Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 19666

 1                          Tuesday, 15 January 2008

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          [The witness entered court]

 5                          --- Upon commencing at 9.11 a.m.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning.

 7            Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.

 8            THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is the case

 9    number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, ma'am.

11            All the accused are here.  From the Defence teams, I only notice

12    the absence of Mr. Meek.  Yes, that's it.  The Prosecution is

13    Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Mitchell.  I can't see behind.  Is that all?

14            Yes.  Mr. Zivanovic, I see you're pretty much crowded.

15            MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Yes, Your Honours.  Here on my right is our legal

16    assistant, Mr. Djordje Kalanj.  He's an attorney at law from Belgrade.

17    Here is also Mr. Petar Vuga.  He's our expert for military and security

18    issues.  Thanks.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  So welcome, Mr. Vuga.

20            Also present are the following Defence experts; Mr. Trifunovic for

21    the Borovcanin Defence team.  Good morning, Mr. Trifunovic.  General

22    Kosovac for the Miletic Defence team.  Good morning, General.  Admiral

23    Antic for the Pandurevic Defence team.  Good morning, Admiral.  Are you

24    named after the famous footballer, because I remember a footballer famous

25    by that name from your country.  He passed away, I understand, didn't he?

Page 19667

 1            Anyway, let's start.

 2            Good morning to you, sir.  Welcome back.  I hope you had time to

 3    rest.  We have a long journey ahead, which we have barely started.

 4                          WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey.

 6            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you and good morning, Mr. President, Your

 7    Honours.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning.

 9            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Good morning, everyone.

10                          Examination by Mr. McCloskey:  [Continued]

11       Q.   Mr. Butler, yesterday, we left off -- we had just -- you had

12    talked about a law that regulated MUP forces in combat with the army; and

13    in looking -- we're now looking at a -- at a document that I just started

14    reading to you, and I'll try again.

15            MR. McCLOSKEY:  This is 65 -- or Exhibit number 4D00087.

16       Q.   This is from the Drina Corps Command, from the deputy assistant

17    commander for logistics, Colonel Ljubo Sobot, and it is to the Main Staff,

18    as we see in the upper left-hand corner.

19            It's entitled:  "Requesting Food Provisions for a MUP Unit

20    Monitoring the Srebrenica and Bratunac Enclaves."

21            It says:  "Among others, a MUP unit comprising 400 policemen has

22    been engaged to monitor the Srebrenica and Bratunac area.  We have been

23    informed that their engagement and, consequently, food supplies for them

24    have been arranged through the Main Staff, rather than organs and sources

25    of the civilian authorities of the RS and Bratunac municipality."

Page 19668

 1            Then it asks for some direction:  "Please advise who is in charge

 2    of the food supplies.  Is it the Drina Corps or the brigade," and it goes

 3    on asking for advice from the Main Staff.

 4            Can you relate this document in any way to any of the provisions

 5    that we'd just seen in the previous law?

 6       A.   Yes, sir, I can.

 7       Q.   How so?

 8       A.   The --

 9            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, one moment.

10            Yes, Madame Fauveau.  I wasn't sure if you were standing or not,

11    actually.  Yes, go ahead.

12            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] It's always the same thing.  There's

13    always a part of a sentence which we don't have, and I think the whole

14    sentence must appear.  It's not only the brigade of the Drina Corps but

15    also the civilian authorities.

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Thank you, Madame Fauveau.

17            Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

18            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I didn't read the whole document.  I didn't think

19    it was necessary.  I don't understand the point she's making.  I mean, I

20    can read it, if she wants me to.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, let's read it.  It will speed things up.

22            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Everyone's looking at it, though.

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

24            MR. McCLOSKEY:  It's a short document, it's on the record, we see

25    it.

Page 19669

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madame Fauveau.

 2            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the problem with this

 3    document is precisely to know whether it is a civilian organ or the army

 4    who are in charge of the food for the police.  I think the presentation

 5    made by the Prosecutor ignores this point in this document.

 6            I'm not asking for him to read the whole document, but he can't

 7    present the document, saying whether it is the brigade or the corps.  It

 8    has to be all the organs mentioned by the corps directly, and in

 9    particular the municipality organs of Bratunac, and also the Ministry of

10    the Interior of the Republika Srpska.

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  I think --

12            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I agree it's asking about that as well.  That's

13    not something I was trying to cover up.  I think we can all see that in

14    the document.

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  But, anyway, the point has been made.  Mr. Butler

16    has the document in front of him.  He knows what the point is; he knows

17    what your question is.  If he wants to move from the military to the

18    municipality or to the Ministry, he's free to do so, I mean, always

19    depending on his personal assessment, knowledge, and assessment of the

20    situation.

21            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.

22       Q.   Mr. Butler, having in mind the whole document, not just my

23    synopsis of it, of course, can you relate it to the previous law we saw?

24       A.   Yes, sir.  It is a reflection of the part of the law on the use of

25    the RS MUP in this nature, that when they're put under military command,

Page 19670

 1    it's incumbent on the military to provide them with the necessary

 2    logistics.  That would include food, that would include ammunition, that

 3    would include other forms of life support.  So this particular document,

 4    you know, reflects that manifestation of law.

 5       Q.   Okay.  Let's move -- oh, one other area related to regs or

 6    policies.

 7            Can you tell us, in the beginning - very briefly - the JNA, was

 8    there a concept for the corps related to the zone of responsibility?  In

 9    the corps rules, was there a concept laid out regarding the corps zone of

10    responsibility?

11       A.   On the basis of the original rules of the JNA, they don't

12    define -- yeah, it's explicitly what's known as a corps area of

13    responsibility.  The JNA was designed to fight as a modern military force

14    on the battlefield, not necessarily as the way that the VRS, you know,

15    fought on a more geographical basis and the Republika Srpska and how the

16    units were organised.  So you don't have a direct -- a direct collateral

17    between the JNA doctrine and what the VRS ultimately used, which was areas

18    of responsibility.

19       Q.   How about did the JNA talk about the areas of responsibility or

20    zones of responsibility for brigade units in the original material that

21    you're talking about from the 1980s?

22       A.   I have to go back and actually look at that.  I believe the answer

23    is, no, that the brigade rules don't specifically delineate that as -- as

24    an area.

25       Q.   Okay.  How about the VRS in the wartime period?  Did you -- the

Page 19671

 1    Court has seen many documents that talk about a zone of responsibility,

 2    and we'll see some.  But in your opinion, was there such a thing as a zone

 3    of responsibility for the brigades?

 4       A.   Yes, sir, there was.

 5       Q.   Can you briefly explain that?

 6       A.   Much of it traces its origin back to the fact that most of the

 7    brigades of the VRS, not only within the Drina Corps but in other areas of

 8    the country as well, were initially organised and supported with respect

 9    to soldiers from that area, funding from that area, by the individual

10    municipalities.

11            So what happened as the army matured was that these particular

12    brigades, not only were they given the names of particular municipalities,

13    but when you look at the VRS map graphics, you'll note that they have

14    designated areas or zones of responsibilities that, more often than not,

15    correspond with the geographical boundaries of the various municipalities.

16       Q.   Okay.  Now moving on to just some of the principal documents that

17    you've cited in your Main Staff report and you've discussed over the

18    years, let's go to 65 ter 2739, which should be in your mixed binder

19    volume 2, tab 1.

20            It's a document from the 5th Corps Command, dated 12 May 1992, and

21    it's referencing a decree of the SFRJ, and talks about General Mladic

22    assuming command.  Can you just tell us what this document is?

23       A.   This is the documents originated by 5th Corps to the commander and

24    commands to inform them that based on the order from above, in this case

25    the SFRY Presidency, noting that Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic has been

Page 19672

 1    appointed to the position of Chief of Staff and concurrently the deputy

 2    commander of the 2nd Military District, which was then the highest JNA

 3    formation in Bosnia, headquartered in Sarajevo.

 4            It also lists, as part of that same degree, assignments of General

 5    Gvero, General Djukic, and Colonel Tolimir within the 2nd Military

 6    District.

 7       Q.   All right.  Let's go to another document you've talked about.  It

 8    should be the next on your list, and it's 65 ter number 25.  This is the

 9    minutes of the 16th session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in

10    Bosnia and Herzegovina, also dated 12 May 1992.

11            If we go to page 2 in the English, item 6, it mentions that the

12    Assembly unanimously elected Karadzic, Vlasic, and Kojovic as members of

13    the Presidency of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14            If we go on to item 8, it says:  "The Assembly unanimously adopted

15    the decision on establishing the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

16    Herzegovina Army.  Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic was appointed the

17    commander of the SRBH Army Main Staff."

18            How does that relate to the previous document, which appears to be

19    dated the same?

20       A.   The former -- or the former JNA 2nd Military District ultimately

21    became the nucleus for what would later become the VRS Main Staff.  So, I

22    mean, I believe some other witnesses, I believe Colonel -- I mean,

23    Colonel-General Milovanovic, testified previously about some of the timing

24    issues related to this.  But there was an awareness particularly with

25    respect to this Assembly meeting, that those JNA officers who were being

Page 19673

 1    appointed to the 2nd Military District were, in fact, going to be

 2    designated as the senior leadership figures of the newly-organised Main

 3    Staff.

 4       Q.   All right.  Now, I want to -- you've also, in this document, in

 5    your reports, cited to -- mentioned something called the six strategic

 6    objectives, which we have put, in part, in paragraph 19 of the

 7    indictment.  I believe you cite to what is English page 13 of this

 8    document, B/C/S page 12.

 9            I believe it's Karadzic saying, I think in the third

10    paragraph:  "The Serbian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency,

11    the Government, the Council for National Security which we have set up

12    have formulated strategic priorities; that is to say, the strategic goals

13    for the Serbian people.  The first such goal is separation from the other

14    two national communities-separation of states."

15            Then it goes on to say:  "Separation from those who are our

16    enemies and who have used every opportunity, especially in this century,

17    to attack us, and who would continue with such practices if we were to

18    continue to stay together in the same state."

19            It talks about the second strategic goal which we did not mention

20    in the indictment, and then it mentions the third strategic goal on the

21    next page.

22            It's B/C/S 13:  "The third goal is to establish a corridor in the

23    Drina Valley, that is, the elimination of the Drina as the border between

24    the two worlds.  We and our strategic interest and our living space are on

25    both sides of the Drina.  We now see a possibility for some Muslim

Page 19674

 1    municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves in order for them

 2    to achieve their rights, but it must basically belong to Serbia, Bosnia

 3    and Herzegovina.

 4            "That belt along the Drina which, as much as it is strategically

 5    useful for us in a positive way, helps us by damaging the interests of our

 6    enemy to achieve their goal of gaining a corridor with which would connect

 7    them to the Muslim International and render this area permanently

 8    unstable."

 9            Mr. Butler, the -- the six strategic objectives referred to in the

10    indictment, especially the two that are in the indictment, how do these

11    comments relate to what we have put in the indictment?  Are they the same

12    or different?

13       A.   Yes, sir.  They are the same.

14       Q.   All right.  I believe, and I won't bring it up, but the formal

15    document regarding the six strategic objectives is dated 1993.  Do you

16    know how that -- we have this Assembly in 1992 and then they come out in

17    1993.  Do you know anything about that?

18       A.   My understanding is that while the actual strategic objectives

19    were articulated in May 1992, for whatever reason the Government of the

20    Republika Srpska did not decide to publish those in their own Official

21    Gazettes until 1993.  I don't know the exact reasons why they elected to

22    do that.

23       Q.   Okay.  Let's go to another document you've talked about.  It's

24    dated back in 1992.  It's tab 3, 65 ter 29.  This is a document that has

25    been brought up several times, I believe.  It's from the Main Staff of the

Page 19675

 1    Army of Republika Srpska, dated 19 November 1992.

 2            It says:  "Very Urgent:  "Directive for further operations of the

 3    Army of Republika Srpska to the commander (Chief of Staff) personally.

 4    Directive operational number four."

 5            It's in the name of Commander Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic and

 6    drafted by Major-General Manojlo Milovanovic.

 7            Now, Mr. Butler, you have --

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madame Fauveau.

 9            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I think there is a

10    mistake in the transcription, because the Serbian version does not

11    say "personal," which has been mentioned in the English version, after the

12    commander and the Chief of Staff.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Madame Fauveau.

14            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Well, we can look into that.

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  I'm not in a position to help you.

16            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I have the CLSS translation, and it

17    says "personally," but I don't know where that came from.  There may be

18    another version of the document out there.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  What's the meaning of the first two words, "na

20    licnost."

21            THE INTERPRETER:  "Personally."

22            MR. McCLOSKEY:  "Personally" is what I just heard the interpreter

23    tell us.  Anyway --

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Let's move.  But thank you for raising

25    the matter.  The only two words that I had doubts upon were precisely, "na

Page 19676

 1    licnost."  So let's go ahead.

 2            MR. McCLOSKEY:

 3       Q.   And, Mr. Butler, did this document help you in your analysis of

 4    looking into the intentions of the RS and the VRS towards the areas of

 5    Srebrenica, Eastern Bosnia?

 6       A.   Yes, sir, it does.

 7       Q.   Okay.  Let me -- you have -- and, first of all, can you tell us,

 8    it says it's a directive.  Can you tell us what a directive is?

 9       A.   At various times during the conflict, either keyed to a perceived

10    change in the political environment or a perceived change in the larger or

11    broader strategic goals of the nation, the Main Staff of the Army drafted,

12    for their leadership, a series of what are known as these operational

13    directives.

14            I believe there are a total of nine of them published through

15    either the course of the war or through the course of the war and then the

16    month beyond to begin the first transition into the postwar environment.

17    I believe the OTP has approximately seven of the nine.

18            These documents essentially lay out what the I would call the

19    strategic direction of the army in how it's going to, in broad terms,

20    fulfill the political objectives that had been mandated by the political

21    leadership of the Republika Srpska.

22            So in the first part of the war, you see a number of these, 1

23    through 4.  In the second several years of the war, where the objectives

24    do not change radically, you see far fewer of these.  Then by March of

25    1995, you see publications of further directives in order to deal with

Page 19677

 1    new, changing situations on the political and military front.

 2       Q.   Okay.  And as the Court has seen, in this document, laying out

 3    some of the background, it says, on page 3 of the English:  "I have

 4    decided the following," and then it starts listing various corps, giving

 5    them their directives.

 6            Let's go to the Drina Corps section, which is page 5, in the

 7    English it should be, and B/C/S, page 11, entitled "The Drina Corps."

 8            It says, in section D:  "The Drina Corps.  From its present

 9    positions, its main forces shall persistently defend Visegrad (the dam),

10    Zvornik and the corridor; while the rest of its forces in the wider

11    Podrinje region shall exhaust the enemy, inflict the heaviest possible

12    losses on him, and force him to leave the Birac, Zepa, and Gorazde areas."

13            Now, I'm going to stop there for a minute.  Is there anything, in

14    your view, illegal or improper, militarily, about that statement?

15       A.   No, sir.  If you were to stop there, there would be nothing wrong

16    with it, as far as I could tell.

17       Q.   But it goes on and says:  "... together with the Muslim

18    population."

19            Now, I don't need you to get into a long discussion about that;

20    but in your view, what is that statement?

21       A.   I believe that it - you know, I don't believe, I'm certain in

22    fact - it fundamentally defines the character of the campaign to follow;

23    that is, objective becomes, in part, the civilian population.

24       Q.   Can you, and, again, just briefly, at the time that this was

25    written, 19 November, can you just give us a little historical background

Page 19678

 1    in the -- in the -- what was happening in this area, Naser Oric's forces,

 2    how they were doing, and what, if anything, this is responding to?

