1 Tuesday, 1 July 2008

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Good morning, everybody and good morning to

7 you, Madam Registrar. Could you call the case, please.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number

9 IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

10 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, ma'am. All the accused are here.

11 From the Defence teams I notice the absence of Madam Tapuskovic,

12 Mr. Nikolic. That's it, I think.

13 Prosecution, we have Mr. McCloskey on his own.

14 The witness is already present. I take it that there are no

15 preliminaries. No.

16 In the meantime, Mr. McCloskey, there are two motions that I'm

17 sure you are aware of from the Beara Defence team. We are shortening the

18 deadline for the filing of the responses up until tomorrow. You can

19 choose between filing a written response, or if you wish to respond

20 orally at the beginning of the sitting or at the end of the sitting, you

21 may do so.

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: Thank you, Mr. President. Yes, we have been

23 discussing those motions and should be able to get back to you very soon.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you.

25 Good morning to you, Colonel Vuga.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honour.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: We are going to proceed with the

3 examination-in-chief of Mr. Zivanovic.

4 Mr. Zivanovic, he's all yours.

5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, and good morning to you, Mr. Zivanovic.

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Good morning, Your Honour.

8 WITNESS: PETAR VUGA [Resumed]

9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 Examination by Mr. Zivanovic: [Continued]

11 Q. Mr. Vuga, yesterday we spent quite a lot of time discussing the

12 rules of service of security organs. I would only like to ask you one

13 more thing. Who knew these rules of service? Whom were they intended?

14 Was it for all members of the army or only certain categories?

15 A. The rules of service are intended primarily for the service

16 itself, to apply them in keeping with what is prescribed. And second,

17 the rules of service are meant for all commanding officers who within

18 their personnel have their security organs and command over them. That

19 applies to the rules of service of the military police and the

20 instructions for applying the rules of service of the military police.

21 Q. Now I would like us to look at document from the Prosecutor's

22 list, 2741.

23 A. I have the document, Mr. Zivanovic.

24 Q. I don't know whether the English text is on the screen.

25 You can see that this is an instruction about command and control

1 over the security and intelligence organs of the Army of Republika Srpska

2 dated 24 October 1994. First of all, could you tell us what does

3 "instruction" mean in military terminology?

4 A. An instruction in military terminology is a regulatory document

5 which instructs as to the procedures of those to whom the instruction

6 applies. It can have a binding nature depending on what weight is

7 attached to it, so it can be either binding or it can serve as a pointer,

8 as a guideline. So this particular instruction on command and control

9 applies to those who command and control over security and intelligence

10 organs, and in the substance of the text there are stipulations as to

11 what those to whom the instruction applies must be guided by. That's all

12 the commanding officers and commanders who within their units have

13 security organs and intelligence organs over whom they exercise command

14 and control.

15 Q. Tell us, can this instruction be considered as a new enactment

16 relative to the rules of service for security organs or not?

17 A. These instructions in keeping with the rules of service of

18 security organs determine the way the rules are going to be applied, but

19 it does not stipulate how particular affairs will be conducted in

20 security organs. It doesn't go that far.

21 Q. Can you clarify a bit? In which way does it determine ways in

22 which the rules of service for security organs will be applied?

23 A. Instructions reflect needs that arise in the specific

24 circumstances in which the VRS was active. It was a very special set of

25 circumstances. I don't need to emphasise that, but let me point out the

1 following: In view of those needs, these instructions imposed on the

2 military leadership and the Main Staff that they should guide security

3 and intelligence organs in such a way as to be able to efficiently

4 protect the army, especially in the area that relates to

5 counter-intelligence because that was one of the greatest problems they

6 faced, at least according to the evaluation given in the introductory

7 part of these instructions. Let me also emphasise that these

8 instructions underlined one set of problems that are related not only to

9 the activities of security organs but also other issues that have an

10 impact on security organs and have an impact on their activities and

11 their job.

12 Q. Can you tell us, please, in which way does this instruction

13 govern this distribution of time that security organs should devote in

14 their work to those affairs that we discussed yesterday?

15 A. In its contents, these instructions established a certain

16 relationship between counter-intelligence affairs for which security

17 organs are responsible on the one hand, and on the other hand affairs in

18 which security organs participate in their commands; that is, staff and

19 command, military police and proceedings preliminary to prosecution. The

20 instruction determines that 80 per cent of all the work load of security

21 organs should be focused on counter-intelligence, whereas 20 per cent of

22 their capacities should be devoted or spent on affairs in the other three

23 areas in which security organs are participants. This ratio is

24 approximate, like, reflected by the study preliminary to this

25 instruction. In our study, this ratio was considered to be optimal. If

1 security organs are 85 per cent engaged in counter-intelligence, then in

2 this instruction it is 80 per cent of their overall engagement. I have

3 reason to believe that the circumstances and the situations in which the

4 security organs in the VRS were active dictated this more stringent

5 ratio.

6 Q. Let us look at paragraph 2 of these instructions, which says that

7 the security organs are directly commanded by the commander of the unit

8 of which they form part; but with regard to professional activities they

9 are controlled centrally by the security and intelligence organ of the

10 superior command. Can you explain exactly what this is supposed to mean,

11 controlled centrally? Can you make this distinction between the powers

12 of the commander and this centralised control by the security organ?

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey?

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: Just a foundational objection. The previous

15 question he said "I have reason to believe that the circumstances ..."

16 Could we clarify whether that is because of his study as an expert or

17 that -- does he have some actual personal experience on the ground or in

18 the field at the time that would give us some idea of how to view these

19 answers?

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. I think that's a very fair comment. Mr.

21 Zivanovic, will you please ask the witness to address these issues?

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, Your Honour.

23 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vuga, let us clear up the point raised by

24 Mr. McCloskey.

25 A. Certainly. I was trying to answer briefly so I did not expand on

1 what I said, I have reason to believe, but I will explain what reasons

2 they are. A study was made, and I compared it -- I compared this text to

3 the study that preceded the rule.

4 Q. Could you just speak more slowly?

5 A. The rule was written and the study was made in peacetime, in

6 regular conditions. That is, at the time when developments occurred in

7 relatively stable conditions. The intelligence activities focused on

8 activities that jeopardised the security of the Yugoslav People's Army

9 and the armed forces, and they took place at a time when there was no

10 armed conflict, there was no war. And even then, the findings of our

11 study indicated that 75 per cent, around 75 per cent - this cannot be

12 quantified precisely, but it can be presented as a ratio - 75 per cent of

13 time and work was devoted to counter-intelligence work. That was

14 satisfactory to counter secret threatening activities.

15 My conclusions about the circumstances in which the armed

16 conflict and the civil war took place of the nature they had in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina compared to the findings of our study and the

18 documents I studied and which I evaluated for the degree of threats and

19 the shape of threats to the VRS, all that led me to say I have reason to

20 believe that this percentage in those circumstances from the viewpoint of

21 engagement of security organs had to be increased compared to the

22 situation in the JNA, in the SFRY, in those past conditions. That is the

23 substance of my conclusion, and that is the basis of my position.

24 When I say I have reason to believe that this led the author -

25 that is, the Main Staff of the VRS - to act in this way with regard to

1 the command and control over security and intelligence organs of the VRS,

2 of course, that applies also to intelligence organs. That is the full

3 answer to your question.

4 Q. Let's just clarify your answer. When you say to increase the

5 engagement of security organs, on what part of their work was their

6 engagement increased?

7 A. Primarily on the greatest threats. At the time when this paper

8 was written, at the time of the study and the rule, we did not have

9 incursions by sabotage terrorist groups. If there were any, they were

10 negligible to what they were like in the war. In the rules of the

11 brigade, there is one provision that says that combat against Special

12 Forces in addition to counter-intelligence work by security organs shall

13 be led in other ways. This is just one illustration of the extent to

14 which the circumstances and the situation changed in wartime for security

15 organs as opposed to peacetime. So that is the substantial difference.

16 Furthermore, it almost needs no explanation what other things the

17 war brings for security organs. Even everyday life is changed in the

18 war.

19 Q. Mr. Vuga, let me come back to the question I asked before. That

20 is, could you clarify paragraph 2 of these instructions? What does it

21 mean that security organs with regard to professional activities are

22 controlled centrally by the superior security organ, by the security

23 organ of the superior command?

24 A. Well, this question you asked, Mr. Zivanovic, points out the

25 existence of strictly professional affairs that we discussed to some

1 extent yesterday, which have certain common needs and common features at

2 all levels of command in the Army of Republika Srpska, and in order to be

3 efficient, they have to be linked up into one functional whole, which is

4 able to provide a fast flow of information within that whole, its

5 appropriate and full evaluation, and quick response in situations where

6 professional work could have the best and the most efficient results. So

7 centralised means that in one place, almost simultaneously all the

8 information about threats flows in, important experience is identified

9 that may be important to the whole system, and that experience through

10 feedback is given to all the vehicles of counter-intelligence affairs,

11 and all officers in position wherever they are can count on it that this

12 experience will be available in their area, in their location. And they

13 in their turn whenever they get information that could be important to

14 the whole system make it available to the system as soon as possible, as

15 quickly as possible, so that there is sufficient knowledge about the

16 threats to Republika Srpska at all levels. This way, the command at the

17 highest level can make decisions and distribute assignments to

18 subordinates in keeping with its overall knowledge and information.

19 Q. In this same paragraph, there is reference to the independence of

20 security organs in the implementation of intelligence and

21 counter-intelligence tasks and operative combinations. You explained to

22 us what counter-intelligence tasks mean. You can perhaps explain in a

23 few words what intelligence task means, but tell us, what is operative

24 combinations?

25 A. The term "operative combination" is a very complex term speaking

1 of the structure of the task that needs to be executed, but I'll try to

2 explain it in simple terms. Security organs have at their disposal or,

3 rather, it is prescribed for them, that they can apply a total of 11

4 methods of work individually or in a combination. So if a source

5 provides a report that somebody is suspected of working for a foreign

6 intelligence service and that a move needs to be made towards an

7 interesting or a potentially interesting contact, it depends on the

8 source what we are going to do next. And then the choice has to be made

9 of the method which will be used for that follow-up activity, and that is

10 a combination of these methods that should lead us to knowledge that will

11 provide the answer to the question, what kind of threat are we dealing

12 with? That's one aspect of operative combination.

13 Another aspect, which is not just the privilege of security

14 organs or intelligence organs of the VRS, this is applied by all services

15 and it's based on their experience, and that is the following: Through

16 persons who are located in an area which is of interest to the

17 intelligence service, they should try to create a possibility for

18 collecting information on the enemy side, legally or otherwise, and bring

19 that person over to our side, also providing them with appropriate cover

20 and a legend as to why they were on the enemy side and then on our side.

21 Another task in this respect is to find persons who are fit for

22 that task, whether it is in the domain of intelligence or

23 counter-intelligence.

24 Q. [No interpretation]

25 JUDGE AGIUS: We are not having translation, basically. I don't

1 know what's happening. I waited a bit, but it went on too long.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I try it again.

