Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 25206

 1                           Thursday, 4 September 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The accused Miletic not present]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 2.22 p.m.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Good afternoon, everybody and to you, Madam

 7     Registrar.  Could you call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  This is the case

 9     number IT-05-88-T, The Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic, et al.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, madam.  General Miletic like yesterday

11     is not present today.  A waiver has been received.  Prosecution team is

12     Mr. McCloskey and Mr. Vanderpuye from what I can see behind the column,

13     and Defence teams I think it's -- I just saw Mr. Haynes.  Where is he?

14     Oh, I see.  Yeah, and then I didn't see him anymore.  So it's only Mr.

15     Bourgon who is absent.

16             MR. HAYNES:  I'm sorry.  I had to move because the monitor over

17     there wasn't working.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  But we have these two columns that, at

19     least as far as I'm concerned, are of obstruction.

20             Witness is present.  Mr. Trifkovic.  Good afternoon to you.

21             THE WITNESS:  Good afternoon.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  You are most welcome.  You are about to start

23     giving evidence as a Defence witness for the Beara Defence team.  Before

24     you do so, our rules require that you make a solemn declaration, which is

25     going to be handed to you, and this is an undertaking to testify the

Page 25207

 1     truth.  Please read it out aloud.

 2             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 3     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  I thank you.  Please make yourself comfortable.  Do

 5     I take it that you are going to testify in English?

 6             THE WITNESS:  Yes, indeed.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Okay.  You are free to testify in any

 8     other language which is translatable here should you feel so.

 9             Mr. Ostojic is going first.  You will be with us today and

10     tomorrow for sure.  He didn't like it.  Okay.  So you can cut down your

11     direct, Mr. Vanderpuye will take my advice to do likewise, and we can

12     send him home today.

13             MR. OSTOJIC:  Good afternoon.  Mr. President, Your Honours.  I'll

14     try to do my best.  May I proceed?

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

16             MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you.

17                           WITNESS:  SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

18                           Examination by Mr. Ostojic:

19        Q.   Sir, as you know my name is John Ostojic, and I'm one of the

20     attorneys here for Mr. Ljubisa Beara.  Can you please state your name for

21     the record?

22        A.   Yes.  My same Srdja Trifkovic.  I'm also known to my

23     English-speaking friends as Serg.

24        Q.   Mr. Trifkovic, we both speak the same language, and sometimes we

25     can overlap as both the person who is asking the questions and the person

Page 25208

 1     who is providing the answers.  We're going to try to take it slow today

 2     even though we will make every effort to conclude with your testimony

 3     today.  Can you share with us briefly, where do you currently reside?

 4        A.   I currently reside in Highland Park, which is a north-shore

 5     suburb of Chicago, Illinois.

 6        Q.   Can you tell us a little about your education?  What's the

 7     highest level of education that you've attained?

 8        A.   A PhD in European history at the university of Southampton in the

 9     UK obtained in the summer of 1990.

10        Q.   Sir, do you -- presently, do you -- are you employed anywhere?

11        A.   Yes, as foreign affairs editor of the monthly magazine

12     "Chronicles Published By The Rockford Institute" in the city of Rockford

13     in Illinois.

14        Q.   How long have you held that position?

15        A.   For the past nine years.

16        Q.   And prior to that, have you been gainfully employed?

17        A.   Yes.  Between 1996 and 1999, I was in academia, first at the

18     University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas, as a visiting professor for

19     one year; and at then at Rose Hill College in Aiken, South Carolina.

20        Q.   Okay.  Can you share with us what you did in 1992?

21        A.   In the first half of 1992, I was completing my one year of

22     post-doctoral research at Stanford -- at the Hoover Institution at

23     Stanford University on a Title 8 grant from the department of state on US

24     policy in the Balkans during World War II.  The second half of that year

25     I spent as Chief of Staff of his Royal Highness Crown Prince Alexander

Page 25209

 1     Karadjordjevic based in London, England.

 2        Q.   And as his Chief of Staff, just briefly describe what your duties

 3     and responsibilities were at that time.

 4        A.   That was a period when the monarchist sentiment in Serbia was on

 5     the rise and when believing that the Crown could electrify a position to

 6     Milosevic, a sentiment I wholeheartedly shared.  I was keen to help him

 7     assert himself as a possible factor who could meaningfully contribute to

 8     the process of political change in Serbia.

 9        Q.   Now, Mr. Trifkovic, you and I know each other, and we've known

10     each other for quite some time, correct?

11        A.   Longer than I care to remember.

12        Q.   Fair enough.  Can you tell me, also, have you testified before

13     the Tribunal in other cases or in any other case?

14        A.   I was an expert witness in March of 2003 in the Stakic case.

15        Q.   And what expertise did you provide for the Stakic case at that

16     time?

17        A.   I provided a background of the Bosnian war in general and the

18     situation in the municipality of Prijedor in particular based not so much

19     on my personal observation of the circumstances but rather on the access

20     to secondary sources, materials, and statements.

21        Q.   And you recognise, sir, although you were an expert witness in

22     that case that you're being called here in this case as a fact witness?

23        A.   Indeed.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Please pause between questions and answers for

25     the sake of the interpreters.  Thank you.

Page 25210

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Did you hear that?

 2             MR. OSTOJIC:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Both of you?  Yes, please.  If you could comply,

 4     we'll appreciate that.  Thank you.

 5             MR. OSTOJIC:

 6        Q.   Sir, following your employment with Crown Prince Alexander in the

 7     capacity as Chief of Staff, what, if anything, did you do in terms of

 8     employment?

 9        A.   In the summer of 1993, it became obvious that contrary to my

10     hopes and expectations the crown prince was not going to move to Serbia

11     on a permanent basis, which I believe he should have done especially in

12     view of the ongoing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and I was not

13     willing to simply continue as basically a glorified administrator

14     preparing press releases and statements out of the London office, which I

15     believed to be somewhat meaningless.

16             So relying on my previous connections as correspondent for US

17     News and World Report in Belgrade and on my access that I had during the

18     period of my work for him, I decided to work as a freelance journalist,

19     and I had a contract with the Belgrade magazine called Duga, Rainbow, and

20     they also had regular slots in a number of English-speaking publications

21     including at that time also the leading bilingual newspaper of the

22     Serbian community in the United States, Sloboda, Liberty.  And I was also

23     providing regular interviews to the electronic media in the UK having

24     spent six years as a radio journalist with the BBC world service in the

25     1980s.  I had connections there, too, and I was regularly interviewed

Page 25211

 1     especially when it came to presenting a Serbian point of view in the

 2     ongoing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

 3        Q.   Share with us, if you will, if you ever had an opportunity to go

 4     to Pale and meet with Radovan Karadzic.

 5        A.   Yes.  The first such occasion was in my capacity as Crown Prince

 6     Alexander's advisor, which was at the end of July of 1993 at the time of

 7     the Igman and Bjelasnica operation, when I also brought in my car, a

 8     consignment of humanitarian assistance and medicines sent by the crown

 9     prince's wife Princess Catherine, and I also had a meeting at that time

10     with a number of political and military leaders in a purely ceremonial

11     capacity conveying the best wishes from the crown prince and delivering

12     the packages to the hospital, Koran [phoen] hospital at Pale.

13        Q.   Were you ever asked to assist with any of the mainstream media

14     from Dr. Karadzic or people from Republika Srpska in connection with --

15     or based upon your experience as a journalist and being knowledgeable in

16     the Balkan area?

17        A.   That initiative came later on.  In September of 1993, my wife and

18     I were touring northern France, and we stopped in Geneva where at that

19     time one of the negotiating sessions was going on, and I was personally

20     acquainted with the late professor Nikola Koljevic somewhat more closely

21     than with the others from the Republika Srpska leadership.  And it was

22     from him that the initiative came that I would be useful as a

23     spokesperson in some capacity because I think he had seen some of my

24     articles and my media appearances up to that time.

25        Q.   And did you accept to attain such a position as a spokesman?

Page 25212

 1        A.   Well, the situation was somewhat delicate because accepting the

 2     position of an official spokesman would have severely curtailed my

 3     capacity to function as a freelance journalist and also to provide the

 4     kind of analysis of the political background to the conflict in former

 5     Yugoslavia that I wanted to continue doing as I deemed fit.  I therefore

 6     indicated to Professor Koljevic before he formalized the proposal to Dr.

 7     Karadzic that I would accept an informal arrangement in which my ability

 8     to continue with my other professional pursuits would not be hindered,

 9     and which would also enable me to present and articulate positions and

10     analysis in accordance with my own understanding rather than in

11     accordance with anyone's formal instructions.

12             I also believed that in this way I could provide a more

13     comprehensive and more useful information to the media consumers in the

14     English-speaking world, especially since, to be perfectly frank with you,

15     I was also skeptical about the ability of people in Pale, the ability of

16     people in the Serbian lands in general, to present and articulate their

17     positions in a way that would be both readily understood by the western

18     media consumer and that would be presented in a convincing and coherent

19     manner.

20        Q.   Mr. Trifkovic, what was your title, then, if any, at that time?

21        A.   My title was the Balkan affairs analyst with close links to the

22     Bosnian Serbs.  I was occasionally in the media presentation, actually

23     referred to as the representative or spokesman for the Bosnian Serbs,

24     which I always insisted on correcting because I did not want this

25     impression of a formal relationship to be created, not only because of

Page 25213

 1     the fact that I wasn't receiving either instructions or payment from Pale

 2     but also because I wanted to give them the ability to obtain plausible

 3     deniability of my statements if they happened to be displeased with them

 4     so that at all times I could both retain the status of an independent

 5     analyst, and the leadership of the Republika Srpska could retain its

 6     ability to distance themselves from my analysis as presented to the

 7     media, which, by the way, did not happen.

 8        Q.   And we've seen -- or received from the Prosecution some media CDs

 9     of you giving speeches to news outlets, and they referred to you as "the

10     unofficial Bosnian Serb spokesman."  Would that be a fair way to say it?

11        A.   No, because spokesman or spokesperson, again, whether official or

12     unofficial is the person who conveys clearly articulated formal

13     statements or positions of a given entity, which I was very careful to

14     emphasize that I was not in the position to do.  But on the other hand,

15     journalists are in the habit of simplifying issues, and if the editor

16     says, give me the Bosnian Serb point of view, they will probably, you

17     know, fill the slot any which way they can even if such a designation

18     which corresponds to the needs of the editorial cycles may fit in neatly

19     with their requirements would not be accurate when it came to my actual

20     role.

21        Q.   Okay.  So let me stick, then, with the title that you provided

22     us, and that is as "the Balkan affairs analyst with close links to the

23     Bosnian Serbs."  Did you hold that position for any length of time?

24        A.   I did until, I believe, first week of September of 1995 when the

25     political leadership of the Republika Srpska decided to authorize

Page 25214

 1     Slobodan Milosevic to negotiate on their behalf.  I could not possibly

 2     continue as someone presented as a person with close links or any links

 3     with a political entity that was now hardly more than an offshoot of the

 4     Milosevic Pale centre.  In fact, I remember saying at one point that --

 5     asking Milosevic to negotiate on behalf of the Republika Srpska was

 6     tantamount to entrusting Count Dracula with a blood bank.

 7        Q.   Now, Mr. Trifkovic, if you could just give us an idea, and since

 8     you started in approximately mid-to late September in the role as Balkan

 9     affairs analyst with close links to the Bosnian Serbs, can you tell us in

10     that year how often you would meet with the Republika Srpska leadership

11     just so we can get a general sense of it?

12        A.   I spent a week in late November of 1993 in Geneva at the

13     Palestine Nations where I tried to set up some kind of media management

14     for -- I obviously wasn't going to stay there, but I wanted to help them

15     out with the art of composing press releases and formal statements and

16     not relying on improvisation as they had been doing until that time.  I

17     am afraid that I was successful in this endeavour to a very limited

18     extent.  And after that, during 1994 I paid a total of four visits to the

19     Republika Srpska at times they coincided with my coming to Belgrade on

20     private business or vacations.  One or two occasions in 1994 and one

21     occasion in 1995 were purpose-made trips because I simply wanted to find

22     out what was the view from Pale, so to say, at particularly sensitive

23     moments of the Bosnian crisis, such as the Gorazde crisis in 1994, the

24     aftermath of Ex-President Carter's visit in 1995, and ironically in the

25     summer of 1995 I visited Pale because I had already intended to be in

Page 25215

 1     Belgrade as part of my summer break without ever suspecting that those

 2     days in the month of July would subsequently prove to be critical in many

 3     ways.

 4        Q.   And we'll come back to July 1995 a little later in your

 5     examination, but just give us an idea.  In 1995 other than July, were you

 6     at Pale?

 7        A.   I was at Pale in late January of 1995.  I remember leaving

 8     Belgrade on Saint Sava's day that year, and I remember it vividly because

 9     --

10        Q.   Just tell us what day.

11        A.   It was 27th of January.  I was at Pale 28th and 9th, and I drove

12     back the following day, so probably on the 30th.  And in March, I was

13     there just for one day, in March -- I don't remember the exact day.

14     Probably 22nd or 23rd or 24th of March.

15        Q.   And help me with this:  After your visit in Pale in July of 1995,

16     did you ever go back to Pale?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Where were you stationed during the time that you were the Balkan

19     affairs analyst?

20        A.   I was dividing time between London and the United States.  I was

21     at that time still pursuing research subsequent upon my post-doctoral

22     work at Stanford, and I was actually looking for employment in the United

23     States because having been frankly disillusioned with the way that the

24     Republika Srpska leadership, one might say, folded up by entrusting

25     Milosevic with the end game, I prepared the ground in the US for my

Page 25216

 1     subsequent move to Houston in the summer of 1996.

 2        Q.   Are you familiar, as I'm sure you are being a historian, with

 3     events that were generally considered the September 1993 action?

 4        A.   I am familiar in the capacity of, you know, someone who takes a

 5     great deal of interest in these affairs, but I'm not familiar with them

 6     on a firsthand basis.  In other words, I have not discussed them with any

 7     of the key participants or key players, and I certainly have not been

 8     privy to any privileged information concerning their background.

 9        Q.   Well, just give us an idea of what it is from the information

10     that you have.

11        A.   The Latin tensions between the political leadership of the

12     Republika Srpska and the military leadership had always been present to

13     some extent.  The military leadership was composed to a large extent of

14     the former YPA officers who were viewed by the political leaders

15     belonging to the Serbian democratic party as people with a great deal of

16     ideological baggage in their tow.  But my first awareness of these

17     tensions came, actually, during the very first visit to Pale during the

18     and Igman and Bjelasnica operation when I gathered from conversations

19     with other people such as one of the advisors to Dr. Karadzic, that he

20     viewed Karadzic, that operation as detrimental to what he believed was a

21     possible diplomatic political break-through and that he believed that by

22     acting without the clear approval from the civilian leadership, the

23     military was somehow undermining the political and diplomatic efforts of

24     the civilian leadership.

25             I, frankly, did not believe that this was substantively the case,

Page 25217

 1     even if Dr. Karadzic believed it to be so.  In fact, I was pretty certain

 2     that no immediate political diplomatic break-through was on the horizon,

 3     and as we had seen subsequent to the summer of 1993, in the fall of 1993,

 4     the negotiations in Geneva under Stoltenberg and Owen, which had a

 5     promising framework of the three entities that had the attributes of

 6     sovereignty, collapsed, torpedoed by the United States just as the

 7     previous Owen-Stoltenberg plan had been torpedoed in the spring of '93.

 8             The second crisis, if you will, in the relations occurred in

 9     September of 1993 with a protest by the war veterans, handicapped and

10     wounded soldiers, and the families of the fallen, and there were two

11     versions of what was going on.  One was that of the political leadership,

12     which claimed that this was engineered by the military top brass as a

13     means of putting pressure on politicians and as a means of pointing out

14     the existence of Banja Luka as the alternative power centre to Pale;

15     while on the other hand, the view of the soldiers was that the Serbian

16     democratic party establishment, allegedly both corrupt and inept, was

17     manipulating the perfectly justified grievances of the veterans, the

18     wounded, the handicapped, and the widows and orphans, in order to

19     engineer a show-down with the military that would give them an excuse to

20     replace the top brass of the BSA.  And either way, I frankly do not have

21     the information that would enable me even at this stage to pass the

22     verdict, whether it was one or the other or the mix of the two.  But

23     either way, it certainly proved that not -- that something was rotten in

24     not the kingdom of Denmark but the Republika Srpska.

25        Q.   Okay.  Let me just follow up if you don't mind and clarify.  You

Page 25218

 1     said BSA.  Just tell us what you mean by that.

 2        A.   I mean VRS, Vojska Republika Srpska or Bosnian Serb Army is the

 3     usually shorthand used in...

 4        Q.   Fair enough.  And then you also use the acronym YPA?

 5        A.   The Yugoslav People's Army or JNA.

 6        Q.   I just want to clarify that.  Now, when, if at all, was the first

 7     time that you heard the name of Ljubisa Beara?

