Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 20664

 1                          Wednesday, 30 January 2008

 2                          [Open session]

 3                          [The accused entered court]

 4                          [The witness entered court]

 5                          --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning, everybody.  Good morning, Madam

 7    Registrar.  Could you call the case, please.

 8            THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case number

 9    IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, madam.

11            All the accused are here.  Absent, Ms. Nikolic, Mr. Meek.  The

12    Prosecution, it's just Mr. McCloskey today.

13            The witness is already present.  Good morning to you, Mr. Butler.

14    Mr. Josse will be proceeding with his cross-examination.

15                          WITNESS:  RICHARD BUTLER [Resumed].

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning to you, Mr. Josse.

17            MR. JOSSE:  Good morning, Your Honour, and thank you.

18                          Cross-examination by Mr. Josse:  [Continued]

19       Q.   Mr. Butler, this morning I would like to turn to the issue of your

20    independent expertise.  And on the 22nd of January of this year, at page

21    20158 of the transcript, my learned friend Mr. Ostojic was cross-examining

22    you on this topic, and forgive me for saying this.  He then got slightly

23    waylaid on the issue of aerial images, and I would like to return to the

24    subject without touching on that rather sensitive matter.  And you had

25    said to him that, and I paraphrase, with respect to the Srebrenica team

Page 20665

 1    and investigation, you accepted that you were integrated as a strategic

 2    member of the OTP.  Do you recall that?

 3       A.   Not of the OTP, but certainly a strategic member of the Srebrenica

 4    investigative team, yes, sir.

 5       Q.   Yes.  Well, the transcript says that.  I'm not going to hold you

 6    to that slight difference, because it's understandable, in particular

 7    because Mr. Ostojic speaks English so fast.  But, anyway, leaving that

 8    aside, perhaps you'd tell us this:  What was your role within that team;

 9    purely an analyst or did you have any other role?

10       A.   My role as an analyst was -- was primarily to help the team

11    members, the investigators and the prosecutors, to understand the military

12    context of the issues surrounding the crime base that they were

13    investigating.  I did not perform duties as an investigator in so much as

14    interviewing witnesses and things of that nature.  I mean, when I

15    participated in those events, and I did participate in a number of

16    interviews, I did so second chair, so to speak, to the investigator. They

17    ran those types of issues that are within their competence to do,

18    certainly.  So my views, analytically speaking, with respect to where

19    military units or police units were involved in various areas and time and

20    everything else ultimately became part of the team's understanding of, you

21    know, the larger issues of where military formations were and who their

22    commanders were with respect to the crime base.  So that was my role as an

23    analyst.  I was not a super investigator or something of that nature.

24       Q.   So far as the interviews were concerned, did it ever occur to you

25    to say to your bosses, "Well, perhaps I shouldn't participate in these.

Page 20666

 1    It's going to compromise my independence"?

 2       A.   No, sir.  In fact, the -- for me, the opposite was more

 3    applicable.  Given the fact that much of my work, as I've testified,

 4    revolves around the fact of taking what was for formerly the JNA doctrine,

 5    the VRS documents and rules as I understood them, and because I wasn't a

 6    member of the JNA or VRS, I had a very keen interest in talking

 7    particularly those military officials who could provide information as to

 8    whether or not I was in fact pursuing a correct theory on the

 9    applicability of those issues.  I mean, I felt that it was vital to my

10    analysis to be able to get that opinion from these individuals.

11       Q.   And you were present at the interviews of some significant

12    characters, so far as this case is concerned.  Correct me if I'm wrong.

13    You were present at Trivic's interview, Sladojevic's interview, Momir

14    Nikolic's interview, Borin's [phoen] interview and Erdemovic's interviews;

15    correct?

16       A.   Yes, sir.

17       Q.   And bearing that in mind, wouldn't it be fair to say that you were

18    Mr. Ruez simply with a military hat on?  You've had a few years experience

19    in the US military, you got to the rank of warrant officer, you did some

20    analysis for the United States.  What's the difference between you and

21    Mr. Ruez?  Why can't he give the evidence you're giving?

22       A.   Well, sir, I mean, going back to that particular context,

23    Mr. Ruez, as a experienced police investigator and as the team leader,

24    dealt with many aspects of the conduct of the investigation, which I would

25    have had no involvement in; the issue of forensics, the issue of evidence

Page 20667

 1    collection, those types of things.  I mean, those are not my area of

 2    expertise.  I have no qualifications in them.

 3            Conversely, you know, as a police investigator and expert, you

 4    know, Mr. Ruez's limits with respect to being able to spend the months and

 5    in some cases years that I have spent looking at the military doctrine,

 6    understanding how the military interrelationship worked during the

 7    conflict, I mean, he would not have the ability to do that by virtue of a

 8    lack of the professional education to do so.  So our roles are

 9    complementary and they're not necessarily overlapping.

10       Q.   So what do you put it down to, your education and experience in

11    the United States Army or the very many years you had working for the very

12    organisation that's prosecuting these seven men?  What is it that you say

13    allows you to come here and give expert military opinion?

14       A.   It's a combination of both.  My training with the United States

15    Army gave me the knowledge and the tools to be able to understand what the

16    job was and to know how to organise it to do the analysis, as I've had to

17    do that in the past.  My specific experience here, essentially working

18    with, for lack of a better term, a non-public collection of material, gave

19    me the specific expertise relating to this particular crime base and this

20    particular military unit, the Drina Corps.

21       Q.   How many warrant officers are there in the United States Army or

22    how many were there at the point you retired?

23       A.   I couldn't tell you that.  I could tell you that in my particular

24    career field, as all-source intelligence analyst, there were, when I

25    retired, roughly 150.

Page 20668

 1       Q.   Would the number of warrant officers go into the thousands?

 2       A.   Well, the warrant officer field in the United States Army probably

 3    would go into about, I mean, easily 25, 30,000.

 4       Q.   Thank you.  And perhaps you'd help us.  The correlation between a

 5    warrant officer and, shall we say, an officer who has just come out of the

 6    US military academy with the rank of second lieutenant is what, please?

 7    In other words, the lowest commissioned officer and a warrant officer,

 8    what is the correlation and the command structure between those positions?

 9       A.   Warrant officers, we are considered by -- in at least my military,

10    we are considered to be our army's professional experts on technical

11    issues.  So in that context, that is why we exist.  We are considered to

12    be, certainly once you get to the rank of chief warrant officer two, you

13    are commissioned, and in fact you take a commissioning oath.  A young

14    lieutenant coming out of the system, you know, these are young officers

15    who will one day, you know -- are considered to be individuals who are

16    also professionals in their trade and they will be groomed for command.

17    As such, their professional education and professional development and

18    career track, you know, are going to differ.

19            By accepting the fact that warrant officers are not going to be

20    individuals who are going to be groomed for senior leadership issues -- or

21    senior issues of command, you know, we have the ability to be able to

22    focus strictly on technical issues of our career fields and not have to,

23    as we say, you know, be reassigned to other areas in order to broaden our

24    perspective on various military issues that are of value to the service

25    but not necessarily have any bearing to our own technical qualifications.

Page 20669

 1       Q.   If push comes to shove, a situation occurs where there's a warrant

 2    officer and a second lieutenant, who's in charge?

 3       A.   Well, the second lieutenant is in charge in the chain of command.

 4       Q.   So -- and there must be tens of thousands of commissioned officers

 5    in the United States Army who therefore have command over warrant

 6    officers; correct?

 7       A.   Yes, sir.

 8       Q.   Literally tens of thousands?

 9       A.   Absolutely, yes.

10       Q.   Now, let's go back, if we may, to your role within the Office of

11    the Prosecutor.  You've described how you would give this, as you put it,

12    technical expertise to the investigators and the lawyers.  To what extent

13    were you involved in constructing the case theory with the investigators

14    and the lawyers, or did you step aside from that in order to maintain your

15    independence?

16       A.   No, sir.  I mean, I -- I didn't see it as an issue of my

17    independence.  I was involved in setting up the case theory, with the --

18    to the extent that we were talking about the potential involvement of

19    units of the Drina Corps and their subordinate formations.  I mean, that

20    was a fundamental component of my analysis, to be able to provide

21    information which we would share with the investigators and with the

22    lawyers that said, you know, here were the designated commanders at the

23    time, here is the information that proves that they were in command during

24    various portions.  So, I mean, it was an integrated process.  I mean,

25    there wasn't an artificial separation there.

Page 20670

 1       Q.   To what extent were you party to discussions as to who should and

 2    should not be indicted before this Tribunal?

 3       A.   I believe as I testified before, I was probably a party to almost

 4    all of those discussions while I was here.  The difference is I just

 5    didn't get a vote.

 6       Q.   What about the construction of the indictment in General Krstic's

 7    case; did you have any say or party -- or part in the construction of that

 8    indictment?

 9       A.   In the sense of General Krstic, I was certainly involved in the

10    construction with respect to the factual issues that went as part of the

11    indictment.  I don't believe I was involved with respect to issues

12    relating to, you know, legal issues, theories of liability, things of that

13    nature.

14       Q.   You had your part and your say in the construction of the factual

15    allegations that that man faced when he stood trial in this building;

16    correct?

17       A.   Yes, sir, absolutely.

18       Q.   What about when it came to Colonel Blagojevic and I think it's

19    Major Jokic?

20       A.   Yes, sir, to the same degree.  My responsibility as part of that

21    process was to contribute with respect to the factual basis.

22       Q.   And clearly perhaps most importantly, what about in relation to

23    these seven gentlemen who are standing trial here?

24       A.   Well, Colonel Pandurevic was indicted as part of the same package

25    that General Krstic was, so certainly I was heavily involved in the

Page 20671

 1    indictment of Colonel Pandurevic.  I think there was -- I was involved to

 2    a certain degree with Colonel Beara, Colonel Popovic, because I believe

 3    the discussions on those individuals was still occurring while I was

 4    here.  With respect to Generals Gvero and Miletic and Colonel Borovcanin

 5    and Drago Nikolic, I don't believe I was involved, because I think most of

 6    the substantive issues behind that may have already occurred either as I

 7    was getting ready to leave or as I was leaving, so I don't think I was

 8    heavily involved in that process.

 9       Q.   All right, let's move on.  I'll ask a matter of a little

10    sensitivity.  What about the unfortunate victims and all their families of

11    these awful crimes; have you had any dealings with them?

12       A.   No, sir, not -- not at any level I'm aware of.  I mean, I would

13    have obviously come across them with respect to, you know, their testimony

14    as witnesses and things of that nature, but on a professional

15    investigative basis, other than maybe meeting, you know, once or twice,

16    you know, someone like Hasan Nuhanovic, no.

17       Q.   What about the wives of some of the men killed; did you ever meet

18    any of them in the field, inadvertently or otherwise?

19       A.   I know that I may have come across the testimony of one or two,

20    again, as part of the witness process, but, you know, as a general

21    practice, dealing with the actual victims was not something that I needed

22    to do or deal with to do my work, so I didn't.

23       Q.   Now, you have conceded that you are not independent of the Office

24    of the Prosecutor, for the reasons you've described, but you have

25    maintained that you're entirely objective.  That's really what you're

Page 20672

 1    saying, isn't it?

 2       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, as a practical reality, you know, I acknowledge

 3    that I'm not independent of the Office of the Prosecutor because I worked

 4    for them.  Having said that, you know, my understanding of what my role is

 5    within the organisation, as an analyst, is to be able to, to the extent

 6    that I can, demonstrate what ground truth was, and it has the impact that

 7    it has on where the Office of the Prosecutor takes cases.  That is why

 8    I've tried to do as detailed a job as I can in footnoting and making clear

 9    all of my particular judgements and conclusions, you know, because I am

10    aware of the fact that I'm not going to be perceived as a neutral party.

11       Q.   Do you think the maxim "he who pays the piper calls the tune" has

12    any application in your case?

13       A.   Again, as I indicated before, as a matter of my professional

14    training, my military superiors expected me to be able to give them the

15    most candid and truthful observation of what was happening on the

16    battlefield, obviously despite my own loyalty to my own army.  That's what

17    I was paid to do, that's what I was trained to do.  I did it in the United

18    States Army, and to the best that I could, I did it in the same location

19    for the exact same reasons.

20       Q.   Well, I don't want to upset the United States Army, so I'm not

21    going to ask you about your role there, but I am going to ask you about

22    your role here and try and test what you have just said.

23            Give the Trial Chamber one concrete example of where you stood up

24    to your bosses in the Office of the Prosecutor and said, "No, I don't

25    think that theory is right because of X, Y and Z," in relation to the

Page 20673

 1    military field.  Demonstrate your independence to this Court.

 2       A.   You've -- you could probably subpoena half of the Galic trial

 3    team, to include the Deputy Prosecutor of the OTP, and get an entire

 4    chapter on my disagreement with how the Office of the Prosecutor dealt

 5    with the Galic case.  I was one of the two military analysts assigned to

 6    that, and I think that if you polled the second floor, you probably would

 7    get most of the senior trial attorneys who would be able to tell you in

 8    chapter and verse how bloody that fighting was with respect to military

 9    opinions versus prosecutorial goals.

10       Q.   And how did that manifest itself in the trial, for those of us who

11    don't know?

12       A.   Well, at the end of the day, it's the responsibility of the senior

13    trial attorney to make the decisions for the conduct of the trial.

14    Perhaps the best thing that can be said about that is the fact that after

15    the Prosecution case was over, I was no longer working for that particular

16    trial team.

17       Q.   And this aspect of your independence you've just described, did it

18    manifest itself at all in the Srebrenica team?

19       A.   To a large degree, it didn't.

20       Q.   Because there was no disagreements?

21       A.   The thing which made it very professionally rewarding for me in

22    the Srebrenica team, and what set it apart from the Galic case, for that

23    matter, was the fact that from the very beginning, the investigative team

24    did not have a preconceived notion of who they were going to indict and

25    how it was going to work and then tried to make the analysis fit.  They

Page 20674

 1    were very receptive to the idea -- to the fact that collectively at the

 2    time, we all didn't know.  I mean, I think I've testified that the Drina

 3    Corps when I got here was an abstract entity.  We didn't know what it was

 4    and what it meant, and it was a collective process where we all came to,

 5    you know, the knowledge base together.

 6            So it wasn't a question of trying to jam military analysis in

 7    order to fit a legal theory.  It was more along the lines of the fact that

 8    the legal theory was built around the analysis.

 9       Q.   All right.  Let's go back, if I may, to where I began.  I've

10    nearly finished this line of questions.

11            You are saying that what distinguishes you from Mr. Ruez or, for

12    that matter, Mr. McCloskey are the years of experience you had in the US

13    doing military analyst work and the fact that you were able to devote so

14    much time to military issues when you came to The Hague; correct?

15       A.   Yes, sir.

16       Q.   You accept, don't you, that if it wasn't for the fact that you'd

17    had all this time to examine these particular matters, you in fact

18    wouldn't be in a position to comment on these matters, over and above

19    thousands of other members of the US Army, for example?

20       A.   Yes, sir.  My expertise is based on my work.  I know we've had

21    this discussion on a legal basis about what a military expert is or is

22    not, but I can assure you that other than CNN, you know, nobody has the

23    title "military expert."  You know, your expertise is developed on the

24    basis of your history, your training, and the work that you do, not that

25    you go to a qualification course and you walk out as a military expert who

Page 20675

 1    can talk about any particular region under the sun.

 2       Q.   But it would be fair to say, wouldn't it, that you couldn't

 3    comment about practicalities in combat in the way that a person who

 4    actually served in combat could?  Do you agree with that?

 5       A.   I would disagree, in so much as I have done a number of

 6    contingency and combat-related tours, and I understand that.  That's my

 7    job to understand that.  I mean, the United States Army trains me to do

 8    intelligence, you know, in the clear light of the fact that it's going to

 9    be done in combat.

10       Q.   How can you comment in the way that, for example, an officer who

11    had senior command of a unit in combat would be able to, bearing in mind

12    the events that you're dealing with here, with real fighting, real flesh

13    and blood, I'm afraid?