 3       A.   Yes, sir.  In keeping in line with the earlier strategic

 4    directives, the key priorities for the Army of the Republika Srpska at the

 5    time pertained to areas with respect to the Krajina; Bijeljina; the

 6    Posavina corridor; Sarajevo; and to a lesser extent, Hercegovina; and

 7    then, finally, the area of the Drina Valley.

 8            Until the beginning of November 1992, that particular area, the

 9    Podrinje and Drina River area, did not have its own dedicated corps.  In

10    fact, that territory was split up between a number of corps courses, the

11    Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the East Bosnia Corps.

12            It was recognised strategically to be important; but with the

13    forces on hand and the other objectives that the army needed to acquire,

14    it was not their top priority.

15            Beginning, as a result, by November of 1992, the Muslims were in a

16    far stronger military position in that particular area than certainly the

17    VRS was comfortable with.  There were active Muslim military forces in the

18    Kamenica, Cerska, Bihac area which greatly threatened communications

19    particularly between Zvornik, Vlasenica, Sekovici, and those key areas.

20            Large forces were in south of that area under the command of Naser

21    Oric, who, of course, was expending his territory at the expense of the

22    forces in the area of Bratunac; and as history would show, a month and a

23    half later, was literally at the gates of the town of Bratunac itself.

24            So while ignoring this particular area, in light of more important

25    objectives nationally, the VRS recognised that it got itself into a

Page 19679

 1    significantly adverse situation with respect to the Muslim military

 2    forces, and this directive is the first mark -- you know, mark in the

 3    sand, along with the establishment of the Drina Corps, that it was time

 4    for the VRS to begin to focus a higher priority on this region.

 5       Q.   Okay.  And in November of 1992, do you know where Vinko Pandurevic

 6    was?

 7       A.   Prior to this period, up through October 1992, then Captain First

 8    Class Pandurevic was the commander of the Visegrad Light Infantry Brigade.

 9    Sometime, I believe it's approximately 14 October, he is wounded in

10    combat, and he leaves the command of that particular unit.  He shows up as

11    the commander of the Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade, as it was referred to

12    at the time, I believe 14 December 1992.

13       Q.   All right.  And let me just go back to the document and ask you

14    about the next line or two.  It says:  "First offer the able-bodied and

15    armed men to surrender; and if they refuse, destroy them."

16            What do you make of that, if anything?

17       A.   That is -- within a military context, there's nothing wrong with

18    that phrase.

19       Q.   Nothing wrong with destroying the enemy?

20       A.   An armed combatant, as far as I understand international law, an

21    armed combatant is a legitimate military target.

22       Q.   Absolutely.  All right.  I don't think I need to ask you about the

23    rest of that directive.

24            Now, let's go to the next document.  It's 65 ter 3029, dated 24

25    November 1992, another document you've cited.  This is a document from the

Page 19680

 1    Drina Corps Command, dated a couple of days later than the previous one,

 2    24 November:  "Very Urgent:  Decision for further operations," to the

 3    Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade Command, personally to the commander or

 4    Chief of Staff.

 5            It says:  "Pursuant to directive of the Main Staff of the Army of

 6    Republika Srpska, strictly confidential number 02/3, of 19 November

 7    1992:  'In an assessment of the situation, I have decided.'"

 8            Now, this is a reference to a directive from the Main Staff.  It

 9    has the same date.  The number is slightly different.  The one that we

10    looked at was 02/5-10, and this one says "02/3."

11            In your view, what are they referencing?  Well, let me not

12    say "they."

13            What is the commander of the Drina Corps, Colonel, at the time,

14    Zivanovic, referencing when he says this directive pursuant to the Main

15    Staff?

16       A.   If one looks at the -- the B/C/S version of that document, it

17    says "2-5."  So, in fact, he is representing the strategic directive that

18    we've just discussed in the last exhibit.  I don't know how it got

19    translated into "2/3," but in the original version, it does, in fact,

20    say "2-5" -- or "2/5."

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  There's a simple explanation to that.  That "5"

22    looks like a "3."

23            MR. McCLOSKEY:

24       Q.   Mr. Butler, when looking at an English documents over the years,

25    have you always required to have the B/C/S at hand?

Page 19681

 1       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

 2       Q.   And why is that, briefly?

 3       A.   While I can't claim, by any stretch, to be able to read the

 4    language, looking at these documents over the years, the number that I

 5    have, particularly those that are written in Latin text, I like to be able

 6    to compare the numbers, the military unit designations, because I

 7    recognise, from a translation perspective, that many of the military

 8    abbreviations and acronyms, our translators don't work with them on a

 9    routine basis like myself and the other military analysts do, and it's

10    just a function of trying to make sure that, in fact, military

11    abbreviations, like the 2nd Romanija Brigade or the 1st Zvornik Brigade,

12    get translated properly.

13       Q.   All right.  Let's just -- I don't want to go over this entire

14    document, but just looking at now in paragraph 1, it says:  "Launch an

15    attack using the main body of troops and major equipment to inflict on the

16    enemy the highest possible losses, exhaust them, break them up, or force

17    them to surrender, and force the Muslim local population to abandon the

18    area of Cerska, Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde."

19            What do you make of this?

20       A.   This is a more detailed reflection of the intent that was

21    articulated in strategic directive 4.

22       Q.   All right.  And as we see down in paragraph 2.1, the Zvornik

23    Brigade is given specific instructions or orders, of course, as is the

24    Bratunac, the Birac unit, and some others.

25            Can you, again, very briefly, describe the military situation from

Page 19682

 1    this November/December time frame in 1992, leading up to the spring of

 2    1993?

 3       A.   Despite the issuance of this order in the middle of November, the

 4    VRS, after a few fits and starts, was ultimately not successful in the

 5    first month or through the month of December in being able to achieve

 6    these objectives.  However, at the beginning of January of 1993, they were

 7    able to set the conditions and initiate what's generally referred to as

 8    the Cerska campaign of 1993.

 9            It was a major winter offensive by the Drina Corps which succeeded

10    in two parts.  The first part was, you know, defeating the Muslim military

11    forces in the areas that was discussed, in Kamenica, in Cerska, and the

12    Bihac area; and, in effect, also pushing out the Muslim civilian

13    populations who inhabited those areas.

14            The general figures are that half the Muslim population chose to

15    try and go to free territory in Tuzla and the other half of the population

16    migrated south towards the territory under the control of Naser Oric, who

17    was also under significant pressure by the VRS and even some units of the

18    VJ federal army who had crossed across the border to engage in military

19    operations.

20            Many of those people who were forced out of Cerska and Kamenica in

21    January and February of 1992 found themselves, you know, in -- compressed

22    into the Srebrenica urban area when you got to March, April, and May of

23    1993.

24       Q.   Okay.  Really, in the briefest terms you can think of, can you

25    tell us what happened on the ground and especially with regard to what the

Page 19683

 1    UN got involved with, just in some spring period?

 2       A.   I think the most detailed accounting is obviously going to be the

 3    UN report on Srebrenica, which I think does an excellent job in laying out

 4    the background information to that point.  But what eventually happened

 5    is, as a result of a series of successful VRS military operations, the

 6    terrain up in Cerska was liberated.

 7            They were able to militarily reverse Naser Oric's gains in the

 8    Bratunac area.  They opened up the road from Konjevic Polje to Bratunac.

 9    They reliberated the Kravica village area, and essentially were able to

10    compress Naser Oric's forces into a small pocket centred on the town of

11    Srebrenica.  This is what the situation looked like in late April, early

12    May of 1993.

13       Q.   And did the Zvornik Brigade play a role in those military

14    campaigns?

15       A.   Yes, in fact, they did.  Their 8th Battalion was particularly

16    active in that area from its base at the time in Drinjaca, as well as

17    other formations such as the Wolves of the Drina, things of that nature.

18    So not only the Zvornik Brigade but all brigades of the Drina Corps used

19    manoeuvre units in order to achieve the necessary military success.

20       Q.   Was Vinko Pandurevic in command of the Zvornik Brigade during

21    those campaigns?

22       A.   Yes, sir.  He was -- he was in command.  Like I say, I believe he

23    assumed command in, roughly, 14 December 1992, and he was directing is

24    brigades military operations at the start Cerska campaign in January of

25    1993 and throughout the rest of the war.

Page 19684

 1       Q.   Again, just give us the brief conclusion of that story after the

 2    Drina Corps was able to bottle up Naser Oric and his forces and the

 3    civilian population in this area, what happened, in the spring?

 4       A.   Again, referencing the UN report on this particular subject, a

 5    humanitarian crisis was created because of the upwards of 30, 35, 40.000

 6    people who were compressed into that area.  General Mladic at the time

 7    agreed to a ceasefire in order to allow for the United Nations to evacuate

 8    the civilians out of that particular region.

 9            The political leadership of both the UN and the Muslim government

10    at the time, many parties viewed that as the UN being a part of ethnic

11    cleansing, and particularly the Bosnian Muslim government denied

12    permission for those evacuations to take place.

13            At that point, General Morillon, you know, unilaterally declared,

14    you know, the town and the population to be under UN protection, which of

15    course morphed into the future as the UN-protected safe area of

16    Srebrenica.

17       Q.   Okay.  I don't want to get into a lot of detail on all that at

18    this -- at this point or perhaps in the future, but let's go on to another

19    document that you've referred to, 65 ter number 731.

20            This is this publication called the "Drinski," which you've told

21    us is the Zvornik Brigade magazine.  Can you just tell us why you've cited

22    this particular area?

23       A.   The "Drinski" magazine, as I believe I've testified earlier,

24    particularly at this time, was the monthly military magazine of the

25    Zvornik Infantry Brigade.  It was published, and, of course, its design

Page 19685

 1    was to inform the soldiers of the brigade.  It was designed to, in part,

 2    help keep morale good.

 3            This particular article is a useful -- is a useful history of the

 4    combat -- you know, the origin and the combat service, commemorating the

 5    third anniversary of the actual creation of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade.

 6            MR. McCLOSKEY:  If we can go to the B/C/S page 6, so we just don't

 7    have the front of the magazine.

 8       Q.   Perhaps to save some time, we see an article that talks about the

 9    leadership of the brigade, then moving in December to Vinko Pandurevic,

10    and then it outlines some of the -- some of the work he had done, some of

11    the -- can you just briefly describe how that -- what's said there, how

12    that fits into your analysis?

13       A.   Yes, sir.  It reflects, you know, the fact that Major Petkovic,

14    the prior commander of the brigade, was severely wounded.  It talks about,

15    in broad terms, the arrival of then Captain First Class Pandurevic as the

16    brigade commander in December of 1992, his work in organising the brigade,

17    improving its combat effectiveness.

18            It talks about, in that second paragraph, the operation lasting

19    from 7 January to 20 February 1992, and the liberated territory with

20    respect to Zvornik and the Drinjaca Road and cutting off enemy forces in

21    other areas of the Cerska region.

22       Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Let's go to another exhibit you've cited.  It's

23    the next one, 65 ter number 414, and this is a very big document that is

24    entitled "Republika Srpska, Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska,

25    Analysis of the Combat Readiness and Activities of the Army of Republika

Page 19686

 1    Srpska in 1992."  It's dated, in Han Pijesak, April 1993.

 2            Now, can you just, first of all, tell us -- and then as we go

 3    through it, at the end we see that it's in the name of Supreme Commander

 4    of the Armed Forces of Republika Srpska Dr. Radovan Karadzic.

 5            Just briefly, what is this massive document?

 6       A.   In keeping with the professional requirements of, you know, the

 7    former JNA and their military education and their understanding of the

 8    command and staff functions, in early 1993 the leadership of the Main

 9    Staff of the Army of the Republika Srpska engaged in this study to, in

10    effect, review their performance for the prior year.

11            Essentially, this is their look in the mirror and their written

12    determination of what happened in the course from their establishment to

13    the present, catalogue those things that they have done correctly and they

14    want to continue to expand on, identify those things that they did not do

15    correctly and learn the lessons from that.

16            Essentially, it is a branch-by-branch, department-by-department

17    review that covers all of the functional areas of the Main Staff, starting

18    from morale, going through operations.  It talks about security, it talks

19    about logistics, it talks about training, it talks about ammunition

20    availability.  It, essentially, is the army's report card of its own

21    performance for the first year.

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey, what's that "ANAGO 92."  Any

23    explanation for it?

24            MR. McCLOSKEY:

25       Q.   Mr. Butler, do you know what that might mean on that front

Page 19687

 1    page, "ANAGO 92"?

 2       A.   No, sir.  They didn't translate it, for some reason, and I don't

 3    know what it means, specifically.

 4            MR. McCLOSKEY:  We'll check that out.

 5       Q.   It also, I left out, it says "Military Secret."  Can you tell us,

 6    who, in your view, this kind of confidential obviously study would go to?

 7       A.   This study was for the purpose of the Main Staff as well as the

 8    political leadership of the Republika Srpska.

 9       Q.   All right.  And we see, it's page 6 of the English, that the --

10    basically the table of contents; and then after the table of contents, it

11    says:  "Chief of Staff, Major General Milovanovic?

12            Now, this is for 1992 and maybe some of 1993, so I don't want to

13    spend much time on it, frankly.  But I do want to ask you about a couple

14    of things that are in here to see if it may have application to 1995.

15            Let's go to the beginning, entitled "Control and Command."  It's

16    page 7 of the English, B/C/S page 8.

17            It starts out:  "In the past year, the Army of Republika Srpska

18    has evolved into the highest strategic organisational formation of the

19    Serbian people in former Bosnia and Herzegovina, capable of realising the

20    strategic and other tasks assigned to it by the Supreme Command."

21            What do you think that's referring to, the strategic and other

22    tasks?

23       A.   The army is, essentially, reflecting, in that line, that it

24    believes it is developing to a point where it is capable and effective in

25    implementing the direction of the Supreme Command, the civilian leadership

Page 19688

 1    of the country.

 2       Q.   Would you include the strategic objectives and the directives in

 3    that or not?

 4       A.   Certainly, the strategic directives, as articulated in 6 May --

 5    I'm sorry, on 15 May 1992, you know, are a component part of the strategic

 6    direction of the civilian leadership of the Republika Srpska, where they

 7    want to take the war aims.

 8       Q.   Okay.  It goes on and says:  "With its organisational structure

 9    comprising seven operational and a number of tactical formations, it is

10    capable of protecting the Serbian people against genocide and of

11    protecting its heritage, of liberating territories belonging to it, and of

12    defeating the Muslim-Croat forces in a significant part of the war

13    theatre."

14            Now, it goes on in one of the following paragraphs.  I won't read

15    all of it, but again it refers to "defend the Serbian people against

16    genocide by the Muslim Ustasha forces."  Throughout this document, there

17    is references to the Serb people being threatened by genocide.

18            What do you make of that repeated reference, protecting the

19    Serbian people against genocide?

20       A.   One of the reoccurring themes, particularly through the public

21    announcements of the military leadership during the course of the war, was

22    that the military operations and the sacrifices that the soldiers were

23    being asked to make were not, in fact, offensive war aims but were

24    necessary in order to protect the Serbian people from the perceived threat

25    of genocide, raising the spectre of what happened in -- you know, during

Page 19689

 1    World War II.

 2            Primarily, it is a theme that permeates both military documents

 3    and also media documents that are for the consumption of the Serbian

 4    soldiers in the "Drinski" magazine or in other outlets of that nature.  So

 5    it is a constant theme throughout the war that, in fact, you know, the

 6    reason why they're engaging in these operations is to, in fact, prevent

 7    the extermination of their own ethnic group.