3 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vuga, the independence of security organs as

4 defined under item 2 of this instruction, does it go beyond the framework

5 that have been laid by the rules of service? Does it redefine this

6 independence in a new way?

7 A. The independence is not redefined here. It is just pointed out

8 and made more prominent so as to put it in the focus of those who make

9 decisions on the tasks of the security organ and when these -- the

10 execution of these tasks is controlled. I've already explained the

11 nature of these tasks, but let me go back to them and say the following:

12 The independence in the choice of source of data and independence in the

13 choice of a combination that will be applied when executing a task

14 reflects in the fact that nothing can be foreseen in advance. You cannot

15 choose a specific person. That's why you have to spend some time seeking

16 a proper solution. It cannot be said in advance that some intelligence

17 activity has been discovered. That's why you need a process and a

18 combination that will lead to that. That is why this -- these data and

19 this manner of work cannot lead to a conclusion that would lend itself to

20 an immediate solution.

21 A question may be asked whether what is beyond the control and

22 command by the nature of its development and occurrence really belongs to

23 the function of command when you take into account the element of strict

24 confidentiality which is prescribed and which has to be complied with.

25 So these are the reasons for which the independence is necessary, for

1 which it is prescribed, and for which it has to be complied with.

2 Q. I would like to move on to item 3 of this instruction, which is

3 page 2 in e-court, both in B/C/S and in English. This part of the

4 instruction speaks about the duty of the intelligence organ to inform

5 their immediately superior commanders about their evaluations and

6 observations.

7 You have already told us how this is prescribed in the rules of

8 service of the intelligence organ -- security organ, but can you please

9 tell us whether this is laid down in the same way in this instruction, or

10 maybe there are discrepancies there.

11 A. In this part, the instruction is very consistent in the

12 application of the provisions of the rules of service, and it just

13 underscores both for the commanders and the security organs the fact that

14 this application -- obligation cannot be ignored because it is of a major

15 significance for the one and the other. That's why it is emphasised here

16 that in security organ is a member of the command and that the data

17 available to the commander- and I'm talking about assessments,

18 conclusions and proposals at -- which they have arrived in their

19 counter-intelligence work - should be made available to the commander of

20 the unit and to the organs of the command when the commander does not

21 need those directly. That's why the instruction is consistent and has

22 not changed anything.

23 Q. Item 4 of the instruction speaks about reporting on the part of

24 the security organ along the professional lines to the security organ of

25 the superior command. Since this part of the communication is defined as

1 a state secret in this part of the instruction, would you be able to tell

2 us whether this is consistent or not with the rules of service of the

3 security organ?

4 A. Yesterday, we looked at item 25, which points to the fact that

5 there are limitations in terms of reporting on one part or, to be more

6 precise, on the data which refer to the methods used by the security

7 organs in their work. This is in keeping with the rules of service and

8 the instructions on the application of methods in the work of the

9 security organs. Actually, just the methods of the security organ

10 because the application is something that the security organs do. So

11 there are no specific requests. This particular request can be found in

12 the rules of service in a somewhat condensed form, both in the domain of

13 command and control and the domain of the collection of data by the

14 security organs, the only difference being the fact that this has been

15 rounded up as one unit and highlighted in a way for everybody to see

16 better.

17 Q. In this item, a special emphasis is put on the telegrams and mail

18 sent by the members of the security and intelligence organs. Tell me,

19 please, is this part in keeping with the rules of service of the security

20 organs?

21 A. The rules of service does not deal with the matters of mail. The

22 rules of service deals with the data and the significance, and manner of

23 their conveyance is only a way to make them available to those that they

24 intended for. As far as this part is concerned, it speaks about the

25 specific manners of conveyance, and the ones that are mentioned here are

1 just some of the ways data can be transmitted in a protected way, or --

2 so as to prevent leaks. A telegram and -- telegrams and mail are

3 mentioned because under those circumstances this must have been or

4 probably was the most common way of establishing contact because other

5 ways of transmitting data were not that readily available.

6 All the transfer of data has to be -- had to be treated in that

7 way, and the data had to be protected in the way mentioned herein.

8 Q. In item 5, a reference is made to the personnel policy in the

9 intelligence and security organs, also reassignments, sending people to

10 special tasks and so on and so forth. Could you please again answer

11 whether this is in consistency with the rules of service or whether there

12 are any aberrations from those rules?

13 A. The rules of service has laid the functional determination as to

14 what the security organs will be dealing with. The person in command and

15 control of the organ of security in totality was duty-bound to apply the

16 rule and find personnel and organisational solutions in order to

17 implement the rule by applying certain criteria for the personnel that

18 will be responsible for the execution of some tasks. And this is not the

19 only criterion that was valid in the JNA and the Army of Republika Srpska

20 that was used in selecting staff. There were other checks for other

21 positions in the Army of Republika Srpska. According to the rule for

22 some positions which are listed in the rules, there is a mandatory

23 vetting procedure. I spoke about the personnel in the security service

24 which apply here when it comes to their removal, transfer, the

25 disciplinary measures, and so on and so forth. In this particular

1 instance, the commander was not powerless. There was a line of command

2 and control with various levels at which all of these issues can be dealt

3 with.

4 In other words, a decision should have been made in keeping with

5 the overall status of the function of the security organ and the work of

6 the security organ in that function. There was one part which was

7 carried out in the command, and there was another part which was part of

8 the counter-intelligence that was professionally guided by the higher

9 organs of security under the full control of its legality,

10 professionalism, and efficiency; and this made up a whole, and that's why

11 it was determined in the terms of the personnel that this should be done

12 in the Army of Republika Srpska in keeping with the rules. Hence, these

13 items of the instructions, which are in consistency with what has been

14 determined by the Main Staff of Republika Srpska when it came to the

15 performance of duties of the security organs as well as in the other

16 spheres of work and activity of different organs of Republika Srpska. It

17 is not in contradiction with the rules. It is in keeping with the

18 function and role of the commander of the Main Staff of Republika Srpska.

19 And this is given in the rules in items 95 and 96 and in the authorities

20 which were given to the commander of the Main Staff. Obviously, this has

21 been translated because we don't have a single document that would

22 exclude any of the items from the rules. Hence, the authority is in

23 consistency with what can be found in the rules.

24 Q. In your answer, page 13, line 25 of the transcript, you said that

25 the commander was not powerless. Could you please expand and clarify?

1 What did you mean when you said that?

2 A. Well, I meant what it actually was. A commander had his security

3 organ and gave him tasks which did not rely only on the methods of work.

4 His participation in all that when it came to the realisation of measures

5 of security, his command and guiding the military police [as

6 interpreted], his participation in the precriminal procedure, and now I

7 can mention a number of other issues that the security organ in the

8 command was involved in. In those issues, the situation is clear and it

9 is absolutely clear that the security organ was absolutely responsible

10 for the security of his unit, and in those terms some of the tasks that

11 he had within the counter-intelligence sphere, he tied as much as

12 possible and resolved as much as possible within the authority of the

13 command.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Ms. Nikolic?

15 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. We have an

16 error in the transcript. Actually, in the interpretation. Line -- page

17 15, line 4, where the witness said that in his professional guiding of --

18 and command of the military police, which has not been entered in the

19 transcript.

20 THE INTERPRETER: Professional guidance, not command of the

21 military police. The interpreter's correction.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And if I can continue. I've been

23 interrupted. I would like to continue providing my answer at the place

24 where I was interrupted.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Go ahead. And the interpreters, please or

1 whoever will be looking after the transcript, make note of the correction

2 that Madam Nikolic has indicated. Check it.

3 Do you agree with what Madam Nikolic has explained to us or not,

4 Mr. Vuga?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. That was absolutely

6 correct. Professional guidance of the military police.

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. So you can now proceed with what you were

8 saying. Thank you.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And let me also say this: In that

10 respect, the commander has the full authority over the security organ

11 with some limitations that said that taking measures against the security

12 organ, any measures, be it reward or punishment, disciplinary measures,

13 promotion, or any other measures that were available within the sphere of

14 command, either in connection with the full knowledge of the 85 per cent

15 of his work in counter-intelligence jobs, and then that decision could be

16 founded on realistic foundations. If that had not been the case, the

17 most important part of the function would have been ignored, and

18 decisions on the work of the security organ would not have been valid,

19 and this is the essence of all these determinations with just one more

20 remark, something that I spoke about yesterday, and this is the criteria

21 that were applied for the selection of personnel for the security organ,

22 and those criteria were in the hands of the commander of the Main Staff

23 of the Army of Republika Srpska.

24 And this could not be interfered with at any level without the

25 knowledge of the person who signed those.

1 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Let me move on to para 7 of this instruction. I believe it's on

3 the next page of both the English and the Serbian.

4 It says that the monitoring of the professionalism, legality, and

5 correctness of the work of the security and intelligence organs shall be

6 carried out exclusively by the first superior organs for security and

7 intelligence affairs except in that part of their engagement which

8 relates to command and staff affairs. Can you just clarify, looking at

9 this instruction, is this in keeping with the rules of service for

10 security organs that we discussed before?

11 A. It is consistent with the rules of service for security organs.

12 It's not only consistent; it makes a clear distinction between technical,

13 professional affairs, and the monitoring of that where the commander does

14 not interfere, and even the superior organs do not have much influence on

15 that part of their work. It says except in that part of their engagement

16 relating to command and staff affairs. So nobody else has the right to

17 control or monitor the security organ in that area. The vertical chain

18 is hereby distinguished. It does not fall within the command.

19 Q. Let us just clarify one part of your answer, where you say that

20 even the immediate -- even when -- that even the superior organs did not

21 have much impact on that area.

22 A. Not much. They have no impact.

23 Q. Do you mean the security organs or the superior command?

24 A. We are talking about the monitoring of professionalism and

25 legality of security organs in the area of counter-intelligence work.

1 The very beginning of the sentence determines the issue, and that is

2 where the separation line lies between the area performed by the command.

3 You don't tamper with that.

4 Q. The monitoring of professionalism, legality, and correctness of

5 their work regarding command and staff affairs, can you tell us again who

6 does this?

7 A. This monitoring is in the exclusive purview of the commander.

8 The commander decides on the proposals of the security organs, how well

9 he reports, and how well he participates in the evaluation of security,

10 et cetera. The commander is the only person who can decide about that

11 and undertake everything and anything that is at the disposal of the

12 command.

13 Q. Do security organs of the superior command have any influence

14 here?

15 A. The instruction rules that out.

16 Q. And let us look at paragraph 8, as well, because you said that

17 the instruction is two-pronged. Can you tell us from para 8 what is the

18 impact and the consequences of these instructions in a specific case?

19 A. The instruction is explicit when it comes to complying with its

20 contents and the persons to whom it applies. It leaves no open questions

21 as to what to do and how to implement it. Strict compliance with this

22 instruction is required. Even the word "strict" is included.

