1 Monday, 6 October 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, everybody, and good morning to you,
6 Madam Registrar. Could you call the case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
8 IT-05-88-T, The Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic, et al.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you, ma'am.
10 All the accused are present. Prosecution, it's Mr. McCloskey and
11 Mr. Vanderpuye who are present today. Amongst the Defence teams, I
12 notice the absence of Mr. Nikolic from the Beara team, Mr. Bourgon from
13 the Nikolic team, Mr. Petrusic from the Miletic team, and that's it.
14 Today we are going to start -- do you have any preliminaries by
15 the way? I am informed that we are to expect some filings from the
16 Prosecution in response to some of the Borovcanin motions; is that
18 MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm told we filed some motions on Friday, three.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. Thank you.
20 Yes, Mr. Gosnell.
21 MR. GOSNELL: Your Honour, one preliminary in relation to that.
22 We plan to be filing a reply in response to the motion in respect of
23 protective measures. So we would kindly request that the Chamber hold
24 off for a couple of days so that we have an opportunity to make that
1 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Okay. Thank you.
2 So today we start with the Borovcanin Defence. Is there going to
3 be an opening statement?
4 Yes, Mr. Gosnell.
5 MR. GOSNELL: Yes, Your Honour. There will be an opening
7 JUDGE AGIUS: How long do you intend to be speaking?
8 MR. GOSNELL: I hope not to exceed 45 minutes, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. Go ahead.
10 MR. GOSNELL: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.
11 I am privileged to appear before you this morning to present the
12 opening statement on behalf of Mr. Ljubomir Borovcanin. Your Honours, at
13 the risk of oversimplifying a very complicated and extensive indictment,
14 Mr. Borovcanin is essentially charged with two overarching crimes:
15 Forcibly transferring the civilian population of Srebrenica and mass
16 murdering the military aged men of Srebrenica.
17 The Prosecution says that is he committed these crimes as part of
18 a joint criminal enterprise to which he contributed by allowing men under
19 his command to assist with the evacuation of Potocari on the 12th and
20 13th of July, knowing that the civilians had been, and were being,
21 coerced to leave.
22 As to the mass murder and genocide charge, the Prosecution
23 alleges that Mr. Borovcanin allowed his units to assist in the separation
24 of military aged men at Potocari, knowing that they were going to be
25 killed. They also alleged that he assisted and ordered his units to take
1 prisoners along the Konjevic Polje road on the 13th of July, again
2 knowing that they would all be killed, not only knowing that they would
3 all be killed, but intending that they would all be killed.
4 Your Honours, the case against Mr. Borovcanin is based upon the
5 fallacy of omniscience. The Prosecution imputes to Mr. Borovcanin
6 knowledge of everything that happened in Srebrenica before his arrival
7 there on the 11th of July, and they impute to him knowledge of everything
8 that would happen after the 12th and 13th of July.
9 Now, the Prosecution is, of course, perfectly entitled to build
10 case on inference, to invite you to draw inferences as to his state of
11 mind and his state of knowledge based upon his conduct. But to establish
12 that he knew and intended that these mass killings would occur, and that
13 he was participating in them, they must show you that that is the only
14 reasonable conclusion consistent with his actions.
15 In our view, the evidence presented by the Prosecution does not
16 show that. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Mr. Borovcanin did
17 his best to act lawfully and honourably despite the difficult
18 circumstances that he was facing and that were not of his creation.
19 We have nevertheless decided, even though we believe that already
20 the evidence is not sufficient, to offer additional evidence on limited
21 topics, hoping that it will assist you to understand Mr. Borovcanin's
22 position at the time and the circumstances that he was facing.
23 Our evidence will focus on five issues: First, the nature of
24 Mr. Borovcanin's authority as a MUP commander assigned to a VRS zone of
25 responsibility; second, the ad hoc and transitory nature of his command
1 to the units that he had not previously commanded without the assistance
2 of any command staff or even a deputy commander; third, the character of
3 the units assigned to him, which included a group of ill-trained
4 deserters; fourth, the limited scope of his involvement in relation to
5 prisoners of war; and, fifth, the nature of the military threat facing
6 his units on the ground and the reasonableness of detaining large numbers
7 of military aged men in civilian clothing from the enclave.
8 What I propose to do in this opening statement, Your Honours, is
9 to summarize the Prosecution case, and to highlight for you the specific
10 areas on which we will be presenting evidence. We believe that this
11 summary is indispensable to understanding the relevance of the
12 information that you'll be hearing, particularly because there are many
13 aspects of the Prosecution case that we do not dispute. Our point of
14 disagreement with the Prosecution is their characterization of what
15 Mr. Borovcanin knew and what reasonable inferences you, as a Trial
16 Chamber, can draw from the circumstances about what he must have known.
17 Let me start with the forcible transfer charge. You'll recall,
18 Your Honours, that the Prosecution alleges that the criminal effort to
19 forcibly transfer the civilian population of Srebrenica starts in
20 March 1995. According to the Prosecution, supplies are progressively cut
21 off to the enclave with the intention of forcing the civilians to leave.
22 That effort then, according to the Prosecution, escalates on the 6th of
23 July or about the 6th of July, when an armed defensive was commenced at
24 least in part, according to the Prosecution, to terrorize the civilian
25 population into leaving. This effort culminates in the takeover of
1 Srebrenica town on the 11th of July.
2 Now, Your Honours, what was Mr. Borovcanin doing throughout this
3 period from March 1995 through the 11th of July 1995? How was he
4 contributing to this alleged joint criminal enterprise? In fact,
5 throughout that period, Mr. Borovcanin was 200 kilometres away engaged in
6 intense combat with Bosnian armed forces in the area around Sarajevo
7 was the deputy commander at the time and through July 1995 of the Special
8 Police Brigade. As you'll hear from our first witness, Dr. Bajagic, the
9 special police was a component of the Ministry Of The Interior akin to
10 the gendarme or the carabinieri. Their purpose in peacetime was to
11 respond to extreme civil unrest such as riots. During the war, however,
12 they could be, and often were, deployed in combat. While in combat, they
13 ceased to have any civil policing function and were subject to military
14 command and military rules.
15 From March 1995 until the 10th of July, Mr. Borovcanin was in the
16 area of Sarajevo
17 involvement in the affairs of Srebrenica during that time. He received
18 no orders, he received no planning documents, he received no reports.
19 And, in fairness, the Prosecution hasn't suggested otherwise.
20 On the 10th of July, he received an order from the MUP staff
21 commander that he should go to Srebrenica to assist in combat tasks. The
22 order indicated that the units -- the order indicated the units that
23 would be under his command, and specifically directed him to report to
24 General Krstic. This was in accordance with the usual procedure and
25 applicable legislation. When acting in a combat role, MUP units were
1 resubordinated to the VRS command in whose zone of responsibility they
2 were to be deployed.
3 Mr. Borovcanin followed this order, arriving in Bratunac on the
4 11th of July early in the afternoon. None of the units that were
5 supposed to be assigned to him had yet arrived. He then went up to the
6 Drina Corps forward command post at Pribicevac trying to obtain orders.
7 He received some general instructions at that time from General Mladic
8 over the telephone, and then returned to Bratunac. By then it was late
9 afternoon, and the first of his three units that would eventually arrive
10 had had arrived at that time. He sent them to the place where they would
11 be billeted over night, and did not issue them any tasks or orders in
12 relation to Potocari or Srebrenica.
13 As it turned out, Mr. Borovcanin would not receive a concrete
14 combat task until late on the evening of the 11th when he went and
15 reconnoitered the terrain around Zuti Most. By this time, Your Honours,
16 the Srebrenica enclave had already fallen.
17 General Mladic, as you've seen on the trial video, had already
18 strolled down the main street of Srebrenica town. The inhabitants of
19 Srebrenica had already fled to Potocari, or they had assembled as part of
20 the column and were preparing to break through towards Tuzla
21 seen the video of the chaos and the panic that already prevailed in the
22 afternoon of the 11th of July. You have seen the displacement of the
23 population to the factories in Potocari. All of this happens before
24 Mr. Borovcanin has come near Potocari, much less issued any orders in
25 support of any operation in relation to Srebrenica.
1 Something else significant happens before Mr. Borovcanin has done
2 anything in support of operations around Potocari. Colonel Karremans
3 arrives at the Hotel Fontana on the evening of the 11th, and conveys a
4 request to General Mladic that he says has come from the Bosnian
5 government and from UNPROFOR that the refugees should be evacuated.
6 You've seen that very request on the trial video. Now, why is this
7 significant? It's significant, Your Honours, because it shows that the
8 die has already been cast by the evening of the 11th of July. Whatever
9 has happened to induce the refugees to leave Srebrenica had already
10 happened and without any involvement or assistance of Mr. Borovcanin.
11 The evacuation of the refugees by that point is an inevitability
12 supported even by UNPROFOR and the Bosnian government.
13 Now, as I just mentioned, late on the evening of the 11th of
14 July, Mr. Borovcanin finally receives an order about what he will be
15 doing the next day. He is told to prepare to secure the northern
16 approaches to Potocari. On the morning of the 12th of July,
17 Mr. Borovcanin follows that order and goes to Zuti Most. The three units
18 that were assigned to him have arrived or do arrive and deploy to that
19 area. Two of the units are MUP units: The 2nd Sekovici Detachment of
20 the Special Police Brigade and the 1st PJP Company of the Zvornik Public
21 Security Centre. We've already mentioned the Special Police Brigade.
22 PJP units, as Dr. Bajagic will explain, are comprised of local police
23 officers from a particular area who can be formed into a combat unit and
24 deployed in combat.
25 The third unit assigned to Mr. Borovcanin, as you'll hear during
1 our case, was not even a unit in the true sense of the term. It was just
2 a group of deserters who at that moment happened to be undergoing
3 training at the MUP training facility in Jahorina. They were deserters
4 in the true sense of the term. All of them had been arrested in Serbia
5 or Montenegro
6 poorly trained and poorly motivated. All told, these three units under
7 Mr. Borovcanin's command consisted of 250 men approximately.
8 Now, one of the matters in which you will hear testimony from our
9 expert witnesses is the ad hoc nature of Mr. Borovcanin's command. These
10 three units were cobbled together extemporaneously and had never
11 previously cooperated in a joint operation. They are put under his
12 command temporarily. He has no command staff to assist him, he has no
13 security organ, he has no logistics. He doesn't even have military
14 lawyers to advise him on the legality of the orders that is he receiving
15 at this time. He has no choice but to rely on the VRS commander in whose
16 area of responsibility he is assigned, for logistical support, security
17 support, and perhaps, most importantly, for information.
18 Mr. Borovcanin himself spends most of that morning on the 12th of
19 July between Zuti Most and Potocari, while his units move through the
20 terrain on either side of the road. You've already heard some evidence
21 during the Prosecution case about that movement. For the most part, we
22 do not contest that evidence. Their task is to ensure that no BiH army
23 forces are in the area. Now, remember, at this stage, the whereabouts of
24 the 28th Division of the BiH army is unknown to the Serb forces.
