Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 836

 1                           Monday, 3 November 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good afternoon to everybody in and around the

 6     courtroom.

 7             Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  This is case

 9     number IT-04-81-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Perisic.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

11             Could we have appearances for today, starting with the

12     Prosecution.

13             MR. HARMON:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  My name is

14     Mark Harmon, and Carmela Javier also appears with me today.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And for the Defence.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Good afternoon.  For the Defence, Novak Lukic,

17     Danijela Tasic, Chad Mair, Tina Drolec, and my name is Gregor Guy-Smith.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Harmon, I just asked that the witness -- I

19     asked the witness be kept out just for me to raise a witness with you.

20     Just so I understand where we're going with this witness, what is he

21     coming to demonstrate?

22             MR. HARMON:  Your Honour, he is coming to confirming his previous

23     testimony in particular parts.  He will be called to testify about --

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I've read through all that.

25             MR. HARMON:  Okay.  He will be --

Page 837

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But what message are we supposed to get from all

 2     that testimony?

 3             MR. HARMON:  Well, he is going to be a witness who was present in

 4     Sarajevo and had information about the events in Sarajevo and in Bosnia

 5     by virtue of his being the Chief of the UNMOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 6     He subsequently went to Belgrade and then to Zagreb.  He remained Chief

 7     of the UNMOs for a considerable period of time.  He received reports

 8     about the events in Bosnia as a result of information that was collected

 9     by his organisation, the United Nations, UNPROFOR, and the UNMOs.  It was

10     disseminated to him.  It consisted of information that was from various

11     parts of the former Yugoslavia.  It identified the events specifically in

12     Bosnia.  It identified specifically events about ethnic cleansing in

13     Bosnia.

14             General Wilson, in Belgrade, received those reports.  Part of

15     those reports were from the Belgrade media.  He had contact with people

16     in Belgrade who were informed about those events that were happening in

17     Sarajevo.  He had communication with members of the FRY leadership and

18     complaints were made to them specifically about Sarajevo and the events

19     in Bosnia.

20             That's what he will be testifying about, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I understand all that.  As I said, I've read that.

22             MR. HARMON:  Okay.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The thing is, all his testimony, for starters, is

24     pre the indictment period.  I want to know how it relates to the accused.

25             MR. HARMON:  Yes, Your Honour.  It relates this way.  I made this

Page 838

 1     remark in my opening statement.  The events that occurred when General

 2     Perisic became Chief of the General Staff in August of 1993, particularly

 3     in respect of events in Sarajevo, were not events that were unknown.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  He's coming to explain --

 5             MR. HARMON:  He will be testifying about notice --

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  That's all I wanted to know.

 7             MR. HARMON:  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

 9             May we call the witness in, please.

10             MR. HARMON:  Your Honour, he will also be testifying generally

11     about the events in Sarajevo.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, about which notice is supposed to have been

13     received according to the Prosecution.

14             MR. HARMON:  That's correct.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I understand.

16             Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Just so I'm clear about what Mr. Harmon just said

18     with regard to who's going to be testifying generally to the events in

19     Sarajevo, do I understand that there's a nexus between all the events

20     he's going to be testifying about and the issue of notice, because if

21     there is not, then it raises another -- it raises another difficulty.

22             MR. HARMON:  Of course there is a nexus, Your Honour.  That's why

23     we're calling General Wilson.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, one can never assume too much.

Page 839

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 2                           [The witness entered court]

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good afternoon, sir.

 4             May the witness please make the declaration.

 5             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 6     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  You may be seated.

 8             Yes, Mr. Harmon.

 9                           WITNESS:  JOHN WILSON

10                           Examination by Mr. Harmon:

11        Q.   General Wilson, could you state your name and spell your last

12     name for the record.

13        A.   My name is John Brian Wilson, W-i-l-s-o-n.

14        Q.   General Wilson, I will not ask you about your qualifications.

15     They are contained in your previous written evidence, and I will be

16     summarising those at the end of certain portions of this examination.

17             Prior to coming into court today, did you have an opportunity to

18     review a statement that you provided to the Office of the Prosecutor on

19     the 5th of June and the 19th and 20th -- of 1995, I'm sorry, and the 19th

20     and 20th of December, 2002?

21        A.   Yes, I did.

22        Q.   And did you have an opportunity to review as well the four

23     associated exhibits that were part of that statement, those being

24     intercepted communications, one from the 28th of May 1992, one from the

25     20th of May, 1992, one from the 21st of May, 1992, and an undated

Page 840

 1     intercept?

 2        A.   Yes, I did.

 3             MR. HARMON:  Could we call up the statement of General Wilson.

 4     It bears 65 ter number 09307, and I'd like to turn to page 2 of the

 5     e-mail -- of the e-court document.  That's, I think, page 1 of the -- I'd

 6     like the next page, if I could.

 7        Q.   Now, is this, General Wilson, the cover sheet of the statement

 8     that you reviewed?

 9        A.   Yes, it is.

10        Q.   All right.  Now, you indicated to me that you wished to make a

11     correction on one page of that statement.

12             MR. HARMON:  So if the usher could please turn to page 13 of the

13     e-court document, I'll quickly go through these corrections.

14        Q.   This relates to paragraph 58 of the statement, General Wilson.

15     It is the fifth line of the statement, and the line starts with the word

16     "Departed in December 1992 ..."  You wish to strike the words "in

17     December 1992" and correct that with the words "on 15 November 1992."  Is

18     that correct?

19        A.   That's correct.

20        Q.   Okay.  Now, General Wilson, with that correction having been

21     made, are the contents of your statement true and accurate, to your

22     knowledge and belief?

23        A.   Yes, they are.

24        Q.   And if you were asked to speak of the same events, would you

25     confirm your statement today?

Page 841

 1        A.   I would.

 2             MR. HARMON:  Then, Your Honour, I would ask that General Wilson's

 3     statement and the four associated exhibits be introduced into evidence,

 4     and I can give the usher the 65 ter numbers.  The statement itself bears

 5     65 ter number 09307; the --

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That statement, then, will be admitted into

 7     evidence.  May it please be given an exhibit number.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, that would be Exhibit P137.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

10             MR. HARMON:  I will now read the exhibit -- the four associated

11     exhibits with the statement; 65 ter exhibit 09308, the intercept from 28

12     May, 1992; the second exhibit is 65 ter number 09309, an intercept of the

13     20th of May, 1992; the third associated exhibit bears 65 ter number

14     09310, an intercept of 21 May 1992; and the fourth associated exhibit

15     bears 65 ter number 09311, an undated intercept.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes, if I might.  With regard to paragraph, I

18     believe it is, 96 of the statement itself, to the extent there is

19     language in that paragraph that is speculative in nature and is also

20     calling for an opinion which is not necessarily within the purview of

21     this particular witness, I would object.  Other than that, I have no

22     objections to the information as contained in paragraph 96 and the

23     associated exhibits, and specifically I'm referring to the language of "I

24     think this transcript," "I think this intercept," and "I do not know."

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Harmon.

Page 842

 1             MR. HARMON:  Your Honour, the witness gave his best opinion in

 2     respect of what those intercepts related to.  If the Court wishes to

 3     strike those intercepts, I have no particular objection.  I think that --

 4     I leave it to the Court's discretion.  I introduced these four exhibits,

 5     Your Honour, for purposes of completeness of the record.  That's my

 6     purpose of introducing these exhibits.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I might make a suggestion, Your Honour.  Then

 8     why don't we defer -- defer a ruling, if that's not too hasty a measure,

 9     and see how the testimony progresses.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Let's do it that way.

11             MR. HARMON:  Your Honour, I intend to ask no questions about any

12     of these exhibits.  They are just included and incorporated into the

13     record for purposes of completeness.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon.  We'll defer a

15     decision on the matter.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Then I have one other brief comment or remark so

17     I have an understanding.

18             With regard to the statement that is being introduced by the

19     Prosecution, I note that a number of paragraphs have been redacted.

20     Since Mr. Harmon has indicated that he is introducing the exhibits for

21     the purpose of completeness, my question becomes:  Do those particular

22     paragraphs that he has redacted, in his opinion, fall outside of or are

23     not caught by that particular doctrine, that being the doctrine

24     completeness?

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Not caught by that particular ...

Page 843

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Doctrine, that being the doctrine of

 2     completeness.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm going through my copy, and I don't see

 4     anything redacted.  I'm not sure whether we have the same thing -- the

 5     same document.  Well, I see on the -- the one on the screen is still

 6     redacted.  That's paragraph 62.

 7             MR. HARMON:  Your Honour, I --

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Do you have anything to say, Mr. Harmon?

 9             MR. HARMON:  I do, Your Honour.

10             We selected certain portions of the statement because we deemed

11     them to be relevant.  Subsequently, after the Court made a decision on

12     unscheduled incidents, particularly events relating to a particular time

13     period, there were subsequent redactions that were made in this statement

14     and they are in this statement because of the -- because of the previous

15     order of the Court.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I believe I -- I believe I understand what

17     Mr. Harmon has said.  I don't necessarily agree with the position he's

18     taken, but I think, once again, the fullness of time will reveal my

19     concerns.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

21             MR. HARMON:  Your Honour, if what counsel is suggesting is that

22     the whole statement go in unredacted, if I understand that to be his

23     position, I'm certainly in a position to entertain that and would

24     consider that as well.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I didn't understand him to say that.  I understood

Page 844

 1     him to be asking whether the paragraphs that are redacted are not caught

 2     by the fullness, completeness of statement, and I guess until and unless

 3     he asks for them, you are the dominus litus.

 4             MR. HARMON:  Okay.

 5        Q.   General Wilson, let me turn now to your previous testimony.  You

 6     have testified previously in the case of the Prosecutor versus

 7     Momcilo Krajisnik.  You testified on the 17th and 18th of May, 2005.

 8     Have you had an opportunity to review both of your transcripts, the

 9     transcripts from the 17th of May, 2005, and the transcript from the 18th

10     of May, 2005, in the Krajisnik case?

11        A.   Yes, I have, counsel.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You referred to a number of exhibits, Mr. Harmon.

13     Are you still going to come back to that?

14             MR. HARMON:  You mean the four exhibits that were --

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's right.  We've assigned an exhibit number to

16     one only.

17             MR. HARMON:  Okay.  Well, I understood we were going to defer

18     consideration, but if the Court -- if we're going to assign additional

19     numbers to them now, I'm happy to do that.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Well, my understanding seems to be that, in fact,

21     the document which has been assigned an exhibit number is the statement

22     itself.

23             MR. HARMON:  That's correct.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Two paragraphs of which have been redacted, and

25     then the others were the exhibits to the statement, and I didn't hear any

Page 845

 1     objection against those exhibits, the exhibits themselves, not the end

 2     part of Mr. Wilson's statement where he thinks -- or what does he say?

 3     "I think this," "I don't know."

 4             MR. HARMON:  So we have admitted -- so there's no objection, I

 5     take it, to Exhibit P137, which is General Wilson's statement?

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  At this stage, no.

 7             MR. HARMON:  And that's where we remain at this point, and if I

 8     may, Your Honour, and if the Court, please, may I then turn to his

 9     transcripts.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Please do.

11             MR. HARMON:  All right.

12        Q.   General Wilson, you've just confirmed that you have reviewed the

13     transcripts of your previous sworn testimony from the 17th of May, 2005,

14     and the 18th of May, 2005.  Did you also have an opportunity to examine

15     six associated documents with that testimony?  And let me just describe

16     what they were.  One is a map of the deployment of UNPROFOR forces in

17     Bosnia.  One was a map of Bosnia and Herzegovina showing the

18     municipalities.  One was a final report prepared by you about your tour

19     with UNPROFOR.  One was a record of discussions with Mrs. Plavsic and

20     General Mladic on the 25th of May, 1992.  One was a record of a meeting

21     between yourself and General Mladic dated the 30th of May, 1992.  And one

22     was an excerpt, or excerpts, from a document entitled "Analysis of Combat

23     Readiness and Activities of the Army of Republika Srpska," a document

24     which was dated the 5th of April 1993.

25        A.   Yes, I did review those documents.

Page 846

 1        Q.   Now, you indicated to me that you wanted to make five corrections

 2     to the transcript of the 17th of May, 2005.

 3             MR. HARMON:  So if we could call up, please, 65 ter number 09312,

 4     which is the transcript of your evidence on the 17th of May, 2005.  And

 5     if we could turn first to page 3 of the e-court document.

 6        Q.   And the first correction is on line 7 of this document.

 7             You indicated that in line 7 the number -- the word "six" is

 8     incorrect, and the word "four" should be put in its place.  Is that

 9     correct?

10        A.   That's right.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I apologise, Mr. Harmon, but my eyes seem to be

12     failing me.  Could you give me the page number, if you don't mind.

13             MR. HARMON:  13030.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you so much.

15             MR. HARMON:

16        Q.   If we could turn to the second correction which is page 5 of the

17     e-court document.  The transcript page number is 13032.  And the change

18     is found on line 13.

19             The words at the end of that sentence "in December of 1992"

20     should be stricken, and in its place the words "on 15 November 1992"

21     should be substituted in its place.  Is that correct, General Wilson?

22        A.   That's correct.

23        Q.   If we could next turn to page 6 of the e-court document, page

24     13033, and focus on lines 10 to 13.  At the end of line 10 and the

25     beginning of line 13, you indicated that the words "a brigade comprised

Page 847

 1     of approximately 5.000 men" should be stricken, and at the end of that

 2     particular sentence, a new sentence should be added:  "The area of Sydney

 3     comprised 5.000 men."  So the correction is that a brigade did not

 4     consist of 5.000 men, but you were the area commander of Sydney and that

 5     area consisted of a command of over 5.000 men; is that correct?

 6        A.   That's correct.

 7        Q.   If we could turn to the next document, which is page 15 of the

 8     e-court document, referring to page 13042, line 6.  On that page, the

 9     word in the middle of the line "commands" is incorrect.  It should be

10     "commanders."  Is that correct, General Wilson?

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   And the last correction.  If we could turn to page 32 of the

13     e-court document, which is page 13060, line 25, the correction should be

14     that the words "the 2nd," which appear toward the end of line 25, should

15     be stricken, and in its place the words "late May" should be substituted.

16     Is that correct, General Wilson?

17        A.   That's also correct.

18        Q.   Now, with those corrections having been made, General Wilson, are

19     the answers to the questions that were put to you in your previous

20     examination accurate?

21        A.   They are.

22        Q.   And if you were to be asked the same questions today, would your

23     answers be the same?

24        A.   They would.

25             MR. HARMON:  Then, Your Honour, I would ask that both transcripts

Page 848

 1     and the associated exhibits with General Wilson's previous testimony be

 2     admitted into evidence.  The transcript of the 17th of May, 2005, in the

 3     Krajisnik case bears 65 ter exhibit number 09312.  I don't know how the

 4     registrar wishes me to proceed.  I can read all of these, the transcripts

 5     and the exhibits, at once and be given numbers, or I can wait until an

 6     exhibit number is given after each one.  Whatever is most convenient.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It would have been perhaps convenient to read them

 8     in chronological order.

 9             MR. HARMON:  Okay, I will --

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If you can do that.

11             MR. HARMON:  I would be glad do that.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

13             MR. HARMON:  Okay.  The transcript of the 17th of May, 2005, is

14     65 ter exhibit 09312.  The transcript for the 18th of May, 2005, is 65

15     ter exhibit 09312.01.  In chronological order, the exhibits that were

16     associated with the transcript are 65 ter exhibit number 09313, a map of

17     deployment of UN forces.  The second associated exhibit is 65 ter exhibit

18     09314, which is an Opstina map of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The third

19     exhibit -- when Your Honour is referring to chronological order, Your

20     Honour, does that mean in chronological order of the 65 ter exhibit

21     numbers or in the package that was presented to the Court?

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I had in mind a chronological order of the 65 ter

23     numbers.

24             MR. HARMON:  That's fine.  I can do that.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Which, in fact, would have started -- I'm not

Page 849

 1     quite sure we are on the same page about the fate of 65 ter 09308 and 9,

 2     10, and 11.  But I see you have -- you've skipped them, but go ahead.

 3             MR. HARMON:  Okay.  65 ter -- the next exhibit is a report, a

 4     final report, by -- in chronological order, Your Honour, 65 ter exhibit

 5     09315, which is General Wilson's discussion with Mrs. Plavsic and General

 6     Mladic on the 25th of May, 1992.  The next exhibit is 65 ter exhibit

 7     09316, which is a record of a meeting between General Wilson and

 8     General Mladic on the 30th of May, 1992.  Then there is exhibit -- 65 ter

 9     exhibit 06940, a final report prepared by General Wilson about his tour

10     with UNPROFOR and there is a 65 ter exhibit 00379, which is an excerpt of

11     the combat-readiness -- an analysis of the combat-readiness and

12     activities of the Army of the Republika Srpska.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You ask that numbers be assigned to those?

14             MR. HARMON:  Yes, please.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Registrar, starting from 65 ter 091 --

16     09312, could you please assign those documents an exhibit number.

