Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 29112

 1                           Tuesday, 2 December 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning.  Mr. Thayer, we're ready for you to

 7     continue.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President, and good morning to you

 9     and Your Honours.  Good morning everyone.

10                           WITNESS:  DRAGISA MASAL [Resumed]

11                           [Witness answered through interpretation]

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Thayer: [Continued]

13        Q.   General, good morning.

14        A.   Good morning.

15        Q.   I want to stay on this day, the 25th of May, 1995, we spoke a

16     little bit about yesterday.  Following the NATO air strikes on VRS

17     facilities, we spoke a little bit about the shelling that occurred of

18     Sarajevo and the enclaves.  I want to just read you a small passage from

19     a lengthy Dutch investigation report, the NIAD report that everybody here

20     is familiar with?

21             MR. THAYER:  This is 65 ter 3970.  It's part 3, chapter 5,

22     section 2.  We don't need to put it up on e-court.  I'll just read it.

23     It's very short.

24        Q.   "Much of the Bosnian Serb revenge following the NATO bombing of

25     Pale on 25 and 26 May concentrated on Sarajevo, but the eastern enclaves

Page 29113

 1     were not spared.  This also had repercussions on the situation around

 2     Srebrenica.

 3             "On 25 May, as immediate retaliation, a number of shells landed

 4     close to a school in Srebrenica.  There were one dead and three wounded.

 5     The VRS also opened fire on the southwestern part of the enclave."

 6             Now, General, we have the Bratunac Brigade daily combat report.

 7             MR. THAYER:  And if we could have P03359.

 8        Q.   I'll let you take a look at that.  General, this is an interim

 9     combat report from the 25th of May from Commander Blagojevic of the

10     Bratunac Brigade.  Paragraph 1, as you can see says:

11             "In accordance with an oral order from Colonel Lazic, we fired

12     two shells from two 105 millimetre Howitzers (a total of four shells) on

13     the town of Srebrenica at 1907 hours.  Artillery observers at Pribicevac

14     reported that two shells fell near the Domavija feature.  The other two

15     shells were not observed, but they fell on Srebrenica."

16             Now, I just want to put a couple of additional facts to you and

17     then ask you a question.  One of those shells, General, killed

18     nine-year-old Jazna Gabelic who was in her home in Srebrenica when the

19     shell struck it; and her sister, Alma, who was seriously wounded, has

20     testified.

21             And I would like to show you one more document and then put my

22     question to you.

23             MR. THAYER:  That's 5D1161.

24        Q.   What we have here, General, is a report from the Main Staff, a

25     daily report to the president, Dr. Karadzic, for the 25th of May, 1995.

Page 29114

 1             MR. THAYER:  And if we go to page 3 of the B/C/S, and that's

 2     going to be page 4 of the English, please.

 3        Q.   And if you look at paragraph 6, in particular 6(b), the situation

 4     in the corps, do you see that, General, that section?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   It says:  "Artillery fire was opened on the Srebrenica and

 7     Gorazde enclaves as well as the Tuzla airport."

 8             Now, General, again I put it to you that these different

 9     subordinate units, firing on Sarajevo, Srebrenica town, Gorazde, and

10     Tuzla, didn't just coincidentally decide to shell all at the same time,

11     but were ordered to do so by the Main Staff.  As chief of artillery of

12     the Main Staff, General, at the time, what is your response to that?

13        A.   I've not seen a single document which says that the Main Staff

14     ordered fire to be open on the protected areas at the same time; i.e.,

15     I've not read in any document that the Main Staff ordered fire to be

16     opened at the time at all.

17             I explained to you yesterday that every unit has, under its

18     immediate command, artillery units, and that every command is autonomous,

19     and also that the commander of every unit has the right to decide when

20     and how, with what weapons, to open fire.  Only if there is a cease-fire,

21     in that situation they will turn to the superior command to ask for their

22     approval.  I don't see anywhere here that the Main Staff ordered fire to

23     be observed at the time in a synchronised manner targeting these

24     particular facilities.

25        Q.   General, my question wasn't whether you saw it in any document or

Page 29115

 1     report.  My question was:  You were chief of artillery of the Main Staff

 2     at the time.  Was this shelling on the 25th of May, which occurred after

 3     the NATO air strikes that day, ordered by the Main Staff?  That's my

 4     question, whether you have any knowledge of that, whether it was ordered

 5     by the Main Staff; not whether you just saw it in some report or not.

 6        A.   This was not an order by the Main Staff issued at the time.

 7     Somebody may have ordered fire to be opened on certain targets; however,

 8     when it comes to these particular activities, this was not proceeded by

 9     an order from the Main Staff.  In any case, the order - if there was

10     one - did not come from me.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Thayer, if you could give me the reference of

12     the testimony of Alma, whose nine-year-old brother was killed?

13             MR. THAYER:  It was her nine-year-old sister, Mr. President, and

14     that was admitted pursuant to 92 bis in this case by the Court's decision

15     back in, I believe, September of 2006.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             MR. THAYER:

18        Q.   So, General, it's your testimony, then, before this Trial Chamber

19     that all of this firing which occurred on the 25th of May occurred

20     coincidentally on the part of individual decisions made by subordinate

21     commanders?

22        A.   In any case, the commanders did receive certain orders, I suppose

23     from the commander of the Main Staff, as to what activities should be

24     under taken.  As for the order to open fire, that order did not come from

25     the Main Staff and nobody in the Main Staff specified any targets or any

Page 29116

 1     particular times at which fire should be opened.

 2        Q.   Let me make sure I understand your testimony correctly, General.

 3     Are you telling the Trial Chamber that it is your understanding that the

 4     orders or the order to fire on the 25th of May came from General Mladic

 5     and not from the Main Staff?

 6        A.   I cannot claim that General Mladic issued an order to that effect

 7     or not.  I was not there to hear General Mladic issuing any order of that

 8     kind.

 9        Q.   But, if I understand you correctly, General, the reason why you

10     just told us that, and I'll quote you, "In any case, the commanders did

11     receive certain orders, I suppose from the commanders of the Main Staff,

12     as to which activities should be undertaken," is that surely you

13     recognise that the possibility that all of this fire at the same time on

14     the eastern enclaves could not have been coincidental.

15             That is why you are trying to identify somebody who must have

16     given the order to open that fire.  Is that what you're telling the Trial

17     Chamber, General?

18        A.   I could not see well, and I did not notice that there was

19     simultaneous fire opened on the enclaves.  If there had been simultaneous

20     fire, as you claim, and if there is a document or a report that the fire

21     was opened simultaneously, then somebody had ordered for fire to be

22     opened at that same time.  If the fire was not synchronised and

23     simultaneous, I am telling you again that it is within the exclusive

24     purview of the commander to issue such an order within their normal

25     competences to decide when to open fire and at what targets.

Page 29117

 1        Q.   Okay.  But, General, we just saw the daily combat report from the

 2     Bratunac Brigade which specifically stated that they have received their

 3     orders to fire upon an oral order from Colonel Lazic, who was chief of

 4     operation of training at the Drina Corps.  Now, he's not an artillery

 5     guy, so who's giving him the order?  Who is in the position to give him

 6     the order to pass on to the Bratunac Brigade on that occasion?

 7        A.   The commander of the chief or the Chief of Staff of the Drina

 8     Corps.

 9        Q.   And if we are talking about coordinated fire, who is going to be

10     giving the order to the commander of the Drina Corps?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, General Masal.

12             Ms. Fauveau Ivanovic.

13             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could one specify about coordinated

14     fire what unit one is talking about?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Thayer.

16             MR. THAYER:  Well, Mr. President, I think it's clear what we are

17     talking about here, and I think the General understands what I've been

18     talking about.  We've been vague a conversation about this for the last

19     20 minutes, so if I may continue and just get an answer to my question,

20     which was --

21             JUDGE KWON:  I understand the question to be asking you whether

22     it was a coordinated operation among the corps, because this refers to

23     the Drina Corps only.

24             MR. THAYER:  That's correct, Mr. President, and the thrust of my

25     questioning, as we have fired, as we heard from the section from the NIAD

Page 29118

 1     report, that there was fire opened up on Sarajevo as well, which involves

 2     the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.  So my question is, if we are talking about

 3     a coordinated response in response to the NATO air strikes, my question

 4     to the General is:  Who is in the position to order these corps to open

 5     that fire?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Thayer.  Your explanation clarified

 7     your question.  I think now the General is in the position to answer the

 8     question.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you want the true answer to your

10     question as to whether the Main Staff coordinated the artillery fire on

11     Sarajevo and Srebrenica as well as Gorazde and Tuzla, then we need to

12     have the information that an order was issued at the same time to the

13     Sarajevo Romanija Corps, the Drina Corps, and the East Bosnian Corps to

14     open artillery fire on the aforementioned sectors.

15             You have provided me with a document which speaks about the

16     shelling of Srebrenica which is within the area of responsibility of the

17     Bratunac Brigade which is on the strength of the Drina Corps.  There is

18     no need for the commander of the Main Staff, and that would be -- not be

19     within the principle of command and control to issue order to the

20     Bratunac Brigade to open fire, for example, at 1500 hours.

21             In other words, I don't see any sort of the coordination in all

22     of this.  I am not excludeing the possibility that somebody may have

23     ordered to the commander of the Drina Corps, Colonel Blagojevic, to open

24     fire, or maybe the commander of the Sarajevo Corps -- Sarajevo Drina

25     Corps opened his subordinate to open fire.  But I don't see that General

Page 29119

 1     Mladic or his deputy in the Main Staff saw it fit to assume such a role

 2     in -- in this situation.  I don't see it anywhere in any of your

 3     documents.

 4             MR. THAYER:

 5        Q.   General, my question to you was quite simple, and nobody is

 6     suggesting that General Mladic picked up the phone and called the

 7     Bratunac Brigade artillery chief.  To the contrary, as we have been

 8     talking about, the order, as we could see from that combat report, to

 9     fire came from an oral order from Colonel Lazic out of the ops and

10     training administration of the Drina Corps.

11             So my question to you is simple:  When we are talking about fire

12     being opened up by multiple corps, who is going to be giving that order

13     if multiple corps are meant to be engaged at or about the same time?

14     That's simple question to you.  Is it you?  Is it someone else?

15        A.   If I was opening at the same time, the exclusive right to issue

16     order is to the -- lies with the corps commander or his deputy.  I did

17     not have the right to issue orders for corps activities if those

18     activities were coordinated.  If it was done over a period of time, then

19     this could have been a coincidence rather than a coordinated activity.

20     If this had been coordinated, then it would be to the minute if not to

21     the second when fire was opened.

22        Q.   I'll try one more time, General.  If it had been coordinated, who

23     would have given the order to the corps?  Where would that order come

24     from?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Madam Fauveau.

Page 29120

 1             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the witness answered

 2     this question, page 8, lines 11, 12, and 13.

