Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 20212

 1                          Wednesday, 23 January 2008

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          [The witness entered court]

 5                          --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning.

 7            Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.

 8            THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case number

 9    IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

11            All the accused are here, and I see a full house amongst the

12    Defence teams.  The Prosecution, Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Nicholls.

13            Good morning, Mr. Butler.

14            THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Ostojic is soon going to finish his

16    cross-examination.

17                          WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

18            MR. OSTOJIC:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  Thank

19    you.

20                          Cross-examination by Mr. Ostojic:  [Continued]

21       Q.   Good morning, Mr. Butler.

22       A.   Good morning, sir.

23       Q.   Sir, can you tell us, if you know, the whereabouts of my client,

24    Ljubisa Beara, from July 17th through July 31st, 1995?

25       A.   Unless otherwise noted in my narrative report, I don't recall that

Page 20213

 1    there is a specific intercept that reflects him, from the 17th through

 2    about the 22nd, 23rd.  I think towards the end of July, there are specific

 3    intercepts which reflect his presence in association with Zepa.

 4       Q.   Right.  And we are talking about the period in association with

 5    Zepa, and an intercept that we reviewed or that you reviewed with

 6    Mr. McCloskey is dated the 1st of August, 1995, and that's why my question

 7    to you is specifically:  From the 17th of July until the 31st of July,

 8    1995, what did your analysis find as to the whereabouts of Mr. Beara?

 9       A.   I don't believe we have any intercepts or any other information

10    pertaining to his whereabouts during that period.

11       Q.   Now, if you were going to be fair and objective in your report,

12    isn't it something that you think you should put in your report, to say,

13    "With respect to Mr. Beara, we do not know the whereabouts of where he was

14    from the period of the 17th of July through the 31st of July, 1995"?

15    Wouldn't that be fair to the man?

16       A.   Which report?

17       Q.   In any of the five that you wrote.

18       A.   Well, sir, with respect to the Srebrenica military narrative and

19    the revised version, given that the focus is on Srebrenica and the

20    Srebrenica crime bases, where he is included, his whereabouts after 18

21    July, with respect to the major crime scenes, his disappearance or his --

22    or a lack of awareness where he is wasn't relevant for me.

23       Q.   Okay.  Help me with this, sir.  Do you agree with me that you

24    cannot and, in fact, were unable to document any significant crimes with

25    respect to Zepa?

Page 20214

 1       A.   My understanding with respect to the crimes that occurred with

 2    Zepa is that they are charged with respect to forcible transfer and a few

 3    other legal things that I'm not sure of.  We do not have, obviously, a

 4    collateral situation like one sees in Srebrenica, where you have the

 5    actual execution in large quantities of prisoners.

 6       Q.   Okay.  Well, we'll come back.  Specifically, on the 17th of

 7    November, 2003, you stated that under oath, sir, on page 4675, lines 4

 8    through 5, and I'll read it just so we have it clear:

 9            "Given that we don't have any significant crimes with respect to

10    Zepa, to my knowledge," and then you proceed to discuss it.

11            Are you telling us that forcible transfer, in your opinion, is not

12    a significant crime, or, sir, is it in fact true that you believe, as

13    you've testified under oath, that there weren't any significant crimes

14    with respect to Zepa that you, as an analyst, found?

15       A.   As an analyst, I believe what I said, which is I don't believe

16    that there are any significant crimes.  As for whether or not forcible

17    transfer is a significant crime within the context of the law is a

18    question that, you know, I don't have the expertise to comment on.

19       Q.   Now, when, if you can give us or help us with this timeline, when

20    does that process --

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, because this needs clarification, once

22    you've raised it.

23            What, in your mind, not having a legal background, do you

24    understand by "significant crimes"?

25            THE WITNESS:  Significant crimes with respect to the process of

Page 20215

 1    gathering people, moving them, and then the conduct of mass executions.  I

 2    understand obviously there are legal discriminating factors between

 3    genocide or extermination or murder, but those are not within my field of

 4    expertise to make opinions on.  The reality is it was a mass execution,

 5    how it's legally categorized.  That's the view that I look at these issues

 6    when I say a major crime, "a mass execution."

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

 8            THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.

 9            MR. OSTOJIC:  I'm not sure if that's clear Mr. President, but if I

10    can just follow it up on that --

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  Very briefly.  I just wanted to do establish when he

12    uses the term "significant crimes," it's what he understands --

13            MR. OSTOJIC:  Fair enough, Mr. President.

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  -- it to be.

15            MR. OSTOJIC:  If I may proceed.

16       Q.   Sir, I want to focus a little bit on this Krstic tape that we saw

17    during our trial, which I think has been identified as the "kill them all"

18    tape.  Do you remember that?  It's an audiotape, actually; correct?

19       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

20       Q.   And I think that under oath you stated previously that you were

21    not to -- you were not prepared to conclude, based on that comment in

22    isolation, that the intent behind the conversation was criminal in nature,

23    and you held open the possibility that it may very well have nothing to do

24    with the commission of any crimes.  Correct?

25       A.   Yes, sir, I did.

Page 20216

 1       Q.   And that's the logic that you used, the military analysis;

 2    correct?

 3       A.   Given when the audiotape was -- well, given when the actual

 4    intercept was taken and given my understanding of the military situation

 5    on the ground at the time, yes, sir.

 6       Q.   And these things, when taken in isolation, can certainly have more

 7    than two meanings; correct?

 8       A.   Yes, sir, which is exactly why I do as much of my analysis as I

 9    can in context, and not in isolation.

10       Q.   And that's the fair and objective and honest way to analyse; isn't

11    that correct, sir?

12       A.   The proper way to analyse these things is in context, yes, sir.

13       Q.   Now, with respect to Zepa, can you give us the timeline as to the

14    date when the people were being either evacuated or transported from the

15    enclave?

16       A.   I believe the civilians were being transported from the Zepa

17    enclave starting 26 July, if memory serves.

18       Q.   Okay.  We won't debate the dates with you, but we have other

19    dates.  When did it end, sir?

20       A.   I think, within two days, three days, the movement was done.

21       Q.   So would that be the 28th, 29th, according to your analysis?

22       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, I believe I have the dates in my report, but

23    I'm going off of memory here, so I think that the movement was only a day

24    or two at max.  It was not a very large movement process.

25       Q.   Well, let's take it at the outside to include it to be two days

Page 20217

 1    from the 26th to the 28th.  Can you share with us what your analysis found

 2    as to where Ljubisa Beara was on July 26th, 27th, or 28th, when we

 3    discussed this transportation or evacuation of the civilians?

 4            Do you have any information whatsoever to identify his

 5    whereabouts?

 6       A.   No, sir.

 7       Q.   In fact, am I not correct, sir, that there is no evidence

 8    whatsoever with respect to Ljubisa Beara involved in the Zepa operation

 9    but for the intercepts that we see purportedly on the 1st and 2nd of

10    August, 1995?

11       A.   To my knowledge, that's correct.  I'm not aware of any

12    information.

13       Q.   Help me with this also, sir.  Is it correct that based on your

14    analysis, there was no evidence that you saw or digested that Ljubisa

15    Beara planned any part of this transportation or evacuation of the

16    population from Zepa?

17       A.   Given that I can't comment on where he was and what he was doing,

18    I mean, that is a logical inference to draw, that I can't and that I have

19    no evidence that he was part of that.  Whether it was true or not, I have

20    no way of knowing.

21       Q.   And the same would go true, sir, for any purported organisation,

22    assistance, supervision, facilitation; correct?

23       A.   The same answer:  I have no information, so, therefore, you know,

24    on a lack of information, I agree with you.

25       Q.   Let's look, if you don't mind, sir, at 65 ter 1378A, and that is

Page 20218

 1    the intercept of the 1st of August, 1995.

 2            And while that's coming up, I would just like to ask you a couple

 3    of preliminary questions, if you don't mind.

 4            You talk a lot about legitimate military activities in your report

 5    and, in part, in your testimony.  You also talk about a legitimate

 6    military combat engagement.  For our purposes, can you describe for me,

 7    what is a legitimate military combat engagement?

 8       A.   A legitimate military combat engagement, it would be an engagement

 9    that falls within the confines of internationally-established Law of War.

10            Now --

11       Q.   And where did you study this Law of War, sir?

12       A.   To finish the answer, obviously military officers aren't experts

13    on that, and that is why, within the context of the VRS, those laws of war

14    were codified within the service regulations on the Law on the Armed

15    Forces with respect to that.  So when I talk about the phrase "legitimate

16    military combat," it is within the context of those SFRY regulations that

17    the VRS adopted.

18       Q.   And just so the record is clear, I think it is, when you say or

19    use the contraction "aren't," you mean "are not experts"; correct?

20       A.   I would assume, yes, sir, the military officers in question are

21    not experts on international law.

22       Q.   Well, I'm asking about you, sir.

23       A.   Well, I'm not an expert on international law, sir.

24       Q.   Okay.  And you're not an expert in criminal law, as we've

25    established; correct?

Page 20219

 1       A.   I did not go to law school.  You can draw your own conclusion on

 2    that one, sir.

 3       Q.   I have.  Sir, with respect to that, we've used the word, and

 4    obviously somewhat incorrectly.  For a legitimate military combat

 5    engagement, we've used the word "ambush" from time to time.  Do you know

 6    what I'm referring to when I use the word "ambush"?

 7       A.   Yes, sir.  In a military sense, I do.

 8       Q.   Is that what a military combat engagement is?

 9       A.   That is one form of a tactical-level military operation, yes, sir.

10       Q.   Now, let's look at this intercept, if you don't mind, of the

11    1st of August, 1995.

12            MR. OSTOJIC:  I think it's at 1002, if I have my notes correct.

13       Q.   Now, here it references -- excuse me.

14            MR. OSTOJIC:  Actually, it's on the second page, I believe.

15       Q.   I'm just looking at the last paragraph in the second page, which

16    would indicate or start with the letter "B."  Do you see that, where it

17    says, "Know what, man ..."?

18       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

19       Q.   Now, with respect to this intercept, we know there are basically

20    two ways to identify a speaker, and one would be compromise, as you

21    discussed, and the other one is voice recognition; correct?

22       A.   Yes, sir.  That was another method that the intercept operators

23    used.

24       Q.   Help me with this:  What, other than those two methods, are there,

25    other than voice recognition and compromise?

Page 20220

 1       A.   Well, sir, depending on the context of the conversation, and even

 2    with respect to the use of call signs and the discussion that they're

 3    talking about, it's possible to make a fair inference on who the

 4    correspondents are.

 5       Q.   From a military or purported military analytical perspective or

 6    from an intercept operator perspective?

 7       A.   Both, sir.  For example, when -- excuse me.  As I've talked

 8    before, when we see "Zlatar 01" personally involved in conversations, it's

 9    a fair inference to make that the individual in the conversation is, in

10    fact, the Drina Corps commander, based on that compromise of a code name.

11       Q.   Well, when we're talking about individuals, we're not talking

12    about where they may have called.  But when you have to identify an

13    individual as a participant in a purported intercepted conversation, the

14    two ways in which to identify them would be voice recognition and

15    compromise; isn't that true?

16       A.   Yes, sir, when talking about the individual.

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  He's already answered that and also told you other

18    factors as well.  So let's move.

19            MR. OSTOJIC:  I was just trying to clarify.

20       Q.   Now, if you look at this last paragraph, sir, it states here that

21    it's alleged to have been purportedly Mr. Beara stating, "When we get it,

22    we'll call the MKCK ..."

23            Do you see that?

24       A.   Yes, sir.

25       Q.   Now, is there anything wrong with calling the International

Page 20221

 1    Committee of the Red Cross with respect to potential prisoners of war?

 2       A.   In the abstract, certainly there's nothing wrong with any

 3    discussion with the International Committee of the Red Cross on prisoners

 4    of war, I agree.

 5       Q.   Tell me, sir, what is the standard for how long of a period of

 6    time do you have to register POWs?

 7       A.   I am not sure what --

 8       Q.   Sorry.

 9       A.   I'm not sure what international standards require.  For the most

10    part, though, the rule is that they're to be registered as quickly as

11    possible.

12       Q.   Well, that's kind of vague, but do you know what the United States

13    government position is on that?

14       A.   I haven't had to deal with that particular situation for a number

15    of years, so I can't say I know what the current US government position

16    is, no, sir.

17       Q.   Okay.  Well, let me show you an exhibit that I found of a recent

18    article.  And you're familiar with the International Herald Tribune, are

19    you not?

20       A.   Yes, I am.

21       Q.   It's a reliability newspaper, as far as you can tell; right?

22       A.   As much as newspapers are reliable, yes, sir.

23       Q.   Now, are you familiar with the Defence Department person by the

24    name of -- I'm sorry, senior Pentagon official called Sandra Hodgkinson?

25       A.   No, sir, I'm not.

Page 20222

 1            MR. OSTOJIC:  And I have this marked as an exhibit, Your Honour,

 2    and let me read this.  It's from the 7th of January, 2008, The Herald

 3    Tribune, and the article is entitled "Troubles at another prison run by

 4    the US."

 5       Q.   I'll give it to you, sir, if the Court wishes, with the assistance

 6    of the usher.

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  In the meantime, for the record, I forgot to mention

 8    that Ms. Schildge from the US Embassy has been present from the beginning

 9    of the sitting.

10            MR. OSTOJIC:  It is in e-court.

11            THE WITNESS:  You're not going to make me read that off the

12    screen, are you?

13            MR. OSTOJIC:  No, no.

14       Q.   It's on the second portion of that article, sir.

15            And when they discuss this, the senior Pentagon official for

16    detention policy, Sandra Hodgkinson, she refused to comment on the

17    complaint, citing the confidentiality of communications with the Red

18    Cross.  She said that the organisations had access to "all Department of

19    Defence detainees in Afghanistan after they are formally registered," and

20    that "the military makes every effort to register detainees as soon as

21    practicable after capture, normally within two weeks."

22            Do you see that?

23       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

24       Q.   And then she goes on to say something else:

25            "In some cases, due to a variety of logistical and operational

Page 20223

 1    circumstances, it may take longer."

 2            Do you see that?

 3       A.   Yes, sir.

 4       Q.   Now, do you agree or disagree with that?

 5            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Agree, disagree with what?

 7            MR. OSTOJIC:  With the statement that it takes 14 days --

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  How can he agree or disagree with a statement of

 9    someone with whom he's no relationship?  The statement exists there in the

10    newspaper.  Don't ask him whether he agrees or --

11            MR. OSTOJIC:  Let me try it this way, Your Honour, if I may.

12       Q.   You're employed currently with the --

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  I interrupted, Mr. McCloskey.  I didn't know what

14    you wanted to say.

15            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Relevance was my objection.

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  But I can see some relevance.  That's why I haven't

17    stopped Mr. Ostojic as yet.  We'll see as he goes along.

18            MR. OSTOJIC:

19       Q.   Sir, you work currently for Homeland Security, do you not?

20       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

21       Q.   And you've testified a little bit about your background in

22    connection with Homeland Security, and you state that in capturing POWs,

23    it should be as soon as possible.  Isn't it correct that the definition

24    that the Pentagon department gives is actually more accurate, given that

25    you work for the same government as Ms. Hodgkinson does, that, in fact,

Page 20224

 1    POWs are to be registered within four weeks -- or within two weeks, and

 2    sometimes it takes longer?  Isn't that fair?

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's move to your next question, Mr. Ostojic.  I

 4    mean, let us decide.  This is so marginal.  Let's proceed, please.

 5            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you.  And just for the record, my co-counsel

 6    is saying I didn't identify the exhibit number and I thought I did, but

 7    we'll find it for the Court and we'll get back to you.  We'll have to get

 8    back to the Court with the exact exhibit number.  I think we have it.

 9            THE REGISTRAR:  It's 2D157, for the record.

10            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you very much.

11       Q.   Sir, in isolation and in context, when we look at this intercept

12    of August 1st, 1995, 65 ter 1378, there is nothing that's improper as to

13    the contents of it, isn't that correct, from a military analytical

14    standpoint?

15       A.   From the passage that I read, you're correct, there doesn't appear

16    to be anything improper about it.

17       Q.   Well, not just from the passage that we've read.  I mean, you've

18    analysed this intercept.  You've included it in your report.  You've

19    discussed it in your direct examination.  What about the intercept do you

20    find, if anything, that would constitute anything improper, militarily

21    speaking?

22       A.   I don't know that I do is what I'm saying.  I mean --

23       Q.   So --

24       A.   That one intercept I don't see in that part; and, again, I didn't

25    read the entire intercept because we just went to page 2.  But for the

Page 20225

 1    context of what we talked about, I see nothing improper.

