Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 29593

 1                           Friday, 12 December 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  So good morning to you.  Madam Registrar, could you

 7     call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is the case

 9     number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic, et al.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  All the accused are here.

11     Mr. McCloskey is here for the Prosecution today.  And from amongst the

12     Defence teams, I only notice the absence of Ms. Nikolic.

13             Good morning to you, Mr. Jevdjevic.

14                           WITNESS:  MILENKO JEVDJEVIC [Resumed]

15                           [Witness answered through interpretation]

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  We are going to continue with Mr. Haynes'

18     examination-in-chief and then we will see what happens after that.

19             Mr. Haynes, good morning to you.

20             MR. HAYNES:  Good morning, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Please go ahead.

22             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.

23                           Examination by Mr. Haynes: [Continued]

24        Q.   When we left off yesterday evening, Mr. Jevdjevic, we were

25     talking about the two communication systems that you set up at the IKM at

Page 29594

 1     Pribicevac, the encrypted system which you used to communicate with the

 2     units on the ground and the radio relay system which you used to

 3     communicate with corps command.

 4             In relation to the radio relay system, was that also capable of

 5     communicating with individual brigade commands?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   How could that be facilitated?

 8        A.   The radio relay communications could not be integrated into --

 9     with the units that participated in Krivaja 95 operation, if I understood

10     your question correctly; but it could be used to establish contacts with

11     the original commands of those units in the garrisons of Bratunac,

12     Vlasenica, Zvornik, et cetera.

13        Q.   Well, you didn't understand my question, but you anticipated my

14     next question so you probably saved us a bit of time.  So if a commander

15     on the ground, such as Commander Pandurevic, wanted to get in touch with

16     his brigade command, what were his options?

17        A.   The only option was to come to the forward command post at

18     Pribicevac, or later on at the forward command around Zepa, personally,

19     and to use the phone, the communications equipment there, to communicate

20     with his original command in Zvornik.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I just want to show you a couple of documents very

22     briefly.

23             MR. HAYNES:  Can we look at P377 at page 96, both in the English

24     and the B/C/S.  In fact, that may be not the best document to look at.

25     Can we look at P378, please, page 83.

Page 29595

 1        Q.   This is the Zvornik Brigade duty officer's diary for the 5th of

 2     July, and if you look at the very top entry, it appears to reflect a

 3     request from Commander Pandurevic to his brigade command for them to send

 4     him some ammunition for a tank.

 5             Now, on the 5th of July, in terms of the communication system,

 6     what was going on?

 7        A.   On the 5th of July in the early afternoon, I came to the forward

 8     command post at Pribicevac and some ten minutes later I was able to

 9     establish communications with the superior command, i.e., the Drina Corps

10     command in Vlasenica.  And I was able to establish radio communications

11     with the subordinate units that took part in Operation Krivaja 95 which,

12     by that time, had already been in their holding areas around the

13     Srebrenica enclave.

14        Q.   Do you recall any conversation with Commander Pandurevic about a

15     need for tank ammunition on the 5th of July?

16        A.   I remember that I established contact with all the units just to

17     check whether the communication lines were good, whether we could all

18     hear each other, and to check whether anyone had any needs, because that

19     was the first time that we all got together at that part of the front

20     line, and since I was the only person able to communicate with the corps

21     command in terms of providing logistics support, things like that.  I

22     don't recall specifically any conversations, but if this is the telegram

23     as noted down by the operations officer at -- by the duty officer at the

24     Zvornik Brigade at 1700 hours, by that time communications were already

25     set up.  And I absolutely allow that it is possible that this either went

Page 29596

 1     through me -- in other words, that I was told by Commander Pandurevic to

 2     relay this message to the duty operations officer in the Zvornik Brigade

 3     because it says here, "Sent a message."  This means that this message was

 4     relayed through somebody, asking that 50 shells be sent to him to the new

 5     forward command post, because this was the practice, the usual practice,

 6     how those messages that had to do with logistics were relayed.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Now, can we just have another look at a further page

 8     in the duty officer's logbook this time.

 9             MR. HAYNES:  P377, page 101, both in English and B/C/S.

10        Q.   And can you see the entry at 1110 concerning an apparent call

11     from Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic and a request to hand something over

12     to the faculty.

13             During the period that the communications centre was active at

14     Pribicevac, do you ever recall Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic coming to

15     the communications centre?

16        A.   Is this about the 7th of July, because I can't see the date?

17        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, it is the 7th of July.

18        A.   I am almost completely certain that on the 7th of July the front

19     line was quiet because it was a rainy day, and then dense fog descended

20     so that on the seventh day, the units of the Drina Corps at that part of

21     the front line did not engage in combat at all, and they were

22     strengthening their combat disposition, and perhaps some corrective

23     decisions were made.  And the Zvornik Brigade carried out an attack from

24     the Zeleni Jadar-Tucak-Javor base, in the area of the road leading to

25     Srebrenica.  This Javor hill is about a kilometre and a half or two from

Page 29597

 1     the forward command post Pribicevac, and I absolutely allow that it is

 2     possible that on that day, when the combat disposition was being

 3     strengthened and when no combat went on, that Lieutenant-Colonel

 4     Pandurevic was able to travel the kilometre and a half to the forward

 5     command post to relay this message to the command of his brigade.  It was

 6     probably some materiel -- or rather some materials to be handed over to

 7     the faculty.  I assume that it was the faculty in Zvornik because at that

 8     time he was an assistant lecturer or something like that at that faculty.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Well, I am going to leave the communications system

10     now and very, very briefly run through some of the details of the combat

11     operations of Krivaja 95 insofar as you can recall them.

12             You told us that combat commenced on the 6th of July.  Was any or

13     much progress made by the forces of the Drina Corps on the 6th of July?

14        A.   On the 6th of July, our forces carried out reconnaissance in

15     force in order to establish where points of resistance was located, and

16     apart from an area between the two sets of trenches that were taken,

17     there were no major developments in terms of combat situation.

18        Q.   Thank you.  From the forward command post at Pribicevac, could

19     you see the two features Biljak and Tri Sise?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   And were they taken in combat operations on the 8th and/or 9th of

22     July?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Now, in general terms, were you aware of the size of the force

25     that had been assembled to carry out Operation Krivaja 95?

Page 29598

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And about how large was it?

 3        A.   I said this two days ago.  It was my assessment that the overall

 4     strength of the maneuver units that participated in Krivaja 95, that were

 5     actually involved in the attack, did not exceed 1.000 troops.

 6        Q.   I'm sorry if I've asked you a question you were asked before, but

 7     did you have also information as to the size of the defending force in

 8     and around Srebrenica?

 9        A.   According to all the data that we had at our disposal and that we

10     had been receiving for years, in the Srebrenica enclave there were

11     between 10 and 15.000 men of military age, and we thought that at least

12     10 to 12.000 were armed.

13        Q.   And in terms of the surrounding terrain, was Srebrenica an easy

14     or difficult town to defend?

15        A.   The terrain itself around Srebrenica, it's a hilly, mountainous

16     ground, impassable because of the gorges, canyons, and there are dominant

17     heights; and in geographical terms, this kind of terrain is highly

18     favourable for mounting a defence.  And it is very difficult to attack in

19     such terrain and to take the heights, to cross the gorges and canyons and

20     so on.

21        Q.   Given everything you've told us, was it your opinion that the

22     forces assembled to carry out Krivaja 95 were designed to take the town

23     of Srebrenica?

24        A.   No.  It was the equivalent of the forces, if you compare it with

25     the forces defending the area, in military terms, even if you are the

Page 29599

 1     most optimistic person you could not even imagine that such a number of

 2     troops could inflict a defeat on 12.000 troops.  Because according to our

 3     military doctrine, the attacking side has to have three times as many

 4     soldiers and as much support for the attack to succeed, given this kind

 5     of terrain.  I did say something to that effect about two days ago.  In

 6     1993, based on my personal knowledge, we had much more respectable forces

 7     in the area and yet we came to a stop at this position, Pribicevac and

 8     Kvarac.  And I remember that at the time our crack unit, the Guards

 9     Brigade, in two hours of combat at trig point 1313 Kvarac, suffered 30

10     casualties.  30 people were rendered hors de combat because they were

11     either killed or wounded.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now, yesterday you were talking about a feature to

13     the south of Srebrenica called Zivkovo Brdo.  Can you just confirm for

14     me - I know you've probably said this before - on what date that feature

15     was taken by the forces of the Drina Corps.

16        A.   The Drina Corps forces took that elevation on the 9th of July,

17     and this was the first major success of our forces in that area.

18        Q.   And can you just confirm for me under whose command the unit was

19     which took Zivkovo Brdo.

20        A.   Those units were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel

21     Vinko Pandurevic.

22        Q.   After Zivkovo Brdo had been taken, what did the units commanded

23     by Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic do?

24        A.   The units that were under the command of Vinko Pandurevic, in the

25     night or, rather, in the early evening of the 9th, secured the positions

Page 29600

 1     at Zivkovo Brdo that were reached so that the units of the Skelani

 2     Battalion could join in in the taking and holding those positions.  Those

 3     were the units that were holding the positions around Srebrenica,

 4     enabling his units to pull out to an area about a kilometre or a

 5     kilometre -- or two kilometres into the rear, in order to get some rest

 6     and prepare for further action.

 7             MR. HAYNES:  And I wonder now if we could have another look at a

 8     document you've seen before.  It's P107, and we want to look at point 5

 9     please.  I think it's on page 3 of both documents.

10        Q.   Mr. Jevdjevic, you see under point 5 that the task of the

11     1st Battalion of the Zvornik Light Infantry Brigade is to smash the enemy

12     along the axis of advance and, more immediately, to capture the trig

13     point 644 Zivkovo Brdo?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   And I am not sure whether you remember the trig points, but is

16     that the hill, the feature you are talking about, that's mentioned in

17     that document?

18        A.   I can't recall the exact trig point, but it's definitely

19     Zivkovo Brdo.  That's the trig point that you are talking about.

20        Q.   And in terms of sound military practice, does it surprise you

21     that having achieved its task, the unit commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel

22     Pandurevic withdrew from Zivkovo Brdo?

23        A.   At that time we had only the smaller equivalent of the forces

24     carrying out the attacks, and it is quite possible that a smaller

25     element, in order to secure the lines that were reached, that this battle

Page 29601

 1     group from the Zvornik Brigade that was carrying out an attack on this

 2     axis may have left a smaller element in that area to secure the front

 3     line.  I think those were two or three resistance points armed with

 4     Pragas, and to my knowledge, the main body of force actually went back to

 5     spend the night there, to sleep, get some sleep in order to be fresh and

 6     to be able to carry out further tasks, any task that may be ordered by

 7     the commander of the forward command post.

 8        Q.   We see at the end of that particular paragraph the phrase, "Be

 9     ready to continue the attack."  Have you seen many operational documents

10     in your time as a soldier?

11        A.   Yes, in relative terms.

12        Q.   And the phrase, "Be ready to continue the attack," is that

13     unusual or is that a common phrase that's used in such documents?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the next page, please.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's a quite usual expression,

16     it's a common phrase.  One finds it in all the forms in which such orders

17     are written.  It's used on all occasions regardless of whether there will

18     be a real need for any continuation of the activities or not.

19             MR. HAYNES:  Judge Kwon, did you mean the next page in English

20     or in --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Now we are seeing page 4, its okay.  Thank you.

22             MR. HAYNES:

23        Q.   Now, you've already told us this, but what happened on the early

24     morning of the 10th of July?

25        A.   On the 10th of July, in the early morning between 4.00 and 5.00,

Page 29602

 1     at the forward command post in Pribicevac the alarm was raised.  We were

 2     all awake and on our feet because there was fierce fire at the

 3     Zivkovo Brdo trig point, and we received information from the radio

 4     communications that the enemy forces from the Srebrenica enclave had

 5     launched a fierce counter-attack.  And that in a very brief period of

 6     time, they had pushed back our units which had taken Zivkovo Brdo the

 7     previous day.  According to the communications we listened to, our forces

 8     were withdrawing in a disorganised manner.  Some of our men were killed

 9     and some of our equipment was captured.  But two hours after the

10     counter-attack was launched, our units managed to consolidate and stop

11     any further enemy advance.  They managed to regroup for a counter-attack.

12        Q.   And to the best of your knowledge, where was Lieutenant-Colonel

13     Pandurevic at that time?

14        A.   Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic was at his forward command post,

15     and I remember that at around 9.00 on the 10th of June --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  July, interpreter's correction.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- when General Mladic arrived at

18     the forward command post, I remember the conversation between

19     Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic and Ratko Mladic concerning the situation I

20     have just described.

21             MR. HAYNES:

22        Q.   And can you summarise that conversation for us to the best of

23     your ability now?

