Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 20583

 1                          Tuesday, 29 January 2008

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          [The witness entered court]

 5                          --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning.

 7            Madam Registrar, could you call the case, please.

 8            THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is the case

 9    number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  All the accused are here.  The Defence teams, I

11    notice the absence of Ms. Nikolic and Mr. Meek.  The Prosecution, it's

12    just Mr. McCloskey.

13            Good morning, Mr. Butler.

14            THE WITNESS:  Good morning, sir.

15                          WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed]

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  Madame Fauveau, good morning to you.

17            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

18                          Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau:  [Continued]

19       Q.   Good morning, Mr. Butler.

20       A.   Good morning, ma'am.

21       Q.   Yesterday, we were discussing directive number 7, and I believe

22    that we agreed that this was the product of a so-called full method. I'd

23    now like to show you Exhibit P698 -- 699.  It's the manual for commands

24    and staffs.  It's a document you used when drafting your reports.

25            Can we have page 52 in English and 56 in B/C/S, please.

Page 20584

 1            On screen we have the chapter dealing with the full method applied

 2    to decision-making.  I believe that it is not necessary for us to go

 3    through all paragraphs, but can you confirm that in this part of the

 4    document, we have a description of the decision-making process using the

 5    full method?

 6       A.   Yes, ma'am, that's correct.

 7       Q.   I'd like us to turn to page 65 -- no, sorry, 56 in English and 60

 8    in B/C/S.  I will be reading out two paragraphs in B/C/S, because there's

 9    a mistake in the English translation.  That's the part of the chapter

10    dealing with the final stage of the full-method decision-making process.

11            Could we see the top of the page in English, please.

12            But as I said, I believe that there's a mistake in the English

13    translation of the document:

14            "Team members and other organs of the command, with their

15    assistants, formulate parts for the order pertaining to their competences,

16    and they submit them to the assistant chief of staff for operations.  The

17    assistant chief of staff of operations puts the order in the right form,

18    organises its technical processes and its delivery to the subordinated

19    units and organs."

20            Would you agree that the actual role of the operations officer in

21    this method is to compile the various information that he received from

22    other organs?

23       A.   For the -- for the organs in that respect, yes, his job, as the

24    operations order -- or as the operations officer, is to compile that

25    information and to integrate it into part of a master plan to make sure

Page 20585

 1    that there are no conflicts, to make sure that all of the other organs

 2    have participated as much as they need to and things of that nature. So, I

 3    mean, he is -- he is the key part of the process, to coordinate that

 4    entire process.

 5       Q.   But with respect to the role of General Miletic in the drafting of

 6    the directive, would you agree that he did not write or draft the

 7    directive, he edited it, he formulated it properly, but he did not draft

 8    most of it?

 9       A.   Ma'am, I don't know that, how much or how little he might have

10    actually drafted himself.  Certainly, there are segments of directive 7

11    where you can read that directive and it's clear that there were other

12    staff organs involved with respect to the issues of morale, with respect

13    to the issues of security, with respect to issues of the political and

14    intelligence.  But I can't look at directive 7 as a body of work and say

15    this is the particular process which General Miletic may have drafted and

16    this is a part where he didn't draft.  I mean, I just don't know that

17    information.

18            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have P5, Exhibit P5.

19    That's directive number 7.  Could we have page 10 in English and 15 in

20    B/C/S.

21       Q.   Do you agree that when the directive was formatted that way, once

22    it had been drafted, it was sent to Radovan Karadzic, the supreme

23    commander, who had to sign it?

24       A.   Yes, ma'am.  As I understand the process, the document was

25    compiled by the Main Staff and that because it represented a supreme --

Page 20586

 1    you know, a directive in that regard, yeah, it did require the approval or

 2    ratification of the supreme command and, by extension, President Karadzic

 3    as the commander-in-chief.

 4       Q.   Radovan Karadzic, as the commander-in-chief and as the signatory

 5    of this document, may have signed -- may have changed parts of this

 6    document before signing it; isn't that possible?

 7       A.   Yes, ma'am, that is a possibility.

 8       Q.   You cannot rule out the possibility that the last sentence

 9    regarding the tasks of the Drina Corps was a sentence that was added to

10    the document by Radovan Karadzic, against the will of the Main Staff

11    members?

12       A.   Ma'am, I agree.  I mean, I have no information one way or another

13    about that, so I certainly cannot rule out that as a -- as a possibility.

14            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we have page 11 on the screen,

15    please.  That's page 17 in the B/C/S version.

16       Q.   If you look at the tasks given to the Drina Corps and the other

17    corps, but here we have the tasks entrusted to the Drina Corps, we see

18    that several operations are mentioned; the Spreca operation, the Zvijezda

19    operations, and further down another operation is mentioned in respect to

20    the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.  Do you agree that some operations were at

21    strategic levels and others were conducted at operational level; all these

22    operations were not planified [as interpreted] at the same level?  Isn't

23    that correct?

24       A.   Yes, ma'am.  Some of them had to do with large-scale issues which

25    would be defined as strategic within the Republika Srpska and their larger

Page 20587

 1    goals.  Some of them are very much operations that reflect much smaller or

 2    tactical-level goals that relate to the battlefield area.  So that's

 3    correct.

 4       Q.   With respect to the Spreca operation we see mentioned here -- but

 5    can we have the bottom of the document?  Yes, thank you.  Here we also

 6    have the Prozor operation mentioned at the very bottom of the page.  The

 7    operation dealing with the -- or pertaining to the separation of the

 8    enclaves was of a tactical nature, wasn't it?

 9       A.   I would say that it's probably -- as it was envisioned, it was not

10    tactical, it would be more of an operational nature certainly with respect

11    to the zone of the Drina Corps, but as a multi-corps operation is

12    something larger as a strategic one, it would not approach that one as it

13    was envisioned in this operation plan or this directive.

14       Q.   In this directive, a number of strategic operations are mentioned,

15    one of them being the Prozor operation; is that correct?

16       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, it specifies Prozor as a strategic-level

17    operation.

18       Q.   Do you agree that the Main Staff, and especially its Operations

19    Department, did not -- was not involved the same way in all these

20    operations?

21       A.   That's a fair conclusion.  I mean, certainly something like what

22    we saw in Krivaja-95, the planning process that went behind that, was

23    certainly well within the capability of a corps command and corps staff to

24    be able to plan.  So there would have been no particular requirement for

25    the Main Staff itself to try and plan all the details of that operation.

Page 20588

 1    So it would only be in cases where you would have multiple corps commands

 2    involved in an operation, where you had significant issues and had to

 3    de-conflict various command relationships and aspects, that you would see

 4    the detailed involvement of the Main Staff.  So, you know, I agree with

 5    that.  And, again, using Krivaja-95 as an example, that is exactly the

 6    type of operation that a corps headquarters could have easily planned

 7    within its own means.

 8       Q.   Remaining with Krivaja-95, would you agree that you have no

 9    information, no indication, that the operations organ from the Main Staff

10    was involved in any way in the planning or in the preparation of

11    Krivaja-95?

12       A.   They were aware of the planning process itself, but I don't

13    believe that there are any documents which reflect that they took an

14    active role in planning that particular operation, certainly during the

15    initial planning stages and even the initial combat activities.  I don't

16    believe the Main Staff took a role until approximately the evening of the

17    9th of July, when there started to be the decision-making process that

18    they were going to change the operation from where it was, in separating

19    the enclaves, to the actual decision to take the town of Srebrenica, and

20    at that point I think you see a lot more evidence of the Main Staff's more

21    hands-on involvement in that.

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Madame Fauveau, in the meantime I forgot

23    to mention that we are sitting pursuant to Rule 15 bis.  Judge Stole is

24    not feeling well today and he hopes to be with us tomorrow.

25            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, may I confer with my

Page 20589

 1    client for a very short time?  It will allow me to shorten my

 2    cross-examination.  We don't need to have a break.  I will need just a few

 3    seconds.

 4            JUDGE AGIUS:  By all means, thank you.

 5                          [Defence counsel and accused confer]

 6            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. President.

 7            Could we have Exhibit P849, please.

 8       Q.   This is a document dated July 9th, 1995.  It's a document sent by

 9    General Tolimir to General Krstic, and the -- it relates to the order of

10    General Karadzic to pursue the operations and to take over Srebrenica.

11    What I find relevant here is the following: "Would you agree that this is

12    the sort of document you would expect to be produced by the operations

13    organ?

14       A.   Yes, ma'am, this is -- this is the type of document that I would

15    expect to be produced.

16       Q.   This document bears the number 12/46-501/95.  Would you agree that

17    the number 12 here indicates or refers to the security and intelligence

18    organ of the Main Staff?

19       A.   I -- I'm not sure of that as a fact, but I believe you might be

20    right.  I don't recall offhand what the number is, but it doesn't strike

21    me as it's a number from the Operations Department.

22       Q.   At any rate, this document bears the name of Zdravko Tolimir, who

23    was the assistant commander for intelligence and security; isn't that

24    correct?

25       A.   Yes, ma'am.

Page 20590

 1       Q.   Do you have an explanation?  Can you tell us why this document was

 2    not produced by the operations organ of the Main Staff?

 3       A.   I don't have an explanation for that, in so much as I don't

 4    believe that the investigation has been able to determine that yet.  The

 5    presumption that I'm operating under when I look at this document is that

 6    at some point in time members of the Main Staff, potentially to include

 7    General Mladic, did personally brief President Karadzic on where the

 8    operation was and what the next possible goals could be.  It may very well

 9    have been that, you know, either General Miletic was part of that and he

10    was relaying the message back through the Main Staff, or the alternative

11    is that General Tolimir was there at that particular meeting and that he

12    was taking it upon himself to call the command post.  Those are the two

13    options, but I don't know why this particular document originated the way

14    that it did.

15       Q.   Do you agree that what you've just said is pure speculation,

16    because you have no evidence that on the 9th of July, General Miletic had

17    contacts with General Mladic or President Karadzic?

18            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

19            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  She asked that question and it calls

20    for that kind of a -- and Mr. Butler is just trying to be helpful, so I

21    think coming back at that is argumentative.

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  Madame Fauveau.

23            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'm not arguing with the witness.

24    I'm just asking him whether he's aware of anything or whether he's just

25    speculating in his answer.

Page 20591

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Mr. Bourgon.

 2            MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 3            Mr. President, since the beginning of the testimony of Mr. Butler,

 4    my colleague from the Prosecution has been making these useless objections

 5    and saying that we are wasting time.  There's absolutely nothing wrong in

 6    my colleague asking the witness to confirm whether he has or not

 7    information to support what he just said.  These objections are making us

 8    waste time.  He is the one making us waste time.

 9            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.

10            MR. BOURGON:  Not the Defence, Mr. President.

11            Thank you.

12            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.

13            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I've got nothing wrong with the way he posed the

14    question.  It was asking for speculation -- a speculative question which,

15    if I remember the months and months ahead, as they challenged Mr. Butler,

16    that's exactly the kind of thing they did not want him to talk about.

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  We are wasting time, we are wasting time, or losing

18    time, in case anyone gets offended by the word "wasted."  Let's proceed

19    with the question.  You can -- but without speculating.  You either know

20    or you don't.

21            THE WITNESS:  No, we have -- as far as I'm aware, there's no

22    information as to the actual conduct of that particular meeting, where the

23    decision was made, and who attended.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, go ahead.

25            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

Page 20592

 1       Q.   There's also the possibility that on the 9th of July, 1995,

 2    General Miletic may not have agreed with the decision of President

 3    Karadzic and may not have been willing to draft this order himself?

 4            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, now it is purely speculative.  I mean, he

 5    doesn't know, he doesn't know.  I mean, he can't ...

 6            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 7       Q.   Is it correct that with respect to the 9th of July, you have

 8    absolutely no information pertaining to the whereabouts of General

 9    Miletic?

10       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, all I can do is tell you where he's supposed

11    to be, and according to the doctrine, as the chief of operations, he

12    usually accompanies the commander, which would be General Mladic.  But I

13    can't tell you whether he did, whether he did not, or what his location

14    was on that particular day.

15       Q.   You stated that usually he would accompany General Mladic.  Would

16    you agree that on the 10th of July, General Mladic left for Srebrenica and

17    that there's no information indicating that General Miletic went to

18    Srebrenica with General Mladic?

19       A.   Now, let me be clear.  When I say "accompany the commander," I'm

20    referring to meetings or issues where there will be material that's put

21    out that, as the chief of operations, he's going to be responsible for

22    coordinating the plan for, so those types of things.  He wouldn't normally

23    accompany the commander out to a site visit, like General Mladic coming

24    out to Srebrenica.  So I believe, looking at the doctrine, you know, it's

25    reasonable to make an assumption that he might have been at that meeting,

Page 20593

 1    because the information imparted at the 9 meeting would have been

 2    information he would have needed to know and deal with as the operations

 3    officer.  He would not have needed to accompany General Mladic on the

 4    10th, so there's no requirement for him to do that.

 5       Q.   You stated that you have no evidence, no proof with respect to

 6    that meeting that would have taken place on the 9th; is that correct?

 7       A.   Yes, ma'am, I agree.  We have no evidence or information as to the

 8    internal participants or things of that nature, so ...

 9       Q.   Concerning the meetings in 1995 in which General Mladic

10    participated, did this associate members of the UNPROFOR or members of the

11    command of the corps?  Do you have any proof at all that General Miletic

12    accompanied him at any of these meetings?

13       A.   I don't believe that General Miletic has ever been identified as

14    someone who has accompanied General Mladic with meetings with the

15    UNPROFOR, and I -- again, I don't have a comprehensive catalogue of where

16    General Mladic was meeting with other members of the VRS or other members

17    of the government, so I have no way of knowing the answer to that.