14       A.   Well, sir, I would go back to, again, as a role of the training

15    and experience.  The United States Army, and my knowledge of the British

16    Army, you know, they don't take experienced combat commanders off of the

17    line and say, "Well, today you're going to be my intelligence officer,"

18    or, "You're going to study logistics."  You know, the fact that I'm not a

19    brigade commander, you know, is precisely why, you know, my army trained

20    me to understand how their brigade commanders work, an opposition force.

21    I don't have to be a brigade commander to understand that.  I do the

22    research.  I don't have to be a professional logistician to understand how

23    an opposing force's logistical train should work.  We don't use our

24    logisticians to do intelligence.  We use our logisticians to supply our

25    army.  That is how we operated.  That is the course of my training and

Page 20676

 1    experience.

 2            So I understand your position, how can I comment on what a brigade

 3    commander was or was not supposed to do with respect to the rules and his

 4    training because I wasn't one, but, you know, the opposite is that because

 5    that is precisely what I was trained to do as part of my own military

 6    profession.

 7       Q.   Your lack of practical experience of combat makes you very

 8    ill-equipped to comment as an expert, doesn't it?

 9       A.   You may have that opinion, but I will disagree.

10       Q.   Let's -- let me ask you one last thing.  Shortly after the passage

11    that I referred to at the beginning of this morning, the learned Presiding

12    Judge tried to cut through things in "a radical way" and asked you about

13    how you understood your role as an expert.  And you commented that, and

14    I'm paraphrasing here at page 20159, that you weren't an independent

15    arbitrator of the facts who had no association with the OTP, but you

16    believed the way your reports are written and information is provided,

17    that you're being as fair and as technically accurate "as I can with the

18    assistance of the Court."

19            You're bound to say that, aren't you?

20       A.   That is -- that is my role as an analyst.  I'm bound to say a lot

21    of things.  I don't quite understand the question.  I mean --

22       Q.   Let's have a look at what I suggest --

23       A.   Okay.

24       Q.   -- is you betray your objectivity and you showing your bias

25    towards at least one of these accused.

Page 20677

 1            And If we could please have in e-court the VRS Main Staff command

 2    responsibility report.  I'm told I need a 65 ter number.  2764.  And we

 3    need to go, please, to paragraph 2.10.

 4            Now, this was the report that you wrote dated the 9th of June of

 5    2006 in relation to the Main Staff, and the passage that I'm taking you to

 6    is the passage that deals with the assistant commander for morale, legal

 7    and religious affairs.  And after saying that the sector was an important

 8    component of the Main Staff, you say:

 9            "First and foremost, this staff element was responsible for

10    managing the information/propaganda campaign in support of war aims."

11            That's not true, is it?

12       A.   I believe it is.

13       Q.   You are saying that the main role of that sector was propaganda,

14    rather than morale, are you?

15       A.   Propaganda is a tool by which people use, you know, information in

16    order to impact morale.  It's -- it's a component part of how it's done.

17    It's not a separate issue.

18       Q.   That may be right, but first and foremost, that sector dealt with

19    morale; propaganda may have been part of the issue and import of morale,

20    but what you should have said there is that they dealt with morale, not

21    propaganda.  You said "propaganda" because it sounds worse. That's the

22    truth, Mr. Butler, isn't it?

23       A.   No, sir, I guess I don't -- I don't put the same meaning or

24    connotation to "propaganda" that you do.

25       Q.   Well, why don't you describe in that report anywhere anything else

Page 20678

 1    about morale other than propaganda?

 2       A.   The issue of morale, while an important part of military

 3    operations, I mean, doesn't play into the issue of what happened in July

 4    of 1995, as far as I can determine.  I mean, the fact that the staff

 5    section is entirely involving itself -- to a large degree, I should say,

 6    not "entirely," you know, involving its issue to maintaining the positive

 7    morale of the soldiers of the VRS and, to a larger extent, also the RS

 8    population behind the war aims, is a fascinating military issue that has

 9    very little bearing on July of 1995.

10       Q.   You're making it up as you go along, Mr. Butler.  Read 2.10.

11    There's no reference to 1995, is there?

12            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay, okay.  Please.

13            MR. JOSSE:  Well, Your Honour, I'm going to put my case forcefully

14    to this witness, and I'm entitled to do that, in my submission.  And if my

15    learned friend feels he needs to be a hound dog and guard dog for this

16    gentleman, then so be it, but I am going to put my case firmly and

17    squarely to him.  If the Court thinks I'm exceeding the bounds of

18    propriety, then they'll tell me.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, and we're telling you precisely that.  I don't

20    think we should -- you should use such words as, "You're making it up as

21    you go along, Mr. Butler."  Please, you can make your point and get there

22    using more moderate language.

23            All right.  I mean, please keep in your mind that not everyone is

24    used, familiar to the kind of cross-examination that you are used to, and

25    that some people happen to be more sensitive than others and some people

Page 20679

 1    would understand the words or the phrase that you used in a way which is

 2    very offensive.  I don't, but I think it's the case of moderating.

 3            MR. JOSSE:  I'll heed the warning, thank you.  I'll rephrase the

 4    question.

 5       Q.   2.10 does not deal with 1995, does it?

 6       A.   No, sir, but the whole context of these reports, as I've indicated

 7    as a component part of the introduction of these reports, is that they

 8    ultimately deal with issues of 1995.  So I've said it up front.  I hope I

 9    don't have to repeat it in every paragraph.

10       Q.   Well, for example, to test what you've just said, why mention at

11    all, then, the issue of the military prosecutor's offices, bearing in mind

12    they had ceased to be a responsibility of my client from mid-1993?  What

13    possible relevance did that have?

14       A.   The possible relevance of that is even though General Gvero's

15    office ceased to have control over that process, the fact that that

16    process was still available to him, first of all, in July of 1995.  The

17    second part and why I believe it's relevant is that going back to the

18    October 1992 guidance, where the -- his particular branch, you know, sends

19    out the information in a correct manner, reminding the senior military

20    officials of the army what their obligations are, and at the time he was

21    sending it out, he also controlled that as well.  So, for me, it's a

22    framework of establishing the fact that by position and not just by his

23    own, what, over 25 years of military experience, that these are issues

24    that he should have been acquainted with and in fact was acquainted with

25    in 1992.  So that was the connection that I am trying to make.

Page 20680

 1       Q.   Would you accept that the concept of morale, using the

 2    word "concept" reasonably advisedly, connoted and involved a great deal

 3    more than information/propaganda?

 4       A.   Absolutely, yes, sir.

 5       Q.   And the reason you didn't say that was because you say it had no

 6    relevance to the events that concern this case; is that your evidence?

 7       A.   Well, sir, I mean, just going through the issues of morale, for

 8    example, under the issue of morale, how soldiers who are killed serving

 9    their army and their country are dealt with, their military funerals and

10    the benefits that the army provides with that respect, particularly in the

11    culture I understand it, is of enormous significance, and the particular

12    morale branches of those units were deeply involved in doing that

13    correctly to honour the families and the service members.  It's an

14    important position, but in the context of what we're talking about in July

15    1995, is not of particular relevance.  By not mentioning it in that

16    context, I'm not saying that it's not an important factor.  It certainly

17    was.  But for the purposes of why we're all here today, it's not relevant.

18       Q.   Okay.  I'm going to ask you this once again.  Let's look at the

19    sentence:

20            "First and foremost, this staff element was responsible for

21    managing the information/propaganda campaign in support of war aims."

22            Bearing in mind your concession that the sector was involved in

23    much more than information and propaganda, do you think that sentence was

24    misleading?

25       A.   Oh, absolutely not, sir.  I mean, the reality is that most of the

Page 20681

 1    soldiers in the army did not, one, have a vested interest in the creation

 2    of an independent state, they did not have a vested interest in the

 3    ascension of power of Radovan Karadzic and the SDS, and that they were

 4    fighting for their own simple goals of the protection of their families

 5    and the protection of their villages.  So the efforts of the VRS, in order

 6    to try and reach out through informational campaigns, through propaganda,

 7    through whatever means necessary to try and impart shared goals and shared

 8    values on a largely apathetic group of soldiers was of enormous importance

 9    to the army.  And I think from very early on, the senior leadership of the

10    army recognised that as such.

11       Q.   Well, I think it's arguable whether you've answered my question,

12    but I'm going to move on and invite you to consider the answer you've just

13    given, because it's an interesting answer.  And you might want to read it

14    back.  It's an answer that comes from someone who has expertise in matters

15    political rather than military, isn't it?  Isn't it a good example of your

16    straying over the boundary and really simply saying whatever suits the

17    Prosecution case?

18       A.   No, sir.  I'm saying what's in a reflection of the military

19    documents that I've read.  I mean, I don't need to be a political expert

20    to understand the ramifications of the 1993 Banja Luka military mutiny and

21    issues related to that.  I don't need to be a military expert to

22    understand what General Mladic is saying in military publications.

23       Q.   Absolutely, Mr. Butler, but none of us need to.  The reason you're

24    here is not to help with things that you don't need to be a military

25    expert about.  You're here to help specifically with military matters, and

Page 20682

 1    that answer belies that, doesn't it?  That answer shows you're straying

 2    into matters of politics and media and propaganda, different areas of

 3    expertise.  Wouldn't you agree?

 4       A.   No, sir, because the issues that I'm talking about revolve around

 5    the conduct of how the VRS operated, I mean, which is a fundamental

 6    component of why I'm here and what, as a role -- my role was in the office

 7    of Prosecutor, understanding how that worked and why it worked the way it

 8    did under various circumstances.

 9       Q.   In this case, we haven't heard from a media expert, but media

10    experts have been instructed by the Office of the Prosecutor, haven't

11    they, in other cases?

12       A.   I -- I mean --

13       Q.   If you don't know --

14       A.   I don't know.  I mean, I won't say that you're wrong, I just -- I

15    don't know.  I don't know what you qualify as a media expert, but --

16       Q.   Well, that's what we said in the case that I was involved in.  Be

17    that -- be that -- be that as it may, you wouldn't accept that the issues

18    contained in, if we turn the page, 2.11 of this report really matters that

19    are better dealt with by someone who has political, media, or even perhaps

20    expertise in the area of propaganda?

21       A.   No, sir, only so much as the fact that my views on these matters

22    are a direct reflection of my work with the VRS military documents.  I

23    mean, if an outside expert wants to come in and spend three years

24    reviewing this in the same manner for these same types of insights, I'm

25    certainly -- you know, it's something that can be done.  But my expertise

Page 20683

 1    on this and what I've written in this particular paragraph is a reflection

 2    of my understanding of what the VRS was saying in its own documents about

 3    its own goals.

 4       Q.   Can I just pick you up on what you just said?  It really did take

 5    you three years or more to get to this state of knowledge to be able to

 6    give this type of expert evidence; is that right?

 7       A.   Probably considerably more than that.  I started the process in

 8    June of 1997, and as I think I indicated to Ms. Fauveau yesterday, you

 9    know, every day I still learn something new about this particular case.

10    So, I mean, I've been working on this now over a decade, and I'm not going

11    to say that I'm even close to approaching the peak of knowledge that I

12    hope to one day have on this.

13       Q.   Let's look at the last paragraph on this subject, 2.12, please.

14    Would you accept that all the warring parties were engaged in

15    disinformation to some extent?

16       A.   Yes, sir.

17       Q.   Why do you say that the sector for morale was itself involved in

18    showing increasing sophistication throughout the war in relation to

19    disinformation?

20       A.   Well, sir, I think -- and again my reflection of reading their

21    documents is that in the early part of the war, their view was that the

22    Western media was particularly biased against them, in substance and form

23    of reporting, and their initial inclination was to deny access to much of

24    that Western media.  As the war progressed, the VRS leadership came to

25    realise that cutting off the media in that respect was actually being more

Page 20684

 1    counterproductive and that what they needed to start engaging in was a

 2    process by which they could start to offset the negative media by allowing

 3    select access to Western media or by offsetting it by media outlets that

 4    they viewed to be more sympathetic to their views.

 5            So part of it is potentially, you know, the socialist culture of

 6    being able to completely control the media, and then here these

 7    professionals are where they don't have that and they start to recognise,

 8    you know, the ramifications that an independent media and independent

 9    reporting, as they called it, was having on their war aims and how their

10    operations and war aims were being viewed by larger communities.  So they

11    did become more sophisticated over time in their efforts to structure

12    information that was being put out by these media outlets in a light more

13    favourable to them.

14       Q.   My question was specific and related to the sector for morale,

15    rather than the VRS --

16       A.   The sector for morale controlled access of the media.  It went

17    through them in the Main Staff and through the corps.  So they were the

18    leading edge of being able to control that process.

19       Q.   But the matter was largely in the hands of the politicians, wasn't

20    it?

21       A.   Not with respect to the armour, sir, no.

22       Q.   No, but largely, insofar as the outside world was concerned, it

23    was the politicians, it was Dr. Karadzic who was controlling it.  Don't

24    lay the blame at my client's door.  Be fair.

25       A.   Again, my views on these issues are shaped by the VRS military

Page 20685

 1    documents that I've read.  They reflect that the VRS itself believed that

 2    it had a role to play in this process and did so.  Whether or not it was

 3    subordinate to Karadzic or superior to the politicians is not a matter

 4    that I looked into.

 5       Q.   All right.  Let's have a look at another aspect of this

 6    paragraph.  You say that the activity of disinformation reached a zenith

 7    in 1995 when UNPROFOR and later the Rapid Reaction Force were seen by the

 8    VRS leadership as significant obstacles to their objectives.  Well, the

 9    Rapid Reaction Force was undoubtedly a significant obstacle to the

10    objectives of the VRS; we can agree on that, can't we?

11       A.   Yes, sir, I mean, certainly from their perception.

12       Q.   And that's why General Smith wanted to create that Rapid Reaction

13    Force, in order to obstruct the Bosnian Serbs; it's as simple as that,

14    isn't it?

15       A.   Well, I believe General Smith has testified to that.  I don't -- I

16    didn't follow all of General Smith's testimony, so I can't tell you what

17    he would have answered with that.  I mean -- so, I mean, I don't know the

18    answer to that.  I mean, I assume General Smith was asked and answered

19    that question.

20       Q.   Okay.  Let's examine UNPROFOR, which is General Smith as well, in

21    fact, because of course he was the commander of UNPROFOR.  But from your

22    perspective as a military expert, UNPROFOR were posing significant

23    obstacles to the objectives of the VRS.  You admitted that yesterday in

24    relation to the Srebrenica and Zepa zones, the enclaves, not policing them

25    properly.

Page 20686

 1       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

 2       Q.   So all you stated there is the obvious, isn't it?

 3       A.   Well, I mean, "obvious" is a point-of-view argument.  My views on

 4    that, again, are with respect to what the VRS was saying about the

 5    UNPROFOR in their own documents.  Whether, in the light of a neutral

 6    review by somebody, the UNPROFOR was or was not neutral is not an issue of

 7    relevance to me.  What is an issue of relevance is the fact that the VRS

 8    believed that the UNPROFOR was tilted against them and that that was a

 9    planning consideration for them and they took it into account.

10       Q.   So you're saying it's not for you to say if that was fair on their

11    part or not; you're just saying it's a fact of life that it's something

12    that they, the VRS, took into account?  That's the tenure of your

13    evidence; correct?

14       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

15       Q.   And you also end with the lovely word "obscured," the true intent

16    of the VRS military objectives obscured.  It's not surprising that the VRS

17    military objectives were obscured.  Most, if not at all, military

18    objectives are obscured in some way, are they not, particularly in

19    wartime?

20       A.   Yes, sir, and -- you know, just like -- you know, I don't mean for

21    the phrase "obscure" to have some sort of a sinister connotation.  You

22    know, the fact that the VRS would want to hide its true military

23    objectives from outside observers, to include the UNPROFOR, is a natural

24    consequence of military actions.  I don't see that as a problem.

25       Q.   I'll be stopped if this is a rude or unfair question, but haven't

Page 20687

 1    you deliberately structured that paragraph, which states, for the most

 2    part, no more than the obvious, in a particularly pejorative way so it

 3    sounds and reads badly for General Gvero?

