Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 25037

 1                           Tuesday, 2 September 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Good afternoon, Madam Registrar, and welcome back.

 7     Could you call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  This is case

 9     number IT-05-88-T, The Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic, et al.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, ma'am.  All the accused are here, and I

11     think we are full house Defence teams; and Prosecution, I only see

12     Mr. Thayer today.

13             Any preliminaries?  None?

14             Good afternoon to you, sir.  You are most welcome to this

15     Tribunal where you are -- and to this case where you are going to give

16     evidence very soon.  Before you start doing so, our rules require that

17     you make a solemn declaration that in the course of your testimony you

18     will be speaking the truth.  Madam usher is going to give you the text of

19     the declaration.  Please read it out aloud, and that will be your solemn

20     undertaking with us.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I solemnly declare

22     that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  I thank you, sir.  Please make yourself

24     comfortable.  What is going to happen is Mr. Nikolic from the Beara

25     Defence team that have summoned you as a Defence witness will be asking

Page 25038

 1     you a series of questions.  He will then be followed by others on

 2     cross-examination, and after that you can go home.

 3             Mr. Nikolic.

 4             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  Good

 5     afternoon.  Good afternoon to everybody in the courtroom.

 6                           WITNESS:  MIKAJLO MITROVIC

 7                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 8                           Examination by Mr. Nikolic

 9        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Mitrovic.

10        A.   Good afternoon.

11        Q.   As you know, I am Predrag Nikolic, and I represent the accused

12     Beara together with my team, and I will be leading you today on behalf of

13     the Defence team.

14             First of all, could you please state your name for the record;

15     also, could you tell us where you were born and your father's name?

16        A.   Your Honours, my name is Mikajlo Mitrovic.  My father's name is

17     Bogodan.  I was born on the 22nd July, 1955, in the village of Zelena in

18     the municipality of Zvornik, which was then the socialist Federal

19     Republic of Yugoslavia.  I'm married.  I have two children, and I reside

20     in Banja Luka at number 50 Skena Koljnevica Street.  My ID number is

21     22079555005013.

22        Q.   Thank you very much, Mr. Mitrovic.  You provided us with quite a

23     lot of details.  Could you please tell us something about your

24     educational background?

25        A.   I completed the technical military academy in Zagreb.  Upon

Page 25039

 1     completing the academy, I became the engineer of electronics, and I

 2     became a lieutenant by rank.

 3        Q.   What is your current occupation, Mr. Mitrovic?

 4        A.   I'm retired, and I am also a post-graduate student at the school

 5     of philosophy in Banja Luka at the department of contemporary sociology.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much.  And now let's go back to the period when

 7     you just completed your academy education.  Where was your first posting?

 8        A.   When I graduated in 1979, I was sent to work at the Postojna

 9     garrison in Slovenia as an official in the technical services, first in

10     the logistics of the garrison and then in the technical department of the

11     division command at Postojna barracks.

12        Q.   Could you slowly give us all the assignments that you had until

13     you retired?

14        A.   I started working in 1979 at Postojna, and I stayed with the

15     technical organ until 1983, and then I joined the security organ upon the

16     proposal of the chief of security of the so-called 9th army and with the

17     approval of the then-commander.  I remained working in the security

18     department of the division, and there I also worked as one of the desk

19     officers.  I also worked at various battalions as a desk officer and then

20     in the security department of the division.  You wanted to know more?

21        Q.   Yes.

22        A.   In 1985, due to my child's illness I was re-assigned to work in

23     the Sibenik garrison where I occupied the post of a desk officer in the

24     8th naval sector.  This was for a year or two, and then I was the chief

25     of the security department of the 11th brigade of the naval infantry in

Page 25040

 1     Sibenik, and on the eve of the war in Croatia I was appointed the chief

 2     of the department of the naval military district for counterintelligence.

 3     This is where I was when the war in Croatia started.

 4             In the course of the war in Croatia, I was injured in Sibenik and

 5     I was captured.  I spent 45 days in a solitary cell in the Sibenik

 6     prison.  Then on the 2nd of November, 1991, I was exchanged and was

 7     re-assigned to the Knin garrison where I was appointed the chief of the

 8     counterintelligence group of the 9th Knin corps.  After that, I was also

 9     assigned to the Drvar garrison, and I was appointed the chief of the

10     intelligence and security department of the 2nd Krajina corps.  I

11     remained in that position from the moment the corps was established to

12     the moment when it was disbanded.

13             After the war, I worked as the deputy chief of the

14     counterintelligence group of the Army Republika Srpska, and then in 1998

15     I was appointed the assistant Minister of Defence of Republika Srpska in

16     charge of security and intelligence, and from there I was pensioned off

17     in 2002.  That would be my career.

18        Q.   This was, again, providing us with a lot of details, but let's go

19     back to some of them.  Mr. Mitrovic, when did you first meet Colonel

20     Beara, actually, Ljubisa Beara as he was then?

21        A.   He was the brigade captain, and I met him sometime in 1985.  I

22     said that that year I was re-assigned to the Sibenik garrison, and when

23     he came to control and tour the security organs of the 8th naval military

24     district, obviously, I reported to him because he was my superior, and

25     that's when I actually met him for the first time.

Page 25041

 1        Q.   Thank you very much.  Just one small correction.  On page 22,

 2     line 14, could you please repeat -- page 4, line 22.  Could you please

 3     tell us the exact rank that Ljubisa Beara held at the time?

 4        A.   He was a captain, which would be the rank of a colonel in the

 5     land forces.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much.  What was the position of Mr. Beara at the

 7     time?

 8        A.   At the time, he was the assistant chief of the security

 9     department of the naval district, and by establishment he was also the

10     deputy chief.

11        Q.   Given your position and given his position, what was your

12     relationship in terms of subordination?

13        A.   Captain Beara was my second superior.  I was a desk officer.  I

14     had my chief, at the time I was captain 1st class, as far as I can

15     remember, and that would be the relationship between the two of us.

16        Q.   How often did you have an opportunity to meet Mr. Beara while you

17     were serving in Sibenik?

18        A.   It's very hard for me to give you any numbers, if you wanted me

19     to give you numbers.  In any case, several times a year, at least four to

20     five times a year in Sibenik itself.  But there were also occasions when

21     Captain Beara would summon us to come to the command, to the naval

22     district, i.e., to the seat of the security department of the naval

23     district.  That's when we had to go to meet him there.

24        Q.   Tell me, please, what was the ethnic composition of your unit and

25     especially the security organ during that period of time?

Page 25042

 1        A.   You have to bear in mind that the army was still the JNA and that

 2     the JNA effectively reflected the ethnic composition of the then-state.

 3     As far as the security organ is concerned, there were representatives of

 4     all ethnic groups starting with Albanians.  One of the organs of security

 5     at the time was Rahim Ademy, the current general of the Croatian army.

 6     There were also Croats, Macedonians, Muslim Serbs, of course,

 7     Montenegrins, and so on and so forth.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please make a pause after my question?

 9        A.   I apologise.

10        Q.   Now, based on your official contacts and relationship with

11     Mr. Beara, what was your opinion of him as an officer, as a professional

12     serving in the same military?

13        A.   Naval Captain Beara in our eyes was a role model in professional

14     terms.  He was a professional, an exceptional professional.  He adhered

15     to the legality of work - that was his main concern - and he was a

16     professional in terms of providing professional guidance to the security

17     organs, especially when it came to counterintelligence.  He was also a

18     professional when it came to the subordination relationship.  He was

19     primarily a person who understood issues and human problems that we all

20     had, more or less, and his appearance was also something that commanded

21     respect, especially when he wore a uniform.  He is an extremely

22     intelligent and educated person, and what he had were manners of a true

23     gentleman.

24        Q.   One must admit that it's very nice to hear these words; however,

25     are there any facts that may corroborate what you've just told us?

Page 25043

 1        A.   I can illustrate this by giving you an example that concerns the

 2     protection of the legality of our work; for example, in the course of

 3     1991, i.e. towards the end of that year, when the units and the command

 4     of the 8th naval district were in Sibenik encircled by the paramilitary

 5     forces of the Republic of Croatia at the time, the ZNG.  I was one of

 6     those who experienced that encirclement, and we experienced all sorts of

 7     provocations, ill-treatment, and so on and so forth.  Every day, civilian

 8     population would be brought to our facilities as a human shield, and in

 9     addition to that huge loudspeakers were mounted up in the winery next to

10     the barracks and they played loud music.  They would try to talk the

11     recruits serving in the army to desert the facilities, and the officers,

12     they also brought their wives and the children of the officers who were

13     trapped in the barracks.  They persuaded him to talk to their fathers and

14     husbands and to try to talk them into deserting, and this went on for 24

15     hours a day for ten or even -- ten days or even longer.

16             We asked from naval Captain Beara for his permission to destroy

17     those loudspeakers.  We had automatic pistols with silencers with which

18     we could do it; however, he refused to approve that because according to

19     him this would have been a provocation which might have led to incidents

20     and that this might have given a reason to ZNG to open fire on us, which

21     would probably result in the deaths of soldiers and officers, let alone

22     civilians.

23        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, at that time which rules and regulations did you

24     apply; i.e., what regulations and laws was your work based on?

25        A.   When we are talking about that time, we are talking about the law

Page 25044

 1     on defence, the rules and regulations of the work in the JNA, and all the

 2     other rules that were in effect; and when it comes to the security organ,

 3     then we were talking about the rules of service of the security organ in

 4     the then-JNA, which had a legal effect at the time; and we are also

 5     talking about the guidance or instruction on the application of the

 6     methods and works of the security organs.  We are also talking about the

 7     rules of service of the military police and the instruction on

 8     deliberation of the rules for the work of the military police.  Those

 9     were the legal documents that we used in our everyday work.

10        Q.   In view of all that you've just told us and the rules that

11     governed your work, I would like to hear your opinion.  In the situation

12     that you've just mentioned and in the face of provocations of the

13     paramilitaries, did you have legal means to use weapons?

14        A.   Yes, because the situation threatened the security of the

15     facilities.  It also lowered the combat-readiness of our soldiers, so we

16     had every right to eliminate those provocations.

17        Q.   So how did the whole of that situation resolve?  How did it come

18     to an end?

19        A.   On the 18th of September, these forces launched an attack on our

20     facilities.  I'm talking about Sibenik.  So those forces used firearms

21     and engaged in combat against us.  On that particular day, fighting

22     started all over Croatia, not only in Sibenik.

23        Q.   At the very beginning of your testimony, you said that you were

24     wounded, that you were injured.  How did that and what was the outcome of

25     your injury, and where were you taken?

Page 25045

 1        A.   When you asked me about my career, I said that, indeed.  I said

 2     that I was injured in my command by a shell shrapnel.  I still have two

 3     shrapnel in the brain because I was wounded in the head, in the shoulder,

 4     and in the knee.  However, the situation was such that the ambulance, the

 5     medical organs of the Sibenik barracks crossed over to the other side.

 6     They were mostly Croatians, and they joined their people, so there was no

 7     way anybody could provide me with first aid.

 8             The then-chief of medical department of the 8th naval district

 9     took me to the hospital in Sibenik.  I believe that he actually handed me

10     over deliberately because he remained living in Sibenik after that.  I

11     was given an anti-tetanus shot there mand after that I was half

12     conscious.  Some ZNG members arrived and they took me to the Sibenik

13     prison, to the district prison in Sibenik.

14        Q.   I have to interrupt you here.  We don't want to depart too far

15     from the topic.  I would kindly ask you to tell me whether you were

16     exchanged, and where?  Which unit did you join after that?

17        A.   I was exchanged on the 2nd of November, 1991, and that was the

18     third exchange that took place.  There were two exchanges before that,

19     but I was not exchanged on those two occasions; it was only on the third

20     occasion.  Whenever the Red Cross came to the prison, they blindfolded me

21     and took me out of my cell to some basement rooms.  They were in fact

22     hiding me because I hadn't been reported, but fortunately in the Knin

23     corps they knew that I was there, and they insisted on having me brought

24     for exchange, and they gave a major and 50 shoulders in exchange for me

25     because you, yourself, are well aware that an exchange is a form of

Page 25046

 1     trade.  After that, I went to Belgrade to the medical military academy to

 2     be medically examined because I had been tortured both physically and

 3     psychologically in prison.  Every day they beat me up; they threw tear

 4     gas into my cell.

