Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 14242

 1                           Wednesday, 27 October 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 12.06 p.m.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Good afternoon to everybody in and around the

 6     courtroom.

 7             Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon to

 9     everyone in and around the courtroom.

10             This is case number IT-04-81-T, the Prosecutor versus

11     Momcilo Perisic.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.

13             Could we have appearances for the day, please, starting with the

14     Prosecution.

15             MR. HARMON:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon,

16     counsel, everyone in the courtroom.  Mark Harmon, Salvatore Cannata, and

17     Carmela Javier for the Prosecution.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  And for the Defence.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Good afternoon to all.  Boris Zorko, Chad Mair,

20     Deirdre Montgomery, Tina Drolec, Novak Lukic, and Gregor Guy-Smith on

21     behalf of General Perisic.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

23             Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes, we would now call our next witness to the

25     stand, Mr. Carl Bildt.

Page 14243

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated] May the witness please

 2     be brought in.

 3                           [The witness entered court]

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith, we see a second person coming in

 5     with Mr. Carl Bildt.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes, we do.  I will inquire as to who that second

 7     person is, because I do not know.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

 9             May the witness please make the declaration.

10             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

11     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.  You may be seated.

13             Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

14                           WITNESS:  CARL BILDT

15                           Examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

16        Q.   Good afternoon.

17        A.   Good afternoon.

18        Q.   Before we start the proceedings today, could you please state

19     your name?

20        A.   Carl Bildt is my name.

21        Q.   And I see that you have somebody with you in attendance in court.

22     Could you please identify who that individual is for us?

23        A.   Mrs. Anette Brolenius.

24        Q.   And could we understand in what capacity is Ms. Brolenius here?

25        A.   She is from the Embassy -- the Swedish Embassy in The Hague.

Page 14244

 1        Q.   Do I understand that you require her assistance during your

 2     testimony here today?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Very well.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I trust that satisfies the Chamber's inquiry with

 6     regard to the individual who is accompanying --

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you very much.

 9        Q.   Welcome to The Hague, Mr. Bildt.

10        A.   Thanks very much.

11        Q.   And thank you very much for coming.

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   As I think we all appreciate, you are an individual who was

14     intimately involved in bringing to a conclusion the conflict in the

15     Balkans.  But before we discuss those matters, if you would be so kind as

16     to give us a rough, not necessarily terribly extensive, indication of

17     your background.

18        A.   In what sense?

19        Q.   In the sense of a curriculum vitae.

20        A.   In the sense of my curriculum vitae, I think that is fairly well

21     known.  I have been member of parliament in Sweden for -- in the order of

22     quarter of a century, although that was quite some time ago.  I was prime

23     minister of my country.  I was intensely involved in different

24     international affairs.  And what is perhaps of relevance for the Tribunal

25     is the fact that I was then, from early June, I think, of 1995, appointed

Page 14245

 1     as the European Union co-chairman of the International Conference on

 2     Former Yugoslavia and served in that capacity until the dissolution of

 3     ICFY, which was a gradual process, but the de facto dissolution of ICFY,

 4     and continued then in different, other working capacities as High

 5     Representative in Sarajevo for two years and later as the Special Envoy

 6     of the Secretariat of the United Nations for the Balkans, But that brings

 7     us into the Kosovo war, so that is at a later stage of the dramas of the

 8     Balkans.

 9        Q.   Understood.  And with regard to -- with regard to the EU special

10     representative position that you held, who did you succeed?

11        A.   I succeeded Lord Owen who served from the setting up of that

12     institution, whenever that could have been, in 1993 or something like

13     that.  And he had served for that period and I succeeded him in early

14     June of 1995.

15        Q.   And with regard to the Dayton peace talks, if I'm not mistaken,

16     you were one of the two co-chairmen of the Dayton peace talks, were you

17     not?

18        A.   I was.  Or three, to be precise.  I think there were three --

19     formally speaking, there were three vice-chairman, or whatever it was

20     called at the time, of the Dayton peace talks.  It was Richard Holbrooke,

21     who was assistant secretary of state for the United States at the time;

22     there was myself for the European Union; and there was Mr. Igor Ivanov,

23     who was the first deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation at

24     the time.

25        Q.   Above and beyond that service, it's my understanding that you're

Page 14246

 1     associated with a number of international organisations and serve on

 2     advisory boards for the centre for European Reform --

 3        A.   Well, did.

 4        Q.   Did.

 5        A.   Did.  As foreign minister of Sweden, I had no other

 6     responsibility but the responsibilities to my country.

 7        Q.   That is the result of the recent election?

 8        A.   No.  That is the result of the Swedish Constitution.  That's the

 9     way it is --

10        Q.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

11        A.   If you are a foreign minister or member of the cabinet, that's

12     what you are, nothing else.  Then I have been quite a number of things in

13     the past.

14        Q.   Okay.

15        A.   But that was in the past.

16        Q.   And in the past you were -- served on that advisory board, the

17     Centre for European Reform?

18        A.   Among others, yes.

19        Q.   The Aspen Institute?

20        A.   Not to my knowledge.  But I certainly attended a lot of the --

21     well, the Aspen Institute Italia, yes, quite, the Italian branch.  That's

22     true, yeah.

23        Q.   And RAND Europe?

24        A.   Not RAND Europe.  But I was on the board of trustees of

25     RAND Corporation in the United States.

Page 14247

 1        Q.   I see.  I take it that you were then also a member of the council

 2     for international -- of the international institute of strategic studies

 3     in London?

 4        A.   I was.

 5        Q.   You at one point in time, I believe, you had your own news

 6     letter.  I don't know if you are still doing that?

 7        A.   Well, depends on how you define things.  But I have always been

 8     fairly active on the Internet in different ways, newsletters or blogs or

 9     whatever.  So you can find my digital track record is rather extensive.

10        Q.   And you have published a number of works?

11        A.   Sorry?

12        Q.   You've published a number of works --

13        A.   I published a number of works, yes.

14        Q.   And including in that, you published the book "The Country that

15     Stepped Out In The Cold" in 1972.

16        A.   Mm-hm.

17        Q.   "A Future in Freedom" in 1976?

18        A.   Mm-hm.

19        Q.   You're a citizen of Holland, Sweden and --

20        A.   Halland, not Holland.

21        Q.   Halland, yes --

22        A.   Halland is a province of SwedenHolland is a country of the

23     European Union and that's always a confusion, but anyhow.

24        Q.   That's Halland with an A not with an O.

25        A.   Halland.

Page 14248

 1        Q.   Yes.

 2        A.   Holland is a different place.

 3        Q.   In 1991.

 4        A.   Mm-hm.

 5        Q.   "The Only Way" in 1991?

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I saw the note.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The court reporter asks that you guys slow down,

 9     please.

10             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:

13        Q.   "The Only Way" in 1994?

14        A.   Mm-hm.

15        Q.   And finally, from -- for our purposes, a book which I think is

16     pertinent to our considerations, "Peace Journey."

17        A.   Mm-hm.

18        Q.   In 1995?

19        A.   No --

20        Q.   1997.

21        A.   1997 in the Swedish edition and then the English version that we

22     referred to in 1998.  Later in versions in the local languages but that

23     is perhaps not relevant.

24        Q.   Could you tell us what honours or decorations you have been

25     awarded?

Page 14249

 1        A.   I can't.  If you had asked me I could have brought a list.  But I

 2     can supply that for the record.

 3        Q.   Okay.  They do include, as I understand it, from the France the

 4     commander of the Legion of Honour?

 5        A.   I think that is the -- I'm somewhat uncertain about the rank,

 6     but, yes.  I can certainly supply all of this for the record.

 7        Q.   Very well.  From Germany?

 8        A.   As well.

 9        Q.   United Kingdom?

10        A.   As well.

11        Q.   Estonia?

12        A.   As well.

13        Q.   And Latvia?

14        A.   As well.

15        Q.   And if I'm not mistaken, you are also a member or were a member

16     of an organisation which I believe is called the Madrid Club?

17        A.   Well, yeah, you can define that in different ways.  Madrid Club

18     is an informal organisation of former prime ministers.  I am a former

19     prime minister, but since I'm also serving cabinet member, I'm no longer

20     part of that.  There are several informal organisations of former prime

21     ministers.  I think there are three or four of them existing.

22        Q.   And your present duties are?

23        A.   Foreign minister of Sweden, yeah.

24        Q.   I want to go back now to 1995.  And I noticed that you have with

25     you a number of documents.  I take it there are things that you have with

Page 14250

 1     you that you may need to refer to in order to refresh your recollection.

 2        A.   Yeah.

 3        Q.   Okay.  I want to start in July of 1995.  And I'd like to focus on

 4     July 7th, if I could.  And ask you if you recall where you were on the

 5     7th of July?

 6        A.   I don't immediately but since I got my book here, we can easily

 7     find it out.  I had obviously been in Sarajevo on the 6th, and I arrived

 8     in Belgrade the day after, Friday, the 7th of July.

 9        Q.   And when you arrived in Belgrade on the 7th of July, who did you

10     intend on meeting with at that time?

11        A.   I intended to meet with President Milosevic.

12        Q.   Apart from President Milosevic, was it your intent at that time

13     to meet with any other individuals?

14        A.   Yes.  Certainly.  I met with diplomatic representatives in

15     Belgrade.  But from the -- what was called the Yugoslav side at the time

16     still, I think, my intention was to meet with President Milosevic.

17        Q.   Do you recall where you met with President Milosevic?

18        A.   No.  But I can find it out.  It was in Dobanovci.

19        Q.   And when you met --

20        A.   It was his -- as you know, his -- one of the Tito places --

21        Q.   Right.

22        A.   -- that he often frequented just outside Belgrade.

23        Q.   And in your meeting on July 7th with President Milosevic, do you

24     recall who else was in attendance at that meeting?

25        A.   From his side?

Page 14251

 1        Q.   From his side.

 2        A.   Well, during the part -- the first part of that meeting it was

 3     always the same.  It was only his assistant by the name of Goran.  You

 4     would know the name, I would assume.

 5        Q.   And with regard to -- with regard to, just for the moment, the

 6     subsequent meetings that you had with President Milosevic in the month of

 7     July, would it be fair to say that this particular individual who you

 8     have identified as Goran was present at all meetings with him?

 9        A.   I would say that there was apart from General Mladic, we might

10     come to that, no one else present at those meetings.  I would not

11     necessarily say that this individual was present during every part of

12     every meeting.  But I can say that there was no one else from the --

13     let's call it Belgrade side that ever attended meetings.

14        Q.   And just so we're perfectly clear, when you say there was no one

15     else who was present from the Belgrade side at those meetings, I'd like

16     you to take a look to the back of the room and see whether you recognise

17     General Perisic or not?

18        A.   I -- I do.

19        Q.   Okay.  Now, was General Perisic at any of those meetings?

20        A.   No.  And I had no -- no contact with General Perisic whatsoever,

21     nor any knowledge of his activities during the entire course of the

22     Bosnian war.  I had one meeting with General Perisic in -- after he had

23     left the VJ and set up a political party, I can't really remember the

24     name of it, in -- after the fall of Milosevic when I was in Belgrade and

25     met with the different political representative, I met with him when he

Page 14252

 1     was chairman of his political party.  That was the beginning of 2000,

 2     2001.

 3        Q.   Understood.

 4        A.   But we had no contact whatsoever and I really have no knowledge,

 5     either direct or indirect, about anything concerning him during the

 6     period of the Bosnian war.

 7        Q.   Very well.  You mentioned General Mladic.  Did you have occasion

 8     to meet General Mladic?

 9        A.   Twice.

10        Q.   Did you meet him on the 7th of July?

11        A.   I think that was the case, yes.  One of the occasions, yes.  Late

12     in the evening of the 7th.

13        Q.   And do you recall how that came about, did you request to meet

14     with General Mladic or --

15        A.   We did --

16        Q.   -- did he request to meet with you?

17        A.   No.  We did request.  That was due to the overall situation at

18     the time.  As I think you are aware, I was responsible for essentially

19     the political negotiations to get a settlement under what was called the

20     Plan B after the de facto collapse of the Plan A, which was the contact

21     group efforts in the preceding summer.

22             At the same time -- at the same time as we were doing these

23     political talks, which was my responsibility, the situation on the ground

24     had deteriorated quite considerably and one of the effects of that was

25     that the normal contacts that had been established or had been there

Page 14253

 1     between UNPROFOR, the UN forces, either UNPROFOR in Zagreb or BiH command

 2     in Sarajevo, and the Bosnian Serb forces, the VRS, had ceased.  That was

 3     after the Pale bombing sometimes in May.  That had led to the fact that

 4     there had not been any regular communications on quite a number of the

 5     different issues where there was a need, according to the UN command, to

 6     communicate, and I was asked to try to facilitate contact with General

 7     Mladic -- or we asked President Milosevic, to be quite frank, to

 8     facilitate a contact with General Mladic to see if there was any

 9     possibility of re-establishing contacts between the UN forces and the VRS

10     in order to handle a number of different issues, notably the resupply

11     issue to the enclaves.

12        Q.   Understood.  You mentioned in your response Plan B.  If you

13     could, in a brief form explain to the Chamber what Plan B was.

14        A.   Well, I'm not quite certain but I'll try.

15        Q.   Okay.

16        A.   Plan A was essentially the contact group effort of -- well, might

17     go even further and say that the original attempt to settle the Bosnian

18     war after the outbreak of the war.  There had been attempts prior to the

19     outbreak of the war in April of 1992 was it -- with the Vance-Owen Plan.

20        Q.   Correct.

21        A.   That collapsed in 1993, I think.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And was the Vance-Owen Plan the Plan A?

23             THE WITNESS:  No, no.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It's just the Vance-Owen Plan.

25             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, quite.  Vance Owen.  Then the -- what we

Page 14254

 1     refer -- what I refer to as Plan A was the contact group plan in the

 2     summer of 1994.  Correct me if I -- 1994.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 4        Q.   Correct.

 5        A.   Which had been the -- which was the product of rather

 6     extensive -- the contact group had then been established by the way,

 7     hadn't existed up to that time.  It was established, and the contact

 8     group had major difficulties getting agreement on a plan to submit to the

 9     parties on the sort of take it or leave it basis.  That was done sometime

10     in July of that year, if I remember it.  It consisted -- and I have a

11     fairly extensive description of it in the book.  It consisted primarily

12     of a map, but the contact group had not been able to agree on the

13     constitutional provisions.  It was a take it or leave it.  The contact

14     group said you either take it or leave it, and in case you leave it,

15     we're not going have any contacts with you.