 4       A.   I guess I have to confess that even though we share a common

 5    language, your view of it and mine are radically different.  No, I don't

 6    see it that way at all, sir.

 7       Q.   I don't have views, Mr. Butler.  I'm simply putting a case to you

 8    and asking you some questions.  Let me make that clear.

 9       A.   No, sir, I would disagree.  I don't believe that I have structured

10    this in some form of a sinister view, no, sir.

11       Q.   All right.  We'll return to the report in a few minutes' time in

12    relation to one other aspect.

13            I would like now to turn, if I may, to my client's presence at

14    Pribicevac and the document P849.  It's 849.  Yes, that's the right

15    document in e-court.

16            Now, you gave evidence, in relation to this document, what seems

17    to many of us, and I suspect this includes the Trial Chamber, an eternity

18    ago on the 16th of January, 2008, at page 19794, and you were asked what

19    you can tell from the fact that it was directed to Gvero and Krstic

20    personally, and you comment on Krstic and then you say:

21            "General Gvero, the Main Staff officer, is present at that

22    location as well."

23            And you in no way qualified that.  You simply said that it shows

24    that Gvero was present as well.  That wasn't always your opinion, was it?

25       A.   My understanding of what General Gvero was doing there was, as

Page 20688

 1    I've discussed before, it was rather a common practice for the Main Staff

 2    to send out an officer --

 3       Q.   I would --

 4       A.   -- to do that, I mean, so --

 5       Q.   Well, I'm going to stop you because I --

 6       A.   If my opinion has changed on that, I mean, you're obviously free

 7    to show me, because I think I've been fairly consistent through the years

 8    on what General Gvero was doing there or not.

 9       Q.   I was only stopping you because we are going to turn to what he

10    was doing there in a few moments' time.  I'm not going to avoid that

11    issue.  The issue that I'm first asking you about is whether your evidence

12    has ever shifted on the issue as to whether in fact he was there and --

13       A.   Oh, okay, whether in fact he was there?

14       Q.   Yes.  I'll give you an opportunity, if you want, before --

15       A.   It -- it may very well have.  I don't believe initially -- I don't

16    believe initially that we had visibility that General Gvero was there at

17    the time.  I think it was only through some latter documents that came out

18    that his presence was established at that location.  So, I mean, it

19    wouldn't surprise me that my view would have changed on that.

20       Q.   Well, it did, because in the case of General Krstic, at page 4823,

21    you were asked this question by Mr. McCloskey:

22            "Now we have General Gvero.  What can you make of his presence on

23    this document?"

24            And your answer was as follows:

25            "This part for me, analytically speaking, an unanswered question.

Page 20689

 1    We have no physical evidence or we have no other information, either from

 2    sightings or from any other aspect of our information, that indicates that

 3    General Gvero was physically on the ground at Srebrenica or at the forward

 4    command post.  There are a lot of ways to read this. I mean, he could in

 5    fact be there, and this is the only indication that we have of it, and I

 6    cannot confirm that or that this message was sent to him at the Main Staff

 7    for his benefit as well.  But the short answer is, relative to General

 8    Gvero, I don't know."

 9            Now --

10       A.   Yes, sir, I remember that passage, and, yeah, at the time that was

11    true.

12       Q.   And what is it that's made you change your mind?

13       A.   Well, I believe that subsequent to that, as part of the continuing

14    investigation, a number of officers from the VRS, you know, have in fact,

15    you know, reflected that he was there during this time.

16       Q.   Yes.

17       A.   So, I mean, that tends to confirm that.

18       Q.   Yes.  So I would accept that, that based on what various people

19    have said in the eight years since you gave that evidence, it's been

20    suggested by a number of witnesses, not all of whom were in the VRS, for

21    your information, in fact, that he was present at that command post at

22    that time.  Why didn't you say that?  Why didn't you qualify the answer,

23    because it's quite an important point, isn't it?

24            And let me explain the point to you and put it to you.  Your

25    analysis of the document didn't reveal that Gvero was there.  You were

Page 20690

 1    quite clear about that in the Krstic trial.  The only reason you're giving

 2    support to my client being present there is based on what other people

 3    have said in the intervening period.  Why didn't you say that?  Why didn't

 4    you make it clear the nature of your analysis?

 5       A.   I believe that I did.  I don't -- again, as I discussed before, I

 6    wasn't in the habit or practice of putting witness base testimony into the

 7    context of my reports, but certainly where I'm asked these questions in

 8    court, you know, I can wrap that particular issue in, and I do as part of

 9    my oral testimony.

10       Q.   But you didn't, Mr. Butler, you --

11       A.   At that point in time, I didn't have that information.

12       Q.   Apologies.  Let me finish.

13       A.   Okay.

14       Q.   You didn't -- when you gave evidence before this Chamber ten days

15    or so ago, you simply said:

16            "General Gvero, the Main Staff officer, is present at that

17    location as well."

18            You didn't seek to qualify that by explaining that you make that

19    assumption, that conclusion, on what others have said and not on the basis

20    of the document.  It belies your trade is what I'm saying to you.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

22            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That's the second time he's misstated

23    the evidence, as if this document has nothing to do with the presence of

24    General Gvero.  It's improper to misstate the evidence.  It creates a

25    chaos in the record and it creates confusion in the witness.  The witness

Page 20691

 1    should not have to identify when a lawyer misstates the evidence.  It is a

 2    fundamental principle that I -- I'm sorry, that I need to object to.

 3            MR. JOSSE:  Well, I agree with that, but how am I misstating the

 4    evidence?  I don't understand the objection at all.

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey's suggestion is that the document

 6    itself has nothing to do with this or cannot be used as a basis reading --

 7    it's --

 8            MR. JOSSE:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, with respect.  I simply don't

 9    understand.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  He said:

11            "This is the second time he is misstating the evidence, as if this

12    document has nothing to do with the presence of General Gvero."

13            This is precisely what he is alleging that you have misstated.

14            MR. JOSSE:  It must be my fault.  I'm --

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  No.  You asked the witness to explain why, in making

16    the statement that he made to us some ten days ago, if I remember well --

17            MR. JOSSE:  Shall I try again, Your Honour, and see if I'm

18    misstating the evidence?  I'll try again, if I may.  Perhaps I didn't make

19    my point or my question clear.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let me find your question, because I think the

21    question was clear.  You said:

22            "You didn't -- when you gave evidence before this Chamber ten days

23    ago, you simply said General Gvero, the Main Staff officer, is present at

24    that location as well.  You didn't seek to qualify that by explaining that

25    you make that assumption, that conclusion, on what others have said and

Page 20692

 1    not on the basis of the document."

 2            MR. JOSSE:  It's been explained to me, I think.

 3       Q.   You're saying, are you, Mr. Butler, that you make the conclusion

 4    that Gvero was present based on the document?  I think that's where

 5    Mr. McCloskey is saying I'm misstating the evidence.  Is that --

 6       A.   I'm trying to unravel this in my own mind --

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  I didn't read Mr. McCloskey that way.  I don't

 8    know.  Perhaps Mr. McCloskey can explain further or perhaps we can -- but

 9    I didn't read Mr. McCloskey as meaning that.

10            Mr. McCloskey.

11            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. Butler has testified he's always taken the

12    document into account and he's also now taken evidence into account.  To

13    pick one or the other and suggest it's the only reason why Mr. Butler has

14    come to a conclusion is a misstatement of the evidence, in my view, and

15    it's an important point.  Otherwise, I wouldn't have bothered.  But to

16    suggest, one way or the another, that his opinion is only based on the

17    document or his opinion is only based on the evidence, is improper,

18    because as I view it, his questions have incorporated both.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  I think we can safely move, Mr. Josse.

20            MR. JOSSE:  Indeed.

21       Q.   So far as the document is concerned, the document alone, you

22    presumably stand by what you said in Krstic's trial --

23       A.   Yes, sir.

24       Q.   -- document alone in isolation?

25       A.   In isolation, yes, sir.

Page 20693

 1       Q.   And what you're saying is in this court, your evidence needs to be

 2    read in conjunction with what other people have subsequently said?  I

 3    think we can agree on that.

 4       A.   Yes, sir, and to expand on that point, the whole purpose of my

 5    narrative reports, and in the past trials as well, you know, need to be

 6    looked at in the light of what other witnesses and what other individuals

 7    have said on these issues.  I don't want my reports to be taken in

 8    isolation for precisely that reason.

 9       Q.   And my question is a simple one.  When you gave the evidence ten

10    days or so ago, why didn't you say that?  Why didn't you say, "It's not

11    based purely on the document, it's based on oral testimony, statements,"

12    whatever, as well?  That's what I'm exploring.

13       A.   Well, sir, if I recall the question correctly as you recited it, I

14    wasn't asked to explain why I know, and, you know, I have been encouraged

15    to some degree to be as brief as possible with my answers.  Certainly, had

16    the question been asked, and it has been asked by you, I'm willing to

17    explain it.

18       Q.   And are you able to say offhand who the individuals are who've

19    made you change your mind?

20       A.   I believe that it was -- one was, in fact, General Krstic.  I

21    believe that the OTP interview of Obrad Vicic, the operations officer for

22    the Drina Corps, also confirmed that fact.

23       Q.   Anyone else?  Anyone who's given evidence in this trial?

24       A.   Nobody strikes me as someone who's given evidence in this trial,

25    so I just don't know.

Page 20694

 1       Q.   Okay.  I promised we'd come to the second part of the evidence in

 2    relation to that, and that is your analysis of Gvero's presence there and

 3    having any significance.  And you went on to say:

 4            "No, sir, other than just, again, a reflection of the practice

 5    where in critical operations, that often officers of the Main Staff will

 6    be present at these command posts to help oversee the operations."

 7            And you go on and expand upon that.  Do you have any idea now

 8    where General Gvero came from prior to arriving at the IKM?

 9       A.   No, sir, I don't.

10       Q.   Do you have any idea where he went when he departed the IKM?

11       A.   I believe that at some juncture, he arrived back at the Main Staff

12    headquarters, because we have him in intercepts and in orders, I believe,

13    on the 11th and 12th.  But, I mean, if -- from where he left and where he

14    went after that, I don't know.

15       Q.   So based on that, how can you conclude so confidently that the

16    reason he was there was to oversee operations on behalf of the Main Staff?

17       A.   Okay, I see.  Then maybe this is where context is useful.  When we

18    normally talk about General Gvero's involvement, particularly with respect

19    to previous trials, a fundamental component of the Defence of General

20    Krstic, particularly, was that General Gvero was in fact there as some

21    form of a manifestation of an independent chain of command around the

22    corps commander.  When I talk about the issue of General Gvero's presence

23    there, you know, as the Main Staff representative, it's -- it's in light

24    of the fact that he's performing his function as the Main Staff and that

25    he is not somehow usurping the responsibility or authority of General

Page 20695

 1    Krstic as the chief of staff and later commander at that juncture.  So

 2    that's -- that's how -- you know, the context by which I address that.

 3       Q.   I invited you to give that particular answer, but what you're

 4    saying is you're basing your analysis, in effect, on what Krstic said in

 5    his own defence at his own trial; correct?

 6       A.   No, sir.  What I'm saying is that normally when the issue of

 7    General Gvero comes up and what his purpose is, that is -- that is one of

 8    the main reasons that colours that.  My analysis of what General Gvero is

 9    doing there is on the basis of what General Gvero's role would have been

10    as a Main Staff officer and the customary practice of the Main Staff to

11    send these people to these forward locations.

12       Q.   But that is ultimately speculation; you don't know what he was

13    doing there, do you?

14       A.   No, sir, and I know that.  My role -- my view of what he was doing

15    there is coloured by his role as a Main Staff officer.  I don't have the

16    specific document that articulates why he's there and exactly what he's

17    supposed to accomplish there.

18       Q.   My last question on this:  Bearing in mind what you've said, from

19    my point of view, rather helpfully in that last answer, I don't want to be

20    unfair, but why didn't you say that when Mr. McCloskey asked you the

21    original question, because the an important qualification, isn't it?

22       A.   Sir, I believe I have said that, when I was asked what he was

23    doing there, and I explained what he would be doing there in his role as a

24    Main Staff officer within the custom.

25       Q.   But you don't actually know that; it is ultimately speculative on

Page 20696

 1    your part, so --

 2       A.   No, sir, it is a presumption, yes, sir.  I don't know, as a fact,

 3    exactly what he was doing.

 4       Q.   All right.

 5       A.   I mean, I assume he wasn't there in a lounge chair, but I can't

 6    tell you that, you know, his role, you know, on the basis of any

 7    specificity.

 8       Q.   I think I'll settle for that and move on.  The next issue I'd like

 9    to turn to, please, is the order purportedly from General Gvero of the

10    13th of July, and that can be found at P45.

11            And simply bring that up for a moment so we can remind ourselves

12    of what I'm talking about.  I'd like to briefly look, as a preamble to the

13    questions about the document itself at what you said about it in your Main

14    Staff report at page 24.  So could we have the Main Staff report up again,

15    please, which was 2764.  And it's 4.9.

16            I'll let you read the paragraph to yourself, Mr. Butler.

17            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could we blow that up?  I can't read that very

18    well.  I don't know if the witness can.

19            THE WITNESS:  That's why I've got my glasses.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  Is it good like that?

21            THE WITNESS:  I'm fine, sir, yes.

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  I can read it, anyway.

23            MR. JOSSE:

24       Q.   You don't give there the detailed analysis of the document that

25    you have in your oral testimony.  Any reason for that?

Page 20697

 1       A.   I'm noting there the context of the order.  If you want to read

 2    back my oral testimony on it to refresh my memory, it might be helpful,

 3    and then I can explain, you know, or answer your questions.

 4       Q.   Well, in essence, you deal there with the fact that -- your

 5    evidence that Gvero was competent to issue the order and also that it was

 6    a broader reflection of the cooperative effort of the generals of the Main

 7    Staff?

 8       A.   Yes, sir.

 9       Q.   That's summarising it.  Why didn't you put that in the report?

10       A.   In this context, I mean, it was something that I didn't know that

11    was going to be an issue brought out in court as part of my testimony.

12    This part of the report, it's just kind of time-lining issues through.  I

13    didn't put that there.  I mean, I thought it was fairly self-evident that

14    that was part of the process.

15       Q.   What, that it was within Gvero's competency, one, and, two, part

16    of the collaborative effort of the Main Staff; you took that as read, did

17    you?

18       A.   Well, yes, sir.  I mean, the documents that you showed me on the

19    issues of unity, command yesterday and those laws, as a matter of practice

20    that, you know, because we're talking about professional military

21    officers, many decades of experience in some part, you know, I -- I

22    operate under the general working assumption that, you know, as military

23    professionals who understand the importance of these issues, that they're

24    not going to be issuing orders that are outside of their competence to do

25    and that at the Main Staff level that these officers are not going to be

Page 20698

 1    engaged in some kind of guerrilla campaign to undermine their own

 2    authorities, the authorities of their fellow officers, or the goals set by

 3    General Mladic.  So that's why I make those statements in that respect.

 4       Q.   I'll come back to that in a moment, if I may.  Briefly on this

 5    paragraph itself, two things.  Firstly, it says "finally directs the Main

 6    Staff be kept informed of ongoing activities ..."  In fact, the document

 7    says that the Corps Command and the Main Staff should be so informed.  Any

 8    reason why you didn't put that in your report?

 9       A.   No, sir.  I mean, that is something that, as you've just noted,

10    should have been something that should have been in the report, yes, sir.

11       Q.   Thank you.  And the other point, arguably equally pedantic, at the

12    same sentence you talk about interim combat reports.  The actual

13    document - and it might be worth getting it back up on to the screen, but

14    perhaps you'll take this from me - says "send interim reports with

15    specific details of the situation," et cetera.  There's a difference,

16    isn't there, between an interim report and an interim combat report?

17       A.   I don't take it as such.  I believe that they're one and the same

18    type of documents.

19       Q.   Let's break that down, if we may.  Is there a difference, in your

20    expert opinion, between an interim report and an interim combat report?