18       Q.   Do you remember on the 20th of July there was a meeting concerning

19    the departure of General Zivanovic?

20       A.   Yeah, I believe we're -- you're referring to the restaurant in I

21    guess it's Hans Kram and there's -- that was the farewell reception for

22    General Zivanovic.  I recall it vaguely, yes, and video from that.

23       Q.   During that farewell party, practically all of the generals of the

24    Main Staff and a number of the corps commanders were present, but General

25    Miletic [Realtime transcript read in error "Mladic"] was not there?

Page 20594

 1       A.   I believe that's correct.  I don't believe that General Miletic

 2    was there at that -- at the luncheon.

 3            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I think there was a mistake.  Page

 4    12, line 5, in the minutes, it was "General Miletic" rather than "General

 5    Mladic."

 6       Q.   When there was this meeting at the beginning of August to support

 7    General Mladic, when there were problems between General Mladic and

 8    President Karadzic, it was once again General Miletic who was not there?

 9       A.   I'm sorry, which -- I think I'm vaguely aware of what you're

10    talking about.  I'm just --

11       Q.   There was a petition signed at the beginning of August to support

12    General Mladic.  This was signed by all the generals of the Republika

13    Srpska who were present at the time in the entourage of Mladic.  General

14    Miletic was not one of those people, and I'm not saying that he didn't

15    support General Mladic.  I just am saying that he was not with General

16    Mladic at the time, he did not accompany him once again.

17       A.   I am aware that there is a written petition out there.  I know

18    that several generals did not attend that meeting, for a variety of

19    reasons.  I don't know much about the meeting other than the fact that it

20    occurred, and while there is a copy of the petition and which generals

21    have signed it, I don't recall at the moment whether or not General

22    Miletic was one of the officers who signed it or not.  I know we have that

23    information.  I just don't remember right now.

24       Q.   Let me ask you this question once again.  Do you have any certain

25    information that in 1995, General Miletic accompanied General Mladic to

Page 20595

 1    any meeting whatsoever?

 2            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Asked and answered.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Correct.

 4            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I don't think the witness answered

 5    that particular question.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Well, I think he's already explained, from his own

 7    personal knowledge, what he knows.  So I don't think he can tell us

 8    anymore -- anything else.  So let's move to your next question, please,

 9    because I'm sure you can deal with this at a later stage.

10            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

11       Q.   In the period from the 2nd to the 12th of July, is it true to say

12    that there was no conversation intercepted that mentioned General Miletic?

13       A.   I believe that's correct.  I don't recall when that mentioned

14    General Miletic.

15       Q.   Indeed, there is no evidence that at the time, during that period,

16    he was actually in the staff, the General Staff of the Republika Srpska.

17            THE INTERPRETER:  Main Staff.  Interpreter's correction.

18       A.   I'm sorry, your question came in that he was actually in the

19    staff.  I presume what you mean is that he was present at the -- at the

20    staff headquarters.

21            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

22       Q.   Yes, quite.

23       A.   That's correct, I have no information that he would have been

24    present there.

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

Page 20596

 1            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'm sorry.  They may understand each other, but I

 2    don't think the record is clear at all, what they're talking about.

 3            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Let me repeat the question, then.

 4            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, the transcript doesn't really -- you are right,

 5    Mr. McCloskey.

 6            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 7       Q.   Is it true to say that there's no evidence of the physical

 8    presence of General Miletic at the headquarters of the Main Staff over the

 9    period from the 2nd to the 12th of July, 1995?

10       A.   Not that I'm aware of.

11       Q.   Let me now show you Exhibit P3038.  It is an order from General

12    Mladic.

13            Can we look at page 2 of the English version, and right at the

14    bottom of the B/C/S page.  I do think there is a mistake in the English

15    version, because the words "SR," which means "personally," do not appear.

16            On the seal of the document, we can see that this document is

17    dated the 11th of July, 1955 -- 45, on the 11th of July.  At that time,

18    General Mladic was at Bratunac.  Do you agree?

19       A.   Yes, ma'am, I believe that's correct.  He would have been in

20    Bratunac at roughly at -- at the Hotel Fontana at that time that it was

21    received.

22       Q.   This order, in the B/C/S version, carries the word "SR" -- bears

23    the word "SR," and I think you explained on the 17th of January last, page

24    19872, that when a document bears the word "SR," that means that the

25    person signed it personally.

Page 20597

 1       A.   Yes, ma'am, that is my understanding of their protocol on this.

 2       Q.   Do you agree that on the 11th of July, in the evening, well, you

 3    have no information that an officer from the operations organ of the staff

 4    was in Bratunac with General Mladic?

 5       A.   I believe that's correct.  I'm -- I'm not aware of an officer from

 6    the operations staff being in Bratunac on the late afternoon or evening of

 7    11 July.

 8       Q.   I would now like to show you Exhibit P1112ASE.  This is a

 9    conversation intercepted on the 12th of July at 1245.  The version A and

10    C.

11            You have had opportunity to look at this conversation on 16th of

12    January, and I think from this conversation, it's perfectly clear that X

13    refers to Panorama.  And you said that Panorama is the Main Staff.  Do you

14    agree that in compliance with this conversation that you have before you,

15    the person Y is the one reporting to Panorama the situation at Potocari?

16       A.   Yes, ma'am.

17       Q.   And from the report that Y is making to Panorama, the population,

18    those people who wish to remain can remain, and those who want to leave

19    will be evacuated?

20       A.   Yes, ma'am, that's the text of the intercept.

21       Q.   Do you agree that on the basis of this report that Panorama

22    received on the 12th of January at 1240, Panorama has absolutely no reason

23    to believe that anything illicit is going on at Potocari?

24            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That calls for speculation.

25                          [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 20598

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Butler, if you think that you need to speculate

 2    by answering this question, then don't answer it.  Otherwise, if you have

 3    sufficient knowledge on the basis of which you can give a knowledgeable

 4    answer, then do proceed.

 5            THE WITNESS:  Well, sir, I believe as I've testified on this

 6    particular one earlier, where I talk about the fact that correspondent Y

 7    doesn't, you know, have a reflection of what's actually going to be

 8    happening on the ground, so if correspondent Y is talking to Panorama at X

 9    and giving his point of view that, you know, those who can stay want to

10    stay and those who don't, you know, will be evacuated, that is what

11    Panorama's going to hear from this particular correspondent, I mean.

12            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

13       Q.   With respect to the evacuation and the events that took place at

14    Potocari on the 12th, this is the only report received about this by

15    Panorama; you have found no other documents related to the events that

16    took place in Potocari on the 12th?

17            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That's a two-part question, both of

18    which are contradictory to each other.  There's a difference between

19    receiving reports and that you have no other documents.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  I think rather than contradictory, they are

21    complementary, one that's over -- or could possibly add over to the

22    other.  But in any case, we also believe that the witness can answer this

23    question, so go ahead.

24            THE WITNESS:  Go back to the original question?

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  The original question was:  With respect to the

Page 20599

 1    evacuation and the events that took place at Potocari on the 12th of July,

 2    this is the only report received about this by Panorama?  And you're being

 3    asked -- it's being put to you that you have found no other documents

 4    related to the events that took place in Potocari on the 12th.

 5            THE WITNESS:  I believe that's correct with respect to information

 6    going to Panorama.  I don't recall intercepts that discuss that were

 7    directed to, you know, the correspondent that we understand to be the Main

 8    Staff.  I understand that there were reports pertaining to the logistics

 9    aspects of getting buses and things of that nature, but I think when we're

10    talking about what was actually happening on the ground in Potocari I

11    don't believe that there were reports that were going back from that

12    situation to the Main Staff.

13            THE COURT REPORTER:  I'm sorry I'm sorry, sir.  I just need a

14    quick moment, please.

15                          [Technical difficulties]

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  I take it that we can go ahead.

17            JUDGE KWON:  He has to repeat his answer.

18            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.  Sorry.

19            MR. McCLOSKEY:  It's a two-part question, and I think that's only

20    part of it.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, yes.

22            MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's the problem.

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  You had started by saying, Mr. Butler:  "I believe

24    that's correct with respect to information going to Panorama.  I don't

25    recall intercepts that discuss -- that were directed to, you know, the

Page 20600

 1    correspondent that we understand to be the Main Staff.  I understand that

 2    there were reports pertaining to the logistic aspects of getting buses and

 3    things of that nature, but I think when we're talking about what was

 4    going, I would" --

 5            THE WITNESS:  But what I was saying was -- when I think we were

 6    discussing the issues of what was actually happening on the ground in

 7    Potocari, I don't see that situation reflected back in either intercepts,

 8    and it wasn't reflected back in the concept of daily combat reports or

 9    anything else.  So, I mean, I think she's correct there, that, you know,

10    the actual situation on the ground in Potocari, with respect to what we

11    know was happening there, wasn't being accurately reported back to the

12    Main Staff.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

14            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

15       Q.   On the 16th of January, you stated, talking about logistics and

16    problems related to the buses and to fuel and so on and so forth, you

17    stated that the orders going to the Ministry of Defence were supposed to

18    be signed by General Miletic or one of the officers working under his

19    orders.  Page 19234 of the transcript.  Would you agree that the Defence

20    Minister was not part of the chain of command of the VRS?

21       A.   That is correct, ma'am.  The Minister of Defence is not part of

22    the VRS command chain.

23       Q.   Would you agree that you never came across a document addressed to

24    the Ministry of Defence signed either by General Miletic or by one of his

25    subordinates?

Page 20601

 1       A.   I believe there are documents that -- from the VRS that go to the

 2    Ministry of Defence requesting buses, but I can't tell you right off the

 3    top of my head who would have signed them.  But I know that we do have

 4    some of those documents that are those requests.

 5            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit

 6    P2899.  That's one of these documents sent by the VRS to the Ministry of

 7    Defence.  Could we have the signature displayed on the screen.

 8       Q.   This is a document signed by the assistant commander, Petar

 9    Skrbic, and I believe we will agree that General Skrbic is definitely not

10    a subordinate of General Miletic.

11       A.   Yes, ma'am, that's correct.

12       Q.   I'd like to show you intercept P1111.  It's an intercept related

13    to fuel from 12th of July, 1995.  You've seen that intercept before. You

14    reviewed it on the 16th of January for us.  What I find relevant here is

15    the part of the conversation where Miletic is mentioned, and we can read

16    the following:

17            [In English] "What are we going to do about fuel?"

18            "I don't know.  I told Miletic."

19            "Yes."

20            "He doesn't know either."

21            [Interpretation] I'm not going to read out the rest of the

22    conversation, but would you agree that the rest of the conversation is

23    done not directly related to Miletic or to what Miletic could have done or

24    not done?

25       A.   No, ma'am.  I mean, I think the context of the conversation is

Page 20602

 1    reflecting the fact that, you know, they have an identified fuel

 2    requirement to move all of these individuals, to fuel all these buses, and

 3    that what you see is the work of not only the Main Staff but who the other

 4    correspondent is representing to figure out how they're going to get the

 5    required amount of fuel to do this.  So I -- the fact that it -- only

 6    Miletic is mentioned in one line, I think the whole conversation pertains

 7    to the work of the Main Staff trying to get fuel.

 8       Q.   It's quite possible, but what I'm interested in is Miletic.

 9    Miletic here is mentioned, no rank is mentioned, only his name, and he did

10    not say that he would do anything.  According to this intercept, Miletic

11    is not going to do anything in relation to fuel.

12            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That's a misstatement of the evidence.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes ...

14                          [Trial Chamber confers].

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  We agree with Mr. McCloskey, Madame Fauveau.  In

16    addition, we think the question is argumentative.  So please either you

17    rephrase it in an acceptable manner or you move to your next question.

18            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we have an intercept,

19    and in this intercept we see he doesn't know, either. There's nothing else

20    to interpret in this intercept.  The witness interpreted the conversation

21    for the Prosecutor up to a certain point.  I'm asking for the full

22    interpretation or analysis of this intercept. I don't see in what way I'm

23    misstating this exhibit or the evidence.

24                          [Trial Chamber confers]

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  By majority, we are of the opinion that

Page 20603

 1    military expertise here has got nothing to do with the question asked and

 2    partly answered.  We don't need the witness' opinion on what is contained

 3    in this alleged intercept.  So let's move to your next question, madame.

 4            JUDGE KWON:  I think it's better specifying -- clarifying the

 5    position.  The second question was triggered by the witness' failure to

 6    answer the first question, and if the witness is such a one that is

 7    capable of dealing with complicated matters, I would prefer the evidence

 8    to flow naturally.  And professional judges are capable of distinguishing

 9    the evidence which is based on speculation and that is not, so if it is

10    not the radically important thing, I would prefer the witness giving

11    evidence in a natural way.

12            Let's proceed.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right, let's proceed.  Your next question,

14    Madame Fauveau.

15            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

16       Q.   Is it not true to say that the commander for logistics was the one

17    who should have been -- had most details about fuel in the Main Staff?

18       A.   Yes, ma'am, the logistics and rear services would have had the

19    most accurate information about the fuel holdings of -- of the Main Staff

20    or what their reserves would have been, that's correct.

21       Q.   You said, and I'm not talking about this particular conversation,

22    I'm talking in general terms, you said that fuel in Republika Srpska in

23    1995 was worth gold.  Do you agree that it was quite customary for army

24    people to talk about fuel at the time?