23 Q. In your report, you also studied the instructions on the methods

24 and resources of security organs, and you told us that there were 11 such

25 methods. I'm not going to go through all of them. You've already

1 explained a number of them sufficiently, such as working with a source or

2 running a source. Just tell us about the first method. That is document

3 3D275. In B/C/S it's page 8; in English, it's 9.

4 I'm sorry. B/C/S, it's page 5. In English, it's 8.

5 The first method listed under number 1, we see

6 counter-intelligence evaluation. 3D275, page 8 in English.

7 Can you tell us what it means, counter-intelligence assessment or

8 evaluation?

9 A. The counter-intelligence assessment by a security organ is a

10 method defined here and should have been and was implemented in practice.

11 It was consistently applied. It is a constant process of mental and

12 practical activity. It is continuous, uninterrupted, within the purview

13 of the security organ, and the objective of this activity is to evaluate

14 on the basis of available information threatening activities and the

15 sources of threat and our own forces for countering these activities,

16 that is, the security service and various security organs distributed

17 across various levels; and to produce a conclusion as to the balance of

18 power between these two sides and what is needed to improve this balance

19 of power to the benefit of protection of one's own security. In this

20 respect, every new fact that is learned that indicates that something

21 needs to be done triggers again a new counter-intelligence assessment and

22 evaluating whether this new fact makes us -- puts us in a better position

23 or in a worse position and what needs to be done to counter this threat.

24 That is the preliminary element, a sine qua non, an element without which

25 we do not know what measures to take. And it says as a basis for any

1 other activity in the sphere of counter-intelligence. That is the

2 substance and the meaning of the counter-intelligence assessment.

3 There are other things that needs to be said, but they belong in

4 the strictly professional domain.

5 Q. Could you clarify, when you said it is a permanent, continuous

6 process, a continuing obligation and duty, in what sense is it a

7 continuing obligation of the security organ?

8 A. I'll try to make a comparison that should illustrate the meaning

9 of the word "continuing" in this sense. A guard, a sentry who was

10 assigned to secure a facility or installation is under obligation to

11 constantly guard that installation and prevent anyone who wants to put it

12 in jeopardy. The security organ is constantly on guard with his

13 counter-intelligence assessments. He must not miss a single fact,

14 occurrence, or development when we are talking about countermeasures

15 beginning with the first indications of threat and going up to the

16 centres and sources of this threat.

17 Q. In point 11, which we see on the screen in English - in B/C/S

18 it's on the following page - we see a list of activities monitored by the

19 security organ. Tell us, is this counter-intelligence assessment subject

20 to modification, and if so, in what intervals?

21 A. It is a living organism and it changes constantly, from the

22 viewpoint of counter-intelligence work, I mean.

23 Q. Could that mean that it changes on a daily basis?

24 A. It can change minute by minute.

25 Q. You told us at great length about methods of running a source.

1 I'm not going to ask you any more about that. But tell us, is that also

2 a continuing task for security organs or not?

3 A. All methods of work that are applied independently by the

4 security organ are continuing. They are equally alive as the

5 counter-intelligence assessments. They constitute a special symbiosis in

6 the sense that there can be no change of counter-intelligence assessment

7 without a new piece of information, a new situation, a new fact; and

8 equally, one cannot successfully run a source and apply methods of work

9 unless we can draw conclusions from the counter-intelligence assessment

10 about the next step, the follow-up method of work, and the next solution.

11 So these two are closely intertwined and condition each other.

12 Q. In response to my question, you said that all methods of work

13 that the security organ applies independently are continuing. Now, tell

14 me, with regard to the 11 methods listed in the instruction, which are

15 the methods that the security organ applies independently?

16 A. The first four. The first four on the list in the instruction.

17 That's counter-intelligence assessment, running a source, interviews, and

18 gathering information and fact-finding. Those are the first four methods

19 of work for which the security organ does not need to request approval

20 from his superior. When I say superior, I mean professionally superior

21 because this is a purely professional, technical part of its work. That

22 is consistent with all the other rules, regulations, and laws, that there

23 should be no interference with the security organ's work where he needs

24 to make decision. I mean wiretapping and recording, secret checks, and

25 inspection of mail and other things. This means that I can run a source

1 independently following the procedure that I explained yesterday as to

2 how a source is recruited and how a source is run. All these same issues

3 are the same when it comes to control by a superior professional organ,

4 professional management, et cetera, in interviews, et cetera.

5 The obligation is continuing for the security organ to regularly

6 report to the superior security officer so that the superior security

7 officer has full insight into his work, that he can provide guidance, and

8 evaluate whether the lower security organ is working properly or if he is

9 either overstepping the -- his authority or violating some other

10 regulation.

11 Q. I would be grateful if you could just clarify one term that we

12 often encounter here. What is an "operative action"? That's on page 26

13 in B/C/S and 32 in English of the same document.

14 A. In the rules of service, we have operative processing as a method

15 of work of security organs for detecting, monitoring, and countering

16 enemy threatening activities directed against the Army of Republika

17 Srpska, whether they are directed against the army from outside or from

18 inside. An operative action, unlike operative processing, is the most

19 complex and the most extensive form of engagement of all security organs

20 of the Army of Republika Srpska. Whereas in operative processing the

21 security officer runs the assignment and performs it as instructed, in an

22 operative action all security organs of the VRS are engaged. That means

23 that there has been a serious breach of security of the VRS or a serious

24 breach of security of some vital point of security that all security

25 organs are under obligation to protect at all costs wherever they are in

1 keeping with the rules and regulations.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zivanovic, I might have missed something, but if

3 you could remind me of the document which deals with the 11 methods of

4 security organs?

5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: This is this directive.

6 JUDGE KWON: Could you show me the --

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It is page 8 -- 18 -- 8, sorry, page 8, in

8 English. And document is 3D275.

9 JUDGE KWON: If the e-court can show the document to me.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We can go very fast through the document, through

11 all 11 methods.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: There is no need for that, I think.

13 JUDGE KWON: Where do you have it? A, B, C, D, E?

14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: No, no, no. We are at counter-intelligence

15 assessment. It is just first method of counter-intelligence -- for all

16 counter-intelligence methods.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE KWON: So let me be clear. So counter-intelligence

19 assessment is number 1 of the 11 methods?

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes.

21 JUDGE KWON: So we haven't seen all those 11 methods. Not yet.

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: We can go through them.

23 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes. I now understand it. Thank you.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. We can move on to page 12 in the B/C/S and 9 in the English

1 version. The second method, running a source. We have been discussing

2 this. I won't have any questions concerning that, but we will just go

3 through all the methods.

4 The next method is gathering and assessing information, page 5 in

5 the B/C/S -- excuse me, page 9 in the B/C/S and page 9 in the English.

6 No, it seems not to be. Page 15 in the English version.

7 The fourth method is interviewing, page 10 in the B/C/S, page 16

8 in the English version or, rather, in the English translation, excuse me.

9 The fifth method, disinformation, is page 17 in the English.

10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear what page it is in

11 the B/C/S version.

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] The sixth method is covert

13 surveillance, page 15 in the B/C/S, page 17 in the English.

14 The seventh method are covert searches, page 16 in the B/C/S, 19

15 in the English.

16 The eighth method is wiretapping and interception, page 17 in the

17 B/C/S and 20 in the English.

18 The ninth method is secret checks of mail, page 18 in the B/C/S

19 and 22 of the English translation.

20 The tenth method is analysis, page 19 in B/C/S and 23 in English.

21 The eleventh method, research, the same page.

22 Q. Mr. Vuga, would you clarify for us a term described at page 27 in

23 the B/C/S and 33 in the English. "Counter-intelligence protection": Can

24 you tell us what it's about?

25 A. One needs to say the following: Counter-intelligence protection

1 can be viewed as overall activities of security organs in the domain of

2 counter-intelligence because it is all for the purpose of

3 counter-intelligence protection of the armed forces. However, this one

4 was singled out as a separate task because it is believed that out of all

5 of the objects protected, some of them will be under a particularly grave

6 threat. In order to prevent such a threat in as organised a way as

7 possible, in order to protect the objects efficiently, as one of the jobs

8 and tasks of the security organ in -- within the framework of combined

9 methods of work, counter-intelligence protection is aimed at particular

10 objects that are to be chosen according to the level of threat and level

11 of importance. In keeping with that assessment, a decision is made to

12 provide counter-intelligence protection for such objects. That should be

13 distinguished from the general term of counter-intelligence protection.

14 However, this one refers to the most important objects. This is

15 separately ordered by a superior, prescribing the methods to be used and

16 prescribing who is to be acquainted with the work of the security organ

17 in terms of counter-intelligence protection of the specific object as

18 part of the specific task.

19 Q. Another question concerning this document: Is there a mention of

20 POWs anywhere in the document?

21 A. In this document, item 134, where sources are referred to there

22 is a mention of POWs as sources of information when these are members of

23 Special Forces, which may be of particular interest to security organs in

24 terms of collecting data. The security organ is duty-bound to detect the

25 activities of such troops in the area they are responsible for, including

1 the facilities in that area. There is no other mention of POWs.

2 Q. Concerning the methods, although I said I wouldn't be asking you

3 any questions concerning that, but please, comment the fourth, continuous

4 method. You mentioned this being the interview. Could you please

5 clarify it for us and tell us what it exactly entails. It is page 10 in

6 the B/C/S and 16 in the English version.

7 A. Interviews as a method of work of security organs could be

8 compared to interviews as existing in other professions. The difference,

9 however, is that these are secret interviews unavailable to other

10 professions and domains. They are target-oriented, limited to such

11 persons who may be in possession of security-related information.

12 Information needs to be gathered on whether there is enemy activity which

13 may be of interest for the security organ as well as to include

14 everything else that can be found out for the security organ to embark

15 upon its counter-intelligence assessment. Interviews are conducted with

16 the persons who are estimated as being of interest and who may be willing

17 to assist the security organ in completing its tasks. These are not

18 sources but people for whom the security organ assessed that may be of

19 assistance. That method of work is very widespread. One does not expect

20 particularly quality information from such interviews but certain

21 indications pointing in the direction of where one should focus its work

22 and when one can expect to come across good cooperation. These people

23 are supposed to provide cooperation in the work of the security organ.

24 How should I put it? This is a very across-the-board, brush stroke-type

25 of communication aimed at a large front of gathering data and

1 subsequently processing it in order to arrive at a right assessment in

2 that domain, which is the topic of the interview.

3 There is something else I need to add to it. By virtue of such

4 interviews, one gathers the most information concerning the general state

5 of security. That general state of security points to certain creaks,

6 weaknesses, through which a danger or threat may arrive. Frequently, it

7 enables the security organ to paint a picture to the commander concerning

8 the situation in the unit on the issues which just border on the

9 counter-intelligence domain. That's the gist of the method and ways of

10 conducting interviews. These are covert ways of communicating. Such

11 persons providing data are protected, and this is applied generally to

12 persons who may provide such information which is not open and available

13 to just about anyone.