21    In other words, isn't there a type of report which could be called an

22    interim report which is not necessarily an interim combat report?

23       A.   If there is, I'm not -- just not familiar with it.  I mean, in

24    almost all of the contexts that I've seen the phraseology used, it's

25    always "interim combat reports."

Page 20699

 1       Q.   And a follow-up from that is:  Notwithstanding the answer you've

 2    just given, why did you add the word "combat" into your report when it

 3    isn't in the actual document?  Do you want to have a look the document?

 4       A.   No, I mean, I take your word for it, and I guess the answer would

 5    be, like I said, it's a phrase that I've long been accustomed to using,

 6    it's one report and it's generally referred to as interim combat report.

 7    If it is your position that there are in fact two different types of

 8    reports, one of them is not -- is an interim report and a combat report, I

 9    mean, I would like to see that, but, I mean, I certainly will hold that

10    open as a possibility.

11            MR. JOSSE:  Let's have the document on the screen, please. That's

12    P45.

13            Could I have a moment.

14            THE WITNESS:  This one, you're going to have to zoom up a little

15    bit.  Thank you.

16            MR. JOSSE:

17       Q.   Yesterday, you were being asked questions by Madame Fauveau, and

18    in the course of an answer, you're talking about General Tolimir, in fact,

19    and you say:

20            "You know he is aware, like everyone else, that, you know, General

21    Mladic is the commander of the army and he's not going to give orders in

22    contravention to what General Mladic wants accomplished."

23            And then you added:

24            "We see this with people like General Tolimir.  We see the same

25    situation with people like General Gvero, who are given what are presumed

Page 20700

 1    to be operational orders that, at face value, one would think they

 2    shouldn't be giving because of their specific role."

 3            Now, it's right, isn't it, that certainly at first blush, when we

 4    look at this order, one wouldn't expect it to come from the assistant

 5    commander for morale, religious and legal affairs?

 6       A.   Yes, sir, I agree.

 7       Q.   And it's right, isn't it, that in the title "Assistant Commander

 8    for Morale," et cetera, the important word was "for"?  In other words,

 9    what he had to do was look after morale, religious and legal affairs; that

10    was his portfolio within the VRS?

11       A.   Yes, sir.

12       Q.   And it goes without saying, as you've already conceded, that this

13    order fell, certainly at face value, outside the remit of that particular

14    job?

15       A.   Correct, sir.

16       Q.   Would you also concede that General Gvero had limited operational

17    experience, probably none that you're aware of, anyway?

18       A.   I disagree, sir.  I've read the translation of his military

19    records, and he had a -- over a decade, at least, of operational

20    experience as an infantry officer before assuming his next, you know, part

21    of his military career and the political side.  So I disagree with your

22    statement.

23       Q.   And when did that cease?

24       A.   Oh, boy.  I think probably by the -- and again, you know, I think

25    we have the documents, I hate guessing, but probably by the mid-1980s he

Page 20701

 1    was focusing much more of his career on the political work side rather

 2    than the operational side.  But, I mean, he is and he remains -- until he

 3    became a general, he remained an infantry officer by career.

 4            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 5            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Perhaps at the break we could get Mr. Butler that

 6    document so that his refreshed recollection to answer the question is more

 7    accurate.

 8            MR. JOSSE:  Agreed.

 9            JUDGE AGIUS:  I couldn't agree more.

10            Shall we have the break now?  Is it convenient for you, Mr. Josse,

11    or do you wish to finish this --

12            MR. JOSSE:  No, it is convenient.  Because also this is, I'm

13    afraid, my longest topic, but I'm doing well time-wise, I can tell the

14    Chamber.

15            JUDGE AGIUS:  That's good, nice music for our ears.  We'll have a

16    25-minute break.

17                          --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

18                          --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Josse.

20            MR. JOSSE:  Your Honour, Mr. McCloskey has been very helpful, if I

21    might say.  However --

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  He always is.

23            MR. McCLOSKEY:  If we can go into private session on this subject

24    at first.

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  You want to go into private session?

Page 20702

 1            MR. JOSSE:  That's what he said.  He didn't have his microphone

 2    on, but that's what he just said.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, I thought I had heard that, but let's go into

 4    private session for a while, please.

 5                          [Private session]

 6  (redacted)

 7  (redacted)

 8  (redacted)

 9  (redacted)

10  (redacted)

11  (redacted)

12  (redacted)

13  (redacted)

14  (redacted)

15  (redacted)

16  (redacted)

17  (redacted)

18  (redacted)

19  (redacted)

20  (redacted)

21  (redacted)

22  (redacted)

23  (redacted)

24  (redacted)

25  (redacted)

Page 20703











11    Page 20703 redacted. Private session















Page 20704

 1  (redacted)

 2  (redacted)

 3  (redacted)

 4  (redacted)

 5                          [Open session]

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  We are in open session now, Mr. Josse.

 7            MR. JOSSE:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 8       Q.   Let me show you this, Mr. Butler, and see if this is what you're

 9    referring to.  I will give you the B/C/S version of the record card, plus

10    the part from 1980 that has been translated.  If you are, in the answer

11    you gave just before the break, alluding to a different document, perhaps

12    you'd let us know.

13       A.   No, sir, I think we're on the same track with this.  There is --

14    on the B/C/S version, there is the material from the 1970s as well, but I

15    think we're all on the same page of data here.

16       Q.   Right, in which case I'll deal with this shortly, and I hope not

17    to make a mountain out of a mole hill.

18            Let's put it on the ELMO.

19       A.   The English or B/C/S version, sir?

20       Q.   Well, English, I think.  Would you agree with me that from 1980

21    onwards, there is no operational experience on that record sheet?

22       A.   I certainly agree that by 1980, it looks like he has tracked into

23    political and legal affairs as his main career focus.  Maybe it's -- and

24    in my mind, a definition of "operational," when I see him performing

25    duties at 2nd Corps in Titograd, I see that as operational, but as I

Page 20705

 1    certainly agree that by 1980 he is spending most of his career focus

 2    dealing with issues of the political and legal affairs branch.

 3       Q.   Yes.  It may be a case of semantics, possibly important semantics

 4    over the use of the word "operational," but this is completely different

 5    sort of work that would be done in the staff section of the Main Staff;

 6    correct?

 7       A.   I don't know that I can say that as an absolute fact, only because

 8    I didn't do a whole lot of in-depth research on the political office or

 9    process in the JNA, so --

10       Q.   You don't know?

11       A.   I don't know the answer to that.

12       Q.   All right.  Well, so far as the document prior to 1980 is

13    concerned, unfortunately, as I've already said, we only have that in

14    B/C/S.  Let's put that on the ELMO.

15            Whilst that's being done, you think you've seen an English

16    translation of this, Mr. Butler?

17       A.   No, sir.  I think my view of it is off of the B/C/S one as well. I

18    don't believe I've seen an English translation of that.

19       Q.   And this isn't --

20       A.   This must be something else, because I wouldn't have -- there's

21    something else out there.

22       Q.   I think you know what my next question was going to do, which is:

23    How were you able to interpret that?

24            Can I put my case to you?  My case is that General Gvero was the

25    commander of a platoon in 1963 and thereafter was not involved in

Page 20706

 1    command-type work for the rest of his career.

 2       A.   (redacted) he

 3    was an infantry branch officer and held the normal suite of infantry jobs

 4    for approximately the first 12 years of his career, which I believe in one

 5    of them is a company command.  But I certainly concede that after that

 6    12-year or 13-year mark, he spent most of his career dealing primarily

 7    with the issues of the political branch and did not continue to follow the

 8    mainstream track of an infantry officer with respect to a battalion

 9    command or a brigade command.  So, I mean, I think we're good on that.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

11            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I'm sorry to do this, but can we go into private

12    session again?

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Let's go into private session.

14                          [Private session]

15  (redacted)

16  (redacted)

17  (redacted)

18  (redacted)

19  (redacted)

20  (redacted)

21  (redacted)

22  (redacted)

23  (redacted)

24  (redacted)

25  (redacted)

Page 20707











11    Pages 20707-20708 redacted. Private session















Page 20709

 1  (redacted)

 2  (redacted)

 3  (redacted)

 4  (redacted)

 5  (redacted)

 6  (redacted)

 7  (redacted)

 8  (redacted)

 9  (redacted)

10  (redacted)

11  (redacted)

12                          [Open session]

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  We are back in open session, Mr. Josse.

14            MR. JOSSE:  Thank you.

15       Q.   Now, Mr. Butler, before the break, I was asking you about the 13th

16    of July order, and we were going through various aspects of General Gvero

17    which related in some way to the order.

18            The next issue I wanted to ask you about was something we touched

19    on yesterday, and that's the subordination principle.  Bearing in mind the

20    subordination principle, again, on the face of it, the order was outside

21    his competence, wasn't it?

22       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, from my view of it, it certainly looks like an

23    order that would have more appropriately been type-signed by the chief of

24    operations as opposed to Colonel Gvero -- Colonel -- General Gvero.

25       Q.   And in the answer that you gave Madame Fauveau yesterday, you

Page 20710

 1    talked about presumed operational orders, in the plural, that at face

 2    value one would think they shouldn't be giving.  Can you think of any

 3    other example like this in relation to Gvero?

 4       A.   During this particular period, I don't believe so, sir.

 5       Q.   Any other period?

 6       A.   To be honest, I haven't -- I haven't gone back and looked for

 7    similar types of orders in 1993 or 1994 or even early 1995, so I just

 8    don't know the answer to that.

 9       Q.   Now, looking at what was happening at the time, there is no

10    question that the VRS perceived that they faced a serious threat; would

11    you agree?

12       A.   Yes, sir, that is correct.

13       Q.   Matters undoubtedly required expedition?  In other words, the

14    instructions, the orders, call it what we will, needed to go out to the

15    subordinate command expeditiously?

16       A.   Yes, sir, I agree.

17       Q.   And there might even have been, within the ranks of the VRS, dare

18    I say it, even within some of the Main Staff itself, a sense of panic at

19    what was happening with the column; do you agree with that?

20       A.   Certainly by 13 July, there was a growing awareness of the

21    military threat of the column.  I wouldn't call it "panic" at that point.

22    Maybe that sets in a few hours later.

23            MR. JOSSE:  All right.  Let's have P45 back on the screen, please.

24       Q.   If we look at the top of the document, and for this purpose the

25    original B/C/S will be fine, if not better, we can see that it

Page 20711

 1    says: "Strictly confidential number," and then it says "03/4-" and then

 2    there's four digits.  "03" meant what, please?

 3       A.   My understanding of the numbering sequence is that the "03/4" was

 4    the numbering sequence used by the operations shop for its orders.

 5       Q.   The number of the morale sector was "07," wasn't it?

 6       A.   I'll take your word for that.  I mean, I think you're correct, but

 7    I just can't recall with certainty.  But it sounds right.

 8       Q.   What significance, if any, in the context of this document, do you

 9    place on the fact that it says "03"?

10       A.   As I believe I've testified, if not in this case, certainly in

11    other cases, that I believe that this -- the contents of this document

12    were drafted by the operations people.

13       Q.   And bearing that in mind, what reason do you think they would have

14    got Gvero to sign it?

15       A.   Again, as I think we discussed yesterday with Madame Fauveau, I

16    mean, since I don't know the hour-by-hour whereabouts of General Miletic,

17    I mean, one of the assumptions that could be made is that General Miletic

18    was temporarily unavailable to sign it.  The bottom line is that, you

19    know, I don't know what the motivation was of the operations people to

20    decide that this order needed to be issued under General Gvero's name

21    versus General Miletic's name.

22       Q.   You said helpfully in your evidence-in-chief that the document had

23    not been signed, as such, by Gvero.  It certainly has his name at the

24    bottom.  There's absolutely no dispute about that.  The fact that the two

25    letters "SR" don't appear on it has what significance, if any, to you?

Page 20712

 1       A.   Again, I think we've all noted that it reflects the fact that it

 2    wasn't personally signed by the individual.

 3       Q.   And it's also right, isn't it - I'm sure there's no dispute about

 4    this - that very soon after receiving it, General Zivanovic at the corps

 5    level basically sent the order out again to his subordinate?

 6       A.   Yes, sir, and in fact, in large degree, it's because of that issue

 7    is why, when I look at this and while it makes for an interesting

 8    discussion on why General Gvero's name would be on it, you know, I think

 9    that given that the people who drafted it didn't seem to have any

10    particular difficulty with it, and certainly the people who it was

11    intended for didn't see this as an unusual type of occurrence, that there

12    was no question about the fact that the people involved, that this was --

13    you know, the fact that General Gvero's typed signature block is on this

14    order was somehow irregular or improper.

15       Q.   So far as that is concerned, what about the reverse point, that

16    when Zivanovic receives it, he thinks to himself, "Hang on, this is

17    strange.  It's come from Gvero.  Gvero has no authority to send out this

18    order.  I'd better send it out again under my name," because it clearly

19    makes sense and it's clearly important, "so there is absolutely no doubt

20    that it has proper command authority"; in other words, a complete reverse

21    to what you've just said?  Isn't that likely or equally likely?

22       A.   Well, sir, if it were a one-time occurrence, it would be.  Having

23    said that, given that there's just such a large body of these types of

24    things where an order will come in from superior command and then

25    effectively be regenerated by the intermediate command, the corps, and

Page 20713

 1    sent down to the lower brigades, that I don't view it as such.  And, you

 2    know, my issue on that would have been, is that General Zivanovic would

 3    have been the first point, on receiving this order, that if he had that

 4    type of a question, it would have been incumbent upon him to inquire back

 5    to the Main Staff, if this were something that could be issued under those

 6    particular circumstances.  And I don't believe there's any information

 7    that says he did that.

 8       Q.   Now, you've just said that my theory, for want of a better word,

 9    would be okay if this was a one-time occurrence, but this was a one-time

10    occurrence, wasn't it?  I don't understand what you're saying.

11       A.   No, sir.  I think when you look over the context of orders that

12    are coming in from various organisations within the VRS, from the Main

13    Staff to the Drina Corps or other corps, for that matter, and then with

14    the corps sending those out to the brigades, it was generally a practice

15    where those intermediate headquarters would essentially -- in many cases

16    they cut and paste these same contents or guts of a directive and put

17    their own header information over it and sent it down.  So, again, as part

18    of that much broader review of material that I've done is where I say I

19    don't see this as a one-off issue, I see this as a consistent practice in

20    most respects.

21       Q.   But it wasn't consistent so far as General Gvero is concerned.

22    You've said that a minute or two ago.

23       A.   No, sir.  Yeah, most of the situations that I've seen, it would be

24    coming under other individuals' signatures.  Like I said, I haven't gone

25    back and looked at Main Staff orders specifically with respect to General

Page 20714

 1    Gvero on this, so I do hold open the possibility that this may very well

 2    be the first time that General Gvero has done this.

 3       Q.   I think we can agree, can't we, that this would not have been sent

 4    by whoever without General Mladic's approval?  You've said that in your

 5    evidence-in-chief.

 6       A.   My evidence -- whether or not he specifically approved this, my --

 7    my thrust of the discussion is the fact that this isn't going to be sent

 8    in such a way that anyone could conceive it as being in contravention of

 9    what General Mladic ultimately wants.  It's going to be issued in the

10    context of that and it may very well be the fact that it is directly based

11    on instructions he gave.  It's not going to be counter to that.

12       Q.   Would you --

13                               [Technical difficulties]

14            THE COURT REPORTER:  I'm sorry, sir.

15            THE WITNESS:  I'm beginning to think it's just me.

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  No, no, no, no.  At beginning of this thing I told

17    my colleagues that you had given me some piece of good news during the

18    break, found the solution to the problem.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  I know that you, like yesterday and

20    before, you will be doing your utmost -- we'll be patient and --

21            THE COURT REPORTER:  Thank you, sir.

22            JUDGE AGIUS:  Is it okay now?  I am still not -- yes, yes, it

23    seems to be okay.

24            THE WITNESS:  I assume I need to re-answer the question for the

25    Court.

Page 20715

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, certainly.