 3             MR. THAYER:  Respectfully, Mr. President, he has not answered the

 4     question.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think he has answered the question, but

 6     albeit speculative.  Please answer the question.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If somebody had ordered this, then

 8     it would be the commander of the Main Staff or his deputy who would have

 9     the exclusive right to order such a thing to the corps.

10             MR. THAYER:

11        Q.   Now, General, last Friday you testified, and let me just quote

12     you directly from the transcript, and this is at 29028.  You said:

13             "What I am aware of, and I do know this, is that in all orders,

14     and especially in preparing combat activities, emphasis was always laid

15     on taking into account possible casualties among the civilian population

16     and reduce such casualties to a minimum especially in built up areas, or

17     to avoid them if at all possible."

18             Do you recall that testimony, General?  I just want to refresh

19     your recollection about it.

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   And you told us yesterday that your basic task was to see that

22     the artillery units were properly used in the units lower down; and to

23     take care and keep records of their technical equipment, the artillery,

24     ammunition; and to be in control of the artillery cadres, that is, the

25     men; and to make proposals for promotions, training, and moving people

Page 29121

 1     around.

 2        A.   Yes, yes.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Now, finally, just one last thing.  You also testified

 4     that you toured the corps and, and I quote:  "And I make proposals to the

 5     corps commanders instructing them how they should deal with the situation

 6     and also to report back to General Milovanovic about the situation."

 7             Do you remember testifying to that effect yesterday at 29100 of

 8     the transcript?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Fauveau Ivanovic.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I don't think it was a general

11     statement.  I think it had to do with the Operation --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the word.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Did you refer to Spreca?

14             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

15             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I don't think that's the case at all.

16     If you look at the answer that General Masal gave, it was in response

17     to --

18             JUDGE KWON:  You could give a more detailed reference to the

19     witness --

20             MR. THAYER:  A very general --

21             JUDGE KWON:  -- so that he could taken question.

22             MR. THAYER:

23        Q.   General, I asked you yesterday, at page 29.100, "Can you give us

24     an he idea, and let's start from the bottom up, when authorisation was

25     required or not for artillery assets to be employed ..." -- let me

Page 29122

 1     withdraw that.

 2             MR. THAYER:  One second.  Wrong question.  I apologise.

 3        Q.   Let me read the correct question that I asked you.

 4             I asked you:  "Presumably on your part, General, that would

 5     require a fair amount of knowledge about the activities at a particular

 6     time within the corps so that you could make that assessment as to

 7     whether the artillery was being properly deployed and so forth; is that

 8     fair to say?"

 9             And your response was:  "I should just like to add that after

10     taking over these duties, some 15 to 20 days afterwards, I managed to

11     tour all the corps and to size up the situation on the spot to see the

12     state of the artillery and how it was grouped.  And on the basis of that,

13     and later on during the operations where I was present, I was able to

14     have an overview of the situation and see whether the artillery was used

15     properly or not."

16             So, General, you are clearly talking about other operations where

17     you were doing your job, touring the corps, making sure that artillery

18     was being properly used; correct?

19        A.   Yes, but I have to make a correction.  I said that after I

20     received my duty, some 20 days later, I toured all the corps and I

21     analysed the situation in the artillery units, the grouping thereof, and

22     whether artillery is used in accordance with the rules for its use.

23             As far as I was concerned as the artillery chief, the important

24     thing was whether -- or how the artillery in the corps was grouped, the

25     artillery pieces that were directly subordinate to the corps commander.

Page 29123

 1     I had the information about the -- all the artillery pieces, but the

 2     grouping in the brigades and battalions was within the purview of the

 3     artillery chief in the corps or in the brigade, respectively.  So I can

 4     say with full responsibility that I could only have influenced and I only

 5     had time to have influence in the depth of the territory in the corps as

 6     far as the use of the corps artillery was concerned; the corps artillery

 7     group, if you are aware of the way in which artillery is groups are set

 8     up.

 9        Q.   And, General, I intend to stay on the topic of the corps

10     artillery, so that's no problem here.  I am not going to ask you about

11     some mortar platoon in Bratunac or something like that, okay?

12             Now, one of the reasons why the corps artillery deployment is so

13     important is because it's corps-wide, it has potentially great influence

14     over the area of responsibility because artillery itself can be much more

15     than simply a tactical weapon; is that fair to say?

16        A.   Artillery is of great importance, but only if groups are set up

17     properly.  And in the corps, in light of the size of the area, the corps

18     artillery group, if it comprises one artillery battalion, can only

19     provide support to the main force, to the main body of troops, not to the

20     whole area of responsibility of the corps.  And if it were to be deployed

21     in this manner, then the corps artillery could not be under anyone's

22     command.  Nobody could exercise command properly over it.

23        Q.   Understood, General.  That's why it was so important for you to

24     be able to make sure that that corps artillery, be it the Drina Corps or

25     the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, artillery groups were properly positioned

Page 29124

 1     and being properly used?

 2        A.   That's correct.  Not directly, because I could not have any

 3     influence.  I could suggest, I could recommend, but the corps commander

 4     decided ultimately whether it would be done in this manner or not on the

 5     basis of the proposal submitted to him by his artillery chief.

 6        Q.   Okay.  Let's talk about that issue for a couple of moments.  You

 7     told us yesterday, General, how the air bombs, the avio bombe, were made;

 8     and you were clear and quick to point out that you understood that they

 9     were legal?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   And, I think, in answer to a question from my friend from the

12     Miletic team, you, yourself, said that these bombs were primitively made,

13     they weren't precise, and very often there were very large deviations

14     from one projectile to the other.  That was at page 29.062.  But,

15     General, these bombs were used by General Dragomir Milosevic's Sarajevo

16     Romanija Corps during the same time you were chief of artillery of the

17     Main Staff; correct?

18        A.   I don't know.  No approval was sought from the Main Staff for its

19     use, but he could decide on his own independently whether to use it or

20     not.

21        Q.   General, is it your testimony that there was no Main Staff

22     control over the use of air bombs?

23        A.   The use of air bombs is, again, subject to the same rules as the

24     use of other artillery pieces.  So the Main Staff could not, in fact not

25     even the corps, could keep records at all times and know at all times

Page 29125

 1     whether an air bomb was used in a sector.  What it would be like for the

 2     chief of the Main Staff or the artillery chief to monitor and to the

 3     follow the use of all artillery pieces and air bombs are, in fact, just

 4     another artillery piece.

 5        Q.   Okay, General.  Well, I could show you an order from June of 1994

 6     that specifically deals with the Main Staff's insistence on controlling

 7     the use of air bombs, in particular in the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.  I

 8     can get that later and show it to you after the break, but let me just

 9     move on on this topic.

10             Given the nature of these air bombs being imprecise, hard to

11     guide, General, weren't they used as a tool of terror on the civilian

12     population of Sarajevo by Dragomir Milosevic and his Sarajevo Romanija

13     Corps during the time-period while you were chief of artillery?

14        A.   I became the artillery chief on the 20th of August, 2004.  Now,

15     whether air bombs were used in this manner that you just described, well,

16     I can't give you answer because I was not present.  I did not have any

17     influence over whether they would be used or not; and I don't know, in

18     fact, who from the Main Staff could exert any influence on whether they

19     would be used in Sarajevo or not.

20             You mentioned the 20th of June; it's much earlier than the 20th

21     of August.

22        Q.   Now, sir, just so you know, the period of time for which General

23     Milosevic faced charges was August of 1994 through November of 1995.  So

24     I think that coincides pretty closely with your tenure as chief of

25     artillery of the Main Staff.  But, based on your answer, General,

Page 29126

 1     concerning your knowledge or lack of knowledge regarding the use of the

 2     air bombs, let me just share something with you.  It's from the trial

 3     judgment in the Galic -- sorry, in the Dragomir Milosevic case.

 4             This judgment is dated 12 November 2007.  I just want to read to

 5     you one of the Trial Chamber's findings.  This is at page 323,

 6     paragraph --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Thayer, can I ask the relevance.

 8             MR. THAYER:  The relevance, Mr. President, is credibility of this

 9     witness, it goes directly to his credibility, it goes to his credibility

10     concerning his answers about what he knew was going on, his control --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We heard his evidence relating to the bombing,

12     shelling, in Sarajevo.  Can we move on to another subject?

13             MR. THAYER:  Certainly, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             MR. THAYER:  May we have P03785.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give the number again, please.

17             MR. THAYER:  3785.  Bear with us, we're trying to get up the

18     right map.

19             Mr. President, if the we may go old school and use the ELMO with

20     the witness, please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, by all means.

22             MR. THAYER:

23        Q.   General --

24             MR. THAYER:  For my colleagues, this is the excerpt from the

25     Susica artillery plan that we've seen before.  For some reason, we can't

Page 29127

 1     get it in e-court.

 2        Q.   General, have a look at -- at this map.  If you want look at the

 3     hard copy that's on the ELMO, if that's easier, please feel free to do

 4     so.

 5        A.   Could you please move it a little bit, because I can only see the

 6     target list.

 7        Q.   If you want, you can just pick it up and actually look at it if

 8     that will be easier to acquaint yourself with it.  You can open the whole

 9     thing up, General, it will just a moment.

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   As you can see, that's an artillery plan or an excerpt from an

12     artillery plan for Operation Susica.  This, I can tell you, was planned

13     in 1995.  We can see that from a related map which talks about forces

14     that would be freed up once Operation Spreca was completed.  So I think

15     that helps put a time-frame on this map.

16             My question to you, General, is:  Do you see the firing table?

17        A.   Yes, I can see it.

18        Q.   And do you see the area of Zepa on the map?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And do you see on the firing table various UNPROFOR checkpoints

21     being listed as targets with specific fire signs or call signs to the

22     right?

23        A.   Yes, yes.  Yes, I can see it in the firing table.

24        Q.   Now, as chief of artillery of the Main Staff, can you tell us why

25     those UNPROFOR checkpoints themselves are listed as targets with firing

Page 29128

 1     signs?

 2        A.   In two sentences.  The excerpt from the artillery plan is a

 3     document that contains the potential targets; and on the basis of that,

 4     precise coordinates are provided, and they are used as known points that

 5     will assist in determine the actual target.  When fire is actually

 6     opened, it will very seldom happen that the fire is opened in accordance

 7     with the plan -- as envisaged in the plan.  The plan is only used in

 8     order to be able to quickly establish the coordinates for the target that

 9     shows up.

10             To be quite specific, the trig reference points, the elevations,

11     the intersections, the dominant features, the UN checkpoints, are planned

12     as artillery targets, targets for artillery fire, but they are not

13     targets as such automatically.  They are there to provide elements for

14     fire to be opened on any target that appears, and that is the -- that

15     lies in the very essence of planning in the artillery.

16             We cannot rule out that a target might appear in the sector where

17     fire was planned to be opened, but automatically they already have all

18     the elements in place in time.  But in most cases, targets appear in the

19     immediate vicinity or at a short distance, enabling the artillery men to

20     fire on those targets on the basis of the elements that are prerecorded,

21     that already exist in the plan.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Thayer.  In order for us to follow the map, why

23     don't we try 65 ter 2884.