25 You will hear during our case from three members of the 1st PJP
1 Company who confirm that they arrived at Zuti Most, that there were no
2 hostilities there with UNPROFOR forces, that they moved through the
3 terrain to the west of the road, that a soldier from the Bratunac Brigade
4 was seriously injured by a land mine, and that having found no sign of
5 Muslim forces, they return to the main road between Bratunac and
6 Potocari, and that after waiting there for some period of time, they
7 returned to Bratunac before being redeployed north along the
8 Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road. Neither the 1st PJP Company, nor the
9 2nd Sekovici Detachment, had any involvement in the evacuation or
10 separation of men in Potocari.
11 Mr. Borovcanin himself moved up the main road towards Potocari,
12 and he arrived there late in the morning of the 12th of July. He sees
13 there an enormous crowd of civilians who are unmistakably waiting,
14 waiting to be taken away, waiting to be evacuated, in fact, desperate to
15 be evacuated. That's precisely what has already been agreed to by
16 UNPROFOR, the VRS, and the Bosnian government.
17 At some point around this time, Mr. Borovcanin has what, I think,
18 can be fairly characterized as a verbal altercation with General Mladic.
19 I won't remind you of the epithet Mladic uses to describe the MUP,
20 according to PW-160. In any event, Mladic orders Borovcanin to deploy
21 his two combat worthy units along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road in
22 case the column of the 28th Division should attempt to go in that
23 direction. Mladic also orders Mr. Borovcanin to leave behind his
24 deserters unit in Potocari, to assist with the evacuation that he says
25 has been agreed to.
1 Now, let's be clear how important Mr. Borovcanin's response is
2 from the Prosecution's perspective. According to the Prosecution theory,
3 Mr. Borovcanin allowed his men to be used in the evacuation, not only to
4 ensure the deportation and forcible transfer, but also to assist with the
5 separation of the military-aged men, and I quote from paragraph 43 of the
6 indictment: "... with full knowledge that those men would be summarily
8 Now, the Prosecution did not present any evidence showing that
9 Mr. Borovcanin had been informed of any such thing. He wasn't at the
10 Hotel Fontana meetings; he wasn't having private meetings with Generals
11 Mladic or Krstic or Blagojevic; and as you'll hear from our expert
12 Dr. Ristivojevic, his units had no particular role or responsibility in
13 respect of prisoners of war.
14 What the Prosecution is really saying is that leaving behind the
15 Jahorina deserters for the purpose of the separations itself shows you
16 that he had the knowledge and the intent of what was going -- of these
17 criminal acts that are alleged. It also serves the purpose of showing
18 not only that the detentions and the executions were going to take place,
19 but that the forcible transfer was taking place. In other words, by this
20 single action, two JCEs are conveniently established.
21 Now, if any of us had been a lawyer on Mr. Borovcanin's
22 nonexistent staff on the morning of the 12th of July, and we were asked
23 to give an opinion on the legality of an order to assist with that
24 evacuation which so we were told had been agreed to by the Bosnian
25 government, by UNPROFOR, what would we have been able to say? Would we
1 have really been able to say, "No, Mr. Borovcanin, you must not
2 participate in this action because civilians may have been over the last
3 week, over the last month, over the last several months, intimidated or
4 coerced or otherwise improperly induced to leave"? Could we really say
5 to him, "No, you can't participate," notwithstanding the circumstances of
6 thousands of civilians who are desperate to leave? How would our
7 analysis been affected if we knew that, in 1993, hundreds of civilians
8 had been evacuated under the aegis of UNPROFOR and UNHCR?
9 Well, we'll leave the answer to those questions, Your Honours,
10 for closing arguments, but the point is that Mr. Borovcanin had complied
11 with the order. He directed the commander of the Jahorina deserters to
12 remain behind to assist in the evacuation. Evidence presented during the
13 Prosecution case shows that Momir Nikolic then took charge of directing
14 the evacuation operation. He was effectively in command of that unit
15 during those two days.
16 Now, what did Mr. Borovcanin see at Potocari while he was there
17 on the 12th and 13th of July? Was there anything in the manner of the
18 detention or separation that would have suggested that all those men were
19 going to be slaughtered? Well, let's consider what Mr. Borovcanin could
20 have seen on the 12th and 13th of July in Potocari.
21 He left Potocari on the 12th before the separations began. He
22 didn't return until the 13th, when he came back with the journalist for
23 about half an hour to deal with the issue of the stolen water truck. On
24 the 13th of July, as you've seen from the videotape shot that day,
25 Mr. Borovcanin would have seen the men of military age being detained in
1 a house opposite the DutchBat compound. But there's absolutely nothing
2 improper or inappropriate in detaining suspected combatants, even if they
3 are wearing civilian clothes. International humanitarian law allows
4 that. In fact, reasonable grounds existed to presume that, in July 1995,
5 all the men of military age were at least potentially combatants.
6 We will present some of the very large number, the surprisingly
7 large number, of BiH army documents showing that, by July 1995, the
8 Srebrenica enclave was, to a very large extent, an armed camp. The
9 purpose of this evidence, Your Honours, is not to establish any tu quoque
10 way Defence. The purpose of this evidence, rather, is to show that it
11 would have been entirely normal and prudent to detain every military-aged
12 person leaving Srebrenica at that time.
13 We will tender documents showing that the BiH Army had at least
14 6.000 armed combatants in Srebrenica, with as many as 10.000 more unarmed
15 or periodically armed; that these men were organised into units, with
16 defined zones of responsibility and specialists tasks; that teenagers as
17 young as 15 years old were being inducted into the military; and that
18 combatants often wore civilian clothing.
19 The need for uniforms was so extreme, and the number required was
20 so enormous, that on the 4th of June, Ramiz Becirovic, the Chief of Staff
21 of the 28th Division in Srebrenica, sent a request for 7.000 uniforms to
22 the 2nd Corps of the BiH Army. In this context, Your Honours, the
23 detention of all military-aged men, would not, and should not have set
24 off alarm bells that they were all going to be killed.
25 Apart from this, the Prosecution points to the conditions of
1 detention and the wholesale confiscation of belongings to suggest that
2 this should have been evident. Again, Mr. Borovcanin's opportunity to
3 observe that was limited. You yourselves have already seen about as much
4 as Mr. Borovcanin could have seen on the 13th of July during the half
5 hour that he was there. You see men crowded into the so-called White
6 House, their belongings dumped on the ground outside. The grainy video
7 of those men crowded together is a chilling sight in light of what we now
8 know happened to many of them; but, at the time, nothing in those
9 conditions would have indicated that they were all going to be executed
10 en masse.
11 Now, you've heard other evidence about violent acts taking place
12 in Potocari on the 12th and 13th of July, about identification cards
13 being burned or confiscated. We dispute these events occurred in the
14 manner described by the Prosecution. But even if you accept that they
15 did occur, there is simply no evidence whatsoever showing that
16 Mr. Borovcanin observed these alleged incidents.
17 Now, would it be natural to expect that he would be informed
18 about those incidents? Well, Your Honours, as I previously mentioned,
19 Momir Nikolic was in effective command of the men that he had left
20 behind. Mr. Borovcanin had no particular role in regulating the
21 detention of prisoners of war, and that will be confirmed by Dr.
22 Ristivojevic who will explain that his units, in light of their lack of
23 support, would only have responsibility at the point of surrender of a
25 On the 12th and 13th of July, Mr. Borovcanin was primarily
1 preoccupied with deploying his units along the Konjevic Polje Road. Why
2 was he doing that? He was doing that because there was a huge column
3 consisting of between 12 and 15.000 people, many of whom were members of
4 the 28th Division, and amongst whom 6 or 7.000 were armed. They were
5 heading north parallel to the road between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje.
6 Throughout the night of the 12th to the 13th, the road was an
7 active combat zone. You've already heard some evidence about that
8 fighting. You will hear more about it from three members of the PJP unit
9 assigned there, two of whom were seriously wounded on the morning of
10 the 13th.
11 Now, that day, on the 13th, members of the Bosnian column started
12 to surrender. Some were detained at the Sandici meadow. As you recall,
13 General Mladic arrives, telling the men that they will be exchanged and
14 sent to Kladanj or Tuzla
15 finishes speaking and proceeds north up the road. The prisoners are then
16 apparently escorted or bused south from the meadow to the Kravica
18 The Prosecution's theory is that Mr. Borovcanin organised the
19 detention of those men with the intention that they should be killed.
20 They also allege that they were, in fact, killed by Mr. Borovcanin's
21 subordinates at the Kravica warehouse. The cornerstone of the
22 Prosecution case is the fact that Mr. Borovcanin passed in front of the
23 Kravica warehouse on the afternoon of the 13th and saw bodies there, as
24 you've seen from the Petrovic videotape.
25 Let's consider a few aspects of this evidence, in particular as
1 it relates to the critical issue of Mr. Borovcanin's intent. First,
2 let's remember that Mr. Borovcanin walked into an interview with the
3 Office of the Prosecutor in 2002, initially without a lawyer, and freely
4 admitted that. He placed himself on the scene and said what he had seen.
5 This is not the admission of a person -- this is not the admission a
6 person is likely to make if they had participated and intended those
8 Now, the Prosecutor dismisses this, saying that Mr. Borovcanin
9 had no choice but to make that admission. You remember during their
10 opening statement, they indicated, and I quote: "Of course, he had to.
11 It was on film, and it was acknowledged." Your Honours, where did that
12 videotape come from? Mr. Borovcanin gave them that videotape.
13 Let me say that again. The videotape showing the bodies in front
14 of the Kravica warehouse was provided by Mr. Borovcanin at a time when
15 the OTP did not have it. In other words, the very cornerstone, the crux
16 of the Prosecution case is based on something that Mr. Borovcanin
17 admitted and then supplied clear evidence was true.
18 Mr. Borovcanin further explained in his interview that he stopped
19 at the driveway to the warehouse compound, which is some distance down
20 the road from the shots that you have seen on the video; that he was told
21 that there had been an attempt by prisoners to escape; and that the
22 people who had done the killings at the warehouse were not from the
23 police. He then got back into his car and drove to Bratunac where he
24 understood one of his officers was wounded.
25 The Prosecution asks you to infer from these acts that
1 Mr. Borovcanin intended that those men should all be killed, and that he
2 was part of a joint criminal enterprise to that end.
3 Your Honours, the Prosecution position defies common sense for
4 several reasons. First, there is Mr. Borovcanin's own conduct in his
5 interviews with the Office of the Prosecutor. The open avowal of what he
6 saw when he did not have to is hardly the conduct of a man who actually
7 did intend those killings.
