Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 20505

 1                          Monday, 28 January 2008

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          [The witness entered court]

 5                          --- Upon commencing at 9.20 a.m.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning.

 7            Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.

 8            THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is the case

 9    number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, ma'am.

11            All the accused are here.  The Prosecution, it's Mr. McCloskey

12    alone.  From the Defence teams, it's only Mr. Meek who is absent.

13            Mr. Bourgon.

14            MR. BOURGON:  Good morning, Mr. President.  Good morning, Judges.

15    I would like to take this opportunity to introduce a new legal assistant

16    on our team, Ms. [indiscernible] from France.  Thank you, Mr. President.

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  Madam, bonjour and welcome to you.

18            Mr. Butler, welcome back.

19            THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning.

21                          WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  Madame Fauveau is going to cross-examine you today.

23            Madame Fauveau, what's your estimate?  And good morning to you.

24            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, eight hours, but of

25    course I'll do my best to complete my cross-examination earlier.

Page 20506

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Let's start.  I would suggest so,

 2    because the longer this evidence takes, the more counterproductive it can

 3    become.

 4                          Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau:

 5       Q.   Good morning, sir.  My name is Natasha Fauveau-Ivanovic.  I

 6    represent General Miletic.

 7            On the 15th of January, you mentioned the humanitarian convoys,

 8    and you said that your task was not to provide a comprehensive view on the

 9    policy regarding humanitarian convoys.  I would like, however, to ask you

10    whether you conducted an analysis concerning the period going from March

11    to July 1995 regarding the number of convoys that were announced and the

12    number of convoys that were refused access.

13       A.   No, ma'am, I did not.

14       Q.   Throughout the same period, you did not, did you, conduct an

15    analysis about the number of convoys that were authorised access but that,

16    for another reason, never went to the enclave?

17       A.   That's correct, ma'am, I did not do that.

18       Q.   On the 15th of January, you stated that the policy of the staff of

19    the VRS, in terms of the convoys, was directly linked to directive number

20    7.  Did you conduct an analysis of the policy of the Republika Srpska and

21    its army regarding the convoys before the directive was passed; in other

22    words, before March 1995?

23       A.   No, ma'am, I did not.

24       Q.   In that case, how can you say that the policy of the Army of the

25    Republika Srpska, in relation to the convoys, was linked to directive

Page 20507

 1    number 7?  How can you state that?

 2       A.   Well, ma'am, it's pretty self-evident in directive 7 what that

 3    policy is, so all I did at that juncture was then look at the convoy

 4    documents to determine whether or not there was evidence that such

 5    policies were being carried out.  Now, with respect to the Dutch Battalion

 6    and their effect in January and February and March, prior to that, I

 7    believe their testimony doesn't reflect the fact that their soldiers were

 8    not being permitted back into the enclaves or that they were not being

 9    seriously degraded in their -- the supplies that they were getting until

10    approximately the March 1995 time frame.  So, granted, while I did not

11    take into account a statistical analysis of that, I did do it on a more

12    anecdotal basis.

13       Q.   Is it correct that you do not know whether the percentage

14    [Realtime transcript read in error, "personage"] of convoys that were

15    refused after the directive was higher than before the directive?

16            "Percentage."  I was talking about percentage, and I see in the

17    transcript that the word "personage" has been included.

18       A.   Yes, ma'am, you're correct, I cannot give you a statistical

19    breakdown.

20       Q.   Would you agree that the policy of Republika Srpska and the policy

21    of its army was the result of the abuse made of the convoys because

22    weapons had been transported in these convoys, as well as humanitarian aid

23    for the ABiH?

24       A.   Yes, ma'am.  For the convoys, Bosnia-wide in general, the VRS was

25    aware of situations where weapons and other illicit goods were being

Page 20508

 1    smuggled in on US -- UN vehicles, I should say, so certainly that is a

 2    consideration that the VRS would have taken into account.

 3       Q.   Do you know that the procedure regarding to the authorisation for

 4    humanitarian aid convoys was different from the procedure regarding

 5    UNPROFOR convoys?

 6       A.   Yes, ma'am, I believe that's correct.

 7       Q.   Are you aware that orders related to humanitarian aid convoys

 8    existed right at the beginning of the war and that the procedure did not

 9    change, was not modified, after the directive was passed?

10       A.   I don't know that as a fact, so I'm just not familiar with convoy

11    operations in the early war years, so I can't tell you "yes" or "no."

12            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like Exhibit 5D605 to be shown

13    to the witness.

14       Q.   In the meantime, I'll tell you that it's an order from the VRS

15    Main Staff, from the 31st of August, 1994, regarding the movement of

16    humanitarian aid.  Please turn to paragraph 1 of this order.  At

17    paragraphs 1 and 2, it appears that authorisations were delivered by the

18    coordination organ.  Do you agree with this?

19            MR. McCLOSKEY:  This appears to be a two-page -- if could can see

20    the whole order before he's asked questions about it.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Fair enough.  Yes, yes, I think he can see it on the

22    screen.

23            THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, I'm reading it now.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, thank you.

25            MR. McCLOSKEY:  My question was:  There's a whole another part to

Page 20509

 1    this.  This may be an order, but the foregoing, you know, he ought to be

 2    able to look at as well.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  I think Madam Registrar heard that too.

 4            THE WITNESS:  Am I on page 1 or -- okay.

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  Otherwise, we get a hard copy and give it to him.

 6            THE WITNESS:  Page 2, please.  Thank you.

 7            Okay, ma'am, if you could ask your question again, please.

 8            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we turn back to page 1 in

 9    English, please.

10       Q.   My question is the following:  Would you agree that with respect

11    to paragraphs 1 and 2 of this order, approvals regarding humanitarian

12    convoys were issued by the coordinating body?

13       A.   Yes, ma'am, they were the initial approval authority, but as you

14    can tell from the remainder of the body of the order, the fact that they

15    would initially approve a convoy, the Main Staff made it quite clear, in

16    the body of the order, that if it wasn't coordinated through them, it

17    still wasn't going through.

18       Q.   But if you turn to paragraph 4 on this first page of the document,

19    we can see that the document says sent by the VRS Main Staff to its

20    subordinate units, was a notification, notification regarding the convoys

21    that had been approved and the convoys that had not been approved?

22       A.   What it's saying, at least to my reading, ma'am, is that they're

23    complaining that one of the problems that they have is that even though

24    convoys may have been approved by the coordinating body, they're aware

25    that sometimes they're not getting notified and that these convoys are

Page 20510

 1    showing up unannounced at VRS check-points and it's causing a problem.

 2       Q.   I don't want to argue with you.  At paragraph 3 on this same page,

 3    mention is made of the control of the VRS on the movement of convoys?

 4       A.   Yes, ma'am.  It specifically states that the army has the

 5    obligation to check the teams and convoys passing through the territory.

 6            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now turn to page 2 of the

 7    same document.

 8       Q.   At point 1 of this order, convoys that had not been announced were

 9    not allowed to go through?

10       A.   Yes, ma'am, it's what it's saying, is that unless they receive --

11    unless the subordinate formations receive authorisation in writing from

12    the Main Staff, they're not to permit the convoy to pass.

13       Q.   In the remaining parts of this order, we have a list of the

14    controls that subordinated formations or units are supposed to conduct

15    when a convoy appears?

16       A.   Yes, ma'am.

17       Q.   Would you agree that these measures are precisely the same as the

18    one that existed in 1995, provided of course that you know what measures

19    were to be followed in 1995?

20       A.   Well, yes, ma'am, with respect to the technical goods and

21    humanitarian aid issues, it just seems to be the same type of order.  The

22    fact that they're not to allow anything more that pass -- that's been

23    authorised to pass, anything else will be confiscated, so in that sense

24    it's correct.  This order obviously does not regulate anything with

25    respect to the issue of UN or even international personnel who leave a

Page 20511

 1    particular area and what the policy is on allowing them to return, so in

 2    that respect it is different.

 3       Q.   This order indeed only mentions humanitarian convoys.

 4            Now I'd like to ask you a question about UNPROFOR convoys.  Do you

 5    know that the VRS had concluded several agreements regarding UNPROFOR

 6    convoys?

 7       A.   Yes, ma'am, I am aware that the VRS did deal with the UN on the

 8    issue of their particular convoys.  I don't know the technical details of

 9    them.

10       Q.   Have you had the opportunity to see the agreements passed between

11    the VRS and UNPROFOR?

12       A.   For which particular time frame, ma'am?

13       Q.   1995, and especially after the directive was passed.

14       A.   No, ma'am, I don't believe I've seen any agreements or any of the

15    technical agreements with the UN with respect to those convoys for

16    post-March 1995.

17       Q.   But before March 1995?

18       A.   I believe my association with those documents relates to convoys

19    passing between the VRS positions around Sarajevo.  They're not directly

20    related to Srebrenica.

21            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit

22    5D725, please.  It's not been translated.  I hope that the Prosecutor will

23    not ask me to read the entire document.  It's an agreement between

24    UNPROFOR and the VRS from 12th July 1995.  My questions regarding these --

25    this document are of a technical nature.  I don't believe that the

Page 20512

 1    substance of the document matters so much.

 2       Q.   First of all, have you had the document to --

 3       A.   The document says 12th --

 4            JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, Mr. Butler.

 5            THE WITNESS:  The document says "12 Feb," sir.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 7            MR. McCLOSKEY:  That was my point.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay, I'm sure Madame Fauveau will come up with an

 9    alternative for it.

10            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, it is 12 February 1995.  I

11    might have misspoken.  But in any case, it's the 12th of February.

12       Q.   Have you had the opportunity to see this document before?  It's a

13    document related to the movement of UNPROFOR on the VRS territory.

14       A.   Ma'am, if it hasn't been translated, even if I did see it, I

15    wouldn't be able to really process it, so I guess the answer is "no."

16       Q.   I'm not asking you to process this document, but this document is

17    related to an agreement between the VRS and the UNPROFOR on the 31st of

18    January, 1995.  At paragraph 2, we see the name of Zdravko Tolimir.  He's

19    the one who signed the agreement on behalf of the VRS.  Would you have any

20    idea about why the VRS decided that Zdravko Tolimir would be the one to

21    sign this agreement related to the movement of UNPROFOR on the territory?

22       A.   I know from my previous work in other cases that General Tolimir

23    was frequently one of the individuals who dealt with the UNPROFOR people

24    on a higher level.  So it wouldn't surprise me that he would be the person

25    that the VRS had dealing with the UN as a way of concluding this

Page 20513

 1    agreement.  So, I mean, to me it's not -- it's not remarkable that he is.

 2    He has had many prior high-level dealings with the UN in the past, so that

 3    doesn't surprise me.

 4            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit

 5    5D727.  It's in English.  Could we see the signature at the bottom of the

 6    document.  It's a letter sent by General Ratko Mladic to General Bernard

 7    Janvier.  If you turn to the text itself of the document, you'll see that

 8    reference is made to an agreement passed on the 4th of June, 1995.

 9       Q.   Have you had the opportunity to see this agreement of 4th of June,

10    1995?

11       A.   I do not believe so, ma'am.

12       Q.   This document mentions contacts between the liaison officers in

13    the enclaves with the local commanders of UNPROFOR.  Have you had access

14    to the material related to these contacts that apparently took place on

15    the 6th of June, 1995, if we are to believe this document?

16       A.   No, ma'am.  With respect to Srebrenica, and Zepa, for that matter,

17    I am not aware of any meeting notes or things of that nature that -- that

18    would have occurred on 6 June 1995.  It certainly may very well have

19    happened, but I don't recall coming across any notes reflecting that.

20            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like the witness to be shown

21    Exhibit 5D615.

22       Q.   And whilst it's being displayed, can you tell me what was the role

23    of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republika Srpska in relation to the

24    movement of convoys?

25       A.   I'm not particularly aware that other than issues related to -- I

Page 20514

 1    mean, particularly with the UN convoys, the military convoys, I'm not

 2    aware that they had any role outside of issues of the check -- you know,

 3    the joint manning of check-points and traffic control to ensure that the

 4    convoy didn't go off route.  I don't know what role they played in the

 5    issues related to the other humanitarian convoys, the ICRC, the food

 6    convoys and things of that nature.  I would have assumed they'd provide

 7    the same role, route security and things of that nature.  I don't know

 8    that they were in the approval process, per se, in the same way that the

 9    Main Staff was.

10       Q.   This document is dated the 13th of March, 1995, and we can read,

11    right at the beginning of the document, it's a document from the Ministry

12    of the Interior of the Republika Srpska, sent to the Public Security

13    Centre of Bijeljina, Zvornik and Sarajevo.  And at the beginning of the

14    document, we can read the following:

15            [In English] "We are hereby informing you that the movement of

16    representative of the ICRC has been approved, so that you can take

17    measures accordingly.

18            "Tuesday, 14 March 1995 - the coordination body for humanitarian

19    aid number 383-ICRC-255."

20            [Interpretation] According to this document, the Ministry for the

21    interior did have to take a number of measures, particularly when

22    reference is made to a convoy and reference is made to the coordination

23    body.  Do you agree that in this particular case the coordination body had

24    approved the convoy?