 5             After this, I was transferred to the Knin garrison, and I have

 6     already told you what duty I took up there.  My immediate superior was

 7     Colonel Zdravko Tolimir when I arrived there.

 8        Q.   You've already answered my next question.  I was going to ask you

 9     who your immediate superior was.

10        A.   Yes.  Well, now that we are talking about this, it might be

11     interesting to mention that naval Captain Beara was the superior of

12     Colonel Tolimir.

13        Q.   And where was Colonel Beara at the time?

14        A.   I don't know where he was exactly, but the command of the naval

15     military district was relocated to Kumbor, I believe, in Montenegro, and

16     I think that's where the command of the naval military district was.  We

17     were not in contact at the time.

18        Q.   After your exchange, when you were transferred to a new unit, the

19     Knin corps, did you have any contacts with Captain Beara, Naval Captain

20     Beara?

21        A.   No, because there was already fighting going on.  It wasn't

22     possible.

23        Q.   And Mr. Mitrovic, when did you begin serving in the Army of

24     Republika Srpska and in what unit?

25        A.   I joined the Army of Republika Srpska on the 25th of May - if I'm

Page 25047

 1     not wrong - 1992, when I was transferred from Knin to the Drvar garrison

 2     and appointed chief of intelligence and security affairs of the 2nd

 3     Krajina Corps.

 4        Q.   At that time, was Colonel Beara in the Army of Republika Srpska?

 5        A.   In that period, no, to the best of my knowledge.  Why?  Well,

 6     because he arrived later on, either at the end of 1992 or the beginning

 7     or the middle of 1993.

 8        Q.   Excuse me for interrupting you, but tell me:  How do you learn

 9     when Colonel Beara arrived in the Army of Republika Srpska?

10        A.   Well, I learned it either through a dispatch or through

11     information sent around by the Main Staff telling us that the Naval

12     Captain Beara had been appointed chief of security in the sector for

13     intelligence and security affairs in the Main Staff, or perhaps we talked

14     on the phone.  I can't really be very precise about this.

15        Q.   Bearing in mind the duty you were performing at the time, do you

16     know what duty he was performing in that period?

17        A.   I told you that he was appointed chief of the security

18     administration, and I have to tell you that I was pleasantly surprised by

19     his arrival because I knew that he was a professional, and I believed he

20     was being appointed to the right post.  I was surprised, also, because I

21     considered him to be a Croat by ethnicity because he spoke like a Croat.

22     He used the Latin alphabet when he was writing something.  I associated

23     him with a well known football player, the goalkeeper Beara from Split.

24     However, later on I learned that he was a Serb and that he had been born

25     in Sarajevo.

Page 25048

 1        Q.   Tell me, Mr. Mitrovic, what legal regulations and rules did you

 2     apply in the Army of Republika Srpska in your service?

 3        A.   In the Army of Republika Srpska, the security organs like the

 4     entire army took over the rules of the then-JNA.  In particular, in our

 5     service these were the rules of service of the security organ, the

 6     instruction on applying the methods and means of work, the rules of

 7     service of the military police, and so on.

 8        Q.   Could we now have in e-court document P407.  We have an ERN

 9     number in the B/C/S version, 00909825; and in English, it's 00920108.

10             Mr. Mitrovic, I'll ask you to take a look at item 16, 17, and 18

11     here.  As you can see, we saw the first document telling us that these

12     were the rules of service.

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And this is the chapter dealing with management of security

15     organs.  Please look at the three paragraphs I mentioned, and tell me

16     when you are ready.

17        A.   I can answer your questions.

18        Q.   Based on these regulations, please tell me:  What was the system

19     of management of security organs in the Army of Republika Srpska?

20        A.   Well, you see, these paragraphs of these rules regulate precisely

21     the manner in which security organs are managed.  In paragraph 16, it

22     says that the security organ is directly subordinate to the commanding

23     officer of the command unit, institution, or staff of the armed forces in

24     whose strength it is placed in the establishment.  That is the gist of

25     that paragraph.

Page 25049

 1        Q.   Well, let's be specific about this.  In your situation in the 2nd

 2     Krajina Corp., bearing in mind the duty you were performing, to whom were

 3     you directly subordinate?

 4        A.   To my corps commander. [Realtime transcript read in error,

 5     "co-commander"]

 6        Q.   And bearing in mind these rules, does that mean that in the

 7     entire organisation of the Army of Republika Srpska, these rules had to

 8     be implemented?

 9        A.   Yes, correct.  It says here in all units, institutions, and so on

10     and so forth.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes -- one moment Mr. Nikolic.  Ms. Nikolic.

12             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Your microphone.

15             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] I wish to enter a correction into

16     the transcript.  Page 13, line 4, the witness said, to my commander, "my

17     corps commander."

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Nikolic.

19             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Could we go back for a minute to

20     clear this up.

21        Q.   To whom were you subordinate in the 2nd Krajina corps?

22        A.   To the commander of my corps.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Did the security -- or rather, were the security

24     organs independent in their actions under these rules?

25        A.   No.  Security organs cannot be independent because, first of all,

Page 25050

 1     they are accountable to their commander; secondly, they are accountable

 2     to their superior officer from the security service, so what sort of

 3     independence could there be?  And they have to adhere to the law and to

 4     the rules.

 5        Q.   Bearing in mind the provisions you've just looked at, tell me:

 6     What was the relationship between the subordinate and superior security

 7     organs in the Army of Republika Srpska?

 8        A.   It was a vertical relationship, and it referred only to

 9     professional guidance of the security organ.  This was done by superiors

10     for their subordinates, but this was only professional guidance.

11        Q.   Can you be more specific about this.  What do you mean by this?

12        A.   Well, you see, first of all, when we are talking about this I'm

13     referring to counterintelligence, primarily, and the application of the

14     methods of work of the security organ and the means of work.  The

15     superior security organ, they were always more experienced and

16     better-qualified officers who were able to have an overview of the

17     problem and provide guidance to their subordinate organ as to how this

18     problem could be solved in the field of counterintelligence.

19        Q.   Please look at paragraph 17, and tell me:  What were the powers

20     of the security organ as regards applying the methods and means of work?

21        A.   This paragraph deals in detail with the methods and means, and it

22     refers to the legality of work.  As regards applying the methods and

23     means of work, it's the federal secretary who corresponded to ministerial

24     rank.  He was a minister in the old system, and he would authorize the

25     army commander, and in peacetime it was the commander of the army who was

Page 25051

 1     the highest ranking, the ultimate authority who was familiar with the

 2     work of the security organ, and when there was combined applications of

 3     methods and means of work, he knew about it, and he also approved a

 4     secret means and methods of work.  In wartime it would be the corps

 5     commander who would do all that.

 6        Q.   I now wish to put a few questions to you about the security organ

 7     and the military police.  What regulations did you use, if any, in

 8     performing your duties as regards the relationship between the security

 9     organ and the military police?  And before you reply, I'll ask to have in

10     e-court Document -- the same document but page 00909826 in B/C/S, and in

11     English, 00920109.  That's page 18 in B/C/S and page 11 in English.

12             Can you see it, Mr. Mitrovic?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Please look at paragraph 23.

15        A.   All right.

16        Q.   Please be kind enough to tell us what paragraph 23 provides for.

17        A.   Well, you first asked me what rules we used.

18        Q.   Yes, you're right.

19        A.   We used the rules of service of the military police that had been

20     taken over, and this relationship was regulated by law, and the rules of

21     service of the security service also deal with this.

22             Paragraph 23 days that the security organ of a commanding unit

23     institution and so on provides a specialist or professional management

24     for a military police unit, and he is responsible for the unit being well

25     equipped, ready for action, and so on and so forth, and the commander of

Page 25052

 1     the unit within whose composition the unit is -- let me clarify.  If, for

 2     example, there is a military police battalion in the corps, which was the

 3     case where I was, I would propose to the commander how the battalion

 4     could be used, and he could accept or reject my proposal, but he issued

 5     orders to the commander of the battalion of the military police directly,

 6     and this is provided for in this rule.  The military police units are

 7     subordinate to the commander of the unit they form a part of.  So, for

 8     example, the commander of the brigade or the -- in the case of a

 9     battalion to the corps commander.

10        Q.   Let's look at paragraph 23, the paragraph 3 thereof, starting

11     with the words "the engagement of units" or "the deployment of units" or

12     "individual members."  Could you please look at that?

13        A.   Very well.  I've had a look.

14        Q.   Can you paraphrase this paragraph 3?

15        A.   This is exactly about what I've just been talking about.  I send

16     my proposal to the commander, and the commander then either approves or

17     disproves the use of military police unit, i.e., the deployment of the

18     military police unit.  That's how I understand this paragraph, and this

19     has to be done with the consent of the superior military officer.  In my

20     case, I had to have the approval of the corps commander, i.e., his

21     consent.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We will no longer need this document, and we will

23     proceed, moving to something else.

24             Mr. Mitrovic, during that period of time from the moment you

25     learned that Mr. Beara was, again, the security organ, did you and how

Page 25053

 1     often had contacts with him, and I mean professional contacts.

 2        A.   Of course we had contacts.  We had face-to-face contacts, we

 3     contacted by phone, by telegrams, by official correspondence, and so on

 4     and so forth.  Captain Beara was conscientious person, and in -- subject

 5     to his other commitments and plans he would come to the corps zone four

 6     or five times, and then that's when we would see each other.  And there

 7     were also cases when he summoned him to come to Banja Luka, for example,

 8     if he was there to report to him there.  It all depended on the current

 9     combat situation.

10        Q.   So when we are talking about the arrivals of your superior

11     officer and when we talk about professional management, what did the

12     rules prescribe and how things looked in practice when Colonel Beara

13     arrived in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Krajina corps?

14        A.   Look, when he arrived in the zone of responsibility of the 2nd

15     Krajina corps, Naval Captain Beara would first pay a visit to the corps

16     commander.  This is a custom, isn't it; when you visit somebody's house,

17     you first say hello to the host.  And then naval captain would brief the

18     corps commander and inform him about his plan of the tour of the security

19     organ and the aim of the inspection.  He would inspect the departments in

20     the corps and the security departments in the brigades during his visits.

21     Only after that would a naval captain come to the offices of the security

22     department, and there we would report to him.  We would brief him on the

23     situation.

24        Q.   Within the framework of these official visits, could you give us

25     an illustration, an example when Colonel Beara insisted on a different

Page 25054

 1     application of rules?

 2        A.   Of course not.  Absolutely not.  He was the beacon of the

 3     protection of legality.  Actually, it would first be the commander and

 4     then everybody else down the ranks.  So he was the one who made sure that

 5     the legality of the rules was respected.

 6        Q.   I would like to go back to the military police.  I would like to

 7     show you Document number P707 in B/C/S; ERN number is 02072110.  And in

 8     the English version, the ERN is 03041648.  In B/C/S, page 32, and in

 9     English, it is page 22.

10             Mr. Mitrovic, tell me, please, briefly, what are the duties and

11     tasks of the military police, just in a nutshell?

12        A.   I would say tasks rather than duties.

13        Q.   I agree.

14        A.   These tasks are defined by the rules of service of the military

15     police; and first and foremost, they mean that -- providing security of

16     -- for facilities, commanders, other persons, routes, roads, and one of

17     the priority purposes of the military police units was to fight

18     infiltrated sabotage and terrorist groups.

19             Within the scope of their work, the police had various services;

20     and when we talk about services, I'd like to say that those services were

21     the security service, the duty service, the patrol service, the escort

22     service, and so on and so forth.

23             MR. NIKOLIC:  Can the document be lowered?  Can we scroll down

24     and display Item number 55, please.