 8       Q.   In your view, is this propaganda or something else?

 9       A.   In this particular document, I don't know that I would call it

10    propaganda, per se, because this is not a document for public consumption.

11    It echoes the theme that I have seen in documents that were for public

12    consumption.  So, like I said, I don't think in this context it's

13    propaganda.  I mean, the general public is not going to have access to

14    this document; and, therefore, putting it in here for that purpose would

15    be pointless.

16       Q.   Okay.  Now, moving down the page to the fifth paragraph, it

17    says:  "During the past year, the Army of Republika Srpska has been under

18    a single control and command structure, despite the fact that initially we

19    had a large number of different armies and paramilitary formations.

20            "This unity has been attained by the following well-known

21    principles, such as unity, continuity, flexibility, efficiency,

22    operationability, and security, with subordination and a single command

23    having a crucial bearing on relations in the control and command process."

24            I emphasise "single command here" because I want to ask you about

25    this.  Is this -- is this anything to do with what you were talking about

Page 19690

 1    before, when you were getting into the command issues?

 2       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, these -- these principles of command were not

 3    only articulated in the relevant JNA documents on command and staff and

 4    brigade command, but you also see these same principles articulated, I

 5    believe, in paragraph 174 of the RS Law on the Army.

 6            So, again, they reiterate the principles, in part, by noting the

 7    fact that it's taken a considerable amount of time in the first year to

 8    achieve these particular principles based on what was actually happening

 9    on the ground.

10       Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next page.  It's page 8 in both

11    languages; and there, at the top of the page, it says:  "Decisions on the

12    engagement of the forces of the Army of Republika Srpska were taken at

13    meetings of bodies of the Main Staff, headed as a rule by the commander,

14    with the presence and active participation of the Chief of the Main Staff,

15    the assistant commanding officers, the heads of the departments, the heads

16    of the combat arms, and a number of operations officers.

17            "The principal decision-making method was the so-called full

18    method.  This shows that the situation on the battlefields was regularly

19    monitored and thoroughly analysed, making it unnecessary to apply the

20    fast-track or some other known method."

21            Can you just briefly tell us what you know, if anything, about

22    this full method versus the fast method and what they're talking about

23    here?

24       A.   These particular methods are defined in detail in the 1983 command

25    and staff manual.  The full method, in fact, is a comprehensive staff

Page 19691

 1    evaluation process, which is the preferred method to want to be able to

 2    make key decisions.  It allows for the time to study the particular issue,

 3    get the advice and input from all of the relevant staff officers and

 4    principals so their expertise can be used to the maximum.  It allows for

 5    the development of various options and plans and decisions as to which

 6    particular course of action will be the most effective course of action

 7    under the circumstances.

 8            It's -- it is the preferred course because, of course, it allows

 9    for the full use of the broad range of experience and expertise of the

10    commander's staff.  When possible, you don't want a situation where events

11    on the ground are occurring so rapidly that this process cannot take place

12    and your commander is forced to make snap judgements and snap decisions on

13    what are -- you know, could be partial or even erroneous information.

14            So, I mean, certainly this reflects, you know, the significant

15    professionalism and professional education of the army in understanding

16    and knowing this process and implementing it.

17       Q.   All right.  And we will get into more specifics, obviously, with

18    the Srebrenica operations in 1995; but as you look just generally at May,

19    June, July 1995, can you determine what method you saw at work during

20    those time periods?

21       A.   I'm not sure I can make a broad statement in that respect.  For

22    example, where you had the publication of operational directive 7 and 7-1

23    and the publishing of orders pursuant to the attack on Srebrenica in July,

24    that was, for the most part, this full method of command and staff

25    analysis.

Page 19692

 1            You have a situation on 12 July when, in the headquarters of the

 2    Bratunac Brigade, the VRS army commander, in consulting with some of his

 3    staff officers, not many, but his brigade commanders, makes a much more

 4    rapid analysis, assessment, and decision to move on forward to Zepa.  So

 5    you had examples of both particular decision-making situations encompassed

 6    in that.

 7       Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  We'll, of course get into that --

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, Mr. McCloskey.

 9            Ms. Fauveau.

10            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'm not sure this is the right time,

11    but I believe there is a problem in translation here.  That's why I

12    decided to stand up, because the document is still here in front of us.

13            Earlier on, my colleague read out a portion of the text, ending

14    with the words:  [In English] "... and the number of operations officers.

15            [Interpretation] Now, if I look at the text in B/C/S, there's no

16    mention of "operations officers" in this text.  Mention is made of

17    administrative officers, officials, but no mention is made of "operations

18    officers."  I don't know if the interpreters can be of any help here.  The

19    word used in B/C/S is the following:  "referent."

20            MR. McCLOSKEY:  We can try to sort that out, but somehow I have a

21    feeling operations officers were involved in this military business.

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  I can't help you, so please go into this during the

23    break.

24            MR. McCLOSKEY:  We'll work with Madame Fauveau on that and try to

25    sort it out.

Page 19693

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, one moment.  Is there -- is everything okay?

 2    All right.

 3            Then please try and check with whoever can help you over the break

 4    and come back to us later on.  Thank you.

 5            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, sir.

 6       Q.   All right.  Now, let's go much further into the document that

 7    starts -- appears to start assigning tasks or priorities.  General tasks,

 8    I believe, as we see on 154 of the -- of the English.

 9            But let's go to 157, because that's where they get to the Drina

10    Corps, and 137 for the B/C/S.

11       A.   I'm sorry, what page in the English, sir?

12       Q.   157.  Up there, it's got "Drina Corps."

13            It says:  "Task:  Shatter, as soon as possible, the Muslim forces

14    in the regions of Srebrenica and Zepa, and then regroup forces and orient

15    at any time them towards Gorazde."

16            So, in April of 1993, when this dated, can you set, again very

17    briefly, the time frame, that this is the task?

18       A.   At this particular junction of time, VRS army forces are rolling

19    back the Bosnian Muslim forces of Naser Oric in a way smaller and smaller

20    encirclement around Srebrenica, their last stronghold in that particular

21    region.  So their goal is to continue military actions against those

22    forces in Srebrenica and Zepa.  Then once those military objectives have

23    been taken, you know, shatter those Muslim forces, you know, be able to

24    reorient and begin operations directed against those in Gorazde.

25       Q.   Okay.  And then we see, at the bottom of the English, the date and

Page 19694

 1    Dr. Radovan Karadzic's name.  Then, if we go over to the next page, 158,

 2    it's entitled "Basic characteristics of the operational-tactical

 3    utilisation of the Army of Republika Srpska," and it's the same ERN --

 4    it's the continuing ERN series.

 5            Then after several pages, this section appears to end in the name

 6    of Colonel Dragutin Ilic.  Do you know, is this connected to the previous

 7    document, in your view, or do you know?

 8       A.   It's connected insomuch as the document signed by Dr. Karadzic is,

 9    in fact, incorporated into this larger, you know, army evaluation and

10    study.  Colonel Ilic at the time was the chief of operations of the Main

11    Staff of the VRS when this was published.

12       Q.   Do you know where I believe it was then Colonel Miletic was?

13       A.   I believe at this time Colonel Miletic was an operations officer

14    on the Main Staff.  He was subordinated to Colonel Ilic at the time.

15       Q.   All right.  Now, let's just go in this part of the document to

16    B/C/S page 139, English 160.

17            On the -- well, on the last part of 159, it talks about priorities

18    and discharging set or approval tasks were selected depending on the

19    actual stage of the war.  The situation in the various areas of the former

20    Bosnia and Herzegovina," now we're on page 160 of the English, "and

21    general social and economic circumstances."

22            I won't read the rest of it; but if people could read that part to

23    themselves, I just want to focus on this last sentence here:  "In the last

24    month and a half, our operations have concentrated on the liberation of

25    Podrinje, as thereby the strategic objective of our war and would be

Page 19695

 1    realised, one that could be defined as 'establishing contact with Serbia

 2    on the River Drina, or the Drina ceasing to be a frontier,'"

 3    quote/unquote, beginning with "establishing."

 4            What do you make of that?

 5       A.   It's an example of how the aims -- you know, the aims and

 6    operations of the military were not being conducted in isolation.  They

 7    were, in fact, being conducted in order to achieve the designated

 8    strategic goals of the political leadership of the Republika Srpska, and

 9    that ties right back to, I believe, strategic directive 3.

10       Q.   Okay.  And on another topic, just the next paragraph:  "In

11    Posavina and Western Bosnia, we have put the emphasis on the grouping of

12    forces, air and artillery support; and in Podrinje, in a specific way, the

13    increased expenditure of ammunition and materiel and equipment, as well as

14    the use of reserves of the Main Staff of the Army of RS."

15            Now, this is the sentence I want you to concentrate on:  "The

16    presence of the commander of the Main Staff, or a representative of the

17    Main Staff, in the units carrying out the mission of the liberation of

18    Podrinje, is a specific way of giving weight to and steering combat

19    operations towards a single goal."

20            Now, it's very clear what that says and means.  This is 1992,

21    right, and perhaps a bit of 1993.  Do you see this practice being used

22    relating to Srebrenica in July 1995?

23       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

24       Q.   Can you briefly explain?

25       A.   From the beginnings of the military component of the operation, we

Page 19696

 1    see references, I mean, not only to the issue of reporting back to the

 2    Main Staff, but, certainly, by the 9th of July, there is a personal --

 3    there is a reference in the reporting to General Gvero being personally

 4    present at the IKM where operations are being conducted.

 5            Beyond that, even later on the -- sometime during the period of

 6    the 10th, General Mladic himself personally shows up at the IKM for the

 7    final day of military operations on the 11th, which lead to the capture of

 8    Srebrenica.

 9       Q.   How about Zepa, any Main Staff person there briefly?

10       A.   Yes, sir.  Once military operations began in earnest, and not only

11    military operations, with Zepa there was a concerted effort by the

12    military leadership to try and coerce the political leadership of Zepa to

13    surrender the enclave without military action; and very early on the

14    ground in that effort, Major -- or General-Major Tolimir was present on

15    the ground.

16       Q.   How about at around the same time with the build-up of forces over

17    in the -- the Croat forces over in the Krajina?

18       A.   Colonel-General Milovanovic's personal presence out there reflects

19    that same principle.

20       Q.   Okay.  Let's briefly now go to page 162 in the English, page 141

21    in the B/C/S.  There's a bullet point:  "By taking Kamenica, Cerska,

22    Glogova, the region of Osmace village, and Jadar, the Drina Corps has

23    considerably expanded the free territory and will shortly have achieved

24    the strategic task assigned to it by the Supreme Command, while at the

25    same time providing protection for the Serbian people."

Page 19697

 1            Is this just a reiteration of what you've already said, this

 2    document has said, basically, with perhaps more description?

 3       A.   Yes, sir.  These are the same terrain features we had been

 4    discussing that were involved in the Cerska 1993 campaign.

 5       Q.   Okay.  All right.  Now, I want to continue on in documents that

 6    you have cited relating to the RS and VRS focus on these -- on these

 7    areas.  So let's go to the next document, which is 65 ter 2742.

 8            This is from the Army of the Republika Srpska Main Staff.  It's

 9    now the 1st of May, 1993.  It's to the -- to various corps and other

10    units.  It's entitled:  "Combat order for the liberation of Zepa and

11    Gorazde."  It is signed off by deputy command -- deputy commander

12    Major-General Manojlo Milovanovic, drafted by Colonel Radivoje Miletic.

13            First of all, what significance, if any, is this deputy commander

14    designation of Milovanovic in this document?

15       A.   It reflects that for the purpose that this order is being issued,

16    during the time of this order being issued, it reflects the fact that the

17    commander of the Main Staff, General Mladic, is unavailable to issue the

18    order himself; and, therefore, then General-Major Milovanovic is issuing

19    the order under his authority as the deputy commander of the Main Staff.

20       Q.   All right.  And this -- and, I mean, we'll get into some of this

21    document in more detail.  It's entitled:  "Combat order for the liberation

22    of Zepa and Gorazde."  Can you put us in a bit of context, where we are

23    now in terms of Srebrenica, and just a very general synopsis of this

24    document?

25       A.   It reflects, particularly the first two pages of this document,

Page 19698

 1    the understanding of the military leadership of where they are on the

 2    ground in the Podrinje area with respect to what they believe the Muslim

 3    objectives are to be able to hold on to certain parts of territory, what

 4    they think the UN's involvement and actions are going to be; and that

 5    based on that particular information, they want to begin to initiate

 6    operations to preclude that, specifically as rapidly as possible, to take

 7    the area around Zepa and follow on to Gorazde.

 8       Q.   But remind us, by May 1st, 1993, is there a Srebrenica enclave, a

 9    UN enclave?

10       A.   There is a UN safe area designated around Srebrenica.  I don't

11    know whether they are calling it the enclave.  You know, they never did

12    define the boundaries of it certainly during that period, so I'm not

13    exactly sure of the terminology of it.

14       Q.   But at that time, would that have been in the mind of the authors

15    of this?

16       A.   It reflects the fact that, you know, they're aware that the

17    foreign military intervention under the UN umbrella, and that's how they

18    viewed what happened at Srebrenica.

19       Q.   Okay.  Let's go into a little more detail on this.  I want to just

20    go to the second page, which should be B/C/S still on the first page, but

21    the second page of the English.  It gives a background about the interests

22    of the major powers in the first part.

23            Then it goes on to say:  "Expecting more strict sanctions against

24    the FRY and the adoption of the resolution on expanding the mandate of the

25    UN forces from the forces for securing humanitarian assistance to

Page 19699

 1    peacekeeping forces, but actually means foreign interventions under the UN

 2    umbrella, the enemy is trying to keep the Muslim enclaves in Srednje,

 3    Podrinje, Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde before the intervention begins,

 4    and to take most favourable position on all fronts, especially in

 5    Podrinje."

 6            Do you have any disagreements with that?

 7       A.   No, sir.  That's their point of view of what's happening.

 8       Q.   And I don't know if you can the Muslim point of view, but is that

 9    what the Muslims are trying to do?

10       A.   I believe, within the context of how it's discussed in the UN

11    report on the events leading up to Srebrenica, this is exactly what the

12    Muslims have been trying to do.

13       Q.   All right.  And:  "Considering their military defeats in Kamenica,

14    Cerska, and Konjevic Polje, and expecting the fall of Zepa within a short

15    period of time, the Muslim leadership is trying to internationalise the

16    problem of the Podrinje region at any cost by bringing the UN forces to

17    Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde and organising other humanitarian actions

18    which would enable constant presence of the representatives of

19    international organisations in those enclaves."

20            Do you agree with that?

21       A.   Yes, sir.

22       Q.   Now, this is drafted by then Colonel Miletic.  In your view, what

23    degree of sophistication and knowledge of the situation does this show on

24    his part?

25       A.   It reflects a knowledge of both the military situation on the

Page 19700

 1    ground in the Drina Corps, and it reflects a broader knowledge of the

 2    larger political and diplomatic situation with respect to particularly the

 3    United Nations ground forces as well as events that are happening up at

 4    the United Nations Security Council.

 5       Q.   Okay.  One last question before the break regarding the next

 6    paragraph.  It's perhaps the next page in the B/C/S -- well, I'm not sure

 7    it is, but it starts:  "Therefore, in the following period, the Muslims

 8    plan to avoid the demilitarisation of Srebrenica, or overcome their

 9    inconvenient operative and tactic position in Podrinje, by proclaiming

10    Gorazde and Zepa 'protected zones,' in order to link these areas and then

11    create conditions for continuing with their attacks, taking over Eastern

12    Bosnia and expelling the Serbs from this territory.

13            "For the time being, they are obviously not able to launch any

14    significant attacks, but we expect sabotage and terrorist actions ... on a

15    larger scale in the regions of Grebka, and they'll try to re-establish the

16    functioning of the Trnovo-Gorazde corridor."