17             THE REGISTRAR:

18                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Harmon, if I may come back to the question of

20     chronological order, what do you understand the fate of 65 ter 09308,

21     09309, 09310, 09311, to be?

22             MR. HARMON:  I understand that there is an objection for -- to

23     those exhibits based on the certain wording that General Wilson has

24     contained in paragraph 96 and that we are deferring the admission of

25     those documents until a later time.

Page 850

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I obviously was not on the same page with counsel.

 2     I thought the objection was to the several paragraphs virtually at the

 3     end of the statement of Mr. Wilson which refer to, "I think," "I don't

 4     know," not necessarily to the actual exhibit itself.  Mr. Guy-Smith is

 5     rising to his feet.  Maybe he is going to clarify what it was he was

 6     objecting to.

 7             Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I believe that we were on the same page and that

 9     my objection was specifically what the Court has just said.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So just the wording of those four paragraphs.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Correct.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's what is being objected to.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Not the documents themselves.

15             MR. HARMON:  Fine, Your Honour.  Then I ask that those documents

16     be admitted as well.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  The last document -- I'm sorry, what's

18     wrong with me today.  The last document to be admitted was Exhibit 137.

19     Can you assign a number to 65 ter number 0938 and sequentially up to the

20     end.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter 0938 will become Exhibit

22     P139 -- I apologise, P138.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Registrar, assign to them all.  09309?

24             THE REGISTRAR:  That will become Exhibit P139.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  09310?

Page 851

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  That would become Exhibit P140.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  311?

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P141.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  312?

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  That would be Exhibit P142.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  09312.01?

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  That would be Exhibit P143.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  09313?

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit Number P144.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  09314?

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit Number P145.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  09315?

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P146.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  09316?

15             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P147.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  06940?

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P148.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And finally, 00379?

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit Number P149.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Harmon.

23             MR. HARMON:  May I now read a summary, Your Honour, of

24     General Wilson's written evidence?

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You may.

Page 852

 1             MR. HARMON:  Thank you.

 2             The witness, General John Wilson, is a retired career military

 3     officer from Australia.  During his career he held numerous command

 4     positions in the Australian army and he participated in United Nations

 5     missions.

 6             From March 1992 he was Chief of the United Nations Military

 7     Observers, a subordinate part of the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia.  In that

 8     capacity he was involved in various high-level negotiations with

 9     political and military representatives of the warring factions, including

10     negotiations to open the airport in Sarajevo, negotiations to evacuate

11     JNA barracks in Sarajevo, negotiations to evacuate the JNA from

12     Dubrovnik, and negotiations to implement the no-fly zone over Bosnia.

13             In December 1992 General Wilson became the military adviser to

14     Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, and later Ambassador Stoltenberg at the

15     international conference for the former Yugoslavia, where he also served

16     as the UNPROFOR liaison officer to the conference.

17             General Wilson's written evidence describes the deployment of

18     United Nations military observers in Bosnia and the work they and he

19     performed, observations relating to shelling and sniping of civilians in

20     Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces, descriptions of reports he received

21     about ethnic cleansing in Eastern Bosnia, descriptions of negotiations in

22     which he participated, and interactions he had with representatives of

23     the various the parties engaged in the conflict, including Ratko Mladic,

24     Radovan Karadzic, Biljana Plavsic, Slobodan Milosevic, and Zivota Panic.

25     His written evidence describes complaints by Lord Owen made directly to

Page 853

 1     Bosnian Serb representatives during peace negotiations about --

 2     complaints about ethnic cleansing and military operations directed

 3     against the civilian population.

 4             That concludes my summary, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you, Mr. Harmon.  Is that it?

 6             MR. HARMON:  That's it, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

 8             Mr. Guy-Smith.

 9             MR. HARMON:  I've concluded my summary.  Now, if I may proceed

10     with my examination, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm sorry.  You may proceed.

12             MR. HARMON:

13        Q.   Now, General Wilson, you were Chief of the United Nations

14     Military Observers from March 1992 until December 1992.  Could you

15     explain to the Trial Chamber what United Nations Military Observers were

16     and what were their duties and responsibilities?  What was the mandate

17     that they had?

18        A.   The military observers in UNPROFOR were a group initially of some

19     75 officers drawn from different countries, I think about 20 different

20     countries were represented.  They were usually between the rank of

21     captain and lieutenant colonel.  Nearly all of them were professional

22     officers, although some reserve officers may also have been represented.

23             Their task was broadly to liaise with the parties in conflict, to

24     participate in negotiations, to assist the parties to achieve agreements

25     or to effect the exchange, perhaps, of prisoners of war or bodies that

Page 854

 1     resulted from conflicts, and they were a source of information for the

 2     United Nations to find out what was going on in the area.

 3             The specific mandate of the UNPROFOR military observers was under

 4     the Vance Plan, was to deploy in areas of growing ethnic tension within

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That was namely in the area of Bihac and also in

 6     Mostar.  They were the only elements of UNPROFOR that had an operational

 7     task within Bosnia-Herzegovina when UNPROFOR was established in March

 8     1992.  The remainder of UNPROFOR's operational focus was in the UNPAs in

 9     Croatia.  I think that's ...

10        Q.   General Wilson, as part of their duties and responsibilities, did

11     they send daily reports to UNPROFOR headquarters and to you about what

12     was happening in their areas of responsibility?

13        A.   They did.  They were required to provide reports on two channels;

14     one with the UN forces that they were supporting and one directly to my

15     headquarters.  Those reports were summarized and forwarded up the command

16     chain to UNPROFOR headquarters.

17        Q.   Now, I would like to direct your attention, General Wilson, to

18     paragraph 73 of your statement.

19             MR. HARMON:  That is 65 -- I'm sorry, that would be Exhibit

20     number -- P137, and I would like to turn to page 15 of the e-court

21     document.

22        Q.   Specifically, I'd like to focus your attention about four lines

23     from the bottom of that paragraph.  It says, in part, and I'm going to --

24     it says:

25             "On this occasion and later meetings in early June, I observed

Page 855

 1     the relationship between Panic and Mladic, and it was clear that Mladic

 2     acted in a subordinate manner towards Panic.  Panic actually forced the

 3     issue to hand over weapons -- handover of weapons on Mladic despite his

 4     strenuous objections."

 5             First of all, to be perfectly clear, who was Panic and what

 6     position did he hold?

 7        A.   General Panic, as I understood, was the commander of the JNA.

 8        Q.   And what was the position of General Mladic?

 9        A.   General Mladic was, or claimed at the time to be the commander of

10     the VRS.

11        Q.   Can you describe to the Trial Chamber the circumstances under

12     which you met General Panic in Sarajevo.

13        A.   We had been negotiating with the Bosnian Serb leadership and the

14     Presidency to effect the evacuation of the JNA out of three barracks in

15     Sarajevo.  One barracks was successfully evacuated.  The second barracks,

16     the largest of the three, was the Marshal Tito barracks, and they were

17     lengthy and complicated negotiations.  Essentially what the JNA

18     represented at those negotiations was to effect the evacuation at

19     whatever cost.  The Presidency's position was to extract as many

20     concessions as they could from the Serb leadership before the evacuation

21     was allowed.  The Bosnian military position or the Bosnian Serb position

22     was that the evacuation should be effected without any concessions being

23     made at all.

24             It became quite clear that the Presidency was not going to assist

25     in the evacuation unless there were significant concessions made; namely,

Page 856

 1     the handover of weapons which they believed belonged to them.

 2     General Mladic's position was that he was adamantly against such a

 3     handover.

 4             General Panic arrived from Belgrade to take part in the

 5     negotiations.  I transported him from the Lukavica barracks across to the

 6     PTT building to participate in those negotiations and later to take him

 7     to Marshal Tito barracks so he could brief the commander there on the

 8     results of those negotiations.  I also transported him back to Lukavica

 9     barracks, and on the occasion that I picked him up at Lukavica barracks

10     and also when I delivered him back there, I was able to see the

11     interaction between Generals Panic and Mladic.  I was also aware that

12     General Panic had made it clear in the negotiations that the JNA was

13     prepared to hand over weapons to effect the evacuation, despite

14     General Mladic's objections, and it was General Panic's position that

15     prevailed in the end.  The weapons were handed over, and General Mladic

16     had to accept that situation.

17             I noted in the interaction between General Mladic and General

18     Panic that there was a clear superior and subordinate interaction between

19     the two, the paying of military compliments.  The way that General Mladic

20     addressed General Panic, to me, made it quite clear that General Mladic

21     was subordinate to General Panic.

22        Q.   Now, let me turn -- let me turn, then, General Wilson, when you

23     say he was subordinate, your statement says he acted in a subordinate

24     manner towards Panic.

25        A.   Yes.  Yes, it does.  And I'm saying there that it was --

Page 857

 1     collectively his actions, the way they talked, the demeanor of both men,

 2     made it clear to me that he was acting in a subordinate manner to a

 3     superior officer.

 4        Q.   All right.  Let me turn to a different area and that -- I want to

 5     just, first of all, focus on where your headquarters were located,

 6     General Wilson.  I'll just summarize this.  I'd like you just to affirm

 7     that this is the case.

 8             Initially, you had temporary headquarters in the Holiday Inn in

 9     Sarajevo, and in early April 1992, UNPROFOR headquarters relocated from

10     the Holiday Inn to the PTT building in Sarajevo; is that correct?

11        A.   That's correct.

12        Q.   And the PTT building is in the urban area of Sarajevo; is that

13     correct?

14        A.   That is correct.

15        Q.   And you remained in -- personally remained in Sarajevo until the

16     24th of June, 1992.

17        A.   I did.

18        Q.   Okay.  You relocated, then, in late July to -- strike that.

19             You remained in day-to-day control of the United Nations Military

20     Observers until the 15th of November, 1992.

21        A.   I did.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, General Wilson, while you remained in Sarajevo, did

23     you have -- did you personally observe the shelling of the city?

24        A.   I did observe the shelling of the city.

25        Q.   And how did you have an opportunity to observe that shelling?

Page 858

 1        A.   Well, I was able -- initially I was residing in an apartment

 2     block in Sarajevo when the war broke out and the fighting was in my

 3     immediate vicinity.  It was very heavy and sustained fighting.  After I

 4     had relocated my accommodation to the PTT building, it was quite possible

 5     from the PTT building, which is a glass and aluminum structure and quite

 6     a tall building, to be able to observe the vast majority of the area --

 7     of the Sarajevo urban area.

 8             MR. HARMON:  Now, if we could turn to P137, if I could turn to

 9     page 11 of the e-court document.

10        Q.   I want to direct your attention to paragraph 47.  I'd like to

11     direct your attention to paragraph 47 of your statement.  In paragraph 47

12     of your statement, General Wilson, you say that:  "The Presidency troops

13     did not have a great number of heavy weapons."  You saw 81 millimetre

14     motors and you describe -- let me ask you this:  Can you describe the

15     disparity in terms of the calibre of weapons, heavy weapons, between the

16     Presidency forces and the Bosnian Serb forces?

17        A.   Yes.  It was thought at the time that -- and I had seen certainly

18     map evidence to support this, that the Presidency -- wrong, that the

19     Serbian military forces around Sarajevo had something in the vicinity of

20     200 artillery and mortar barrels that they could direct at the city.  In

21     terms of military power, this is a significant capability.  In addition

22     to that, they also had a large number of other weapons, such as

23     anti-aircraft weapons which they were able to use in a ground role, a

24     direct-fire role.  Additionally they had armoured forces that could also

25     deploy their main armament to engage targets in the city.

Page 859

 1             The Presidency forces, as indicated in my statement, had a very

 2     small number of what I'd describe as heavy weapons.  That's mortars or

 3     artillery pieces.  I only saw two or three tanks that were in their

 4     possession.  There was a significant disparity in the weight of fire that

 5     both sides could bring to bear.

 6        Q.   General Wilson, did you have occasion to see a mobile mortar?

 7        A.   I did.  I was observing one day from the -- high up on the PTT

 8     building, on the road which ran down to the city.  I saw a truck with an

 9     81 millimetre mortar mounted on the back.  It was firing a short number

10     of rounds, two or three rounds, out, I presume, against the Serbian

11     military forces and it was then quickly redeploying.  Now, the reaction

12     to this fire was a return of artillery fire by the Bosnian Serb forces.

13     It was a significant return of fire involving very heavy calibre

14     artillery, I assess probably 150-millimetre artillery, plus

15     120-millimetre artillery.  There were a large number of rounds which were

16     fired back into what was a civilian area.  These rounds hit certainly the

17     road area but also a large number of rounds hit surrounding accommodation

18     buildings causing significant damage.

19        Q.   Now, if I could turn your attention, General Wilson, to paragraph

20     53 of your statement.

21             MR. HARMON:  That's page 12 of the e-court document.

22        Q.   Paragraph 53 of your statement should appear in front of you.  It

23     says:

24             "General shelling and sniping in Sarajevo was such a common

25     occurrence that they were not investigated.  It became part of the

Page 860

 1     day-to-day reality in Sarajevo."

 2             From your perspective as a career military officer, can you

 3     provide the Trial Chamber with your general observations about both

 4     shelling and sniping in Sarajevo?

 5        A.   Yes, I can.  For a period of approximately six weeks prior to the

 6     time that I left Sarajevo at the end of June, shelling and sniping within

 7     Sarajevo was a daily event.  It was -- on most days for that six weeks,

 8     it was very heavy.  It was directed virtually at the whole of the city,

 9     so it was widespread.  It was intense for, on some days, 16 hours.  It

10     started at 5.00 in the morning and go through until 11.00 at night.  It

11     was indiscriminate, in my view, in that it engaged widely dispersed

12     targets that had no clear military value to them.

13             On other occasions the artillery was clearly in support of ground

14     assaults taking place.  But for the most part, the artillery being

15     directed into the city was, in my view, indiscriminate, widespread, and

16     did not take account of the fact that civilians were residing in the

17     area.

18             "Sniping" is a term, I think, which can be interpreted in a

19     number of different ways.  The pure technical description of a sniper is

20     a highly trained marksman who can engage a target at a thousand or 1.200

21     metres with a great degree of accuracy.  The local people in the former

22     Yugoslavia tended to describe an individual with a weapon firing as a

23     sniper.  I think in the case of Sarajevo people were really talking about

24     individual riflemen who were engaging targets within the city.  Once

25     again, this was common, particularly down in the downtown area, where

Page 861

 1     individuals would engage, quite often civilians travelling on trams or as

 2     pedestrians in the street.

 3             On numerous occasions, to fulfil my UN responsibilities, I was

 4     required to go downtown and the vehicle in which I travelled, I would

 5     say, 70 or 80 per cent of the time, was engaged by this small-arms fire.

 6     It was too dangerous to go down to the city in other than an armoured

 7     vehicle.  And the people of Sarajevo lived in this environment certainly

 8     for the six weeks that I was in Sarajevo, there.

 9        Q.   General Wilson, now I want to focus your attention on a slightly

10     different topic, and that is, what information about what was happening

11     in Bosnia and what was happening in Sarajevo was available to you while

12     you were in Sarajevo?

13        A.   Well, I think the most important preamble here is that most

14     international media left Sarajevo in mid-May when the war broke out and

15     didn't return until sometime in early June.  So, to the best of my

16     knowledge, the only media in the city at that time were former Yugoslavia

17     republic reporters.

18             In the PTT we had the facility to be able to translate the

19     written media that was produced in the city, and when we had electricity,

20     we were able to watch the local Sarajevo TV.

21             Additional to that, from Sarajevo headquarters we received

22     regular operational reports which indicated their knowledge of what was

23     happening in Sarajevo, and we also received daily media summaries in

24     written form which summarized what was happening in the media in the

25     former Yugoslavia and in the international written media.

Page 862

 1        Q.   When you say "summaries from the media from the former

 2     Yugoslavia," did that include summaries of media from Belgrade, from

 3     Zagreb, and from other parts of the former Yugoslavia?

 4        A.   Yes, mainly, to my memory, Zagreb and Belgrade.

 5        Q.   And what, if anything, did those media summaries relate in

 6     respect of, one, the events in Sarajevo, specifically shelling and

 7     sniping; and, two, events in Bosnia that related to ethnic cleansing?

 8        A.   Yes.  I made --

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  The question posed is vague as to time, and if we

12     could have a bit for focus, that would be appreciated.

13             MR. HARMON:  Yes, Your Honour, the first question that I asked

14     General Wilson and I've been directing my questions to him about deal

15     with the time period he was in Sarajevo.  I intend to explore with him

16     later the media coverage that was available when he was in Belgrade, but

17     these questions and the last question is to be understood as relating to

18     the time he was in Sarajevo.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Could we take those two questions one by one?

20             MR. HARMON:  Yes.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Please.

22             MR. HARMON:

23        Q.   Could you please tell the Trial Chamber, General Wilson, in the

24     media summaries that were coming from the former Yugoslavia, including

25     those from Belgrade and those from Zagreb, what information was available

Page 863

 1     and what was reported about the shelling and sniping that was occurring

 2     in Sarajevo?