25       A.   Well, ma'am, it says it's been approved.  I assume it's from the

Page 20515

 1    coordination body.  But I think as you can also tell from the header

 2    information, I mean, it appears that the primary reason for this is the --

 3    is to notify the border crossing station that these people would be

 4    arriving, as well as part of their route.  And certainly the physical

 5    control of the international border would have been a MUP responsibility,

 6    not an army one in this context.

 7       Q.   I would then like to show you document P2522.  It's a document

 8    that you analysed on the 15th of January last.  It was signed by the

 9    Colonel Miletic at the time, General Miletic.

10            Now, if you look at the bottom of the first page in the English

11    version, this document refers to another document which is dated the 6th

12    of March, 1995 as well and in which the approved convoys are listed.  Did

13    you ever see this other document with the approved convoys?  Document

14    0618102.

15       A.   Ma'am, I looked at the entire suite of documents, so it's entirely

16    possible that I did see the approved convoy document, yes, ma'am.

17            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now go on to page 3 of the

18    English version.

19       Q.   We can see that on the 6th of March, it was at 2200 hours.  Do you

20    see the time and the date on the document?

21       A.   Yes, ma'am, I do.

22       Q.   Let me now show you the document P5D620.  This is the document I

23    just -- well, the previous document just referred to, in other words, the

24    staff document 0618102.  This is document 5D620.

25            Can we now look at the last page of this document -- or rather

Page 20516

 1    page 3 first.  Page 3 in the English version, please.  The bottom of the

 2    page, please.  Lower down, please.  I want to take a look at the name.

 3            Sir, this document was written, at least from what we see here,

 4    the General Milovanovic is apparent here on this document.  Now let me

 5    show you the last page.  I'd like to see the seal.

 6            On the seal, what we see is "6th of March, 2030" or "2045."  How

 7    can you explain that General Milovanovic -- well, that his name is on this

 8    document which came out at 2035 and that two hours later Colonel Miletic's

 9    name appears on the -- another document?

10       A.   I can't explain that.  He could either be physically there or it's

11    just that is the way that they -- you know, they either -- they chose to

12    put it that way.  I mean, I have no explanation for that.

13            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we come back to P2522, please.

14       Q.   In the meantime, you said, on the 15th of January last, that when

15    General Miletic, who was a colonel at the time, sent out this document, he

16    gave instructions whereby the subordinate units had to -- well, that the

17    subordinate units had to comply with --

18            THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter corrects herself.

19            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation].

20       Q.   ... And that in the absence of the notification, in any case, the

21    convoys would not have been able to go through?

22       A.   I'm sorry, your question must have been mistranslated.  Could you

23    repeat it, please?

24       Q.   Do you agree that in the absence of such a notification, in any

25    case, no convoy would have been able to go through?

Page 20517

 1       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, the General Staff -- sorry, the Main Staff,

 2    you know, had made it clear that unless the units who were manning the

 3    check-points at various locations had received a written clearance message

 4    that they were not to permit any of the convoys through, so I agree.

 5       Q.   So this, in itself, doesn't change anything?  The fate of the

 6    convoys is exactly the same, with or without this document?

 7       A.   Which document, the one signed by General Milovanovic?

 8       Q.   No, this one that gives the list of the convoys that are not

 9    approved.

10       A.   No, ma'am.  The list of the -- the document -- the convoys that

11    it's not approved is an additional backstop so that the VRS people at the

12    check-points, if a particular convoy showed up without explanation, there

13    would be some awareness of it and the soldiers would know and the officers

14    there would know specifically to turn it around.  The reason behind doing

15    that was to prevent, you know, an individual from essentially talking

16    their way through a check-point by saying that clearance has been granted

17    and that it must be just a paperwork issue or something like that.  This

18    way, the VRS people had explicit instructions as to which convoys were

19    permitted to pass and under what circumstance, and they also had the list

20    of which convoys were not permitted to pass under any circumstance.

21       Q.   Yes, but you do agree that on the notification -- according to the

22    notification, the convoys could not go through?

23       A.   Well, the first part of this document, at least the one I'm

24    looking at here, it talks about "informing you of the convoys that were

25    approved."  Now, like I said, at part of these things, they also -- on

Page 20518

 1    each of these same orders, they also did list which convoys were not

 2    approved, and I think if you scroll down on this one, you'll see the

 3    notation to that effect.

 4            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May I show the witness my copy.

 5    This is the paper copy of the same document, to make things easier, but

 6    before looking at this --

 7            THE WITNESS:  I appreciate that.

 8            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 9       Q.   Before that:  You said, on the 15th of January, last page 19716,

10    that this particular document said the following:

11            [In English] "We at the Main Staff have already decided that these

12    convoys will not pass.  We are informing you of our decision.  In the

13    event that the convoy shows up at the check-point and is one of these

14    convoys that has already been denied, you are to take the following

15    measures."

16       A.   Yes, ma'am.  And as you note right here, on page 2 of the English

17    translations, it goes into that exact thing that I've just discussed.  It

18    tells you about which convoys were approved, and then it tells you, and

19    just in case, so there's no confusion here, the ones that were not

20    approved and why.  So, you know, this particular order does discuss that.

21    It discusses which ones were not approved.

22       Q.   My question is slightly different.  When you said that this

23    document said "we at the staff have not approved the following convoys,"

24    can you take a look at the document, please?  Would you agree to say that

25    the document in no place says either -- either "we" or "the General Staff

Page 20519

 1    of the Republika Srpska," all it says is that these convoys are not

 2    approved?

 3       A.   Well, ma'am, it may be a linguistic issue, but the way the first

 4    sentence reads in English, it says, you know:

 5            "In order to exercise strict control over the movement of convoys

 6    and teams which alone have been approved, we hereby provide details of the

 7    convoys which have not been approved."

 8            So given the fact that the order is from the Main Staff, you know,

 9    I take it that -- from that that these are the ones that the Main Staff

10    did not approve.  Now, I could stand to be corrected, in that these were

11    not approved at the commission level, but that's not how I read the

12    document.  And, again, it may very well be a linguistics issue and not a

13    factual one.

14       Q.   In any case, I do not dispute that this document says that the

15    convoys are not approved, but it doesn't spell out who did that.  And on

16    the basis of this document alone, one cannot exclude that the coordination

17    body may have not approved that?

18       A.   Yes, ma'am, that is a possibility.

19       Q.   When you were in the witness box on the 15th of January, you

20    talked about Bratunac and the Bratunac Brigade.  It's document P230 we're

21    talking about.  This document dealt with the situation in the Bratunac

22    Brigade from the 1st of January to the 30th of June, 1995, and in this

23    document it is written that the check-point was established for the

24    purpose of monitoring entries and exits from and into Srebrenica.

25            What I would like to know is whether you are in agreement with the

Page 20520

 1    fact that this check-point referred to was indeed established well before

 2    the 1st of January, 1995.

 3       A.   Yes, ma'am.  As far as I'm aware, the yellow bridge check-point,

 4    as its referred to, existed from at least late 1993 onwards.  It was the

 5    primary road in and out.  They did not allow convoys to enter through the

 6    back way into Srebrenica, which would be the Zeleni Jadar road.  So

 7    everything went over the yellow bridge, so far as I'm aware.

 8       Q.   We agree, then, that this check-point was not established as a

 9    consequence of directive number 7?

10       A.   Correct, ma'am, yes.

11            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D321.

12       Q.   And whilst the document is being displayed, I would like to say

13    that it's a Zvornik Brigade document that you were shown, and it deals

14    with a number of goods that were confiscated from MSF.

15            Could page 2 in English be shown, point 10 in particular.

16            You've analysed two of the reports from the Zvornik Brigade which

17    stated that sometimes goods would be confiscated from convoys. Did you

18    review the entire collection of the Zvornik Brigade documents dealing with

19    the convoys that went through that territory?

20       A.   I don't believe so.  I mean, I would have read the reports, but I

21    don't believe I looked at them from the context of -- of the convoy

22    issues.

23       Q.   Don't you think that for the period from March and -- between --

24    to July 1995, it would have been relevant to find out how many convoys

25    went through without any problems instead of focusing on just two convoys

Page 20521

 1    that had difficulties?

 2       A.   The goal in this context was -- and again looking at 7-1, and

 3    primarily not with respect to the humanitarian good convoys, but for my

 4    purpose the key thing was the convoys that were being permitted to leave

 5    the enclave with UN personnel and not being permitted to return with those

 6    same personnel, again as part of the larger plan of adversely impacting

 7    the ability of the UN to perform its mission, which was something within

 8    the larger goal of the VRS.  It wasn't to do, as I've indicated before, a

 9    broad statistical analysis of the convoys back and forth through there and

10    come up with a comprehensive list of materials as to what was permitted to

11    pass and what wasn't.  I mean, I agree that it is -- you know, in this

12    case, you know, it is illustrative in nature. It's not meant to be a

13    comprehensive convoy review, and I don't believe I've ever said that it

14    was.

15       Q.   Would you agree that when a convoy showed up at a check-point, it

16    was supposed to have all relevant documents listing the goods transported

17    and the quantity of goods in the convoy?

18       A.   Yes, ma'am, that is correct.  They were -- the VRS required them

19    to have everything completely manifested.

20       Q.   And if the goods confiscated in this convoy was not listed in the

21    documents or if the quantity listed was not the same as the one in the

22    convoy, then the goods should have been confiscated, according to the

23    rules of the VRS?

24       A.   Yes, ma'am.  As we earlier discussed, and I believe you actually

25    had that particular order up, the units were told by the Main Staff that

Page 20522

 1    they were to confiscate anything that was beyond the listed authorised

 2    item.

 3       Q.   The Zvornik Brigade properly reported to the Drina Corps that the

 4    goods had been confiscated; that's what happened?

 5       A.   Yes, ma'am, they listed as part of their daily combat report the

 6    goods that they had confiscated.  I did not try and cross-index this to a

 7    convoy -- to a particular convoy listing to find out whether or not these

 8    goods were above what was manifested or not.  I mean, I don't know that we

 9    even have that information that would reflect whether or not the goods in

10    this convoy were properly listed or not, so I didn't do that.

11       Q.   Do you know whether the Drina Corps reported to the Main Staff

12    that these goods had been confiscated?

13       A.   No, ma'am, I don't know that.

14            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have the first page of the

15    document displayed on screen, the first page of this Zvornik Brigade

16    report.  It's a report dated April 4th, 1995.

17       Q.   I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D722 now.  It's a Drina Corps

18    Command report dated the 4th of April, 1995.  Unfortunately, this document

19    has not been translated into English.  I read out the relevant part in

20    B/C/S.  I know -- I think that you are familiar with regular combat

21    reports from this brigade or from the corps.  We can see what's the

22    situation on -- in the area of responsibility.

23            "Situation under control.  All the planned convoys and UNPROFOR

24    teams have passed through our territory without any delays."

25            Would you agree that under these circumstances, or here in

Page 20523

 1    particular, the Drina Corps has not correctly reported the situation to

 2    the Main Staff?

 3       A.   Well, in this context, it's clear that the Drina Corps did not

 4    feel that it needed to notify the Main Staff of whatever confiscated

 5    material there was.  All it noted was that the convoys had passed as

 6    scheduled.  So I agree with you, there is no accounting of confiscated

 7    material.

 8       Q.   The goods that were confiscated were confiscated from an MSF

 9    convoy.  Do you remember that or should I show you the exhibit again?

10       A.   No, ma'am, I remember.

11       Q.   Do you know that before April 1995, there had been problems with

12    MSF?

13       A.   Could you be more specific?  I mean, that's a pretty broad -- what

14    type of problems are we talking about?

15       Q.   Do you know that Medecins Sans Frontieres, MSF, brought an

16    unauthorised goods into the enclave, they abused the trust of the Serb

17    authorities?

18       A.   I am aware that there were reports of MSF trying to bring in

19    additional medical and other related gear in excess to what was often

20    manifested, so I guess if that's what you mean by "problems," yes, I am

21    aware of that.  I just want to make sure we weren't getting into a

22    situation like the UN, where there were allegations of fuel and weapons.

23    I'm not aware of any of those allegations against MSF.

24            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D609.

25    It's a report by Momir Nikolic.  It's a report from the intelligence organ

Page 20524

 1    of the Bratunac Brigade, dated January 11th, 1995. I'd like you to turn to

 2    the penultimate paragraph on the first page in English.  In this

 3    paragraph, we can read:

 4            [In English] "I would also like to inform you that the coordinator

 5    of the MSF, Medecins Sans Frontieres organisation, publicly apologized for

 6    the abuse of trust of one of his members in Srebrenica and publicly

 7    admitted that the Serbian side has behaved perfectly correctly when it

 8    confiscated the vehicle and smuggled goods.  This delegate, Jean, was

 9    removed from the MFS organisation and returned to his country because of

10    abuse of trust and smuggling with Muslims from Srebrenica and Naser Oric."

11            [Interpretation] Have you had the opportunity to read this report

12    before?

13            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could he be allowed to read the entire document?

14    Again, we're just getting pieces of it.

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  There are two things.  Have you seen this document

16    before?