 2       Q.   Well, I thought you read the intercept before, sir, but I'll give

 3    you the opportunity, if you'd like, to read the intercept in its entirety.

 4       A.   If -- yeah, that would be fine, sir, and then I can comment on it.

 5       Q.   Mr. Butler, is this the first time you've seen this intercept?

 6       A.   No, sir, but I hope you'll appreciate my position.  There has been

 7    a whole lot of documents that have been going by, and --

 8       Q.   And I do, sir.  Now, let me ask you this:  When, if -- when, to

 9    the best of your recollection, given that you left the OTP in November of

10    2004, as you've told us yesterday --

11       A.   2003, sir.  If I said "2004," that's a misstatement on my part.

12       Q.   And thank you for that clarification.  You know, I'd hate to waste

13    the valuable time that was given to me by the Court.  If you'd like to

14    read it, I'll give you the opportunity, since you asked to read it.  I

15    don't want to be accused of being unfair to you.  But I'd like to move on,

16    so it's really your call, sir.  If you need to read it --

17       A.   No, sir.  I mean, you can proceed on, I mean.

18            MR. OSTOJIC:  Let's look at the next intercept, 65 ter 1380, and

19    this is an intercept also purportedly capturing Mr. Beara at 2245.

20       Q.   Do you see that, sir, at the top?

21       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

22       Q.   Among others, of course.  And then what I'd like to do is focus

23    quickly on the second page of that intercept, where it states that

24    purportedly Mr. Beara is discussing ICRC escorts and for them to be

25    exchanged here.  Do you remember that at all?  It's about a third from the

Page 20226

 1    bottom.

 2       A.   I see it, certainly.

 3       Q.   Now, is there anything wrong with that, sir, with having an ICRC

 4    escort and having the POWs exchanged at some point?

 5       A.   They're not talking about their POWs.  What they're talking about

 6    is what the Serbian MUP is doing with the POWs in Serbia, that -- as far

 7    as I can tell from this one.

 8       Q.   Well, keep reading, sir:  "We had no plans to kill them ... but to

 9    exchange them."

10            Is Mr. Beara with the MUP at this point, according to your

11    analysis?

12       A.   The context of the conversation, as I understand it, is they're

13    talking about the activities of what the Serbian MUP are doing.  That's

14    how I -- that's how I understand the context of this conversation.

15       Q.   Okay.  Are you familiar, sir, with respect to the intercept

16    operators, if any of them were trained in voice recognition?

17       A.   I have -- I don't know that yes or no, I mean.

18       Q.   Well, in your analysis and participation and reliance on those

19    intercepts, did you ever ask that question?

20       A.   No, sir.  I did not ask that question of the intercept operators.

21       Q.   Would you be surprised to learn -- would you be surprised if none

22    of them had experience in voice recognition?

23       A.   No, sir.  It wouldn't surprise me at all.

24       Q.   Do you know, sir, if the intercept operators ever had a dossier or

25    a file of various VRS officers or military personnel?

Page 20227

 1       A.   No, sir.  I don't know that, that the operators would have it.

 2       Q.   Well, certainly, that's something you would have asked; correct?

 3       A.   Actually, sir, normally speaking, that's not material that the

 4    actual operators would routinely get.  Their job is to collect the

 5    information, not to make judgements with respect to analysis at a higher

 6    level based on other forms of information.  They're collectors, not

 7    processors.

 8       Q.   So would you agree with me that it would be somewhat strange, if

 9    not unbelievable, that intercept operators would have dossiers on VRS

10    officers or military personnel?

11       A.   Yeah.  If they had full dossiers on these individuals, I would

12    agree that it would be strange, yes, sir.

13       Q.   And you've never seen such dossiers from these military

14    operators.  They've never given you a copy of that; correct?

15       A.   The only product I'm aware of is the general working notes of

16    various operators with respect to frequencies and other technical data,

17    not broader notes as you discuss.

18       Q.   And in your several or few meetings, interviews, that you've had

19    with these intercept operators, that issue never came up; correct?

20       A.   The issue of dossier or voice recognition?

21       Q.   Dossier.

22       A.   No, sir, as far as I know.

23       Q.   And it never came up in your investigative team with Madam

24    Stefanie Frease or Mr. Ruez; correct?

25       A.   Not to my knowledge with respect to dossiers.  I know that there

Page 20228

 1    was an effort to go out and obtain and clarify the relevant technical data

 2    that was incumbent in the intercept notebooks, but not with respect to

 3    analytical dossiers.

 4       Q.   Now, I want to just spend a minute, if we can, on compromise and

 5    to make sure that I understand it correctly.  And that's for

 6    identification, voice identification.

 7            When we talk about compromise, there are two ways in order that an

 8    identity of a participant in a conversation can be compromised; correct?

 9       A.   Yes.  As we've discussed, it's either a voice compromise, the

10    individual compromises his own identity, or he's compromised by --

11       Q.   By the other --

12       A.   -- yeah, by the other party.  And then leading on to that, he's

13    compromised by the context of his own conversation.

14       Q.   Now, let me ask you this:  Did you discuss with any of the

15    analysts, when there was no voice compromise, how were they able to deduce

16    whether or not the speaker that they were purportedly intercepting the

17    conversation was, was person A, B, or C?

18       A.   I didn't.  If it was not clear within the context of the

19    conversation, whether it was a compromise or not, I took that into account

20    in my analysis.

21       Q.   And you would give it less weight, if you will?

22       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, there are other factors.  For example, if the

23    compromise was not done prior to the actual contacts, there's certainly a

24    possibility that as a component of the conversation, they would have

25    recognised the voices of the individuals and used that accordingly.  They

Page 20229

 1    were the best people who were taking that information at the time to make

 2    those judgements.

 3       Q.   And we'll get to voice recognition in a second.  But if we just

 4    stay with compromise, it would be fair that, as I said, you would give it

 5    less weight and, therefore, it would be less reliable; correct?

 6       A.   Notwithstanding the reliability of the correspondence we're

 7    talking about, I would give it less weight with respect to identity, yes,

 8    sir.

 9       Q.   And now let's turn to voice recognition.  How often do you think

10    that a person, such as an intercept operator with the level of experience,

11    education, and certification that these gentlemen had, who are the

12    intercept operators, how many times would they need to hear the voice of

13    an individual participant so that it could be qualified as voice

14    recognition?

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  Do you have the expertise to answer that question,

16    Mr. Butler?

17            THE WITNESS:  I'm not sure that it requires an expert opinion,

18    Your Honour.  I mean, simply put, it's the same level of expertise that we

19    use every day when we recognise people we hear over a telephone. It's not

20    a technical question, sir.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Let's move, Mr. Ostojic, please.

22            MR. OSTOJIC:  Okay.

23       Q.   Sir, as an analyst, albeit a historical analyst, did you address

24    or analyse the NIOD report with respect to the intercept operators?

25       A.   No, sir.  I didn't analyse the NIOD report.  I'm not even sure how

Page 20230

 1    much of it had been translated into English.

 2       Q.   Okay.  I'd like to, if we may, turn to Srebrenica for a few

 3    moments.

 4            Sir, when we talk about the evacuation and the movement of the

 5    population of Srebrenica, can you give me, based on your analysis, what

 6    was that timeline?  When did it start and when did it end?

 7       A.   I believe the -- excuse me.  I believe the first buses departed

 8    the Potocari compound at approximately between 1200 and 1400 hours.  The

 9    convoys were suspended at darkness on the 12th.  I believe they resumed as

10    early as between 800 and 1000 hours on the 13th, and I believe that all of

11    the individuals were evacuated by darkness on the 13th of July.

12            I'm not aware of any information that there were still remaining,

13    on the evening of the 13th of July, civilians that were going to be

14    subsequently evacuated on the 14th.

15       Q.   Let's talk about the visibility of Mr. Beara with respect to this

16    period.

17            Do you know the whereabouts of Mr. Beara from the beginning of

18    July, and you can pick any date, but we can go with July 1st, up to and

19    through July 13th, 1995?

20       A.   No, sir.  There's no information that I'm aware of with respect to

21    intercepts or sightings that place Mr. Beara on the ground, with the -- I

22    think the only exception that places him on the ground prior to the 13th

23    is the identification of him by one Dutch officer at Nova Kasaba.  I'm

24    just unclear whether that identification is on 12 July or on 13 July.

25       Q.   And let's talk about or continue to talk about the visibility of

Page 20231

 1    Mr. Beara.  You have no documentation and you've reviewed no such reports

 2    or information that he was ever at Srebrenica during that period of time;

 3    correct?

 4       A.   I'm not aware of any military documents or video footage that put

 5    him there.  I don't recall if statements by either Mr. Nikolic or

 6    Mr. Deronjic or other individuals place him on the ground or place him at

 7    Srebrenica.  The town of Srebrenica, I just don't recall, but I don't

 8    believe that there is either video footage or documents that put him in

 9    the town of Srebrenica, no, sir.

10       Q.   And the same would be true with respect to Potocari, would it not,

11    that there are no military documents or video footage or information that

12    you've seen or analysed to put Mr. Beara in Potocari on or about that time

13    period; correct?

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, one moment Mr. Butler.

15            Mr. Bourgon.

16            MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17            I wanted to avoid interrupting my client, but just at page 20,

18    lines 7 and 8, the witness, Mr. Butler, mentioned a name "Nikolic."  I'd

19    just like him to confirm that we're not talking about Drago Nikolic.

20            Thank you, Mr. President.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Bourgon.

22            Do you confirm that?

23            THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, I can.  We're talking about Momir Nikolic.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.

25            THE WITNESS:  Getting back to your question, sir:  I don't believe

Page 20232

 1    so, but it's been a few years since I've actually seen the video coverage

 2    of Potocari.  So I can't say that as an absolute fact, but I don't recall

 3    that I've ever seen video footage of him at Potocari or any documents that

 4    reflect that.

 5            MR. OSTOJIC:

 6       Q.   And what about the Hotel Fontana in Bratunac?  It's true, isn't

 7    it, that there's no evidence whatsoever that would place Mr. Beara at the

 8    Hotel Fontana at Bratunac for those what we've described as three meetings

 9    on the 11th and 12th of July?

10       A.   I believe there are some records that place him at the Hotel

11    Fontana, that he has a room there during that relevant period.  However,

12    I'm trying -- I don't believe that he is listed as one of the participants

13    in any of the three meetings, no, sir.  I think that's correct.

14       Q.   We have to break this down a little bit.  What room records are

15    you referring to, sir, that you claim Mr. Beara had a room at the Hotel

16    Fontana?

17       A.   Well, I'm -- like I said, there are records that, as part of the

18    Bratunac Brigade collection, that shows that a number of VRS officers,

19    where essentially the Bratunac Brigade was paying for their rooms at the

20    Hotel Fontana during this period.  I don't recall whether or not Colonel

21    Beara was one of those listed officers.  I mean, we have those records,

22    but I just don't recall at the moment whether he was one of those

23    individuals who had a room or not there.

24       Q.   Okay.  And we'll take a look at that, sir, and I think your

25    recollection will be refreshed that he was not.  But in any event, you say

Page 20233

 1    in line 19, that he's not listed as one of the participants in any of the

 2    meetings.  Aside from the lists, sir, I mean, we have video footage of

 3    those meetings, in part, do we not?

 4       A.   Yes, sir, the OTP has that.

 5       Q.   So let's not limit it to just a list.  But all the documents that

 6    you've reviewed, including the video footage, all that which you're trying

 7    to put in this historical context for us that you reflect in your report,

 8    it's rather clear, is it not, that Mr. Beara was not - and you've

 9    concluded this, sir - he was not a visible figure in Bratunac; correct?

10       A.   I basically said, as part of my report, if I recall correctly that

11    particular paragraph, that he wasn't one of the listed participants at the

12    meetings.  That would be based off of, you know, lists, the material, as

13    well as the video coverage.  Whether or not -- I mean, there is testimony

14    and there is other information that he was a participant in and around

15    Bratunac at that time, but, you know, that's witness testimony, that's not

16    documents or video.

17       Q.   And so why do you keep referring to it, Mr. Butler?  I mean, you

18    yourself said that you don't rely on that, you're not asked to rely on or

19    analyse that witness testimony, you haven't done it.  You're simply going

20    to take the documents; and as Mr. McCloskey or my learned friend said,

21    connect the dots or link them up to this historical analysis that you've

22    done, but you seem to insist to want to talk about these interviews.

23    That's not part of what your job is here, is it, to talk about those

24    interviews?

25       A.   No, sir.  But when you ask me a broad question that encompasses

Page 20234

 1    that information and want me to agree or disagree with it, I have to take

 2    it into account.

 3       Q.   Well, I'm accepting that you're going to talk about the documents,

 4    that you're going to talk about the intercepts, and that you're going to

 5    use this analysis that you've come up with to put it in context.  In the

 6    context of Ljubisa Beara, he was nowhere to be found, from those documents

 7    that you've reviewed, the intercepts, and the material that you've

 8    examined, in either Srebrenica, Potocari, or Bratunac, including the Hotel

 9    Fontana; correct?

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

11            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  It appears that there may be an alibi

12    defence coming.  I have no information from counsel of any alibi defence;

13    and before any further questioning is going on, I think he should be

14    ordered to follow the Rules of this Tribunal and provide us with alibi

15    information.  I have asked it repeatedly and received nothing.

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  The question is also limited to the documents that

17    the witness examined.

18            MR. OSTOJIC:  Well, I'm not and I don't want to get into a debate

19    in front of this witness with what my learned friend said, but he's wrong

20    to suggest that I'm not following the law, and he's wrong to suggest --

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment.  Because if you're going to proceed,

22    then we have to do it in the absence of the witness.

23            The thing is this:  I am drawing a distinction between what you

24    said, generally, and in the broader sense of the word, and, in fact, the

25    question itself, which was limited to the documents that the witness

Page 20235

 1    examined.

 2                          [Trial Chamber confers]

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Objection overruled, Mr. McCloskey.  We need to

 4    remember that in the indictment, you also have "joint criminal

 5    enterprise."  So what Mr. Ostojic may have in mind may not be that

 6    relevant for the time being, but what's more important is that the

 7    question is limited to the documents that the witness has reviewed, that

 8    is, intercepts and others, all the material that he has examined, either

 9    surveillance of Potocari or Bratunac including the Hotel Fontana.  He

10    hasn't answered that question, and he is being asked now to answer it.

11       Q.   THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, for the 12th of July, that is correct.  On

12    the 13th of July, we start seeing intercepts that refer to the individual,

13    depending on where various phone conversations are attributed to, and I

14    believe there is one that attributes him to "Badem," which is the code

15    name for the Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade on that date.

16            I mean, that is an intercept document that potentially places him

17    in Bratunac on that day.

18            MR. OSTOJIC:  Is the Court happy with the answer, and if I may

19    proceed, in terms of did he answer the Court's question?

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  I suggest that you move ahead, Mr. Ostojic.

21            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you.

22       Q.   Sir, let me stick, then, with this, so we understand it correctly.

23    And we'll get to that intercept on the 13th that you want to.

24            Am I correct, sir, that Beara is not a visible figure in Bratunac

25    in that period of time?  Yes or no?

Page 20236

 1       A.   For the period of time for the 12th of July, that's correct, from

 2    the documents and the intercepts, yes, sir.

 3       Q.   How about for the period of time after the 12th of July, sir?

 4       A.   I believe, for the 13th of July, his presence in and around

 5    Bratunac, and when I talk about in and around Bratunac, I qualify that as

 6    Bratunac Brigade, Nova Kasaba, and up the road, that road area there, I

 7    believe the intercepts reflect his presence on the 13th of July.

 8       Q.   And I want to cover two little points with respect to this, and

 9    just so we're clear.  So, prior to - although, you said, on the 12th of

10    July, you agree there's no documents to support that he was present in

11    Srebrenica, Potocari, Bratunac and/or the Hotel Fontana - but prior to the

12    12th of July, do you know what his whereabouts are, from the 1st through

13    the 12th, up to and including this intercept of the 13th?

14       A.   No, sir.  I'm not aware, incorporated in my reports or the

15    material that I have seen, that I have any information about his

16    whereabouts during that period through the 13th, when he becomes visible.

17       Q.   Help me understand what you said under oath on the 21st of

18    November, 2003, in the Blagojevic case.

19            MR. OSTOJIC:  And it's on page 5073, lines 11 through 13.

20       Q.   You go on to say:  "And, again, Beara, it may well be; do they

21    know who he is?"

22            Then you go on to say:  "He is not a visible figure in Bratunac."

23            Then you go on to describe Momir Nikolic, among others, as being

24    that people should know who they are on sight.

