceful solution for
2 Kosovo is not a simple matter. You have to prepare negotiations very well
3 if they are to be successful. You can't prepare negotiations with
4 governments. This is never done anywhere in the world. Negotiations --
5 always negotiations that are held at a less official level. So they
6 accepted this proposal, naturally, but reluctantly.
7 Q. And do you know why Mr. Milosevic had a preference for an NGO, as
8 opposed to a third government or a third party in the form of an
9 international government?
10 A. Well, so that he could later say that the negotiations were not
11 serious negotiations, that it was just a discussion between intellectuals,
12 that everything was unofficial. So it was in order to be able to dismiss
13 the negotiations. Negotiations that his closest associates and he himself
14 participated in, in fact, because this process went on for about three or
15 three and a half years.
16 Q. Let me ask you to take a look at the document --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I --
18 MR. HANNIS: Yes.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Just before you go on.
20 Is it not commonplace in the world for national governments to
21 resist the involvement of third-party governments in their own internal
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is common; however, the Kosovo
24 problem had a strong international dimension. And as far as I know,
25 Milosevic was not really very involved in the issue of sovereignty. He
1 was more involved in the fact that it was difficult for him to deal with
2 this. But naturally, there is the problem of sovereignty.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: But I'm interested in the leap that you then make
4 to say that this was a deliberate choice so that the negotiations would
5 not succeed. Now, that's a -- not necessarily a logical leap for me on
6 the information you've presented so far.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I didn't say so that the
8 negotiations wouldn't succeed, but so that Milosevic could subsequently
9 dismiss them or distance himself from them if he wanted to do so. If the
10 negotiations were successful, then all the credit would go to Milosevic
11 and his associates. If the negotiations failed to succeed, well, then he
12 could say that these were just intellectual discussions, discussions
13 amongst intellectuals. This is a fairly common technique that is employed
14 throughout the world.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you see, that puts a completely different
16 complexion on your evidence, because the way you initially answered the
17 question, it was on the basis that there was only one potential outcome,
18 that the negotiations would be dismissed. Now you're saying that he would
19 only wish to distance himself if they failed, and that clarifies it for
20 me. I now understand the position. Thank you.
21 MR. HANNIS:
22 Q. Mr. Tanic, could you now take a look at the document that's on the
23 screen and tell us if you recognise what that is.
24 A. Yes, I can recognise it.
25 Q. What is it?
1 A. Well, the document is called, "Jointly Agreed Positions." It
2 concerns the Serbian and Albanian side. It's a document from New York.
3 It's one of the many documents that was signed.
4 Q. And this is one that you refer to in paragraph 32 of your
5 statement. You say this was a result with your negotiations up to this
6 point in time as sort of the ground rules for the negotiations between the
8 A. Fine. Yes. This represented some of the results obtained.
9 Naturally, we obtained more significant results, but this document,
10 nevertheless, shows that the Albanian side was prepared to accept a
11 political solution. However, I have to point something else out.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I received this piece of
14 paper but there's no signature, there's nothing on it. It can't be a
15 document. It can't be accepted as a document anywhere in the world. I
16 can type something out at home and then pretend it's a document. Does it
17 have a signature or a title? Can this be treated as a document? If so,
18 fine, I have nothing against that. But I'm just asking this as a matter
19 of principle. What is this?
20 JUDGE BONOMY: The difference here is that the witness himself is
21 identifying this as a document in the compilation of which he
22 participated, and therefore a signature is not an essential requirement
23 for authenticity in these circumstances.
24 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] That would be fine if it was his
25 document, but he's talking about jointly held positions. So this concerns
1 a number of individuals and that is why I raised this objection. If it
2 was Mr. Tanic's position, well everything would be fine.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I clarify this matter?
4 JUDGE BONOMY: You will be asked some more questions in a moment.
5 Mr. Fila, in case there is doubt about authenticity, Mr. Hannis
6 will explore it a little bit further and clarify it, but my impression was
7 that the witness was party to these, the negotiations which led to the
8 compilation of this document.
9 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Mr. Tanic, you heard the Judge's comments. Were you a participant
11 in the production of this document?
12 A. Yes. I worked on the preparation of the document. I wasn't in
13 New York, though, but the leader of my party, Dusan Mihajlovic, was there
14 and I also participated in preparing other documents. The negotiations
15 were held in secret, and, naturally, the documents that were related to
16 those negotiations were not signed.
17 Q. And --
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the question really is: What is this
20 That's a question for you, Mr. Tanic. What is this document?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, okay. It is a document. It's
22 one of several documents through which the Albanian side demonstrates that
23 it is prepared to find a peaceful political solution to the problems in
25 JUDGE BONOMY: How did you acquire it?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mihajlovic gave it to me when
2 he returned from New York. Representatives of the American Ministry of
3 Foreign Affairs were there. Agani was there, too; he was the number two
4 man in Kosovo.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE BONOMY: There are adequate indications of the authenticity
7 of this to be an exhibit in this case with the number P2481.
8 Mr. Hannis.
9 MR. HANNIS: I would note, Your Honour, also this document has the
10 identifier on the English version as item TX-7, which is the one that's
11 referred to in paragraph 32 of his statement.
12 JUDGE CHOWHAN: [Microphone not activated]
13 MR. HANNIS: The handwritten -- the handwritten TR item TX-7 is
14 referred to in paragraph 32 of the statement.
15 Q. Mr. Tanic, if I can understand, this -- these three paragraphs
16 were the result of negotiations that had been going on for some time?
17 A. Yes, that's correct. And it also concerns a far broader document.
18 There are at least 20 witnesses who can say that this was agreed on by the
19 Serb and Albanian associates in New York. There are some associates of
20 Madeleine Albright, for example, and Madeleine Albright, herself, and I
21 could identify another person in the afternoon. I would have to check my
22 agenda. There was Mihajlovic, Raskovic on our side; I think there was
23 Vesna Pesic there, as well as many witnesses as you could wish for. And
24 this document is fully authentic.
25 Q. Let me stop you there. You say, in paragraph 32, that Mr.
1 Mihajlovic and Fehmi Agani went to New York to somehow formalise this
2 agreement. Do you know, was there a separate document that was signed, or
3 was it because of the nature of these discreet negotiations that there are
4 no signatures? Do you know the answer to that?
5 A. No. There were no signatures, no documents, because, as I said,
6 the negotiations were discreet. At the time the American side wanted to
7 have something more concrete on paper, so Mihajlovic on the part of the
8 governing coalition and Agani on behalf of the government went to New York
9 to do this. But there's another piece of paper that has been signed, but
10 I don't want to get ahead of myself. So I assume that we'll be dealing
11 with that later.
12 Q. Well, I do want to move forward in the negotiations from this
13 point --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you do that. You described the second point
15 in this document as representing Kosovo Albanians' agreement to step back
16 from independence. How do you read that into the second point?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this can't be seen in this
18 document. I know that they accepted to step back from that or postpone
19 independence for a long period of time. I know that on the basis of
20 conversations, but I do agree that this document doesn't demonstrate that.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. Thank you.
22 Mr. Hannis.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Nor did Albanians or -- nor were
24 Albanians able to put that into any of their documents, just as we
25 couldn't put into these documents everything that we wanted. This was a
1 very difficult and sensitive issues, the positions of the two sides were
2 far apart; and as a result of that, some matters were not put on paper
3 because of the public at home, which is quite understandable.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: But you go on to say in your statement that
5 Milosevic accepted this pre-agreement. Are you suggesting that he had
6 accepted the second point in this document?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, absolutely. In the
8 period between 1994 and 1997, Milosevic behaved as if he was fully
9 involved in trying to find a solution of the Kosovo issue together with
10 his associates, but that is valid only for that period of time between
11 1994 and 1997. It was only occasionally in the course of 1997 that he
12 started to ...