24        A.   As all of us at the forward command post were rather concerned

25     because the previous day we had been encouraged by the initial success

Page 29603

 1     and then the military situation was reversed, I recall that

 2     General Mladic contacted Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic who, at that

 3     point, had managed to consolidate his battle disposition.  And I remember

 4     that Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic told him how dissatisfied he was with

 5     the response of the neighbouring units which were attacking to his left

 6     and to his right.  I assume he was referring to their passivity in

 7     dealing with this military situation.  And, in my view, he said in a very

 8     brilliant and self-assured manner to General Mladic that he would

 9     recapture Zivkovo Brdo by 11.00.  I thought this was unrealistic.  I

10     thought it was very bold of him to say that, but a few hours later it

11     really happened that way on the ground.

12        Q.   Are you familiar with the village of Pusmulici?

13        A.   I think the name is Pusmulic.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Are you familiar with the village of Pusmulic?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And where is that in relation to the feature Zivkovo Brdo?

17        A.   I don't have the map before me now, but viewed from the direction

18     of the attack it was on the left-hand side.

19        Q.   Now, you told us yesterday, when answering questions to

20     Mr. Petrusic, that on the 10th of July General Mladic was urging all the

21     commanders towards Srebrenica.  Did you understand him to be urging the

22     commanders, on the 10th of July, actually to enter the town or just to

23     get closer to it?

24        A.   On the 10th of July, I understood him to be ordering the

25     commanders to advance towards the town, to approach the town, because

Page 29604

 1     their position on the battlefield was still so far away from Srebrenica

 2     that it was not realistic to expect him to order them to enter Srebrenica

 3     at that time.  He was simply hurrying them up, trying to get them to

 4     pierce through to the features that were set as the next goal.

 5        Q.   And when, to your recollection, did any order come to actually

 6     enter the town itself?

 7        A.   I think this order was issued only on the 11th when our units or,

 8     rather, when we passed through the town, but on the 11th, when I passed

 9     through the town, I did not see our units there.  But quite literally, I

10     had the impression that on the 11th the town was no longer being

11     defended, and that the 28th Division of Bosnia and Herzegovina had ceased

12     to exist and that they had left the area, grouping mostly on the

13     northwest -- in the northwest part of the enclave.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And on the 11th of July, did you have occasion to

15     meet Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   In what circumstances did that take place?

18        A.   On the 11th of July, the combat situation developed in such a way

19     that we received information from the battlefield that the enemy was not

20     putting up any significant resistance anywhere.  And some of our units,

21     which were still very far away, which had lagged behind, had to be

22     transported along the road to get as close to the front line as possible.

23     General Krstic, because I was familiar with that part of the terrain,

24     sent me to the area of Alibegovac where I was supposed to take a company

25     from the 2nd Romanija Brigade, which would find it very difficult to

Page 29605

 1     advance over that impassable terrain over such a distance, to take them

 2     by way of Jasenova and Zeleni Jadar to the area between Rajna and Bojna

 3     and to get them to join in the combat activities in that area because

 4     they were very late.  When I had done that, in the area between the

 5     village of Rajna and Bojna, I met Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic with his

 6     communications man, who was in an improvised shelter.

 7             We spoke.  I told him about this unit, which was now supposed to

 8     be his left-hand neighbour, and at that point in time the NATO planes

 9     flew over.  And I remember that a bomb was dropped very close to where we

10     were on the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica road, and the windscreen of the jeep

11     of the commander of the maneuver unit, Captain Jolovic, shattered.  On

12     that day, the 11th, I met Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now I just want to ask you a few general questions

14     about the combat operations between the 6th and the 11th of July.  Did

15     you come to learn, through communications on the ground, of the proximity

16     of 28th Division positions to UN observation posts?

17        A.   During the attack of our forces on the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica

18     road, near those three nameless elevations which we called the three

19     tits, there was a trig point called Biljeg, and on that trig point there

20     was a UN observation post.  On the communications, I listened to the

21     subordinate commanders communicating with General Krstic about the

22     problem of that elevation called Biljeg because UNPROFOR was stationed

23     there.

24             General Krstic did not find it in his interest to have the

25     complications -- to have complications regarding the UNPROFOR situation,

Page 29606

 1     so he ordered his commanders to go around them, to bypass them by every

 2     possible means, both with infantry and everything else.  But the

 3     commanders complained that the formations of the 28th Division, which

 4     were defending themselves in that area, had infiltrated into the

 5     improvised shelters of UNPROFOR and were firing from there on our units.

 6     And this complicated the combat situation significantly.

 7        Q.   Well, you've already told us about what General Krstic's orders

 8     were in relation to UNPROFOR, so I won't ask you that again.  What about

 9     targets within the town of Srebrenica itself?  Did you hear anything

10     suggesting that artillery fire was being directed at the town of

11     Srebrenica?

12        A.   The support we had for the Srebrenica operation was a unit which

13     was in the communications plan, and that was the Mixed Artillery

14     Regiment, and I remember that Colonel Borovina was the commander of that

15     regiment.  And that for this operation in this part of the war theater,

16     we had only two artillery pieces, I think they were howitzers,

17     150-millimetre howitzers, and I know that the commanders of the

18     subordinate units --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction, 105 millimetres.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- asked for support on targets

21     along the line they were attacking simply so that the artillery could

22     soften the points of resistance.  And there was no need for them to ask

23     for any shelling of any goals in the depth of the territory, and here I'm

24     referring to the town of Srebrenica itself.

25             MR. HAYNES:

Page 29607

 1        Q.   Thank you.  We mentioned briefly the village of Pusmulic.  Did it

 2     become apparent to you, through the communications centre, that that was

 3     an area, at some stage, that was being used as a defensive position by

 4     the forces of the 28th Division?

 5        A.   I don't remember those particular details.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Just one last thing.  Presumably you saw quite a

 7     number of the forces assembled to conduct Operation Krivaja 95.  Did you

 8     ever see any VRS forces that were equipped with dogs?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   Thank you.  I am going to move on now to the meeting in Bratunac

11     on the 11th of July.  Do you have any recollection now of who was present

12     at that meeting?

13        A.   General Mladic chaired the meeting.  On his left- and right-hand

14     side were General Zivanovic and General Krstic.  I remember, as I've

15     already stated, I am not sure how many commanders were absent, maybe one

16     or two, but as I said almost all of the commanders participating in the

17     Krivaja 95 operation were there.  I remember that Lieutenant-Colonel

18     Furtula was there also, he was the commander of the Visegrad Brigade

19     which had not participated in the operation.  And of course I remember

20     very well that Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic was there, too.

21        Q.   Who spoke at the meeting?

22        A.   It was mostly General Mladic who spoke at that meeting.  He set

23     out briefly a description of the newly arisen situation.  He was

24     satisfied with the military success that had been achieved, and after

25     this analysis by him, he said that on the following day all the units

Page 29608

 1     that had participated in the attack on Srebrenica -- or, rather, in the

 2     Operation Krivaja 95, should regroup and immediately march and begin an

 3     attack on Zepa.

 4        Q.   And did Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic also speak?

 5        A.   To the best of my recollection, Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic did

 6     speak, and I remember very well what he said to General Mladic.

 7        Q.   You may have told us this in summary before, but to the best of

 8     your recollection, can you tell us what he said?

 9        A.   Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic described a situation in which we

10     did not have precise information as to where the 28th Division was.  In

11     his opinion, this division was still a potential problem because the

12     situation was very unclear.  If they wanted to breakthrough in the

13     direction of Tuzla, this could be a significant problem both for the

14     forces around Srebrenica and for the depth of our territory in the

15     direction of Tuzla.  He proposed to General Mladic that it would be a

16     very good idea if this situation was cleared up in military terms, the

17     military situation in Srebrenica, so that later on we could carry out his

18     orders.

19        Q.   And what was Mladic's response?

20        A.   General Mladic listened to this proposal and said right away,

21     Regardless of all that, tomorrow everyone has to go towards Zepa.

22        Q.   Was it unusual for what I'll call a junior officer to stand up to

23     General Mladic in that way?

24        A.   General Mladic was a commander who was very authoritarian, and it

25     was unusual for us, for someone who was junior both to General Krstic,

Page 29609

 1     General Zivanovic, and all the other colonels, to put forward such an

 2     obvious and rational proposal.

 3        Q.   Now, did this meeting take place on the eve of a particular

 4     religious festival?

 5        A.   The meeting was held on the 11th of July, and on the 12th of

 6     July, according to the Christian calendar, it was St. Peter's Day.  Is

 7     that the day you meant?

 8        Q.   It's not for me to answer your questions, but you've answered

 9     mine.  And is there a particular tradition as to what one eats on the eve

10     of St. Peter's Day?

11        A.   In the Christian calendar, St. Peter's Day is the end of a major

12     fast.  And on the 11th of July, the last day of the fast, Christian

13     believers eat food which is suitable for a fast day.

14        Q.   And was there a meal prior to the meeting on the 11th of July?

15        A.   I don't remember any meal before the meeting, but after the end

16     of the meeting, when I received an order from General Mladic and when we

17     rose and everyone was going to go about his own business, suddenly the

18     door of this larger office opened and someone called Zvonko Bajagic

19     entered, he was a man from Vlasenica, a householder, working in the

20     logistics of the Drina Corps, and he carrying a huge oval platter with a

21     huge fish on it.  I remembered that because I found it unusual, in

22     military terms, but I saw that as connected with the fast day.  After

23     that I immediately left the premises.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And is there any doubt in your mind that the meeting

25     you've told us about occurred on the 11th of July?

Page 29610

 1        A.   I never doubted that.  I am absolutely sure it was on the 11th of

 2     July.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Now, just to clear up a few details, you were, as you

 4     told us, dispatched Krivace by General Mladic on the 11th of July.  Did

 5     you go directly there or did you stop somewhere else first?

 6        A.   On the 11th of July, at around 2400 hours, I arrived in the

 7     command of the Drina Corps in Vlasenica, which was on the road towards

 8     Han Pijesak and Krivace.  I dropped in to see the duty operations officer

 9     to evaluate the situation.  I needed to repair a vehicle, the vehicle we

10     used to transport the mobile communications centre.  I knew that I was

11     far more mobile than the units in Srebrenica were and that I would get to

12     the Zepa area before them.  That's why I decided to give my men a rest,

13     to replenish our equipment, our generators, and then following the

14     development of the situation, to go on to Zepa on the following day.

15        Q.   And did you in fact do that?

16        A.   Yes, that's what I did.  And on the following day in the morning,

17     I was already at the forward command post at Krivace, between Han Pijesak

18     and Zepa.

19        Q.   When did you establish from Krivace communications with corps

20     command in Vlasenica?

21        A.   As soon as I arrived there on the 12th of July.

22        Q.   And did you receive communications from corps command from that

23     moment onwards?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   What did you understand the forces which had conducted Operation

Page 29611

 1     Krivaja 95 to be engaged in on the 12th of July?

 2        A.   I found it very unusual in view of the fact that on the 11th of

 3     July, in the evening, General Mladic had ordered everyone to move towards

 4     Zepa on the following day.  I found it unusual that the units which had

 5     participated in Krivaja 95 were not arriving in Zepa already.

 6        Q.   When in fact did they arrive in Zepa?

 7        A.   They arrived in the holding areas around Zepa in the night

 8     between the 13th and the 14th of July, for the most part.  In the

 9     meantime, I learned that in this area around Vijogora [phoen], between

10     Milici, Podravanje, and Suceska, were carrying out a search operation of

11     the terrain, resting their personnel, and that they had a line-up and a

12     brief meeting with General Mladic.  And then after that, in marching

13     columns, they took various axes because they were afraid of the

14     air-strikes.  And under cover of the night, they regrouped for the

15     waiting operations with the attack operations in Operation Stupcanica 95.

16        Q.   Thank you.  I want you to look at a document for us now, please.

17     You've seen it before.

18             MR. HAYNES:  It's P114.

19        Q.   You recognise this document, Mr. Jevdjevic, I imagine?

20        A.   Yes.  I did not receive this document myself but I had an

21     opportunity to look at it in the proofing for my testimony here.

22        Q.   Who would have written this document?

23        A.   This document was signed, I think, by General Krstic, and that's

24     what it probably says on the last page of this document.  And it was

25     probably on his orders and under his instructions that this document was

Page 29612

 1     drafted by Colonel Vicic, who was at General Krstic's side at all times

 2     in the course of both Operation Krivaja 95 and Stupcanica 95.

 3        Q.   Now, Colonel Vicic's position changed, as we understand it,

 4     sometime around about this period.  What was his position at the

 5     beginning of July of 1995?

 6        A.   I can't be precise about it.  I think that he was in the

 7     operations organ.  But for the purpose of those two operations, he had

 8     full trust of General Krstic because he was a professional officer, he

 9     had undergone military training, and he was familiar with all the jobs,

10     all tasks, within his purview, and he was there at his side at all times

11     throughout those two operations.

12        Q.   And after General Krstic became commander of the Drina Corps,

13     what role did Colonel Vicic then have?

14        A.   I think that he became the chief of the operations department in

15     the Drina Corps command.

16        Q.   All right.  And did he have any specific role in Krivaja 95 or in

17     Stupcanica 95?

18        A.   Well, he was simply in the service of General Krstic, and all the

19     information from the front lines came to him.  He drafted the reports and

20     whatever General Krstic ordered him to do.  Any concepts that he may have

21     had, he turned them into written documents and he took care of all the

22     correspondence.