16             Now this was accepted sort of by Sarajevo.  It was rejected sort

17     of by Pale.  I said rejected because Pale said, We want to see the

18     constitutional provisions.  So since there weren't any constitutional

19     provisions, this was interpreted as a rejection, which it was, formally

20     speaking.  That meant that, of course, in accordance to what the contact

21     group had said, contact ceased.  The idea was then to go on the basis of

22     that for direct negotiations between the parties.  The parties I can

23     describe as Sarajevo and Pale, for the sake of simplicity.  That had then

24     collapsed and the Sarajevo position, President Izetbegovic, to use a

25     name, but not necessarily only him, was that accordingly there could be

Page 14255

 1     no contacts with Pale, with the Bosnian Serb leadership.

 2             Then after some considerable deliberations, I think, in the

 3     beginning of 1995, I think it was in March, the contact group reached

 4     agreement on what I refer to as Plan B.  The Plan B was to go primarily

 5     to President Milosevic and say, Try to get agreement on a couple of

 6     different things.  One was a recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an

 7     independent and sovereign country.  Number one.

 8        Q.   Understood.

 9        A.   Number two was an agreement on the basic outlines of

10     constitutional structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, two entities, whatever

11     they were to be called.  That was a separate issue in itself, as well as

12     the principle of division of the territory according to the 49, 51.  And

13     I think the third element, if I remember rightly, of that plan was that

14     as a part -- assuming that this was possible to achieve, then, of course,

15     the second stage was how to move from Plan B back to some sort of Plan A.

16     That is an implementation on the ground.  And then one was going to force

17     the Pale leadership to do that.  An element of that was that

18     President Milosevic had to agree to further tightening of the ordered

19     existing sanctions received against Republika Srpska.  Those were

20     essentially the three elements of what I referred to as the Plan B.

21        Q.   And with regard to Plan B, what was Milosevic's position with

22     regard to those three elements that you have mentioned about the plan as

23     well as the tightening of further sanctions?

24        A.   Well, we had rather extensive -- not only me, by the way.  I

25     mean, these negotiations had been initiated by the US diplomat,

Page 14256

 1     Robert Fraser who had been representing the contact groups in rather

 2     extensive talks with President Milosevic all through the spring of 1995.

 3     I think they solved most of the problems, although not all, but then

 4     there were some divisions inside the contact group and in the different

 5     countries so it was not carried to fruition.  And Ambassador Fraser

 6     stepped down for a number of reasons and I took over, but, of course,

 7     there were extensive discussions on all of these three issues.  I mean

 8     the, as I think the Tribunal is aware of, the devil is always in the

 9     details.  And here it was the details that were more difficult than the

10     overall scheme.  The overall scheme was easier, but the details were

11     extremely heartily fought over for a long time.

12             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If I may just intervene here.  Exactly when did

13     the Plan B start and for what was its duration?

14             THE WITNESS:  If -- I mean, this was said before I entered but I

15     read -- tried to re-read my book on the flight down.  Earlier of that

16     year.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated] 1995.

18             THE WITNESS:  Early 1995, yes, after the -- because there had

19     been effectively been no peace attempts after the collapse of the contact

20     group plan in the summer of 1993.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

22             THE WITNESS:  So then this was another attempt, another way

23     around the problem.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So Plan B went from early 1995 to the end of the

25     war to the Dayton --

Page 14257

 1             THE WITNESS:  Well, that's debatable because a lot of things

 2     happened during the latter part of the summer, of course.  You can say

 3     that what happened, if you speak in terms of the plans, that we

 4     effectively collapsed Plan B and Plan A into what became Dayton.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Or Plan B did also collapse?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Well, no collapse in the sense of merge.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure, fair enough.  Are you able to say more or

 8     less when it collapsed or when it merged?

 9             THE WITNESS:  Well, I think you can say that it merged with the

10     intensified efforts that were initiated after both Srebrenica and

11     Operation Storm, which was -- because from -- for a number of reasons.

12     We saw a deterioration in the situation, of course, escalation of

13     fighting -- well, earlier than that, as a matter of fact.  And the summer

14     of 1995 was, in my opinion, the worst period of the war after the initial

15     period of the Bosnian war, which was in 1992.  There was a number of

16     reasons for this and we need not go into that.  And then for other

17     reasons that are related to other factors on the international scene,

18     there was an acceleration of the efforts, in that it was necessary to

19     bring the parties together.  I would say that the critical meeting in

20     these respects was the meeting that took place in Geneva at some --

21     between the -- all of the foreign ministers of the region at the date

22     that I can't remember at the moment.  That is in all of the records, I

23     guess.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

25             Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

Page 14258

 1             Yes, Mr. Harmon.

 2             MR. HARMON:  Just a procedural point.  Could I -- I see Mr. Bildt

 3     is referring to his book.  I have a copy of his book with me.  When

 4     Mr. Bildt is refreshing his recollection, if he finds some point in the

 5     book that refreshes his recollection, it would be of assistance to me and

 6     to the parties if he could identify the page on which he has found the

 7     point that refreshes his recollection.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Indeed.  And another procedural point --

 9             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I concur with that.  I have no difficulty with --

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The other procedural issue here, Mr. Guy-Smith, is

11     that a witness is really expected to testify from memory and at each time

12     there's a need for refreshing memory there should be a clear indication

13     that --

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Very well.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Indeed.

16             Thank you so much.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:

18        Q.   Just for purposes of clarification so we're sure that we're all

19     on the same page.  Are you reading from the Swedish version right now or

20     from the English version so in case we need to refer to it, we can go to

21     the right page number?

22        A.   English version.

23        Q.   Very well.  Thank you so much.  Now, contained -- contained in

24     your answer there was one point that was, I believe, missing which was

25     Milosevic's response to the plan itself.  The three components of Plan B

Page 14259

 1     as well as the tightening of sanctions that had previously imposed, was

 2     he in accord with that or was he in disagreement with that?

 3        A.   I -- I can't recall that I -- without going back in -- in the --

 4     in the documents or the book and recall every single aspect of the

 5     negotiations but I said we negotiated every single detail was difficult

 6     to negotiate with him.  Needless to say, these were difficult issues.

 7             As to the overall recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that was

 8     okay with him.  But he linked that, of course, to the agreement on the

 9     internal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that was, needless to say, a

10     somewhat controversial issue.  Eventually we ended up with the wording

11     that you see reflected in the communique coming out of the Geneva meeting

12     that I -- that I referred to, and that was then directly taken into --

13     sort of fleshed out, you can say, in Dayton.  I think the 49, 51

14     principle he grudgingly agreed to.  As to the -- what was called the

15     Drina blockade, that was not necessarily one of the issues that we spent

16     the most time on.  It was already in effect.  But we discussed further

17     tightening of it in different respects.  It was somewhat difficult to

18     tighten but anyhow there might have been different ways that you could do

19     that.

20        Q.   I notice the noticeable absence of one name from -- from your

21     discussion and I mention the name and then I want to go back to the issue

22     of meeting Mladic on July 7th.  But I noted the notable absence of the

23     name of President Karadzic from your discussion.

24        A.   Mm-hm.

25        Q.   Was there a reason for that?

Page 14260

 1        A.   There was the reason that I mentioned, that after the collapse of

 2     the contact group plan, which had been on the take it or leave it basis,

 3     it was said, If you don't accept it, we're not going have contact with

 4     you.  The policy was not to have contact with President Karadzic.  So

 5     there was no contacts.  I had one telephone conversation with him during

 6     the entire period that I was involved in the Balkans.  But we had no -- I

 7     had no contacts with him whatsoever.  There were other contacts with him

 8     but they were not by me.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I guess you're referring to the 7th of July, 1995,

10     when you say the name of President Karadzic is not mentioned?

11             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm referring to the negotiations that are extant

12     throughout this period.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Oh.  Okay.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:

15        Q.   With regard to the answer that you have just given, which is that

16     the policy was not to have contact with President Karadzic, could you

17     identify for us whose policy that was?  And I will use the term

18     internationals generically, but I don't know whether that is necessarily

19     accurate for purposes of the decision that was being made after his

20     refusal to take -- to take up the contact group plan in the initial

21     instance.

22        A.   No, it -- this was essentially the policy of the contact group.

23     There were, however, other contacts.  I think that during the summer

24     there was a contact from -- I think, the Russian Federation sent an envoy

25     to Pale at some point in time.  So there were exceptions to the rule, but

Page 14261

 1     from our side, we were sort of conducting negotiations at the time.  We

 2     didn't not have any contacts.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I might ask then who were the parties to the

 4     negotiations under the auspices of this contact group.  The reason I'm

 5     asking you is you say you had no contact with Karadzic.  And my question

 6     would be:  Who represented the Republika Srpska in those negotiations?

 7             THE WITNESS:  No one.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Hmm.

 9             THE WITNESS:  No.  Because the idea, which was later, sort of

10     that was the way Dayton was done.  The idea was to have an agreement with

11     President Milosevic and then for President Milosevic to use all of the

12     powers at his disposal to impose that settlement on the Pale leadership.

13     And at the end of the day, that is what also happened.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  So --

15             THE WITNESS:  So it was an indirect approach --

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So the contact group was really not a facilitator

17     for negotiations.  It came with a plan.  It imposed it on everybody --

18             THE WITNESS:  Well, it tried to but failed.  Because, I mean,

19     that was the idea in the summer of 1993, I think, yeah, end of the first

20     year.  But when the plan was put on the table, you can -- historians

21     could discuss whether that was a particular perfect plan, and I might

22     have my views but that is a separate issue, but since that did not fly,

23     then we had a stalemate.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure --

25             THE WITNESS:  In order to break out of that stalemate, then what

Page 14262

 1     I consider -- what I refer to as Plan B, which was to use Milosevic in

 2     order to impose the settlement on the Bosnian Serbs.

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Well, for purposes my question, I'm really

 4     not interested in what whether it was a good or bad plan.  What I want to

 5     know is how it was put in place.  You've been using a "take it or leave

 6     it" phrase in describing it.  You have now used the word "impose," but

 7     you are also saying, no, it was not something that the contact group

 8     brought and said you take it and you shall have it, whether you like it

 9     or not.

10             THE WITNESS:  Well, that was the case in the summer of 1993.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Right.

12             THE WITNESS:  Then when we come to 1994 and the autumn and the

13     Geneva Dayton process, as you're aware of, the negotiations in Dayton was

14     a negotiation with President Milosevic.  There was no sort of

15     Republika -- there was some Republika Srpska -- there was one

16     Republika Srpska representative or person on the delegation of

17     President Milosevic in Dayton.  But then --

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But Dayton is post-Plan B?  It's post-contact

19     group?

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes [Overlapping speakers] --

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  my question is really related to contact group.

22     In the contact group phase, there was really no question of negotiation.

23     It was, You want to take it, if you don't want to take it, we've got no

24     contact with you.

25             THE WITNESS:  No, we -- with the Bosnian Serb leadership, yeah,

Page 14263

 1     quite.  We had no negotiations or contact with the Bosnian Serb

 2     leadership during that --

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You had contact with Izetbegovic?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Oh, yes.  Oh, yes.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And with Milosevic?

 6             THE WITNESS:  And -- yes.  And should be added for the sake of

 7     clarity, I mean, President Tudjman in Zagreb because at this

 8     particular -- to get the entire picture although it gets complicated.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure, sure.

10             THE WITNESS:  A lot of the drama was associated with Republika

11     Srpska Krajina which eventually went into Operation Storm, which was

12     another of the major events.  So I would say that even if a lot of our

13     focus is now on sort of the eastern front of Bosnian war, I would argue

14     that at the time there was even more attention on the western front, of

15     the drama there, involving also the Croats.  And then President Tudjman

16     was a key actor.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure.  but the point I want to establish is that

18     during the contact group period everybody else was represented but

19     Republika Srpska.

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Thank you.

22             Mr. Harmon.

23             MR. HARMON:  Yes, Your Honour.  I want to note for the record

24     that at page 17, starting at line 16, part of Mr. Bildt's answer was not

25     recorded.

Page 14264

 1             The question that was put to Mr. Bildt was:  Whose policy was it

 2     not to have contact with President Karadzic?  And Mr. Bildt, I recorded

 3     in my notes, answered:  It was the policy of the contact group.  What is

 4     recorded at line 17 is the remainder of Mr. Bildt's answer and absent

 5     from that answer is that it was the policy of the contact group.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You are referring to line?

 7             MR. HARMON:  Page 17, line 16.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  You confirm that that was part of your

 9     answer, Mr. Bildt.

10             THE WITNESS:  Was it lost on the transcript?

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes.

12             MR. HARMON:  Yes.

13             THE WITNESS:  I don't follow the transcript so I don't know if it

14     was lost --

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure, but --

16             THE WITNESS:  -- but I assume it was lost --

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure.  No, no, the question is:  Was that your

18     answer?

19             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, yeah, yeah.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That was your answer.

21             THE WITNESS:  Correct, correct, correct.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  So we put it back on the transcript.

23             Thank you very much, Mr. Harmon.

24             Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Just for everyone's comfort, my understanding is

Page 14265

 1     there always a transcript check and there's a manner by which all words

 2     are captured.  And knowing the individual who is presently reporting, I

 3     know that's something that is done quite assiduously.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure.  But we always --

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I'm just --

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We always also thank the recorder.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  -- just trying to get some ...

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  If I may just mention this little housekeeping

 9     matter in the middle of your examination, Mr. Guy-Smith, given that we

10     started at an unusual time, the plan is that we'll break at quarter past

11     1.00 for a lunch break and come back at quarter past 2.00.

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Very well.

13        Q.   We almost have Mladic arriving on the 7th of July.  That's where

14     we were moving towards.

15             Did you have an opportunity to meet with General Mladic on the

16     7th of July Dobanovci in the evening hours?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Now is this the first time that there has been contact with

19     anybody in the leadership, be it political or military, of the

20     Republika Srpska, since the initial contact group plan failed?

21        A.   It was my first contact.  Whether -- and I said, to my knowledge,

22     there had not been any contact between the UN command and General Mladic

23     since May.  Prior to that, of course, whether it had been with

24     General Mladic or his different representatives, of course, there were

25     fairly constant contact.  But that is prior to my time, so you'll have to

Page 14266

 1     ask others about that.