14 Q. To clarify, are such interviews conducted only with army members?

15 A. I used the term "persons." There are conditions to be met in

16 order to have such interviews with persons outside the unit. So it says

17 here "persons." Therefore, it is not restricted to army members only,

18 but it is the most practical to do it with soldiers because they are in

19 the same environment. However, it can also include persons in the

20 territory or persons occupying such job posts that may have access to

21 certain information. There are numerous possibilities for conducting

22 such an interview.

23 Q. Mr. Vuga, do you believe that in clarifying your report one needs

24 to address any other issues from the instruction, save for or in addition

25 to those I've asked you about?

1 A. Yes. I believe we should.

2 Q. Please go ahead.

3 A. At the end of everything said, there are three important things

4 to be borne in mind. The methods of work of the security organs are

5 covert ways of gathering information. It applies to all of the methods

6 and all of the information as well as all of the persons providing

7 information.

8 The second part of it is this: The methods of work of the

9 security organs include covert ways of processing data. What does it

10 mean? When processing data, there is a very strict number of persons who

11 may be acquainted with what is being processed.

12 The third part of everything that was said so far is this: The

13 methods of work of the security organs are covert ways of using data.

14 All information users in relation to the information itself are

15 determined selectively according to certain criteria. Every person can

16 know things to the extent needed in order to perform his or her

17 functional duties or to the extent of what he or she needs in order to

18 implement a task. Anything beyond that is not permitted.

19 That is the entry and exit delineating the space in which the

20 methods of work of the security organs can be used.

21 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Can we make a break?

22 JUDGE AGIUS: I think we will have the break now. 25 minutes.

23 Thank you.

24 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

25 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

3 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vuga, I would like to move to the rules of

4 service for the military police that you also dealt with in your expert

5 report. This is P707.

6 First, let me ask you -- page 7 in B/C/S and page 8 in English,

7 and I'm speaking about the rules of service for the military police,

8 P707.

9 First of all, could you please tell us in very general terms and

10 very briefly, what is the military police? How are the military police

11 defined by the rules?

12 A. This is defined as specially trained and organised units which

13 perform military police tasks. This is not just any ordinary troops or

14 people performing combat tasks in the units. Those are especially

15 selected, specially organised and trained units that perform military

16 police tasks. According to the rules, they have everything that is

17 intended for these units to have, which is equipment, organisation,

18 professionalism. In other words by norms, organisation and education,

19 they are intended for the military police tasks which they are entrusted

20 with by law. I have been too fast, I believe.

21 Q. Yes. You should slow down, I believe.

22 A. I understand.

23 Q. Under item 5, which is on the following page in the B/C/S version

24 - the English page remains the same - it arises from this item that a

25 certain sort of selection is carried out for the replenishment of these

1 units. Can you please explain?

2 A. When we spoke yesterday about the criteria and the selection

3 process, I said that there were authorities given to the persons in the

4 security organs. These authorities are also given to the individuals in

5 the military police to use weapons. They are independent in their

6 decisions to use weapons. One of the reasons for the selection process

7 is to decide who will be able to decide independently on the use of

8 weapons in combat. The second reason is the character and nature of

9 tasks performed by the military police in peacetime under the immediate

10 threat of war and in the conditions of war, which differs from other

11 tasks performed by the military and the military organisations. The

12 difference lies in the fact that they have to apply law in the areas

13 which are not in conflict with the enemy side in terms of being engaged

14 in combat directly but, rather, they have to institute the regime of

15 safety, maintain the regime of safety and security, protect facilities,

16 control the area and amongst other things, they have to conduct combat

17 and fight against the infiltrated sabotage enemy units whose activity is

18 aimed at threatening those facilities under the protection of the

19 military police.

20 Q. Could you now explain for us under item 1 of this rule -- can we

21 please go back to the previous page in the original B/C/S text. The

22 English text is before us, the same as before. It says here amongst

23 other things that the military police perform certain security jobs.

24 Since you've already told us that the security organs also

25 perform certain security jobs, could you please make a distinction

1 between the two groups of jobs, the security organs on the one hand and

2 the military police on the other hand? Can you please explain the

3 difference between the two groups of jobs and tasks?

4 A. Since we have already spoken at great length about the security

5 organs and their tasks, unlike the security organs the military police

6 within its purview deals with the tasks pertaining to the area of general

7 security, which means that in this domain the security tasks do not

8 contain the elements of fighting covert enemy activity, and they don't

9 apply those methods of work as applied by the security organs, save for

10 those that are prescribed for the -- for fighting crime and acting upon

11 performing certain jobs in terms of providing technical security of the

12 facilities. Everything else is a relatively classical manner of action

13 within the domain of security, and they perform those tasks by performing

14 prescribed duties and services.

15 Q. Can we now go to command and control of the military police?

16 This is page 8 in B/C/S and page 10 in English. I apologise. It will be

17 page 9 in B/C/S.

18 It says here that the officer of the military unit is in control

19 and commands over the police -- military police unit on its strength.

20 What is the meaning of the word "commands"?

21 THE INTERPRETER: Controls the military police unit. The

22 interpreter's apology.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: If I could ask Mr. Zivanovic to tell us which B/C/S

24 word you used in asking this question?

25 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Rukovodjenje. [Interpretation] Control.

1 Q. I believe this has been translated as command, but this is not

2 the -- what I wanted. I didn't want you to explain the term command but

3 the term "control." What does it mean to control a military police unit?

4 Now this has been interpreted in a different way, but it is

5 another issue. Anyway, can you please explain the meaning of the term

6 "to control" a military police unit?

7 A. The term "control" in the military police has the same

8 significance as the term "control" in military units, in other spheres of

9 activity, not only in the sphere of security but in other spheres as

10 well. I'll try and explain the meaning in very broad outlines. Control

11 is a planned and organised activity aimed at preparing, organising,

12 enabling, and equipping a unit to perform its tasks. This would be in

13 the most general terms, which means that a commander who commands and

14 controls a military police unit which is on its strength has the powers,

15 the obligations, and the responsibility which is -- with which he is

16 entrusted with regard to the activities comprised within the term of

17 "control." I believe that I have been clear enough.

18 Q. Can you please tell us very briefly, if you can, what does the

19 term "control" imply?

20 A. The term implies the fact that the commander has a unit whose

21 purpose is prescribed by this rule and that the commander has this unit

22 under his command within the framework of its intention. It has to be

23 prepared and organised and be capable of doing what it is supposed to do

24 to influence. He has to control, command, and influence the unit to be

25 ready to perform its tasks. When he makes a decision that, the unit has

1 to act upon his decision. He does that in keeping with the organisation

2 and establishment structure that he has in his command in the unit that

3 is intended for the purposes relative to the military police. He doesn't

4 have to do everything in person, but it is part of his responsibility to

5 deal with the issues, and he has the powers of the commander within his

6 commanding role. So this is practically this part of activity, i.e., it

7 is within the authority of the commander to do this when it comes to the

8 military police. In practical terms, that is that. I could tell you

9 more about the unit. He has to be reported on the status of the unit.

10 Within the status of the unit he can order some corrective measures that

11 have to be undertaken in order for him to take control over this, to see

12 what is the difference between the task given and the task accomplished,

13 what is the difference between the mission given and the mission

14 accomplished. There is a number of things that the commander has to know

15 in order to know the status of the unit that he commands.

16 Q. And now I would like to ask you this: How do you effect control

17 over the military police unit? I.e., how does one control the

18 performance of the tasks; how do you check that the unit has accomplished

19 the tasks given to it?

20 A. Yesterday we explained the part that concerns the professional

21 control of the -- over the military police unit. We have to make a

22 connection between the professional control and the command over the

23 unit, and we have to separate one from the other. Actually, we have to

24 tie one to the other and establish -- and separate one from the other.

25 The security organ is the professional organ for the tasks of the state

1 security in the command. He has the broadest knowledge within that area,

2 and based on that knowledge he can assess the threats and those who pose

3 that threat, and he can also assess the ways and manners to counter the

4 threat in the way most efficient to protect the unit. Since the police

5 acts within the domain of the protection of the unit and its -- and the

6 safety of facilities, people, and technical means and everything else

7 within its purview, and the organ of security does the same only using

8 other methods. That means that in one part of the protection, countering

9 the enemy is the common foundation for the assessment, conclusion, and

10 evaluation --

11 MR. McCLOSKEY: Excuse me. He's going so fast that I think there

12 is misstatements and mistranslations. He's talking about state security.

13 So I think it may benefit all if he would slow down, and you may want to

14 see if that's a correct translation.

15 JUDGE AGIUS: I think the most practical way to go about it is

16 for me to read out the question and he to start giving his answer again.

17 Forget about what we have between lines 12 and 25.

18 Please answer the question again, Colonel Vuga, and try to speak

19 as slowly as you can, please. The question that Mr. Zivanovic put to you

20 was the following: "And now I would like to ask you this: How do you

21 effect control over the military police unit? That is, how does one

22 control the performance of the tasks; how do you check that the unit has

23 accomplished the tasks given to it?"

24 Could you please answer that question going slowly. Thank you.

25 JUDGE KWON: One more question by me. Out of curiosity, the

1 English word "control" in this set of question and answer is a

2 translation of "kontrola," not "rukovodjenje." I stand to be corrected.

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I believe that it is -- there is no consistency

4 in translation.

5 JUDGE KWON: I noted the consistency in transcript.

6 "Rukovodjenje" is translated as in inverted commas.

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes. Yes.

8 JUDGE KWON: And here we see "control" without inverted commas.

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yeah. My question is regarding "control" as

10 "kontrola."

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That's what I observed. Thank you.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Let me consult my colleagues on

13 something which is related to this.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE AGIUS: Let's proceed and if anyone is not able to follow,

16 please let us know.

17 Colonel, do you want me to repeat the question to you?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, thank you, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you. Then go ahead.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I don't know how the word "control" was

21 translated to the colonel from your question, as "rukovodjenje" or as

22 "kontrola." I do not follow it in the B/C/S.

23 JUDGE AGIUS: I wasn't addressing him. I was addressing you. So

24 that's not a problem. The important thing is that since we are following

25 in English, I wouldn't know unless I have the inverted commas whether

1 you're using "rukovodjenje" or "kontrola."

2 [Trial Chamber confers]

3 JUDGE AGIUS: I see. Okay. Judge Prost is referring me to the

4 question that I read out, which was your question, and we would like to

5 know when I used, how do you effect control over the military police

6 unit, and then how does one control the performance, what word was used

7 by the interpreters in translating my English into B/C/S. Did you use

8 "rukovodjenje," or did you use "kontrola"?

9 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I used "kontrola," B/C/S word "kontrola."

10 JUDGE AGIUS: No, I am not receiving an input. Yes, Mr.

11 McCloskey?

12 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't want to complicate this.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: I hope not.

14 MR. McCLOSKEY: But in none of the -- if he's referring to the

15 regulations and all that we've seen, we see the word "rukovodjenje." It

16 doesn't mean the term "kontrola" is not relevant, but it certainly is

17 going to confuse the issue.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Ms. Nikolic?