 8        A.   The first time I heard the name of Ljubisa Beara was during the

 9     week I spent in Geneva in late November of 1993, when during the long and

10     arduous negotiating sessions of which I was not -- to which I wasn't

11     privy and obviously was not invited, I spent a few hours in all with the

12     members of the Republika Srpska delegations security detail.  Being both

13     a journalist and a historian, I was very interested in the views and

14     experiences of these young men who were all veterans of the early battles

15     in the summer of 1992 and who being, you know, mostly simple folk from

16     the grass roots of the Bosnian/Serb public at large were providing -- I

17     don't want to sound condescending about this, but it was the genuine vox

18     populi.  It was something that one doesn't get in a raw form unless you

19     actually spend a long time in the Republika Srpska, which I wasn't able

20     to do.

21             And so just listening to them chatting among themselves, joking,

22     reminiscing, and commenting provided me with a fascinating insight into

23     the -- you know, the nitty-gritty of the perception of events on the

24     ground.  And it was in this context that I heard them refer to Ljubisa

25     Beara's appointment as "bezbednjak," chief of security of the

Page 25219

 1     Bosnian/Serb army, with displeasure and even indignation because they

 2     believed that it simply meant that the old-school Tito-restrained former

 3     YPA officers who had internalised the Yugo nostalgic -- who had internal

 4     analysed the both Yugoslav rather than Serbian loyalty and the particular

 5     brand of Titoist communist Yugoslav loyalty as their formative experience

 6     in the period of their personal and professional development and that

 7     therefore he wasn't someone that they would look upon with approval as

 8     the chief of security of what they expected to be a new army for a new

 9     Serbian state.  Nevertheless --

10        Q.   And just so -- sorry.

11        A.   Sorry.  At the same time, they referred with a degree of grudging

12     respect to what I understand was his successful arrest of some Croat

13     demonstrators who were guilty of killing a Macedonian conscript during

14     the demonstrations in Split in May of 199 -- oh dear, it would have been

15     May of 1991.  But they specifically referred to the killing of two

16     volunteers belonging to the Serbian radical party in the region of

17     Dubrovnik as the proof that he doesn't like caucades [phoen] Serbian

18     nationalist berges [phoen] and beards, and I now quote from memory.  He

19     can't stand caucades and beards, was a comment made at that time.

20        Q.   And who were these individuals again?  They were providing

21     security detail for who?

22        A.   For the Serbian -- Bosnian Serb delegation.  They were -- I have

23     to tell you the truth.  I don't remember their names, but they were in

24     their late 20s, perhaps early 30s, and they were the veterans of the

25     early battles.  I believe that most of them came from the special police

Page 25220

 1     units rather than the military structures.

 2        Q.   Now, you mentioned, also, two instances, one with the Macedonian

 3     conscript, and then you also mentioned a killing of Serbian radical party

 4     volunteer.  Do you know if that was the same incident or two separate

 5     incidents?

 6        A.   These would be two separate incidents, and they were referred to

 7     with a very different sentiment.  The killing of two volunteers was

 8     referred to as the proof of Beara's animosity to any display of Serbian

 9     particularism within what was still at the time the JNA, but the

10     apprehension of Croat culprits for the killing of the Macedonian

11     conscript was mentioned, as I say, in the spirit of grudging respect as

12     the proof that the man is a pro.

13        Q.   Now, help me with this:  Since you were there and based on your

14     personal observations and experiences, were there any idealogical

15     differences between the civilian authorities, let's call them, in Pale

16     and Banja Luka and those who were former JNA either officers or members;

17     and then if you can, describe that for us.

18        A.   Well, even at this distance of more than a decade, it is hard to

19     tell to what extent differences that acquired the guise of ideology were

20     rooted in the differences over personalities, the position in the power

21     structure, or even the accusations of corrupt dealings and outright

22     criminality which was occasionally levelled by the military leaders

23     against the civilian authorities and in particular against the SDS party

24     structure on the grounds.  But suffice to say that I became aware of

25     these differences in fairly outspoken references by Dr. Karadzic to the

Page 25221

 1     "commie bastards," "komunjare," and the Red Plague, which I do not recall

 2     being referenced to any particular person but which I took to imply the

 3     top brass, the, basically, top leadership of Bosnian/Serb army.  The

 4     constant spirit of this underlying animosity was based on the claim that

 5     they had divided loyalties and that many of them were still on the

 6     payroll of the Yugoslav Army, which at that time was no longer Yugoslav

 7     People's Army but was -- became VJ and Milosevic himself, and that they

 8     were playing a duplicitous game on the one hand accepting the primacy of

 9     the political leadership but on the other still continuing to act as an

10     independent power centre in its own right.

11             On the other hand, the view from the military was that the

12     political leadership displayed a mix of political and diplomatic

13     inaptitude on one hand and the proclivity to corruption and even

14     criminality on the other; that the civilian leadership had failed to

15     proclaim the state of war in the entire territory of the Republika

16     Srpska; that it had failed to control the smuggling of fuel, cigarettes,

17     and even munitions and military hardware, either by the politically

18     connected individuals or through the state company, which even though was

19     supposedly serving the treasury of the Republika Srpska was still in the

20     end allegedly used by the various SDS bigwigs and well connected

21     individuals to line their pockets.  But as I mentioned earlier, all of

22     these elements in the puzzle, I haven't been able to glean from any

23     first-hand sources but, rather, from fragmentary accounts and from

24     elements of, you know, press articles and public statements somewhat

25     reinforced by this remarkable level of almost vehement personal animosity

Page 25222

 1     that I noticed in Dr. Karadzic on a number of occasions when it came to

 2     the top brass of the Bosnian/Serb army collectively.

 3        Q.   And did this attitude, if you will, based on the observations

 4     that you've made and had, did this attitude persist throughout the period

 5     that you worked as a Balkan affairs analyst, meaning until September of

 6     1995?

 7        A.   I would say that it was less pronounced in 1994 or maybe early

 8     1995 than it was in the summer of 1995.  In the summer of 1995 - that was

 9     my final visit - I had two meetings with Dr. Karadzic, one with two

10     Serbian/American people --

11        Q.   We'll get to that.

12        A.   Yes.  And at that time I actually became aware of rather strong

13     language used with reference to the events surrounding the assembly of

14     the Republika Srpska held at Sanski Most in mid-April.  Even though

15     reference to what amounted to a coup was not something I heard from

16     Karadzic itself, I cannot exactly recall who made that particular

17     reference or who used that metaphor, but I believe it was an exaggeration

18     that the attempt by the military leaders at that assembly to obtain a

19     number of decisions from the politicians regarding the conduct of the

20     war, the organisation of both the production geared to supplying the

21     military, and the more even burden of the effort on different strata of

22     the population, that was certainly interpreted by the political leaders

23     as an attack on their own position and on -- certainly on their own

24     authority.

25        Q.   And what time period are you speaking of?

Page 25223

 1        A.   Well, it was a two-day assembly of the Republika Srpska.  I

 2     believe it was April 15th and 16th of 1995.

 3        Q.   And where was it specifically?

 4        A.   At Sanski Most.

 5        Q.   And who was giving the speeches that led to this, as you put,

 6     increased or almost vehement personal animosity that you were generally

 7     discussing and this coup that you mentioned?

 8        A.   Obviously I wasn't there, but my understanding is that General

 9     Mladic came up with a list of specific demands and that on behalf of the

10     SDS the party secretary Velibor Ostojic responded in vehement terms that

11     those demands were nothing short of an act of disobedience, disloyalty.

12        Q.   And help me with this:  Did it ever come other than the

13     conversations you shared with us with the security detail of the

14     political establishment at the Palace of Nations in Geneva, was there any

15     other opportunity that a discussion about Mr. Beara was undertaken in

16     your presence?

17        A.   It was either during my January visit of 1995 or my March visit,

18     I can't remember which of the two, that vice-president Nikola Koljevic's

19     Chief of Staff, Zdravko Miovcic, referred to Beara as someone who doesn't

20     trust all these foreign Serbs who have gained access to the political

21     leaders.  In addition to myself, he mentioned Jovan Zametica and Milos

22     Prica as, you know, the diaspora Serbs who simply by virtue of living in

23     the West or having lived in the West where one might say suspicious by

24     definition, that therefore, their loyalty was open to doubt, but Miovcic

25     added half-jokingly, but don't worry about it, he doesn't count for much

Page 25224

 1     around here, meaning Pale.

 2        Q.   Just remind us of who Mr. Zametica was at that time?

 3        A.   He was advisor to Dr. Karadzic.  I believe he was particularly

 4     focused on foreign and diplomatic affairs.

 5        Q.   And the same with Mr. Mitrovic?  What was his role?

 6        A.   No Miovcic.  He was vice-president, Koljevic's Chief of Staff.

 7        Q.   Did you form an impression as to whether or not they were

 8     speaking as a result of their position and their close ties with Mr.

 9     Karadzic that perhaps those were his views as well?

10        A.   Not necessarily, but nevertheless, I found it remarkable that

11     both at the level of, you know, simple but, you know, honest-to-God young

12     fellows who comprised the security detail of the political leaders and at

13     the upper echelon of their entourage, for instance, the Chief of Staff to

14     the vice-president, a fairly similar sentiment was expressed, and also

15     that if what Mr. Miovcic said was true about Beara's dislike of the fact

16     that all these diaspora Serbs are, you know, making themselves

17     conspicuous, that would imply that the security experts in the

18     Bosnian/Serb army took a somewhat dim view of the judgement of political

19     leaders themselves, because if they surround themselves by people who by

20     virtue of having lived abroad are of dubious loyalty, then obviously

21     their own judgements and their own loyalty, perhaps, could be open to

22     some doubt.

23        Q.   Mr. Trifkovic, the transcript and I misspoke when I used the name

24     Mr. Miovcic, it's M-I-O-V-C-I-C, correct?  Is that the way we would spell

25     it?

Page 25225

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Okay.  It's important just so we have it right.  Thank you for

 3     that.  Now, have you ever heard of Karadzic referred to Beara --

 4        A.   No.

 5        Q.   -- at any time during any of your visits or the times that you

 6     spent in Pale from 1993 to September 1995?

 7        A.   No.  Let me reiterate.  The only specific references to Beara by

 8     name were the ones made by the security detail at the Palace of Nations

 9     in Geneva in late November 1993 and the comment by Mr. Miovcic in either

10     late January or else mid-March of 1995.

11        Q.   Share with me, if you will, are you familiar with the name of Bob

12     or Robert Djurdjevic?

13        A.   Yes.  He was a businessman based in Phoenix, Arizona, who had

14     previously lived in Canada and who was publishing a newsletter called

15     "Truth In Media."

16        Q.   And do you remember seeing him at all in Pale in July of 1995?

17        A.   Yes, I remember seeing him in a very brief encounter at the

18     office of Dr. Zametica.  I don't think it was a particularly friendly

19     encounter because of -- there are two things.  One of the two Serbian

20     Americans who came with me on that trip was Mrs. Slavica Ristic from

21     Phoenix, Arizona, who knew Bob Djurdjevic well.  They lived in the same

22     city and even volunteered when he started his newsletter with the layout

23     and the data entry but who by that time had come to the conclusion that

24     he was, as she put it, a Milosevic man.

25             That opinion could have been justified some years later when I

Page 25226

 1     came across a report in the English language edition of the Haaretz daily

 2     newspaper in Israel that in the course of trial of General Sharon's son

 3     for corruption, it was mentioned that he received a particular payment

 4     from Belgrade, from the government of Serbia and Milosevic for stealing

 5     power at that time, which was delivered by Bob Djurdjevic.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Mr. Trifkovic, we will go into detail on your visit in

 7     Pale, but I just wanted to cover with respect to Bob Djurdjevic whether

 8     you knew him or not.  Thank you for that.

 9             Can you share with us where you were in early -- or in July 1995

10     prior to you arriving in Pale?

11        A.   Yes.  I was in Belgrade.  I was also briefly in my in-laws'

12     cottage, mountain retreat on Mount Jelica near Cacak, and during my trip

13     to Pale with Mr. Premovic and Mrs. Ristic, I actually left my family in

14     the cottage because having visited Bosnian/Serb republic in the summer of

15     1993 they were not particularly keen to go, especially since it was the

16     time when military operations were underway.  They deemed it wiser not to

17     join me on that trip, and I completely concurred.

18        Q.   Why did you go?

19        A.   Because at that time the Srebrenica military operation was in

20     full swing, and I generally wanted to hear what was their take on what

21     looked like an unexpected development.  By the way, I had intended to go

22     even before the military operations started unfolding, but when I left,

23     which was July 12th, I was really keen to obtain the kind of firsthand

24     account of what was going on and what was the political leader's take on

25     future course of events so that upon my return to London, which was

Page 25227

 1     scheduled for July 18th, 17th or 18th, I could address the media with

 2     some degree of authority having been to Pale:  Having spoken to the

 3     political leaders, having considered the situation with analysts in

 4     Belgrade, I can now tell you that this is what's going on.

 5        Q.   And did you provide such interviews or commentary to the news

 6     media?

 7        A.   Well, yes, and one point on which the political leaders were

 8     particularly insistent, Karadzic, Koljevic, and their advisors, was that

 9     the failure of the United Nations to demilitarise the UN-protected zone

10     of Srebrenica had effectively compromised its status as the protected

11     zone and the military operation was made necessary by the failure of the

12     UN to act in the way that would prevent its further use as an armed camp

13     when raids are carried out against surrounding Serb villages on the one

14     hand and as a UN-protected zone when the Serbs threaten retaliation.

15        Q.   Do you remember, sir, specifically how long you stayed in Pale in

16     July of 1995?

17        A.   I stayed -- I stayed from the evening of the 12th until the early

18     morning of the 16th, so I was there the 13th, 14th, and 15th.

19        Q.   And where did you go afterwards on the 16th?

20        A.   On the 16th, I drove to Belgrade, and then either the following

21     day or the one after I flew to London.  I really need to look at my old

22     passports to see the stamps in order to ascertain this.

23        Q.   Now, I'd like to show you what we've identified or are going to

24     use as an exhibit in e-court, which is P2905.

25             MR. OSTOJIC:  And just so the Court's aware, this is an excerpt

Page 25228

 1     from an appointment calendar for Radovan Karadzic in July 1995.  It was

 2     used in the Milosevic trial, and although I understand now we do have

 3     what purports to be the complete calendar, this one was used, I think it,

 4     as my learned friend has told me, is almost if not identical to the one

 5     that was recently seized, but we're using the one given to us by the OTP

 6     previously?

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Just to -- this is obviously an important

 9     document.  We did not purport we have the complete version of this diary,

10     but we did provide what we do have, that what we know we do have from the

11     recent seizure of that diary, and it matched what came out of the

12     Milosevic trial.  So we have -- I think it's roughly the month of July

13     for the diary, but we did have the material that was included that came

14     out in the Milosevic trial, just so that's clear.

15             MR. OSTOJIC:  And just so it's further clear, this is the

16     document from the Milosevic trial.  We didn't go through -- since we were

17     only given the seizures from Radovan Karadzic only yesterday, this is the

18     one that was actually used in the Milosevic trial, so...

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, both of you.  Please proceed.

20             MR. OSTOJIC:

21        Q.   Mr. Trifkovic, you are looking at, obviously, as you've heard,

22     what purports to be an excerpt from an appointment calendar for Radovan

23     Karadzic for July.  Specifically, I think it's the 13th and 14th of July,

24     1995.  Do you see that on your screen?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 25229

 1        Q.   There's an English version to the left, and do you have both

 2     versions there?

 3        A.   Yes, except that I don't see the bottom of the handwritten

 4     Serbians.  Oh, there we are.

 5        Q.   Do you see your name depicted anywhere on that entry after the

 6     13th of July, 1995?

 7        A.   Yes.  Both the 13th with the two visitors from the US and on the

 8     14th with Dr. Zametica.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Well, let's take it one step at a time if you don't mind.

10     The entry which is at the top portion of this exhibit P2905, the 13th of

11     July, how many times is your name entered there?  Do you see?

12        A.   Just once under the 13th.

13        Q.   And what time does it designate?

14        A.   1700 until 1840.

15        Q.   There seems to be some hash marks or minus signs or plus signs to

16     the left of the names of some of the purported visitors with Dr.

17     Karadzic.  Can you explain that to us?

18        A.   Well, I don't know for fact, but it stands to reason that when

19     appointments are made a minus sign would be put next to the name, and if

20     the appointment is actually realized, then the cross or plus sign would

21     be completed.  But if for whatever reason the appointment was not, then

22     -- or if it was rescheduled, then the minus would stay because the third

23     from top on July 14th Professor Karadzic and V, presumably Velibor

24     Ostojic, we have the minus sign and -- with the addition tomorrow.  So I

25     would say that wherever you see the plus sign, that meeting had actually

Page 25230

 1     taken place.