23        Q.   Very well.  Well, we'll leave that there.  The forward command

24     post at Krivace, what was the visual capability there over the combat

25     area?

Page 29613

 1        A.   Krivace is a dominant height.  It gives a clear line of vision of

 2     all the terrain, the enclave of Zepa, and even further from the enclave

 3     itself.  It's a hilly, mountainous terrain which is densely wooded.

 4        Q.   And were you aware, not just, as it were, through the

 5     communications system, but visually, of the arrival of the units

 6     commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic in the area around Zepa?

 7        A.   Yes.  In front of us in the valley itself there is a large field.

 8     This is where the villages of Podzeplje and Plane are located.  There is

 9     a large meadow where those two fields are, a plain of sorts, and I saw it

10     myself when the Zvornik Brigade units came.  They were quite striking

11     because they had two -- they had vehicles that were used for combat

12     purposes, because they had machine-guns mounted on them.  I saw them

13     station themselves in the Podzeplje village, in the village of Podzeplje,

14     and that's where they set up their forward command post.

15        Q.   On what date was that?

16        A.   That was on the 14th, in the morning of the 14th.

17        Q.   And what combat activity, if any, did those units conduct on the

18     day of the 14th?

19        A.   On that day, an approach march was carried out from the

20     deployment line to the front end of the enemy defence lines.  This area

21     was quite remote because the village of Podzeplje, which was under our

22     control, and the Brlog mountain where we assumed that the front defence

23     positions were -- Brloska mountain, Planina, where we assumed that the

24     Zepa Brigade defence positions at the front end were located, they are

25     quite far away.  So it was only at the early evening that our forces were

Page 29614

 1     able to come close to the Zepa Brigade units.  And throughout the 14th,

 2     this was the activity that was carried out, and there were no major

 3     operations or actions apart from maybe some sporadic actions and

 4     reconnaissance in force that was carried out.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now we have talked previously about Major

 6     Dragan Obrenovic.  Is he somebody you had known all your life?

 7        A.   Yes.  We are quite literally from the same village.  We were born

 8     in the same year and we completed all our schools together in the same

 9     year.  We were in the same class all the up -- down to military academy.

10        Q.   And did you hear from him at any time during the 14th of July of

11     1995?

12        A.   Yes.  There was a telephone conversation on the 14th of July.

13        Q.   Can you help us as to about what time that telephone conversation

14     was?

15        A.   I know very well that it was on the 14th.  I don't know the exact

16     time, but I do know what we were talking about.

17        Q.   Well, just approximately, was it in the morning, afternoon, or

18     evening?

19        A.   I think that it is logical to assume that it was not in the

20     morning, not in the evening, but in the middle of the day or thereabouts.

21        Q.   And this might seem an odd question, why do you think he called

22     you in particular?

23        A.   Major Obrenovic, that was his rank at the time, called me and he

24     was very much concerned.  He told me that the military situation in the

25     Zvornik area was very unfavorable because he had received information

Page 29615

 1     about a huge column of the 28th Division that was carrying out a

 2     breakthrough out of the encirclement, going through the defences of his

 3     units, that his reconnaissance units had already been in close contact

 4     with those units, with the column, and that he did not have enough men to

 5     deploy, to carry out those combat missions.  And I simply had a feeling

 6     that he had already discussed this with somebody from the corps command.

 7     Then he told me, I have a feeling that the guys from the superior command

 8     do not have any understanding from my position that they have -- that

 9     they fail to understand the magnitude of the problem I am facing.  You

10     know that I am not afraid, that's what he told me, and that I am not a

11     coward, but this is a huge problem.  And I would like to ask you,

12     therefore, to present this situation to General Krstic in some way so

13     that he could make his decision and to give him back the battle group

14     that was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic at the Zepa

15     front line in order to assist him in dealing with this problem.

16             At the forward command post, some ten metres away from me,

17     General Krstic was there, and it was quite unusual to me that

18     Major Obrenovic was telling me about this problem.  But the reason why he

19     did that was because he thought that the superior officers did not take

20     the situation seriously enough, and he was hoping, since I was there

21     closer to General Krstic and that I knew him, and I knew Obrenovic very

22     well, that I would be able to paint a more vivid picture of the problem

23     to General Krstic.

24        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Jevdjevic.  And did you do that?

25        A.   Yes, I relayed all that to General Krstic.

Page 29616

 1        Q.   And how did General Krstic respond?

 2        A.   I think that at that time General Krstic knew, from a military

 3     standpoint, that the problems that Major Obrenovic was facing were quite

 4     real.  But he, himself, faced another problem.  If, in order to solve

 5     those problems he were to send Colonel Pandurevic and his unit back to

 6     that area, then the whole concept of the attack - in other words

 7     Stupcanica 95 - would be jeopardized.  So he was in two minds for a long

 8     time how to juggle those two problems, how to deal with those two

 9     problems at the opposite ends of the corps area.

10        Q.   So on the afternoon of the 14th of July, what decision did he

11     take?

12        A.   On the 14th of July, he was still assessing the situation, that

13     was my opinion, and I don't recall any specific decisions that he made

14     relating to this plea on the part of Obrenovic.

15        Q.   Well, did he order Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic to go back to

16     Zvornik on the 14th of July?

17        A.   Not on the 14th.

18        Q.   Did he even call Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic to the forward

19     command post to discuss the matter with him on the 14th of July?

20        A.   No.  Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic was quite far away, in the

21     direction of the Brloska mountains, carrying out the reconnaissance in

22     force, and that was the first time that his unit was actually deployed in

23     Stupcanica 95, in that operation.  So that on that day General Krstic,

24     regarding the problems in Zvornik, did not have any contacts with

25     Colonel Pandurevic.

Page 29617

 1        Q.   Now what time on the 14th of July did General Krstic leave the

 2     forward command post for the evening?

 3        A.   In the evening, after receiving reports about the situation at

 4     the front line and once he was sure that the situation was okay,

 5     General Krstic would go to a neighbouring village to see his wife's

 6     parents and to spend the night there, because at that time he had big

 7     problems with the prosthetic leg that he had fitted after he lost his leg

 8     in a shell explosion.

 9        Q.   Thank you for that, but I don't think you did answer the

10     question, which is:  About what time was that?

11        A.   He always left in the evening around 9.00 or 10.00.  That's when

12     he would leave the forward command post.

13             MR. HAYNES:  I wonder if we could now put into e-court, please, a

14     succession of documents.  Firstly, P169.

15        Q.   Now, that's a report to the Drina Corps command.  It's dated the

16     14th of July and timed at 2230 hours.  Did that come through to the

17     forward command post at Krivace on the evening of the 14th of July?

18        A.   Yes.  This report designated as "Very urgent, attention Krstic,"

19     arrived at 2230.  And it was received by Oliver Sekulic, my cryptographer

20     at the forward command post.  He signed it here.

21        Q.   And did General Krstic see that before he retired for the

22     evening?

23        A.   No, this document came after he left the forward command post.

24             MR. HAYNES:  Can we look at another one, please, P327.

25        Q.   This is an interim combat report from the Zvornik Brigade to the

Page 29618

 1     Drina Corps, dated the 15th of July, in the very small hours of the

 2     morning at 10 past 1.00.  Did that come through to the forward command

 3     post at Krivace?

 4        A.   Well, I can't really say that.  I can't really see it here, but I

 5     assume that since this information was meant for General Krstic, that one

 6     of his assistants or the duty operations officer at the corps command in

 7     Vlasenica forwarded that to the forward command post at Krivace because

 8     at that time it was a very significant document.

 9        Q.   Now, the following morning, on the 15th of July, at what time did

10     General Krstic arrive at the forward command post?

11        A.   General Krstic would arrive at the forward command post in the

12     morning at around 7.00 a.m., sometimes earlier, sometimes later.

13             MR. HAYNES:  And can we now look at, please, P163.

14        Q.   A report of the 4th Radio Reconnaissance Platoon describing the

15     situation towards Zvornik, addressed to the commander of the Drina Corps.

16     Did that arrive at the forward command post on the morning of the 15th of

17     July?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   And when General Krstic arrived for duty on the morning of the

20     15th of July, was he given three documents to look at concerning the

21     situation in Zvornik?

22             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection, leading.

23             MR. HAYNES:  No, it's not, because the answer can be either yes

24     or no.  A leading question is one which suggests the answer.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It is.  A specific number of documents is

Page 29619

 1     something coming directly from the mind of the lawyer.  I mean, it's so

 2     easy to get around that.  Why do -- why is he -- why does it have to be

 3     three?

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  We seem to be in disagreement here, but

 5     basically --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  In the beginning I thought it wasn't leading.  But

 8     I see that you specifically refer to three documents, so that makes it

 9     leading according to me, but anyway --

10             MR. HAYNES:  Fine.  Fine, we'll move on.

11        Q.   Was General Krstic provided with information about the situation

12     in Zvornik when he arrived for duty on the morning of the 15th of July?

13        A.   Every morning when he came to the forward command post,

14     General Krstic always familiarised himself with the situation at the

15     front line, and he would be shown all the telegrams that had arrived in

16     his absence to the forward command post so that he had an opportunity to

17     read all the telegrams and to familiarise himself with the overall

18     situation.

19        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Jevdjevic.  But on that particular morning, was

20     his attention directed to the situation in Zvornik?

21        A.   Yes.  The focus of his activity and the reading of the documents

22     was precisely on the situation that the Zvornik Brigade command

23     encountered in Zvornik.

24        Q.   And just to satisfy everybody's curiosity, was he given one, two,

25     three, four, five or more documents?

Page 29620

 1        A.   We gave him all the documents, including the three documents that

 2     we are talking about now.

 3        Q.   And what was his reaction?

 4        A.   He was very concerned.  And he made a decision at that time, and

 5     he ordered me to use the radio equipment to invite Lieutenant-Colonel

 6     Vinko Pandurevic, the commander of that battle group, to come to the

 7     forward command post.

 8        Q.   And did Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic do that?

 9        A.   Yes.  He came to the forward command post in his vehicle and with

10     an escort.

11        Q.   And how long after General Krstic had reviewed the material did

12     he do that?

13        A.   Well, he arrived maybe 20 minutes or half an hour later in the

14     motor vehicle.

15        Q.   And did any discussion follow or did General Krstic just issue

16     him with an order?

17        A.   General Krstic briefed him about the new developments in the

18     Zvornik area, briefly, about the documents that he had received that

19     dealt with those problems, and ordered him -- in fact, told him that the

20     only way to deal with it was to take the whole unit involved in

21     Operation Stupcanica in Zepa and to immediately return to the Zvornik

22     area to solve the problem.  And I know that after that conversation,

23     Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic wanted to acquaint himself with the

24     situation in Zvornik himself, and he told me to set up a communications

25     line with the Zvornik Brigade command, and he also used the other

Page 29621

 1     communications equipment to call all of his commanders who were still at

 2     the Zepa front line and issued some preliminary orders to them.

 3        Q.   And to the best of your recollection, about what time of the

 4     morning was that?

 5        A.   It was at around 8.30 or thereabouts, that was when he talked to

 6     his brigade command.

 7        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Jevdjevic.  I am nearly at an end but we are due a

 8     break, I think.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  And when you say nearly, how near?  Is it a matter

10     of five minutes, in other words?  Because if it's five minutes, we can go

11     a further five minutes.

12             MR. HAYNES:  It might be ten because there are some documents

13     involved.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Then let's have the break.  Thank you.  25 minutes,

15     please.

16                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Mr. President, good morning.  Good morning,

20     everyone.  This is just a short point.  As we are getting to

21     cross-examination -- could we go into private session.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, of course.  Let's go into private session for

23     a short while, please.

24                           [Private session]

25   (redacted)

Page 29622











11  Pages 29622-29623 redacted. Private session.















Page 29624

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6                           [Open session]

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  We are now in open session.  Thank you.

 8             MR. HAYNES:

 9        Q.   Going back to where I left you just before we had a break, we

10     were at the forward command post at Krivace, and you were describing how

11     Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic was making contact with his brigade back in

12     Zvornik.  Do you recall that?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And just to act as a sort of aide-memoire for you, I want to show

15     you a few documents to see if they remind you of that morning.

16             MR. HAYNES:  And we'll start with P117 A in English.  P1171 B in

17     B/C/S.  It's 1171.  I -- I've got it wrong.

18        Q.   Now, we are going to test the system straight away.  You will

19     know from your previous experience here at the Tribunal that certain

20     communications on the open line were allegedly intercepted by the army of

21     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  You've heard of that, have you?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And this is an example of that, and you should look at the bottom

24     of that page, and this is said to be at 8.34 on the morning of the 15th

25     of July.  Do you have any recollection that you were a participant in a

Page 29625

 1     conversation where you were told that Semso Muminovic was asking to speak

 2     to Vinko Pandurevic and leaving a telephone number?