25            I want to focus on the words that you used:  "He," meaning Beara,

Page 20237

 1    "is not a visible figure in Bratunac."

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 3            MR. McCLOSKEY:  For that to be fair, we need to see the questions

 4    before and answers, but taking anything out of trial --

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  Fair enough.  Do you have them available,

 6    Mr. Ostojic?

 7            MR. OSTOJIC:  I've given the page cite.  I only have my copy that

 8    the witness is more than happy -- I'm more than happy to give him my copy.

 9            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  I think, at least if we put that on the ELMO,

10    we can proceed at a faster rate.

11            MR. OSTOJIC:  And I do have markings, Mr. President, on that, so I

12    apologise for that.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's see what markings they are.  Let's put it on

14    the ELMO.  All right.  Okay.

15            MR. OSTOJIC:  Okay.

16       Q.   Do you see it, sir?

17       A.   Yes, sir.  I understand the context of this comment, and I can

18    explain it.

19       Q.   First, is it true that Mr. Beara was not visible, according to

20    your own sworn testimony, a visible figure in Bratunac?

21       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, the --

22       Q.   Okay.

23       A.   -- context of the conversation was whether or not visibility, not

24    in the form of "I see you," but visibility in the form of somebody who is

25    a figure in and around Bratunac and would be recognised by these

Page 20238

 1    individuals, and that's why, you know, individuals of the Drina Corps who

 2    are more habitually there, you know, would be recognised, such as Momir

 3    Nikolic.  And individuals such as Ljubisa Beara, who would not be expected

 4    to frequent Bratunac, would not be recognised as readily, and that was the

 5    context that I made that comment about visibility on.

 6       Q.   Well, help me with this, and I want to stick to the period of time

 7    when the evacuation of the population started.  That's the time period I

 8    want to start.  That means everything that's involved in that that you, as

 9    a purported military analyst, knows.

10            Up until the 12th of July, 1995, not only is Mr. Beara not

11    physically visible, there's no documents whatsoever to indicate that he

12    participated at all in any of the events leading up to the July 12th, 1995

13    evacuation of the population; isn't that true?

14       A.   Within the context of the 12 July, there are no documents that

15    reflect that, that's an accurate statement, sir.

16       Q.   And when you say "documents," you include the intercepts as well;

17    correct?

18       A.   Yes, sir.

19       Q.   Now, help me with this, because my learned friend seems to be

20    shocked about what he calls an alibi, but do you know of a newspaper

21    reporter called  Sredoje Simic?

22       A.   No, sir, I don't.

23       Q.   Do you know that the Prosecutor had called this person as a

24    witness in their case-in-chief?

25       A.   No, sir, I don't.

Page 20239

 1       Q.   Do you know, sir, that that person, Mr. Simic, interviewed

 2    Mr. Beara regarding some of the events involved in Srebrenica?

 3       A.   No, sir, I don't.

 4       Q.   Did the Prosecutor, at any time during your tenure here or during

 5    your proofing sessions for your testimony, inform you that in that

 6    interview, Mr. Beara says that during this time period, up until the 12th

 7    of July -- up until the 13th of July, 1995, that he was not at or around

 8    Srebrenica, Potocari, or Bratunac, or in that area?  Do you know that?

 9       A.   No, sir, I'm no aware of that.

10       Q.   Do you know that in that interview, Mr. Beara said that he was

11    actually at -- in Bihac at that time?

12       A.   Again, since I don't know of the interview, I don't know what

13    Mr. Beara said.

14       Q.   Well, maybe you could help us with that, sir.  Do you know --

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  Stop, Mr. Ostojic.

16            Mr. McCloskey.

17            MR. McCLOSKEY:  If Mr. Ostojic is standing by that interview and

18    the answers, as his duty regarding alibi, I would appreciate that, but

19    that has never happened before.  And if that's what he is saying, I think

20    the law requires him to do that.

21            MR. OSTOJIC:  Again, I --

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey, I don't want to sound cold-blooded,

23    but we don't have a notice of alibi, in terms of Rule 67.

24            So let's proceed.

25            MR. OSTOJIC:

Page 20240

 1       Q.   Sir, can you help us understand, from your analysis of the

 2    documents, what, if anything, was going on in Bihac in that time period

 3    prior to the 13th of July, 1995?

 4       A.   I can't tell you specifically what was happening in Bihac during

 5    that period.  That was outside of my -- my area of review, so I don't

 6    know.  I know in broad terms, but I don't know specifically what you would

 7    be referring to.

 8       Q.   Well, tell me in broad terms, and maybe we could connect it, like

 9    we would the --

10       A.   In broad terms, the VRS military leadership was concerned about

11    the potential that 5th Corps, as well as the Croatian Army forces, were

12    going to launch a large-scale attack in the western part of the country.

13            In that context, you know, there was a significant military

14    interest in that particular region, the western part of the country.  As

15    for the actual details of what they were doing in preparation or to

16    attempt to spoil that or other things, I don't know the answer.  That's

17    not an issue that I've looked at.

18       Q.   Or analysed; correct?

19       A.   I didn't look at it.  Obviously, I didn't analyse it.

20       Q.   Who was the officer by the name of Manojlo Milovanovic; do you

21    know?

22       A.   Yes, sir.  He's the deputy commander of the Main Staff or -- I'm

23    sorry.  He is the Chief of Staff of the Main Staff.

24       Q.   And he was in that position in July of 1995; correct?

25       A.   Yes, sir.  General Lieutenant-Colonel Milovanovic was in that

Page 20241

 1    position in July of 1995.

 2       Q.   Help me with this, if you don't mind, from looking at the

 3    documents and analysing this case and spending time with the investigative

 4    team:  Do you have any idea where Manojlo Milovanovic was in the early

 5    parts of July 1995?

 6       A.   It is my understanding that he was in Banja Luka.

 7       Q.   Do you know if he was ever in Bihac?

 8       A.   No, sir, I don't, not during July of 1995.  I have no idea.

 9       Q.   I'd like to show you now 65 ter number 480, which is a Prosecution

10    document, and it's the article.  I just want to be fair and put it to you,

11    sir, since you've analysed all what you call relevant documents in this

12    case.

13            MR. OSTOJIC:  So 65 ter 480.

14            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection on whatever that last comment was, but

15    he's not stated that he's analysed every relevant document.

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  You are correct.

17            MR. OSTOJIC:  Let me, then, ask the question.  I thought that's

18    what we got.

19       Q.   What relevant documents, sir, did you not analyse for purposes of

20    your historical analysis?

21       A.   As I've indicated now for probably the fifth time, it's not a

22    historical analysis; it's a limited analysis with respect to the military

23    intercepts and the military documents and their correlation with the crime

24    bases.

25            This would be an example of a document that probably would not

Page 20242

 1    have made the cut, whether it's accurate or not, as relevant, because it

 2    has no particular relevance to a crime scene.  I mean, I've never seen

 3    this before, so, I mean, I'm kind of commenting in the abstract on it.

 4       Q.   And I can imagine.  Do you think that's something that you should

 5    have been given, so that you could at least digest it and make the

 6    determination as to whether or not --

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's move to your next question, please.

 8            MR. OSTOJIC:

 9       Q.   Sir, we're sticking with the time period up through and including

10    the start of the process for evacuation, and I want to make sure.  You've

11    seen not one order, not one military document, not one directive, not one

12    intercept, not one piece of evidence to indicate that Mr. Beara was in any

13    way involved with any of the process with respect to the evacuation or the

14    movement of the people from either Srebrenica or Potocari; correct?

15       A.   I'm not delaying.  I'm just going down through your checklist.

16    You've asked a lot of questions here.

17            Yes, sir, I believe that that's correct, as long as we're fair

18    that whatever witnesses may or may not potentially say is not what I'm

19    including in your context of one piece of evidence.

20       Q.   And we know that.

21       A.   I just want to be clear on that.  Okay.

22       Q.   You've said it several times and we accept that, and thank you for

23    repeating it, but we know that.  It's just from your analytical

24    standpoint, from the documents that you've reviewed, and my question was

25    limited, just so you can rest comfortably.  Okay?  So, I know it's limited

Page 20243

 1    to that.

 2       A.   Then I believe that that's accurate.  I'm not aware of any

 3    information that with respect to the movement of the people from

 4    Srebrenica or Potocari, in the context that we're talking about, the

 5    civilian movement.

 6       Q.   Now, I'd like to turn to the column, if you don't mind.

 7            During your -- and, I'm sorry, I thought we had called it

 8    yesterday "historical analysis," and I didn't mean to offend you if think

 9    it's not --

10       A.   No, sir.  You've called it that.  I've been consistent --

11       Q.   With all due --

12       A.   -- about what I've called it.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's move, please, Mr. Ostojic.

14            MR. OSTOJIC:

15       Q.   With all due respect, sir, you called it that under oath in the

16    Blagojevic case, but we'll look at that record again.

17            With respect to your analysis, did you analyse at any time how

18    many military combat engagements were there with respect to the column of

19    Bosnian Muslims that were leaving Srebrenica and Potocari from Susnjari

20    and the VRS?

21       A.   No, sir.  I never engaged in a process to do a step-by-step

22    accounting of each particular engagement of the column.

23       Q.   Well, let's go a little broader.  Did you ever engage in a process

24    to do something more general than this step-by-step accounting that you

25    referred to?

Page 20244

 1       A.   Yes, sir, I did.  In fact, based on the information that I had, I

 2    worked to be able to establish the track of the column from where it left,

 3    and particularly once it crossed over the road -- excuse me, the

 4    Konjevic Polje-Milici road and went through the zone of the Zvornik

 5    Brigade, so I could track the broad movement of the column in point of

 6    location on the ground and in point in time.

 7       Q.   I'm sorry, Mr. Butler.  I'm really actually referring to the

 8    combat engagements.  Did you track where, specifically, these military

 9    combat engagements occurred?

10       A.   No, sir.  I didn't track specifically, other than the general

11    references to ambushes at Snagovo, at various terrain features that were

12    listed in the brigade combat reports on the 12th, 13th, and 14th.

13            I did not track specific -- or did not make an effort to track

14    specific combat activity of the column, 12th and 13th, south of the road.

15       Q.   So you can't tell us, as you sit here, how many military combat

16    engagements were undertaken during that period of time in July of 1995;

17    correct?

18       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

19       Q.   Now, you've called and you've used the word "legitimate military

20    combat engagement," and do you agree with me, sir, that these were,

21    indeed, legitimate military combat engagements?

22       A.   As a result of the mixed character of the column, with a mixture

23    of military units and personnel and civilians, I believe I've been fairly

24    consistent by saying that, you know, regardless of the civilian presence,

25    that, you know, at face value, it would qualify as a legitimate military

Page 20245

 1    target.

 2       Q.   Now, I asked you if you analysed when and where these legitimate,

 3    if we can call them now, with your opinion, legitimate military combat

 4    engagements occurred.  Did anyone else, to your knowledge, any of your

 5    other assistants, or associates, or anyone on the investigative team,

 6    actually sit down and do a step-by-step process of where these legitimate

 7    military combat engagements occurred?

 8       A.   No, sir, not to my knowledge, or certainly not to the degree that

 9    you're talking about.  The only ones that was done, to my knowledge, is

10    the ones that I did.

11       Q.   Now, in order to give an objective, fair balance, or a

12    conservative approach to any analysis, wouldn't that be something that

13    should be included in a report?

14       A.   No, sir.  Again, given what the goals of my report were, if I were

15    prepared to concede that the column was a legitimate military target, any

16    casualties related to that particular operation would, by definition, be

17    lawful.

18            Given the context of what we were looking at with the crime base,

19    it didn't matter what happened to the column, per se.  It only mattered

20    what happened to the individuals after they came into the custody of the

21    VRS after being captured or surrendered.

22            That is why that particular type of analysis that you have looked

23    for was not done.

24       Q.   Thank you.  And just so I'm clear, so when you say "legitimate" in

25    your report, especially or specifically when you reference "legitimate

Page 20246

 1    military combat engagements," you're really saying "lawful military combat

 2    engagements," are you not?

 3       A.   I say "legitimate military combat engagements" because the column

 4    represents a military target.  I will concede that particularly in this

 5    institution, there will be and no doubt will continue to be a debate as to

 6    at what point and juncture so many civilians changed the character of not

 7    only a column but any other military objective.  That's why I took myself

 8    out of that process.

 9       Q.   Well, no, I don't know that you have, but thank you for your

10    analysis of that.  But on page 35, line 1, you, in fact, state that -- you

11    mean that "legitimate" means lawful, does it not, in your opinion?  Don't

12    worry what everyone else thinks about.  You're the one who is under oath

13    here as a witness in this proceeding.

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey.

15            MR. McCLOSKEY:  He's calling for a legal opinion which Mr. Butler

16    has not made, and I don't think it's appropriate.  These are not items

17    that are part of the charges of the indictment, either.  So where are we

18    going?

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Ostojic.

20            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21       Q.   Sir - and maybe I can direct a little more attention to where we

22    might be going with it, since my learned friend doesn't know - did you

23    analyse at any time, sir, whether there were minefields on that stretch

24    from Susnjari through to Tuzla?

25       A.   Yes, sir.  I was, in fact, aware that there were minefields not

Page 20247

 1    only around the enclave but that there were minefields particularly

 2    between the confrontation lines between the Zvornik Infantry Brigade and

 3    the ABiH 2 Corps people close to Tuzla.

 4            We had heard that there were potentially uncharted minefields

 5    along some of the smuggling routes that some of the units, whether the

 6    Zvornik or the Milici or the Bratunac Brigades, might have placed along

 7    areas that they thought that the ABiH was smuggling in weapons, but I --

 8    I'm not aware whether or not those have actually been located.

 9            So, I mean, while I've heard rumours of those types of minefields,

10    I don't know them as a fact.

11       Q.   So how many minefields were there, Mr. Butler?  Three?

12       A.   I couldn't give you a distinct number.

13       Q.   Ten?

14       A.   The mining records exist.  I just never -- I can't give you a

15    number.

16       Q.   Well, how many people -- or strike that.

17            Who, on the investigative team that you were involved in, was in

18    charge of determining how many minefields there were?  Who was the person

19    who would be in charge of that, in reviewing these landmine records that

20    you say?

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Why don't you ask Mr. McCloskey, and he will tell

22    you.

23            MR. OSTOJIC:  If you wish.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's move on.

25            MR. OSTOJIC:

Page 20248

 1       Q.   Sir, did you, as a military expert, in your report analyse how

 2    many people died as a result of coming into contact in landmine fields or

 3    landmines?

 4       A.   No, sir, I didn't.  I didn't analyse ABiH military casualties at

 5    all.

 6       Q.   And let me restrict it again and confine it, and thank you for

 7    that.  It's quite clever.  Confine it to the column that we're talking

 8    about, sir.

 9            With respect to the column that left from Susnjari to go towards

10    Kladanj and Tuzla, do you know, sir, or did you ever analyse how many

11    people died as a result of landmines?

12       A.   No, sir.  I thought I just answered that question.  I didn't.

13       Q.   Fair enough.  Do you know of anyone on the investigative team --

14    sir, do you know of anyone on the investigative team who actually has

15    conducted any sort of analysis whatsoever to determine how many people

16    from the column that left from Susnjari to go towards Tuzla died as a

17    result of landmines?

18       A.   I don't know whether or not that was a function of one of the OTP

19    forensics teams that were part of the investigation or not.  I mean, I

20    just don't know the answer to that.

21       Q.   Okay.  My next question with respect to this column, sir, is:  Did

22    you personally analyse how many people died as a result of these

23    legitimate combat military engagements?

24       A.   I believe I've given the numbers of VRS casualties, but I told you

25    I did not analyse ABiH casualties.

Page 20249

 1       Q.   Why not?

 2       A.   It wasn't relevant to my analysis.

 3       Q.   Is it relevant to determine how many people may have died during

 4    the period in Srebrenica in July of 1995, to distinguish whether some of

 5    them died from legitimate military combat engagements?  Isn't that really

 6    what you're saying, that that's not relevant?

 7       A.   It would only be relevant if the forensics evidence of the mass

 8    graves were showing evidence that would reflect that the bodies in those

 9    graves reflected combat casualties.  The forensics evidence, as I

10    understand it coming out of those mass graves, reflects the opposite, that

11    they're not combat casualties.

12       Q.   And that's based on -- I'm sorry?

13       A.   I'm sorry.  That's it, yeah.

14       Q.   And that's based on your recollection of the summary of these

15    forensic pathologists who have reviewed the material; correct?