25       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, given the context that they were a mechanised

Page 20604

 1    army, to some degree, and that fuel was going to be required for most of

 2    the operations that they were engaged in, there was a natural

 3    preoccupation for them to be trying to ensure that they had not only an

 4    adequate amount of fuel to conduct the operations, but they were also able

 5    to maintain fuel reserves in case some unanticipated requirement came up.

 6    So, I mean, I agree, there is a preoccupation with fuel, absolutely.

 7       Q.   Do you agree that the units that supplied the fuel for

 8    transportation of the population on the 12th and 13th of July, they needed

 9    fuel?

10       A.   The -- my understanding of the fuel is that the original fuel in

11    the buses came from the locations where they were.  In some cases, those

12    were VRS, which means the VRS provided the fuel.  In some cases, they were

13    provided by the Ministry of Defence.  However, I think as the information

14    is aware, by the 13th what the decision was made is that the military

15    would requisition fuel that was being held at the Vihor facility in

16    Bratunac, which is a state-owned industry, and that that fuel in fact then

17    would be replenished by fuel provided by the United Nations for the

18    purpose of doing that.  So, I mean, that's how that process worked.

19       Q.   Do you know whether the Zvornik Brigade supplied part of the fuel

20    on the 12th and 13th of July for the transportation of the population?

21       A.   Other than what is in the buses, I don't believe the Zvornik

22    Brigade did.  There is another entity up in Zvornik, the 63rd Auto

23    Transport Battalion, which is a Drina Corps asset, or even higher than

24    that.  Actually I think it's a Main Staff asset, but I don't have any

25    visibility on any fuel that they might have provided.

Page 20605

 1       Q.   And you cannot exclude with certainty that there was a possibility

 2    that the Zvornik Brigade did supply fuel.  If that had been the case,

 3    would it be exact to say that on the 14th or 15th of July, the Zvornik

 4    Brigade would have needed to ask the Drina Corps for fuel?

 5       A.   If the fuel -- if the Zvornik Brigade had used much of its fuel

 6    reserves to supply buses or other vehicles, you know, as part of this, it

 7    would have been reasonable to expect that they would have asked their

 8    higher headquarters, the Drina Corps, to replenish those fuel reserves.

 9    They're required to maintain a certain amount of fuel for emergencies and

10    things of that nature, and when you dip into that reserve, you want to

11    fill that -- you know, you want to regain that reserve as rapidly as

12    possible.  So that wouldn't be an unreasonable expectation.

13       Q.   Let me now show you P1164.  Once again, this is an intercept dated

14    14th of July, 1995, 2102 hours.  This is the conversation in which the

15    on-duty officer of the Zvornik, Jokic -- Brigade then informed Colonel

16    Beara that he should call number 155.

17            Perhaps we could look at the A and C version.

18            In the wording of this text, when reference is made to number 155,

19    it also talked about the senior house, the higher house.

20       A.   I'm sorry, was there a question?  I missed it if there was a

21    question.  Sorry.

22       Q.   Can you see this part of the document where reference is made to

23    number 155, which is part of the higher house?

24       A.   Yes, ma'am, I do.

25       Q.   Is it true to say that in the case of Jokic, as part of the

Page 20606

 1    Zvornik Brigade, well, his higher house was the Drina Corps?

 2       A.   His immediate subordinate would have been -- or his immediate

 3    superior would have been the Drina Corps Command, yes, ma'am.

 4       Q.   Colonel Beara, the Main Staff, is not his higher house, is it,

 5    because he is part of the Main Staff, himself, is he not?

 6       A.   Yes, ma'am, and that's why, like I said, within the context of

 7    this, the higher house and number 155, I mean, I combine both of those

 8    facts to draw the conclusion that, you know, we're talking about the Main

 9    Staff here.  It's not just that one euphemism.

10       Q.   You said that this number, 155, is connected with the operations

11    room of the Main Staff.  Is it true to say that the operations room is the

12    place where somebody's always on duty?

13       A.   Yes, ma'am, there should -- by function, there should always be

14    people on duty in the operations shop or operations room, I agree.

15       Q.   When somebody's in the field, the easiest way of contacting the

16    Main Staff is to call the operations room, isn't it?

17       A.   Yes, ma'am.  It -- by design, it's supposed to be the focal point

18    where all incoming information starts, and then the officials in that room

19    will parse out to the other elements of the staff information that they

20    need to deal with.  In large respects, it operates the same way that the

21    corps or brigade duty officer operates.

22       Q.   Is it not unlikely that Colonel Beara, who for some years had been

23    part of the Main Staff, unlikely that he did not know the number of the

24    operations room of the Main Staff?

25       A.   I'm quite sure that Colonel Beara knew the number of the

Page 20607

 1    operations room of the Main Staff.  I think that's -- that it's quite

 2    reasonable that he would have known that.

 3       Q.   But when we read this conversation, it would seem that he doesn't

 4    know what this number means, this number 155?

 5       A.   I -- I can't explain that little anomaly.  I don't know whether

 6    it's linguistics or what.  But I certainly believe that Colonel Beara

 7    would have known what the numbers of the Main Staff operations office is.

 8       Q.   Let me come back to what you said in the General Krstic case.  The

 9    transcript of the 30th of June, 2000, pages 5055 and 5056.  At the time,

10    you said the following:

11            [In English] "The designator 155 and again a reflection of the

12    fact that the communications lines were not secure.  As part of the

13    communication plan, individuals within the organisation were given a three

14    designator number that changed every ten days, and these numbers were

15    distributed to the entire corps."

16            [Interpretation] At the time, you didn't talk about the operations

17    room, nor about the staff?

18       A.   No, ma'am, at the time that I -- that I said that, what -- what I

19    was referring to is that as part of the tactical-level intercepts, we had

20    that.  I'm not sure I ever used -- I mean, if I did, it was an error.  I

21    mean, the 155 number was a phone extension, it wasn't one of those

22    three-digit numbers.  So, again, I'm not sure where this came from in

23    respect to what I said eight years ago, but the number 155, as I

24    understand it now, and certainly from my subsequent work, is not one of

25    those three-digit numbers that changes as a code issue.  It is in fact a

Page 20608

 1    telephone extension.

 2       Q.   I hope that you will accept that what I just read out to you, you

 3    did indeed say in connection with this very same intercept.  And as I

 4    said, this was on the 30th of June, 2000, pages 5055 and 5056.  You can

 5    check this on the internet, that this does indeed relate to the same

 6    thing.

 7       A.   No, ma'am, I'm more than happy to take your word for it.  It's

 8    just a reflection of -- again, my state of knowledge has obviously changed

 9    over the last eight years.  And I recall exactly the context that we were

10    discussing this with eight years ago, and certainly, you know, what I said

11    about 155 at that time, you know, I now know that it's certainly not the

12    three-digit number; it's in fact the phone extension.  So, you know, that

13    is the beauty about this particular line of work.  You learn something

14    every day.

15            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can I now see Exhibit P1166A and B.

16       Q.   The OTP last time claimed that the written version carries the

17    name -- bears the name "Obrenovic."  Now, let's take a look at the B/C/S

18    written version.  Even though you don't speak the language, I'm sure

19    you'll recognise the name.  I think we can see "Obrenovic" in the B/C/S

20    version.

21       A.   Yes, ma'am.

22       Q.   You said on the 18th of January that when you found this

23    intercept, you tried to find General Miletic in the Republika Srpska Army,

24    and since you didn't locate him, on the basis of the similarity of names,

25    you -- you mentioned General Vilotic on line 14, V-i-l-o-t-i-c, and when

Page 20609

 1    you didn't find General Vilotic, on the basis of similarity of names, you

 2    concluded that this must have been General Miletic.

 3            Now, what I'm interested in is the following:  Could you please

 4    give us a temporal reference?  When did you draw the conclusion that this

 5    was in fact General Miletic?

 6       A.   It would be probably when I would have first seen this intercept

 7    in -- sometime in 1999 when I was looking at them and came across the name

 8     "General Vilotic."  And from my understanding of the names of the general

 9    officers that we were aware of in the VRS at the time, I recognised that

10    that was not a name that I was familiar with, so my first course of action

11    was to start going through all other documents and everything else to

12    determine whether or not there might have been a General Vilotic on the

13    VRS that I was unaware of.  I mean, admittedly back at that time, we

14    certainly didn't have a complete picture of who all of the relevant

15    personalities were on the Main Staff, let alone the corps, so I certainly

16    held open the possibility that there was a General Vilotic that I was

17    unaware of.  And as a result of my looking into that, I was unable to

18    find, within any of the documents that we had or any other open source

19    references, a reference to a General Vilotic.  So coming up with a

20    negative on that, and again looking at the context of the conversation, I

21    assumed that there wouldn't be a situation where you would have a VJ

22    officer from the federal army in Serbia, then the Federal Republic of

23    Yugoslavia, calling the duty officer of the Zvornik Brigade under those

24    circumstances.  You know, after eliminating all those other possible

25    issues, that's when I settled on the fact that the reference to General

Page 20610

 1    Vilotic was, in fact, you know, a garbled translation or garbled

 2    understanding and it was General Miletic.

 3       Q.   Do you agree that neither in the Krstic case nor the Blagojevic

 4    case, you do not advance that this was indeed General Miletic?  You have

 5    always said that there was this possibility, but you prefer to be

 6    cautious.  In particular, in the Krstic case, you said - and this is on

 7    the 30th of June, 2000, page 5057:

 8            [In English]" In the context of the correspondence first clearly

 9    Major Jokic, and as for General Miletic, I am unsure."

10            [Interpretation] And also in your report, the most recent

11    narrative, at page 74, footnote 455, and here you write:

12            [In English] "Presently the identification and role of General

13    Miletic is unknown."

14       A.   Yes, ma'am, I take your point, and what I would answer to that is

15    that in 2000 and 2002, given the state of the investigation, you know, I

16    was willing to hold open the possibilities that were out there that there

17    was information I didn't in this respect and was willing to be very

18    conservative about that.  I think now we're in 2008, and I guess the same

19    way that, you know, the conversation around the meeting of triage

20    revolved, you know, in 2002 I understood the state of the investigation,

21    that there was a possibility that there were wounded being treated on the

22    battlefield.

23            In 2008, given where we are years later, you know, I think all of

24    those things have been completely run to ground, as we say in America, and

25    as a result I have much higher confidence, you know, being able to say,

Page 20611

 1    you know, what my opinion is on certain of these issues.  So, I mean, I

 2    certainly agree, yes, in 2000 and in 2002, I was more conservative, as a

 3    process of the fact that there was a lot of information out there that I

 4    didn't know as a fact.  In 2008, I'm more confident in making some of

 5    these assertions because I'm aware of the state of the investigation that

 6    has ruled these other issues out.

 7       Q.   Indeed, if I say that starting from 2002, relating to this

 8    particular conversation, no document exists that corroborates this

 9    conversation, moreover corroborates the participation of General Miletic

10    in the conversation, can you tell me what is the information document that

11    would enable you to say that it was General Miletic now?

12       A.   Unless I'm mistaken, I believe that in some of the various

13    discussions that the OTP has had with Major Jokic, that he has

14    acknowledged this.  I mean --

15       Q.   Well, let's set aside the interview with Major Jokic, who is not a

16    witness.  Apart from the interview with Major Jokic, what is the basis for

17    your conclusion?

18       A.   Well, again, the basis of my conclusion, if we set that aside, is

19    going to be by process of elimination.  There's -- knowing who the general

20    officers are in the VRS, knowing who's out there, knowing who would be

21    making phone calls to this particular correspondent at this time, you

22    know, General Miletic is the only logical named individual whose name

23    would even closely correspond to "Vilotic."  So, I mean, forcing me to set

24    other issues aside and then look at this in isolation, I mean, I still

25    believe as a process of elimination, my theory is supported.

Page 20612

 1       Q.   Let's take first what you say by process of elimination and

 2    similarity of names.  Let's start with that.  Do you agree to say that the

 3    person who wrote "Vilotic" could have heard "Miletic" but might have even

 4    heard something completely different, because if you look at this

 5    conversation, it would seem that there were problems with the

 6    conversation?

 7            MR. McCLOSKEY:  It seems like we're getting into the area that is

 8    really not military expertise, that anyone can figure out and can be

 9    argued.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, and I don't think we need the witness to tell

11    us that.  I mean, we can draw our own conclusions, Ms. Fauveau.

12            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Fine.

13       Q.   In the conversation, reference is made to Vasic, and you said that

14    he was the head of the Security Centre at Zvornik?

15       A.   Yes, ma'am.  At the time, I believe he was the head of CSB

16    Zvornik.

17       Q.   Can we go on to the next page.  A reference is made to Tripkovic.

18    Do you know who this Tripkovic was?

19       A.   I believe I might have at one time, but I don't remember now who

20    Tripkovic is, no, ma'am.

21       Q.   General Miletic was the officer in the Main Staff of the Republika

22    Srpska.  Do you agree that he was in charge of not only the Drina Corps,

23    the Sarajevo Corps, the Herzegovina Corps, the Eastern Bosnian Corps, and

24    he needed to take care of all those areas of responsibility?  I didn't say

25    he was in charge.  I said he had to take care of all the areas -- of those

Page 20613

 1    areas of responsibility.

 2       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, I agree with your position.  As the chief of

 3    operations, he would have been responsible for dealing with issues with

 4    all of the corps.

 5       Q.   And doesn't it seem, too, improbable that he would know the name

 6    of the head of the Zvornik Security Centre?  Does that mean that he knew

 7    the names of all the heads of security all over Bosnia, not just Republika

 8    Srpska?

 9       A.   Ma'am, I don't know enough about the history of Mr. Miletic in

10    Eastern Bosnia to know by what basis he would or would not know some of

11    these other personalities.  I just can't answer that question.