 3        A.   The media summaries indicated that there was extensive coverage

 4     of the military attacks against the city, both in the form of artillery

 5     and also small-arms fire.

 6        Q.   And was that being reported in the Belgrade press, to the best of

 7     your recollection?

 8        A.   Yes, it was.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Now, in respect of other events in Bosnia, ethnic

10     cleansing, for example, focusing on the Belgrade media reports that you

11     were receiving, was there any reference to the practice of ethnic

12     cleansing in the events on the ground relating to it?

13        A.   Well, it certainly would not be addressed as that and, indeed,

14     the Belgrade media would tend to focus on the Serb refugees that were

15     generated by the war.  I have no recollection of a detailed account of

16     ethnic cleansing per se or any great mention of the number of Muslim or

17     Croat refugees that had been created by the conflict.

18        Q.   And in terms of the television coverage of events that were

19     occurring in Sarajevo while you were in Sarajevo, could you describe what

20     that coverage consisted of?

21        A.   The television coverage was provided by Sarajevo Television.  It

22     was graphic footage of attacks against civilians with, in the case of an

23     attack on the 27th of May against a bread line, continual replaying of

24     quite graphic shots of casualties, wounded.  This sort of coverage would

25     go on for hours, repetition of that sort of scenery.

Page 864

 1        Q.   And while you were with UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, did you get

 2     coverage from the international media, CNN, SkyNews, BBC, and the like?

 3        A.   After some time we were able to receive CNN, BBC news, by

 4     satellite transmission, but it took us some couple of weeks after

 5     UNPROFOR headquarters relocated to Belgrade before my headquarters was

 6     able to have this facility.

 7        Q.   And what do you recall the international media was broadcasting

 8     in respect of the events in Sarajevo?

 9        A.   In my view, they were fairly accurately representing what was

10     taking place there.  It was also quite clear that what was happening in

11     the former Yugoslavia was the lead item on the news virtually around the

12     world for that time and for many months after.

13        Q.   And when you say what was happening -- your evidence was "in my

14     view they were fairly accurately representing what was taking place

15     there," what was it they were showing on the video -- on the television

16     that was taking place?

17        A.   Well, it depends on the timeframe we're talking about, but until

18     the international media were able to get back into the city, they were

19     reliant on other people, I presume, for TV footage.  But my recollection

20     is that there were certainly statements by journalists as to what was

21     happening, and later when the cameras were able to get into the city,

22     there was actual footage of shelling, civilian casualties, damage being

23     caused to the city.

24        Q.   Okay.  Now, General Wilson, you relocated from Sarajevo on the

25     24th of June.  You went to Belgrade, and you remained in Belgrade until

Page 865

 1     late July 1992.  During that period of time, General Wilson, did you

 2     have -- did you continue to receive media compilations from UNPROFOR

 3     headquarters which included reports of -- summaries of the media

 4     throughout the former Yugoslavia, as well as international media

 5     publications?

 6        A.   Yes, we did.

 7        Q.   And were those summaries similar to the summaries that you've

 8     described in your previous -- in your earlier testimony?

 9        A.   Yes, exactly the same.

10        Q.   Now, while you were in Belgrade, was there television coverage

11     about what was happening in Sarajevo?

12        A.   Yes, there was, but I don't speak Serbo-Croat so the exact

13     content of them, I don't know.  But certainly the visual content seemed

14     to suggest that there was very heavy fighting going on down in Bosnia.

15        Q.   And was there television coverage through CNN and through BBC and

16     SkyNews that was being received in Belgrade while you were there?

17        A.   We had the facility for that.  I don't know whether the local

18     people there did or did not.

19        Q.   Can you tell me, General Wilson, what was your impression about

20     the people of Belgrade insofar as being informed about what was happening

21     in Sarajevo?

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'll have to object to that question.  The

25     impression of the people of Belgrade, the entire city of Belgrade,

Page 866

 1     I'll --

 2             MR. HARMON:  I'll reframe the question.  I don't mean the entire

 3     people.

 4        Q.   Let me ask you, General Wilson.  In terms of the people with whom

 5     you had contact -- strike that.

 6             Did you have contact with people in Belgrade, who, first of all,

 7     discussed the events with you in Sarajevo?

 8        A.   Yes, I did.  When I left Sarajevo and returned to Belgrade, I

 9     reoccupied my accommodation in the Yugoslav Hotel.  Since I'd lived in

10     that hotel for several months before going to Yugoslavia, I was quite

11     well known there to the domestic staff and they were -- some of them

12     spoke to me and asked me for my opinion as to the likely safety -- the

13     safety of their relatives down in the city.  They indicated that they had

14     seen reports of what was happening in Sarajevo, and they were greatly

15     concerned for the safety of their family down there.

16        Q.   Okay.  General Wilson, I want to change the topic.  I want to

17     fast-forward to the period when you acted as a military advisor to

18     Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen, and Ambassador Stoltenberg at the ICFY

19     negotiations.  In your trial testimony you were asked questions about

20     Lord Owen and Lord Owen bringing to the attention of the Bosnian Serb

21     leaders events that were taking place, ethnic cleansing and the like, and

22     your testimony found at transcript pages 13080 to 13083, as well as

23     13110, you indicated, to put it succinctly, that Lord Owen spoke

24     directly, bluntly, and non-diplomatically to Karadzic and others about

25     what was happening in Bosnia.  Do you recall your testimony?

Page 867

 1        A.   Yes, I did make that statement.

 2        Q.   Now, what you weren't asked, and what I want to ask you about

 3     briefly about was the parties to the ICFY negotiations also included

 4     representatives from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, for example,

 5     Slobodan Milosevic, and the FRY foreign minister; is that correct?

 6        A.   Yes, they did.

 7        Q.   Did Lord Owen express similar concerns to Slobodan Milosevic and

 8     FRY officials about events that were occurring in Bosnia?

 9        A.   Yes, he did, and it was done in basically two forums, in

10     one-on-one meetings, basically between General Milosevic and the

11     co-chairman.  The co-chairman would generally raise whatever issue was

12     paramount at that time.  It might be the cutting off of electricity or

13     water to the city.  It might be the provision of emergency aid.  It could

14     be the intensity of military action against the city at that time.

15             At various stages they would use a different approach with

16     General Milosevic.  In the early days they would ask for his support and

17     intervention, and he would usually respond that he would try and use his

18     influence, but he had limited influence over the Bosnian Serb leadership.

19     Later they would become more direct and ask that he take urgent action.

20     In many cases he would disassociate himself with the actions of the

21     Bosnian Serbs.  He would agree that their actions were inappropriate, but

22     he would claim that he had no authority, no way of influencing them.

23             There's a second forum in which he would be -- the co-chairman

24     would be negotiating with the Bosnian Serb leadership, mainly Karadzic,

25     Milosevic, maybe Plavsic, and President Milosevic would be present and it

Page 868

 1     would not be possible to progress the negotiations because the Presidency

 2     were refusing to participate until some military or humanitarian crisis

 3     was resolved.  This was quite a common event and was quite common for

 4     Lord Owen to speak very directly to the participants there about what was

 5     happening and to demand their intervention and to point out to them the

 6     inappropriateness of this conduct.

 7        Q.   What kind of conduct was he specifically describing when he was

 8     directing his comments to Milosevic and describing -- and to Karadzic and

 9     other participants in the ICFY negotiations?

10        A.   There were many of these meetings and, of course, many such

11     discussions, but to summarize, it would certainly deal with the nature of

12     military action being conducted in Bosnia in general and in Sarajevo in

13     particular, but also be matters of a humanitarian nature and specifically

14     about the conduct of ethnic cleansing which continued right through my

15     period with the ICFY.

16        Q.   Just to follow up, in your answer, General Wilson, you said:

17             "There were many of these meetings, and, of course, many such

18     discussions, but to summarize to would certainly deal with the nature of

19     the military action being conducted in Bosnia in general and in

20     Sarajevo ..."

21             Did he go -- what did he say about the nature of the military

22     action being conducted in Bosnia and in Sarajevo?

23        A.   Well, it certainly depends upon the event or the particular time,

24     but typically -- I can quote an example.  The turning on and turning off

25     of electricity -- I'm sorry, you asked for military action.

Page 869

 1        Q.   Yes.

 2        A.   Yes.  Shelling, I think, is a particularly good example because

 3     shelling tended to fluctuate during 1993.  It continued through 1993 but

 4     was more intense at some times rather than others, and Lord Owen would be

 5     asking for moderation of artillery fire being directed at the city.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Finally, let me direct your attention, General Wilson, to

 7     Prosecution Exhibit P146.

 8             MR. HARMON:  If I could have that pulled up on the screen, and I

 9     would like to go to page 1, the bottom of page 1, of that particular

10     document.

11        Q.   The paragraph, which is paragraph 4, I want to direction your

12     attention to, is paragraph 4 and it carries over to page 2 as well.  So

13     let me just read that part of what is on paragraph 4:

14              "In regard to the proposal of opening Sarajevo airport, the

15     General said the airport was the most practical resupply route for

16     humanitarian assistance."

17             I'm sorry, I'm reading from the wrong paragraph.  Let me go back

18     to paragraph 3:

19              "International military intervention could only bring

20     catastrophe on Sarajevo as, in a military option, Sarajevo would be

21     leveled."

22             Can you just explain what that paragraph -- the context of that

23     paragraph, General Wilson?

24        A.   This was a meeting that we had with General Plavsic to talk about

25     the possibility of opening the airport for the delivery of assistance of

Page 870

 1     humanitarian aid.  This was an aside.  At that time there was some

 2     discussion in the international media that some of the western European

 3     nations might be prepared to take military action against the Bosnian

 4     Serbs to -- unless they were to moderate their behaviour against

 5     Sarajevo.

 6             General Mladic's -- I'm reporting here his statement to me that

 7     if there was some form of foreign military intervention, he would attend

 8     to level the city of Sarajevo by intense artillery fire, and he had

 9     demonstrated for ten days or so before this meeting that he was quite

10     capable of mounting quite a ferocious level of artillery fire against the

11     city and therefore his threat was quite believable, and hence I reported

12     this threat to my superior in headquarters UNPROFOR.

13        Q.   I would just like to direct your attention to a correction, if I

14     may, Your Honour and General Wilson.  It appears on line 17, the first

15     part of your answer where it says:

16             "This was a meeting that we had with General Plavsic."

17        A.   Sorry, General Mladic and Mrs. Plavsic.

18        Q.   All right.

19             MR. HARMON:  I have no further questions, Your Honour.  Thank

20     you.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Before you sit down, line 17 of which page?

22             MR. HARMON:  Line 17 of page 34 says --

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Line 17 of page 34 says -- can you explain the

24     context of that paragraph.

25             MR. HARMON:  I have 34 -- Your Honour, I have -- my LiveNote is

Page 871

 1     rapidly disappearing, line 34, the answer to the question appears at 15

 2     minutes --

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Line 34.

 4             MR. HARMON:  Line 17 of page 34.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Are you not able to stop it so that it does not

 6     disappear?  I can see it at line 19.

 7             MR. HARMON:  I can see it at line 19 on this.  I can't see as

 8     well as I used to be able to, Your Honour.  I apologise.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's fine.  Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon.

10             Mr. Guy-Smith.  Yes, you are right.

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Very well, then.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

13             We're virtually two minutes from the break, so we'll take a break

14     and come back at 4.00.  Court adjourned.

15                           --- Recess taken at 3.29 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 4.00 p.m.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.

19                           Cross-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

20        Q.   You have been involved in a military career for the greater share

21     of your life, have you not, sir?

22        A.   Just a little over 34 years.

23        Q.   I won't ask you how old you are; it's none of my business.  But a

24     fair period of time.  And I take it that you, in the work that you've

25     done and the tours of duty that you have experienced, you've seen a fair

Page 872

 1     amount of different conditions of war.  Would that be a fair statement?

 2        A.   That's true, counsel.

 3        Q.   And one of the things that's kind of unique about the situation

 4     in Sarajevo was that for perhaps the first time in modern history - and

 5     I'm excludeing here, of course, Stalingrad - a battle was being fought in

 6     a city that was comprised of competing factions and civilians and the

 7     battle itself was in the city proper, which is kind of a unique

 8     situation, wasn't it?

 9        A.   I don't think it was unique.  I was involved in the Battle of

10     Beirut in very similar circumstances.

11        Q.   Okay.  Since you've mentioned the Battle of Beirut, one of the

12     things that is unique about warfare that occurs within an urban

13     environment is that the rules of engagement become much more difficult to

14     keep a bright line on.  Would that be a fair statement?

15        A.   No, I don't believe so.  The rules of engagement are quite clear.

16     It's the interpretation of them that's perhaps a little more difficult.

17        Q.   I'm not a military man, and I'm sure you can help me in that

18     regard.

19             And with regard to the issue of interpretation of the rules of

20     engagement and now with regard specifically to Sarajevo, one of the

21     realities was that in the city proper there were barracks that at one

22     point were manned by JNA members; correct?

23        A.   Yes, they were.

24        Q.   And that was, as a matter of fact, if I'm not mistaken, the

25     Marshal Tito barracks were barracks where supplies of both water and

Page 873

 1     electricity had been cut off by the, as I think you called them, the

 2     Presidency forces on a number of occasions; correct?

 3        A.   Yes, I'm aware they had done that.

 4        Q.   In your opinion, would that be a legitimate military act, to cut

 5     off the electricity or water in a region of town where there are military

 6     people?

 7        A.   Are you talking there about cutting off electricity/water to the

 8     barracks or to the city?

 9        Q.   I'm talking about cutting off water and electricity to an area of

10     the city where there are barracks.

11        A.   And --

12        Q.   And the reason that's why I asked you previously the question

13     about the rules of engagement, because that's why I think we're

14     immediately find ourselves in an issue of interpretation, or maybe we

15     don't, but that's what I'm trying to understand.

16        A.   So if the aim, if you can limit it entirely to the barracks, that

17     would be your aim.  If it was impossible to only limit it to the barracks

18     and you had to include part of the city, that would probably be a

19     legitimate action.

20        Q.   Okay.  And those are the kinds of discretionary decisions that

21     have to be made by whoever is a commander during the period of time that

22     they are engaged in that particular action.

23        A.   Not only by commanders, by individual soldiers too.

24        Q.   Okay.  Now, I want to just fast-forward for a moment.  Are you

25     aware of the fact that NATO bombed Belgrade and in doing so bombed a

Page 874

 1     transformer and radio stations?

 2        A.   I'm unaware of that.  I'm aware that NATO bombed targets in

 3     Serbia.  I was no longer engaged in the UN at that time.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Would, in your opinion as a man with some substantial

 5     military experience, would the bombing of a radio station or a television

 6     station be a legitimate military target?

 7        A.   It could be, provided you minimised collateral damage.

 8        Q.   Okay.  And by the same token, would the bombing of or the

 9     destruction of the transformer that supplied electricity to your enemy,

10     in an urban environment where there are civilians admittedly, would that

11     be a legitimate military target?

12        A.   That's a grey area, I must say.

13        Q.   Uh-huh.  Well, much of war is grey, is it not?

14        A.   It is, indeed.

15        Q.   Now, would it be fair to say that when you arrived in Sarajevo

16     the battle that you saw was, I think, what would be characterized, and I

17     don't know if it was the parlance that was being used then but I know

18     it's the parlance being used now, of asymmetric war?

19        A.   I'm not aware of the precise definition of that.  It's an

20     American term.

21        Q.   Well, I happen to be American so that's probably the reason I'm

22     using it.  And what I'm referring to here, and perhaps you have a more

23     precise term or a term that could help the Chamber in a way that I can't,

24     is that you have disparate munitions or artillery or ammunition between

25     the opposing forces, and you have disparate manpower.  Those are the --

Page 875

 1     that's what I'm putting into the formula.  I don't know whether that's

 2     sufficient or not.

 3        A.   If you're saying that there's a gross discrepancy between the

 4     ability and the capabilities of both sides, is that your definition?

 5        Q.   Yeah, absolutely.

 6        A.   Well, if that's your definition, then I accept that.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Is that what you found when you came to Sarajevo, that

 8     there was a gross disparity between the two sides?  And by that I mean

 9     between the ability and capabilities of the two sides.

10        A.   To be pedantic, when I first came to Sarajevo there was no

11     fighting at all.

12        Q.   Okay.

13        A.   But as the situation developed, yes, it's true, there did appear

14     to be a great weight in favour of the Bosnian Serb military forces as

15     opposed to what I'd describe as the Presidency forces.

16        Q.   Okay.  Now, with regard to the issue of the Presidency forces,

17     you had -- you had made yourself aware, I would take it, before you came

18     to Sarajevo of the nature and extent, to the best obviously that you

19     could, of the Presidency forces, how many there were, didn't you?

20        A.   No.  When UNPROFOR deployed to Sarajevo in March of 1992, the

21     operational focus of UNPROFOR was in Croatia, with the exception of my

22     military observers who had an operational focus around Mostar and Bihac.

23        Q.   Okay.

24        A.   What was happening in Sarajevo was simply the location to which

25     the headquarters was deployed.