 2        Q.   And so what does it say with respect to you in the meeting that

 3     you had with Dr. Karadzic?

 4        A.   Well, that --

 5        Q.   For the 13th.  We're only talking about the 13th.

 6        A.   That's right.  Originally, I seem to remember that we were

 7     supposed to have at least a brief meeting with Dr. Karadzic on the

 8     evening of the 12th because as I mentioned earlier, for the two visitors

 9     from the United States it was a matter of something -- they wanted purely

10     formal and ceremonial reasons and especially as people who had also

11     provided a lot of humanitarian assistance and so on, but we were not able

12     to do so when we arrived on the evening of the 12th.  So on the 13th, we

13     had a meeting during which Dr. Karadzic greeted and took pictures and

14     then gave a rather optimistic account of the likelihood for the, you

15     know, speedy political and diplomatic conclusion to the war because with

16     the fall of the eastern enclaves, we are probably going to enter the

17     period of intense diplomatic activity which, as he believed, would pave

18     the way for, you know, a peace on terms favourable to the Serb.

19        Q.   To the best of your recollection, do you recall who was

20     maintaining the appointment book for Dr. Karadzic in July of 1995?

21        A.   There was a secretary.  I believe her name was Mira.  I really

22     can't remember her last name.  I may have been told it at some stage, but

23     --

24        Q.   And just so we have a better understanding of the entries there,

25     to the right of the name in parentheses, do you know what that -- those

Page 25231

 1     designations are?

 2        A.   Well, I would say that once the meeting is completed, she was

 3     probably entering the actual times when it was held.

 4        Q.   And help us with your meeting and entry on the 13th of July,

 5     1995.  How long did that meeting last, first to the best of your

 6     recollection, and then we'll compare to the entry.

 7        A.   Well, I wouldn't have been able to tell you from my recollection

 8     what was the duration.  I would have said more than an hour, less than

 9     two, and this sounds about right.

10        Q.   Does it just give the length of the meeting, or does it designate

11     the time that perhaps the people met with Dr. Karadzic?

12        A.   I would say that this actually indicates the time when visitors

13     came and left.

14        Q.   And what does it say for your entry on the 13th of July?

15        A.   1700 until 1840.

16        Q.   Is that the only entry that bears your name on the 13th of July,

17     1995?

18        A.   Yes.  On the 13th, it is the only one.

19        Q.   Let's move, then, on to the 14th of July.  Do you see any entries

20     that bear your name?

21        A.   Well, I do, but can you bring the handwritten page down?  Yes.

22     We are -- there we are, second from bottom.  Myself and Zametica, meaning

23     Dr. Jovan Zametica, 2305 until 0035 -- 25 to 1 a.m..

24        Q.   Now, looking at this document, do you -- and we mentioned Mr.

25     Djordjevic.  Do you see whether he met with Dr. Karadzic?

Page 25232

 1        A.   Yes.  We see his name entered from 5 p.m. until quarter past 7.

 2        Q.   It's far for me.  Does it say actually 5 p.m., or does it have

 3     the military --

 4        A.   Actually, it has 1700.  All designations are military style.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Now, let me take you to the next document, and we'll come

 6     back to this in short order, and I'd like you to now look at 2D531.  And

 7     it's a long document, but I'd like first for Mr. Trifkovic to see the

 8     front page of it so he can become familiar with it.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  The speakers are kindly asked to slow down and

10     to pause between answer and question.  Thank you very much.

11             THE WITNESS:  Sorry.  I will bear it in mind.

12             MR. OSTOJIC:  I'm sorry.

13        Q.   Mr. Trifkovic, this 2D531 exhibit is something the Prosecution

14     provided us during this case, and it seems to be a diary of sorts from

15     Bob Djurdjevic as indicated on the first page, and I think -- from my

16     understanding its his handwriting on the bottom right-hand corner where

17     he says not to open until after the YU war ends -- after three years

18     after the YU war ends.  I want to go to a couple of entries in his diary

19     just to see whether it matches or not with the appointment book that we

20     were just looking at.  So I would ask with respect to this diary that we

21     go to immediately to - and I think I have the right number here -

22     2D40-0508.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  Are you contesting this?

24             MR. OSTOJIC:

25        Q.   It's a doc ID --

Page 25233

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, because we could skip this if the

 2     Prosecution does not contest the -- what would be the outcome of this

 3     piece of part of the evidence?  We can skip it if it's just for

 4     confirmation of what is contained in the diary and the appointment book.

 5             MR. OSTOJIC:  It's not just that.  It also goes to the

 6     authenticity.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Well, okay, then -- but the way you described that

 8     was as if it was just that.  Okay.  Go ahead.  Go ahead.

 9             MR. OSTOJIC:  I was getting there, though.  It's more than a...

10        Q.   Do you see the entry before you, sir, that from this diary of Mr.

11     Djurdjevic that he says that he had a meeting with Radovan Karadzic and

12     the time that he notes that he had this meeting in Pale?

13        A.   Yes, it would seem to fit the entry in the appointments book.

14        Q.   Now, if we just go a couple of pages prior to that which is Doc

15     ID number 2D40-0504, which is the date that Bob Djurdjevic writes as the

16     when the meeting took place.  And as you know, we looked at the diary

17     from the 14th when that meeting took place from 1700 hours on.  He in his

18     diary, however, writes that it seems to have taken place on the 13th of

19     July, 1995.  I'm not going to ask you if you remember what day that falls

20     on, but I will take you further back to Doc ID number 2D40-0491.  If we

21     can just look at that entry.  That also is July 13th, 1995, but it's a

22     Thursday, and it's actually the start of Bob Djurdjevic's trip from

23     Belgrade to Han Pijesak with a driver called Milos Tomovic.  Now, with

24     respect to the dates is it fair to say, and I know you didn't read the

25     entire article, that the meeting that Bob Djurdjevic had, as did you,

Page 25234

 1     with Radovan Karadzic actually occurred on the 14th of July, 1995?

 2        A.   I would say that we had two meetings.  One was with the visitors

 3     from the United States on the 13th, and the other was with Dr. Zametica

 4     in attendance late at night on the 14th.  I'm sorry, Mr. Ostojic.  Are

 5     you referring to my own meetings?

 6        Q.   I wasn't, and that's what I was looking at.

 7        A.   Oh, sorry.

 8        Q.   That's okay.  I'm just looking to get some help to see the

 9     authenticity of this document.  Now, the 13th of July, 1995, we see from

10     Bob Djurdjevic's diary that he actually arrives in Pale on the 13th, and

11     he has no reference to meetings with Dr. Karadzic, but his only reference

12     is the next day, which he state is th 13th, which is an error, at least

13     according to the appointment book, correct?

14        A.   Correct.  The 14th was Friday, not the 13th.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

16             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I object, obviously, to the form of question.

17     It's leading, and he suggested the answer to the witness.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  It had been better had you stood up earlier.  It's

19     over.  So let's -- but in future try to avoid leading questions, please.

20             MR. OSTOJIC:  I will.  Thank you.

21        Q.   Now, do you -- I'm going to show you an entry that Mr. Djurdjevic

22     makes -- strike that.  Let's go back to the appointment calendar of

23     P2905.  I want you to walk us through some of this, and thank you for

24     your assistance on this, and once we get it up we'll be able to look at

25     it, I guess.  I want to in particular focus on the 14th of July, 1995,

Page 25235

 1     and the meetings that Dr. Karadzic seems to have had on that day.  But

 2     first I want to ask you this question:  Do you know a person or did you

 3     know a person by the name of Miroslav Deronjic?

 4        A.   No, I don't recall ever hearing his name or meeting him.

 5        Q.   And can you share with us, please, whether you can identify his

 6     name as having purportedly had a meeting with Dr. Karadzic on the 14th of

 7     July, 1995?

 8        A.   Well, yes, indeed.  He figures on the list at 1100, 11 a.m., as

 9     scheduled but actually held from 1240 until 1310.  Sorry.  Yes.  It is

10     somewhat unclear.  It looks like Deronjic himself had a meeting, 1240 to

11     1310, and then with the delegation from Srebrenica later that afternoon

12     from 1425 until 1825.  This is potentially somewhat confusing, but I

13     presume that this is what it means because in the handwritten notes it

14     looks like the meeting was scheduled for 1100, that's the figure on the

15     left; that it was actually held between 1240 and 1310, that's the numbers

16     in parentheses above his last -- his first name; and then the subsequent

17     meeting with the delegation, since it is right next to his name,

18     presumably he was with that delegation from 1425 until 1825.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

20             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, I'm sorry.  I object to this line

21     of questioning.  It's clear that this witness doesn't have any personal

22     familiarity with this book.  The book speaks for itself.  Everyone can

23     read what it says, and this line of questioning is completely

24     inappropriate to pursue with this witness because all we're getting from

25     him is speculation.

Page 25236

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Do you wish to comment, Mr. Ostojic?

 2             MR. OSTOJIC:  I think we can determine as to whether or not the

 3     book has any level of accuracy and authenticity because this witness was

 4     a participant in several meetings, and he can confirm whether or not

 5     approximately he met with Dr. Karadzic at that time.  I think it's

 6     likewise very important for this Court to know when Miroslav Deronjic met

 7     with Karadzic at least according to the appointment book.  It is indeed

 8     relevant.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  What you haven't answered is the following:  There

10     is the document itself, which purports to say that, but is the witness in

11     the position to confirm that indeed a meeting took place between Deronjic

12     and Karadzic on that day at a time or at any other time?

13             MR. OSTOJIC:  By him describing his meeting and the hash marks --

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  He can only confirm -- he can only confirm that he

15     himself had this meeting, but can he confirm -- yes, Mr. McCloskey.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could we have a brief discussion without the

17     presence of the witness.  This, again, is an important document.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Right.  The witness needs to leave the courtroom

19     because the discussion will be in English, of course.

20                           [The witness withdrew]

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, who wishes to go first?

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  And I apologise for interrupting Mr. Vanderpuye

23     on this, but this, again, goes back to -- perhaps folks don't know, but

24     Mr. Karadzic's secretary was interviewed about these pages and described

25     what these marks meant, and those statements are available.  I believe

Page 25237

 1     they've been provided to people, and we can sort this out through that so

 2     it's clear to everyone.  My memory is I think his speculations are

 3     correct, but I would stand by Mr. Vanderpuye's objection that these are

 4     about the numbers and who's meeting with who.  Those are speculations.

 5     However, you know, whether he saw Deronjic, whether -- you know, those

 6     sorts of things are perfectly appropriate.  But I am sure -- we can go

 7     over those -- the secretarial interviews with Mr. Ostojic and get this

 8     sorted out.  I don't think it's, frankly, a big issue, but it can be

 9     sorted out.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, one moment.  I'll give you the floor,

11     Mr. Ostojic, soon.  Mr. Josse.

12             MR. JOSSE:  We support Mr. Ostojic's position in relation to

13     this, Your Honour.  In this diary, it's clear that Bob Djurdjevic spoke

14     at some point to this witness.  That's detailed in the diary.  And in our

15     submission, it's perfectly permissible to ask the witness about other

16     parts of -- sorry, I'm not going to -- other parts of the diary.  Diary

17     is confusing because, of course, we are dealing with Karadzic's diary and

18     Djurdjevic's diary, and I am referring to Djurdjevic's diary.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yeah, but I --

20             MR. JOSSE:  If the objection relates to Karadzic's diary, we take

21     no stance.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  That's how I was understanding it to be.

23             MR. JOSSE:  That's my fault, then.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  That's how I was understanding -- if I am wrong, I

25     apologise, of course.

Page 25238

 1             MR. JOSSE:  I'll only enter the fray if it relates to

 2     Djurdjevic's diary.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  No, no.  I never understood it that way.

 4     Otherwise, I wouldn't --

 5             MR. JOSSE:  That's my fault.  I'm sorry.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers please not overlap.  Thank

 7     you.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  I apologise to you.  Mr. Ostojic, your question did

 9     relate, indeed, to the Karadzic appointment book and not to Djurdjevic's

10     diary?

11             MR. OSTOJIC:  Specifically, it did, but we were going to go back

12     to Bob Djurdjevic's diary.

13             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yeah, but that's another matter.

14             MR. OSTOJIC:  Okay, well, just so the Court knows.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think it can be seen from Mr. Vanderpuye's

17     objection that most of this we don't have any problem with, but when he

18     starts speculating about what the secretary's meant is where finally

19     we've said -- you know, Mr. Vanderpuye's objection.  And just so people

20     know -- and out of an abundance of caution, can we go into private

21     session for one second?

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Let's go into private session for a

23     short while.

24                           [Private session]

25    (redacted)

Page 25239

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13                           [Open session]

14                           [The witness entered court]

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Mr. Ostojic.

16             MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17        Q.   Can we please have the appointment diary back on the screen.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  I understand it is.  The appointment diary,

19     Karadzic appointment diary, no.

20             MR. OSTOJIC:  Yes.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yeah, it is on the screen.

22             MR. OSTOJIC:

23        Q.   Sir, let's look at -- and we'll get back to it on the 13th of

24     July, 1995, in your meeting with Dr. Karadzic.  You started to briefly

25     tell us who was in attendance at the meeting, and share with us, if you

Page 25240

 1     will, what was discussed during that meeting.

 2        A.   There wasn't really a discussion.  It was more in the form of a

 3     fairly long and detailed monologue, I, Dr. Karadzic, on what I remember

 4     as a rather optimistic view of developments and his confident expectation

 5     that with the fall of the two enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa we are on

 6     the threshold of a diplomatic solution to the war by which I believe he

 7     implied the realization by the western powers, primarily the United

 8     States, that the Serbs had the wherewithal to end the war by military

 9     means and that they, meaning the western powers, will finally come up

10     with an offer that was better than, as I remember him putting it, the

11     meaningless offer of the contact group, which consisted of nothing more

12     than an unacceptable map.

13             I wasn't sure at the time, since we didn't have a private

14     meeting, whether this was actually what he believed or whether it was

15     more of a - how shall I say - public gloss for the other two visitors.

16     But in view of the fact that the meeting lasted a fairly long time and

17     that my own views were distinctly more dim regarding the likelihood of a

18     speedy political solution on terms favourable to the Serbian side, I was

19     particularly keen to meet him one more time, which happened the following

20     day in the presence of Dr. Zametica when in fact even, you know, without

21     the presentation of visitors he reiterated what I can only call a

22     rose-tinted view of developments and predictions about the future.

23             So -- unfortunately, my precise notes about the meetings were

24     lost when my computer crashed, and I had not had the copies of the files.

25     That was back in the late '90s, but my overall impression from those

Page 25241

 1     meetings was that he was in an upbeat mood and believed that the end of

 2     the war was on the horizon in the form of an improved political package

 3     that would give the Serb Republic the elements of sovereign statehood

 4     within whatever Bosnian package was finally negotiated.

 5             As I say, I did not agree with that analysis, but on the basis of

 6     previous similar encounters I did not argue the point, either.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Now, immediately under your name we see a name of another

 8     individual.  Do you see that?

 9        A.   Yes, Vladimir Dimitrijevic.  I know that the man.  He is a

10     Serbian Swiss publisher.

11        Q.   I'm looking at the English version.  On the 13th of July, 1995,

12     we're still talking about.

13        A.   Oh, sorry.

14        Q.   That's okay.  The meeting that you had with Toma and Slavica and

15     Dr. Karadzic, immediately under that entry by your name Dr. Karadzic had

16     another meeting, correct?

17        A.   I don't want to get into the interpretation of the diary.  I

18     would say that on the basis of what's in parentheses that meeting must

19     have taken place before our meeting.

20        Q.   And I could see that, Mr. Trifkovic.  I'm not suggesting the

21     meeting, just the name beneath yours.

22        A.   Tomo Kovac.  Yes.

23        Q.   Do you know who Toma Kovac was at that time?

24        A.   No.  It rings a bell, but I don't have the precise recollection

25     of his function.

Page 25242

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now, had you met with Dr. Karadzic on the 13th of July,

 2     1995, other than on one -- this occasion and for that approximately one

 3     hour and 40 minutes?

 4        A.   No, I did not.

 5        Q.   What did you do on the 13th of July, 1995, during the day when

 6     you didn't have this meeting with him?

 7        A.   I also had a meeting with Professor Koljevic later that evening,

 8     and also during the day, I do not recall exactly at what time, I had a

 9     lengthy conversation with Dr. Zametica.

10        Q.   And share with us that meeting you had with Professor Koljevic.

11        A.   It was in the evening hours, and Professor Koljevic was also in

12     an upbeat mood, and --

13        Q.   Tell us who was present.  I'm sorry for interrupting.

14        A.   I believe that there were both his Chief of Staff, Zdravko

15     Miovcic, and Karadzic's advisor, Zametica, in attendance.

16        Q.   And you were starting to tell us.  What were the discussions to

17     the best of your recollection at that meeting?