 3        A.   He left the frequency they should talk on, and most probably, as

 4     I remember the event, this commander Semso Muminovic, who was on the

 5     Tuzla side in that area of responsibility between the Zvornik Brigade and

 6     the Tuzla Corps, he had probably already had some communications with

 7     Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic.  And I allow for the possibility that

 8     someone talked to me and conveyed this message to me, asking me to try to

 9     find Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic and tell him that this Semso Muminovic

10     was asking to speak to him.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             MR. HAYNES:  Now can we go to P1173.  A in the English and B in

13     Serbian.  Yes.  I'm sorry.  Can we have D in the B/C/S, please, because

14     it gives us the date, which B doesn't.

15        Q.   I think we can take this quite shortly.  You've seen this

16     document before, haven't you?  This is another transcript of an

17     intercept --

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   And does it accord with your recollection of one of the calls

20     which Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic made from the forward command post on

21     the morning of the 15th of July -- 14th -- 15th of July?

22        A.   I remember that I established communications for him with the

23     command of the brigade in Zvornik and that he didn't find Major Obrenovic

24     there at the time, his Chief of Staff.  And I know that he spoke with

25     some officers from his command, and that they discussed the combat

Page 29626

 1     situation.  But I don't know, or I didn't know at the time, precisely

 2     with what officers he spoke; whereas, here I can see that they were

 3     Milosevic and Mijatovic.  I knew them both.

 4             MR. HAYNES:  And just to complete the picture, can we have P1174.

 5     A in the English and B in the B/C/S.  I think it's already up in the

 6     B/C/S, so I'll proceed with my questions.

 7        Q.   Do you recall one call made by Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic or

 8     more than one call from the forward command post that morning?

 9        A.   What forward command post are you referring to?

10        Q.   Krivace.

11        A.   That morning when General Krstic conveyed to Vinko what the

12     situation was in the area of his brigade in Zvornik and ordered him to

13     come back with the unit from Zepa in order to deal with the military part

14     of that situation, Vinko asked for additional information and he asked to

15     contact his command in Zvornik personally.  He spoke to some officers

16     from the command of his brigade about these problems.  That's all I know

17     from my personal knowledge at the time because I was there.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I just want to summarise events at the forward

19     command post on the morning of the 15th of July.  Did you see any

20     document that came through on the teleprinter that made any reference to

21     prisoners of war?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   Did any of the discussion between General Krstic and

24     Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic concern prisoners of war?

25        A.   Absolutely not.

Page 29627

 1        Q.   And from what you could hear of what Lieutenant-Colonel

 2     Pandurevic was saying to Milosevic or Mijatovic or Jokic, who we can see

 3     that he spoke to in one of these conversations, did any of those

 4     conversations concern prisoners of war?

 5        A.   No.

 6        Q.   Now, just to complete the picture.  Did Lieutenant-Colonel

 7     Pandurevic withdraw his units from Zepa?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And was that a straightforward process or did it take a little

10     time?

11        A.   Well, logically, it took some time for that because it wasn't

12     easy to pull out a unit which was in contact with the enemy, in combat in

13     impassable terrain on a mountain.  And then the commander, General

14     Krstic, had to introduce another unit into this gap, this breach gap, so

15     that this hand-over of positions, which the Zvornik Brigade had taken up

16     to that morning, required some time.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             MR. HAYNES:  I just want to look briefly at another intercept, if

19     we can.  It's P1176.  A in the English and B in the B/C/S.

20        Q.   Do you understand the code names Palma and Zlatar?

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  This document is under seal so be careful what use

22     you make of it, and it's not to be broadcast.

23             MR. HAYNES:  I'm very sorry.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

25             MR. HAYNES:

Page 29628

 1        Q.   Mr. Jevdjevic, do you understand that the duty officer at Palma

 2     was the duty officer at the Zvornik Brigade?

 3        A.   Yes.  He was the duty officer in the command of the Zvornik

 4     Brigade.

 5        Q.   And Zlatar was the code name for the Drina Corps?

 6        A.   Yes.  That was the code name for the Drina Corps in that period

 7     of time, and this conversation probably refers to the duty officer in the

 8     command of the Drina Corps.

 9        Q.   It's recorded as being a conversation taking place on channel

10     three, what does that tell you about where it originated from?

11        A.   The previous conversations had the frequency entered here that

12     corresponds to the frequency range of the RRU1 equipment.  We did not

13     have cryptographic protection on that equipment, and I assume this was

14     between the Krivace forward command post and Velika Zepa [as interpreted]

15     because that was the sort of equipment we used on that channel.  This is

16     probably RRU800, the radio relay equipment active from Vlasenica to the

17     stationery switchboard of Veliki Zep, and with that equipment we

18     communicated with the brigade commands in Zvornik, Sekovici, and

19     Rogatica, and I assumed that this can only refer to that equipment.  It

20     would be even clearer to me if whoever drew up this document had also

21     entered the frequency of the equipment.

22        Q.   And you've seen this intercept before.  What does it appear to

23     you to refer to?

24        A.   According to my interpretation, as I understand this

25     conversation, in view of the fact that in the command of the Zvornik

Page 29629

 1     Brigade, the situation regarding the problems they had because the

 2     28th Division was passing through their area of responsibility, before a

 3     written telegram was sent, someone wanted to encourage them and comfort

 4     them and tell them that their special formation was on the way back from

 5     Zepa.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  It's in quite cloudy language.  Would that be normal

 7     to -- in conveying such a message over an open line?

 8        A.   As I understand this, probably the duty officer at Zlatar wanted

 9     to conceal this information from anyone listening in, so he told the duty

10     officer at Palma, that is in Zvornik, something that the other one didn't

11     understand, which is why he cursed.  He said, "Our men -- with our lot

12     with the boss," and this corresponds to the situation at the time.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             MR. HAYNES:  Can we now look at 7D686.

15        Q.   The time on this order is 1041, and can you tell us what this

16     order is or this document is?

17        A.   This is a document issued by the command of the Drina Corps in

18     which on the 15th of July, while this document was being dictated and

19     typed out and encrypted, a certain amount of time elapsed.  And the

20     person who encrypted it handed it over in the Zvornik Brigade at 1041.

21     The document itself is to inform the command of the Zvornik Brigade in

22     writing that the combat composition which had been engaged at Zepa was

23     returning to its original area of responsibility, and it explains why

24     that is, in order to prevent the consequences of a possible attack on

25     Zvornik and the joining up of Muslim formations from Srebrenica and Tuzla

Page 29630

 1     and that all measures should be taken to block and, if possible, rout and

 2     capture the Muslim formations before the arrival of this unit and so on

 3     and so forth.

 4        Q.   And just so that we are clear, could Lieutenant-Colonel

 5     Pandurevic have returned to Zvornik without an order from General Krstic?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Let's move on.  You've already told us, but the

 8     communication plan for Stupcanica 95, did that in any way differ than

 9     that which had been in operation for Krivaja 95?

10        A.   No, that was the same communications plan.  It was identical.

11     The only thing we changed was the location of the forward command post,

12     so we just had to alter the azimuth of the antenna for the RRU equipment

13     at the Veliki Zep node.  And this other plan included as reserve

14     participants the Rogatica and Visegrad Brigades which had not taken part

15     in the Krivaja Operation but they did take part in the Stupcanica

16     operation.

17        Q.   And so did you still retain as part of the network the Zvornik

18     Brigade with its appropriate code name?

19        A.   Yes, it was identical.  The same plan remained.

20        Q.   Now, you answered some questions to Mr. Petrusic about the combat

21     and the evacuation of Zepa.  Did you, during any of that period, have any

22     communications over that network with any unit of the Zvornik Brigade?

23        A.   No.

24        Q.   I am going to show you just two more documents and then we are

25     done.

Page 29631

 1             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look, please, at P1353.  And that's A

 2     in the English and B in the B/C/S.

 3        Q.   This is another transcript of a conversation said to be between

 4     Major Jevdzevic, would that be you, and somebody called Vinko.  Would

 5     that be Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic?

 6        A.   Yes.  I assume so because at that time I did not know of any

 7     other Vinko.

 8        Q.   And it appears to concern the combat situation in Zepa and

 9     whether Lieutenant-Colonel Pandurevic is going to be required to come

10     back there.  Do you recall having such a conversation on or about the

11     26th of July?

12        A.   I remember that conversation roughly, in general terms, but I

13     wasn't sure about the date.

14             MR. HAYNES:  It's just been pointed out to me that, in fact, on

15     the B/C/S the conversation begins at the very bottom of the page, and

16     perhaps the next page of that document is what the witness should have to

17     look at.

18        Q.   Can you see that the person called Vinko asks you:

19             "Have you gone over to the Zepa side?"

20             And you said:  "Well, I sort of have."

21             "Is the work going all right?"

22             "It is going all right."

23             "Are they going to ask me to go there?"

24             "Probably not."

25             And you apparently said:  "We will see today.  Last night a big

Page 29632

 1     convoy went ..." and so on.  And "Where is their army?"  Are you

 2     following that?

 3        A.   Yes, yes.

 4        Q.   And did you see, after the 15th of July, Lieutenant-Colonel

 5     Pandurevic at the theater at Zepa at all?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Now, just lastly I want to you to look at a different -- well,

 8     another document.

 9             MR. HAYNES:  It's P3893.

10        Q.   And this goes back to some questions I asked you yesterday.  Can

11     you see the name bottom of that document, Jovicic Nedo?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Do you know who that is?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   This document hasn't been translated, but can you tell us what it

16     appears to be, what it appears to say?

17        A.   In the heading it is handwritten, "The command of the Drina

18     Corps, Pribicevac forward command post."  The date is the 11th of July.

19     It is addressed to the command of the special police brigade.  The

20     subject is, "Combat documents delivered herewith."  And it says here:

21             "We hereby deliver to you the coded map Grmec, the code book

22     Krivaja 95, the work plan Krivaja 95, and call signs, strictly

23     confidential, 04/156-3."

24             MR. HAYNES:  And can we go to page 2 of this document.

25        Q.   We've seen that before as P3753, that's the communication plan.

Page 29633

 1     Did you recognise the writing on the handwritten document on page 1 of

 2     this document?

 3        A.   No.

 4        Q.   Did you have anything to do with this letter?  Did you write it

 5     or ask for it to be written?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   Did you know it had been done?

 8        A.   No.

 9        Q.   Mr. Jevdjevic, thank you very much.  I have no further questions

10     for you.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  I thank you, Mr. Haynes.

12             Mr. Zivanovic.

13             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Thank you.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Take your time, Mr. Zivanovic.

15                           Examination by Mr. Zivanovic:

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Jevdjevic.  Although we know

17     each other, let me introduce myself for the record.  My name is

18     Zoran Zivanovic, and in this case I defend Vujadin Popovic.  My

19     question --

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Do you need the lectern?

21             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  The lectern?  No, no, no.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Thank you.

23             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  I haven't used it yet.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.

25             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 29634

 1        Q.   My questions, Mr. Jevdjevic, will be limited to the organisation

 2     and the functioning of the communications in this period that we are all

 3     interested in and at the time when you were the commander of the

 4     5th Battalion, the Communications Battalion in the Drina Corps.  We have

 5     spoken about this at length here and we have an expert report drafted by

 6     Mr. Djuro Rodic where he states, inter alia, that in addition to all the

 7     documents that we provided him, he consulted you when he was drafting

 8     that document.  It is 1D321 tendered by us.  It's at page 6 in the

 9     English version; at page 5 of the B/C/S version.  That's at paragraph

10     221.

11             Now, I would like to ask you if you could tell us whether you had

12     any contacts with Mr. Rodic and to tell us very briefly what information

13     he sought from you and what information you provided to him?

14        A.   I don't know Mr. Rodic personally.  We only spoke on the phone

15     once, twice at the most.  As he was drafting his expert report, he wanted

16     to know with greater specificity what equipment we used at one or two

17     locations in order to be able to provide a credible expert report.

18        Q.   In the course of your proofing for the evidence here, when the

19     two of us met, could you please tell me whether you had an opportunity to

20     acquaint yourself with his expert report, to read it, to look at it?

21        A.   Yes, I have read it.

22        Q.   Now, could you please tell me in general terms, I don't want to

23     go into any details, but can you tell me whether this expert report

24     reflects faithfully the organisation and the functioning of the

25     communications in the Drina Corps while you were the commander of the

Page 29635

 1     5th Signals Battalion?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   I have already said that I don't want to go into details, but let

 4     me just deal with some issues.  First of all, could you please tell me

 5     whether there was a radio relay communication, a direct radio relay axis

 6     between Vlasenica and Zvornik?

 7        A.   No.

 8        Q.   Could you tell us briefly why it was that this radio relay axis

 9     was not set up, to the best of your knowledge?

10        A.   I would have been very happy had there been such a possibility,

11     because it would have made our communications system more flexible, but

12     simply the nature of the dispersion of the electro-magnetic waves at

13     frequencies used by this type of equipment is such that they require a

14     line of vision.  There has to be a line of vision.  The two spots, the

15     two aerials, have to be eye-to-eye, and it was impossible to do that

16     between Vlasenica and Zvornik because there are several geographical

17     obstacles that disrupt the line of vision.