24             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  That's very helpful.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure whether it is there, but ...

Page 29129

 1             Is this the one, Mr. Thayer?

 2             MR. THAYER:  This is the original, Mr. President.  The version

 3     that General Masal is looking at actually has an English translation with

 4     it, but this is the original that he was looking at.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We seem to have a translation of this.

 6             MR. THAYER:  We do, Mr. President.  We had looked at it before

 7     and I thought I had the right 65 ter number, so I apologise that we are

 8     not able to get that on e-court.

 9        Q.   But I just have one last question for you on this topic, General.

10     Isn't it also the case that by 1995 the VRS, in fact, regarded UNPROFOR

11     as a hostile force and that these targets of these checkpoints in Zepa

12     represented the VRS's recognition that they might have to fire directly

13     on UNPROFOR?

14        A.   Two fires that were planned to be opened in sectors where there

15     were UNPROFOR checkpoints, in actual combat situation, could have been

16     positions of the enemy forces, not of UNPROFOR; or, for instance, if the

17     enemy forces appeared in the vicinity of this sector, this was planned

18     not because of UNPROFOR, because to make it faster for the fire to be

19     transferred from the point where elements already existed to the target

20     that had just appeared.  I am now in the shoes of the artillery chief who

21     drafted this.

22             The UNPROFOR checkpoint was not an enemy target at all.  It is

23     merely a sector where the enemy force might -- an enemy target may appear

24     in its immediate or close vicinity.  And the claim that in the Main Staff

25     or in the VRS, UNPROFOR was the enemy is simply not valid, or at least to

Page 29130

 1     my knowledge it's not valid, because the prevailing opinion in the VRS

 2     was that UNPROFOR was not carrying out mission.

 3             In many cases, it went against the mandate it had received.  It

 4     did not operate in accordance with this mandate.  That was the position,

 5     but I did not share with you this view that you just put to me that they

 6     were considered the enemy.

 7        Q.   Okay, General.  Let's move off the maps and go back to Visegrad.

 8     You assumed your command of the Visegrad tactical group in early February

 9     of 1993, I take it, you told us 4 February, and remained there until 20

10     August of 1994.  I think you told us that your area included Rogatica,

11     Visegrad, Rudo, Cajnice, and Gorazde.  Do I have that correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And when you assumed that command, you held the rank of full

14     colonel; correct?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   You recorded to General Zivanovic as Drina Corps commander?

17        A.   I was subordinate to General Zivanovic.

18        Q.   And which units were subordinated to you, General, when you

19     arrived?

20        A.   Five brigades:  The 1st Podrinje Brigade in Rogatica, the 2nd

21     Podrinje Brigade in Visegrad, the 3rd Podrinje Brigade in Cajnice, the

22     4th Podrinje Brigade in Rudo, and the 5th Podrinje Brigade --  the

23     Gorazde brigade which was not, in fact, in Gorazde because Gorazde was

24     under the Muslim control.

25        Q.   And if you could just clarify, for us, just one issue, as briefly

Page 29131

 1     as you can, General:  How did the command and control operate when you

 2     were in command of this tactical group in terms of the reporting?  Were

 3     these brigades still reporting directly and subordinate to General

 4     Zivanovic, or would they report to you and then you would report on to

 5     General Zivanovic?  How did that work?  Can you just give us an idea,

 6     because as you've told us, there were already established brigades with a

 7     command structure, and then there is you over them.

 8        A.   The brigade commands were subordinate to me.  To make this clear,

 9     the tactical group was just a temporary force.  It is not a permanent

10     unit like brigades or corps or companies or battalions.  It is a

11     temporary command that unifies a combat operations in the area of

12     responsibility of some units.  The brigade commands were subordinate to

13     me; and in some situations and when it came to some issues, they also

14     reported directly to the corps command.

15             For instance, if a report about UNPROFOR movements had to be sent

16     quickly and directly, then it was sent directly to the Drina Corps, too.

17     But combat reports were sent to me, to the command of the tactical group,

18     and I in turn reported to the Drina Corps command.

19        Q.   General, do you know who Milan Lukic is?

20        A.   Yes.  I heard of Milan Lukic, and I even met him once.

21        Q.   Okay.  It's hard a to talk about Visegrad during this period of

22     time without talking about Milan Lukic; is that fair to say, General?

23        A.   I wouldn't agree with you on that.  Visegrad was not Milan Lukic.

24             MR. THAYER:  Well, let's go into private session for a moment, if

25     we could, Mr. President, and I want to show you a couple of documents.

Page 29132

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2                           [Private session]

 3   (redacted)

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10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

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14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

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Page 29133











11  Pages 29133-29134 redacted. Private session.















Page 29135

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4                           [Open session]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we are now in open session.

 6             MR. THAYER:

 7        Q.   General, earlier on in your testimony, you mentioned an

 8     individual named Luka Dragicevic.  He served under you; correct?

 9        A.   Yes.  He was the commander of the Visegrad brigade; the 2nd

10     Podrinje Brigade, that is.

11        Q.   And did he ever tell you about his encounters or experiences with

12     Milan Lukic?

13        A.   Not in any great detail.  On one occasion when I met Milan Lukic

14     on the street, I asked Luka Dragicevic about Milan Lukic, and he just

15     gave me a few sentences to explain who that was.  This was not a topic of

16     discussion between allow Luka Dragicevic and myself.

17        Q.   What did Mr. Dragicevic tell you about who Milan Lukic was?

18        A.   Just briefly, he told me that he had his own group and that he

19     sometimes experienced problems with him when it came to military duties

20     and subordination to the brigade command as the official military

21     formation.

22        Q.   And did Mr. Lukic eventually become absorbed, as it were,

23     subordinated to the army at some point?

24        A.   Wherever I was informed about the activities of the Visegrad

25     Brigade, I never had the occasion to see either Milan Lukic or his

Page 29136

 1     associates in any of the operations or actions.

 2        Q.   Well, my question was a little bit more simple:  Did you ever

 3     become aware that Mr. Lukic and his group ultimately subordinated

 4     themselves to the VRS?  Whether you saw them in any operation or report

 5     or not, did you ever become aware that that was the case?

 6        A.   No, I don't know.  Nobody ever told me anything like that.

 7     Commander Dragicevic never reported to me about that.

 8        Q.   Okay, General.  I want to move to a new area and try to pick up

 9     the pace a little bit.

10             You just mentioned Operation Sword, Operation Mac.

11             MR. THAYER:  May we see 5D1169, please.

12        Q.   General, you were shown this combat order dated 22 May 1993

13     during your examination-in-chief.  I just wanted to clarify a couple of

14     things about it, partly because I think part of this combat order was not

15     translated into English, and I wanted to ask you a couple of questions to

16     clarify the record.

17             I think my -- my learned friend from the Pandurevic team asked

18     you about Mac 1 or Mac 2, there being a couple of operations Mac.  Do you

19     recall there being more than one Mac, or do you recall only one Operation

20     Sword?

21        A.   There were two.  This was the first one which was ever carried

22     out, and the second was launched but was never completed.  Some 15 days

23     into the operation -- actually, the combat operations went on for maybe

24     two or three days from the direction of Cajnice, but the operation was

25     then called off.

Page 29137

 1        Q.   And you're referring to Mac 1 or Mac 2, General?

 2        A.   Mac 2.  Mac 2 was completed.

 3        Q.   Okay.  So it's Sword 1 which went on for a few days, but then was

 4     terminated.  Do I have that correct?

 5        A.   No.  Sword 1 is the one that was ordered, and we are looking at

 6     the order.  It was completed, it was carried through.  Sword 2, Mac 2,

 7     was launched 15 days subsequently.  It went on for a few days, two or

 8     three, but it was called off, it was never completed.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Glad I've asked.

10             MR. THAYER:  Now, can we go to page 2.  That's page 2 of the

11     original and page 3 of the English.

12        Q.   The English translation says:

13             "Carry out this operation in two stages of eight to ten days,"

14     And then it refers to the first stage taking five to six days.

15             But I think that you will agree, General, that when we look at

16     the B/C/S original that you're reading, that English translation is

17     incorrect.  So I would just ask you to read for us what the actual order

18     entailed for Mac 1 with respect to these two stages.  If you could just

19     read that.

20        A.   Do you want me to read it aloud.

21        Q.   Yes, please, General.

22        A.   "In the first stage, which should take three to four days,

23     breakup enemy forces in a rigorous force in the Brodar area of Ustipraca

24     and Medjedja, on the right bank of the Drina and on the left banks of the

25     Drina and Praca rivers, in the Ustipraca Brodar section.  During the

Page 29138

 1     second stage, which should take between five and six days, regroup forces

 2     and use the circular bases, introduce fresh forces, and continue a

 3     vigorous attack towards Gorazde.  Take the elevations that are around

 4     Gorazde as soon as possible and encircle it; thus, creating conditions to

 5     disarm the remaining Muslim formations and allow the civilian population

 6     to move out to Central Bosnia or to remain in town on a condition that

 7     they recognise the Serbian authority."

 8        Q.   Thank you, General.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  So that the first paragraph is omitted in English

10     translation.  That's what you are suggesting.

11             MR. THAYER:  That's correct, Mr. President, and then the second

12     paragraph where it says "In the first stage ..." in the English

13     translation is just wrong because it's obviously --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we follow.

15             MR. THAYER:  -- misunderstood something there.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             MR. THAYER:

18        Q.   Now, as we can see from the title of this combat order, it's for

19     the liberation of the general area of Gorazde.  And that was the

20     objective of Mac 1, correct, General?

21        A.   Yes, that was the objective of the operation; however, the

22     objective was not fully achieved.

23             MR. THAYER:  Now, if we could go to became 8 of the English

24     please, and this will be the last page of the B/C/S, page 5.  And it's at

25     the top of both pages that I'm interested in.

Page 29139

 1        Q.   General, do you see there is a reference to the logistics sector

 2     of the Main Staff securing the required quantities of fuel and means of

 3     explosives?

 4        A.   At a request by the command of the Drina Corps.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Now, in paragraph 8, the order states:  "In the

 6     organisation of communications, rely on the exhumations system of the

 7     Visegrad tactical group ..."

 8             And then it says:  "Organise a separate mobile ..." and then

 9     there are the initials CV; I believe that stands for a communications

10     centre, "... to be deployed in the Borike section of Rogatica.

11             And I just note that that's been mistranslated.  If we look at

12     the original, it is Borike and not Bork.

13             Do you see that section, General?

14        A.   Yes, I do.

15        Q.   Now, have you been to Borike, General?  Can you tell us what's

16     there?

17        A.   Yes.  I was in Borike.  It's a village.  There is a motel there

18     in a forest.  There is a villa type house; and maybe a kilometre away

19     from there, there is a very famous horse breeding farm known as the Farm

20     at Borike.  And that is that.

21        Q.   Now, what did this Main Staff communications centre at Borike

22     consist of?  Can you tell us about that?