25        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, let's look at Item 55 where one of the military

Page 25055

 1     police duties is mentioned, and that is escort service.

 2        A.   I've had a look at it.

 3        Q.   Could you please tell me briefly:  What would be the tasks

 4     prescribed by the rules of service of the military police according to

 5     this item?

 6        A.   When it comes to escort service, this item defines the categories

 7     of persons which may be escorted by the military service; and primarily,

 8     these are persons who have been apprehended for having committed a crime

 9     and so on and so forth, and this is basically the long and the short of

10     it.  These persons would be escorted to a military prison or to another

11     type of detention facility.

12        Q.   Have you read the Item 55 to the end?  Did the military police

13     have any powers or authorities in terms of prisoners of war?

14        A.   Yes.  Military police had powers and the authority to escort

15     prisoners of war from their temporary detention units at the brigade

16     level to the prisoner of war camps.

17        Q.   Thank you very much.  We'll no longer need this document.

18             And now, when we are talking about the relationship between the

19     security organ and the military police, you have already stated that your

20     relationship towards the military police was primarily in professional

21     terms.  Could you please be more specific?  Could you please provide us

22     with some more details and explain this term "professional terms," the

23     essence of the term; what does it mean?

24        A.   My obligation was to primarily make sure that the military police

25     unit is manned by professionals or if there are no such men that there

Page 25056

 1     was training to provide professional education.  In war there were very

 2     few professionals, so there were a lot of training courses organised for

 3     those who joined.

 4             The second task would be to control the training levels of the

 5     military police unit and its capabilities, and it was done during the war

 6     whenever possible.

 7             The next task would be to make sure that the military police

 8     units were equipped with all the means that were necessary for the

 9     performance of the unit's task, starting with flak jackets, APCs, and

10     other very specific pieces of equipment, technical equipment and material

11     that are indispensable for the work of a military police unit.

12        Q.   It arises from your answer that during the war you did not have

13     enough professionals to work in the military police.  How did you resolve

14     that?  How did you deal with that situation?

15        A.   Throughout the war, there was a hovering problem of professionals

16     not only in the military police but also in the security organs because

17     there was a lack of professional servicemen, especially in the military

18     police units.  There were not enough men -- and I apologise for speeding.

19     There were not enough men who had completed the appropriate training

20     courses in the intelligence and security training centre in Pancevo.

21     That's why we had to make do with what we had.  If somebody -- a certain

22     profile -- professional was necessary, we either had him or not, but that

23     was not just the case in the military police, but there was also problem

24     with the brigade commands.  For example, in the brigade commands there

25     would be, perhaps, one or two professionals, and the others had been

Page 25057

 1     recruited from the reserve forces.

 2        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, let's go back to your contacts with Mr. Beara, who

 3     was your superior at the time.  What was your attitude towards the

 4     problems that you have just shared with us?  Was he aware of such

 5     problems?  Did you brief him about the problems that you faced?

 6        A.   Of course I briefed my superior about the situation in the

 7     military police unit, and I also asked for his assistance, both with the

 8     equipping of the units as well as with the professional staff.

 9        Q.   And did you receive any assistance, and how was the assistance

10     provided to you?

11        A.   There was assistance.  For example, if there were men in another

12     unit of a different corps, for example, Bosnia or Herzegovina corps, and

13     if they had a surplus of such men, then they would be re-assigned to come

14     and work with -- in my corps.  They had broader possibilities than I did,

15     and the same applied to the equipment that I mentioned.  The security

16     administration is in charge of making sure that the units of the military

17     police were well equipped.

18        Q.   You have stated that your professional contacts took place in

19     various shapes and forms; either Mr. Beara would come to the zone of

20     responsibility of the 2nd corps or you would go and meet him somewhere

21     else.  Did Mr. Beara arrive in the zone of responsibility of the 2nd

22     Krajina corps in July 1995?

23        A.   Yes.  Naval Captain Beara did come to the zone of responsibility

24     of the corps.  At that time it was either in mid-July or in the second

25     half of the month of July; I'm not sure.  I remember the instance very

Page 25058

 1     well because it was a few days prior to the fall of Glamoc and Grahovo.

 2        Q.   When was that?  When did that line fall?

 3        A.   Grahovo fell into the hands of the enemy on the 27th of July and

 4     Glamoc on the 28th of July.  So that is some -- there is one event that I

 5     tie to his arrival, and the second event was the fact that I took the

 6     opportunity given the dire situation in the zone of responsibility of the

 7     2nd Krajina Corps in the face of the attacks of the Croatian army on the

 8     one hand and the Muslim army on the other hand, and we also were exposed

 9     to the HVO attacks.  In other words, the situation on the frontline was

10     rather difficult.

11             And in the meantime, I had introduced upon the approval of the

12     corps commander the measures against a person from the corps command,

13     operative measures to be very precise, and that person had provided

14     confidential data to an unauthorized person, and that is why operative

15     measures were introduced against that person.

16             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could we please just

17     briefly go into closed session because I'm going to mention some names

18     that should not be mentioned in open session.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Nikolic.

20                           [Private session]

21    [Part of Private Session made public by order of Trial Chamber]

22    (redacted)

23    (redacted)

24    (redacted)

25        A.   First of all, I have to tell you that towards the end of 1994 and

Page 25059

 1     the beginning of 1995 was a very difficult period.  During that period,

 2     there was a lot of antagonism between MUP members and the military

 3     members, and that antagonism had been created by the then-politics of the

 4     SDS.  Because of this antagonism and conflicts, the normal flow of

 5     information had been interrupted between the intelligence and security

 6     organs and the MUP organs.

 7             You know, the rule was that information would flow vertically

 8     from me, or if you start with the corps brigade security administration

 9     and then added the level of the administration for security, the exchange

10     of information would be carried out.  While the relationship was good, we

11     at lower levels could also be involved in the exchange of information

12     with our peer services, which is normally provided for by the rules of

13     service of the security organ.

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 25060

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18                           [Open session]

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  We are in open session.

20             MR. NIKOLIC:

21        Q.   [Interpretation] Could we have P407 in e-court, please.  In the

22     B/C/S version, it's number 00909828; and in English, it's 00920112.

23             Mr. Mitrovic, I'll ask you to look at paragraph 31 of this

24     document.

25        A.   Excuse me, can this be moved?  Yes, thank you.  Very well.

Page 25061

 1        Q.   Well, now you've seen it and read it.  Was this the basis on

 2     which your measures were taken?

 3        A.   Yes, this was the basis in wartime.  You must bear in mind that

 4     it was war.

 5        Q.   And who did you inform of this?

 6        A.   Well, first I reported to the commander and the security

 7     administration.

 8        Q.   When reporting to your commander on the introduction of these

 9     measures, was Colonel Beara present?

10        A.   Well, you see, first I must emphasize that operative processing

11     was introduced before the arrival of Naval Captain Beara sometime in late

12     May or in June, and this processing was being done.  We asked for the

13     application of secret methods, and this was approved by the corps

14     commander because under the instructions on the methods -- implementation

15     of the methods and means of work, he is the authorised superior officer

16     mentioned in paragraph 17.  And as the situation at the front was very

17     difficult, I took this opportunity to inform Naval Captain Beara of the

18     overview of our work, and I asked him for guidance as to what should be

19     done next, first of all, because the situation at the frontline was very

20     difficult and we didn't have much time to deal with these -- or rather,

21     with this officer.  So we agreed to put him under control until the end

22     of the offensive and then to put a stop to this activity, which is what

23     we did sometime in September of that year.

24        Q.   Thank you.  We don't need this document anymore.  I'll put my

25     next question.

Page 25062

 1             Within the scope of these activities, was it your duty to

 2     regularly inform Colonel Beara for this.

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   On what basis?

 5        A.   Well, he was my superior along the professional line, and this

 6     was a counterintelligence problem and, of course, I had to do this.

 7        Q.   In the course of this conversation, you mentioned that the

 8     background of this whole case was a conflict between the Ministry of the

 9     Interior and the Army of Republika Srpska concerning the exchange of

10     important information.  My question is as follows:  How was the flow of

11     information regulated in that period?

12        A.   Well, you see, according to the rules of service of the security

13     organ, there is a chapter there dealing with relations with similar

14     services, services which are akin:  the MUP, the state security, and so

15     on and so forth.  So this wasn't optional.  It wasn't a discretionary

16     matter.  So it was the security administration or the security sector for

17     intelligence and security which exchanged information at the level of the

18     Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska.  At corps level, exchange

19     of information was conducted with public security centres and at brigade

20     level with local public security stations.  That's how it was regulated

21     in principle.

22        Q.   And what in particular was the conflict about?  Why did this

23     break out?

24        A.   Well, it was because of these false reports sent by individual

25     members of the state security - I won't say that they were all doing this

Page 25063

 1     - and also some members of the MUP, reports concerning the situation at

 2     the frontline.  I told their chiefs, please, feel free to come and ask

 3     for whatever information you are interested in; there's no reason for you

 4     to illegally visit the units, and this did occur, and then send reports

 5     which are not true, and then the officers are blamed.

 6             At the same time, individual members of the MUP said they didn't

 7     need officers, that they were educated to command brigades and other

 8     units.  These were people who had completed reserve officer training many

 9     years ago, and now they thought they were able to command the corps, I

10     ask you.

11        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, this conflict, was it ever resolved, and if so,

12     how?

13        A.   This activity was interrupted with the arrest of this person we

14     mentioned, and the filing of a criminal report and the submission of this

15     whole case to the military investigation organs.

16        Q.   And please tell me, when did this happen?  When was this conflict

17     concerning the exchange of information between these services which are

18     akin resolved, and when was the legal framework restored?

19        A.   Well, maybe I'm subjective, but this situation obtained until the

20     end of the war.  There were even situations where we were engaged in

21     combat together, and the separate MUP staff would be established, for

22     example, in Petrovci, and the corps command would be in Ostrelj, so

23     regardless of the fact that the MUP units were being used in the theatre

24     of war, which was the responsibility of the corps.

25        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, very briefly, please tell me:  In addition to your

Page 25064

 1     testimony today, did you ever have an interview with the OTP?

 2        A.   Yes.  In 2004 -- I think it was in June, in 2004 when I was

 3     interviewed by an investigator of this Tribunal.  The interview lasted

 4     for two days.  I can give you names if need be.  I had the status of

 5     suspect in the case against Ratko Mladic.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, could I check my

 8     notes, please.  Would it be convenient to take a break now, and then I'll

 9     be very brief after the break and round off my examination.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Of course, Mr. Nikolic.  We'll have a 25-minute

11     break now.  Thank you.

12                           --- Break taken at 3.39 p.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 4:11 p.m.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Ostojic -- Mr. Nikolic.

15             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  It won't

16     take long now.

17        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, let's try and clarify one thing.  When I asked you

18     about the arrival of Mr. Beara in the territory of the 2nd Krajina Corps,

19     could you be more specific and tell us:  When did he arrive, bearing in

20     mine the objective events such as the fall of the Glamoc and Grahovo

21     line?

22        A.   The most specific thing that I can tell you is that it was a few

23     days before the fall of Grahovo and Glamoc.  I remember that well for two

24     reasons as I've told you, but I wouldn't be able to give you the exact

25     date.

Page 25065

 1        Q.   And just one more thing:  Do you remember, how much time did

 2     Colonel Beara spend in the territory?

 3        A.   Given the situation on the frontline, he stayed at the corps

 4     command for just one day or several hours, not longer.  He did not have

 5     much time, and then he proceeded according to plan.

 6             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  Mr. President

 7     I have no further questions for this witness.  I would just like to add

 8     one more thing.  At one point we were in private session, and as I looked

 9     at the transcript we are of the opinion that not everything has to be in

10     private session from page 22, line 24, to page 23, line 12.  This is the

11     part that don't have to be in private session because they don't contain

12     any elements that would call for a private session.  At least that's our

13     opinion.  Thank you very much.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Do you agree to that, Mr. Thayer?