12       Q.   According to the content of the conversation, wouldn't you say

13    that it is more likely that this conversation took place between General

14    Zivanovic and Jokic or General Krstic and Jokic, someone who is an actual

15    commander with the Zvornik Brigade?

16       A.   I believe there is already an earlier intercept where there's a

17    conversation involving General Zivanovic with the Zvornik Brigade, so I

18    don't read it as that, no, ma'am.  I mean, I think within the context, I

19    wouldn't agree that it's General Zivanovic.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  We'll continue after the break, because I have a

21    meeting now at 10.30.

22            Thank you.  Twenty-five minutes.

23                          --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

24                          --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Madame Fauveau.

Page 20614

 1            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 2       Q.   With regard to this intercept, you stated that you do not agree

 3    that it was General Milovanovic -- or, correction, Zivanovic.  Would you

 4    agree that it could be General Krstic?

 5       A.   Could you -- could I ask you to scroll -- the Registrar, to go

 6    back to page 1 of the intercept, please, the English language.

 7            It certainly is an intriguing possibility that if you replace the

 8    name "Krstic" or "Miletic" or "Vilotic" with "Krstic."  I think the

 9    problem that I have, and again I just want to make certain it's not a

10    function of my memory, is that where I discussed the Zivanovic intercept

11    earlier, I think as part of that, one of the problems that they talk about

12    is the fact that the Zvornik Brigade has been unable to reach General

13    Krstic at an earlier point in time, and that is why they're having to talk

14    to General Zivanovic, and General Zivanovic in that intercept makes a

15    comment that says:  "Take this as an order."

16            I -- certainly General Krstic won't own up to this intercept, that

17    it could possibly be him, and I'm just trying to recall if there was -- I

18    mean, I seem to recall again, and it may be just fading memory at this

19    point, that there was a question with respect to the Krstic trial where

20    (redacted), the communications officer, testified, and there seemed to

21    be an issue that was being raised that for a technical reason the IKM

22    where General Krstic would have been was out of the communications net for

23    about four or five hours due to a technical fault, which was one of the

24    reasons why people were complaining that they could not get in touch with

25    General Krstic.  And this would have fallen during this time frame, if I

Page 20615

 1    remember correctly, but I certainly -- I can't say that with full clarity,

 2    because I'm trying to remember details that were discussed seven or eight

 3    years ago.  So, again, it's an intriguing possibility that it could be

 4    General Krstic, but none of the information that I'm aware of would lend

 5    weight to that.  So I certainly -- you know, I hold it open in the

 6    abstract.  I just don't know how to prove it or not prove it at this

 7    juncture.

 8       Q.   [No interpretation]?

 9            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, I don't know if your microphone is on, because

10    I have a suspicion that it wasn't.  Could you repeat, because in any case

11    we were not receiving the interpretation.

12            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

13       Q.   On the fourth line, at the bottom of the page, we see the

14    following sentence, this sentence here:

15            [In English] "Carry out my order immediately."

16            [Interpretation] Is this sentence typical from a corps commander

17    when dealing with his subordinates at lower levels?

18       A.   Yes, ma'am, it would be something that a corps commander would

19    certainly use, in tone and substance.

20       Q.   When you talked about this intercept, on the 18th of January, page

21    19977, you stated the following, but I'd like us to have the second page

22    in English and in B/C/S, please.

23            When discussing the first sentence you see on the second page in

24    English, you stated that the subject is the column -- what it's about is

25    the column, and you said that this might refer to the prisoners.  You said

Page 20616

 1    that it was a possibility.  Do you agree that when you reviewed these

 2    intercepts, when you were able to find a military explanation, you stuck

 3    to that military explanation?

 4       A.   Yes, ma'am, and I believe with this case, while it's a

 5    possibility, I think I've testified prior that I think the most logical

 6    explanation that they are discussing here is in fact the issue of the

 7    column, you know.

 8            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we move to Exhibit -- Exhibit

 9    P2754, please.

10       Q.   In the meantime, I would like to tell you that it's a Main Staff

11    document regarding to a Krajina Corps unit going into the area of

12    responsibility of the Drina Corps.  When discussing the exhibit on the

13    18th of January, you stated that this was a typical document, the type of

14    document discussing or showing the powers of the Main Staff, the powers of

15    the Main Staff to give orders to units from one corps, to move into the

16    area of responsibility of another corps?

17       A.   Yes, ma'am, with respect to a redeployment of a particular unit,

18    that's correct.

19       Q.   First of all, with respect to the authority to send one unit from

20    a corps to the area of responsibility of another corps, wouldn't it have

21    been better to talk about the authority of the power of the commander of

22    the army himself, General Mladic?

23       A.   Certainly, the ultimate authority vested to do that would be

24    General Mladic.  I believe I've been clear in this respect, that when

25    General Miletic exercises these functions, he's doing so under the

Page 20617

 1    delegated authority of General Mladic to perform this, particularly on 15

 2    July, when General Mladic is known to be at least for the good part of the

 3    morning and early afternoon hours where he's in Belgrade.  So, you know,

 4    in this context, General Miletic is acting under the authority of General

 5    Mladic to make this happen.

 6       Q.   You can see here that the title of this document is "Report," but

 7    I don't believe that it is an accurate translation of [indiscernible],

 8    because I believe that the proper translation would be "information."

 9            When turning to the first page -- or sentence, rather, of this

10    document, you read:

11            [In English] "Based on an agreement with the 1st Krajina Corps

12    commander ..."

13            [Interpretation] With respect to the agreement entered into with

14    the 1st Krajina Corps, did you ever establish who entered into this

15    agreement with General Talic, the commander of the 1st Krajina Corps?

16       A.   Establish who personally, on the Main Staff, was making this

17    discussion?  No, ma'am, I don't know who personally would have been

18    talking with General Talic on this issue.

19       Q.   You said that at the time Mladic was in Belgrade.  General

20    Milovanovic was in the Krajina, wasn't he?

21       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I believe at the time General Mladic was -- I mean,

22    his IKM -- sorry, General Milovanovic's IKM was in Banja Luka.  If I

23    recall correctly, it was actually even co-located in the same headquarters

24    building as the 1st Krajina Corps was.

25       Q.   General Milovanovic was undoubtedly the one who had the powers,

Page 20618

 1    the power, the authority, to enter into such an agreement with General

 2    Talic; isn't that correct?

 3       A.   Yes, ma'am.  General Milovanovic certainly could have directed

 4    General Talic to make the forces available, absolutely.

 5       Q.   If General Milovanovic was at the HQ of the 1st Krajina Corps,

 6    then quite logically he must be the one who has entered into this

 7    agreement?

 8       A.   Well, again, it doesn't say that in the face of the order, and as

 9    you've noted, the question is the big "if."  I don't know where General

10    Milovanovic was on that particular day, so I can't say that, you know, he

11    was aware of it or not.  I know that he has testified.  Maybe he's

12    provided the answer.  I just -- I don't know what the answer is on that.

13            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown Exhibit

14    P192.  It's a document bearing the name of Lieutenant Colonel Savcic.  We

15    can see that there's no date on this document and there's no reference

16    number on this document either.  Do you agree that this is something very

17    unusual, for documents from the VRS not to use the proper format?

18            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  There is a date on that.  I think I

19    know what she means, but if she could be more particular.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madame Fauveau.

21            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No, I don't believe there's a date.

22    There's a date written on the document afterwards.  We can all see that

23    there is no date on this document.  This document is not dated.

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Where are you saying there is the date,

25    Mr. McCloskey?

Page 20619

 1            MR. McCLOSKEY:  It's at the end.  I think she means there's not

 2    typed in the beginning, like what we're used to seeing, but there's a

 3    clear date on the end, always has been.

 4            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  If you agree on that, I think it's clear for

 5    the witness and he can proceed with answering the question.

 6            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 7       Q.   Would you agree that there is no date on this document, typed on

 8    this document, as is usually the case for VRS documents, and isn't that

 9    very unusual or rather unusual for VRS documents?

10       A.   Yes, ma'am, it certainly does not have the same header information

11    and order number that we've become accustomed to seeing on VRS documents,

12    that's correct.

13       Q.   In this document, we see a mention of the IKM of the 65th

14    Protection Regiment in Borike -- and the name of Borike.  Did you review

15    the testimony of General Savcic at the time he was a lieutenant colonel?

16    Did you review his testimony when he came to testify in this case?

17       A.   Yes, ma'am, I did.

18       Q.   Did you notice that General Savcic stated that there had never

19    been an IKM at Borike?

20       A.   I don't recall that, but certainly I'll accept your word on that

21    if that's what he said.  I mean, I just don't recall it off the top of my

22    head.

23       Q.   Let me specify that this is a transcript of the 12th of September,

24    2007, page 15263 of the French transcript.  Were you able to establish

25    whether the commander of the military police of the 65th Regiment ever

Page 20620

 1    received this document?

 2       A.   I'm sorry, I thought you were going to read me back the

 3    transcript.  I apologise.  Was I able to establish?  I think at one point

 4    the investigative team did talk to the commander of the police.  I do not

 5    recall whether or not, one, they had this document at the time they talked

 6    to him or, two, that that issue ever came up.  So I don't know the answer

 7    to that.

 8       Q.   With respect to this document, you do not have any information,

 9    according to you, any information confirming -- corroborating this

10    particular document?

11       A.   Well, I wouldn't say that, because I think when you look at the

12    context of the document, it makes it clear that the information that's

13    being described is consistent with the situation that's on the ground,

14    with respect to the number of individuals at Kasaba, with respect to the

15    Main Staff order that's discussed, with respect to the security measures

16    and everything else, so, you know, contextually speaking, it is consistent

17    with the other information that we know is out there.

18       Q.   I get your point.  But with respect to this particular document

19    here, is it correct that you do not have any information available to you

20    confirming that this particular document was received at the Main Staff

21    and was also received by the commander of the military police who was at

22    Nova Kasaba?

23       A.   I don't have -- I mean, I see an ERN number, so I don't know --

24    you know, I don't know offhand where this document originated and how it

25    came into the OTP possession, so I don't know whether it was received by

Page 20621

 1    an individual who was on the Main Staff or on the Drina Corps, whatever,

 2    so I can't answer that one.  And I think as I've said before, I don't know

 3    if we've been ever able to confirm that Major Malinic, the military police

 4    commander, ever received this or not.

 5            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we turn to the second page in

 6    English, please.

 7       Q.   Let's assume that this document was sent at 1510 hours on the 13th

 8    of July.  Isn't it correct that at the time, General Mladic was in the

 9    same region as commander Malinic?

10       A.   I'm aware that on the afternoon of 13 July that General Mladic was

11    travelling up and down the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road and that he did in

12    fact get as far as Nova Kasaba.  So, I mean, I can tell you that, yes, he

13    was there during the afternoon.  I don't know how-- timing-wise, you know,

14    that particular hour.

15       Q.   Do you know if Major Malinic on that day, on the 13th of July, had

16    any contacts with General Mladic?

17       A.   I don't recall.  I know that witnesses have put him at Nova

18    Kasaba.  I just don't recall the details of what Malinic might have said

19    in an OTP interview, whether he actually physically met with him or not,

20    so, I mean, I just don't -- I just don't remember the answer, whatever it

21    may be.

22       Q.   Just one more question of a technical nature.  If you look at the

23    document in B/C/S, if you look at the form of this document, you can see

24    that this is not a document that was sent via -- through a telescripter or

25    teleprinter?

Page 20622

 1       A.   No, ma'am, the actual construct of the document, this looks like

 2    to be the typed-up version of what would be -- what we would call the

 3    original.  It's not the teleprinter version.

 4            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Bourgon.

 5            MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6            I didn't want to interrupt my colleague, but I'd like if the

 7    witness can tell us, just to clarify something.  At page 23, lines 14, and

 8    this is not the first time that this is mentioned, he says:   "I know that

 9    witnesses have put him at Nova Kasaba."  I'd just like to know, is he

10    talking about witnesses in this case, witnesses in previous cases, or what

11    witnesses is he talking about, at least in a category, so that we can

12    relate to them?

13            Thank you, Mr. President.

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  Fair enough, and thank you for that.

15            Mr. Butler.

16            THE WITNESS:  I believe that the witnesses I'm referring to in

17    this context was that, if I recall correctly, there were not Dutch, but I

18    think one of the Muslim individuals at Nova Kasaba places him there.  I

19    mean, I think that -- that's what I remember.  I don't think that it was

20    the Dutch officers who were at Nova Kasaba at that point in time, so ...

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Is that sufficient for you, Mr. Bourgon?

22            MR. BOURGON:  Mr. President, that's not exactly what I was looking

23    for.  I'm looking for more if it's a witness in this case, when he got the

24    material, or if it's something he reviewed from a past case.

25            Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 20623

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  This is why I have referred back to you.

 2            Are you in a position to tell us whether you recall this from

 3    another case or from this case?

 4            THE WITNESS:  It would probably be from either another case or the

 5    investigation.  I don't recall that in this particular case that I went

 6    over witness testimony related to that particular area, so it would have

 7    to be back in the past.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Butler.

 9            MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Bourgon.

11            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

12       Q.   Just to come back to this document, you state that this is

13    probably the original, but then shouldn't it bear a signature if it's the

14    original?

15       A.   Yes, ma'am, in theory it should have a signature.

16       Q.   On the 17th of January, page 19936 of the transcript, you stated

17    that the 65th Protection Regiment was an operational unit and therefore it

18    was under the orders of the operations organ of the Main Staff, it was

19    subordinated to that organ of the Main Staff; is that correct?