18        A.   Professor Koljevic shared Karadzic's optimistic predictions and

19     upbeat mood, and he was also planning to go to Srebrenica the following

20     day, as he put it, to provide reassurance to the civilians that they

21     would be treated properly, which, by the way, was a point strongly

22     emphasized by Dr. Karadzic, and I had the distinct impression that at

23     that point Dr. Koljevic was not -- functioned under the impression that

24     the civilians were still there.  And obviously, I myself was not in the

25     position to know what was the score on the ground, but in retrospect I

Page 25243

 1     found it remarkable that Professor Koljevic on the evening of the 13th

 2     seems to have believed that he would be going to -- the following day,

 3     the 14th, and that the civilians would still be in Srebrenica.  It

 4     implied to some extent, again, looking back with hindsight, that maybe

 5     the left hand didn't quite know what the right hand was doing over there.

 6             MR. OSTOJIC:  I think it may be time for a break, but we can go

 7     on, whatever the Court wishes.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yeah.  Shall we have a 25-minute break now?  Okay.

 9     25 minutes.

10                           --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 4.13 p.m.

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Mr. Ostojic.

13             MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14        Q.   Mr. Trifkovic, we're going to try to complete this more

15     efficiently if you don't mind.  And now, we're looking at the 14th of

16     July, 1995, and can you remember as you sit here whether you had a

17     meeting with Radovan Karadzic on the 14th of July?

18        A.   Yes, even without the diary I would have remembered that it was a

19     meeting late in the evening with Dr. Zametica in attendance.  It was a

20     fairly short meeting and far from giving me some useful insights that

21     would have been at odds with this upbeat and optimistic assessment given

22     on the 13th in the presence of two visitors.  On that occasion, Dr.

23     Karadzic broadly reiterated the points already made this that meeting.

24     In other words, his firm belief that the military successes were

25     heralding the political and diplomatic end game that would work out to

Page 25244

 1     the Serbs' favour.

 2        Q.   And do you recall how long that meeting lasted on the 14th of

 3     July, 1995?

 4        A.   Well, having seen the appointment, it would indicate about an

 5     hour and a half.  I seem to remember -- or rather, my impression from --

 6     or my memory from that meeting would have appeared to be a bit shorter

 7     than that.  It didn't in my memory feel like an hour and a half, but

 8     that's what it says here.

 9        Q.   Now, let's turn to Mr. Djurdjevic's diary again, and the doc

10     number is 2D40-0507.  As that's coming up, do you remember meeting with

11     Bob Djurdjevic on the 14th of July, 1995?

12        A.   I believe I already mentioned that we had a brief encounter when

13     he entered the office of Dr. Zametica where I was at that time using his

14     computer because he was feeling unwell, and I went to the office to write

15     a letter from Dr. Karadzic to A.M. Rosenthal, the former editor of the

16     New York times, and also to translate a press release into English that

17     he -- no, sorry, Zametica asked me -- he, meaning Zametica, asked me to

18     do on his behalf and pass it on to the SRNA news agency.

19        Q.   And as you're looking at this exhibit, which is a portion of Bob

20     Djurdjevic's diary, he also has your name depicted that he saw you there,

21     on the top of the page, as you see, on 2D40-0507.  Do you see that?

22        A.   Yes, yes.

23        Q.   And it reflects, also, a meeting or an encounter with him in

24     Jovan Zametica's office?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 25245

 1        Q.   Okay.

 2        A.   I can tell from that brief summary that the mutual love and

 3     affection between us was fully reciprocated.

 4        Q.   We won't get into the contents of that, but thank you for that.

 5     I wanted to ask you, the day of July 14, 1995, did you have any other

 6     meetings with Radovan Karadzic other than that which you've testified to?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Now, let's go to the next day, the 15th of July, 1995.  Did you

 9     have any meetings with Radovan Karadzic on the 15th of July, 1995?

10        A.   No.  No, I didn't.

11        Q.   When was the last time you had any meeting or had contact with

12     Dr. Radovan Karadzic?

13        A.   It was on the evening of the 14th.

14        Q.   And then can you tell us when you departed Pale?

15        A.   I departed Pale early in the morning on the 16th.  In fact, the

16     15th I remember taking Mrs. Ristic and Mr. Premovic just for walks

17     around.  We may have driven up to Jahorina, and it was not a day filled

18     with substantive meetings, and I don't have much of a memory of that last

19     day.  Certainly, it wasn't significant in terms of conversations or

20     encounters.

21        Q.   And sir, have you ever met Ljubisa Beara?

22        A.   No, I have not.

23             MR. OSTOJIC:  That's all the questions I have.  Thank you,

24     Mr. President.

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Ostojic.  Mr. Zivanovic?

Page 25246

 1             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  No question for this witness, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Okay.  Thank you.  Ms. Nikolic?

 3             MS. NIKOLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  No

 4     questions for this witness.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Lazarevic?  Thank you.

 6             MR. LAZAREVIC:  I'm sorry.  No questions.  Thank you, Your

 7     Honours.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Lazarevic.  Madam Fauveau, s'il vous

 9     plait?

10             MS. FAUVEAU:  [Interpretation] No questions, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Merci, madam.  Mr. Krgovic?

12             MR. KRGOVIC:  I have some questions for this witness, Your

13     Honour.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Go ahead.

15                           Cross-examination by Mr. Krgovic:

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Trifkovic.  My name is

17     Dragan Krgovic, and I appear on behalf of Milan Gvero.  I have some

18     questions for you.  Since I'll be asking you in the Serbo-Croatian

19     language, and I can see you've already taken your headset off, I'd kindly

20     ask you to wait until you've completed my question in order to answer so

21     as to avoid any overlap.

22             You said here that on several occasions you went to Republika

23     Srpska and that you met with certain individuals.  Did you have occasion

24     to see or meet my client General Gvero?

25        A.   I did have two encounters with General Gvero that I can remember,

Page 25247

 1     and also I met him once with a group of other people where we didn't have

 2     an opportunity to actually talk.  The first such occasion that I do

 3     remember was in July of 1993; and the second, it was on my way back from

 4     Pale at a hotel or restaurant of the hotel at Han Pijesak on the

 5     roadside, which would have been either in late January or in late March

 6     of 1995 on my way back when I believe that General Tolimir was also in

 7     attendance.

 8             The first meeting was also my very first visit to the Republika

 9     Srpska, and I remember remarking to General Gvero on the need for someone

10     who is fully proficient in English to be appointed their - meaning the

11     VRS, the Bosnian/Serb army - spokesperson, and that ideally it should be

12     a diaspora-born Serb, hyphenated Serb from either the US or Canada

13     because in the western world to a large extent the medium is the message,

14     and if the messenger is fully proficient in the language of the intended

15     target audience, then the message itself will be more readily accepted.

16     As we had seen with the example of the Muslim foreign minister,

17     Sacirbegovic, Sacirbej, as he was called in the English-speaking world,

18     whose fluency in American English was a great boon to their side of the

19     story.

20             I don't recall the exact date of the second meeting, but I know

21     that my overall comment to General Gvero and I believe there were Tolimir

22     and maybe one or two others was that -- and I tried to be as tactful as I

23     could knowing the tensions between the political and the military

24     leaders, that I wanted to indicate that I do not share the optimistic

25     assessment of the political situation that was prevalent at Pale, and I'm

Page 25248

 1     now talking about early 1995, the aftermath of Jimmy Carter's visit, and

 2     yet another set of assurances from Dr. Karadzic that things were just

 3     hunky-dory and that in fact the political and diplomatic solution was

 4     going to favour the Serbs and would not take a long time to come.

 5             My impression is that on both occasions, General Gvero was just

 6     listening to what I had to say rather than engaging in, you know, an

 7     active two-way conversation.  I certainly had the impression that my

 8     point about the need for an effective spokesperson fully bilingual was

 9     well taken, and whether it was acted upon, I don't think because we would

10     have known about it.  But on the other hand, the fact that he did not

11     actively comment on my somewhat gloomy assessment of the prospects for a

12     negotiated peace favouring the Serb side, which by the way had been a

13     constant theme of my various visits to Pale, that his reluctance to

14     comment upon that may have reflected, you know, the desire not to appear

15     explicit about the differences that must have existed between the

16     military and the civilian leadership on this point just like on many

17     others.

18        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Trifkovic, for a very thorough explanation.  When

19     answering to my learned friend Mr. Ostojic's questions, you mentioned

20     certain comments made by President Karadzic when he commented on the VRS

21     top brass.

22             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please show 2D531 to the

23     witness next, ERN number 2D40-0510.

24        Q.   Mr. Trifkovic, it is the third paragraph from the bottom.

25     There's a sentence uttered by Mr. Karadzic talking about General Gvero.

Page 25249

 1     [In English] "Mladic and a small number of communist pig."

 2     [Interpretation] The part beginning:  [In English] "The RK said that

 3     judging by the reaction most officers were shocked to learn that.  It was

 4     clear that the coup was being planed only by Mladic and a small number of

 5     communist pigs, 'komunjare,' around him like Gvero.  He said Gvero is one

 6     piece of human garbage."

 7             [Interpretation] Mr. Trifkovic, such expressions, have you ever

 8     heard Mr. Karadzic utter those things when talking about the generals of

 9     the VRS?

10        A.   I have to admit that the particular term, "djubre coraka," "human

11     garbage," I haven't heard, but I have heard the term "komunjare," which

12     Djurdjevic translates as "communist pigs" and maybe should be more

13     colloquially translated as "commie bastards."  I have certainly heard it

14     often enough, and I also seem to remember this "Red Plague" term,

15     although not in particular reference to General Gvero, although from the

16     context of his remarks I think it would not be difficult to guess that he

17     would regard General Gvero as part of this inherited milieu of ex- JNA

18     officers to which whom he - had how to put it tactfully - serious

19     misgivings.

20        Q.   Do you know why Karadzic singled out Gvero in that context?  Do

21     you know what was General Gvero's role and function in the VRS?

22        A.   I don't know what was the exact formal title, but I know that he

23     was in charge of relations, public relations and that he had the role of

24     port parole of the Republika Srpska military.  I don't know the exact

25     context of the remarks referring to the meeting of May the 1st, but that

Page 25250

 1     meeting would have been two weeks after the session of the Republika

 2     Srpska assembly at Sanski Most on April 15th or 16th at which, as I know

 3     from open sources and my own reading of many years later, General Gvero

 4     was present and was at least implicitly one of those supporting the 25

 5     points that represented -- at that time by Mladic that represented as

 6     specific demands from the political leadership for the more effective

 7     waging of the war.

 8        Q.   Do you know that the result of the work of the assembly was that

 9     they made a recommendation for General Gvero to be pensioned off?

10        A.   I'm not aware of General Gvero being singled out by himself.  I

11     believe that shortly before the fall of the Krajina, and now we are

12     entering into an area where I don't have any firsthand experiences or

13     knowledge based on personal encounters, but I believe that it was shortly

14     before the fall of the Krajina in the first week of August that an

15     attempt was made to pension off a whole group of senior officers

16     including not only General Gvero but also General Mladic.

17             MR. KRGOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Trifkovic.  No

18     further questions.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Mr. Haynes?

20             MR. SARAPA:  No questions, thank you.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.  Mr. Vanderpuye.

22             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good afternoon to

23     you.  Good afternoon to my colleagues.

24                           Cross-examination by Mr. Vanderpuye:

25        Q.   And good afternoon to you, Dr. Trifkovic.  My name is Kweku

Page 25251

 1     Vanderpuye.  On behalf of the Prosecution, I'm going to put some

 2     questions to you in relation to your direct examination and also in

 3     relation to your cross-examination.  So if there's anything that I ask

 4     you that's not clear to you, please let me know and I'll try to rephrase

 5     it in a way that we can better understand one another.

 6             Now, you mentioned that you never met Colonel Beara.

 7        A.   I have no recollection of meeting him.  I was present on a few

 8     occasions in gatherings where several people were present, for instance,

 9     in the area of Gorazde when there was a reception.  I'm not aware of

10     meeting him, and I certainly have no memory of exchanging any words with

11     him.

12        Q.   Okay.  But you've -- you learned his name, and you heard him

13     spoken about in 1993, you mentioned, right?

14        A.   Yes.  The -- I remember him mentioned by name in November of 1993

15     and then again in early 1995 on the two occasions that I described.

16        Q.   Okay.  Now, you indicated that you had gone down to Pale from I

17     think it was Belgrade on the 12th of July, 1995, right?

18        A.   That's right.

19        Q.   Okay.  And about what time did you arrive at Pale?

20        A.   It was towards late afternoon, early evening.  I would be

21     hard-pressed to give you more precise time than between 530 and 7 or so.

22        Q.   All right.  And for what purpose were you going?

23        A.   I was spending the previous ten days in Serbia on -- as part of

24     the summer break and was going to visit, anyway, at some point in order

25     to learn the details of what was going on in the aftermath of the

Page 25252

 1     Srebrenica operation which, of course, was very much in the news at that

 2     time, although obviously not for the reasons that we are mostly concerned

 3     these days.  And the two friends of mine from the United States -

 4     independently of each other, by the way - were also in Serbia, and it was

 5     a sort of friendly favour that I took them along pay a visit which both

 6     of them very earnestly wanted to make.  But my primary interest was, to

 7     put it colloquially, get the score on the what views from Pale were,

 8     which I could then usefully employ in my own analysis, writings, and

 9     media presentations.

10        Q.   Okay.  And the two friends you are talking about are Tom

11     Premovic?

12        A.   That's right.

13        Q.   And Slavica Ristic?

14        A.   That's right.

15        Q.   Okay.

16             MR. VANDERPUYE:  If I could have 65 ter 3690 in e-court, please.

17     If we could just go down and blow up, that's probably okay.

18        Q.   This is another entry from the appointment book of Dr. Karadzic,

19     and with respect to your name, you see it appears on -- below 12 July

20     1995.  It's the second line following the date.

21        A.   Right.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, you see below that the name of Vukcic?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Do you know who that is?

25        A.   No.

Page 25253

 1        Q.   Do you recognise any other names that you see on this particular

 2     page, that is, under the 12th July date?

 3        A.   No.

 4        Q.   All right.

 5        A.   And by the way, let me add that this meeting was not actually

 6     held.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8        A.   Yeah.  We were supposed to arrive somewhat earlier, and the

 9     secretary informed me that the meeting was rescheduled for the following

10     day.

11        Q.   All right.  And when did you learn that the meeting had been

12     rescheduled for the following day?

13        A.   Upon arrival at Pale.

14        Q.   And do you recall the name of the secretary who told you that?

15        A.   As I mentioned earlier, I believe her name was Mira, M-I-R-A, but

16     my visits were not frequent enough to establish any kind of rapport with

17     administrative support staff.

18        Q.   And did you -- well, following the rescheduling of the meeting,

19     did you meet with anybody else on the 12th?

20        A.   I'm sorry.  The transcription says "were not frequent" -- all

21     right.  Sorry.  On the evening of the 12th, the only -- the only person I

22     recall meeting, or rather, persons were Dr. Koljevic's Chief of Staff

23     Zdravko Miovcic and Dr. Karadzic's advisor Dr. Zametica.

24        Q.   Okay.  And were these meetings -- were these meetings actually

25     scheduled beforehand or were they scheduled simply after --

Page 25254

 1        A.   No, I knew them privately, so to say.  I -- they were not people

 2     with whom you would need to formerly schedule a meeting.  They were

 3     people who I actually relied upon to give me informal behind-the-screens

 4     briefing of what's going on.

 5        Q.   And with respect to the rescheduling the rescheduling of the

 6     meeting that you had for the 12th, were you given an explanation as to

 7     why the meeting had been cancelled?

 8        A.   That our arrival was later than had been anticipated and that,

 9     therefore, his schedule for the evening was full.

10        Q.   Okay.  When did you make the appointment actually, initially?

11        A.   When I called Dr. Zametica to say that we would be coming, and I

12     believe it was only done a day or two before we left Belgrade because I'm

13     pretty certain that I wasn't able to fix the dates until at most two days

14     before leaving.

15        Q.   All right.  The reason, as you can imagine, I'm asking is because

16     there's no time indicated for your planned meeting.

17        A.   Well, the details are somewhat blurred after all these years, but

18     I believe that I would have been advised to give them a call once I

19     actually arrived.

20        Q.   All right.

21        A.   And in view of, you know, crossing the border and checkpoints and

22     so on, one couldn't be very precise about the timetables and schedules.

23             MR. OSTOJIC:  Sorry.  Can we have the B/C/S version of that

24     appointment calendar moved so we can see the full writing on the

25     right-hand side of that, please.

Page 25255

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Vanderpuye speak closer to his

 2     microphone or more into the microphone.  Thank you.

 3             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I'm sorry.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  Is it good enough like that?