 2            THE WITNESS:  Okay.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's see first whether we have the full question:

 4            "I think we can agree, can't we, that this would not have been

 5    sent by whoever without General Mladic's approval.  You've said that in

 6    your evidence-in-chief."  You didn't add anything to that, did you?

 7            MR. JOSSE:  I didn't.

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  So you can now proceed with your answer,

 9    please.

10            THE WITNESS:  And again, as I discussed I believe in my

11    evidence-in-chief, while I don't know that General Mladic may have

12    specifically directed this to be sent out in such a way, it is that -- you

13    know, that it's not going to be in contravention to what General Mladic's

14    views are on the situation and what his overall goals are.  So it's not

15    going to be General Gvero or any general on the Main Staff, for that

16    matter, issuing orders that are in contravention to those decisions by the

17    commander.

18            MR. JOSSE:

19       Q.   Mr. Butler, would you exclude the possibility that this order was

20    sent out in General Gvero's name without him actually knowing of its

21    existence at that time?

22       A.   No, sir, I can't exclude that as a possibility.  I mean, while as

23    a matter of military professionalism an officer is supposed to know what

24    orders are going out under his name, I certainly can't prove as a fact

25    that he did know this.

Page 20716

 1       Q.   Thank you.  I've got two small issues and then one slightly longer

 2    one, and then I'll be done.

 3            The first of the small issues relates to Colonel Djurdjic, who you

 4    referred to in your examination-in-chief at page 19725.  You were asked by

 5    Mr. McCloskey who, in your opinion -- I'll read it as it reads in the

 6    transcript:

 7            "Who is your opinion of who Djurdjic works for, if you can tell?"

 8            And your answer was:

 9            "I believe the documents that I see in Colonel Djurdjic is a Main

10    Staff officer.  I'm not sure at present whether he in fact worked directly

11    for General Gvero or worked out of the operation shop for Colonel

12    Miletic."

13            In that regard, could we please have in e-court 6DIC149.

14            Now, Mr. Butler, whilst this is being brought up, let me tell you

15    what it is.  You will immediately recognise the diagram or the schematic.

16    The addition to it was made by General Skrbic on the 18th of September of

17    last year when he was giving evidence before this Chamber, and it's the

18    short -- the little addition that I want to ask you about.

19            There it is.

20            We can see that other than his signature and the date, he has

21    added, next to the commander of the Main Staff, "AK," and that "K" was "K"

22    for "Kabinet," and in effect he was saying that in parallel with General

23    Mladic, there was a cabinet or an office which was involved in running the

24    Main Staff.  And I'm not going to ask you to comment on that quite yet.

25            MR. JOSSE:  Can we go to the next document, which again was used

Page 20717

 1    by Madame Fauveau in her cross-examination, which is 5D431.  And we'll

 2    need to go, please, to I think the second page of that in both English and

 3    B/C/S.  Yes.

 4       Q.   We can see that this is a summary of duties of units and

 5    establishment elements, and at the top we've got the commander and his

 6    aide-de-camp and then after that we have something which is described as

 7    Kabinet, with a "K," in B/C/S, translated as "office" in English.  And

 8    beneath number 4, we see: "Foreign military representative liaison

 9    department," and underneath that, the chief.

10            And that, we suggest, is Colonel Djurdjic, and that's where we say

11    he fits into things.  In other words, what I'm putting to you, and I know

12    this is a long question, is that he was part of the cabinet of the

13    commander.

14       A.   Well, yes, sir, and again while it is inconsistent with the

15    information that I've seen, certainly this raises that as a valid

16    possibility.

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  One question perhaps which you can explore with --

18    or one matter which you can explore with the witness, Mr. Josse.  I see

19    that against that "chief" under number 5, there is a code which is exactly

20    the same as that next to "chief" under 3 under "office," so could we be

21    talking -- does the fact that the two code numbers are identical mean that

22    we're talking of the same person, or could we have two different persons

23    having the same code reference?

24            THE WITNESS:  Is that question directed to me or --

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  I am not putting the question directly.  I'm asking

Page 20718

 1    Mr. Josse whether he wishes to explore this with you.

 2            MR. JOSSE:  Well, I'm glad to say I'm not in the witness box.

 3       Q.   Can you help, Mr. Butler?

 4       A.   I'm afraid not, sir.  I would have to look at this document in its

 5    whole context.  I notice, going down there, there's another "chief" that's

 6    listed, and it has the same particular code as well.  So I don't know if

 7    it has a direct relevance or not.  I mean, so far -- on the B/C/S version,

 8    I'm seeing three with that same code numbers, and I can't possibly believe

 9    it would be the same individual trying to hold three positions.  So the

10    short answer is:  Probably not, but I really would have to look at it.

11            MR. JOSSE:  Your Honour, Mr. Krgovic has gone to take some

12    instructions, and perhaps I could be given a moment.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  The way I see it - but of course I may be

14    wrong, and the witness can help us further if he is in a position to do

15    so - is that for a chief in whichever area of duty it occurs, the code

16    number is what you see on the screen, that's "110001".  That's how I

17    understand it, because wherever it occurs, you have "Nacelnik," and

18    that's "chief"?

19            MR. JOSSE:  In fact what I -- I can help a little.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  I don't know.  I don't know.  Yes.

21            THE WITNESS:  The same way with "adjutant."  Obviously, the phrase

22    "adjutant" is there three times and it has three code numbers as well, so

23    I mean--

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  So that's what I think it is.

25            MR. JOSSE:

Page 20719

 1       Q.   Can I suggest to you that in fact the chief of the cabinet was a

 2    man called Banduka [phoen]?

 3       A.   I have heard that name associated with -- while it's called

 4    cabinet, we call it -- basically it's the commander's personal staff.  I

 5    believe that's correct.

 6       Q.   Now, just going back to the answer you gave a few moments ago, you

 7    said that it is inconsistent with the information that you've seen.  What

 8    information is it inconsistent with?

 9       A.   Yes, sir, I have a -- a version of the Main Staff -- a working

10    roster of that organisation where the names of individuals are penciled in

11    at various points of time, how long they've been in that position, and

12    where it fits within the organisational structure.  I have a copy of that

13    in my hotel room with the notes.  I believe this is a document that

14    Ms. Fauveau and I had talked about before.  I guess I will add that to my

15    shopping list of material to bring at the end of court today for your

16    examination.

17       Q.   Thank you.  The next issue relates to P3025, which is the

18    Krivaja-95 document.  Could we go to page 4 in the English, please, and

19    it's going to be page 3 of the B/C/S.  The very bottom for the B/C/S.

20    English, middle of the page.

21            We see that it mentions here, as part of the targets, "open fire

22    on observed targets in the sector of the Potocari school," and then it

23    mentions a number of other places.  And you were asked, at page 19783:

24            "And these target lists that they give, do you have any reason to

25    believe that any of those are either civilian or UN targets?"

Page 20720

 1            And you say:

 2            "Yes, sir, I do.  I believe the facility known as the 11th March

 3    Factory was in fact one of the buildings that the UN was using."

 4            Now, a few points.  First of all, isn't -- wasn't that factory

 5    outside of the UN compound?

 6       A.   Yes, sir, I believe it was.

 7       Q.   But your understanding is, nonetheless, the UN were using it?

 8       A.   I believe, like I said, this is an issue that the investigation

 9    had looked at and determined that there was either equipment being stored

10    there at some point for the UN, so that's the basis of my decision, that I

11    understand it was.  If in fact that's not the case, then certainly I'll

12    stand to be corrected on that.

13       Q.   Was it in fact targeted, that factory?

14       A.   I believe that question was raised at some juncture with the

15    individual concerned, Captain Mico Gavric, who was the artillery officer

16    for Bratunac.  I'm not sure what his answer was.  I believe it's a

17    component of the Blagojevic case so -- I don't believe that I'm aware of

18    any direct information that shells were hitting it, but I'm not, again,

19    sure whether or not -- whether Mico Gavric indicated that it was shelled

20    or at least targeted.  So, I mean, I don't know the answer to that

21    offhand.

22       Q.   So far as the school is concerned, could we go to page 2 in the

23    English and page 1 at the bottom in the B/C/S.

24            At the top there, we see the suggestion that the 28th Division

25    reserve, I'm paraphrasing, "is stationed in Srebrenica, the village of

Page 20721

 1    Potocari (the school)."  So it does appear on the face of this document

 2    that it was the belief of the VRS, or at least the author of this

 3    document, that there was a military component at the school?

 4       A.   Yes, sir.

 5       Q.   Any idea whether the school in Potocari was actually targeted?

 6       A.   I don't know, sir.  Again, it's been a while since I've heard Mico

 7    Gavric talk about it, so I just can't recall.

 8       Q.   All right.  I'll move on, if I may.

 9            You were asked in your evidence about 6D207, which was a document

10    purportedly from General Gvero to the Drina Corps headquarters, and at

11    page 19800, in the course of your evidence-in-chief, I'm going to

12    paraphrase this I hope fairly by saying, in effect, you said that what the

13    VRS were saying here is:

14            "People from the outside the International Community are looking

15    at us.  Let's make sure we put our best face on."

16       A.   Yes, sir, that's a fair characterisation of it.

17       Q.   Gvero sent this very soon after a rather fraught conversation that

18    he had with General Nikolai; isn't that right?

19       A.   Correct, sir, I believe so.

20       Q.   And that conversation with Nikolai, certainly common sense would

21    indicate, had a significant causal effect in him sending out this warning;

22    would you agree with that?

23       A.   It may very well have.  I mean, I won't disagree with that.  I

24    mean, I don't know the -- the answer, but it certainly is a plausible, you

25    know, explanation.

Page 20722

 1       Q.   You're in effect saying that this was put out not so much for

 2    show, because of course it was an internal document, but to make sure that

 3    VRS subordinates, corps and brigades, presumably, would behave in a way

 4    that would be seen as acceptable by the International Community?  In other

 5    words, it was a rather cynical document is really what you're saying?

 6       A.   No, sir, I'm not saying it at all, per se.  What I -- what I

 7    believe I've testified about this is the fact that, and again what we

 8    discussed earlier this morning, it was a legitimate military interest for

 9    the VRS to be perceived as acting fairly in this regard.  And, again,

10    particularly with this document, you know, I highlighted the fact, I

11    believe, that at the time that General Gvero is sending this, his

12    superior, General Mladic, is orchestrating threats against the UN.

13       Q.   You did -- I want to be fair.  You characterized it as "a good

14    military idea."

15       A.   Yes, sir.

16       Q.   And so I certainly don't want you to get resolved --

17       A.   I think this illustrates exactly what we were talking about this

18    morning, that, you know, it isn't eye-wash; it is the fact that General

19    Gvero inherently recognises the value of this towards the aims of the VRS.

20       Q.   Right.  And there are other documents that we can find in the vast

21    array of documents at your disposal which indicate VRS commands telling

22    subordinate units to obey international humanitarian law, for example?

23       A.   Yes, sir.  You can go over them, but I agree, I would say there

24    are multiple references.

25       Q.   I'm not going to go over very many, but perhaps we could have a

Page 20723

 1    look at P414, which is the combat analysis document of 1993.  Page 59 in

 2    English.  No, it's 414.  It's a very large document.

 3            And this extract, I'm sure you'll take it from me, is in section

 4    2, which is the part that deals with the assessment of the morale of the

 5    Army of the Republika Srpska in 1992, so it's from the morale section of

 6    that report, which itself is quite large.  Page 53 in the B/C/S.

 7            And we see here it says:

 8            "In contacts with UNPROFOR, ICRC representatives and those of

 9    other humanitarian organisations and of the media, establish correct,

10    measured and civilised relations befitting the military and perform the

11    duties professionally with mutual respect and appreciation."

12            That's right, isn't it?

13       A.   Yes, sir.

14            MR. JOSSE:  Could I just have a moment.

15       Q.   I'm going to take what you've said, Mr. Butler, your helpful

16    remark, at face value and save some time.  You have said a few moments ago

17    you can go over them, but I agree there are multiple references.

18       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, from 1992 onward, there are multiple references

19    that VRS senior officers understood the importance of adhering to the law

20    of war throughout the course of the conflict.

21       Q.   Finally, and on a similar note, could I ask you to have a look at

22    two photographs, which is 6D193 and then 6D194.

23            Now, 6D193 is a photograph of a commemorative plaque, dated 13th

24    of August, 1996, that was given to General Gvero by Michael Walker, a

25    British general.  And if you turn it over, on the other side is the actual

Page 20724

 1    plaque.

 2            I don't know whether you've become aware of this in the evidence

 3    in this case.

 4       A.   No, sir.

 5       Q.   This hadn't -- wasn't something you --

 6       A.   It wasn't hit by the radar scope --

 7       Q.   No.

 8       A.   -- no, sir.

 9       Q.   And 6D194, take from me, was a bottle of whiskey signed and

10    presented to my client by a Major General Wilcox, another British

11    general.  Both of them were with the -- it says there the Ace Rapid

12    Reaction Corps, which was the succession of the Rapid Reaction Force in

13    1996, so this was just after the war had ended.

14            In your exploration of this unfortunate war, have you come across

15    multiple examples of UN generals giving gifts to the warring parties?

16       A.   It was relatively a common practice.  I mean, one that stands out,

17    of course, in my mind and I believe many people's is, you know, the rather

18    playful picture of General Mladic and General Clark switching hats

19    around.  It happened.

20       Q.   And why did it happen?

21       A.   I -- I couldn't begin to explain that, that one.  I mean, how

22    they're going to interact with each other as part of their liaison

23    professional relations, I just don't know.

24       Q.   Because you were never in that position, isn't that --

25       A.   No.

Page 20725

 1       Q.   -- is that --

 2       A.   I was not in a position to be doing that type of stuff, I agree.

 3       Q.   That's why you don't know, is it?

 4       A.   Yes, sir.

 5       Q.   Yes.  Well, that's fair enough.  And the fact that these gifts

 6    were given after the war, in other words, there was far less reason for

 7    the giver of the gift to in any way try and curry favour with the

 8    recipient, any significance in that?

 9       A.   You know, I don't know.  I mean, I have heard many anecdotal

10    stories, again particularly with the focus of the VRS, because that was

11    the American sector, and their very high thoughts about what they saw was

12    the professionalism of the VRS where they were and that this type of

13    practice did occur, but, I mean, I don't have an opinion one way or

14    another on it.

15       Q.   And as you've already explained, you've -- do you have any

16    specific awareness in relation to this particular case, have you come

17    across it in relation to any of the other accused either in this case or

18    indeed in relation to the Krstic case, or anything that you specifically

19    have investigated or analysed yourself?

20       A.   I'm sorry --

21            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  More time-consuming than probative.

22            MR. JOSSE:  I'll move on.

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Josse, and thank you, Mr. McCloskey.

24            MR. JOSSE:

25       Q.   Just finally this in relation to it:  You're saying this doesn't

Page 20726

 1    surprise you at all, that General Gvero received these gifts from these

 2    gentlemen?

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  I think he said it, he's not surprised.

 4            THE WITNESS:  No, sir.

 5            MR. JOSSE:  Thank you.  Yes.  I've got nothing else.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  So thank you, Mr. Josse.

 7            Mr. Haynes.

 8            MR. HAYNES:  I wonder if you could just give me five minutes to

 9    get physically set up and take over from Mr. Josse.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  If it's even more convenient for you or if you

11    so wish, we could also have the break now, and then you start and continue

12    until quarter to 2:00.

13            MR. HAYNES:  Yes, that would be fine.  Thank you very much.

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  Agreed?

15                          [Trial Chamber confers]

16            JUDGE AGIUS:  So that's what we will do.  We'll have a 25-minute

17    break now.  Thank you.

18                          --- Recess taken at 11.55 a.m.

19                          --- On resuming at 12.24 p.m.

20            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Mr. Haynes.

21            MR. HAYNES:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22                          Cross-examination by Mr. Haynes:

23       Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Butler.  I'm the last of the magnificent

24    seven, and as you can probably tell, another Brit.

25       A.   I won't hold that against you, sir.

Page 20727

 1       Q.   I'm glad about that.  In May of 2000, when you wrote your first

 2    Srebrenica military narrative, can we take it that the -- you had reached

 3    a state of knowledge that the Drina Corps was no longer an abstract entity

 4    to you?