13 JUDGE BONOMY: So -- started to what? Do we not have a complete
14 answer? Could you just tell us again the end of your answer. The
15 interpreters missed something. The transcript says: "It was only
16 occasionally in the course of 1997 that he started to ..."
17 Could you complete that?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Only in the second half of 1997, he
19 started giving away some telltale signs, as did his associates, that a
20 political solution would not come into effect; whereas in 1998, definitely
21 he and his associates turned toward a war solution and the provoking of a
22 war in Kosovo.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: It may be you didn't entirely understand my
24 question. The second point on this document is a reference to
25 negotiations starting with "no pre-conditions." Now, are you saying that
1 Mr. Milosevic accepted no pre-conditions?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I understood your
3 question. He accepted no pre-conditions, whereas everywhere in the world
4 -- yes. Thank you.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: And that would mean no pre-condition that Kosovo
6 should remain a part of Serbia?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the time, nobody believed that
8 Kosovo would remain part of Serbia. First of all, the discussion was that
9 it would become -- that it would remain part of Yugoslavia --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Please, that's a helpful comment, but please try to
11 confine yourself to answering the question. The reason it becomes a bit
12 blurred, of course, is because you describe the second point in your
13 statement as representing the Kosovo Albanians' agreement to step back
14 from independence, which would suggest that they were accepting a
15 pre-condition. And therefore, an element of confusion comes into the
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In negotiations surrounding such
18 matters, there are always quite a few misunderstanding. Of course one
19 could conclude, from point 2, that they gave up their requests, because
20 previously they always said that they wanted independence or nothing. One
21 -- when we read here that they gave up any pre-conceived or possible
22 outcomes of negotiations, yes, one could conclude that they stepped back
23 from their request for independence; hence, my conclusion in the
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
1 MR. HANNIS:
2 Q. Mr. Tanic, at the beginning of these negotiations, wasn't that the
3 biggest stumbling block to even get started, that is the question about
4 the status of Kosovo?
5 A. [No verbal response]
6 Q. You're gesturing with your hand, but I don't know what that means.
7 A. Can you please switch off your microphone. Yes. Of course, the
8 first problem was to even broach discussions, to start negotiations.
9 Another problem was that the positions of the parties were far apart, and
10 one had to at least work toward bringing them closer together. The
11 pre-condition for that, of course, was even to start negotiating.
12 Q. And they were far apart on the issue of Kosovo's status in what
13 way exactly? What was the position of the Kosovo Albanians about the
14 status of Kosovo? What did they want when you were trying to start these
16 A. I appeal to the Trial Chamber to understand the need to give a
17 more extensive explanation. In negotiations, every side tries to gain as
18 much as they can from the other side. The Albanians only spoke of
19 independence of Kosovo; whereas, we spoke, the Serbian side, spoke of the
20 limited autonomy in Serbia.
21 In the negotiations process, it was quite clear that none of the
22 sides were able to achieve their maximum demands or extreme positions, and
23 I know that the Albanians were aware of that. I can say that because I
24 spoke to them, and I know that the western community was against such
25 extremist positions from Albanians. This meant that both sides had to
1 give up on their quite extreme positions.
2 Q. And give up forever or just temporarily so discussions could go
4 A. I will be quite frank. What Mihajlovic and I told Milosevic, and
5 what I told the security service, the State Security Service, and which
6 was the only wise tactics for Serbia, and this was that we should try to
7 outwit the Albanians. Not to win them, but to outwit them. Therefore, we
8 drafted a plan, which we advocated, and that was to achieve a temporary
9 political settlement over the period of some ten to 15 years. In the
10 meantime, we would become a member of the European Union. At that time,
11 in 1997/1998, the Union was strongly in favour of that, unlike today. And
12 we said, Okay. If the Albanians want to secede Serbia and Yugoslavia,
13 then they have to secede from the European Union; and if they want to,
14 they can try.
15 We simply wanted to give the Albanians the economic carrot, which
16 would induce them to give up their political demands. They were aware of
17 that; the realised that and they knew that this was their reality. They
18 would rather become members of the European Union than to create a circus
19 surrounding independence, because the political reality would be quite
20 different. Our negotiations were geared toward politically outwitting the
21 Albanians; that was our approach. For this reason, the Albanians said,
22 Very well. If this is the path toward European Union, then what can we do
23 about it? This is our destiny.
24 At the time the west exerted strong pressure on them to give up on
25 their ultra-nationalist positions. They agreed to that at the time with
1 hesitation, I have to say, reluctantly. Whether this would be a lasting
2 solution or not, I am under the impression that had this been successful
3 this would have been -- would have proved to be a permanent political
4 settlement. At the time, the Albanians didn't have a KLA. They weren't
5 organised. They existed mostly abroad; however, at that point Milosevic
6 decided to give up on the political process and started provoking
7 incidents and conflicts in Kosovo, together with his associates.
8 MR. HANNIS: That's a good point for a break, Your Honour, if we
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.
11 Mr. Tanic, we have to have a break at this stage.
12 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we'll need to go into closed session while
14 the witness leaves the courtroom.
15 [Closed session]
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
8 Mr. Hannis.
9 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
10 Q. When we broke, sir, we were talking about this sort of a
11 pre-agreement for the negotiations that dealt, in a way, with the
12 stumbling block about the issue of Kosovo status. What -- can you
13 describe the process for us in terms of the negotiations from that point.
14 What was your approach? What did you agree on about how to approach
15 negotiating this issue?
16 A. No. These were already full-blown negotiations. There was the
17 preparation for very short negotiations where Milosevic and Rugova would
18 take part and produce a complete agreement; therefore, these were already
19 negotiations, not preparations for them. Because, of course, we had to
20 have this preliminary part, we couldn't expect Milosevic and Rugova to
21 meet for 30 times before they come up with an agreement.
22 Milosevic got this text where he knew already that the European
23 Union and the United States supported the document, and he was supposed to
24 prepare together with his associates for the signing of the agreement with
25 Rugova. We didn't have to do anything about it, because we already had
1 this three-phase agreement in our hands, which cropped up on several
2 occasions afterwards and, among other occasions, in the
3 Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement, too.
4 Q. You talk about that three-phase approach in your statement in
5 paragraph 16.
6 MR. HANNIS: And can we show the witness Exhibit 704, please.
7 Q. Can you recall now what those three phases were and describe them
8 in short terms. The first phase was?
9 A. The first phase comprised a number of confidence-building measures
10 in the area of education, health care, sports, and joint security. These
11 were the classic confidence-building measures, also involving education,
12 health care, and sports. The second phase provided for a temporary
13 political settlement of the crisis, which was the must sensitive one, and
14 of course the implementation of the agreement.
15 The third phase was the definite status of Kosovo, but of course
16 this bridge was to be crossed by the time we reached it, after the
17 political agreement is reached. It had to be there in order for both
18 sides to save face and to be able to defend the agreement at home in the
19 sense and in the meaning which it had in political terms.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, where is this in the statement? Which
22 MR. HANNIS: Paragraph 16, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Paragraph 16.
24 MR. HANNIS: Paragraph 16.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: And what is this document?
1 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, should I address that question to the
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please.
4 MR. HANNIS:
5 Q. Witness, do you see that document on the screen?
6 A. On the screen, I see the text written by Mr. Surroi. But I don't
7 see anything which has to do with what I've been defending in the
8 negotiations as our, so to speak, official approach; namely, the
9 three-phase settlement.
10 MR. HANNIS: [Microphone not activated]
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 MR. HANNIS: I'm sorry. If we can put the English on the screen.
13 I think we've got the wrong B/C/S translation associated with this
14 document. Yes. The English is the one that I had in mind.
15 Q. Mr. Tanic, you read and understand English?
16 A. Yes, yes. I graduated from my studies in English.
17 Q. Okay. For purposes of this document, can you look at the English
18 and tell us what it is?