 5             MR. OSTOJIC:  If that's the best they can do.  I'm just told that

 6     in parentheses it has an indication of something, and maybe it might

 7     assist us to have the witness inform us what it says.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Well, I think --

 9             MR. OSTOJIC:  Or if they have the original, they can share it.

10             THE WITNESS:  I think it probably means for tomorrow because it

11     says "za se" [phoen] so it would be "za sutra."

12             MR. VANDERPUYE:

13        Q.   Okay.  Now, you'd mentioned that you'd met -- you'd had some

14     meetings after this particular meeting was cancelled, right?  These are

15     private meetings?

16        A.   As I say -- I wouldn't necessarily call it a meeting.  It was a

17     private conversation that had more of a character of a social get-

18     together with, you know, snacks and drinks and informal off-the-record

19     chat about what's going on, who's doing what to whom, what's the mood,

20     what's -- it would be, as I say, the kind of friendly briefing that you

21     get from people you know personally rather than people who are

22     communicating with you on the basis of their function or the chain of

23     authority.

24        Q.   Okay.  And what is the nature of the informal conversations that

25     you had with Mr. Miovcic?

Page 25256

 1        A.   I don't have precise recollection, but I would probably guess

 2     that it had to do with the unexpected or seemingly unexpected collapse of

 3     the Defence of Srebrenica and the diplomatic implications and what is the

 4     take at Pale on the significance of this event and on the presentation of

 5     the issue which in -- at that time was primarily focused on -- in my

 6     personal interest was also whether there would be the continuation of the

 7     military activity in the direction of Gorazde, whether they would try to

 8     wrap it up in one swoop, and also, what feedback, if any, were they

 9     getting from the UN and from various other international powers that be.

10             But I can't give you more precise answer because I know this

11     would be the kind of conversation I would have with Zametica and Miovcic

12     with whom I had both a better personal rapport than with the officials

13     higher up and also with whom I was able to be more frank about my

14     disagreements or differences of opinion than would have been the case

15     with someone like Karadzic or even Koljevic.

16        Q.   Well, seeing as you've discussed this matter with them, did you

17     get the sense with them at any point as to what direction this particular

18     operation was going?

19        A.   I had a strong sense both then and the following day that they

20     were generally surprised that Srebrenica fell effectively without a fight

21     and that there was also some difficulty in getting the feedback from the

22     ground as to what was actually going on.  I remember while I was with the

23     other two visitors at Karadzic's office the following day that on a

24     couple of occasions he actually was interrupted and tried to get the

25     connection through to someone at Han Pijesak, but one particular term I

Page 25257

 1     remember used is that the line is down.  So what I got from those two

 2     gentlemen was the sense that they really didn't know what happened, that

 3     after, you know, a long period of tenacious defence that Srebrenica just

 4     fell.

 5        Q.   Well, did you discuss some of the concerns that would normally

 6     arise in the situation like that, such as humanitarian concerns?

 7        A.   Absolutely, and --

 8        Q.   Okay.  What did you discuss?

 9        A.   That it would be very important for the Serbian side to make sure

10     that nothing happens in the treatment of the civilians and, by the way,

11     the focus was primarily in our conversations with the civilians that

12     would be used in the way that during the different episodes earlier on

13     with Gorazde, with Bihac, and of course, Sarajevo itself that there was

14     immediate treatment of the Serbian side that was greatly detrimental to

15     the Serbian interests, which was at least to some extent, even though

16     possibly exaggerated, but at least to some extent based on real events.

17             I had the impression that they shared this assessment, and I also

18     have the impression that during the meeting the following day, Dr.

19     Karadzic was particularly insistent that he would issue orders that

20     nothing would happen to the civilians that could be used in the media

21     presentation as a tool against the Serbs.

22        Q.   Well, why did you -- what gave you the impression that they

23     shared that particular concern?

24        A.   Because I commented on, first of all, that I saw a number of

25     civilian buses, that as we drove down from the Drina River, from the

Page 25258

 1     Serbian border towards Pale, I didn't see much in the way of traffic,

 2     military or civilian, but there were certainly buses parked by the

 3     roadside especially in the area where the road turns left towards

 4     Bratunac from the main highway from Zvornik to Sokolac.  And on that

 5     first evening, which is the 12th, I have to emphasize that my own

 6     knowledge or understanding of what was actually going on was sketchy in

 7     the extreme.  On the other hand, I again have to reiterate that even the

 8     following evening, the 13th, Dr. Koljevic, the vice-president, expressed

 9     intention to go and visit Srebrenica the following day, the 14th, which

10     would at least suggest that he, also, was not fully appraised of the fact

11     that the civilians had been removed or were being removed at that time.

12             MR. VANDERPUYE:  All right.  If I could, could I have 65 ter 2047

13     in e-court, please.  2048, I'm sorry.  Page 58 through 61.  58 through 61

14     in the English.  Page 43 in the B/C/S, please.  All right.  I don't see

15     it yet.  Thank you.

16        Q.   What you have in front of you now, sir, is a -- it's a broadcast

17     of an interview with Dr. Karadzic on 12 July 1995.

18        A.   Mm-hm.

19        Q.   In particular, the reason why I've put it up on the screen for

20     you to see, it relates to the information that Dr. Karadzic had on the

21     12th of July, and in particular it touches upon some of the concerns that

22     you raised with Mr. Miovcic in your meeting with him as regards the

23     humanitarian concerns following the fall of Srebrenica.  If we could --

24     first of all, have you seen this document before?

25        A.   No.

Page 25259

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now, you can see on this page, that is, ERN 92454, that

 2     Dr. Karadzic is saying:  "Our army is enabling the establishing of our

 3     civil authorities there because the Serbs were exiled from Srebrenica at

 4     the beginning of the war."  You see that, right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Further on it says:  "And there is now as affairs settle

 7     down an activity of the refugees who want to leave."  Before I go on, let

 8     me ask you first:  Did you have any of this information on the 12th

 9     pursuant to your meeting with Mr. Zametica and Mr. Miovcic?

10        A.   No, I did not.

11        Q.   Did this particular issue come up at all?

12        A.   It came in the general sense that it would be important for the

13     Serbian side to avoid any mistreatment or appearance of mistreatment of

14     the Muslims, not only as a matter of principle but also in order to

15     prevent the media treatment of any such incident in the way that would

16     magnify it and render it politically useful to the other side.  In other

17     words, it was more a discussion in principle of an issue that was

18     presumably going to be on the agenda in view of the fact that there were

19     large numbers of people in Srebrenica.  So it wasn't prompted by any

20     specific information I had.  It was simply the discussion that presumably

21     I would have had if at that time either Bihac or Gorazde rather than

22     Srebrenica was on the agenda.

23        Q.   All right.  So your understanding from your conversations on the

24     12th which were followed up with Dr. Karadzic in a sense on the 13th was

25     that it was important at least from the point of view of the western

Page 25260

 1     press that was there was the appearance that humanitarian treatment of

 2     the refugees is being appropriately administered, right?

 3        A.   No.  What I was not saying is that there should be the

 4     appearance, but rather that such treatment should be substantively so in

 5     order to avoid the media presentation of -- or rather, misrepresentation

 6     of the appearance of mistreatment.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Thank you for clarifying that.  If we could go to the next

 8     page, please.  Now, if you go -- sorry, we also have to move forward in

 9     the B/C/S.  Now, if we could go all the way down to the bottom of the

10     page in the English.  All right.  I would say about the fifth line or

11     sixth maybe or seventh line from the bottom, you can see it says

12     "secondly".  This is in response to a question put to Mr. Karadzic:

13     "Mr. President, what information do you have on the humanitarian

14     situation in this town?"

15             And I'll refer you to where it starts:  "Secondly..."  It says:

16     "Our commissaria for refugees as you can see rushed in to help.  Everyone

17     can see that these people look well-fed and that there are no problems at

18     all.  If you compared what happened in western Slavonia where the

19     Croatians were allegedly liberating with what has happened in Srebrenica

20     where the Serbs are doing the liberating, there is such a difference that

21     it is impossible to talk about war at all."

22             Now, first of all, I just want to ask you:  Did you discuss

23     western Slavonia at all during your conversations with Mr. Zametica and

24     Mr. Miovcic?

25        A.   I can't remember that I did.  I can only tell you if we did what

Page 25261

 1     I would have said about western Slavonia.  I would have used it as one of

 2     the arguments for my constant misgivings or unease that Milosevic had

 3     some kind of deal with Tudjman and that the overall lay of the land

 4     didn't look right to me.  The way that western Slavonia fell, and as

 5     indeed it happened with the Krajina on a grander scale in August,

 6     reflected my constant suspicion that the powers that be in Belgrade were

 7     striking deals that were detrimental to the western Serbs' position.

 8        Q.   Did you discuss with Mr. Karadzic at some point what his

 9     consideration or concerns were about western Slavonia as they related to

10     Srebrenica?

11        A.   No, I don't have any memory of that.  I do remember, however,

12     that in the meeting on the 13th he stressed that the treatment of the

13     Muslim civilians in Srebrenica will be such as to put the Serbian side

14     beyond any reproach even by the non-benevolent media.

15        Q.   And when you say non-benevolent media, what do you mean by that?

16        A.   I would say that he would regard most of the western mainstream

17     media as not friendly to the Serbian side in their reporting or analysis.

18        Q.   All right.  And in fact, you yourself have referred to the

19     situation in western Slavonia on a number of occasions in interviews that

20     you gave, right?

21        A.   I would need to look at those interviews.  It's been a long

22     while, and I believe, yes, that I did make a number of observations about

23     it at the time, yes.

24        Q.   All right.  Well, in particular -- I don't think we have this in

25     e-court because it was just provided by Defence counsel last night, but

Page 25262

 1     let me read it to you, and let me see if that refreshes your

 2     recollection.  This is an interview with BBC TV Newsnight live.  It's

 3     dated 28th May, 1995, and it's entitled:  "UN Making Mockery Of Its Own

 4     Resolutions."  Interview with Dr. S. Trifkovic.  Presenter:  Peter Snow.

 5             And in this interview, the question is put to you:  "What is

 6     going on?  Have the Serbs now thrown all restraint to the wind?"  In your

 7     answer.  You say:  "If mockery is made of UN-protected zones, it is of

 8     the UN's own making.  They are not enforcing their own resolutions when

 9     it is the Croats and the Muslims who are violating them.  The Serbs are

10     fed up.  They are feeling very irritated because only three weeks ago in

11     western Slavonia we had a slaughter of Serb civilians.  We had a mass

12     exodus of Serb civilians, and the UN did nothing.  They did not even

13     castigate the Croatians in the security counsel; ditto with the misuse of

14     the safe havens."

15             Is that essentially what Dr. Karadzic is referring to in this 12

16     July broadcast interview?

17        A.   Well, first of all, let me emphasize that I did not either

18     receive inputs from Pale or seek them in my presentation of -- in fact,

19     the mood of the Serbs at that time was more than amply supplied by the

20     media from Serbia Proper or Republika Srpska.  It was the early days of

21     the internet, but it was already possible at that time to have it at

22     one's fingertips, if you will, not video streaming but certainly written

23     reports.  And my judgement on what happened in western Slavonia in the

24     first week of May of 1995 did not need to rely on Dr. Karadzic's

25     assessment.  If the two coincide, it is probably because there was some

Page 25263

 1     substance to such an impression, that, indeed, it was an attack in

 2     violation of the UN rules, and that, indeed, it was both brutal and

 3     indiscriminate when it came to the treatment of the Serb civilians.

 4        Q.   All right.  Well, I want to talk about your independence as a --

 5     I've forgotten the term that my colleague used but what I understand it

 6     to be is an unofficial spokesperson for VRS, but we'll talk about that

 7     separately.  But let me equate you with a different news article, if I

 8     could, and this is one from London news radio, and this one is dated

 9     Monday, 17 July 1995.  I don't think I gave you the time for the last

10     one, but I have the time for this one, and that's 2135.  And it's

11     entitled:  "Consequences Of Failure To Demilitarise.  Live interview with

12     Srdja Trifkovic.  Presenter:  Paul Reynolds."  And the question that he

13     puts to you, he says -- well, you finish the previous paragraph saying:

14     "These places have not been demilitarised."  He says:  "But is that an

15     excuse to have the Muslims of Srebrenica ethnically cleansed?"  And in

16     your response, you say:  "In the Balkans, one ethnic group does not trust

17     soldiers belonging to another ethnic group.  In the hundreds of years of

18     civil and religious wars in the Balkans, this has been a regular feature.

19     Only two months ago we had a tragedy on a much greater scale in western

20     Slavonia, also nominally a UN-protected area, where the Croat army

21     attacked the Serbs, drove them out, and massacred hundreds of them.

22     There are 600.000 Serb refugees in both Serbia and the Serb republics of

23     Krajina and Bosnia."

24             Okay.  Now, this is a separate interview, obviously, and it's

25     dated just about a week -- well, five days after the interview with

Page 25264

 1     president Karadzic.  Now, in relation to your statement there, were those

 2     statements predicated upon your conversations with Dr. Karadzic or your

 3     understanding of what Dr. Karadzic is referring to on the 12th of July?

 4        A.   Well, in fact, no.  If you read my response to that particular

 5     question, I'm actually making a factual statement that is amply supported

 6     by the empirical evidence of the wars of Yugoslav succession, that,

 7     indeed, the ethnic group that is faced with the sudden change of

 8     authority in a given territory will do its best to depart the territory

 9     because it does not trust, and I'm not either quantifying the degree of

10     unpleasantness of one group towards the other or trying to qualify in any

11     way that the Serbs behaved necessarily better or worse than the other two

12     sides.  I'm simply stating a fact that has been a regular feature of

13     warfare in that part of the world for a very long time, that if, for

14     instance, the Croat troops come into the area of Neretva valley, the

15     Serbs from Mostar will run away to Trebinje or Nevesinje, or when the

16     Muslims overrun parts of central Bosnia, the Croats will be the ones who

17     sometimes even using Serbian territory will escape to Croatia proper, and

18     needless to say that the Muslims when the Serbian army advances will feel

19     more comfortable going to Tuzla or Zenica than staying put.  It is, I

20     would say, more of a descriptive factual statement than analytical let

21     alone value judgement.

22             JUDGE KWON:  What is the 65 ter number, Mr. Vanderpuye?

23             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Judge Kwon, this doesn't have a 65 ter number as

24     yet because these were provided to me last night by Defence counsel.  So

25     I'm only -- I'm not tendering the documents as it were, per se.  I'm only

Page 25265

 1     putting the questions to the witness, and if it becomes an issue then I

 2     think I'll have to pursue the course to enter the documents into

 3     evidence.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Judge Kwon.

 6        Q.   All right.  In fact, in the interview that Dr. Karadzic gave on

 7     12 July 1995, he says -- oh, it's only -- okay.  Page 60 the English, and

 8     that was 65 ter 2048.  Let me just read it in the interim so that we can

 9     move along.  He says -- all right.  It's there now.  It's the third line

10     from the bottom on this screen.  It's page 45 in the B/C/S, I understand.

11     "I would also like to remind the entire international community of a

12     particular hypocrisy.  Whenever Muslim forces from these safe havens

13     advance through the Serb territory from Bihac" -- as you've just

14     mentioned -- "Tuzla, Sarajevo" -- as you also mentioned -- "and even from

15     Gorazde, the whole word applauds.  But when the Serbs undertake

16     counteroffensives and neutralise their opponents, then the world starts

17     to wail and mourn Over the losses.  You can see that the Muslim civilians

18     haven't lost anything, but the Muslim army has."

19             Now, did you have any information as concerns the Muslim

20     civilians when you spoke to Mr. Miovcic and Mr. Zametica on the 12th of

21     July?

22        A.   Other than the agreement with the absolute necessity of acting in

23     the way that would be beyond reproach and other than the indication given

24     by Koljevic that he still believed that basically they were there on the

25     evening of the 13th, no.  However, I was becoming aware that the

Page 25266

 1     evacuation was underway or had already taken place at the tail end of my

 2     stay, ironically more through listening to the BBC World Service than

 3     being told firsthand by anyone over there.

 4        Q.   All right.

 5             MR. VANDERPUYE:  If I could have 2748, please, in e-court.  All

 6     right.  Thank you.

 7        Q.   This is an urgent combat report.  It's directed to the president

 8     of the Republika Srpska, and it's dated 12 July 1995.  Let me ask you

 9     this:  Have you ever seen a document like this before?

10        A.   No, and in fact, this would be the kind of documents that I

11     normally wouldn't see or, indeed, expect to see.

12        Q.   All right.  If I could go to page 3 in the English.  It's the

13     last bottom of paragraph A.  6(a), I'm sorry, and I believe it's page 3

14     in B/C/S.  At the bottom of this paragraph, that is, where it says under

15     number 6, "In the DK zone of responsibility," Drina Corps zone of

16     responsibility.  Paragraph A, "The enemy..."  At the bottom of that

17     paragraph, you'll see it says:  "The enemy has been attempting to

18     withdraw from the Srebrenica enclave with women and children in the

19     direction of Ravno Buljine and Konjevic Polje but ran into a mine field."