 2             And then to make -- to go back to the original question, contact

 3     with the Republika Srpska, which we discussed, I mean, in some formal

 4     sense, well, more than formal, General Mladic was Republika Srpska.  But

 5     when I refer to Republika Srpska, I refer to the Republika Srpska

 6     political leadership, de facto, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Should I then understand that while there was no

 8     contact with Karadzic, there was contact with Mladic during the contact

 9     group period?

10             THE WITNESS:  Yes.  But that was of a different nature.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Sure.  He was the military leader.

12             THE WITNESS:  [Overlapping speakers] ... he was a military leader

13     and the UN commander on the ground, and, of course, there had also been

14     contacts on the humanitarian level.  I mean, there were, as you are aware

15     of, numerous UN agencies on the ground trying to help people, and they

16     were in constant touch with other representatives in Pale and the

17     Republika Srpska leadership.  So when I refer to it, I refer to sort of

18     full political talks with, de facto, Mr. Karadzic, who was in charge of

19     that.  And -- sorry.

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And during that period did you meet Mr. Mladic?

21             THE WITNESS:  No.  I mean this is the first time which we are

22     coming to now, yeah.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:

24        Q.   When you met General Mladic on the 7th of July, could you tell us

25     what the nature of that conversation was?  What were the topics that were

Page 14267

 1     discussed?

 2        A.   Page 53 is the -- the -- the description of the meeting and I

 3     have really nothing to add to it because this was 15 years ago, and what

 4     is written here I wrote down fairly immediately afterward.  So this is a

 5     more accurate description that I have in the book than anything I can

 6     supply at the moment.

 7             The idea was, as said, to see if there was the possibility to

 8     re-establish a contact between the different military commands primarily

 9     in order to sort out of the supply situation for the enclaves.  And among

10     the enclaves, I would say that Sarajevo and Gorazde were the ones that

11     were the focus of attention.  And we had then asked President Milosevic

12     whether it was possible to get in contact with General Mladic.

13     President Milosevic said he wasn't certain but he was going try, and

14     General Mladic turned out, if I remember it rightly, fairly late in the

15     evening and claimed that he had come from far away.  We assumed that was

16     western Bosnia, but that was just an assumption since that was the

17     military drama, and he was also fairly taken up by the military drama in

18     the west at the time.

19        Q.   I'll ask you since you referred to us page 53 --

20        A.   Mm-hm.

21        Q.   You say in the book and I wonder if this is -- refreshes your

22     recollection as to what your intentions were at the time:

23             "When darkness had descended over Dobanovci, another black car

24     swept up to the large house and General Ratko Mladic climbed out, dressed

25     completely in black.  Milosevic had obviously called him.  I let Mladic

Page 14268

 1     talk.  I wanted to know his mindset."

 2             And then you go on, and you describe what you've described to us

 3     here in your oral testimony.

 4        A.   Mm-hm.

 5        Q.   I'd like for you to take a look at the bottom of the page because

 6     you make a comment that:

 7             "He --"

 8        A.   Mm-hm.

 9        Q.   "-- lived in a narrow medieval world of injustices, revenge and

10     continual struggles."

11             Are you referring to your view of Mladic's --

12        A.   Yeah.  This is my -- these were my impressions at the time of

13     General Mladic.  He spoke time and again about, quote, his people, as he

14     were some sort of medieval warlord.  And my enduring impression of our

15     first meeting was that this was just what he was.

16             "He lived in a narrow medieval world of injustices, revenge and

17     continuous struggle.  For him peace seemed to be an alien concept.  No

18     more than a truce in an everlasting struggle against the injustices to

19     which history and the rest of the world had subjected his Serb people."

20             That was how I interpreted the mindset of General Mladic.

21        Q.   In the context of that particular mindset, what progress did you

22     make on the 7th, in your estimation, with regard to the issues at hand?

23        A.   Well, not -- not much has to be said.  What he talked at the

24     time, of course, and I think I'm now 53 or 54, anyhow, but around there,

25     he wanted to -- he wanted to have a cease-fire which was fairly natural.

Page 14269

 1     I mean, he was sitting on 70 per cent of the territories.  It would be

 2     fairly natural that he wanted to have that.  He wanted to have a contact

 3     with the command of the ABiH for direct military to military talks.  That

 4     was not possible for a number of reasons.  I very much made the point to

 5     him as well as to President Milosevic, needless to say, who was present,

 6     during -- because I had spent some time with Milosevic prior to that,

 7     because we spent quite some time waiting to see if Mladic was going to

 8     turn up.  Impressing on them that in order for there to be an end of the

 9     war, there had to be a calming down of fighting, no fighting on the

10     ground because any further fighting would seriously disrupt the political

11     process.

12        Q.   With regard --

13        A.   And also I stressed to him to try to -- I stressed the need of

14     military restraint on the ground.  It was inhuman, I stressed to him, to

15     try to strangle Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Bihac.  He did

16     not object but asked why the UN did nothing to stop what the Croat army

17     was doing along the Dinara mountains.  I remember that.  He kept coming

18     back to Dinara all the time.

19        Q.   This leaves you, I think, in somewhat of an interesting situation

20     and you said he did not object.  Did he indicate to you that he agreed

21     with your general notion of what I will call for -- for the purposes of

22     our discussion in a cease-fire or a stopping?  And I'm talking about

23     orally.  A stopping of military movement?  Were you left the impression

24     after the 7th that Mladic was going to stop?

25        A.   Fairly obviously.  I mean he was sitting on -- I think he was

Page 14270

 1     still sitting on 70 per cent of the terrain.  I'm not quite certain at

 2     that particular stage.  The tide of the war had turned.  And another

 3     thing that was fairly vivid in the debate at the time was that he was, of

 4     course, suffering or Republika Srpska was suffering under the impact of

 5     the Drina sanctions.  They also faced -- I forgot the sort of population

 6     divisions, but, I mean -- but he had very difficulties to get the

 7     manpower to man his very long defensive lines.  He was trying to get

 8     recruits from Yugoslavia proper in order to man the lines.  The lines

 9     were long.  They were thin.  They were under pressure.  So it's fairly

10     obvious that he was very keen on a cease-fire at that particular time in

11     order to sort of consolidate what he already had, which was essentially

12     what he got in -- with a few exceptions, essentially what he acquired or

13     taken control over in the beginning, in the first year of the war in

14     1992, when his forces were in [indiscernible].  But then the tide of the

15     war turned and he saw that things were going in another direction.  So

16     what he said was, from the purely military point of view, fairly logical.

17        Q.   After your meeting on the 7th, both with Milosevic and with

18     Mladic, my understanding is that you left the region for but a moment and

19     flew out on the Saturday, the 8th.

20        A.   Mm-hm.  I did.

21        Q.   At which point you had a series of meetings with various

22     individuals.  I think perhaps including Richard Holbrooke.  I don't know

23     whether any of those are critical to our discussion right now but I want

24     to keep us in a chronological order.

25             There was some discussion, however, I believe, with regard to the

Page 14271

 1     status of UNPROFOR and the continued involvement of UNPROFOR in the

 2     region that was occurring.  And I --

 3        A.   Well, the first two sentences of -- that must refer to the first

 4     two sentences on page 55, which just refer to the fact that on July the

 5     8th, there was report from UNPROFOR in Zagreb to UN headquarters in

 6     New York.  So it's the fact that there was a regular UN report on that

 7     particular day.  Nothing that had anything to do with me.  I just know of

 8     the fact.

 9        Q.   You also note the fact on page 54, at the bottom of the page,

10     that threat of UNPROFOR withdrawal --

11             MR. HARMON:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I'm going to object to this

12     manner of proceeding.  I think we should proceed on a question and answer

13     basis.  I find Mr. Bildt's book quite interesting but I don't think it is

14     productive to sit and refer to various parts of the book --

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And read the book.

16             MR. HARMON:  -- and read the book.  So we if could proceed in the

17     normal fashion, which is ask questions.  If Mr. Bildt needs to refresh

18     his recollection, he can refer to the book and he can inform the parties

19     that he needs to refresh his recollection, and then we can proceed from

20     that way.  But I think we evolved into a system now where we are just

21     reading the book and --

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  We'll back away from that system.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.  I had referred to that earlier too.

24     And while there is this interruption.  Mr. Bildt, I'm not quite sure that

25     your answer was captured as I thought I heard it.  At page 26, line 13,

Page 14272

 1     if you can look on the screen.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Sorry --

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Page 26, line 13 -- page 26 has just disappeared.

 4     But it's line 13.  Well, the first two sentences -- that must refer to

 5     the first two sentences on 55, which just referred to the fact that on

 6     July 8th, there was report from UNPROFOR in Zagreb to UN headquarters.  I

 7     thought you did tell us what the report was about but it's not captured.

 8             THE WITNESS:  No.  But I said we were now really into sort of

 9     fairly peripheral facts.  It's just the fact that there was a regular UN

10     report.  For some reason I have noted that in my book.  I have no -- I

11     was not involved in any sort of way, and since I got a question, I

12     referred to the book and I read from the book.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

14             THE WITNESS:  I failed to see that this has any relevance to the

15     case, I have to confess, but that is my view.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's the question that's put to you.  Okay.

17     If -- to the extent possible, if you can just put the book aside and try

18     to answer the questions from counsel, and if you do need to refresh your

19     memory from the book, you are obviously allowed to do so, but at that

20     point everybody in court needs to know that you are now referring to the

21     book.

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:

23        Q.   I'm now going to move from the 8th to the 11th of July.  With

24     regard to the 11th of July would it help refresh your recollection with

25     regard to those events if you refer to your book or do you have an

Page 14273

 1     independent recollection sufficient at this time to be able to give us a

 2     response?

 3        A.   Your Honour, I mean, I don't have a sufficient independent

 4     recollection so anything I would say without referring to the book would

 5     be substantially less reliable than relying on the book.  I mean,

 6     that's -- because these were events and it was a very sort of rapid

 7     sequence of events so -- and the book does record them fairly detailed.

 8        Q.   With that in mind, referring now to the 11th of July, do you

 9     recall on the 11th of July who you were with and where you were

10     travelling from or to?

11        A.   I wouldn't recall it if I hadn't re-read it in the book earlier

12     today.

13        Q.   Very well.  Having re-read it earlier in the book today, is your

14     recollection refreshed as you sit here right now?

15        A.   Yes, yes.  I was going from Geneva, I think, to Strasbourg for

16     meetings that had been planned.  That was meetings -- there was a meeting

17     happening in Strasbourg at the time between President Chirac of France,

18     Chancellor Kohl of Germany.  I recollect having meetings with Chancellor

19     Kohl but that was on separate issues, nothing do with the Bosnian war,

20     and later with President Chirac.  And then I had a meeting with the

21     foreign minister of Bosnia, Mr. Sacirbegovic.  Or Sacirbey

22     [indiscernible].

23        Q.   On the 11th, what information, if any, had you received with

24     regard to the situation militarily in the area of Srebrenica?

25        A.   Well, during the 11th, when we were in Strasbourg, in the

Page 14274

 1     European Parliament or the then buildings of the European Parliament in

 2     Strasbourg, we received through the newswires information about the fall

 3     of Srebrenica.  The situation there had been heating up during the --

 4     really since the Friday, if I remember, the date of that, I can't

 5     remember that, but that is easy to find in the calendar.  And I remember

 6     also having sent a message to President Milosevic on the 10th, I think, a

 7     direct message to him saying that he should be aware that any moves in

 8     terms of Srebrenica would have seriously detrimental effects on the

 9     political situation and could endanger the entire peace efforts.

10        Q.   Now, with regard to the representations that had been made to you

11     on the 7th by General Mladic, with regard to the issue of continued

12     military action, how did you interpret General Mladic's statements to you

13     on the 7th when on the 11th you learned that, in fact, there had been a

14     continued military action?

15        A.   I don't interpret.  I just note.

16        Q.   You just note?

17        A.   Yeah.

18        Q.   When you say you just note, what did you note in that regard as

19     it related to the statements made to you and assurances given to you by

20     General Mladic?

21        A.   Well, that evidently things were happening on ground.  That is

22     why we sent this message to -- or I sent the message to President

23     Milosevic with a very clear warning to him on the 10th.  If I remember it

24     rightly.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm sorry, had General Mladic made any assurances?

Page 14275

 1             THE WITNESS:  That --

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  He had not -- he --

 3             THE WITNESS:  I don't think I mentioned any assurances, did I?

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It's in the question.  It's in the question.  It

 5     comes in the question.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:  It's not -- it's in his question.

 7        Q.   Would it be fair, going back to the 7th now, based upon previous

 8     response, would it be fair that after your conversation with Mladic on

 9     the 7th, that you came away from that meeting with assurances from Mladic

10     that there would no further military activity?

11             I understand your analysis with regard to the fact that he had

12     70 per cent of the region.

13        A.   No.  I did not have any such impression, no.

14        Q.   Based upon your conversations with Mladic on the 7th, were you

15     comfortable in the notion that there would be no further military

16     activity?

17        A.   No, I wasn't.  I mean, I wasn't confident with anything at that

18     particular stage, I have to be quite honest, because we were in a

19     situation where things were deteriorating by the day in different parts

20     of theatre.  As said, from roughly whatever, May or something, May, June,

21     we were in a situation of rapid deterioration of both the military and

22     the political situation.  I wasn't comfortable with anything.

23             We were busy trying to sort of calm things down and trying to

24     restart the political process, but we were not confident about anything,

25     not comfortable with anything and things were going from bad to worse by

Page 14276

 1     the day.

 2        Q.   Now with regard to the situation on the 11th, did a new factor

 3     come into consideration with regard to the international response to

 4     Mladic's attack on Srebrenica?  And by that I'm referring to NATO or the

 5     use of any kind of air support.

 6        A.   Well, obviously, I mean, the fall of Srebrenica changed the

 7     entire equation because this was the first time any of the sort of

 8     enclaves had been attacked and fallen.  It had obviously very severe both

 9     political and humanitarian repercussions, although the humanitarian ones

10     were -- turned out to be far worse than anyone was aware of at the time.

11     But it was bad as it was.  Srebrenica had been the subject of acute

12     concerns ever since back to 1993 again, I think, when the safe areas were

13     established.  So it was, of course, a major event, a major further

14     erosion of the overall situation that occurred.

15        Q.   I want to back up for a minute.  Before you took this post,

16     enviable or unenviable as it may be, in retrospect, were you briefed with

17     regard to the history of the negotiations and the historical situation

18     that had occurred on the ground from 1993?

19        A.   I was briefed on the political negotiations, yes, not necessarily

20     on the situation on the ground.