8 Second, Mr. Borovcanin was accompanied throughout the 13th of
9 July by a journalist with a video camera who was filming indiscriminately
10 whatever he saw. The Prosecution dismisses this individual as a
11 quasi-journalist. Well, the point is, Your Honours, this individual was
12 from a respected television station and he had a video camera. If
13 Mr. Borovcanin had the intent that there would be massacres of Muslim
14 detainees when he drove from Potocari, where he was dealing with the
15 tank, up to Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road, would he really have taken
16 someone with a video camera; or would he, rather, have simply dropped
17 that person off in Bratunac on his way to the area?
18 The Prosecution also alleges that Mr. Borovcanin had a duty to
19 intervene based on what he saw at that moment at the warehouse, and they
20 seem to suggest that not only does this establish responsibility under
21 Article 7(3) as a superior, but also from that failure to intervene that
22 you should infer his intent that those killings should take place.
23 Your Honours, the evidence does suggest that there were two
24 member of the 2nd Sekovici Detachment at the warehouse. According to
25 hearsay evidence presented during the Prosecution case, one of them was
1 named Krsto Dragicevic, and he asked to be relieved of his duties along
2 the road where he was deployed, so that he could speak to the detainees
3 about the fate of his father, who apparently had disappeared in the area
4 sometime before. His commander, Rade Cuturic, perhaps concerned about
5 what he might do, accompanied him.
6 Now, Mr. Borovcanin, of course, does not know about this sequence
7 of events. He is north on the road between Sandici and Konjevic Polje.
8 The Prosecution theory of what happens next is that there is an
9 execution, a planned execution at the Kravica warehouse, and that after
10 this execution has started, the prisoners surge out, managed to grab a
11 gun, kill Krsto, and injure Cuturic.
12 Now, Mr. Borovcanin, when he does arrive back at the warehouse
13 later on, is told something different. He is told that the prisoners, as
14 I've mentioned earlier, had attempted to escape, and that no police were
15 involved in the killings.
16 The Prosecution presented no evidence showing which of these two
17 accounts is correct. They presented no evidence about what happened to
18 initiate the shooting. What we do know is that Mr. Borovcanin received
19 frantic calls over his Motorola. He did not himself hear Cuturic's voice
20 because he was out of range. All he heard was a response by someone at
21 Sandici meadow.
22 This is in Mr. Borovcanin's own statement, it's tentatively
23 confirmed by Mr. Petrovic, and we will corroborate that evidence by
24 presenting you with the results of field tests showing that a Motorola
25 signal could not be heard between the Kravica warehouse and the position
1 where Mr. Borovcanin was located.
2 Now, by the time Mr. Borovcanin passes by the warehouse, Krsto is
3 already dead, and Cuturic is on his way back to Bratunac with the injured
4 hands. So, at least these two subordinates, or alleged subordinates, of
5 Mr. Borovcanin, are not committing crimes at the warehouse.
6 No evidence was presented during the Prosecution case showing
7 that Mr. Borovcanin's other men were there at the warehouse, much less
8 that he should have known that they were there. On the contrary, the
9 evidence suggests that his units were not in control of the Kravica
10 warehouse. They were spread out along the road further to the north
11 preventing the column from crossing the road.
12 You've also heard evidence that it was not the police who
13 escorted the prisoners from the meadow, but that it was others; and you
14 also have the testimony from one of the Muslim survivors at the
15 warehouse, who said that the people at the warehouse guarding them were
16 not the same as the ones guarding them at Sandici meadow.
17 Your Honours, the Prosecution has also alleged, or perhaps just
18 implied, that the warehouse was in an area controlled by Mr. Borovcanin's
19 units, and for which he is therefore responsible. This is both factually
20 and legally incorrect. Our experts will demonstrate that MUP units were
21 not assigned distinct areas of responsibility in the military sense;
22 rather, they were inserted into pre-existing areas of responsibility of
23 the army units. The notion that the warehouse was within a MUP zone of
24 responsibility is simply wrong.
25 Second, you'll hear, also from our experts, that members of the
1 Special Police, including Mr. Borovcanin, did not have ranks in 1995, in
2 July 1995. He was not an officer, much less a superior officer. His
3 sole authority was to command police officers in his units. He had no
4 authority whatsoever to order any other soldier to do or not do anything.
5 Then, Your Honours, leaving aside these deficiencies concerning
6 who perpetrated the killings at Kravica warehouse, how it happened, and
7 whether Mr. Borovcanin had any authority to intervene, we take issue with
8 a more fundamental problem. The Prosecution argues that Mr. Borovcanin's
9 failure to investigate further shows his intent. This is fundamentally
10 contrary to basic principles of criminal law, not to mention human
11 nature. Failing to make further inquiry to determine whether a crime has
12 been committed cannot be equated with the intent to commit that crime.
13 This is not a case where an accused sees his subordinates
14 repeatedly commit crimes. This is a case of a single event bursting on
15 the accused suddenly, where he has no basis to believe at the time that
16 his men are involved, and, further, where he has no authority to
17 intervene. Now, failing to intervene under those circumstances cannot
18 lead to the inference that Mr. Borovcanin intended the commission of
19 those crimes; and, in fact, you will hear evidence from two witnesses who
20 will describe Mr. Borovcanin's reaction late on the afternoon of the 13th
21 of July when he arrives back in Bratunac.
22 Mr. Borovcanin arrived at the Bratunac police station in a very
23 agitated state and asked to be connected to the Bratunac Brigade
24 headquarters. His duty, as you'll hear from our experts, while
25 subordinated to the VRS, was to report any criminal conduct to his
1 military superiors. Even assuming, which we do not accept, that anyone
2 from the 2nd Sekovici Detachment may have been involved at the Kravica
3 warehouse unbeknownst to Mr. Borovcanin, his primary duty was to report
4 what he knew about the commission or possible commission of crimes up his
5 chain of command.
6 As you will also hear from our experts, responsibility for
7 further investigations and, if necessary, Prosecution, rested with the
8 brigade authorities. That was prescribed by regulation but, more
9 importantly, it's also reasonable and sensible in light of the transitory
10 nature of Mr. Borovcanin's command. He doesn't have resources to
11 undertake investigations, and he doesn't have jurisdiction over anyone
12 other than his own men. In that context, it's more suitable that such
13 reporting and such investigations occur to the brigade.
14 Now, what about the alleged Krstic intercept? We will not be
15 adducing any specific evidence on this. We contest that the person with
16 whom General Krstic is speaking is Mr. Borovcanin. But even if it were
17 Mr. Borovcanin, we think that when you view this rather anodyne
18 conversation in light of the totality of the evidence, it hardly shows
19 that Mr. Borovcanin was engaging in a broad criminal conspiracy to
20 execute thousands of Muslim civilians or detainees.
21 Your Honours, you are also going to hear or read evidence of the
22 good character of Mr. Borovcanin. This is a man who has, and I quote, "a
23 warrior's sense of honour"; a man who tries to find, and I quote again,
24 "common sense compromises in times of crisis to avoid violence." Those
25 are not my words, Your Honours; that's the opinion of an American general
1 who worked with Mr. Borovcanin during the implementation of the Dayton
3 In conclusion, Your Honours, our case is about adding context and
4 perspective to the evidence that has already been presented by the
5 Prosecution. We are confident that once you have the benefit of all that
6 evidence, you will see that Mr. Borovcanin did not intend mass murder,
7 that he did not intend forcible transfer, and that he did not intend any
8 of the other crimes alleged against him.
9 He was trying his best to deal with the humanitarian consequences
10 of the takeover of territory on which there were 30.000 civilians who
11 were terrified and desperate to leave. At the same time, he was trying
12 to fulfill combat duties that had been assigned to him in response to a
13 credible and real combat threat. This naturally involved taking
14 prisoners. This is a normal, if perhaps unpleasant consequence of
15 combat, and very serious crimes were subsequently committed against those
17 But to lay that at the feet of Mr. Borovcanin, to say that he
18 knew about that in advance without any meaningful evidence and by
19 conflating his cooperation with others in the military affairs, the
20 military offensive, is unjust and unfair. It verges, in fact, on an
21 attempt to impose collective responsibility for those crimes without
22 bothering with the essential elements of criminal responsibility such as
23 individual intent.
24 Your Honours, I'm relatively new to this case, and I wish to
25 repeat that I'm honoured to be here before you and amongst respected
1 colleagues, and I'm also deeply honoured to represent Mr. Borovcanin and
2 to have had this opportunity to address you on his behalf.
3 Thank you.
4 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Gosnell.
5 Now, I think we can proceed with the first witness.
6 Now, let me brief you a little bit on what is going to happen
7 today. Due to unforeseen circumstances, we will need to stop at 13.25
8 instead of at 13.45, in order to try and gain a little bit from the time
9 which would be lost. We have agreed to reduce the breaks from the usual
10 time to 20 minutes. So we'll have two breaks as usual, but they will be
11 of 20 minutes duration. The first one will be in about 12 minutes time.
12 So, in the meantime, we can start with the first witness, and then we'll
13 have a break at 10.20.
14 [The witness entered court]
15 JUDGE AGIUS: Good morning, to you, Professor.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.
17 JUDGE AGIUS: You are most welcome to this Tribunal. As you
18 know, you've been summoned as an expert witness by the Defence team for
19 Ljubomir Borovcanin in this case. You will be starting your evidence,
20 your testimony soon. Before you do so, our rules require that you enter
21 a solemn declaration, the text which is being handed to you now, as to
22 the effect that in the course of your testimony, you will be speaking the
24 Please go ahead, read it aloud, and that will be your solemn
25 declaration with us.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. I solemnly
2 declare that I will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
4 JUDGE AGIUS: I thank you. Please make yourself comfortable.
5 Mr. Lazarevic, who will introduce himself to you shortly, will go first.
6 He will then be followed by others on cross-examination.
7 Mr. Lazarevic.
8 MR. LAZAREVIC: Good morning, Your Honours.
9 WITNESS: MLADEN BAJAGIC
10 [Witness answered through interpreter]
11 Examination by Mr. Lazarevic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Bajagic.
13 Of course, we had an opportunity to meet several times prior to
14 this day; but for the record, I would ask you to -- I'm going to
15 represent or introduce myself. My name is Lazarevic, and I'm part of the
16 Defence team of Mr. Borovcanin.
17 Now, for the record, please state your full name.
18 A. My name is Mladen Bajagic.
19 Q. Just a little warning before we begin, since we both speak the
20 same language, and in order to avoid a situation in which we might
21 overlap, could you please be so kind to wait until I finish my question,
22 and you can see that on the transcript in front of you. As soon as it
23 stops, then you can start giving your answer; thereby, we shall avoid any
24 possible problems.
25 Dr. Bajagic, can you tell us the place and the date of your
2 A. I was born on the 5th April 1962 in Sarajevo
3 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was part of the SFRY.
4 Q. Tell me where you finished primary and secondary schools?
5 A. I finished my primary and secondary schools in Sarajevo
6 Q. After finishing secondary school, did you enroll in the
8 A. Yes, I did.
9 Q. Can you tell me which university, when did you graduate, what did
10 you study?