15             MR. THAYER:  I do, Mr. President.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Any of the other parties, judges?  All

17     right.  Okay.  So that part that you have indicated, Madam Registrar

18     would have certainly taken note of which pages and lines will no longer

19     remain in private session.

20             Yes.  Mr. Zivanovic, do you have a cross-examination?

21             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Yes, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Go ahead.

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Zivanovic:

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Mitrovic.

25        A.   Good afternoon.

Page 25066

 1        Q.   We have already met, but I will introduce myself for the record.

 2     My name is Zoran Zivanovic, and I represent Vujadin Popovic in this case.

 3     I would like to ask you, first of all, whether you know Vujadin Popovic?

 4        A.   Of course, I do.

 5        Q.   Can you please tell us since when have you known him, and how did

 6     you first meet him?

 7        A.   Your Honours, I know Mr. Vujadin Popovic, and I met him in Drvar

 8     when I first took the position that I have already spoken about, and for

 9     a while Vujadin Popovic was a desk officer in the department for security

10     and intelligence of the 2nd Krajina Corps.

11        Q.   If I understand you well, at the time you were his immediate

12     superior; wouldn't that be correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Could you tell us approximately, how long did he remain working

15     in the same department as you and where you were his superior?

16        A.   After my arrival in May 1992, he stayed until the moment the

17     Drina Corps was established.  At that moment, upon my proposal, given

18     that the be fact that he was a promising officer at the time who was

19     captain 1st class, Mr. Popovic was re-assigned to the Drina Corps in

20     order to take up the position of the chief of the intelligence and

21     security department in that corps because he hails from Vlasenici.  That

22     was one of the reasons.

23        Q.   While he worked in your department, in the security department in

24     Drvar, what was your impression of his professional qualities and

25     personal qualities that he displayed during his work?

Page 25067

 1        A.   I believe that at the time Mr. Popovic was captain 1st class.  He

 2     was a very responsible officer, very conscientious.  Whatever tasks he

 3     was entrusted with, he performed well in time and professionally correct.

 4     When I speak about him as a person, I have to say that he was -- he had a

 5     very good sense of humour.  He liked to sing and play instruments.

 6     Everybody liked him.  However, he was a professional, a very promising

 7     officer, and that's why I recommended him for promotion.

 8        Q.   While you were positioned in the 2nd Krajina Corps, were there

 9     any members of other ethnic groups in the 2nd Krajina Corps, i.e., people

10     who were non-Serbs or non-Montenegrins?

11        A.   Yes, there were.  There were quite a few such persons or

12     individuals.  For example, the commander of the command office was a

13     Muslim officer.  I can share his name with you if that would be of some

14     significance.

15        Q.   Maybe we can go into private session if that is necessary.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  If you want to go into private session, please

17     decide, Mr. Zivanovic, and I will --

18             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.  If we could, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's do that straightaway.  I think it will

20     simplify matters.

21                           [Private session]

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 25068

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15                           [Open session]

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  We are in open session, Mr. Zivanovic.

17             MR. ZIVANOVIC:

18        Q.   [Interpretation] And now I wanted to ask you this:  What was the

19     attitude of Vujadin Popovic towards these corps members who were of a

20     different ethnic group?  Did you notice anything unusual?  Did you glean

21     any intolerance towards members of others in the groups while you were

22     his superior?

23        A.   No, I did not see any such thing.  There was no intolerance, nor

24     did I expect Popovic to display any sign of intolerance because it's

25     simply not the person that he is.  He was a JNA officer, and it was only

Page 25069

 1     normal that we had people from all over the place in our midst.  In our

 2     units, there were people from all over Yugoslavia.

 3        Q.   And that attitude remained unchanged while he was a member of

 4     your unit?

 5        A.   Yes, you are right there.

 6        Q.   When you say that there were people of other ethnic groups in

 7     your unit, could you tell us whether that remained the fact until the end

 8     of the war, or was it only of one particular period?

 9        A.   These people remained on the strength of the corps until the end

10     of the war.

11             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [In English] Your Honour, thank you.

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Ms. Nikolic.

13             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I'll try

14     and complete my examination within the 15 minutes that I asked for, but I

15     would kindly ask the Trial Chamber to grant me a possible extension of

16     maybe 10 minutes or 15.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Madam Nikolic, your team has been extremely

18     cooperative, so please, go ahead.

19             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honour.

20                           Cross-examination by Ms. Nikolic:

21        Q.   Good afternoon, sir.  My name is Jelena Nikolic.

22        A.   Good afternoon.

23        Q.   I represent Mr. Drago Nikolic in this case.  I would like to ask

24     you something about the topics that you've already told us something

25     about during your testimony today.  It arises from your testimony that

Page 25070

 1     you spent your entire career working in the security organs?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   You have a very rich experience when it comes to the application

 4     of the rules of service of the security organs and working in security

 5     organs?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Judging from your testimony, the Army of Republika Srpska after

 8     the year 1992 fully adopted and implemented the rules of security organs

 9     and other rules from the previous JNA; wouldn't that be correct?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   In the meantime, in the course of 1994 and 1995, a document was

12     issued under the title "The Instruction Of the Main Staff."  The number

13     is P2741 in e-court, 2741, and this instruction regulates the issues of

14     command and control of the security organ.

15             Mr. Mitrovic, could you please look at that document.  You will

16     find the B/C/S version on the right-hand side of the screen.  As the

17     chief of security of the 2nd Krajina Corps, did you have an occasion to

18     see this document in the course of 1995?  Are you familiar with this

19     document?

20        A.   This document was indeed issued in 1994 and now -- as I'm reading

21     this instruction now, I remember it.  I know what the document is about.

22        Q.   Could you please pay attention to the first paragraph starting

23     with the words:  "Lately, frequent problems, failures, and irregularities

24     have been registered in command and control over the security organ."

25     And this instruction refers to these problems as the rationale for

Page 25071

 1     issuing this instruction.

 2             Do you know what problems and irregularities turned up in the

 3     command and control of the security organs in the Army of Republika

 4     Srpska in 1994?

 5        A.   Well, you see, in the preamble the reason is given why these

 6     instructions had to be compiled and sent to the lower-ranking units.

 7     There were irregularities in the manner in which command and control was

 8     exercised by individual commanders at various levels in relation to the

 9     security organs.  All I know is that the commanders often sent security

10     organs to perform tasks which were not part of their prescribed duties.

11     In the course of the war, the commander would often go and tell me to

12     bring back a unit from its position or to try and prevent people running

13     away from their positions or to go and disarm paramilitary units if they

14     turned up, and they did, in the zone of the corps, and so on and so

15     forth, and this was not our domain of work.

16             Also, there were certain commanders who designated security

17     organs to be on duty in the commands even though it was well known that

18     their stints of duty were to be within the security organ, not outside

19     it.  Further, there were commanders who opened mail even though they were

20     not authorised to do so, mail sent to the security organs.  There were

21     such things happening, and all this indicated that there were

22     irregularities in command and control in relation to the security organs.

23        Q.   Can you clarify why the commanders had limitations when it comes

24     to opening mail sent to the security organs in the units in which the

25     security organs were active?

Page 25072

 1        A.   Well, you see, first of all, it's not polite to open somebody

 2     else's mail - that's the first point - because every document received by

 3     the security organ was always sent to him personally.  It wasn't sent to

 4     the commander.  Why they did this, well, you should probably ask them,

 5     but they were not authorised to do so.

 6        Q.   And the correspondence, or rather, the communication that went

 7     along the professional line of the security organs, did it contain

 8     details from the counterintelligence work or other forms of work of the

 9     security organs?

10        A.   Most often, these were counterintelligence issues and also

11     overall security, so the issues in question were such that only the corps

12     commander would be informed of them.  Not brigade commanders, for

13     example, but I can clarify if you like.  There are certain situations

14     where a brigade commander would be informed by the security organ of

15     certain cases from the counterintelligence assessment.  This information

16     reflected the situation in the unit, in the area of responsibility, and

17     so on, and they could know about this.  But what was secret from the

18     level of the brigade commander, and this was prescribed by the rules, was

19     the application of secret methods of work.

20        Q.   Are you referring to Rule 153 in the methods of work?

21        A.   Well, it's defined in the instructions, yes.  The secret methods

22     are defined there and those that are not secret.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I now wish to show you another document.  Could we

24     have in e-court 7D576.  This is a document not from your unit, 17D176.  I

25     do apologise; the number in the transcript is wrong.  7DP176.  Thank you.

Page 25073

 1             This is a document which was not issued by your corps, but it

 2     illustrates precisely what you have just described.  Would you please

 3     look at the title.  It says:  "Warning Regarding Prevention of Leaking of

 4     Secret Information."  Please read this document silently to yourself just

 5     to see what it's about, and then I will put two or three questions to

 6     you.

 7        A.   Go ahead.

 8        Q.   According to your many years of experience as chief of the

 9     security organ, does this document show that all persons who come into

10     contact with secret information are duty-bound to give a written

11     declaration and to keep secret the information they have gleaned from

12     unauthorized opening of mail sent to the security organ?

13        A.   In this particular case, you can see that the brigade commander

14     opened mail addressed to the security organ, although he was not

15     authorised to do so, and according to the normal procedure he was

16     supposed to sign a written declaration stating that he would keep

17     confidential the information he had learned in this manner.  There were

18     instances where people opened mail sent to the security organ by

19     accident, and then they would sign the declaration.  This was the

20     procedure to be followed according to the rules.  Security organs also

21     have to sign a declaration that they will keep information confidential

22     when they are leaving the service, for example, or retiring, and so on.

23        Q.   Look at point 6 of this document, item 6.  You have explained to

24     us what the procedure was.  My question is the following:  Can this

25     letter or this warning be considered to be a disciplinary measure or a

Page 25074

 1     threat to the commander?

 2        A.   No, by no means.  It is only a warning asking him not to do this

 3     again.

 4        Q.   I'd like to go back to the document we discussed previously.

 5     Could we have again P2741 in e-court, please, page 1, item 2, second

 6     paragraph.  In item 2, second paragraph, can we have the B/C/S version.

 7     Can we scroll the B/C/S version, yes, so that Mr. Mitrovic can see it.

 8             In paragraph 2, it says that all members of these organs and

 9     services are authorised by law to act and work on tasks from their field

10     of work analogous to the authority of the members of the RS MUPs, state

11     security department.  Could you please tell us what this means, in fact?

12        A.   What this in fact means is that we perform the tasks of state

13     security in the army - that's the simplest explanation - and we are

14     authorised to do so.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Based on your years of experience, Mr. Mitrovic, can

16     you tell us -- you were the security organs.  If a security organ

17     violated the rules or the law, the commander of the unit he is in, does

18     he have the right to initiate procedure to have this chief of security

19     replaced?

20        A.   Yes, certainly, because he is his immediate superior.  Regardless

21     of the fact that he is a security organ, if he violates discipline or

22     commits a crime, he is not amnestied.

23        Q.   To the best of your knowledge, who monitors the professionalism

24     and lawfulness of the work of the security organ?

25        A.   Monitoring of professionalism and lawfulness is carried out by

Page 25075

 1     the superior in the security organ who monitors his subordinate organs.

 2     That's the basic principle.  And by your leave, I'd like to add in

 3     relation to what you asked me just before, the commander does have the

 4     right to ask for the dismissal, the replacement of the security organ.

 5             There was a situation, for example, in the Kupres brigade where

 6     the security chief and the commander fell in love with the same woman,

 7     and their mutual cooperation and relations became impossible, and the

 8     commander asked for the security organ to be transferred from his unit.

 9     He asked this of the corps commander, of course, and we did this so that

10     normal relations could be re-established.

11        Q.   Thank you.  When answering this question regarding the monitoring

12     of professionalism and lawfulness in the work of the security organ, as

13     we laypersons are a bit confused by this description, 80 percent and 20

14     percent of security and staff work respectively, so does the commander's

15     authority, or rather, the monitoring extend to the 20 percent, or is it

16     somebody else who does that?