21        Q.   Did you have any information with regard to the concerns that had

22     existed in previous years, both militarily as well as from a humanitarian

23     standpoint?

24        A.   On Bosnia?

25        Q.   Yes.

Page 14277

 1        A.   Well, I had prime minister of my country.  I had received I think

 2     150.000 refugees.  I had been receiving them nearly on a daily basis.  I

 3     fought an election campaign in my country defending their rights to come

 4     to the country.  I was acutely aware of the suffering in Bosnia, needless

 5     to say.

 6        Q.   The reason I'm -- I'm asking you the question is because I want

 7     to make sure that we have an understanding of not only the level of your

 8     sophistication with regard to the issues that were of immediate concern

 9     but also the history and your awareness of the history of the region in

10     that particular time, so we understand what you were juggling with while,

11     as you've put it, these events were unfolding and rapidly deteriorating.

12             With regard to the 11th of July, were any requests made to you to

13     use air power in reaction to Mladic's overtaking of Srebrenica?

14        A.   No.  Not that I can recollect.  Why should they?  I didn't have

15     an aircraft of my own even.  I mean, I was not in any sort of military

16     chain of command.

17        Q.   Very well.

18        A.   The chain of command for the UN forces was a UN chain of command,

19     and I was not in the UN.  I was the European Union.  The UN was, of

20     course, separate.  Mr. Stoltenberg, Mr. Akashi, Mr. Rupert Smith, and add

21     to that, of course, when it comes to air power they have a separate

22     arrangement with NATO and a separate chain of command.  But I was not in

23     either of those chains of commands.

24        Q.   You mentioned on the 11th that you had meetings with

25     Muhamed Sacirbey, the foreign minister, Sacirbey.  Did you get any

Page 14278

 1     indication from him what his reaction to was -- his reaction was to the

 2     fall of Srebrenica?

 3        A.   We spent most of -- it was a rather short meeting I had with him

 4     because obviously we were both running off in different directions.  That

 5     focussed to a very large extent on the need to get humanitarian help.

 6     Because obviously lots of people and it was a question of their faith and

 7     it was a question of helping them to de facto get out.  This was the

 8     subject of subsequent talks that I had also with President Izetbegovic,

 9     because that was a somewhat sensitive issue, to help them with the

10     evacuation.  But that was the -- primarily what was discussed.

11        Q.   We have heard testimony that you told an individual on the day

12     that Srebrenica fell, that Srebrenica also Zepa and Gorazde would not be

13     defended if they came under attack.

14             Did you ever make such a statement?

15        A.   No.  I mean, at that time Srebrenica had fallen.  So I couldn't

16     have made such a statement because that was -- had already happened.

17             Gorazde, of course, we did somewhat later try to defend or at

18     least threaten to defend or to be precise tried to deter attack on with

19     air power.  Although whether that would have worked was debatable in my

20     opinion.  Zepa was a separate story which is much more complicated.  But

21     as I referred to in our conversation with Milosevic and Mladic on the

22     7th, we were very clear in our messages that they should respect the

23     rights, if you call them rights, of the -- of all of the enclaves, and

24     you had the three eastern enclaves.  Sarajevo was also an enclave, you

25     should not forget.  This was a period when the isolation of Sarajevo was

Page 14279

 1     among the tightest it had been during the entire war period and we should

 2     neither forget Bihac, which is also very isolated.

 3        Q.   Right.  Understood.  With regard to your conversations with

 4     Mr. Sacirbey, did he indicate to you that Srebrenica was or was not a

 5     problem?

 6        A.   I mean, needless to say, Srebrenica was a problem.  It was a

 7     major challenge both for the international community and for everyone

 8     else because there was -- don't remember, 30.000, 40.000 people or

 9     something like that under absolutely appalling humanitarian

10     circumstances, as well as a lot of other problems associated with it

11     which had to do with the inner dynamics of Sarajevo.  And it was a major

12     concern in terms also of the supply of the UN forces there because, as

13     you're aware of, there had been -- I mean, the UN forces had not been

14     supplied for quite some time, if I remember it rightly, so they were low

15     on virtually everything.  So it was one of the major concerns.  If it was

16     the one, I don't know.  But it was one of the major concerns.

17        Q.   With regard to the effect that a peace negotiation or ultimate

18     peace settlement would have with respect to Srebrenica, did he voice to

19     you his position with regard to what would happen once peace was

20     obtained?

21        A.   Well, I -- going back to Your Honours' question about what I

22     remember and what's in the book, I have sort of very little

23     recollections.  There is something in the book which I might refer to but

24     I have no independent recollections after 15 years.

25        Q.   If you would take an opportunity to take an opportunity to take a

Page 14280

 1     look at your book --

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   -- read it and tell us what page are you referring to.

 4        A.   Mm-hm.  I think I'm on 56, but --

 5        Q.   May I suggest 57.

 6        A.   You may suggest 57.  Thanks.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note, could counsel please switch

 8     off his microphone when not asking questions.  Thank you very much.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I write here something about his reaction,

10     that he was somewhat calmer than even me.  It might be that he had been

11     following the situation on the ground more closely than I had been.  He

12     said that they knew that a peace settlement would mean the loss of the

13     enclave.  Whether that is true or not, I don't know.  Ask him.  But then

14     he was deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation, appealed for as

15     much active assistance as possible to evacuate --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Bildt please read slower.  Thank you.

17             THE WITNESS:  [Previous translation continues] ... I could.  He

18     appealed for as much active assistance as possible to evacuate the

19     refugees and to help him in this very difficult situation.  I eagerly

20     promised to do whatever I could in this respect.

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:

22        Q.   Thank you for that response.

23             MR. GUY-SMITH:  And I note the time, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you so much.  We will take the break until

25     quarter past 2.00.  Thank you very much.

Page 14281

 1             THE WITNESS:  Is that necessary?

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Well, the staff must go for lunch.  They have been

 3     in court for the whole morning.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.  I -- I -- just to urge you that I have sort

 5     of fairly urgent at some point -- I'm happy to be here, no question

 6     about, but I have some sort of fairly urgent government business awaiting

 7     me in Stockholm as well.

 8             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I understand that, Mr. Bildt.  But the other

 9     problem is that, as you may see or have been taught, the tape goes one

10     and a quarter hours and then they need some time to -- to clean that and

11     we've got to come back.  As you might have heard Mr. Guy-Smith referring

12     to corrections that are made, so during the break they make corrections,

13     we come back.  That's how it operates here, and unfortunately, using --

14     given the technology we use here, we can't do it otherwise.

15             So we will take a break and come back at quarter past 2.00.

16                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.15 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 2.14 p.m.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

19             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20        Q.   Mr. Bildt, before -- before we start, I have been -- I have been

21     asked to speak up and speak more slowly, and it's also been asked that

22     you speak also a bit more slowly, especially when you're reading, because

23     you have a tendency to speed up, as we all do.  So if we could just keep

24     that in mind, I think that we then might avoid some of the interruptions

25     that we've had thus far and we'd make a number of the staff much happier

Page 14282

 1     and we'd have a more complete record.

 2             With that in mind, I'd like to know whether or not you ever

 3     engaged in discussions or approached anyone concerning the trade of the

 4     eastern enclaves for Sarajevo as a solution or as a part of the peace

 5     settlement process.

 6        A.   No.  The eastern enclaves, no.  As you -- there obviously had

 7     been a lot of discussion during the course of the negotiations on the

 8     territorial question.  May I remind you that I was brought in early June

 9     of 1995.  My focus, what I was asked to do was really to negotiate some

10     of the political aspects of it.  I did not go into, neither had I the

11     mandate to go into, the territorial issues.  They came, of course, to the

12     forefront somewhat later, when we approached Dayton, when it was a

13     question of sorting out of map.  I mean, to decide what was the 49 and

14     51, and was then the subject of rather intense discussions in Dayton.

15             There was also -- but that was not me.  There was also, of

16     course, a subsequent American attempt to present some sort of preliminary

17     map, but I was never involved in that.

18        Q.   We have previously heard testimony that, with regard to the trade

19     of the eastern enclaves for Sarajevo, that an individual was approached.

20     He never initiated, and he would have, he was approached by you with

21     regard to the concept of trade of the eastern enclaves for Sarajevo

22     [sic].

23             Is that statement an accurate or true statement, that you

24     approached any individuals?

25        A.   Whom should I have approached?

Page 14283

 1        Q.   Well, put it in -- in these terms.  That during the time that you

 2     were involved with negotiations concerning the peace settlement, you have

 3     mentioned a number of individuals that you spoke with.

 4        A.   Mm-hm.

 5        Q.   I am constrained by certain procedural rules from mentioning any

 6     specific names.  So the question is:  Do you have any independent

 7     recollection of ever dealing with, for example, anybody of the Republika

 8     Srpska side in which you approached them with regard to the issue of

 9     trading the eastern enclaves for Sarajevo?  Let's start with that and

10     then I will go through each group.

11        A.   Well, as said, we did not have -- go back to what we said

12     earlier, during this particular phase we didn't have any contacts of that

13     sort --

14        Q.   Very well.

15        A.   -- with the representatives of Republika Srpska.

16        Q.   Now with regard to the Bosnia-Herzegovina side, did you ever

17     approach any individuals on the Bosnia-Herzegovina side with regard to

18     the same issue, once again that being --

19        A.   No, because we were -- as said, my focus was on the political

20     part of the settlement, which was the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

21     it was the internal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while sort of the

22     territorial issues which had been dealt with with the contact group map,

23     summer of 1993, was left aside for the time being.  They were later to

24     resurface, needless to say.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's the 51, 49?

Page 14284

 1             THE WITNESS:  The 59, 41 [sic].  And how to implement, sort of,

 2     that particular thing.  That was the focus of a lot of the Dayton talks,

 3     by the way.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 5        Q.   Very well.  I want to take us up to the 14th of July, if I could.

 6        A.   Mm-hm.

 7        Q.   And ask you if you can recall, as you sit here today, where you

 8     were on the 14th of July, 1995?

 9        A.   Well, I arrived in Belgrade from somewhere for a subsequent

10     meeting with, among others, President Milosevic.  I'd had number of

11     scheduled meetings with him fairly frequently as part of the negotiation,

12     so this was the next scheduled meeting that was going take place, on

13     Friday, the 14th of July.

14        Q.   And with regard to the meeting on the 14th of July, can you tell

15     us who else was present during that meeting?

16        A.   There were a series of meetings during the 14th and the 15th,

17     which quite certainly --

18        Q.   Very well.

19        A.   -- you're aware of.  And my recollection might not be perfect on

20     exactly the sequence of different meetings but I think that it started

21     with me meeting -- well, it started with me having other meetings of the

22     diplomatic community, and in Belgrade having contact with Washington and

23     with other places to prepare for -- because we were then in a completely

24     different situation that had to do with the fall of Srebrenica.  So it

25     was a question of internationally calibrating the message that we're

Page 14285

 1     going to give to President Milosevic.  But as -- then I assume that my

 2     meeting with President Milosevic was the same format as usual --

 3             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. --

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 5        Q.   Let me interrupt me just a --

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Bildt, if you can come closer to the

 7     microphone --

 8             THE WITNESS:  And be slower.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And be slower.  If you look at that screen, the

10     stenographer says can you please come closer to the microphone.

11             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.  I'm sorry.

12             Yes, the different meetings on July 14th and 15th.  Arriving in

13     Belgrade, I had the reason to coordinate with the international community

14     and I used the diplomatic facilities available to me to communicate with

15     key capitals, notably Washington, because we were then in a completely

16     new situation after the fall of Srebrenica.  Then my meeting with

17     President Milosevic, which I think was in Dobanovci as usual, I would

18     assume.  I have no recollection of anyone else from the Yugoslav side,

19     I'd say, than the individuals that we mentioned previously being there.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:

21        Q.   That being the individual you've identified as Goran?

22        A.   Yes, quite.  Yes, I would have remembered if there were -- and if

23     I remember it rightly, there was is no one else mentioned in my book that

24     would have been.

25             Then, subsequently, at some point in time we had General Mladic

Page 14286

 1     again.  And then during the 15th, we had for follow-up meetings, of

 2     course, quite an elaborate procedure of international representatives.

 3     The UN SRSG, Mr. Akashi; the UN Special Envoy, Mr. Stoltenberg; the

 4     commander UN BH command, General Rupert Smith; and from my staff, General

 5     de Lapresle and General Elliot.  And there might well have been others as

 6     well.

 7        Q.   With regard to meetings that were held on 15th of July, do you

 8     recall whether or not an agreement was made or working points were

 9     obtained between General Smith and General Mladic?

10        A.   Well, there was a preliminary agreement made which was to be

11     ratified at a meeting a week later between General Mladic and

12     General Rupert Smith, which related to both access to Srebrenica, which

13     was to go into effect immediately, and access to the enclaves.  This was

14     the first meeting between the Generals since at least May.  And

15     accordingly, on the 15th, there was a rather lengthy and very heated

16     discussion between the Generals on both the situation, what had happened

17     and how to proceed.  And there was the preliminary agreement along the

18     lines that I indicated to be formalised at the meeting I think a week

19     later that subsequently took place somewhere, in Eastern Bosnia.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could please have P2369 on the screen.

21        Q.   The document -- yes, it is with us now.

22        A.   Mm-hm, mm-hm.

23        Q.   I'd like to ask you to take a look at this Prosecution exhibit,

24     if you would.

25        A.   Mm-hm.

Page 14287

 1        Q.   Which consists, I believe, of three pages in total.  Yes.  And in

 2     terms of -- in terms of, first of all, the first page, is that the

 3     meeting that you were referring to that occurred on the 15th?  Or one of

 4     the meetings that -- let me rephrase that question.  One of the meetings

 5     that you were referring to that occurred on the 15th of July?

 6        A.   Yeah.  This is obviously the cable from Mr. Akashi to the

 7     then-head of peacekeeping, Mr. Kofi Annan, in New York, that refers to

 8     meeting on Saturday, July the 15th.

 9        Q.   And this is -- you were discussing, as I think -- if I'm not

10     mistake, there was a long meeting between the two Generals, that being

11     General Smith and General Mladic.  They had not met for some time.  And

12     you mentioned that some informal agreement had been reached.