23        A.   The mobile communications centre is actually the staff vehicle;

24     it's the establishment vehicle.  It's a van that houses the

25     communications maze which allows for communication to be established for

Page 29140

 1     any location where that vehicle may be.  That's why it's called mobile

 2     communications centre.

 3        Q.   And who exactly is going to be manning that van or in that van or

 4     accompanying that van?

 5        A.   Officers and soldiers who belong to the communications branch,

 6     who were trained to establish and maintain communications.

 7        Q.   And for the Main Staff communications centre, what unit are they

 8     going to be from?  Let me put it concretely, in this operation, do you

 9     recall where they are from?

10        A.   I don't know.  I've never asked them.  I don't know whether they

11     were from the communications regiment of the Main Staff or the Drina

12     Corps, but, obviously, an order had been issued to prepare the

13     communications centre for the IKM of the Main Staff.  I never had an

14     opportunity to inquire what unit that actually belonged to.

15        Q.   General, just one last question on this document before the

16     break.

17             The reason that Gorazde alone is the objective of this combat

18     order, and not Gorazde and Zepa together, is that Zepa had just been

19     declared a UN safe area; is that correct?

20        A.   Yes, yes.  Combat activities around Zepa finished 20 days or a

21     month before at the most.

22             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I see we are approaching the break.

23     May I suggest we take it now, and I'll move on to a new document when we

24     get back.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Can I ask how much longer do you have for the

Page 29141

 1     moment?

 2             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I think I am going to require pretty

 3     close to the full four hours that I had estimated.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We'll see.  25 minutes.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Thayer.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9        Q.   Good morning again, General.  Earlier this morning, when we were

10     talking about the air bombs, I mentioned an order that I was going to put

11     my hands on during the break.  I've done so, I've handed out hard copies

12     for my friends, and we have Chamber for the Chamber at hard copy had.  I

13     don't think we've managed to load it into e-court yet, but I just wanted

14     to -- and I have a copy for you, too, General.

15             MR. THAYER:  For the record, we've given this 65 ter number 3981.

16        Q.   Take a moment and read this, if you will, General.

17        A.   Out loud or just to myself?

18        Q.   Read it to yourself.  Thank you.

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   General, this 12 June 1994 document makes it clear, does it not,

21     that the VRS Main Staff decides on the use of air bombs exclusively?

22        A.   Not exclusively.  Possibly the corps subject to the approval.

23        Q.   Correct, General, but it has to have Main Staff approval, the

24     corps does, correct?

25        A.   That's right.

Page 29142

 1        Q.   So the ultimate authority rests in the Main Staff according to

 2     this document that we're looking at, right?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   Now, you told us that this predated your duties as chief of

 5     artillery for the Main Staff, but is it your testimony that you never

 6     became aware, during your entire service in the Main Staff as chief of

 7     artillery, that the Main Staff had the ultimate authority and the only

 8     authority regarding the use of these air bombs?

 9        A.   This order, I see now; but as to whether the Main Staff decides

10     or approves the corps commands to use air bombs, there is a document that

11     I drafted to that effect, that the use of air bombs is approved for the

12     use of the Drina and East Bosnian Corps for the Spreca Operation.  So

13     obviously that order, too, shows that the Main Staff did decide when to

14     approve the use of air bombs to a particular corps.

15             Now, whether the corps commands or the brigades commands really

16     abided by this, I believe they did.  But there may have been some

17     arbitrary actions taken on their own initiative, but I can't tell you

18     that for fact because I don't know.

19        Q.   Okay, General.  Let's go back to where we left off before the

20     break, May of 1993.  You talked to us about Operation Sword 1.  That

21     combat order was dated 22 May.  I want to talk about another combat order

22     that was issued on the 1st of May, a nearly identical combat order to

23     that of Sword 1 that ordered the liberation of Gorazde and Zepa.

24             And that was Operation Spring 93.  Do you remember that

25     operation, sir?

Page 29143

 1        A.   Yes.  Before the break, I told you that 20 days or a month before

 2     this operation, an operation was conducted to liberate Zepa.  That

 3     operation had ended, and then the order was drafted to liberate Gorazde.

 4        Q.   Yes.  And you testified just before we broke that the fighting

 5     around Zepa had stopped at a certain time.  How long was Operation Spring

 6     underway before it stopped, General?

 7        A.   I don't know specifically, but I think about ten days or so;

 8     maybe even less.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Now, may we have 65 ter 2742 on the screen, please.

10        Q.   And just quickly, looking at this front page of this combat order

11     for the liberation of Zepa and Gorazde, we can see that it's addressed to

12     various commands including the command of the Visegrad tactical group.

13             Do you see that, General?

14        A.   Yes.

15             MR. THAYER:  Now, if we turn to page 15 of the English and 9 of

16     the B/C/S.

17        Q.   I want to draw your attention to a couple of items on those

18     pages.  If we look at paragraph 8 on your version, and it's what's

19     showing on the English version as well, do you see where it says:

20             "In the organisation of communications, take the example of

21     communications of the TG Visegrad ..."

22             And a little bit further down it says:

23             "Communication shall be provided with the Foca TG and the

24     Visegrad TG ..."

25             Do you see those entries, General?

Page 29144

 1        A.   Just a moment, please.  Yes.

 2        Q.   Now, can you describe what your involvement with this operation

 3     was, General?

 4        A.   One of my brigades took part in this operation, the 1st Podrinje

 5     Brigade from Rogatica.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Now, if we could go back to page 8 of the English,

 7     and this will be the bottom of the page 5 of the B/C/S, please.

 8        Q.   At the bottom of your page, General, it says:

 9             "The Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska shall coordinate

10     the operation from the IKM in Rogatica.  Colonel Dragutin Ilic shall be

11     responsible for merging, planning, linking, and command and control of

12     the forces engaged in the liberation of Gorazde, and Colonel Radivoje

13     Miletic of the forces engaged in the liberation of Zepa."

14             Now, General, given that then-Colonel Miletic was going to play a

15     significant command and control role in this operation, and, as you said

16     your forces were involved and your coms, what contacts did you have with

17     then-Colonel Miletic after receiving this order or, indeed, during the

18     course of this operation?

19        A.   Since my tactical unit as a whole did not take part, it was just

20     the 1st Podrinje Brigade, all the tasks and all the orders that were

21     received from the Drina Corps command were received by the brigade

22     commander.  I attended one meeting in the course of the preparations for

23     the operation.  The mainstay of this operation was the Drina Corps

24     command.  They were the main responsible agent.  And the merging or the

25     unification, since some of the headquarters units from the Main Staff,

Page 29145

 1     the TG Foca, and the Protection Regiment also used, then the Main Staff

 2     from Rogatica command post unified and coordinated the activities around

 3     Zepa.

 4        Q.   And can you tell us where then-Colonel Miletic's forward command

 5     post was physically located?  Where was he working out of during this

 6     operation?

 7        A.   The operation was under the direct control of the Drina Corps

 8     command -- or, rather ...

 9             THE INTERPRETER.  ... under direct command; interpreter's

10     correction.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And as for control and direction,

12     it went for the Main Staff.  I attended a meeting that was chaired by

13     General Milovanovic in the course of the preparations.  That was at the

14     command post of the 1st Podrinje Brigade in Rogatica.

15             MR. THAYER:

16        Q.   And, again, my question to you, General, was:  Where was

17     then-Colonel Miletic physically located during this operation?

18        A.   The only time that I saw Colonel Miletic and the others from the

19     Main Staff, it was at the command post of the 1st Brigade in Rogatica.

20        Q.   And what was then-Colonel Miletic doing when you saw him there?

21     What was his role?

22        A.   At that meeting that I attended, I don't recall that anyone

23     actually said anything apart from the Drina Corps commander and the chief

24     of the Main Staff.  The commander of the Drina Corps briefly outlined the

25     concept of the operation, and General Milovanovic accepted that and also

Page 29146

 1     issued some supplementary.

 2        Q.   And based on your experience during this operation, it was

 3     carried out consistently with what we just saw in the combat order; that

 4     is, in terms of then-Colonel Miletic's role, in actual practice in the

 5     operation, the role that was ascribed to him in the combat order is

 6     actually what he performed during the operation.  Do I understand your

 7     testimony correctly there, General?

 8        A.   The order stipulates that a team from the Main Staff headed by

 9     Colonel Miletic at Zepa shall coordinate, plan, and harmonize activities.

10     This team did not command the operation.  The person in charge of the

11     units that were actually carrying out the actions was in command, and

12     that was the Drina Corps commander and his subordinate commanders.

13        Q.   And so then just, if you can tell us, what was then-Colonel

14     Miletic's role, just so we are clear?

15        A.   I can say on the basis of my experience, of things that I did

16     when I was in a similar role, and that's coordination and organisation of

17     the cooperation and concerted action between units from different corps,

18     and perhaps providing some suggestions in the course of the operation

19     itself to subordinate commanders, all this on the basis of the order from

20     the Main Staff commander.

21        Q.   Okay, General, let's go to a new topic.  You testified on Friday,

22     and this was at page 0928 of the transcript, and I quote:

23             "In every territory which was being liberated, the Muslim

24     population was given the option of staying; but if they decided to leave

25     and move to territories under the control of their army, they could do

Page 29147

 1     so."

 2             Do I have that correct, General, that that's what you said?

 3        A.   That's correct.

 4        Q.   Now, we've seen in a couple of these documents from 1993 that if

 5     the Muslims want to stay where they are, they have to recognise Serbian

 6     authority.  Can you tell us what that entailed?  What does that mean

 7     "recognizing Serbian authority," General?

 8        A.   I also said that in practice, I had not encountered a case where

 9     I would liberate a territory with my unit and then encounter Muslim

10     population there; but it is quite clear that the decision of the Supreme

11     Command and of the Main Staff made it possible for the population to make

12     a choice, either to move to the territory controlled by their army or to

13     remain abiding by the Serb authority.  So nothing more and nothing less

14     than the Serb population had as their rights and obligations.

15             And in this sense, this explains what I said that for over three

16     years in our area of responsibility, we had four Muslims villages.

17        Q.   Now, let's talk about the Muslims men, for example, that chose to

18     stay in Serb-held territory.  Were they required to serve in the VRS; did

19     they have, instead, a work obligation; or were they just free to live

20     their lives without any war-related obligations?

21        A.   In the course of my command in Visegrad, I did not have any such

22     cases.  But while I was the commander of the garrison and of the

23     artillery regiment in Bijeljina, which was part of East Bosnian Corps, I

24     know that a battalion was set up and troops were of Muslims ethnic

25     background.  They took part in the fighting as did the Serb units, side

Page 29148

 1     by side with them.  No distinction was ever made.  Those who were unable

 2     to serve at the front line were made part of the work obligation, just as

 3     Serb males who were not subject to the military obligation.  Military

 4     obligation or conscription was a general one.

 5        Q.   So with respect to these four villages that you told us about,

 6     what was supposed to happen to the military aged men that were living

 7     this in terms of their military service?  I understand you've told us

 8     about some Muslim fighters that were, I presume, united with their Serb

 9     neighbours against whom, I presume, are Croatian forces, up in the

10     eastern Bosnia corps.