17        A.   This figure in my view is there to tell commanders that security

18     organs should have time to do their work.  I'm referring primarily to

19     counterintelligence activity, and this is normal in wartime.  It's quite

20     normal, but how much 80 percent is, well, there are no working hours in

21     wartime.  You work day and night.  You are up at all hours, so it's very

22     hard to define this precisely.  The idea was to let the commanders know

23     that they should allow these people to do their work and give them fewer

24     tasks of other kinds.

25             You asked about the 20 percent.  Well, if these are staff

Page 25076

 1     security tasks you would do that in the command, and of course, the

 2     commander and all the members of the command can see what you are doing,

 3     and they know about it.

 4        Q.   In case of criminal or legal activities, police actions, who

 5     oversees the work of the organ?

 6        A.   Well, if we are talking about the -- I apologise to the

 7     interpreters.  I apologise to the Court.  All those jobs that you

 8     referred to are in the security organ's domain of work, and this is,

 9     again, something that is done immediately by the security organ's

10     superior officer.

11        Q.   I just want to go back to a question that I put slightly earlier.

12     I asked you, in the case that the security organ violates a law or

13     initiates a security measure, can the chief [as interpreted] initiate

14     measures against his security organ by bringing this problem up before

15     the superior command, let's say, from the corps to the staff or from the

16     brigade to the corps?

17        A.   Yes, of course.

18             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation]  I apologise.  My colleague has

19     just warned me that we have in the transcript on page 40, line 9, I think

20     that the question was:  "Can the commander initiate measures..." and in

21     the transcript it says "chief."  So can we just correct this?  Perhaps we

22     can listen to it again and have it corrected.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, can I reply?  The commander

24     can initiate even the replacement of the security organ if he is not

25     satisfied with his work, and he does that.  For example, if it's me, the

Page 25077

 1     corps commander can initiate this replacement towards the commander of

 2     the Main Staff or towards the chief of the security administration.

 3        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Mitrovic.  I have no further questions.

 4        A.   Thank you as well.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Mr. Lazarevic.

 6             MR. LAZAREVIC:  Your Honours, we have no cross-examination for

 7     this witness.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Ms. Fauveau?

 9             MS. FAUVEAU:  [Interpretation] Yes, Chairman.  Yes, Judge, we do

10     have questions.

11                           Cross-examination by Ms. Fauveau:

12        Q.   [Interpretation] You were talking about the relationships

13     existing between you and the security organ in the staff.  Is it true

14     that there were the exchange information between your organ in the 2nd

15     corps and the organ in the Main Staff responsible for security and

16     counterintelligence?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   I would like to show you the document.  This is Document 5D1192.

19     This is a document coming from the security and -- sector of the staff,

20     of the Main Staff.  Can we see the second page of this document.

21             You can see at the bottom of this document, we can see that this

22     document bears the name of Zdravko Tolimir, and right below we can see

23     that it was sent to the security and intelligence department of the 1st

24     Krajina Corps, the 2nd Krajina Corps, and the other corps of the

25     Republika Srpska.  Can you confirm that this document had actually been

Page 25078

 1     sent to your organ and your corps?

 2        A.   Most probably it was because in this dispatch you can see that

 3     it's going to the 2nd Krajina Corps.

 4        Q.   I now would like to know -- we can go back to page 1 of this

 5     document, but before we look at this document, can you tell me whether

 6     you had the information concerning smuggling in of weapons or oil in

 7     humanitarian assistance?

 8        A.   Yes, we did some -- have some indications of that.

 9        Q.   And I would like to read the first paragraph and the beginning of

10     the second paragraph of this document.  In this document, it is stated:

11     [In English] "With the help of international organisations, allies in the

12     west, and Islamic countries, the Muslims are continuing intensively to

13     import weapons, ammunition, and military equipment via Croatian

14     territory.  Under the guise of sending family packages, around 400

15     parcels, on 29 May a convoy was sent from Austria with ammunition and

16     military equipment for use by the 2nd corps of the so-called BH Army.

17     The transport has been organised by a certain Norwegian member of UNHCR

18     called Mak.  We have also noted that UNPROFOR is supplying the so-called

19     BH Army."

20             [Interpretation] Before we move on to another question, can you

21     confirm that your corps, the 2nd corps of the army in Bosnia, can you

22     confirm that your corps was actually -- had something to do with the

23     Bihac pocket?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   And the information mentioned here, because here we're talking

Page 25079

 1     about the 2nd corps of the army, the BH Army, but did you have similar

 2     information concerning the corps of the Bosnia or Herzegovina army which

 3     was in the Bihac pocket?

 4        A.   Yes, we did have some indications that supplies were being

 5     provided by land and air to the 5th corps of the B&H army.

 6        Q.   I would now like to show you a document.  This is Document

 7     5D1195.  This is a document from the armed forces of the Republic of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 5th corps.  You can see that at the top of the

 9     document.  Is it correct to say that the 5th corps was based in the Bihac

10     pocket?  We are talking about the 5th corps of the army of the Republic

11     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12        A.   Yes, throughout the war.

13        Q.   We can read right below the name of the person who wrote the

14     document.  We see what it's talking about, and we see that this is a

15     logistics report concerning the receipt of a shipment by UNHCR, and there

16     is an acronym, UBS.  Can you tell me what "UBS" means?

17        A.   This is the usual abbreviation for devices for killing.

18        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... items sent out and indicated

19     in this document, we realise that we are talking about weapons here,

20     right?  Do you agree with that?

21        A.   Yes, I agree.

22        Q.   I now would like to show you another document, 5D1196.  This is a

23     document coming from the Bosnia-Herzegovina embassy in Croatia, which was

24     sent out to the 5th corps.  Do you agree with that, the 5th corps of the

25     BH Army?

Page 25080

 1        A.   Yes, yes.  That's what it says in the document.

 2        Q.   And here, again, we can see that the items mentioned here are

 3     weapons, actually?

 4        A.   Correct.

 5        Q.   And right at the bottom of this page, can we see the bottom of

 6     the page in English?  Actually, it's the second page in the English

 7     version.  Excuse me.  So right at the bottom of this page in the B/C/S

 8     version, we can see that the truck bears the number UNHCR 10379.  From

 9     the information you had in your job, did you ever hear that the UNHCR is

10     -- that this organisation transported these weapons and was responsible

11     for smuggling weapons or oil?

12        A.   Yes, there were indications of that.  Specifically, I heard that

13     the ammunition was packed in sardine cans and so on.  I said that this

14     was also done by air; things were dropped by a parachute in wooden

15     crates.  This is how ammunition and other equipment was delivered.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers please be asked not to

17     overlap.

18             MADAM FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   [Previous translation continued] ... 97.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Madam Fauveau, in fact you were overlapping.  If

21     you could together with the witness please try to avoid it as much as you

22     can.  Even though you are not speaking the same language, still, it's a

23     problem.

24             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'll pay attention to that.

25        Q.   Can we now show the witness Document 5D1197.  Earlier on, you

Page 25081

 1     told us that you did have indications about smuggling, weapon-smuggling.

 2     This is another document from the Embassy of the Republic of the BH in

 3     the Republic of Croatia as sent to the 5th corps, and in this document we

 4     can see that -- at the very beginning of this document we can read:  [In

 5     English] "The Bihac district office has sent 70 tonnes of D-2 fuel from

 6     the 5th corps from the ARBH Army of the Republic of Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina fuel contingent.  Transport is carried out by UNHCR."

 8             [Interpretation] Did you also get some information about

 9     fuel-smuggling?

10        A.   We did have indications that this was also done with oil, and you

11     know that fuel is a strategic material or asset in wartime.

12        Q.   My colleague reminded you that you had an interview with the --

13     in the Prosecutor's Office in 2004, and I would like to read you an

14     excerpt from this interview.  It's Document 5D1193, page 83.  In this

15     interview, amongst other things you mentioned the signature on the

16     military documents.  You explained who signs these document, who has the

17     authority to sign these documents, and how they are signed.  And you

18     said:  [In English] "You can sign, you know, the everyday report,

19     everyday documents, combat reports, and staff.  You can sign that for

20     someone.  But if these documents were more important, if you were talking

21     about operations, about directives, about orders for the attack or

22     defence, then, you know, the Commander couldn't be absent.  So he would

23     then sign himself."

24             [Interpretation] Based on what you said, could we conclude that

25     all documents are not as important as the daily -- the everyday documents

Page 25082

 1     sent from one unit to the others are not necessarily as important as

 2     orders concerning a specific operation?

 3        A.   Yes, that is correct.  Depending on what I said on that interview

 4     and based on what you've said, daily reports, combat readiness that was

 5     -- that were dispatched, if -- or for example, the daily report sent from

 6     my organ to the security administration if I was absent, this report

 7     could be signed by my deputy.  But what you asked about documents, orders

 8     to execute some kind of combat assignment or an operation, defence

 9     operation or an attack, equally, then the person had to be the commander

10     in this case.  He could not be absent from the unit while his unit was

11     getting ready to go off into battle or preparing to execute an operation.

12        Q.   I have another question for you.  Did you have any information --

13     or do you know whether President Karadzic sometimes gave orders directly

14     to the corps without going through the Main Staff?

15        A.   Yes, yes.  I'm familiar with such situations.  I will give you an

16     example, when Karadzic ordered General Talic to begin the Prsten, ring,

17     operation in the Posavina, and the Main Staff was not informed about the

18     operation and that it would begin.  I remember that because my corps at

19     that time was denied the ammunition that was essential to us, which Talic

20     took for himself and used in that operation ring, Prsten.

21             There were also -- there was also talk that General [as

22     interpreted] Karadzic was issuing orders to General Milosevic in the

23     Sarajevo-Romanija corps.  Yeah, there were examples.

24             MADAM FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I believe there's a mistake in

25     the transcript.  On page 12 [as interpreted] we can read "General

Page 25083

 1     Karadzic," but I don't believe that the witness stated that.  He only

 2     said Karadzic, I believe, right?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU:  [Interpretation] We are talking about page 46, line

 5     12.

 6        Q.   Thank you very much, sir.  I have no further questions for you.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Krgovic?

 9                           Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic:

10        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon.  Mr. Mitrovic, my name is Dragan

11     Krgovic.  On behalf of the Defence team, I'm going to ask you a few

12     questions about some things that you've already spoken about today.  Mr.

13     Mitrovic, you have spoken at great length about the work of your organ

14     and the way things functioned in your corps.

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   If I ask you about the Main Staff and the relationship between

17     certain people in the Main Staff and how they exchange information, you

18     could only answer by assumptions?

19        A.   I agree because I never worked in the Main Staff.

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Krgovic please come closer to the

21     microphone.  It's practically impossible to hear him.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Krgovic, we have the same problem as yesterday.

23     I don't know how I can help you more than mentioning it.  You need to

24     come closer to the microphone, please.  Thank you.  The microphone can't

25     come up any further.  No, it's fixed.  Okay.

Page 25084

 1             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, what you have spoken about today mostly concerns

 3     the principles of work in the corps and its subordinated units,

 4     especially in your corps?

 5        A.   Yes.  That was my level.

 6        Q.   I wanted to ask you this.  In answering my friend Nikolic's

 7     questions, you have also spoken about combat activities in the summer of

 8     1995 in the western part of the frontline in the zone of responsibility

 9     of your corps.  Do you remember when combat was launched, i.e., when the

10     Muslim-Croat forces launched their attack in the zone of responsibility

11     of your corps?

12        A.   I wouldn't be able to give you the precise date.  I know that the

13     preparations started sometime towards the end of July -- June, and if

14     we're talking about the Glamoc axis, members of the Croatian army took

15     Mali Sator feature, which is the most dominant feature near Glamoc.  As

16     of the end of June, the intercity of the operations stepped -- was

17     stepped up for the rest of the month and culminated with the fall of the

18     part of the territory that we have already mentioned.

19        Q.   Given the critical situation in the zone of responsibility, did

20     officers of the Main Staff arrive in the zone of responsibility of your

21     corps in the period leading up to the fall of Glamoc and around the fall

22     of Glamoc?