18        Q.   Could you tell me briefly how the communication line was

19     established between Vlasenica and Zvornik since there was no direct line?

20        A.   In order to establish communications with Zvornik, because of the

21     geographical situation, the lay of the land, we had to use three radio

22     relay nodes in order to reach Zvornik indirectly.  The communications

23     were set up using four radio relay sections.  The first radio relay

24     section was Vlasenica-Veliki Zep.  The second one was Veliki Zep-Cer.

25     The third one was Cer-Gucevo.  And the fourth one was Cer-Zvornik -- or,

Page 29636

 1     rather, Gucevo-Zvornik, I'm sorry.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Can you now tell me, at those sections, what

 3     equipment was used?  Was it one equipment, one device, several devices,

 4     and what kinds?

 5        A.   Each of these sections was covered by two radio relay devices.

 6     So the entire line, radio relay line, was covered by eight devices.  At

 7     the first, third, and fourth sections we used radio relay devices RRU800.

 8     And in the second section, between stationary node Veliki Zep and the Cer

 9     stationary node, we used a radio relay device with a larger channel

10     capacity called MSC [as interpreted].

11        Q.   You said SMC?

12        A.   Yes, that's right.

13        Q.   Now I would like to ask you this.  We have this organisational

14     chart.  I don't think that we need to look at it anymore.  We saw that

15     between Veliki Zep and Cer there was another direction or axis where it

16     is indicated that an RRU80 [as interpreted] device was used, and could

17     you tell us whether this axis functioned or whether it didn't function,

18     what was its role, what was it used for?

19        A.   That was a backup axis because this radio relay section was very

20     important for us.  It carried a large number of channels used by a

21     variety of users, not only in the military but also political figures.

22     And that is why a plan was made to have this backup axis.  If the first

23     radio relay axis is disrupted, we usually -- when we did our charts, we

24     drew those backup lines with broken lines.  I don't have it now in front

25     of me, but this is how we usually drew in the backup axis.

Page 29637

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We have in the translation "RRU80."  Is that

 3     right or is that a new machine?

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, I think you can clarify that.  It's line 24 of

 5     the previous page, at least on my monitor.

 6             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Yes.  Your answer is interpreted as saying "RRU80."  So could you

 8     please repeat what kind of radio relay device was used.

 9        A.   RRU800.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.

11             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   I just want to ask you this:  To the best of your knowledge and

13     recollection, we are interested in July 1995, do you recall whether the

14     radio relay, the backup line or the backup axis, actually functioned

15     between Veliki Zep and Cer or was it actually only the SMC that was

16     actually functioning?

17        A.   I don't know.  I have no knowledge of the radio relay axis using

18     the SMC being disrupted which would require the activation of the backup

19     line using RRU800 devices.

20        Q.   Now I would like to show you another document from this report.

21             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] That's 1D322.  That's the annex

22     to the report.  Pages 13 and 14 in the English version.  However, this

23     document is in the B/C/S, so I would like us to look at P2823.  It's a

24     Prosecution exhibit because it does have a translation.

25        Q.   I think you remember this, but please tell me if you do.  These

Page 29638

 1     are the frequencies used by RRU800 device, and now I would like to ask

 2     you first:  Do you recall having seen this document?

 3        A.   I saw this document in the course of the proofing sessions.

 4        Q.   Yes.  Could you now tell me --

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Slow down a little bit, both of you, please.

 6             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Sorry.

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] Can you tell me now, there are some frequencies

 8     used by the RRU800 device.  As the commander of the 5th Signals

 9     Battalion, were you able to switch frequencies?

10        A.   No.

11        Q.   And could this be done by anyone from your unit, let's say,

12     people operating those devices?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   Could it have been done by, let's say, your signals chief in the

15     Drina Corps?

16        A.   Not even the signals chief in the Drina Corps was authorised to

17     make those changes.

18        Q.   Now, could you please tell me regarding this document, to the

19     best of your recollection -- I know that you see that this document dates

20     from 1993.  So to the best of your recollection, were these frequencies

21     changed in the course of the war?

22        A.   I don't think so because there was no need to change them.

23        Q.   Very well.  Now I would like to show you a document, it's a

24     Prosecution Exhibit 1468.  It's a map that the BH army had indicating the

25     disposition of the radio relay communications devices of the army of

Page 29639

 1     Republika Srpska.

 2             This is the work map of the counter-electronic warfare section of

 3     the 2nd Krajina Corps, and as you can see, it refers to the period

 4     between January and September 1995.  Could you please tell us, did you

 5     have an opportunity in the course of the proofing sessions for your

 6     evidence here to see this map?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Now, I would like to ask you to tell me whether this map reflects

 9     the situation as it existed in the communications system of the

10     Drina Corps.  I will now limit myself only to the Drina Corps.

11        A.   No.

12        Q.   And could you tell us in what way does it not reflect the

13     situation.  At least in the roughest terms, what is it that is not an

14     accurate reflection of the actual situation?

15        A.   If I could just ask the usher to show the lower, the bottom part

16     of the map.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Would it help the witness more if we gave him the

18     original document?  Otherwise, we will -- I will have to zoom in because

19     the names, the topological names are barely visible.  Do you have it

20     available?

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  We can go get it, Mr. President.  This is first

22     time I've heard of any of this.  I don't have a proofing note.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  All right.  Let's -- Mr. Jevdjevic, and

24     Mr. Zivanovic, are you interested in the point where all these lines

25     converge towards the bottom of the --

Page 29640

 1             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  Yes, yes.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  So let's zoom there for the time being.  And

 3     see whether we can --

 4             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  I believe that's enough.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Okay.  I am trying to help.  Okay.

 6             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   You can perhaps look at the hard copy and then you will be able

 8     to give us a more accurate description.  I will not be asking you to make

 9     any markings.

10        A.   Let me start by explaining and indicating the differences between

11     the actual situation, the way in which our radio relay communications

12     were set up, and what is in line with the radio relay chart that I saw in

13     the documents at the relevant time-period.  First of all, this radio

14     relay node of Veliki Zep is where all the lines go out.  It's like a

15     centre of a circle.

16        Q.   In that case perhaps you can just mark it on the screen.

17        A.   So this here is the stationary node Veliki Zep and this is indeed

18     true.

19        Q.   Could you please mark it with 1.

20        A.   And that was the key radio relay node for the organisation of the

21     radio relay communications of the Main Staff and the Drina Corps whose

22     radio relay line to Vlasenica was just some 15 kilometres away.

23             First of all, this radio relay line or direction, this one here,

24     did not exist.  And this intelligence organ and the counter-electronic

25     warfare organ from the 2nd Corps indicated this direction as leading from

Page 29641

 1     Veliki Zep to Gucevo.

 2        Q.   Could I now ask you to mark this with number 2.

 3        A.   Furthermore, this -- the second radio relay line, if we go from

 4     the direction of north and then clockwise, this one here, indicated as

 5     leading from Veliki Zep to Milici, the Milici Brigade, did not exist.  I

 6     will mark it as 3 because as far as the Milici Brigade was concerned, in

 7     the 13 kilometres between Vlasenica and Milici we had a landline, and it

 8     was impossible to set it up because of the line of vision problems and it

 9     was unnecessary because there was a landline which was almost completely

10     surveillance proof.

11             The third radio relay line, Gric-Vrelo, I don't know what unit it

12     refers to, but in that area which is marked here, we only had -- we may

13     have had an engineer regiment in Konjevic Polje.  I can see that this

14     line extends to them, but we did not have a radio relay line with them,

15     because from Kasaba on we had a landline.  I personally laid it.  So that

16     did not exist either.

17        Q.   Could you please mark it with 4 to prevent any confusion because

18     you marked it with three.

19        A.   The so-called thick line, the fourth line, that's what we called

20     it, the thick line, because it had a multitude of channels, that is

21     correct.  It used the SMC device, and I'll mark it with 5.

22        Q.   Perhaps it would be good for you to limit yourself to the details

23     that did not reflect the actual situation.

24        A.   Fine.  So with Skelani we did not have a direct radio relay line.

25     We used land-lines going through the territory of Serbia so that this

Page 29642

 1     line here is not correct.  I'll mark it with 6.  Then this line that is

 2     indicated here, where it says "The Rogatica Brigade," is not correct

 3     because we used the stationary node Strazbenice in Montenegro with them

 4     because there was no line of sight.  This thick line for Veliki Tmor,

 5     well, Veliki Tmor is a TV tour.  There is a TV tower there but the

 6     military never used the communications, not before the war, not during

 7     the war, because this was rugged train, impassable.  And I will mark it

 8     with 8.

 9             This line here for Pale, Pale also had the communications line

10     from Strazbenice to Jahorina and then onwards so that there was no thick

11     line Zepa-Pale.  This line with the Sokolac Brigade, where it says "The

12     breach," did not exist.  I will mark it with 10, because the radio relay

13     line with the Sokolac Brigade was carried out through radio relay lines

14     Veliki Zep-Strazbenice, Strazbenice-Sokolac.  So we did not have a direct

15     line because, simply, there was no line of sight from Sokolac to

16     Veliki Zep.

17             Here where it says "The 2nd Romanija Brigade."  This line did not

18     exist either.  I will mark it with 11, because the command at Knezina was

19     connected with the landline.  12 channels operated in Knezina.  There was

20     an aerial line, in fact, that was used primarily for civilian purposes.

21             And then this line to Zlatar, here at Vlasenica, it is marked

22     here but it is marked at the Visalac [phoen] feature and that's wrong;

23     it's not here.  It's in the town itself.  Where the arrow is marking the

24     command, that's where the station was located.  So here this is where the

25     command was.  We had it on the command building.  This is very important

Page 29643

 1     for the radio relay communications, because they go from one point to

 2     another.  So this line did not exist the way it is drawn here.

 3             So this document should have been drafted on the basis of the

 4     intelligence data that the 2nd Corps of the BH army had.  And on the

 5     basis of all that, they were supposed to give instructions to their

 6     units, the electronic reconnaissance units and their audio surveillance

 7     stations, to direct their receivers, their aerials, in order to optimise

 8     reception.  And this is my opinion, but everybody can compare it with our

 9     chart for the radio relay communications for the relevant period.  So all

10     the changes that I drew in, everybody can mark them.  Everybody can see

11     that they are there.

12        Q.   Now I would just like to ask you this.  Do you notice -- do you

13     think that the features used by the Main Staff are marked correctly here?

14     Can you -- or the facilities used by the Main Staff?

15        A.   The Main Staff is marked as being in Han Pijesak, and in fact, it

16     was located just below Veliki Zep in the facilities in an area called

17     Crna Rijeka.  And I think that's some 11 kilometres away from Han Pijesak

18     itself, from the town itself.

19        Q.   Does that mean that this facility marked with an aerial is

20     actually wrongly marked?

21        A.   Yes, well, this line.  It --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the speakers please

23     not overlap.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, because we are missing something.  You

25     have been overlapping, and as a result the interpreters couldn't catch

Page 29644

 1     up.

 2             Could the interpreters help me exactly where they found

 3     difficulties.  The last that we have is Mr. Zivanovic's question saying:

 4             "Does that mean that this facility marked with an aerial is

 5     actually wrongly marked?"

 6             And we then had -- I think you can start from there,

 7     Mr. Jevdjevic.  Could you start your answer -- your reply again, please?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it's wrongly marked, because

 9     the Main Staff or, rather, the command post of the Main Staff was located

10     at Crna Rijeka and there was no relay up to that location.  Instead,

11     there was a wire line, a cable, from Crna Rijeka to the Veliki Zep node

12     so that this relay axis here did not exist for the needs of the

13     Main Staff.

14             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [No interpretation]

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  That's very nice, but we are not receiving

16     interpretation.  Now it's coming.

17             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   I think that you have already replied to the question; but in any

19     case, if you think you haven't, tell us.  What were the practical

20     consequences if, on a map like this, the true axes and the true

21     facilities through which listening in to enemy conversations were carried

22     out are not entered correctly?

23        A.   This working map and its reliability is very important because it

24     is on this basis that information is provided to the units for electronic

25     reconnaissance.  That is, in what direction they should point their

Page 29645

 1     aerials so as to best listen in to the conversations of the enemy side.

 2     If it's approximate, just an approximate sketch like this one of our

 3     radio relay connections and command posts, I ask myself how it's possible

 4     to organise precise listening in to these communications.

 5        Q.   Mr. Jevdjevic, I'll ask you a question about your going to Zepa

 6     in the evening of the 11th and your arrival on the 12th.  I would like to

 7     know when you arrived -- or, rather, when you arrived did you see any

 8     soldiers there, any smaller units?  Was anyone still there or did anyone

 9     arrive after you arrived, right after your arrival?