11             But how about down in your four villages, General, what about the

12     males of military age in those villages?  What was their obligation?

13        A.   Just a very brief correction, it was not the Muslims who took

14     part in the fighting against Croats side by side with the Serbs; they

15     also served at the front lines facing the Muslim army.  And as regards

16     the four villages, I know for a fact that two soldiers, the Golic

17     brothers, who served in the 1st Podrinje Brigade from the very beginning

18     of the war.  I think that from those villages -- that the men from those

19     villages did not take part in combat operations, and they were not part

20     of the work obligation units that were engaged at the front line as far

21     as I know.  There were some work duty obligations in town; and, there,

22     side by side with elderly Serb men, they worked on those duties.

23        Q.   And were those Muslim men -- other than the Golic brothers that

24     you mentioned, were those Muslim men who stayed in those four villages

25     allowed to own weapons?

Page 29149

 1        A.   No.

 2        Q.   And why not, General?

 3        A.   I think that the distribution of weapons that would be held or

 4     kept in the depth of the territory would have been inappropriate; and,

 5     after all, the Serb population in the free territory did not have - I am

 6     talking about civilians - did not have weapons.

 7        Q.   No hunting rifles, General?

 8        A.   Well, there probably were some hunting rifles.  I don't know

 9     whether there were any in the Muslims villages.

10        Q.   Okay.

11             MR. THAYER:  Well, let's look at 65 ter 3971, please.

12        Q.   This is an analysis of combat readiness in the 1st Podrinje Light

13     Infantry Brigade, otherwise known as the Rogatica Brigade.  This was

14     conducted by then-Major Kusic, and it's dated February 25th of 1993.  I

15     just want to ask you one question about it.

16             MR. THAYER:  It's on page 4 of the English; page 3 of the B/C/S.

17        Q.   And I'll just read this to you quickly.  He states that, during

18     this period of time, and I quote, "Further activities included disarming

19     of Muslims in the villages of Setorovici, Okruglo, and Osovo, and

20     separating them from Ustasha formations."

21             My question is:  Is that consistent with what you saw when you

22     arrived in this area, that the army had disarmed the Muslims in those

23     villages?

24        A.   No.  As far as I can conclude, this is not about these villages.

25     We are talking about a period which started with the beginning of the war

Page 29150

 1     and ended on the 31st of December, 1992.  This is about the disarming of

 2     Muslims formations in other villages, in all the villages of Rogatica

 3     municipality.  These four villages are not expressly mentioned.  All the

 4     other villages are mentioned, and those may include the four in here.

 5     Whether there were weapons or not, I can't tell you with any degree of

 6     reliability because I was not in the area at the time.

 7        Q.   Well, let's just look at the original document, sir.  Do you see

 8     where it specifically says, and it's just about a little more than

 9     halfway down the document:  "Further activities included disarming of

10     Muslims in the villages of Setorovici, Okruglo, and Osovo, and separating

11     them from Ustasha formations," and this is for the period of 1992.

12             Isn't that what this just plainly says, General?

13        A.   No, I did not see this.  I only saw where it says "in the

14     villages ..."   Then further on, it says "Further activities ..."

15             I suppose that I implies that they will be disarmed and separated

16     from Ustasha formations, and the reason for that might be that these

17     villages decided to remain loyal to the Serb authorities and to remain

18     living in the villages; I am talking about the population.

19        Q.   And, so, isn't it the case, then, General, that in order for

20     them, those four villages, to live in the villages, loyal to the Serb

21     authorities, they had to be disarmed?  Just a simple question.

22        A.   I believe that the answer is simple.  No single commander would

23     allow people in his territory, in four villages, to be armed.  The

24     civilian police was in charge of the safety of the population; the

25     civilian police of the municipality of Rogatica.

Page 29151

 1        Q.   So, then, is it your testimony, General, that the Serb population

 2     was also disarmed throughout this area that you were responsible for?

 3        A.   The answer for the civilian population is yes; and the answer for

 4     the military, the soldiers, is no.

 5        Q.   So if Serb civilians in those areas had hunting rifles, would

 6     they be subject to arrest and imprisonment?

 7        A.   No, not for the hunting rifles that they had a license to carry.

 8        Q.   Now, I want to just give the Trial Chamber an idea of how many

 9     people we are talking about in these villages.  I looked at the 1991

10     census information, and let me just share with you what I found and see

11     if this corresponds with your knowledge of those villages.

12             According to the census info that I have, Burati had 68 Muslims

13     and 16 Serbs; Okruglo had 95 Muslims and 36 Serbs; Oslovo had 149 Muslims

14     and 169 Serbs; and Setorovici had 112 Muslims and no Serbs; for a total

15     424 Muslims and 221 Serbs.

16             Do those numbers sound right to you in terms of the numbers we

17     are talking about in these four villages?

18        A.   There weren't as many; there were between 200 and 250.  I believe

19     that between 1991 and 1992, a number of them had moved out or were

20     working somewhere else and so on and so forth.

21        Q.   And that would be not surprising, and, again, you are talking

22     about the Muslims in these villages; correct, General?

23        A.   Correct, correct, yes.

24        Q.   Now, you testified that these Muslims lived peacefully in these

25     villages and that they lived there until the second half of 1994

Page 29152

 1     peacefully, and that they moved away probably in the direction of

 2     Sarajevo or somewhere in Central Bosnia.  You said that at page 29.030.

 3     Is that correct, sir?

 4        A.   Correct, you're right.

 5        Q.   Sir, do you know a man from Setorovici named Ibro Konakovic?

 6     Does that name ring a bell to you?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   He says in a statement to the Sarajevo SDB --

 9             MR. THAYER:  And this is 65 ter 3979, if any of my friends want

10     to follow.  But I am going to save a little bit of time and just move

11     through this.

12        Q.   He says that on 21 November of 1993, Major Kusic went to

13     Setorovici and Osovo, and told the military aged men to report to the

14     school at Okruglo where the command post was based.  Then he says that

15     the Muslims' houses were searched, and that they were told by Major Kusic

16     to hand over their guns or they would be shot on the spot.

17             Then, final, he says that about 20 guns and rifles were handed

18     over, their owners were beaten; and then when the men reported to the

19     school, as ordered, 73 men were trucked to the Rasadnik prison near

20     Rogatica, and that some were released, about 10 the next day, but the

21     rest remained in the prison until they were released in July 1994.

22             General, do you know anything about what Mr. Konakovic is talking

23     about, and why these men were put in prison, 73 men?

24        A.   No, I really don't know anything about that.

25        Q.   Okay.

Page 29153

 1             MR. THAYER:  May we see 65 ter 3977 please.  Unfortunately, we

 2     don't have an English translation, but it is a short combat report.

 3        Q.   And I'll just ask you, General, to take a look at that if you

 4     would, and read it to yourself.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  In the meantime, Mr. Thayer, just to let you know

 6     that we are going to have a break at quarter past 12.00 for 20 minutes,

 7     and we will adjourn for the day at half past 1.00.  I would like you to

 8     try to do your best to conclude before the break.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Before 12.15, Mr. President?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I've read this.

12             MR. THAYER:

13        Q.   Now, if we look at the date of this, and this is a regular combat

14     report from yourself to the Drina Corps command - and there seems to be a

15     hole punched - but it look to he many like the date of this is

16     November 21.  I think I can see the bottom of a 2 and the bottom of a 1

17     there.  Can we agree on that, that that's the day of this report?

18        A.   I suppose so.  I can see number 11 standing for November 1993,

19     but I'm not sure about the actual date.

20        Q.   Okay.  Can you tell us what this daily combat report says?

21        A.   This is a regular combat report.  It says that in cooperation

22     with the SAJ -- SJB Rogatica members, control was carried out in the

23     villages, two people were discovered hiding, and also quite a quantity of

24     automatic weapons was discovered.  These two people were disarmed and the

25     weapons were ceased.

Page 29154

 1             If I may explain, I can see that there is my signature at the

 2     bottom, but I am sure that I don't know anything about this incident.  I

 3     suppose that the combat report was written, signed by the Chief of Staff,

 4     because if this is either the 20 or the 21st of November, I was most

 5     probably not in the area of the tactical group because that is around my

 6     birthday.  I suppose I was absent.  There is no other reason for me to

 7     deny any knowledge of the event.

 8             But the fact that I was probably absent from the area of

 9     responsibility, that's why I don't know anything about this.

10        Q.   Okay, General.  Well, I can save a little bit of time and I can

11     tell you that I've got a number of other statements from people from

12     Setorovici, from Osovo, all men, one of whom was over 60 at the time he

13     was arrested.  That man's name was Muradif Hodzic.

14             Do you know Muradif Hodzic, General, born 11 September 1930?

15        A.   Save for the retired General Asim Hodzic, I did not know anybody

16     in these villages.

17        Q.   Okay.  Well, he said that in about April 1992, he moved from

18     Rogatica to Setorovici because Rajko Kusic began mistreating the Muslims

19     then.  I've got other statements from other individuals from these

20     villages who also talk about being arrested on 21 November, and on other

21     occasions, and taken to the Rasadnik prison; and then on to Kula prison

22     in Sarajevo where they were exchanged, in one case over a hundred people.

23             Do you know anything about that, General?

24        A.   No, I don't.  I've already told you that I was never informed

25     about any of the arrests that took place in these four villages.

Page 29155

 1        Q.   Were you aware, sir, that in the fall of 1994, Muslims were moved

 2     out of Setorovici and Serb civilians were moved in?  Were you aware of

 3     that?

 4        A.   Yes.  I knew that they had been moved out, that they wanted to

 5     move out, and that they moved out in an organised manner.  I don't know

 6     when that was.  It may have been at the time when I had already left for

 7     the General Staff -- rather, the Main Staff.  I also know that when they

 8     expressed their wish to move out, this met with some resistance.  In

 9     Sarajevo, they did not want to take them, there were certain problems,

10     some delays and procrastination when it came to their transfer.

11        Q.   Now, you were shown the other day -- we've spoken about Rajko

12     Kusic a few times, and you were shown a document where he was requesting

13     that the local police provide some protection for these villages because

14     they were being harassed.  That was in -- sometime in 1994.

15             Do you remember that document?

16        A.   Yes.  I saw this document, and I learned from Major Kusic that he

17     had intervened and he had requested from the civilian authorities to send

18     more frequent civilian police patrols to protect the population in the

19     four villages in question.

20             MR. THAYER:  May we have 65 ter 3968, please.

21        Q.   General, I know -- I know this is a little hard to read.  What it

22     is, if you look in the upper right-hand corner, it's a letter to Avdo

23     Palic, March 1993, and this is a letter written by Rajko Kusic.  I want

24     to draw your attention to page 2 of this letter and just ask you some

25     questions about it.