23        A.   Yes.  Members of the Main Staff did come to the zone of

24     responsibility, and I can even give you their names if you want me to do

25     so.

Page 25085

 1        Q.   Yes.

 2        A.   I'll give you those that I can remember.  There was General

 3     Jovica Maric, who hails from Glamoc, so he had some personal interest in

 4     the territory.  There was also General Tolimir who was there for awhile.

 5     He hails from Glamoc.  General Gvero also came.  He hails from Mrkonic

 6     Grad.  General Zivorad Ninkovic, also from Glamoc, also came; and General

 7     Milovanovic was at the forward command post of the Main Staff, needless

 8     to say.

 9        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, I am interested in a very concrete issue.  During

10     the time surrounding the fall of Glamoc and Grahovo, did you see General

11     Gvero in the zone of responsibility of your corps?

12        A.   I saw General Gvero around the fall of Glamoc; to be more

13     precise, on the 28th of July.  He arrived together with General Jovica

14     Maric.  Why do I remember this?  The Croatian air force was opening fire

15     on our positions around that time, and they attacked with chemical

16     weapons, and there were dozens of members of the Glamoc brigade who

17     suffered the effects of the chemical weapons that the Croats used.  The

18     two generals, Maric, who was the chief of the air force in the Main

19     Staff, and General Gvero to raise the morale of the fighters and the

20     people had who had been chased from their homes arrived in the zone of

21     responsibility of our corps.

22        Q.   Could you please repeat the position of General Maric because it

23     hasn't been recorded properly in the transcript.

24        A.   The chief of the air force of the Army Republika Srpska in the

25     Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.  I believe that was the

Page 25086

 1     official title of his position.

 2        Q.   And can you please repeat the date when you saw the two generals?

 3        A.   It was on the 28th of July.

 4        Q.   That was the day when Glamoc fell?

 5        A.   Yes.  That's when the enemy forces entered Glamoc and when our

 6     units left Glamoc.

 7        Q.   I apologise; did you say that in your previous answer, as well,

 8     because it wasn't recorded properly the first time around.

 9        A.   Yes, this is what I said.

10        Q.   Can the witness please be shown Exhibit 6D306.

11             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is a translation

12     of the original, which is in English.  We have the sufficient number of

13     photocopies of our draft translation.  I would kindly ask the usher to

14     distribute these among the Prosecutor, the Trial Chamber.  The official

15     translation is still pending.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter apologises.  The original is in

17     B/C/S, and the translation is in English.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Go ahead.

19             MR. KRGOVIC:

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Mitrovic, this is a document which you sent

21     to the Main Staff in December 1995.  Does this document describe the

22     event that you have just spoken about?

23        A.   Yes, this is my report, i.e., a report of the security organ

24     describing precisely the events that I have just described, i.e., the

25     chemical agents that were used on that day.

Page 25087

 1        Q.   Do you remember the time of day when you saw General Gvero on

 2     that day?

 3        A.   It was during the day, while it was still light, but I can't tell

 4     you exactly when it was.

 5        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, we are talking about two different dates.  On the

 6     27th of July, chemical agents were used; and then on the following day,

 7     you saw General Gvero on the 28th?

 8        A.   Yes, on the following day when the enemy forces entered Glamoc

 9     and when our units together with the civilian population left Glamoc, on

10     the 28th of July.

11        Q.   And where did you encounter General Gvero?

12        A.   I believe that it was in the village of Kovacevici, after Glamoc,

13     on the road from Glamoc towards Mlinista and Baraci.  This is where the

14     command of the third Serbian brigade was, at least for awhile.

15        Q.   Did you see the car that General Gvero arrived in, if you can

16     remember?

17        A.   Well, I'm sorry.  I don't.  I suppose that he arrived in a Jeep

18     or something.  I don't know.

19        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, at that time in July 1995, how long would it take

20     to travel distance from Banja Luka to Han Pijesak by car?

21        A.   Again, I could only give you my assumption or my estimate.

22        Q.   If you were to take that journey from Banja Luka to Han Pijesak,

23     how long would it have taken you at that time?

24        A.   I did the journey just once during the war.  I was in our Main

25     Staff only once, and I believe that it would have taken about eight hours

Page 25088

 1     approximately.  I really don't know.  It's very difficult for me to say

 2     because -- well, I can't be any more precise because the roads at that

 3     time were different than they are now.  Things have changed.  The

 4     intensity of the traffic was not the same.

 5        Q.   And from Banja Luka to Ostrelj, how long would it take?

 6        A.   From Banja Luka to Ostrelj, about two to two and a half hours,

 7     approximately, and Mlinista is a bit further than that.

 8        Q.   Do you know where General Gvero left after this event, if you

 9     know, of course?  Did anybody tell you anything about that?

10        A.   I believe that General Gvero went in the direction of Mlinista

11     and Baraci because that's where the OG was and those were the next

12     positions of the Army Republika Srpska after the fall of Glamoc.

13        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Mitrovic.  I have no further questions for you.

14        A.   Thank you.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Krgovic.  Mr. Haynes.

16             MR. HAYNES:  Just a few question.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Please go ahead.

18                           Cross-examination by Mr. Haynes:

19        Q.   Mr. Mitrovic, when you were chief of security at the corps level,

20     did you have a deputy?

21        A.   I did have a deputy, yes.

22        Q.   And did you have other people who were subordinate to you, who

23     answered to you?

24        A.   In the security department, I had subordinated desk officers who

25     answered to me.

Page 25089

 1        Q.   Did you ever have occasion to speak to any of your subordinated

 2     officers about the way in which they were doing their job?

 3        A.   Every day.  We analysed our work every day.  Every day, we had

 4     meetings to discuss our further steps.

 5        Q.   And if you ever considered that one of your subordinated officers

 6     wasn't doing his job properly, did you have him into your office to speak

 7     to him about that?

 8        A.   Yes, that's precisely what I would do.

 9        Q.   And if you thought he was not doing his job properly, did you

10     warn him about the performance of his job and how he was to do it in the

11     future?

12        A.   Yes.  We would have a conversation, and I would warn him about

13     things, and I would provide him with my remarks about his work.

14        Q.   And would you not regard that as being a way of disciplining that

15     officer?

16        A.   No, I wouldn't.  A disciplinary procedure is something that is

17     provided for by the rules and regulations of service in the JNA, and

18     these rules envisage disciplinary measures, and what you are talking

19     about and what I'm talking about would have been just a conversation

20     during which the officer would receive caution of sorts.

21        Q.   I see.  Did you ever have occasion in which you had to decide

22     whether one of your subordinated officers had broken the law or not?

23        A.   I don't remember any such situation.

24        Q.   But would you agree that another way of describing having to

25     decide whether somebody has broken the law or not is monitoring the

Page 25090

 1     legality of their work?

 2        A.   I would agree, yes.

 3        Q.   And would you also agree that if somebody has the exclusive right

 4     to do something, it means they are the only person who is permitted to do

 5     it?

 6        A.   I am afraid I don't know what you are referring to.

 7        Q.   Well, what do you understand by the word "exclusive"?

 8        A.   I use the word myself when I spoke about the command in and

 9     control over security organs, and I said that unit commanders were

10     exclusively superior to the security organs in their own units, if you

11     will.

12        Q.   Well, we'll move on.  You've probably answered the question in a

13     roundabout way.

14             Just one other thing.  During the course of your work, did you

15     ever use human sources of intelligence, sometimes called "informants"?

16        A.   It is the obligation of the security organ to create

17     collaborators with the security service, so the answer is, yes, I did.

18     But these are not people to whom a derogatory term should be applied.

19        Q.   I didn't intend to apply a derogatory term to them if that's how

20     it sounded through translation, but were some of these collaborators

21     encouraged to give information by being given money?

22        A.   There were different motives out of which people agreed to

23     cooperate with the security organs ranging from patriotism to money, as

24     you say.  The motive's different from one person to another, depending on

25     the character and the significance of the person for the security organs.

Page 25091

 1     To put it more precisely, whether that person had access to information

 2     or not, that's what we were concerned about.

 3        Q.   So were you involved in your service in paying money to

 4     informants, cash?

 5        A.   As a rule, I was not involved in such a situation, but we might

 6     have paid the travel expenses of these informers if they had to travel to

 7     a certain place where the meeting or the contact would take place.

 8        Q.   So did your service keep an amount of cash somewhere?

 9        A.   The service had a certain amount of money in cash for expenses.

10     In peacetime this would be approved by the army commander, and this money

11     for expenses was used for per diem payments to security organs if they

12     had to travel and to cover operative expenses.  If you, for example,

13     invite a collaborator to lunch, you can't expect him to pay.  You pay,

14     and you have to justify the expense by a valid financial document, a bill

15     or receipt or such like, or a cheque.

16        Q.   And was that the position in wartime?

17        A.   In wartime, I never had expense money.  There was none available.

18        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Just one other thing.  You told us about a

19     love triangle between a brigade commander and his chief of security.  Can

20     you give us an example of a chief of security ever being sacked by a

21     brigade commander?

22        A.   I did not have such an example in the 2nd Krajina Corps.  A

23     brigade commander cannot sack him, but he can suggest that this person

24     should no longer perform duties in the security organ of the Brigade.

25             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you very much.

Page 25092

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Haynes.  Yes, Mr. Thayer, there's

 2     still time before the break.

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Thayer:

 4             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good afternoon, Your

 5     Honours.  Good afternoon, everyone.

 6        Q.   Good afternoon, sir.

 7        A.   Good afternoon to you, too.

 8        Q.   My name is Nelson Thayer, and I'll be asking you some questions

 9     on behalf of the Prosecution.

10        A.   Yes, please go ahead.

11        Q.   During the war, Colonel, were you a member of any political

12     party?

13        A.   During the war, I was not a member of any political party.

14        Q.   So not a member of SDS or the radicals?

15        A.   Never, no.

16        Q.   And before the war when you were in the JNA, you were a member of

17     the communist party, the Communist Alliance of Yugoslavia; is that

18     correct?

19        A.   Yes, I was.

20        Q.   And that was the norm for JNA officers, was it not?

21        A.   It was the norm, yes.

22        Q.   And can you tell the Trial Chamber how common it was for a JNA

23     officer not to have been a member of the communist party?

24        A.   There were such officers, but a small number.

25        Q.   And I think as you put it in your interview with the OTP back in

Page 25093

 1     2004, that was simply the world you were living in at the time; is that

 2     fair to say?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Now, we've heard from you today testimony about the friction or

 5     conflict that developed between the army on the one hand and the state

 6     security services and MUP on the other, you said, towards the end, I

 7     think, of 1994, 1995.

 8        A.   Yes, that's what I said.

 9        Q.   Now, during the war, sir, there was a conflict that developed

10     between the leadership of the political parties, for example, the SDS and

11     the Radical party, as well as the political leadership of the Republika

12     Srpska on the one hand and members of the VRS on the other.  Do you

13     recall that, sir?

14        A.   Yes.  You are probably referring to September 1993 when you

15     mentioned the SDS and the Radical party.  That was when manipulation of

16     part of the units of the Army of Republika Srpska in Banja Luka occurred.

17     They were dissatisfied, and rightly so, with their personal situation at

18     the time, and it later transpired that the aim of this whole action was

19     an attack on some soldiers.  However, the slogan was, let's fight against

20     war profiteers, against people who grow rich, but in the end these

21     soldiers arrested certain officers.  It was a rebellion of sorts, an

22     uprising of sorts in the Army of Republika Srpska.  I don't know if

23     that's what you were referring to when you put your question.

24        Q.   Well, that's partially what I'm referring to.  The conflict or

25     friction, however you want to put it, between the political leadership of

Page 25094

 1     Republika Srpska on the one hand and the army of the Republika Srpska, in

 2     particular its JNA-trained officer corps, that continued after 1993; is

 3     that correct, sir, after the September 1993 incident that you described.