17            Just going through this a little more slowly, "in the following

18    period the Muslims plan to avoid the demilitarisation of Srebrenica," did

19    the Muslims, in fact -- were they able to, in the words of Mr. -- or

20    Colonel Miletic, avoid the demilitarisation of Srebrenica?

21       A.   Yes, sir, they were.

22       Q.   Again, I won't get into how -- you know, what kinds of things were

23    taken or not taken, but the Court's, I think, heard more recorded in human

24    history at that point.  How about the part about "or overcome their

25    inconvenient operative and tactical position in the Podrinje by

Page 19701

 1    proclaiming Gorazde and Zepa protected areas"?

 2            Did that happen?

 3       A.   Yes, sir.  It did as well.

 4       Q.   "... in order to link up these areas and then create conditions

 5    for continuing their attacks, taking over Eastern Bosnia ..."

 6            Did they try to do that?

 7       A.   Particularly with respect to Gorazde and linking it up with the

 8    other forces from Central Bosnia, the conduct of the operations out of the

 9    Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves from 1993 to 1995 reflect the fact that while

10    they had combat power to conduct raids and operations of that nature, they

11    were never going to have -- they never generated enough significant combat

12    power to significantly take large swashes of territory that were then

13    under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska in that area.

14       Q.   Okay.  So then we get the next part "expelling the Serbs from this

15    territory."  They didn't get to that part?

16       A.   Certainly not in the -- the area that we're referring to from Zepa

17    to Srebrenica to the north.

18       Q.   Were Serbs expelled from the Tuzla area?

19       A.   Yes, sir.  They were, early in the war.

20       Q.   Completely?

21       A.   I don't -- I can't tell you the population numbers specifically,

22    but my own --

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  I don't think this is military expertise.  It's

24    demographic expertise.

25            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I was just preparing for cross-examination is all,

Page 19702

 1    Mr. President.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Anyway, let's prepare for the break instead

 3    for the time being.

 4            So we'll have a 25-minute break.  Thank you.

 5                          --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

 6                          --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 8            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9            We heard, Mr. President, shortly after your request from

10    Translation, and with the agreement of at least some Defence counsel, that

11    this acronym for "ANAGO" is "Analysis of Readiness."

12            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you for that information, yes.

13            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.

14       Q.   Mr. Butler, we're still on the Milovanovic, drafted by Miletic

15    document.  I don't want to get into all the ins and outs of that.  There's

16    discussions of more Muslim intentions and the Vance-Owen plan and issues,

17    which I don't want to get on to.

18            But on page 7 of the document, in B/C/S, it should be 5, it just

19    lists basically the order:  "I have decided the following:  The forces of

20    the Drina Corps," with the assistance of various units which I won't get

21    into, and "the support of the Main Staff reserve forces is to crush and

22    destroy the Muslim armed forces in the broader area of Zepa and Gorazde as

23    soon as possible, shall cut off Kladanj-Zivinici road, securing a firm

24    holding of the lines achieved around Srebrenica and on the north-west part

25    of the corps front and prevent the incursion of the Muslim forces from the

Page 19703

 1    direction of Kladanj, Kalesija, and Vitnica."

 2            It goes on in the next paragraph and gives objectives, one of

 3    which is to crush enemy forces in Zepa and liberate Zepa.

 4            Was this ever carried out, from this particular plan and this

 5    particular time period?

 6       A.   The VRS tried to implement this; however, very rapidly, following

 7    the creation of the Srebrenica safe area, both Zepa and Gorazde were also

 8    declared UN-protected areas as well.  So, you know, while preparations

 9    were underway to do this, they were never able to actually achieve these

10    goals.

11       Q.   Okay.  Then going over to page 8, I think it's page 5 in the B/C/S

12    down at the bottom paragraph, it says:  "The Main Staff of the Army of

13    Republika Srpska shall coordinate the operation from the IKM in Rogatica.

14    Colonel Dragutin Ilic shall be responsible for merging, planning, linking,

15    and RiK," which means command and control, "of the forces engaged in the

16    liberation of Gorazde and Colonel Radivoje Miletic of the forces engaged

17    in the liberation of Zepa."

18            Now, remind us, at this time, what you believe Miletic's position

19    at this time was?

20       A.   At this point in time, I believe Colonel Miletic is either the

21    deputy -- I don't think at this point in time he's become the chief of

22    operations.  I believe he's the deputy to Colonel Ilic.

23       Q.   And this sentence is a bit short:  "... and Colonel Radivoje

24    Miletic of the forces engaged in the liberation of Zepa."  What do you

25    take that to mean that Miletic's responsibilities are, the document

Page 19704

 1    drafted by Miletic?

 2       A.   In this context, I mean, it's not Miletic being appointed as a

 3    commander.  What they are saying is, in this -- in this situation, is that

 4    these designated officers, Colonel Ilic and Colonel Miletic, will be

 5    responsible for coordinating the combat activities from these two various

 6    locations.

 7            That reflects the practice that we've discussed before, where even

 8    though the brigades and corps are conducting these combat operations,

 9    there is a preference, where they can, at key locations to have a Main

10    Staff official or officer present at that site in order to de-conflict any

11    potential issues and to continually monitor the combat operations; and if

12    the situation changes, that particular officer is in a position to give

13    guidance as to how to deal with those changes.

14            It is, particularly within the context of the JNA and as we saw it

15    applied to the VRS, a common practice.

16       Q.   All right.  Now, let's -- as you've stated, those areas became

17    UN-protected areas.  Let's skip ahead to July 1994 and a document that

18    you've cited.  It's 65 ter 2667.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Haynes.

20            MR. HAYNES:  Just while this document is coming up, I was going to

21    raise this later but there's now an inconsistency.  The transcribers have,

22    this time around, correctly attributed that document to Milovanovic.  On

23    four previous occasions, page 7, line 19; page 10, line 2; and page 32,

24    lines 11 and 12, they attributed it to Mr. Milutinovic, which might in due

25    course prove confusing.

Page 19705

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Thank you for that.

 2            Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 3            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  Thank you very much.  I don't think the

 4    press guy was doing these sorts of documents.  I hope not.  Thank you.

 5       Q.   Back to where we were, we were getting ahead closer to July 1995,

 6    but we're still in July 1994, 65 ter 2667, a document from the Drina

 7    Corps, under General Zivanovic, entitled "Very Urgent: "Defining tasks

 8    from the briefing and urging their completion."  It's to the Zvornik

 9    Brigade and other brigades of the Drina Corps and some other units.

10            It says:  "Pursuant to a briefing on 1 July 1994 to the VRS Main

11    Staff commander by Drina Corps commander and regiment/brigade commanders

12    about level of combat readiness in units and corps commands, pursuant to

13    the tasks issued and pursuant to the VRS Main Staff orders dated 22 July

14    1994, in order to regulate measures, actions, and tasks relating to the

15    Muslim enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde, I am issuing the

16    following order."

17            Then it goes down, under number 1, and reference is by the order

18    of the Main Staff, dated April 18, 1993:  "It is now declared null and

19    void (the ceasefire and action around Srebrenica)."

20            What's that a reference to?  Tell us about that, just a bit?

21       A.   That is a reference to the actual ceasefire agreement that was

22    signed by General Mladic and, I believe on the Muslim side, I believe it

23    was General Halilovic, I'm not exactly sure, with respect to the military

24    ceasefire that was brokered by the United Nations in concert with the

25    establishment of the Srebrenica safe area.

Page 19706

 1       Q.   All right.  And I'm not going to go into all the details of that,

 2    but there is, I think, one paragraph that helps us understand some of it.

 3    It's paragraph 13.  It's number 5 in the English.  It's B/C/S page 3.

 4            It says:  "Since Muslim forces and UNPROFOR from the enclaves of

 5    Srebrenica and Zepa did not fulfill the discussed agreement on the

 6    demilitarisation of Muslim forces, and since they continued to move around

 7    armed and to open fire from infantry weapons and mortars against VRS

 8    soldiers and our population, the brigade command (independent infantry

 9    battalion) and units and units must take all measures to prevent that and

10    to reduce the enclaves to the area listed in the agreement - Srebrenica

11    town, Zepa, and Gorazde (the town and a three-kilometre area)."

12            What does that document do?  What does it tell us?

13       A.   It is instructing the brigades to start to enforce what the VRS

14    considered to be the designated boundaries of the particular UN safe

15    areas.  They never recognised the much wider areas.  You know, they

16    recognised them on their maps as de facto this was the borderline of the

17    UN protected area, but their own understanding of what they had agreed to

18    was that these protected areas would, in fact, be much smaller than the

19    UN's interpretation of them.

20       Q.   So what is your view of what they mean when they say "reduce the

21    enclaves to the urban area"?

22       A.   Specifically, with respect to Srebrenica, and I've testified

23    before, my understanding is what the VRS articulated was the one-kilometre

24    by two-kilometre, you know, area that was, in fact, the urban area of

25    Srebrenica.

Page 19707

 1       Q.   What would be the realistic effect of that?

 2       A.   You would be, essentially, looking at the same humanitarian crisis

 3    situation that occurred in April of 1993 which triggered the decision to

 4    declare the area a safe area in the first place.

 5       Q.   The statement that I just read out, that they did not fulfill the

 6    discussed agreement on demilitarisation of Muslim forces, do you agree or

 7    disagree with that?

 8       A.   I agree with that, yes, sir.

 9       Q.   And:  "Since they continued to move around armed and to open up

10    fire from infantry weapons and mortars against VRS soldiers and our

11    population ..."

12            Do you agree or disagree with that?

13       A.   Yes, sir.  They in fact did.

14       Q.   I'm not going to get into any detail on this, but did the UN

15    provide sufficient forces to protect the Muslim population in Srebrenica

16    and Zepa?

17       A.   No, sir.  They did not, not to protect them in a military sense

18    against an armed aggressor from outside and not in the sense of enough

19    military forces with a requisite mission to enforce the ceasefire

20    agreements or the demilitarisation agreements.

21       Q.   Okay.  Now let's -- continuing to move towards this, we're now to

22    March of 1995 and documents that you've identified relating to the

23    possible intentions of the RS and the VRS.  A document that everyone is

24    familiar with is 65 ter number 5.  It's directive 7.  It's dated 17 March

25    1995, under a cover letter from the Chief of Staff Milovanovic, and we see

Page 19708

 1    again drafted by Colonel Miletic.

 2            As we saw before, there's the listings of the various corps.  We

 3    get to the Drina Corps listing, page 10 of the English, page 15 of the

 4    B/C/S.

 5            When it gets to down at the bottom by "Drina Corps," it gets to

 6    the area that we're concerned about:  "While in the direction of

 7    Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, complete physical separation of Srebrenica

 8    from Zepa should be carried out as soon as possible, preventing even

 9    communication between individuals in the two enclaves, by planned and

10    well-thought-out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of

11    total insecurity, with no hope of further survival or life of the

12    inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

13            Mr. Butler, I don't want to ask you a lot about that.  Is that

14    consistent or inconsistent with directive 4, in your view?

15       A.   I believe that's -- that's very consistent with directive 4.

16       Q.   Okay.  Let's go on to another -- another section in this.  It's

17    page 14 of the English, and it's page 21.  It's under this area: "Support

18    for combat operations" under the "Moral and psychological support" area.

19            I believe it's around the fourth paragraph down and it says:  "The

20    relevant state and military organs responsible for work with UNPROFOR and

21    the humanitarian organisations shall, through the planned and

22    unobtrusively restrictive issuing of permits, reduce and limit the

23    logistics support of UNPROFOR to the enclaves and the supply of material

24    resources to the Muslim population, making them dependent on our goodwill,

25    while at the same time avoiding condemnation by the international

Page 19709

 1    community and international public opinion."

 2            Do you see or infer any reference to the Muslim army in this

 3    paragraph?

 4       A.   No, sir.

 5       Q.   Okay.  And just how do you -- how do you take -- how do you take

 6    this to mean, briefly?

 7       A.   I read it at face value for what it says.

 8       Q.   Okay.  Fair enough, fair enough.  Let's -- now, after this, which

 9    is Defence Exhibit 5D00361, is something called "Directive 7-1", and this

10    is again drafted by Miletic, under the name of Mladic this time.

11            Can you briefly describe to us what this document is?

12       A.   This is a common thing I've seen in connection with some of the

13    other strategic directives, particularly strategic directive 4, where

14    after the issuance of the original directive, the headquarters will issue

15    additional amplifying or technical instructions on how to accomplish these

16    specific goals related to the base directive.

17            What directive 7-1 does is, in fact, lays out a more military

18    technical series of orders and instructions for the corps to implement, so

19    it's exactly clear what they're expected to be able to accomplish.

20       Q.   And are there any references in this document to the two

21    references I've just referred you to, and directive 7 specifically, making

22    life unbearable for the Muslim population, making it impossible, and the

23    reduction of aid to the Muslim population; any references to those two

24    issues?

25       A.   No, sir, there are not.

Page 19710

 1       Q.   Does that -- how does that affect, if it does, those two

 2    directives in directive 7?

 3       A.   I don't believe it does, primarily because the issues related to

 4    the control of United Nations convoys, granting the clearance and

 5    ultimately determining which convoys will pass and under what

 6    circumstance, was not a responsibility that was delegated down to the

 7    corps or other formations.  It was a responsibility that the Main Staff

 8    itself, you know, directed.  As a result, given this order going down to

 9    the corps giving them more technical guidance and instruction, since they

10    didn't have to deal with that specific aspect of the plan, they didn't

11    need to amplify those issues.

12       Q.   Okay.  That's the issue of restricting.  What about the issue of

13    the first one, making life unbearable and impossible for the population?

14       A.   Again, with respect to this is being a more technical document

15    with respect to military technical tasks, there's not a collateral

16    military order or terminology that equates to -- you know, there's no

17    military mission that says make life, you know, unbearable for a

18    population.  You can attack, you can defend, you can advance, but there's

19    no collateral order to say that, so that's not exactly a military goal

20    that can be defined.

21       Q.   Okay.  Now, are you familiar with -- well, first of all, are you

22    familiar with a collection of convoy -- humanitarian and UN convoy

23    documents that was assembled by the OTP?

24       A.   Yes, sir, I am.

25       Q.   And can you briefly describe that collection and where it came

Page 19711

 1    from, as best as you know?

 2       A.   The first few that we had, within the context of the Office of the

 3    Prosecutor, was with the seizure of documents for the Bratunac Light

 4    Infantry Brigade in 1998.  There were a number of orders there to the

 5    brigade from -- through the Drina Corps to the Main Staff, reflecting what

 6    we call convoy clearance messages.

 7            Those are messages from the Main Staff sent down to the relevant

 8    formations that are responsible for the blockade or the control of convoys

 9    back and forth out of the enclave, letting them know which particular

10    convoys and what particular cargo have been approved to go into the

11    enclaves, and which particular cargo and which particular convoys are not

12    approved, and in some cases the circumstances why they were not approved.

13    Bratunac had a collection of these documents because Bratunac controlled

14    the UN access into the enclave over the yellow bridge.

15            Later, as part of the Drina Corps collection, there was a wider

16    selection of these same types of documents, reflecting convoy clearance

17    messages for other parts of the country as well, Zepa, Gorazde, and even

18    Sarajevo, so you just had a much broader framework.  But we've seen these

19    documents, from an analytical perspective, since 1998.