Page 29156

 1             I want to draw your attention to the sentence that says, "The

 2     Americans will not come to defend you ..."

 3             If you could just orient yourself to that portion of the letter,

 4     where it says, "The Americans will not come to defend you ..."

 5             Its towards the top, I think, maybe the one, two, three, fourth

 6     line down.  Do you see that?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Okay.  From there the letter continues, Kusic writes, and I

 9     quote:

10             "Look what happened to Cerska, Konjevic Polje, and Srebrenica.

11     Diplomatic help is feeble.  They perished.  Trnopolje is surrounded, as

12     is Medjedja.  Every day they are perishing, but every day they are

13     running towards Jahorina.  Where will you go?  You still have a little

14     time left to make the right decision.  I am not an enemy of the Muslim

15     people, but of the criminals among this people and of those who want to

16     have slaves.  The Serbs were the first to have a state, and we have it

17     again.  There is no more living together.  I suppose this is clear to

18     you."

19             MR. THAYER:  And if we can scroll down.  A little bit more,

20     please.  That's fine.  Thank you.

21        Q.   "Your people will honour you if you make the right decision, and

22     I suggest to you quit the fighting in a jungle.  Take your people to

23     economic centres.  You cannot stay on the border to Serbia to separate us

24     from our people.  This must be clear to you.  You chose the wrong place

25     to fight.  The titles of authority in Zepa are small.  Go with your

Page 29157

 1     people to the place you belong to in Central Bosnia while there is still

 2     time.  Use the corridors which are opening.  Leave the American food; it

 3     won't do you any good.  Do not accept charity, but try to give it away.

 4     Europe does not allow Islam to go on, don't you see that?  Big politics

 5     is going deep.  Leave the weapons, organise the people for salvation, and

 6     leave Zepa or become loyal.  This is your last chance."

 7             General, Major Kusic was your subordinate during this period of

 8     time.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Does this letter reflect your understanding of the VRS policy

11     towards the Muslim population in your area?

12        A.   If you're asking for me to dwell upon the letter that Major Kusic

13     wrote to Avdo Palic, it's pointless.  Major Kusic was my subordinate.  He

14     performed military tasks that I ordered him to perform.  What he wrote to

15     somebody or what he kept in his head, what he thought of, I really

16     wouldn't be able to tell you.  I don't know.  In any case, this was not

17     part of the policies of the army of Republika Srpska in the -- in that

18     area.

19        Q.   Well, what part do you disagree with, sir?  If what was just read

20     to you does not reflect your understanding of the VRS policy towards the

21     Muslim population in your area, what part of that do you disagree with or

22     did you disagree with at the time?

23        A.   I don't agree with the letter.  I really don't know why a

24     commander would exchange letters with the opposing side's commander.  I

25     had an opportunity to legally talk to their commander, but we never

Page 29158

 1     exchanged any letters, and that's why I don't agree with the letter.  I

 2     don't agree with the form, because a letter is not a military form.  If

 3     he had consulted me, asking whether to send this letter or not, or if he

 4     had shown it to me, I am sure I would not have agreed to that.

 5             This is just a piece of paper and a heap of sentences on that

 6     paper that have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the combat or

 7     any military tasks for that matter.

 8        Q.   General, I am not talking about form or the propriety of

 9     commanders exchanging letters.  What I am asking you is, based on what is

10     written here by this VRS commander, to the commander of the Muslim

11     forces, what is it in that section, can you point out to the Trial

12     Chamber, that I read on you to the that you disagree with?

13             I am not talking about just the fact that a letter was written,

14     and you can't identify anything that you don't agree with, then just say

15     so and I'll move on.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Without necessarily having to hear from Madam

17     Fauveau, have we not heard enough?  Can we not move on?

18             MR. THAYER:  If the Court wishes, I will move on, Mr. President.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please.

20             MR. THAYER:

21        Q.   Based on your testimony, General, were you in the western front

22     from late May 1995 continually through October of that year, or were you

23     going back and forth to various locations?

24        A.   I was mostly in Krajina in the western front.  I may have gone

25     home for a couple of days, but I wouldn't be sure of that, I don't

Page 29159

 1     remember.

 2        Q.   But during that period of time, you weren't beside any IKMs or

 3     any other specific assignments.  You were, for all intents and purposes,

 4     in the Krajina full time from late May through October of 1995; is that

 5     fair to say?

 6        A.   Yes, you may put it that way.

 7        Q.   And just to be crystal clear, when did you leave the Krajina?

 8     Was it in October, was it in November, do you recall?

 9        A.   I believe that this was in October, but again I don't know the

10     date.  I can't even give you any specific longer period of time.  I

11     believe that it was in October.  It was about that time that we all

12     withdrew to the Main Staff headquarters.

13        Q.   Okay.  Maybe I can help you out a little bit with some dates.

14             MR. THAYER:  Ma we see 5D999 please.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

16             MR. THAYER:

17        Q.   As you can see, we've got Directive 9 up.  It's dated

18     28 September 1995.

19             MR. THAYER:  And if we can scroll down a little bit.

20        Q.   You talked about this directive relatively recently, General, and

21     I presume that you reviewed it in the course of your proofing; do I have

22     that correct?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Okay.  In this directive, General, there is no mention of MUP

25     forces being part of Operation Stit 95, Operation Shield; is that

Page 29160

 1     correct?

 2        A.   MUP forces are not mentioned.

 3        Q.   And to your knowledge, did MUP forces participate in this

 4     operation, specifically during the counter-attack that you spoke about

 5     the other day?

 6        A.   Let's be clear on one thing.  This operation never took place; it

 7     was never carried out.  The intention of the Main Staff was one thing,

 8     i.e., the decision of the commander and his idea was one thing.  The

 9     situation on the territory throughout the next few days was something

10     completely different.  Very soon, we encountered major problems on the

11     front line, so we were mainly engaged in defence.  During my first

12     stage -- stay in Krajina from October -- the end of October 2004 to

13     mid-March, yes, there were also MUP forces there, the police forces.

14        Q.   Just for clarification of the record, the transcript shows

15     October 2004 to mid-March, can you please just clarify General what dates

16     you are talking about.  I presume it's not 2004.

17        A.   I am talking about 2004.  My first departure for the IKM in

18     Jasenica with General Milovanovic and General Jovo Maric was the end of

19     October 2004 and my stay there until the second half of March 1995.

20     During the combat at the time, we also had some MUP forces attached

21     to us.

22        Q.   General, I will just go right to it.  We are talking about 1994

23     and 1995 are we not, not 2004 and 2005?

24        A.   I apologise.  I misspoke, obviously.  I apologise.

25        Q.   That's right, General.  My brain is on life support itself, so.

Page 29161

 1     Do you recall, during your time on the front in October of 1995, MUP

 2     forces and the Serbian volunteer guard participating in a counter-attack

 3     that was nearing Kljuc at one point.  Do you remember that happening?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  General Masal, before you answer.

 5             Yes, Mr. Gosnell.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, I know where my friend is going.

 7     Before I possit an objection, I would like the Prosecution to explain

 8     what the relevance of this line of questioning is to the indictment, so I

 9     can articulate a reasonable objection in response to the submissions of

10     the Prosecutor.

11             JUDGE KWON:  General Masal, if you could take off your headphones

12     for a moment.

13             Mr. Thayer, would you like to respond?

14             MR. THAYER:  Certainly, Mr. President.

15             The Prosecution's position clearly, from the evidence and

16     arguments we've put forward during the course of this trial, is that the

17     accused Ljubisa Borovcanin, in his role as deputy commander of the

18     special police brigade, operated frequently in coordination with other

19     units, be they PJP units, be they Serbian MUP units, be they VRS units.

20     That is the modus operandi, as it were, of how the special police brigade

21     worked during the course of the war, and that is how it worked during the

22     time-period of this indictment.  Commander Borovcanin was not a stranger

23     to having ad hoc forces by his side or under his command.

24             We have heard, through the Defence case of Mr. Borovcanin,

25     reference to the situation he was placed in as being a typical or unusual

Page 29162

 1     or that he was some how burdened by the troops that he was in charge of

 2     as commander of the mixed units pursuant to the 10 July order.

 3             What this evidence shows, again, is the special police brigade

 4     engaged in combat activities in coordination with various units right up

 5     until the end of the war.  That is probative and relevant evidence that

 6     goes directly to the accused's command ability, his intent, his presence,

 7     and performance during the Srebrenica operation.

 8             What we have is a very brief video, and I intend to ask the

 9     witness a very brief question or two about the video, and that's it.

10              And, if I may, as well, there is also an additional issue with

11     respect to the directive and the involvement of MUP forces outside of the

12     directive and how those MUP forces were engaged.  I have one additional

13     question with respect to that which is related to another document, and

14     then I'm going to have one other question on one other issue and then

15     I'll be concluded with my examination.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Now, we'll hear the objection, Mr. Gosnell.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, if the purpose of this line of

18     questioning is to establish that the special police brigade units were

19     deployed on an ad hoc basis with other units in combat during the war, we

20     can stipulate to that right now.  There is no need for questioning to

21     establish that.  There is lots of evidence that already establishes that.

22             I can tell you that that is not where the Prosecution is going.

23     The Prosecution is not being entirely candid in explaining why they wish

24     to put this section of video to you.  They essentially wish to besmirch

25     the character of my client by insinuating that he is associating with bad

Page 29163

 1     people.

 2             I suggest to you that that is the real reason why they want to go

 3     through this road, and I suggest to you that that is entirely improper.

 4     It's far outside of the scope of this indictment.  There has been nothing

 5     during the Prosecution case that suggests that this Krajina case is

 6     relevant.  There is nothing in the material that's listed on the

 7     Prosecution exhibit list which establishes any kind of command function

 8     of my client whatsoever.  And on that basis --

 9             Moreover, to follow-up on an objection that was made yesterday,

10     but now you it's more serious, we had no notice whatsoever in the 65 ter

11     summary that any of this kind of material would be gone into.  We have no

12     prior statement by this we understand, we have no idea where precisely

13     where he was during this period of time, we did not meet with this

14     witness.

15             So it's not only a question of it not being relevant to the

16     indictment, not only a question of it being outside of Rule 90(h)(1),

17     it's also a question of it not being fair to us in terms of not having an

18     ability to know that this going to be gone into and have an opportunity

19     to speak with this witness, find out what he knows or doesn't know and,

20     make decisions accordingly.

21             So on that basis, we object to this line of questioning entirely.

22             JUDGE KWON:  You would be ready to stipulate as to the presence

23     or participation of Mr. Borovcanin at the time, also?

24             MR. GOSNELL:  Well, Mr. President, I don't think it's incumbent

25     upon us to be making stipulations about events in October --

Page 29164

 1             JUDGE KWON:  No.  You said --

 2             MR. GOSNELL:  -- 1995, in an area unrelated to the Srebrenica.

 3     So we would not be willing to make any stipulations on material that's,

 4     in our submission, far outside the scope of the indictment.  But as I

 5     said, if it's a question of stipulating that special police units were

 6     engaged in other units on an ad hoc basis in combat, clearly we would be

 7     willing to do that.