10        A.   When I arrived at the Pribicevac [as interpreted] forward command

11     post on the 12th, first I found a small unit there, a platoon from the

12     protection regiment, the 65th Protection Regiment, which was holding

13     defence positions and controlling the territory.  At the entrance to the

14     village of Pod Plane, a unit had already arrived from Visegrad which was

15     to join in the Stupcanica 95 operation later.  They had arrived directly

16     from Visegrad.  They had not been at Srebrenica, and with their

17     communications man, I exchanged the indispensable information.  And I saw

18     some small groups of soldiers, I don't know whether they were logistics

19     men or people reconnoitering the locations where these other units were

20     supposed to arrive, but I don't really remember them.  They didn't seem

21     significant to me.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Just one moment, Mr. Zivanovic.  Mr. Haynes.

23             MR. HAYNES:  I think there must be a mistake in line 15.  I don't

24     think that the witness said that he arrived in Pribicevac on the 12th.

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Jevdjevic.  Here at the beginning of your

Page 29646

 1     last answer to Mr. Zivanovic's question, we have in the transcript:

 2             "When I arrived at the Pribicevac forward ..." That is obviously

 3     a mistake.  On the 12th, command post on the 12th.  Where did you arrive

 4     on the 12th?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the Krivace forward command

 6     post.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you Mr. Haynes.

 8             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Mr. Jevdjevic, I would like to ask you to sign this map and put

10     today's date on it.  Today is the 12th of December.

11             MR. ZIVANOVIC: [Interpretation] And can this be saved, please.

12        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Jevdjevic.  I have no further questions for you.

13     Thank you.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

15             MR. ZIVANOVIC:  No further questions.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Zivanovic.  Mr. Ostojic.

17             MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.

18                           Cross-examination by Mr. Ostojic:

19        Q.   Mr. Jevdjevic, my name is John Ostojic and I represent

20     Ljubisa Beara.  Good afternoon to you, sir.  I have a couple of questions

21     for you, and bear with me, and I apologise if they seem repetitive, but I

22     just want to have a better understanding of these intercepts and some of

23     the work that you do.  First of all, before we get into the intercepts,

24     can you tell me who -- or whether or not your commander was a gentleman

25     by the name of Eric?

Page 29647

 1        A.   Of my immediate subordinates, there was no one called Eric.

 2     There may have been someone in the 2nd Romanija Brigade, a lower ranking

 3     commander of that last name.

 4        Q.   [Previous translation continues]...

 5        A.   In the 2nd Romanija Brigade, I think there was a reserve captain

 6     called Ljubo Eric, if he is the one you are referring to.

 7        Q.   Yeah, I think it is actually Ljubo Eric.  Can you tell me, sir,

 8     moving along, who was your direct superior in July of 1995?

 9        A.   My direct superior at the forward command post in July was

10     General Krstic.

11        Q.   First, how many subordinates did you have in July of 1995, if

12     any?

13        A.   I was the commander of the Communications Battalion, and it was

14     the company commanders in that communications battalion who were my

15     subordinates.

16        Q.   Okay.  Well, how many of them were there?

17        A.   Two.

18        Q.   And what are their names?

19        A.   At that point in time one of them was Captain Zeljko Drljaca, and

20     I think the other one was Captain Ranko Todorovic.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Let me switch gears a little bit.  Are you familiar

22     with the 5th Podrinje Infantry Brigade?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Who led that brigade?

25        A.   At that time it was Lieutenant-Colonel Furtula.

Page 29648

 1        Q.   And just focusing on specifically July of 1995, was the

 2     5th Podrinje Infantry Brigade involved in any of the activity or actions

 3     with respect to Srebrenica?

 4        A.   I think there may have been a platoon from that brigade engaged

 5     in one of those subordinate units.

 6        Q.   And do you remember the name of that platoon?

 7        A.   I am not sure exactly what the name of the platoon was, but more

 8     or less, the information I have, although we didn't talk about this, was

 9     that there was a platoon from that brigade in Operation Krivaja 95.

10        Q.   And now turning to the Zepa action, were they involved, the 5th

11     Podrinje Infantry Brigade, in the Zepa operation, if you know?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   From what date to what date?

14        A.   They arrived in their holding area on the 12th, when I was there,

15     and remained there until the end of Stupcanica 95.

16        Q.   Did you ever see Commander Furtula there from the 12th through

17     the, let's say, the 2nd of August, 1995?  And when we say "there," I

18     think we are talking about specifically the Krivace area, where you were

19     at one of the forward command posts.  And I recognise there were three

20     and we will get into that a little later, but ...

21        A.   Yes, he was there.

22        Q.   And who was his superior at that time, if you know?

23        A.   General Krstic.

24        Q.   Now, taking -- focussing you on the period back now to the 5th

25     through the 11th of July, 1995, when you were at the forward command

Page 29649

 1     post -- we've identified it as Pribicevac, can you tell me, sir, at that

 2     time - and I know we looked at a couple of exhibits - whether or not

 3     General Krstic was there during that entire time-period, the 5th through

 4     the 11th?

 5        A.   He was there throughout this period; and in the evening, I think

 6     he would go to Bratunac to spend the night there, because it was required

 7     for his health.

 8        Q.   And am I correct, sir, in understanding your testimony that in

 9     the evening of the 11th of July, 1995, you left with your communications

10     centre from Pribicevac and you went to Bratunac, correct?

11        A.   Correct.

12        Q.   And you spent the night, generally, on the 11th of July, 1995, in

13     the area of Bratunac and then you were ordered to proceed to or towards

14     Zepa and to establish a forward command post, as we've identified it,

15     being Krivace, correct?

16        A.   Yes.  I didn't spend the night there, but I was there during that

17     part of the night when that order arrived.

18        Q.   Okay.  It was my understanding that you went to Krivace on the

19     12th of July at approximately 1400 hours; is that correct?

20        A.   That's correct.  But in the night of the 11th, at about 11.00 in

21     the evening, I left Bratunac and arrived at the command post of the corps

22     in Vlasenica, and I spent the night in Vlasenica.

23        Q.   Thank you for that.  Now, I have a curious question.  You

24     mentioned in your prior testimony that you set up three forward command

25     posts in Zepa, and I apologise if I'm going to mispronounce them.  One is

Page 29650

 1     obviously Krivace.  The other one is Godjenje, and the third one is

 2     Zlovrh; is that correct?

 3        A.   Zlovrh, yes.  Those were three forward command posts because

 4     that's how the combat disposition changed and the forward command post

 5     followed the units.

 6        Q.   And thank you, you're anticipating my question.  Just reflecting

 7     back on the Zepa action -- I mean the Srebrenica action, it only had one

 8     forward command post during that entire time from the 5th to the 11th; is

 9     that right?

10        A.   Correct.

11        Q.   Now let's talk a little bit about the intercepts and to maybe

12     draw from some of your experience that you have, and I'm grateful to

13     discuss it with you.  I've seen that from the intercepts that there are

14     several key elements that we need to look at; in essence, maybe seven,

15     from what I can discern.  And one would be that we would identify the

16     azimuth, the frequency, the channel, the direction, the participants if

17     possible, and obviously the date and the time.  Would that be accurate?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Are there any other elements that are necessary in order to have

20     a complete and thorough reflection of an intercept that is purportedly

21     captured, other than those seven elements that we've just described?

22        A.   That was it, more or less.

23        Q.   Looking, generally speaking, at the intercepts, and we've seen

24     some that my learned friend Mr. Haynes had shown you, are we able to

25     determine where a participant or where the participants were at a given

Page 29651

 1     time and date, if we know simply the channel, for example?  Or is it

 2     necessary to have all of the seven factors in order to conclude with

 3     specificity where the participants may have been?

 4        A.   In the case of most of these intercepts, one would need to take

 5     into account quite a few elements in order to be able to say with

 6     precision where the participants were.

 7        Q.   Okay.

 8             MR. OSTOJIC:  Well, let's look at P1171, please.

 9        Q.   That's an exhibit that you looked at during your direct

10     examination.  And just so I can get a better understanding of it, do you

11     see the frequency there of being 285.850?  Oh, 255, I'm sorry, point 850.

12     Do you see that?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And can you, just looking at the frequency, tell us where the

15     call was either made from or coming to?

16        A.   At that time we had an RRU1 radio relay piece of equipment

17     between the forward command post and Veliki Zep.  I assume this was the

18     15th of July, and this frequency tells us that this was an RRU1.  At that

19     time we had relay communications with these pieces of equipment organised

20     on the Krivace-Veliki Zep line.  So if all this has been taken down

21     correctly and if the conversation has been properly intercepted, one of

22     the participants was at Krivace, the forward command post at Krivace.  As

23     for the other participant, it's hard to establish where he was because

24     after Veliki Zep he could have called from a location unknown to me and a

25     distance unknown to me.

Page 29652

 1        Q.   Okay.  And I am not sure I understand.  How is it that it cannot

 2     be known to you?  I mean, you're a communications guy.  With just having

 3     one frequency, are we able to discern where both participants in a given

 4     conversation are with only one frequency that's identified?  Or is it

 5     because many possibilities exist?

 6        A.   Only on the basis of the frequency one cannot know from where the

 7     participants spoke.  I assume that this conversation was intercepted

 8     somewhere between Krivace and Veliki Zep.  As Krivace is the ultimate,

 9     the final relay station, someone had to speak from there, and I assume

10     one of the participants was at Krivace for that reason.  Then, the

11     similar transits from Veliki Zep towards Vlasenica and from Vlasenica to

12     the entire area of responsibility of the corps, and one cannot know for

13     certain from which location this other participant answered the call

14     because the intercept was intercepted between Veliki Zep and Krivace.

15     And there are many possibilities beyond that.  We enter into a whole

16     network of communications, and one participant could come in from any

17     number of directions.  I hope you understand me now.

18        Q.   I do.  Thank you for that.  Now, let me try to see if I could --

19     or you could help me decode some of this.  Just looking at this, 255.850,

20     is it fair to say that every time we see this frequency, that indicates

21     that it came from Krivace or went to the Krivace-Veliki Zep area, at

22     least that part of the conversation?

23        A.   At that time, we had organised communications with RRU1 on some

24     other directions of secondary importance.  But this text, I think, deals

25     with the Krivace forward command post and that's why I think that that

Page 29653

 1     was part of that section.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now, what about other numbers or other frequencies.

 3     If I give you a couple, maybe you could help me understand them.  Like,

 4     where would 254.300 -- where would that frequency be located, if you

 5     know?

 6        A.   That's another frequency from the range of the RRU1 equipment.

 7     So as the conversation was intercepted where two participants were

 8     communicating using that radio relay section.

 9        Q.   But where would it be, where specifically would it be

10     geographically?

11        A.   Geographically?  Well, there was a direction between Krivace and

12     Veliki Zep, so I assume one of the participants was at Krivace and the

13     other -- it's hard to say where he was.  You saw that network represented

14     schematically.  They all come to Veliki Zep, and then from Veliki Zep

15     there is a line going to Krivace.  I cannot say now where that signal

16     went or, rather, where this participant came from to Veliki Zep in order

17     to enter the section from Veliki Zep to Krivace.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And I'm just waiting for the translation.  Thank you,

19     sir.  I am just trying to have a better -- maybe a layperson's

20     understanding.  When the forward command post, whether it was at

21     Pribicevac or Krivace, if they were to be connected with, let's

22     hypothetically say, the Bratunac Brigade, can someone calling from an

23     area outside of Bratunac, whether it's within the Republika Srpska or

24     even Serbia, can they be connected through Bratunac to the forward

25     command post?

Page 29654

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And can you just explain that for me.  If someone was calling

 3     outside, let's even take Zvornik because it's there, if someone was

 4     calling from the Zvornik zone, if they called Bratunac and asked for

 5     someone, can Bratunac connect them to a forward command post like

 6     Pribicevac?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  Would there be any indication on the actual

 9     intercept that that call came through Bratunac from another part of the

10     country in Republika Srpska?

11        A.   That's impossible.

12        Q.   And let me concretely ask you this.  I mentioned a little bit

13     Serbia, how about if someone was in Belgrade and they called Bratunac and

14     asked to be connected to the forward command post.  Can they be -- is

15     that probable or possible?

16        A.   Yes, it's possible, absolutely.  In all the communications

17     centres of the brigades we had telephone switch boards, and these

18     switchboards were used to connect various kinds of participants.  And

19     there was a post office number, a Telekom number, such as all the

20     inhabitants of Bratunac had.  And then, on another place of the -- in the

21     same switchboard we had the corps command in Bratunac and some battalions

22     in that brigade.  So it would be sufficient for someone from Belgrade or

23     anywhere else in the world to dial that Telekom number which ended up at

24     the switchboard in the Bratunac Brigade and to ask for the corps command

25     in Vlasenica or simply to ask for Pribicevac.  The communications man

Page 29655

 1     would know how to connect him up to Pribicevac, because that's what the

 2     switchboard was used for, actually.

 3        Q.   Now, I asked you a little bit about the 200 series frequency,

 4     namely 255 and 254.  Can you tell me about the 700 series, and I am

 5     talking about after July -- or approximately July 15, 1995, when you were

 6     at Krivace; for example, 784.650.  If you could help me, do you remember

 7     what that frequency was, if at all?

 8        A.   That was a frequency from the range of the RRU800 radio relay

 9     device.