20       Q.   All right.  And were you asked to review that collection for this

21    testimony?

22       A.   Yes, sir, I was.

23       Q.   And what were you asked to do?

24       A.   Essentially, I was asked to review those documents and present

25    them as a way of providing a not necessarily comprehensive review but give

Page 19712

 1    the Court an idea of the types of measures that the Main Staff and the VRS

 2    forces undertook with respect to convoy clearance, why they cleared

 3    certain convoys and why they did not, what some of their underlying intent

 4    and goals were behind these issues, and how the actual practice occurred

 5    on the ground.

 6       Q.   From this collection, did you -- can you in any way tie it to what

 7    we saw in directive 7, that talks about restrict -- restricting convoys?

 8       A.   Yes, sir, I believe it does.

 9       Q.   All right.  And you picked out several.

10            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Your Honours, Mr. President, I have thought of a

11    way to try do this and save some time, but I -- so I'm going to try to go

12    through these fairly quickly.  I just couldn't find a way to save time,

13    and I think it's an important area, given that many of them, as you know,

14    already are authored by General Miletic.

15       Q.   Mr. Butler, can you tell us, before we get into the individual

16    documents, what do you know about how this system worked at the time?

17       A.   At the time, there was a political body of the Republika Srpska

18    that would meet and discuss, in broad terms, issues related to what

19    material could come into the Republika Srpska as part of UN aid packages

20    or UN convoys.  It dealt with issues on a nationwide basis, and it was

21    very much involved in ensuring that for aid that was going to the Muslims

22    and to the Croats, that, in fact, the Serbs also received their requisite

23    amount of aid.

24            At the same time, there was a military not body but military

25    officers at the Main Staff who were concerned and dealt with the actual

Page 19713

 1    application of the movement of those convoys, designating specific routes,

 2    designating specific times, designating specific cargoes; and, certainly,

 3    that made sense with respect to the fact that, you know, the Main Staff

 4    would have the best view on the ground of ongoing combat activities and

 5    would know what areas would be safe for the UN to move convoys through at

 6    what particular times.  So that particular -- you know, that particular

 7    apparatus was in place.

 8            Once it was decided which convoys would be able to pass, what

 9    times they would be able to pass, what their cargo was, those decisions

10    were then crystalised into orders which were sent to the military units

11    that were actually controlling the access of roads from the United

12    Nations.

13            Convoys coming into Serbia -- from Serbia would either come in

14    through Zvornik or through the bridge at Ljubivoje, so those orders would

15    go there.  Convoys going into Srebrenica would go across the yellow

16    bridge, so orders would be sent to the Bratunac Brigade so they could

17    adequately inspect the convoys before it entered the UN territory.  Those

18    types of details, and that's how that apparatus worked.

19       Q.   This political body that you talk about working with the VRS, was

20    there any member of the Main Staff on that body?

21       A.   I believe that there was one member of the Main Staff on that

22    body.

23       Q.   When you say "I believe" --

24       A.   Yeah.  My understanding is it was Colonel - and I don't want to

25    butcher the name; I'm not good at it - Djukic -- not Djukic, Djuric.

Page 19714

 1       Q.   Djurdjic?

 2       A.   Close enough.

 3       Q.   I'll probably -- anyway, we'll get to some documents.

 4       A.   That helps.  I'm not very good at the names, unfortunately.

 5       Q.   And you've seen the collection of documents that are here.  Are

 6    those documents that you've identified largely because they were excluding

 7    materials, and some other reasons?

 8       A.   The documents that I've selected are there because they show what

 9    type of material was included, what type of material was excluded, and

10    also because it gives glimpses into the rationale behind the Main Staff of

11    excluding certain material.

12       Q.   Okay.  And are there plenty of other documents in the collection

13    that you didn't refer to that actually, you know, allow convoys to go

14    through?

15       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.  It's not a comprehensive collection of

16    what I've assembled today.

17       Q.   Okay.  We're going to go through these, and I will probably do

18    some leading; but in coordination with my colleagues, just so we can try

19    to get through them.

20            Let's go to 65 ter 2522, a -- one of these Main Staff -- it's

21    entitled "Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska," 6 March 1995, to

22    the SRK and Drina Corps Command:  "In our document of 6 March 1995, we

23    informed you of the convoys and movements of UNPROFOR teams approved for

24    7 March 1995."

25            Just so we know, this is going to be under the name of Radivoje

Page 19715

 1    Miletic, standing in for the chief.

 2            In order -- then on page 2:  "In order to exercise strict control

 3    over the movement of convoys and teams which alone have been approved, we

 4    hereby provide details of the convoys which have not been approved, of

 5    which you will promptly inform the check-points in order to prevent

 6    unapproved movement, as follows."

 7            What does this tell us about the process and who was involved in

 8    it from the top?

 9       A.   It demonstrates the involvement of the Main Staff in some detail

10    with respect to, again, not only clearing which convoys, but deciding

11    which convoys are not cleared.  It shows involvement at the highest levels

12    of the Main Staff.

13       Q.   So we see this under the name of Radivoje Miletic.  Do you have

14    any explanation why he, as it's said here, standing in for the Chief of

15    Staff, why he would be involved in this kind of matter?

16       A.   I certainly can't say that he would have drafted this particular

17    order.  But as his role as, you know, standing in now for the Chief of

18    Staff, this was something under the purview of the Main Staff operations

19    people and something that, you know, subordinate staff members would have

20    drafted and expected to go out under his authority.

21       Q.   If he had signed this, would that be significant; if so, how?

22       A.   I'm not sure how much more significant it will be.  You know, a

23    superior is expected to know what orders are being issued in his name.

24    What should normally happen as a part of the process, that even if this is

25    signed for him by a subordinate officer, at some point in time he is

Page 19716

 1    expected to review it because he's responsible for it.  If he signed it,

 2    personally, it reflects the fact that he would have read it, personally.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  One moment, Mr. McCloskey.

 4            Madame Fauveau.

 5            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, perhaps it's a

 6    technical detail, but I think it's important.  I don't believe the

 7    document we have here is in order.  I don't think it is in order.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Thank you, Madam.

 9            Mr. McCloskey, can we see the first page, please?

10            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  Directive.

12            MR. McCLOSKEY:

13       Q.   Mr. Butler, maybe you can clear this up for us.  We see, in this

14    document, General Miletic telling people to do things, but how do you

15    evaluate that, from his position at the time?

16       A.   No.  He's not -- he's not directing the subordinate formations to

17    deny convoy clearance.  What he's saying, in the context of this order, is

18    that, "We, at the Main Staff, have already decided that these convoys will

19    not pass.  We are informing you of our decision.  In the event that a

20    convoy shows up at a check-point and is one of these convoys that has

21    already been denied, you're to take the following measures."

22            Those measures are actually explained in detail in following

23    documents, where it specifically notes that, "You're to turn the convoy

24    around and you're to notify the Main Staff."

25            So, at this point, when you look at this document in isolation,

Page 19717

 1    you know, there's an assumption that the brigades and the subordinate

 2    commands already know what they are supposed to do in the event that a

 3    particular convoy that has not been approved shows up at their doorstep.

 4       Q.   But when he's telling people to do things, like he is here, do you

 5    view that as something that the subordinates that he's telling it to have

 6    to follow?

 7       A.   Yes, sir.  The subordinate commands are going to be expected to

 8    follow these instructions.

 9       Q.   And I don't think at this time I'm going to ask you about the

10    standing in for and that whole area.  I think that's been dealt with

11    thoroughly.

12            All right.  Let me just go to one of the restrictions.  It's

13    number 4.  It's page 2 in the English.  As we see in the top paragraph in

14    the English:  "The unapproved movement, as follows," and it describes the

15    Ukrainian Battalion from Sarajevo to Zepa, 7 March, returning 9 March, in

16    order to supply fuel to the Ukrainian Battalion in Zepa.

17            What do you say about this?

18       A.   It's a reflection of part of the larger plan to slowly limit the

19    ability of the United Nations forces to effectively operate under their

20    mandate of policing the safe areas.

21       Q.   Can you think of any military reason to prevent the Ukrainian

22    Battalion from getting fuel?

23       A.   The only military justification that comes to mind, given the fact

24    that the UN's not going to militarily attack the VRS, would be their

25    suspicion that the Ukrainian military forces in this case might either be

Page 19718

 1    providing fuel to the Bosnian Muslim forces or that the fuel that's going

 2    there might in some way be hijacked or compromised and still end up in the

 3    hands of the Bosnian Muslims.

 4       Q.   The Bosnian Muslims in Zepa, what armed forces were you aware of

 5    that would actually use fuel in military vehicles?

 6       A.   They did not have military vehicles, per se; it was a light

 7    infantry brigade.  But there may well have been generators that would have

 8    required diesel fuel to provide electricity, things of that nature, which

 9    would have facilitated communications.  So while they weren't doing

10    large-scale vehicle operations, you know, there certainly would have been

11    a potential for the Muslims to want to siphon fuel off the United Nations.

12       Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next one, 2678.  Now, this is one that

13    we should take a look at the original B/C/S, which we see on the screen.

14    Like the other one, it was entitled "Main Staff, Army of Republika

15    Srpska," dated 2 April 1995.

16            Then we have this handwritten part in the upper right-hand corner

17    of the original, which says:  "Not a single convoy or ICRC team or MSF may

18    enter Srebrenica without my permission and presence.  M. Nikolic."

19            What do you make of this?

20       A.   Momir Nikolic is the assistant commander for security affairs with

21    the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, which was also the focal point for

22    the Bratunac Brigade controlling the access of material going into the UN

23    enclave.  It was an additional -- it was an additional duty he had

24    assigned to him, to perform this function.

25            This is a notation by him.  I'm not sure whether this message was

Page 19719

 1    actually posted at the yellow bridge or whether it would have been at the

 2    Bratunac Brigade headquarters.  But he's reiterating the fact that before

 3    any particular convoy of these natures goes in -- or, you know, to the

 4    enclave, he has to personally be there and give it permission.

 5       Q.   Okay.  So is this -- this original, is that one of the documents

 6    found at the Bratunac Brigade, in your view?

 7       A.   Yes, sir, it was.

 8       Q.   And how do you know that?

 9       A.   If it wasn't found at the Bratunac Brigade, one, it would be

10    unlikely that it would have Nikolic's handwriting on it; and, second, I

11    kind of recognise the ERN range that reflects the earlier document

12    collections that the ICTY had.

13       Q.   All right.  And we can see, on paragraph number 3, a reference to

14    an approved -- I believe it's an approved ICRC team going to Srebrenica.

15            All right.  Let's go to the next, 2689.

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madame Fauveau.

17            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could we see the

18    signature on this document, please, the document that's on the screen

19    right now?

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  By all means, Madame Fauveau.

21            THE WITNESS:  If the Registrar scrolls up on the right-hand image,

22    you should -- there it is.

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  Is that the signature you meant, because I didn't

24    understand you that way.

25            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] You have understood very well.  I

Page 19720

 1    just wanted to see the signature at the bottom of this document.

 2            Thank you very much.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, yes.

 4            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we -- I do want to clarify who's -- what

 5    superior officer is at the bottom of each page, and I didn't for that

 6    document.

 7       Q.   So, Mr. Butler, can you just tell us on that document, 2678, who

 8    is the superior officer whose name this goes out under?

 9       A.   Yes, sir.  This goes out under the name of General Lieutenant

10    Colonel Milovanovic.

11       Q.   Can you explain, they seem to be sharing these duties?

12       A.   It's not a question of sharing the duties, sir, it's a question

13    of, when Colonel Milovanovic is back in the headquarters for any period of

14    time, he's going to reassume his duties.

15       Q.   All right.  Let's go to 2689, dated 7 April 1995, again in the

16    name of Lieutenant-General Milovanovic, and I want to point out the part

17    that's on B/C/S 1.

18            It should be English, page 2:  "We did not approve the following

19    in this weekly plan.  Material for the Swedish construction project for

20    Srebrenica and Drinjaca on 9 April, 11 April, and 13 April for Srebrenica,

21    until we receive the position of the state for cooperation committee

22    regarding the matter.  In addition to the above, we did not approve beef,

23    salt, oil, and clapboards for the enclave on 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 ..."

24            What do you make of this?  In The first paragraph, they're

25    saying, "We didn't approve because we haven't -- we don't have the

Page 19721

 1    position of the committee," that I think you've referred to, but then it

 2    goes on to say, "but we did not approve those other matters."

 3            Can you tell anything about this?

 4       A.   Yes, sir.  It reflects the work, first of all, of the state

 5    committee.  It also reflects the fact that in addition to the above, you

 6    know, other issues, these are all -- all food-stuff-related items.

 7       Q.   And can you remind us what the Swedish project is?

 8       A.   The Swedish ultra project was a project by the International

 9    Community to construct temporary housing for Bosnian Muslim population

10    that was displaced back in 1993.  I believe they had a construction site

11    going on to the southeast of the town of Srebrenica, towards the --

12    towards the end of the enclave area.

13       Q.   Can you think of any militarily justifiable reason to not approve

14    beef, salt, oil, clapboards?

15       A.   No.  The clapboards, potentially, might have a military use; and,

16    again, the food stuffs, particularly within the context of the Swedish

17    ultra project, where they would be under the administration of the

18    International Community, the only potential justifiable reason would have

19    been, you know, a fear that this food stuff might have been stolen by the

20    BH Army.

21       Q.   Okay.  And his comment:  "We wish to remind you that this is the

22    last batch of heating oil being transported to the enclaves as part of the

23    winter programme.  According to this plan, our towns will receive 80.000

24    litres of heating oil and another 20.000 litres of heating oil according

25    to the plan for next week."

Page 19722

 1            Why is that referenced there, in your view?

 2       A.   Again, it reflects the fact that it's not a matter of generosity

 3    that the Republika Srpska is allowing heating oil into the enclaves. It,

 4    in fact, reflects the fact that this was a concession that they had to

 5    make in order to get their own supplies of heating oil that they didn't

 6    have for their own population.  So this was reciprocal.

 7       Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the next one, 65 ter 2687, also 7 April, under

 8    the name of Milovanovic.

 9            On the first page, it says:  "Please be informed that we have not

10    approved movement of the following UNPROFOR convoys and teams," and then

11    it's a list of various places.

12            Getting to number 9 -- sorry, to Srebrenica on April 8th and back

13    on the 9th, comprising seven vehicles and 18 persons which were supposed

14    to transport diesel fuel.  That's B/C/S and it should be page 1.  It may

15    go into page 2:  "We told them that they had 79 tonnes of fuel with Oric."

16            What do you make of that?

17       A.   It's pretty self-explanatory.  Their view is that material that is

18    going into the enclave, even though it's supposedly under the mantra of

19    aid to the civilian population or supplies to the UNPROFOR, you know,

20    they're making the case in this context, somewhat flippantly, that, you

21    know, "We're not going to be party for the United Nations to supply our

22    enemies."

23       Q.   Did Oric have any weapons that you knew of that actually took

24    diesel fuel?

25       A.   I don't believe Naser Oric's military forces had any motorised or

Page 19723

 1    mechanised weapons systems that would have used diesel fuel.

 2       Q.   Okay.  Paragraph 10, another convoy related to Srebrenica.  It

 3    talks about water trailer, field beds, hospital beds, X-ray machine, beams

 4    for construction, nails, light fittings, satellite telephone system.  I

 5    think this is self-explanatory.

 6            So some of that can be used for military purposes and some of it

 7    can't; is that a fair conclusion to get to?