17            THE WITNESS:  I don't believe I've seen this document before, no,

18    sir.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Then I think you need time to go through it, unless

20    you are going to be very limited in your question.

21            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was my only question

22    related to this document.  The Prosecutor has submitted volumes of

23    documents to the witness whilst only showing fractions of these documents,

24    so I don't mind if the witness is given time to read out this document.

25    But then I will ask for more time for my cross-examination.

Page 20525

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 2            MR. McCLOSKEY:  She can count on an objection every time that

 3    we're getting piecemeal documents.  We've seen the problem with that.

 4    These are important matters, and Mr. Butler, as I know the Court knows,

 5    needs to see the whole document.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  But what's your question?  Your question

 7    is whether he's seen this document before or what?

 8            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes.  My question was whether the

 9    witness had ever heard of this incident and whether he had seen this

10    document.  That's all.

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  I think you can answer that, Mr. Butler, can

12    you?

13            THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  No, I'm not aware of the specific

14    incident in question, and like I said, I don't recall.  I might have seen

15    this document at some juncture in the past, but it doesn't stand out as

16    something that -- that I'm remembering.  So, I mean, I can't say that as a

17    fact.

18            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

19       Q.   Do you know that the policy of Republika Srpska and the Army of

20    Republika Srpska was exactly the same concerning the enclaves in Eastern

21    Bosnia compared to the other ones, such as Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac?

22       A.   For what periods of time, ma'am, because in July -- in late 1995,

23    that's not necessarily the case.  I mean, we know, for example, that when

24    we look at what happened in particularly Srebrenica and Zepa, where the UN

25    was completely dependent upon the VRS for access to the enclaves, that in

Page 20526

 1    many cases the UN soldiers were not being allowed to return.

 2       Q.   I think we're talking about two quite different things.  I'm

 3    talking about humanitarian aid.

 4            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That was an interruption of Mr. Butler

 5    in the middle of an answer, and it was a very broad question and he was

 6    attempting to answer it.

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Let him answer the question first.

 8            Mr. Butler, could you proceed with your answer.

 9            THE WITNESS:  That was it.  I believe that the issue was that with

10    respect to the eastern enclaves, that the policy, particularly after

11    directive 7, was different than it was in enclaves such as Sarajevo, Tuzla

12    and Bihac, primarily because in Srebrenica and Zepa, the UN was -- and the

13    International Community was completely dependent upon the VRS for access.

14    They weren't dependent upon the VRS for access, for example, to get to

15    Tuzla.

16            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

17       Q.   Did you analyse the humanitarian convoys that went to Tuzla, Bihac

18    and Sarajevo to find out -- well, to be able to assert that the policy was

19    not the same as compared with Eastern Bosnia, as between the two?

20       A.   No, ma'am, again I didn't analyse that, and certainly, you know,

21    one of the issues that occurred in the middle of that process that

22    completely threw everything out of kilter was in May of 1995, when the

23    NATO air strikes began, and almost all cross-conflict lines movement

24    stopped because of the VRS, you know, apprehending UN soldiers in that

25    regard.  So, I mean, it's tough to do a broad statistical analysis as to

Page 20527

 1    what all of that meant, given that that particular event occurred in the

 2    middle, which skews everything.

 3       Q.   Do you agree that what happened concerning the NATO strikes and

 4    the impact that this had on the convoys had nothing to do with directive

 5    number 7?

 6       A.   No, I agree.  I mean, it did not -- it was not a cause-and-effect

 7    relationship to directive number 7, that's true.

 8            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like now to show you

 9    document 5D728.  It is a document that is rather lengthy.  We received it

10    last Thursday from the -- from the OTP, and hopefully the OTP will not ask

11    us to read it out in full.  It is a report on the application of the

12    agreement on the cessation of hostilities, March 1995, and what is of

13    interest to me is on page 4 of this document, point 7, concerning the

14    UNHCR convoy.  And we're talking about UNHCR convoys and humanitarian aid.

15       Q.   We see in this paragraph that on the 28th of March, 43 of 263

16    UNHCR planned convoys were blocked, and right at the bottom of the same

17    paragraph we can see that 22.800 metric tons of humanitarian aid was

18    intended for the enclave, but in actual fact 18.000 metric tons arrived.

19    And then we see the proportions for each enclave.  We see that Bihac

20    received 29 per cent, Sarajevo 71 per cent, Srebrenica 93 per cent, Zepa

21    80 per cent, and Gorazde 83 per cent.

22            Now, when we see that the Srebrenica enclave received 71 per

23    cent -- and I grant you that we're talking about March 1995.

24            THE INTERPRETER:  93 per cent, the interpreter corrects herself.

25            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation].

Page 20528

 1       Q.   Can we really talk about a policy of obstruction?

 2       A.   Well, ma'am, as you said it yourself, we're talking about March.

 3    I mean, directive 7-1 was just being published, and obviously there's

 4    going to be a lag between the actual implementation -- or actual directive

 5    and then the actual implementation of it.  So, you know, I grant it up to

 6    March, it appears that 93 per cent of the aid is being delivered.  I don't

 7    know that that number is valid for April and beyond.

 8       Q.   Witness, I don't know whether you saw the information for the

 9    other months.  I haven't seen them, so I can't refer to them.  But since

10    you are mentioning this, do you know the data concerning the other months,

11    April, May, June?

12       A.   No, ma'am, I don't, and that's why I say, I mean, I don't know

13    that this number is valid, I mean, so there's just -- as far as I know,

14    there is no data with respect to the period April, May, June, until 1 July

15    when everything pretty much stopped at that juncture.  So I don't know

16    what the situation is with respect to a number on that.

17            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could we go down and let Mr. Butler read a few

18    more paragraphs down to paragraph 12 perhaps.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Butler.

20            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, one moment.  But can he read until

22    paragraph 12 or is it too small?  Yeah, it should be okay now.

23            THE WITNESS:  Yes, I see it, sir.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay, thank you.  Enough, yeah, okay.

25            Yes, Madame Fauveau.

Page 20529

 1            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I don't know whether the OTP would

 2    like to take over the cross-examination, but in any case I have no further

 3    questions on this particular document.

 4            I would like to go on to another document, 5D729.

 5       Q.   Before we see this document, can you tell us whether you know that

 6    in 1995 -- are you aware of a ceasefire that was signed at the end of 1994

 7    and was valid until the 30th of April, 1995, concerning all of the

 8    territory, not just Srebrenica?

 9       A.   Yes, ma'am, I am aware that there was a broader ceasefire in

10    place.

11       Q.   Do you agree that during the ceasefire, the Army of

12    Bosnia-Herzegovina undertook to arm itself considerably?

13       A.   Yes, ma'am, they did, and the VRS was well aware of that fact at

14    the time.

15       Q.   The document that you now see, we're talking about a report from

16    Mr. Akashi to Mr. Annan concerning the attitude of the Bosnian government

17    to UNPROFOR, dated 1st of March, 1995, I'd like to show you a little down

18    on this page, in the middle of the paragraph, there's a sentence that

19    begins:

20            [In English] "Despite the acceptance of the cessation of hostility

21    agreement on 31st December 1994 and of the accords of several joint

22    commissions held at the various command level, the BiH has obstructed

23    attempts by UNPROFOR to improve liaison, observe confrontation lines, and

24    separate forces by refusing to attend regularly the joint commission

25    process.  They have applied significant additional restrictions on

Page 20530

 1    UNPROFOR movement, increased the tempo of their own force restructuring,

 2    resupply and training, and threatened the lives of the BSA liaison

 3    officers."

 4            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Again, could Mr. Butler be allowed to look at the

 5    whole document?  It's hard to say who, where, what this has to do with.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Is this a long document?  How many pages?

 7            MS. FAUVEAU:  Twenty-five.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  In the meantime, can we know what your

 9    question is so that more or less --

10            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

11       Q.   Did the witness know about this policy at the beginning of 1995

12    vis-a-vis the UNPROFOR?

13       A.   Yes, ma'am, with respect to where I obtained my knowledge of that

14    is the review of the United Nations report on Srebrenica which

15    incorporates, you know, many of these same documents.  So in that respect,

16    you know, I was aware, and as I believe I just said, I mean, the ABiH did

17    in fact use the ceasefire period in order to militarily strengthen their

18    own capabilities, and part of that was denying the UN, particularly their

19    liaison people, access to some of the BiH military units and front lines,

20    as a way of trying to keep that restructuring and retraining and

21    re-equipping secret.  So, I mean, that's a known fact and certainly one

22    that I was aware of, and, as I indicated earlier, one that the VRS was

23    aware of as well.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Shall we have the break?

25            Can I suggest that we limit our breaks to 20 minutes instead of 25

Page 20531

 1    minutes today so that we will try and recover 10 of the 20 minutes we lost

 2    in the beginning because of technical problems.  Is it okay?  All right,

 3    okay.

 4            So we'll have a 20-minute break instead of 25.

 5                          --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

 6                          --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  What happened?  Did we lose all the previous

 8    transcript?

 9                          [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

11            Yes, Madame Fauveau.

12            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Before we begin, page 26, line 25,

13    the question was whether the witness knew -- was aware of the policy of

14    the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ABiH, but I do believe that the

15    witness's answer was completely clear.

16            I still need 5D729, document 5D729, page 2 of this document.  The

17    same document as we had just before the break.

18       Q.   You can see paragraph 3 of this document:

19            [In English] "The BiH has improved numerous restrictions on

20    movement ROM on UNPROFOR.  The historical trend is that the ROM are levied

21    wherever the BiH is undertaking military activity or attempting to

22    pressure UNPROFOR.  Over the past two months, the BiH has applied ROM in

23    Sector North East and South West presumably to screen their military

24    activities and also to force the withdrawal of the BSA liaison officers

25    from Tuzla and Gornji Vakuf."

Page 20532

 1            My question is:  When this document talks about the North East

 2    sector, this is indeed where Srebrenica was located, wasn't it?

 3       A.   Yes, ma'am.  From the UN geographical perspective, Srebrenica

 4    would be included in United Nations Sector North East.

 5       Q.   And then paragraph -- subparagraph (a), at the end of that

 6    subparagraph what we see is:

 7            [Previous translation continues] [In English] "... In the northern

 8    region of the sector as well as UNPROFOR movement in the Zepa town in the

 9    west of Srebrenica enclave are the subject of restrictions imposed by the

10    BiH.  Concurrently, an unprecedented number of BiH fuel and supply convoys

11    have been seen moving into the northern region of the sector."

12            [Interpretation] What I would like to know:  You said, on the 15th

13    of January last, page 19721, that most of the goods that were not

14    authorised to enter into the enclaves, well, these could have been used in

15    one way or another for military needs.  Do you think -- do you not think

16    that the policy of the authorities of Republika Srpska concerning

17    humanitarian aid and the convoys could have been different if the enclave

18    was totally demilitarised?

19       A.   Yes, ma'am, I -- had the UN completely demilitarised the

20    Srebrenica enclave, and by extension the Zepa enclave, I suspect that the

21    VRS would have factored that into their calculations as to the issue of

22    humanitarian aid.  If they were comfortable with the fact that none of the

23    aid that would have been going in could have had a potential military use,

24    you know, it may very well have impacted their decision to allow that aid

25    in.

Page 20533

 1            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to look at page 4

 2    of this same document, right at the bottom of this page.

 3       Q.   Right at the bottom of page 4, in the last part of this paragraph,

 4    what we see is:

 5            [In English] "The government actions are designed in part to

 6    convince the International Community that the cessation of hostilities

 7    agreement is not working, with the aim of discrediting the Bosnian Serbs.

 8    In fact, it is the Bosnian government which is proving the more difficult

 9    by imposing new restrictions on freedom of movement and refusing to attend

10    joint commission meetings."

11            [Interpretation] Do you agree that the constant behaviour of the

12    authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular in 1995, demonstrate that

13    they intend to compromise any agreement with the Serbs?

14            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That's calling for speculation, and

15    it's massively broad.

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Ms. Fauveau.  Do you wish to proceed with your

17    next question?

18            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

19       Q.   Do you know the route taken by the convoys when they went to

20    Karakaj to go to Srebrenica?

21       A.   No, ma'am.  My understanding is that most of the convoys that --

22    that were going there went in and out of the international border

23    crossings along the Drina.  You know, there may have been a few that went

24    in through Karakaj, but I think the bulk of them went in through the

25    border crossings of the Drina.

Page 20534

 1       Q.   Do you agree that when convoys entered from Yugoslavia into

 2    Bosnia-Herzegovina to go to Srebrenica, they didn't go through Konjevic

 3    Polje?

 4       A.   I don't know that.  I would assume that convoys entering at

 5    Zvornik and taking the road south to Srebrenica would have to, at some

 6    juncture, pass through Konjevic Polje.  Certainly, the convoys entering at

 7    the Loznica -- I'm sorry, not Loznica, but Ljubovo-Bratunac area would

 8    not.

 9       Q.   You analysed a series of documents from the staff, in particular

10    those relating to convoys.  Would you agree to say that the name of

11    General Milovanovic appears on many of these documents right up to the end

12    of May 1995?