16       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, that was a -- one of the very first -- when we

17    talk about holding analytical options open, when I first started here,

18    that was one of the obvious options that I felt that you do explore,

19    whether or not the bodies that were in the mass graves were not victims of

20    crimes or alleged crimes, but who are, in fact, casualties that would have

21    occurred in combat.

22            So that was an option that I held open, and the forensics teams

23    were able to answer those questions.

24       Q.   And when did you have these discussions with the forensic teams,

25    specifically with respect to the issue of whether any of the bodies that

Page 20250

 1    were found in the mass graves were or were not as a result of legitimate

 2    military combat engagements?

 3       A.   I don't have specific discussions with the forensics people.

 4    However, because I was incorporated into the investigations, as I was

 5    continuing to do my analysis, and particularly as they were also working

 6    concurrently on the forensics, you know, we were able to conclude,

 7    particularly with respect to Zvornik, that the individuals that were

 8    coming out of these particular mass graves and the associated secondaries,

 9    you know, were not meeting the characteristics of combat casualties, in

10    fact they were meeting the characteristics of victims from crime scenes.

11       Q.   We'll revisit some of that.  Thank you.  What I'm asking you now,

12    sir, is:  Do you know, based on the materials that you reviewed, what the

13    number is of these -- strike that.

14            From your review of the materials in the time that you spent with

15    the Office of the Prosecution, do you know, sir, what the number of deaths

16    were there as a result of the legitimate military combat engagements from

17    the side of the Bosnian Muslims?

18       A.   No, sir.

19       Q.   Okay.  Would it surprise you, sir, that the Office of the

20    Prosecution has taken witness statements from witnesses which indicate

21    that in, for example, one particular combat engagement, over a thousand

22    people died as a result of this legitimate military combat engagement?

23       A.   It would not surprise me that a witness would say that.  I would

24    think that from my knowledge of the situation, that that number would be

25    high for any particular combat engagement.

Page 20251

 1       Q.   Do you know that there are witnesses that say that there were, in

 2    fact, 1.000 to 2.000 people from the column that died as a result of these

 3    combat engagements?  Are you aware of that?

 4       A.   As a gross period from 12 to 18 July?

 5       Q.   Correct.

 6       A.   I'm not.  I'm not aware of the engage -- I'm not aware of the

 7    specific number, but that particular number of 1.000 to 2.000 sounds

 8    reasonable, given the context of the combat that I'm aware of.

 9       Q.   And you're saying that, including all of the combat engagements,

10    correct, as opposed to one isolated combat engagement?  Would that be

11    fair, if I can understand what you're saying?

12       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, I think the 1.000 to 2.000 number would be

13    reasonable with respect to the combat casualties starting, you know, from

14    12 July through the life span of the column, which is effectively 18 July.

15       Q.   Did you at any time, sir, consider this sworn testimony from these

16    Bosnian Muslims who survived and were either captured or made it to Tuzla

17    and their description of the number of combat casualties in any of your

18    analyses?

19       A.   No, sir, I didn't.

20       Q.   Now, in speaking or in telling us that one of the options was to

21    consult with these forensic pathologists, do you remember if you told them

22    that, in fact, of the mass graves that they'll uncover, there may be

23    bodies in those mass graves that would include people who were -- who

24    suffered injuries or ultimate death as a result of these combat

25    engagements?

Page 20252

 1       A.   I've heard --

 2       Q.   That the number -- sorry.  Let me throw this in so I don't have

 3    to -- we're getting near the break:  And that the number can be as high as

 4    1.000 to 2.000?

 5       A.   No, sir.  I mean, I didn't give specific guidance to any forensics

 6    people.  The forensics part of the investigation began well before my

 7    tenure at this institution; and, particularly, when I started my own

 8    military analysis, I mean, it was clear to the investigative team that I

 9    was interested in, you know, having, you know, confirmation, one way or

10    another, that, you know, relevant gravesites that we were looking at were,

11    in fact, the results of criminal activity and not the results of combat.

12       Q.   But where are those people and the bodies, the corpses of those

13    people who unfortunately died as a result of the legitimate military

14    combat engagement with the VRS during their trek from Susnjari through to

15    Tuzla?  Even if the number, as you suggest, is as low as 1.000 or as high

16    as possibly 2.000, where are those bodies located?

17       A.   My understanding, particularly in the early postwar years, was

18    because of the high threat of uncharted minefields and uncharted or

19    unexploded ordinance, that there was no effort made for many years to go

20    in and attempt to recover those surface remains.  I think that I recall,

21    somewhere around 2001 and 2002, the Bosnian government felt it was safe

22    enough to start doing that, but I'm not aware of how many remains that

23    they've ever collected or things of that nature.

24            But, I mean, I know that particularly in the early post-war years,

25    there was a deliberate decision not to try and police up those remains

Page 20253

 1    because of the ordinance and mine threat.

 2       Q.   Thank you, sir.  Just before the break, I just have a couple of

 3    other questions unrelated to this, specifically, but related more to your

 4    broad analysis, or generally your analysis, if I can say that.

 5            Now, you've in the past, in testifying both in the Krstic and in

 6    the Appeals -- with the Appeals Court in Blagojevic, and you've conceded

 7    that you, as an analyst, and I think even during your direct, you've

 8    conceded, as an analyst, that you have made some misinterpretation of

 9    several things; like an intercept, for example.

10            You know what I'm referring to; right?

11       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

12       Q.   Now, analysts such as yourself - and we've seen, although we won't

13    use the example of analyst intelligence, analysts who show aerial

14    photographs to the United Nations for weapons of mass destruction that

15    ultimately are not proven.  We're not going to ask you that - but you

16    concede, sir, that given, given your limited analysis, as you suggest, and

17    looking at only some of the documents, that there is indeed and could be

18    error in some of your findings; is that correct?

19       A.   I certainly will concede up front that there is a possibility of

20    error in my findings, absolutely.  And for the record, the Secretary of

21    State is not an analyst.  He was the one who showed the photographs.

22       Q.   I'm familiar with who Colin Powell is, but, sir, do you think that

23    he actually showed the photographs without consulting with any

24    intelligence analyst before showing them to the United Nations?

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's move, Mr. Ostojic.

Page 20254

 1            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you.

 2       Q.   Sir, who else assisted you in the preparation of your reports,

 3    both on the brigade, the corps, the Main Staff, your narrative, and then

 4    the revised narrative, historical analysis, that you provided to us?  Who,

 5    if anyone, assisted you in that?

 6       A.   I believe I indicated yesterday my partner with the analysis was

 7    Ms. Amanda Brettell.  She is also a MAT analyst.  She has a police

 8    background and a research background, not necessarily a military one.  My

 9    research assistant was a Ms. Sally Lattin, and we had a number of

10    translators.

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  We had this yesterday.

12            MR. OSTOJIC:  All he could have just said was the same people

13    identified yesterday.

14       Q.   Who, in particular, assisted you with the analysis on the Main

15    Staff narrative that you wrote?

16       A.   Ms. Brettell was responsible in part with I think some of the

17    young interns for helping to assemble material and send it back to me.

18    But in that particular context, I drafted that report myself.

19            MR. OSTOJIC:  Your Honour, we're near the break time.  I'm moving

20    into another subject when we come back, with your permission.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  How much longer do you have, Mr. Ostojic?

22            MR. OSTOJIC:  I believe an hour and a half, Mr. President,

23    although it's difficult to gauge.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's have a 25-minute break.

25                          --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

Page 20255

 1                          --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Ostojic.

 3            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4       Q.   We're almost done, Mr. Butler.  A few more areas that I'd like to

 5    cover with you.

 6            Sir, I'd like if we can turn now to the 15th of July, 1995.

 7            MR. OSTOJIC:  And in particular, with the assistance of the Court,

 8    if we could have document 65 ter 2518 on the screen, and it was also

 9    identified under the number 2754 as well.  So I'm not sure what number

10    they may be using, and it bears the ERN number 0427983.  Just so that

11    we're accurate.

12            Okay.  Apparently, we don't have the English version.

13       Q.   But I can still ask the preliminary question, if you don't mind,

14    Mr. Butler, while they're finding that.

15            This is a report, do you recall, that you discussed with my

16    learned friend during your direct examination?

17       A.   Yes, sir.

18       Q.   Now, do you remember that in this report, there was, at least

19    during your proofing session, there was some handwritten material that was

20    located on the top right-hand corner?  Do you remember that?

21       A.   Handwritten material, insomuch as -- I mean, there's a notation

22    that says, "Handwritten:  Files."  Is that what you're referring to?

23       Q.   No, actually --

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Why don't you show him straight away.

25            MR. OSTOJIC:  I have one copy here.  Maybe we could place it on

Page 20256

 1    the ELMO.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you for being practical, Mr. Ostojic.

 3            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President, for your suggestion.

 4       Q.   Do you see that, sir?

 5       A.   Yes, sir.  I see the handwritten in -- on that version, yes, sir.

 6       Q.   Okay.  You discussed that handwriting, did you not, during your

 7    proofing sessions with Mr. McCloskey, did you not?

 8       A.   I don't recall.  If -- it might help if I -- I don't recall

 9    whether I had it translated or not, so, I mean, I don't recall at this

10    juncture whether I did or not.

11       Q.   Okay.

12            MR. OSTOJIC:  Well, just for my learned friend, if he looks at his

13    proofing session notes of Mr. Butler, on page 14, paragraph 7, he

14    discusses that.

15       Q.   You discussed it and state that.

16            Quote, in the third paragraph again on page 14, under paragraph 7,

17    discussing this document, it states:  "In relation to the handwritten note

18    at the top of the document, Butler stated that the reference," and then it

19    goes on to discuss what the references are.  Do you remember that at all?

20       A.   I would probably remember it in context to what the reference was,

21    if you could refresh my memory as to what it actually says.

22       Q.   Well, it says there:  "50 MUP men."  Do you see it?

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey?

24            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we get a full reading?  There's been quite a

25    few of these notes on various documents, and I don't remember it either.

Page 20257

 1    If we could read the whole thing, maybe that will help refresh the

 2    recollection.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Ostojic.  How much can you help us there?

 4            MR. OSTOJIC:  Not much, but I can read what's said in the proofing

 5    note; and as I think as I cited, it's on page 14 of the proofing note.

 6            It says as follows, Mr. Butler, to put it in context, may you can

 7    help us --

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  But we don't have that, as you know.  But go ahead,

 9    go ahead.

10            MR. OSTOJIC:

11       Q.   On the third paragraph, it says:

12            "In relation to the handwritten note at the top of the document,

13    Butler stated that the reference to '50 MUP men' may be connected with the

14    arrival of a company of military police from the East Bosnia core in the

15    Zvornik area on the 15th July 1995; to a Sekovici unit from Bratunac who

16    also arrived in the Zvornik area on the 15th July 1995, or a group of

17    municipal police from Doboj, whose commander was captured by the Muslims."

18       A.   Yes, sir.  Now I remember that, that handwritten notation.

19       Q.   Now, because we're trying with your evidence, I think, to keep

20    things in context, help us contextually, if you will, when was this

21    commander captured by the Muslims?

22       A.   I believe that the MUP commander in question was captured either

23    late night 14th or the 15th of July, 1995.

24       Q.   Now, this letter or this exhibit that we're looking at also

25    discusses reinforcements, does it not?  I think that was part of your

Page 20258

 1    testimony on direct; correct?

 2       A.   Yes, sir.

 3       Q.   Now, my question to you is:  You said and set out that there's

 4    approximately, if not only three, but at least three variations as to who

 5    the reference may be to these 50 men.  Do you see that?

 6       A.   Yes, sir.

 7       Q.   And that's a reasonable approach, and I'm sure you'll agree, is it

 8    not, to an analyst, to list out all the different options that he thinks

 9    they may be referencing to if you're going to interpret or analyse such an

10    entry?

11       A.   Yes, sir.

12       Q.   And now it talks also in that report, reinforcements related to

13    this commander who was captured, but also reinforcements for other

14    reasons; correct?

15       A.   I'm sorry.  Repeat the question again.

16       Q.   Thank you.  I think it was somewhat awkward.

17            When you list out the three options, you identify three particular

18    units; and for the third unit, according to the proofing note we got from

19    Mr. McCloskey, you say that it could be related to a group of municipal

20    police from Doboj whose commander was captured by the Muslims.

21            What my question is, with respect to the other two options:  Do

22    they have anything to do with this commander that was captured from Doboj?

23       A.   No, sir.  The military police from Bijeljina were VRS, so I don't

24    believe they're in context to that particular one.  There were -- there

25    was another municipal police unit that came in obviously from the Sekovici

Page 20259

 1    one.  I don't believe that the military commander was from that one,

 2    either.  So, I mean, I only -- I only note that because it's my

 3    understanding or at least my recollection that it was the commander of

 4    that particular unit who was captured.

 5       Q.   What's the time, if you could look at the time stamp ...

 6            MR. OSTOJIC:  And maybe help us by just moving the paper a little

 7    higher.

 8       Q.  ... when that document was either created or sent?

 9            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, sir, for your assistance.

10       A.   It's the -- what appears to be the receipt stamp on it is

11     "15 July," then I see a zero, and it may be another zero or not, but I

12    can't tell.  There's one notation that says "15 July," and there's a

13    second one under the -- hold on one second.  I can't make out the second

14    one, because it says "16", and I'm not sure, but that looks like either a

15    "08" or "09" or something.  So I don't know that I can make sense out of

16    that one.

17       Q.   You don't know that it says 8:00 or at any other given time;

18    correct?

19       A.   No, sir.  I mean, I can't make that out at what time it says.  The

20    reproduction is just too blurry.

21       Q.   Now, the time stamp there, does that indicate when it was

22    initially sent, or can you help us understand the time stamp just a little

23    bit better?

24       A.   My indication of the document that we're talking about on the

25    ELMO, this particular stamp at the bottom is a time stamp that indicates

Page 20260

 1    when it was received, not a "sent" stamp.

 2       Q.   Is there any indication as to when this document was prepared and

 3    sent?

 4       A.   You have a 15 July 1995 date on it, and it may be possible, in the

 5    English language version, that from the context of the document, you might

 6    be able to further divine at least which times they were talking about

 7    something happening prior to.

 8       Q.   Thank you.  And this document, they're talking about

 9    reinforcements to be used for three to four days, are they not?  Do you

10    see that plainly on the second paragraph of the document?  Even though

11    it's B/C/S, I think you can make out "3-4 dana," which is three to four

12    days?

13       A.   Yes, sir.

14            MR. OSTOJIC:  Let's turn, if we can, to the 15th of July, 1995,

15    and the purported intercept with Mr. Beara, which has a 65 ter number

16    1178.

17       Q.   Now, as you may know, as they're placing this document up, if I

18    can just ask you, if you recall, there are actually more than one

19    purported transcriptions, if you will, of this conversation of the 15th of

20    July, 1995; correct?

21       A.   Yes, sir.  I believe, on this particular one, there's somewhere

22    between -- on this one with General Zivanovic, there's two.  I think

23    there's -- there may even be a partial floating around as well.  I don't

24    know that we've incorporated that, but I know there are multiple versions.

25       Q.   In looking at this document, can you tell me if the intercept

Page 20261

 1    operator used either voice recognition or compromise to identify the

 2    participants in the conversation?

 3       A.   In the context of this, it appears that General Zivanovic has been

 4    voice compromised.

 5            Can you scroll down, please, to the bottom in English?  Thank you.

 6            It does not appear that Lieutenant-Colonel Beara has been voice

 7    compromised.

 8       Q.   It not only not appears, it's rather clear, is it not, that there

 9    was no voice compromise relating to the identity of the person who this

10    purported operator believes is, as he puts, Colonel Ljubo Beara; correct?

11       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

12       Q.   Now, if we could turn, sir, to the next intercept of the 15th of

13    July, 1995.

14            MR. OSTOJIC:  And for the record, I'm being told, just so that we

15    have a clean copy or a correct version of the record, that what we were

16    looking at was 65 ter 1378 and not 1178.  But if there is a confusion on

17    that, I was just given this sheet.  I think it's 1178.  But with all due

18    respect, I just want to put that on the record, so that we don't have any

19    confusion.  But I think we've identified it sufficiently enough as the

20    intercept at 0954 hours on the 15th of July.  Thank you.

21       Q.   Thank you, Mr. Butler.  I'm sorry for that.

22            MR. OSTOJIC:  Turning to the next intercept that we have of the

23    15th July 1995, that would be 65 ter 1179.  Thank you.

24       Q.   Sir, how many different intercept operators purportedly captured

25    this conversation between allegedly a Colonel Ljubo and Krle?

Page 20262

 1       A.   I can't tell you intercept operators.  My recollection is that

 2    there are two versions of this, as well as a partial version.