19 A. Yes, of course. Yes. This is the document produced under the
20 auspices of one of the NGOs involved in the process. It is the
21 Bertelsmann Foundation. The document was adopted at the talks in Halki
22 and Munich. Kinkel and Vedrine, the German and French foreign ministers
23 supported the document and presented it to the European Union which
24 accepted this as the basis. Monsignor Paglia was also involved at the
25 time as the representative of the Kosovo contact group. He was privy to
1 that and in full agreement with it.
2 It was all -- it was all dealt with at this level. This is to
3 say, that this document is not merely a document of an NGO, but is a
4 document which served as the basis for negotiations involving the
5 international community. This document contains the three-phase solution.
6 MR. HANNIS: Could we go to the next page of this exhibit, please.
7 Q. Now, this document on the cover page was dated --
8 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, excuse me. I'm sorry, Your Honours, for
9 interrupting. But there is again a problem with the transcript that I
10 heard clearly that the witness said something about "the low-key," but
11 it's not in the transcript. And he said it in English, and that's why. I
12 believe after the -- it's 54, 5 and 6. It was all dealt with at this
13 level, something "low-key."
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, did you use the expression "low-key"
15 somewhere in your answer?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Because, from the very start,
17 I've been saying that the negotiations were semi-secret and that in order
18 for Milosevic to be able to dismiss them in the future if he found them to
19 be unsatisfactory. But in order to avoid any confusion, I wanted to
20 clearly say, also for the benefit of the Trial Chamber, that this was not
21 merely an NGO document, but that this was a document that was subsequently
22 defended before the European Union by Kinkel and Vedrine in order to
23 provide the basis for further associations, and also by Monsignor Paglia.
24 And we always negotiated at this low level. When I say "low
25 level," it was semi-secretive so that if anyone made the wrong move,
1 Milosevic and his associates could -- well, this is normally done
2 worldwide. This is the way things are done abroad. Mr. Milutinovic is a
3 professional diplomat, and he knows what the practice in this regard is
4 and he can confirm that. And I believe he became the foreign minister in
5 1997, and he was informed about this when the international community said
6 "all right" --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: I have to interrupt you, Mr. Tanic. You must
8 confine your answers to the particular questions we're asking. We have a
9 lot of material. We have the three points here, and we've a long way to
10 go in this evidence. So, please, try to control your answers to the -- so
11 that they are confined to the questions raised.
12 Mr. Hannis.
13 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 If we could go to page 4 of this document, it's two pages on from
15 where we are. No, I'm sorry. I misspoke, Your Honour. I have an
16 excerpt. It's actually page 69, I believe. In my hard copy, I just
17 printed out the particular excerpt relating to Mr. Tanic's contribution to
18 this document.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. It's referred to in his own statement, and
20 we'll read the particular passage in due course, Mr. Hannis.
21 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
22 One more page, please.
23 Q. And I'll just ask you one question about it.
24 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
25 Q. Mr. Tanic, is that a document that you wrote that was a part of
1 this paper at the Munich conference in August of 1999 -- or 1997, my
3 A. Yes. Yes, it is one of the documents I drafted.
4 Q. Thank you. And in there you described the three-phase process
5 that you had -- that you and the others involved in the negotiations had
6 been using to approach this problem?
7 A. Yes. This is the same document that Mihajlovic and I showed to
8 Milosevic in 1995 and familiarised him with it. It is the same type of
9 document. It's not word for word the same document, but that's the
10 initial document that we have here.
11 Q. Thank you. Now I want to move on to paragraph 19 of your
12 statement, where you talk about the participants in the negotiations. You
13 mentioned that you had numerous meetings with Fehmi Agani in the process.
14 Were those meetings one on one?
15 A. Some five or six meetings were indeed one on one, especially so at
16 the time when we were trying to find a formula on the basis of which the
17 Albanians would give up on their autonomy, whilst not undermining their
18 position vis-a-vis the Albanian extremists. These negotiations were led
19 and meetings were held in Pristina; whereas, there were other meetings
20 where some other persons would be present, most often -- well, I've given
21 you my answer.
22 Q. Thank you. You also say in that paragraph that at the end of
23 1997, Mr. Milosevic cancelled these discreet negotiations. Can you tell
24 the Judges how that came about. How did he cancel them?
25 A. He did not cancel only the negotiations. But Milosevic's regime,
1 Milosevic and his associates, rejected the entire process which we
2 supported and worked on between 1994 and 1997. He did that in several
3 ways. First, he held a speech in Pristina, where he said that there was
4 no way in which autonomy would be restored. Then several months later, he
5 retracted his positions; and then in his conversations with foreign
6 ambassadors, he said that this statement on his part was done for some
7 internal purposes and that the negotiations would go on.
8 However, Dusan Mihajlovic and I, since we were known in Serbia as
9 the main protagonists of the Serbian settlement of the Kosovo issue, we
10 were told not to engage in that at all. There would be no discussion, the
11 entire political solution fell through, and there would be a war.
12 Milosevic and some of his associates provided some quite incomprehensible
13 arguments in favour of a war because a peaceful political settlement was
14 in Serbia's interests.
15 We can talk about this later. At any rate, I received personally
16 from Milosevic, and through the security service and through Mihajlovic, I
17 received signals -- or actually orders that we should give up on this
18 political project and that there would be a war. So this was the
19 deterioration of the situation leading to the war.
20 Q. Can you give this Court some specifics about when or how you got
21 these orders to stop trying to negotiate a political settlement?
22 A. It's quite difficult to pin-point that. It happened on several
23 occasions, and it was a process rather than an event. I know for a fact
24 that Mihajlovic summoned me one day and told me, Rato - this was the way
25 they addressed me - the entire matter fell through. Milosevic doesn't
1 want to negotiate, he wants a war, I spoke to him, and so on and so forth.
2 At one reception Milosevic told me, all furious, that nothing
3 would come out of these negotiations, that he would prove that there are
4 less than one million Albanians in Kosovo. All of a sudden this issue of
5 the size of the Albanian population became topical. This was an informal
6 conversation. I didn't have a chance to ask him to clarify.
7 Later on in our discussions with Mr. Milutinovic as well, we were
8 able to see that nothing would come out of it; not because of Mr.
9 Milutinovic's wishes, but because of the orders from Mr. Milosevic.
10 Finally, the security service also told me to take care of keeping a head
11 on my shoulders rather than getting involved in these matters.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Petrovic.
13 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we have a problem with
14 the translation. This entire discussion between the witness and the --
15 and Milosevic was at a reception organised in a July. I don't think that
16 is in the transcript, and I think it's very important so that we can
17 really place this witness's testimony in the appropriate context.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: So you say the date is missing?
19 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honours, not
20 just the date, but also the occasion on which this discussion was held.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: The occasion -- line 5 on page 58 gives the
23 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, JUL, J-U-L, is a
24 political party. It's not the month July; it's the Yugoslav United Left.
25 So it was a reception at J-U-L, which means the political party, J-U-L,
1 the political party, and not "Jul," as we say in our language, which is
2 the month of July.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. J-U-L receptions were always
5 held in July. The receptions of the J-U-L were held in the month of July,
6 so we all thought that that was a nice coincidence because the JUL
7 receptions were held in July.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Please, Mr. Tanic. The point that needs to be
9 clarified was whether the evidence you've just been giving about a
10 discussion with Milosevic took place at a reception organised by the J-U-L
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The coalition party, in power
13 together with us and Milosevic, yes.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
15 Mr. Hannis.
16 MR. HANNIS:
17 Q. And can you tell us the approximate date of that reception?
18 A. Well, it was July 1997. But, as I have already said, Milosevic
19 procrastinated a bit and said, "Well, let's negotiate a bit," and then,
20 "Let's not." So it took him some time to come to the dismiss the
21 negotiations in a political solution. He didn't take this decision
22 overnight. He had problems with his associates, too. So he didn't
23 dismiss this solution out of hand; it took him a while in the course of
25 Q. And you said at that reception that he said something to you about
1 the number of Kosovo Albanians. What was that about?