13       A.   Yes, ma'am, his name does appear on a number of the documents.

14            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show the witness

15    P2891.  It is an OTP document that is only in B/C/S.

16       Q.   This is an order from the Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska on

17    the 28th of April, 1995.  I'm going to read out the first paragraph, item

18    1:

19            [No interpretation].

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  We are not receiving -- madam, we are not receiving

21    the interpretation in English.

22            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] It was my fault.

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay, yeah.  I think you can proceed now again.  You

24    have to start again, madame, please.

25            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] [No interpretation].

Page 20535

 1            THE WITNESS:  Still not getting it.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  We still have a problem.  We're not getting the

 3    interpretation.  I would wait for a while, but we never got it.  So what's

 4    the problem?  Shall we try again?

 5            Sorry, Madame Fauveau.  I mean, it's not your fault at all.

 6            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No matter.

 7            " ... With a view to combining the activities of the forces

 8    engaged according to the Fletcher Plan 95 and a more efficient

 9    implementation of the orders issued and the creation of conditions for the

10    realisation of the operation Coordinated Action 1995, I hereby issue the

11    following order:  From the Main Staff officers of the VRS, led by the

12    chief of staff, set up the forward command post 1 in Zvornik at the former

13    forward command post of the Drina Corps, and the forward command post 2 in

14    Bijeljina, at the command post of the Eastern Bosnian Corps."

15            For the time being, can you tell me whether these are the

16    operations that were mentioned in directive 7 and 7-1?

17       A.   Yes, ma'am, and those have to do with -- you know, in the context

18    of time, what is happening here is less an offensive operation but more

19    the fact that the ABiH 2 Corps has initiated its large offensive against

20    Mount Majevica and that what is happening here is that the VRS is having

21    to react to that with the forces of the northern component of the Drina

22    Corps and of the East Bosnia Corps to defend that particular area.

23       Q.   According to this document, the chief of the -- the chief of staff

24    was the one in charge of setting up the post at Zvornik.  We're talking

25    about General Milovanovic, aren't we?

Page 20536

 1       A.   General Milovanovic is, by formation, the chief of staff, yes,

 2    ma'am.

 3       Q.   And when you drafted your report on the responsibility of members

 4    of the staff, did you take into account that at the end of April 1995,

 5    General Milovanovic is in charge of setting up forward command post at

 6    Zvornik?

 7       A.   No, ma'am, I did not.  I'm not exactly sure how it's particularly

 8    relevant.

 9            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now show the witness 5D714.

10    What I think is relevant is item 1.

11       Q.   We're still here talking about the Spreca 1995 operation, and let

12    me read out to you paragraph 1 and 2(a):

13            "From among the officers of the Main Staff of the Army of

14    Republika Srpska, three teams are to be set up to be engaged in providing

15    assistance, combining combat activities, and ascertaining the state of

16    affairs in the 1st Bratunac Brigade or Birac Brigade.  In accordance with

17    the order of the president of Republika Srpska, the composition of the

18    first team, the first team, Lieutenant Colonel General Milovanovic,

19    Manojlo Milovanovic."

20            My question is this:  On the 12th of May, 1995, do you know that

21    General Milovanovic went into the field in the Drina Corps area to examine

22    combat activities?

23       A.   No, ma'am, I did not specifically know that at this date.

24       Q.   Yes, but according to this document, General Milovanovic, as the

25    chief of staff, would go into the field in order to monitor the situation

Page 20537

 1    in the field, didn't he?

 2       A.   Yes, ma'am.  While normally the chief of staff is the stay-home

 3    person, while the commander or other members of the operation staff do

 4    that, you know, the fact that the chief of staff does do it is not

 5    remarkable.  It's a perfectly normal occurrence.

 6            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit P2669A,

 7    and be reassured that there is a translation -- an English translation of

 8    this document, and I believe that you've already seen this document.  It's

 9    an order from the staff regarding the deployment of UNPROFOR prisoners,

10    and this document is dated 27th of May, 1995.

11       Q.   Before going into this document, let me remind you that on the

12    16th of January, at page 19764, you mentioned that order and you stated

13    that item 5 of this order dealt with prisoners -- people taken prisoners

14    at the Echo post.  I'd like to show you page 2 of this document in English

15    for you to be able to read item 5.  In B/C/S, it's also page 2 of the

16    document.

17            When you read item 5 of this document, you see that the Command of

18    the SRK has to disarm the remaining blocked UNPROFOR forces.  Would you

19    agree that the Command of the SRK here is the Command of the Sarajevo

20    Corps?

21       A.   Yes, ma'am, Sarajevo Romanija Corps.

22       Q.   Then they're supposed to disarm the remaining forces and to deploy

23    them to various installations, pursuant to item 1 of the order.

24            Could we go back to item 1 of the document, please, on page 1 of

25    the document.

Page 20538

 1            At point 1, all corps are mentioned, aren't they?

 2       A.   Yes, ma'am, I take that to mean all the major formations, which

 3    were the 6 Corps commands as well as the air-and-air forces.

 4       Q.   And therefore the first wave of captured UNPROFOR personnel were

 5    deployed in the Krajina Corps area, the Eastern Bosnia Corps and the

 6    Bosnia and Herzegovina Corps area?

 7       A.   Yes, ma'am, that's correct.

 8            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we go back to page 2 of the

 9    document, please.

10       Q.   At paragraph 5, mention is made of UNPROFOR forces that have to be

11    disarmed by the Command of the Sarajevo Corps and that they have to be

12    deployed in the Drina Corps area of responsibility.  Isn't that what we

13    understand when reading the second page of this paragraph?  Sorry, the

14    second sentence of this paragraph.

15       A.   No, ma'am.  I take it that -- I take it from this paragraph that

16    the Command of the Drina Corps will take any captured UNPROFOR troops or

17    members of the International Community that it takes, not that they're

18    going to await for additional people from the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.

19       Q.   Yes, but according to you, the second group -- the second wave of

20    people that have to be disarmed by the SRK, where should they be deployed,

21    this second group of people?

22       A.   According to the first sentence, it's to deploy them at

23    installations pursuant to paragraph 1.

24       Q.   And item 1 refers to all the corps.  Why not to the Drina Corps,

25    then?

Page 20539

 1       A.   At that time, the Drina Corps did not have any UN individuals

 2    under its custody, I presume.  And that's why, like I said, when I read

 3    the second sentence of paragraph 5, the way I read it is that, you know,

 4    once the Drina Corps does get such people into their custody, it will

 5    place them in installations within its area of responsibility.  I do not

 6    take -- because it's two separate sentences, I do not take paragraph 5 as

 7    an interpretation that it's the responsibility of the Sarajevo Romanija

 8    Corps to take additional UN -- UNPROFOR people and turn them over to the

 9    Drina Corps.

10       Q.   According to this order, no order is given to the Command of the

11    Drina Corps to capture UNPROFOR personnel, and the Command of the SRK is

12    supposed to disarm these people and to deploy them in the area of

13    responsibility of the 3rd Corps?

14       A.   Yes, ma'am, there's no -- there's no -- there's no explicit

15    instruction for the Command of the Drina Corps to actually capture any of

16    these individuals.  I take it that that's the inference behind this.

17            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Let me correct page 36, line 1. I

18    did not mention the 3rd Corps.  I mentioned the other formations, the

19    other corps.

20       Q.   Earlier on, at page 35, line 15 and 16 of the transcript, you

21    stated that at the time the Drina Corps -- or you believe that at the time

22    the Drina Corps did not have any UNPROFOR members in its custody.  When

23    you say that you think or you suppose, it means that you're not sure of

24    your fact?

25       A.   No, ma'am.  As far as I'm aware, at that particular time the Drina

Page 20540

 1    Corps had not specifically captured or been able to detain any UN

 2    members.  So as I noted in my earlier response to the Office of the

 3    Prosecutor, or the Prosecutor's question on that, you know, they were also

 4    aware that they were going to begin military operations against the UN

 5    forces with respect to Observation Post Echo.  So I take this is to be

 6    that, you know, if UN people should come into their custody as part of

 7    that, this is what the Drina Corps is supposed to do, is supposed to

 8    deploy them in accordance with the previous instructions in installations

 9    around the corps zone.

10       Q.   Don't you believe, sir, that you're speculating when you are

11    making that statement, because that's nowhere to be found in this order?

12       A.   No, ma'am, I agree.  As I told you before, it's not -- it's not

13    explicitly stated that the Command of the Drina Corps will capture

14    those -- will capture individuals.  I believe that it is inferred behind

15    the intent here.

16       Q.   This order is dated 27th of May, 1995, and the name we find here

17    is that of General Milovanovic.  Would you agree that at the end of May

18    1995, and we saw that it was the case also in April and on the 12th of

19    May, 1995, would you agree that General Milovanovic did not only deal with

20    Western Bosnia, he also dealt with affairs pertaining to the Drina Corps

21    and the Sarajevo Corps?

22       A.   Ma'am, as evidenced by this particular document, he dealt with the

23    affairs of the entire army.  Particularly of note is his listing is not

24    even as chief of staff in this context, it's as deputy commander, implying

25    that General Mladic, for whatever reason, is unavailable to issue this

Page 20541

 1    order and it's being issued under the authority of General Milovanovic as

 2    his deputy.

 3       Q.   Would you agree that General Milovanovic, when he was at the

 4    forward command post, was acting as the deputy commander of the VRS?

 5       A.   In times of absence by General Mladic, you know, General

 6    Milovanovic would have been, you know, in a de jure role the deputy

 7    commander of the VRS, yes, ma'am.

 8       Q.   Would you agree that General Milovanovic, as the chief of staff,

 9    was the deputy commander of General Mladic because of the establishment,

10    he did not need to receive any particular order to fulfill that these --

11    position?

12       A.   Yes, ma'am, I agree.  I mean, the inherent authorities that he had

13    as the chief of staff of the Main Staff and as deputy commander meant that

14    he did not need any specific order to function in that role when

15    necessary.

16       Q.   Would you agree that General Mladic [as interpreted], as chief of

17    operations and training, was not, as such -- because of his position, was

18    not, as such, the deputy commander -- or the deputy chief of staff?

19       A.   No, ma'am, I disagree.  By -- by position, the chief of operations

20    is the deputy chief of staff and functions as such when the chief of staff

21    is unavailable or, you know, otherwise cannot perform the role.  I mean,

22    in the same way that General Milovanovic is the deputy commander under

23    those same circumstances.

24       Q.   Let me correct page 38, line 3 of the transcript.  I'm talking

25    about General Miletic and not General Mladic?

Page 20542

 1            On what basis did you come to that conclusion?  I'm talking about

 2    the answer you've just given me.

 3       A.   Ma'am, as the -- looking at the JNA command and staff regulations

 4    of 1983, 1984, looking at the corps regulations, looking at the relevant

 5    brigade regulations, all of them are consistent with designating that the

 6    chief of operations has the responsibility, as the deputy chief of staff

 7    of a formation, in the absence of the chief of staff.  So, you know, given

 8    the fact that the Main Staff is functionally organised along the same

 9    criteria, for the most part, that the corps are, my view is that, and I

10    believe others have verified, that the chief of operations of the Main

11    Staff, you know, does in fact assume the position of deputy chief of staff

12    in the absence of the chief of staff.

13       Q.   Would you agree that the rules you've analysed are the rules that

14    apply at a lower level, at the brigade level and the corps level, but

15    they -- we're not talking about rules that apply specifically to the

16    staff, the Main Staff?

17       A.   That's correct, ma'am.

18       Q.   To the Main Staff?

19       A.   Yes, that's correct, ma'am.  We don't have a set of instructions

20    for how the Main Staff is organised.  A main staff is not a body that's

21    formed under regulations, at least not as far as I'm aware, so in that

22    context what it did was -- I had to take the lower-level rules and then to

23    determine whether or not those same rules and practices were applicable to

24    the Main Staff.  And one of those was whether or not the chief of

25    operations had a concurrent role as the deputy chief of staff.  And again

Page 20543

 1    as part of the investigative process, that is one of the questions that

 2    we'd asked a number of individuals who were on the Main Staff, as to

 3    whether or not that was in effect, and the answer that we got was an

 4    affirmative, that, you know, they acknowledge that, you know, their

 5    understanding, as members of that body, was that, you know, in the absence

 6    of the chief of staff, General Miletic, as the chief of operations,

 7    assumed that role.

 8       Q.   Did you ever come across an official document from the VRS related

 9    to the structure of the Main Staff?

10       A.   Yes, ma'am, and in that regard I think the most useful document

11    that I came across was the 1992 analysis of the combat operations of the

12    VRS, because inherent in that document, which lays out all of the combat

13    roles and functions of the VRS, the report was authored in part by the

14    Main Staff, and in each particular segment of that report you get an

15    understanding about what the Main Staff's roles and functions were into

16    overseeing those activities.  So you can actually do a fairly good job of

17    taking that report and using that to organise the structure of the Main

18    Staff.

19       Q.   I'll come back to that document later, but now I'd like to show

20    you document 5D431.  Have you ever seen this document?  It's a portion of

21    the document.