 3       Q.   So that would make it three, would it not?

 4       A.   I believe so.  I mean, I don't know -- I mean, I can't put it to a

 5    direct operator, but, I mean, I'm telling you how many versions that I

 6    know are in existence.

 7       Q.   And that's all I'm asking you.

 8       A.   Okay.

 9       Q.   And we'll have you look at this quickly and then we'll look at the

10    other two, just so you have the complete grouping of these intercepts.

11            MR. OSTOJIC:  And the next exhibit, if we can just have, I have it

12    marked as 1179H, as in "Henry."

13       Q.   This would be another version of this intercept purportedly

14    captured on the 15th of July, 1995, just a slightly different time period.

15    The first one, and you can take my word for it, I believe, was at 0955.

16    And the second one is at 0957.  Correct?

17       A.   Yes, sir.

18       Q.   And then the third one, just so you can take a look at it, is

19    under 65 ter number 1179C, as in "cat."  This, sir, has a time of 1000

20    hours.  Do you see that, sir?

21       A.   Yes, sir.

22       Q.   Those are the three versions, if we could call them, or the three

23    intercepts that were purportedly captured on the 15th of July, 1995, at or

24    approximately 10.00, between allegedly Mr. Beara and Mr. Krstic; correct?

25       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

Page 20263

 1       Q.   Now, did you link, given the time scope of this document, this

 2    intercept with any potential reinforcements that may be asked for by

 3    anyone from the Main Staff, such as the documents that we just saw, 65 ter

 4    2518, also using the number 2754?  Did you make any link or connect the

 5    dots with that?

 6       A.   No, sir.

 7       Q.   Did you link this intercept of the 15th of July, 1995, with the

 8    document that's on the ELMO, with the handwritten material that we've just

 9    discussed moments ago?  Did you connect the dots there at all?

10       A.   No, sir.

11       Q.   Now, in this intercept, and I'm generalising, you claim that

12    Mr. Beara is asking for 30 or so men; correct?

13       A.   It's what the intercept says, yes, sir.

14       Q.   And in the document that's on the ELMO, there's a reference to 50

15    or so men, is it not?

16       A.   Correct, sir.

17       Q.   In this intercept of the 15th of July, 1995, at approximately

18    10.00, there's a reference to three days, is there not?

19       A.   Yes, sir.

20       Q.   And in the document that we have in front of you on the ELMO,

21    which we thought, although we'll have to amend it, which is 65 ter 2518,

22    there's a reference to three to four days, is there not?

23       A.   That is correct, sir.

24       Q.   How do you, sir, as a reasonably prudent person, how do you not

25    include that the men that were being requested were not requested for the

Page 20264

 1    same reason as that which you list with respect to this exhibit, 65 ter

 2    2518, and the notation that we see on the top right-hand corner on the

 3    ELMO of that?

 4       A.   Well, sir, first of all, in the context of the intercepts, the men

 5    that he's been asking for particular men for two or three days.  In the

 6    context of the reinforcements from the Krajina Corps, there's no

 7    information that anyone has been asking for them for two or three days.

 8    So I think it's an "apples and oranges" type of argument.  Boban Indjic

 9    and individuals from Visegrad are not to be confused with people coming in

10    from the 1st Krajina Corps.

11            The other issue is that, while this particular 15 July Main Staff

12    order wasn't available for me when I was doing my analysis with the

13    reports, I did have other information with respect to documents from the

14    Zvornik Brigade and Bratunac Brigade, as well as from the RS police, which

15    laid out those particular units that the reinforcements were coming from.

16    So because I already had that, I was able to exclude that particular

17    avenue of analysis.

18       Q.   Let's -- thank you for that.  Let's look at the comment that you

19    attribute or that they attribute to Mr. Beara, where he says, "I've been

20    waiting three days."

21            Do you see that?

22       A.   Yes, sir.

23       Q.   Now, is it reasonable to, when you analyse this, to say that Beara

24    has not done anything for those three days prior and he's simply waiting

25    for three days, from the 12th, 13th, and 14th?

Page 20265

 1       A.   No, sir.  I take, within the context of that intercept, that the

 2    order was given three days prior for these individuals to arrive and that

 3    he is, in fact, still waiting for them.

 4       Q.   Well, did you find an order to that effect?

 5       A.   No, sir.  There is no written order to that effect.

 6       Q.   So are you making an assumption here, sir, with respect to this

 7    order that we have no documentation of, that you claim in your analysis is

 8    as to what occurred?

 9       A.   No, sir.  I'm not making an assumption at all.

10       Q.   Isn't it true, Mr. Butler, that it's pure speculation on your

11    part, since you have no corroborating evidence whatsoever, that there was

12    even such an order?

13       A.   No, sir, because, in fact, there is corroborating information with

14    respect to another intercept, related to the fact that a vehicle

15    supposedly carrying these individuals from Visegrad had broken down.  So

16    in that respect, there is.  But, you know, I agree with you also that

17    there is no written order deploying these individuals.

18       Q.   Sir, you've connected that intercept or that purported intercept

19    of a few days earlier with this intercept, but you refuse and don't want

20    to connect this intercept, which is temporally, date and time-wise, on all

21    four squares with the material that you have on the ELMO requesting

22    reinforcements, the number of reinforcements, and the number of days.

23            How do you make that illogical conclusion, with all due respect,

24    sir?

25       A.   Well, because logically for me the infantry company from the 1st

Page 20266

 1    Krajina Corps has absolutely no relationship to a group of men coming from

 2    the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade, which is a Drina Corps asset.

 3    It's apples and oranges.  They're discussing two different things.

 4       Q.   Now, you list, on the data that we have --

 5            THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Please make breaks between

 6    questions and answers.  Thank you.

 7            THE WITNESS:  It might help if I could see the transcripts on my

 8    screen.  That way, I would know.  I didn't know it was something I could

 9    do.  I'm sorry.  Thank you very much.  Hopefully, that will help pause us.

10            MR. OSTOJIC:

11       Q.   Sir, let me ask you, with respect to the exhibit that's on the

12    ELMO, which has a 65 ter number 2518, and just so the record is clear, it

13    has the handwritten information on the top right-hand corner that we've

14    discussed, why didn't you, during your direct examination, while

15    discussing reinforcements, tell us that you saw a different exhibit with

16    handwriting information on it?

17       A.   As I believe, as is evidenced when you started your line of

18    questioning on this, I didn't remember.

19       Q.   And, certainly, you didn't incorporate that in any of your

20    analyses because you didn't have a chance to review it but for during the

21    proofing sessions --

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  He's answered that already.

23            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24       Q.   Now, sir.  I want to ask you a couple more questions in connection

25    with that intercept.

Page 20267

 1            Can we see where purportedly Mr. Beara is during this

 2    conversation?  You're welcome to use any of the three intercepts that we

 3    have.

 4       A.   It's okay.  Just waiting for it.  Could you scroll down to the

 5    bottom, please.  Okay.  The next page, English, please, or is that it?

 6       Q.   While you're looking at that, Mr. Butler.

 7            MR. OSTOJIC:  If I could just ask the Court to ask the usher to

 8    return the document that's on the ELMO.  We're done with that.

 9            Thank you, Mr. President.

10            THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, I've read it.  I do not believe, in any of

11    this version of the intercept, there is a compromise or any indication

12    that you could attribute a physical location of Colonel Beara at the time.

13    I believe that I make that observation of where he's located from the

14    prior intercept, which gives a "139" phone number.

15            MR. OSTOJIC:

16       Q.   Now, just so I understand, sir, you can have compromise both with

17    respect to the identity of the participants and the location; correct?

18       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, any amount of -- you can have any number of

19    compromises within context.

20       Q.   Now, in your analysis - and I'm trying to just go a little slower

21    as a courtesy - in your analysis and in keeping this in context, are you

22    familiar with how the switchboard operator was able to connect incoming

23    calls from two parties that may be calling that specific operator?

24       A.   No, sir.  I don't have a detailed knowledge of how the switchboard

25    worked.

Page 20268

 1       Q.   Who, in the investigative team, would have that purported detailed

 2    knowledge as to how the switchboard worked?

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 4            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we just have a little more definition.  Which

 5    switchboard?

 6            MR. OSTOJIC:  Fair enough.

 7       Q.   Take any switchboard.  Well, let me give you the hypothetical,

 8    that you're the switchboard, Mr. Butler, that I call you and that my

 9    learned friend Mr. McCloskey calls you to your right.  Do you know that

10    they had a capacity to actually put Mr. McCloskey's call to my call, even

11    though we were not either at Mr. McCloskey's place or your place, where

12    the switchboard operator was?  Did you know they had that capacity?

13       A.   No, sir.  I mean, I don't know the capacities of the local

14    switchboards.

15       Q.   Who would in the investigative team that you worked for involving

16    the Srebrenica issues?

17       A.   I don't know.

18       Q.   So, as an analyst, do you think that that is something that may be

19    lacking in order to determine whether or not someone is at a given place,

20    if you don't have a full and complete understanding of how the switchboard

21    worked?

22       A.   Sir, it is a piece of information that I would have liked to have

23    had at the time, but I didn't think that in the context of the other

24    information that I had, that it was a critical piece of information.

25       Q.   And if you're saying that someone is at a certain area, whether

Page 20269

 1    it's an IKM, for example, and if you make the assumption that as a result

 2    of this call, person X is at the IKM in Zvornik, and if you don't know how

 3    that switchboard worked, your analysis could be actually deficient and in

 4    fact wrong, because that person may have just called in that IKM and was

 5    connected with another individual; wouldn't that be accurate?

 6       A.   I believe your hypothetical is wrong, because I've never said the

 7    IKM.  My analysis of where the correspondents are talking in this

 8    intercept is that General Krstic is at the Drina Corps IKM that was

 9    established for Zepa, and that based on the phone number attributed to

10    where Colonel Beara can be reached in the prior intercept, that he is

11    located at the Zvornik Brigade headquarters, not the IKM, because the

12    number is attributed to the phone number of Drago Nikolic.

13       Q.   And that's that 139 phone number; correct?  "Extension," I should

14    say.

15       A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

16       Q.   And in your analysis, did you find whether or not that 139

17    extension is attributed to anyone else other than Drago Nikolic,

18    allegedly?

19       A.   No, sir.  My -- my analysis reflects that the 139 number was the

20    number for the security office.

21       Q.   I'm sure you'll be asked some questions about that, so I'll move

22    on.

23       A.   I'm sure I will.

24       Q.   Thank you, sir.

25            MR. OSTOJIC:  Let's go to the intercept that I think the

Page 20270

 1    Prosecutor has coined from time to time as the triage intercept, which is

 2    dated the 16th of July, 1995, and it has a 65 ter number 1187, I believe.

 3       Q.   And if you could just be kind enough to take a look at that

 4    purported intercept of the 16th of July, so that I can ask you some

 5    questions about it.

 6       A.   Yes, sir.

 7       Q.   Now, from my reading of this, "triage" is used on four separate

 8    occasions, the specific word, is it not?

 9       A.   Yes, sir.  I'll take your word on that one.  I guess I don't have

10    to count.

11       Q.   Thank you, but you're welcome to do so.  And how many times does

12    purportedly Mr. Beara use that word?

13       A.   I don't believe that that particular phrase is associated with the

14    correspondent Beara.

15       Q.   Where is the individual X?

16       A.   Once the X is identified at Cerovic, at that point time, Colonel

17    Cerovic is the duty officer of the Drina Corps.  He would be in Vlasenica,

18    at the Drina Corps headquarters.

19       Q.   Sir, will you agree with me that the word "triage," as mentioned

20    in this purported intercept, can have multiple meanings?

21       A.   It can have multiple meanings, yes, sir.  Within the context of

22    this intercept, though, I believe it has only one.

23       Q.   Okay.  And do you remember, sir, in your testimony under oath in

24    the Krstic case on the 19th of July, 2000, you also said that there's a

25    military meaning of the term which pertains to the separation of wounded

Page 20271

 1    on medical grounds?

 2            In fairness to you, and I'm sorry, I should give the page number.

 3    It's on page 5357, lines 11 through 12.

 4            You begin by saying, "In fairness, sir, the military lexicon

 5    defines the term in a medical sense."

 6            Do you recall that?

 7       A.   Yes, sir, I do.  I recall that conversation.

 8       Q.   And then you go on, if I can, from lines 11 through 24, again on

 9    page 5357, during your testimony in the Krstic case on the 19th of July,

10    2000.

11            "I would hesitate to get very far down the road, speculating what

12    the phrase 'triage' might mean.  In various other forms of potentially

13    criminal or non-criminal applications, it is the word that they used.  And

14    as I generally note, I try not to put additional or more meaning into

15    their words than is self-evident."

16            Do you remember that sworn testimony, sir?

17       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

18       Q.   And then the Honourable Judge Riad asked you, because he wasn't

19    sure was meant by "self-evident":  "What do you mean by self-evident?"

20            Then you proceed to answer the question as follows:

21            "Sir, they use the phrase 'triage.'  One possible explanation, is

22    as Mr. Petrusic forwards, there could be multiple possible explanations.

23    All I'm saying, as part of my analysis, is here's the word that was used

24    as translated, and I would prefer not to try to speculate as to what they

25    really mean behind that individual word, sir."

Page 20272

 1            Do you remember that?

 2       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

 3       Q.   Now, wouldn't you agree with me, in keeping in mind one of your

 4    fundamental components of your analysis, that you're trying to be as

 5    conservative as possible, that you cannot infer from the text of the

 6    intercept alone that there was any dark connotation, as I think you refer

 7    to during the Vasic identification document and the word "killing,"

 8    attached to the use of the word "triage"?  Wouldn't you agree with me on

 9    that?

10       A.   Yes, sir.  In the abstract of this intercept, I agree.

11       Q.   Now, at that time on the 15th of July, 1995, and I know we -- or

12    16th, I'm sorry, 16th of July, 1995, we discussed the column and some of

13    the -- that's from these legitimate military combat engagements.

14            Are you familiar, sir, that there was statements that the

15    Prosecutor received from Bosnian Muslims, who were in the column, who

16    identified during this time period that there were many hundreds wounded

17    as a result of these legitimate military combat engagements?

18       A.   Yes, sir.  And particularly seven years ago, during the Krstic

19    trial, I held that possibility open because the investigation had not been

20    able to either confirm or deny or identify the numbers of potentially

21    wounded combatants that might be in the custody of the Zvornik Infantry

22    Brigade.

23            Seven years down the road now, the investigation has been able to

24    run that particular issue to ground; and because of that and because now I

25    have a better understanding of the context, I'm more willing to exactly

Page 20273

 1    give you what I believe the phrase "triage" means in the context of that.

 2       Q.   I don't want you to speculate, sir, as you've said that that's

 3    what it would mean.

 4       A.   I am not speculating.

 5       Q.   Sir, do you know, during your proofing session with Mr. McCloskey,

 6    whether you discussed if other former VRS officers ever used the word

 7    "triage"?

 8       A.   No, sir, I don't recall that came up.

 9       Q.   In your review of the documents and the material in total that you

10    reviewed, did you ever find that some or any officers would use the word

11    "triage"?

12       A.   I know that, as a component of the investigation, that question

13    was asked to a number of individuals in this particular context.

14       Q.   Who?

15       A.   I believe General Zivanovic was asked that particular question.

16       Q.   Who else?

17       A.   I'm not sure if Major Golic was asked that question as of conduct

18    of his interviews.

19       Q.   How about Mr. Cerovic, was he asked?

20       A.   I don't know if the investigation had ever interviewed Colonel

21    Cerovic.  I understand he either was interviewed and at some point in time

22    stopped, or didn't consent to be interviewed.  I don't know the answer to

23    that.

24       Q.   Well, wait.  He's a participant of this supposed July 16, 1995

25    intercept, isn't he?

Page 20274

 1       A.   Yes, sir, he is.

 2       Q.   Don't you think it might be reasonably prudent that the Office of

 3    the Prosecution would have interviewed another participant in this

 4    purported conversation?

 5       A.   If the Office of the Prosecutor had meaningful subpoena power to

 6    be able to do that, I'd say yes; but we don't and we do not have the

 7    ability to go to Serbia and demand people show up.

 8       Q.   What about this, sir, the use of the word "triage"?  If we're

 9    discussing the column of the 28th Division passing through, do you

10    remember if an officer ever said that, "We do not try to carry out a

11    triage to see who was a civilian and who wasn't"?

12       A.   Could you -- do I remember if an officer ever -- could you provide

13    more information on who the officer might be?  That's pretty abstract.