2 A. Well, the problem appeared out of the blue, and Milosevic and
3 associates of his, some who are now dead unfortunately, started saying
4 that there were fewer than a million Albanians, under 10 percent of the
5 total population of Serbia as a result. They claimed that they didn't
6 have the right to consider themselves as a constituent people in Serbia
7 and in Yugoslavia. They could only consider themselves as a minority.
8 Seselj said that on one occasion, some of Milosevic's associates also said
9 that. All of a sudden that issue became an important one, although it had
10 not been previously discussed. But that wasn't true.
11 There were far more than a million Albanians. When I said that
12 there were more of them, there weren't two million of them, but there were
13 at least a million and a half, or between 1.300.000 to a million and a
14 half. And then he said, I'll demonstrate that there are under one million
15 Albanians. But that was Milosevic; none of the gentlemen present here in
16 the court ever mentioned that problem.
17 Q. Let me ask if you can explain for us a little bit about the
18 significance of that. What difference does it make whether there were one
19 million or one million and a half or 800.000? Why was that important?
20 A. Well, let me first say that I couldn't understand that either
21 initially; and then I was provided with some explanations, according to
22 which if they represent less than 10 percent, they can't be considered as
23 a constituent people who would have the right to substantial autonomy.
24 They can only be considered as a minority, so the Albanians were just an
25 ethnic minority. And suddenly they started discussing the problem of
1 Kosovo and not Kosovo Albanians.
2 I didn't really look that case in, detail because it was clear to
3 me that people from Milosevic's regime and Milosevic, himself, were trying
4 to find a justification, a pretext, for that conflict, because it's not
5 important whether there were 800.000 or 1.200.000 Kosovo Albanians. I
6 didn't really see a difference; and then they started discussing other
7 things that Broz's regime had given them 200.000 passports, that they had
8 come from Albania. These arguments were characteristic for Milosevic's
9 regime when the desire was to provoke a conflict. There were no rational
10 arguments there.
11 Q. And for those of us who might not know, you say Broz's regime, who
12 are you referring to?
13 A. Well, to the late president of Yugoslavia and the party leader,
14 Josip Broz Tito. He was dead then; and then they started saying that
15 Broz's regime had issued a lot of pass ports to Albanians so they could
16 move into Kosovo, and they could artificially inflate the number of
17 Albanians there. It is as if Broz was some sort of a traitor. It's
18 something invented in cloud, cuckoo land.
19 Q. Let me stop you there. Go to paragraph 27 of your statement. You
20 indicate that although these negotiations were discreet and confidential,
21 that, occasionally, there were newspaper articles about events related to
22 the negotiations; correct?
23 A. Well, yes. Gradually, we were preparing the public to understand
24 that there were negotiations underway, that a political solution was
25 possible. We sort of leaked articles to the public, and this included
1 three interviews of mine.
2 Q. Yes.
3 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honours, for the record, I won't put those
4 up now to save time, but those listed in paragraph 27 is TX-2, TX-3, and
5 TX-4 are exhibits P705, 706, and 707, respectively, for your review at a
6 later time.
7 Q. In paragraph 28, you describe the achievements of these discreet
8 negotiations, and you make reference to the joint recommendations on the
9 Kosovo conflict.
10 MR. HANNIS: If we could put up Exhibit P709.
11 Q. And, Mr. Tanic, if you could tell us briefly, what were the joint
12 recommendations that came out as a result of these negotiations.
13 A. Well, in fact they were identical to the initial political
14 solution that Mihajlovic and myself had presented Milosevic, and Milosevic
15 had approved it. So they were almost identical. That means that the
16 international community had in fact accepted our position. So the idea
17 was that there should be measures to re-establish trust, to have elections
18 organised, to have joint security units, a tripartite or bilateral basis,
19 the Serbians and Albanians or the Serbians, Albanians, and Keps [phoen].
20 This was in order to provide security, improve the security situation in
21 the area.
22 Elections were to be held. Transitory solution was to be found.
23 They were supposed to be granted somewhat more autonomy than in 1974, than
24 the autonomy they had in 1974, but their autonomy should be returned.
25 And then later their status would be definitively solved. But naturally
1 these recommendations were also of a practical kind. There was a series
2 of practical recommendations. I wouldn't like to go into all of them, but
3 some of them are recommendations I can no longer remember. So I'd have to
4 examine the relevant documents.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Paragraph number for this, Mr. Hannis?
6 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour. This is --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Is this 31?
8 MR. HANNIS: No, Your Honour, I think it's paragraph 28.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: This is a document?
10 MR. HANNIS: Yes. It's document TX-6, which is Exhibit P709.
11 Q. And, Mr. Tanic, you say in your statement that these joint
12 recommendations were the results of two meetings held on the island of
14 A. Not only those two meetings. This represents the result of the
15 series of meetings and of consultations, at least 30 meetings were held.
16 The Bertelsmann Foundation participated with Mr. Paglia and the European
17 Union. Paglia also met Milosevic and Milutinovic, I believe. But that
18 was later on, not at that time, since Mr. Milutinovic wasn't yet the
19 minister of foreign affairs. Perhaps they did meet in Greece, however, I
20 don't know. But nevertheless there were about 30 meetings; and yes, in
21 technical terms, you might say that that's -- this represents the results
22 of two meetings in Halki, one in Munich, one in Rhodes, and one in New
23 York, to be brief.
24 Q. Do you know if Mr. Milosevic implemented any of the proposals in
25 this document?
1 A. Well, earlier on he had signed a proposal on education, which was
2 part of those measures for re-establishing trust; that was the first
3 stage. And then other measures were to be taken to re-establish trust, to
4 reinforce trust, but this wasn't done. He didn't sign this with me or in
5 my presence. He signed this with Rugova through the intermediary of
6 Monsignor Paglia. He was from a paradiplomatic association, the community
7 of San Edigio. He had a contact group involved in his work, and he often
8 met with me and Milosevic, and then they signed that agreement on
9 education. There was just this one measure that was taken in order to
10 reinforce trust.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. HANNIS: And, Your Honours, for the record that is Exhibit
13 715, which has been presented in the court previously to other witnesses,
14 including Mr. Surroi. Thank you.
15 Q. Now, I want to move forward in your statement to paragraph 43 and
16 44. Now we're moving in time to October of 1998. You talk about the
17 Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement in October of 1998, which you describe as
18 implementing some of the things that had been recommended previously in
19 the joint recommendations. In paragraph 44, you say: "After concluding
20 this agreement with Holbrooke, Milosevic sent Serb negotiators to Kosovo
21 13 times to discuss the autonomy of the province and not of the Kosovo
23 Can you explain for the Judges what the significance, if any,
24 there is to this difference between autonomy of the province versus
25 autonomy of the Kosovo Albanians.
1 A. Well, if you have an autonomous province, well, that didn't mean
2 much for the Kosovo Albanians, because they wanted to enjoy their right to
3 self-determination in a certain sense after the break-up of the former
4 Yugoslavia. And regardless of how far they wanted to go down the route of
5 self-determination, regardless of whether they wanted a semi-solution or
6 whether they were going to stand by their most rigid positions, well, the
7 autonomy of Kosovo really didn't provide them with a way of meeting their
8 right to self-determination. And it, in fact, created the conditions for
10 But, yes, the agreement with Holbrooke is almost identical to the
11 spirit of these agreements -- well, Holbrooke was naturally familiar with
12 the way the negotiations were going. We had, naturally, contact with the
13 American ambassador. When I say "we," I mean Mihajlovic, myself. We also
14 had contact with state department representatives. So easy for them and
15 Milosevic to sign that because they knew that such an agreement existed,
16 but it wasn't his intention to implement it. Then all of a sudden there
17 was the problem of the autonomy of Kosovo Albanians that was transferred
18 into him into the autonomy of the province of Kosovo.