22            Could we zoom in on the part of the document in English, where it

23    says "Establishment number."

24       A.   Yes, ma'am, I've seen this document in the last several months. I

25    don't believe that I had this document when I was doing my reports.

Page 20544

 1            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we display the third page of

 2    this document, page 3, please.  Page 2 in B/C/S.

 3       Q.   You see right at the bottom of this page, fourth line, we can

 4    see:

 5            [In English] "Chief of staff, deputy commander."

 6       A.   Yes, ma'am, I can.

 7       Q.   [Interpretation] And then afterwards you see:

 8            [In English] "Chief."  [Interpretation] And here there's no

 9    mention that this person is also the deputy chief of staff?

10       A.   Yes, ma'am, that's correct, there's no mention of it.

11            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page in

12    English, please.

13       Q.   Here we see the "Operations Department."  That's part of the

14    Operations and Training Administration.  And here again we have the chief,

15    who is at the same time the deputy head of ONP Administration.  Would you

16    agree with that?

17       A.   Yes, ma'am.  When -- it's normally the operations person, in the

18    absence of the chief of operations, it's the head operations person who

19    assumes the role as the deputy.

20       Q.   Based on this establishment, based on this formation, could we

21    agree that it's not the head of the ONP Administration who is the chief of

22    staff when the chief of staff is not present?

23       A.   Ma'am, as I noted, it doesn't say that.  However, the information

24    that I'm aware of reflects the fact that the head of -- that the head of

25    ONP did function as the deputy chief of staff.  So, I mean, I understand

Page 20545

 1    that particular document doesn't say that.  However, I believe that the

 2    large body of information, much of it that has come before here reflecting

 3    him perform the duties, you know, as essentially the chief of staff, runs

 4    counter to that.

 5       Q.   You've been shown or you've seen a great deal of documents signed

 6    by General Miletic, who was first a colonel, with the mention "zastupa" in

 7    B/C/S, [B/C/S spoken], and in most cases this was translated by standing

 8    in for the chief of staff.  Did you notice that in some document,

 9    this "zastupa," this mention "zastupa" was translated by chief of staff

10    representative, [In English] "and also on behalf of chief of staff"?

11       A.   My understanding is that there are different translations with

12    respect to standing in for the chief of staff or standing in for another

13    officer or a -- there's a lesser abbreviation just known as "za" where the

14    individual is signing for that person.  My understanding is that with

15    respect to -- with respect to the formalised title that we're doing is

16    when the person has signed it that way or is titled as standing in for the

17    chief of staff or standing in for a particular individual, that it's a

18    more formalised process than somebody just signing for them.

19       Q.   Did you ever ask the translators to explain this difference in the

20    translation in English of this phrase?

21       A.   Yes, ma'am, and where it first came up was in the analysis of

22    Zvornik Brigade documents that we saw in August and September of 1995,

23    where we noticed a particular phrase associated with Major Dragan

24    Obrenovic standing in for the commander.  And in that context, what I

25    asked the translators to do was to go back to the JNA military lexicon,

Page 20546

 1    which gives those definitions, so I could understand what that particular

 2    phrase meant in context of command authority, what it entitled the

 3    commander or what it entitled an individual to do or to not do.  So, I

 4    mean, that's -- I was aware, when that particular issue came up, that

 5    there was a difference in terminology that I had to explore.

 6       Q.   But did anybody ever tell you that in B/C/S, "zastupa" can have

 7    different meanings and refer to the various levels of standing in for

 8    someone or representing someone?

 9       A.   That's why I went to the JNA military lexicon, because military

10    terminology by and large is designed to be clear so there is absolutely no

11    confusion, on a battlefield environment, as to what it means and what the

12    phrase -- you know, what the phrase implies and what it means in the

13    military sense.  So that's why we went to that particular reference

14    source, to be clear.

15       Q.   This lexicon dates back to the year 1981, if I'm not mistaken.

16    Are you aware that after the war started, a number of words started

17    meaning something different, started changing, depending on the state or

18    on the territory they were used?

19       A.   Well, ma'am, I will assume that that's the case.  But having said

20    that, my understanding is, again going back to the JNA military lexicon,

21    and of course, you know, these were questions that we asked VRS officers

22    as we started gaining access to them, to ask them what these particular

23    phrases meant as well, if there was any confusion.  So, you know, in my

24    mind there's not any confusion behind it.

25       Q.   You mentioned Obrenovic.  Isn't it the case that Obrenovic was not

Page 20547

 1    standing in for but was the acting commander?

 2       A.   The -- and, again, it may be a linguistic and terminology issue,

 3    but the phrase that we associate with Obrenovic is "the acting commander,"

 4    because in a command sense, you know, somebody standing in for the

 5    commander does not have inherently the same legal authorities that an

 6    individual would do if he were acting as that particular person.  My

 7    understanding is in the case of Obrenovic, while I know that sometimes the

 8    translations go one way or another, the actual term of art we used during

 9    that period for him is that he's acting -- he's the acting commander.

10       Q.   General Milovanovic was chief of staff of the VRS.  He was the

11    direct superior of General Miletic.  Would you agree with that?

12       A.   Yes, ma'am.

13       Q.   On Friday, not last Friday but the Friday before that, at page

14    20009, you said that Obrenovic, who was standing in for the commander

15    whilst [indiscernible] was not there, only had the authority to deal with

16    daily matters, daily affairs.  Isn't it the case that General Miletic,

17    when General Milovanovic was not there, could only deal with daily

18    matters, daily affairs?

19       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I don't believe that, even though General Milovanovic

20    was present at an IKM or in Banja Luka or another location, General

21    Miletic had the authority to essentially perform as General Milovanovic

22    would.  General Miletic, you know, in assuming the position as the deputy

23    chief of staff, you know, is going to act within the competence of his

24    position and in light of the guidance that he receives from General

25    Milovanovic and General Mladic in that manner.  Again, any authority that

Page 20548

 1    he is performing under, you know, has been delegated by General

 2    Milovanovic in that respect.  It is not an independent authority that he

 3    has.

 4       Q.   Do you agree that General Miletic never performed the full range

 5    of functions of General Milovanovic, the same that the latter performed;

 6    would you agree to say that General Milovanovic took part in the meetings

 7    with the UNPROFOR?

 8       A.   I'm -- while I don't have a whole documentary basis to say that,

 9    I'm fairly comfortable saying that certainly General Miletic, you know,

10    would not have performed the entire range of functions that General

11    Milovanovic was entitled to perform based on his position.

12       Q.   We all saw that General Milovanovic went into the field in May to

13    monitor the situation.  From what you know, in 1995, did General Miletic

14    go there?  He didn't, did he?

15       A.   I don't know whether or not General Miletic at any point left the

16    Main Staff headquarters facility to go out and monitor anything in the

17    field.  I have no information one way or another on that, so I don't know

18    that I can answer the question.

19       Q.   On the 15th of January, 1995, you talked about an order dated the

20    1st of May, 1993, and the order which was drafted by General Miletic and

21    signed by General Milovanovic.  Well, you said that at the time General

22    Miletic was a deputy of Colonel Ilic, who was the chief of the operations

23    for education at the time.  What is the source of your information, when

24    you say that on the 1st of May, 1993, General Miletic was the deputy of

25    the -- of Colonel Ilic?

Page 20549

 1       A.   I am aware that the -- there is a document which lists, in some

 2    respect in a similar manner to this, it lists the formations and positions

 3    of the individuals assigned to the Main Staff during the course of the

 4    war.  That particular document, and again I don't know the number of it

 5    offhand, has a penciled-in notation on Colonel Miletic showing at what

 6    point in time he was -- he was a member of various organs of the Main

 7    Staff.  It's that particular document which I base my information off of.

 8    And, again, while I don't recall what number it would be offhand, I think

 9    I have a copy of it among my notes somewhere, and it's something I can

10    produce, if necessary.

11       Q.   Do you agree that you do not know what the exact function of

12    General Miletic was in May 1993?

13       A.   I'm basing my understanding of the function of then Colonel

14    Miletic off of that particular document.  It says what it says.

15       Q.   Do you agree that the administrative operations and training of

16    the Main Staff was made up of the -- [Technical difficulties] --

17    Operations department and the department for training and the department

18    premises -- the operations premises?  Sorry.

19            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could you repeat that?  I don't know that that

20    came well in translation.

21            THE COURT REPORTER:  Excuse me, sir.  We have a --

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  We will wait and see if we can find a solution

23    to this.  If not, then we can have the break now.  All right.  Let's have

24    a very short break, because we need a break in any case.  Five minutes.

25                          --- Recess taken at 11.47 a.m.

Page 20550

 1                          --- On resuming at 11.50 a.m.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  It's working.  All right.

 3            It says when we took the recess, the break.  It doesn't say when

 4    we started again.

 5            It says "Recess taken at 11.47." " On resuming at 11.50."  That's

 6    perfect.  Okay.  I think we can proceed.

 7            Madame Fauveau.

 8            THE WITNESS:  Could I ask you to repeat the question again, ma'am,

 9    please.

10            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

11       Q.   So this was my question:  Do you agree that the Operations

12    Department -- Operations and Training Department comprises two

13    departments, the Operations Department and the Education, Operations and

14    the Training Room -- Operations Room?

15       A.   My understanding is that it's three separate elements.  It is the

16    Operations Department, it is the Training Department, and it is the

17    Education Department.  So, I mean, those are the three particular

18    functions.  Now, an operations room, you know, it may be part of a

19    particular department, but I don't believe it's a separate department, per

20    se.

21       Q.   Well, I won't go into detail about this.  It's not really

22    relevant.  But you do agree that the chief of the Operations Department is

23    the Deputy Ilic who was the chief of the Operations and Training

24    Department?

25       A.   At what time frame?  We're talking 1993, ma'am?

Page 20551

 1       Q.   Yes, 1993.  May 1993, to be specific.

 2       A.   Yes, ma'am, I believe that May 1993, Colonel Ilic was the chief of

 3    operations and training.

 4            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I show you 5D723?  And before

 5    that -- well, this is an excerpt from the personal file of General

 6    Miletic.

 7       Q.   Did you have an occasion to look at General Miletic's personal

 8    file?

 9            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think we're talking personnel file, just --

10    because that's not the way it got translated.

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  It got translated "personal" file, but ...

12            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, that is the way it was called.

13    I did mention the personal file.  That's how it was presented to us.  I

14    agree that the dates are completely mixed up, as least as regards the

15    first line, and that is no doubt General Milovanovic's fault.  He wrote

16    this.  But what is of interest to me is this:  The function of General

17    Miletic, the first is of Training Department, and then, on the 26th of

18    August, 1993, he -- Administration for Operations and Training.

19       Q.   Do you agree that General Miletic, as chief of the Education

20    Department, was not the deputy of Colonel Ilic?

21       A.   Ma'am, I can only tell you what -- what that other particular

22    document shows.  And, again, I'll -- I'll endeavour to produce that

23    document.  I think I've seen an English language translation of this.  I

24    believe one exists.  And I have seen this particular document as well.

25       Q.   You said, on the 14th of January, page 19632, and I'm going to

Page 20552

 1    read out what you said about the organisation of main staffs:

 2            [In English] "In practical terms, within a particular staff, it

 3    recognises the fact that the staff may be organised in many certain ways

 4    in the context of the former JNA, where you have assistant commanders of

 5    morale or political works at the time, assistant commander for logistics,

 6    assistant for security, you have chiefs of intelligence and other staff

 7    bodies."

 8            [Interpretation] My question is:  In the Republika Srpska Army, do

 9    you agree that all these assistants to the commander were not part of the

10    sector of the staff, the staff sector?

11       A.   No, I mean, and again the same way when we talk about the brigades

12    or the corps, the assistant commander for morale, legal and religious

13    affairs, the assistant commander for logistics, the assistant commander

14    for intelligence and security, those individuals do not fall under those

15    bodies that are known as the operative staff part of the Main Staff, where

16    you would have, you know, armour forces, where you would have, you know,

17    the staff officer for mechanised, the staff officer for air defence, the

18    staff officer for training, things of that nature, communications.  So we

19    do have to parse out within, you know, the larger body of the Main Staff

20    that there's a specific operations-related staff that for the most part

21    deals with the day-to-day operational activity of the army.  And it's

22    certainly, you know, within that context people like General Gvero aren't

23    part of that staff, or General Djukic aren't part of that staff.

24       Q.   Do you agree that General Milovanovic, what we're talking about,

25    is the chief of the sector of the staff?

Page 20553

 1       A.   Oh, yes, sir, and again I believe also, as -- as General

 2    Milovanovic himself has indicated, you know, as the chief of staff, he is

 3    the first among equals with respect to the assistant commanders, because

 4    he alone, you know, has the position of deputy commander when necessary.

 5    So while, you know, in an administrative sense he is on par with the other

 6    assistant commanders, the reality is because of position, he is first

 7    among equals and, you know, has authority over them when performing in the

 8    deputy commander function.

 9       Q.   And when General Miletic, in the limited framework that you

10    describe, replaces General Milovanovic, he does this in the framework of

11    the activities of that sector of the staff?