14       Q.   I will.  Let's just take it one step at a time.  In that sentence,

15    if it's true, "triage" in that sense is being used to separate civilians

16    from military combatants or soldiers, is it not?

17       A.   I suppose that, you know, in that, it could be used in that

18    context.  That would be a definition that would make sense, yes, sir.

19            MR. OSTOJIC:  Now, Mr. President, I'm just looking for a little

20    guidance, but may we go into private session for a moment?

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Of course.  Let's go into private session, please.

22                          [Private session]

23  (redacted)

24  (redacted)

25  (redacted)

Page 20275

 1  (redacted)

 2  (redacted)

 3  (redacted)

 4  (redacted)

 5  (redacted)

 6  (redacted)

 7  (redacted)

 8  (redacted)

 9  (redacted)

10  (redacted)

11  (redacted)

12  (redacted)

13  (redacted)

14  (redacted)

15  (redacted)

16                          [Open session]

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  We are in open session.

18                          [Trial Chamber confers]

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's go into private session for a moment, please.

20                          [Private session]

21  (redacted)

22  (redacted)

23  (redacted)

24  (redacted)

25  (redacted)

Page 20276











11    Pages 20276-20277 redacted. Private session















Page 20278

 1  (redacted)

 2  (redacted)

 3  (redacted)

 4  (redacted)

 5  (redacted)

 6  (redacted)

 7  (redacted)

 8  (redacted)

 9  (redacted)

10  (redacted)

11  (redacted)

12                          [Open session]

13            MR. OSTOJIC:  May I proceed, Your Honour?

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

15            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you.  I was just waiting.

16       Q.   Sir, given what we've seen now in private session and - I know

17    we're in open.  Yes, thank you.  Just so it makes sense later - and the

18    fact that you did not have any material from the person who used the word

19    "triage," whether it's X or this C which is attributed to Cerovic on the

20    16th of July, 1995, we can see, if we actually study hard, that there can

21    be multiple reasons or multiple -- strike that, multiple definitions of

22    this military lexicon, as you put it under oath in the Krstic trial, of

23    the word "triage"; isn't that correct?

24       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, the word itself has multiple meanings, I agree.

25       Q.   Now, I want to put into focus, if we can, if we take words in

Page 20279

 1    isolation, we saw that the Dragomir Vasic letter -- or, I mean, I'm sorry,

 2    the document, which is dated, and I have it here --

 3            MR. OSTOJIC:  It's 65 ter 886.

 4       Q.   You testified - if I may proceed while it's being brought up to

 5    the screen - on the 17th of July -- I'm sorry, 17th of January, 2008, the

 6    reference to that word "killing," and you said, and you gave your

 7    identification about it, that, "It has no dark meaning."

 8            Do you remember that, pages 19870, lines 10 through 14?

 9       A.   Yes, sir.  Again, while the word itself has multiple meanings,

10    it's my interpretation of what the word implies within the context that

11    it's being discussed.

12       Q.   And, also, I think, in another example of the utilisation perhaps

13    of the word "kill" or "killing" is the Krstic tape, and I think you also

14    at that point came to the same conclusion, that despite that the word

15    "kill" was used, that it didn't have a dark connotation.  Is that correct?

16       A.   Yes, sir, or it had multiple connotations.  At that -- and my

17    analysis at that time, I didn't attribute it a darker or murderous intent,

18    which may be a more accurate way to say it, to that phrase.

19       Q.   Now, sir, I want to discuss, if you will, a little bit a different

20    area, and that is internal affairs.  Do you generally know what internal

21    affairs is?

22       A.   I assume we're referring in a law enforcement perspective,

23    internal affairs or --

24       Q.   Let's take it first from a law enforcement perspective, and then

25    we'll move to a military perspective.

Page 20280

 1       A.   Well, law enforcement perspective, my understanding of "internal

 2    affairs" is a group of individuals who investigate the activities of law

 3    enforcement officials to ensure that they're functioning in compliance

 4    with law and not themselves using their official functions to commit

 5    crimes.

 6       Q.   Investigating their own people within their unit or organisation;

 7    correct?

 8       A.   Yes, sir.

 9       Q.   And what about in a military setting, how would you describe an

10    internal affairs officer or an internal affairs person?

11       A.   I can't tell you how it is in a broader military setting.  I am

12    sure that the US military's, you know, criminal investigation division may

13    have those; although, I don't know that.  So, I mean, I couldn't tell you

14    how that function works within a military.

15       Q.   Well, no, no --

16       A.   If we're talking about the VRS, in that context, I think I can

17    give you an explanation.

18       Q.   We are talking about the VRS, sir.

19       A.   Okay.  In that context, it would be those investigative activities

20    to ensure that military officials are, again, operating in compliance with

21    law and regulation.

22       Q.   And who would they be?  Who would really be identified in this

23    term of art "internal affairs" in the VRS military, based on your analysis

24    of the documents?

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey.

Page 20281

 1            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  There's no foundation that this term

 2    "internal affairs" has been used in any military context at all, and so

 3    the form of the question is incorrect.  This is a -- this is a term from

 4    American television.

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Ostojic has very little opportunity to watch

 6    here in The Hague.

 7            MR. OSTOJIC:  Although, I am rather offended by the comment, I

 8    won't go into an argument about it now, but I think the witness answered

 9    the question both in terms of law enforcement and military, and so --

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  It's understandable why he has answered the

11    question, too.  So let's hear what Mr. Bourgon has to say, coming to the

12    rescue.

13            Mr. Bourgon.

14            MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

15            The witness has referred to internal affair organs on a number of

16    occasions in his reports.  Thank you, Mr. President.

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  I know that he has.  I know that he has, but is it

18    necessary to dwell on this matter any longer, Mr. Ostojic, or shall we

19    move ahead?

20            MR. OSTOJIC:  No, it is necessary, I think, Your Honour.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Very briefly, then, please.

22            MR. OSTOJIC:  Okay.

23       Q.   Which organ of the VRS would have the function and the duties and

24    responsibilities to that which is equivalent to what you, sir, have

25    identified, whether it's from your personal experience in law enforcement

Page 20282

 1    or your experience in the military, taking aside anything you may have

 2    gleaned from television, who would be similar to that as an internal

 3    affairs person?  What organ within the military of the VRS?

 4       A.   Yes, sir.  And given the fact that the security organ also has a

 5    crime prevention function, it would be the security organ of the VRS.

 6       Q.   And, sir, I say this without trying to be humorous to my learned

 7    friend.  Forget about anything you may have learned from watching American

 8    television.  But in your experience, sir, in the law enforcement aspect,

 9    the internal affairs officers are the ones who are, wouldn't you agree

10    with me, least liked by their fellow employees, because they're worried

11    that they may or may not from time to time be investigated?

12       A.   In my experience --

13       Q.   Well, you've told us about your experience, Mr. Butler.  You

14    couldn't identify in the US military whether or not there was such a

15    department; although, you believe that there is.

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  Now let's move, Mr. Ostojic.

17            MR. McCLOSKEY:  He just interrupted the witness.

18            JUDGE AGIUS:  Stop, Mr. Butler.  Please move to your next

19    question.

20            MR. OSTOJIC:

21       Q.   With respect to the VRS, sir, can you find which organ, other than

22    the security organ, was least liked by other people within the military,

23    from your analysis, if you've come up with that at all?

24       A.   I --

25            MR. McCLOSKEY:  You know, that is such an open question.  Least

Page 20283

 1    liked by who?  I mean, that is such a massively broad question.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  You are right, you are right.

 3            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Commanders are not very well liked by sometimes

 4    their men.

 5            MR. OSTOJIC:  I don't know if he needs to testify, but my

 6    question, with all due respect, says "least liked by whom," and it says

 7    "other people within." It's right there on page 72, lines 10 through 12,

 8    but we'll move on.

 9       Q.   I'll just ask this question:  Did you ever analyse that,

10    Mr. Butler, the relationship between, specifically, and the personal

11    relationship between various VRS personnel and the security personnel?

12       A.   Yes, sir.  I am aware of the fact that regardless of

13    personalities, that by position there is going to be a natural

14    organisational tension between the roles and responsibility of the

15    security branch and the roles and responsibilities of other organs and the

16    roles and responsibilities of the commander himself, I mean.  So I -- I

17    certainly took that into effect.

18       Q.   And now you're talking about tension here, but let's turn to

19    another subject area, and that's the relationship between the VRS and the

20    SDS.  Do you know what the SDS is, sir?

21       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

22       Q.   And in 1995, you knew what it was; correct?

23       A.   I knew what it was in 1995 with respect to the analysis.  I didn't

24    know --

25       Q.   Of course, of course.  [B/C/S spoken]

Page 20284

 1            Did you analyse or did anyone that you know on the investigative

 2    team analyse the relationships, whether there was tension or if it was

 3    strained or even hostile, between the VRS and the SDS from 1992 through

 4    1995, given that you're giving us, in some part, with all due respect, a

 5    historical analysis of what may have occurred at that time?

 6       A.   Yes, sir, I did, particularly for the period of 1995, because it

 7    was relevant to my analysis.  So I did, in fact, explore that, yes, sir.

 8       Q.   And where can I find it in your pieces of work, if you will, such

 9    as the narrative, the revision, and the brigade, corps and Main Staff

10    analysis that you've written?

11       A.   I believe that you would find references to that.  The specific

12    incidence that I draw to is the 4 August 1995 firing of General Mladic as

13    the commander of the Main Staff and moving him to be the personal adviser

14    to President Karadzic, who assumes personal command of the military, and

15    the next day the military generals on the Main Staff subsequently publish

16    a letter basically saying that they're not going to recognise President

17    Karadzic's authority to do that.  I believe I encapsulate what you're

18    talking about in that part.

19       Q.   What about prior to that, anything prior, leading up to July of

20    1995?  Did you ever analyse - I haven't seen it in your report, with all

21    due respect, but I'm sure you'll correct me if I'm wrong - the

22    relationship between the VRS and the SDS in order to determine whether

23    there was tension, whether it was strained, or whether it was hostile at

24    some point?

25       A.   I was generally aware, when I was doing my analysis, that it was.

Page 20285

 1    However, during the period of the construction of the reports, I did not

 2    have documentary evidence that reflected that.  Clearly, and I think as

 3    part of my testimony, I mean, we have seen documentary evidence where that

 4    relationship had deteriorated to a point where, by March of 1995, the army

 5    believed that people from the SDS were actually out to assassinate key

 6    leadership figures.

 7            So while I kept that issue in mind about the strained relationship

 8    between the two, in my report, I did not have documentation which I could

 9    cite back to it.

10       Q.   And just so I'm clear, on page 74, line 13 through 14, you, in

11    answer to my question, state, "I was generally aware, when I was doing my

12    analysis, that it was."

13            And you're saying that you were aware that there was tension and a

14    strained relationship, if not hostile relationship, between the VRS and

15    SDS during the time frame that we're discussing; correct?

16       A.   Yes, sir, 1995 and particularly the middle portion of the year,

17    yes, sir.

18       Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Now, just quickly to turn to the relationship

19    between the VRS and the MUP, which we know the acronym stands for Ministry

20    of Interior; correct?

21       A.   Yes, sir.

22       Q.   Now, that relationship, what -- did you analyse at all the

23    relationship between the VRS and the MUP leading up to July of 1995?

24       A.   Yes, sir.

25       Q.   And where is that located in your report?

Page 20286

 1       A.   I believe  - and, again, if it's not in my report, it's because

 2    the information wasn't available at the time, but I talked about it as an

 3    exhibit certainly in the Blagojevic case.  I don't know if we've discussed

 4    it in this case - the fact that the relationship between the army and the

 5    MUP was acrimonious, because soldiers would frequently desert from their

 6    military units and try to sign on with MUP units in part because the MUP

 7    was paying their soldiers in cash and not other forms of either credit or

 8    script; and that particularly from an army perspective, the MUP was not

 9    returning those soldiers back to the military units, and that was having a

10    significant impact on the VRS.

11       Q.   When you're discussing that the relationship between the army and

12    the MUP was acrimonious and that it had a significant impact on the VRS,

13    isn't it true that the period of time you're discussing, sir, is the

14    period of March, April, May, June, and July 1995, among other periods?

15       A.   Yes, sir.  In fact, through July 1995, there are references where

16    particularly General Mladic was not a fan of the MUP.

17            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. Butler.

18            Mr. President, I ask, and I know it's 20 minutes before the break,

19    but if I can just have the break now, I think I'm done, and I think it's

20    within the -- within the time period that I've asked for, and I would like

21    to take the break now so I could just go over a couple of materials.  And

22    I promise I won't be more than 15 minutes, if that, when I return.  I'd

23    like to consult with my colleague and my client, of course, as well.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  We'll have -- unless Mr. Bourgon objects to

25    that.

Page 20287

 1            MR. BOURGON:  No, Mr. President.  I'll be ready to go immediately

 2    when my colleague sits down.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Thank you of informing of that,

 4    Mr. Bourgon.

 5            We'll have a 25-minute break now.

 6            Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 7            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I've been informed informally by both Mr. Bourgon

 8    and Mr. Ostojic that they don't think they'll be into US issues, and so,

 9    in that event, I think my colleague will be leaving, if that's all right.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, I'm not going to interfere or intervene in

11    that.  It's up to you, madam.

12            MS. SCHILDGE:  Thank you, Your Honours.

13            I think given the other issues I have at the office, I would take

14    this opportunity to depart, but I will be certainly available should any

15    issues that require my attention arise.

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, madam.

17            So we'll have a 25-minute break now.  Thank you.

18                          [The witness stands down]

19                          --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.

20                          --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey.

22            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes.  Very briefly, Mr. President.

23            I did not object during the questioning because of the presence of

24    Mr. Butler, but you recall when Mr. Ostojic was questioning Mr. Butler

25    about Mr. Cerovic and whether or not the OTP had interviewed him.

Page 20288

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

 2            MR. McCLOSKEY:  In fact, we did interview him in September of

 3    2005, and that was, of course, after Mr. Butler left.  I just wanted to

 4    clarify that, that's all.

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Let's bring Mr. Butler in, please.

 6            At the end of the sitting, we'll be calling upon you to respond

 7    orally to the latest Prosecution motion for the addition of another

 8    witness.  The Prosecution has filed a motion yesterday, I think, for the

 9    addition of another witness.

10                          [The witness entered court]

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Ostojic.

12            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13       Q.   A few more questions, Mr. Butler, just to tidy up a little bit.

14    We were speaking of the tension or acrimonious relationship between the

15    VRS and the MUP, and your answer, certainly with respect to General

16    Mladic, was that he was not a fan of the MUP.

17            My question specifically, with respect to the relationship, was

18    that:  Am I not correct, sir, that the MUP was also or had tension and

19    strained relationships with the army, insofar as that the MUP also were

20    not fans of the VRS.  So it would work both ways; isn't that correct?

21       A.   I don't know that as a fact.  I mean, I am aware of what the

22    army's criticisms of the MUP were.  I am not aware of what potential

23    criticisms that the MUP would have had of the army.

24       Q.   And just to clarify a couple of other issues, if I may.  You spoke

25    of an UN person that I think has placed Mr. Beara purportedly, on or

Page 20289

 1    about -- on or about the area of Nova Kasaba.

 2            Are you familiar that he places allegedly Mr. Beara at Nova Kasaba

 3    at a certain time and date; and if so, do you know what time and date he

 4    places him purportedly at Nova Kasaba?

 5       A.   I know that he places him there at a certain date.  I don't

 6    recollect when I -- when that date is at present.

 7       Q.   I don't think it's a dispute between my learned friends, but it

 8    was some time, I believe, the 14th of July, 1995.  Does that refresh your

 9    recollection at all?

10       A.   That may well be the case.  I just don't remember the exact date.

11    I mean, if it is, in fact, the 14th, then that's fine.

12       Q.   Because it was in relation to my questions with respect to

13    Srebrenica and the evacuation, and my time period was clearly up through

14    July 12th, I just didn't want the record to be confused or unclear as to

15    whether or not you believed that this UN person places my client anywhere

16    near any of those areas, including Nova Kasaba, prior to the 14th of July,

17    1995, allegedly.

18       A.   Yes, sir.  In the context of what we're talking about with the

19    movement of civilians out of Potocari, that would have concluded by 2000

20    hours on the 13th, so you're correct.

21       Q.   Just a couple other issues, if I can tidy up.

22            I'd like -- we talked about the minefields and the landmines that

23    were present, and we discussed the number of deaths as a result of the

24    legitimate military combat engagements.  Are you familiar with a report

25    from the United Nations, UNPROFOR, actually, protection force, dated the

Page 20290

 1    17th of July, 1995, where they discuss a number of Bosnian Muslims who

 2    were killed on their way to Tuzla as a result of mines and BSA

 3    engagements?