19 Q. Let me stop you there to ask you a question. You say it was easy
20 for Milosevic to sign that, but it wasn't his intention to implement it.
21 What do you base that on? How do you know that, that it was not his
23 A. Well, according to all the information that we had through
24 political intelligence and personal contacts, well- and this is the reason
25 for which we left the coalition government, the New Democracy left the
1 coalition with Milosevic, because we saw that he and his associates was
2 deceiving people at home and abroad. He would pretend that he wanted a
3 political solution. He was deceiving his associates by saying that there
4 was no political solution, whereas there was.
5 He wanted us to procrastinate to see what we would do, and this
6 all reminded us of his rhetoric that he had used earlier. And we, as a
7 party, myself, Mihajlovic, and others from the core party, when we saw
8 that he and his regime wanted to provoke one more war, well, at that point
9 in time we said, "This really isn't necessary. There's a political
10 agreement. If you want a war, then you can wage it yourself or with the
12 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not really an answer to this question, Mr.
13 Tanic. Mr. Hannis wants to know how you came to the conclusion that he
14 was not going to implement or had no intention of implementing it. It's
15 easy to say, but what is your basis for coming to that conclusion?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I didn't draw any conclusions.
17 I was working on the basis of information. The information was such that
18 there was no agreement. He had signed an agreement with Holbrooke just to
19 buy time. That was information we received through the State Security
20 Service and through the political establishment.
21 Secondly, given Milosevic's behaviour, well, he agreed on the
22 autonomy of Kosovo Albanians with Holbrooke. But two days after that
23 agreement, he started sending negotiators to discuss the autonomy of
24 Kosovo. And this immediately demonstrated the fact that he wouldn't
25 accept the agreement. Thirdly, we had clear information according to
1 which he was preparing for war. He was storing equipment. He had started
2 creating decoys, model tanks, model artillery, et cetera. Why would you
3 engage in such activities if you were prepared to implement an agreement?
4 And, finally, on a number of occasions, Milosevic told me and
5 Mihajlovic, "If you don't feel good about this" -- he said this when
6 Mihajlovic or I would criticise him. He said, or rather, he told
7 Mihajlovic - I think I was present, too - he told Mihajlovic, "If you
8 don't feel good here, you can leave." That means if you don't want to
9 accept a war, leave. All of this information is reliable.
10 We're talking about a process, not an event that took place on
11 Thursday, the 24th of July, of such and such a year. This is a process
12 that lasted over a number of months. Milosevic and his associates needed
13 some time to take the decision to go to war. For that reason, Milosevic
14 also had problems with Stanisic and Perisic, because they were also
15 against this option.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Please don't be so dismissive of the questions that
17 are asked of you. You have, in fact, answered that question in precisely
18 the way I anticipated by indicating material from which you have drawn
19 conclusions, as well as referring to the information you received. So we
20 now have a clear understanding of the position and an actual answer to the
21 question that was asked.
22 We are now into what I have to confess I find difficulty territory
23 of political theory about constituent peoples and the right to
24 self-determination. And I know that in the Constitution of the Federal
25 Republic of Yugoslavia -- sorry, the Socialist Federal Republic of
1 Yugoslavia, there was a concept of constituent peoples. But was there
2 such a concept in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, no, there wasn't.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: So -- can I stop you there. Where then does this
5 idea come from that if you've got 10 percent of the population, you are a
6 constituent people?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as I have already said, this
8 was one of the irrational [Realtime transcript read in error "rational"]
9 justifications that I had heard. Milosevic and his associates would just
10 come up with these justifications. I was quite surprised by what I heard.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
12 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honours, again the transcript. I
13 believe the witness said the irrational, 68, 7, irrational justifications
14 that I had heard.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, did you describe the justification as
16 irrational or as rational?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Irrational, irrational.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you for clarifying that.
19 Mr. Hannis.
20 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
21 Q. You said your party -- you said "we," your party, New Democracy
22 then left. Is this the point in time you left the coalition with the SPS
23 and JUL?
24 A. Yes. When we became persuaded on the basis of all the information
25 we were receiving, not just on the basis of the information I had, but on
1 the basis of the information that our party leader had and other party
2 members, when we became persuaded that Milosevic and his associates wanted
3 to provoke a new war in Kosovo and when we became persuaded that he
4 thought there was no political solution, whereas there was a political
5 solution, we then left the coalition. And I apologise if you seem to
6 think that some of my answers were perhaps dismissive that these are very
7 emotive issues for me because my country suffered a lot for no reason.
8 Q. Let me ask you. In several of your recent answers you referred to
9 Milosevic and his associates, but can you be more specific who you are
10 referring to as his associates in the context of these most recent answers
11 that you've given.
12 A. Well, when I myself am concerned -- well, that was Jovica
13 Stanisic, through Zoran Mijatovic I received a message from Mr. Stanisic,
14 as the head of the State Security Service at the time. And according to
15 this message -- he said, "Well, the boss doesn't want to hear about that.
16 We're done with the political solution." He said Jovica Stanisic had
17 problems with Milosevic because he wanted to provoke a war in Kosovo.
18 Stanisic was against this. So I was told to be careful, to watch myself
19 and distance myself from that issue to the extent it was possible. So
20 Jovica Stanisic was one of Milosevic's associates, and he confirmed this
21 to me through Zoran Mijatovic.
22 As far as Mihajlovic and myself are concerned, well, I don't know
23 what channels Mihajlovic had. I assume he had direct channels to
24 Milosevic. On one or two occasions, Mr. Milutinovic said this to us, too,
25 in a far more civilised way. Since Mr. Milutinovic is a different kind of
1 person in comparison -- when compared to Milosevic, I don't think he was
2 happy about the war. But we also heard from him that the political
3 solution wasn't functioning. Mr. Milutinovic tried to show us that the
4 western forces wanted to deceive us, that they wouldn't allow us entry
5 into the EU, even if we achieved a political solution with the Kosovo
6 Albanians. So these would be the associates I was referring to. Mr.
7 Jovica Stanisic, Zoran Mijatovic, Milutinovic, and so on and so forth.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: The difficulty for me with that, Mr. Tanic, is that
9 each one of these persons you've indicated had a different view from
10 Milosevic, and what Mr. Hannis is after is identifying who the associates
11 of Milosevic were that wanted a war along with Milosevic.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Milosevic gave us that
13 information. We didn't obtain that much information from his associates;
14 we obtained far more information from him.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: But it's you that used the expression, "Milosevic
16 and his associates wanted another war." Now, who are these associates?
17 You'll understand my reason for asking the question, bearing in mind who
18 the accused are in this case and what this case is all about.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as far as the accused are
20 concerned in this case, the associates were Milutinovic and Sainovic,
21 naturally. Mr. Milutinovic didn't approve of Mr. Milosevic's reasons, but
22 he supported his idea that they should go to war and Mr. Sainovic was
23 actively involved in provoking that war. I don't have direct information
24 from Mr. Sainovic about that, but I have very reliable information from
25 the State Security Service that had quite a lot of problems with Mr.
2 And they told me that he was pretty involved in provoking a war in
3 Kosovo. That's as far as the accused are concerned here. There are other
4 people, some are dead now, such as Vlajko Stojiljkovic. I also had
5 several conversations with him and there are colleagues of mine. Admiral
6 Jokic, who had been sentenced here. He admitted that he had shelled
7 Dubrovnik. He was a member of the New Democracy council. Then there were
8 the heads of military and intelligence services. They were all members of
9 our council --
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, please restrain yourself also. The
11 events in Dubrovnik were long before what we are talking about here, and
12 to draw that sort of conclusion, without a foundation, is not assisting
13 the process of this trial. Mr. Hannis will endeavour to elaborate if he
14 feels it necessary.