12       A.   Yes, ma'am, to a point where -- where he performs as deputy chief

13    of staff that he does.  In instances where, as a result of absence or

14    other circumstances, he is called to function as the deputy commander, he

15    would exercise the same inherent authorities as General Milovanovic would

16    as the deputy commander.

17       Q.   And are you -- do you agree that in no circumstance could General

18    Miletic replace Milovanovic as deputy commander of the army?

19       A.   I've never seen -- I've never seen a document reflecting, at least

20    during the time frame we're talking about in July and beyond of 1995,

21    where General Miletic is ever identified as deputy commander or deputy

22    commander of the army as that would be the case, so I agree in that sense,

23    I mean, I've never seen -- I've never seen his name categorised as such.

24            THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  Microphone.

Page 20554

 1            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 2       Q.   Did you have the opportunity to review the testimony of General

 3    Skrbic, the testimony he gave here in this Tribunal?

 4       A.   No, ma'am, I don't believe I've read that testimony.

 5       Q.   Did you know that General Skrbic -- I believe that you said that

 6    he was assistant commander for logistics, but actually he was assistant

 7    commander for personnel affairs.  Did you know that?

 8       A.   No, ma'am, I don't believe I've ever identified him as that.  I

 9    know that -- I know that position is filled by General Djukic, as

10    assistant commander for logistics.  I don't believe I've ever referred to

11    him as that, and if I did, it was in error.

12       Q.   Do you agree that General Skrbic was the assistant commander for

13    mobilisation and personnel affairs?

14       A.   Yes, ma'am, that is my understanding of his position.

15       Q.   Do you know that as assistant commander, General Skrbic was higher

16    up in the hierarchy than General Miletic?

17       A.   Under normal -- you know, by position, he would be.  I mean, he is

18    the -- he is the general officer who is -- who is responsible for the

19    administration of his particular sector.  So given that all of the

20    assistant commanders are on somewhat of an equal footing and that, you

21    know, General Miletic is not designated as an assistant commander under

22    his role as chief of operations, that would make sense.

23       Q.   Let me now move on to a different topic.

24            On the 15th of January, you mentioned that strategic objectives

25    were discussed at the Republika Srpska Assembly on the 12th of May, 1992.

Page 20555

 1            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit

 2    P25.  It's the minutes of this Assembly meeting.  I'd like page 13 in

 3    B/C/S and page 14 in English, please.

 4       Q.   Out of these six strategic goals, I'm only interested in the first

 5    and the third one, and I'd like to deal with the third one first, the

 6    elimination of the Drina as the border.  Would you agree that this is

 7    indeed a political goal?

 8       A.   Well, within the context of when it was delivered, at that

 9    particular time it was not envisioned that the Republika Srpska would

10    exist as an independent state.  My understanding is that the political

11    goal at the time was that the predominantly Serbian territory would in

12    fact be incorporated into the remaining part of the FRY.  So it does

13    reflect a political goal, yes, ma'am.

14       Q.   When President Karadzic mentioned this third goal, he stated:

15            [In English] "We now see a possibility for some Muslim

16    municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves in order for them

17    to achieve their rights, but it must basically belong to Serbian Bosnia

18    and Herzegovina ..."

19            [Interpretation] When Radovan Karadzic talked about the

20    possibility of setting up Muslim municipalities, then the idea was for the

21    Muslims to stay in the region; that's something envisaged?

22       A.   It was envisioned within the context that Muslims who stayed in

23    that territory would have to essentially accept that they would be living

24    under the control of the Bosnian Serb government at the time, yes, ma'am.

25       Q.   Yes, but it did not envisage the -- that the population would

Page 20556

 1    leave the region?

 2       A.   Well, the practical problem here is the same as the practical

 3    problem in the Krajina region, which was the fact that the areas that they

 4    were referring to were areas where the Muslim population was effectively,

 5    in some cases, almost a 70 per cent majority population. You can -- in the

 6    abstract, you can say certainly the Muslims will be permitted to stay as

 7    long as they submit to Serb authority.  The flip side, of course, is that,

 8    you know, when you're 70 per cent of the population, you're not going to

 9    want to do that, presumably.  And if you have an ability to resist, you're

10    going to resist.  So, I mean, I would also, you know, keep in mind when

11    you read this, there's also, you know, the other documents that are out

12    there with respect to the fact that, you know, which municipalities, you

13    know, have to be depopulated to a point where they become majority Serb

14    population municipality.  So, I mean, I can't -- you don't read it in

15    isolation.  You have to read it into the practical aspect of what was

16    happening at the time.

17       Q.   Do you agree that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the population

18    breakdown and composition was extremely complex, it was a mixed

19    population; most Muslims lived in towns, though, and the Croats and the

20    Serbs lived in the countryside?  Please answer if you know, of course.

21       A.   I am aware that certainly there are all sorts of ethnic factors

22    involved, and I don't pretend to be an expert on those.  My -- my

23    understanding on that, you know, again relates to what the VRS or what the

24    Bosnian Serbs were saying about the situation in 1992 and 1993, not from

25    an understanding of demographics as an independent observer.  So my

Page 20557

 1    observations of what the situation was in that area is, in large part, a

 2    reflection of the VRS and of the Republika Srpska documents that I've read

 3    describing that situation, not my own independent observations.

 4       Q.   I'd like to go back now to the first objective, first goal to the

 5    separation of the Serb people from the other people.  Let me first put to

 6    you the following question:  Reading your reports, I can see that you've

 7    read a lot of laws from the former Yugoslavia, not only the ones related

 8    to the army.  For example, you read the Penal Code.  But I would like to

 9    know whether you ever read the Constitution of the former Yugoslavia.

10       A.   No, ma'am, I have not.

11       Q.   Did anyone draw your attention to the fact that the preamble of

12    this 1974 Constitution granted the right to the people, not to the

13    republic, to -- granted them the right to self-determination that could go

14    to the point that they would separate from the rest of the country?

15       A.   No, ma'am, I don't know that that's in there or not.  I'm

16    certainly not a Yugoslav constitutional scholar by any means, so I'll take

17    your word for it.

18       Q.   If you take my word for it, isn't the first objective of a Serb

19    people in Bosnia part of the right that was granted to it by the Yugoslav

20    Constitution?  Isn't it part and parcel of it?

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  You don't need to object, Mr. McCloskey.

22            Move to your next question, please.  Thank you.

23            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, I'll move on to something else.

24       Q.   Do you know that the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina

25    proclaimed the same objective six months before the Serbs?

Page 20558

 1       A.   I am aware from a -- from the political context that certainly a

 2    number of months before a declaration of independence, there was a great

 3    deal of political discussion with respect to whether or not Bosnia and

 4    Herzegovina would either choose to become independent or whether they

 5    would choose to remain as part of the -- or what was then going to become

 6    the FRY.  As for the actual details of the discussion and the context

 7    behind that, I don't know the answer to that.  That's not my area of

 8    expertise.

 9            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like the witness to be shown

10    Exhibit 5D546.  5D546.  It's a joint document from the regional

11    communities of Herzegovina and Travnik.

12       Q.   I'll let you read the first paragraph of this document.  It's a

13    document dated 12th of November, 1991.  What I find relevant here is the

14    last part of this paragraph, where we can read as follows:

15            [In English] "On 12 November 1991, jointly and unanimously decided

16    that the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina finally have to start

17    conducting a decisive and active policy which should bring about the

18    realisation of our eternal dream, a joint Croatian state."

19            [Interpretation] Do you agree that there's no real difference

20    between the goal set out here by the Croatian people and the one that

21    would be proclaimed six months later by the Serbian people?

22       A.   I mean, I'm -- I'm generally aware that both the Serb people and

23    the Croatian people in Bosnia were looking, to some degree, to become, you

24    know, more closely aligned with their native ethnic states, but again

25    you're really approaching the outer limits of my not only area of

Page 20559

 1    expertise but my basic general background on these types of issues

 2                               [Technical difficulties]

 3            THE COURT REPORTER:  Sorry, sir, the computer shut down.  Can we

 4    have a short break so I can replace it with another computer.

 5                          [Trial Chamber confers]

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  No, no.  I don't think so, Judge Kwon.  I don't see

 7    at least what I'm saying scrolling.  I think the best thing to do would be

 8    to take the 20-minute break now instead of in 15 minutes' time and then

 9    try and see if we can solve this problem.

10            In the meantime Ms. Fauveau will see how she could shorten her

11    cross-examination further.

12                          --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.

13                          --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  For the record, because I didn't notice her

15    absence earlier on, Ms. Nikolic is also not present today.

16            Madame Fauveau, please.

17            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show the witness

18    Exhibit P29.  It is directive number 4, dated 19th of November, 1992.

19    Perhaps we could go to page 11 of the B/C/S version and page 5 of the

20    English version.  Can we see the bottom of the page of the English

21    version.

22       Q.   On the 15th of January last, you said that the last part of the

23    first sentence concerning the stage -- entrusted to the Drina Corps,

24    defined the character of campaign and the civilian population becomes the

25    objective.  Page 19677.  When you were a witness, you mentioned on several

Page 20560

 1    occasions the doctrine of the JNA.  Is it right to say that that doctrine

 2    was indeed the doctrine of the People's Defence, the All People's Defence?

 3       ?

 4       A.   Well, All People's Defence was the primary defence doctrine of the

 5    former SFRY.  The JNA, just like the TO, had their pieces of that, so, I

 6    mean, their -- their military doctrines were a -- were a component part of

 7    the larger All People's Defence doctrine.

 8       Q.   The basis of this concept for the society in former Yugoslavia,

 9    which was based on self-management, the basis of the concept of All

10    People's Defence was that everybody should take part, in one way or

11    another, to defence?

12       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, it's a reflection of the -- one, the past

13    history of the former Yugoslavia under occupation during World War II, and

14    also a reflection of their modern defence strategy, which called for a

15    situation where, if invaded by either the NATO Bloc or the Warsaw Bloc,

16    you know, recognising they didn't have the military force to forestall

17    that invasion, they would adopt a strategy of insurgent warfare within

18    their own country as a way of making a foreign occupation so expensive

19    that an opponent would ultimately leave.  So, you know, in that context,

20    that is what All People's Defence revolved around, the fact that not only

21    all individuals but that all sectors of the Yugoslav state would be a part

22    of that defence.

23       Q.   Let me now show you Exhibit 5D659, which is indeed the Law on All

24    People's Defence, the Yugoslav law.  Strangely, this law -- I was able to

25    find it only in English, so you have a version that you can readily read.

Page 20561

 1            Perhaps we could go to page 2, paragraph 3 which begins at the

 2    very bottom.  In this paragraph, what we see is:

 3            [In English] "All People's Defence is a unit system whereby

 4    working people and citizens self-management organisations and community

 5    sociopolitical and other social organisation and sociopolitical

 6    communities organise themselves, prepare for and take active part in

 7    deterring and forestalling aggression and other threats to the country in

 8    arm struggle and other form of All People's resistance."

 9            [No interpretation].

10            [Interpretation] Do you agree that on the basis, and I think

11    you've already said this, that indeed everybody, including all the

12    structures, took part in this, do you agree that on the basis of this

13    article, what we conclude is that any able-bodied men could join or should

14    join the army, and in particular join in combat?

15       A.   What it notes is the fact that all sectors of society, you know,

16    need to be prepared to resist foreign occupying power.  The reality is

17    that, you know, it was mandatory military service in the JNA, so that for

18    the most part, all military-aged males were inducted into the army for a

19    short period and didn't receive military training, and were expected, in

20    times of conflict, that they would in fact be mobilised and take part in

21    the conflict.

22       Q.   Do you know that according to this law, and I'll show the page 10,

23    Article 19, paragraph 2, women aged between 15 and 55 years were compelled

24    to take part in the bodies in charge of civil defence?

25       A.   I did not know that within the former SFRY, but I would not find

Page 20562

 1    that surprising.

 2       Q.   Do you agree that under this concept, it is difficult to conceive

 3    that the civil population should remain in one place when the army is

 4    withdrawing or has withdrawn from the same place?

 5       A.   I'm -- I'm kind of confused about the context.  I mean, what civil

 6    population are we talking about?  I mean, are we talking about an occupied

 7    territory?  I mean, I don't understand.

 8       Q.   We're talking about the population that can only be civilian, in

 9    other words, children, elderly people, and the context is the war in

10    Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular in the context of directive 4.

11       A.   Okay.  Well, in the context of directive 4, you know, it would not

12    make sense, I would suspect, that if the Muslim soldiers were forced out

13    of a particular territory, that their families and other male

14    non-combatants, those too old to serve or those infirm would want to be

15    left behind.  As a practical matter, you know, their ability to support

16    themselves would potentially be suspect, not to mention the fact that

17    given the context of the conflict to date, they probably wouldn't have a

18    whole lot of confidence that they would be permitted to remain there

19    anyway.  So in that regard, it would make sense that if the army were to

20    pull out, that the civilian population that was dependent upon them would

21    want to accompany them, yes, ma'am.