 4       A.   I have -- I have seen a lot of UN reports during that time frame.

 5    If you care to show me the document and refresh my memory, I can probably

 6    give you a more accurate picture, whether I recall it or not.

 7       Q.   Fair enough.

 8            MR. OSTOJIC:  If we can have 1D374 on the screen for Mr. Butler,

 9    please, and if I can just direct -- well, we'll show him the first page as

10    well, in all fairness to him.

11       Q.   And this is a document, sir, that we, I think, have used a couple

12    of times in this case.  It's something that was drafted by a person,

13    Edward Joseph, as you can see in the third box on the right-hand side.  It

14    was released by an officer, Ken Biser, do you see that, with a signature

15    accompanying his typewritten name?

16       A.   Yes, sir, I do.

17       Q.   And have you seen this document before, sir?

18       A.   If I could look at the actual context of the document.  I couldn't

19    tell you, offhand, just looking at the header data.

20       Q.   Of course.

21       A.   Could you scroll down, please, on the text?

22       Q.   And we'll return, when you let us know you've reviewed it, to the

23    second and third pages of this document.

24       A.   Next page, please.  Thank you, ma'am.

25       Q.   Thank you for letting us know, sir.

Page 20291

 1       A.   Next, there we go.  Next page, please.

 2            I cannot say that I've specifically seen this report.  I don't

 3    recall.  However, I do recall seeing, in other UN reports, essentially the

 4    same information, so it may have well been that it was incorporated into

 5    this report.

 6            MR. OSTOJIC:  I'd like to focus, if we can quickly, on page 2 of

 7    this report, the first paragraph and the third subsection of that

 8    paragraph.

 9       Q.   And if you could see, sir, the UNMOs and Civil Affairs are

10    reporting to UNPROFOR in that third subsection that, "up to 3.000 were

11    killed on the way, mostly by mines and BSA engagements."

12            Do you see that?

13       A.   Yes, sir.

14       Q.   Can you tell us, contextually speaking, why that isn't included

15    anywhere in any of your reports?

16       A.   Why the document and information or why the -- or why the issue of

17    how many were killed on the way isn't in the report?  In the document, it

18    looks like a UN Rule 70 document, which is why I wouldn't have included

19    it.  As I testified prior, the information, how many people were killed on

20    the way with respect to combat activities, was not relevant for the

21    analysis that I was doing.

22       Q.   But is there -- do you have, as you sit here, sir, any doubt as to

23    the veracity of what Mr. Biser and Mr. Joseph have reported, that up to

24    3.000 were killed on the way, mostly by mines and BSA engagements?  Did

25    you analyse that to see if it was accurate at all?

Page 20292

 1       A.   Sir, again, because I did not detail through the combat activities

 2    and the casualty rates of the column, I have no way of knowing whether

 3    that number is accurate or not.

 4       Q.   And do you know of anyone while you were here, the investigative

 5    team, who conducted this analysis at all, whether it be your commander or

 6    anyone else?

 7       A.   I don't know that anyone looked at specifically trying to

 8    determine the number of combat-related casualties from the column,

 9    regardless of how they were killed.

10       Q.   Now, we talked about the combat engagements.  Do you know where

11    these people, who they reference as of the 17th of July, 1995, where they

12    were buried?

13       A.   No, sir.  I don't know where and under what circumstances these

14    casualties were -- were buried.  My understanding of the situation was

15    that because of the danger of mines, that at least in the initial years

16    following the hostilities, that there was no effort to collect these

17    individuals and bury them at all.  They were left and are often referred

18    to as surface remains.

19       Q.   Okay.  We'll discuss that with other people, but let me ask you

20    this, if I may:  Not only, as you say, you don't know that anyone looked

21    at it, isn't it a fact that no one looked at this issue at all from the

22    investigative team during the time that you were with the Office of the

23    Prosecution?  Correct?

24       A.   Correct, sir, my understanding is that.

25       Q.   Now, in reading some of your testimony in Blagojevic, there was a

Page 20293

 1    point where you were asked about your relationship with the Office of the

 2    Prosecution, and I'm summarising just for the sake of time.

 3            At one point, it's my recollection that you said that the last two

 4    years of your engagement with the Office of the Prosecution, you were

 5    hired by them.  Prior to that, you were just a liaison, loaned from the

 6    United States military.  Is there -- am I recalling that correctly, sir?

 7       A.   No, sir.

 8       Q.   Your status was always that you were a United States military

 9    employee at the service of the OTP; correct?

10       A.   My status for the first five years was that I was seconded to the

11    OTP, loaned if you will, for the purpose of assisting in doing analysis.

12    I was never a liaison.  I was not a conduit of information going back and

13    forth.  My final two years here, I was no longer in the United States Army

14    and I was here under a contract.  So I was, I guess for lack of a better

15    word, a UN civil servant.

16       Q.   But you were under contract, so that means from the year 2001

17    through 2003; correct?

18       A.   September 2001 through September 2003, yes, sir.

19       Q.   And you were paid through the Office of the Prosecution, correct,

20    for those two years?

21       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

22       Q.   Because I wasn't sure if during the direct testimony, when you

23    gave us the 75 per cent/25 per cent for your education that the US

24    government paid.  Prior to 2001, you were paid by the United States

25    military; correct?

Page 20294

 1       A.   Yes, sir.  I received a military salary.  That was my

 2    compensation.

 3       Q.   Thank you.  I just wanted to clarify that.

 4            One last area that I'm going to ask you about that you touched

 5    upon, and that is the whereabouts of a General Mladic on the evening of

 6    July 14th and 15th.

 7            I think in your testimony - and please correct me if I'm wrong -

 8    that you have information that you've gleaned or reviewed that he was, in

 9    fact, in Belgrade.  Correct?

10       A.   Yes, sir.  The body of information that's available to me reflects

11    that he is in Belgrade starting the -- or he leaves the Main Staff and

12    then is in Belgrade.  He arrives there early evening hours of the 14th and

13    remains there through the 15th, yes, sir.

14       Q.   And just so we can be more precise, when does he leave the Main

15    Staff on the 14th, sir?

16       A.   I believe that there's an intercept that we attribute General

17    Mladic saying that somewhere around 1500 he's, "going to the field."  So I

18    take that as the time that he was anticipating leaving the Main Staff.

19       Q.   And what time did he return, if at all, in the evening or late

20    hours of the 15th July 1995?

21       A.   I don't believe that I have clear visibility on when General

22    Mladic would have returned from Belgrade and whether or not the Main Staff

23    was his first destination.  I don't know.

24       Q.   Where is the next time that you have visibility of General Mladic

25    after his visit in Belgrade on the 14th of July, 1995?

Page 20295

 1       A.   I believe, and, again, I'd like to look back at the documents, but

 2    I believe, somewhere around either the 16th or the 17th, there may be a

 3    Main Staff document that reflects his name and says "S.R.," and I can't

 4    swear to that as a fact right now, because my memory is just not getting

 5    around that.

 6            I believe, also, that there has been, at least in the form of a

 7    statement to the OTP, one Main Staff officer has discussed the fact that

 8    he did personally see General Mladic at the Main Staff headquarters on the

 9    17th.  So, I mean, that's my broad framework of my belief.

10       Q.   Did you analyse who was the security detail, if any, that General

11    Mladic took with him on the 14th at approximately 1500 hours, up to and

12    including the 16th or 17th, 1995, in Belgrade?

13       A.   No, sir, I did not.

14       Q.   Did you investigate who the driver was that took General Mladic,

15    assuming, of course, that he didn't drive himself?

16       A.   Sir, to be honest, I don't know that he drove.  He may well have

17    gone by helicopter.  I just don't know how he got to Belgrade.

18       Q.   Did anyone on your investigative team analyse who was with

19    Mr. Mladic or how he got there, how long he stayed, and when he returned,

20    that you're aware of?

21       A.   I am aware that the investigative team, and I believe individuals

22    have testified, with respect to General Mladic's presence in Belgrade at

23    various meetings on the 14th and the 15th.  I don't believe that there was

24    a component of the investigation with respect to how General Mladic got to

25    Belgrade, and I don't believe investigatively anyone looked at how General

Page 20296

 1    Mladic returned from Belgrade and at what time.  So I think that -- yeah.

 2       Q.   How about the other variable to my question?  Who else may have

 3    been with him during that time period?  The investigation, was there one

 4    conducted with respect to that?

 5       A.   No, sir, there was not.

 6       Q.   Thank you.

 7            MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Ostojic.

 9            Mr. Bourgon.

10            Yes, Mr. Haynes.

11            MR. HAYNES:  Just before Mr. Bourgon starts to cross-examine

12    Mr. Butler, I missed your words immediately after the break about the

13    response you anticipate to the motion which was filed by the Prosecution

14    late yesterday evening.

15            To be honest, I would prefer it if you didn't insist upon a

16    response to that today.  We haven't, owing to the lateness of the hour of

17    the receipt of the motion and the state of the evidence in the case and

18    our preparation for cross-examination of this witness, had the opportunity

19    to coordinate our response to it.

20            It is said in the motion to particularly affect my client, and at

21    this point in time I've neither seen the transcript of what this witness

22    said, nor heard the CD of what he said, nor had the opportunity to consult

23    with my client about what response I should offer.

24            If you insist that the matter is so very urgent that we must deal

25    with it today, then I would anticipate you are likely to receive several

Page 20297

 1    submissions of length from a number of Defence teams, and it may be wise

 2    to send Mr. Butler back to his hotel in about ten minutes' time.  But my

 3    initial submission is that you don't deal with that today.

 4            JUDGE AGIUS:  When do you think you would be in a position to come

 5    with your response?  Tomorrow?

 6            MR. HAYNES:  Tomorrow.

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  All right.  So we'll receive submissions

 8    tomorrow, at the end of the day.  Thank you.

 9            Mr. Bourgon.

10            MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

11                          Cross-examination by Mr. Bourgon:

12       Q.   Good morning or good afternoon, Mr. Butler.

13       A.   Good afternoon, sir.

14       Q.   My name is Stefan Bourgon, and I represent Drago Nikolic in these

15    proceedings.

16            Kind of a strange place to meet after all these years, isn't it,

17    Mr. Butler?

18       A.   Indeed, sir.

19       Q.   I'm sure we'll be fine, and I'll try to keep my cross-examination

20    as short as possible.

21            The first thing I would like to look into is duties and

22    responsibilities of the assistant commander for security, and to focus on

23    your report or what you included in your VRS command responsibility

24    report.  You've testified about this report already; and, first, I'd like

25    to look at the sources which you considered to be important in order to

Page 20298

 1    understand the functions of the assistant commander for security.

 2            So, in your report, at the end - I can't really give you a page

 3    number, because at the end it says "a" and "b" - you remember 18 different

 4    sources that you consulted to compile your report?

 5       A.   Yes, sir, I remember that generally.

 6       Q.   So I'd like to go over some of these just to discuss how you

 7    looked at these sources and whether you thought they were important to

 8    understand the duties and responsibilities of the assistant commander for

 9    security.

10            The first such reference is called "The Brigade Rules for

11    Infantry, Motorised, Mountain, Alpine, Marine, and  Light Brigades," dated

12    18 July 1994.

13            MR. BOURGON: That is 65 ter 694.

14       Q.   I believe that you referred to this document as being the brigade

15    rules.  Is that correct?

16       A.   Yes, sir.

17       Q.   Now, in paragraph 1.7 of I'll say "your report" - and at this

18    stage, I refer specifically to your VRS brigade command responsibility

19    report, which was 65 ter 684 - in paragraph 1.7, you state that the

20    primary reference defining JNA regulations on brigade-level operations and

21    responsibilities in peacetime and in wartime is indeed those brigade

22    rules; is that correct?

23       A.   Yes, sir.  I don't see the document, but I agree with the

24    statement.

25       Q.   At any time, if you want to see one of those documents, I'll try,

Page 20299

 1    unless it's really necessary, not to show you the document; but if you

 2    feel there's a need, do not hesitate.

 3            Now, you would agree with me that this document includes the basis

 4    for the rules and responsibilities of the brigade commander, the brigade

 5    staff, as well as other branches of the brigade?

 6       A.   Yes, sir.

 7       Q.   And that, of course, this was beyond any doubt an important source

 8    for you in analysing the duties of the security organ?

 9       A.   Yes, sir.  This was an important source.

10       Q.   The second source that I'd like to refer to is the Rules of

11    Service of Security Organs in the Armed Forces of the SFRY, dated 21 March

12    of 1984.

13            MR. BOURGON:  That was referred to as being 65 ter number 407, and

14    we'll use the short title "Rules for Security Organs."

15       Q.   This was source 17 in your VRS brigade responsibility report.  Do

16    you recall this?

17       A.   Yes, sir.

18       Q.   Now, in paragraph 3.13 of your command responsibility report, you

19    refer to this -- you refer to this manual in a number of -- on a number of

20    issues to highlight the duties and responsibilities of the assistant

21    commander for security; is that correct?

22       A.   Yes, sir.

23       Q.   So you would agree with me that this is also an important source

24    to understand the duties and responsibilities of the security organ?

25       A.   Yes, sir, it is.

Page 20300

 1       Q.   Now, there's another manual I would like to show you, which is

 2    called "The Directions on the Methods and Means of Work of JNA Security

 3    Organs," which is dated 1 August 1986.

 4            MR. BOURGON:  If I could have 65 ter number 3D275 in e-court,

 5    please.

 6       Q.   Mr. Butler, I will use for this manual the title "Methods and

 7    Means of Work of Security Organs."  My first question is:  While this was

 8    indicated in number 19 of your sources, but it was never referred to in

 9    your brigade command responsibility report; is that correct?

10       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

11       Q.   Are you aware of this publication and have you seen it before?

12       A.   Yes, sir.  I have seen it before.

13       Q.   And would you agree that because it is an application of the Rules

14    for Security Organs, that it would have been an important publication to

15    refer to in your report?

16       A.   Yes, sir, insomuch that, you know, I referred to it as a document

17    that I had reviewed and referenced.  However, given the technical aspects

18    of the material involved for what I was doing the responsibility reports

19    for, there did not appear to be much pertinent information.  So, while I'm

20    aware of this and I have reviewed it, that explains why it's not cited by

21    footnote in my brigade reports, or the corps report, for that matter.

22       Q.   Of course, we will have the opportunity, as part of our Defence

23    case, to bring a different point of view.  I'd just like to confirm what

24    you've just mentioned, that the information contained in this publication

25    was not pertinent for your analysis.

Page 20301

 1       A.   It was not -- I didn't say it wasn't pertinent for my analysis.

 2    Because I read it, it was pertinent for my analysis.  What I'm saying is

 3    that because it involved mostly technical issues related to how

 4    clandestine sources are run, how counter-intelligence plans are made,

 5    things of that nature, it wasn't relevant in respect to the broader issue

 6    of the rules and responsibilities.  These are more like the "how to"

 7    manual.

 8       Q.   And what if I suggest to you that in this manual is the only place

 9    where you find any source or any reference to the relationship which may

10    exist between prisoners of war and the assistant commander for security?

11            Would that raise the level or the relevancy of this manual?

12       A.   I'm -- I'm not sure that your broader statement is true, but

13    certainly any reference to the responsibilities of the security branch and

14    prisoners of war would be of interest, yes, sir.

15       Q.   Yesterday, or the day before, you were asked a question by my

16    colleague representing Mr. Popovic to the fact that you did not find any

17    reference to a relationship which exists between assistant commander for

18    security and prisoners of war.  That was, of course, in the Rules on

19    Security, and you confirmed that; is that correct?

20       A.   Yes, sir.

21       Q.   So you would agree with me that if this manual highlights that

22    relationship, it is something that is missing from your report?

23       A.   Well, sir, if I recall correctly, the highlighted relationship

24    between the security branch and prisoners of war in this manual has more

25    to do with operative possibilities of taking prisoners of war and creating

Page 20302

 1    collection agents out of them, as opposed to the handling of them during a

 2    tactical state.  That is why, in that particular context, I didn't see it

 3    as relevant.

 4       Q.   Okay.  Later on we'll go into the prisoner of war issues in more

 5    detail, and we'll go into the specific provisions of this manual.

 6            MR. BOURGON:  Let's move on to another source, which is called

 7    "The Service Regulations of the SFRY Armed Forces Military Police," 24

 8    September 1985, 65 ter number 707.

 9       Q.   I take it you're familiar with this publication?

10       A.   Yes, sir.

11       Q.   The short title we can use for this one is "Military Police

12    Regulations," and this was source 18 in your brigade command

13    responsibility report.