15 Mr. Hannis.
16 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 Q. Well, yeah, let me ask you a question about that. You mentioned
18 Admiral Jokic in this connection. Did he have anything to do with the --
19 what you described as Milosevic and his associates wanting to have a war
20 with regard to Kosovo?
21 A. As far as I know, he didn't have anything to do with it, but he
22 had reliable information. Members of your presidential council were,
23 among others, Aleksandar Vasiljevic, former; and then he was to become
24 head of the state security; Milanovic, the former chief of the Serbian
25 army. I wanted to say that we had a number of information channels, both
1 Mr. Mihajlovic and I. This wasn't just one person. There were many of
2 them; that's why I used the term "Milosevic's associates." Other than
3 that, Mr. Jokic has nothing to do with Kosovo. I apologise in that
4 respect. I just referred to him by way of illustration.
5 Q. Okay. Let me see if I can clear this up a bit then. You're
6 describing Admiral Jokic as one of the persons who was a source of
7 information for you about Milosevic and some of his other associates
8 wanting a war. Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, that's right, because Mr. Jokic, as did the other Milosevic's
10 associates, describe Milosevic's strategy of provoking a war earlier on.
11 In my statement I said how I came by information. I obtained information
12 on three levels. It wasn't just accidental eavesdropping in a hotel or
14 Q. Thank you. Let me go back to where I was a few moments ago. When
15 New Democracy left the coalition, do you recall approximately what date
16 that occurred?
17 A. We abandoned the coalition within a process, again. We held
18 several closed sessions and then one public session. Mr. Mihajlovic and I
19 wrote a national platform where we described Milosevic's regime along the
20 lines that we were mentioning now. This was in 1997, and then we passed
21 decisions along the party bodies that we would no longer form part of the
22 coalition. We left the coalition, and then there were some elections
23 which we did not participate in because there was the joint parties of
24 SPS, New Democracy, and JUL before. So we simply parted ways in a
25 civilised way, through the meetings that I mentioned.
1 Q. And in the course of doing that, did you or Mr. Mihajlovic or New
2 Democracy, as a party, bring to Mr. Milosevic's attention why you were
3 leaving in respect of it being because you saw him as preparing for a war?
5 A. Oh, yes, on several occasions, to him and Milutinovic. I don't
6 know whether Mihajlovic spoke to Sainovic directly or through some
7 mediators. I can't say. I believe he did, but I can't confirm that. I
8 know that we spoke to Milosevic on several occasions. We sent messages
9 and fax -- facsimiles. We also spoke to Milutinovic. Through the State
10 Security Service, I also sent information anticipating this, and I also
11 anticipated the attack by NATO on Serbia because of the exacerbation of
12 the situation with the Kosovo Albanians. Milosevic and Milutinovic
13 rejected that, but of course Milutinovic did this in quite a different
14 way, in a very polite way, as saying that we were wrong in thinking that,
15 whereas Milosevic was quite brutal.
16 Now, as for Sainovic, I believe Mihajlovic told me that he tried
17 to speak to him two or three times. I really can't say at this time
18 whether he did talk to him. I can't remember.
19 Q. And did New Democracy make any kind of public pronouncement at a
20 press conference or in the media about why they were leaving the
22 A. As far as I know, he did. There were a number of press
23 conferences where, to the extent we were allowed, we explained our
24 reasons. Had we listed all the reasons, we were would have lost our lives
25 at the time. But I said that Mihajlovic and I wrote a booklet, where we
1 clearly laid out what Milosevic's regime was doing. We held several press
2 conferences, and I gave several interviews. It was a public parting.
3 Everyone knew that New Democracy did not support Milosevic's preparations
4 for the provoking of a new war, this time in Kosovo. And we -- our
5 prediction that this would lead to the NATO attack was true. I directed
6 his attention to this through the State Security Service, and the answer I
7 received back was that I was simply being fed misinformation by someone so
8 that he might, in turn, be misled.
9 Milutinovic didn't believe that there would come a -- such an
10 attack either, but I have to make a distinction between them. He was
11 never -- he supported Milosevic's ideas, but I don't believe that he was
12 the mastermind behind it all at any point or that he himself wished for
13 these things.
14 Q. All right. Let me move on to another topic. In 1997/1998, did
15 you become aware of any international offers to Serbia to help deal with
16 the problem of the Albanian terrorist or the UCK? First of all, yes or
18 A. Yes, but before 1997; therefore, in this period but before 1997 as
20 Q. And how did you learn about these offers, from whom?
21 A. Credible diplomatic sources of Great Britain, Italy, United
22 States, Germany, then from among intelligence services, the British
23 intelligence service. And when we matched the information our service
24 had, they tallied, plus there was the Russian diplomacy as well. They all
25 contacted us as the junior partner in the government in an attempt to help
1 solve the problem of terrorism in Kosovo.
2 Q. When you say "our service as well," do you mean the SDB?
3 A. Yes, the SDB had information consistent with my information to the
4 effect that western countries were prepared to help Milosevic to solve the
5 problem of terrorism in exchange for a political settlement with Kosovo
7 Q. And what was the information you learned about the nature of the
8 offer to Mr. Milosevic to reach a political settlement with the Kosovo
10 A. It was -- well, along the lines of the three phases that I
11 mentioned. The confidence-building measures. It was called the
12 substantial autonomy or substantive. They also offered technical
13 solutions for border control. That would have been the electronical
14 border control and other solutions that would reduce the risk of Albanian
15 terrorists. And you have to keep in mind that in 1995/1996, they were
16 still abroad. The offers were quite credible and they were conveyed to
17 Milosevic through other channels as well, as well as to him personally.
18 Therefore, not just through me. I don't want you to get the wrong
19 impression that I'm trying to exaggerate the role I had. The offers were
20 not passed only through me.
21 Q. And are you aware of what Mr. Milosevic's response was to these
23 A. I can talk about my experience. For the most part, he ignored
24 them. Once or twice, he even rejected them. As for other offers, I can
25 only tell you what I indirectly know, what I learned from diplomats who
1 confirmed this to me. In conversations he seemed agreeable, but when it
2 came to the implementation stage he rejected the implementations. He
3 didn't even wanted the security service to locate the KLA terrorists
4 abroad. He even obstructed that line of work.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila.
6 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I have no objection. I just don't know
7 whether Mr. Hannis is still following the statement or are we following
8 something else because I can't find this in the statement. Is this still
9 paragraph 45 of the statement or have we gone past that?
10 MR. HANNIS: We've gone past that, Your Honour. I'm now into
11 portions of the statement that are not in evidence. If Mr. Fila wants to
12 follow, I can tell him that I'm in paragraph 47 of the full statement.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: But we have gone back in time, Mr. Fila.
14 MR. HANNIS: Correct.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. May I receive this
16 extended statement? I only have 45 paragraphs of my statement.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: The Trial Chamber has decided to allow the
18 Prosecution to present your evidence in writing up to paragraph 45 of the
19 statement, but thereafter we wish to hear what you have to say from your
20 own personal knowledge. So that statement is not part of the evidence in
21 the case beyond paragraph 45.
22 Mr. Hannis.
23 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. You mentioned in your last answer that you learned some of this
25 information from diplomats, who confirmed it to you. Can you tell us who
1 any of those individuals were?
2 A. Well, ambassadors of the countries I mentioned. I had regular
3 contacts with them. Of course there were individuals abroad; and for
4 reasons that are quite understandable, these are members of the British
5 intelligence service, I cannot name them.