20       A.   Yes, ma'am, for the most part, particularly the manoeuvre

21    battalions would have been.

22       Q.   You stated that you reviewed the testimony of General Savcic.  Do

23    you know that he said that the regiment was under the direct orders of the

24    commander of the Main Staff?  Do you know that?

25       A.   Well, yes, ma'am.  I mean, that -- you know, when I talk about

Page 20624

 1    under the operations, again I'm distinguishing the operational command

 2    chain from, for example, the intelligence and security command chain.  I

 3    don't mean to make the impression that this is a subordinate formation

 4    that directly answers to General Miletic, as the chief of operations.

 5       Q.   In other words, you agree that the 65th Protection Regiment was

 6    placed under the command of General Mladic?

 7       A.   Just the same as all the other corps formations would be, you

 8    know, under the command of General Mladic, yes, ma'am.  I mean, I guess

 9    maybe the best way to clarify it is to -- as a Main Staff asset is to

10    distinguish it, for example, from the 10th Sabotage Unit, which is an

11    independent unit as well, but not under the operations people.  It in fact

12    answers to the assistant commander for intelligence and security.  It also

13    is under Mladic, but it's not something that the operations people are

14    deeply involved in.  This is an intelligence and security unit.  So that's

15    how I need to distinguish it when I say under the sight of operations

16    versus under the sight of another assistant commander.

17       Q.   So you agree that General Mladic couldn't have given orders to

18    the -- sorry, Miletic couldn't have given orders to the lieutenant

19    colonel?

20       A.   No.  I mean, any orders that General Miletic gave to --

21       Q.   Savcic.

22       A.   Yes.  Any orders that he gave to Lieutenant Colonel Savcic, you

23    know, he would be doing so under the derived authority of General Mladic,

24    the commander of the army, not necessarily of an independent authority.

25    It would be the derived authority.

Page 20625

 1       Q.   General Mladic, this delegated authority could have been given to

 2    any officer in his staff?

 3       A.   Well, in -- you know, keeping it in context, you know, the Main

 4    Staff officers are all going to function within their assigned not only

 5    competence but within the authorities that they understand that they

 6    have.  That's a natural military staff issue.  I mean, as I've discussed

 7    before, you're not going to find, as part of good working order and

 8    military professionalism, where you're going to have individuals who are

 9    giving orders outside of their normal competence.  The orders that General

10    Miletic may or may not give to a certain individual under a certain

11    circumstance are going to be orders that he believes he's empowered to

12    give on the basis of his guidance from his superior, General Mladic.

13            So, you know, that's what I talk about when I mean "derived

14    authority."  All the authority to give those orders ultimately comes from

15    the commander of the Main Staff.

16       Q.   In the context of the operations at Zepa and Srebrenica, we do

17    need to talk about the hypothetical situation, because in that context you

18    didn't see any order from General Miletic in this respect?

19       A.   I don't understand "talk about a hypothetical situation."  Could

20    you --

21       Q.   You explained the situation in which General Miletic might have

22    given an order that -- in the case of the Srebrenica and Zepa operations,

23    is it true to say that you never saw an order from General Miletic?

24       A.   I guess we go back to that 15 July document.  I mean, that's

25    General Miletic -- I take that, particularly when you look at it in

Page 20626

 1    context, as an order from General Miletic at the Main Staff through the

 2    Drina Corps to the Zvornik Brigade, telling them that they're going to be

 3    receiving a particular unit and what steps that they have to take. So, I

 4    mean, that is an order from General Miletic.

 5            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we go -- or come back, rather,

 6    to P25 -- sorry, 2754.  This is a document entitled "Report" in the

 7    English version, and as I said, the word "Information" is more appropriate

 8    when you look at the B/C/S version.

 9       Q.   Would you agree that, yes, indeed, this is information about what

10    was going to go on and that it is not an order?

11       A.   Ma'am, I wouldn't agree, and I believe that when you read

12    paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, they are directive in nature.  Paragraph 1

13    indicates where the company commander shall report to.  Paragraph 2

14    indicates what steps the Zvornik Brigade needs to do to organise the

15    reception and deployment of the unit.  Paragraph 3 directs the Zvornik

16    Brigade that they have to assume logistic support.  So regardless of the

17    linguistics issue of instruction, report, or whatever, I read this in

18    context.  This is directive in nature.

19       Q.   Now, when you look at the addressee of what you call an order, and

20    you say that this is an order for the Zvornik Brigade, but it is addressed

21    to the Zvornik Brigade only for information.  The Zvornik Brigade is not

22    the direct addressee of this.  It is addressed to the Krajina Corps and to

23    the Drina Corps.

24       A.   Yes, ma'am, and I believe there are a number of orders that have

25    the same type of information, and I believe, you know, not only have I

Page 20627

 1    talked about this, but other VRS officers, you know, have indicated that

 2    this was a common practice when they were dealing with a very

 3    time-sensitive issue and they wanted to ensure that in the proper time,

 4    that the actual effective unit, which in this case would be the Zvornik

 5    Brigade, would be seeing this order at the same time that the Drina Corps

 6    did and could -- and that way, they had the appropriate time to take what

 7    measures they needed to.  So, I mean, this -- this is a common practice.

 8       Q.   And do you agree that this document couldn't have been written if

 9    there hadn't been the approval with the Command of the 1st Krajina Corps?

10       A.   The -- the implied behind this is that, yes, at some juncture,

11    with the concurrence of the commander of the 1st Krajina Corps, that this

12    unit was released from whatever its current assignment was.  Now, whether

13    that's -- you know, somebody directed them to agree to that or whether

14    that was something that, in a more inquiring tone, the Main Staff

15    asked, "Do you have any resources available," and General Talic agreed, I

16    don't know, but certainly I can't see a situation where if General Talic

17    had said that, "I can't spare this unit because I will risk a problem in

18    my own formation," that the Main Staff would have directed him to send it

19    anyway.

20            So, I mean, again as part of the staff process, you have an

21    inquiry that before you issue an order, you know, you want to be able to

22    make sure that your subordinates have the material means to carry that

23    order out, so that's how I take it when we say, you know, in agreement

24    with the 1st Krajina Corps, that it has been properly staffed and that the

25    corps commander, you know, acknowledges that this is something he can

Page 20628

 1    accomplish.

 2            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now go to Exhibit P1231A and

 3    C.  This is the intercept between General Krstic and General Mladic on the

 4    17th of July at 1950 hours.

 5       Q.   As you can see, the name "Miletic" is mentioned in that

 6    conversation, and you said that indeed General Mladic said to General

 7    Krstic that he should contact Miletic so as to get the details about the

 8    operations, the Zepa operations.  This was on the 17th of January, page

 9    19920.  Is it true to say that General Krstic, as commander of the Drina

10    Corps, had responsibility for the region around Zepa, but also in the

11    other areas of Zvornik, Bratunac, Potocari, Gorazde?

12       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, General Krstic, as the corps commander, would

13    have had responsibility for those regions.

14       Q.   This conversation does not show the topic of the conversation that

15    General Miletic had with General Krstic?

16       A.   I believe from the context of the conversation, we're talking

17    about the -- the acceptance of the conditions, and when you look at it,

18    what was happening on the ground, you know, my inference is that we're

19    talking about Zepa here.

20       Q.   Do you know, at the time in July of 1995, what the involvement of

21    the operations organ was of the Main Staff in the events at Krajina or

22    around Sarajevo?

23       A.   I'm sorry, did you -- did you say "Krajina or around Sarajevo"?

24       Q.   Krajina or around Sarajevo, or the other fronts, Posavina,

25    Herzegovina?

Page 20629

 1       A.   I can't say that I know in great detail how deep the Main Staff

 2    was involved in that.  Obviously, as a reflection of the combat -- daily

 3    reports that they sent up, I mean, there was a full awareness of what was

 4    going on, but I can't give you details on a day-by-day basis what they

 5    were doing.

 6       Q.   Do you agree that for the operations organ of the Main Staff,

 7    there's no reason to take -- pay more attention to the Drina Corps zone

 8    than the zones of other corps?

 9       A.   Well, ma'am, we are talking 17 July, and as I believe there's

10    adequate information -- one of the primary concerns of the Main Staff on

11    17 July was trying to figure out what had happened in the Zvornik Brigade

12    area, and as a result two Main Staff officers or three, actually, were

13    dispatched up there.  So I'd have to disagree with that.

14            At the same time, we also know what's happening in Zepa with

15    the  -- you know, with General Mladic's involvement there, so, I mean, I

16    just -- I can't agree that there's not a reason why there would be more of

17    a focus there than anywhere else.  I think that, you know, when you look

18    at the historical context, the -- there was a reason why they should be

19    focusing more there.

20       Q.   I'll come back to this later on.  Do you agree that at the time, a

21    brigade of the Drina Corps was on the Sarajevo front in the area of

22    responsibility of that corps?

23       A.   Yes, ma'am.  The unit was called the 4th Drinski Brigade, and it

24    was a two-battalion brigade that was put together in an ad hoc manner out

25    of the resources of the Drina Corps and had been sent to the Sarajevo

Page 20630

 1    battle front at Trnovo I think around mid-June.

 2       Q.   But at the time in July, it was still there, was it?

 3       A.   Yes, ma'am, it was.

 4       Q.   And if General Krstic for any reason, and we know that he did have

 5    contacts with the command of that particular unit, if he had wanted to

 6    contact Colonel Velotic [Realtime transcript read in error "Miletic"], who

 7    was the commander, he would have probably gone through the Main Staff,

 8    wouldn't he?

 9            One second, please.  Line 29, I mentioned Colonel Velotic.

10       A.   V-E-L-O-T-I-C, I understand what you're talking about, Velotic.  I

11    think I've got it close.  I know who you're talking about, obviously.

12            I disagree with that, because I think there are intercepts on the

13    16th or even -- the 15th or 16th with respect to communications with that

14    particular unit, because they were trying to get Lieutenant Colonel Vlacic

15    back from the Drinski unit to deal issues with the Sekovici or Birac

16    Brigade, and so, I mean, I think we've seen intercepts there, and I don't

17    think they go through the Main Staff.

18       Q.   For Colonel Vlacic to come back from this unit, was the

19    authorisation from the Sarajevo Corps commander necessary?

20       A.   I don't know whether it would have or not.  I mean, the

21    circumstances, of course, were that with General Andric, one, deployed

22    down in the Zepa area with elements of his unit, and now also at this time

23    being, you know, put in as the chief of staff of the Drina Corps, there

24    was certainly a requirement for the former chief of staff, you know,

25    Vlacic, to get back to the -- you know, to the unit to exercise a stronger

Page 20631

 1    command.  Whether or not General Milosevic would have had to approve that,

 2    I don't know the answer to.  And in this case, just -- it's General

 3    Dragomir Milosevic, the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.

 4       Q.   Do you agree that you cannot rule out the possibility that General

 5    Krstic was required to get in touch with General Miletic on this

 6    particular point regarding this unit that was a part of -- this unit of

 7    the Drina Corps that was at the time deployed in the area of the Sarajevo

 8    Romanija Corps?

 9       A.   I wouldn't agree with that, ma'am, because the second sentence of

10    the line:  "I didn't accept the Turks' conditions," and given the context

11    of what was happening at Trnovo, I just do not see what that particular

12    sentence would have to do with that particular situation.

13       Q.   Would you not agree that in a war situation as that one, people

14    were trying to say a lot of things, using few words, and that sometimes

15    the information we get is rather mixed and it's rather risky to draw hasty

16    conclusions on the basis of this?

17       A.   Certainly, as they're occurring in a contemporaneous manner, I

18    would agree that you could have problems there.  But when you kind of

19    overlay this particular situation and look back at what actually happened

20    in the context of the historical background, I mean, I believe you can

21    clearly see where, you know, at this date and at this time, what General

22    Mladic is referring to are the ongoing discussions about whether or not

23    the Muslims would surrender in Zepa and under what circumstances.

24       Q.   As a follow-up of this conversation that took place at 1950 on

25    that 17th of July, do you have any other conversation available between

Page 20632

 1    Krstic and Miletic or any other type of contact?

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 3            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Maybe I should take that as a sign, no mic.

 4            THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  You are having second thoughts on whether you should

 6    raise an objection or not.  Let's proceed.

 7            Could you answer the question, please.

 8            THE WITNESS:  I don't know that I can give an answer with a lot of

 9    certainty.  I mean, it's been a lot of years since I've had to go through

10    a lot of this type of information, and I just don't know if I could

11    remember an answer with a degree of certainty that there wasn't another

12    particular issue of contact or something like that.  I mean, I -- I don't

13    mean to not be helpful on the particular issue, but I just don't know that

14    I can answer that, you know, just as a function of memory.

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Ms. Fauveau.

16            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

17       Q.   On the 17th of -- 19th of January -- or 17th of January, you

18    stated that General Miletic was the chief of operations at the Main Staff,

19    and you said that on that basis, you assumed that he had more informations

20    related to the Zepa operation than anyone else.  Isn't it true that the

21    Zepa operation was planned at Bratunac on the 12th of July?

22       A.   Yes, ma'am, that's correct.

23       Q.   You stated on the 15th of January, page 19692 of the transcript,

24    that the army commander, in consultation with some of his officers, not

25    many of them, just the brigade commanders, conducted a rapid analysis of

Page 20633

 1    the situation and decided to go to Zepa.  General Miletic was not one of

 2    the officers that were consulted at the time, was he?

 3       A.   General Miletic certainly wasn't present in Bratunac while this

 4    process was undergoing.  I can't say one way or another whether or not he

 5    was consulted as part of the process.  I don't know the answer to that.