Page 876

 1        Q.   Gotcha.

 2        A.   What the military forces were, there was absolutely no interest.

 3        Q.   There came a point in time when they became of some importance to

 4     you, did there not?

 5        A.   After the conflict broke out, yes.

 6        Q.   When would that have been?

 7        A.   It happened on the 14th of May.

 8        Q.   And on the 14th of May, when the conflict broke out, at that

 9     point in time did you educate yourself as to the number of forces that

10     existed with the Bosnian Presidency, to the best that you could,

11     obviously.

12        A.   Sure.  That began my education, yes.

13        Q.   And could you give the Chamber an indication of what the strength

14     was of those forces.  And I'm not at this point talking about artillery

15     or munitions because obviously I think it's well understood by all that

16     there was a discrepancy or a disproportionate, shall we say, possession

17     of those, but in terms of manpower.

18        A.   Sure.  When the war broke out on the 14th of May, the Presidency

19     forces described their fighting elements as police forces.  They made no

20     particular claim to an army.  It was only in the period perhaps a couple

21     weeks later that I was able to meet somebody who described himself as

22     commander of the army and a defence minister, in fact.  But on the 14th

23     of May, the forces that were fighting on behalf of the Presidency were

24     police forces, armed with small arms.  I actually met some of these

25     fighters in the building -- my accommodation building where I was

Page 877

 1     residing in in Dobrinja, Nedzarici.

 2             I only caught glimpses of the forces on the Serbian side.  I

 3     certainly saw their way to fire.  I saw fleeting views of their infantry

 4     during assaults around the area of what was known as the Rainbow Hotel.

 5             Does that answer your question?

 6        Q.   We're getting closer.

 7        A.   Okay.

 8        Q.   After a couple of weeks, since you've given us a start date of

 9     the 14th, after a couple of weeks - and for purposes of my question, I'm

10     not trying to tie you down to a particular date at all; I'm just trying

11     to get a rough sense of time - after a couple of weeks, did you make at

12     that point a determination, after you'd had an opportunity to meet with

13     these gentlemen, what the size of the forces were of the Bosnian

14     Presidency, after they transformed themselves what I understand to be,

15     what they previously called themselves as police forces into an army?

16        A.   Sure.  To my knowledge they made no claim to a particular number,

17     but given the size of the city that they were defending, and they were

18     defending it against infantry probes, they must have had some, I

19     estimate, tens of thousands of people on the confrontation lines.  If you

20     want an educated guess, it would be in the order of 30.000.

21        Q.   Okay.  And with regard to those 30.000 as an educated guess, and

22     I understand it's that, and I'm not -- once again I'm not trying to tie

23     you down to anything, but with regard to those 30.000 forces, were those

24     forces deployed throughout the city?  Were they in specific areas?  Could

25     you tell us what you learned in that regard?  Once again, I'm talking at

Page 878

 1     that initial time, a couple weeks after May 14th.

 2        A.   If I could correct my previously educated guess, I would say

 3     perhaps 15.000.

 4        Q.   Very well.

 5        A.   I believe they were deployed on the confrontation line, and not

 6     in depth, if you understand the military term.

 7        Q.   I do.  But could you define it for the Chamber and more

 8     importantly for the record so that we all have the same understanding.

 9        A.   A military force is deployed in attack and defence normally in

10     echelons, in lines, if you wish, so that it adds depth in defence, in

11     particular, that an attacking force has to get through.  It's both depth

12     in manpower and depth in fire-support, in fire-power.

13        Q.   Now, we now find ourselves, if my calculations are correct, we

14     now find ourselves in June; correct?  Starting May 14th, we're now at the

15     beginning of June.

16        A.   If you wish to nominate that period, yes.

17        Q.   I wish to be accurate, and that's what I'm trying to get to, is

18     an accuracy here with you with regard to certain things.

19             At that point in time were you involved in negotiations by then

20     with the various parties?

21        A.   Yes, I was.  Those negotiations started in perhaps the third week

22     of May and continued through until about the 5th of June.

23        Q.   What knowledge did you have in the third week of May with regard

24     to the status of Mr. Karadzic vis-a-vis who he represented and what

25     importance he was to your negotiations, if any?

Page 879

 1        A.   I was learning about the political situation in the third week of

 2     May.  Dr. Karadzic, my understanding, was the President of the Bosnian

 3     Serb republic and presented himself as such.

 4        Q.   And with regard to General Mladic, by the third week of May, what

 5     had you learned with regard to the status of General Mladic?

 6        A.   That was somewhat more debatable.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8        A.   I had known General Mladic since January of 1992 when he was the

 9     JNA commander in Knin.  And when he arrived in Sarajevo sometime in the

10     middle of May, I believe, he claimed then to be the commander of the

11     emerging VRS; however, the JNA commanders that we were -- the JNA

12     representatives in the negotiations over the evacuation of the barracks

13     did on a number of occasions indicate that Mladic was a loose cannon.  He

14     was carrying out individual irresponsible actions.

15        Q.   As a matter of fact, not only was he carrying out, as you've just

16     put it, independent irresponsible actions, he was acting also, to use

17     your language in your testimony - and I refer counsel to page 13068 of

18     the prior testimony - that he was "out of control and acting

19     independently and irrationally."

20             Now, you've told us that one of the things that you did in your

21     assessment of --

22             MR. HARMON:  Could I just ask that counsel, when you refer to a

23     page, if you can give me a line site.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Absolutely.  Lines 17 through 19.

25        Q.   One of the things that you've mentioned to us here today is that

Page 880

 1     your determination about the relationship of people was predicated in

 2     part on their demeanor, and I'd like to talk to you for a moment with

 3     regard to the -- your assessment of the demeanor of General Mladic.

 4             Having heard from representatives of the JNA that he was acting

 5     in such a fashion, being out of control, did you try to make an

 6     independent assessment for your purposes with regard to the accuracy of

 7     such a concern that was being voiced by those representatives?

 8        A.   Yes, I did, counsel.

 9        Q.   Okay.

10        A.   I --

11        Q.   And in that regard --

12        A.   Can I answer that?

13        Q.   Sure.

14        A.   On a number of occasions in late May and early June I -- with

15     this discussion I'd had with the JNA representatives in mind, I had said

16     to General Mladic that it was understood that he wasn't responsive to

17     political direction or anybody else's direction.  He was a lone maverick

18     and he made it quite clear on a number of occasions that he was

19     responsible to and responsive to the political leadership of the Bosnian

20     Serb people.

21        Q.   And when you say that he was "responsible to and responsive to

22     the political leadership of the Bosnian Serb people," you would be

23     referring to his Commander-in-Chief, that would be Dr. Karadzic, would

24     you not?

25        A.   I don't know that he was the Commander-in-Chief, but he was

Page 881

 1     certainly his political boss.

 2        Q.   He was his superior.

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And he, General Mladic, was subordinate to Dr. Karadzic.

 5        A.   General Mladic said that, yes.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Well, as a matter of fact, not only did he say that but

 7     you, in terms of your observations of the negotiations that occurred, saw

 8     that, and by that I mean you have pointed out to us that there were

 9     essentially differing views about the negotiation of what I'll call the

10     freedom of the airport.

11        A.   That's true.

12        Q.   One of the views, that being the view of the JNA representative,

13     that would have been General Panic and others, is -- I'm sorry, not "is"

14     but "was," that they were willing to give up everything; correct?

15        A.   They were certainly flexible about what they were prepared to

16     offer.

17        Q.   And to use your language in your previous testimony at page

18     13059, lines 11 through 18, you said:  "The JNA position was to effect

19     the immediate evacuation of their forces at any cost as quickly as

20     possible."  And the evacuation of their forces and the airport

21     negotiations, as a matter of fact, were all tied up with one another,

22     were they not?

23        A.   No, I saw them as separate issues.  And, in fact, Mladic said he

24     wouldn't negotiate on the airport arrangement until the barracks had been

25     evacuated.

Page 882

 1        Q.   That's what Mladic said.

 2        A.   Mladic.

 3        Q.   I see.  Well, then, let's talk about the barracks negotiation for

 4     a moment here.

 5             With regard to the Presidency position, that would be the Bosnian

 6     Presidency position, and their position was to bargain for the release of

 7     these forces to obtain arms and ammunition and concessions for

 8     humanitarian activity within the city.

 9        A.   That's true.

10        Q.   Okay.  Now, when you say that the release of these forces -- that

11     the bargaining there was for, among other things, to obtain arms and

12     ammunition, what did they want?  What did the Bosnian Presidency want in

13     terms of arms and ammunition in terms of this negotiation?

14        A.   Okay.  The detail of the negotiations was conducted by one of my

15     officers, a Colonel Hoglund, so he was in the meetings for the many hours

16     that they progressed.  I was called in at critical times, so I'm not

17     aware of the detail, bids and counter-bids, that took place.  I am aware

18     that in the end that two, I recall, but I read somewhere else that three

19     semi-trailer loads of small-arms weapons were handed over to the

20     Presidency forces as a result of the deal that was struck between

21     General Panic and the Presidency forces.

22        Q.   Now, with regard to -- with regard to the Bosnian Presidency

23     forces' negotiations, considering what your mandate was, irrespective of

24     the type of munitions that were being negotiated for, I take it that what

25     the Presidency was negotiating for was more weapons, not less.

Page 883

 1        A.   They wanted more.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And that was for the purpose of continuing - and I'm

 3     asking the question if you took this into your calculations when you were

 4     trying to close these negotiations - that was for the purpose of

 5     continuing the war efforts.  They didn't ask for more weapons just on a

 6     whim; they wanted more weapons so they could be armed for purposes of

 7     making themselves stronger with regard to what was going on.  Correct?

 8        A.   I mean, I don't know what their purpose was, but it would be a

 9     reasonable assumption that they wanted to continue the fight.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm sorry.

11             Counsel, when you say "more weapons," you're saying they wanted

12     more weapons than the Bosnian Serbs had, or did they want more weapons

13     than they would have been offered, if there was any offer at all?

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, I -- thank you.  Clearly, not a very clear

15     question and I will clear -- clean it up.

16        Q.   In following the Judge's question, the -- without getting into

17     the details, because that, I understand, you were not privy to.  What the

18     Bosnian Presidency wanted was more weapons than they had at the time for

19     their forces.

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Okay.  Obviously, they would have liked more weapons than the

22     Serbian forces had, but that's a different issue.

23        A.   Yes.  There were various ambit bids.  They wanted a greater

24     number than they got in the end, yes.

25        Q.   And that in and of itself is not an uncommon thing to occur

Page 884

 1     during these negotiations processes; right?

 2        A.   No.  That's normal in that part of the world.

 3        Q.   Because, after all, as we all know, war is not illegal.  Nations

 4     can fight against each other.  There's nothing wrong with that; right?

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm sorry to be pedantic.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm sorry to be moving in the wrong way, then.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You're not moving in the wrong way.  When you say

 8     "what the Bosnian Presidency wanted was more weapons than they had at the

 9     time for their forces," what do we mean?  Do we mean they had maybe 10

10     tanks, and they wanted 11 or 20, or do we mean they wanted to amend what

11     they had, even if it was only by one, so what they had before is more

12     than -- is less than what they now have by one or two.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay, I understand.

14        Q.   I don't know whether or not, by virtue of your position in terms

15     of the negotiations, you have that particular kind of information with

16     regard to the various ambits that the Bosnian Presidency were seeking to

17     achieve, and if you can be of some help to us in that regard, I would

18     appreciate it.

19        A.   I think as an illustration one -- if one proposed that the

20     Presidency forces may have had 15.000 small-arms weapons before the

21     negotiations commenced, the negotiating process was to acquire an

22     additional, say, 5.000 weapons, so at the end of the process they would

23     have 15.000 weapons.  That's what the negotiation was about.  They would

24     end up with more weapons at the end of it than they had before they

25     commenced the negotiations.

Page 885

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Are we good?

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 5        Q.   Now, the Bosnian Serb position, which was being at that time

 6     championed by Mladic, if I'm not mistaken, was not to hand over any

 7     weapons; correct?

 8        A.   That's correct.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Which was in direct contradiction with the JNA position.

10        A.   Exactly.

11        Q.   Okay.  Now, with regard to the evacuation of the barracks, the

12     barracks were ultimately evacuated somewhat successfully, and by that I

13     mean young JNA soldiers left the barracks; correct?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   And with regard to Marshal Tito barracks, during the time that

16     they were evacuated from those barracks, I take it that the agreement

17     between the parties, and the parties then being, if I'm understanding

18     correctly, the Bosnian Presidency, General Panic on behalf of his young

19     soldiers, and General Mladic on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, was that

20     these forces would be evacuated and during that period of time there

21     would be no attack upon them.

22        A.   That was the agreement and that's what, in fact, happened.

23        Q.   During the evacuation of those barracks, the Marshal Tito

24     barracks, no injuries or casualties were suffered.

25        A.   Not that I'm aware of.

Page 886

 1        Q.   And there were also other barracks that were being evacuated at

 2     the same time.  When I say "same time," I don't mean precisely the same

 3     time, but around that period of time, where there were other JNA

 4     soldiers, and is your answer the same with regard to them?  That they,

 5     too, suffered no casualties?

 6        A.   No.  On the fourth barracks to be evacuated, in the last --

 7     within the urban area of Sarajevo, there were, I believe, 30 soldiers who

 8     went missing actually during the process of leaving the barracks and

 9     arriving outside the city.  Now, what exactly happened to those people is

10     unclear.  They ran up against a position, and there was some firing that

11     took place.

12        Q.   Okay.

13        A.   They may have been killed.  They may have been taken prisoner.

14     They may have deserted.  But there was some 30 missing --

15        Q.   When you say --

16        A.   If I can finish.

17        Q.   I apologise.

18        A.   One might attribute that this operation was less than successful

19     was because of a poorly planned and executed evacuation.  They began this

20     evacuation at twilight.  With quite a large convoy and without warning

21     anybody along the route they were coming, it was almost inevitable

22     something like this would happen.

23        Q.   When you say that "it was almost inevitable something like this

24     would happen," I take it, then, what you mean by that that the forces of

25     the Bosnian Presidency in such a situation, seeing such a convoy, would

Page 887

 1     find it necessary to fire upon them, for some reasons, none of which we

 2     know about.

 3        A.   I don't know if it was Presidency forces that fired on them.  It

 4     could have been Serb forces.

 5        Q.   Oh, really?

 6        A.   It happened in the dark, and there was mass confusion.  I don't

 7     think anyone can accuse the Presidency forces of that particular

 8     incident.

 9        Q.   So in your mind, once this occurred, did this create any

10     difficulties with regard to the negotiation process that you were in for

11     further negotiations, once these young men had been fired upon by

12     whomever they had been fired upon?

13        A.   To be honest, the parties seemed to shrug their shoulders and

14     accept that it was an incident, and they moved on.

15        Q.   Okay.

16        A.   But I certainly learned a very strong lesson from it, that we

17     should insist upon a properly planned operation before we became involved

18     in it.

19        Q.   Now, with regard to the next negotiation, and if I'm

20     chronologically accurate, during that period of time you were engaged in

21     shuttle diplomacy because, in fact, the Bosnian Presidency refused to

22     negotiate with their certain Serb counter-parts; is that a fair

23     statement?

24        A.   That's true.

25        Q.   And were those Bosnian Serbs that they refused to negotiate with

Page 888

 1     or were those members of the JNA that they were refusing to negotiate

 2     with?

 3        A.   They were refusing to meet the political leadership of the

 4     Bosnian Serb organisation.

 5        Q.   I see.  That was something that was communicated, was it not, to

 6     the Bosnian Serb leadership.

 7        A.   Yes, it was, and it was an arrangement that continued on through

 8     to my time in Geneva.

 9        Q.   And with regard to their refusal to negotiate with the Bosnian

10     Serb leadership, did that, in your mind, constitute difficulties

11     concerning their stated purpose to retain a fully integrated ethnically

12     inter-twined Bosnia-Herzegovina?

13        A.   I don't know I'm competent to answer that.  I mean, it made

14     negotiating logistically more difficult, but I've got no idea what the

15     political impact was.  That's not my expertise.

16        Q.   Well you, as a matter of fact, took the position, did you not,

17     that the Bosnian Presidency stated political position was to retain a

18     fully integrated ethnically intertwined Bosnia-Herzegovina?  That was

19     clear in 1992 and subsequently all through 1993.  You've testified to

20     that, and I refer the Court and counsel to page 13052, lines 9 through

21     13.

22        A.   I'm repeating statements made to me on numerous occasions by the

23     Bosnian Serb leadership in making that statement.

24        Q.   I see.  You personally experienced, however, the reality of the

25     situation, which is that one group refused to meet with the other group.

Page 889

 1        A.   Yes, I'm aware of that.

 2        Q.   Okay.  It makes it a little difficult to come to an accord,

 3     doesn't it, if one group refuses to meet with the other group?

 4        A.   Well, physically refused to meet with them but certainly were

 5     prepared to consider the negotiating position of the other side.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Now, I'm trying to understand something, which is with

 7     regard to the airport negotiation, is it your testimony that in that

 8     regard, the demeanor that you saw between the participants was such that

 9     you determined during the negotiation for the airport that Mladic was

10     subordinate to Panic?