20             Go to the next page, and we look at B, "Situation In The Corps."

21     And I think it's the next page -- it's not.  Okay.  It's in the middle of

22     the paragraph in the B/C/S.  At the bottom of that paragraph, that is

23     paragraph 6(b), it says:  "On..." and then slashes, "... important axes,

24     parts of our units in the MUP have laid ambushes in order to destroy

25     Muslim extremists who have not surrendered and who are attempting to

Page 25267

 1     break out of the enclave in the direction of Tuzla."

 2             So my question to you is in respect of the information that is

 3     contained in this report, did you have any discussions on the 12th, or

 4     for that matter, on the 13th as regards these Muslim extremists who have

 5     not surrendered and are attempting to break out of the enclave?

 6        A.   In order to answer this adequately, I have to emphasize that on

 7     the 12th I drove with two visitors from Zvornik from Karakaj border

 8     crossing to Pale on that very road, and at the checkpoint outside Zvornik

 9     driving south we were warned of the possibility of small armed groups

10     crossing the road and that we were proceeding on our own responsibility.

11     We were not either told to take a detour or advised not to proceed.

12             We were also told that in case of any such movement, it is better

13     -- best to avoid contact or to make a U-turn, but certainly didn't look

14     like they were overtly concerned at the level of military activity was

15     such that it would make the trip risky.

16             So I have to admit that on the basis of what looked like a fairly

17     uneventful drive through the very area that -- of Konjevic Polje and the

18     vicinity of Bratunac and Tomorici and from there up to Vlasenici and so

19     on that I already arrived at Pale, maybe lulled into a false sense that

20     the military activity was practically over.

21        Q.   All right.

22        A.   But I was certainly not aware of -- in fact, the conversations at

23     Pale proceeded with the assumption that it's over, the enclave has

24     fallen.  There was, you know -- I believe you know, imminent expectation

25     of the news of Zepa, but I wasn't aware at that time of any attempts by

Page 25268

 1     the armed groups of a significant size and magnitude to break through.

 2        Q.   All right.  So nobody at Pale when you had these conversations

 3     within the circle of the Presidency actually discussed this particular

 4     information with you --

 5        A.   No.

 6        Q.   -- at least not on that day?

 7        A.   The focus of the conversation both on the first day when I came

 8     with the two visitors from the United States and on the second day late

 9     in the evening when I was there accompanied by Dr. Zametica was on Dr.

10     Karadzic's view of the political diplomatic aftermath of Srebrenica's

11     fall.  In other words, on the first day I heard what looked like, in my

12     opinion, excessively optimistic assessment, and on the second I really

13     hoped to have a more realistic conversation, but having encountered even,

14     you know, in -- in a more -- without the presence of the first-time

15     visitors, having encountered a similar outlook, I basically did not argue

16     the case because on a number of previous occasions, assessments that I

17     regarded as faulty or poorly based by Dr. Karadzic, I tried to enter into

18     some kind of analysis in terms of real politik and scenario-making, and I

19     never got very far with it.  On the contrary, I could sense that the

20     discussions based on the non-acceptance of favourable assessments were

21     not welcome or encouraged.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, with respect to the information that you received

23     concerning these small armed groups, did you receive that before you

24     crossed at Zvornik?

25        A.   Well, no, but I think that it stood to reason to assume that in

Page 25269

 1     such immediate aftermath of what at that time one assumed was a fairly

 2     major military operation that it would be necessary to obtain the

 3     information from the military on the ground about the possibility of the

 4     road.

 5        Q.   Okay.

 6        A.   And that's why I mentioned this relaxed attitude of the Serbian

 7     soldiers at the checkpoint exiting Zvornik because I didn't have any

 8     specific information about the level of military activity, but I assumed

 9     that it was possible that some was still in evidence.

10        Q.   But in fact, somebody did tell you that you should be aware of --

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   -- small arms groups?

13        A.   Yes.  That was the soldiers manning the checkpoint exiting

14     Zvornik in the direction of Konjevic Polje.

15        Q.   Okay.  So these are VRS soldiers, right?

16        A.   That's right.

17        Q.   Okay.  And they had the information concerning these potential

18     extremists that are mentioned in this combat report?

19        A.   Well, in retrospect I would say that their demeanour was more

20     relaxed and --

21        Q.   Well, they're further away, too, right?

22        A.   But I would say that, you know, in retrospect and with hindsight

23     I would not have made that drive.  It was maybe their assessment or their

24     impression of the situation but certainly that we were told that, yeah,

25     we should exercise caution, but it was not presented in terms of, you

Page 25270

 1     know, serious warning that there is some likelihood of encounters that

 2     could be dangerous.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Now, I think I may have forgotten to ask you, but you tell

 4     me if I've repeated the question.  I'm sure my colleague will tell me.

 5     When you met with Mr. Zametica and Miovcic, did you meet with them alone,

 6     or did you meet them, also, with Mr. Premovic and Mrs. Ristic?

 7        A.   I believe that Mrs. Ristic was tired and was not with us.  Mr.

 8     Premovic would have been with us at least part of the time, but it was --

 9     I really can't be sure.  But the conversation was certainly of the kind

10     that had more to do with background briefing of the overall mood of the

11     place rather than end, you know, outlook, hopes, expectations, rather

12     than any specific information that would preclude the desirability of a

13     third-party presence.

14        Q.   All right.  Did you meet with anybody else following your meeting

15     with Mr. Zametica and Mr. Miovcic --

16        A.   I'm pretty certain --

17        Q.   -- on the 12th of July?

18        A.   No.  No, I believe that was it.  In fact, it was getting on,

19     anyway, and it had been a long day.

20        Q.   All right.  Now, you've indicated that you also met -- you met

21     with Mr. Karadzic on the 13th of July?

22        A.   That was with the visitors from the States, yes.  It was on the

23     13th in the afternoon.

24        Q.   And this is when you described his upbeat monologue that he

25     delivered?

Page 25271

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And you indicated, also, in relation to your contact with Mr.

 3     Karadzic that you had some notes concerning these conversations that you

 4     had between -- well, over the 13th and the 14th, right?

 5        A.   Yes.  I don't think I had my laptop with me on that particular

 6     occasion, but I would have entered then from scribblings, brief notes

 7     made at the end of the day.  However, with my laptop crashing I believe

 8     in 1997 and the backup diskettes not covering some of these -- in fact,

 9     it's a source of great regret to me personally.  But to be perfectly

10     frank, I had the overall sense of deep frustration and misgivings, not

11     for the first time, after what was yet another encounter with the

12     inability of Dr. Karadzic to look at the predicament of the Republika

13     Srpska in the full complexity of the wider international situation, and I

14     make no qualms about that.  I think that that meeting would have been yet

15     another occasion for such sense of frustration that the view from Pale

16     was rather narrow and based on wishful thinking rather than a

17     comprehensive analysis of the global diplomatic and political situation.

18        Q.   All right.  Now, you mentioned that you met with Mr. Karadzic on

19     the 13th for between one and two hours.

20        A.   I believe from the diary it would appear that it was about an

21     hour and a half.

22        Q.   Okay.

23        A.   Yeah.

24        Q.   And you met with him in the company of Mr. Premovic, Ms. Ristic,

25     right?

Page 25272

 1        A.   That's right.

 2        Q.   Was anybody else present during the course of this meeting?

 3        A.   I think that Mr. Zametica came in and out but was not present

 4     throughout.

 5        Q.   Okay.  And during the course of your meeting with Dr. Karadzic,

 6     was he in contact with anybody else, any soldiers or --

 7        A.   Well, I remember him shouting a few times, give me connection,

 8     what's up with the connection, "veze su u prekidu," who exactly he was

 9     trying to contact, but I also got the sense that some lines were down.

10        Q.   Okay.  How did you get that sense?  Did somebody say that

11     specifically?

12        A.   He actually said something like [B/C/S spoken] or something like

13     that.  Whether it referred to the film connection or some other form of

14     communication, I'm not sure, but I believe he was actually shouting this

15     to the secretary, so it must have been the film.

16        Q.   All right.  But -- okay.  How many times did he shout this during

17     this hour and a half that you were with him?

18        A.   I would say two or three times.

19        Q.   Okay.  And did he have access to any other telephones that were

20     there?

21        A.   Yes.  Occasionally, the phone would ring, and -- I wouldn't be

22     able to say how many times, but yes, our meeting was being interrupted,

23     and it wasn't a particularly structured meeting in that it was mostly his

24     resume of how he saw things to the visitors.

25        Q.   Okay.  You said that he seemed -- well, "buoyant" is, I think,

Page 25273

 1     too strong a term, but optimistic?

 2        A.   Upbeat, optimistic.  Yes.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And was that because he felt as though -- well, tell us

 4     why that was, what your understanding was of that.

 5        A.   This would really take us into the overall propensity of Dr.

 6     Karadzic to look upon the situation of the Republika Srpska in a more

 7     optimistic and more upbeat manner than was warranted by circumstances or

 8     by the attitudes of the great powers.  For instance, the hope or

 9     expectation, even, that Russia would take a more strongly pro-Serbian

10     position had been a salient feature of his comments and remarks

11     throughout the -- I wouldn't say each and every time I came, but I would

12     say that the majority of times he would say something like, "Rusija se

13     budi," "Rusija progledava," Russia is waking up, Russia is coming to see

14     the light, an opinion I didn't share.  I actually believed, and as we

15     know in retrospect, this is correct, that Yeltsin's Russia did not want

16     to confront the West over the Balkans at that time.  Likewise, I think

17     that his hope or expectation that some kind of diplomatic deal or offer

18     was imminent is another salient feature of his comments in the winter of

19     1995 January after the visit of President Carter or, for that matter, in

20     the spring of 1994 after the Gorazde operation.

21             So all the time I had the increasing sense of frustration with

22     the inability to communicate my understanding of the problem of the

23     Bosnian/Serb position as seen from the other side of the Atlantic or from

24     London in the way that would be readily understood because ultimately I

25     realized that in a very deep cultural sense we did not speak the same

Page 25274

 1     language.

 2        Q.   Well, speaking of language, what exactly did he say to you during

 3     the course of this meeting?  What exactly did he say in terms of his

 4     position concerning the operation?

 5        A.   Because of my lack of precise notes, I can only give you the best

 6     recollection I have of the meeting after 13 years, which is that he was

 7     greatly optimistic that the outside world will realise from the success

 8     of Serbian arms in Srebrenica that it is futile to expect the Serbs to

 9     continue taking punishment and not getting the elements of a political

10     package that it can live with, and he expressed repeatedly his confidence

11     that in the near future as the result of this demonstration of Serbian

12     military might, there should be a political movement and diplomatic

13     movement that would actually wrap up the war.

14             I do remember -- and I'm sorry, before coming here I didn't call

15     Mrs. Ristic or Mr. Premovic to compare not notes but memories, but I do

16     remember his saying that the war is coming to a close.  Now, with

17     hindsight we know it was but certainly not on the terms he had in mind.

18        Q.   All right.  I think this is probably a -- am I wrong about the

19     break time?

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  No, you are right.

21             MR. VANDERPUYE:  All right.  So --

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  We still have another 15 minutes for the break.

23             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Very well, then.  Thank you, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  However, that said, if you prefer to have it now,

25     we can have it now.

Page 25275

 1             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Now would be a good time, I think.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Right, we'll have a 25-minute break.  Thank

 3     you.

 4             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Could I ask you, how much longer do you think you

 6     require?

 7             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I think about -- well, half an hour, 40 minutes.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  And do you envisage --

 9             MR. OSTOJIC:  Not much, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.  Then think about who is coming

11     tomorrow.

12             MR. OSTOJIC:  We'll talk about that.

13                           --- Recess taken at 5.29 p.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 5.57 p.m.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

16             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Trifkovic.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could some microphones be turned off, please.

19             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I was asking -- I'm sorry, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  No, no.  Just checking to accommodate the

21     interpreters.  Is there anybody else with his microphone or her

22     microphone on apart from me, which I will switch off immediately now.  Go

23     ahead.

24             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

25        Q.   Mr. Trifkovic, when we left off I was asking you about your

Page 25276

 1     meeting with Dr. Karadzic on the 13th of July, and I'd asked you

 2     specifically what he had said regarding the operation in Srebrenica.  Can

 3     you tell us what, if anything, else he said during the course of that

 4     meeting?

 5        A.   On the basis of my conversation with Dr. Zametica and Mr. Miovcic

 6     the previous evening, I recall being curious about the military details

 7     of what seemed to be rather sudden, unexpected, and swift fall of

 8     Srebrenica on which he didn't really enlighten me.  In fact, to be

 9     perfectly honest I left Pale and the Republika Srpska on the 16th still

10     none the wiser as to what actually happened in terms of the military

11     aspect of the operation itself.  Bearing in mind the tenacious fighting

12     in Bihac in the fall of 1994 or Gorazde in the spring of 1994 or

13     Srebrenica in 1993, I have to admit that the issue as to what actually

14     happened to make the fall of this enclave so swift and so unexpected, at

15     least my impression was that to them up in Pale it was unexpected, that I

16     still didn't get the answers to that particular question.

17        Q.   No, I understand that, Mr. Trifkovic, and I appreciate your

18     response.  But my question to you is specifically what it is that Dr.

19     Karadzic told you during the course of that meeting, and you understand

20     the distinction --

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   -- between that and what your impressions of what he said are?

23        A.   I have to confine myself to overall impressions because I don't

24     have the minutes, and after all this time the memories tend to acquire

25     the character of overall impressions rather than specific snippets or

Page 25277


 2        Q.   I understand that, too, but as you recall, you did testify about

 3     a conversation that you had which concerns Mr. Beara in 1993.  I take it

 4     you don't have notes of that conversation?

 5        A.   Well, no, but it was, nevertheless, to someone who had

 6     encountered these grassroots soldiers from the ranks, if you will, for

 7     the first time.  It was a memorable experience because it was also the

 8     first time that I sensed first-hand this latent mistrust bordering even

 9     on animosity between the two traditions among the Bosnian Serbs.  It

10     would be a characateur to describe as the partisan tradition versus the

11     Chetnik tradition, but it was certainly something of that spirit at work

12     there.

13        Q.   Well, Mr. Trifkovic, at that period of time in particular, that

14     is, on the 13th of July, 1995, you were still functioning in some

15     respects in the capacity of dealing with the western media regarding

16     specifically the information that you came to acquire?

17        A.   Well, when it comes to the attitude of the western media to the

18     issue of Srebrenica, I became aware of the question of what happened to

19     the military man or man of military age only after returning to London.

20     In fact, the theme of conversations that I had was solely the treatment

21     of civilians.  The issue of the treatment of military prisoners didn't

22     even come up.  But again, to give you a very precise answer, I didn't

23     find that particular visit useful when it came to articulating positions

24     in media interviews.  I didn't find the optimistic scenario for the

25     future useful.  I certainly wouldn't have condoned it or shared its

Page 25278

 1     overall tone.

 2        Q.   Well, maybe I've misunderstood what you've said, but on your

 3     direct examination I believe you said that you came down -- the reason

 4     why you went to Pale was to get information about the specific goings on

 5     as concerns the Srebrenica operation for the purpose of dealing with the

 6     western press or the outside media.  So my question to you is this.

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   If that's the reason why you went there and you actually had an

 9     appointment and spoke to the object, the purpose of your being there, you

10     spoke to the president of the Republika Srpska, and he spoke to you about

11     the specific incident that you were there to inquire about, but is it

12     your testimony that you have no recollection of what he told you on the

13     13th of July knowing --

14        A.   No --

15        Q.   -- knowing now in retrospect what transpired on the 13th of July?

16        A.   No.  My answer is that it wasn't particularly fruitful or useful

17     meeting from the point of view of having either a closer understanding of

18     what was going on on the ground or of getting an insight into the

19     political background and the realistic scenario for the end game from

20     which Srebrenica might lead.

21             So whereas it is, indeed, very much the purpose of my visit to

22     have a clear picture, from the meetings with Dr. Karadzic far from

23     getting clear picture, I get an upbeat story of the war entering its

24     finale on terms favourable to the Serbs and the absence of clear

25     description, even, of what actually happened to make Srebrenica fall

Page 25279

 1     quickly and unexpectedly.

 2        Q.   Did you ask the question?

 3        A.   Yes, I did.  Yes.

 4        Q.   Did you ask him what happened to the military that was in

 5     Srebrenica --

 6        A.   Well, actually, the --

 7        Q.   -- that is, the Muslims?

 8        A.   The issue of what happened to the military had never arisen until

 9     that moment, and I'll tell you why.

10        Q.   I just want to know if you asked.

11        A.   No, I didn't.

12        Q.   Okay.

13        A.   It didn't occur to me because in all previous operations the

14     prisoners -- my understanding was that the prisoners were regarded as

15     valuable assets to be exchanged for one's own side, and I had no reason

16     to believe that this was an issue, and I didn't ask.