 5       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

 6       Q.   And that at that point in time, you felt sufficiently

 7    well-appraised of all the documents you had by then seen to draw the

 8    conclusions that you did in that report?

 9       A.   Yes, sir.

10       Q.   Just to place matters into context, by the time you signed off

11    that report, General Krstic's trial had been underway for about two

12    months; that's correct, isn't it?

13       A.   I thought it had been a little bit longer, I mean, but again my

14    memory may not be clear on that.  Two months sounds --

15       Q.   It probably doesn't matter, Mr. Butler.  You knew the trial was

16    underway?

17       A.   Oh, yes, sir, the trial was underway before I signed off on it,

18    yes.

19       Q.   And did you at the time you signed off the report appreciate the

20    purposes for which that report was going to be used?

21       A.   Yes, sir.

22       Q.   Namely, that it was going to be used as evidence to convict

23    General Krstic of the most serious offences imaginable?

24       A.   I knew it was going to be used as evidence in court.  The issue of

25    guilt or innocence was not something that I was making a consideration out

Page 20728

 1    of.

 2       Q.   Well, I don't want to get into an argument too early, but you knew

 3    you were going to be called as a Prosecution witness?

 4       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

 5       Q.   And you knew your evidence was going to be used to support the

 6    indictment?

 7       A.   Yes, sir.

 8       Q.   Can I ask you this:  The form of that report has been put to you

 9    as historical.  Was that a report the form of which you had ever written

10    before in your prior career as an intelligence analyst?

11       A.   Yes, sir, I have on occasions been asked to take a static point in

12    time and to essentially deconstruct it and to explain it as a part of my

13    role as an intelligence analyst, so I have done that on occasion.  It's

14    not my primary purpose, which of course is more a predictive issue, but

15    it's something that I have engaged in in the past, yes, sir.

16       Q.   Well, that was the point I was seeking to make, but I'm not going

17    to labour the point.  In terms of the content of the report, I want to see

18    if you agree with my assessment that the military narrative report really

19    contains four categories of information, and I'll list them for you, and

20    you tell me whether you agree.  Firstly, there is unattributed prose;

21    secondly, there is prose which is directly referred to a footnote;

22    thirdly, there are quoted sources, for example, the rules of the brigade;

23    and, lastly, there are phrases placed directly inside quotation marks or,

24    as you may say, parentheses?

25       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean -- I mean, I -- "prose" versus "text" may be a

Page 20729

 1    semantic, but, I mean, yes, I believe what we're talking about is the same

 2    information.

 3       Q.   And I assume that in placing phrases inside quotation marks, your

 4    intention is to reflect the fact that you are directly quoting from a

 5    document or other source.

 6       A.   Yes, sir.

 7       Q.   Now, you were good enough to tell an advocate earlier in the case

 8    that you had been heavily involved in the preparation of the case against

 9    Vinko Pandurevic, my client?

10       A.   Yes, sir, that's correct.

11       Q.   And I'm not sure you did tell us this.  At what point in time did

12    that become part of your responsibility?

13       A.   Well, the preparation of the case, you know, it's always been my

14    responsibility with respect to, you know, analysing the information and

15    related to that.  I think that if I get the thrust of where you're going

16    on this, is at a point in time, and I believe it would be probably around

17    summer of 1999, if I have it correct, is when the state of the

18    investigation and the material that we had gave us an initial read on the

19    first three individuals that, you know, the decision was being made might

20    have potential criminal liability, those being General Krstic, Pandurevic

21    and Blagojevic.

22       Q.   So certainly by the time you signed off the report of May 2000?

23       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, I'm not -- as indicated, the Pandurevic

24    indictment was approved internally by the Office of the Prosecutor and, I

25    believe, then sent to -- you know, for confirmation by one of the Judges

Page 20730

 1    at the same time as the Krstic one.  So, I mean, that was the initial

 2    series of indictments.

 3       Q.   Thank you.  And just to complete this little chronology of the

 4    report and your involvement in various people's cases, you testified in

 5    the Krstic case on the 17th to the 21st of July, 2000, a couple of months

 6    after you signed off the report?

 7       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, if it was 2000, I'm -- I'm just trying to

 8    remember offhand.  I don't exactly recall whether we -- when we actually

 9    did the indictments, whether it was the summer of 1998 or the summer of

10    1999, so I'm a little bit fuzzy on that.  I just -- but, yeah, I do recall

11    testifying in the summer of 2000.

12       Q.   Now, as somebody who, like me, is heavily involved in the case of

13    Vinko Pandurevic, I'm sure you'll agree that one of the, if not the most

14    significant documents in his case is the interim combat report of the 15th

15    of July, our P329?

16       A.   Yes, sir, I agree.

17       Q.   And you'd also agree that it's very important that anybody trying

18    to determine his guilt or innocence gets a full understanding of his

19    meaning in that document?

20       A.   Yes, sir.

21       Q.   And that is a document which you sought to interpret not only here

22    in evidence but in your narrative report of May of 2000; that's right?

23       A.   Correct, sir.

24       Q.   I'll suggest to you at the outset that the critical phrases in

25    that report are pregnant with ambiguity and give you the opportunity to

Page 20731

 1    comment on that now.  Would you agree or disagree?

 2       A.   I would disagree, and my basis for disagreeing is that, you know,

 3    having gone through this issue of ambiguity and parsing of words, my

 4    foundational position is that, you know, military documents, written by

 5    military professionals, are written for clarity and so that there are no

 6    misinterpretations of the meaning, so that's usually my foundational

 7    position on these issues.  It means what it says, but certainly I will

 8    hold open your, you know, comments on ambiguity, and I expect you'll ask

 9    me about them.

10       Q.   Well, to cut straight to the chase, I'd like to ask you a few

11    questions and see whether you agree with me about, as it were, the context

12    in which the document was written, before we come to the precise words of

13    the document itself.  And if you don't mind, can we move to a couple of

14    days after the document was written, the 17th of July of 1995, and that is

15    the day after the so-called corridor had been opened and many thousands of

16    enemy soldiers, many of whom were armed, had been allowed to walk free to

17    the free territory by Vinko Pandurevic; that's correct, isn't it?

18       A.   Yes, sir.

19       Q.   And as you told Mr. McCloskey, this had been done in direct

20    contravention of orders of superior command?

21       A.   Yes, sir.

22       Q.   And on that day, the 17th of July, the brigade -- the Zvornik

23    Brigade, that is, was visited by three colonels from Main Staff?

24       A.   Correct, sir.

25       Q.   And the purpose of their visit was to investigate why an order of

Page 20732

 1    superior command had been disobeyed by Vinko Pandurevic?

 2       A.   Yes, sir, correct.

 3       Q.   And to put that visit in context, throughout the prior 24 hours

 4    we've seen several examples of disingenuous behaviour by Vinko Pandurevic

 5    towards his superior command as to what he was doing and what in fact he

 6    had done?

 7       A.   I wouldn't agree with that characterisation of his behaviour.  I

 8    don't know that it matters for where we're going, but I don't believe he

 9    was being disingenuous.  It may very well have been a function of the fact

10    that, you know, he made the decision, hadn't been able to fully brief his

11    superiors at that point, but I don't think there was ever a design that he

12    was trying to deceive them about what he did.  And in fact he made it

13    clear later on exactly what he did and why.  So, I mean, I don't agree

14    with your characterisation on that.

15       Q.   Very well.  Prior to the opening of the corridor - and I will come

16    to this in another section of my cross-examination - would you agree that

17    there is evidence of frequent communications between Vinko Pandurevic and

18    enemy forces, with a view to negotiating the passage of the 28th Division?

19       A.   There is -- there is much information out there, and I believe

20    Dusko Vukotic was a part of that, I believe that PW-168 discussed that to

21    some degree as well, that certainly on the Muslim side, they were trying

22    to forge an agreement with Colonel Pandurevic to let the column through.

23    But, you know, throughout the 15th and at least the early morning hours of

24    the 16th, Colonel Pandurevic felt he had the military means to continue to

25    resist the column and did so.

Page 20733

 1       Q.   And is it within your knowledge that the negotiations were

 2    conducted throughout the day and the evening of the 15th of July, before

 3    and up to the point at which the irregular combat report of that date was

 4    written?

 5       A.   I don't have an exact timeline of when they were going on.  I

 6    mean, I certainly believe that by the 15th, the Muslim commanders are

 7    talking.  They may have even been talking over this issue as early as the

 8    14th, before Colonel Pandurevic got there.  So I take what you're saying.

 9    I just don't know it as a fact.  But it wouldn't surprise me if it were

10    that early.

11       Q.   Just so that we're clear, did you, during the whole of your seven

12    years' attachment to the Office of the Prosecutor or at any time

13    previously, ever have the opportunity to listen to tape-recorded

14    conversations between Vinko Pandurevic and Semso Muminovic?

15       A.   No, sir.  If they exist, I didn't listen to them.  I mean, I don't

16    know whether they're in the possession of the OTP or whether they're in

17    possession of ABiH Army, so, I mean, I did not listen to the context of

18    those conversations.

19       Q.   Did you ever during the course of your seven years employment at

20    the OTP or any period since then have access to witness statements or

21    interviews with members of the 28th Division who'd passed through in the

22    column?

23       A.   Yes, sir, and at one point I remember early on talking with

24    Semso - and I'm going to butcher his last name.  I apologise in advance -

25    is it Mutanovic [phoen] or --

Page 20734

 1       Q.   I think if you just call him "Semso," we'll know who you mean.

 2       A.   I did talk with him and he had indicated that.  But at the times

 3    of having that discussion with him, my own basis of information wasn't

 4    sufficient that I really understood what he was really trying to get to.

 5    So, I mean, I was aware that there was a -- you know, talk back and forth

 6    between Colonel Pandurevic and others of the Zvornik Brigade and the

 7    members of the column to negotiate this, but it wasn't an issue that I

 8    particularly focused on.

 9       Q.   So when you give your opinion as to any meaning of the irregular

10    combat report of the 15th of July, it is ignorant, as it were, of the

11    exchange of information between them that might have dealt with their

12    respective military and humanitarian positions?

13       A.   No, sir.  I mean, again, going back to what I've said before, it's

14    not a question of not knowing about it.  Whether or not it's in the detail

15    that I may have liked to or not, it's the fact that given the position

16    that, you know, what happened with the column was a military act, it

17    wasn't a particular issue of relevance, the negotiations back and forth,

18    with respect to what happened along the crime base.  So that's why it

19    didn't receive perhaps as much attention as you suggest.

20       Q.   Not for the last time during the course of this cross-examination,

21    I'm going to refer you to some evidence which you may have now appraised

22    yourself of, namely, the evidence of PW-168 before this Trial Chamber.  He

23    agreed with these two propositions:  That by the evening of the 15th of

24    July, two things were obvious; that in order to avoid massive loss of life

25    on both sides, the soldiers of the 28th Division would have to be let go;

Page 20735

 1    and, secondly, that Vinko Pandurevic's superior command were never going

 2    to give him an order to do that.  Does that affect your opinion as to --

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's go into private session, please.

 4                          [Private session]

 5  (redacted)

 6  (redacted)

 7  (redacted)

 8  (redacted)

 9  (redacted)

10  (redacted)

11  (redacted)

12  (redacted)

13  (redacted)

14  (redacted)

15  (redacted)

16                          [Open session]

17            MR. HAYNES:

18       Q.   But here we must be careful, Mr. Butler.  Does the information

19    that you have available to you cause you to concur with his assessment of

20    the situation?

21       A.   Yes, sir, I believe that the documents that we had and we have in

22    our possession to this date does correspond to that view.

23       Q.   I don't want there to be any ambiguity here.  I'm suggesting that

24    that was the position by the evening of the 15th of July, at the time the

25    irregular combat report was written.

Page 20736

 1       A.   Like I said, I mean, the documents correspond to the general

 2    situation.  I cannot say, obviously, as a fact whether or not that the

 3    witness is correct with respect to what Colonel Pandurevic recognised at

 4    that juncture.  I mean, I just -- I don't know that.  I can confirm that

 5    the documentary evidence that's out there does dovetail with the situation

 6    on the ground.

 7       Q.   Very well, then.  Let's turn to your interpretation of this

 8    document.  And can I make a couple of very simple points first.

 9            You're not the author of our P329, the interim combat report of

10    the 15th of July, are you?

11       A.   You're asking me if I wrote the combat report; is that correct,

12    sir?

13       Q.   Correct.

14       A.   No, sir, I did not write the combat report.

15       Q.   And you haven't spoken to the man who did write it, have you?

16       A.   I agree, I have not.

17       Q.   So your interpretation of this document is not based on any

18    knowledge of what the writer had in his mind?

19       A.   Well, sir, certainly during the proceedings with respect to the

20    first two trials, I agree with that.  There were -- and maybe I shouldn't

21    do this in public session.  Maybe this might be more appropriate in

22    private session.

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  We'll just jump into private session straightaway.

24          [Private session] [Private Session made public by order of Trial Chamber]

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  We are in private session, Mr. Butler.

Page 20737

 1            THE WITNESS:  I just -- again, not knowing the full background, I

 2    mean, I understand that at some point in time, there were contacts between

 3    the Office of the Prosecutor and then General Pandurevic where there were

 4    discussions related to his potential surrender to the custody of the

 5    ICTY.  And, again, while I wasn't a direct participant in those, one of

 6    the issues that did come up was, you know, I did become aware of

 7    information with respect to the explanations that Colonel Pandurevic gave

 8    for that particular document.  So, I mean, I certainly have that in mind

 9    when I get to this particular juncture in time.  So that's all I needed to

10    raise.  I don't know whether it was appropriate to do that in public or

11    private session, sir.  I apologise then.

12            JUDGE AGIUS:  I think we could have done it in public session, if

13    you agree to change the status of that part of the transcript.  I don't

14    know.

15            Mr. McCloskey, I don't see any problems with the Prosecution.

16            We've heard more or less the same evidence before, and I think it

17    was in public session so --

18                          [Trial Chamber confers]

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  So that part of the -- this part of the

20    transcript will become public. 

21    We can revert to open session now and proceed from there.

22                          [Open session]

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Butler, and thank you, parties.

24            Go ahead.

25            MR. HAYNES:

Page 20738

 1       Q.   Just to clarify that last answer, there's no mystery about what

 2    you're talking about.  You're talking about an investigation report that

 3    deals with a conversation or an interview over the course of a meal

 4    between an investigator on a different team called Eileen Galice and my

 5    client, Vinko Pandurevic, aren't you?

 6       A.   In part, but there was also a series of conversations related to

 7    the potential negotiation process of a surrender that weren't part of that

 8    particular issue, and that's why I -- that was the other part that I was

 9    thinking of, because I know that there was some sensitivity at the time

10    pertaining to the Office of the Prosecutor and those contacts with the

11    accuseds, so that's the other part of it.

12       Q.   Very well.  But you can't possibly have known about them in May

13    2000, when you signed off this report, can you?

14       A.   No, sir, and that's what I said, that's why I structured

15    accordingly what my state of knowledge was at that time during those

16    proceedings and then what it is at this juncture.

17       Q.   And even after May 2000, did what you read in the investigation

18    report from Eileen Galice impact at all on your interpretation of this

19    document?

20       A.   Well, sir, it did impact in so much as that as part of Rule 68

21    obligations, it was an issue -- you know, his interpretation of what that

22    phrase meant or what he was talking about was an issue that we had to

23    explore, because it was, you know, a potentially exculpatory issue.  So it

24    did impact me.

25       Q.   Are you suggesting that at any stage in your review of this

Page 20739

 1    document, you have sought to use it as exculpatory material in the case of

 2    Vinko Pandurevic or, indeed, anybody?

 3       A.   I haven't sought to use it as such, because I don't get into the

 4    issues of whether, you know, it's exculpatory or not.  My view is, you

 5    know, I interpret the document based on what I understand at the time.