11        A.   That was the opinion I formed.

12        Q.   Okay.  And the difficulty that was occurring at that time was

13     that Mladic was refusing to hand over the airport; correct?

14        A.   That was his negotiating position.

15        Q.   Okay.  Now, do you recall that Karadzic took Mladic into a room

16     because of his incalcitrance, and you could hear Karadzic screaming at

17     Mladic, and after the screaming session was over, Karadzic came out and

18     said there will be no further problems.  And I'm, essentially I'm

19     paraphrasing what I understood your testimony to be, but I'm trying to

20     get to, rather than your testimony, the reality of what occurred.

21        A.   Once again, to be pedantic, I don't know the reason for Karadzic

22     taking Mladic into the other room, but yes, there was a violent

23     disagreement which you could hear through the walls of the room we were

24     in, and when they returned to the negotiations, it's true that Karadzic's

25     position prevailed.

Page 890

 1        Q.   Okay.  In that regard, Karadzic's position at that time was the

 2     precise position of Panic, which is, Let's get the airport negotiated and

 3     taken care of, and both of them were in disagreement with General Mladic,

 4     the individual who at least one party, and by that I mean Panic, had

 5     indicated some concern about, let's say, his control issues and clearly

 6     you had seen or heard -- you didn't see it, you heard that there was some

 7     need to use a fair measure of force upon the man in order to bring him to

 8     the table.

 9        A.   To the best of my recollection, Panic -- General Panic, head of

10     the JNA, was not involved in the airport negotiations at all.

11        Q.   I see.

12        A.   The military representative there was General Mladic, and I at

13     the time understood his authority extended over the JNA forces which

14     remained in the Sarajevo area and would have been, in my view, present at

15     the airport.  Panic, as I recall, was only interested in the evacuation

16     of the barracks.  The last of them was -- wrong.  He was only interested

17     in the barracks.

18        Q.   And in your conversations with General Mladic, General Mladic

19     made it very clear to you, and I think it was probably something that was

20     of importance to you in trying to determine who the players -- not only

21     who the players were but what their lines of authority were.  He made it

22     very clear to you that he was subordinate to the political leadership of

23     the Bosnian Serbs.

24        A.   Both through his statements on a number of occasions and also by

25     his demeanor, yes.

Page 891

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now, during the time that you were in Sarajevo, did you

 2     have working for you in UNPROFOR a British officer named Pyres Tucker?

 3     Does that name ring a bell?

 4        A.   The name doesn't ring a bell.

 5        Q.   Did you receive information from any UNPROFOR Canadian officers

 6     concerning indications that it was common knowledge through

 7     investigations carried out by the United Nations that Muslim forces did

 8     on occasion shell their own civilians?

 9        A.   I can't remember such a conversation.  I can remember a report

10     that was associated with the bread line attack.  It was a crater analysis

11     of where the mortars had landed which could not rule out the possibility

12     that there were potential mortar positions along the line of attack so --

13        Q.   That was an investigation that was carried out by the French;

14     correct?

15        A.   The French, yes.

16        Q.   And that was an investigation that you discussed in your

17     statement, I believe at paragraph 51 of the statement that you were

18     discussing with Mr. Harmon earlier today, that the French had done the

19     investigation and they couldn't come up with a conclusive determination

20     as to who had done that particular shelling; correct?

21        A.   That's true.

22        Q.   I see.  Did you receive information -- first of all, do you know

23     of a gentleman by the name of Richard Mole, or Mole?  I could be

24     pronouncing it incorrectly.

25        A.   A general?  I think so.  I think I know a lieutenant colonel.

Page 892

 1        Q.   Well, he may be a general now.

 2        A.   Perhaps we can talk about him, and I might recall him.

 3        Q.   He was a senior UNMO from September to December.

 4        A.   Of 1992?

 5        Q.   Yes.

 6        A.   Yes.  I know him well.

 7        Q.   Somebody you had contact with?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Did you receive any information from him that there were

10     potential incidents that occurred where the Presidency forces may well

11     have been, I don't want to say "targeting," but I'll say attacking their

12     own areas so they could assist in the view that the population of

13     Sarajevo was beleaguered and that they may well have fired upon their own

14     city?

15        A.   I don't recall such a report.

16        Q.   Okay.  Are you aware of -- it may have been after your time

17     there, are you aware of any of the opinions of, I believe, his name is

18     Michael Rose with regard -- once again, this same issue, of whether or

19     not some of these forces were, in fact -- and by that I mean the Bosnian

20     Presidency forces were, in fact -- that there had been information that

21     they were at some point firing on their own areas?

22        A.   I was well gone by the time Michael Rose appeared.

23        Q.   Okay.  Okay.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I might be of some assistance to my colleague,

25     that's information taken from the Galic trial judgement at paragraph 211.

Page 893

 1        Q.   During the time that you were in Sarajevo, were you aware of the

 2     fact that there was a tunnel that was in the control of the Presidency

 3     forces?

 4        A.   Not while I was in Sarajevo but subsequently, yes, I was aware of

 5     it.

 6        Q.   Do you know whether or not that tunnel was a tunnel that the

 7     Presidency forces allowed the civilian population to depart from or not?

 8        A.   I don't know who went through the tunnel, but I do know that the

 9     political leaders of the Presidency were able to move about when the city

10     was invested, so I presume that they may have had the opportunity to use

11     that tunnel.

12        Q.   Did you receive information in your capacity as an observer that

13     that tunnel was being used for purposes of bringing any weapons or other

14     aid and materials to the Bosnian Presidency forces?

15        A.   I'm unaware of the detail of what went through the tunnel, but I

16     think it's reasonable to assume that some sort of assistance for their

17     military action would have gone through the tunnel.

18        Q.   Okay.  Did you receive any kind of information -- what I should

19     say, really, similar information with regard to the use of the airport

20     for bringing in material supplies to the Bosnian Presidency forces?

21        A.   I would think that's highly unlikely.

22        Q.   Okay.

23        A.   A system was set up which allowed the Serbs to actually supervise

24     the detail of the cargo outside the country where it was led.  It's

25     highly unlikely that any sort of contraband like that would make it

Page 894

 1     through the airport.

 2        Q.   With regard to September of 1992, you were at that point

 3     involved, I believe, in another negotiation, were you not?

 4        A.   Yes, the evacuation of the JNA from the area surrounding

 5     Dubrovnik.

 6        Q.   And just briefly with regard to that particular negotiation, am I

 7     accurate in stating that in October 1992, the JNA unilaterally executed a

 8     well-conducted withdrawal broadly in accordance with the agreement that

 9     you had negotiated, and the Croatians, on the other hand, failed to

10     adhere to the --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Harmon.

12             MR. HARMON:  I'm going to object.  I don't see any relevance to

13     the issues in this case.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Surely.  To the extent this is a prefatory

16     question to my next question which deals with whether or not this

17     gentleman obtained information concerning the Bosnian Presidency forces

18     and the Croatian forces combining together for purposes of conflict.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  How is this question that you intend to ask

20     predicated on the previous one?

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Well, first of all, if there has been a -- if

22     there has been a violation by one of the parties to a negotiated

23     disagreement and that party then, here the Croatians, then begin to work

24     with the Bosnian Presidency for purposes of resisting their perceived

25     enemy at the time and that information is communicated to the other side

Page 895

 1     or they become aware of it, it certainly impacts on ultimate issues

 2     concerning how one views intent and notice and the reaction of the

 3     Serbian -- and by that I'm not referring to the Bosnian Serbs but the

 4     Serbian political structure in future days.  And it really deals directly

 5     with some of the issues that were raised by Mr. Harmon in his opening

 6     statement with regard to forecasting in 1992 a series of events that

 7     ultimately, as I understand his theory of prosecution, are, shall we say,

 8     that gestate through that period of time and are given birth at the point

 9     in time that our client becomes the Chief of Staff of the VJ.

10             But if that seems a too long a road to take, and in looking at

11     you, I have that sneaking suspicion it may well be, I'm willing to --

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You're welcome to interpret my body language.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you so much.  Maybe I've gotten wrapped up

14     in General Wilson in that.  I have one or two questions.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We'll allow the question.

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you so much.

17        Q.   That the Croatians, however, failed to adhere to the guidelines

18     of the agreement and subsequently invaded Serb-held territory in

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina with elements of their regular army.

20             Now, first of all, I understand that was your particular view of

21     what occurred in terms of the negotiation that you had put together;

22     correct?

23        A.   Yes, but there was never an agreement between the two parties on

24     this.

25        Q.   I see.  Did you -- did you have discussions with any members of

Page 896

 1     the Bosnian Serbs concerning this particular subsequent invasion?

 2        A.   No, only General Bobetko, General Bobetko of the Croatian forces,

 3     and a JNA general whom I can't recall his name.

 4        Q.   Okay.  And when you say "a JNA general," was that somebody you

 5     had been actively involved in in terms of these negotiation processes?

 6        A.   We had a couple of hours' discussion during this process.

 7        Q.   I take it -- and I understand you don't remember his name, but I

 8     take it that he was somewhat exercised by the fact that he had engaged

 9     in -- not he, but the JNA had engaged in a unilateral withdrawal and then

10     an area that they had withdrawn from was invaded.  He was not particular

11     pleased about it, was he?

12        A.   Well, I never saw him after he had executed the withdrawal.  But

13     I have to say that he acted in the most professional manner.  He took

14     note of what their proposal was but indicated that he would not sign any

15     bit of paper.  It would then be a point of honour to him that he didn't

16     want to be associated with the withdrawal of the JNA from territory.  But

17     when the withdrawal was executed some days later, it was done in a very

18     professional operation.

19        Q.   Now, in terms of the parties that you're dealing with, and I

20     understand that the withdrawal was done professionally, and I take it by

21     that there was no fire and no -- there were no casualties in terms of the

22     withdrawal.

23             Were these discussions that you had in terms of the success of

24     these kinds of withdrawals, were these discussions that you had with

25     Dr. Karadzic in terms of after the withdrawal was successful?

Page 897

 1        A.   No.  At that time I had no negotiation -- I had no role in

 2     negotiating with the Bosnian Serb political leadership at all.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4        A.   I was a subordinate officer working out of UNPROFOR headquarters.

 5     Those negotiations from the end of June no longer involved me and would

 6     have been carried out, more than likely, by Mr. Thornberry, the senior

 7     political officer, and perhaps General Morillon or General Mackenzie.

 8        Q.   So your duties passed into another area then, I take it?

 9        A.   Yes.  And I was used as a -- you might call it a project

10     negotiator.  When something came up that there was nobody else obvious to

11     do it, then I was invited to do that task.

12        Q.   Sounds like you were used as a closer on a fair number of

13     different occasions.

14        A.   I had been there a while.

15        Q.   You mentioned to us in your direct testimony that when asked,

16     Slobodan Milosevic indicated in one-to-one conversations that he had

17     limited influence on the other parties, and I take it by that

18     specifically the influence would be upon Dr. Karadzic or General Mladic,

19     when he said he had limited influence.

20        A.   He did make that statement from time to time.  He had a variety

21     of responses, and that was one of them.

22        Q.   And the other one that he -- that he mentioned, as I understand

23     it, was that he had no authority over these individuals.

24        A.   Well, he never at any point claimed any authority.  The question

25     was the degree of influence that he may or may not have.

Page 898

 1        Q.   Okay.  And when you're talking influence, influence is a

 2     relatively, and I'm sure it's something that you were quite familiar

 3     with, is a relatively popular tool in the world of diplomacy and

 4     negotiation, is it not?

 5        A.   Yes, it is, but it's a very broad term.

 6        Q.   Indeed so.  Indeed so.  And with regard to that term, the term of

 7     "influence," it takes into account such issues as political favors,

 8     economic issues.

 9        A.   Yes, it does.  It could also include the turning off of any aid

10     or support that might be provided, both in material or political, or

11     diplomatic sense also.

12        Q.   It could be the imposition of an embargo or the lifting of an

13     embargo.

14        A.   A water type one, yes.

15        Q.   As a matter of fact, you saw, you experienced both of the use of

16     this kind of influence by the international community with regard to the

17     general situation.  By that I mean the embargoes, whether they were

18     successful or not being an entirely different matter?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   They may have been limited influence, a great deal of influence,

21     but nevertheless you would not say that in that situation, when those

22     particular kinds of events were occurring, by that I mean international

23     embargoes, that that would be a matter of control now, would you?

24        A.   Certainly one of influence.  I'm not sure what you're implying by

25     "control."  I mean, the embargo attempts to influence, if you wish, or to

Page 899

 1     push the authorities in the former Yugoslavia in a certain direction.  It

 2     can't physically make them do it.  There's not a gun at the head.  It's a

 3     strong suggestion that this would be a good idea.

 4        Q.   With regard to the issue of the threat of bombing, which also was

 5     something that was discussed on a number of different occasions, but

 6     during your tenure in Sarajevo, that was another example of what we call

 7     influence, which is, Listen, if you don't come up to the table and start

 8     doing what we believe is appropriate - and once again, I'm not putting

 9     value judgements on any of these things - there is this option that you

10     may be bombed.

11        A.   Yes, it's a threat.

12        Q.   It's a threat.

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Now, that particular threat was a threat, as I recall it, that

15     was the same threat that Mladic engaged in in the paragraph that you were

16     so kind to discuss with Mr. Harmon, in which he says, if I understand,

17     basically, If you bomb us, then we're going to -- or I'm going to shell

18     Sarajevo.  Right?

19        A.   Yes.  General Mladic is very believable.  I mean, he had -- his

20     very recent actions in the two weeks before that made such a threat very

21     believable.  Another characteristic of General Mladic was generally what

22     he said he'd do, he did it.  Whether he liked the consequences is another

23     matter, but he was a man of his word.

24        Q.   Sure.  And in the context of the negotiations that you were going

25     through and that you were privy to, one of the things that you always had

Page 900

 1     to gauge was exactly what you just mentioned, which is when the party

 2     says something, are they going to follow through?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   And that's something that is being done by all of the parties

 5     with regard to these negotiations, whether they be in peace, but more

 6     specifically when these negotiations are occurring in a war setting.

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And --

 9        A.   And I might say that General Mladic, with 200 pieces of artillery

10     surrounding a city, is a more credible threat than a rather vague threat

11     done through the international media that air attacks might under certain

12     circumstances be launched.

13        Q.   Well, that was a threat that just took a long time for NATO to

14     get to the point of when they made the determination to do that.  But

15     when they decided to pull the trigger, they pulled the trigger.

16        A.   But at the time that paragraph was drafted, Mladic was more

17     incredible than the international air threat.

18        Q.   In your estimation?

19        A.   In my estimation.

20        Q.   Okay.  Did others share your view in that regard?

21        A.   I don't know what I was told.  I'm sorry.

22        Q.   Do you know whether or not the information with regard to

23     international bombing of that region, whether the information was

24     communicated throughout Bosnia and in Belgrade?  Did you tell, for

25     example, Milosevic this?

Page 901

 1        A.   No.  I had no contact with Mr. Milosevic --

 2        Q.   Do you know whether others discussed this with Mr. Milosevic?

 3        A.   I don't know.  I wasn't present.

 4        Q.   Were you involved in any discussions where the issue of how

 5     Milosevic would respond to the notion that NATO or the international

 6     community was going to bomb Belgrade?

 7        A.   I was certainly aware and received cable traffic that there was

 8     support from the -- from President Milosevic in regard to opening the

 9     airport.

10        Q.   He didn't want to get bombed, did he?

11        A.   I don't know why he said that.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I could have a moment.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

14                           [Defence counsel confer]

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:

16        Q.   One final question, which is surrounding Sarajevo there are a

17     number of high points; correct?

18        A.   There are.

19        Q.   And one of them is, I believe, an area called Mount Igman?

20        A.   Yes, although I'm unaware of its exact location.

21        Q.   During your tenure in Sarajevo was Mount Igman under the control

22     of the Bosnian Presidency forces?

23        A.   Mount Igman came to my attention in 1993 during the negotiations

24     in the Geneva, and my understanding was that the Presidency forces had

25     carried out some military operation which resulted in the capture of that

Page 902

 1     feature.  There had been a counter-attack, a successful counter-attack,

 2     by the Bosnian Serb forces who had cleared the Presidency of that

 3     position, and that to allow the negotiations to proceed, a UN force was

 4     placed on the mountain and the opposing forces, the Presidency and the

 5     Serb forces, withdrew from that area.  It was a sort of demilitarization

 6     process.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Wilson, what do you mean, at page 66, line 12,

 9     by "cleared the Presidency" of that position?

10             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry, sir, I don't have the document in front

11     of me.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  No, page 66 on your screen.  On your screen, line

13     12, you said:

14             "There had been a counter-attack, a successful counter-attack, by

15     the Bosnian Serb forces who had cleared the Presidency of that position."