22       Q.   Do you think that the sentence in directive 4 that everybody is

23    familiar with, I think, was written more in this particular context, i.e.,

24    the concept whereby the army and politicians of the Serbs were impregnated

25    with the All People's Defence, in other words, that this sentence meant a

Page 20563

 1    campaign against the civilian population?

 2            My question was perhaps badly formulated, but in any case there's

 3    an error in the translation.

 4            What I want to know:  Do you agree that this sentence in directive

 5    4 could be more the expression of that doctrine of the All People's

 6    Defence rather than a campaign -- or, rather, the expression of the

 7    campaign against the civilian population?  The expression of the campaign

 8    against the civilian population?

 9       A.   Certainly, the VRS understood, within the context of that, that

10    the Bosnian Muslims who were fighting with them at the time, you know,

11    were dependent upon, to some degree, their own civilian population for

12    shelter, food, housing, things of that nature.  And, you know, as a matter

13    of, you know, technical military expediency, you know, forcing the

14    civilian population out would have a significantly detrimental impact upon

15    the ability of the Muslims to continue to engage successfully in combat

16    operations.

17            Now, having said that, you know, when you look at the directive

18    under 4 and then you look at what actually happened as part of the Cerska

19    1993 operation, it doesn't appear that way.  You know, what you -- what it

20    appears that you have is a campaign that is not having any regard for the

21    civilian population whatsoever in an effort to get it to leave that

22    particular area.

23       Q.   You're talking about the Cerska 1993 campaign.  Is it true to say

24    that what happened in the spring of 1993 was, in fact, in response to the

25    Muslim aggression that had no regard for the Serbian civilians, either?

Page 20564

 1       A.   The Cerska campaign started in January, so it was a wintertime

 2    campaign, and certainly with regards to what the VRS believes the trigger

 3    event to be would be the attack on the village of Kravica.  You know,

 4    their view is that the Bosnian Muslims also fought without regard to the

 5    civilian population, so it's not a one-sided affair, I agree.

 6       Q.   Do you think that indeed this war, on one side and the other, was

 7    not directed against the civilian population, as such, but it was simply

 8    the nature of the war that made it a war of people against the people, and

 9    that is what determined their respective behaviours?

10       A.   The problem in making that particular conclusion is that you have

11    to -- to do it, you have to ignore the underlying diplomatic context that

12    was occurring at the time, particularly as we go into 19 -- late 1992,

13    early 1993, where the relevant international peace plan was dependent upon

14    establishing the majority population blocs in certain geographic areas of

15    Bosnia.  The Republika Srpska understood at the time that going into early

16    1993, that the Muslims were the majority population bloc in Eastern

17    Bosnia, and they also understood that if the Vance-Owen Plan, as it was

18    coming out, was going to reflect allowing, you know, control over various

19    areas of Bosnia to be determined by the majority population in those

20    areas, they recognised that they would have to cede control over what they

21    understood to be a very important geographic portion of then the Republika

22    Srpska.  So you can't ignore -- or you can't view what happened to

23    civilians on both sides without at least, you know, some regard to the

24    over-arching context of what each side was trying to obtain.

25       Q.   Well, I appreciate what you have just been saying, but my question

Page 20565

 1    may perhaps not be simple, but I do think it needs a rather shorter

 2    answer.  Do you accept that it is possible to give another explanation to

 3    directive 4, particularly the task entrusted to the Drina Corps, i.e.,

 4    that it is a campaign partially directed against the civilian population,

 5    and this other explanation is that this is phraseology in the doctrine

 6    that was -- that prevailed in all the former Yugoslavia entities?

 7       A.   Well, as I understand the All People's Defence doctrine and why

 8    these types of phrases were incorporated into law was so that in

 9    circumstances where individuals who might normally be characterised as

10    civilians were caught by an occupying power engaged in military-related

11    acts, that they might be afforded some protections as potentially

12    prisoners of war, as opposed to civilians being unlawfully engaged in

13    combat.  So I can't read these particular laws in a way that would somehow

14    be used as a way to justify attacking a civilian population with the idea

15    that, well, they could become militarily relevant at some point, so it's

16    important to do that.  I don't think that that's the intent of the laws

17    behind All People's Defence, and therefore I don't read it in that light.

18       Q.   Have you studied the concept of All People's Defence once you had

19    finished at the OTP?

20       A.   No, and I don't -- I don't pretend to be an expert on the issue of

21    All People's Defence.

22       Q.   That was indeed what I was going to ask you.  In the Blagojevic

23    case, page 4799, you said that you didn't -- you weren't very familiar

24    with the All People's Defence system.

25       A.   No, agreed, and that's why I said, I mean, the context that I

Page 20566

 1    understand it is -- is what others who understand the law have noted, not

 2    that it somehow -- you know, the concept of All People's Defence, you

 3    know, is some form of a legal justification to attack civilians.  I mean,

 4    I believe that the opposite was -- you know, that I described was in fact

 5    true.  It's designed as a mechanism to allow their own civilians to seek

 6    some protection under the law with respect to their conduct against an

 7    occupying power.

 8       Q.   My proposition is not that it justifies this, but rather that this

 9    particular phrase does not mean a particular attack against civilians, but

10    rather the reality of a war situation in this system where the people are

11    fully implicated in the -- in the war, including children and elderly

12    people.

13            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Asked and answered.

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, I think so, and I was actually thinking of

15    inviting you to move to something new, Madame Fauveau, something else.  I

16    think you have belaboured this point.

17            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we see Exhibit P414, analysis of

18    combat readiness of the VRS in 1992.  You've already mentioned this.

19    Perhaps we could take a look at page 161 in the English version, 137 in

20    the B/C/S version.

21            No, that's not it.  No, I don't think that's the right page.  The

22    next page, please.  Is this the new or the former version?  I know there

23    are two versions of this document.

24            In the meantime, with the help of my case manager, we'll try and

25    find this page, but I'll read it out to you in English.  This was the task

Page 20567

 1    entrusted to the Drina Corps, and according to this, the task was:

 2            [In English] " ... The Muslim forces in the regions of Srebrenica

 3    and Zepa and then regroup forces and orientate them towards Gorazde, plan

 4    and prepare the operation in coordination with forces of the SRK and KK,

 5    and ensure the linking up of these corps on the southern slopes of Mount

 6    Jahorina on the Gorazde-Trnovo line."

 7            [Interpretation] This is page 157 in English.  It was my mistake.

 8    What I'm interested in is the first part of this task.

 9       Q.   This is a document that dates back to April 1993.  This task that

10    was entrusted to the Drina Corps concerns exclusively the Muslim forces,

11    does it not?

12       A.   Yes, ma'am, it specifically notes the Muslim forces.  I take that

13    to be the Muslim military forces.

14       Q.   Nothing in the document demonstrates that the action should be

15    directed against the civil population, civilian population, does it?

16       A.   No, ma'am, that's correct, I mean, there's nothing in this

17    document -- in this particular task that notes that.

18            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now go to page 8 of this

19    document, and I think this time this is the right page.

20            Right at the beginning of the second paragraph, we can see how the

21    decisions were taken.  In particular, we can read:

22            [In English] "Decisions on the engagement of the forces of the

23    Army of Republika Srpska were taken at meetings of bodies of the Main

24    Staff headed as a rule by the commander, with the presence and active

25    participation of the chief of Main Staff, the assistant commanding

Page 20568

 1    officers, the heads of the departments, the heads of the combat arms, and

 2    a number of administrative officers."

 3            [Interpretation] This is the new version of the document, and we

 4    can see here administrative officers are mentioned, whereas previously

 5    operational officers were mentioned instead.  Do you think there's a

 6    reason for the fact that "administrative officers" was in fact translated

 7    by "operations officers"?

 8            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Your Honour, this is a CLSS document, and so I

 9    don't understand the thrust of that question.  Is it suggesting some ill

10    will on the part of CLSS?

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madame Fauveau.  Shall we move to your next

12    question?

13            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, of course.

14       Q.   Among the people mentioned in that paragraph, commanders,

15    assistants, heads of departments, is there a particular category that

16    covers operations officers?

17       A.   I believe the operations officers would fall into the category of

18    the heads of the combat arms, because the combat arms branches were part

19    of the larger Operations Department.  So specific operations officers

20    would be included in that particular genre of individuals.

21       Q.   Later on, I will show you something else, but I don't think that

22    the head of the army is in the operations.  Do you make a distinction --

23       A.   I'm not saying the head of the army is operations.  What I'm

24    saying is that, you know, the heads of the departments or the heads of the

25    combat arms branches are where you would find the various operations

Page 20569

 1    officers who would be supporting that process.

 2       Q.   But the army corps which they were chiefs of were not part of the

 3    Department of Operations and Training, were they?

 4       A.   No, they would be the -- the heads of combat arms were their own

 5    departments, but they did generally have to operate within the context of

 6    the operation and -- the guidance of the operations and training people.

 7    They were -- they were the technical experts in their particular branch

 8    fields who would support the -- you know, support the issuance of orders

 9    as well as provide the technical expertise as to what the various branches

10    could contribute or should contribute to various operations.  So, I mean,

11    that's why I say that's where I see them as part of that process.

12       Q.   Do you agree that the head of the combat arms are not subordinate

13    to the head of the Operations and Training Department but, rather,

14    directly to the head of the staff, to the chief of staff?

15       A.   At the Main Staff level, I believe that's true, they would be --

16    they would be directly responsible to the chief of staff.

17       Q.   If we look at the next sentence, it refers to the complete method

18    for decision-making, the so-called full method.  I'll come back to this,

19    but can you confirm that this full method was used at every level, not

20    just by the staff but also by the corps and the brigades?

21       A.   As a rule, where time and resources allowed, the VRS wanted to use

22    the full level in order to develop the best possible plans, using the

23    widest experience and talent pool they had available.  There are

24    obviously, particularly when you get to the brigade level and you have a

25    shortage of both time and officers, you're not going to have that as the

Page 20570

 1    case.  Sometimes it may very well be that the commander is going to have

 2    to make that -- you know, that fast-track type of decision because he's

 3    out of time to take a longer method.  So, I mean, certainly it was

 4    preferred, but I can't say as a blanket statement it was always done

 5    particularly at the brigade level.

 6       Q.   Do you agree that when the brigades and corps did use the full

 7    method for decision-making, the Main Staff was not involved in planning

 8    each particular military action, these military actions that were planned

 9    and performed at a tactical level by the brigades?

10       A.   Yes, ma'am, that -- that certainly would not have been the

11    function of the Main Staff to get into the necessary detail where -- where

12    they were involved in actually planning tactical-level operations.

13            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to move on to Exhibit

14    P2749.  And whilst the document is being displayed, I'd like to say that

15    it's an order from General Mladic, dated the 22nd of July, 1994, and on

16    the 15th of January you mentioned the Drina Corps order that was based on

17    this particular order I'm going to show you now.

18            Could we show page 2 of this order, please.

19       Q.   At the very top of this page, we can see the roads or the road

20    that were used to bring supply to Srebrenica-Zvornik-Drinjaca-Zelinje-

21    Polom-Krasonovici and Bratunac.  Is that the way you understood the

22    situation was that the road or the route used to go to Srebrenica -- we

23    mentioned it earlier on.

24       A.   Yeah, I don't recall this, but I guess it makes sense that they

25    would go through -- so they're following the left bank of the Drina, so in

Page 20571

 1    this particular order they're not being -- they're not being directed

 2    along through Konjevic Polje.  I think two paragraphs down, it does even

 3    reflect that it's specifically designed to prevent movement along that

 4    route.

 5       Q.   Yes, absolutely.  And the paragraph just below that one mentions

 6    check-points to be set up to monitor the convoys.  Would you agree with

 7    that?

 8       A.   Yeah.  I mean, it talks about that.

 9       Q.   We cannot say, therefore, that directive 7 changed anything with

10    respect to the convoy policy?

11       A.   The -- you know, what directive 7 specifically noted was that it

12    was to create the conditions within the enclaves where the UN and

13    presumably, you know, the civilian population --

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Butler, let's move.  Madame Fauveau, I don't

15    think the witness needs to repeat what he thinks of directive number 7.

16    He said it already about 20 times.

17            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we move on to page 4 of this

18    document, page 4 in English and 3 in B/C/S.

19            Could you please turn to paragraph 13, paragraph 13 of that order

20    to the Drina Corps, talking about all measures to be taken in respect to

21    the enclaves mentioned in the agreement.

22            THE WITNESS:  Yes, ma'am.

23            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

24       Q.   According to what we read in this paragraph, this order is linked

25    to the -- to whether the Muslim forces and UNPROFOR respect the agreement

Page 20572

 1    on demilitarisation?

 2       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, it reflects the fact that, you know, because

 3    the VRS's position is that the Muslims are not fulfilling the terms of the

 4    ceasefire agreement and demilitarisation, that the VRS needs to take

 5    actions to reduce the size of the enclaves to what it perceives to be the

 6    actual agreed-upon size.  I believe I indicated that last time I talked

 7    about this document.

 8            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we go back to the first page

 9    of this document, please.

10       Q.   At item 1 of this order, mention is made of an order -- another

11    order dated 18th of April, 1993, which is hereby declared null and void.