17        Q.   I take it you asked about civilians?

18        A.   Very much so because --

19        Q.   And what did he tell you?

20        A.   Well, I expressed the opinion that I already shared with Miovcic

21     and Zametica on the first evening, that it would be extremely important

22     to avoid any incidents or exercise that would be detrimental to what I

23     believed was very sensitive political situation of the Serbs at that

24     moment and that Dr. Karadzic gave me assurances on this point.  In fact,

25     I believe that I was also given a press release in Serbian about these

Page 25280

 1     assurances to translate into English in the absence of Dr. Zametica for

 2     further distribution by the SRNA news agency.

 3        Q.   And what did this press release say?

 4        A.   If there is a record of the SRNA news agency releases for that

 5     period, you might see the precise wording, but my memory is that it

 6     contained specific guarantees that their safety would be -- that they

 7     would be looked after and they have nothing to fear.

 8        Q.   All right.  Now, I've asked you a lot of questions and a lot of

 9     time as concerns about -- as concerns what Dr. Karadzic told you on the

10     13th.  Is it your testimony that you have no specific recollection as to

11     what he spoke to you about or what he said, I should say, over that hour

12     and a half to two hours that you were with him on the 13th of July, 1995?

13        A.   Well, first of all, it wasn't two.  It was an hour and a half

14     during which time some interruptions due to phone calls and his attempts

15     to make them were taking place.  Some of the time was taken up by social

16     niceties connected with the introduction of the two visitors, but I am

17     being perfectly frank with you when I say that what I recall of that

18     meeting is, first of all, a very long discourse on the end game which he

19     confidently expected to follow that would be favourable to the Serbian

20     point of view; and secondly, the agreement with my insistence that it is

21     both substantially and in terms of media relations extremely important to

22     avoid any incidents in the treatment of the civilian population that

23     would be reminiscent of the early stages of the war.

24        Q.   And that's your best of your recollection?

25        A.   It is, indeed.

Page 25281

 1        Q.   Now, you mentioned that you had you notes concerning these

 2     meetings that you had with Dr. Karadzic on the 13th?

 3        A.   Particularly what I recall, and I don't know if the record of it

 4     exists somewhere else, was a letter that I wrote to A.M. Rosenthal, the

 5     former editor of the New York Times, by Dr. Karadzic in which he praised

 6     his editorial published a few days previously and made some specific

 7     suggestions about the renewal of direct contacts between the Clinton

 8     administration and the Republika Srpska leadership.  So this is the

 9     closest I can get to some specifics of our conversation that were

10     contingent upon his overall favourable assessment of the situation, that

11     he felt so confident that in fact the situation is ripe for some kind of

12     diplomatic end game that he approached Rosenthal with a suggestion that

13     such -- that he explores the possibility of such contact.

14        Q.   The notes that you referred to that were on your computer, you

15     say they were destroyed?

16        A.   No, they were not destroyed.  I had what they call a hard disk

17     crash --

18        Q.   All right.

19        A.   -- either in late 1996 or early 1997, and I had not been doing

20     backups in a timely manner at the time.

21        Q.   Well, what did you do about it?  Did you try to get your hard

22     drive fixed?

23        A.   Yes, I did, but it was -- I was not able to recover anything,

24     which in fact is a source of great anguish to me personally, not that it

25     matters.

Page 25282

 1        Q.   I can imagine.  Do you have that computer?

 2        A.   No.  It's been discarded.

 3        Q.   It's been discarded?

 4        A.   Many years ago, yes.

 5        Q.   Did you keep any handwritten notes?

 6        A.   Well, no, because --

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment.  Forget the computer because the

 8     computer you will discard, for sure.  It's the hard disk itself.  Did you

 9     keep the hard disk?

10             THE WITNESS:  Well, no, because it would have meant dismantling

11     it.  Once I was told by the Best Buy technician that it was a matter of a

12     basically catastrophic failure, the business of defragmentation - and I

13     don't know the technical jargon - was, as I again recall, beyond their

14     ability to take care of but might have been done at a considerable

15     expense by some expert company specializing in that kind of problem,

16     which I in hindsight regretfully decided not to do.

17             MR. VANDERPUYE:

18        Q.   Sorry, you say that computer crashed in 1996?

19        A.   In the winter of --

20        Q.   Or 1997?

21        A.   -- 1996, 1997.  Yeah.

22        Q.   All right.  So you had it for a good year after the events in --

23        A.   It was a brand new computer that I took with me to Serbia, but I

24     didn't take it with me to Pale.  It was actually the first colour laptop

25     that I had.

Page 25283

 1        Q.   Did you produce any articles based on the information that you

 2     had in that computer, the notes that you took?

 3        A.   Well, no, because I must emphasize, the meeting with Dr. Karadzic

 4     was both disappointing in terms of his analysis and not particularly

 5     informative in terms of the background to the specific military

 6     circumstances surrounding the fall of Srebrenica.  So on the basis of

 7     that particular meeting, I did not write anything or publish anything.

 8        Q.   All right.  But you did have contact with the press after that,

 9     right?

10        A.   Yes, I did, and in fact I don't think that my comments to the

11     press would have been much different if I had not gone to Pale at all in

12     July of 1995.

13        Q.   In other words, they were not specific, but they were general

14     comments that you made?

15        A.   Even if they refer to -- again, you have some advantage over me

16     because I haven't actually been revisiting my old interviews in awhile.

17     But suffice to say that the only point that I came with was the assurance

18     that the civilians would be treated well, and also, let me add the

19     reiteration of the insistence that military operation was necessitated by

20     the failure of the UN to demilitarise the enclave.  But there was nothing

21     new about that.  That had been the old theme early on in the spring of

22     1994 in connection with Gorazde.

23        Q.   All right.  Mr. Trifkovic, you met again with Dr. Karadzic on the

24     14th -- well, first, before I get to that, I'm sorry.  On the 13th -- and

25     you'll correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you mentioned on the 13th

Page 25284

 1     that he had mentioned something about Zepa?

 2        A.   I think it was taken more or less for granted.  I have no

 3     recollection whether Zepa had already fallen or was about to, but it was

 4     pretty much taken for granted that it would.

 5        Q.   Well, let me ask, again, then:  What did he say in respect of

 6     Zepa on the 13th?

 7        A.   Again, I can only say that he said with Srebrenica and Zepa, we

 8     have proven that the strength of our weaponry, our military prowess is

 9     such that it can no longer be assumed that the Serbs will accept any

10     terms of final settlement that do not address their key interest.  I

11     don't know even on what specific day Zepa fell, but I think with that he

12     assumed that it was going to happen as a matter of course.

13        Q.   All right.  You met with him on the 14th, right?

14        A.   On the 14th.  It was quite late at night.  It was with Jovan

15     Zametica, and the specific purpose of that meeting as far as I was

16     concerned was to try and see if there was a more nuanced and a more

17     critical view or understanding of the overall political and diplomatic

18     situation than the one displayed the previous afternoon.  In other words,

19     to be perfectly frank, whether he was playing to the gallery with

20     Serbian/American visitors who are prominent in their local community and

21     presenting the upbeat front for their benefit or whether it was indeed

22     what he believed, and it was indeed what he believed.

23        Q.   Well, since you recall so specifically what he believed, can you

24     recall what he told you on the 14th?

25        A.   I think that it is possible to recall the overall tone, flavour,

Page 25285

 1     and "stimmung" is the German word, which maybe the best in English

 2     equivalent would be -- yeah, the overall tone is good enough, without

 3     recalling the specific quotes.  He was saying that the war is coming to a

 4     close, that the Serbian military success in Srebrenica will present the

 5     world with the reality that can no longer be denied, and that after this

 6     we can look forward to the diplomatic movement which will finally be

 7     based upon the realisation that the Serbs cannot be defeated and that

 8     they will not accept a settlement that does not address their key

 9     concerns.

10             Yeah, I'm again quoting from memory of many years ago, but again,

11     what I found remarkable is that in a more private meeting, in a different

12     setting, just with his advisor Dr. Zametica in attendance, he essentially

13     repeated the same-old, same-old, which I found deeply flawed both in

14     terms of the rigor of analysis and in terms of the understanding of the

15     diplomatic facts of life.

16        Q.   Well -- and forgive me for this, but I'm a bit puzzled.  You're a

17     historian by profession, by training, right?

18        A.   Right.

19        Q.   You have a PhD --

20        A.   Right.

21        Q.   -- in history?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   An historian is a kind person who remembers dates, events, places

24     and things of that nature very well, right?

25        A.   I --

Page 25286

 1        Q.   And can recall them?

 2        A.   I would argue that, in fact, it is far more important in the

 3     study of history to remember the essential underlying intent of the key

 4     participants rather than their verbatim quotes.  We don't know exactly

 5     word for word who said what to whom in July 1914, but we do know that the

 6     underlying tendency was for Wilhelm in Germany to give Austria a blank

 7     cheque to deal with Serbia as she deemed fit.  And if you ask me how --

 8        Q.   Mr. Trifkovic, you are were in the middle an historic event

 9     concerning the former Yugoslavia, full-out war, and you were there in the

10     midst of it with a note pad, with a computer, and for the specific

11     purpose of gaining access to information that would help you discharge

12     your obligations to the -- to the civilian authorities of the Republika

13     Srpska.  That's why you're there, and you're a historian, and you're

14     telling this Court today that you have no recollection, specific

15     recollection of what Dr. Karadzic told you on two separate occasions on

16     the 13th and 14th of July, 1995, knowing fully well looking back what was

17     occurring on those days?  You know that on the 13th of July, 1995, that

18     people were being killed?

19        A.   I know now.

20        Q.   Yes.

21        A.   I didn't know then.

22        Q.   Well, you knew that in 1996.

23        A.   I have to remind you that I've tried to give a fairly detailed

24     and comprehensive answer about the essentials of that conversation, and

25     my inability to reproduce -- and my inability to reproduce verbatim

Page 25287

 1     quotes is really based on my respect for occasion that we need to get --

 2     to understand the character of that meeting rather than try to and

 3     reproduce unreliably the specific, quote-unquote verbatim segments of it,

 4     and in that respect I've done my best today.

 5        Q.   All right.  I appreciate your concern for the integrity of these

 6     proceedings and your respect for the Court as concerns the information

 7     that you're providing and the accuracy that you wish to provide it in.

 8     Now, you have written a number of articles in the past, right?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And you've also testified at these -- at this particular Tribunal

11     in the past as well, right?

12        A.   As an expert witness in the Stakic case five and a half years

13     ago.

14        Q.   Now, do you recall writing an article in 1996 -- a 1996 article

15     called "The Hague Tribunal:  Bad Justice and Worse Politics"?

16        A.   Indeed, I do.

17        Q.   And it is true that you wrote in that article that:  "The

18     tradition, that is to say the International Court of Justice tradition

19     which is now being destroyed by a pseudolegal imposter, the Yugoslav war

20     crimes Tribunal, which was inserted deliberately into The Hague to

21     provide the pretender with a legal and cultural pedigree and at that same

22     time devalue the true legacy."

23        A.   Yes, I did.

24        Q.   "It's as if Jimmy Swaggart set up shop in Rome, took a crash

25     course in Latin, and took to wearing a miter."  Did you write that?

Page 25288

 1        A.   Yes, I did.  Yes.

 2        Q.   You also wrote that:  "This so-called Tribunal uses legal

 3     language.  It has jurists on its panels, and they are dressed in a

 4     bizarre imitation of continental judicial attire."  And you said that "It

 5     has funds, lots of funds, but it's a fraud."  Right?

 6        A.   It's been a few years, but certainly, the sentiment is right.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Well, in fact, what you said on page 13790 of that

 8     transcript, that is, in the Stakic case, is that -- yeah, that's a

 9     verbatim section of the article published in June 1996, and you readily

10     admit that you have considerably modified your views of the Tribunal

11     since then.  That was back in 2003.

12        A.   Right.  That's what I said, yes.

13        Q.   And in fact, other than the comments about the judicial attire,

14     you still hold the view that the Tribunal is in fact a fraud, don't you?

15        A.   I would say that this has to be somewhat qualified in -- on

16     several counts.  First of all, I think that the Tribunal is an extremely

17     important forum for the presentation of the historical record.  Secondly,

18     I believe that some of the decisions of the Tribunal, particularly in the

19     Haradinaj case and in the Oric case would only reinforce skepticism of

20     its modus operandi and its process, but at the same time that because of

21     the need to set the historical record straight as comprehensively and as

22     dispassionately as possible, I certainly respect it as the forum in which

23     the attempt to get a very complex story analysed in as comprehensive a

24     manner as possible is indeed here.

25        Q.   All right.  Well, you wrote -- I should say you said, rather, in

Page 25289

 1     an interview with BBC, and this is 65 ter 3684.  I don't think I enter it

 2     into e-court.  You'll let me know if you want to see it.  All right.  You

 3     were asked this question, and this concerns -- well, let me give you the

 4     date first.

 5        A.   22nd of July.

 6        Q.   22nd of July, 2008, and you were asked about the indictment of

 7     Mr. Karadzic, and you were asked specifically, "Do you think the war

 8     crimes were committed?"  And your answer to that was:  "The war crimes

 9     were committed.  Absolutely.  What remains to be seen is to what extent

10     the war crimes committed by the Serbs will continue to be treated as

11     uniquely more substantial, more evil, and more massive than those

12     committed by the other two sides."  Do you recall giving that answer to

13     that question?

14        A.   Yes, I do.

15        Q.   And you stand by it, don't you?

16        A.   Yes, I do.

17        Q.   Okay.  Because you think -- well, in your opinion, I should say,

18     this Tribunal is anti-Serb?

19        A.   No.  If you look at that quote, I said it remains to be seen.

20     Which means I'm --

21        Q.   So you're optimistic?

22        A.   I'm still giving this Tribunal the benefit of the doubt that

23     after two verdicts that, indeed, would reinforce the skepticism about its

24     nature and its underlying premises, the Haradinaj and Oric case, we may

25     as yet with the Karadzic case get a more dispassionate and more

Page 25290

 1     evenhanded treatment than the one that, as I say, we've seen in those

 2     cases.

 3        Q.   All right.

 4        A.   It would sound haughty and arrogant for me to say that I'm giving

 5     the Court the benefit of the doubt, but hopes springs eternal.

 6        Q.   Well, do you think that that somehow makes it sound less haughty

 7     or arrogant?

 8        A.   No, it is maybe a human touch that the lawyers will take as such.

 9        Q.   You have expressed the view that you expect Mr. Karadzic to be

10     convicted because the verdict has already been written, haven't you?

11        A.   Well, the verdict I didn't say was written by the Court, but the

12     verdict but the media chorus and of the commentators on each and every

13     flickering screen and printed page in the world is not only written; it's

14     cast in stone.

15        Q.   All right.  And that's your view as you sit here testifying

16     before this Tribunal today, isn't it?

17        A.   Yes, indeed, it is.

18        Q.   You've also written several pieces with respect to your views

19     about Muslims, haven't you?

20        A.   We have to draw the distinction between pieces about the Muslims

21     and pieces about the Islamic ideology.  I would appreciate if you'd let

22     me know which of the two you particularly refer to.

23        Q.   Well, I'm referring to Muslims.  Let me refer you to 65 ter 3687.

24     This is an article that you wrote.  It appears to be on the 24th of

25     November, 2003, and it's entitled:  "Islam and Slavery:  The Concealed

Page 25291

 1     Truth.  Excerpt from a lecture by Srdja Trifkovic."  Xavier University of

 2     Louisiana, New Orleans, 14th -- I'm sorry.  This is 14th November, 2003.

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   I don't know if we can go to page 6 on this one.  I'm on page 6,

 5     and I guess we'll get there.  You see the paragraph which begins:  "It is

 6     richly ironic", right?

 7        A.   Mm-hm.

 8        Q.   What it says below that is it says:  "The violent and inherently

 9     discriminatory message of the Koran is a huge problem for all Muslims.

10     We cannot solve it for them, and we should not be asked to deem the

11     problem solved by pretending that the Koran is a pacifist tract."  Right?

12        A.   Right.

13        Q.   And that's your view with respect to not only Islam but as to all

14     Muslims, right?

15        A.   No.  I don't see where you see the connection.

16        Q.   I see the connection where you say "all Muslims."

17        A.   It is the problem for all Muslims, and some Muslims resolve it by

18     choosing to reinterpret the Koran while others stick to the view that the

19     Koran is the unadulterated view of Allah, which is immutable for all time

20     and cannot be interpreted but must be taken literally.  And there is a

21     great deal of distinction between saying that it is a problem for all

22     Muslims and further saying, which I'm not, that all Muslims regard the

23     Koran as literal -- in its literalist way, the way that, for instance,

24     the Muhabis do and the way that in which the Rema [phoen] of the chief

25     centres of learning ital alaskar [phoen] university do.