 4        A.   I agree with you, yes.  This antagonism or this conflict

 5     escalated towards the end of the war.  I don't want to prejudge things,

 6     but on the one hand you had the army, which was quite impoverished and

 7     which was fighting every day, and on the other hand you had the civilian

 8     leadership, people who were in the then-ruling party who took advantage

 9     of the war to enrich themselves personally, and this situation went on

10     throughout the war but especially in the period I mentioned.

11             Of course, it was quite natural that there should be

12     dissatisfaction and that a conflict should arise.  It went so far that

13     humanitarian aid which arrived, for example, from Serbia, was sold by

14     these people.  They were members of the SDS, to make it quite clear.

15     They were representatives of municipal organs, so they were deputies in

16     the assembly and so on.  For a time, there was even a situation where

17     members of the municipal leadership of the SDS could not be mobilised,

18     and that gave rise to conflicts as well; or you had situations where

19     Karadzic ordered that from every municipal SDS, five SDS members were to

20     be designated, and they had to be taken into the state security service,

21     regardless of the fact that they knew nothing about the work of the

22     service.

23             I'm just trying to illustrate, but there were many other

24     situations which all led to a conflict.  There was an assembly meeting,

25     which I did not attend, where all this escalated into an open conflict.

Page 25095

 1        Q.   And as the conflict intensified, and putting aside the war

 2     profiteering for a moment, the conflict had a significant political

 3     element to it, as well; wouldn't you agree?

 4        A.   I agree, yes.

 5        Q.   The political leadership or politicians in the VRS -- I'm sorry,

 6     in the Republika Srpska would refer to officers of the army as "commies"

 7     or "reds" or "the red guards"; is that correct?

 8        A.   That's correct.  I personally was called those names.  I was

 9     called a commie.  But I'll tell you something interesting:  Some of these

10     SDS leaders had previously been members.  For example, Dragan Karadzic

11     had been a member of the central committee of the communist party, and he

12     was not called a commie, but I was, and I was just a rank and file member

13     of the party.  So that was absurd, you know.

14        Q.   And in your experience, those types of terms were used quite

15     liberally against members of the VRS; is that correct, sir?

16        A.   If you are referring to terms such as "commies," "red guards,"

17     "reds," that was the usual terminology they used, yes.

18        Q.   And in fact, Colonel, basically any former JNA officer could be

19     the target of such abuse in your experience; is that correct?

20        A.   Well, you know what?  Basically, it is correct, but there were

21     officers who immediately became close to that party and those organs, and

22     they were not targeted.  But I was not among them.

23        Q.   And in your experience, sir, the security organs came in for

24     particular abuse along those lines in terms of being branded or called

25     "commies" and "reds" and "red guards" and such; is that correct?

Page 25096

 1        A.   Yes, they among others.  Karadzic even introduced the term "5th

 2     column" or "6th column."  I'm not sure.

 3        Q.   And can you tell the Trial Chamber why you think the security

 4     organs were singled out for that type of attitude on President Karadzic's

 5     behalf?

 6        A.   Your Honours, I can say that one of the reasons, certainly, was

 7     that the security organs made efforts to prevent crime, to prevent

 8     smuggling and black marketeering, to prevent the unlawfulness of the work

 9     of those organs, which was evident.  There was a situation where a

10     security organ from the Sarajevo-Romanija corps arrested Krajisnik's

11     brother as a criminal, and Krajisnik was a high-ranking official.  On the

12     other hand, he had Karadzic's approval to import fuel without paying

13     taxes or duties, and they all had that, practically.  Also, there was a

14     situation when Sanski Most was about to fall in 1995.  It was on the

15     point of falling, and the-then president of the municipality - he was

16     most likely an SDS president, as well - issued approval for electrical

17     appliances practically looted from houses to be used, well, for the

18     Defence of Republika Srpska.  That's absurd.

19             So what I'm trying to say is -- well, that's what I understood

20     you to ask, anyway.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  I think you have understood me, Mr. Thayer.  It's

22     time to have the break.  25 minutes.  Thank you.

23                           --- Recess taken at 5.45 p.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 6.14 p.m.

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Thayer.

Page 25097

 1             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 2        Q.   Good evening, sir.

 3        A.   Good evening to you, too.

 4        Q.   Just a couple more questions along this line, and then I'm going

 5     to move on to a different subject.

 6             In your experience, during this period in which the animosity

 7     that you felt directed from the political leadership of the Republika

 8     Srpska increased towards the army, did you understand that - again,

 9     putting war profiteering to the side - also to be as a result of the

10     particularly high political leadership in the Republika Srpska's belief

11     that the power of the security organs of the army, whether that power was

12     real or perceived by President Karadzic, presented a threat to him and

13     the high political leadership in the Republika Srpska?  I understand that

14     was a very long question.  Please, take your time to think it through.

15     If I need to rephrase it, I will, but please take your time in answering

16     that question.

17        A.   From my point of view, I can tell you that we were never a threat

18     to the political leadership of Republika Srpska, nor we ever considered

19     being one at all.  The complete military and the security organs had just

20     one focus, and that was war, unlike some members of the political

21     leadership.

22             The problems were mounting, and they were never dealt with, and

23     in addition to the problems that I've already spoken about, the problems

24     also reflected in the supplying of the troops, which did not function at

25     all, and in any normal state, in the state of war, this is a matter of

Page 25098

 1     the civilian authorities.  In our case, our unit commanders had to find

 2     their own means to get ahold of food, ammunition, clothes.

 3             All I'm saying is that they spent most of their time thinking

 4     about dealing with the logistics problems and less thinking about combat.

 5     In other words, we were never a threat.  We took measures against those

 6     members of the SDS, and I don't mean to speak in general terms because

 7     there were some very commendable people there who were engaged in crime,

 8     who deserted from the front lines, and we did that in our own respective

 9     zone of responsibility, and this at one point culminated.

10             And there was another thing that needs to mentioned.  Certain

11     local warlords were against the army, and they were permanently making

12     efforts to create their own little armies that would be under their

13     command, just like the situation was at the very beginning of the war

14     when the Territorial Defence units and MUP units were under their

15     command.

16             I'm really not privy any -- to indicia to the effect that we were

17     a threat to them.  We just wanted everybody to do their own job and to

18     put an end to criminal activities.  They also had the state security

19     service and MUP organs under their control, and of course, they had the

20     military.

21        Q.   Let me just follow up on that, if I may, Colonel.  I understand

22     what you're telling the Trial Chamber in terms of where you were coming

23     from, as it were, as a member of the security organs.

24             My question is, did you ever understand based on what was being

25     said from the Republika Srpska political leadership that they perceived

Page 25099

 1     that the security organs of the army presented a threat to their power?

 2     Whether or not that was your intent, like I said, whether it was real or

 3     perceived on the part of the political leadership, was it ever your

 4     understanding that that was also a component of this increasing friction?

 5        A.   I know nothing about that.  I don't know whether they considered

 6     the security organs a threat, whether they were intimidated by them.  I

 7     suppose that they were because we were the ones who tried to curb some

 8     activities, and as far as the leadership is concerned, I really don't

 9     know of any measures being taken against them.  They were independent in

10     every possible way.

11        Q.   And despite the -- this friction in 1994 and 1995 and the

12     cessation of horizontal communication between yourself, for example, and

13     your counterpart in the state security service or the MUP, despite that

14     horizontal sharing of information which you said stopped at a particular

15     time, it's the case that vertically, at the very top, there was

16     communication between General Tolimir and Dragan Kijac, correct?

17        A.   Most probably.  That's how things should have been.

18        Q.   And I believe as you told the investigators in Banja Luka in

19     2004, that information that they shared, if the VRS deemed it worthy,

20     would then get transmitted to President Karadzic?

21        A.   Yes.  That is correct.  There was a line of communication with

22     the Supreme Commander, and through the Main Staff he was informed about

23     all the information that was obtained by the security services of the

24     Army Republika Srpska.

25        Q.   And it was General Tolimir's duty or his responsibility to ensure

Page 25100

 1     that relevant or important information, when it was deemed such by the

 2     security organs, would be transmitted to the Supreme Commander President

 3     Karadzic, despite whatever the conflict was between the political

 4     leadership and the VRS.  Is that also fair to say, sir, based on your

 5     experience?

 6        A.   I believe that this is correct.  That line of communication still

 7     existed, but I can't be sure of that.  This is just my assumption.  I was

 8     never a member of the Main Staff.

 9        Q.   I understand, sir, that you were never actually serving on the

10     Main Staff.  I'm asking you based on your experience in the army, based

11     on your work with General Tolimir, based on everything that you observed,

12     that's the basis upon which I'm asking for your answer.

13        A.   Yes, I understand what you are saying.  I believe that this

14     communication went on because fighting the enemy was something that went

15     beyond the frictions and mutual misunderstandings.

16        Q.   And again, based on your work with General Tolimir, your

17     observations of General Tolimir, that communication, for example, from

18     General Tolimir to General Karadzic would have been one that was

19     respectful, that would have been done properly according to military

20     discipline; is that correct?

21        A.   I believe so.  I believe that you can put it that way because

22     that's how things functioned, I suppose.

23        Q.   Now, sir, in the about 15 minutes or so that we've got left, I

24     want to go back a couple of years before the war, and I'm sorry to do

25     this to you at the end of the day, but I want to get some dates firm in

Page 25101

 1     the record and ask you some questions about some of the command

 2     relationships that obtained pre-war and just at the beginning of the war,

 3     and then we can start fresh again tomorrow.

 4             When you were assigned to the Sibenik garrison in the 8th

 5     maritime sector, Colonel Beara was one of your superiors, you testified,

 6     correct?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Now, it's been translated differently in your 2004 interview from

 9     today, and I just want the record to be a little clearer.  Was he the

10     assistant chief of the security organ at that time or the deputy chief of

11     security, just so the record is clear.

12        A.   According to our establishment, the assistant chief of security

13     is also his deputy.  That's how it has been defined by the establishment

14     books, similarly to the fact that a chief of staff of a unit is also the

15     deputy commander, and that's the analogy of the matter.

16        Q.   And that was for the naval military district, correct, sir?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Just briefly, could you describe for the Trial Chamber what

19     geographic area that district encompassed?

20        A.   Your Honours, the naval military district encompassed the entire

21     territory of the Adriatic Sea, which belonged to the former state of

22     Yugoslavia.  This implies all of the islands, peninsulas, and in the

23     depth of the territory, the area from, let's say, Pula to Balka [phoen],

24     Kotorska, or even further down to Ulcinj.  This is where the navy units

25     of the JNA were deployed.

Page 25102

 1        Q.   Okay.  And just to define terms, is "military maritime district"

 2     --

 3             THE INTERPRETER: [French spoken]

 4        A.   I also defined the military naval district.  It was a unit of the

 5     JNA, which stood side by side with the army, the land army.  It was one

 6     branch of the JNA.

 7        Q.   Okay.  I'm sorry if I threw you off there, sir.  I started to get

 8     French interpretation in my ear, and I think maybe some other folks did

 9     as well.  Let me just -- so there's no confusion on the record, is the

10     term "military maritime district" the same as "naval district"?  That's

11     the simple question.

12        A.   A military naval district is a military unit, and this does not

13     imply a territorial area but a military area or a military definition

14     thereof.  Just like you have the army as a branch of the military

15     referring to the infantry, you also have a naval district, which implies

16     certain military units, and each of these military units had its zone of

17     responsibility in professional and military terms.  This is what I mean.

18        Q.   And how did the 8th maritime sector fit into the district?  Was

19     it a component of that district, I take it?

20        A.   The 8th maritime sector was a unit which was a part of the naval

21     military district, a unit which consisted of naval forces and infantry or

22     land forces.  In organisational terms, it was a unit of the naval

23     military district as a whole.

24        Q.   Okay.  And so just to be clear, when Colonel Beara was one of

25     your superior officers, he was assistant/deputy chief of the security

Page 25103

 1     organ for the district or for the sector?

 2        A.   District.

 3        Q.   And also while you were assigned to the 8th maritime sector, I

 4     think you testified that General Tolimir was also assigned there, and

 5     what exactly was his position at that time?