 8       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, some of it has potential military utility and

 9    some of it is strictly humanitarian.

10       Q.   Do you have any reason to believe that UNPROFOR was providing

11    satellite telephone systems to the Muslims?

12       A.   Not within the -- you know, the aspect of Srebrenica and Zepa.

13    They had already established their own secure communications system.  They

14    didn't need it.

15       Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the next one, 2651A, 14 April 1995.

16            This says:  "On behalf of the Chief of Staff Colonel Radivoje

17    Miletic."

18            MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's just - perhaps my friends can tell me -

19    just the same standing in for and just a different translation.  I

20    apologise for the inconsistent translation.

21       Q.   I want to take you to page 3 in the English, page 2 in the

22    B/C/S:  "We would also like to inform you that we did not authorise the

23    following convoys."

24            Number 1 was one to Zepa involving jeeps and trucks.  Number 8 was

25    to Srebrenica, carrying 16 personnel and 17 motor vehicles supposed to

Page 19724

 1    carry diesel fuel.  Number 9 involves personnel.  Number 10 involves

 2    personnel and other things.

 3            Your knowledge of the investigation, was there any -- was -- did

 4    the -- this denying of personnel have any effect on the Dutch-Bat forces?

 5       A.   Yes, sir.  In one of the -- one of the actions that was undertaken

 6    over the preceding months that seriously compromised the ability of the

 7    Dutch UN battalion to accomplish its own missions was the fact that there

 8    was a practice where Dutch soldiers who were medically evacuated or who

 9    left the enclave for leave or for other purposes were not permitted to

10    return back into the enclave.

11            Those numbers, of course, were always in the fives or tens or

12    fifteens, but over time it created a situation where the Dutch Battalion

13    had a significant shortage of its authorised manpower; and, as a result,

14    it was not able to be -- perform all the missions necessary that it was

15    supposed to do.

16       Q.   All right.  Now let's go to the next one, 2652B, 14 April 1995.

17    This is under Colonel Miletic's name, and it begins by agreeing to several

18    items, including some things to Srebrenica.

19            What I wanted to ask you about is:  At the end, I think it's page

20    3 in the B/C/S and page 4 in the English, and here the document notes

21    that:  "This convoy should have taken place on 13 April 1994," I don't

22    know if that's a typo on whose part but, "was unable to pass in Rogatica,

23    owing to our error.  We hereby assign the competent person and command to

24    escort the seed programme and for it to take place in full.  In the event

25    of any delay and at the check-points, call Colonel Djurdjic immediately on

Page 19725

 1    telephone 249."

 2            Is this the guy's name that you were trying to pronounce earlier?

 3       A.   Yes, sir, it is.

 4       Q.   Okay.  And so what is this reference of Colonel Miletic mean to

 5    you?

 6       A.   It's a reflection that the plan to limit the convoys was not just

 7    an abstract, and it was not something that was left to other units.  There

 8    was a great amount of detail placed in the execution of this plan.  Those

 9    convoys that the Main Staff did not want to travel did not go through, and

10    the collateral was that those convoys that the Main Staff had approved for

11    delivery, you know, there was the same expectation that they would be at

12    the point in time, you know, delivered when they were supposed to be.

13            And in this particular case, a convoy was delayed by error, and

14    the Main Staff, you know, was reiterating back the fact that this convoy

15    has been approved, ensure that it gets to where it's supposed to be when

16    it's supposed to be there.

17       Q.   Who is your opinion of who Djurdjic works for, if you can tell?

18       A.   I believe that the documents that I see in Colonel Djurdjic is a

19    Main Staff officer.  I am not sure, at present, whether he, in fact,

20    worked directly for General Gvero or worked out of the operation shop for

21    Colonel Miletic.

22       Q.   Let's go to the next one, 2714, a 2 June 1995 document.  This is

23    under the name of Colonel Miletic.

24            On page 1 of the B/C/S, page 2 of the English, it's noting:  "We

25    did not approve one truck with school supplies, Karakaj-Zepa," and a

Page 19726

 1    listing.   "We did not approve 60 litres of oil for saws."  As we go

 2    down:  "We did not approve the Swedish construction project for

 3    Srebrenica."

 4            Then on 3 in English, near the end, it says:  "Note:  Persons in

 5    the convoy may carry small quantity of cigarettes and food for four days

 6    for their personal needs."

 7            How was it that we have documents under the name of Miletic

 8    controlling actually the amount of cigarettes a person can carry?  What

 9    does that tell you, if anything?

10       A.   It reflects back to, one, a broader belief that the UN forces were

11    somehow complicit in supplying the Muslim armed forces and the Muslim

12    civilian population with -- by hiding excess cargo or additional food

13    stuff or fuel in their vehicles.  It just kind of reflects the specificity

14    of just how closely and how seriously the Main Staff took this particular

15    issue, the fact that they're sending a reminder out to the units at the

16    actual check-point, you know, to ensure these people aren't bringing in

17    food beyond what their immediate needs are or cigarettes for what their

18    immediate needs are.

19       Q.   All right.  Now, I want to ask you, as we look through the

20    original, we see this is, of course, like the others.  It's like a

21    teletyped format so no signature on it; but, then, at the end of it, we

22    found a handwritten note, which has got the following ERN number, meaning

23    it was somehow connected to this document.

24            Can you connect this handwritten note in any way to this document

25    and account for its potential meaning, where it says:  "The RS Army

Page 19727

 1    attacked,, we consider that an act of war against the UN and Dutch

 2    Battalion," it's in quotes, "and then we want to get in touch with,"

 3    illegible, "and obtain more information about your future intentions."

 4            Then, in quotes:  "'Is that it or does your side want to do

 5    something else?'"

 6            Now, again, in this first document, can you tell if that was that

 7    picked up from the Bratunac Brigade?

 8       A.   Yes, sir.  I can confirm that because, in fact, on the written

 9    notation on the document, when we began our own handwritten indexing, it

10    actually has -- it's my handwriting on the document, reflecting that it's

11    one of the documents I personally indexed out of the Bratunac Brigade.  So

12    I know it did, in fact, originate from that location.

13            On a broader level, at the time that this document would have been

14    around on 2 June of 1995, VRS forces were engaged in activities related to

15    the takeover of what is referred to as Dutch OP Echo.  That took place

16    late May, early June of 1995, in order to set the framework for future

17    operations in Srebrenica.

18            So reading into it a bit, it sounds like this is, in part, the

19    context of a United Nations complaint to the VRS about those military

20    activities.

21       Q.   All right.  We'll get into more detail on OP Echo in the future.

22            Let's go to 2717, 12 June 1995, again under the name of Colonel

23    Miletic.  It talks about:  "The request contains data on unauthorised

24    rotation of personnel.  Only the exit of the following persons from the

25    cited enclaves is authorised."

Page 19728

 1            How does that fit into your knowledge of what happened?

 2       A.   I believe it's consistent with the practice that I've described

 3    earlier, where they were -- you know, they were comfortable letting people

 4    out of the enclave, but not putting people back into it.

 5       Q.   All right.  Then 2497 is an 18 June 1995 document under the name

 6    of Colonel Miletic.  This one's addressed to the brigades.

 7            The part I want to ask you about starts off:  "We approved" some

 8    UNPROFOR convoys, and then Colonel Miletic says:  "I demand a detailed

 9    check of all vehicles, including the inspection of cargo.  Pay special

10    attention to the fuel and the fuel tanks and the fuel being brought into

11    the enclaves.  Check the documents and identity of all persons on board.

12    Make a list of their names and their ID cards in order to ensure that the

13    persons who enter the enclaves must leave the enclaves upon the completion

14    of the task."

15            It goes on:  "We informed the UNPROFOR Command about this demand."

16            Now, the Court has seen this before.  I don't need a lot of

17    details on what that demand is, but I'm interested in, militarily, we

18    still have Colonel Miletic at this time standing in for the Chief of

19    Staff.

20            What does the fact that he can make a demand to these brigades

21    mean to you regarding his authority, if anything?

22       A.   I believe it's reflective of his authority, you know, standing in

23    for the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff.  I think this is an accurate

24    reflection of his authority.

25       Q.   Okay.  Let's go to 65 ter 2551, 29 June 1995, a document again

Page 19729

 1    under now Major-General Radivoje Miletic to the Command of Military Post

 2    seven11, and it talks about an approved movement of UN civilian observers

 3    from Srebrenica to Belgrade.

 4            It talks about where it's going, and then it says:  "On 29 June

 5    1995, we sent a separate letter to the Drina Corps Command and the

 6    Bratunac Brigade-Captain Nikolic, in which we set out the manner of

 7    inspection and requests in this connection once they leave the enclave."

 8            So what can you infer, if anything, about General Miletic's

 9    knowledge or military relationship with Captain Nikolic in this area of

10    endeavour?

11       A.   They're -- they're aware that Captain First Class Momir Nikolic is

12    their point man on the ground dealing with the issue of personnel moving

13    in and out of the Srebrenica enclave.  All of that traffic went over the

14    yellow bridge and, you know, the combined UN and VRS check-point at that

15    location.  General awareness of the fact that, you know, "We know who's on

16    the ground, we who what's before us," and personal instruction to follow.

17       Q.   Let's go to 2514.  It's a 1 July 1995 document, again in the name

18    of General Miletic, and there's various approvals.  I just want to ask you

19    briefly about this one comment.  It's page 2 of the B/C/S, page 3 of the

20    English, in the middle.  It talks about movement of the convoys, 5 and 6.

21    If you could read that to yourself, it starts with a note.

22            Then, near the middle of it, it says:  "If the lorries come to

23    Zvornik without the said cargo, do not let them go to Sarajevo or

24    Srebrenica."

25            He spells it out and says:  "In other words, when the convoy

Page 19730

 1    arrives in Zvornik, check it, establish what its carrying, and inform the

 2    commander, after which instructions regarding continuation of their

 3    journey will be given."

 4            Do you remember what this is about?

 5       A.   This is part of what I indicated earlier, that aid that did go

 6    into the enclaves in some cases was tied to reciprocal aid that the United

 7    Nations or the International Community was providing to the local Serb

 8    population; and in this instance, basically, they're noting the fact that,

 9    you know, "We're doing an aid convoy into Zvornik.  If that convoy does

10    not arrive," you know, "do not allow the supplies to go into the enclaves

11    to follow through."

12       Q.   All right.

13       A.   Well, in this case it's not necessarily supplies, but I believe

14    they're talking about personnel rotation, so I just want to be clear,

15    going back to 5 and 6.  Medical staff, okay.  So they're making -- it's a

16    humanitarian issue, but they're making it reciprocal.

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

18            Mr. Bourgon?

19            MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20            Page 28, line 10, it's mentioned "Captain First Class Nikolic."

21    The witness says "Momir Nikolic."  It's just that, in that area, Zvornik

22    is mentioned, and I'd like the record clear.

23            Thank you, Mr. President.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Everyone agrees with that, I suppose.

25    Okay.  Thank you.  Let's proceed.

Page 19731

 1            MR. McCLOSKEY:  All right.  Next is 65 ter 2556, 3 July 1995,

 2    another one of these documents under General Miletic.

 3            It starts out of:  "We hereby inform you that we have approved

 4    movement of UNPROFOR convoy" number so-and-so "of the Dutch from

 5    Srebrenica to Zagreb on 4 July through Bratunac and Zvornik.  We have not

 6    approved the return of the convoy on 5 July."

 7            It describes the composition.  Where does this fit in?

 8       A.   Well, at this point, it's fairly overt.  On the timeline for the

 9    military operation related to Srebrenica, by the end of June and the 1st

10    or 2nd of July, the Main Staff of the Drina Corps are already into the

11    advanced planning of the military operation against Srebrenica. I believe

12    a warning order is issued on this very -- either on the 2nd or the 3rd.

13            So, you know, they recognise that they're planning, you know, a

14    military operation in that area in the next couple of days, and this is

15    part of the larger programme:  Allow the UN forces out, not without a

16    problem, but nobody comes back.

17       Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next one, 65 ter 230.  This is not one

18    of those documents.  It's another document that you've talked about in the

19    past.  It's a document under the name of Commander -- Colonel Vidoje

20    Blagojevic, dated 4 July, and is entitled "Analysis of Combat Readiness in

21    the First Half of 1995". I just want to ask you about one point.  It's in

22    B/C/S page 31, English page 8.

23            It's the fourth paragraph down, and it says:  "In the brigade's

24    area of responsibility, a check-point was established for the control of

25    all international organisations entering and leaving the enclave of

Page 19732

 1    Srebrenica.  This check-point functions in accordance with the orders of

 2    the Main Staff of the VRS and instructions and orders of the brigade

 3    commander."

 4            Do you agree with that?

 5       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

 6       Q.   How does this fit into what you've been previously telling us

 7    about?

 8       A.   I believe it's an accurate reflection of that.

 9       Q.   And Blagojevic, is he Momir Nikolic's command at the time of this?

10       A.   Yes, sir.  In fact, Colonel Blagojevic assumed command of the

11    Bratunac Brigade in late May, early June of 1995, so he had been the

12    commander on the ground for approximately four or five weeks when this was

13    drafted.

14       Q.   Okay.  Let's go back to these -- another convoy document and date

15    order, 65 ter 2558.  This is dated 5 July 1995, under the name of General

16    Miletic, and there's one comment at the end of it, when it describes the

17    various approved -- I believe it's approved convoys:  "Check them and

18    enable them to travel along the above-cited route.  We wish to underline

19    that convoy," number so-and-so, "item 4, must be exhaustively checked at

20    Djuti Most, to prevent photo and video material from being taken out.  If

21    you find such material, confiscate it and inform the VRS."

22            Now, in the context of July 5th, what is your analysis of this

23    statement by General Miletic?

24       A.   On July 5th, 1995, the mobile forces of the VRS that had deployed

25    to Srebrenica, in order to begin combat operations the following day, by

Page 19733

 1    this point of time they would have been approaching their final positions

 2    and getting ready at what we would call their jump-off points and line of

 3    departure.

 4            Certainly, General Miletic is aware of that, and the concern is

 5    that they want to make sure that no UN individuals or people leaving the

 6    enclave might have taken pictures of these military forces in order -- and

 7    somehow, you know, compromised the security or secrecy of the operation.

 8       Q.   Okay.  Let's go to 2570, another convoy document, 18 July 1995.

 9    So we've skipped a rough period of time and gone over to 18 July.  This is

10    again General Miletic, and it's to the commands of the Military Post

11    Sarajevo, Vlasenica, and Ilaca.  It talks about various convoys for other

12    places, as well as number three, which makes a reference to Bratunac on 19

13    July to monitor medical evacuation:  "The following team will travel in

14    UNHCR vehicle," and then it lists a bunch of names.

15            It says:  "Note:  Related to this journey, security organs of the

16    1st Bratunac Brigade must constantly monitor their movement and

17    activities. They must not allow them to go anywhere on their own and must

18    restrict their movement, but be very polite.  In other words, the security

19    organs must direct their movement."

20            Okay.  That's pretty self-explanatory, but why is -- or can you

21    explain, you've got, well, continuing to stand in for the Chief of Staff,

22    Miletic, giving this direction clearly to the security branch.  How does

23    that fit into the analysis we've talked about and the professional

24    overview of the security branch, the commander?  I mean, this guy isn't

25    any of those things.

Page 19734

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, one moment, Mr. Butler.

 2            Madame Fauveau.

 3            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, first of all, this is a

 4    leading question.  I am not opposed to the witness explaining to us who

 5    this document was sent to and how this document was then implemented.