19 MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] If you allow me, Your Honour. Let

20 me just answer your question. You asked how the interpreters interpreted

21 when you used the word "control." In B/C/S, we heard "kontrola." So for

22 "rukovodjenje," the witness heard "kontrola."

23 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, but I understand that was the word used by

24 Mr. Zivanovic himself. In putting the question to Colonel Vuga,

25 according to Mr. Zivanovic, he -- for "control" he didn't use the word

1 "rukovodjenje" but he used the word "kontrola."

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, in my last question. In previous question,

3 I used word "rukovodjenje."

4 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay, let's proceed. Have you been

5 able to follow what we have been discussing, Colonel?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I followed very carefully, and I

7 believe I understand what is being asked of me.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. Then proceed with your answer,

9 please, and move slowly. Thank you.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Kontrola, monitoring, is one of the

11 functions of command, one of. Monitoring means that the commander has

12 full information about the status of the unit and all the things that are

13 relevant to its function, as opposed to what was set as an objective of

14 control, and to establish discrepancies between what has been achieved

15 and what was set as an objective. So compared to the task, the

16 objective, what was achieved in practice. That is monitoring or

17 inspection. Based on monitoring, further measures, follow-up measures,

18 are taken.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Now, could you please tell us with regard to a unit of military

21 police, who in fact does the monitoring of its performance?

22 A. The monitoring instead of -- in the sense of assessing the

23 status, as has been said, is done on behalf of the commander by the

24 security organ as a technical, professional organ for monitoring

25 professional guidance and other activities over the military police

1 because this is a technical job, a professional job. It's not generally

2 military so much as technical in terms of organising, enabling, and

3 equipping the military police unit in keeping with its profile as

4 defined. The security organ reports to the commander about the results

5 of the monitoring and the inspection that the commander needs to carry

6 out over the military police unit.

7 Q. Tell me, in addition to security organs and those professional

8 elements, is monitoring done by anyone else?

9 A. A unit of the military police has its own commanding officer who

10 directly commands his unit. He is duty-bound to report to the commander

11 about the state of affairs in his unit and everything else relevant to

12 the military police unit within the system of command, within the

13 framework of commanding a military police unit. So under the system of

14 single command, the primarily responsible person is the commander of the

15 military police unit who has operative command. He monitors the

16 performance of tasks and reports to the commander. This answerability to

17 the commander may be direct or may be effected through the security

18 organs. This is on a case-to-case basis depending on how it is decided

19 to effect command and control over the military police units. I used the

20 term "command" now because the whole system of controlling is directed

21 towards command. That is assigning and performing tasks. That's the

22 only reason a military police unit exists, to be given a task and to

23 perform it. Everything else is subordinated to that.

24 Q. Does the commander of the unit within whose composition the

25 military police unit is, does he monitor, does he have the powers to

1 monitor the execution and the performance of this military police unit?

2 A. The unit commander has the right to monitor every unit

3 subordinated to him in all aspects. That includes the military police.

4 There are no exceptions. Here we are talking about the professional

5 component, which is dominant in establishing insight into units. That's

6 the reason why the security organ is involved as the professional organ

7 of the commander for controlling military police.

8 Q. Could we now go back to point 7, para 7, of this rule? It is on

9 page 8 in B/C/S and page 9 in English.

10 It says here that military police may not be used for performing

11 work outside its own requirements and assignments, save for the army

12 commander or some other highly placed military commanding officer. Tell

13 me, what is the situation if a military police unit is used for

14 assignments that are not envisaged by the rule of service of the military

15 police? First of all, who would be answerable for such a use of the

16 military police?

17 A. Using a military police unit outside its purview, outside its

18 prescribed tasks, requires special procedure, which means that approval

19 must be requested from the competent commanding officer. That would be

20 here the commander of the Main Staff of the VRS. He must be asked to

21 approve to use a military police unit outside its prescribed tasks. If

22 situations occur when the military police is used for assignments that

23 fall within the area of expertise of combat units, a chain of command, a

24 chain of jurisdiction exists, in place, how that would be done, and the

25 commanding officer has to act accordingly.

1 Let me use an example. If in the VRS there is a general order or

2 a general approval from the commander of the Main Staff that military

3 police may be used in combat activities on the front line together with

4 other units of the Army of Republika Srpska, then the decision fell to

5 the commanders of units who had military police on their strength because

6 such a general order existed that the military police may be used in this

7 way.

8 Q. You told us about the professional management of military police

9 units and professional monitoring of their performance. Tell me, did --

10 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Zivanovic. Are you

11 leaving this item 7? Para 7? You're done with it?

12 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, yes, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE KWON: I'm wondering, in addition to the commander, this

14 paragraph provides that an equal or higher ranking military officer also

15 is able to give authorisation.

16 So, Mr. Vuga, if you could tell me the meaning of this phrase.

17 Who are they referring to, an equal or higher ranking military officer?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The meaning of this term lies in

19 how the military police is defined together with its function and task.

20 That is to avoid situations where military police units would be used too

21 frequently or irrationally. Therefore, this decision, how to use these

22 units for certain tasks, is given to the higher ranking commander

23 depending on how the needs arise. That is because the military police in

24 view of its training and capacity is a very suitable unit for use in

25 various tasks which fall outside its area of expertise. To avoid

1 resorting to this kind of use of military police units, it is required

2 that approval must be sought. It is an entitlement of a higher-ranking

3 officer to decide that.

4 JUDGE KWON: If you can give me examples of such equal or

5 higher-ranking military officer who can give such authorisation for the

6 military police to be used to perform duties outside their needs.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can use the example of combat

8 operations. In territories where combat operations took place, problems

9 sometimes occurred that needed to be dealt with from the segment that

10 begins with roads being cut off as a result of military destruction,

11 military police could be used for such assignments. It's not strictly

12 within its purview, but it can be used for that purpose. But in that

13 case, a higher-ranking officer has to decide whether the assignment is of

14 such a nature that military police can be taken away from its regular

15 duties and whether they can be spared for that amount of time in order

16 that the military police can deal with the emergency assignment, so to

17 speak. That is a matter of assessment. The officer who makes the

18 decision takes that risk upon himself.

19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I'll leave it at that, then.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Could you tell us now, since you described professional

22 monitoring and general monitoring over the performance of military police

23 and its use, what are obligations of security organs in professional

24 monitoring of military police units when they are used outside their

25 prescribed assignments, outside their prescribed scope of work as defined

1 by the rule?

2 A. We can say one thing immediately: When the military police is

3 really military police, and when does it go beyond that function or

4 outside that function? As long as military police is performing its

5 duties within the prescribed scope of work, they are acting as military

6 police. When military police go outside of that function and perform

7 some other tasks, including the example I've just given, then the

8 security organ can no longer professionally control the military police

9 because the expertise for such use of the military police lies with the

10 person who suggested such use and who will implement it.

11 Q. You dealt with the next point quite sufficiently in your report,

12 but could you tell us some more about the scope of work of the military

13 police? That's on page 11 in B/C/S and page 12 in English.

14 A. The jurisdiction and the scope of work of the military police are

15 precisely defined by this rule. They relate to security provided for the

16 purposes of the Army of Republika Srpska in wartime, and it was the task

17 of the JNA and the Territorial Defence, but that's not the way it

18 functioned in the VRS, in Republika Srpska. You have security provided

19 to areas, persons, installations, detection of crimes that are prosecuted

20 ex officio before military courts. It also includes security provided to

21 military officers when required, protection of documents of the highest

22 degree of confidentiality that are of significance for the defence of the

23 country. So those are the main tasks for which the military police is

24 engaged.

25 Q. Is this the scope of work or its tasks?

1 A. These are both the scope of work and tasks of the military

2 police. The military police is in charge of security and security jobs,

3 both its scope of work and its tasks.

4 Q. Very well, then. I would now kindly ask you to tell me, within

5 the framework of the military police tasks, how do we go from the tasks

6 to the service of the military police? This is 17 in B/C/S and 20 in

7 English.

8 A. All the tasks that are prescribed by the rules of service the

9 military police realises by performing the services of the military

10 police. It is prescribed for the military police to perform seven

11 different types of services through which it carries out the tasks.

12 These services are prescribed by the instruction on the application and

13 use of military police. This instruction elaborates the ways how the

14 rules of service are implemented. The instruction, therefore, elaborates

15 the services of the military police.

16 Q. I would like to focus on two of these services. I would not

17 dwell upon each and every one of them. The first one would be the

18 security service that you have on the screen before you. I will kindly

19 ask you to tell us briefly what this service implies.

20 A. The security service is actually the most voluminous service that

21 the military police is involved in. It comprises several actions and

22 tasks which are in the function of performing the security service that

23 the military police is entrusted with. The service's task is to provide

24 security for the object of security, which may be persons, facilities,

25 military data, and everything that falls within the scope of work of the

1 military police and its tasks. When it comes to the security service,

2 the substance is to prevent access, incursion, or any other threat to

3 those things that are secured by the military police and to acquire the

4 level of security for anything that has been determined. I don't mean

5 just anything but all those things that are designated as objects of

6 security. It may be the command post, the officer. In other words, the

7 security service comprises everything that should not fall under any

8 threat, and that is the object of security. This is the essence of the

9 security service, which implies all sorts of things that have been

10 incorporated into the security service. Those are patrols and other

11 services that are incorporated into the overall security service in order

12 to achieve the goals and objectives of this security service.

13 Q. I apologise for gesturing. I just wanted to warn you to slow

14 down.

15 A. Yes. I understood. I may be a little bit slow on the uptake,

16 but I certainly understood what you meant by your gesture.

17 Q. Now I would like to ask you to look at page 19 in B/C/S and in

18 page 20 of the English translation, and the service that I'm interested

19 in is the so-called escorting service. Actually, it is 21 in English.

20 This is paragraph under number 4 at the very bottom of the English page

21 21. It should be 19 in B/C/S. Yes. That's it.

22 Item 54 speaks about the escort service, and here a reference is

23 made to people deprived of liberty. I'm talking about items 54 through

24 57. In the English version, it will be on the following page, and the

25 same applies to the B/C/S version. So can you tell us something about

1 people who have been taken into custody? Actually, were prisoners of war

2 mentioned under item number 55? Could we then hear from you something

3 about this service in particular and more specifically about prisoners of

4 war and people taken into custody?

5 A. It says here that the escort service applies to people and

6 property who are secured from the moment of reception to the handover to

7 the bodies in charge. The essence of this escort service is in providing

8 security. In the following paragraph, it says that the military police

9 carry out escort service upon an order by the officer in charge of the

10 military unit, also applies to prisoners of war, but one thing has to be

11 noted here. This is when the authorities request that. An authority

12 that may request escort is determined inasmuch as being able to make

13 decisions on the command and use of the military police, and he may be

14 requested to issue an order for some prisoners of war to be escorted.