16             THE WITNESS:  I meant to say there, Your Honour, the Presidency

17     military forces.  The Bosnian Serb military forces through a

18     counter-attack had driven the Presidency military forces, the Muslim

19     forces, away from the objective that they had recently captured.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:

22        Q.   And to your recollection, was Mount Igman then turned over to

23     UNPROFOR forces by Serbian forces or by the Bosnian Presidency forces?

24        A.   I understand by Serbian forces.

25        Q.   I see.  Okay.  Thank you, General.

Page 903

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 2             Mr. Harmon, any re-examination?

 3             MR. HARMON:  Yes.

 4                           Re-examination by Mr. Harmon:

 5        Q.   I have a question just on one point, General Wilson.  My

 6     colleague referred to a portion of your previous testimony Exhibit 142,

 7     the transcript of you previous evidence on the 17th of May, 2005, in

 8     which part of your answer reads as follows:

 9              "I raised those issues."  "Was there some concern from the JNA

10     representatives at the barracks negotiation that Mladic was out of

11     control and acting independently and irrationally?"

12             So my question is there was some concern of JNA representatives.

13     Which representatives expressed that concern?

14        A.   That would have been General Boskovic, who was at that stage

15     leading the negotiations, and also Colonel Kardelj, I think his name was.

16     He was the JNA liaison officer to UNPROFOR and was participating also in

17     the negotiations.

18        Q.   So at page 54 of the transcript, when my colleague asked you:

19     "Did General Panic express concern about control issues over Mladic," and

20     you essentially said yes, do you wish to clarify that answer that you

21     gave?

22        A.   Then I've given an incorrect answer.  The only disagreement that

23     I recall between General Panic and General Mladic was over the issue of

24     weapons in terms of the barracks negotiations.

25        Q.   And so to clarify the question and answer, General Panic was not

Page 904

 1     one of those individuals from the JNA who expressed concern about control

 2     issues over Mladic.

 3        A.   No.  And to my knowledge, General Panic did not talk to General

 4     Mladic about his conduct of, say, artillery attacks on the city, and if

 5     he had, I wouldn't have understood it because I don't speak the language.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much.

 7             MR. HARMON:  I have no further questions.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon.

 9                           Questioned by the Court:

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Just one question.  Did you testify in the Galic

11     case.

12        A.   No, Your Honour.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

14             Any questions arising from the questions from the Bench?

15             MR. HARMON:  No, Your Honour.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith?

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:  None, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Wilson, thank you very much for coming to

19     testify.  This brings us to the end of your testimony.  You are now

20     excused.  You may stand down.  And travel well back home.

21                           [The witness withdrew]

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Harmon.

23             MR. HARMON:  Ms. Sutherland will lead the next witness, who is an

24     expert witness, Patrick Treanor, Your Honour.  If we can have a few

25     minutes to readjust.

Page 905

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Indeed, you do.

 2             MR. HARMON:  Thank you.

 3                           [The witness entered court]

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good afternoon, Mr. Treanor.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  May the witness please make the declaration.

 7             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 8     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  You may be seated.

10             Madam Sutherland.

11                           WITNESS:  PATRICK TREANOR

12                           Examination by Ms. Sutherland:

13        Q.   Mr. Treanor, can you state your full name and date of birth for

14     the record.

15        A.   My name is Patrick Joseph Treanor.  I was born on 14 February

16     1947.

17        Q.   Before I deal briefly with your academic qualifications and your

18     relevant work experience, I just want to remind you that as we both speak

19     the same language, we need to remember to pause between questions and

20     answers.

21        A.   Yes, thank you.

22        Q.   Mr. Treanor, you received a Bachelor of Arts degree in modern

23     languages from the College of the Holy Cross in Massachusetts, USA, in

24     1968; correct?

25        A.   That's correct.

Page 906

 1        Q.   You received a Masters degree in Russian and Eastern European

 2     studies in 1970 from the Yale University Graduate School in Connecticut,

 3     in the United States?

 4        A.   That is correct.

 5        Q.   You received a Doctor of Philosophy from the University of London

 6     in the United Kingdom in 1999 after completing a course of study at the

 7     School of Slavonic and East European Studies in Bulgarian history.

 8        A.   That is correct.

 9        Q.   And having said that, receiving the doctorate, you would prefer

10     in these proceedings to be referred to as Mr. Treanor; is that correct?

11        A.   That's also correct.

12        Q.   You began your professional career as an intelligence analyst in

13     the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress in 1977 until

14     1980, and that work involved analysis of Yugoslav military and related

15     affairs; correct?

16        A.   That's correct.

17        Q.   In late 1980 you began work as a historian and later senior

18     historian in the Office of Special Investigations of the US Department of

19     Justice, until 1994.

20        A.   That is correct.

21        Q.   During that time you assisted in the investigation and litigation

22     of cases of alleged Nazi war criminals living in the USA, and your

23     responsibility centered on the identification, research, and analysis of

24     wartime and post-war documentation, including Yugoslav documents;

25     correct?

Page 907

 1        A.   That's correct.

 2        Q.   The work involved planning and carrying out independent

 3     investigative research at archives in several countries in North America,

 4     Europe, and the Middle East.

 5        A.   That is right.

 6        Q.   From July 1994 to the present, you've been engaged first as a

 7     research officer for the Office of the Prosecutor and subsequently as

 8     Head of the Legal Research Team and Senior Research Officer, a post you

 9     assumed in February 1998?

10        A.   The name of the team is the Leadership Research Team.  Yes, I

11     became the head of that team in 1998.  I became the acting head at the

12     end of 1997.

13        Q.   And in that position you conducted your own research and

14     supervised the research efforts of others on your team?

15        A.   That is right.

16        Q.   That work primarily involved the collection and analysis of

17     original documentary and published materials relating to the organisation

18     and activities of the various parties involved in the conflict in the

19     former Yugoslavia, and more specifically to the Serb and Bosnian Serb

20     governmental organs and the SDS?

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers please slow down for the

22     purposes of the interpretation.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Could you please slow down, Madam Sutherland.

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

25             MS. SUTHERLAND:  My apologies to the interpreters.

Page 908

 1        Q.   The materials included the records of governments, political

 2     parties, and military units --

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I've been somewhat patient, obviously, because I

 5     understand the intent to get some information out of the way, but I think

 6     at this point, it may be of some importance for the witness to testify as

 7     opposed to answer yes-or-no questions, as regards to what he did.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Sutherland.

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:

10        Q.   Mr. Treanor, what materials did you review -- have you reviewed

11     over the last 14 years?

12        A.   Well, over the last 14 years, I've been involved in the

13     collection of documents in the region of the former Yugoslavia, which

14     involves reviewing documents in situ.  I've also reviewed documents that

15     were collected by other OTP staff, either in the region itself or via

16     request for assistance from authorities in the region.

17             The types of documents that I've reviewed fall into several

18     categories.  I'll just name them.  One category would be what we call

19     open sources, that is, newspapers and magazines from the region of the

20     former Yugoslavia.  We have made a systematic effort over the years to

21     collect as many newspapers and magazines published in the region during

22     the periods of the conflict and the years before and indeed after.  We

23     now have a collection of some 31.000 separate issues of newspapers and

24     magazines.  We also made -- we have also made an effort to collect the

25     Official Gazettes of the various entities in the former Yugoslavia.  I

Page 909

 1     think we have complete -- or at least almost complete sets of the

 2     Official Gazettes of all the entities in the former Yugoslavia for the

 3     period of the conflicts there, and by "the conflicts," I mean the period

 4     from, say, 1991 to 1995, as well as for some periods -- years before

 5     those dates and after those dates.

 6             Our original documentation includes records of political parties,

 7     records of governments, and military records.  The type of records that I

 8     particularly work with would include documents such as minutes of

 9     meetings, transcripts of meetings, orders, decisions, correspondence.

10     I've also reviewed numerous, if I can use the term, "intercepted

11     communications" between members of various parties to the conflicts

12     there.  Those would be conversations that were intercepted by another

13     party to the conflict and have been made available to OTP in various

14     fashions.

15             I think that about covers it, in general terms.

16        Q.   As team leader of the LRT, is it common practice to supervise the

17     production of reports for investigations and trial teams?

18        A.   Yes.  A part of my duties is to -- certainly to assist my staff

19     in doing their research, guiding them to appropriate collections of

20     documents, for instance, and to review their work product, as well as to

21     prepare my own analyses, which would also include incorporating analyses

22     which had been made by other members of the team into a joint -- into a

23     joint product.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Sutherland, would that be a convenient time?

25             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.

Page 910

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We'll take a break and come back at a quarter to

 2     6.00.  Court adjourned.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 5.16 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 5.45 p.m.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Madam Sutherland.

 6             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 7        Q.   Mr. Treanor, what's your proficiency in the language that's

 8     commonly referred to as Serbo-Croat?

 9        A.   I have a very good reading knowledge of the language.  I can

10     conduct rudimentary conversation, certainly, and understand it fairly

11     well.

12   Q.   You testified before this Tribunal previously, once in the Brdjanin case

13   in July and October 2003 and then in the Krajisnik case in February 2004; is

14     that correct?

15        A.   I believe those dates are correct, yes.

16        Q.   In preparation for and in support of that testimony, did you

17     prepare some reports that were subsequently tendered into evidence in

18     those cases?

19        A.   Yes.  I think there was one report for the Brdjanin case and

20     another report for the Krajisnik case.  Each of those reports was

21     submitted under my name; however, other individuals worked in the

22     preparation as well.

23        Q.   And you prepared for this case, did you not, the report entitled

24     "the Belgrade leadership and the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia 1990 to

25     1995," which is dated the 1st of September, 2008?

Page 911

 1        A.   Yes, that's the latest version.

 2        Q.   That report describes several aspects in the breakup of the SFRY

 3     in the years 1990 to 1995, and it concerns in particular the goals of the

 4     Serbian leaders during this process and the state structures they sought

 5     to create for the Serbian people in pursuit of those goals; does it not?

 6        A.   Yes --

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm going to object as leading.  It also calls

10     for a series of conclusions which the report may or may not actually

11     define, and I would ask once again that the gentleman answer questions

12     and develop his testimony as apart to having the Prosecution testify and

13     having him answer yes or no.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Ms. Sutherland.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, that sentence was contained in the

16     in the introduction to the report, and I was clearly just summarising

17     what the report was about before we got into particular questions about

18     the aim of the report to which Mr. Treanor would be answering the

19     questions to.  So that was my last question on that matter.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, but may you put questions, please, to

21     Mr. Treanor, and let him answer and testify.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Thank you.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Would the Registry please call up 00646.01.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You said 066 or 006?

Page 912

 1             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I understood the number to be 06646.01, Your

 2     Honour.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 5        Q.   Mr. Treanor, do you recognize that this is the report that you

 6     prepared?

 7        A.   Yes, I do.

 8        Q.   What is the aim of the report?

 9        A.   Well, in the report I describe within the context of the

10     dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which

11     I'll refer to as the SFRY, the goals that were adopted by the Serbian

12     leadership within that process.  The Serbian leadership is a group which

13     I define as those persons holding the highest level, civilian and

14     military positions within Serbia; the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the

15     FRY; the Republic of Serbian Krajina, the RSK; and Republika Srpska, the

16     RS.

17             I describe in particular the developments of those entities,

18     again within the context of the dissolution of the former SFRY with the

19     focus on the goals that those leaders had set for themselves.

20        Q.   Can you provide the Court with some understanding of the nature

21     of the documents that are cited in that report and upon which you relied,

22     further issues you focused on and the conclusions you drew?

23        A.   Yes.  The types of documents I use in the report are the type

24     that I described at the beginning of my testimony as the type of

25     documents I generally work with.  They are official documents of the

Page 913

 1     various Serbian entities, documents such as minutes and transcripts of

 2     meetings, laws, decisions, constitutions.  There are also some press

 3     items that are used.  Those are -- typically are the, say, speeches of

 4     leaders that were given on particular occasions and published in the

 5     press.  I also use some UN documents, such as UN Security Council

 6     resolutions, presidential statements, and -- I think those are the main

 7     categories of documents.

 8        Q.   What methodology did you use in the criteria, what criteria were

 9     chosen by you in reviewing and selecting these documents?

10        A.   Well, let me answer that question by saying that -- going back to

11     the fact that I've been engaged in collecting and reviewing documents

12     from the former Yugoslavia for almost 15 years -- over 14 years.  In the

13     course of that process, I have personally made an effort, and others in

14     OTP have made an effort, to systematically collect various categories of

15     documents.  I mentioned earlier the open sources of the press, for

16     instance, Official Gazettes.  But more importantly, I think, for this

17     case we have categories of documents, such as the records of various

18     types of meetings.

19             So I've made it my business to collect and review, for instance,

20     all the records of meetings of the Bosnian Serb Presidency, as the

21     Presidency of Republika Srpska; all the records of meetings of the

22     Bosnian Serb assembly; the records of meetings of the FRY's Supreme

23     Defence Council, the SDC.  So there are whole categories of documents

24     which I have reviewed and made notes or summaries of, and that material

25     is part of my tool bag, if you will.  When I'm asked to produce a report,

Page 914

 1     I go into my collection of summaries and notes on documents, most of

 2     which are embodied in a CaseMap format.  Our team has its own CaseMap.  I

 3     put many of the documents in there myself and other people put things

 4     there as well under my direction.  So I have all that available to me

 5     when dealing with a specific request for a report.  So that material is

 6     pre-existing, if you will.

 7             When I get a request for a report such as this one, I then go

 8     into that body of material and review items that I -- that I think --

 9     review and select items that I think may be relevant to the subject, to

10     the report.  The report, of course -- writing a report of this nature

11     takes place within the context of certain constraints, the most important

12     being time and space.  Ordinarily, the trial team wants it pretty fast

13     and also wants to keep it short, concise, for the benefit of the Trial

14     Chamber.

15             So within the -- within the framework of the type of material

16     that I've been describing, which is based on a systematic review of

17     various categories of documents from the region, I produced this report.

18             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honours, in keeping with your order of the

19     27th of October, I will, at the completion of Mr. Treanor's testimony, be

20     seeking to tender his CV, the report, and the documents that are cited in

21     that report.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Madam Sutherland, but I'm not

23     quite sure that your question has been answered.  Your question was

24     specifically what methodology was being used and what criteria were used.

25     We've been told, for instance, "that I think for this case we have

Page 915

 1     categories of documents, such as the records of various types of

 2     meetings."  Now, on what criteria do we choose some and not others, and

 3     how do we determine relevance?

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 5        Q.   Mr. Treanor?

 6        A.   Well, the categories of documents that I have reviewed include

 7     the records that we have available in OTP, and again they become

 8     available after efforts to obtain them for, for instance, the highest

 9     level policy-making bodies of the entities in the former Yugoslavia and

10     some of the political parties.

11             So in the case of this report, particularly important are the

12     records of the Presidency of the SFRY, the records of the assembly of the

13     Republika Srpska, the Official Gazettes of the FRY --

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm sorry to interrupt you.  You've told us that,

15     sir.  The question is:  What criteria do you use to pick on certain types

16     of records and not others?  You said, as I said earlier, "for this case

17     we have categories of documents such as the records of various types of

18     meetings," and a little later you said you pick them on the basis of

19     relevance.  The question is:  How do you determine relevance and how do

20     you -- what criteria do you use to pick on certain documents and not

21     others?

22             THE WITNESS:  Let me clarify that.  I have, as I say, available

23     to me these various collections of records, and I select from those

24     various collections those portions of individual records which, in my

25     judgement, are relevant to the topic in the report.

Page 916

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  On what criteria is your judgement based, sir?

 2             THE WITNESS:  Well, my judgement is based on my knowledge of the

 3     subjects and my -- my personal judgement as to whether a particular item

 4     is relevant to the topic that I was requested to produce a report on.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, but, you see, you're testifying as an expert.

 6     As an expert we expect that you have certain expertise, certain

 7     principles within your area of expertise that guide you in making your

 8     selection.  I'm trying to find out what those are.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Right.  Well, I'm a historian by profession, and we

10     don't use a -- some sort of numerical or --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's the --

12             THE WITNESS:  -- analytical framework of that sort.  It's based

13     on the judgement of the individual researcher as to what is "relevant."

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Indeed.  That's the problem, sir, because then it

15     may very well be that you left certain documents that are relevant and

16     brought in documents that are not relevant if you don't have a system of

17     doing things, and this is the problem.  And if you say you don't use some

18     sort of -- well, the sentence is incomplete.  Then the question becomes:

19     How do we take this report as an expert report?  Because if you say

20     you're a historian, anybody can write history, is that what you're

21     saying, and pick up facts that he wants to pick up, based on his personal

22     judgement?

23             THE WITNESS:  Well, training for a historian involves doing

24     research and producing an analytical product, and extensive analytical

25     product, usually referred to as a thesis or a dissertation on a

Page 917

 1     particular topic, and that product of thesis or dissertation on a

 2     particular topic.  And that product of thesis or dissertation is reviewed

 3     by usually senior people in the field, and they pass judgement on it.

 4     There is, as I said, there is no mathematical key to how you select

 5     documents.  It's a judgemental question, and one develops one's judgement

 6     in this field by, A, reading history and, B, doing research.