 8             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, if I may respond just briefly on this

 9     issue.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Thayer.

11             MR. THAYER:  If -- if my friend thinks that video with his client

12     and Arkan in October of 1995 is incriminatory or goes to his character

13     somehow, then that is a fair response to the character evidence that came

14     in during the Defence's case.  Now, if he's willing to stipulate to the

15     presence of these forces there, then that's fine with us and we can

16     stipulate to that.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just briefly, Mr. Gosnell.

18             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, that says it all.  I mean, that was

19     truly outrageous.  This is the purpose that they are trying to do this,

20     and it's not proper.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We'll consider.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Thayer, having heard from the Defence that they

24     are ready to stipulate as to the participation on the general basis -- on

25     an ad hoc basis by the special brigade, the Chamber does not find that

Page 29165

 1     part of your suggested evidence to be necessary or relevant to the case.

 2             So could you move on to another topic, please.

 3             MR. THAYER:  I will, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Gosnell.

 5             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, I certainly don't by making this

 6     observation suggest that my -- the words out of my learned friend's mouth

 7     are worthy of being interpreted as evidence.  Nonetheless, I would ask

 8     that you strike from the record lines 21 through 25 of page 52.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President --

10             JUDGE KWON:  It's not in evidence.  Rest assured, we'll take that

11     into account.

12             Let's go on.

13             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14        Q.   General, on Friday, my learned colleague asked you, and the

15     question was, I quote:

16             "What was the overall policy of the army of the Republika Srpska

17     when it entered a town in which the Muslims lived?"

18             And you answered, and I think we've recurred to this answer

19     already, but I want to be fair and give you the expire quote.

20             You answered:  "It is evident that in every territory that is

21     being liberated, the Muslims population was given the option of staying;

22     but if they decided to leave and move to territories under the control of

23     their army, they could do so.  In my own experience, I never found any

24     civilians in any of the territories we liberated.  Evidently, even before

25     intensive fighting began, the civilian population was moved out of the

Page 29166

 1     area where the fighting would take place."

 2             My question to you, General, is:  As Visegrad tactical group

 3     commander, overseeing the areas of Visegrad, Rogatica, Zepa, and Rudo,

 4     can you tell the Trial Chamber what happened to the mosques in those

 5     municipalities?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Masal.

 7             Ms. Fauveau Ivanovic.

 8             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, how is this question

 9     relevant?  Why are we mentioning mosques in 1994 and 1995?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Haynes.

11             MR. HAYNES:  Having seen a document upon which the question might

12     be based, I think it would also be fair to the witness if the question

13     had some sort of time-frame as to when a particular mosque or mosque was

14     said to have had something happened to it and who is alleged to have done

15     it.

16             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I'm perfectly happy to do that.  It

17     will take some time.  I think in the meantime, the question that I am

18     asking this witness is commensurate with the generality of the question

19     that was put to him in his examination-in-chief about the policy, the

20     overall policy of the army of Republika Srpska when it entered a town in

21     which the Muslims lived.  That was the question that was asked.

22             My question to the General is, and he can simply answer without

23     any reference to dates:  What happened to the mosques in those

24     municipalities?  That's all I'm asking.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 29167

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was clear about the population.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not quite sure what he said.

 3             But, General Masal, are you in the position to answer the

 4     question?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not really.  I said about the

 6     population, and I really don't have any information about the mosques,

 7     none whatsoever.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Thayer, please proceed.

 9             MR. THAYER:

10        Q.   General --

11             JUDGE KWON:  How much longer do you have?

12             MR. THAYER:  I have one more question, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             MR. THAYER:

15        Q.   General, during your entire time of service as Visegrad tactical

16     group commander, did you see any mosques standing in those

17     municipalities?

18        A.   I did not see, I did not pay attention, I did not see any

19     mosques.

20        Q.   Thank you, General.

21             MR. THAYER:  I have no further questions.

22             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break of 20 minutes, after which Madam

23     Fauveau you will have redirect.

24             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I think I will need 20

25     minutes maybe.

Page 29168

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Then I take it there will be none from Gvero

 2     Defence?

 3             MR. JOSSE:  We are not going to avail -- ask or avail of the

 4     Trial Chamber indulgence on this occasion.  Perhaps we will reserve it

 5     for another time.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  20 minutes.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Fauveau Ivanovic.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

11                           Re-examination by Ms. Fauveau:

12        Q.   [Interpretation] General, you said that military administration

13     was introduced in Rudo.  What was the situation in Visegrad?

14        A.   Military administration or rule was introduced in Rudo.  Visegrad

15     did not have military rule.  It was a wartime situation and one could say

16     that it was normal given that it was wartime.

17        Q.   Which organs were responsible of the safety of civilians and

18     public law and order in Visegrad?

19        A.   The organs of the Ministry of the Interior.

20        Q.   And which organs were responsible for the safety of citizens and

21     law and order in the villages of Setorovici, Burati, and Osovo?

22        A.   Organs of the civilian authority in Rogatica municipality.  And

23     to be quite specific when it came to the security and safety of the

24     people, that was the civilian police of the Interior Ministry in

25     Rogatica.

Page 29169

 1        Q.   Were the international organisations able to come to these

 2     villages, the UNHCR, for instance, and the Red Cross?

 3        A.   Yes.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [No interpretation]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think we get the translation, if you could

 6     repeat it.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  I do apologise, Your Honour.  Apparently, there

 8     was a technical failure.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I didn't get the

10     interpretation.

11             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I will put the question once again.

12        Q.   Let me show you the item that is already on the screen.  This

13     authorises a convoy to go through dated 30th of March 1994.

14             The item one indicates UNHCR.  It is indicated that this convoy

15     is going to Rogatica to have authorities -- discussions with the local

16     authorities, and the UNHCR is also due to visit the following villages:

17     Smajlovici, Setorovici, Levetinci, Tmurni Do, Vrbarije, and Burati.

18             Did the UNHCR ever inform you of difficulties in the villages

19     where population -- Muslim populations were living?

20        A.   No.

21             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] A slight translation correction

22     from the transcript.  We are not talking about a "convoy," but about

23     officials from the UNHCR, at line 15.

24        Q.   Before you join your position at TG Visegrad, did you ever meet

25     paramilitary units?

Page 29170

 1        A.   Yes, in Bijeljina.

 2        Q.   And what was your position in Bijeljina, and how did you relate

 3     to these military -- paramilitary units?

 4        A.   I was the commander of an artillery regiment in the East Bosnian

 5     Corps, and, at the same time, I was the garrison commander in Bijeljina.

 6     My experience with the paramilitary units was extremely bad.  On several

 7     occasions, there were quite serious conflicts, and, at my initiative, the

 8     president of the republic and the commander of the Main Staff themselves

 9     intervened.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I'd like to look another 5D1406.

11        Q.   It is one of your reports dated 24th of August 1992.  Please take

12     a look at the final sentence in item 8.  It is indicated here that:  "We

13     should not enable the establishment of an army under Arkan."  What does

14     that mean?

15        A.   Well, to be quite specific, this was a campaign in Bijeljina and

16     in Semberija as a whole, aimed at a young soldiers who had been trained

17     at the command, or, rather, the 3rd Artillery Regiment, to recruit them,

18     and not only them but the youth who had not been through the training, to

19     recruit them to the units of Arkan's Guard.

20             They were then taken to Erdut, where his training camp was, to

21     undergo a brief training course.  And some 15 or 20 days later, after

22     this training, they became specials.  And from the point of view of a

23     professional soldier, this couldn't have been done at all.  It would have

24     been tantamount to a miracle, and this is why I intervened with this

25     superior command to put a stop to these kind of activities in that area.

Page 29171

 1             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Now I would like to look at 5D1169.

 2        Q.   You have seen this already when you discussed the communications

 3     centre in Borike.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I will need the last page of both

 5     versions.

 6        Q.   I would like to discuss with you what happened with the

 7     communication centre after the end of the operation; we are talking about

 8     Operation Mac.

 9        A.   You mean the mobile communications centre?  Right after the end

10     of the operation, this centre ceased to exist.  The equipment that was

11     provided for the mobile communications centre was brought back to the

12     original units.

13        Q.   We've discussed the use of avio bombes, and you were shown a

14     document saying that these corps could use these avio bombes under

15     approval of the Main Staff.  You discussed this yesterday already, but

16     can I maybe ask you who at the Main Staff could authorise these -- the

17     use of avio bombes by the corps?

18        A.   The commander of the Chief of Staff.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now show the witness

20     P2742.

21             I think there is a mistake.  It should be kind -- it should be

22     "or" rather than "to."

23             [In English] "The Commander or the Chief of Staff."

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  That will be clarified.

25             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could we now move on to page 8 in

Page 29172

 1     English and 5 in B/C/S.  Is this P2742?  I do apologise.  Well, maybe I

 2     will have to move on to another exhibit then.

 3             Could we please show the witness 5D1161.

 4        Q.   This is a report from the Main Staff that you have already seen.

 5     It's a report dated the 25th of May relating to the bombings and

 6     shelling.

 7             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to turn to page 4 in

 8     English; page 3 in B/C/S.

 9        Q.   Look at what it says about the Drina Corps' area in the first

10     paragraph.  At the last sentence, it says:

11             "[In English] At 1045 hours, the enemy fired four projectiles on

12     the village of Kiseljak, killing a woman."

13             [Interpretation] If you look a little bit lower, where it

14     describes the situation on the ground, it says, in the second half of the

15     paragraph:

16             "[In English] An enemy DTG was infiltrated in the zone of

17     operation of the Skelani battalion with traces being found in the village

18     of Popovici; the message 'Serbs, I will slaughter you all' written on a

19     asbestos board and signed by Arif Zenda.  This had created panic among

20     many locals."

21             [Interpretation] We know that there were NATO bombings that day;

22     but on the basis of the information I have just given you, could you tell

23     us why there were air raids around Srebrenica on that day?  If you know,

24     of course.

25        A.   Well, I can only assume what was going on around Srebrenica, but

Page 29173

 1     I don't know why it was around Srebrenica.  I don't know that for a fact.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] No further questions.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  General Masal, just a second.

 5             Mr. Gosnell.

 6             MR. GOSNELL:  Mr. President, could I ask the witness to remove

 7     his headphones, or ask --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  If you could do so, General Masal.  Thank you.

 9             MR. GOSNELL:  There was a reference in the course of the

10     redirect, and the word "specials" was used.  Now, I don't believe there

11     would be any dispute between the Prosecution and the Defence, the

12     Borovcanin Defence, that this is not a reference to the special police

13     brigade.

14             If we can stipulate to that, then I won't have to engage in any

15     further questioning; otherwise, I will request leave to do so.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give me the reference.

17             MR. GOSNELL:  Page 59, line 1.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Thayer --

19             MR. GOSNELL:  And, furthermore -- I'm sorry, Mr. President, for

20     interrupting.  If I could just make one further remark.