13        A.   Mm-hm.

14        Q.   There's something else that's indicated on the first page with

15     regard to the presence of Mladic at these meetings.  Could you share with

16     us what the decision was with regard to it being made public whether

17     Mladic was involved or present at these meetings.

18        A.   I think, as a matter of fact, if we go to the second page of this

19     particular document, which I recollect, it says -- yes.  You read there

20     in the beginning, the specified agreement will be revealed of the meeting

21     with General Mladic and General Smith scheduled for Wednesday, the 19th

22     of July.  For some reason which had to do with internal dynamics on the

23     Serb side, they wanted to have this in the public domain a week later.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:

Page 14288

 1        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... the determination was made

 2     that it would not be in the public domain on the 15th.  Mladic's presence

 3     was being kept secret at that time for some reasons.

 4        A.   Well, most of the meetings -- yeah.  There was no press release

 5     on most of this, I would say.

 6        Q.   Since we are on -- on the second page, and looking at the very

 7     top, it says understandings from Belgrade discussion situation in Bosnia

 8     and Herzegovina, and then there are a series of issues that are -- as I

 9     understand it, the informal agreement that was made at that time as

10     between General Mladic and General Smith.

11        A.   Mm-hm.  Yes, that is correct.

12        Q.   I'd like to focus on the Srebrenica portion of the

13     understandings.

14        A.   Mm-hm.

15        Q.   The fourth paragraph down, which discusses that the ICRC shall

16     have immediate access to "prisoners of war," to assess their welfare and

17     register and review procedures at Bosnian Serb reception centre in

18     accordance with the Geneva Convention.

19        A.   Mm-hm.

20        Q.   Is there any further information that you can give us with regard

21     to this particular aspect of the informal agreement that was had between

22     Mladic and Smith?  Was this --

23        A.   No.  With the exception that, concerning Srebrenica, the informal

24     agreement, which I don't know if that is specified in this particular

25     document, was that this should go into force immediately.  And there was

Page 14289

 1     set up, if I remember it rightly, some sort of point of contact for the

 2     UN on the VRS side to arrange this.  I think it was General -- was it

 3     Gvero?

 4        Q.   Gvero?

 5        A.   Yeah.  Whether it was UNHCR to get in touch with him or whatever,

 6     I can't remember.  But the UN contact with General Gvero that should

 7     happen fairly immediately in order to implement these particular aspects

 8     of it.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And I --

10        A.   If it --

11        Q.   It maybe sound a bit foolish and I don't mean it to be, but with

12     regard to the understanding of -- to have access to prisoners of war,

13     what would the -- what would that entail in a practical sense?

14        A.   You will have to ask ICRC and others because they had their

15     particular channels and I was not prior -- I was not informed about

16     everything.  ICRC has a specific mandate and a specific role and they had

17     their specific channels and my role here, as indicated earlier, I was

18     responsible for the political talks.  It was just that since the military

19     to military and other links had been broken down, I was just facilitating

20     these particular meetings and contacts at that particular time.  But the

21     ones who were dealing with these issues was UNHCR, obviously, but also

22     ICRC.  When it comes to what was defined as prisoners of war, that was a

23     controversial issue in itself, how you define a prisoner of war.

24        Q.   And do you know what the controversy was there as between

25     Generals Mladic and Smith?

Page 14290

 1        A.   Not the -- I'm not aware of any controversy on this particular

 2     point that you ask now.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4        A.   They had a rather profound disagreement on the nature of the war,

 5     needless to say.

 6        Q.   Needless to say.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If we could turn to the next page.

 8        Q.   And I'm specifically interested in the topic which is entitled

 9     "Cessation of hostilities" for the first moment.  Which is -- it says

10     here:

11             "Serbs propose that all generals commanding warring parties be

12     invited, in the presence of Mr. Bildt, to discussions on a cessation of

13     hostilities agreement."

14             I take it that was something to happen in the future.  And when

15     it says "Serbs propose" here, is that referring to the Bosnian Serbs?

16        A.   I think we alluded to this earlier.  This was a fairly

17     standard -- I don't know what he wants, but standard request by

18     General Mladic.  As said, he, for reasons that I indicated, had an

19     interest in closing down the war.  He was sitting on 70 per cent of the

20     territory.  The tide of the war was turning, fairly obvious.  He wanted

21     to have a direct link with General Delic, commanding general of the BiH,

22     and sit down with him and agree on this, and he wanted to us facilitate

23     that.  That was obviously a distinct non-start because, as you quite

24     certain are aware of, at that particular point in time, there was a

25     breakdown between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic.  I'm not aware of how they

Page 14291

 1     were communicating, if they were commuting at all.  There was an acute

 2     political conflict between them, which is extremely obvious and extremely

 3     public.  So Mladic was operating from that point of view.  Uncertain how

 4     much but quite independently.  While, of course, General Delic was in a

 5     completely different situation.  In Sarajevo these issues, the detailed

 6     issues were dealt with by the political leadership, while, on the VRS

 7     side, Mladic was in command.

 8        Q.   And when you say the details were dealt with by the political

 9     leadership, on the -- with regard to the BiH, I take it you're referring

10     to the political leadership at that time being President Izetbegovic?

11        A.   The Presidency.

12        Q.   The Presidency.

13        A.   The Presidency which was headed by President Izetbegovic.  So it

14     was no question of them allowing, for good reasons in my opinion, sort of

15     the direct talks between General Mladic and General Delic.  Although that

16     was what Serbs wanted, for reasons that are fairly obvious, or the VRS

17     wanted for reasons that were fairly obvious.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I would like to satisfy my curiosity here.

19             Given the breakdown of relations between Mladic and Karadzic and

20     to your communication with Mladic, what hope was there of implementing

21     any agreement that might have come about between Mladic on the one hand

22     and any other party supposing Delic came, for one reason or another?

23             THE WITNESS:  I do think that any meeting between Mladic and

24     Delic would have been a distinct non-start because the issues were

25     essentially political at this particular phase.  So it had to be

Page 14292

 1     political agreement on how to settle the war.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Let me ask my question slightly differently.

 3             Given this breakdown, what was the basis for your pursuing

 4     negotiations with Mladic as a party?

 5             THE WITNESS:  Well, we did not negotiate with Mladic as a party.

 6     We negotiated with Milosevic.  He was our party to negotiations.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But he keeps on bringing Mladic to whatever

 8     meetings you are having.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Yeah.  Well, not to whatever meetings.  No, no, no.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

11             THE WITNESS:  No, I had extensive meetings with Milosevic.  We're

12     just talking twice.  And that was at our request in order to facilitate

13     the re-establishment of the military to military contact, which was

14     between the UN and the VRS.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

16             THE WITNESS:  I mean, the UN forces were, of course -- they were

17     to some extent in between, as we know, so they were in need of constant

18     communication with the three armies on the ground.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  According to this exhibit that's on the screen,

20     Mladic is featuring quite a lot.  There are lots of discussions between

21     him and General Smith.  And in response to your question about the Serbs

22     proposing that all Generals commanding warring parties being invited,

23     you -- I think you said that Mladic was the guy who was making this

24     demand, because he was sitting on 70 per cent.  This war was turning

25     against him and -- so it seems to me as if Mladic is the main player.

Page 14293

 1             THE WITNESS:  On the military side he was, on the Bosnian Serb

 2     side, yes.  Then our -- to be quite frank, at the time we could only note

 3     the conflict that was there between Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic.  We

 4     saw it in the Bosnian Serb media and at some point in time, I can't

 5     remember when, of course, Mr. Karadzic sort of dismissed General Mladic

 6     as commander of the VRS.  That -- and Mr. Karadzic appeared in uniform on

 7     the streets of Banja Luka.  He made himself a laughing stock by doing

 8     that because it was obvious that the army units were responding to

 9     General Mladic and not to Mr. Karadzic.  But the exact nature of the

10     relationship was, of course, unknown to us at the time.  I'm quite

11     certain that the different documents available to the Tribunal today

12     would shed light on that.  But --

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Overlapping speakers] ... we --

14             THE WITNESS:  -- at that particular time, we --

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  We have that light.  I was just interested in --

16     if I'm -- and I'm not being disrespectful here because I'm just trying to

17     be as clear as I possibly can, what you hoped achieve by -- and when by

18     you, not you personally, the group that was negotiating -- the group that

19     is mentioned on this exhibit.

20             THE WITNESS:  No --

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Or simply because he is a military head he could

22     impose his will on the political leadership, maybe was that the

23     expectation?

24             THE WITNESS:  No, not for this.  He was in command of what was

25     the acute issue from the UN military side.  I was facilitating those

Page 14294

 1     contacts, as I said.  I was not primarily doing them.  But the acute

 2     situation that was there was, of course, the situation of the enclaves.

 3     And when we talked about the enclaves, the enclave that was really acute

 4     was Sarajevo.  I mean, Milosevic was sitting on the supply lines and he

 5     was denying the resupply of all of the enclaves and he was tightening the

 6     siege of Sarajevo.  And, of course, apart from the humanitarian concerns

 7     which were foremost in our minds, I mean, the population was suffering

 8     heavily, this was -- and I remember in Sarajevo they were heading for the

 9     third or the fourth winter of war at that particular time.  It was also

10     the resupply of the UN forces that were in the different enclaves,

11     including in Sarajevo.  And I don't know if that is reflected here in the

12     document, but the most vivid discussion was concerning the resupply of

13     Sarajevo, where we had managed to get agreement to open up the land

14     access with some limitations, because up until that time he had closed

15     all land access, and we and the UN had been dependant upon the -- both

16     unreliable, very limited and very dangerous route over the Igman, with

17     all of the problems associated with that.  Here we got agreement to open

18     the road from Kiseljak into Ilidza.  Although, as I think is somewhere in

19     the documents as well, the critical issue was supply of ammunition, where

20     Mladic was adamant in his use.

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated] ... yes, Mr. Harmon.

22             MR. HARMON:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, to interrupt.  Just at

23     page 47, line 10, I'm not sure if that name is the correct name that was

24     correctly reported.  I heard that name but I'm not sure Mr. Bildt

25     intended that to be the name and so I'd just like to clarify that part of

Page 14295

 1     his answer.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Can you see that Mr. Bildt?  Page 47, line 10.

 3             MR. HARMON:  Where it says -- I will read it, if you'd like.  It

 4     says:

 5             "When we talked about the enclaves, the enclave that was really

 6     acute was Sarajevo.  Milosevic was sitting on the supply lines ..."

 7             And I'm not sure and just --

 8             THE WITNESS:  No, Mladic.

 9             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Mladic was sitting --

10             THE WITNESS:  Mladic was sitting on supply lines.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I did see it and I was wondering and I thought --

12     but either could fit.  [Microphone not activated].

13             MR. GUY-SMITH:

14        Q.   Since His Honour has focussed somewhat on the relationship as

15     between Milosevic and Mladic and Mladic's --

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I focus between Mladic and Karadzic.  That was my

17     focus.  Not Milosevic and Mladic.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:

19        Q.   Since the Chamber's -- excuse me.  Since the Chamber's focus was

20     on Mladic and Karadzic and necessarily with -- within that becomes

21     another issue which is the relationship between Milosevic and Mladic, I'd

22     like to discuss with you whether or not on the 14th specifically, you had

23     any indications of the ability of Milosevic to control Mladic?

24        A.   Well, I -- "control" is a word that one can discuss in different

25     terms.  But I vividly remember where he was not able to do it, and that

Page 14296

 1     was the issue that I indicated.  That is the supply of ammunition.

 2     Because we had a need to get [indiscernible] from the humanitarian things

 3     into Sarajevo, I mean, food, everything that is needed for supply of

 4     city.  People were having very, very difficult situation.  Supply of the

 5     UN forces with everything you need.  I can't remember how many thousands

 6     there were but substantial numbers anyhow in Sarajevo.  But the critical

 7     issue was ammunition.  They were running low on certain ammunitions.

 8             And Milosevic -- sorry, Mladic took heavy -- after a while he

 9     agreed that we could open up supply lines again.  But he would not allow

10     lethal -- that is ammunition to the UN forces to come in.  He took

11     particularly -- and I think that was caused by the fact that at that time

12     the UN forces had begun to be in certain respects rather tough.  There

13     had been deployed, I can't remember exactly when, but some French heavy

14     mortars with artillery locating radars as well, which means that there

15     was the possibility certainly to do counter-battery fire, which had not

16     been the case before.  And there had been, I think it is in my book

17     somewhere, case where this counter-battery fire had been deployed with

18     devastating effect, and that had impacted upon him and he did not want to

19     have this particular battery resupplied with ammunition.

20             I mean, perfectly logical from his point of view.  But we were,

21     of course, insisting on that because the UN -- we had the UN, UN had the

22     right, Security Council resolutions, whatever legality, was completely on

23     our side.  We demanded the right to resupply the forces with whatever the

24     forces needed.  On this particular point Milosevic tried to say to

25     Mladic, You have to agree with this.  The situation is such you have

Page 14297

 1     agree to it.  But I'm not -- I can't recollect exactly what was the

 2     resolution of the issue because that went into the subsequent meetings

 3     between General Rupert Smith and General Mladic and I was not prior to

 4     the resolution of that particular conflict.  But it was a fairly lively

 5     one, I can tell you.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  But did you -- it is not a question of Milosevic

 7     gives an order and Mladic carries it out.  It was a question of

 8     negotiation.

 9             THE WITNESS:  It was a question of Milosevic saying, "I think we

10     should do this."  And on quite a number of issues you see Mladic saying,

11     "Yes, yes, yes," but there were limits to it.  There were distinct limits

12     to it at some times.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:

15        Q.   I picked up right after the -- Judge Moloto asked you the

16     question that you your first answer was no.

17        A.   Mm-hm.

18        Q.   You said -- he asked you the question which is not reflected in

19     the transcript which is why I'm asking.  He asked the question:  It's not

20     a question Milosevic gives an order and Mladic carries it out.  It was a

21     question of negotiation.  I heard you saying no.  Is that accurate, did

22     you say no?

23        A.   I don't know what I said.  But -- but I wouldn't -- I wouldn't

24     call it negotiation either because then you have sort of two independent

25     parties negotiating.  I mean, it was a complex relationship, and I was

Page 14298

 1     only subject to two conversations between the two men.  So my knowledge

 2     of the relationship is somewhat limited.  I had limited impressions from

 3     those.  But I can say that on a certain part of that it was Milosevic

 4     said, This is the way it should be done or you ought to do, and he said

 5     okay.  But on certain other cases, he said distinctly, No, I'm not going

 6     do it.  And Milosevic could be quite firm against him and didn't really

 7     help.  Although, I, as said, Your Honour, I don't know what was the final

 8     outcome of those particular issues but during the conversations that I

 9     was part of it.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Let me ask this question.

11             Are you able to recollect Mladic's response to Milosevic's

12     statement that Mladic ought to allow weaponry to go through?