12    When talking about General Zivanovic's [Realtime transcript read in error

13    "Jovanovic's"] order that referred to this same order that he's here

14    declared null and void, you stated that according to you, what was

15    declared null and void was the agreement, the ceasefire agreement that had

16    been signed by the Serbs and the Bosnians.

17            At line 3 of the transcript, I'd like to have a correction.

18    It's  "General Zivanovic."

19            My question is the following:  Isn't it the case that order number

20    03/8-9 is an order from the Main Staff?

21       A.   Yeah, I'm curious about your reference to Zivanovic.  I hope I

22    didn't say that.  I believe that what the order is is there's an order

23    signed by General Mladic to that effect.  I hope I didn't say "General

24    Zivanovic," because it is a Main Staff order; it's not a Drina Corps

25    order.

Page 20573

 1       Q.   I mentioned General Zivanovic because you were shown the Drina

 2    Corps order that was delivered based on the order I have just shown you.

 3            Now, with respect to order number 03/8-9, dated 18th of April,

 4    1993, my question is whether you've seen that order.

 5       A.   I think I have, and I may even have referenced it in my

 6    narrative.  I believe I have seen that order, because it is the

 7    implementing order for the ceasefire that was signed.  So I think if

 8    memory serves me, I have seen that order.

 9            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have Exhibit 5D708.

10    Unfortunately, we only have this exhibit in B/C/S, but you might have seen

11    it in English somewhere else.

12       Q.   I'll read out the relevant portion of this document:

13            "Pursuant to the agreed ceasefire, the delegation of the Army of

14    Republika Srpska, the UNPROFOR forces and the Muslim forces, in a view to

15    further regulating further procedures of the army of Republika Srpska

16    around Srebrenica, I hereby order:  On the 18th of April, 1993, at 0459

17    hours, the corps commands and other commands subordinated to them, as well

18    as the officers, will ensure a complete and total ceasefire in Srebrenica

19    and its surroundings, and at the same time all the combat activities shall

20    stop.  The ceasefire and combat activities imply the following:  A ban on

21    opening fire from all types of infantry, artillery and other weapons, as

22    well as the use of mines, explosives and other pieces; an interruption of

23    the movement of forces and equipment around Srebrenica, as well as of the

24    manoeuvre of the forces and equipment, bringing new troops and new

25    equipment to the general sector of Srebrenica.  After the aforementioned

Page 20574

 1    time, not a single bullet must be fired from any piece or any weapons.

 2    Anybody who violates this ceasefire shall be taken to task in disciplinary

 3    or criminal terms."

 4            Please tell me, would you agree that this order signed by General

 5    Milovanovic is in accordance with the agreement signed by the Muslim and

 6    the Serb side in April 1993 with respect to Srebrenica?

 7       A.   Yes, ma'am, it incorporates that.  I believe many of those --

 8    those exact same measures are incorporated into the broader agreement that

 9    General Mladic signed, so I believe this is consistent with that, yes,

10    ma'am.

11            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to show you Exhibit 5D748.

12    It's a document from the ABiH.  5D548.  It's a document from the ABiH,

13    dated 8th of June, 1993, less than three months before the first agreement

14    was signed and only two months after the signature of the second

15    agreement.  At point 1, we can see:

16            [In English] "Organise your own reconnaissance and deploy

17    reconnaissance patrols as deep as possible behind the enemy lines, and

18    based on their reports and your own assessment, take action (operations)

19    against the enemy."

20            [Interpretation] This document, this order, comes from the chief

21    of staff of the Supreme Command of the OS RBiH, Sefer Halilovic.  It is

22    addressed to the defence of Srebrenica and to Naser Oric.  Would you agree

23    that this paragraph does not fulfill the terms of the agreement signed or

24    entered upon by the Muslims and the Serbs?

25       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, it reads very much in reality what happens,

Page 20575

 1    that the ABiH didn't make any serious effort to demilitarize itself or to

 2    stop combat operations out of the enclaves, particularly when they could

 3    support operations in other parts of the country.

 4       Q.   In the second paragraph, we can read:

 5            [In English] "Engage guides through the territory by yourself, by

 6    hook or by crook, by engaging the local population."

 7            [Interpretation] Do you agree --

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey.

 9            MR. McCLOSKEY:  This has been part of the Prosecution's case and

10    Mr. Butler's narrative for years, and I don't know where this is taking

11    us, especially this kind of detail.  There's no disagreement on any of

12    this.  Mr. Butler has testified about this about 10 times already.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  And a good part is amongst the adjudicated facts

14    that we listed in our decision of 2006.

15            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, I believe that what was admitted

16    was that they were armed and that they never proceeded to demilitarize the

17    enclave, but that's not the meaning of my cross-examination.  That's not

18    what I'm driving at at all.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  It's more than that, it's also that they mounted

20    operations and attacks inside and outside the enclave, so it's more than

21    that.

22            Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

23            MR. McCLOSKEY:  To the degree of relevance that this has at this

24    point, it's her decision to go through this, but there should be a time

25    limit placed on this because this will -- we'll be here forever at this

Page 20576

 1    rate.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  What are you trying -- what are you seeking to

 3    prove, Madame Fauveau?

 4            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] The Prosecutor started his case with

 5    the sixth objective of the strategy, and they used all the documents from

 6    1992, from the date of the establishment of the army, until the end of the

 7    enclaves.  They were allowed to submit all these documents.  I mentioned

 8    it earlier on.  They would show parts of these documents, show them in a

 9    certain light, and I think I'm entitled to respond to these allegations.

10    Furthermore -- but I don't know if I should continue with the witness here

11    in the courtroom.  I'm not bothered, I don't mind.

12            But the case of the Prosecution is that all that happened in

13    Srebrenica and Zepa is a consequence of directive number 7.  My case is

14    that it's not the case, and in order to demonstrate that, to prove that, I

15    have to talk about what happened before.

16            And with respect to this particular document, what I find relevant

17    here, and I can tell you and you may decide whether I may ask the question

18    or not, is whether this paragraph 2 of this document shows that the Muslim

19    army was engaging the civilian population, involving the civilian

20    population in military operations.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

22            MR. McCLOSKEY:  The Prosecution's case is, of course, much more

23    complicated than that.  It involves much of what Mr. Butler has repeatedly

24    testified to, which supports everything that Ms. Fauveau just said, as

25    this document does.  But I don't think we need to go over it and over it

Page 20577

 1    and over it.  I agree with her, the Muslims did lots of things, and we've

 2    heard about them and the Court has ruled upon them.  We're starting to get

 3    into the Croats -- you know, making the Croats look bad here, too.

 4            It's just getting so repetitive on items that we agree with that

 5    it's just really wasting time, in my view.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  The other thing is where I have doubts is whether

 7    you can prove your point with this witness, particularly with these

 8    documents.  Paragraph 2 deals with guides, as I see it.

 9            Anyway, please think about it, Madame Fauveau.  I'm not stopping

10    you, but I think what's important is to know exactly what you want, how

11    you can get there, and without causing damage along the way.  So it's up

12    to you.

13            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

14       Q.   When the army uses guides from the civilian population, doesn't it

15    mean that these guides are involved in military operations, in particular

16    when dealing with reconnaissance operations?

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  Ma'am, I don't think we need a military expert to

18    tell us that.  We can draw our own conclusion, combined with other

19    evidence that we have heard.

20            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] In that case, I'll come back to my

21    first question.

22       Q.   Isn't it the case that paragraph 2 of this document shows that the

23    Muslim army involved the civilian population in military operations?

24       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, not only with respect to, you know, engaging

25    local guides, but, you know, by virtue of the fact that, you know, members

Page 20578

 1    of -- you know, members of the civilian population who were males were --

 2    were instructed that they had to meet a military obligation and become

 3    part of the 28th Division.  So they did involve the civilian population to

 4    that degree.

 5       Q.   Let me now show you document P5, directive number 7.

 6            While we wait for it, do you know this directive -- do you know

 7    whether this directive mentioned the Krivaja operation, the Krivaja-95

 8    operation?

 9       A.   I believe when that question came up before, I didn't recall

10    whether Krivaja-95 was specifically an articulated operation.  I'd have to

11    re-read the English version to make sure.  It might have, but I just don't

12    recall off the top of my head.

13            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we get to page 12 of this

14    document in the English version.  I think this is page 19 in B/C/S.  Can

15    we look at the bottom of the page, where you can see that there are tasks

16    entrusted to the Zigovina [phoen] Corps?

17            THE WITNESS:  I think it's Krivaja-95 and it's in relation to a

18    Herzegovina Corps operation.

19            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

20       Q.   So this operation had nothing to do with the Drina Corps?

21       A.   Somewhere along the line, the names obviously got switched, yes,

22    ma'am.  But as designed in March, you know, the Nervetna Valley wouldn't

23    have fallen within the Drina Corps area of competence.

24            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 10 of the English

25    version, page 15 of the B/C/S version.  This is the tasks entrusted to the

Page 20579

 1    Drina Corps.

 2       Q.   Do you agree that the separation of the enclaves was a military

 3    task that was perfectly well suited to the military context that the

 4    Republika Srpska Army was confronted with in March 1995?  I'm talking

 5    about the tasks without the last sentence; I'm talking about the

 6    separation of the enclaves.

 7       A.   Yes, ma'am, and I believe I've said that before, that, you know,

 8    there would be a large military justification to be able to move in and to

 9    be able to -- and when I use the phrase "separating the enclaves,"

10    obviously they are geographically separated, but to create the situations

11    where you would be able to interdict the movement of Muslim military

12    forces from Zepa to Srebrenica, from Srebrenica to Zepa.  So, yes, there's

13    a large military advantage to be gained by being able to do that.

14       Q.   This directive in relation to the separation of enclaves, does

15    this entail restricting the urban area of Srebrenica?  Let me repeat my

16    question.

17            The tasks entrusted to the Drina Corps concerns solely the

18    separation of the enclaves, and no mention is made of reducing the urban

19    areas?

20       A.   Yes, I -- in this particular paragraph, it -- it doesn't use the

21    phraseology "reduce Srebrenica to the urban area," that's correct.

22       Q.   The last sentence that you commented on, the same thing with

23    directive 4, do you think what we're talking about here is an expression

24    of that doctrine of self-management and All People's Defence rather than a

25    phrase that was directed against the civilian population?

Page 20580

 1            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we be specific, what she's talking about?

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madame Fauveau.

 3            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the last sentence

 4    relating to the Drina Corps, the last three lines.

 5            THE WITNESS:  Ma'am, it says what it says.  I don't take that

 6    particular last sentence to be something along the lines of All People's

 7    Defence.  I believe, as I've testified, I take that to mean that they want

 8    to create the conditions to force the UN at this juncture to remove the

 9    civilian population from the enclaves.

10            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we go on to the next page,

11    please.  In fact, I think it's the previous page in the English version.

12       Q.   The first paragraph refers to the Jadar operation, which was to be

13    carried out only if the UNPROFOR forces left Srebrenica.  Do you agree

14    that this is the case?

15       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I think what we're referring to in this context is

16    just that.  I mean, in the event that the UN, for whatever reason,

17    evacuates their people out of the enclave, that the VRS is supposed to be

18    able to -- or the Drina Corps, specifically, is supposed to be able to

19    immediately undertake an operation to go after the Muslim military forces

20    there.

21       Q.   Nothing in this paragraph is directed against civilian

22    populations?

23       A.   No.  This particular sentence, it's a one-sentence paragraph,

24    reflects, you know, going after the Muslim military forces.

25       Q.   This directive was signed by President -- or the supreme

Page 20581

 1    commander, Radovan Karadzic.  Do you agree that the directive signed by

 2    the supreme commander is a military act that is generated by the overall

 3    full method for decision-making?

 4       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, I -- I believe that when you look at the

 5    entire body of this particular directive, where it talks about the entire

 6    situation in context and that what each various organ will do and will

 7    contribute, it does reflect a planning process which is the -- is the full

 8    method of decision-making.

 9            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 3 of the

10    directive.  Paragraph 2, 2.1, the Croat-Muslim coalition forces are

11    mentioned.

12       Q.   Do you agree that this paragraph, the following one, is part and

13    parcel of the powers of the Intelligence Department?

14       A.   I mean, I'd have to read the whole paragraph on 3 and 4, but

15    certainly information with respect to what's happening within the

16    federation forces would be something that the VRS Intelligence Department

17    would be targeted against and collecting against, yes, ma'am.

18       Q.   And the structure of the staff, the Intelligence Department, is

19    part of the intelligence and security sector, isn't it?

20       A.   Yes, ma'am, and, you know, one of the differences in the Main

21    Staff from the corps is that at the Main Staff level, intelligence doesn't

22    work directly for the chief of staff as it would in a corps.  In fact,

23    intelligence and security is its own combined branch under General

24    Tolimir.

25            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, can we go on to

Page 20582

 1    another document, I think?  I was going to go on to another document, so

 2    perhaps we could have the break.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  All right.  We will continue tomorrow at 9.00

 4    in the morning.

 5            Thank you, Madame Fauveau.  Thank you, Mr. Butler.

 6                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,

 7                          to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 29th day of

 8                          January, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.