 7             JUDGE DAVID:  Mr. Treanor, are there any objective structures in

 8     the report constituted by the historical and factual data, and have you

 9     used a course of discretion in selecting certain facts from others?

10     Because I imagine that there is no historical work without at least some

11     hypothetical presumptions that later on are verified on the facts, which

12     is to say that there is no history without some degree of subjectivity,

13     but at the same time that history should not be purely arbitrarily

14     impersonal.  Is the subjectivity based on the selection of the most

15     relevant facts in relation to some hypothetical lines of thinking that

16     are expressed in the conclusions of the report?

17             I don't know if I am confusing you or clarifying the situation,

18     because I believe that in any historical report, there are always some

19     degree of subjectivity, but it's not the subjectivity that is purely

20     personal of the researcher but a subjectivity that consists of selecting

21     certain paths of thinking according to the general overall perspective of

22     the situation.  Is that your case?

23             THE WITNESS:  I think you might have helped a bit, Your Honour.

24     As a general matter, I would say that that is the case.  As you've

25     stated, there is always an element of subjectivity or even ideological

Page 918

 1     approach that each person is imbued with when they approach particular

 2     material and seek to analyse it.

 3             Perhaps it would assist if I note -- if I noted the following:

 4     In tracing the developments of the various entities that I mentioned, I

 5     sought to do that - again, I sought to do that; perhaps I didn't succeed

 6     - in a uniform fashion by picking the same types of documents from each

 7     entity which chronicle their development from the beginning of some sort

 8     of declaration to the establishment of an autonomous area to the

 9     establishment of a republic.  What does the constitution say about what

10     the organs of that power will be?  Who occupied the offices?  Again, I

11     attempted to do that for each of the entities that I was describing.

12             JUDGE DAVID:  There is in paragraph 4 of the introduction:  The

13     focus, you said, is rather on the goals of the Serbian leaders and the

14     extent to which they achieve them.  The facts recorded thus do not by any

15     means represent the whole history of the conflict of the region, but

16     there will be essential elements in any such telling."

17             So you have started already saying what are the objectives of the

18     research, the goals of the research.  This goal was given to you by the

19     Prosecution or --

20             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.

21             JUDGE DAVID:  -- or were you free in the selection of the goals?

22             THE WITNESS:  The Prosecution asked for a report on a -- of a

23     particular nature, and that's what I've described in the introduction.

24             JUDGE DAVID:  So we must say that your research is not absolutely

25     personally value-free because you have been given a task to comply with

Page 919

 1     in the sense that you have been given a purpose and a task, some

 2     objectives.  Now, the important point is that you have rendered, to the

 3     extent of your knowledge, with methodology, tools, and so on, the best

 4     product that you were able to achieve.  Are you sure that this is the

 5     best you could -- that you could have achieved in producing the

 6     prescribed goals?

 7             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  I mean, the task was set by the trial team

 8     and within the framework of that task, I was free to do whatever I wanted

 9     to, basically.  Could I have produced a better product?  Given more time

10     and more space, it would have been more complete and much longer.  But I

11     think that the main outlines of the topic are in the report.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Did you say the task was given by the Trial

13     Chamber?

14             THE WITNESS:  No, by the trial team.  I'm sorry, I may have

15     misspoken.  The trial team.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Trial team.

17             JUDGE DAVID:  Thank you.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry, I'm going to pick up something now that was

19     said in answer to Judge David's questions.

20             You say:  "As you have stated, there is always an element of

21     subjectivity or even ideological approach that each person is imbued with

22     when they approach particular material and seek to analyse it."

23             Were you driven by that in compiling your report?

24             THE WITNESS:  Well, I think that based on the theoretical

25     literature on this topic with which I have some familiarity, although not

Page 920

 1     a deep one, I'm told that, as Judge David was saying, that everyone sort

 2     of has some sort of bias or another, and then they may not realize it.  I

 3     mean, I'm from the United States.  It's a liberal democracy.  We believe

 4     in equal rights in the United States and the equality of all its

 5     citizens, et cetera, et cetera, so that's the -- something that I suppose

 6     will affect my approach to anything, as opposed to somebody who, for

 7     instance, might have come from the former Soviet Union and believed in --

 8     was a Marxist, et cetera, et cetera.  So that type of bias operates

 9     subconsciously or unconsciously.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I don't understand your reference to the

11     United States and Russia.  My question to you was:  Were you driven by

12     that subjectivity and ideological approach in compiling this report?

13             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, I was trying to describe what my

14     ideology is.  That was my reference to the United States.  That

15     informs --

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And how did you apply that ideology in the

17     compilation of this report?

18             THE WITNESS:  As I indicated, I think that that type of thing is

19     generally -- operates subconsciously or unconsciously.  I couldn't say

20     how I consciously applied it.  Someone else who has a different -- from a

21     different ideological background may have approached this in an entirely

22     different way.

23             JUDGE DAVID:  Mr. Treanor, in addition, just because of your

24     answer, there is no question that every work of history or in the social

25     sciences is surrounded by implicit ideological options, but one thing are

Page 921

 1     the ideological options, and the second thing are the strict structure of

 2     an objective research.  You have obtained a Ph.D. in a US university, or

 3     in any other university, and certainly your masters will have a

 4     structure, your research, in such a way that you will maximize the

 5     objective in parenthesis of the factual data and of the interpretation of

 6     the data in order to get it purer from obscure ideological connotations,

 7     implying that certainly values are there in any thinking.  Are you

 8     following me?

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE DAVID:  And so you might have some options from what part

11     of the world you come, but there is a universal set of rules concerning

12     the minimal standards of a scientific objective piece.  Are you

13     following?  Are you in agreement with this?

14             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

15             JUDGE DAVID:  And my question is to you:  Despite this

16     ideological bending that anyone from various part of the world has, are

17     you convinced that you have insisted upon the most extreme objectivity on

18     factual -- on factual data and underlining interpretations?

19             THE WITNESS:  Well, yes, I believe that's true, and let me give

20     an explanation to that directly related to the report.

21             The report is based on certain documents, which I've mentioned,

22     and the -- each paragraph is referenced to a particular document and

23     generally each paragraph is a description or a summary or an extract from

24     the contents of that document.  I sought to make no -- draw no

25     interpretive conclusions from any document or any set of those documents.

Page 922

 1     In other words, just -- I sought to simply lay out in a string, if you

 2     will, usually chronologically in each section, what the contents of each

 3     document that would be important to consider in the context of this

 4     report, what that document says, again without drawing any conclusions of

 5     my own or putting any interpretation on them.

 6             Now, it's given, of course, that I selected the documents based

 7     on my judgement, and I selected the portions of the documents that I

 8     wanted to use, and I'm the one that is responsible for the -- for the

 9     summaries of the documents, but -- as opposed to a standard work of

10     historical research where the historian will feel free, indeed feel

11     compelled, to make various interpretations and judgements.  I sought to

12     refrain from that.

13             JUDGE DAVID:  Thank you very much.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Madam Sutherland.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:

16        Q.   Mr. Treanor, for the purposes of your testimony, you also

17     selected a number of documents to assist the Court in understanding your

18     report; is that right?

19        A.   Yes, I selected a number of documents that were not cited in the

20     reports that I thought might also be useful.  Again, when I wrote the

21     report, there were certain constraints of time and space in producing it

22     for the purposes of this testimony.  Of course, we're not going to use

23     nearly all the documents that are cited in the report, so I thought it

24     might be beneficial to introduce some new ones which would shed

25     additional light on some of the matters raised in the report.

Page 923

 1             MS. SUTHERLAND:  With Your Honours' leave, Mr. Treanor has

 2     binders of documents in front of him which have the B/C/S versions of the

 3     documents, and I would seek Your Honours' leave that he be allowed to

 4     refer to those.  I have shown them to my colleague Mr. Gregor Guy-Smith,

 5     so he has reviewed those binders.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That is correct.  I have reviewed the binders.  I

 8     do have a question, however, with regard to the issue of the

 9     interpretation and translation of that material.  As I understand what

10     we're about to do is that Mr. Treanor, who has some proficiency in

11     reading the language, is, I take it, going to be commenting and

12     translating, he's going to be performing the function of a translator and

13     potentially an interpreter - and I make a distinction as between the two,

14     for obvious reasons - with regard to source documents themselves which I

15     think, quite frankly, poses a problem.  Because if we do not have

16     official interpretations of those documents, something which all parties

17     can rely upon, and I don't know whether or not Mr. Treanor has had the

18     opportunity to take the proficiency examination of an interpreter or

19     translator, such that there is a common basis for his understanding of

20     the language and the subtleties of the language specifically as it deals

21     with matters before the Tribunal and any kind of legal issues that could

22     occur, I believe that we may run into a rather unfortunate problem with

23     regard to the issue of translation as well as interpretation with regard

24     to the content of those documents upon which he relies, which he wishes

25     to share with the Chamber.

Page 924

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Sutherland.

 2             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Mr. Treanor is going to give his opinion on the

 3     documents.  The documents are going to come in e-court.  There's a

 4     translation there, and there's also the B/C/S version.  In order to

 5     assist him, he has the documents, the B/C/S version of the documents, in

 6     front of him so that he can go to those documents in order to give his

 7     opinion to whatever question I may put to him.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And you say there's an official translation of the

 9     documents that you are going to show him here?

10             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, the Rule 65 ter translations so there is --

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Then I'm not bothered.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  To the extent -- to the extent that there may

14     be -- we'll see how this progresses.  There may be a distinction between

15     what Mr. Treanor believes the document says and what the official

16     translation presents could be an entirely different issue.  But for the

17     moment I think we'll be okay.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Based upon the specific methodology, and I'm

20     pleased of hear of a methodology that we're going to be using.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You may proceed, Madam Sutherland.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:

23        Q.   Mr. Treanor, can we begin then by discussing the documents you

24     selected, and perhaps we can begin with the speech of the President of

25     the Presidency of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, in the Republic of Serbian

Page 925

 1     Assembly on the 26th of June, 1990.

 2             MS. SUTHERLAND:  And if document number 06812 could be brought up

 3     onto the screen, please.  In the B/C/S it's page number 1, and in the

 4     English translation it's on page number 3.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Sutherland, did you say 06813 or 2?

 6             MS. SUTHERLAND:  06812, Your Honour.

 7        Q.   Perhaps you could start, Mr. Treanor, by just putting briefly

 8     that speech into context.

 9        A.   Yes, certainly.  This speech was given in June 1990, as has been

10     mentioned.  At that time the process of the dissolution of the SFRY was

11     progressing to the extent that at the beginning of 1990, the ruling party

12     of the SFRY, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, essentially

13     dissolved.  Yugoslavia had been a one-party state until that time.

14             After the -- indeed, in some cases before the dissolution of the

15     League of Communists of Yugoslavia, non-communist parties were formed in

16     the various republics of the SFRY, and those parties, and indeed some

17     members of the League of Communists in the various republics, raised the

18     demand for multi-party elections, which hitherto had not taken place in

19     the SFRY.  Such elections had taken place in Slovenia and Croatia in the

20     spring of 1990, in April, and those elections resulted in the victory of

21     non-communist parties in those republics; that is, non-communist parties

22     elected the majority of members of the assemblies of those republics.

23             Now, in Serbia a similar process was beginning.  Non-communist

24     parties were in the course of being formed in the summer of 1990, and

25     they were raising the demand that multi-party elections be held in Serbia

Page 926

 1     also.  The ruling party in Serbia, the League of Communists of Serbia,

 2     was willing to accede to that but first they wanted to amend -- adopt a

 3     new constitution for Serbia before the elections were held so that the

 4     elections would be held under the new constitution and the elections

 5     would be for the bodies that were set up by the new constitution and with

 6     the authorities established in the new constitution.

 7             This speech is given by Slobodan Milosevic, who was the President

 8     of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia to the Serbian

 9     assembly in connection with the adoption of a new constitution.  The

10     situation in June in that respect was that the League of Communists of

11     Serbia was proposing that a referendum be held in Serbia on the issue of

12     whether the new constitution should be adopted before the elections or

13     after the elections.  That referendum, in fact, was held at the end of

14     July and resulted in --

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  We certainly are past the month of June when the

16     speech was given, and his answer was to put the speech in context.

17     Anything then after the speech certainly doesn't give us any context.

18             I also think that there's another difficulty here in the answer

19     to the extent we're talking about putting the speech in context, which

20     is, and I'm referring to line 90, where it indicates -- I'm sorry,

21     page 90, line 2, where Mr. Treanor indicates "the ruling party in Serbia,

22     the League of Communists of Serbia, was willing to accede to that, but

23     first they wanted to ..." and then he discusses amending the

24     constitution.  But later on he indicates, and that's on page 90, at line

25     12 and 13 -- starting at line 10, that "the situation in June in that

Page 927

 1     respect was that the League of Communists in Serbia was proposing that a

 2     referendum be held on the issue of whether the new constitution be

 3     adopted."

 4             So I'm not sure whether or not he's speaking from a standpoint of

 5     contextually of, in fact, what was occurring with the League of

 6     Communists at that time.  And rather than go through, I think, a rather

 7     arduous or torturous process of cross-examination with this kind of

 8     particular detail, since he is, for purposes of discussion, dealing with

 9     the context of a speech, I would appreciate it if rather than put value -

10     which is what he's doing now, he's making subjective value judgements

11     with regard to what was occurring - he gives us the context, meaning the

12     factual information, that was present at the time, which he obviously

13     received from those documents that he specifically chose.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Sutherland.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, the referendum is part of the

16     context of the speech.

17        Q.   If I can ask Mr. Treanor, can you tell the Court what Belgrade's

18     position was to the breakup of the SFRY?

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sorry.

20             THE WITNESS:  I think we can go to the speech now.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You have been asked a question now.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, he's going to answer the question in

23     relation to that.

24             THE WITNESS:  In the speech Slobodan Milosevic sets out certain

25     positions in regard to the issue of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia,

Page 928

 1     which is -- forms the subject of the passages that we've selected to --

 2     I've selected to focus on here.  I'm not sure how to direct you to the

 3     proper --

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 5        Q.   If we can blow up what is on the second column, above the bullet

 6     point in the B/C/S, and then on page 3 of the English translation,

 7     starting with the text "That is why this draft on the constitution of

 8     Serbia has been prepared ..."

 9        A.   The portion I would like to focus on is further down in this

10     column, toward the bottom, in which Slobodan Milosevic notes that

11     basically that if the SFRY were to be changed into a confederation as

12     opposed to a federation, then the issue of the borders of the republics

13     of the federation would be opened.  He says that he does not consider a

14     confederation to be a state and that therefore the borders of the

15     republics cannot be changed into -- cannot remain as borders if the

16     federation were to cease to be a federation and become a confederation.

17        Q.   And --

18        A.   And he concludes in the next column by saying that if that were

19     to happen, the question of the borders of Serbia would then become an

20     open political question.

21        Q.   And that's on page 4 of the transcript -- the English

22     translation, I'm sorry.

23             Did the idea of assisting Serbs outside of Serbia find any

24     additional expression at that time?

25        A.   Well, it finds expression elsewhere in this document.  If we can

Page 929

 1     move over to the next column, the last column on the extreme right, and

 2     blow that up.

 3             In that portion he notes that the -- the Serbia that will be

 4     established under the new constitution, which will be a unitary state, a

 5     unitary state of Serbia, meaning that it will -- the government of Serbia

 6     will have power throughout the territory of Serbia, whereas previously

 7     there had been two autonomous provinces in Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina,

 8     which had extensive powers.  Those have been eliminated -- actually, they

 9     had been eliminated by constitutional amendment previously, and that

10     situation would be enshrined in the new constitution as well.  He says

11     that this new unitary Serbia will be in a position to defend the

12     interests of Serbs outside of Serbia.

13        Q.   And does this idea of --

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, I don't know whether at this point,

15     and this is whether or not Mr. Treanor is reading from the original as he

16     interprets it, but if I'm following his response, he is referring to the

17     second full sentence which I read in English as not that this new unitary

18     Serbia will be in a position to defend the position to defend the

19     interests of Serbs outside of Serbia, but rather that Serbia will at the

20     same time be certain guarantee for protection of the interests of Serbian

21     people who live out of Serbia.  And that's quite a different statement

22     from that which Mr. Treanor has suggested.  I don't know if that's

23     occurred because he was reading from the document as he interprets it or

24     whether or not he is being now liberal with the language of

25     Mr. Milosevic's speech.  But I think it's kind of important that with

Page 930

 1     regard to the road that we're going down, that we are quite accurate and

 2     that we rely upon here the translation as it is set forth, because

 3     certainly a position to defend the interests is quite different than a

 4     guarantee for protection of the interests, and it embodies a series of

 5     not only political but social principles that are distinct from that

 6     which I think Mr. Treanor is driving at in his answer.

 7             My concern is that we are verbatim accurate in this regard and

 8     that we should not -- we should not slip into interpreting that which has

 9     been said and been translated.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Sutherland.