15 This is elaborated in the instruction on the use of -- on the application

16 of rules of service, which provides further instructions about the

17 request and a decision upon this request. One thing has to be noted

18 here. Prisoners of war are not included in the regular tasks of the

19 military police. They are given as a possibility that a body in charge

20 will issue a request and that the military police will act upon the

21 decision or the request. If a request is issued, it may be approved or

22 not approved, so this is given as a possibility for the military police

23 to perform such tasks as well.

24 Q. Tell me, please, in addition to this provision, is there anything

25 in the rules of service for the military police, any other provision that

1 regulates the issue of prisoners of war?

2 A. There is a provision according to which within the security

3 service the military police provide security for prisoners of war in the

4 prisoners of war camps and participates in escorting them from the

5 division stations for prisoners of war to the places designated for them,

6 which may be a prisoner of war camp. In other words, the military police

7 participates in these tasks. In a camp, it provides security for the

8 prisoners of war or the inmates of the camp.

9 Q. I would now kindly ask you to move to the next document, which is

10 the instruction on the application of the rules of service of the

11 military police. This is 3D276.

12 Can we please look at Article 18, which is on page 10 in B/C/S

13 and on page 2 of the English translation.

14 In this text, in paragraph 18 of this text, it says, "The

15 commanding officer of the military police makes a proposal to the

16 superior military commander directly or through the security organ of the

17 command staff unit and institution of which the military police unit is

18 part on the use of the military police for carrying out duties and tasks

19 falling within its range of responsibilities."

20 Tell me, please, is this what you were talking about yesterday,

21 about proposals to use the military police? Is this what you were

22 talking about? Is this the norm that provides the basis of the commander

23 of the military police unit to propose the way it's going to be used?

24 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment, Colonel. Mr. McCloskey?

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection, leading. "Is this the norm."

1 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes.

2 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Tell me, please, who gives proposals for the use of the military

4 police unit in accordance with this rule?

5 A. One has to be more specific when talking about the term "command"

6 over the military police use because in principle, a single command means

7 that a commanding officer proposes the use of his unit because he is the

8 one responsible for the performance of the unit's tasks and the security

9 organ, and he proposes that to the immediate superior or through the

10 security organ as it is stated herein.

11 And now we come to the two proposals that need to be very clear.

12 The first proposal is the proposal of the commander of the unit who is in

13 command of the unit and is responsible for its overall status and the

14 performance of its tasks. He is the best suited to know every single

15 individual in his unit and based on that thorough knowledge and the

16 thorough knowledge of the unit, he formulates the proposal and submits

17 that proposal to his own commander. The security organ whose role has

18 already been explained in the unit has additional information about

19 possible threats against the object of protection, and based on his

20 professional knowledge he assesses the proposal of the commander of the

21 military police unit and provides the proposal with the part of

22 professional contents which he as the person best informed and privy to

23 the security matters can propose, can draft, and then he makes an

24 integral proposal from the professional point of view on as -- on how the

25 military police unit should actually be used. The unit commander based

1 on the proposal submitted to him has ample or might have ample elements

2 in order to make a decision based on thorough and full information from

3 the purview of the commander of the military police unit and from the

4 purview of the security organ, and then he will be able to draft an

5 integral proposal for the protection of unit, which falls under the scope

6 of objects protected by the military police unit.

7 Q. Can we now clarify your answer? Because in two places you

8 mentioned the unit commander, and in one situation you said that the unit

9 commander issues a proposal and in another situation he decides on that

10 proposal.

11 A. Of course we have a problem. We have commanders of military

12 police battalions, and we have a commanders of military police companies,

13 and I may have not been precise because I was talking about the

14 battalions on the one hand and the companies on the other hand. So

15 that's one part of the problem that concerns the military police in

16 purest terms. And when I was talking about the commanders, I omitted to

17 use the word "The commander of the military police unit." I have not

18 explained myself thoroughly.

19 Q. In other words, he's the one who submits his proposals?

20 A. Yes, that's his task. That's one of his duties.

21 Q. I would just like to refer to item number 255 on page 49 in B/C/S

22 and on the same page of the English translation, the same page that is

23 already on the screen. This provision also talks about escorting POWs,

24 so I would kindly ask you to tell us, what are the specific

25 characteristics of this provision as opposed to the provision quoted just

1 a little while ago from the rules of service for the military police?

2 A. This provision falls within the escorting service and provides

3 very clear guidelines as to what obligations does the military police

4 have in escorting POWs, what is determined as a possibility in the rules.

5 It is here stated how this should be done. The activity itself is worked

6 out in a rather great detail here. Now, the escorting techniques and the

7 manners of escorting are not the essence -- of any essence for us here,

8 but there are some indications about the escorting of the POWs. They

9 refer primarily to the fact that when a military police unit is assigned

10 to escort POWs, according to this instruction this military police unit

11 is assigned to escort more important POWs, which implies that those are

12 persons or POWs for whose security in escort there is a higher degree of

13 interest, hence a higher degree of obligation, and then there is also a

14 procedure regulating the escort of such POWs that goes from making a list

15 to the handover. There are a lot of things that I wouldn't like to dwell

16 upon. What matters is the fact that the persons, the military policemen,

17 i.e. the unit in charge of the escort has to be fully informed of all the

18 details of their task by the person who issues the task, who requests

19 this escort, because the essence of everything is in the request, what

20 has to be realised when the military police is given the task of escort

21 of POWs. There is also a part of the regulation which says that the

22 military police participates in the escort of POWs, i.e. it not only

23 escorts the more important ones but also participates when this is

24 specially requested.

25 I have to emphasise that the issue of participation is the matter

1 of assessment. When we talk about participation, a possibility is given

2 to the officer to assess the justification of the request, and based on

3 the justification of the request he can decide to have the military

4 police engage, and this is a more closer determination of what is stated

5 in the rules of service. By this, a task is given to the military police

6 to act according to all the principles and requests that have to be

7 complied with in the escort service when prisoners of war or any

8 prisoners are escorted. There are different things here. For example,

9 it would be good if somebody spoke the language of the prisoners of war,

10 different procedures that are prescribed to be undertaken in various

11 cases that may occur during the escort service, and one more part that is

12 important to know, the security organs in their professional management

13 of the military police, in the part that concerns prisoners of war have

14 an obligation to, if they are aware of something that might put the whole

15 assignment under risk, should point to those risks to the commander.

16 They have to point to the threats, and they have to propose measures to

17 him to enable him to react and remove that threat or prevent that threat

18 with a view to a successful accomplishment of the task. The security

19 organ is not a higher authority for the escort service. The best-suited

20 people for that are the military policemen and the unit in charge.

21 However, they need additional information if such information exists,

22 which will allow them to understand what needs to be done in order to

23 accomplish the mission to the end. They are duty-bound to receive a

24 signature on the piece of paper proving that they have accomplished the

25 mission, and on their return they have to brief the officer who has

1 ordered the security service and to tell him how and when the mission was

2 actually accomplished.

3 Q. Can you please explain something? You said that the military

4 police can participate in the escort of prisoners of war. Does this mean

5 that somebody else will be in charge of such activities? And if that is

6 the case, could you please tell us who that person or body is?

7 A. It means that it is somebody else who is in charge, and it also

8 means that I have to go back to the reasons why somebody else is in

9 charge to explain things better. First of all, very rare situations in

10 which military police takes prisoners, prisoners are taken where combat

11 takes place, on the front line, on the separation line where prisoners of

12 war appear as disarmed enemy soldiers who have fallen under the authority

13 of, first, the unit that took them and then the force that this unit is a

14 part of. This means that the first part of escort is something that has

15 to be done by the unit who took the prisoners of war, and then in depth

16 as they go further away from the combat area, they are gradually taken

17 over from one place to another where they are finally going to be

18 collected. This happens at the divisional station, and I'm quoting from

19 the rules in order to explain things better. When the military police,

20 who is professionally equipped for this task and when the number of

21 prisoners is higher, they will participate together with the unit to help

22 them. In professional terms, the military police never do it on their

23 own, but their professional capabilities will help the unit who has

24 captured them to do their job better. This is the term of participation

25 in that part. When this comes to the person in charge, then it will be

1 the unit with its troops starting with the company commander. There is

2 an instruction which describes the level at which the issue of the

3 treatment of prisoners of war is dealt with. This was issued by the

4 Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska in July 1992. And in this

5 instruction, it says that the responsibility starts with the company

6 commander. The company doesn't have a military police unit, and the next

7 place will be the battalion. That will be the place where prisoners of

8 war are collected and there, as well, there is no military police. And

9 then it is necessary to deal with these matters at the level of the

10 brigade command that has a military police unit, and they have to

11 participate in that. Now, this is the term of "participation" that you

12 asked me about.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey? Sorry, but I couldn't make the

14 witness stop.

15 MR. McCLOSKEY: I apologise for interrupting on this important

16 topic. I just -- there was an interchange of the terms "in charge" and

17 "command," if that would be clarified.

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.

19 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Vuga, you probably heard the Prosecutor's remark. Could you

21 please clarify?

22 A. First, I would need to learn more about where the

23 misunderstanding lies.

24 MR. ZIVANOVIC: If the Prosecution has the reference.

25 MR. McCLOSKEY: Sorry. It was in the beginning of the answer,

1 and he said that the command was in charge several times. And it may

2 again just be a translation issue, but is this unit in charge or in

3 command or something else?

4 JUDGE AGIUS: It's in the first line. That's line 18 on the

5 previous page, page 50.

6 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. I will read out the part --

8 JUDGE AGIUS: The thing is that even your question was translated

9 by the use of the words or the phrase "in charge." In you look at lines

10 14 to 17, particularly line 16, you'll see that.

11 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Yes, it is part of my question, it seems.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: Yeah, but I don't know because I'm following in

13 English, not in B/C/S. So ...

14 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I will repeat my question. Please tell us briefly, you said that

16 the military police takes part in the escort of POWs, which means that

17 somebody else should -- is the principal player in that process.

18 A. Well, we were about to arrive there but the longer way, the

19 longer route. The instruction sets out that the main entity doing that

20 begins with the unit which had taken prisoners, and its commander, and

21 then vertically along the line of command up to the highest-ranking

22 organs which are to decide the fate of the POWs. In other words, it

23 means that the line of command is used starting from the company upwards.

24 In that sense, the -- that's where the care of POWs lie. The commander

25 of the unit which has military police as a part of it decides at a

1 certain moment of the POW escort and guarding in the police stations

2 decides on the participation of the military police, and I've already

3 explained the notion of the term "participation."

4 Q. Tell me next, in order to clarify your report even further, do we

5 need to focus on any other part of the rules of service of the military

6 police and the instruction we have analysed?

7 A. I'll try to be brief to be able to understand what the essence of

8 the topics discussed so far. There is this -- the professional aspect of

9 security in any given unit, which comprises basically all elements in

10 terms of threat assessment and actors of the threat as well as all the

11 elements which are used to counter such activities. That's the

12 professional component. It also, of course, includes assessing

13 information, making conclusions in that domain.