21             I don't believe that the full terminology in Serbian was used,

22     but none -- in fact, I am assured of that.  But I simply wanted to ensure

23     that there will be no confusion or submissions at a later time that would

24     rely on this.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think there is any anyway dispute on this.

Page 29174

 1             Mr. Thayer.

 2             MR. THAYER:  No, Mr. President.  My understanding is that at that

 3     point in time, Arkan's forces were referred to in certain areas as

 4     "specials."

 5             It was later that they were referred to as the Serbian Volunteer

 6     Guard, which my friends all know refer to his forces.

 7             MR. GOSNELL:  We are content with that.  Thank you,

 8     Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  General, could you put on your

10     headphones again, yes.  Yes.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE KWON:  That concludes your evidence, General Masal; and on

13     behalf of the Tribunal, I thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give

14     it, and now you are free to go.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16                           [The witness withdrew]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we deal with the documents.  Have we received

18     the lists?  Yes.  Have we received the list from Miletic?  It's coming.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I have just sent it, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE KWON:  What a marvelous technology.

21             I wonder whether the parties are in a position to deal with it

22     right now?

23             Mr. Thayer.

24             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, we are in the process.  We just got

25     the list, so we are double checking it.

Page 29175

 1             JUDGE KWON:  So we will deal with it for the first thing

 2     tomorrow.

 3             MR. THAYER:  Very well.  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  And in addition, there is a motion from the Miletic

 5     Defence team in relation to the witness after this one to add some two

 6     documents.  I would like to hear the response from you on an expedited

 7     basis.

 8             MR. THAYER:  No objection, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  No objection.  Thank you.  I take it there will be

10     no objection from the other Defence teams; therefore, it is so granted.

11             So shall we bring in the next witness.

12             Ms. Fauveau Ivanovic, next one is Vojislav Babic.

13             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Indeed, it is, Your Honour, and my

14     colleague will examine him.

15                           [The witness entered court]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, Mr. Babic.

17             THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]

18             JUDGE KWON:  If you could take the solemn declaration.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

20     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

21             JUDGE KWON:  If you could make yourself comfortable.

22     Mr. Petrusic from the Miletic Defence team will ask you some questions.

23             Please go ahead, Mr. Petrusic.

24             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, and good afternoon,

25     Your Honours.

Page 29176

 1                           WITNESS:  VOJISLAV BABIC

 2                           [Witness answered through interpretation]

 3                           Examination by Mr. Petrusic:

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Babic?

 5        A.   Good afternoon.

 6        Q.   As the President of the Trial Chamber has just indicated, I will

 7     be asking you some questions on behalf of General Miletic's Defence today

 8     and also tomorrow.

 9             First of all, for the record, could you please state your full

10     name?

11        A.   I am Vojislav Babic.

12        Q.   Mr. Babic, could you please tell us when and where you were born?

13        A.   Your Honours, I was born on the 7th of July, 1950, in the village

14     of Bijekovac [phoen], Bosanska Dubica municipality as it was known at the

15     time, and now it's Kosarvska [phoen] Dubica.

16        Q.   Now I would like you to tell us what school you graduated from?

17        A.   After I completed elementary education, I we want secondary

18     military school.  That was between 1967 and 1970.  And after I graduated,

19     I was promoted to a non-commissioned officer, and I was assigned to

20     367th Communications Regiment or signals regiment in Samobor.

21        Q.   It was the republic of Croatia at the time?

22        A.   At the time, it was the republic of Croatia.  The state was the

23     Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

24        Q.   Over a certain period of time, did you continue getting further

25     training or further indication?

Page 29177

 1        A.   I wanted to pursue a higher education, and with the approval of

 2     my command, I enrolled in the military academy.  I was a part time

 3     student; and so between 1979, 1980, until 1984 or 1985, I studied there,

 4     and that is when I promoted to an officer.  I was -- I received my

 5     commission as a lieutenant, and I continued in my job.  In fact,

 6     throughout my studies, I worked in the same unit and I continued after I

 7     completed my studies.

 8        Q.   Mr. Babic, could you tell us, what was your course of studies in

 9     the academy?

10        A.   It was the ground forces academy.  In addition to general

11     studies, I specialised in communication or signals, so I became a signals

12     officer.

13        Q.   Mr. Babic, now I would like to ask you to pause after I ask you

14     my question for the interpreters to be able to interpret my question.

15     The best guidance should be to look at the screen, and once the cursor

16     has stopped, you can start giving your answer.

17             After you graduated from the military academy and after you

18     received your commission as a lieutenant, where did you continue with

19     your career?  Where did you serve then?

20        A.   I continued my service in the 367th Signals Regiment in Samobor.

21        Q.   Could you please tell us where were you when the war broke out,

22     in what part of the former Yugoslavia?

23        A.   It was in the Republic of Croatia.  The war started in 1991.  And

24     at that time, in accordance with the plans of the command, the regiment

25     set up communications in the areas where combat operations were going on

Page 29178

 1     or where there was a possibility that combat operations might take place,

 2     and I was setting up communications for the operational group in Plitvice

 3     from the 1st of April 1991.

 4             I was not in that area at all times.  I went there from time to

 5     time as stipulated in the plan that was put in place by the regiment

 6     command.  It was not always the same group, but groups were rotated so

 7     that other duties could be taken care of, too.

 8        Q.   Mr. Babic, how long did you remain in Croatia?

 9        A.   I remained in Croatia until the 12th of December, 1991, when I

10     was exchanged, because I had been taken prisoner, and that's when I left

11     the Republic of Croatia.

12        Q.   Could you tell us, where did you go from there?

13        A.   Together with a group of people who were exchanged, I went to

14     Belgrade, and from there to Sarajevo; and from there, I was dispatched to

15     Visoko where my original unit had been relocated.  I am talking about the

16     367th Regiment.

17        Q.   And how long did you remain in the 367th Regiment in Visoko?

18        A.   The signals regiment - now we are talking about 1991, the end of

19     the year, the month is December - was transferred to Sarajevo to

20     Lukavica, and the regiment remained there until the war broke out in

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina sometime in early April 1992.

22        Q.   Did there come a time in 1992 when you found yourself in the

23     territory of Han Pijesak or Crna Rijeka?

24        A.   In 1992, in the month of May, since not the entire regiment was

25     transferred from Lukavica at the time, one part of the regiment was

Page 29179

 1     transferred in the beginning of April.  I was among those who were

 2     transferred later.  So with the rest of the unit, we were transferred to

 3     Han Pijesak -- or, rather, Crna Rijeka, on the 12th of May 1992.

 4        Q.   What was the unit to which you were assigned when you arrived in

 5     Crna Rijeka on the 12th of May?

 6        A.   I was still a member of my own original unit, the 367th Signals

 7     Regiment.  At that time, I was the deputy battalion commander.

 8        Q.   What was your rank at the time when you arrived in Crna Rijeka?

 9        A.   When I arrived in Crna Rijeka, I was captain first class.

10        Q.   Did there come a time when the 367th Signals Regiment changed its

11     name?

12        A.   The 367th Regiment did change its name as some of the officers

13     and foot soldiers who hailed from the territory of the then-Federal

14     Republic of Yugoslavia Serbia left, and the regiment became the 67th

15     Signals Regiment.  That was on the 19th of May, and, as of that time, the

16     regiment bore the other name.

17        Q.   Mr. Babic, what was your position in 1995?  Were you still a

18     member of the 67th Regiment and what was your position there?  What were

19     your duties there?

20        A.   I remained with the 67th Signals Regiment until the end of war,

21     and even further on; and in 1995, I was the Chief of Staff.  That was my

22     position.  I was the Chief of Staff of the 67th Signals Regiment.

23        Q.   Could you tell us who the commander of that was at the time in

24     1995?

25        A.   The commander of the 367th Signals Regiment was Colonel Nedeljko

Page 29180

 1     Gredo.

 2        Q.   You said the commander of 367th Signals Regiment Nedeljko Gredo?

 3        A.   I apologise.  It was the 67th Signal Regiment.

 4        Q.   Mr. Babic, how was the signals regiment organised at that time?

 5        A.   The signals regiment had an unchanged establishment.  As of

 6     May 1992, it had its command; it had a signals battalion for the

 7     communications centre at the command post or the 1st Battalion; the

 8     signals battalion for the rear command post or the 2nd Communications

 9     Battalion; and it also had a signals company for the signals garrisons.

10             Further on --

11        Q.   I apologise.  Go on.

12        A.   -- it also had a rear company or a logistics company.

13        Q.   Could you please tell us something about the principle task of

14     the 67th Signals Regiment in the course of 1992 and from there -- from

15     that time on until 1995; or, better still, what was the purpose of that

16     unit?

17        A.   The signals regiment was tasked with establishing and providing

18     communications for the command functions, i.e., for the Main Staff of the

19     Army Republika Srpska.

20        Q.   Are you talking about the communication within the Main Staff

21     only, or are you talking about communication lines towards some other

22     organs?

23        A.   The signals regiment provided and secured communication lines

24     also for the commands of the airforce and the anti-aircraft defence, also

25     for the centres for communication and information.

Page 29181

 1        Q.   What about this communication information centre, what was that?

 2        A.   We provided -- we were provided channels of communication between

 3     different positions in the municipalities from which signals information

 4     were conveyed about various threats.  This served to inform about the

 5     situation on the territory.

 6        Q.   When you spoke about the tasks of the 67th Signals Regiment, you

 7     mentioned one.  Was that the only task within the purview of this

 8     regiment?

 9        A.   The signals regiment also provided communication channels for the

10     government of Republika Srpska and the presidency.  In addition to the

11     communications issues, the signals regiment also performed other tasks

12     and duties; for example, providing immediate security for the regiment

13     itself, as well as some parts of the Main Staff in the territory assigned

14     to the regiment.  Furthermore, the regiment organised and implemented all

15     other current tasks, primarily education and training.

16        Q.   Are you finished, sir?

17        A.   No.  I was talking about education and training, but they also

18     monitored and maintained the combat technique, mainly communications

19     means, and all other current issues that pertain to everyday duties of

20     any unit.

21        Q.   You said that the commander of the unit was Colonel -- or,

22     rather, Lieutenant-Colonel Nedeljko Gredo?

23        A.   Yes, he was.  Actually, he was Colonel, Colonel Nedeljko Gredo.

24        Q.   Did General Mladic have the command authorities over this unit;

25     if the answer is yes, what kind of authorities did he have, or powers,

Page 29182

 1     command powers?

 2        A.   General Mladic was the commander of the Main Staff.  He was the

 3     one who directly commanded all units including the 67th Signals Regiment.

 4        Q.   If I understand you properly, did you say that General Mladic was

 5     the only one who could issue combat orders to this unit?

 6             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  Objection leading.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Shall we adjourn for today, Mr. Petrusic?

 8             Mr. Babic, we will resume your evidence tomorrow morning, during

 9     which time you are not to discuss with anybody about your evidence you

10     are going to give.  Do you understand that?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  9.00 tomorrow morning.

13                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.29 p.m.,

14                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day of

15                           December, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.