11 A. I enrolled in the faculty of political sciences at the Sarajevo
12 university and graduated in 1988.
13 Q. After the university, did you acquire any other academic titles?
14 A. Yes, I did. In the period between 1997 and the year 2000, I
15 attended masters degree studies at the faculty of political sciences at
16 the Belgrade
17 master of political sciences.
18 Q. Thank you very much.
19 A. After that, I entered into the course for a Ph.D. and I defended
20 my doctor's thesis in 2006, again at the faculty of political sciences in
22 degree in the political science and international relations.
23 Q. Thank you very much.
24 Can you just tell me now, because I would like to go through
25 shortly through your career, after the university, what was your first
2 A. Even before I graduated and during a period after I graduated and
3 earned my bachelors degree, I worked in journalism, and I was also
4 involved in the then-sociopolitical organizations that existed at the
5 time in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 Q. When you say "sociopolitical organizations," can you tell us a
7 little bit more what that involves, because I suppose this is a rather
8 foreign term to the people who are not from that region?
9 A. At the time in all republics of the former Yugoslavia, there were
10 a number of political organizations that work the under the umbrella of
11 the then-League of Communists. Among them were the Alliance of the
12 Socialist Youth and the Socialist Alliance of Working People.
13 Q. Thank you very much.
14 Can you tell us how your career progressed from that point
16 A. In 1992, I found a job with the then-National Security Service,
17 which was later to become the State Security Department of the Ministry
18 of the Interior of the Republika Srpska.
19 Q. Thank you very much.
20 Can you tell me, please, what kind of duties you discharged
21 within the National Security Service of Republika Srpska?
22 A. Given that I had a university degree, I was given the job of an
23 operational worker in the -- or the operative in the State Security
25 MR. LAZAREVIC: We'll take a break at 10.20 which is right now,
2 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, let's have the break now, and as I said 20
4 --- Recess taken at 10.19 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 10.43 a.m.
6 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Lazarevic, next break will be at noon.
7 MR. LAZAREVIC: I'll bear this in mind. Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Bajagic, before we took the break, you had
9 told us that you found employment at the then-National Security Service
10 of Republika Srpska and that you worked as an operative.
11 Just to clarify things, what kind of duties does the post of an
12 operative entail?
13 A. This entails, to put it shortly, the realisation of intelligence
14 and counter-intelligence activities.
15 Q. Could you please explain in more detail, because we here are
16 laymen, what you mean by the realisation of intelligence and
17 counter-intelligence activities?
18 A. That involved gathering intelligence information, preparation of
19 intelligence studies, and passing them on to those who wielded political
20 power. This was relative to all forms of endangerment of national
21 security and the protection of national interests.
22 Q. Thank you very much.
23 While you were working at the then-National Security Service,
24 which then later became the State Security Department, with respect to
25 this first level on the ladder that you had, did you, for example,
1 acquire any higher position in the hierarchy later on?
2 A. No, I didn't. Throughout the whole period of my work at the
3 State Security Department, I was an operative.
4 Q. How long did you work there?
5 A. I worked for the State Security Department until the end of
6 December 1995. When I left my job, I actually resigned at my own
8 Q. After that, what did you do? What kind of jobs did you do?
9 A. From January 1996, I took permanent residence in Belgrade; and
10 from September 1996, I started working at the then-police State Security
11 Department as an assistant intern on the subject of the state security
13 Q. After that, did you advance through your teaching career?
14 A. Yes, I did. When I acquired my masters degree in political
15 sciences, I was given an academic title of assistant. After that, I
16 acquired the titles of lecturer, senior lecturer, and professor. At the
17 police college, after I had acquired my Ph.D., I became a teacher -- or,
18 actually, assistant professor at the State Security Department of
19 criminology and police.
20 Q. Are you still doing the same job?
21 A. Yes, I am. I am working as a teacher at the State Security
22 Department of criminology and police in Belgrade.
23 Q. Can you tell us what subjects are you teaching?
24 A. At the moment, I am teaching the following subjects:
25 International security, the methodology of intelligence work, security
1 systems, and terrorism and political violence. There are some other
2 subjects, but they are of a more specialised nature and are taught at a
3 masters level. I think what I just told you would suffice.
4 Q. Absolutely. In addition to teaching, were you involved in
5 scientific and research work as well?
6 A. Working at university invariably involves teaching and research
7 work as well, so, yes, I was involved in research, both independently and
8 as part of individual projects.
9 Q. Have you published any scientific works? Of course, we are not
10 going to go through all of them, but can you just highlight what of these
11 papers would, in your view, be the most important ones?
12 A. So far, I have published some 50-odd scientific articles in
13 national and international magazines and proceedings, but I think the
14 most important ones are monographies and textbooks that I have published
15 so far.
16 Q. Can you tell us some of their titles, please?
17 A. I'm talking about three monographies. The first one is entitled
18 the "Role of the Intelligence Community in Foreign Policy, the Show Case
19 of the US"; two publications of the monography entitled "World Security
20 from Transparency to Secrecy," which deals with the structure and
21 analyses of various intelligence systems existing in the world; and,
22 finally, the fourth one is a textbook entitled "Basic Elements of
24 Q. Thank you very much.
25 During your professional career, were you a visiting professor at
1 any other universities; and if you were, can you tell us which
3 A. Yes, I was. I worked at the faculty of political sciences in
4 Belgrade, the faculty of security, and some privately owned universities
5 in Belgrade
6 Q. Just a couple of questions about this, during your professional
7 career, did you cooperate with any international organisations?
8 A. Yes, I did, particularly within the framework of the project
9 entitled "Reform of Police and Police Educational System in Serbia" with
10 the OSCE and the Council of Europe
11 Q. Thank you.
12 And, just for the record, your expert report within the
13 electronic system of this court is number 4D499, and your CV is 4D500.
14 Let us now move to some other topic.
15 Tell me, please, when was the first time you had contact with the
16 Defence team of Mr. Borovcanin.
17 A. That was in the spring of 2007. I think it was late April or
18 early May, I'm not quite sure.
19 Q. How was this contact established between you and Mr. Borovcanin
20 's Defence team?
21 A. First, there were telephone contacts; then, we agreed to have
22 some working meetings; and, then, we met in person.
23 Q. Can you tell us where this took place?
24 A. In view of my professional commitment, I asked members of the
25 Defence team to meet with me in my office at the Academy of Criminology
1 and Police.
2 Q. What were you told at the time about the subject of your expert
4 A. Members of the Defence team of Mr. Borovcanin indicated that the
5 subject of my expert report should be organisation and responsibilities
6 of the Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska in the period
8 Q. And, of course, you accepted to act as an expert, and when your
9 employment was formally acknowledged by the registry of this Tribunal,
10 was that followed by any further contacts by the Defence team of Mr.
12 A. Yes. There were a number of telephone conversations and there
13 were some meetings in person.
14 Q. Did the Borovcanin Defence team provide you with the appropriate
15 documentation necessary for drawing up your report?
16 A. Yes. These meetings were precisely designed for that purpose.
17 Q. Apart from the document mentioned in your report, did
18 Mr. Borovcanin give you some other documents?
19 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Microphone not activated] The transcript here
20 says on page 30, line 23 -- no, it's 31, I am sorry: "... did
21 Mr. Borovcanin give you some other documents." "The Defence of
22 Mr. Borovcanin," this is what I meant.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: Okay. Thank you.
24 MR. LAZAREVIC:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Is there a need for me to repeat the question?
1 A. I understand the question, there is no need. No. The answer is
3 Q. Thank you very much.
4 As you were drafting your expert report, did you peruse any other
5 documents not originally received from Mr. Borovcanin's Defence?
6 A. Yes. I did use other documentation. I believed that the topic
7 and the structure of the report that I chose to use required using some
8 other references and research material available as part of the public
10 Q. Thank you.
11 Before coming to The Hague to testify on this occasion, did you
12 ever visit The Hague before that?
13 A. Yes, in late November, early December 2007. My stay here lasted
14 for about six or seven days.
15 Q. What was the reason of your stay in The Hague in November 2007?
16 A. As I have explained already, in my contacts with Mr. Borovcanin's
17 Defence team, I expressed my desire to try and arrange such a visit on my
18 part to The Hague and the Tribunal, in accordance with the procedure of
19 course, the purpose of which was for me to see what it all looks like. I
20 know now that it assisted me greatly.
21 Q. During your stay in The Hague, did you have occasion to meet
22 Mr. Borovcanin in person?
23 A. Yes. Upon approval of those in charge at The Hague Tribunal, one
24 afternoon during my stay was dedicated to a visit of mine to see
25 Mr. Borovcanin at the Detention Unit in Scheveningen.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 Were you alone with Mr. Borovcanin on that occasion?
3 A. No. There were three Defence team members in attendance as well.
4 Q. Just one more thing, as best you can remember, how long did the
5 meeting take?
6 A. I think the meeting lasted for about an hour and a half or two
7 hours with a short break. That was according to procedure, but I didn't
8 may much heed to such details. In any case, at least an hour and a half.
9 Q. During are the meeting, what was your topic of discussion with
10 Mr. Borovcanin and the Defence team members?
11 A. Primarily, we talked about the general methodological framework
12 which would serve as a basis for drafting my expert report.
13 Q. Be it Mr. Borovcanin or anyone else from his Defence team, did
14 any of those people try to exert any influence on the conclusions of your
15 expert report?
16 A. Given that the topic of my analysis and expert report was known
17 to everyone, Mr. Borovcanin's Defence team members could only generally
18 be familiar with certain individual elements of my expert report;
19 however, they exerted no influence be it on the contents or the chapters
20 of the report, and especially the conclusions. I would simply not have
21 allowed that because finally I was the person signing the report.
22 Q. Thank you very much.
23 You said already that during your stay in The Hague, you met with
24 Mr. Borovcanin. Before that, that is to say, before November last year,
25 had you known Mr. Borovcanin?
1 A. Yes. Officially, we met in person in 2000. We were both
2 participants of a scientific gathering dedicated to the topic of world
3 terrorism. That gathering took place in Banja Luka.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The year is 2002.
5 MR. LAZAREVIC:
6 Q. [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
7 Excuse me, for the record, what was the year?
8 A. 2002.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 After the meeting in the Detention Unit in The Hague, did you
11 ever meet with Mr. Borovcanin subsequently; and if so, in what
13 A. Yes, very briefly. I believe it was in early summer this year.
14 I saw Mr. Borovcanin for a few minutes when he was visiting his family.
15 I believe that was the occasion. It was a very brief encounter amounting
16 to five or six minutes.
17 Q. Can you tell me where that took place?
18 A. We met in front of a house where Mr. Borovcanin's parents live, I
19 believe. It is in the outskirts of Bijeljina.
20 Q. Did anyone else attend this occasion?
21 A. Yes, certain Defence team members did. Those people are also
22 present in the courtroom today.