 6       Q.   But when you mentioned the decision taken at Bratunac, you agree

 7    that General Miletic was not there, don't you?

 8       A.   Yes, ma'am.

 9            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to move to Exhibit P146.

10    It's a document from General Tolimir, dated July 23rd -- no, it's document

11    186.  It's a document from General Tolimir, sent to the IKM of the Drina

12    Corps Command to General Krstic and to a number of other individuals.

13            THE WITNESS:  Okay, now I'm looking at the right document.

14            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

15       Q.   This document bears number 12, that's the number at the beginning

16    of the reference number, and it bears the name of General Tolimir.

17            Could we have page 2 of the document, please.

18            JUDGE AGIUS:  Page 2 in B/C/S or in English, Madame Fauveau?

19            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Page 2 in English.  I believe it's a

20    one-page document in the original version in B/C/S.

21       Q.   Could you please turn to the paragraph starting with the words:

22            [In English] "Continue combat operations in order to surround and

23    destroy the 1st Zepa Brigade until the Muslims make the exchange and carry

24    out the agreement from the 24 July related to their disarmament and

25    surrender."

Page 20634

 1            [Interpretation] This relates to an operational order, to a

 2    combat-related order; isn't it correct?

 3       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I mean, in the context of this, you know, General

 4    Tolimir is noting the continued combat operations with respect to the 1st

 5    Zepa Brigade.

 6       Q.   Is he just taking stock of the operations or is he giving the

 7    order to continue the combat operations?

 8       A.   It's difficult to tell.  Again, he is, particularly at this

 9    juncture, you know, in contact with General Mladic, and as I've noted

10    before, you know, as a military professional, he's not going to be giving

11    orders that are outside of his competence to do.  Whether or not, you

12    know, he's indicating, you know, take all necessary measures to prevent

13    them from leaving the encirclement, I mean, these are directive in nature,

14    so I certainly, you know, understand that, you know, he is in fact giving

15    some form of orders on this, yes.

16       Q.   The problem is that when you look at the B/C/S version, the

17    imperative tense is used, and that's the sort of tense you used, "combat

18    activities," to give orders.  How come General Tolimir gives an

19    operational order?  That's my question.

20       A.   Again, ma'am, I'd have to go back to what I just said.  You know,

21    my presumption is that when I look at something like this, that General

22    Tolimir is giving this order because he has been given the either

23    delegated responsibility -- or delegated authority to give this order;

24    that he's not, as a matter of his routine function, is going to give

25    orders that are outside of his competence.  You know, he is aware, like

Page 20635

 1    everyone else, that, you know, General Mladic is the commander of the army

 2    and that he's not going to be giving orders that are in contravention to

 3    what General Mladic wants accomplished.

 4            We see this with people like General Tolimir.  We see the same

 5    situation with people like General Gvero, who are given what are presumed

 6    to be operational orders that, at face value, one would think that they

 7    shouldn't be giving because of their specific role.

 8       Q.   Well, that's indeed my question.  Why, in those orders that are

 9    operational in nature, that we don't see General Miletic, who was the head

10    of the Administration for Operations, why do we always see somebody else?

11       A.   Ma'am, I don't know the answer to that.  I mean, it may very well

12    be because since General Mladic is physically at that location with some

13    of his other generals, a determination is made that, you know, they're

14    more aware of what his orders may or may not be.  General -- you know,

15    again, General Miletic, there is some evidence that puts him physically on

16    the ground at that location, other than at the Main Staff, so again I

17    can't answer that question, why we're seeing it or why we wouldn't see

18    something that would normally come out of under the chief of operations.

19       Q.   Do you agree that at a given period, that General Tolimir was

20    indeed on the ground in Zepa?

21       A.   Yes, ma'am, and I think when you look at the larger body of

22    information that we have, it reflects General Tolimir's active involvement

23    in many of the aspects of what's happening around Zepa.

24       Q.   And we also know that General Mladic spent a few days or at least

25    a few hours on the ground around Zepa?

Page 20636

 1       A.   Yes, ma'am, that's correct.

 2       Q.   And so there were two generals of the Main Staff, including the

 3    commander, who actively occupied or engaged in Zepa.  The head of the Main

 4    Staff was at Krajina, General Milovanovic.  Don't you think that the Main

 5    Staff should have taken some interest in the other corps, in particular

 6    the situation in Sarajevo was rather tense and that there was a dangerous

 7    situation that prevailed in the corridor, and that it would have been not

 8    logical to assign a third general to Zepa because Zepa, after all, is a

 9    rather small territory, and leaving aside or neglecting the other corps

10    and without supervision from the Main Staff?

11       A.   I -- I agree with the concept that with -- between a corps

12    commander, General Mladic and General Tolimir, with respect to Zepa, there

13    was certainly enough command presence in that particular region to warrant

14    attention there.

15            Having said that, I mean, there are still going to be issues that

16    are going to have to be dealt with, and, you know, with respect to Zepa,

17    specifically the fact that with a lot of the Zvornik Brigade resources

18    being pulled out, to continue the offensive operations, you know,

19    additional reinforcements will have to be found, additional logistics will

20    have to be found.

21            So, you know, the fact that there are three generals at that

22    location dealing with the details of that is not going to mean that the

23    Main Staff has an ability or should be washing its hands of the

24    situation.  I also recognise that, you know, they do have another workload

25    as well, and certainly they are going to have to keep track of what's

Page 20637

 1    happening in the situation elsewhere around the country.  As a matter of

 2    military prudence, they're not going to ignore that either.

 3       Q.   Do you know how many people worked in the Operations

 4    Administration of the Main Staff?

 5       A.   I think we have a good recounting of the individuals who were

 6    there as the senior branch individuals.  I don't know that I have at the

 7    top of my head an accounting of their assistants and things of that

 8    nature.  But, I mean, it certainly wasn't a large number, or perhaps to be

 9    more fair, it wasn't anywhere near the number of officers that they would

10    have really needed to completely manage all those activities.  I mean,

11    they, like everyone else, were short of talented officers.

12       Q.   Do you agree that the person at the Main Staff who received only

13    field information, because he didn't have enough personnel, may have had a

14    totally disfigured image of what was going on in the field?

15       A.   Well, I mean, in the military reporting chain, and certainly as

16    applied to the VRS, you know, there was the, you know, obligation that the

17    subordinates were going to report up as accurately as possible.  One of

18    the reasons why the Main Staff and even the corps headquarters undertook a

19    practice of sending one of their officers down to these locations is to

20    ensure that, you know, people at the higher headquarters would have not

21    only a mechanism for getting additional information, but also, you know, a

22    person on the ground to make some of the decisions that could be made on

23    the ground.  Yeah, but I mean, you know, in an abstract situation, higher

24    headquarters is dependent upon the reporting of its lower headquarters to

25    find out what's going on.  If that's not reported accurately or there's a

Page 20638

 1    deliberate effort to deceive, it's going to skew the perception of that

 2    higher headquarters.

 3       Q.   I suppose that you have looked at many reports from the Drina

 4    Corps, particularly when the Srebrenica operation was ongoing.  Do you

 5    agree that these reports are daily reports that provided very little

 6    information in fact?

 7            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objections.  What reports?  I mean, there's so

 8    many reports.

 9            JUDGE AGIUS:  It is a rather broad -- a very broad question that

10    you put, Madame Fauveau.

11            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, this is a general

12    question on the daily reports of the corps, not just the Drina Corps, but

13    I think the witness has looked at the Drina Corps ones mostly.

14            Shall I go on to another question or can I remain with this one?

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  Are you in a position to give an answer to that

16    question?

17            THE WITNESS:  Well, sir, I understand that certainly the Drina

18    Corps sent up its daily combat reports, which was, you know, one of the

19    mechanisms by which the Main Staff kept itself informed of what was

20    happening in the Drina Corps.  Interim combat reports would, of course,

21    supplement that information.  And as I understand the process, as part of

22    that information-gathering, at a certain point in time every day the Main

23    Staff would call down to the corps for a telephonic update as to what was

24    happening to ensure that they had the most up-to-date information before

25    they had to generate their own report.

Page 20639

 1            Those are the primary reporting mechanisms that I'm aware of.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  I think you can move to your next question

 3    now, Madame Fauveau.

 4            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 5       Q.   This document, can we go back to page 1 of this document, and the

 6    upper part of the B/C/S version, please.

 7            When we look at the addressee of this document, one of them is the

 8    1st Krajina Corps.  Can you explain to us why this document, which

 9    concerns Zepa in Eastern Bosnia, was sent to the 1st Krajina Corps, which

10    is in Western Bosnia, i.e., diametrically opposite?

11       A.   Well, I notice that it's to the East Bosnia Corps and the 1st

12    Krajina Corps, so it's to two outside formations in that regard.  And if I

13    recall the context correctly and why they were engaged in this process, it

14    was because there was a previous document or request out there from at

15    least the 1st Krajina Corps that indicated that they were aware that a

16    number of their prisoners -- their soldiers had been taken prisoner by

17    various Muslim formations, and that particularly when we were talking

18    about Zepa, there was an interest in being able to, as we catalogued

19    various prisoners captured at Zepa, to be able to use them as a

20    negotiating lever to free Muslim prisoners who could then -- not to free

21    the Muslim prisoners, but to trade them in order to get captured Serb

22    soldiers back.  So I believe that's the context of what we're talking

23    about in this situation.

24            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now go on to Exhibit 3036.

25    This is a document from the Podrinje Brigade, sent to several people,

Page 20640

 1    including General Miletic.

 2       Q.   This document was sent to the Krajina Corps and to the staff of

 3    Republika Srpska.  The date is the 1st of August, 1995.  Do you agree that

 4    on the 1st of August, most of the members of the Main Staff were in the

 5    Krajina?

 6       A.   I'm sorry, I'm -- are you sure that this was sent to the Krajina

 7    Corps?

 8       Q.   No, no, no, no.  That's an interpretation mistake.  I might have

 9    misspoken.  But in any case, it was sent to the Drina Corps and to the

10    Main Staff of the Republika Srpska Army, and my question was:  Do you

11    agree that on the 1st of August, most of the members of the Main Staff

12    were in the area of the Krajina?

13       A.   I don't know that I can agree or disagree with that.  I mean, I

14    just don't know the answer.  I mean, I know that there were a number of

15    staff officers at the Krajina IKM, but I certainly can't qualify it as

16    some, more than half, or most.  So I just don't know.

17            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now go to page 3 of the

18    English version.

19       Q.   Look at the last paragraph, which mentions the number of Muslims,

20    referred to in a derogatory manner, that remained in the Zepa area.  In

21    particular, in the corridor between Srebrenica and Zepa.  This is a

22    document written by the intelligence officer of the Podrinje Brigade.  Do

23    you agree that this information, in particular, had operational

24    significance?

25       A.   I -- I have to disagree with your -- your categorisation of the

Page 20641

 1    location when we're talking about the thousand people, because as it says

 2    in the context, they seem to be crossing the right bank of the Drina

 3    River.  I don't take that to mean that they're between the former

 4    Srebrenica and Zepa enclave, first of all.  And, second, this is a --

 5       Q.   Just at the beginning of the last paragraph.  Perhaps I could read

 6    out to you the part I was referring to.

 7       A.   Please, ma'am, that would help clarify.

 8       Q.   [In English] "Persons who know the territory well, the number of

 9    balija remain in hiding in the general area of Zepa, especially in the

10    area of the former Zepa-Srebrenica corridor."

11            [Interpretation] That was the portion I was referring to.

12       A.   Okay, eliminating confusion.  Like I said, I think this is -- it's

13    operational in so much as the fact that as an intelligence report, it's

14    providing valuable information to commanders to make decisions on as to

15    their next course of action.  So, I mean, I agree, it is of an operational

16    nature.

17       Q.   Do you agree that this document, dated 1st of August, do you agree

18    that prior to that, with the exception of the Podrinje Brigade, which was

19    located in this area anyway, the other forces withdrew from the Zepa area

20    at the time?

21       A.   I don't know that as a fact.  I know that at some point in time,

22    there were Zvornik Brigade assets that were withdrawn on the 15th, but

23    again they -- they went back down there later in the month.  I don't know

24    as a matter of timing, whether by the 1st of August all of those

25    particular formations had been withdrawn again.  So, I mean, I haven't

Page 20642

 1    analysed the situation to a point where I can say on that day, the

 2    deployed units had already departed.

 3            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like now to show you Exhibit

 4    P528, the UN report from the Secretary-General of the UN concerning

 5    Srebrenica.  Let's go to page 96, I believe.

 6            THE INTERPRETER:   93, correction from the interpreter.

 7            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] That's right.

 8       Q.   Look at the paragraph 431, in which it is said -- let's start with

 9    the second sentence:

10            [In English] "On 29 July, the UNPROFOR commander wrote to his

11    superiors at UNPF headquarters in Zagreb that the BSA regular troops

12    around Zepa had largely been withdrawn and that most of the remaining

13    troops were reservists who he assessed would not conduct operations to

14    clear the area of remaining Bosniaks."

15            [Interpretation] From your analysis, does this -- is this

16    consistent with what happened in the field, starting from the 29th of

17    July?

18       A.   And again, ma'am, I don't know the answer to that.  I could --

19    like I said, we have the documents to be able to do that, and, you know,

20    as a matter of consequence, you know, I think it's well known that the UN

21    didn't have an accurate reflection of all of the things that were

22    happening in these areas.  He may very well believe what he's saying.  I

23    think we have the vehicle to verify that one way or the other.  I'm just

24    saying I haven't done it yet, so I can't agree or disagree.