6 MR. HANNIS: May I have just a moment, Your Honour.
7 [Prosecution counsel confer]
8 MR. HANNIS:
9 Q. Did the -- did the SDB, to your knowledge, have a position about
10 these offers from the west to assist in dealing with the problem of
11 Albanian terrorism or Kosovo Albanian terrorism?
12 A. But of course. They supported it with all their might; however,
13 Milosevic obstructed them and he had Sainovic assisting him in that and
14 other associates. I can mention them. And he tied up their hands in
15 other ways as well. I can tell you about it. This was one of the reasons
16 why Jovica Stanisic started suspecting that Milosevic didn't want to solve
17 the Kosovo problem at all, but rather that he wanted to create a new war.
18 Milosevic's regime seemed to have protected Albanian terrorists from --
19 and shielding them from any problems.
20 [Prosecution counsel confer]
21 MR. HANNIS:
22 Q. You just said that Mr. Sainovic was assisting in -- him in that.
23 Can you tell us in what ways he was assisting the obstruction of accepting
24 or using these offers from the international community.
25 A. According to the information I received from the service- and I
1 have no reason to doubt the credibility of the information- Mr. Sainovic
2 interfered with the service of the police in two or three different ways.
3 One way was that he conveyed personal Milosevic's messages that were
4 contradictory to the actual situation on the ground and quite often they
5 went against our law.
6 Secondly, whenever he was able to learn about some actions about
7 the SDB, he tried to, in order to be able to misrepresent their reports or
8 to have an impact on these reports. This is information I had -- I
9 received from the SDB. I didn't have any personal dealings with Sainovic
10 ever, but I do not doubt the authenticity of the information; they are
11 highly credible. This is the helicopter incidents, the establishing of
12 the actual situation in Kosovo, various recordings that were made.
13 Sainovic was one of the people obstructing the work of our security
14 service and police, upon Milosevic's orders, in order to create on
15 impression that the Kosovo situation could not be solved by any means
16 other than the war.
17 Q. Let me stop you there and ask you if you can clarify part of your
18 answer. You mention the helicopter incidents. What are you referring to
20 A. Perisic and Sainovic [as interpreted] wanted to organise a
21 fact-finding mission in Kosovo. Both of them were opposed to Milosevic's
22 provoking the war, and they hoped that they themselves, and through Lenic
23 they would be, or rather, through Lenic.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They would be able to have an impact
1 on Milosevic's thinking. All at once as they were about to set off on
2 that mission Sainovic got on the helicopter. And according to the
3 information I received from both Perisic and Stanisic, he -- the situation
4 was quite different in his presence. All of a sudden, the reports on the
5 situation on the ground were different. Sainovic later on, with
6 Milosevic, accused the security service for the chaos in Kosovo.
7 There were even stories about the security service and police
8 being involved in drug trafficking with the Albanians in Kosovo. They
9 simply wanted to establish the situation on the ground and to propose
10 measures by which the Albanian terrorism would be halted, because by that
11 time it had gained a much greater hand. It had gone a bit out of hand.
12 So this is just one example.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: There are two matters there arising in the
14 transcript. Page 78, line 18, I think is a reference to Perisic and
15 Stanisic, not Sainovic. And one other matter I'd like you to clarify,
16 Mr. Tanic, you said Sainovic was one of the people obstructing the work of
17 your security service and people on Milosevic's orders, in order to create
18 an impression that something could not be involved by any means other than
19 the war. What did you say there?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, it is true, I meant --
21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's true. I meant Perisic and
23 Stanisic. Now, as for Sainovic, the information I have --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Please stop there. Let's simplify it and if it's
25 not going to be easy for you to answer. Did you actually refer to the
1 terrorist situation in Kosovo could not be resolved other than by war?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No, absolutely not.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.
4 Mr. Hannis.
5 MR. HANNIS: Now, I'm not sure that answered to your question,
7 Q. Mr. Tanic, did you mean that the terrorist situation in Kosovo
8 could not be resolved by any other means than by war?
9 A. This isn't what I thought or Perisic or Stanisic, but Sainovic was
10 working toward creating the impression as if there is no other solution
11 than war. And in that sense, he distorted information flowing to
13 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand -- Mr. Tanic, I understand that but in
14 the transcript it said the Kosovo problem or situation, I can't now
15 remember. But did you not actually say the position of terrorism in
16 Kosovo. You actually mentioned terrorism in your answer, or is that not
17 the case? I just want to be clear if you used the word "terrorism."
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I did.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. That clarifies the situation. And
20 you're attributing that wish or idea to Sainovic, we understand that. But
21 it was the use of the word that was important for the transcript.
22 Mr. Hannis.
23 MR. HANNIS: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Now, we were just talking about offers from the west to assist
25 Serbia with the problem of Albanian terrorism in Kosovo, and you said SDB
1 was in favour of that. But when it was turned down or declined by Mr.
2 Milosevic, did the SDB itself have some alternative plan at that time for
3 how to deal with the problem of Albanian terrorism?
4 A. Yes, the SDB and the army.
5 Q. What was that plan, if you know?
6 A. At the time, and we are talking about 1998 now, when the situation
7 in Kosovo was worse than at the time of the negotiations, both services,
8 the SDB and the army and definitely also the police, were in favour of the
9 declaration of a state of emergency in Kosovo, because that would make it
10 possible to legally employ the police and army in fighting terrorism and
11 to --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness please repeat the second matter
13 that he said.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Second, the final negotiations with
15 the international community were opened where Milutinovic started acting
16 as the person who also conveyed distorted information. This is what
17 Sainovic did at home and Milutinovic did abroad. They asked -- they
18 wanted the definitive negotiating process to be opened up with the
19 Americans and the European Union. And, thirdly, they -- well, a political
20 settlement had already been passed for that, because they said that if in
21 the absence of a political settlement, the terrorists would multiply
22 because they would have a pretext for that and nobody would be able to win
24 The service and the army also had some specific technical
25 solutions for that, but I wouldn't talk about them in open session. These
1 are not pleasant solutions, but, of course, when faced with terrorists
2 they cannot be. Milosevic did not want to accept any of these. In
3 addition, the SDB and the army wanted to expand the area which they would
4 control by ten kilometres. Milosevic didn't want this. They asked for
5 electronic equipment for surveying the borders, for monitoring the
6 borders. But Milosevic was opposed to that as well, and there was no
7 equipment arriving at any point. Simply put, together with his
8 associates, Milosevic raised the issue of the Albanian terrorism to a
9 level which did not correspond to reality; and both Sainovic and
10 Milutinovic had a hand in that, the former one at home and the latter one
12 MR. HANNIS:
13 Q. I want to ask you about something you mentioned earlier when you
14 explained to me about the helicopter incident. You described a
15 fact-finding mission. In February or March of 1998, was there some sort
16 of governmental effort to find out or get a better idea about the nature
17 of the problem of terrorism in Kosovo. Who organised that, and what was
18 the objective? How were they going to achieve it?
19 MR. HANNIS: Paragraphs 52 and 53.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Microphone, please, again.
21 Well, the state took certain steps -- or I should say Milosevic's
22 regime made some efforts, but they were more declarative than substantial.
23 He set up a state commission for the Kosovo issue; this was Minic,
24 Sainovic, Lukic, and others. Practically, by doing so, he took up the
25 entire Kosovo issue from the hands of the legal organs; the police, state
1 security, and army. These efforts to solve the problems of terrorism in
2 Kosovo -- well, I cannot even describe them as efforts because certain
3 police actions, which were conducted under the instructions from Belgrade,
4 were conducted in such a way that our police suffered losses and Albanian
5 civilians got killed or wounded. And this cannot be termed as an effort.
6 It is true that by forming the commission, he --
7 MR. HANNIS:
8 Q. Let me interrupt you there. I did not phrase my question very
9 clearly, I guess. You had mentioned the helicopter incident and the
10 fact-finding mission that Mr. -- I think you said Mr. Stanisic and Mr.
11 Perisic were going on. That is what I meant to ask you about. Were you
12 aware of that at the time?