23 Q. How did it come about that you were in Bijeljina at the time?
24 A. My sister lives in Bijeljina. I was visiting my family. Since I
25 was in the area, I spoke on the phone with Defence team members, and I
1 asked that I be allowed to undertake a short trip to Bijeljina,
2 Srebrenica, and back. I was simply curious and I wanted to see that
3 area. Although I hale from Bosanska Krajina, I never had visited those
4 two towns before that.
5 Q. To close this topic, I wanted to ask you this: Between 2002,
6 when you met Mr. Borovcanin for the first time, and coming to The Hague,
7 did you meet with Mr. Borovcanin during that time?
8 A. Between what period?
9 Q. Between 2002 and today?
10 A. No.
11 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Correction for the transcript,
12 page 34, line 11, the answer was "between 2002 and 2007," rather than
14 Q. To round off the topic, how would you describe your relationship
15 with Mr. Borovcanin.
16 A. Well, since we only met on a couple of occasions, I can say that
17 he is an acquaintance of sorts.
18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Bajagic.
19 Can you tell me what is before you on the desk?
20 A. Before me is a copy of my expert report as well as a binder with
21 documents in chronological order that support my expert report; and I
22 have some additional papers in my briefcase, but I can't place them on
23 the table. There's no more room.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 Can you explain briefly the structure of your report?
1 A. As we know, the report is entitled "Minister of the Interior of
2 the Republika Srpska, Organisation and Competence between 1992 and 1995."
3 According to the contents, you can see that it consists of five chapters:
4 Chapter 1, General Context; Chapter 2, Establishment and Development of
5 the MUP of Republika Srpska; Chapter 3, Control and Command in the
6 RS MUP; Chapter 4, Reporting and Informing in the MUP; finally,
7 Chapter 5, Ranks and Functional Insignia in the RS MUP.
8 Of course, preceding the chapters, there is a list of acronyms
9 and abbreviations to refer to when reading the body of the text.
10 Q. Another question: The five chapters, do they contain
12 A. Certainly. There are five general topics discussed in the
13 chapters; and in the first three chapters, there are subchapters.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 I want to move on to the topic of your expert report.
16 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] It is 4D499.
17 Q. Under "General Context," you provided a definition of the police,
18 at page 4 in the B/C/S and page 4 in the English in e-court. It is
19 paragraph 4.
20 There you state that the police can be defined as an organ of
21 governmental authority, the purpose of which is to protect societal
22 values ascribed to it through the law including any forceful means deemed
24 If we start with this definition, what would be the basic
25 function of the police?
1 A. Starting with this definition, as well as many other definitions
2 of the police, generally speaking, it's basic function could be defined
3 as serve and protect; that is to say, to implement tasks and duties in
4 order to protect public law, security, and order, and so on.
5 Q. In your experience, the definition provided therein, does it only
6 refer to the RS police, or is it universal in nature?
7 A. This is certainly not something specific to the RS. It is a
8 working definition used for the report and can be applied to any police
9 organisation in the world.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 In your expert report, item 6, which is page 5 in the B/C/S and
12 in the English version in e-court, save for the basic function of crime
13 prevention and repression, you also mention the service segment.
14 What did you mean by that?
15 A. In contemporary police school of thought, it is said that the
16 police is there is serve and protect. To protect means combatting crime,
17 protecting law and order. As for the service or social service segment,
18 that means that the police force should serve, which encompasses several
19 duties and obligations within a society. If you wish, I can enumerate
20 some of those: Assisting the elderly and infirm, assisting the young,
21 assisting inebriated persons or persons who find themselves in similar
22 states, as well as promoting safety and educating the society in that
24 Q. If you now look at point 8, this is also on page 5 in both
25 versions. Can you tell us what are, in your view, the basic groups of
1 police tasks?
2 A. In addition to this social service aspect of police work, another
3 two major groups of police tasks are definitely maintaining law and order
4 and fighting crime. Fighting crime, in general terms, involves both
5 prevention and repression.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 Can we now move to another topic, and that would be security.
8 Can you tell me, in general terms, what security involves? I would like
9 to refer you to paragraph 11 in your report.
10 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] That is on page 6 in B/C/S
11 version and the same page in English.
12 A. Paragraph 11 deals with national security, which necessitates
13 full comprehension of the notion of national security. Security is a
14 very wide notion difficult to be defined, but I will do my best to give
15 you the brief version.
16 Security has two aspects: An objective one and a subjective one.
17 Objectively speaking, that implies absence of threat to an acquired
18 values embraced by individuals or society, and also the absence of fear
19 of loss of these acquired values. This is a very often used notion of
20 security in defining this aspect scientifically.
21 Security in every sense implies that this is one of the basic
22 human needs, values, and interests; and, finally, security is most
23 certainly one of the basic attributes and functions of a state.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 Of course, this brings me to my next question. What is a
1 security system?
2 A. Every state, in order to fulfill the functions that it's being
3 established for, including security, must set up a certain system, as I
4 call it here, the security system as a subsystem or part of the executive
5 branch system. This implies forms of organising and functioning a
6 society, or rather, a set of measures and activities pursued by
7 organisations entrusted - I'm not going to quote precisely - with
8 achieving and preserving security in the full sense of the word; and
9 internationally, it has been recognised as state security.
10 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at paragraph 14
11 on page 5, and page 7 in English.
12 Q. What can you tell us about the subjects of the security system?
13 How did you explain that in this particular paragraph?
14 A. There is a multitude of various classifications of security
15 subjects as basic elements of every security system. In my report, I
16 just mentioned one of the possibilities in order to facilitate the
17 further reading of my report. According to this classification that you
18 can see here, the security system subjects can be divided into three
19 groups. These are conventional, non-conventional, and supplementary
20 subjects or elements of a security system.
21 Q. Can you just tell us briefly something about these three systems?
22 Can you tell us what conventional, non-conventional, and supplementary
23 systems represent?
24 A. Conventional or, let's say, traditional or classic security
25 systems definitely include Ministry of the Interior, i.e., the police;
1 army as the second element; intelligence and counter-intelligence
2 institutions and other institutions set up at the national level;
3 judiciary; prosecutor's Office; customs; service inspections; and other
4 organs entrusted with imposing criminal sanctions, et cetera.
5 Non-conventional elements of security systems are legislature,
6 depending on the nature of the political system, whether it has a
7 parliament or an assembly; then there's executive organs; foreign affairs
8 organs; and that would be it.
9 Finally, bearing in mind one of the basic roles of the police, in
10 addition to protects and serve, there are some additional elements that
11 both the police, as well as other conventional and non-conventional
12 organisations have, we can include local communities and local
13 government; public services; educational institutions; scientific
14 institutions; non-governmental organisations; religious institutions; and
15 citizens, as individuals.
16 Q. Thank you very much.
17 In this regard, what can you tell us about police as one of the
18 security system elements?
19 A. Police represents in every sense, regardless of which state we
20 are talking about, one of the pillars of security systems. To put it
21 simply, there is not a modern state in the world that does not have its
22 own police force.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 In your report, paragraph 18, page 8 in B/C/S, you use the term
25 "administrative actions of police," and how are they classified?
1 A. As I said, the purview and the competence of police are very
2 precisely defined by various regulations and rules. Apart from the fact
3 that these laws and bylaws, rules and regulations define the purview of
4 the police, they also provide definitions of what legal authorisation and
5 power police have in terms of in carrying out administrative actions
6 within their scope of responsibilities.
7 These are actually police duties or, as we define it in the part
8 of the world where I come from, are police powers.
9 Q. Can we now explain in more details the administrative activities
10 of police?
11 A. I am sorry. I did not give an answer --
12 Q. I apologise for interrupting you.
13 A. I did not give you an answer to the second part of your question.
14 The science which deals with police says that administrative
15 actions of police can be divided into two basic groups. These are
16 administrative actions carried out by the police towards things and those
17 applied to persons. Maybe later we will have an opportunity to speak
18 about both.
19 Q. Thank you again, and I apologise for interrupting you.
20 In July 1995, can you tell me which legal document or act
21 governed the authority and the powers of the RS police?
22 A. That was the Law on Internal Affairs passed in 1994.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now look at Exhibit 4D358.
25 Q. And in your folder, it's tab 67, in the binder.
1 A. I apologise. Yes, I found it. I found the tab.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.
3 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us first look at Article 40
4 of this law. It's on page 4 in B/C/S and page 8 in English.
5 Q. Can you see this Article 4 [as interpreted]?
6 A. Yes, I can.
7 Q. Can you tell me what police activity is stipulated by Article 4
8 [as interpreted]?
9 A. As we can see, Article 40 defines the you powers of the police to
10 issue --
11 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us now move to Article 41.
12 It's page 4 in B/C/S and pages 8 and 9 in English.
13 Q. Can you tell me which administrative action is determined by
14 Article 41?
15 A. This involves checking ID papers in order to establish the
16 identity of persons, and bringing these individuals before the organ in
17 charge. So, actually, there's two powers inherent to this article: One
18 is to check the ID, establish the identity; and then bring such a person
19 to the organ in charge.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us now look at Article 42,
22 the same page in B/C/S; and in English, it's page 9.
23 Q. Can you tell what administrative action we are talking about
25 A. This involves issuing information and warnings to individuals or
1 summoning persons in order to give them notices and warnings?
2 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let's move now to Article 43,
3 pages 4 and 5 in B/C/S, and pages 9 and 10 in English.
4 Q. What administrative actions are we talking about here?
5 A. Article 43 speaks about bringing people into custody.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us move on now to Article 46,
8 page 5 in B/C/S, pages 10 and 11 in English.
9 Q. So, Article 46, what administrative action we are talking about
11 A. This is one of the characteristic administrative actions that
12 most police forces carry out, and that is the right to use vehicles and
13 communication devices belonging to other people.
14 Q. And in what way is this issue regulated?
15 A. Well, it reads here that in exception or circumstances, members
16 of police and MUP can requisition or make use of private vehicles and
17 communications devices, but provided that if they incur any costs in the
18 process, they are obliged to refund the owner of the vehicle or the
19 communications device.
20 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let's move on to Article 48, page
21 5 in B/C/S and page 11 in English.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to Article 48, the police
23 is authorised to carry out administrative activities involving gathering
24 of information and intelligence.
25 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Thank you very much.
2 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Can we now move on to Article 50,
3 page 5 in B/C/S, and page 11 in English.
4 Q. Can you tell me what administrative actions are envisaged by
5 Article 50?
6 A. Article 50 envisages the following administrative activities by
7 using oppression means. I can tell you more specifically that it
8 involves the use of physical power, rubber trench, and service dogs,
9 service mounted police force, water cannons, gas, and other means.
10 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us look at Article 50 next --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 51.
12 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] It is pages 5 and 6 in the
13 B/C/S; in the English version, it is page 12.
15 A. It defines the police authority to use firearms. As far as I can
16 see, it provides the conditions in which the police have the right to use
17 this authority.