25       Q.   That's fine.  And just above that paragraph, the preceding

Page 20643

 1    paragraph, can we look at the upper part of that page, please.  No, up.

 2    I'm interested in this sentence that begins:  "General Mladic ... ":

 3            [In English] "General Mladic, who had spent the whole of July in

 4    the Srebrenica-Zepa area of Eastern Bosnia, moved to Banja Luka, taking

 5    key staff, including General Tolimir, and some military resources with

 6    him."

 7            [Interpretation] I think what is of particular interest here in

 8    this sentence, when he mentions key staff, I think that you can agree that

 9    General Miletic never went to the Banja Luka area, did he?  I'm talking

10    about this particular period, of course.

11       A.   No, ma'am, I don't believe that I'm aware of any information out

12    there that suggests that during the late July, August 1995 time frame,

13    that General Miletic was one -- was going up to Banja Luka.  So, I mean,

14    I -- I agree with your -- like I said, I'm just not aware of any

15    information from people who would, in theory, know, so I agree.

16            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like now to show you P3015.

17    I think everybody will be happy to know that this is the next-to-last

18    document I will be presenting.

19       Q.   This is a request from General Krstic that was sent to General

20    Miletic on the 20th of July concerning the deployment of the military

21    police of the 65th Protection Regiment in Zepa.  First of all, do you have

22    any information whereby the Commander Malinic's unit ever came to Zepa?

23       A.   No, ma'am, I don't -- I don't know if -- I don't think --

24    certainly they didn't deploy as a whole body, and I don't have any

25    information that a company or two may have gone down to Zepa or not.  So,

Page 20644

 1    I mean, like I say, I don't know that this was in fact acted upon.

 2       Q.   Let me now ask you to look at the paragraph -- the second

 3    paragraph of this document that refers to people who were pillaging or

 4    looting Zepa and didn't contribute to liberating Zepa, and then there's a

 5    reference to the former enclave of Zepa on the last line.  Do you agree

 6    that this document is dated the 20th of July and that on the 20th of July

 7    Zepa hadn't been liberated from the point of view of Serbs; Serbs hadn't

 8    entered into Zepa yet?

 9       A.   I don't agree with your position that when they're making the

10    phrase "into the former enclave," that they're referring to Zepa.  I

11    believe, in fact, that when they make the reference, you know, "into the

12    former enclaves and loot for themselves," I think we're talking about

13    Srebrenica, and I think what they're doing is a comparative -- what

14    they're saying is that, you know, "We know what happened in Srebrenica,

15    where various military formations came in and looted, and that we don't

16    want to have that situation repeated in Zepa."  I mean, that's --

17       Q.   But this document talks about the deployment of the military

18    police at the check-points around Zepa, so I don't see, if you place the

19    police around Zepa, how you can compare with looting that took place in

20    Srebrenica.

21            THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction "prevent looting in

22    Srebrenica."

23       A.   Again, it may be just a function of linguistics, but, I mean,

24    whether it is or is not, again it goes back to the function that what they

25    wanted to do was to prevent a situation where material that they would

Page 20645

 1    capture would not essentially get stolen, it would in fact be maintained

 2    and properly accounted for by the army.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Madame Fauveau, aren't the words in paragraph

 4    2 "check-points on roads leading out of Zepa" indicative that the enclave

 5    that is referred to, the former enclave that is referred to here at the

 6    end, at the end of that paragraph, couldn't be Zepa itself?

 7            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I believe that we need to read out

 8    the whole sentence:

 9            [In English] "At check-points on roads leading out of Zepa and

10    would take most vigorous measures to prevent the looting of war booty by

11    looters who did not contribute to the liberation of the Zepa enclave in

12    any way, but got together to loot and are waiting behind the combat

13    formation of the units to make an incursion into the former enclave and

14    loot for themselves."

15            THE WITNESS:  I certainly -- I mean, I can read it and I can see

16    exactly what your point is on this, and I think for the purpose of your

17    question, I mean, at this point in time, you know, I would agree that the

18    Zepa enclave had not fallen yet.

19            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

20       Q.   When we analyse this document today, we do it on the basis of

21    information that we have.  But at the time, when such a document with that

22    wording reached the Main Staff, do you think that the person who received

23    it at the Main Staff might have thought that Zepa was liberated?

24       A.   Well, as -- as you're aware, at various points in times, the VRS

25    thought that Zepa was liberated, in so much as they thought they had

Page 20646

 1    reached an agreement on the surrender of the Muslims, only to find out

 2    that either the Muslims had been ordered to repudiate that agreement or

 3    backed away from it on their own.  This easily sounds like one of those

 4    times where they thought that the operation was now concluding, they had

 5    achieved their goal, only to find out that, no, it wasn't the case.

 6            So, like I said, I mean, this obviously looks like, you know,

 7    again something that a prudent, you know, commander would be thinking

 8    about, how to control the battlefield after the liberation, and, yeah, he

 9    jumped the gun a few days because it wasn't quite liberated yet.

10       Q.   In any case, for somebody who was not in the field and received

11    such information, well, the situation was rather confused, to say the

12    least.  Would you agree with that?

13       A.   Yes, ma'am.  I think when you look at the whole body of

14    information there, there are many cases where the VRS thought that a

15    situation was turning out in one particular way, only to find out that

16    they were wrong, again either by design or just by faulting reporting.

17    That's a natural part of it.

18            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

19            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] One last document and one question

20    only.  Would you let me finish before the break?  I think it's only going

21    to take us two minutes.

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, by all means, Madame Fauveau.

23            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24            Exhibit P3039.  This is an exhibit from the OTP.  We only have it

25    in B/C/S, but you've seen it before.  It's a document from MSF.  And we

Page 20647

 1    have a list of the local personnel that left the former enclave of

 2    Srebrenica with them.

 3       Q.   This document is addressed to the 2nd Corps of the ABiH.  You can

 4    see the seal of the Command of the 2nd Corps on this document.  We can see

 5    the date, 19th of July, and the document was received by the Command of

 6    the 2nd Corps on the following day.  The only thing I'm interested in here

 7    is why MSF drew up the list of its local personnel and addressed the list

 8    of its local personnel to the ABiH.  Why?

 9            JUDGE AGIUS:  Madame Fauveau and Mr. McCloskey, should we

10    broadcast this or not?  It's not being broadcast.  Okay.

11            THE WITNESS:  I have no idea, ma'am.  I don't know the answer to

12    this one.

13            MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  I have no

14    further question.

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  I thank you, Madame Fauveau.

16            We'll have a 25-minute break, and then who is going -- Mr. Josse

17    or Mr. Krgovic?

18            MR. JOSSE:  I've got the pleasure, Your Honour.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  And how long do you expect your cross-examination to

20    last?

21            MR. JOSSE:  I'm confident that I will finish within my four-hour

22    estimate.

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  We'll continue later.  Thank you.

24                          --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

25                          --- On resuming at 1.13 p.m.

Page 20648

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Sorry for the delay.  It wasn't our fault, it's

 2    again a technical hitch that has now been solved.

 3            Mr. Josse, towards the end we will need a few minutes to get an

 4    update from Mr. McCloskey on the Beara motion.

 5            Yes.

 6            MR. OSTOJIC:  Just quickly, I think we can resolve it.  That's

 7    been resolved, Mr. President.  We've withdrawn the motion.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Then we just need one minute to hand down a

 9    decision -- a ruling rather than a decision, yeah.

10            Mr. Josse.

11            MR. JOSSE:  Thank you, Your Honour.

12            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

13                          Cross-examination by Mr. Josse:

14       Q.   Mr. Butler, my name is David Josse, and along with Dragan Krgovic,

15    we represent General Gvero in this trial.

16            And I want to begin by asking you something which is very dear to

17    General Gvero's heart, and that is the issue of morale as a military

18    concept.  Presumably, you received some basic training in that concept in

19    the US Army.  Correct?

20       A.   Yes, sir.  Morale and the maintenance of good morale is of

21    fundamental importance to a military formation.

22       Q.   And did you receive specific training in morale as a military

23    concept?

24       A.   As part of my junior officer training, issues of morale, yes.

25       Q.   What about when you left the US military and you came to the

Page 20649

 1    ICTY?  And by that I mean either on secondment or as a UN employee.   It

 2    doesn't matter for the purposes of this question.  Did you make specific

 3    studies of the concept of morale in the JNA, or the VRS, or Warsaw Pact

 4    countries in general?

 5       A.   Yes, sir, I did.  I mean, beyond my knowledge of how that works

 6    within the Warsaw Pact, I did look at it within the context of the

 7    importance of where the former JNA placed that, as well as how it was

 8    applied in the VRS during the war.

 9       Q.   To what extent are you aware of the development of the role of the

10    assistant commander for morale in both the JNA and the VRS, really, since

11    partisan times?

12       A.   Well, within the context of the JNA, morale as a concept was

13    covered under the broader mantra of the types of issues that the political

14    officers would deal with.  Again, it was part of the larger process of

15    motivating soldiers by educating them on the -- at that time, obviously,

16    the socialist values of the nation-state of the former Yugoslavia and, you

17    know, how that process evolved.

18            As it turned into the VRS and the communist/socialist droppings

19    came off, it was more along an exercise of how to be able to essentially

20    educate the rank-and-file soldiers with respect to, you know, the goals

21    and objectives of the new nation-state Republika Srpska and what they were

22    fighting for and what their fight actually meant.

23       Q.   It goes without saying that the socialist ethos that you have just

24    described does not exist in the army in which you served.  It's an obvious

25    point.  I'm sure we can all agree on that.

Page 20650

 1       A.   I've heard it declared in some quarters that the United States

 2    military is the last bastion of socialism in an otherwise capitalist

 3    nation, but, yeah, I agree, we don't train our officers and personnel in

 4    the socialist methods.

 5       Q.   And at a practical level, there's no concept or notion of an

 6    assistant commander for morale in the US Army or, indeed, any NATO army;

 7    isn't that right?

 8       A.   Certainly within the United States, there's not an assistant

 9    commander or equivalent position for morale.  Morale or the maintenance of

10    good morale is a responsibility that all officers are required to engage

11    in.

12       Q.   And morale is looked after in the US Army by commanders rather

13    than a specific assistant commander; would you agree with that

14    generalisation?

15       A.   Yes, sir, it is a command function.

16       Q.   And your study of how the morale sector developed within the VRS,

17    from the socialist days into the JNA and so on and so forth, came from

18    what, in short?

19       A.   The -- looking at the doctrine and regulations of the former JNA

20    on how they describe the roles and the functions of that particular

21    branch, again under the auspice of the political works at the time and

22    then looking at the VRS and seeing how they applied it or how they did not

23    apply certain aspects of that.

24       Q.   Did you have a tutor who was familiar with this type of thing, in

25    other words, someone who'd served in an army where there was an assistant

Page 20651

 1    commander for morale or such like post?

 2       A.   No, sir.  At the time, we did not have any members of the military

 3    analyst team who had any background in a former Warsaw Pact or socialist

 4    military.

 5       Q.   So would it be fair of me to say that your experience is

 6    exclusively academic and has no practical background at all?

 7       A.   The basic tenets of morale, obviously, I know as an officer, but

 8    certainly the aspects of how the JNA applied it and -- you know, and how

 9    the VRS applied it are based on my studies.  They're not based on any

10    practical realisation I have done.

11       Q.   And nor, for that matter, based on a conversation that you've had

12    with anyone?

13       A.   I have had discussions with some individuals who are associated

14    with this, but I don't -- to the degree that I think you're looking for,

15    no, we didn't do it to that depth.

16       Q.   All right.  Now, the next issue I'd like to ask you about is some

17    of the terms that we have seen in military documents.  And we had a brief

18    example of that earlier, I'm not going to bring it up, where Madame

19    Fauveau showed you a document, and she said the particular term in it had

20    been slightly mistranslated.  Issues such as that, how, when you started

21    at the ICTY, did you confront them?

22       A.   Certainly in the early days of my analysis, as we would go over

23    military documents and they were translated, there were a number of

24    questions that would come up on various documents as to how a word or how

25    a phrase was translated, and at that point I would go to the various

Page 20652

 1    translators, not only team translators but in some cases to the CLSS

 2    translators and advisers, and, you know, using the JNA lexicon or other

 3    military documents, we would seek to come to an understanding as to what a

 4    term or phraseology would be and how it best translates into the English

 5    language.  So we did come across those issues.

 6       Q.   How would you use the JNA military lexicon, practically?  It's in

 7    Serbian, isn't it?

 8       A.   Yes.  It would be translated -- you know, the various phrases

 9    would be translated.  You know, we would bring up a phrase, what we needed

10    to do, and talk to the translators and ask them what this meant under the

11    various circumstances.

12       Q.   Did you have any specialist military translators?

13       A.   At the time, the ICTY did not have anyone who I would call a

14    specialist military translator.  I think as a course of working through

15    this over the years, a number of those translators that we're dealing with

16    in the early years are probably now some of the best in the world at doing

17    it, but certainly not in 1997 and 1998.

18       Q.   Well, if what I'm about to do is deemed unfair, then I'm going to

19    be stopped, but we, in the Gvero team, have looked in part at the JNA

20    lexicon and have compiled a list of terms, which is 6D227, please.  I've

21    got a hard copy for you, to make it a little easier, Mr. Butler.  This,

22    for obvious reasons, is not translated, but all the words that -- all the

23    words that are on this list, we have had officially translated, the

24    entries that relate to them from the JNA military lexicon.  If you could

25    perhaps turn to that in a few moments' time.  I hope that's clear.

Page 20653

 1            Now, we appreciate, Mr. Butler, as you've made clear, that you

 2    worked in conjunction with translators, but there is often a very narrow

 3    and subtle difference in the meaning of some of these terms.  Would you

 4    agree with that?