Page 25292

 1        Q.   Well, let's look a little bit further down on the page if we

 2     could.  Looks like it's just about the last sentence on that paragraph,

 3     you say:  "The West has yet to learn fully the lesson that my Balkan

 4     ancestors were forced to learn six centuries ago, that Islam a collective

 5     psychosis seeking to become global, and any attempt to compromise with

 6     madness is to become part of the madness oneself."  You wrote those

 7     words, right?

 8        A.   Yes, I did.

 9        Q.   You believe that Islam is a collective psychosis, right?

10        A.   Yes, I do, but without putting it in the context of the

11     literalistic interpretation, it wasn't conveyed.  In other words, you are

12     taking this totally out of context.

13        Q.   Am I?

14        A.   If we say that in the discriminatory message of the Koran is a

15     huge problem and if we, then, say that Islam is a collective psychosis

16     without reference to the particular problem that the Koran presents with

17     its inherently discriminatory message, then it would be necessary to

18     explain whether this collective psychosis reference refers to each and

19     every Muslim believer or to those who take the Koranic message in its

20     literalist sense.  This is where I think you have to look at it in the

21     totality of my piece and not in isolation.

22        Q.   All right.  Well, looking at it in that context, then, it would

23     make sense that people that are not Muslim should seek ways to defend

24     themselves, right, by disengaging from the world of Islam physically and

25     figuratively?

Page 25293

 1        A.   That --

 2        Q.   Does that make sense to you?

 3        A.   That disengagement is indeed something that I have long

 4     advocated, which is vastly different from attempts to intervene in the

 5     Muslim world and to "bring democracy to the Muslim world."  In fact, I

 6     think that from the civilisational point of view it is far more

 7     productive, far more promising of a peaceful discourse to disengage than

 8     to engage in the way that engagement has been practiced in Mesopotamia

 9     and Afghanistan.

10        Q.   All right.  So that means it would make sense to separate from

11     somebody from the Islamic faith, right?  Because that would be the most

12     practical solution to the problems that you've identified in Islam, isn't

13     it?

14        A.   It would indeed be the best advisible strategy for the western

15     world to deal with the problem of Jihad, not by trying to bring

16     counter-Jihad to the heartlands of Islam but to, indeed, disengage in the

17     way that would preclude open-ended military commitments that are only

18     helping the Jihadists obtain new recruits for their cause.

19        Q.   All right.  In your article dated January 26, 2007, this is

20     called Dines Vedemi [phoen], and that was published in Chronicles

21     Magazine, you say -- 65 ter 3693 for the record.  "It's never happened

22     before because" -- well, let me go back so I can put this in context.

23             "Now, think how amazing this is.  Has it ever happened in this

24     country - I'm not talking about some totalitarian country, but America -

25     has it ever happened that a prominent intellectual called on leading

Page 25294

 1     writers on a subject of major importance to stop writing what they are

 2     writing because it would offend someone?"  That's your question.  You

 3     answer it.  "No, this is has never happened before.  It has never

 4     happened before because it is only in response to Mohammedinism that

 5     westerners adopt the posture of preemptive surrender which Batjar calls

 6     mental dhimmitude.  Of all the social, ethnic, religious, political

 7     movements in the world, only Islam has the ability to evoke this eagerly

 8     cringing attitude.  Only Islam has this faculty of inducing people to

 9     surrender" --

10             THE INTERPRETER:  We need to look at the original of the text on

11     the screen in order to be able to interpret it correctly into B/C/S.

12     Thank you.  Because we don't see it on the transcript, either, because it

13     too fast.  Thank you.

14             MR. VANDERPUYE:

15        Q.   Okay.  If we could go -- it's on the second page -- or third page

16     of this document, and reading from paragraph 8, it's the third paragraph

17     in that series.  I'll start here where it says -- it's the third line

18     from bottom of the page on the screen:  "Of all the social, ethnic,

19     religious, political movements in the world, only Islam has the ability

20     to evoke this eagerly cringing attitude.  Only Islam has the faculty of

21     inducing people to surrender psychologically to it even before it has any

22     actual power over them."

23             You believe that, right?

24        A.   Well, in fact, this is -- that's yours, quote, but I agree with

25     it, that in fact the self-censorship that the elite class of the western

Page 25295

 1     world exercises when it comes to misogyny, violence, and the active

 2     attempt to change the liberal nature of the western society in order to

 3     accommodate the views and beliefs that are not shared by the overwhelming

 4     majority of the host population is, indeed, unprecedented.  I think that

 5     the level of self-censorship witnessed in connection with Muhamed's

 6     cartoons, for instance, or with the non-reporting of the dark side of

 7     family violence among the Muslim diaspora in western Europe and so on

 8     reflects this fundamental truth, that if there is any other social,

 9     ethnic, religious, or political movement that is guilty of such

10     transgressions, for instance, deep southern evangelical Christianists, or

11     in terms of ideologies, members of either far left or far right

12     movements, the level of public indignation of the media class and of

13     disclosure and unmasking of the facts of the case would be far greater.

14     I think that it is not even particularly unique nowadays to complain of

15     this tendency to self-censorship.  You will find it in articles by Stein

16     or by Robert Spencer, by -- in fact, it is beginning to come from both

17     the left and the right, that one does not help either the continuation of

18     the liberal character of the western society or the integration of the

19     Islamic community to gloss over the unpleasantness that is all too often

20     present.  And yet, the media editors prefer not to dwell on it because

21     not only is it tricky; it can be physically dangerous as unfortunately

22     Vince - I said almost Vincent van Gogh - the documentaries van Gogh found

23     to his peril on the streets of Amsterdam not a million miles from here a

24     few years back.

25        Q.   In your article, this one's dated 27th February, 2002.  It's

Page 25296

 1     called:  "Islamic Terrorism In Italy:  The shape Of Things To Come" by

 2     you.  That's 65 ter 3688.  If we could go to the bottom of the page.  Oh,

 3     wait a minute.  If we could go to page 3, please.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Microphone.

 6             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I'm sorry, Mr. President.  If we could just go

 7     to page 3.

 8        Q.   If we could -- all right.  You see this paragraph that leads

 9     "Britain leads the way"?

10        A.   Right.

11        Q.   Now, in the paragraph you mention in the second sentence of the

12     second paragraph below it where it says "Islamic law" --

13        A.   Mm-hm.

14        Q.   -- in brackets.  It says:  "In Britain today where Islam controls

15     the inner cities..."  Now, I'll grant you this article was written in

16     2002.  Now, when you make this reference to inner cities and Islam

17     controlling inner cities, do you have any particular cities in mind?

18        A.   Well, this is actually something that needs qualification.  The

19     inner cities does not refer to areas not inhabited by Muslims, but on the

20     other hand, there are significant areas of some inner cities,

21     specifically Leeds, Bradford, Birmingham, Leicester, parts of east

22     London, parts of other industrial cities in the midlands, such as lower

23     Hampton and also in Yorkshire that, indeed, exist de facto communities

24     under their own Islamic-based rule.  You will not find alcohol in any of

25     the shops, you will not find video stores that would offer material not

Page 25297

 1     to the liking of the adherence of Mohammed's faith, and you will find

 2     that there is a great deal of pressure on local people to conform to such

 3     an extent that even young Britons of Pakistani origin are very keen to

 4     leave such areas if they do not subscribe to the cultural assumptions and

 5     the lifestyle prevalent in them.  Again, to those of us who know

 6     circumstances in Britain, this I think is neither particularly new nor,

 7     indeed, remarkable.

 8        Q.   Well, Mr. Trifkovic, with all due respect, that's known in some

 9     circles as commercialism.  One does not sell what another will not buy,

10     and that's why you don't find these things in certain shops in all kinds

11     of places around the world.

12        A.   At the same time, those who would try to test the market for

13     alternative products which are not offered would soon find his shop

14     window smashed and his physical security jeopardised, and that is --

15        Q.   And that's what we call the mafia, and that exists all over the

16     world, too, Mr. Trifkovic.

17        A.   No, not if it is not motivated by commercial interest but by

18     idealogical convictions of the perpetrators, which by the way is similar

19     to what is it happening in France where young girls who in similar

20     suburbs of eastern valieus [phoen] of Paris do not wear the head scarf,

21     risk getting something called the "smile," which is a knife slash that

22     goes from the angle of the lip to the lower earlobe.  So no, it is not

23     the Mafia; it is fanaticism.

24        Q.   Let me ask you this question.  If we could go to page 5.  You see

25     that paragraph that leads "Meanwhile across the channel..."

Page 25298

 1        A.   Mm-hm.

 2        Q.   You write in this paragraph:  "In Germany, the highest Court in

 3     the land ruled in January 2002 that Muslim butchers should be allowed to

 4     slaughter animals according to Islamic practice by slitting their throats

 5     and letting them bleed to death and without stunning them first in any

 6     way.  German law says animals cannot be slaughtered without first being

 7     stunned, but the constitutional court has now overturned it.  The head of

 8     Germany's Islamic counsel Hassan Hosjogan [phoen] declared that this will

 9     be an important step in the integration of Muslims in Germany."  You then

10     write:  "If and when the constitutional court allows a clitoridectomy for

11     Germany's Muslim girls, presumably another important step will be made,

12     but that integration will be complete only when Pakistanis in Britain,

13     Algerians in France, and Turks in Germany turn the host country into an

14     Islamic society by compelling it to adapt to their way of life."

15             You wrote that, right?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And you believe it?

18        A.   Believe what specifically?

19        Q.   Well, you believe that the only way that a Muslim person can

20     integrate into a Christian society is by turning the Christian society

21     into one that is based on Islamic law, right?

22        A.   I'm not saying it is the Islamic activists that are saying it,

23     that the only end product of their activism is the complete triumph of

24     Dar al-Islam over Dar al-Harb and if you doubt that this is indeed the

25     self-proclaimed objective of each and every Islamic activist in the

Page 25299

 1     world, given the sufficient time I would be more than happy to supply you

 2     with ample quotes that settle the matter beyond any doubt.  This is not

 3     suggesting that all Pakistanis in Britain, Algerians in France, and Turks

 4     in Germany are sharing such views.  In fact, specifically for the Turks

 5     in Germany I would say it is, indeed, a minority.  But I'm suggesting and

 6     I still stand behind this view that making legal exceptions and

 7     exemptions for a religious group in order to accommodate its particular

 8     demands only feeds appetites for further demands which are ultimately

 9     unlimited in scope and nature.

10        Q.   Well, thank you very much for that, Mr. Trifkovic.  I do

11     appreciate your candor.

12        A.   Thank you.

13        Q.   I have no questions for you.

14             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Vanderpuye.  Mr. Ostojic, do you

16     have any re-examination?

17             MR. OSTOJIC:  I do not, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  That's -- do you have any questions?

19     Do you have?

20             Mr. Trifkovic, that means that we have come to the end of your

21     testimony.  I was wrong in the beginning when I imagined you will be with

22     us again tomorrow, but I'm sure you are happier.  On behalf of the Trial

23     Chamber, I wish to thank you for having come over, and on behalf of

24     everyone present here I also wish you a safe journey back home.

25             THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Your Honour.

Page 25300

 1                           [The witness withdrew]

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Documents?

 3             MR. OSTOJIC:  We've sent the list around, but I think it is just

 4     2D531 that we'll be requesting.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Any objections?

 6             MR. VANDERPUYE:  There's no objection, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Any objection from the other Defence teams?  None?

 8     So admitted.  Mr. Krgovic, you didn't use any documents so as of

 9     course...

10             MR. KRGOVIC:  Same documents, so...

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yeah, but apart from that, in other words, you

12     haven't used anything else.  Mr. Vanderpuye?

13             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Just bear with me for

14     one second.  I'm sorry.  I'm just going through the list.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, of course.

16             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  We tender 65 ter 3678

17     through -- 3678 through 3690, and then 3693.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Any objections?

19             MR. OSTOJIC:  We have to take a closer -- thank you.  I'm not

20     sure that -- you know, if they want to bring in the articles, I don't

21     have an objection to that if that's their point, but I don't know with

22     respect to 3690 through 3693.  I do have an objection to 3691 and 3692.

23     I guess 3693 -- you're not offering that?  I have to maybe have a

24     clarification.  Through 3690 and then 3693, no objection, Your Honour.  I

25     read it now.  I have no objection.  Thank you.

Page 25301

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  I thought you were misreading it.

 2             MR. OSTOJIC:  I was.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.  So those documents are also

 4     admitted.  Now, before we adjourn, what is the position about tomorrow?

 5             MR. OSTOJIC:  We -- Professor Wagenaar, obviously we haven't been

 6     in contact with him since his testimony.  He was instructed to be here on

 7     Monday.  With the scheduling, we really don't have any witnesses in town

 8     to present to the Court, and I apologise for that.  We just envisioned

 9     that -- as I tried to suggest on Wednesday, I believe, that we may have a

10     gap and maybe we should start Professor Wagenaar on Friday because I

11     envisioned possibly a shortened Mr. Trifkovic or an overlapping one.  We

12     do not have any witnesses here in The Hague to present for the Court

13     tomorrow, so I do apologise for that.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  I was expecting to hear something different.  I

15     mentioned specifically before the last break what's going to happen

16     tomorrow in the hope that you will take the hint and during the break try

17     to contact Professor Wagenaar.

18             MR. OSTOJIC:  I took the Court's hint, and my intern who we gave

19     the two days off because we're scheduled to meet on Sunday morning to

20     prepare, we're trying to get a hold of her and have someone from the

21     victim and witness unit call Professor Wagenaar.  We haven't been able to

22     accomplish that.  We just can't get ahold of him, nor did we -- I

23     personally didn't try to call him, but we have called our intern who was

24     here, and I know we have scheduled for her to meet with me Sunday morning

25     to go over the transcript and the testimony.  That was yesterday when we

Page 25302

 1     finished with him.  So we can continue to try this evening, and I can get

 2     back to the Court on that.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  In the meantime, of course, everyone else, all your

 4     colleagues, Prosecution, forget ourselves because we will be here in any

 5     case, but everyone else will have to come here and wait to see what's

 6     going to happen in the morning, whether we are sitting or not sitting.

 7     This is what I purposely tried to avoid.  Yes, one moment.

 8                           [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  And in particular, Madam Registrar is also drawing

10     our attention to the accused because to come here they have to wake up

11     early.

12             MR. OSTOJIC:  Mr. President, I suggested I think on Wednesday

13     that Professor Wagenaar does continue to testify on Friday, and with all

14     due respect to you, I think you mentioned at least two separate occasions

15     and specifically to the witness that he recommence on Monday, and I --

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  That's because you told me that you required the

17     full day for Trifkovic and another full day was required by the

18     Prosecution, and then Mr. Zivanovic wanted one hour which was -- or 45

19     minutes which then reduced to 10 and which resulted into nothing today.

20     We can't go on like this.  One moment.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  I hope we've made ourselves pretty well understood.

23     Last thing we want to do is to complicate matters, and at least this

24     Trial Chamber as composed tries to be as pragmatic as possible.  In our

25     mind, we have got two concerns, that this kind of occurrence should be

Page 25303

 1     avoided.  The second concern is the Nikolic Defence team, that by Monday

 2     first thing in the morning need to know exactly from you, Mr. Ostojic,

 3     when you will definitely be concluding your case so that they can start

 4     theirs.

 5             So what we are going to do, we are going to adjourn until Monday

 6     when Professor Wagenaar will continue his evidence.  I don't want to keep

 7     everyone else hanging until tomorrow morning, come over here, and then go

 8     back; the accused wake up at 7 and are brought here only to be taken back

 9     after I don't know how many hours waiting for transport.  It's simply not

10     done.  It's an inconvenience, which should be avoided at all costs.

11             So we'll reconvene Monday morning, no -- Monday morning, Monday

12     the 8th at 9 o'clock with Professor Wagenaar, and you need to tell us

13     Monday morning before we start with his testimony all your definitive

14     plans indicating the day of completion of your case, when you will rest

15     your case.

16             MR. OSTOJIC:  And we will do that, and we will send out a

17     schedule as we do on Thursdays, which I think we already did.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yeah.  That, we have received.

19             MR. OSTOJIC:  My only troubling fact is I don't know how to rely

20     on the estimates by the other parties and the Prosecution to give you a

21     definitive.  I think we can reasonably conclude on Thursday of next week.

22     At the outset, I believe we will conclude by Friday.  The only concern is

23     that DutchBat individual who I'm in conversation with my learned friends

24     to see if we can resolve that.  Our case wouldn't technically close

25     because we have two witnesses that will b e coming during the case of the

Page 25304

 1     Miletic case just so that the Court is aware of it.  But I think by

 2     Friday we will have -- our case should close with the exception of the

 3     DutchBat individual and obviously the two witnesses we've previously

 4     provided notice to the Court and our learned friends who are calling on

 5     direct as well.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.

 7                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 8th day of

 9                           September 2008, at 9 a.m.