 6    There is, to some degree, a difference of opinion between myself and

 7    others, you know, with respect to its legal value, I mean, so, I mean,

 8    that's why I just stick with what it means in the context of the military

 9    issue, not what it means in the legal sense or anything else.

10       Q.   Now, before we actually come to looking at the document, I want to

11    revisit something you said to Mr. Josse yesterday when you were dealing

12    with your understanding of the Serbian language.

13            In your evidence-in-chief, you told us that the Serbian

14    word "asanacija" has been translated by the CLSS as meaning restoration of

15    the terrain and that you understood it to mean the process by which

16    biological, human, animal waste and things of that nature were removed or

17    buried?

18       A.   Or disposed of on the battlefield, yes, sir.

19       Q.   Does that phrase come from the military lexicon or is it, as it

20    were, an expression that you, together with the CLSS at this Tribunal

21    have, to use a better word, compromised on?

22       A.   It is my understanding that it does come, and if memory serves, it

23    was actually we pulled the phrase right out of the JNA lexicon, and it was

24    an exhibit in the Krstic case, so everyone was quite clear what it meant.

25    So I don't think I'm attributing a different meaning to it. I mean, we did

Page 20740

 1    bring the meaning forward before the Court because we did recognise that

 2    particular terminology issue existed.

 3       Q.   And forgive me, did I understand the drift of your evidence

 4    correctly that the difficulty with that particular word meant that the

 5    irregular combat report of the 15th of July, in translation, went through

 6    a number of drafts?

 7       A.   I don't believe so.  I think the difficulty with that -- and I

 8    don't know if that was the first document where it was used.  The

 9    difficulty wasn't with -- at multiple revisions.  I believe the difficulty

10    was that from an English language perspective, I didn't feel that the

11    euphemistic phrase of "restoration of the terrain" somehow conveyed the

12    right context of the fact that what we were talking about was, you know,

13    in a technical state, you know, burying biological hazard products, human

14    and animal wastes, and that's why, I mean, as a matter of just trying to

15    keep the record as clear as possible, we endeavoured to actually put the

16    definition before the Court so we wouldn't get into an interpretational

17    battle.  It meant what it said.

18       Q.   Did you look at other documents other than the military lexicon in

19    translating this unusual expression?

20       A.   I don't believe so.  I mean, the JNA lexicon gave what I believe

21    was an adequate definition.  I know that somewhere along the line, we did

22    come into possession of a JNA document which was dated 1974, if memory

23    serves, that talked about medical and veterinary processes on the

24    battlefield, and I think we actually did check there and came up with

25    essentially the same definition.  So, I mean, I didn't think we went any

Page 20741

 1    further than that.  The issue seemed to resolve itself in the Krstic case

 2    as to what the definition meant.  Nobody essentially disputed it, and we

 3    moved from there.

 4       Q.   And just to finish on this particular aspect of your involvement

 5    with the CLSS, was it the case that you were in consultation over how the

 6    English translation of this document should be produced or what it should

 7    look like or what it should say?

 8       A.   No, sir.  I -- I don't get involved in stuff like that at all.  My

 9    involvement was strictly revolving around the phrase that, when translated

10    into its literal term, didn't seem to make any sense.

11            MR. HAYNES:  Now, I wonder if we can put our first document into

12    e-court.  It's 7D480, please, and we'll start with the first page of that

13    document.

14            THE WITNESS:  Definitely a newer version than I've seen before,

15    1991.

16            MR. HAYNES:

17       Q.   You haven't seen this document before?

18       A.   No, not this particular version.  This is a much more recent

19    document than -- than I'm familiar with.

20       Q.   We've had this translated by the CLSS, and, I mean, you can look

21    straightaway and see that their 2008 translation of this document is quite

22    different.  They translate "asanacija" as hygiene and sanitation measures,

23    rather than restoration of the terrain.  Was that how the 1974 document --

24            JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey.

25            MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's apples and oranges.  The term

Page 20742

 1    was "asanacija terena [phoen]," and so -- and I don't see that on this.

 2    And grilling Mr. Butler about, you know, words such as this, I think the

 3    definition should be -- or the word should be correct.  The term we're

 4    talking about is -- in the document is "asanacija terena."

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  Do you wish to comment on that?

 6            MR. HAYNES:  I'm going to come to that.  Mr. Butler has told us

 7    that the phrase "asanacija" means restoration of the terrain, and I'm

 8    going to come to why there's a "terena" in that sentence.  So that's an

 9    you utterly false objection, and I'll carry on.  I'm merely showing him

10    the front of the document so that we can proceed.

11            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

12            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I don't believe that that's -- was what Mr. Butler

13    said.  That may be the way it's being interpreted.

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  I don't think we should continue this discussion in

15    the presence of the witness.  I think if there is going to be a

16    discussion, it won't be in the presence of the witness, but I think we

17    can -- having heard you both, I think we can proceed.

18            Mr. Haynes.

19            MR. HAYNES:  Yes.  Can we go to English page 5 and B/C/S page 6 in

20    this document.

21       Q.   Mr. Butler, is that sufficiently enlarged and focused for you to

22    read it?

23       A.   Yes, sir, and I appreciate that because I've noticed I've left my

24    glasses in the room, so that's fine.

25       Q.   You and I both have the same problem.

Page 20743

 1            JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, one moment.  The B/C/S and the English

 2    pages that we see do not correspond.  The B/C/S starts with paragraph 4.

 3            MR. HAYNES:  Yes.  Well, the B/C/S probably needs to go back a

 4    page.

 5            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  No, no, no.  No, I still don't think we are

 6    there.

 7            MR. HAYNES:  Well, in that event --

 8            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, we are there now, we are there now.

 9            MR. HAYNES:  Yes, thank you.

10            JUDGE AGIUS:  Can we -- yes, zoom in, please, that's correct.  And

11    start with 1.  Yes.

12            Okay.  Your question, Mr. Haynes?

13            MR. HAYNES:

14       Q.   Just read, really, the first two paragraphs over to yourself.  You

15    said you saw a much earlier document.  Was it in similar terms to these as

16    to, as it were, the general provisions of hygiene and sanitation measures

17    in battlefields?

18       A.   No, sir.  I mean, this is the same -- in general terms, this is

19    the same type of process that they are talking about.

20       Q.   And so under paragraph 2, the process that you were talking about,

21    hygienic and sanitation measures, included the following:  Finding the

22    wounded who were accidentally left behind, gathering them, giving them

23    first aid, and evacuating them into medical institutions; finding,

24    gathering and helping wounded or deceased animals or animals that were

25    accidentally left behind and, if necessary, evacuate them.

Page 20744

 1            I'm going to stop because somebody is trying to attract my

 2    attention.

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Of course, I don't read the B/C/S language, but now,

 4    even comparing the two texts, it's obvious that they do not correspond.

 5    For various reasons.  If you look at paragraph 1, there's something

 6    missing in the English translation.  Paragraph 2, it's not subdivided into

 7    the various bullets in the B/C/S, so I don't think we are looking at the

 8    same page in B/C/S.

 9            MR. HAYNES:  Well, I'm going to suggest a practical measure.  If I

10    carry on reading it slowly, we can cure the problem in e-court later on,

11    and then the translators can do their best to let the accused know how

12    this document translates back into B/C/S.  But for present purposes, I'll

13    read paragraph 2 and pose a question to Mr. Butler.

14            JUDGE AGIUS:  I think if we go to the previous page in B/C/S, we

15    are there.  Yes, correct.

16            MR. HAYNES:  Certainly looks like it.

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, yes, it is, that's it.  Thank you, Madam Usher

18    and Madam Registrar.

19            Mr. Haynes.

20            MR. HAYNES:

21       Q.   And carrying on:

22            "Finding, gathering and (burying or burning) those who have been

23    killed and establishing the necessary records; finding, gathering and

24    removing (burying or burning) or using animals carcasses; gathering and

25    eliminating (burning or burying) all kinds of waste dangerous to the

Page 20745

 1    health of people or animals; catching abandoned (lost, stray) animals,

 2    gathering military property and personal belongings of wounded military

 3    personnel (or military personnel who have been killed or who have died of

 4    natural causes)," and so on.

 5            And did your understanding of the term mean that it included, as

 6    it were, the recovery of the wounded and the treatment of them?

 7       A.   No, sir, my understanding of the term did not include the

 8    treatment of wounded in that broader phrase.

 9       Q.   So in your view, when you wrote your report of May 2000 and you

10    interpreted the irregular combat report of the 15th of July, you were

11    predisposed to the view that "asanacija" could only be carried out once a

12    battle was over; would that be right?

13       A.   No, sir.  My view was that the phrase "asanacija" was -- that we

14    were talking about was resulting in the issue of burial of biological

15    waste, human or otherwise.  It didn't reflect on to whether it occurred

16    before, during, or after battle.

17       Q.   Well, forgive me.  Then that must mean, seeing a document that now

18    describes to you that it includes the recovery and treatment of wounded,

19    that you concede you had a fundamental misunderstanding of the term when

20    you wrote your report, mustn't it?

21       A.   No, sir, I believe the term as it's used in that report is

22    referring to the activity that was occurring on the ground.  I mean, we

23    can parse words all we want on this, but you have to look at it in context

24    to the overall situation, and we can talk all day about what it could have

25    meant, but when we are confronted with a large body of information that's

Page 20746

 1    saying -- or that's indicating exactly what it was, you know, it could

 2    have meant recovering the wounded, but there's absolutely no information

 3    that suggests that it was.  It could have meant digging -- burying animal

 4    carcasses, but there's no information to suggest it was.  It could have

 5    been gathering straight military property, but there's no indication that

 6    that's what it was.  So, I mean, we can play the word game, but I think

 7    that you have to ultimately, when you look at these military documents,

 8    look at them in the context of what was happening at the time.

 9       Q.   Well, we'll do that.  But before we do, let's just have a look at

10    English pages 8 to 10 and B/C/S pages 15 onwards of this document to

11    reinforce this particular point.

12            Thank you.

13            I'm not going to invite you to read entirely Chapter 3, but you

14    can see that it's a chapter that describes the procedures for implementing

15    hygiene and sanitation measures in battlefields during combat operations.

16    And in particular, I invite you to look at 84:

17            "During attacks, hygiene and sanitation measures shall be

18    implemented as soon as the situation so allows.  Units within the first

19    combat echelon will not always be able to implement hygiene and sanitation

20    measures in the battlefield, in which case it is their duty to inform

21    superior officers that hygiene and sanitation measures have not been

22    implemented."

23            Just quickly, your understanding of the term, did it include, in

24    May 2000, when you wrote your report, the concept of "asanacija" during

25    combat operations?

Page 20747

 1       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, I would -- I would read 84 and not see that as

 2    inconsistent with my understanding, yes, sir.

 3       Q.   So without having seen this document, where did you get that from?

 4       A.   Again, it goes back to my understanding of the definition under

 5    the JNA lexicon.  Certainly as a practical matter, I agree with the

 6    context of paragraph 84, and first echelon units who are engaged in combat

 7    are often not going to have the time to implement these measures.  That's

 8    a practical matter of common sense in some regard.  So that's why I'm

 9    saying, my reading of paragraph 84 is not consistent with my broader

10    understanding of what that process was.

11       Q.   And did you ever review any VRS document giving instructions for

12    the carrying out of implementation of hygiene and sanitation of the

13    battlefield?

14       A.   At the time of the May 2000 narrative, the OTP did not have in its

15    possession the documents that it now has, which talk about those

16    activities that I believe they're now -- they take place in context of

17    time starting around the 20th of July.  I did not have those available to

18    me at the initial reports.

19       Q.   Have you seen them since?  I'm going to show you 7D481, please.

20       A.   I believe I talked about them in one case or they were on a

21    Prosecution exhibit list.  I don't know if I actually talked about them or

22    not.  I think I did.

23       Q.   Well, they're not on a Prosecution exhibit list in this case, so

24    I'm going to show you 7D481, if I may.

25            MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's not correct.

Page 20748

 1            MR. HAYNES:  Well, if I'm wrong, I'm sorry, but can he see this

 2    document and can we get on?

 3            JUDGE AGIUS:  Are you insisting on a ruling on that or -- we've

 4    had this happening in the past, and we always found a solution.

 5            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yeah, I think we can work it out.  I just want to

 6    make sure that we're clear.

 7            JUDGE AGIUS:  If there are other documents that you have not

 8    indicated previously, Mr. Haynes --

 9            MR. HAYNES:  I don't think it's a case of not indicating it.  It's

10    on my list of documents for cross-examination.  I think the issue between

11    us may well be whether it bears a Defence 65 ter number or a Prosecution

12    65 ter number.  It's really a matter of little consequence.

13            JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  If that is the case and if you agree, I think

14    we can move ahead.

15            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think we can move.  It was on my -- there's two

16    of them that were on my list.  I can't remember if I pulled them to save

17    time or he spoke about them, but they're clearly -- there's no

18    disagreement.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's move, let's move.  Okay.

20            MR. HAYNES:

21       Q.   Have you seen this document before, Mr. Butler?

22       A.   No, sir, it does not look familiar to me.

23       Q.   Just describe to us who it's an order from and what it concerns.

24       A.   It appears -- like I said, in its initial context, it appears to

25    be an order from the Main Staff on issues relating to clearing up the

Page 20749

 1    battlefield, and as was noted, one of the earlier practices that the Drina

 2    Corps Command just essentially scratched off some of the header data,

 3    rewrote in their own, and it was a document that looks like it would have

 4    been disseminated all the way to the brigades.

 5       Q.   And, again, under paragraph 1, a description of the duty of

 6    virtually every unit, operative and tactical, of the army to carry out

 7    clearing up of the battlefield, including gathering and offering first aid

 8    to wounded, offering first aid to wounded and sick animals, gathering

 9    (burying or burning) the bodies of the dead, and establishing records,

10    finding and gathering animal corpses or using them, gathering and removing

11    all types of waste dangerous to humans, much in the same terms as the

12    order of the -- as the instructions of the JNA we just looked at?

13       A.   Yes, sir.  I mean, in large terms, it's a reflection of a known

14    military concept that often in modern battlefield environments, disease

15    kills more soldiers than combat does, and these issues reflect the

16    importance that the Main Staff, particularly the medical branch, places on

17    that.

18       Q.   Now, were you aware that during the course of the 15th of July, at

19    Baljkovica, there was or were ceasefires arranged between the column and

20    the forces commanded by Vinko Pandurevic?

21       A.   On the 15th, no, sir, I was not.

22            MR. HAYNES:  I wonder whether we could look at P2232, page 13 in

23    the English and page 17 in the B/C/S.

24            I'm very sorry.  Of course, I've forgotten that the exhibit has a

25    different 65 ter number in B/C/S.  It's 2231.  But I think the clerk has

Page 20750

 1    found it anyway.

 2       Q.   I'd like to direct your attention to the entry beginning at 1330:

 3            "Vuk to Lovac:  I talked to Semso."

 4            Then there's Djuko:

 5            "He wants to negotiate.  He wants me to give him the frequency of

 6    the Turk who is leading the group."

 7            "1345.  Vuk spoke to Zukov again and agreed to ceasefire under

 8    pretence that they would negotiate later.  Then he fired one more round 1

 9    for 1."

10            "Igman to Igman 1 - cease all activities."

11            This is the book of the tactical intercepts operators for the

12    Muslim forces.  That indicates that there were negotiations for and in

13    fact a ceasefire on the 15th of July, doesn't it?

14       A.   It may have indicated that the individual in question, and I

15    assume in this context we're talking Vuk is Dusko Vukotic, the

16    intelligence officer who's carrying these out, I mean, he may believe

17    that, but that's not the way that the situation played out on the ground.

18       Q.   Go to the very bottom entry:

19            "Vuk to Ikar to Pavle.  I talked to Semso and stopped the

20    activities."

21            What does that mean?

22       A.   Well, I have to assume that Semso is Semso Muminovic, and again I

23    poll joins for butchering the pronunciation.  Again I don't know what --

24    the context of what he's talking about.  I mean, they are obviously

25    talking about the mechanisms of trying to negotiate a ceasefire, but as I

Page 20751

 1    again recall, they may have been talking about this over the radio, but

 2    that's not what was happening on the ground.