18 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Article 52 is next. It's on the
19 next page. In English, it is also page 12. Very well.
20 Q. What does Article 52 foresee?
21 A. Freely interpreted, I would say that it describes the procedure
22 in which a firearm may be used in the sense that the firearm can only be
23 used if all other means of force failed in implementing the police task.
24 There's also an obligation of any authorised official entitled to carry
25 and use a firearm to issue a warning prior to its use, and to, of course,
1 keep in mind all other legal prerequisites that have to be met prior to
2 using a firearm.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 During the proofing, you stated that this law was published in
5 August 1995; but as far as we can see from the preamble, it was a revised
6 text of the regulations passed before 1994, but were in force in July
7 1995 as well?
8 A. Yes. It says, "amended and revised text in the preamble of the
9 law on Internal Affairs"; however, the gist is the same.
10 MR. LAZAREVIC: I understand, in the English version, it says
11 "amended and revised text." What we suggest as being the correct
12 interpretation should be "consolidated."
13 JUDGE AGIUS: All right. That can be taken care of in due
14 course. Thank you for your observation, Mr. Lazarevic.
15 Please proceed.
16 MR. LAZAREVIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
17 Q. [Interpretation] Now that we went through some regulations
18 defining the authority and powers of the RS MUP, can you compare that
19 with the regulation of other countries pertaining to the same topic? Are
20 there any similarities or differences?
21 A. Certainly. There are two different approaches two regulating the
22 administrative activities of the police forces elsewhere in the world.
23 Some define general authority and subsequently going into the details and
24 specifics of those. There are examples which clearly and in a detailed
25 fashion describe all of the different powers that such police forces
1 have. Such police authority may not be defined only by the law on the
2 police, but also as part of some other laws such as the laws in
3 combatting organised crime, terrorism, et cetera. Some such examples are
4 cited in my report.
5 Q. Thank you. Let us go to item 33 of your expert report.
6 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] It is on page 11 in the B/C/S;
7 and in the English, it is page 12 in e-court.
8 Q. I came across a term there, "a state of national necessity."
9 What do you refer to there?
10 A. A state of national necessity is not specific to Republika Srpska
11 alone. Any state can be in a state of peace or in a state of war or
12 other circumstances. Such a state can be referred to a state of national
13 necessity which may include several different situations.
14 Q. This term, "state of national necessity," how can it be applied
15 to the situation in Republika Srpska between 1992 and 1996?
16 A. Certainly. The most extreme variations of a state of national
17 necessity is a state of immediate threat of war and a state of war. Such
18 two types of states of national necessity apply to the situation that was
19 in place in Republika Srpska in that period.
20 Q. Thank you.
21 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Could we please in e-court have a
22 look at the next document, 4D219.
23 Q. In your binder, it is tab 2.
24 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] I'd like us to have a look at
25 page 2 in B/C/S and at page 4 in English.
1 Q. It is the 35th amendment of the RS constitution published in the
2 Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska on the 11th of November 1994 in
3 Sarajevo. Please have a look at amendment 35.
4 Pursuant to this amendment, what is the difference between a
5 state of immediate threat of war and a state of war?
6 A. The difference between an immediate threat of war and the state
7 of war means that in the state of war, the fighting had already begun;
8 whereas, a state of immediate threat of war entails the existence of a
9 serious and invariable threat that armed conflict may ensue.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 We also have a state of emergency in subitem (3). Can you tell
12 us what that is according to the amendment?
13 A. It means that there was a danger of safety, human rights, and
14 freedoms, or normal functioning of constitutional organs, according to
15 amendment 35.
16 Q. Let us have a look at item 2 of amendment 35. Do the authorities
17 of the president of Republika Srpska increase as opposed to certain other
18 governmental organs, say the assembly, in such a state?
19 A. Since it is up to the assembly to decide on the issue of war and
20 peace, in item 2, it say that is should the national assembly be unable
21 to meet, the state of immediate threat of war is pronounced by the
22 president. According to this amendment, he is authorised to declare the
23 state of immediate threat of war and of war.
24 Q. So far, we have been discussing the constitutional amendments in
25 1994, when they were passed. The state of national necessity, as such,
1 did it exist in Republika Srpska even prior to 1994?
2 A. The state of national necessity existed in Republika Srpska prior
3 to 1994 in the form of an immediate threat of war. I believe it was
4 April 1992 when in the territory of the then-Serbian Republic of BiH,
5 subsequently Republika Srpska, that the state of immediate threat of war
6 was declared. I believe, according to the documentation I perused, that
7 it was the 14th of April.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us have a look at that
10 document in e-court. It is 4D527.
11 Q. In your binder, it is tab 3. Is this the decision that you
12 referred to?
13 A. Yes, I can see it. It is a decision to declare an imminent
14 threat of war and mobilisation throughout the territory of the republic.
15 If my memory was correct, and it seems that is it was, it was the 15th of
16 April 1992.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 The state of national necessity you referred to, does it have any
19 impact on the police as regards its authorities and administrative
20 activities it may undertake?
21 A. Certainly, it does. In any case, any state of national necessity
22 impacts directly on the work and functioning of state bodies, including
23 the police which in such situations, and according to some other legal
24 regulations in relation to a declared threat of war, receive special
25 tasks and also special administrative activities.
1 Q. What was the law that prescribe the functioning of the police in
2 states of national necessity?
3 A. It is the law and the application of the Law on Internal Affairs
4 in times of an immediate threat of war, dated November 1994, to be
5 precise the 29th of November.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 During your testimony, we will frequently refer to that law. For
8 now, I only have a general question concerning that. The administrative
9 activities foreseen by the law, were they of permanent nature?
10 A. No. Much as the state of national necessity was considered
11 temporary, so did the law define all administrative activities of the
12 police put in force by the new law for the duration of such a state of
13 immediate threat of war or of war. Upon cessation of such states, the
14 police no longer has the right to use them.
15 Q. In order to be able to understand what the issue at hand is, I
16 wanted to direct you to footnote 20 of your expert report.
17 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] In e-court, it is at pages 12 and
18 13 in the B/C/S; in the English, it is page 13 [as interpreted].
19 Q. Can you tell me which are the most characteristic administrative
20 activities foreseen by that law?
21 A. According to the law you refer to, in my expert report, I singled
22 out some characteristic situations of revised or added administrative
23 activities. I stipulated them in the footnote. In item 1, it is
24 enforcing a special regime of accessing or leaving an object that is of
25 security interest. This is not included in the basic law. This is a
1 completely new activity. Another activity or authority is enforcing a
2 special traffic regime for motor vehicles in designated locations, which
3 is also a completely new administrative activity.
4 Activity number 3 is prohibiting the carrying and use of weapons
5 and ammunition including explosive substances in public places except for
6 authorised personnel. If used in accordance with the rules of service,
7 this administrative activity had existed before. The fourth one is
8 prohibiting the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages in public
9 places. This is a brand new administrative activity.
10 Item 5, suspending the transport and trade of weapons and
11 explosive substances in designated locations except for the needs of the
12 army and the MUP. It was a somewhat modified administrative activity
13 compared to the regular activities. Under 6, ordering persons to reside
14 in a designated place or prohibiting them to leave a designated place
15 with mandatory reporting to the police. This was a new administrative
16 activity not envisaged by the peacetime law.
17 7, prohibiting the crossing of the state border. Save for a
18 narrow category of certain persons, this was a new activity. Under 8,
19 terminating the sojourn of certain categories of persons, a new
20 administrative activity. Then next is 9, taking specific measures
21 against certain persons which impact the inviolability of personal
22 rights. Here what is included is, for example, detaining and
23 apprehending persons.
24 Item 10 is taking specific measures without a previous written
25 notice being served. That is an amended activity. The next one is
1 ordering the measure of detention of persons, as well as searching places
2 of residence, including a possible use of firearms; that is to say,
3 police officers participating in such an activity need to have their
4 firearms ready.
5 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] This was footnote 20. I believe,
6 in e-court, we did not have the proper page displayed.
7 This is a good time for the break, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE AGIUS: What's the matter?
9 MR. LAZAREVIC: It's 12 o'clock.
10 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, I know. I heard you say that, I note. Is
11 there a problem?
12 MR. OSTOJIC: Just on page 47, line 9, it just said footnote 20
13 appears in English --
14 JUDGE AGIUS: One moment. Let me get to page 47 because we are
15 on page 49. Yes, line 9.
16 MR. OSTOJIC: It says that footnote 20 of his report appears on
17 page 13 in English; it's actually just page 10. I think that's what they
18 wanted to talk about.
19 MR. LAZAREVIC: The difference is the pages in e-court do not
20 correspond to the actual report.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, yes, yes. Thank you for that.
22 We'll have a 20 minute break.
23 --- Recess taken at 12.01 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 12.23 p.m.
25 JUDGE AGIUS: Yes, Mr. Lazarevic.
1 MR. LAZAREVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Bajagic, I have just completed with one
3 section of your report before the break. Now I would like to move on to
4 chapter 2 in your report, and that is Establishment and Development of
5 the MUP of Republika Srpska. We are going to go more quickly through
6 this topic.
7 In the subsection entitled "General Framework," that's page 39 --
8 actually, item 39; and on page 14 in English. You mentioned a large
9 number of documents and events that in your view were particularly
10 important in 1991 and 1992, and the crisis in Bosnia. I am not going to
11 go with you through the entire report of yours.
12 Based on item 39, can you tell us please in your opinion which
13 circumstances had decisive impact on the establishment of MUP of the
14 then-Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was later on
15 transformed into the MUP of Republika Srpska?
16 A. Well, this is a list of documents that deal with the general
17 political situation in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and
18 within this context, we might highlight some documents that, inter alia,
19 had had an impact on the creation of the first outline of the Ministry of
20 the Interior of the present Republika Srpska.
21 Q. In your view, what was the significance of Cutileiro's plan, and
22 particular the fact that the then-president of the Socialist Republic of
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, abandoned this plan?
24 A. Well, Cutileiro's plan in the lengthy process before it was
25 finally adopted certainly constitutes a basis that all the political
1 protagonists that here to as the basis for setting up their state
2 administration organs including Ministry Of The Interior. Cutileiro's
3 plan, according to the version that I had an opportunity to read, in its
4 chapter (d) speaks about the right of the three entities in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish administration organs, which included
6 Ministry of the Interior as a separate organ.
7 This plan had originally been endorsed by all the three parties
8 involved in the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At any rate, the
9 acceptance of the plan and then the abandonment of the plan of one party,
10 i.e., Mr. Izetbegovic, certainly didn't go well down with the remaining
11 two parties, and it had the impact that it had.
12 Q. I don't think it's necessary that we look into Cutileiro's plan.
13 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] For the record, I would like just
14 to say that this is the document already in e-court and has previously
15 been used in this court. That is document 4D169, and the translation
16 version is 1D1156.
17 Q. I would like to hear your document -- to hear your comment on the
18 document on 4D174; and in your binder, you will find it under tab 4.