 6    That's okay.  But it's not for the Prosecutor to say that these are

 7    instructions given to the security organs.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 9            MR. McCLOSKEY:  It says it right in the document, but I don't need

10    to quibble over it, over that.

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madame Fauveau.

12            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if we have to continue

13    this discussion, the witness should not be present.  But I don't believe

14    that it is for the Prosecutor to interpret this document in that

15    particular manner.

16            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, I can respond to that, and it

17    shouldn't -- I mean, just related to this journey, "security organs of the

18    Bratunac 1st Battalion must constantly monitor their movement and

19    activities."  All I'm doing is repeating this direction to the security

20    organ.  I mean, I don't think that's an unfair conclusion, based on what's

21    in the document.

22            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] But was this document addressed to

23    the command of the brigade, to the security organs?  Who was it addressed

24    to?

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  Well, I think we are moving in circles.  Let me

Page 19735

 1    phrase the question myself.

 2            Having read the paragraph yourself, Mr. Butler, what do you make

 3    of it?

 4            THE WITNESS:  Well, sir, it's Colonel Miletic or Colonel -- in

 5    this case, I'm sorry, General-Major Miletic, reflecting the fact that

 6    while this medical team is in Bratunac, that he expects the Bratunac

 7    Brigade security people to restrict their movement, which makes a lot of

 8    sense, given the context of what's happening in Bratunac on that day.

 9            JUDGE AGIUS:  Who was he telling this to?

10            THE WITNESS:  The directive is sent to -- again, within the proper

11    context of the military, it's sent to VP 1111 Vlasenica, which is, in

12    fact, the military command for the Drina Corps.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  We can then move to your next question.  Thank you.

14            MR. McCLOSKEY:

15       Q.   My question is:  We've heard about -- is it within the purview of

16    the -- a person standing in for the Chief of Staff to issue this kind of

17    direction?

18       A.   Yes, sir.

19       Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next one, 2575.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  You still have an ample ten minutes for the break or

21    until the break; however, if you -- any time you wish to have the break,

22    please let us know, Mr. McCloskey.  It depends on your intention.

23            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'm all right.  I got a little sit-down just then,

24    so I think we'll try to get through these documents, if we can.  I'm not

25    sure we'll make it.

Page 19736

 1       Q.   But another document, 2575, 20 July 1995, to Military Post 711 and

 2    7590.  Again, we're now, of course, beyond some of our dates, but can

 3    you -- and this, we see it has to do with the travel of a General Nikolai

 4    to Potocari on the 21st, and this is again General Miletic.

 5            What events can you relate this to?

 6       A.   It's just this -- this would be reflective of the final

 7    negotiations and withdrawal of the Dutch Battalion from Potocari.  I

 8    believe it took place on 22 or 23 July.

 9       Q.   All right.  So this area is a bit -- bit different than what we've

10    been talking about.  It's not a convoy restriction, it's not something to

11    do with the security of their forces, it's not something to do, I don't

12    believe, with -- what area, if any, do we see General Miletic becoming

13    involved in now?

14       A.   This is, again, the withdrawal of the UN Dutch-Bat forces.

15    General Mladic himself was involved with the agreements with General Smith

16    to implement this.  This is General Miletic implementing the broad

17    guidance and direction of his commander, General Mladic.

18       Q.   All right.  The next document, 2573.  I don't see a date on this.

19    It seems to be a similar document that you've picked out.  Anything

20    different to state on that?  Again, it mentions General Nikolai.

21       A.   Yes, sir.  It reflects the -- it reflects the convoy going in with

22    General Nikolai, and it reflects the convoy clearance with respect to the

23    withdrawal of the Dutch Battalion from Potocari on 21 July.

24       Q.   All right.  And going to 2661A, 26 July 1995, again it's General

25    Miletic involved.  And the part I wanted to ask you about is at page 2 of

Page 19737

 1    the B/C/S, and it talks about various -- another convoy, a group that was

 2    allowed through.  It says:  "Note:  I hereby charge the commander of the

 3    1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade to designate a representative of his

 4    unit who will attend the meeting in Bratunac and Srebrenica and follow the

 5    movement of the UNHCR team."

 6            Can you just tell us what this is about, if you remember?  Take a

 7    look at it.

 8       A.   In the context of this message, this is the -- this is the

 9    International Community, a series of teams that are coming in, looking for

10    prisoners, looking for individuals that the VRS capture pursuant to

11    Srebrenica, as part of their international duties to identify and

12    catalogue these individuals.  And at this point in time, by the 26th, the

13    VRS is now acceding to the demands of the International Community and

14    letting these individuals in the country.

15       Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next one, 27 July 1995, and 2586.  Do

16    you recall what significance you found in this document?  It appears to be

17    allowing Russian soldiers to go on leave --

18       A.   Yes.  That was the significance, the fact that the applications

19    against the UN were not uniform.  For the most part, Russian and Ukrainian

20    peacekeepers were allowed far more freedom of movement than Western

21    European counterparts.

22            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, this might be a good time to break.

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  By all means.

24            We'll have a 25-minute break, starting from now.

25            Mr. McCloskey, you've asked for 14 hours.  How are you doing?

Page 19738

 1    Yesterday, you spent three hours and 12 minutes.  Today, I haven't made my

 2    calculations as yet.  But how are you doing?

 3            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think I'm doing okay.  We get into the minutiae

 4    of the documents on the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th, and it's hard to say

 5    how long that's going to take.  I'm feeling it's going to be most of the

 6    week.  I'll try to -- I'm going to try to get through it, and I will try

 7    to cut down also, as I see how it's going, as I do.  But it looks like,

 8    like I said, most of the --

 9            JUDGE AGIUS:  I'm telling you this because you are aware of the

10    filing from the Defence teams about the estimates.

11            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I sure am.

12            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  So, okay, we'll have a 25-minute break.

13                          --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

14                          --- On resuming at 1.01 p.m.

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

16            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17       Q.   Mr. Butler, let's go to a few Zvornik Brigade documents you picked

18    out on this same topic of convoy restrictions, the first being 5D00320,

19    and this is a 2 April 1995 regular combat report by Commander

20    Lieutenant-Colonel Vinko Pandurevic.  It begins at 0703 hours:  "The

21    poturice launched a minor infantry attack."  I am not really interested in

22    all that, though I will ask you a little bit later on about this

23    derogatory comment.

24            Mostly, let's go number 10 of this, which talks about UNPROFOR and

25    other humanitarian convoys passing through the border crossing at Karakaj.

Page 19739

 1            The last reference is: "An UNPROFOR convoy, The Dutch Battalion,

 2    on route from Banja Koviljaca to Srebrenica, two vehicles, four soldiers.

 3    They left at 2100 hours on 1 April.  One field sterilizer was ceased from

 4    the Dutch Battalion."

 5            Why did you comment on this seizure of a sterilizer?

 6       A.   Well, in this context, in a larger sense, it shows that it's not

 7    just the Bratunac Brigade at the yellow bridge check-point which is

 8    implementing this policy directive against the UN forces in the convoys.

 9    It's also the other units as well.  In this particular case, you know, my

10    view is that it's hard to prescribe a military or dual-use purpose to

11    something like a sterilizer.

12       Q.   All right.  Let's go to the next one.  It's 5D00321.  It's another

13    regular combat report from the Zvornik Brigade under the name of Vinko

14    Pandurevic; and, again, I don't want to get into the military details.

15            But at paragraph 10:  "Passage of UNPROFOR convoys and other

16    humanitarian organisations through the Karakaj crossing."

17            It lists a number of those, and then it talks about:  "MSF team on

18    the Belgrade-Srebrenica route confiscated the following from this team:

19    Laundry detergent, floor detergent, shampoo, beer, towels, wine, coffee,

20    cigarettes, rolling papers."

21            Why do you comment on this?

22       A.   Essentially, the same comment I made before.  This is a reflection

23    of material that doesn't appear, at its face value, to have any military

24    utility.

25       Q.   All right.  Now, let's go to another area, getting into some

Page 19740

 1    documents I want to ask you about, if they reflect the intentions towards

 2    the Srebrenica area, and this would be 65 ter 2920.  It's a report from

 3    the Command of the 1st Zvornik Brigade under the name of Commander

 4    Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevic.

 5            It's entitled, to the Drina Corps:  "The success of our forces in

 6    combat operations aimed at crushing the enemy offensive."

 7            And if we look at the original, it looks like - as well as the

 8    English translation - Drina Corps seems to have written in on top of a

 9    line.  What do you make of that?

10       A.   As I testified earlier, the practice for a lot of these documents,

11    particularly when they went to multiple organisations, was that they would

12    essentially put the command line, leave a blank, and then they would

13    hand-write in who each of these organisations it went to.  So this was a

14    consistent practice with the administrative practices I understand took

15    place.

16       Q.   All right.  Now, I'm not going to read this whole document, but I

17    do want to read portions of it and ask you about it.

18            It begins by saying:  "The moment has come when the issue of

19    liberating the Serbian lands from poturice will be finally resolved in

20    this area by a resolute and successful action of our forces.  Obviously,

21    the enemy cannot be allowed to threaten the fate of the Serbian people in

22    this area any more by countless violations of previously-signed truces."

23            Then it goes on to talk about things like media hype.  It makes

24    more references to poturice.

25            The last sentence in that paragraph:  "One should not be

Page 19741

 1    short-sighted and fail to see that, precisely by doing this, they have

 2    given us a unique chance to push them away from us for all time, as they

 3    are asking for it, and put them under control in this area."

 4            Then it goes on:  "We must dash for all time their hope of

 5    creating a "Muslimanija" extending to the Drina and the Sava, and make it

 6    possible for our people to return to their centuries-old homes.

 7            It makes more references to poturice, comments like:  "The

 8    adequate response of our forces meant that we realised that there would be

 9    no peace and security in will be in Semberija and Donje Podrinje until the

10    poturice were completely defeated and driven out of this area."

11            What do you make of the messages in this document?

12       A.   First, the -- this particular document illustrates what, in US

13    military terminology, would be the command climate of this particular

14    brigade.  It is a reflection of the views of the commander on a lot of

15    these issues.  I suspect that this particular message might have received

16    in -- while it's noted "strictly confidential," that it very well may have

17    been, in some sanitised form, received wider distribution among soldiers

18    and men of the Zvornik Brigade.

19            When -- you know, when I go back to my prior testimony on this

20    issue about command being personal, and those principles of command that

21    were articulated in the JNA regulations about, you know, personal courage,

22    personal attitudes, personal behaviour, and the effect that such behaviour

23    and attitudes had upon subordinates, this is a classic example of a

24    document that, you know, would be reflective of the type of behaviours and

25    attitudes that the brigade commander wanted to encourage through his

Page 19742

 1    command.

 2       Q.   All right.  But we see in all wars, in fact we see on CNN, leaders

 3    making comments of ethnic origin, vilifying people.  Does this kind of

 4    thing, this kind of example, have, in your view, any kind of a knock-on

 5    effect or is it just so much words?

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes.

 7            MR. HAYNES:  This is getting so far beyond the confines of this

 8    man's expertise.  Perhaps we ought to have some foundation if

 9    Mr. McCloskey wants to ask him about this document.  Does he know who

10    wrote it?  Which organ from the brigade it's emanated from?  Has he ever

11    spoken to anybody about its contents?  Does he know what poturice is or

12    what Muslimanija is.  This is way beyond the confines of his expertise and

13    it ought to be stopped.

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

15            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Breaking my question down to its simplest form

16    is:  Does a commander's actions, setting an example for his troops, have a

17    knock-on effect on his troops.

18            MR. HAYNES:  Asked and answered yesterday.

19            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Well, in the context of this document.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  We got the point.  Let me confer with my

21    colleagues.

22                          [Trial Chamber confers]

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Haynes, we have discussed

24    this, and our position is that we don't find this kind of question as

25    necessary for our purposes.

Page 19743

 1            MR. HAYNES:  Thank you very much.

 2            MR. McCLOSKEY:

 3       Q.   Mr. Butler, let's go to the end of this document, where there's a

 4    comment that I'd want to ask you about, right at the very

 5    end:  "Therefore, let us gather our strength with determination and focus

 6    it on the most important goal at the moment, driving the enemy away from

 7    this area forever and defeating him.  That is the only guarantee of our

 8    freedom and survival in these lands."

 9            About 25 April, can you tell us what, if anything, you know from

10    documents?  Is there anything beginning to move towards the Srebrenica

11    enclave, in terms of VRS forces or intent, either before, during, or

12    shortly after this -- this document?

13            Actually, we don't need to go before, I think we've talked about

14    before, but during or after this document, do we see any movement towards

15    this objective of --

16            MR. HAYNES:  That's an outrageously leading question.

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

18            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Do we see any documents that support this last

19    paragraph of the goal of driving the enemy from Srebrenica?  That's --

20            MR. HAYNES:  It's still an outrageously leading question.

21            MR. McCLOSKEY:  It's not in any way, shape, or form leading.

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  I think the second one is perfectly legitimate.  The

23    first one was leading, by all means, but not the second one.

24            MR. McCLOSKEY:

25       Q.   The second one, Mr. Butler?

Page 19744

 1       A.   Make sure I have them straight.

 2       Q.   Well, when I'm using the terminology of Vinko Pandurevic, leave

 3    that aside.

 4       A.   The documents reflect the goal as articulated in directive 7; and

 5    as we get to the issue of the publication of the combat orders related to

 6    the operation directive against Srebrenica, I'm not sure if you see it in

 7    such blatant language, but, I mean, those are the military manifestations

 8    of this goal.

 9       Q.   Okay.  Let's -- let's go to another document that you've talked

10    about.  It's 65 ter number 204, and this is a document from the Command of

11    the Drina Corps, dated 15 May, I think, or so after this last one.

12            It is to various brigades, I think all the brigades in the Drina

13    Corps.  I'm looking for "Zvornik."  Perhaps I don't -- oh, yes -- now I

14    don't see -- I'm sorry.  I don't see "Zvornik," but to many brigades of

15    the Drina Corps.

16            It is in the name of Deputy Commander Colonel Radislav Krstic,

17    and I won't ask you about the "deputy commander."  I think we've heard

18    enough about what that means.

19            This order is entitled:  "Order to stabilise defence around Zepa

20    and Srebrenica enclaves and establish conditions for the liberation of the

21    enclaves."  Now, what intention, if any, does the material in this

22    document indicate towards the enclaves?

23       A.   Well, by 15 May 1995, the Drina Corps command and staff would have

24    been well aware of directive 7 and the objective that the enclaves were

25    eventually to be taken.  They realised that from their current combat

Page 19745

 1    positions, that they could not immediately begin military operations with

 2    that goal in mind, that there would have to be, to some degree, a series

 3    of preliminary orders and operations in order to set the framework for the

 4    military operation to actually take Srebrenica to occur.

 5            So this represents one of those orders to start taking the

 6    necessary steps in order to conduct operations that will ultimately lead

 7    to the setting up stage where a military operation against the enclave can

 8    be accomplished.

 9       Q.   Okay.  Let's go to page 2 in English, page 1 in the B/C/S, under

10    the order of General Zivanovic.  I won't go into all the details and the

11    units, but it appears to talk about using the forces around the Zepa

12    enclave and talking about Zepa; and then, after that, from there, it goes

13    down and then talks about the continuation of the attack towards the

14    Srebrenica.

15            So what -- in what order is this -- is this plan of operations

16    going, in terms of the enclaves, as far as you can tell?

17       A.   Well, in this particular order, it's envisioned that the initial

18    military operations are going to be oriented in the direction of Zepa, as

19    opposed to Srebrenica; and in context of what was happening on the ground

20    at the time, that made a certain amount of sense.