 3       Q.   "I talked to Semso (Vuk) and stopped all activities."

 4            Mr. Butler, are you not able to construe anything in a way that

 5    might be favourable to a defence suggestion?

 6            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection, that's a misquote.  It says "stop the

 7    activities," not "all activities."

 8            MR. HAYNES:  I'm very sorry, I'm very sorry.

 9       Q.   Is that not capable, Mr. Butler, of indicating that a ceasefire

10    took place on the 15th of July?

11       A.   Again, sir, I mean, he may have believed it.  I'm just saying that

12    my information of what was happening on the ground reflects that that's

13    not accurate information.  I mean, it's not the first time where I've

14    talked about the fact that in intercept information, it's not necessarily

15    uncommon that correspondents who are talking about it don't have the

16    accurate information.  There's no corroborating information that I'm aware

17    of that would support this.

18       Q.   So you dismiss it as a possibility because of the absence of

19    corroborating information; is that right?

20       A.   I don't dismiss it as a possibility.  I hold it open.  I'm just

21    noting that I don't have any corroborating information that suggests that

22    there was a -- there was a ceasefire in place that early on the 15th.

23            MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look at another document, please, which

24    you won't have seen, I don't believe.  It's 7D293.  English, page 5;

25    B/C/S, page 6.  And the witness will need to look at paragraph 20.

Page 20752

 1       Q.   This is a witness statement made by Dragan Obrenovic, dated

 2    February 2004, so it post-dates your departure from the OTP, as I

 3    understand it.  Is that right?

 4       A.   Yes, sir, I would have been gone by then.

 5       Q.   And I direct your attention to paragraph 20, please.

 6            "I think that many Muslims were killed during the fighting and

 7    that the corpses had been removed, because we only found about 20 corpses

 8    between the 17th and the 19th.  The Zvornik Brigade buried these corpses

 9    at Motovska Kosa on the 19th or 20th of July, 1995."

10            What Mr. Obrenovic is saying -- well, I better check this with

11    you.  Had you read this before?

12       A.   No, sir, I don't believe I've read his -- this particular

13    statement.

14       Q.   What Mr. Obrenovic is saying is that at least the Muslim forces,

15    prior to the 17th of July, had and took the opportunity to remove a lot of

16    their wounded and dead?

17       A.   Yes, sir, and my understanding is that where they could, they did

18    in fact do that, they carried their dead out.

19       Q.   Then presumably, you concede that that was something that was open

20    to the VRS side to do during the period prior to the 17th of July, would

21    you?

22       A.   I guess I'm not clear about your question.  Are you suggesting

23    that -- I mean, I'm not aware of the VRS, except in maybe one or two

24    instances when soldiers went missing, that the VRS abandoned its dead

25    casualties.  My understanding is, for the most part, that as the units

Page 20753

 1    withdraw -- withdrew from the lines, they took their dead with them.  I

 2    don't think there was a large body of missing soldiers that fall into the

 3    same context.  So I think if I understand your question correctly, you

 4    know, the VRS took out its dead as well, yes, sir.

 5       Q.   And wounded?

 6       A.   Yes, sir.  I don't believe they've left any wounded behind.

 7       Q.   So during the course of the 15th of July, if they were carrying

 8    out those sort of operations, namely, taking their dead or wounded from

 9    the battlefield, that would be "asanacija," wouldn't it?

10       A.   Yes, sir, in the technical sense that we're talking about on that

11    definition, it would.  The evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield

12    would qualify as that, yes, sir.

13       Q.   Thank you very much.  I'll be content with that answer.

14            Can we now have a look, please, at P329.  I should say 65 ter

15    P329.  And just a few basic question about it.

16            In its original form, it is a handwritten document; is that right?

17       A.   Correct, sir.

18       Q.   And have you troubled to identify the sort of paper it is written

19    on?

20       A.   I don't believe I've done that, no, sir.

21       Q.   It's not paper that has any formality about it, it's the sort of

22    paper that might have just been to hand at the forward command post;

23    that's the sort of thing it is, isn't it?

24       A.   That's certainly a fair characterisation, yes, sir.

25       Q.   And I think you and I will agree that this was something that was

Page 20754

 1    dictated to another man and written out on dictation.

 2       A.   Yes, sir, that is my understanding.

 3       Q.   And in the circumstances as you know them to be, not a document

 4    that got, in the circumstances, a great deal of thought; would you agree

 5    with that?

 6       A.   I would disagree with it.  I mean, when you look at the document

 7    in its entirety, it reflects what I believe to be a fairly accurate

 8    reflection of how Colonel Pandurevic understood the battlefield situation

 9    at the time.  So, I mean, I can't say that it didn't have a lot of

10    thought.  I think the opposite is true.  I mean, I think he puts a very

11    clear message out with respect to the situation that he's facing and the

12    problems that he has.

13       Q.   In any review you've given -- I'm sorry.  In any review you have

14    given of this document, you have confined your interpretation, haven't

15    you, to paragraphs 4 and 5?

16       A.   I believe for the purposes of this testimony and others, yes,

17    sir.  I mean, the paragraphs that people were concerned about were

18    paragraphs 4 and 5.

19       Q.   So you've lifted them from the context of the document, have you?

20       A.   When I considered the document in its entirety, no, I didn't lift

21    them out of context.  It's just for the discussions -- the larger context,

22    I mean, I will certainly entertain talking about that as much as you want,

23    but most situations, again, the part that people were interested in were

24    those two paragraphs.

25       Q.   Well, what people were interested in?

Page 20755

 1       A.   When questions would come -- arise from either the Prosecution or

 2    other Defence counsel, or in the Krstic case, when the Judges were talking

 3    about this.  I mean, those were the operative paragraphs.  I don't think

 4    the issue of the combat situation on the lines, as well as other issues

 5    beyond that on offers to negotiate, I mean, I believe I've talked about

 6    them, but those obviously weren't the issues of interest in this document.

 7       Q.   You would, I assume, concede that apart from the fourth paragraph

 8    in the English version, the entirety of this document is written about the

 9    military situation, isn't it?

10       A.   Well, I -- I disagree, only so much as I believe that the fourth

11    paragraph is part of the military situation as far as Colonel Pandurevic

12    was concerned at the time.  It's all part of the military situation, just

13    the same as, you know, the discussion on -- you know, with respect to

14    offers to the opposite commander about issues, I mean as part of the

15    military situation.  So I disagree with the characterisation.  It's all

16    part of the military situation.

17       Q.   I'd like now to turn to the interpretation of this document that

18    you gave in your narrative report, please, since we are short of time, and

19    I'd like to conclude this aspect today.  And that's P685 at page 101 in

20    English and page 106 in B/C/S.  And I want to focus your attention,

21    please, on paragraph 13.12.  And, really, you can begin eight lines up

22    from the bottom of that paragraph with the sentence that begins:  "Later

23    that same day ...," and you can read it over to yourself.

24            Firstly, can we just satisfy ourselves that you are talking, in

25    that interpretation of this document, about the interim combat report of

Page 20756

 1    the 15th of July?

 2       A.   Correct, sir.

 3       Q.   Would you like a hard copy alongside you while I go through this?

 4       A.   I guess if it adds to clarity, yes, sir, I mean.

 5       Q.   Then I'll give you one.  You agreed with me earlier, I think, that

 6    the use of quotation marks was intended to -- in your report, was intended

 7    to reflect/direct attribution to a source; is that right?

 8       A.   Yes, sir.

 9       Q.   And for example, you attribute certain words to Colonel Beara,

10    "we'll see what," and you put in square brackets because presumably the

11    word "here" is not there, "he can do."  Is that right?

12       A.   Yes, sir.

13       Q.   And, again, in this report you note that Colonel Pandurevic noted

14    that there were a large number of prisoners distributed in schools in the

15    brigade area.  And we'll find that phrase in your report, won't we?

16       A.   Yes, sir.

17       Q.   The next phrase in quotation marks:  "Security operations," do we

18    find that in the report?

19       A.   Obligations of security.  It is not a literal translation.  I

20    agree, sir.

21       Q.   Well, why have you put the phrase "security operations" in

22    quotation marks?

23       A.   A technical error on my part.  I concede your point on that one.

24       Q.   Technical error?

25       A.   And I think we can go down further and there will be another one,

Page 20757

 1    I'm just looking at it, where it says:  "Let the prisoners go."  So, yes,

 2    those are technical errors.  I hope I dealt with them on my testimony in

 3    the court, but certainly in this context my default position is always go

 4    back to the original document.

 5       Q.   Why did you put the phrase "asanacija" in brackets after the

 6    words "burying of the bodies"?

 7       A.   Again, as part of the issue of clarity on my understanding of what

 8    the phrase "asanacija" meant.

 9       Q.   Who translated "asanacija" as meaning burying of the bodies for

10    you?

11       A.   Again, that's a -- what I understand that the passage means, and

12    that's what I put it at.  We can go over, around and around on the words,

13    but again this is a reflection of my understanding of it at the time.

14       Q.   So you put "asanacija" in the brackets after the phrase "burying

15    of the bodies" as an indication that that was a proper translation of that

16    Serbian word, did you?

17       A.   Well, no, sir, not as a proper translation, but within the context

18    of when the phrase is used, what we're talking about.

19            JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment.  Perhaps this would clarify things in my

20    mind.

21            Looking at the supposedly corresponding B/C/S text, "asanaciji" is

22    also in brackets, and those brackets are preceded by the words "i

23    pokapanju tijela."  Can anyone tell me what "i pokapanju tijela" means?

24            THE INTERPRETER:  "And the burying of bodies."

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  So isn't it the case of a literal translation?  The

Page 20758

 1    question was:  Why did you put "asanacija" in brackets.  It's in brackets

 2    in the original text -- oh, I see.  This is a translation of his report.

 3    Okay, all right, okay.  That explains it, then.  All right.

 4            Thank you, thank you, Judge Kwon.

 5            Mr. Haynes.

 6            MR. HAYNES:  Yes.

 7       Q.   I'm not sure you've answered my question, and I'm going to ask it

 8    again.  Please clarify why you put the word "asanacija" in brackets after

 9    the phrase "burying of the bodies."

10       A.   Because that's what I was talking about, it was an interpretation

11    of burying of the bodies, that's why I put it there.

12       Q.   Where did you get that from?

13       A.   Again, my understanding goes back to the phrase out of the JNA

14    lexicon.

15       Q.   So you chose to ignore the official CLSS translation and imposed

16    your own, as it were, understanding of the word; is that --

17       A.   No, sir.  I mean, somewhere along this line, in a footnote I have

18    the CLSS definition of what the phrase means as a footnoted thing. I'm not

19    ignoring it.

20       Q.   Well, let's come to the third one.

21            "Finally, he made it clear that his unit could no longer deal with

22    these issues, and that if 'no one' takes responsibility, he would be

23    forced to 'let the prisoners go.'".

24            Is that phrase in the irregular combat report of the 15th of July?

25       A.   No, sir, and I think I said it a little bit before, that I did

Page 20759

 1    recognise it in looking at it.  That is a technical inaccuracy on my part,

 2    and again I invite the Court to go back to the document and not rely on

 3    this as a direct quote.

 4       Q.   Why did you put that in quotation marks?  Did you genuinely

 5    believe that's what Vinko Pandurevic had written in the irregular combat

 6    report of the 15th of July?

 7       A.   I'd love to be able to tell you the exact reason why I did it in

 8    2000, but I just don't have the ability to say that.  I mean, the reality

 9    is it is a wrong quote and it shouldn't be there.

10       Q.   Did you check this document before you signed it off?

11       A.   Yes, sir, I did.

12       Q.   So you saw those errors, did you?

13       A.   Obviously not, because in this particular context if I saw them, I

14    wouldn't let them go through.

15       Q.   Well, I thought you agreed with me that there is scarcely a more

16    important document in this whole case.  You didn't see that you'd

17    misquoted it twice and imposed upon it your own interpretation of a word

18    in a language you don't understand?

19       A.   No, sir, and I hope that when one goes back and looks at the

20    Krstic transcripts, that in fact the actual issue of what the document

21    said and what it meant would have been explored there.  I don't think that

22    this was something that was left askew at this juncture.

23       Q.   That's not my point, Mr. Butler.

24       A.   Okay, well --

25       Q.   You wrote it.

Page 20760

 1       A.   Yes, sir, and I've acknowledged that it is inaccurate.

 2       Q.   And you knew what it was going to be used for?

 3       A.   Yes, sir.  I -- I acknowledged that it was inaccurate, it's not

 4    the literal translation, and again, you know, I believe that it has been

 5    dealt with prior.  But if not, certainly, I mean, my position is that we

 6    should go back to the original document and not to rely on a quote from

 7    me.

 8       Q.   And you knew, presumably, that it was going to be published?

 9       A.   In so much as published by ...

10       Q.   Well, made a public document in the Krstic trial, which had by

11    then started.

12       A.   It was going to be tendered as an exhibit, yes, sir.  I

13    guess "published" is -- okay.

14       Q.   I just want to give you the opportunity to assess yourself and

15    your work.  Just imagine for a minute that you did not write that and you

16    were reviewing it as, for example, a Defence expert.  How would you assess

17    those few sentences as an example of expert document analysis?

18       A.   Again, sir, I take it as a technical inaccuracy.  I acknowledge

19    that.

20       Q.   Score it 1 out of 10, Mr. Butler.

21            JUDGE AGIUS:  I think we can stop here on this.  You keep

22    qualifying it as a technical error.  Why is it technical and not a

23    substantive one?

24            THE WITNESS:  Sir, I -- and I'm sure Defence counsel will go into

25    this more, but I don't believe that it changes the context of the

Page 20761

 1    discussion that was underway and what this means, and I'm sure we'll

 2    explore that down the line.  So, I mean, it's a technical inaccuracy on my

 3    part that I misconstrued the actual translation of the document.  I do not

 4    believe that it changes the overall context of the discussion, and again I

 5    think we're going to hear more about that down the line.

 6            JUDGE AGIUS:  So let's go to the point, please, Mr. Haynes.

 7            MR. HAYNES:

 8       Q.   The phrase you used earlier when you were answering questions to

 9    Mr. Ostojic was that you thought your objectivity was such that you always

10    strove to be fair and technically accurate?

11       A.   Yes correct, sir.

12       Q.   Is that passage of your report, interpreting the interim combat

13    report of the 15th of July, technically accurate?

14       A.   No, sir.  I believe that we've acknowledged that it is not.

15    Certainly I acknowledge that it's not.

16       Q.   Left as it stands, is it fair?

17       A.   Again, it's inaccurate, but I don't believe that, when I look at

18    this as from the original document, that it changes my opinion as to what

19    it means.  So whether it's fair or not is not something I -- I'm qualified

20    to comment on.  It certainly will be an issue for the Trial Chamber to

21    look at.

22       Q.   Is it professional?

23            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

24            MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think he's made his point very clear, and --

25            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Let's move to -- let's move to whatever you

Page 20762

 1    have in mind, Mr. Haynes.

 2            MR. HAYNES:  I don't want to move to anything else this morning,

 3    so if that's a convenient time to stop.

 4            JUDGE AGIUS:  So we can stop here, adjourn.

 5            Mr. Butler, thank you so much.  We'll continue tomorrow morning.

 6            Mr. McCloskey, working on the assumption that tomorrow, hopefully,

 7    Mr. Haynes will conclude his cross-examination, as things stand at the

 8    moment, do you have a re-examination or are you planning for one, in which

 9    case could you give us an indication of the expected duration?

10            MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, I am, and I hope one session will do it.

11    There's a -- I am going to go look at the documents that I think have

12    been -- are now relevant, and I'll try to get them cut down and then get a

13    better estimate.  And, of course, I'll revise it depending on how far we

14    go with this cross, but I should have a better estimate for tomorrow.

15            As you know, I hope I can do this in an hour and a half.  I really

16    want this to be over with.

17            JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, we stand adjourned until tomorrow morning.

18    Thank you.

19                          --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,

20                          to be reconvened on Thursday, the 31st of

21                          January, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.