14 Another part is the operational capacity and purpose to tackle

15 the issues from the security domain in which we have organisation,

16 education and training, professionalism, and capacity to react. All

17 these factors are adjusted with a view to performing a function. The

18 security organs are one entity and the military police another entity in

19 the field of security. If their joint goal is to protect a unit, they

20 still have divided competences and tasks as well as capacities. In that

21 way, each of them can be active in their respective domain with a clear

22 profile. The security organ from the point of view of security domain

23 professionalism are those which are the professional organs assigned to

24 any command. That's why we have difficulties because the operational

25 aspects of a task are sometimes unnecessarily carried by the security

1 organ. That is not the point. There is an operational organ within the

2 unit under the unit's command, whereas the security organ, if there is a

3 need for a unit or an individual to implement certain tasks, that

4 individual or that unit can do that in terms of engaging the military

5 police but only following an approval. Otherwise, no tasks could be

6 assigned to any military policeman or to the military police unit because

7 that type of work lies exclusively with the unit commander as regards the

8 military police and the commander of the unit as regards his unit.

9 That's what I thought was necessary to explain from everything we have

10 said so far in terms of relationships.

11 Q. A clarification, please. You said that the security organ -- or

12 rather, that the security organ is a professional organ dealing with

13 threat protection. Could you please be precise? Are these secret

14 threats, all threats in general, or something else?

15 A. The organ for security as part of its command carries out threat

16 assessments. Such threat assessments encompass all types and means of

17 threat, and the security organ is there to collect information on those.

18 Once that is done, the security organ proposes to the command what to do,

19 and the security organ takes participation in that, and in its own

20 security assessment the professional part belonging to the security

21 organs is taken apart, is taken out. If in the course of a security

22 assessment the security organ concludes that the threat involved is of

23 greater size but, however, still does not have any clear and visible

24 data, based on the assessment used as a platform to make an assessment on

25 the overall security that security organ also needs to participate in the

1 collection of data with the command to see what they have on their part.

2 Then that is put together, and together with the counter-intelligence

3 assessment the security organ talks to the commander, explaining the

4 level of threat from the point of security. The function of security

5 reached the conclusion that the unit's security is endangered to this or

6 that level or extent. And then the command needs to take up that part,

7 and the security organ follows up through its own professional line in

8 terms of security aspects alone, professionally speaking.

9 Q. Mr. Vuga, another thing: We are quite interested in how the

10 security rules we have been discussing were applied at the corps level.

11 What rules in the VRS regulated the work of the corps of the VRS?

12 A. In the VRS, the rules of service of the corps land forces was in

13 application. That was the rules that were applied. One can see that

14 from the various combat and operational documents, and there were no

15 other rules in place. The army was established according to the rules

16 per tasks. The corps was established in a way that it was visible from

17 the rules that it had been established according to the rules themselves

18 with certain adjustments. The rules provide for a general framework as

19 -- but real-life situations and practice do not make it possible to

20 always implement the rules to the fullest. However, in general, the rule

21 was -- the rules were in place.

22 Q. Could we please have a Prosecution exhibit, which is P412, next.

23 We can move to page 181 in the B/C/S and 110 in the English.

24 The English text is fine. In the B/C/S, we should skip two pages

25 forward. It should be 183, I believe. That's it.

1 Mr. Vuga, in your report you also took into account security

2 regulation. That is in your second binder. Please go ahead and find

3 that in your documents.

4 A. I have the rules in front of me.

5 Q. Paragraph 468. It begins with item 468 and then carries on, and

6 I meant paragraph 468, not page 468.

7 As regards to the rules of service, are these security items

8 which you had occasion to analyse, do they truly and accurately reflect

9 the provisions of the rules of service for security organs which we have

10 discussed? Were those rules reflected in these rules?

11 A. As regards the rules of service of the security organ, in terms

12 of army security those provisions put in simplest words were distributed

13 across or into various rules in keeping with the level of units that they

14 were supposed to be applied in. That's why we have a situation, then,

15 that whenever a security organ is involved, its role is defined as part

16 of the command depending, of course, on the level of command. Its tasks

17 and duties and its range of responsibilities stems out of the rules of

18 service of the security organ, this being the basic document defining

19 everything that has to do with the range of responsibilities of the

20 security organ and its tasks. When one looks at these rules, we always

21 have to refer back to the rules of service of the security organ and the

22 military police rules of service, which are decisive when the application

23 of these rules that we have before us are concerned, in terms of security

24 and the application of the rules of service of the military police and

25 security organs. When you studied the rules of the corps, you always

1 have to refer to the previous rules. There are no inconsistencies, only

2 the definitions were changed and applied to the corps level in terms of

3 command, cooperation, and everything else done at the corps command.

4 Anything that is important for the functioning of the security organ of

5 the corps command is included therein.

6 Q. Paragraph 468, first sentence, it says, "Security support is a

7 type of support in operations and other combat actions which is based on

8 a system of security and self-protection in the corps established earlier

9 in peacetime." When it says, "In the corps," does it encompass the

10 entire defence area of the corps or only the corps command?

11 A. One can see that this includes the whole of the corps and not the

12 command alone. That means that it is the area of responsibility of the

13 corps, and the command is of course at the head -- at the helm of the

14 corps. Within this context, however, security issues are tackled by the

15 corps command and its organs, and the area involved is the area of the

16 corps where the corps was deployed.

17 Q. Let us move on to item 3, which is in the B/C/S on the next page

18 and in the English, we can see it on this page, but it carries over to

19 the next page. Among other things, it says that this includes timely

20 organisation and implementation of counter-intelligence measures and

21 activities, these being detection and prevention of secret organised

22 activities of foreign intelligence services, activities and actions of

23 reconnaissance, sabotage, and terrorist forces, activities and actions of

24 special units of the enemy, activities of enemy emigrants, and internal

25 enemies.

1 Does that mean that the corps security organ needs to take care

2 of all these things, as it's stated here, in a timely fashion, in order

3 to detect the aforementioned activities throughout the area of defence of

4 the corps?

5 A. The security organ, according to this definition which has been

6 adopted from the rules of service of the security organ, but here it has

7 been adapted to the corps, is duty-bound to organise all this and to

8 implement all this in the corps. Obviously, that's why he has a certain

9 structure which will be able to realise all this, but he is responsible

10 for everything that will be done in the corps as the person in charge of

11 the counter-intelligence function and tasks as their organiser and

12 professional manager.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. I think we have to leave it at that for

14 the time being. We'll have a 25-minute break now. Thank you.

15 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

17 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

18 MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Mr. President. Just briefly, I wanted to

19 inform you that the Prosecution has no objection to another opening

20 statement from Mr. Ostojic. We would like to continue to speak with him

21 on all the other matters this afternoon as we have been speaking, and I

22 think after that tomorrow morning we will have a better idea and be able

23 to tell you more information then.

24 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you. Would you while doing this kindly

25 remind him that he hasn't filed a revised complete 65 ter list, please?

1 MR. McCLOSKEY: I will certainly. Yes, yes, Mr. President.

2 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. Let's proceed.

3 Mr. Zivanovic, you'll need to wait for the witness to come in.

4 Where are we? Halfway through?

5 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Approximately, yes.

6 [The witness entered court]

7 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.

8 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Thank you.

9 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Vuga, we were discussing paragraph 468 of

10 the rule of the corps that deals with the organisation and implementation

11 of certain measures, and now I'd like to move on to 469, which stipulates

12 types of tasks that are implemented in zones of operation and are placed

13 within the framework of security support in the corps.

14 Let us look at the first two points because my next question will

15 focus on them. That is, counteraction to and prevention of activities of

16 foreign intelligence services, reconnaissance and sabotage units of the

17 enemy, special units, activities of hostile Yugoslav emigration, and the

18 internal enemy. And point 2, protection and direct security of the

19 system of command and control and communications, commands and units of

20 the corps and the units of Territorial Defence acting in concert with

21 them, protection of sensitive and vital structures within the units and

22 in the operation zone, protection of the secrecy of decisions, plans and

23 combat documentation.

24 Now, does this also pertain to the entire zone of defence of the

25 corps?

1 A. Yes, all of it pertains to the entire zone as written here.

2 Q. Mr. Vuga, tell us, is it possible in times of war that these

3 tasks not be performed by anyone?

4 A. It's not possible because the purpose of the corps as a unit

5 would be called into question, and then this element of security of

6 executing tasks would be absent, and the tasks themselves could not be

7 executed in the absence of the prescribed measures.

8 Q. I'd like to look at one more document, a regulatory document.

9 That's an instruction for the work of commands and staffs, 699, P699.

10 [In English] Page 109 in B/C/S and 100 in English.

11 [Interpretation] It's an instruction for the work of commands and

12 staffs. Let me first ask you, was this instruction applied in the Army

13 of Republika Srpska as a regulatory document?

14 A. From the documentation that I studied, I concluded that this

15 instruction was applied. I concluded that because in various documents I

16 found elements of orders and provisions which can be identified as

17 compliance with this instruction.

18 Q. Let us look at paragraph 222, the second paragraph of this item,

19 which is on the next page in English. It reads, I'm only reading the

20 first sentence, "Security measures must be continuous and functionally

21 organised." In the context of this provision, could it happen that these

22 measures failed to be implemented for one or more days within the command

23 of the Drina Corps in the course of combat operations?

24 A. The answer to your question could boil down to a comparative

25 analysis whether there was an interruption in threatening activities when

1 the command of the corps could rest and not take any steps to secure

2 itself. The continuous character and functional organisation of security

3 measures depends primarily on the continuity of threatening activities

4 which were also uninterrupted and targeted the whole system with the aim

5 of destabilising it and endangering its function. That means the whole

6 system of command, command posts, systems of communication, et cetera.

7 So if this is implemented consistently, it could not be interrupted, not

8 for a second.

9 Q. Mr. Vuga, do you believe from the viewpoint of your report

10 anything else needs to be said about the rule of ground forces or this

11 instruction that we have been discussing?

12 A. From the point of view of the rule of ground forces, we discussed

13 the segment that is part of what I studied. It provides answers,

14 although not detailed, to what we have been discussing, a bit more than

15 what I wrote in my report, but this needs to be said. I think we need to

16 note that with such extensive tasks as we have here in the zone of the

17 corps, a certain organisational structure needs to be in place that has

18 the capacity to perform these tasks. The tasks themselves as defined

19 tell us that these are very complex, very extensive, continuous tasks.

20 That implies adequate human resources, a high degree of professionalism

21 on their part; they must be equipped properly for these tasks and have

22 the capacity to perform them within the time they are given in such a way

23 as to enable the whole system to function securely. There are two terms

24 that are used at a level of needed security and at the level of set

25 security. One element is the security that provides safety to those who

1 are executing their tasks, in peacetime, in wartime, and in circumstances

2 of immediate threat of war under the specific circumstances of each of

3 these conditions.

4 Q. And before we conclude the examination of these documents that

5 are covered in your reports, what is the practical meaning of security

6 support and security specifically at times of war?