13 A. Stanisic and Perisic, as the chief of the security service and the
14 chief of the military, well, they wanted to examine the situation in the
15 field and to see what the situation was; and then to make suggestions to
16 Milosevic, so that they could have a basis upon which the state could try
17 to solve the problem. But they weren't able to do anything with Mr.
18 Sainovic in their company. I knew something about that mission, but not
19 much. I knew about Perisic's and Stanisic's efforts.
20 And as far as this [indiscernible] is concerned, I knew something
21 about it. I knew about the conflict between Stanisic and Milosevic
22 through the service. I knew about the details. But as far as the
23 helicopter incident is concerned, I only heard something about it at the
24 time, and this was later confirmed by Perisic. As far as the military
25 problems and Milosevic, I found out about that later. But as far as the
1 service are concerned, I had detailed information about that.
2 Q. You said Stanisic and Perisic weren't able to do anything with Mr.
3 Sainovic in their company. What led you to that conclusion? Why do you
4 say that?
5 A. Well, that was their opinion, naturally my opinion, too. If they
6 are coming to a joint conclusion as to the situation in the field, well
7 Sainovic is there, too, and naturally the conclusions will be the
8 conclusions that Milosevic wants. They won't reflect the actual situation
9 in the field. The conclusions under the influence of Sainovic were
10 catastrophic. It turned out that our soldiers in the security service
11 were in fact the cause of terrorism in Kosovo. I'm saying this in a
12 somewhat cavalier manner, but that's how things looked.
13 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Your Honour, I'm going to object to this. If we
14 look at the last ten or 15 lines of the transcript, the witness is saying
15 he's got second- or third-hand information, coupled with details he
16 doesn't know about; someone's opinion, which is a bit like his opinion as
17 well. It's inadmissible hearsay. It's conjecture and speculation and
18 shouldn't be allowed to continue.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, see, Mr. Hannis, the witness himself has
20 described this as rather cavalier.
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I can ask a couple other questions.
22 Q. Your answer to my question about what led you to conclude that
23 Stanisic and Perisic weren't able to do anything with Mr. Sainovic in
24 their company on that fact-finding mission, was -- that was their opinion.
25 How do you know that was their opinion?
1 A. Well, you know the chief of the State Security Service and the
2 head of the military, well, this isn't second- or third-hand information.
3 We constantly exchanged our opinions, and Jovica Stanisic via Zoran
4 Mijatovic told me the number of occasions that they had many problems with
5 Sainovic, and that Sainovic wanted to misrepresent the information that
6 was going from Milosevic to the police and to the Serbs and vice versa.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, let's concentrate on the question you've
8 been asked. You see, you're dealing with a particular situation, that the
9 trip wasn't going to be worthwhile. Now, can you concentrate on that.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, of course, of course. I was
11 told that by Jovica Stanisic through Zoran Mijatovic. I knew about the
12 trip and so did Mihajlovic. But we didn't really look into the matter at
13 the time, because we weren't in power. I wasn't describing something that
14 I didn't know about. Later General Perisic confirmed the details.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: So this is -- although you say it's not second- or
16 third-hand hearsay, in fact it's both second- and third-hand hearsay.
17 Now, Mr. O'Sullivan, you now know the basis for this, which is
18 said to come from two sources, one third-hand and one second-hand hearsay.
19 Do you still maintain your objection now that we know the precise details,
20 and bearing in mind that you can cross-examine this?
21 MR. O'SULLIVAN: In my respectful submission, this isn't the kind
22 of evidence that should be led. The point's been clarified, and we will
23 have a chance to cross-examine. But as a more -- as a preliminary point,
24 in my submission, which is whether or not this sort of evidence should be
25 heard by the Trial Chamber at all. There's no foundation for it.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you telling me there is some authority that
2 would exclude this?
3 MR. O'SULLIVAN: Yes. I can refer you to the Aleksovski Appeals
4 Chamber decision on -- which we cited in our motion in relation to this
5 witness already. Now, we know as a general proposition that hearsay is
6 admissible. And if you give me a moment, I'll give you a more specific
7 reference. Well, maybe I won't. The Aleksovski Appeals Chamber decision
8 says that the Trial Chamber has discretion whether or not to admit hearsay
9 evidence. There must be indicia of reliable. There must be foundation
10 for that, whether it's first-, second-, third-hand hearsay.
11 In addition, the Appeals Chamber has stated -- now I have the
12 reference to the decision. It's Prosecutor versus Aleksovski; decision on
13 the Prosecutor's appeal on admissibility of evidence, 16 February 1999,
14 paragraph 14, IT-95-14/1A. And there the Appeals Chamber is saying that
15 you must consider both the content and the trustworthiness of the
16 circumstances under which the evidence arose. And we say that with this
17 witness and this particular form of hearsay, which he's offering, that
18 there's a -- has not been proof, or it has not been established by the
19 Prosecution that there's any basis for this to be trustworthy information.
20 The context in Tadic, which is the basis of hearsay, is one that
21 is quite different. There, it's people with shared experiences, people
22 who lived through the same events, some of whom did not survive, may have
23 told an individual who recounts it. Someone who actually lived and shared
24 the experience; this is not the case with this witness. And we say that
25 Aleksovski provides a basis for you to exercise your discretion and not
1 allow this type of evidence to be heard.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
3 Mr. Hannis.
4 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, one of his answers was that
5 General Perisic later confirmed this to him. I would argue that that's
6 first-hand hearsay, and that is -- that's about as close as we can get,
7 short of having General Perisic here. We know that General Perisic is a
8 person. We know that General Perisic was in the army. We have evidence
9 that he did go on that mission. We'll have an exhibit from him where he
10 complained what was being done with the army and about how things were
11 being done in Kosovo that are in conformity of being disappointed on the
12 fact-finding mission. And he was -- he and Mr. Stanisic both were
13 replaced from their positions, not a long time after this, we say because
14 of disagreements with what Mr. Milosevic was doing. So it's consistent
15 with that, too.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: You say you'll have an exhibit from Perisic?
17 MR. HANNIS: We have a letter that he wrote to --
18 JUDGE BONOMY: All right.
19 MR. HANNIS: -- Mr. Milosevic that has been published in a book
20 and was led as evidence in Milosevic and is, I think, not strongly
21 disputed that it is his letter to Mr. Milosevic about the situation.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll consider the authorities that have been
25 referred to, since I -- the point pervades this evidence. It's not just
1 related to this one passage. And we'll give a decision first thing on
3 Mr. Fila.
4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the Prosecutor had just
5 said that they have an exhibit on that helicopter flight. Perisic,
6 Stanisic, and Sainovic were allegedly in that helicopter. This never took
7 place, so I would like to see the exhibit referred to --
8 JUDGE BONOMY: No, that's not what he said. He's talking about a
10 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] And there is a letter written by
11 Perisic that has nothing to do with the helicopter. The helicopter isn't
12 mentioned in that letter.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed, I don't think Mr. Hannis suggested it was.
14 I am --
15 MR. HANNIS: No. It has to do with recommendations he made after
16 the fact-finding mission.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.
18 In any event, we don't have time at the moment to deal with
19 anything arising from that.
20 Mr. Tanic, we now have to interrupt. That brings our proceedings
21 for the week to an end, and you will require to return on Monday to
22 continue with your evidence. I need to check at what time on Monday,
23 9.00. So it will be first thing on Monday morning, 9.00, ready to resume
24 here at that time. We'll now go into closed session to enable you to
25 leave the court. Over the weekend it is vital, Mr. Tanic, that you have
1 no discussion with anyone about any aspect of your evidence, either the
2 evidence you've given or the evidence you've yet to give. You can talk
3 about anything else that you wish to with anybody you wish to, but you
4 must keep off, absolutely off, the subject of your evidence.
5 THE WITNESS: [Microphone not activated]
6 [Closed session]
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,
3 to be reconvened on Monday, the 13th day of
4 November, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.