13             THE WITNESS:  Not literally but effectively he was refusing that,

14     yes.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  So effectively it didn't happen.  He just

16     didn't --

17             THE WITNESS:  [Overlapping speakers] ... I said, Your Honour,

18     what eventually happened a couple of weeks later, or one week later, at

19     the meeting between General Rupert Smith and General Mladic, I don't

20     know.  Whether the resupplied -- but then, of course, things changed

21     fundamentally.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And you don't know what caused the change there

23     but while you were there --

24             THE WITNESS:  It did not happen.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It -- that's --

Page 14299

 1             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 3             THE WITNESS:  That's correct.

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 5        Q.   I get the sense from the number of interchanges we've had here

 6     that -- and I'm asking, would this be fair to say that there were limits

 7     to what Milosevic could get Mladic to accept?

 8        A.   It is very difficult to me to make a generalised statement on

 9     such an issue because that is obviously a rather complex relationship

10     with very many dimensions to it.  I can only refer to the two meetings

11     that I had, where the two meetings -- where the two men were at the same

12     time and those were the only two times I met General Mladic ever.

13        Q.   Would it help refresh your recollection, with regards to the

14     specific question that I asked you, to refer to your book where you talk

15     about this?  And that would be page 62.  And starts with the second

16     paragraph:  "In general terms ..."

17        A.   Yeah.  No, that's -- yeah.  Now I read it that is exactly what --

18     that's roughly what I've said here previously.  In somewhat more literal

19     language perhaps but ...

20        Q.   So is it your recollection that with regard to these discussions

21     Milosevic was helpful?

22        A.   Milosevic at that time was interested in -- in my opinion getting

23     a deal fairly fast for reasons that we don't need to go into.  He was

24     aware of the fact that there was a very strong international reaction to

25     the fall of Srebrenica.  And obviously it was his interest to be helpful

Page 14300

 1     in order to moderate that international reaction.  So he was helpful in

 2     trying to facilitate the document that you saw here, the exhibit.  Then

 3     as a completely separate issue is, of course, to which extent that

 4     document was implemented.  And we all know the facts concerning that.

 5     That's a later story.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Bildt, if you could just read, if it is a

 7     short passage, that page 62 in general terms because we don't have a copy

 8     of your book.

 9             THE WITNESS:  Sorry about that.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Not a problem.  It's not your problem.

11             THE WITNESS:  No, I said in general terms Milosevic was helpful

12     in these discussions.  He knew how sensitive the Sarajevo issue was to --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Would you please read slower.

14             THE WITNESS:  I'm sorry.

15             "He knew how sensitive the Sarajevo issue was to world opinion,

16     but there were limits to what he could get Mladic to accept.  When

17     Milosevic joined me in pressing him to accept the complete freedom of the

18     UN to resupply its force in Sarajevo, his face flushed dark red, he

19     banged his fist on the table, stared at Milosevic and said he would never

20     accept the bringing in of ammunition that the UN forces could use against

21     his soldiers.  And indeed, the UN forces in Sector Sarajevo had started

22     to counter-attack with effect.  The French heavy mortars were deadly in

23     their accuracy ..." and that's roughly what I said.

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  [Microphone not activated].

Page 14301

 1        Q.   You say Milosevic fell silent and beat a discrete --

 2        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ... that was the literary language, yes.

 3        Q.   -- retreat.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 6        Q.   I now want to move from that time.  We have a problem here which

 7     apparently we were overlapping and I wanted to just make sure the record

 8     is clear here.  On line 11, apparently, we started speaking over each

 9     other.

10             I said:  "You say Milosevic fell silent and beat a discrete

11     retreat."  And I believe your response was that it was -- that's what

12     your book says and it was a styled in a literary form.  I'm using -- I

13     may be paraphrasing your language but I believe that's what the two of

14     us -- that's the meaning of that particular part of the conversation.

15             And if I can get you to answer, because a nod doesn't come up on

16     the --

17        A.   Yes, sorry.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.

19             Now I want to move now to the 19th of July --

20             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Before you do that --

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Surely.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  -- didn't Mr. Bildt also mention that Mladic hit

23     the table?

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I don't see --

Page 14302

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  He did.  Did that not come up either?

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  It might have disappeared but I didn't see it.

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  It's there.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's fine.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 6        Q.   Moving to the 19th of July, do you recall where you were on the

 7     19th?

 8        A.   In Belgrade again.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And at that time, when you were in Belgrade, did you have

10     occasion to meet Mladic again or have we now completed our meetings with

11     General Mladic?

12        A.   We have now completed them because what has happened was that

13     then the contact had been re-established between the military commanders,

14     so at the same time I think there was the meeting between General Rupert

15     Smith and General Mladic and the discussion on the -- sort of the on the

16     ground issues were then back to the military to military, UN, VRS, ABiH

17     level.  And I was dealing solely with the political issues.

18        Q.   Now with regard to the situation in Srebrenica up until this

19     point, the understanding is that there has been a military assault on the

20     enclave which has been vigorously objected to, as I understand it, by you

21     and the rest of the international community.  Is that fair?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   There have been efforts to obtain a cease-fire and an informal

24     discussion has occurred in which there are a series of points, speaking

25     points or actual agreements have been made between the two Generals that

Page 14303

 1     are supposed to take effect on the 19th.

 2        A.   I -- I wouldn't necessarily say there had been efforts to obtain

 3     a cease-fire.  Because clearly that was not in the cards at the time.

 4        Q.   All right.

 5        A.   There had been -- General Mladic had expressed the view -- the

 6     wish for such a meeting in order to discuss that, but clearly for reasons

 7     that I have alluded to, that was not in the cards at the moment.

 8        Q.   So then --

 9        A.   At that moment.

10        Q.   Understood.  Mladic had in effect inserted a condition precedent

11     to there being a cease-fire which is the meeting with Delic which you

12     explained to us was not going to occur for a series of political reasons.

13        A.   I wouldn't put too much emphasis on this because this was

14     really -- I mean, these comments of him were really a side show.  It

15     passed by and it's a passing reference in my book only because I think he

16     knew also that was a non-starter, as things were at that particular

17     period of time.  It sort of -- a couple of weeks later things were

18     different but we were -- we are now in an extremely dynamic and dramatic

19     situation --

20        Q.   Understood.

21        A.   -- as to the situation on the ground.

22        Q.   Understood.  Now, I believe it's the next day that you learn for

23     the first time about the events that you have termed and others have

24     termed as being the massacres in Srebrenica, the 20th of July?

25        A.   Yes.  Depends on what you mean.  Srebrenica were quite a number

Page 14304

 1     of events.  I mean, we had the fall of it.  We had the -- which I was

 2     involved in then, trying to get people out, and -- and that was, of

 3     course, primarily the women and the children.  There was the convoys that

 4     were organised and the receptions at Tuzla airfield.  There were a lot of

 5     problems associated with that that we had to deal with.  Eventually that,

 6     as we know, happened.

 7             We were aware of the fact that there was a column trying to break

 8     through.  I can't remember exactly when and how we got our detailed

 9     information about that, because things were obviously somewhat difficult

10     to get information on what exactly was happening at that time.  And then

11     there were the fact that sort of the men had been separated.  We knew

12     that from the women coming out.  And then, of course, I think on the

13     20th, the first indication that the men had not been kept in custody

14     of -- but had been massacred or killed in large numbers.  It was sketchy

15     information at the time.

16        Q.   And that information, if we were to take a look at the meeting on

17     the 15th, in which a series of -- of negotiation points had been arrived

18     at, was obviously directly contrary to anything that you -- that you had

19     expected because there was, among other things, an understanding there

20     would be access to prisoners of war?

21        A.   Yeah, but I wouldn't use the word "expected."  Because in the

22     word "expectation" is the assumption that we believed everything that was

23     said.  At that time, my experience was perhaps not as extensive as later,

24     but I was already aware of the fact that you should not necessarily take

25     for granted that what people promised that they delivered.  So the word

Page 14305

 1     "expectation" I wouldn't necessarily say.  That did not prevent us from

 2     trying to get commitments by people because there was at least some

 3     possibility that they would implement some of it.  But I can't really say

 4     that when we found out that it was not implemented, that that came as a

 5     complete bolt out of the blue and was out of the ordinary.  I mean, there

 6     had been -- my knowledge of the previous negotiating history was that

 7     there had been, unfortunately, a lot of this before.  That things being

 8     promised and things turned out otherwise.

 9        Q.   Just to back away just for a moment.  You have been involved in

10     negotiations, political negotiations, both at a domestic level and an

11     international level for some many years now.  And would it be fair to say

12     that generally speaking with regard to the issue of negotiations and

13     statements that are made in a negotiation process, that it is not

14     necessarily the best thing in the world to rely on everything that is

15     being said?

16        A.   That is somewhat dependant upon the situation.  I wouldn't take

17     that as a generalised statement.

18        Q.   With regard to the situation in the Balkans.

19        A.   I wouldn't take that as a generalised statement on the Balkans

20     either.  But I noted that I would not use the word "expected" for the --

21     what you referred to earlier concerning this particular situation.

22        Q.   With regard to representations that were made by General Mladic,

23     would that be a fair statement?

24        A.   My only -- as said, I only had these two meetings in order to

25     facilitate other contacts with him, so I never sort of went into sort of

Page 14306

 1     true negotiations with him or anything of that sort.  But I noted that

 2     there were these -- you referred to the agreement that he concluded here

 3     or the whatever you call it, with the -- with the UN commanders on the

 4     ground, and we all know that those -- what he promised there, was not

 5     delivered.

 6        Q.   With regard to the --

 7        A.   Primarily on Srebrenica.

 8        Q.   Understood.

 9        A.   Was delivered on certain other aspects.

10        Q.   With regard to the situation and ultimately the information you

11     received on the 20th of July concerning the massacres in Srebrenica, at

12     that time based on all the information that you had, was the situation

13     that occurred in Srebrenica foreseeable or not?

14        A.   Which situation?

15        Q.   The massacres.

16        A.   The massacres or the genocide.

17             I think I write in the book and I think that is still my view,

18     that what happened in Srebrenica was even by the standards of the Balkan

19     wars surprising.  It was -- I mean, this was an extremely brutal war.  I

20     referred to -- my impression of General Mladic and sort of the medieval

21     mindset, I wouldn't necessarily say that he was the only one with that

22     medieval mindset when it comes to -- we have a concept of warfare in the

23     west, for better or worse, that is that we nowadays make a distinction

24     between armies and the population.  That is the laws of the -- the laws

25     of war.  That didn't really apply.  So there were horrendous war crimes

Page 14307

 1     committed throughout the war.  I don't need to tell this here, by the

 2     way.  But even by those standards I think what was happening in

 3     Srebrenica was unique in its barbarity.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  The question was --

 5             THE WITNESS:  Did we expect it.

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yeah, was it foreseeable.

 7             THE WITNESS:  I don't have an answer to that.  We -- we spent a

 8     long time afterwards trying to see -- or others spent a long time

 9     afterwards, but I'm aware that others spent a long time afterwards, where

10     the intelligence was available, on the attack and the answer to a large

11     extent was no.  Was there the possibility of foreseeing what later

12     happened?  I don't know, frankly speaking.

13             The only one that -- I think that's in the book as well, the one

14     when I started in early July -- no, early June, the one who sort of was

15     very worried about what might happen in Srebrenica was the Russian

16     foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, and the reason for that, I think was

17     the fact he had been Russian foreign minister for quite some time, so he

18     had been involved in Srebrenica in 1993 and was perhaps more aware than

19     many of the emotions and tensions surrounding that particular issue.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.

21        Q.   I want to move a slightly different subject for the moment.  And

22     that deals with whether or not you ever had occasion to be at an airport

23     where there were US air forces and Iranian aeroplanes delivering

24     weaponry?

25        A.   Weaponry, I don't know.

Page 14308

 1        Q.   Okay.

 2        A.   Aeroplanes, yes.

 3        Q.   Could you expand on that a bit.

 4        A.   I --

 5        Q.   What you did see; where were you?

 6        A.   I think referred to one instance where at Split airport I noted

 7     that lined up each -- beside each other was US Air Force that was

 8     delivering equipment, whatever it could have been, for the rapid reaction

 9     force that was coming in, and then there was an Iranian plane with, I

10     understand, an Iranian delegation of some sort.

11        Q.   And when you say an Iranian delegation, do you know what that

12     Iranian delegation was in the midst of doing?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   Okay.  After the information that you received on -- on the

15     20th - I'm going to move forward now - I understand there were a series

16     of discussions with regard to potential use of air-strikes and a number

17     of other matters that occurred.  But I want to move now, if I could, to

18     the 29th of July.  29th of July is a time when you received a, I believe,

19     specific telephone call.

20        A.   Mm-hm.

21        Q.   And I'd like to get some understanding of what happened there, if

22     we could.

23        A.   I guess this refers to what is on page 69 and 70 of -- of my

24     book.  I was -- I was in Stockholm at the time and I received a telephone

25     call from Mr. Muratovic, who I think was prime minister in Bosnia at the

Page 14309

 1     time, and he wanted to meet with me urgently in Split.  I was on my way

 2     to see Chancellor Kohl in, I think, in Austria before, which I did.  But

 3     when Mr. Muratovic wanted to see me urgently, I knew it was something

 4     important, particularly in view of the fact that he said we should meet

 5     in Split.  And for him to go from Sarajevo to Split during the siege in

 6     the war was not an easy thing, to put it mildly.  So it was something

 7     major that was obviously there.

 8             We met at the airport at some point in time, and the conversation

 9     was about Zepa.  As you know the -- after -- after the fall of

10     Srebrenica, the Bosnian Serb forces concentrated or intended to

11     concentrate on capturing Zepa.  There was a very close connection between

12     those enclaves, both, for all sorts of reasons.  Zepa enclave was, as I

13     think you are aware of, very small but very rugged terrain and

14     [indiscernible] a very difficult place also from the purely military

15     point of view.  I think there was a Ukrainian UN component there as well.

16     Well, there was some difficulty associated with that.

17             To make this long story short, Mr. Muratovic wanted my help to

18     communicate with Mr. Milosevic on the possibility for the remaining

19     HBiH [sic] units to evacuate Zepa to Serbia.  This was somewhat

20     surprising demand to me, but I said, I'm your humble servant, more or

21     less.  If you think it is better to bring them out of Serbia and you

22     think that is safe, he said, We don't know, but can we get assurances

23     from Milosevic that he would receive our fighters.  Because the -- if you

24     look at the map, Zepa is closer to Serbia than it is to Sarajevo

25     territory and obviously -- fairly obviously, I would say, Bosnian Serbs

Page 14310

 1     forces were concentrated in the area between Zepa and Sarajevo, but

 2     between Zepa and Serbia significantly less on extremely rugged terrain.