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, Mr. Treanor does not have to read

12     verbatim the translation.  He can put his own opinion to the words that

13     are written on that page.  The very fact that certain words are written

14     there doesn't mean that it's true.  He can -- he can tell you his

15     interpretation of what that text means.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  In that event, why should we have this text here?

17     Why doesn't he just close this text and he gives us his opinion?

18             MS. SUTHERLAND:  He can do that, but this is to assist Your

19     Honours.  This is the --

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Now, when we are going out here to write the

21     judgement and Mr. Treanor is not here, we're going to be looking at this

22     document, we're going to be looking at the transcript, and if we find

23     that there are inconsistencies between what he says and the document,

24     what do you suggest we do?

25             MS. SUTHERLAND:  He's putting his view of what he believes that

Page 931

 1     paragraph means, so it's the weight that you want to give to his

 2     testimony.  And if my colleague wants to cross-examine him on any of

 3     these matters, then he can do that.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I think before he gives his opinion, he must tell

 5     us the facts first, as they stand, and then he can give his opinion on

 6     those facts.

 7             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.

 8        Q.   Mr. Treanor, did the idea of assisting Serbs outside of Serbia

 9     find any additional expression at that time?

10        A.   Yes.  At this time, just a few weeks later, the --

11        Q.   If I can just pause there.

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could have Rule 65 ter number 06739 called

13     up, please.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Are we done with the speech?

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.

16        Q.   If you can go to page 10 of the B/C/S version and page 11 of the

17     English translation, please.

18        A.   Yes.  A few weeks after the speech in the Serbian assembly that

19     we just saw, the Socialist Party of Serbia was founded.  It was founded

20     as an amalgamation of the League of Communists of Serbia and the

21     Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia, which were two

22     preexisting political institutions from the SFRY.

23             At the founding congress on the 16th of July, 1990, the party

24     adopted a programme, a rather extensive programme covering all sorts of

25     social, economic, and political issues.  And we find in the programme

Page 932

 1     points that deal with the Serbs outside of Serbia.

 2             At the top of the page, I would like to draw your attention to

 3     that passage, Your Honours.  At this point I'm -- I must admit I'm a

 4     little bit confused as to what you want me to do, whether to summarize

 5     the passage or to give it my own translation.  I have been in other

 6     courtrooms and different Trial Chambers have adopted different approaches

 7     to that, so I'd appreciate guidance as to your approach.

 8             In considering that issue, I would venture that the report I've

 9     written and the testimony I'm given -- I'm giving is mine.  It's my

10     report and my testimony.  I have, as I mentioned, been through this

11     process before, and I'm aware that the translations that are provided are

12     often inaccurate and need correction on the one hand, and on the other,

13     of course what you are offered in the report and my testimony is my

14     understanding of the documents rather than the understanding of a

15     translator, however good the translation may be.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The short answer is do what your counsel asks you

17     to do.  We can't prescribe to you what to do.  And if what you do is

18     found unacceptable by your counsel's opposite number, he will rise onto

19     his feet.

20             MS. SUTHERLAND:

21        Q.   Mr. Treanor, just touching on the translations, if you will, for

22     a moment, and you said that sometimes they are incorrect.  Is it the case

23     that in this institution, due to the limited resources from CLSS, that

24     the Office of the Prosecutor has draft translations done from a certain

25     unit and that those translations are then submitted into the court, and

Page 933

 1     unless either of the parties find discrepancies with those translations,

 2     then they can be admitted into the court?

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I believe that -- the answer to that question may

 4     certainly be well outside the purview of this particular witness's

 5     knowledge.  That is a matter that exists as between the parties

 6     themselves and is -- with regard to that, it's one of a number of

 7     solutions that have been found.  But it, many times, depends on the

 8     importance and critical nature of the translations that exist, whereas

 9     here the witness has indicated there are inaccuracies, and we do not know

10     what those inaccuracies are, and if the Prosecution is inviting me at

11     this point in time to wholesale make such an agreement with them, I

12     respectfully decline because of the important nature of the words that

13     have been translated and the meaning that is going to be given to those

14     words by this Chamber as a result of how this witness testifies.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I certainly wasn't --

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes.

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:  -- I wasn't asking my friend to concede

18     anything.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

20             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I was simply making a distinction that there are

21     differences of translations.  Some are in final form and some are in

22     draft form.  If I can move on, Your Honour.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You can --

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I apologise.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Go ahead.

Page 934

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Perhaps it would be of some guidance, then, with

 2     regard to the exercise that we're engaged in right now whether we're

 3     dealing with draft translations or final translations and what we are

 4     going to do in the future with regard to the import of this information,

 5     which is independent of the issue of the witness's offer to operate, as I

 6     understand it, at least in some regards, as a summary witness, which

 7     raises other legal considerations.

 8             MS. SUTHERLAND:  He's not being offered as a summary witness.

 9     He's giving his opinion as to what this document states.

10             Your Honour --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I have a problem, and the problem I have is -- I

12     have it with both counsel.  You put the proposition, Madam Sutherland, to

13     the witness that, due to the limited resources in CLSS, the Office of the

14     Prosecutor has drafted translations done from a certain unit and that

15     those translations are then submitted into court.  Mr. Guy-Smith says

16     that that is a matter that exists as between the parties themselves and

17     is with regards to that, it's one of a number of solutions that have been

18     found.

19             I'm left with the impression that the parties are agreed that

20     some translations were not translated by official Tribunal translators.

21     Is that understanding correct?

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That is my understanding as of now.  In this

24     session I now understand that.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And that is a position that is held by both

Page 935

 1     parties?

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.  Being in court today, I now understand that

 3     we do not have official translations with regard to all documents that

 4     are being presented to this Chamber.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Before this session, I would not have been able

 7     to say that.  That's something I learned in the course of what's going on

 8     here.  Perhaps I made an assumption --

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith, from --

10             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, can I assist please?

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, please, ma'am.

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:  This has been going on in this institution for a

13     number of years, and it is quite easy to work out whether it's a CLSS

14     translation or it's done by a unit within the Office of the Prosecutor.

15     If it's done within the Office of the Prosecutor, it will have the words

16     "ET" before the translation number at the top of the page, or it, in

17     fact, says "Draft Translation."  If it's done by CLSS, then it's a

18     revised translation, and it has the words -- or it may, in fact, even be

19     a draft translation done by the CLSS, but it has the words "EDT" at the

20     end of the number.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes.  That may very well be so, ma'am.  It hasn't

22     happened in this chamber.

23             Let me come back to you, Mr. Guy-Smith.  I don't understand you.

24     Your statement to the effect that it's one of a number of solutions that

25     have been found, and this solution has been found as between the parties,

Page 936

 1     like you said, that suggests you had prior knowledge.

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I do -- I do apologise for not being more

 3     specific.  The reference that I am making there is to the prior trials

 4     that I have been involved in where there has been a draft translation or

 5     there has been another document and the Prosecutor has offered the draft

 6     translation as being the document upon which we could rely --

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  -- and I have said -- I have said both yes and

 9     no.  That's what I meant by "the agreement between the parties."  So that

10     when we come to the Chamber, we say, as the Chamber has said to us on

11     occasion, This is a draft translation; are the parties comfortable with

12     it?  And we have said yes, and we have said no.  That's what I meant by

13     that.  Not with regard to this particular case.  That issue never came

14     up.  We have never had that discussion, and I did not consider that we

15     would be having a translation discussion.  I didn't -- I didn't consider

16     we'd be in that world with this particular witness.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith, can we get on to the same page.  We

18     are not discussing other cases, we are discussing this case.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  With regard --

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Now, if what you're referring to relates to other

21     cases, then that's not what we are talking about.  We are talking about

22     this case.  And the language that you use relating to that -- to the fact

23     that you say that that is a matter that exists as between the parties

24     themselves, which parties are you referring to?

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  With regard to this specific case, I clearly used

Page 937

 1     a language that was inexact and inappropriate, and I apologise to the

 2     Chamber for doing that, because with regard to this particular case there

 3     is nothing that exists between the parties with regard to this issue.

 4     Nothing.  So to the extent that I used inexact language, let me be very

 5     clear.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Before you sit down and before I hand over to

 7     Madam Sutherland, what, then, do you suggest be done with this

 8     translation that is apparently not by a qualified CLSS employee?

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  At this point my concern is that this translation

10     is now going to be interpreted by the witness, thereby removing us

11     further from potentially what actually was said in the original document,

12     and that is something that I would object to.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That's about as far as I can go for the moment

15     because thus far what we have experienced is the presentation of a

16     document in the original language and in English and then a factual

17     recitation of what that document says by the witness, which is already

18     distinct from the specific language that exists in English.

19             So I have -- since I think we're at a point where a number of

20     these words are going to have great intent, and by "intent" I mean

21     meaning, with regard to some kind of fundamental issues that exist in

22     this case, I have grave concerns about operating on the basis of a

23     translation that is, as the witness has said, inaccurate, upon which he

24     is now going to render an opinion.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Madam Sutherland.

Page 938

 1             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, Mr. Treanor didn't say that this

 2     translation was inaccurate.  He was making --

 3        Q.   Is that correct, Mr. Treanor?

 4        A.   That's right.  I was not referring to this particular document.

 5     I was speaking in general.

 6             Again, if I can explain my work, perhaps, in more detail.  We

 7     discussed earlier at some length the process of review and selection of

 8     documents.  I do that, and the people that work for me do that, working

 9     with the original documents.  We don't work from translations.

10             Why don't we work from translations?  Well, first of all, we

11     don't need to.  Second of all, typically, the documents that we're

12     working with haven't been translated yet.  When I wrote this report, very

13     many of those documents had not been translated.  I'm not sure which ones

14     were, which ones weren't, but I know that recently there's been quite a

15     push put on to get documents in the report -- that are mentioned in the

16     report, used in the report, translated.  So I infer from that that many

17     of them were not translated.

18             Again, that doesn't bother me because I don't use the

19     translations, I use the original documents.  And as I indicated before,

20     what I offer in the report and what I seek to offer the Court now is the

21     meaning of these documents to me and not the meaning that those documents

22     may have to someone else.  I'm not calling into question any particular

23     translation, and not this one which, by the way, appears to be the

24     official SPS translation of the document, although I'm not a hundred per

25     cent certain of that.  But that's what it appears to be.  It's just that

Page 939

 1     in my experience, I have run into occasions where the translations that

 2     were offered were, in fact, incomplete and inaccurate.  So I -- which is

 3     just another reason for me to not to be bothered with translations at

 4     all.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But I heard you say at the beginning of your

 6     testimony, Mr. Treanor, that you have - excuse me - a basic reading

 7     knowledge of the language.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Basic.

10             THE WITNESS:  Well, I don't think I said "basic."  I believe I

11     said I had a very good reading knowledge of the language.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I don't think you said "good" either.  I'm clearly

13     left with the impression that it was not a good knowledge.  I don't know

14     the line and the page, but that's the impression I was left with.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:

16        Q.   Mr. Treanor, how long have you been reading the B/C/S language?

17        A.   Approximately 35 years.  I've been using it in my research, in my

18     official capacity, and as a translator for about that period of time.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Anyway, Madam Sutherland, you have an objection

20     from your learned friend.  Any response to it?

21             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I'm sorry, I've lost it on the page, and I don't

22     recall it.  If you could summarize it for me, I would be grateful.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith said if we are using unofficially

24     translated documents which may, in fact, be inaccurate and then we still

25     get a personal opinion of the witness on them, we're moving further away

Page 940

 1     from what the original document said and on that basis, he would object.

 2             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, there's two issues there.  The

 3     first one is on unofficial translated documents.  Mr. Guy-Smith has just

 4     come onto this case, but this case has been dealing for a long time with

 5     draft translations, and that's just the nature of the beast.  We have in

 6     this institution eight trials running simultaneously, or we're supposed

 7     to be having eight trials running simultaneously.  CLSS do not have the

 8     resources to translate thousands and thousands and thousands of pages of

 9     documents in relation to those trials.  And so we have to, everybody has

10     to rely on the draft translations that have been done by CLSS because

11     they haven't -- they don't have the resources to revise them before we

12     need to use them in the courtroom, or the other department that does the

13     draft -- that does the unofficial translations.  And it's been the

14     practice for quite a number of years that those translations are accepted

15     into the court unless the parties object to them, and then they are sent

16     for revision.  But if there's no objection, then those draft unofficial

17     translations are accepted.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You do have an objection to them, number one,

19     ma'am, number two, and that's what we discussed, the objection to using

20     them.  And number two --

21             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If I can just touch on the second issue, Your

22     Honour.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can I just finish with what you've told us.

24             You say it's been a number of years.  How long have we been

25     having eight cases running at the same time?  Is it a number of years?

Page 941

 1             MS. SUTHERLAND:  At least four years, maybe three years.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Eight cases?

 3             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.  I mean, don't quote me on it.

 4     I know that for at least two years.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And because of that are you saying we should run

 6     the risk of unfair proceedings because of likely mistakes?

 7             MS. SUTHERLAND:  No, Your Honour.  I just said unless the Defence

 8     objects to a document, if they don't object -- it's not unfair to the

 9     accused, if the Defence don't have a problem with the translation.  This

10     institution would come to a grinding halt if we had to get a revised CLSS

11     translation of every single document that we seek to tender into

12     evidence.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I understand that indeed it may happen that the

14     opposite number doesn't object, but that does not remove the fact that if

15     indeed the inaccuracy has slipped the attention of the opposite side or

16     he has no way of finding out whether it is an inaccurate and it does slip

17     in, then there is unfairness either to the Prosecution or to the Defence,

18     and that is why CLSS was established.

19             MS. SUTHERLAND:  CLSS have a very limited number of staff.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I understand that.

21             MS. SUTHERLAND:  The completion strategy, we would still be here

22     in 2020 if we had to wait for the translation of the number of pages that

23     are going through the courts at the moment.  And a lot of these bigger

24     cases are so document heavy, as opposed to where you may have one accused

25     from Prijedor in a camp case, as opposed to the leadership cases where

Page 942

 1     they are very document oriented.  I mean, that's the -- that's the

 2     reality, Your Honour.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Is that your response to the objection?

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, as I said, unless the Defence

 5     object --

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I thought they said they're objecting.  You asked

 7     me to summarize what the objection was, and I told you -- I summarized it

 8     for you.

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If I understand Mr. Guy-Smith well, he's now

10     saying he's objecting to the draft translation of any document we seek to

11     tender?  Is that right?

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Would you like to clarify yourself, sir?

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.  With regard to those documents that

14     Mr. Treanor is using which are draft translations, in the absence of

15     information at the present time concerning the accuracy of those

16     translations, we object.  With regard to any other witness, we may reach

17     a different point depending on who the witness is and what the import is

18     of those translations.  But given the experience that we have had thus

19     far in a very limited period of time concerning the issue not only of

20     translation but also his interpretation of what is being said, we have no

21     alternative but at this point to object because we are concerned that we

22     will not be dealing accurately with the information that's contained

23     therein and cannot intelligently respond thereto.

24                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 943

 1                           [Defence counsel confer]

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Madam Sutherland.

 3             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, if I can just briefly say that

 4     we've been disclosing a lot of documents over a number of years, and we

 5     advised the Defence that they have a number of Serbo-Croat readers on

 6     their team.  If they have any objection to the documents, then one would

 7     assume that they would bring them up with us before now, instead of at

 8     the moment the witness is testifying.

 9             But if I can say, Your Honour, if we can address this issue with

10     you in court tomorrow, we would prefer to do that, the whole translation

11     issue of the documents.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You're expanding the problem.  At this stage we're

13     dealing with this document before us.  If, however, you do want to talk

14     about the whole issue of translation, you're welcome to do so at an

15     opportune moment.  Bear in mind that at this stage you have an objection

16     in your hands, and it is no answer to that objection to refer to the

17     translations that have been done over the years.  I would like a response

18     that is focused on what is before us right now.

19             I note the time.  You might perhaps want to respond to this

20     objection, pertinently to what we are doing now, tomorrow.  You're

21     welcome to do so.  And then if you want to expand the document to all

22     translations, we'll do so.

23             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I will take you up on your offer to

24     go into the matter tomorrow and answer the objection.

25             Just on one matter, though.  In relation to Mr. Treanor's

Page 944

 1     proficiency, I would just direct Your Honours to page 74 of the LiveNote,

 2     lines 12 to 16, that is, his reading proficiency in the language.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Page 74?  Line?

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Twelve to 16.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 6             My apologies to you, Mr. Treanor.  My apologies to you.

 7             THE WITNESS:  No need to apologise, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  There is a need to.  If I misinterpreted you --

 9     misquoted you, there is always a need.

10             THE WITNESS:  I thank you for your apology.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Madam Sutherland, would this then be an

12     opportune moment?

13             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour, given the time.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Court adjourned to tomorrow, quarter past

15     2.00.  Same courtroom.  Court adjourned.

16             You do know, Mr. Treanor, that being in this witness stand, you

17     don't have to talk to anybody.  You don't need to be told this, in any

18     case.

19             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Very well.  Court adjourned.

21                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,

22                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 4th day of

23                           November, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.