10        Q.   Well, tell me what the range is specifically, sir.  How far does

11     it go above or below the frequency that I just identified 784.650?  Is it

12     up or down a hundred or up or down more than that?

13        A.   It's in the frequency range of that device, which is from 610 to

14     960 megahertz.

15        Q.   And similarly with respect to the RRU1, what was the range of

16     that?

17        A.   Well, that's significantly different.  There is also a

18     significant difference in the characteristics of those electro-magnetic

19     waves.

20        Q.   Let me just quickly ask you to help me look at Exhibit P3753,

21     which I think is a communication plan for Srebrenica or -- that you

22     discussed.  3753.

23             MR. OSTOJIC:  And if we could just enlarge that.

24        Q.   Now, sir, we looked at a couple of these columns during your

25     examination here, and we do note that there are specifically 22 different

Page 29656

 1     areas here on the middle or towards the left-hand section, but just help

 2     me understand this a little bit.  After the number one, two -- three, you

 3     see the different designations for the frequency.  Do you see that?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Now just help me to understand that.  Is that the frequency that

 6     those specific brigades or platoons or units were given that frequency at

 7     that time?

 8        A.   No.  We started work at the first frequency.  In fact, it's not

 9     the frequency, it's the channel designation.  So this device has three

10     switches, A, B, C, where you jump from one frequency to another.  And it

11     was much easier for us to write 250, that's a channel, one of the

12     channels which corresponds to a certain frequency.  And at the beginning

13     and end of this operation, we worked only on that channel, on that

14     frequency.

15             The other frequencies, up until number 22 [Realtime transcript

16     read in error "222"], whoever drafted this plan merely envisaged them as

17     a possibility.  If something should go wrong, in terms of security of the

18     communications, if our encryption devices fail to function properly, then

19     this was planned so that we could switch from channel to channel lest the

20     enemy should catch us out on just one frequency.  But this did not occur,

21     and there was no need for us to use the backup frequencies.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I do have a few more minutes, like, 15 possibly.  So

23     I don't know if it's time for a break or I can proceed --

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  It is time for a break.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

Page 29657

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  My apologies to the interpreters.  If

 2     you have 15 minutes, I think we better have the break now.  Thank you.

 3     25 minutes.

 4                           --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 1.00 p.m.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Ostojic.

 7             MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   Sir, I just have a few questions for you to just follow-up on a

 9     couple of issues.  We did talk about the 2nd Romanija Brigade, and in

10     looking -- and you still have this exhibit in front of you, 3753, is it

11     listed here as being part -- I think on the fourth row, is that part of

12     the Drina Corps?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Okay.  And just so that I am clear, the person or the commander

15     of that brigade is Ljubo Eric, correct?

16        A.   The commander of that brigade was Colonel Trivic, and commander

17     of his battalion, the battalion that took part in the attack -- in

18     Krivaja 95, rather, was Captain First Class Ljubo Eric.  He was later

19     promoted to major.  I don't know whether he was major at that time or

20     not.

21        Q.   Because it may be considered a common name, but do you know what

22     his full name is?  Do you know if he goes by -- is it Ljubo or does he

23     have another full name like Ljubisa or Ljubislav or Ljubomir?

24        A.   I assume that his full name was Ljubomir, but we all called him

25     Ljubo.

Page 29658

 1        Q.   Okay.  Now a couple of other questions if I can - thank you for

 2     this exhibit - go back to the frequencies and the RRU1 and the RRU800

 3     that you described.  And I know -- and I apologise and you can correct me

 4     if I'm wrong, you talked about the ranges for both frequencies, is it

 5     possible or to the best of your knowledge can a conversation be

 6     intercepted from both an RRU1 and an RRU800 machine simultaneously,

 7     meaning the same conversation?  Or is that impossible?

 8        A.   It is possible to intercept a conversation at a section, but you

 9     have to have two surveillance groups.  One listening in on the section

10     where the RRU1 is operating at a certain frequency; and the other

11     surveillance group needs to eavesdrop on a completely different relay

12     line in a different geographical area where RRU800 devices are used.

13     That is the only way in which it is possible to audio surveil a single

14     conversation at different sections, but you need to have several

15     surveillance groups to do that.

16        Q.   Thank you very much, sir.  I think that's all I have.  Thank you,

17     Mr. President.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Mr. Bourgon.

19             MR. OSTOJIC:  Oh, one, I'm sorry, Mr. President.  And I'm sorry,

20     my learned friend.  There was an error on the transcript before the break

21     at page 63, line 11 -- 14.  And I think the witness said "222" -- it

22     should be recorded as "22" but it's reflected as "222."  If we could just

23     note that and double-check that, we'd appreciate it.  Thank you.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  He said:  "The other frequencies up until

25     number 22."

Page 29659

 1             MR. OSTOJIC:  Right.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.

 3             MR. OSTOJIC: [Microphone not activated] And I think we could see

 4     it on the exhibit itself.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Thank you.

 7             Mr. Bourgon.

 8             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9                           Cross-examination by Mr. Bourgon:

10        Q.   Good afternoon, sir.

11        A.   Good afternoon.

12        Q.   Although we have had the opportunity of meeting earlier this

13     week, for the record, allow me to introduce myself.  My name is

14     Stephane Bourgon and today I am accompanied with my colleague

15     Dragan Djukic, and together we represent Drago Nikolic in these

16     proceedings.  I have a few questions to ask you in respect of five

17     specific areas, and I will do my best to complete today before 1345.

18             The first area I would like to get into, I would like to clarify

19     a few points regarding the establishment of communications and, of

20     course, the possibility for the enemy to intercept such communications.

21     So, of course, it's a common theme this morning, but I will try to make

22     my questions quite precise in order to clarify this area.

23             First, I would like to get a confirmation from you that documents

24     could be sent by teleprinter between the Drina Corps command and the

25     Main Staff, as well as between the Drina Corps command and subordinate

Page 29660

 1     brigades of the Drina Corps by secure means; is that correct?

 2        A.   That's correct.

 3        Q.   And when we say "secure means" for sending documents, or when we

 4     say that a document is encrypted, can you confirm that the encryption of

 5     a document does not require the use of any codes, that encryption is a

 6     mechanical purpose; is that correct?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Moving on to oral communications or oral conversations between

 9     the Drina Corps command and the Main Staff, and I insist here my question

10     is precisely with the Main Staff.  Can you confirm that both ways of

11     transmission were available:  A secure line with a limited possibility

12     and the other line which you have described, the open line, working

13     partly with wire communications - that is the telephone or the handset -

14     going through the radio relay; is that correct?

15        A.   Yes, that is correct.  You said at the beginning that radio

16     communications were -- you had mentioned radio communications and we are

17     talking about radio relay communications.

18        Q.   Indeed.  Thank you for this correction.  Now, I've mentioned --

19     of course, I am talking specifically now here with oral conversations

20     between the Drina Corps command and the Main Staff, but I guess you would

21     agree that this -- the same applies for the Drina Corps IKM or forward

22     command post?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   And if I look at oral conversations between the Drina Corps

25     command or the Drina Corps IKM with its subordinate brigades, the same

Page 29661

 1     thing applies; that is, we have an open line going through radio relay

 2     but there was no secure means for oral conversations; is that correct?

 3        A.   Yes.  We did not have the encryption device for the radio relay

 4     lines from the corps to the brigades.

 5        Q.   And as you've answered previously during your

 6     examination-in-chief, a conversation between someone calling from the

 7     Bratunac area, for example, calling the Zvornik Brigade or the

 8     Zvornik Brigade IKM, for that matter, this is a conversation that could

 9     be intercepted; is that correct?

10        A.   Yes, if it goes through radio relay devices that did not have the

11     protection.

12        Q.   Now, a number of intercepts have been shown to you since the

13     beginning of your testimony, and I take it that you are also able to

14     confirm, based on your experience, that conversations going through radio

15     relay, no codes were used for such conversations; is that correct?

16        A.   The conversations were mostly done over open line without speech

17     protection, but the usual practice among the officers was to speak in the

18     usual way, but to -- when mentioning important information, to do it in

19     such a way that it is not comprehensible.

20        Q.   But there was no use of codes; is that correct?

21        A.   No.

22        Q.   And "no" meaning no codes?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Now, if I move on to communications using military inductor

25     phones, I take it you know when I mean when I say military inductor

Page 29662

 1     phones?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And you will agree with me that this is a secure means of

 4     communications, that conversations cannot be intercepted when you have

 5     wire between two military inductor phones?

 6        A.   Yes.  It's a fairly secure -- almost 100 per cent secure.  There

 7     can be no eavesdropping.

 8        Q.   And of course using those military inductor phones, which were

 9     linked by wire, the practice was not to use codes; is that correct?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   If I move on to radio communications, not radio relay but

12     specifically radio communications, and if I refer to Krivaja 95 -- first

13     that during this operation you testified already that you were using a

14     radio that looked or that was almost the same as a RUP-12 with the

15     specificity that you added a scrambling device; is that correct?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And my colleague asked you a question of you yesterday and you

18     confirm that it was your belief, and you haven't seen any evidence to the

19     contrary, that all radio communications during Krivaja 95 using this

20     scrambling device, that those communications were secure; is that

21     correct?

22        A.   Yes.  I did not have any knowledge, and I don't have any

23     knowledge now, that those lines -- that it was possible to surveil those

24     lines.

25        Q.   And on this basis -- and of course considering that you were on

Page 29663

 1     the ground at the time and you did listen to this radio network, you can

 2     confirm that no codes were used when using the radio with the scrambling

 3     device?

 4        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 5        Q.   Now, if I move on to radio communications using the RUP-12

 6     without the scrambling device, you will agree with me that this, of

 7     course, is a not secure means of communications that can be easily

 8     intercepted?

 9        A.   That's correct.

10        Q.   And that is where the codes that we find in your communications

11     plan, that's where they could become useful; is that correct?

12        A.   That's correct.

13        Q.   But I take it you will also agree with me that the use of codes

14     is a very time-consuming process; is that so?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   And are you in a position to confirm that, in fact, very few

17     members of the VRS were trained in -- to using codes, whether to code or

18     decode information on the radio?

19        A.   Well, depending on the unit.  The practice and the level of

20     discipline that the unit imposed on its lower levels, battalions, and

21     companies, I cannot generalise now; but I do know that major messages

22     were encoded using the slow method, and I know that there was quite a lot

23     of open communication going on, which made it possible for important

24     information to leak out.

25        Q.   And would you agree with me that the best way, in fact, if you

Page 29664

 1     don't want to use codes using the RUP-12, that the best way to protect

 2     information is to change frequency regularly and, even more importantly,

 3     to keep the communications as short as possible?

 4        A.   Yes.  That is one of the ways in which it is possible to protect

 5     a line from being surveilled.

 6        Q.   And would you go as far as confirming that discipline imposed

 7     when using RUP-12 would be to, indeed, keep the conversations to very,

 8     very, short transmissions?

 9        A.   That was a rule that we applied.

10        Q.   Now, there is one more means of communication I would like to

11     cover with you and that is to send documents by courier.  Do you agree

12     with that?

13        A.   Yes, courier is the most -- is the securest form of

14     communication.

15        Q.   I thank you for this answer.  I was going to quote you from your

16     testimony in the Krstic case, where you referred in fact, and I quote

17     here from transcript 7178, to the rule that "the safest communications is

18     by courier."

19             Now, in the same case -- in the Krstic case when you testified,

20     you said that:  "There was no use of courier from the Drina Corps forward

21     command post at Pribicevac, as it was not practical due to the distance."

22             Do you confirm that today?

23        A.   In the course of Operation Krivaja 95, to the best of my

24     recollection, couriers were not used because relied on the radio

25     communications that we used.  We relied on them being secure.

Page 29665

 1        Q.   And you also said in the same case at 7178, and you were talking

 2     at that moment specifically for the forward command post in Krivace, that

 3     the distances were closer.  You mention six kilometres between the

 4     forward command post and the Main Staff Command, and 30-odd kilometres

 5     between the forward command post and the Drina Corps command.

 6             Are these distances more or less correct?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   And you also stated in that case that although you did not plan

 9     to use couriers, it is quite possible that written messages were sent by

10     drivers.  Would you agree with that?

11        A.   Yes, I looked at it logically because it was only six kilometres

12     from the Main Staff while we were at Krivace.  And the time it took for

13     the cryptographer to type out the information on the teleprinter, to set

14     up the line and to send it, it was faster to just drive there by car, but

15     I don't recall any specific actions of this kind.

16        Q.   Thank you.  One last question with respect to couriers.  A

17     military expert testified in this case, and I refer to the transcript at

18     26269, and he was asked to comment on the use of couriers.  And his

19     answer was the following, I quote from lines 20 to 23:

20             "That is why one sends a courier to deal with anything

21     confidential and to make sure that none of the elements of information

22     are caught and that the information be delivered with precision."