14            Now, you agree, in paragraph 3.15 of your report --

15            MR. BOURGON:  I apologise.  I will slow down for the transcript.

16       Q.   So, in paragraph 3.15 of your brigade command responsibility

17    report, you discuss the relationship between the officer in charge of the

18    security body and the commander of the brigade with respect to military

19    police; is that correct?

20       A.   Yes, sir.

21       Q.   So, in this respect, this -- those service regulations for

22    military police are relevant, and they were used in your report?

23       A.   Yes, sir.

24            MR. BOURGON:  I'd like to have in e-court, please, 3D276.

25       Q.   And, Mr. Butler, I'd like you to take a look at this manual, which

Page 20303

 1    is called "The Instruction on the Application of Regulations of the SFRY

 2    Armed Forces Military Police."  We can use, as a short title, "The

 3    Instruction on Military Police Regulations."

 4            Now, to the best of my recollection, this was not included in the

 5    sources to your brigade command responsibility report, nor was it referred

 6    to or footnoted in the same report.  Would that be a fair statement?

 7       A.   Yes, sir.  I'm not familiar with this document.

 8       Q.   Well, that was my next question, whether you were aware and

 9    whether you had seen this publication, which is only available, to the

10    best of my knowledge, in the B/C/S language.

11            If I tell you, Mr. Butler, that this publication deals

12    specifically with the interaction between military police and prisoners of

13    war, would you agree that this was indeed a source that maybe should have

14    been consulted in drafting your report?

15       A.   Under that hypothetical, if I had had access to it, it might very

16    well have, yes, sir.

17       Q.   Is that something -- a publication that you looked for,

18    considering the fact that it is the application of the military police

19    rules?  Is that -- did you expect or look for such a publication?

20       A.   Yes, sir.  As part of the investigative process and part of the

21    analytical process that I was undertaking, we actively looked for all such

22    regulations that would relate with respect to command and with respect to

23    security, so that we could identify them and get them translated to

24    determine, you know, where they fit into the broader picture.  So that was

25    an effort that we did undertake.

Page 20304

 1       Q.   But this one, you yourself never found?

 2       A.   No, sir.  I take it -- I take it from the ERN range of 046 that

 3    this is a document that would have hit the OTP long after my departure.

 4    It has a very late ERN number on it.

 5       Q.   Would you agree with me, then, that to a certain extent, not

 6    having consulted this manual, that your brigade command responsibility

 7    report is incomplete?

 8       A.   In light of the fact that there may be additional information out

 9    there, I hold open the prospect that it may very well now be incomplete,

10    yes, sir.

11       Q.   Let's move on to another source, which is the Instruction on

12    Command and Control over the Security and Intelligence Organs of the VRS,

13    which is not a publication, but rather instructions, dated 11 November

14    1984 and signed by General Mladic.

15            MR. BOURGON:  This is 65 ter 2741.

16       Q.   I take it you know what document I'm referring to.

17       A.   Not by that date, sir.  Are you correct?

18            MR. BOURGON:  Well, let's put it on the screen.  This is 65 ter

19    2741, if I may have that on e-court, please.

20       Q.   I will be referring to this instruction at length during my

21    cross-examination, and I'll be referring to it as being the Main Staff

22    Instruction on Security and Intelligence Organs.

23       A.   Yes, sir, that explains it.  The date is 24 October.

24       Q.   And the date would be -- maybe I misled you with the date.  It is

25    being brought to my attention now that the date is, of course, 11 November

Page 20305

 1    1994, 1-9-9-4, which is the probably what the problem was why you could

 2    not recognise the instruction itself.

 3            But you know which instruction I'm talking about?

 4       A.   I have it up on my screen, sir, yes.

 5       Q.   Okay.  Now, you would agree with me that this -- this is an

 6    important document to understand the role of the --

 7            MR. BOURGON:  11 November 1994 is the stamp, but the directive is

 8    24 October.  Another mistake.  I apologise.  24 October 1994.  The other

 9    date, 11 November, is a reception stamp, I believe.

10       Q.   Okay.  So this, you would agree with me, is an important document

11    to understand the role of the assistant commander for security, if only

12    because it was drafted months before the events in July of 1995?

13       A.   Yes, sir.

14       Q.   And in your examination-in-chief, you were referred to this

15    publication or to this publication or to those instructions, but they were

16    not included in the sources to your brigade command responsibility report?

17       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

18       Q.   And they were not footnoted or referred to in the brigade command

19    responsibility report?

20       A.   That's correct.  As I'm sure you're aware from the Blagojevic

21    testimony, at the time that those reports were drafted, the Office of the

22    Prosecutor had this document but was not able to get it out of a

23    particular collection.

24            I only became aware that we had this document and had it

25    translated, and I did discuss it during the testimony phase of that trial.

Page 20306

 1    I believe this was a document that Mr. Karnavas' people found.

 2       Q.   Indeed.  This was a document which you testified about at the

 3    Blagojevic trial.  But to the extent that it was not used in your brigade

 4    command responsibility report, would you agree with me that this is

 5    another, I would say, missing part of your report?

 6       A.   Well, sir, the obvious conclusion is I can't include material that

 7    I do not know about.

 8       Q.   And that affects, of course, the validity of your report as we sit

 9    here today; would you agree with me on that?

10       A.   The absence of information would potentially impact some of my

11    conclusions, yes, sir.

12       Q.   The next source I would like to refer to --

13            MR. BOURGON:  I'm being told to slow down.  I apologise.

14       Q.   The next source I would like to refer you to is the Intelligence

15    Support of the Armed Forces manual under 65 ter number 710.

16            Are you aware of this -- which manual I'm referring to?

17       A.   I think I am generally.  It's not up on the screen, but yes, sir.

18            MR. BOURGON:  Let's put it up on the screen in e-court, please, 65

19    ter number 710.  The short title of this document, I think we can use

20    "Intelligence Support Manual."

21       Q.   Are you familiar with the manual?

22       A.   Yes, sir, I am.

23       Q.   Indeed, it was, in fact, referred to in paragraph 3.8 -- 3.18,

24    sorry, of the VRS brigade command responsibility report; however, you did

25    not discuss this publication during your examination-in-chief.

Page 20307

 1            So my question is the following, even though it was not brought up

 2    earlier:  It is, indeed, an important publication if only to understand

 3    the distinction between the intelligence and the counter-intelligence

 4    functions; would you agree with me on this point?

 5       A.   Yes, sir.

 6       Q.   Now that we have these seven sources, and whether they were

 7    included or not in your report, I'd like you to simply confirm what was in

 8    your report concerning the application of the JNA doctrine to VRS in the

 9    field of security.

10            Now, all of these sources that we've referred, other than for the

11    Main Staff instruction of October 1994, they were all drafted and adopted

12    years before the events of July 1995, at a time when JNA doctrine and

13    rules were to be applied, of course, by units and members of the JNA; do

14    you agree with that?

15       A.   Yes, sir.

16       Q.   And you'll agree with me that when these regulations refer, at

17    least today, to concepts such as the League of Communists or other similar

18    concepts, these were not -- no longer being -- or concepts that were in

19    use in July of 1995?

20       A.   Yes, sir.

21       Q.   Now, nonetheless, in your report, you say, for the purposes of the

22    VRS, and more specifically I can say the Drina Corps and its subordinate

23    units, you maintain in your report that for the conduct of their daily

24    activities in 1995, these regulations and doctrine did find application.

25    Is that your conclusion?

Page 20308

 1       A.   Yes, sir.

 2       Q.   You also stated one of the reasons for this was probably military

 3    effectiveness.  The professional officers were trained using this doctrine

 4    and regulations; and, therefore, it would be normal for them to continue

 5    using it in 1995.  Is that a summary of your conclusions in your report?

 6       A.   Yes, sir.  In fact, many of the officers that we have talked to

 7    over the years have confirmed that, so, you know, that's my conclusion.

 8       Q.   And another reason could be lack of time and opportunity to

 9    develop new doctrine by July of 1995?

10       A.   Well, sir, as I expect you well appreciate, rewriting a military

11    doctrine on the fly is not something that most states do.  It requires a

12    long educational process within the officer and leadership core of a

13    military, so it's unsurprising that they wouldn't do that.

14       Q.   Would I be correct in saying that your opinion in this regard is

15    also based on your analysis of all the documents at your disposal in order

16    to conclude that the JNA doctrine and regulations did apply in 19 -- or

17    was applied in 1995?

18       A.   Yes, sir.  To the extent that we could when analysing through the

19    broader body of documents, we did look for material either where it would

20    directly relate to that or bodies of documents or orders which would

21    either tend to confirm or deny that procedures in these JNA documents were

22    continuing to be followed.  So that was a constant process.

23       Q.   And does your conclusion apply to the responsibilities of the

24    brigade assistant commander for security?

25       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, with respect to the brigade assistant

Page 20309

 1    commanders for security, with the addition of the 1994 -- the October

 2    1994 document - and I believe I testified to this fact - I believe

 3    that document tends to reinforce the fact that the brigade rules were

 4    being applied and that the security rules were being applied as envisioned

 5    by the former JNA.  I don't take that document to be something different

 6    than that.

 7       Q.   And your conclusion, I take it, also applies to the command

 8    relationship between the military police company and the brigade

 9    commander.

10       A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

11       Q.   So, in your view, on the basis of the analysis of all the material

12    at your disposal, would I be right in saying that it is not possible that

13    those issues - I'm talking about the brigade commander to military police

14    command relationship and security organ issues - that they were governed

15    any differently in July of 1995?

16       A.   No, sir, I agree.  I have not found any substantial or any body of

17    evidence that would suggest that there was some form of another command

18    structure in place.  The -- the leadership and command structure, as it

19    was envisioned in the brigade and security rules back in the 1980s,

20    appeared to be in place in July 1995.

21       Q.   And as you stated, this Main Staff instruction on security and

22    intelligence of October 1995 did not modify and was in accordance with the

23    application of the JNA doctrine and regulations?  The matter of security,

24    I'm talking about.

25       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, there may have been some technical issues

Page 20310

 1    addressed, but I -- by and large, they did not alter the regulatory

 2    relationships and they did not alter the command relationships.

 3       Q.   Now, you mentioned a little earlier that you spoke to a number of

 4    people on this issue, that you conducted some interviews.  Were you

 5    informed by the Office of the Prosecution that some witnesses in this case

 6    may have offered different conclusions on the issues of security or on the

 7    issue of the command relationship between commander of the brigade and

 8    military police?

 9       A.   No, sir.

10       Q.   Would that change your conclusions, if that was the case?

11       A.   Again --

12            JUDGE AGIUS:  He would require to know the details.  I mean, how

13    can you put the questions so vague and expect him to answer?

14            MR. BOURGON:  I'll move on, Mr. President.

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

16            MR. BOURGON:

17       Q.   I just want to get a confirmation from you as to how firm you are

18    concerning your conclusion of what we just discussed concerning the

19    application of JNA doctrine and regulations in those two fields, namely,

20    security organs affairs and command relationship between the brigade

21    commander and the military police, and whether -- how firm you are on

22    those conclusions in your report.

23            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That is another hugely broad question

24    that --

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Let's move on, Mr. Bourgon.  Let's move on,

Page 20311

 1    and then it can become an argument later.

 2            MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3       Q.   I move to another topic, Mr. Butler, before we leave each other

 4    today.  I'd like simply to use your expertise to highlight the difference

 5    between security and intelligence organs.

 6            First, I take it you will agree with me that, pursuant to these

 7    regulations and doctrine we've referred to, that there are significant

 8    differences between intelligence and security functions.

 9       A.   Yes, sir, I agree.

10       Q.   For example, the intelligence officer is a member of the brigade

11    Command Staff, and his immediate superior is the brigade Chief of Staff;

12    while on the other hand, the security officer holds the position of

13    assistant commander for security, and his immediate superior is the

14    brigade commander.  So that's one of the differences; is that correct?

15       A.   Yes, sir.  That's specified in the regulations, and I believe

16    within the context of the documents, it was applied as such.

17       Q.   Now, of course, if the commander is away and the Chief of Staff

18    exercises command and control over the brigade units, in whatever

19    capacity - I don't want to get into this debate - then the immediate

20    superior of the assistant commander for security becomes the Chief of

21    Staff; is that correct?

22       A.   With respect to command responsibility, you're correct.

23       Q.   And another difference between the intelligence officer and the

24    assistant commander for security is, indeed, the nature of the work they

25    perform?  Would you agree with that?

Page 20312

 1       A.   Yes, sir.

 2       Q.   If we look at the essence of the work performed by the

 3    intelligence officer, I suggest to you that the essence of his work is the

 4    gathering of intelligence, while the main component of the work performed

 5    by the assistant commander for security is counter-intelligence.  Do you

 6    agree with that?

 7       A.   I believe that's a fair reading of the rules and certainly the

 8    intent behind what the VRS was trying to do at that time, yes, sir.

 9       Q.   And looking specifically at the intelligence function, I take it

10    that you, in your capacity as an intelligence warrant officer within the

11    United States Army for many years, you are aware of the importance of

12    intelligence gathering for the successful conduct of combat operations or

13    combat activities within a brigade.

14       A.   Intelligence gathering as well as the successful analysis of that

15    information, yes, sir.

16       Q.   And at paragraph 3.17 of your brigade command responsibility

17    report, you describe the responsibilities of the intelligence organ, and

18    you use, for this basis, the brigade rules.  I'd like to go over quickly

19    some of these responsibilities.

20            So, for example, the intelligence organ will be responsible for

21    and organises intelligence support for combat actions.  Is that one of the

22    things that the intelligence organ does?

23       A.   Yes, sir.

24       Q.   And the intelligence organ would continuously monitor and assess

25    the enemy, and report on the enemy's condition to everyone concerned in

Page 20313

 1    the Command?

 2       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, the primary customer for the intelligence

 3    officer and his information would be the remainder of the operations staff

 4    and the commander, yes, sir.

 5       Q.   And it also controls the reconnaissance activities of all organs

 6    and units in the brigade; would you agree with that?

 7       A.   Yes, sir.

 8       Q.   And I just refer you now to the brigade rules.

 9            MR. BOURGON:  And if we can have on the e-court 694, I'd like to

10    have -- this is the brigade rules, and I'd like to have English page 61

11    and B/C/S page 99.

12       A.   I would simply read something, to see if you agree, that the

13    purpose of intelligence support of combat operations conducted by brigades

14    would be to gather, process, and use intelligence about the enemy, the

15    area of combat operations, and weather conditions in the zone of

16    intelligence responsibility.

17            That's what we find at paragraph 208.  Does that summarise the

18    intelligence function with respect to combat activities?

19            It's a bit small to read.  Most of the other documents I have--

20       A.   I'm doing fine, that's all right sir.  Well, I was doing fine.

21       Q.   So, again, this is paragraph 208, and I take it you must have read

22    by now the -- at the end of this paragraph, where it says that, "in

23    wartime, the focus is on gathering data relevant for making decisions for

24    the deployment of forces."  Is there anything in this paragraph 208 that

25    you disagree with?

Page 20314

 1       A.   No.  As written, I think paragraph 208 is a fair reflection of the

 2    issues related to intelligence, particularly in a -- in a battlefield

 3    environment.

 4       Q.   And making reference to your answer just a little earlier, you

 5    will agree with me that intelligence is very much, to use our language,

 6    talking about military language, an "ops matter."  Would you agree with

 7    that?

 8       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

 9       Q.   Now, in paragraph 209, we see that the intelligence organ actually

10    carries out intelligence support tasks, and we also see --

11            JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Bourgon, could you take a look?  Is the text what

12    you are referring to?

13            MR. BOURGON:  209, yes, it is, but I need to go to the next page.

14            JUDGE KWON:  Take a look at 208, whether it's the correct one.

15            MR. BOURGON:  Thank you for pointing that out, because I was

16    looking from afar and I don't think it's the right paragraph.

17            I was looking for the brigade rules.

18            JUDGE AGIUS:  Shall we continue this tomorrow, Mr. Bourgon?

19            MR. BOURGON:  Indeed.  I will just make sure I have the right

20    references and give the right paragraph to the witness.

21            THE WITNESS:  I was fine in 208.  As I read 208, it was a fair

22    application of the battlefield.  But when you started to get to 209, we

23    talk about terrain factors.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's leave it at that for today.  Tomorrow, we will

25    be sitting in the afternoon, you know that, not in the morning.

Page 20315

 1            MR. BOURGON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Of course, what I just did, I

 2    did it on purpose for the witness.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

 4            THE WITNESS:  And I appreciate that.

 5                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

 6                          to be reconvened on Thursday, the 24th day of

 7                          January, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.