19 This is a dispatch sent by the collegium of MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 dated the 1st of April 1992.
21 A. Yes, I can see it.
22 Q. Can you tell me what this document is about. I would like to
23 hear your comment.
24 A. In short, this document speaks about a meeting of the expert
25 collegium of the then-Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at
1 which this Sarajevo plan was being discussed and the possible
2 implementation of Cutileiro's plan, in terms of initiating a sort of
3 decentralization of the Ministry of the Interior into three separate
4 entities. In view of the structure of the personnel, it is noticeable
5 that this meeting was attended by the highest official BH at the time,
6 starting from the minister, his deputies, and all other officials who
7 were members of the collegium.
8 Q. Excuse me. If you look at the first part of this dispatch, can
9 you tell me what were the general premises exercised by the members of
10 the collegium of the then-Ministry of the Interior or BH?
11 A. These general premises were that first phases or stages of
12 re-organisation of MUP had already been underway; that's the main point.
13 The collegium had been advised that certain legislative foundation had
14 been laid for the Ministry of the Interior of the Serbian side, i.e., the
15 Serbian Republic
16 Q. Thank you.
17 In paragraphs 46 to 53, pages 16 to 18 in your report in B/C/S,
18 and pages 16 to 19 in English in e-court, you spoke about illegal arming
19 of members of the SDS
20 of the MUP of the Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that respect, you analysed a
21 number of documents and books which were listed in the footnotes.
22 Can you just tell us briefly - I don't want to dwell on this too
23 long - about this phenomenon. So I'm speaking about the arming of
24 members about the SDA? How did this phenomenon affect the situation in
1 A. In any case, the reasons for the setting up of the MUP and
2 consequently taking into account the Cutileiro's plan, although I don't
3 think these were the only reasons that exacerbated the crisis, but one of
4 the reason was definitely operational activities of all three parties,
5 and I here mentioned only one of them.
6 I analysed the reasons for establishing the first state organs of
7 the future Republika Srpska, which was prompted by secret and illegal
8 arming of certain formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 and in spring
9 of 1992. These facts could not have remained clandestine, and they
10 definitely contributed to the worsening of the situation and prompted the
11 initiation of the realisation of the plans to establish the Ministry of
12 the Interior of the Republika Srpska.
13 Q. Further on, in your analysis, you spoke about the activities of
14 the HDZ, which was the party of the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
15 their aspirations towards political and every other separation from the
16 central government in Sarajevo
17 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] This is on pages 54 --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please read the pages slowly.
19 JUDGE AGIUS: Mr. Lazarevic, the interpreters have kindly asked
20 you to read out the pages slowly please. Thank you.
21 MR. LAZAREVIC: I apologise to the interpreters; I didn't pay
22 attention to the transcript.
23 JUDGE AGIUS: It's okay. Thank you.
24 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] So these are pages 18 and 19 in
25 e-court, in B/C/S; and 19 and 20 in the English version, also in e-court.
1 Q. Mr. Bajagic, is it necessary for me to repeat my question?
2 A. No, it isn't.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 Can you please give me an answer now?
5 A. As you can read in certain paragraphs in my report, I focused my
6 attention on the third party which had certain input in the generating of
7 the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is, conditionally speaking, the
8 Croatian party that I'm talking about. For me, it was particularly
9 indicative because of the dates and years when the mention of first state
10 organs were mentioned within the Croatian community, and particularly the
11 mention of an existence of a source of Herceg Bosna in 1992, as well as
12 the fact that they started forming their own units, like HVO and others.
13 So, just as I was speaking about the authority Sarajevo, I also
14 mentioned the aspirations of the Croatian community. So all of these
15 aspects can be amalgamated to create a reason that precipitated the
16 activities undertaken by the Serbian side.
17 Q. Let us now move to the next topic in your report, and that is the
18 Creation and Development of MUP of Republika Srpska in the period
19 1991-1993. In your report, it is dealt with in paragraphs 60 to 91, and
20 you and I will just go through a number of details.
21 Can you please first look at paragraph 61 of your analysis.
22 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] It's on page 20 in e-court, and
23 on page 21 in English.
24 Q. Here you say that all the three ruling ethnic parties strove to
25 exert as much influence as possible on the then-MUP of
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you give us more details about what this refers
3 A. In view of the interparty agreement that was reached in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, at the highest level, the certain offices
5 in state administration were allocated according to these percentage
6 ratio. Based on this interparty agreement, for various reasons, this
7 agreement was violated in that all three parties, by appointing their
8 representatives in the MUP, strove to occupy the best possible position,
9 and, thereby, have an opportunity to have a decisive impact on the policy
10 of MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
11 So that was a process that was concurrently aimed at personnel
12 policy, and was pursued by all three parties.
13 Q. Further on, you spoke about the filling of jobs in MUP and the
14 departure of Muslims for training in Croatia. Can you tell me how did
15 these processes affect the overall situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
16 A. As a state administration organ, the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina is
17 part of the executive branch and is entitled to issue certain guidelines
18 relating to personnel policy in the MUP. It is very indicative that
19 political parties, and in this particular instance, the Party of
20 Democratic Action, exerted a decisive influence on the administration for
21 personnel of the Ministry of the Interior, and I illustrated this with a
22 number of specific examples.
23 Q. Let us look just at one such example.
24 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] That's document 4D167, and if we
25 can please have this document brought up in e-court.
1 Q. This is a dispatch sent to the Public Security station in
2 Bratunac dated 16 March 1992, and that is tab 5 in your binder.
3 Can you tell us what this document is about?
4 A. This document is one of the forms of passing on information at a
5 higher level of organisation -- or rather, to a higher level of
6 organisation compared to the Bratunac station. It speaks about a number
7 of Muslims who had gone to undertake training -- or undergo training in
8 Croatia organised by MUP of Croatia.
9 The chief of the Public Security station said explicitly that he
10 did not know upon whose orders or recommendations these men had gone to
11 undergo training in the MUP of Croatia, and he also adds that the Serbs
12 do not trust these people because they could be recruited for the reserve
14 Q. Who signed this document?
15 A. It was signed Senad Hodzic, the then-chief of the Public Security
16 station. This is as much as I can gather from this document.
17 Q. In paragraph 74 of your expert analysis, it's on pages 23 to 25
18 in English, and 25 and 26.
19 You enlisted some crucial regulations that governed the creation
20 and the development of the MUP of Republika Srpska. Let us go through
21 some of them.
22 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] The first document that I would
23 like to show is 4D168.
24 Q. And in your binder, it's tab 6. That's the constitution of the
25 Serbian Republic
1 Let us look at chapter 4, Article 68.
2 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] That's pages 5 and 6 in e-court
3 in B/C/S, and in English as well.
4 Q. Let us first look at the heading of this chapter. Can you tell
5 us what is the heading of this chapter where Article 68 is?
6 A. That's chapter 4 of the constitution of the Serbian Republika
7 Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina of 1992, and it's entitled "The Rights and
8 Duties of the Republic."
9 Q. Thank you.
10 Let us now move n to Article 68, item 2.
11 A. Pursuant to Article 68, the obligation of the republic is to
12 provide and to secure various arrangements or areas of life enumerated
13 under numbers 1 to 15 and under number 2, defence and security of the
14 republic is specified which is directly related to the Ministry of the
16 Q. Item 13 on the next page?
17 A. Item 13, the state should regulate and provide for the
18 functioning of the competent governmental bodies.
19 Q. What is your understanding of the provisions we just looked at as
20 regards the creation and organisation of the Ministry of the Interior in
21 Republika Srpska?
22 A. If the then-Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had the right
23 to organise the activities in certain walks of life, we can see that they
24 enumerated 15 of the most important such areas, much as would be in any
25 other state. If they had such a right, then they also could get involved
1 in the organisation, competence, and the work of such state agencies that
2 have to do with security.
3 Q. Thank you. Let us move on to the next document.
4 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] It is the Law on Government of
5 the Republica of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In e-court,
6 it's 4D173.
7 Q. In your binder it's tab 7.
8 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us look at chapter 2,
9 Article 6 on the Law on Government. It is page 6 in e-court in the
10 B/C/S; in the English, page 2.
11 Q. Do you have Article 6 in front of you?
12 A. I do.
13 Q. If we look at Article 6, item 1, what can you tell us about that?
14 A. We can see that, in keeping with Article 5, the government
15 consists of the prime minister, two deputy prime ministers, and 13
16 members ministers. In Article 5, it is further stated that presidents of
17 executive bodies, districts, and/or ex officio members of the government;
18 and then we have the stipulation of all of the various areas of
19 government that needs to have officials appointed to.
20 Q. I believe you should repeat.
21 A. I can repeat, certainly.
22 Q. Can you tell us which ministries are those that are being formed
23 in the then-Republic of the Serbian People of the Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. There were 13 ministries. I can enumerate: First, Internal
25 Affairs; then, National Defence; the Ministry of Justice; Finance;
1 Foreign Affairs; Economic Affairs; Agriculture, Forestry, and Water
2 Management --
3 Q. I do not wish to interrupt, but --
4 A. Well, and so on and so forth. But I believe the first few are
5 the most important ones.
6 Q. Let us move on to the next document.
7 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] It is 4D170. It is the Law on
8 State Administration, dated the 23rd of March 1992. Let us have a look
9 at chapter 4, Article 19. That is page 3 in the B/C/S version; in the
10 English the same.
11 Q. In your binder, tab 8. Do you have the document before you?
12 A. I do, but which article are you in?
13 Q. Article 19.
14 A. Thank you.
15 Q. What is regulated by Article 19?
16 A. Chapter 4, Organisation of Administrative Organs, Article 19, it
17 says administrative organs shall be established as ministries,
18 secretariats, and administrations; that is to say, the law foresaw three
19 types of state bodies: Ministries, secretariats, and administrations.
20 Q. As regards the field of Internal Affairs, was it also arranged
21 according to this provision?
22 A. Together with the Law on the Government and the Law on Government
23 Administration, these two pieces of legislation organised the -- rather,
24 prescribed the organisation of the Ministry of the Interior of the
25 then-Serbian Republic which is later to be dubbed Republika Srpska.
1 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] The next document is the Law on
2 Defence which is 4D181.
3 Q. Tab 68 in your binder, dated the 1st of June 1992.
4 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] The article that I want to focus
5 on is in e-court at page 2 in the B/C/S, and pages 2 and 3 in the
7 Q. It regulates -- well, first of all, Article 7, what does that
9 A. If I may have a moment.
10 Q. What does it regulate in its introductory part?
11 A. Article 7, it's introductory part regulates certain areas which
12 fall under the competence of the president of the Serbian republic of
13 B&H, with regard to organising defence preparations.
14 Q. Let us look at item 3 of the article. What is the authority
15 given to the president the of Serbian Republic
16 A. Item 3 of Article 7, it states that is the president of the
17 Serbian Republic of B&H operates and commands the army in peace and
19 Q. Thank you.
20 Item 6 of the same article is next. What does it regulate?
21 A. I've read it. The president has the right to define the basis
22 for organisation and strength of the police force, issue orders for
23 utilization of the police in case of war, imminent threat of war, in
24 order to protect the rights and duties of the republic and its citizens
25 and their duties and obligations accorded by the constitution. This
1 presidential role has to do with the police.