 3     I said I do what I can and then went and saw President Milosevic at the

 4     fairly distant location, another one of these Tito hideouts or lodges.

 5     And said to him this had to be a matter of extreme secrecy and said this

 6     is the case, can you guarantee that your forces will accept these people

 7     coming in.  And he promised that.  And I returned -- I sent that message

 8     back.  I can't really remember by which way but some secure way of

 9     communication to Prime Minister Muratovic and eventually this is what

10     happened.  They were later taken in by the UNHCR in a special camp in --

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  In Serbia?

12             THE WITNESS:  In Serbia.  And there was some issues with them

13     later after the war, because obviously Sarajevo wanted them

14     [indiscernible] come back to Sarajevo, some of them did, but quite a

15     number of them wanted to go elsewhere.  And I think a fair number of

16     them, as a matter of fact, settled in Australia.

17             MR. GUY-SMITH:

18        Q.   Only one quick matter which is I believe on line 17.  It

19     should read -- page 61, line 17, it should read "evacuate the BiH to

20     Serbia."  Sorry?  Army -- it should read "evacuate the Army of the BiH to

21     Serbia."

22        A.   The remaining fighters of the unit of the HBiH which was, of

23     course, was the locals in Zepa to large extent.

24        Q.   Your labours are certainly not done yet in terms of what is

25     occurring at this time.  And I now would like to move on and focus on

Page 14311

 1     another issue, which is the issue of the French pilots who were shot

 2     down, if I might.

 3             First of all, do you recall when they were shot down?

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Harmon.

 5             MR. HARMON:  This is a subject matter that is not contained,

 6     Your Honour, in the 65 ter summary.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Mr. Harmon is correct in that respect, but to the

 9     extent that it plays upon the ultimate issue of Dayton and -- I think

10     that it's relevant for the Chamber to have some understanding of what

11     occurred.

12             I certainly don't think that it is something that the Chamber

13     should not be aware of.  I appreciate what Mr. Harmon has said and to

14     that extent I do apologise to Mr. Harmon.  I wasn't trying to pull a fast

15     one on him in any sense whatsoever.

16             MR. HARMON:  I'm not sure what the ultimate issue of Dayton is in

17     this proceeding, Your Honour, so I'm not sure it's relevant.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's my problem and I don't know too.  And I --

19     I understand you were not trying to play a fast one on Mr. Harmon, but

20     unfortunately --

21             MR. GUY-SMITH:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  -- you've got to play the game also by the rules

23     and the rules --

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Let me explain to you -- let me explain to you

25     precisely what I'm getting at which is that the French pilots were shot

Page 14312

 1     done.  There were negotiations for the release of the French pilots.  The

 2     issue of the release of the French pilots was something that President

 3     Chirac made a, as a term I used before, a condition precedent to the

 4     signing at the Paris peace conference on December 14th.  And the question

 5     -- and that's the beginning an end of it [Overlapping speakers] ...

 6             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Perhaps we must talk about the Paris conference on

 7     the 14th and find out from the witness how it came about.

 8             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Sure, okay, fine.  I'm just trying to -- trying

 9     to help.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  In effect, it is more helpful if you do it the way

11     I suggest --

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Very well.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  -- because then are you dealing with something

14     that you have given notice about and you can tell us how that came about.

15             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Okay.

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  And if the French pilots are part of the step

17     towards, so shall it be.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:

19        Q.   Let us move to the 14th of December, then, if we could.

20             Do you recall what, if anything, occurred on the 14th of

21     December that was of the moment?

22        A.   There was the signing -- if I remember, the signing of the Dayton

23     agreement on peace, as it was called, for Bosnia and Herzegovina in

24     Paris.  I mean, what is referred to as the Dayton Agreement was initialed

25     in Dayton on November the 21st, I don't remember really but something

Page 14313

 1     along those lines, and was signed formally in Paris on December the 14th.

 2        Q.   And with regard to signing on the 14th, were there any conditions

 3     that existed prior to that document being signed and that agreement being

 4     entered into by the French government?

 5        A.   Not that I am aware of but I know that you allude to the fact

 6     that they wanted to add the French -- there were some French pilots who

 7     had been shot down and were held in -- by the VRS and that was obviously

 8     a concern of President Chirac.  I was aware of this through the media.  I

 9     don't really remember very much but I had no role whatsoever in that

10     particular procedure.

11        Q.   With regard to your recollection of this matter, if you could

12     take a look at your book at page 167 and see whether or not that helps

13     refresh your recollection --

14        A.   Sorry, in which page?

15        Q.   167.

16        A.   167.  Okay.  I'm happy to read my book.

17        Q.   It's an excellent book, sir.

18        A.   Thanks very much.

19        Q.   And I'm referring to the third paragraph.

20        A.   Yes, I said that, yeah.

21        Q.   Yes, you did.

22        A.   Yeah, true.

23        Q.   And so we don't run into the same problem that we had before,

24     could you read it so that the Chamber is also aware of what's being said.

25        A.   Should I read the book?

Page 14314

 1        Q.   Not the whole book, but --

 2             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

 3             MR. GUY-SMITH:  [Overlapping speakers] ...

 4             THE WITNESS:  That might help.

 5             "We were rapidly approaching the formal peace conference in

 6     Paris.  However, President Chirac had declared that it could not take

 7     place until two French pilots captured by the Bosnian Serbs when their

 8     aircraft was shot down over Pale on August the 30th had been released.

 9     There was no reason to doubt his determination to make the meeting in

10     Paris conditional on the release of the pilots."

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Kindly slow down when reading.  Thank you.

12             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  Sorry.

13             "I had raised the matter with various representatives of Pale on

14     numerous occasions during the autumn."  I stand corrected my memory was

15     wrong.

16             "We knew, from the pictures taken, that both pilots had survived

17     and been detained.  Even though there were some who believed that they

18     were no longer alive, all the information available to be indicated they

19     were still in Pale.  Krajisnik played ignorant but promised to take up

20     the issue in Pale and keep us informed.  Naturally he did no such thing.

21     Milosevic also said he knew nothing but promised to send some of his

22     special police platoons to Bosnia to look for them.  Whether he was

23     telling the truth, I don't know, but his reference to the ability of his

24     special police to operate in Bosnia was interesting.  Indeed, this had

25     implications in other context."

Page 14315

 1             Should I continue?

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 3        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 5             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Microphone, Mr. Guy-Smith.

 6             MR. GUY-SMITH:

 7        Q.   Does that refresh your recollection as with regard to issue of

 8     whether or not this signing of the agreement that ultimately became the

 9     Dayton Agreement was conditioned by President Chirac on the release of

10     the French pilots?

11        A.   Yes.  President Chirac, rightly so, was very concerned with the

12     release of his pilots.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I could have a moment.

15                           [Defence counsel confer]

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Guy-Smith, sorry.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Yes.

19        Q.   Mr. Bildt, I would like to thank you for your time.  I would like

20     to thank you for your candor, and most particularly, I would like to

21     thank you for the efforts that you engaged in during this tumultuous

22     period in the history of the world.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Harmon.

24                           Cross-examination by Mr. Harmon:

25        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Bildt.

Page 14316

 1        A.   Good afternoon.

 2        Q.   Just a few questions.  You were asked on -- a question by Defence

 3     counsel, on the 20th of July, 1995, whether you had heard or you were

 4     getting information about the massacres.  In fact, prior to the 20th of

 5     July, as early as the 14th of July, you had received information that the

 6     men in Potocari had been separated from the women and children and that

 7     the men had disappeared.  Isn't that correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   Okay.  And in respect of an answer that you gave to Defence

10     counsel, this is the answer that you gave Defence counsel on page 59,

11     starting at line 14, you were asked a question about foreseeability.  And

12     your answer was:

13             "The one who is very worried about what might happen in

14     Srebrenica was the Russian foreign minister," and you named him, I don't

15     have the name recorded, "and the reason for that, I think, was the fact

16     that he had been Russian foreign minister for quite some time, so he --

17     so I -- he been involved Srebrenica since 1993 and was perhaps more aware

18     that many of the emotions and tensions surrounding that particular

19     issue."

20             Can you expand on that, please, that answer?

21        A.   Yes, I could.  Of course, when I'm saying this, I said the only

22     one who brought it up with me.  It doesn't necessarily mean the only one

23     in the international community.  But I said, I was dealing primarily with

24     the political aspects but occasionally, of course, people said to me

25     certain things concerning be aware of that and be aware of that,

Page 14317

 1     concerning developments on the ground.  I remember Lord Owen handing over

 2     to him, asking me to keep a particular eye on a particular -- other

 3     spots.  It wasn't this particular one.  The one who really said to me

 4     keep an eye on this, on Srebrenica, was the Russian foreign minister.

 5     And my sort of theory for that, going back, I mean, this is not

 6     something -- I did note it and I took a note of it at the time.  And then

 7     when I went back, of course, after the massacre and the genocide, of

 8     course, then you go back over this issue and said why was it him and no

 9     one else?  Then it is my explanation to myself that that is the reason

10     why it was him.  Because he had been around for a long time and knew the

11     issue quite well.

12        Q.   What precisely was he worried about?

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

14             MR. HARMON:

15        Q.   Mr. Bildt, what precisely was the Russian foreign minister

16     worried about in respect of Srebrenica?

17        A.   I can't remember how he phrased it.  I went, saw him, this was in

18     the very early stage of my mission when I went around and looked -- I

19     mean, really, I started by seeing sort all of the main actors of the

20     international drama and, of course, Russia, key country, US, UK, France,

21     those were the key ones and then, of course, the UN, others.  So I went

22     down and see him, and I knew him quite well, since previous dealings on

23     other issues.  Went down and had dinner with him in Soci, by the

24     Black Sea, and later on, I mean, when I was writing my book, when I went

25     back over my notes I was struck by this particular fact that he had said

Page 14318

 1     something, beware of Srebrenica, and that's roughly what he said.  I

 2     can't remember more than that.  But it was a very emotional and sensitive

 3     issue obviously.

 4        Q.   Was his concern about the enclave itself, was his concern about

 5     the people in the enclave?  What was the focus, as you recall, what was

 6     the focus of his concern that he told you to be aware of?

 7        A.   If I were to interpret it, but take it as it is, it was that he

 8     was aware of this being a very sensitive issue where emotions were

 9     running very high.  Accordingly, where things could go extremely wrong

10     from his -- from the humanitarian point of view.

11        Q.   Okay.

12        A.   There had been a lot of evil committed around it.  And a lot of

13     feelings of evil around Srebrenica.  I wouldn't say this was the only

14     place, needless to say.  But he indicated to me at that particular time,

15     and I do not -- and I said, this was something that I found in my own

16     notes when I was writing my books, two years after the event, and it

17     really struck me that he was the only one who pointed at Srebrenica.

18             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Are you able to remember -- are you able to

19     remember the interpretation of this warning by him at the time it was

20     made, that is, before Srebrenica took place?

21             THE WITNESS:  Yeah, this was -- yeah.  We, of course, in those

22     sorts of discussions you sort of mentioned -- which I had naturally with

23     all of the foreign ministers, where were the sensitive points, where were

24     the difficulties in achieving peace.  It was mainly dealing with the

25     political issues, sometimes we mentioned sort of certain areas.  Needless

Page 14319

 1     to say, the main concern of the international community was on Sarajevo,

 2     but it was also on the enclaves.  I would also say that a lot of concern

 3     was on the situation in the west, around the Krajinas; and later, of

 4     course, that exploded.  Just after the eastern front exploded, which was

 5     just after the major fighting around Sarajevo during this rather horrible

 6     summer of 1995.

 7             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Yes, Mr. Harmon, you may proceed.

 8             MR. HARMON:  Could I have an exhibit on the monitor, please.  It

 9     is P1089.

10        Q.   Mr. Bildt, what you're going to be seeing and what I'm going to

11     be directing your attention to is an article, and I'm going to direct

12     your attention specifically to some comments by the UN High Commissioner

13     for Refugees, Sadaka Ogata, and I'd like you to comment on that.  You'll

14     see --

15             MR. HARMON:  If we could get a little bit larger text.

16             THE WITNESS:  Mm-hm.  Mm-hm.

17             MR. HARMON:  This is not the article.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

19             MR. HARMON:  This is not P1089.  This is not the document.

20             THE WITNESS:  This is an AFB telegram but --

21             MR. HARMON:  No, this is not the document I've called up.

22     Perhaps the wrong document has been uploaded into court.  But this is ...

23     we can use this document.

24        Q.   Can you go down to --

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, Mr. Harmon.  I have no difficulty at

Page 14320

 1     all with you using the document obviously if it is on the list on one

 2     fashion or another, but I'd like to know what document I'm --

 3             MR. HARMON:  Well, this should be --

 4             MR. GUY-SMITH:  -- dealing with, that's all.

 5             MR. HARMON:  Let me just clarify that because it needs to be

 6     clarified.

 7             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you.

 8             MR. HARMON:  This is P1089.  This is the correct document.

 9        Q.   Mr. Bildt, if we could go down to the fifth paragraph, it starts

10     with the words:  "In Geneva ..."

11             Can you read that?  It says that in Geneva the UN High

12     Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, called the wholesale removal

13     from Srebrenica residents one of the most blatant examples of ethnically

14     motivated forced displacement we have seen yet in the war.

15             And this is dated on the 13th of July, 1995, when she made those

16     remarks.  Can you comment on -- first of all, were you aware of the

17     forcible displacement of people from Srebrenica on the 13th of July,

18     1995?

19        A.   Oh, yes.  And that was -- I should not really comment too much on

20     what the UN did and did not to.  But, of course, there was an ethical

21     dilemma involved in it from the UN side, in the sense that part of this

22     was facilitated by the UN and that is why we had talked with

23     President Izetbegovic because if we take the women and the men

24     [indiscernible] what was taken out of Srebrenica courtesy of the UN.  The

25     men were then separated -- or some of the men were separated then we have

Page 14321

 1     the big column all together, of course.  It was a complete cleansing of

 2     Srebrenica, yes.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And was the cleansing of Srebrenica foreseeable assuming

 4     it was taken over by the Bosnian Serb army?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Okay.