 6        A.   I did not testify that General Tolimir was in the sector.  He was

 7     in the naval military district if we are talking about the time when I

 8     first met him, which was sometime in 1985.  At the time, he was the chief

 9     of the counterintelligence group in the naval military district.  Later

10     on, he became the chief of the security department of the Knin corps.

11     That corps, as well, was one part of the naval military district.

12        Q.   Okay.  You mentioned during your evidence-in-chief that at this

13     time Beara was superior to Tolimir.  Can you just explain to the Trial

14     Chamber how -- why that was?

15        A.   Well, I just said that Tolimir was the chief of the

16     counterintelligence group at the time, and when he discharged those

17     duties his superior was Naval Captain Beara.  Later, when General Tolimir

18     was re-assigned to work in the 9th corps, again, Beara was his boss

19     because the 9th corps was also an element of the naval military district.

20        Q.   Okay.  So in other words, there's nothing unusual about that;

21     it's just the way it was?

22        A.   Yes.  That's how things were at the time.

23        Q.   And when did General Tolimir become security chief for the Knin

24     corps?  Do you remember?  Just the year would be enough.

25        A.   I can't tell you that because I don't remember the year.  I know

Page 25104

 1     that in 1991, or rather, in 1992 when I first joined the corps he was

 2     there.  I beginning that -- he was re-assigned at the beginning of war,

 3     but I'm sure that he was already there in 1992.  Actually, I'm sure that

 4     he was there towards the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992.

 5        Q.   And now, moving to the Main Staff, do you have any idea when

 6     General Tolimir moved to the Main Staff?  Just a year, again.

 7        A.   Again, I can't give you the exact date.  I suppose that this was

 8     at the moment when the Army Republika Srpska was first established.  I

 9     actually established a link; I put a link between these two events.

10        Q.   Okay.  So in any case, Colonel Beara arrived at the Main Staff

11     after General Tolimir?

12        A.   Correct.  That is correct, sir, yes.

13        Q.   Now, at some point, sir, the security organs were separated from

14     the intelligence organs.  Do you recall what year that was,

15     approximately?

16        A.   That was in the course of 1993.  That's when Naval Captain Beara

17     was appointed chief of the security administration.  Before that, there

18     was a vacancy for that position, and I believe that it was then that the

19     sector for intelligence and security was also established.  Up to then,

20     these two functions or positions were merged in the person of one organ.

21        Q.   And then subsequently, they were separated for the remainder of

22     the war?

23        A.   Yes.  How shall I put it?  I'm trying to find the right word, if

24     you will just bear with me.  They were separated, actually.  There was a

25     change in the structure of the intelligence and the security system of

Page 25105

 1     the Republika Srpska army.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Well, just to save a little time in the 20 minutes we've

 3     got left, before the two organs were separated, you told us that you

 4     remembered the following people being assigned as the security and

 5     intelligence department chiefs.  This is before they were separated.  In

 6     the 1st Krajina Corps, you recalled a person named Stevilovic, who was

 7     then succeeded by someone named Bogajevic.  Do you recall that, sir?

 8        A.   I have not received the full interpretation of your question,

 9     sir.  I'm sorry.

10        Q.   Okay.  We were having a staring contest, so I was wondering if

11     you had.  Do you recall telling us and identifying from your recollection

12     who the various security and intelligence department chiefs were before

13     they were separated?

14        A.   I remember.

15        Q.   And in the 1st Krajina Corps, you identified a -- someone named

16     Stevilovic, who was then succeeded by someone named Bogajevic.  Do you

17     remember that?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   You identified yourself in the 2nd Krajina corps, and in the

20     Sarajevo-Romanija corps, you identified Marko Lugonja.  Do you remember

21     that?

22        A.   I believe that this is down to misinterpretation.  You asked me

23     whether I remember that.  I named myself as the organ in the 2nd Krajina

24     Corps, and Lugonja, Marko, was in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, yes.

25        Q.   In the Eastern Bosnia corps, it was Milenko Todorovic, and in the

Page 25106

 1     Drina corps it was Vujadin Popovic?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And then when the split came, they all stayed as security chiefs,

 4     and other people took on the intelligence chief role.  Is that also

 5     correct?

 6        A.   Correct, yes.

 7        Q.   Now, as a corps command officer, you became familiar with members

 8     of the Main Staff command, is that fair to say, although you never served

 9     on the Main Staff.

10        A.   Yes.  I knew nearly all the generals who served on the Main Staff

11     and some colonels, of course.

12        Q.   And when you were asked during your interview about the origin of

13     the Main Staff, do you recall identifying the following officers, Main

14     Staff officers who came to your mind:  General Mladic, General

15     Milovanovic, General Tolimir, General Gvero, General Djukic, and General

16     Miletic?

17        A.   Yes, I remember that I said that.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the page of the interview

19     please be put on the screen.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Mr. Thayer.

21             MR. THAYER:  Sure.  It's page 20.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Page 20.

23             MR. THAYER:  But I don't have any further questions on this

24     issue, so...

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yeah, but maybe Madam Fauveau still wishes to see

Page 25107

 1     it.  All right.  Can we proceed?  Okay, we can proceed then.  Thank you.

 2             MR. THAYER:

 3        Q.   Now, with respect to Colonel Beara, you said in your interview

 4     with the OTP that since Colonel Beara used to be General Tolimir's boss

 5     and since Colonel Beara knew General Mladic, it was only natural that he

 6     became involved in the Main Staff activities.  Do you remember telling us

 7     that?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   What can you tell the Trial Chamber about the relationship

10     between Colonel Beara and General Mladic?

11        A.   I think that General Mladic and Colonel Beara knew each other

12     from the military naval district because General Mladic was for a time

13     the Chief of Staff of the Knin Corps, which was part of the military

14     naval district, and later on he was the commander of that corps.  I think

15     that their acquaintance started there.

16        Q.   And how would you describe the nature of their relationship in

17     terms of professionally and how they got along?  Can you give the Trial

18     Chamber some more idea of the depth, nature of that relationship?

19        A.   Your Honours, it was a superior/subordinate relationship before

20     everything else.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Nikolic.

22             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] I think this calls for speculation.

23     How could the witness know about the relations between two other men?

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Of course, he could.  If he doesn't, he will tell

25     us.  I mean ... Yes.  In any case, you had started giving your answer

Page 25108

 1     saying that it was a superior subordinate relationship before everything

 2     else, and then after that, what was it?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour.  I

 4     consider that their relationship was primarily of that nature in their

 5     contacts.  As to their personal relationship, I assume it was good, but

 6     whether or not they were friends and so on, I couldn't tell you.  I

 7     think, however, that they were on good terms.

 8             MR. THAYER:

 9        Q.   And how about the relationship, and the same questions as I've

10     just been asking you, between Colonel Beara and General Tolimir?

11        A.   Well, for a time Naval Captain Beara was superior to Tolimir, and

12     in wartime it was the other way around.  They worked together in the

13     service for many years, and the fact that Tolimir became Beara's superior

14     I think did not impair their professional relationship.  Such things do

15     happen in the military, especially in wartime.  Tolimir was promoted

16     before Beara and appointed to that duty because he arrived before Beara

17     did.  Beara arrived later on, and he accepted the situation.  He accepted

18     the fact that Tolimir was now his superior.

19        Q.   And beyond that professional superior/subordinate relationship,

20     what can you tell the Trial Chamber about their personal relationship?

21        A.   To the best of my knowledge, their personal relationship was

22     correct, maybe even friendly.  In my contacts with both of them, I did

23     not notice any misunderstandings or anything that would disrupt their

24     relationship.

25        Q.   Now, I just want to show you a document and just ask you a quick

Page 25109

 1     question about it before we break, and if you know anything about the

 2     subject matter, please say so.  If you don't, that's okay as well.  May

 3     we have 65 ter 3516, please, and I can tell you this was seized from the

 4     Croatian Ministry of Defence in 1998.  And if we could look at page 6 of

 5     the document, please, in B/C/S.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Nikolic?

 7             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] We have an objection to this

 8     document because this is biographical data not supported by relevant

 9     documents.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Wait, wait, wait.  If you are going to give reasons

11     for your objection, you will -- particularly the kind of reasons that you

12     have just mentioned, I cannot let you say that or explain that in the

13     presence of the witness.  So we have two options.  Either we give the

14     pay-off to the witness and send him to the hotel, and we hear what you

15     have to say, and then we continue tomorrow; or else we adjourn until

16     tomorrow straightaway if you need consultation time.  It's up to you.

17             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] We can be very brief.  The witness

18     can leave, and we can put forward our arguments very briefly.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Could you kindly leave the courtroom,

20     please.

21             No, no.  He is leaving and just staying outside for the time

22     being because he said his intervention is very short.  It's 5 to -- I

23     mean, I think we can safely send him back.  One moment, go back.

24                           [Trial Chamber confers]

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Mr. Mitrovic, we are going to stop here for

Page 25110

 1     the day.  It has been very tiring for everyone, and I thank you very much

 2     for your patience with us.  We'll continue tomorrow in the afternoon.  In

 3     the meantime, have a good rest, and I'm sure we'll finish tomorrow within

 4     an hour or so.  Thank you.  You were also given an advisory not to

 5     discuss with anyone, not to talk to anyone or discuss with anyone the

 6     subject matter of your testimony between now and tomorrow.  It's a very

 7     strict order.

 8             He said something, but his microphone, is it switched on or

 9     switched off?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I understand your

11     warning, and I also wish you a good rest until tomorrow.

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Nikolic, very briefly, please.

15             MR. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  First of all, the OTP

16     has stated that this documentation was something they obtained in 1998,

17     but it was disclosed to us only when witness Medic testified, although

18     this documentation was not produced at the time.  So that's one

19     objection.

20             The second objection I wish to put forward is that in this

21     document there are incorrect details contrary to what witness Medic

22     testified about as an investigating judge concerning the detention of

23     Colonel Beara in connection with the incident we discussed when witness

24     Medic testified.  It would be logical for the OTP to adduce along with

25     this the documentation which will prove that the situation was the way

Page 25111

 1     it's described here.  There is documentation concerning this event, which

 2     in the course of the testimony of that witness we discussed here in this

 3     courtroom.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Thank you, Mr. Nikolic.  Mr. Thayer?

 5             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I --

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Do you need this document desperately, or can you

 7     use the information that you have in there without using the document?

 8     That's my first question to you.

 9             MR. THAYER:  I could quite literally just repeat the language

10     that's in the document.  I mean it's -- as I think I mentioned, it was

11     just one quick question about one paragraph on the second page about him

12     being picked up by -- personally by Generals Mladic and Tolimir on a

13     certain occasion.  I just wanted to ask if he knows anything about that.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  So anyway -- I mean, because that's my

15     hunch, but anyway, I will -- yes, Mr. Ostojic.

16             MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you.  Yeah, I know we're running out of time,

17     but we really object to the late disclosure.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  We are also -- not only running out of time, but we

19     are also violating the usual rule that one voice is enough.

20             MR. OSTOJIC:  And your exception --

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  But it's Monday, 7 o'clock in the evening, and you

22     have our permission.  Come on.

23             MR. OSTOJIC:  I have it as Tuesday, and thank you.

24     Mr. President, it's the late disclosure.  Ten years --

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Tuesday, sorry.

Page 25112

 1             MR. OSTOJIC:  -- ten years from when they seized the documents.

 2     Since we've been in on this case, they have not produced the document

 3     which clearly has Mr. Beara's name on it and his biography.  We would

 4     just like an explanation why we weren't given this document through the

 5     course of the trial as well as the pretrial phrase.  Thank you.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, but that's another matter.  It may not

 7     necessarily relate to its admissibility in evidence.

 8             So anyway, we'll let you fight this out between now and tomorrow

 9     morning and tomorrow afternoon, until which time we stand adjourned.

10     Thank you.

11                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

12                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day of

13                           September, 2008, at 2:15 p.m.