7 A. The aspect of security that we are discussing is the function of

8 security organs and the professional security service. It has a special

9 importance in wartime because enemy activities and threats as a whole

10 directed against commands and units of the corps are implemented usually

11 covertly with small forces in order to maximise the effects and to

12 achieve an effect of surprise, both in terms of the objective and in

13 terms of method. Therefore, the system of command and the corps as a

14 command must have at their disposal the staff, professionally trained,

15 organised staff and resources, in order to achieve maximum success in

16 executing these tasks. Therein lies the importance of security support.

17 As for the consequences of not implementing these measures, they

18 are usually very grave and irreparable. They cannot be removed quickly,

19 and redressing the consequences requires a lot of time and great efforts,

20 and it's usually too late. That's the importance of this provision.

21 Q. Before we move on to discussing combat documents that you

22 analysed in your report, I'd like to go through certain regulatory

23 documents enacted by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the

24 time and just before, documents which should reflect the general

25 situation and especially the security situation in this part of Bosnia

1 and Herzegovina.

2 Could you please take the third binder in your set, and take

3 document 1D710.

4 This is an enactment of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic

5 of Bosnia-Herzegovina dated 4 April 1992. In item 1, you see that a

6 decision was made by the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 3rd of April, 1992, to carry out a mobilisation

8 of Territorial Defence units. First of all, tell us, do you know whether

9 this decision was taken by the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina in its full composition or not?

11 A. Based on the documents that I analysed, the Presidency was not in

12 its full composition when it took this decision. The representatives of

13 the Serbian people in the Presidency, those who represented the Serbian

14 people under the constitution, were not present.

15 Q. Could you clarify what this term "Territorial Defence" meant in

16 that system? Who was comprised by Territorial Defence?

17 A. The Territorial Defence was an integral component of the armed

18 forces of the SFRY. JNA was one component as federal army, and the

19 Territorial Defence was another component of the armed forces of the

20 SFRY.

21 Q. Can you tell us what were the requirements, who had the

22 obligation, who had to be a member of the Territorial Defence?

23 A. Members of the Territorial Defence were citizens of the SFRY who

24 were not in the JNA, who were not doing their military service, but who

25 were of military age and able-bodied and who had the obligation to be

1 members of the Territorial Defence of the territory of the Republic in

2 which they had wartime assignments and in which they resided. The whole

3 thing was governed by the constitution. It was stipulated in the

4 constitution what the Territorial Defence was, who was responsible for

5 it.

6 Q. Take it slowly, please. In item 3, there is a reference to the

7 mobilisation of the reserve force of the police of the Socialist Republic

8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you specify what was the reserve force of

9 the police?

10 A. The reserve force of the police was within the jurisdiction of

11 the Ministry of the Interior. It doesn't infringe upon the Territorial

12 Defence and the jurisdiction of military authorities. That is a separate

13 plan and a separate type of implementation of that plan. I did not deal

14 with this issue in particular, but I know from my previous jobs what the

15 reserve force of the police means. I knew what sphere they worked in

16 because in my various security-related positions I had some insight into

17 that.

18 Q. Could we look at document 1D1282. Could we lower the page.

19 This is a decision to proclaim an immediate threat of war. Can

20 you see when it was taken?

21 A. As far as I can see, it was taken on the 8th of April, 1992,

22 signed by the President of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, if I made

23 the right connection because it's on two different pages in my copy.

24 Q. Could we move to the second page? Here we see the signature, but

25 we moved to this page to look at another decision that is closer to the

1 bottom of the page. It's the decision to introduce the work obligation.

2 Can you tell us, from what you know, what does "work obligation" mean

3 under circumstances when an immediate threat of war has been proclaimed

4 as we have seen from the previous decision?

5 A. The work obligation as explained here in the context of these

6 developments and under the legislation implies that introducing the work

7 obligation will create the prerequisites and introduce an obligation for

8 layers of society to whom the work obligation applies will act in a new

9 way as opposed to before, and that these segments of society will

10 function in accordance with the state of immediate threat of war.

11 Q. We see from the text that the work obligation is entering into

12 force for all the state authorities, public enterprises, self-employed

13 businessmen, banks, republic and municipal organs of administration. So

14 as far as I can see, no one is left out.

15 A. I understand that these agencies are explicitly included, but I

16 don't know what it took to include other elements. Perhaps there is an

17 aspect that could ensure that the work obligation and the work performed

18 be in the interests of security, so it is possible that not everything is

19 encompassed by this provision.

20 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey?

21 MR. McCLOSKEY: Objection to relevance, and for the first time

22 the witness appears to be speculating. He's saying, perhaps, I don't

23 know, and this is not something I see in his report, and it's really not

24 like him to speculate.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. I think the witness has heard what you

1 just said and will avoid doing that in the future. In the meantime,

2 let's proceed.

3 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'm going to another document.

4 Q. [Interpretation] Let's now look at 1D731.

5 This is a decree on defence. This is a decree Law on Defence.

6 Could you please tell us when this decree law was passed and by whom?

7 A. This decree law was passed by the Presidency on the 17th of June,

8 1992, according to the document, which is signed by President Alija

9 Izetbegovic.

10 Q. If I -- I believe that you are looking at a wrong document, or

11 maybe we have made a mistake. The number is 1D731.

12 A. The decree law was passed by the Presidency. There is no doubt

13 about that.

14 Q. What I have is a -- the decree Law on Defence bearing a different

15 date. That's why I'm saying that you may be looking at a different

16 document.

17 A. I believe that it's not clear enough.

18 Q. Maybe you can look on the screen if that's not a problem. Maybe

19 it will be better.

20 Can you see in the right upper corner? Let's blow it up just a

21 little bit for you.

22 A. It says 20 May 1992, but I was looking at the date when the

23 decree law was passed, not when it was published. It was published in

24 the Official Gazette of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 20 May

25 1992.

1 Q. This is precisely what I was going to ask you. Now I would like

2 you to look at Article 48 of this decree law. It is on page 3 of this

3 document.

4 Kindly look at the definition of the age limits for the work

5 obligation that I've just asked you about.

6 A. The age limit for the work obligation is from the age of 15

7 onwards.

8 Q. Thank you. Can you please look at Article 50 on the same page,

9 which defines the age range for the civilian protection units.

10 A. The age range for the civilian protection units is between 80 to

11 60 years of age -- I apologise, between 18 to 60 years of age. This is

12 for men, and 55 years of age is the upper limit for women.

13 Q. And now, can we please look at Article 51, which is relative to

14 the training for defence. Could you please, again, give us the age range

15 when it comes to rights and obligations for training for defence?

16 A. It says that the range is between 15 and 60 years of age for men

17 and between 15 and 55 for women if they are fit for training. So the

18 main conditions are fitness and age.

19 Q. Can we now go to a different document, which is 1D729. I believe

20 that's the one that we saw just a while ago.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. McCloskey?

22 MR. McCLOSKEY: I haven't objected but just going to documents

23 and having him read out things really is more time-consuming than

24 probative.

25 JUDGE AGIUS: That's true. I mean, if we can avoid that. You

1 know, in practically all the domestic jurisdictions that I know, that is

2 an anathema.

3 MR. McCLOSKEY: I don't have an objection to him citing that

4 information and asking it in the question.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, your question, Mr. Zivanovic?

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Could the witness please be shown 1D729? And can he tell us

9 whether the state of war was ever proclaimed in the territory of

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if it was, when was it proclaimed?

11 A. In the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the state of war was

12 proclaimed on the 20th of June, 1992.

13 Q. In the same document, could you please look at an order and tell

14 us what it refers to.

15 A. When it comes to this document, the essence of this document

16 refers to the proclamation of public mobilisation, which is binding upon

17 all citizens between the ages of 18 and 65 who are fit for service and

18 women between the ages of 18 and 55, to report to the units of civilian

19 protection where they will be assigned duties to perform. And also, this

20 is a call for general public mobilisation of all militarily able men

21 between the ages of 18 and 55 who are to report to their respective

22 military units.

23 Q. The order in paragraph 1, does it prescribe what military

24 conscripts have to bring when responding to the mobilisation call?

25 A. Yes. It is stated very clearly that they should bring military

1 equipment and personal weapons and that they should report to the nearest

2 unit of Territorial Defence. The mobilisation implied that they should

3 come with all the gear that is envisaged to be brought to a Territorial

4 Defence unit.

5 Q. Can we now look at 1D712 -- 1D720.

6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter's apology.

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Could you please tell us about this document?

9 A. This is a decree law on military obligation.

10 Q. Could you please -- I apologise. Let's just wait for the

11 document to appear on the screen. Could you please tell me the date of

12 this decree law?

13 A. The 1st of August, 1992.

14 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. On what basis is he saying that this

15 is -- goes back to the 1st August, 1992? Because what I see in front of

16 me here on the monitor --

17 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Because he looks at his binder and not on the

18 display. It is wrong document on display.

19 JUDGE AGIUS: Oh, I see. All right. That explains it.

20 MR. ZIVANOVIC: It could be displayed on ELMO.

21 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay.

22 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. I'm now going to ask you to look at Article 2. This is the sole

24 provision that we are concerned with. Could you please tell me,

25 according to this decree law who falls under the military obligation?

1 A. According to the provisions of this decree law in Article 2, in

2 both peace and war, all the citizens of Republika Srpska in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina who are fit for service fall under the military

4 obligation. This is the basis. And later on, there are conditions which

5 are subsequently prescribed and arise from this decree law, but the

6 general provision and condition is fitness for work, and it also says

7 here that the responsible persons are companies, institutions, and other

8 legal persons, and their organs and other legal persons. The important

9 thing is that part of the obligations that have to be carried out are

10 also binding upon the structures of society who have been tasked with

11 implementing duties within the area of defence.

12 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Ms. Fauveau. One moment, Mr.

13 Zivanovic.

14 MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we maybe be a little more

15 clear on lines 13 and 14 in 1970? It says that it is the citizens of

16 Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is it Republika Srpska, or is it

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes. Thank you.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a correction which has

20 not been recorded. I said, no, I misspoke, it was -- it is

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this has not been recorded, the fact that I

22 corrected myself, and this is probably due to the speed.

23 MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Just one more question about this. Tell me, if you remember, do

25 you remember the lower age limit for the work obligation? How young can

1 a person be in order to fall under the work obligation provisions? If

2 you can't remember, let's go back to the document to refresh your memory.

3 A. Yes, we can go back but the lower limit.

4 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. McCloskey?

5 MR. McCLOSKEY: The relevance of work obligation in 1992? I

6 mean, what -- this is going to be a long war.

7 MR. ZIVANOVIC: I'll explain it.

8 JUDGE AGIUS: What's the relevance, and then we close it there

9 because it's time.

10 MR. ZIVANOVIC: Because -- the relevance of it because the

11 working obligation starts at 15 and military obligation starts at 15, as

12 well, according to this rule.

13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. We'll take that up. I will take that

14 up tomorrow, until which time we stand adjourned. We start at 9.00

15 sharp. Thank you.

16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

17 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 2nd day of July,

18 2008, at 9.00 a.m.

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