23             Would you agree with that statement?

24        A.   At the time when those two operations were carried out, I don't

25     recall -- or, rather, I don't know that I organised and I didn't notice

Page 29666

 1     that anyone else organised couriers running towards the Main Staff or the

 2     Drina Corps command.

 3        Q.   Maybe my question was not precise enough, but the statement that

 4     I just read to you from this military expert, do you agree that sending a

 5     courier is a very good way to deal with confidential information and to

 6     ensure that the information, of course, is not intercepted but also that

 7     the information is delivered with precision?  Do you agree with that?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   I move on to my second area, dealing with some questions that

10     were put to you concerning the 10th Sabotage Detachment.

11             First, you stated yesterday and you can confirm that this unit

12     appeared on 10 July 1995 in the area of Pribicevac; is that correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   Now, in the Krstic case when you testified, you said the

15     following, that is T7086:

16             "I think they arrived in the area only a day or two before

17     Srebrenica fell militarily, which means a day or two prior to the 11th."

18             On this basis, my question is:  I take it that they could have,

19     in fact, arrived on the 9th of July; is that correct?

20        A.   I made a comparison and it stuck in my mind that they reached

21     that area approximately the same day when General Mladic did, perhaps

22     give or take one or two days in this period.  Having analysed those

23     activities -- so I really still claim that it was a day or two, the 10th

24     or the 9th, but now it seems to me that it may have been the 10th for

25     some reason.

Page 29667

 1        Q.   Thank you for that precision.  Now, can you confirm that when

 2     this unit appeared in the area of Pribicevac, that of course the VRS had

 3     not yet entered into Srebrenica, that we know, but I would like you to

 4     confirm that on that day the Drina Corps possessed very little, if any,

 5     information regarding the intentions of the 28th Division to move towards

 6     Tuzla?

 7        A.   We did not have the information, accurate information, about the

 8     actual intentions of the 28th Division.

 9        Q.   Now, you also stated that this unit, that what you -- what your

10     interest in this unit was, is that you wanted to know when you would be

11     required to provide them -- to provide them, sorry, with the scrambling

12     device; is that correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And you stated yesterday, that was at page 67, lines 9 to 12,

15     that in an effort to find a solution, you asked General Krstic, and I

16     quote from the transcript, asking him:

17             "When I would be asked to provide them with such equipment and

18     what activities they would be involved in order to be able to exercise

19     command over them."

20             My question is the following:  What was General Krstic's answer

21     to your question?

22        A.   Well, I don't recall the exact answer, but generally my memory is

23     that it was introduced between Pribicevac and Kvarac, between the two

24     hills along a valley, connecting the forces that were attacking in the

25     direction of Srebrenica.  They were part of those forces.  And since this

Page 29668

 1     was a unit of 20 to 30 -- 20 to 30 soldiers strong, I did not think that

 2     they could make any contribution, significant contribution, in military

 3     terms.  But I assume that they had some kind of a special mission within

 4     the purview of what they were doing, their special purpose, whether it

 5     was removing mines or perhaps preparing for street fighting, fighting in

 6     a built-up area, which was something that they were equipped for.  I came

 7     across a piece of information earlier that they had tried to enter an

 8     area in the enclave using the mining tunnels that were leading in that

 9     direction, so I assume that they had a special mission in combat terms.

10        Q.   And of course you assume, but you did not have this information.

11     Other than this last piece of information, you did not know exactly what

12     they were doing there; is that correct?

13        A.   That's correct, yes.

14        Q.   And General Krstic, of course, was aware of the arrival of this

15     unit in the area?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And when you had this conversation with the signal man from the

18     10th Sabotage Detachment, and he told you that they had Motorolas, that

19     this was sufficient for them, and that he had no intention to carry a

20     large piece of equipment around with him.  That was at 29587, lines 7 to

21     9.

22             And my question is:  The reason why he did not want your

23     scrambling device was because they had the communications they needed and

24     he did not want to carry a heavy radio with him; is that correct?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 29669

 1        Q.   And at 29587, you said that this signal man told you that they

 2     had some special assignment.  Now, he did not say to you "secret

 3     assignment," did he?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Now, I asked this question because I -- when we met, in some

 6     proofing notes that I saw the word "secret" was there, but you informed

 7     me and you can confirm that this was a mistake.

 8        A.   They had some kind of a special mission.  That's the way I

 9     understood it and that's the way I said it.

10        Q.   Okay.

11        A.   I said the same thing eight years ago.

12        Q.   Now, you also mention, and I'd like to confirm, that the reason

13     or one of the reasons you did not pay attention to this conversation with

14     the signal man from the 10th Sabotage Detachment was that both

15     General Krstic and General Mladic were there, so they must have known

16     what was going on with that unit?

17        A.   That's correct.

18        Q.   I move on to my next area of questioning, and I'd like to show a

19     document.

20             MR. BOURGON:  And can I have in e-court please 4D124.

21        Q.   And while we wait for this document that will appear before you,

22     I would just like to confirm what you said in your testimony in the

23     Krstic case, that you read this document when preparing for your

24     testimony in that case.  That's at 7104, lines 18 to 22.  So did you read

25     this document when preparing for your testimony in the Krstic case?

Page 29670

 1        A.   If I said so then, I probably did.

 2        Q.   Well, do you recall that today?  I am not wanting to ...

 3        A.   I've read this document now, if that's what you mean.

 4        Q.   And do you remember reviewing this document when preparing for

 5     your testimony in the Krstic case?

 6        A.   I do not deny anything I said then.

 7        Q.   Okay.  It's not -- there is no trap.  It's just simply to

 8     confirm, because I am not sure if we referred yet to your interview with

 9     the Prosecution, but you can confirm that you were interviewed by the

10     Prosecution in April of 2000.  Do you recall this?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And at page 7150 of this interview, you stated the following, and

13     I quote:

14             "During preparations for this interview, I was told that it took

15     place on the 13th."  "It" being the issuance of this document.  "At the

16     time, I knew it happened but I cannot recall the exact date, but I know

17     it actually happened at the beginning of the attack on Zepa."

18             My question today is:  On this basis, can you confirm that this

19     actually happened at the beginning of the attack on Zepa?

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we clarify what "this" means.

22             MR. BOURGON:  Indeed.

23        Q.   "This" being that this document and the change of command over

24     the Drina Corps from General Zivanovic to General Krstic happened on the

25     13th of July, 1995?

Page 29671

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Petrusic.

 2             MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is the first

 3     time this document appeared before the Chamber -- or, rather, it appeared

 4     on the 19th of April, 2001, for the first time.  The witness was

 5     interviewed on the 4th of April, 2000, by the OTP and testified in the

 6     Krstic case in November 2000.  So that this document was not available at

 7     the time of his testimony.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  My memory is the same as Mr. Petrusic's.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Yes.  Do you have anything to say?

11             MR. BOURGON:  No, Mr. President.  I mean, the Prosecution can

12     take this up on -- in his -- in his cross-examination if he wants, but

13     the transcript I have from Krstic, at 7104, the witness said that he saw

14     the document when he was preparing for his testimony in that case.

15     That's where I get my information and that was the basis for my

16     questions.  So it's no big deal, and I can move on.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Well, this is a very big deal.  It was a very big

19     deal.  Mr. Petrusic and I remember it as such, so I think we had better

20     check on that before we deal with this subject.

21             MR. BOURGON:  Mr. President, I will move on and if I am not

22     finished I can clarify this on Monday morning.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  That's what I was going to suggest.  Thank you.

24             MR. BOURGON:

25        Q.   Sir, what I would like you to confirm -- it's my last question

Page 29672

 1     and I am not sure if you did answer this, and the question was:  That the

 2     change of command between General Zivanovic and General Krstic, that, as

 3     you said in your interview, you knew that it actually happened at the

 4     beginning of the attack on Zepa; is that correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And can you confirm that a change of corps commander is a major

 7     happening?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And that in military terms and in logical terms it is very

10     important when there is a change of command that everyone be informed as

11     quickly as possible?

12        A.   Yes, logically.

13        Q.   If we go back to this document, which is 4D124, I draw your

14     attention to the last line of the document, just above the signature

15     block, where it says:  "Acquaint all members of your unit in appropriate

16     manner with this document."

17             So my question is the following:  As we can see from this

18     document, it was received by the Zvornik Brigade, and we can also see

19     that it was transmitted on the 13th and received on the 14th at some

20     point.  Can you confirm that upon receiving such a document, everyone

21     would be informed of this change, and especially the commander of the

22     unit, if he's there?

23        A.   At that time, I was at the Krivace forward command post, I,

24     myself, so that this document did not arrive at the forward command post,

25     and this information as to the hand-over of duty is not something I was

Page 29673

 1     clear about because my information was only secondhand.

 2        Q.   But as a matter of principle, you can confirm that when the

 3     Zvornik Brigade received that document, that it would disseminate the

 4     information because it is important to know when there is a change of a

 5     corps commander; is that correct?

 6        A.   Yes, I agree with that.  It's quite logical to me.

 7        Q.   Now, in the sake of saving some time, I have two documents I

 8     would like to show you.  Maybe we can cut short, and I'll just ask you

 9     this question:  If I have two documents, the first one being signed by

10     General Zivanovic as commander at 1610 hours, I refer here to 7DP1032, on

11     the 13th of July, and I have a second document signed by General Krstic

12     as commander at or about 1945 hours on the 13th of July, is that a

13     reliable indicator that the change of command has indeed taken place?

14        A.   Are you going to show that document or are you just asking me the

15     question without showing the document?

16        Q.   Well, if you want I can show you those documents, but the just --

17     one is signed by Zivanovic at 4.00 and one is signed by Krstic at 1945.

18     Is that a good indicator that the change of command has taken place?  And

19     I think the Prosecution will take up on that later, so I just want to

20     know from you whether you believe, on the basis of your experience, that

21     this is a good indicator?

22        A.   If the document that arrived later was signed by General Krstic

23     using the title "Corps Commander" without the "for" in front, then that

24     would imply that he was the corps commander at that point in time.

25        Q.   Thank you.  And I think that might be covered by others in

Page 29674

 1     cross-examination.  I move on to -- I only have two more areas.  My

 2     colleague asked you some questions about a telephone conversation you had

 3     with Major Obrenovic, and you said this conversation took place at some

 4     point on the 14th of July, 1995.  Do you recall what conversation I'm

 5     talking about?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   On what means did you receive this phone call?

 8        A.   An automatic telephone, a normal telephone, attached to the RRU1

 9     device.

10        Q.   So that would mean that this conversation between wherever

11     Major Obrenovic was at the time and you, went through radio relay; is

12     that correct?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And that Major Obrenovic could not have used a radio RUP-12 for

15     this conversation?

16        A.   That is also correct.  He had to call me from a place where he

17     also had a telephone, whether an induction telephone or one with a dial;

18     but in any case, he could only have called me and communicated with me

19     using a telephone.

20        Q.   Thank you.  I only have two more questions, and I think we can

21     finish today.  In the Krstic case when you testified, a question was put

22     to you by Judge Wald concerning intercepts.  This is on page 7114 and

23     7115.  Her question was the following:

24             "If there were mistakes or if an intercept did not accurately

25     reflect what had actually been said between the parties, where is it most

Page 29675

 1     likely the mistake would have been made, on the side of the monitoring

 2     person who was listening who did not understand or, I mean, where is it

 3     most likely that the thing went wrong if, in fact, at the end of the

 4     intercept didn't reflect what actually went on in the conversation?

 5     Where is the most likely area that it would have broken down?"

 6             That was the Judge -- the question put to you by the Judge.  Your

 7     answer was:

 8             "Based on my experience, most probably where it would have broken

 9     down would be the individual monitoring the conversation, because as a

10     rule, those conversations are taped and then they are transcribed and

11     recorded on the basis of what is listened to and heard."

12             And at the end you say:  "According to our regulations, those

13     individuals would have had to spend five years doing that kind of work to

14     be considered competent to sift through the correct information from the

15     incorrect and the important and unimportant."

16             Do you stand by your answer and can you add to this today?

17        A.   Fully.

18        Q.   My last question is the following.  Also in your testimony in the

19     Krstic case, you were asked about the command and the officers and their

20     experience in 1995.  And you stated at 7132:

21             "I also wish to note that this was the year 1995 when the command

22     and officer cadres already had a great deal of experience and only a few

23     input information was required by all the assistants for them to be able

24     to act more speedily than the theory envisages the procedure to take and

25     which I have tried to describe to you."

Page 29676

 1             And that had to do with the drafting of orders.  My question is

 2     the following:  Do you agree that by 1995 the level of experience within

 3     the VRS in general was much better than at the beginning of the war?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   I thank you.  I have no further questions.

 6             MR. BOURGON:  I might come back on Monday morning, Mr. President,

 7     just to clarify this one document.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, yes.

 9             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.  And thank you very much,

10     sir.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Jevdjevic, we have to finish here today because

12     it's already past our time.  We will continue on Monday morning.  In the

13     meantime between now and Monday, please refrain from communicating with

14     anyone or discuss with anyone the subject matter of your testimony.  Have

15     a nice weekend, everybody.

16                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

17                           1.47 p.m., to be reconvened on Monday, the

18                           15th day of December, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.