 7        A.   Yes, I don't think there was any -- any doubt on that, that if an

 8     enclave was taken -- I mean, that was unfortunately the pattern of a

 9     large part of the Bosnian war.  When an army conquered the territory,

10     consequences did happen.

11        Q.   Amongst those consequences was murder?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   One of the consequences?

14        A.   More or less.  In this case --

15        Q.   In this case there was an extraordinary --

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   -- murder on a larger scale --

18        A.   Oh, yes.

19        Q.   -- than what had been seen before.  But was murder a foreseeable

20     consequence of the takeover of the Srebrenica enclave?  Not on the scale

21     that we're talking about, that we now know historically took place.

22        A.   I mean, difficult to say.  In retrospect, of course.  In

23     retrospect, of course, but murder on this -- because what happened here

24     was -- of course, particularly the fact that people who had been sort

25     of -- the men who had been separated, who had been taken to different

Page 14322

 1     sort of encampments in schools and facilities, and you know this

 2     extremely well, that they were sort of massacred in large numbers.  I

 3     mean, thousands after thousands after thousands.  That had never happened

 4     before during the Bosnian war.  Indeed, it is rather unique in post-war

 5     European history.  It is unique in the post-war European history, to be

 6     precise.

 7        Q.   Putting aside the scale of the murders, in the Bosnian war

 8     historically when territory was taken over and ethnically cleansed, in

 9     part, part of that ethnic cleansing included the killing of the ethnic

10     group that had been conquered?

11        A.   Not necessarily entire ethnic group --

12        Q.   Not the entire ethnic group.

13        A.   Individuals of the ethnic group, absolutely, if you go through

14     the history of the Bosnian war, yes.

15        Q.   So when Srebrenica was taken over by the Bosnian Serb army, was

16     it foreseeable that there would be killings with the conquest of that

17     territory?

18        A.    It was foreseeable that there would be a -- connection with

19     fighting or connection with remnants of fighting, or a connection with

20     retribution, or connection with revenge, or connection with something

21     else.  Unfortunately, that was the nature of that war.  But then, as

22     said, now we're talking about what would unfortunately we call the normal

23     picture of the war, but what subsequently happened in Srebrenica goes

24     well beyond even the rather horrendous normal picture of horrendous war?

25        Q.   So your answer to my question was:  Yes, it was foreseeable?

Page 14323

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  No, I don't think that was the answer to your

 2     question, sir.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers] ... [Microphone not

 4     activated] ...

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH: [Overlapping speakers] ... if it was an answer

 6     that was conditioned upon a series of factors.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Overlapping speakers] ... was the genocide

 8     foreseeable.

 9             MR. HARMON:

10        Q.   No, I'm not asking you about the genocide.  I'm asking about the

11     killings.  Were the killings -- were killings --

12        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

13        Q.   -- foreseeable when the territory was ethnically cleansed.

14        A.   Killings, yes.  The killings is another question.

15        Q.   I understand that, and that's why I put aside the question of the

16     scale.

17        A.   Right.

18        Q.   Okay.  Now, let me discuss my last point, and that is, you

19     discussed at the end of your evidence, you discussed Zepa, and you said

20     there had been agreement with Mr. Milosevic that the -- that he would

21     accept members of the ABiH who'd come over from Zepa.

22             And let me just ask you this question, Mr. Bildt.

23     Notwithstanding that agreement with Mr. Milosevic, to your knowledge,

24     were some of the ABiH soldiers who had made it to Serbian territory, in

25     fact, returned to the Republika Srpska, if you know?

Page 14324

 1        A.   Don't know.  I know there were other killings in connection with

 2     Zepa.  I mean, notably the commander, of course, in the -- who was -- I

 3     think you are aware of this particular incident, when they were in the

 4     final stages of the Zepa drama, there was a negotiation or talk

 5     between -- I don't know who it was, with the UN commander, and there was

 6     Mladic, and there was commander of the HBiH forces in Zepa, and there was

 7     the Ukrainian UN people.  The Bosnian army commander was then taken away,

 8     and I think it had been confirmed that he was killed directly after those

 9     negotiations or talks.  So, of course, there were also substantial

10     killings in the times of Zepa.

11        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Bildt.  I have no additional questions.

12     Thank you, sir.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

14             It is past time for the break.  Do you have any questions for

15     re-examination, Mr. Guy-Smith?

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  If I could have about a minute and a half and I

17     would be able to answer that question.  I don't know if the Chamber has

18     any questions.  And I am appreciative also of Mr. Bildt's --

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  That's why I'm asking.

20             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Mr. Bildt's schedule.  So if I could have but a

21     second.  Because if I have a question, I have one question.

22             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Go ahead.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I have one question.

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  One question.

Page 14325

 1                           Re-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

 2        Q.   My question is this.  With regard to the issue of killings being

 3     foreseeable, you indicated that it was foreseeable that killings with the

 4     conquest of territory could occur for a number of reasons.  Those

 5     reasons, as I understood your answer, included fighting between the

 6     warring factions, the remnants of the warring factions, retribution.  And

 7     then you mentioned something else?

 8        A.   I probably did.  What?  Revenge.

 9        Q.   Revenge, okay.

10        A.   Probably.  Yeah.

11             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Was that your question?

12             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That was my question.

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Thank you, Judge.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I'm trying desperately to get you out of this

16     courtroom.

17             THE WITNESS:  I appreciate that, Your Honour.

18                           Questioned by the Court:

19             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] I have but two very short

20     questions for you, sir.

21             My first question is the following.  When you met

22     President Milosevic in Belgrade around the 14th and 15th of July, 1995,

23     according to you, was he aware of the events in Srebrenica?

24        A.   Of course he was.  I mean, the events of Srebrenica -- well,

25     depends on -- now we have to define --

Page 14326

 1             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] No, I'm talking about massacres,

 2     in fact.

 3        A.   That I don't know.  That I don't know.  But clearly we were -- I

 4     mean, the fall of Srebrenica was on the 11th.  Srebrenica was headlines

 5     all over the world by that particular time.  It had fundamentally changed

 6     the diplomatic discourse.

 7             He was aware of the letter of warning I had sent him.  He was

 8     aware of the intense diplomatic activity under way.  I -- I --

 9     immediately when I saw him, I said, Mr. Milosevic, you understand that

10     this has changed everything.  You are now in a different situation, and

11     we are in a different situation, and you have to act accordingly.  So he

12     was clearly aware of -- I mean, the genocide comes later.  Well,

13     awareness of the genocide comes later, to be precise.  But the fall of

14     the -- Srebrenica in itself, the fall of an enclave, was such a serious

15     event in itself and the humanitarian issues that we were aware of at the

16     time were such a serious event in themselves that it changed the entire

17     discourse.  And that he was aware of.  And we made him even more aware of

18     it.

19             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] Yes.  But I was only talking

20     about, in fact, the information that he may have had about massacres that

21     may have taken -- that took in place in the enclave.  If you don't know,

22     then I got my answer.

23             Now, my following question is the following.  You said that the

24     contact groups were refusing to have contacts with Karadzic and that the

25     only contact, in order to stop the war or to try to negotiate, was -- was

Page 14327

 1     Milosevic.

 2             So my question is as follows.  Was that sufficient for

 3     negotiators to convince Milosevic or to pressure Milosevic in order to

 4     stop the war in Bosnia?

 5        A.   A very good question.  History happens only once.  That was the

 6     decisions that had been taken by the key capitals.  And you can say that

 7     in retrospect, yes, the war was been stopped.  I think the key question

 8     is, really, would it have been possible to close down the war earlier,

 9     and that's for the historians to debate.  Clearly the summer of 1995 was

10     exceedingly horrible, in terms of both massacre, genocide, ethnic

11     cleansing, different sides.  Clearly the worse since it's war in 1992.

12     Would it have been possible for some sort of diplomatic initiative prior

13     to that, I wasn't around the Bosnian scene at that particular time,

14     so ...

15             JUDGE PICARD: [Interpretation] But, in fact, my question was

16     little bit more -- was focussing something else, in fact.

17             During the entire trial, he was saying that Bosnian Serbs would

18     not have been able to survive without the material help from Serbs from

19     Serbia.  So if the Serbs from Serbia had stopped to -- to help, in terms

20     of giving the them the material -- material help, would that have stopped

21     the war?

22        A.   Well, that is, of course, what we tried to do.  There had been

23     the Drina blockade since I can't remember exactly when.

24             But prior to me entering the scene, Milosevic had agreed to

25     impose a complete embargo on Republika Srpska, and as -- I had a

Page 14328

 1     co-responsibility from the ICFY for the ICFY border monitoring mission, I

 2     think the name of it was.  We had monitors along the Drina to try to see

 3     if there were any major supplies coming through.  And I spent quite some

 4     time, and I had a special American team under me trying to see if there

 5     were any signs of major resupply of Bosnian Serb forces from Serbia.  So

 6     we were clearly -- and there's no doubt that there was smuggling.  But

 7     whether there was any major resupply, we did not, with the monitors that

 8     we had in place on all of the crossing points and all of the bridges,

 9     detect any major smuggling.  Could there have been?  With helicopters and

10     hidden pipe-lines and the small supplies, I'm quite certain there was.

11     But we spent quite some time trying to find out, for example, how the

12     Bosnian Serbs forces were supplied with fuel, which is an interesting

13     question.  But when you went into that interesting question, you also

14     found that there were many dimensions to the war in Bosnia, and there

15     were very many who were prepared to trade in ways that you would not

16     necessarily think of immediately.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Quickly, quickly, are there any questions arising

18     from the questions by the Judge?

19             Mr. Guy-Smith.

20                           Further Re-examination by Mr. Guy-Smith:

21        Q.   On the very end of your answer, sir, to Judge Picard's question,

22     which is when you went into that interesting question you found that

23     there were many, many --

24             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Dimensions.

25             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Dimensions.  Thank you.  The language of the

Page 14329

 1     question, as it is written here, is a bit funny.

 2        Q.   Could you expand, please, on what you mean by that:  Many, many

 3     dimensions.

 4        A.   Every war produces, and every sanctions produces black markets.

 5     There are always people who are prepared to make money independent of

 6     ethnicity and political loyalties in the middle of a war.  And in this

 7     particular war, there was no difference.  So as far as weapons were

 8     concerned, there was no need for that, because there was an abundance of

 9     weapons in the area that had to do with the fact that, of course, Bosnia

10     was the most heavily militarised part of former Yugoslavia, because that

11     is where the Yugoslav Army had prepared these last bastions in defence

12     against an invasion.  So there was both territorial army, and VJ, and

13     arms depots, and arms factories, and enormous amounts of both arms and

14     ammunition in enormous quantities.  I mean, military -- western military

15     people who came there subsequently looked at the ammunition dumps were

16     really surprised by the magnitude of how the Yugoslavs had stored

17     ammunition for a prolonged war.  That had to do the wartime history of

18     Tito and the partisans.

19             Fuel you could buy on the black markets.  Then there was also a

20     lot of smuggling of beer and cigarettes, because it turned out that on

21     Republika Srpska territory there was no brewery.  And there was no

22     cigarette factory.  The cigarette factory was in Sarajevo, and the

23     breweries were elsewhere.  Soldiers want beer and they want cigarettes.

24     So that was also commodities that were very high demand and were smuggled

25     in not in significant quantities across the front lines.

Page 14330

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you.

 2             Mr. Harmon.

 3             MR. HARMON:  I have no questions.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Thank you very much.

 5             Mr. Bildt, we just made it by the skin of our teeth.  Thank you

 6     very much for coming to testify, Mr. Bildt, and we know that you are a

 7     busy person and that you had to take time off from your very busy

 8     schedule, but the Tribunal is grateful to you that you could make the

 9     time, and that brings us to the end of your testimony and you are now

10     free to go, and you may stand down.

11              Please travel well back home.  I hope you can still make your

12     appointment in Stockholm.

13             THE WITNESS:  I will.  Thanks very much.

14             JUDGE MOLOTO:  You're welcome.

15                           [The witness withdrew]

16             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Mr. Guy-Smith, are we coming back or are we -- is

17     that the end of the day?

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That's the end of the day, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Until?

20                           [Defence counsel confer]

21             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Until?

22             MR. GUY-SMITH:  At present, until the 4th.

23             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Are you able to put us in the picture,

24     Mr. Guy-Smith [Overlapping speakers] ...

25             MR. GUY-SMITH: [Overlapping speakers] ...

Page 14331

 1             JUDGE MOLOTO:  What is happening [Microphone not activated].

 2             MR. GUY-SMITH:  I am more than happy to put you in the picture.

 3     Sure.

 4             We are awaiting the attendance of two foreign nationals who have

 5     made further requirements upon us before we can have them come to court.

 6     It had been our intention to have them testify on the 2nd or 3rd of

 7     November, and then to have further testimony on the 4th and 5th of

 8     November from one of the experts.  That expert is Mr. Djokic.

 9             It is anticipated that the other expert to testify in this case

10     will then testify, depending on some other calendaring issues that we

11     have been alerted to, next week, at the conclusion of the next week.

12     That would then leave us --

13             JUDGE MOLOTO:  [Microphone not activated].

14             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That's correct.

15             JUDGE MOLOTO:  13th.  So the whole of the week up until Friday --

16             MR. GUY-SMITH:  That is correct.

17             JUDGE MOLOTO:  -- there will be no witness.

18             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Excuse me, hold on.  Let me double-check

19     because -- for the moment, I'm not fully cognizant of the calendar.

20             When you rush us, we start speaking Serbian and then I get really

21     lost.

22             11th.  A witness, the 4th, the 5th; and then a witness the 11th.

23             Now, what I -- we are going to attempt to get the two foreign

24     nationals here earlier, if we can, and we are very close to the end --

25             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Earlier than?

Page 14332

 1             MR. GUY-SMITH:  Hopefully we will get them in next week.  We will

 2     try.  I don't know if we will be able to do it.  I just don't know if we

 3     will be able to do it.

 4             JUDGE MOLOTO:  I doubt it.  Given the filings, I doubt it.

 5             MR. GUY-SMITH:  We had thought that we were, to be perfectly

 6     honest with you, all systems go.  I have been pushing, pushing, pushing.

 7     I thought we were in fine shape, and then all of a sudden, I hit a --

 8     what they call in -- in the Netherlands a "grote drempel," a really big

 9     bump, so now I'm really trying to attend to that really big bump.

10             JUDGE MOLOTO:  Okay.  Then the Trial Chamber will stand adjourned

11     to the 4th of November.

12             Court adjourned.

13                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.46 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 4th day of

15                           November, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.