 5       A.   Yes, sir.

 6       Q.   Now, take, for example, at number 12, and you'll have to excuse my

 7    pronunciation because it's absolutely atrocious, but I think

 8    it's "naredjenje," that is a word that is frequently seen in the documents

 9    to mean "order"; correct?

10       A.   I believe that's my understanding of it, sir, yes.

11       Q.   But by the same token, the word at number 23, "zapovest" also

12    means "order."  Would you, without consulting the lexicon, be able to help

13    the Trial Chamber with the difference between those two terms?

14       A.   In fairness, I'm not familiar with the term listed under 23, so I

15    couldn't do that.  I don't recall seeing that in the documents that I've

16    dealt with.

17       Q.   Perhaps I should go back a stage and ask you this:  Would you

18    accept that the word "naredjenje" is a term of military art?

19       A.   The whole point of them being in a military lexicon is a

20    reflection that it has, in military art, a specific terminology to it,

21    yes, sir.

22       Q.   What about 17, "odluka"?  That -- I don't want to be unfair.

23    That, translated in the translation that I have as "decision."

24       A.   Again, that's not a word that I am particularly familiar with.  I

25    mean, I may have seen it, but it doesn't strike me as a word that I'm

Page 20654

 1    familiar with.

 2       Q.   So -- and I could go through this exercise in relation to several

 3    other words, for example, words that relate to information, which is 2, 5

 4    and 15, for everyone's information.  You, when confronted with these

 5    terms, would be obviously wholly reliant on the translator, wholly

 6    reliant?

 7       A.   When -- I mean, certainly reliant completely on the translator for

 8    a translated version of that.  Where my role in this process would be is

 9    if I were reading a particular order or a document and I recognised within

10    the context of that document that there was a word or phrase that just

11    seemed completely out of place with the body of the remainder of the

12    material, is where I would ask for a clarification to determine whether or

13    not it had been translated properly, because certainly I'm aware that many

14    of the words as they're defined in the lexicon have a different meaning or

15    different interpretation in a civilian context.  And particularly in the

16    early years, we did have situations where our translators would translate

17    them in a civilian context and not necessarily in a military one.

18       Q.   So one last try on this, and then we'll have a look at the

19    lexicon.  Take 2, "informacija," and number 15, "obavestenje," which I

20    understand means "notice," offhand, are you able to tell us what the

21    difference is, if any?

22       A.   No.  I mean, I'm familiar with the term at number 2, but I'm not

23    sure that I've seen the term 15 used in the military context.

24       Q.   Okay.  Let's then have a look at the lexicon briefly so that we

25    have some idea how you might work with the lexicon, along with the

Page 20655

 1    translator, of course.

 2            So this is 6D223, and let's go to page 5 in the English.  Let's go

 3    to the word we perhaps see most commonly, "naredjenje" and I'm about to

 4    get the B/C/S page number.  Page 9 -- 8, I beg your pardon, it's 8.

 5            So this entry in the lexicon has been officially translated. What

 6    would happen?  Would the translator who was assisting you have written out

 7    the definition for you, or would he or she read this out to you, would it

 8    be a joint effort?  I'd like to know how you were able to deal with these

 9    highly-technical matters in a language you simply don't understand at all.

10       A.   What I would do as a matter of course, if there were a question on

11    the definition of the word -- or not definition but in where the word was

12    or how it was being translated, I would go up to, in this particular case,

13    you know, as my first port of call, would be our team translator, and she,

14    in this case, would read out the definition to me, as to what it was

15    and -- you know, in its entirety, and I would make a decision, you know,

16    whether or not, well, are we talking about this or is this a potentially

17    different word.

18            If there still remained a question in my mind that, you know,

19    somewhere along the line a word was being mistranslated because it didn't

20    fit within the broader context, I would actually go over to the revisers

21    at CLSS, who were considered to be, you know, the most senior authorities

22    on these issues, I would explain, you know, what the document was, how it

23    was translated, and ask them to look at it because my understanding is

24    that the way it's being translated now didn't make sense in the military

25    context, and to go back and confirm that this was in fact what it had

Page 20656

 1    said.  If they went back and researched it and said,"This is what it

 2    said," that's fine, and if they came back and said, "We went back and we

 3    believe that this word is a more appropriate word," you know, that's what

 4    they did.  And I think, you know, the give -- the give and take that we

 5    did with respect to the phrase "asanacija" is a good example of that,

 6    because that as a phrase in the Yugoslav language doesn't literally

 7    translate well into the English language, and it took a lot of discussion

 8    to come up with a phrase that, you know, somehow made sense, and knowing

 9    what -- and what the intent and meaning was behind that.

10            So there was a lot of work with respect to trying to understand

11    these phrases as accurately as possible.

12       Q.   That is a good example, because that remains a matter of

13    contention in cases where that word is of pertinence.  It's not really in

14    this case, but --

15       A.   That's right.

16       Q.   That's right, isn't it?

17       A.   Yes.  You know, from an English language perspective, obviously

18    restoration of the terrain, as it is literally translated, does not have,

19    you know, the same underlying meaning as when you look at the actual

20    definition of what the word is, and so there is some kind of -- you know,

21    there is some discussion that goes along to try and determine how one can

22    describe the word, even though it doesn't literally translate, in order

23    that the proper meaning is employed.

24       Q.   Would you agree that it was a great failing on the part of the

25    Office of the Prosecutor not to provide you with a military expert who

Page 20657

 1    understood intimately, (a), the B/C/S language and, (b), the use of these

 2    terms, having had practical experience of working with them over a number

 3    of years?

 4       A.   I would disagree, because if you understand the reality at the

 5    time, the reason why that wasn't the case is because precisely these

 6    people did not want to cooperate with the institution or the Office of the

 7    Prosecutor.  Certainly, I would have loved to have had these same battery

 8    of military experts that we all see now back in 1997.

 9       Q.   Well, that's a -- that's a completely different point.

10       A.   Well, no, sir, not if you're going to judge whether or not it's a

11    failing or not.

12       Q.   You're saying that practically it wasn't possible --

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  No arguing with the witness.  If you have a

14    question -- I think he's answered your question, that he doesn't agree

15    with your proposition that it was a failing -- failure on the part of the

16    Prosecution.  If you have a further question for him, go ahead.  If not,

17    then proceed with your next question, but no argument with the witness.

18            MR. JOSSE:  My apologies.

19       Q.   You're saying practically it wasn't possible?

20       A.   That is correct.  I mean, under the circumstances at the time, we

21    didn't really have the ability to get these types of individuals.  They,

22    for the most part, were not interested in cooperating with the Office of

23    the Prosecutor.

24       Q.   But you are saying it would have been highly desirable, aren't

25    you?

Page 20658

 1       A.   Yes, sir.  I certainly -- I certainly would have welcomed that

 2    development.

 3       Q.   And that development never happened during your tenure with the

 4    Office of the Prosecutor; correct?

 5       A.   That is correct, yes, sir.

 6       Q.   And perhaps finally on this, you said it's not practical.  To what

 7    extent did you personally ever, for example, consult with a -- well, why

 8    don't I give you an example.  A Macedonian general who had no direct

 9    involvement in this conflict, ethnic or otherwise.

10       A.   Where -- where I had the opportunity, I tried to avail myself to

11    that.  I think in one particular case, I know I couldn't talk to him

12    personally, I mean, I was aware that we had, I believe, a Slovenian expert

13    who assisted in one case, and I closely followed that person's work to

14    essentially glean what information that I could out of that, recognising

15    that, you know, that person would have a more JNA-unique perspective, and

16    I did that as a way to, you know, continue to try and verify that where I

17    was going down was the correct path.  So to the extent that I could do

18    that, I tried to.

19            MR. JOSSE:  Could we, before we leave this document, have a quick

20    look at the definition of number 3, "informacija," which is page 2 in the

21    English.  And then I'm going to show you number 14 or 15.

22       Q.   Just looking at the document I've given you there in hard copy,

23    227, are you able to tell us offhand the difference between those two

24    terms?

25       A.   I'm sorry, which two terms again?

Page 20659

 1       Q.   Number 2 and number 14 or 15.

 2       A.   Again, no, sir, I don't believe I'm familiar with that -- that

 3    second term.  I mean, I may have seen it, but it doesn't strike me in the

 4    same way that I've seen on a number of occasions number 2.

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  I think you put the question already and he

 6    confirmed that he was not familiar with the second --

 7            MR. JOSSE:  I'll move on, Your Honour.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, thank you.

 9            MR. JOSSE:

10       Q.   A matter I can deal with quickly before we break for the day.

11    Single subordination, a very important concept in the JNA and the VRS;

12    would you agree?

13       A.   Yes, sir.

14            MR. JOSSE:  And just for completeness, could we have a look,

15    please, at P703, and it's page 24 in English.  And it's Article 173 at the

16    bottom of the page, and it's my apologies, I'm afraid I don't have the

17    B/C/S page number offhand, but it's a short article:

18            "Command in the Army shall be founded on principles of a unified

19    command regarding the use of forces and means, single authority,

20    obligations to enforce decisions, command and orders issued by superior

21    officers."

22            And this, for completeness, comes from the Official Gazette of the

23    Serbian people in BH of June of 1992, and it's part of the Law of the

24    Army.

25       Q.   Are you familiar with it?

Page 20660

 1       A.   Yes, sir, I am.

 2       Q.   And that sets out the single-subordination principle?

 3       A.   Yes, sir, it does.

 4       Q.   And just help us.  That principle, does it apply in the US Army?

 5       A.   I believe it applies with most respects to most modern military

 6    forces.

 7       Q.   So is there any difference between that and the US Army?  Is that

 8    the law in the US Army?

 9       A.   I couldn't quote you the chapter and verse out of Title 10, but I

10    mean certainly as a military principle within the US Army, unity of

11    command, which reflects the single authority, is in fact, you know, the

12    principle that we follow.

13       Q.   And just before we finish, for completeness, if we go down to the

14    bottom of the page, Article 175, and then turn over to the actual text of

15    that article, we see, summarising it, it says that the commander of the

16    Main Staff shall command the army in compliance with the authority

17    delegated to him by the president of the Republic in accordance with the

18    law.  So that's how the structure is devised?

19       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, that's -- it's evident.

20            MR. JOSSE:  Thank you.

21            That's a convenient moment, Your Honour.

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

23            Mr. Butler, you can leave the courtroom.  Thank you so much. We'll

24    meet again tomorrow morning at 9.00.

25                          [The witness stands down]

Page 20661

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

 2            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, just to let you know, as I've

 3    mentioned to my colleagues, it is my intention to withdraw Mr. Vasic as a

 4    witness.

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay, thank you.  We have no comments.

 6            We have a --

 7            MR. HAYNES:  No, I should say I haven't fully digested that

 8    information yet.  It may well be that I want to place a certain condition

 9    on that, but I'll discuss it with Mr. McCloskey.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay, thank you.

11            We have a ruling which will refer you back in time to a previous

12    decision of this Trial Chamber, which goes back to the 12th of September

13    of 2006.  In that decision, which I will be referring to as "the Rule 92

14    bis decision" for practical reasons, the Trial Chamber provisionally

15    admitted the written statements of Witnesses 27, 51, 57, 60, 61 and 81,

16    without requiring any of the said witnesses to appear for

17    cross-examination, and that was pending the provision of their statements

18    in a form that, in the Trial Chamber's judgement, satisfied the

19    requirements of Rule 92 bis, paragraph (b).

20            Reviewing our records, it transpires that Witness 81 subsequently

21    testified before this Trial Chamber pursuant to Rule 92 ter on the 11th

22    and 12th of January of last year.  Witness 60 was subsequently withdrawn

23    by the Prosecution, according to our records, on the 3rd of October, 2007.

24            In a submission which dates back to 19th October 2007, the

25    Prosecution provided certified statements for Witnesses 27, 57 and 61.

Page 20662

 1    Subsequently, in a further submission dated 8 November 2007, the

 2    Prosecution provided a certified statement for the remaining witness,

 3    namely, Witness 51.

 4            Now, we have, that's the Trial Chamber, reviewed the four

 5    submitted statements carefully, and we have come to a conclusion that they

 6    comply with the requirements of Rule 92 bis, para (b).  Accordingly, the

 7    four written statements are being admitted in evidence, in accordance with

 8    the Trial Chamber's decision of the 12th September 2006, which I referred

 9    to as a Rule 92 bis decision.

10            The statements are the following:  P02199, and that refers to

11    Witness number 27; P02203, and it refers to Witness 51; P02217, and it

12    refers to Witness 57; and P02225, and it refers to Witness number 61.

13            So we stand adjourned until tomorrow.  I would suggest at this

14    point in time, because we have no intention of wasting any time at all,

15    that Mr. McCloskey and the representation of the Defence teams, you sit

16    down and organise a little bit the scheduling now that Vasic is not coming

17    over.  I think Mr. Josse and Mr. Haynes need to give you an indication of

18    how long their cross-examination of this witness will last, and then you

19    do the rest, and you will give us a little bit of a clearer breakdown

20    tomorrow.

21            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22            Just one thing.  Mr. Parsons, it's my understanding he is

23    available for all day Friday but then the following week has various

24    meetings, so we hope to get to him on Friday.  And the other person is

25    in-house and is ready to go, so I'll be discussing that, but just so you

Page 20663

 1    know.

 2            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, please.  Thank you.  And please convey our

 3    apologies to the next Trial Chamber.  Thank you.

 4                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.58 p.m.,

 5                          to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day of

 6                          January, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.