2 Q. In this law, there is a mention of the Army of Republika Srpska.
3 In keeping with this law, is the Ministry of the Interior mentioned as an
4 element of the armed forces?
5 A. No, not in this law.
6 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us now go to Article 10 of
7 the law. It is on the same page in the B/C/S; in the English version, it
8 is pages 3 and 4 in e-court.
9 Q. Let us look at the bottom part of the article. There is a
10 subheading, "Ministry of the Interior." Have you found it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. What are the competences of the Ministry of the Interior
13 according to this regulation that have to do with the defence of the
15 A. I can tell you right away. According to Article 10, the Ministry
16 of the Interior is competent to organise and implement its own
17 preparations for defence and work in a situation of an imminent threat of
18 war or of war. It organises security measures and provides security for
19 objects important for the defence, and organises preparations of the
20 police in the state necessity, as defined here. These being the threat
21 of war and state of war.
22 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us go next to some of the
23 most important regulation concerning the police, and that is the Law on
24 Internal Affairs. Could we next have 4D172 in e-court, Official Gazette,
1 Q. It is tab 9. The date is 23 March 1992. Do you have it?
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us look at Article 3 of the
4 law. It is in e-court page 2 in the B/C/S; in the English version,
5 page 1.
6 Q. How does this law regulate the field of Internal Affairs in terms
7 of police tasks?
8 A. According to this article, and as part of this law, the role of
9 the police is the following: Tasks and activities relating to public
10 security, tasks and activities related to national security, as well as
11 tasks and activities relating to certain administrative issues such as
12 names, places of residence, citizenship, registers, holding public
13 gathers and meetings, and so on and so forth.
14 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us move to Article 5. It is
15 the same page, page 2 in e-court in the B/C/S; and page 1 in the English.
16 Q. According to Article 5, who was entrusted with Internal Affairs
17 activities referred to in this article?
18 A. Naturally, Article 5 entrusts the ministry with the Internal
19 Affairs; the Ministry of the Interior, that is.
20 Q. In keeping with this law, in addition to the Ministry of the
21 Interior at headquarters, which other two organisational units were there
22 within the MUP?
23 A. Those were the Public Security and State Security Services.
24 Q. Let's talk about the Public Security Service for a moment.
25 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us go to Article 15 of the
1 law. In e-court, it is page 3 in the B/C/S, and page 2 in the English
3 Q. I'm talking about Article 15. What does it regulate?
4 A. Article 15 of the law regulates the competence of the Public
5 Security Service in terms of certain activities and tasks. I won't go
6 into all the detail, but it has to do with administrative and specialised
7 services as one area; another area is protecting law and order and
8 property of the citizens; the third area is crime prevention enforcement;
9 as well as certain societal services, such as dealing with the
10 consequence of states of emergency, and so on and so forth.
11 Q. Let us move to Article 16. I'd like you to focus on the last few
13 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] In e-court, it is page 3 in the
14 B/C/S; in the English version, pages 2 and 3.
15 Q. We can see here that certain reserve police force members are
16 mentioned. Can you tell me what was the role and position of the reserve
17 police force?
18 A. As we can see, Article 16 defines activities in the field of
19 public law and order and property safety of the citizens, as well as
20 combatting crime. It can be done by the active duty policeman, as well
21 as members of the reserve police force.
22 Q. Let's go to the next article of this law that I want to analyse.
23 It is Article 26.
24 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] It is page 4 in the B/C/S in
25 e-court; the same page in English.
1 Q. Do you have Article 26 before you?
2 A. I do.
3 Q. In keeping with the article, except for the ministry at
4 headquarters, which are -- which regional units were there as part of the
6 A. In addition to the ministry at headquarters, there were regional
7 units such as Public Security centres, and then the next lower level in
8 territorial terms were Public Security stations.
9 Q. Let us move to Article 28 of the law.
10 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] page 4 in the B/C/S; in the
11 English, version page 4 as well.
12 Q. In keeping with Article 28, how many centres of Public Security
13 were there envisaged by the law from 1992, and where?
14 A. According to Article 28, Public Security centres of the MUP were
15 in Banja Luka, Trebinje, Doboj, Sarajevo, and Bijeljina. There were
16 five: Banja Luka, Trebinje, Doboj, Sarajevo, and Bijeljina.
17 Q. Article 30 is next.
18 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] It is page 4 in the B/C/S; the
19 same page in the English version.
20 Q. What does Article 30 refer to?
21 A. Article 30 sets out some other levels of organisation within the
22 MUP. More precisely, it says that police stations are to be set up
23 within Security Services centres, and also a number of reserve police
24 stations. In other words, these police stations and reserve police
25 stations were within the framework of the Public Security station.
1 In the second part of this article, it's last sentence, it says,
2 whenever necessary, i.e., in specific situation, a police station can
3 have its detached squads outside its headquarters. I'm talking about
5 Q. There were smaller organisational units with respect to the
6 police station?
7 A. Yes. Within the Public Security station, there were police
8 stations and also some detached squads outside --
9 MR. LAZAREVIC: The word used is "militia." And in Serbian
10 language, words "militia" and "police" are synonymous. So, having in
11 mind that in English word "militia" might have a negative connotation, I
12 would just like to draw your attention to this fact to just in order to
13 avoid any misunderstanding.
14 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you Mr. Lazarevic. We'll take note of that.
15 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. We will no longer need this document for now. Let us move to the
17 next one. That is tab number 10 in your binder.
18 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] That's Exhibit 4D192. That's the
19 set of rules on internal organisation of MUP in the state of an immediate
20 threat of war or a state of war from September 1992.
21 I have to advise Chamber that we do not have the translation of
22 this document, and I think the best approach would be if we continue by
23 reading the relevant paragraphs that I wish to discuss with this witness.
24 Q. Mr. Bajagic, in your report, I have found a piece of information
25 that in April 1992 --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1993.
2 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. -- a set of rules were adopted that had the identical title as
4 the one mentioned earlier. Do you know the reason why two set of rules,
5 identical set of rules were adopted on different dates?
6 A. Well, the main reason is probably -- well, actually this is
7 identical text. At the bottom of the front page, it reads, "September
8 1992." And as you can see, in the upper part above, the are words
9 "official secret, strictly confidential." There's a number, 10-3/93,
10 which means that is probably March 1993.
11 So I presume that probably, in March 1993, this set of rules had
12 been debated; and that, in 1992, it was just a draft; and that in the
13 identical form and with the identical wording, it was adopted in
14 April 1993.
15 Q. Can you confirm, please, once again, practically, there are
16 absolutely no differences in the content of these two documents?
17 A. Absolutely no difference whatsoever, so it's all the same
18 whichever document you take.
19 Q. Let us now look at Article 2 of this set of rules.
20 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] And since we unfortunately do not
21 have translation, I'm going to read it for the record.
22 Q. Heading of this chapter is Roman numeral II, and it says
23 "Organisational Units."
24 "Appropriate basic and internal organisational units shall be
25 established within the ministry for the purpose of carrying out duties
1 and activities from its purview as follows: Number 1, at the seat of the
2 ministry administration, special police brigade, police detachment,
3 squad, school, inspectorate, section, office, group, and secretariat;
4 number 2, outside the seat-centre, sector, Public Security station,
5 department, police station and station department, section, group, and
7 Now, after reading Article 2 of this set of rules, can you
8 explain to me the difference between organisational units intended for
9 carrying out duties in the seat of the ministry and outside the seat of
10 the ministry?
11 A. Well, there are certain organisational units in the seat of the
12 ministry or some forms of organisation that functionally deal with
13 specific problems or they are concentrated on specific areas of interest.
14 However, when we speak about organisational structure of the ministry
15 outside of its seat, that is territorial organisation of units at a lower
16 level than the ones in the ministry itself that we have already
17 mentioned, and these are two main organisational levels outside the seat.
18 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation] Let us now move to Article 7 of
19 this set of rules, and I'm going to read it for the record.
20 Q. The title under Article 7 reads "Organisational Units At the Seat
21 of the Ministry."
22 Article 7: "The following basic organisational units shall be
23 established at the seat of ministry: Number 1, police administration;
24 number 2, administration for prevention and detection of crimes; 3,
25 inspectorate for fire and explosion protection; number 4, administration
1 for analytical and information tasks, and the operation of the IT system;
2 number 5, communications and crypto-protection administration
3 information; number 6, administration for legal, personnel affairs, and
4 issues relating to aliens; number 7, secondary school of Internal
5 Affairs; number 8, administration for financial and technical affairs;
6 and, number 9, office of the minister.
7 Can you tell me what was the nature of these units that we have
8 just listed here?
9 A. All these organisational units that you listed constitute
10 organisational part of the ministry at its seat. So that's the
11 headquarters of the ministry, and we can see --
12 Q. Please go on.
13 A. And we see that we have functional principle of organising the
14 work processes.
15 MR. LAZAREVIC: Your Honours, I feel that I should apologise for
16 not having the translation of this document. This is the only document
17 that we still haven't been provided with translation. We addressed the
18 CLSS quite a long time ago, but for some reason we still haven't received
19 it. I have to assure that you this is the only one that we don't have a
21 JUDGE AGIUS: Thank you, Mr. Lazarevic.
22 Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.
23 MR. VANDERPUYE: Mr. President, I understand that we actually
24 have a translated version of it, and I think we can provide that to
25 Defence counsel, if that will assist the Court.
1 JUDGE AGIUS: It makes things easier. You've still got another
2 five minutes to go.
3 MR. LAZAREVIC: [Interpretation].
4 Q. Mr. Bajagic, let us look at Article 8 of this set of rules, and
5 I'm going to read it for the record and, hopefully, tomorrow we shall
6 have an opportunity to work with an English translation which will
7 expedite the process.
8 So, Article 8: "Organisational units referred to items 1 to 3 in
9 the previous article shall be part of the Public Security Service.
10 Organisational units referred to under items 3 to 9, in the previous
11 article, shall carry out other internal and joint affairs."
12 So, pursuant to Article 8, which of these units were part of of
13 the Public Security Service?
14 A. Part of the Public Security Service, which is an integral part of
15 the ministry, were police administration, administration for preventing
16 and detecting crime, and in the inspectorate for fire and explosion
18 MR. LAZAREVIC: Your Honours, maybe we should stop now because
19 the next article that I intend to quote to the witness is very long one.
20 It won't be appropriate.
21 JUDGE AGIUS: That's fine. So we'll continue tomorrow at 9.00.
22 Thank you.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.22 p.m.
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 7th day of October
25 2008, at 9.00 a.m.