21       Q.   All right.  Now, let's go to document 2892.  It is from the Drina

22    Corps Command, 16 May, the same date, "Urgent," regular combat report to

23    the Main Staff.  Is there any -- this is at about 6.30 p.m., is how we see

24    it being received from someone, thereabouts.

25            Is there any indication in this document of knowledge of the -- or

Page 19746

 1    communication to the Main Staff of this operation related to Srebrenica

 2    and Zepa, and particularly looking to the combat readiness status comments

 3    on the first page?

 4       A.   Yes, sir.  It reflects that they're continuing preparation in

 5    accordance with "your order."

 6       Q.   All right.  And what's the purpose of the combat report from the

 7    Drina Corps to the Main Staff, in your view?

 8       A.   The purpose of the reports, the regular, the interim combat

 9    reports, they're a vehicle in order for the subordinate command to keep

10    the superior command informed about what actions are being taken, what the

11    situation is on the ground.

12            It's the report -- the orders and the report phase is part of that

13    larger command doctrine, for lack of a better word, on the issue of

14    verification.  This is one mechanism by which the superiors verify that

15    the orders and instructions that they have given are being carried out by

16    subordinates.  So reports are a function of verification.

17       Q.   How important is that?

18       A.   It's a fundamental tenet of command.  I believe I testified

19    yesterday that orders and directives, instructions, cannot be given in a

20    vacuum, that superiors have a responsibility, under JNA and VRS doctrine

21    as it was applied, to ensure that their orders were accurately complied

22    with.

23       Q.   Now, we'll see -- well, we'll see very soon after this documents

24    coming from the Main Staff to the office of the president in much the same

25    format we've seen the other reports.  Do you have anything to add to your

Page 19747

 1    analysis for those particular reports?

 2       A.   Well, sir, in -- the military was not the only agency that was

 3    mandated to report on activities within the combat zones.  Particularly by

 4    this juncture of May 1995, there was close to if not actually an open

 5    distrust between leadership of the army and the political leadership of

 6    the Republika Srpska.

 7            So in order to ensure that the story and the situation in they

 8    were getting of the combat zones from the army was accurate, the RS

 9    political organs used the offices of what we know as the RDB, the

10    Republika Srpska internal security apparatus, to also report on actions

11    and activities on the battlefield through the Ministry of the Interior

12    channels.

13            This would, of course, provide the president of the Republic and

14    the political leadership with another source of information by which they

15    could use to verify that what the Main Staff and army were telling them

16    were, in fact, accurate representations of the situation.

17       Q.   Okay.  Now, let's go to 65 ter 205.  Now this is dated 16 May

18    1995.  It's a little later in the day.  It's about 8.25 -- at some point,

19    about 8.25 is noted in this document, at the end, and it's again

20    entitled:  "Stabilisation of defence around Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves,

21    addition to the order."

22            As we go down through it, we see:  "Due to a lack of forces to

23    fully succeed in closing of Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves and create

24    conditions for liberation of the enclaves, the above mentioned order is

25    supplemented and changes as follows:  Do not perform the planned offensive

Page 19748

 1    operations on Srebrenica," and it talks about the units involved,"until

 2    the forces are sufficiently reinforced."

 3            What does indicate to you of what's going on on the ground?

 4       A.   At the time these series of orders are going out on the field, the

 5    Bosnian Muslim 1st Corps out of Sarajevo is beginning a major offensive in

 6    that part of the battlefield.  What you see in other documents related to

 7    this time is that a number of these forces that were initially earmarked

 8    to participate in these activities are, in fact, withdrawn and sent to

 9    that more critical sector of the battlefield.

10       Q.   Okay.  Now I want to draw your attention to some map graphics that

11    you've commented on that came out of the Drina Corps collection related to

12    the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, and we'll try, through e-court, to see

13    how this works out.

14            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, I have three of these maps both in

15    full size and in a very simple A3 size, if you would like them.  We will

16    be able to see this on e-court, but you don't get the whole picture when

17    you do it on e-court.  So we have them here, if you would like them.

18    Counsel has been provided documents in the past.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, please.  Have they also been made available to

20    the Defence teams?

21            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, they have.  They have full-sized colour

22    copies.

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  That's good.  Thank you.

24            MR. McCLOSKEY:  We have full-sized colours, but we have the

25    smaller versions that are right on the top for you if -- that are a little

Page 19749

 1    easier to deal with in a courtroom.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

 3            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'm told those are the small ones.  We have the

 4    bigger ones or -- if you'd like them.

 5            So the first one, let's see how we can do it with e-court.  It's

 6    65 ter 1500.

 7       Q.   But as we're getting to that, Mr. Butler, we have a

 8    miniaturised --

 9            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I apologise.  We meant to have four, and we do

10    not.  That's my mistake.

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  You have ample time to remedy that by tomorrow.

12            MR. McCLOSKEY:  We certainly will, Mr. President.  We may have

13    given the fourth to Mr. Butler by accident.

14            In fact, just to -- all right.  There is an English translation

15    version of this as well that people should have, but if we can start with

16    the Srebrenica enclave, like you have, in the centre there.  Could we blow

17    that up a bit more.  Okay.

18       Q.   This is entitled, at the top:  "Disposition of our enemy and

19    UNPROFOR forces around the enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa."  If we look

20    carefully at that, we see various markings.

21            Mr. Butler, have you had a chance to look at this document in

22    preparation for your testimony?

23       A.   Yes, sir, I have.

24       Q.   Were you able to date it at all?  Is there any date on this

25    document?

Page 19750

 1       A.   The documents are not dated, per se.  There is a plan -- there's a

 2    comment there with respect to Susica 95, as well as Major General Milenko

 3    Zivanovic.  So it's my belief that these documents were probably produced

 4    originally around March or April of 1995.

 5       Q.   We haven't got to the documents that say "Susica 95" yet.

 6       A.   Sorry.

 7       Q.   This 65 ter is just the one with the disposition of forces on it?

 8       A.   Sorry, my apologies.  Yes, sir.  In this context, when you look at

 9    the Srebrenica enclave and the Zepa enclave, and the forces that are

10    listed there, they are -- or they fairly well match up to the units of

11    the -- the units and the strengths of the 28th Division and the units in

12    Zepa as we understood them in early July of 19 -- I'm sorry, in early

13    January, February, March of 1995 as well.

14       Q.   All right.  And what I'm most interested on this document is that

15    we see, in little circles around the perimeter of the enclave, it looks

16    like "UN" is marked in the circles.  Have you had a chance to study that

17    and any other materials to determine what those markings mean?

18       A.   Well, on this particular map, there, in the lower left-hand corner

19    an English-language translation, it reflects what the symbol is as a UN

20    check-point.

21       Q.   And do you know if that accurately depicts where the UN

22    check-points were in, say, June 1995?

23       A.   Yes, sir, as far as I know, it does.

24       Q.   Okay.  And can you -- can you tell us which one --

25            MR. McCLOSKEY:  And if we could go back to Srebrenica for now,

Page 19751

 1    really.  Thank you.

 2       Q.   Can you tell which one of those is, if any of them are, OP Echo?

 3       A.   OP Echo is, if you look --

 4       Q.   Well, you're going to be able to mark now.  We've got a new system

 5    I may have mentioned to you, if the usher could help you.  Just if you

 6    could circle the mark that you think reflects OP Echo.

 7       A.   [Marks]

 8       Q.   And if you could just put your initials and date it in the

 9    right-hand corner.

10       A.   Today is the 15th?

11       Q.   Fifteenth.

12       A.   [Marks]

13       Q.   Had you had a chance to look at any other documents, UN documents,

14    and compare the locations of the OPs to this map?

15       A.   Yes, sir.  My primary source of the UN information are those --

16    those UN documents related to the initial Dutch -- the initial Dutch

17    report on the fall of Srebrenica that's dated approximately 1996; and in

18    that there is a document, at the back of that document, which annexes out

19    what the identifications are of the check-points.

20       Q.   All right.  Now I want you to go to the next document, which is

21    65 --

22            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Please save that.  I'm sorry.

23       Q.   The next document, which is 65 ter 2885.  And as that's coming up,

24    I'll just give us a slight -- a short brief on the English.  It's

25    entitled:  "Drina Corps Command, Battle Plan, Susica."

Page 19752

 1            Over on the left-hand corner, it says:  "I approve Commander

 2    Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic," but there is no signature.

 3            Then on the right-hand corner, it says:  "Military secret.

 4    Strictly confidential.  Susica."

 5            It has what the Court has seen before, similar from other maps,

 6    the various markings on it, blue, red, red arrows.  Can you -- before we

 7    get into any more detail on this, have you ever heard of Operation Susica?

 8       A.   I believe this particular operation is referenced in either

 9    directive 7 or directive 7-1.

10       Q.   All right.  Do they sometimes change the names of their battle

11    plans?

12       A.   Yes, sir, they did.

13       Q.   Okay.  Did you -- can you -- is there a date on this that you were

14    able to find?

15       A.   Again, I don't believe there's a specific date on this.

16       Q.   All right.  Can you reference it to any sort of time frame, with

17    your analysis?

18       A.   I can't specifically -- as I discussed before, I believe it would

19    probably have been around the March or April 1995 time frame that the

20    original graphic was created.  However, if you look at the area of the

21    Zepa enclave, you'll notice a series of pencil marks.  And if you

22    cross-index those between the last series of exhibits we talked about with

23    respect to the Drina Corps in May of -- May 15th and 16th of 1995, these

24    pencil marks and unit designators tend to --

25       Q.   Excuse me.

Page 19753

 1            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Just for everyone else, could we bring this up a

 2    bit, and right there, and then blow that up, and you'll see pencil marks.

 3    You're going to have to go north of Zepa a bit.  There you go. That's

 4    perfect right there.

 5       Q.   Okay.  I'm sorry for interrupting.  What do you make of those

 6    pencil marks?

 7       A.   They tend to correspond with the units identified in some of the

 8    initial axes of advance in those 15 and 16 May orders.  So it looks like

 9    somebody essentially pulled this plan off the shelf, whether it had been

10    approved or not, and very quickly started using, you know, part of it is

11    for the basis of this operation in May.

12       Q.   Okay.  And just very briefly, I don't want to get into the

13    military manoeuvres, but you know the -- where the attack came from in

14    July 1995.  Is this attack plan at all similar to that for Srebrenica?

15       A.   There are some -- there are some differences with respect to

16    Srebrenica.  In this particular context of the way the attack came,

17    there -- more of the forces were on the southern and eastern parts of the

18    enclave.  Here they have the attack coming in more from a -- from a

19    northeasterly direction -- or, yeah, from the northwest to the -- to the

20    southeast.

21            Whether it was a reflection of the terrain or whether it was a

22    reflection of other combat forces, they chose to go in slightly different

23    routes in July of 1995.

24       Q.   All right.  How about Zepa, from what you know about that?

25       A.   In Zepa, it is remarkably consistent; and, again, considering the

Page 19754

 1    terrain around Zepa, that very much limited where military forces could or

 2    could not go.  I mean, that's a valid explanation why it would be.

 3       Q.   Okay.  Let's go to the last map in this series, 65 ter 2884.  As

 4    that's coming up, this is entitled:  "Extract from Drina Corps artillery

 5    firing plan towards the enclave of Srebrenica and Zepa."  And, again, it's

 6    strictly confidential, Susica 95, and it's got target tables and listings

 7    and little marks all over this thing.

 8            Have you had a chance to review this map?

 9       A.   Yes, sir, I have.

10       Q.   Can you relate it to any of the -- well, the previous map

11    marked "Susica" in some way?

12       A.   This is the -- a graphic representation of the fire support plan

13    for this particular operation.

14       Q.   Okay.  And what are -- can you explain to us -- and if we could --

15    let's start with Srebrenica.

16            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Let's blow up the enclave a bit; on the screen,

17    that is.

18       Q.   Can you tell us what these little red rectangles mean?

19       A.   Those red - those orange, in my case - rectangles are -- they're

20    what are known as target boxes.

21       Q.   All right.  And did you have an opportunity to compare the

22    locations of the UN OPs for Srebrenica and where the target boxes are on

23    this particular map?

24       A.   Yes, sir, I did.

25       Q.   Did you find any targeting that was at or near any of the OPs for

Page 19755

 1    this plan?

 2       A.   Yes, sir, I did.

 3       Q.   Okay.  Could you take that pen again and just circle the different

 4    areas that you're talking about?  Now, I don't know if it's easier for you

 5    to circle the target plan or go back to the OP, the UN map.

 6       A.   [Marks]

 7            I think I can -- I think I can kind of try it this way.  This

 8    particular location is in very close proximity to what's known as UN OP

 9    Mike.

10       Q.   What do you mean when you say "very close proximity"?

11       A.   From the map distance indicated, within several hundred metres,

12    200 metres in some cases.

13       Q.   Now, when you say that, let me just try to clarify it.  Does that

14    mean it's targeted within 200 metres or you're saying it's a 200-metre

15    area of accuracy?

16       A.   No, sir, it is the actual target box itself, some part of that box

17    comes -- in some cases it's on top of, but in other cases it's within 100

18    or 200 metres of the locations on the map.

19       Q.   This first one, "M," the target box is within how close to the OP,

20    in your view?

21       A.   In this particular case, it looks like it's no more than -- the OP

22    is no more than 100 metres to -- let me make sure I get this right.  It

23    looks like it's no more than 100 metres away to the south and east of the

24    target box.

25       Q.   Okay.  Why don't you go to the next one.

Page 19756

 1       A.   [Marks]

 2            This is what is known as UN check-point or OP Alpha; and in this

 3    case, it looks like the actual UN check-point is located up on the hill

 4    above the town of Slatina -- or, in this case, it's the actual village.

 5    The village is the centre of the target box, so this looks like it's 150

 6    metres, 200 metres up the hill.

 7       Q.   All right.  Any others?

 8       A.   [Marks]

 9            This particular one, I'm not sure what to make of it, because

10    while it is identified on the Bosnian Serb Army map as a UN check-point,

11    and there is a target box within several hundred metres of it, maybe 200,

12    there's no corresponding -- on the Dutch list of check-points, there's no

13    corresponding UN check-point.

14       Q.   Why don't you put a question mark next to that, so we know which

15    one you're talking about.

16       A.   [Marks]

17       Q.   Any others?

18       A.   [Marks]

19            Moving further to the south, this corresponds almost exactly on

20    what is known as Check-point Charlie or OP Charlie.

21       Q.   Okay.

22       A.   [Marks]

23            The last one, I believe it is this one right here, which

24    corresponds to a notation on the artillery map.  There's a green flag

25    there with the annotation that says "UN" on it, and it looks like to be a

Page 19757

 1    headquarters annotation.

 2       Q.   In July 1995, were you aware of any UN facility in that location?

 3       A.   I don't believe the UN facility was physically located that far to

 4    the east.  I believe it was closer to the road at the battery factory

 5    complex at Potocari.

 6            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Okay.

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  We need to stop here.

 8            MR. McCLOSKEY:  If he could sign off on it before I forgot.

 9    Sorry.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, yes, please.

11            And while you are signing and it's being recorded, I see next to

12    all these triangles that you were referred to, a reference number,

13    like "122," "342," "340."  I tried to see, from the rest of the document,

14    whether there is a table or a legend which corresponds or explains those

15    numbers, but I don't see anything.  If you can give us some information on

16    that tomorrow, I think it will be useful.

17            So we stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9.00.  I thank you

18    all, and have a nice afternoon and evening.

19                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

20                          to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day of

21                          January, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.