Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 30016

 1                           Tuesday, 13 January 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Madam Registrar, good morning to you.  Could you

 7     kindly call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case

 9     IT-05-88-T, The Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Thank you.  All the accused are here.

11     Representation is exactly as it was yesterday; that means only

12     Mr. Nikolic for the Beara Defence team missing.

13             Okay.  Good morning to you, General, and welcome back.  We are

14     going to proceed with your testimony.

15             Ms. Fauveau.

16             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

17                           WITNESS:  SLOBODAN KOSOVAC [Resumed]

18                           [Witness answered through interpretation]

19                           Examination by Ms. Fauveau:  [Continued]

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Yesterday, you were talking about the absence

21     and standing in for a commander.  What is the situation with the Chief of

22     Staff?  Who replaces the Chief of Staff when he's absent?

23        A.   In the absence of the Chief of Staff, the most senior officer

24     stands in for him.

25        Q.   I would now like to show you another training book.  That's not

Page 30017

 1     the one we talked about yesterday.  This is Exhibit 5P -- P3178.  This is

 2     an exhibit from the Prosecutor's case.

 3             Actually, the relevance of this training book is that it is more

 4     legible than the one we were looking at yesterday.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I need, please, the following page.

 6     Could we please zoom in and enlarge on the bottom part of the page.

 7        Q.   So yesterday, we talked about the function of the Chief of Staff

 8     who at the same time is the deputy commander.

 9             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to move to the

10     following page, please, and I need to show the first part of this page.

11     Now, what you can see on this page is the Administration in Charge of

12     Operational Affairs and Training, and one sees that next to the function

13     of the chief of this administration, there is no mention that this is the

14     Deputy Chief of Staff.

15        Q.   Now, what is the influence of this fact on the powers and the

16     competences and the authorities of the Chief of Administration in Charge

17     of Operational Affairs and Training when the Chief of Staff is absent?

18        A.   First of all, I'm not sure whether we understood each other

19     properly.  I heard from the translator that this is a training book.

20     Actually, what I'm seeing here is a working map of the personnel organs.

21     Based on the extracts from the establishment papers - this is the first

22     three column - they fill in the data relating to the actual situation in

23     the VRS.  And based on this map, they follow whether any positions are

24     filled or not.  In this particular instance, in the operations and

25     training administration, the establishment position has been filled

Page 30018

 1     properly, and you can see that after Major General Dragutin Ilic came,

 2     Miletic -- Radivoje Colonel, Miletic Radivoj.  This is consistent with

 3     what the information show.  The chief of the administration and

 4     training -- training and operation administration is at equal footing

 5     with other chiefs.

 6        Q.   Now, when you say that the chief of the administration for

 7     operational affairs and training is at the same level as the other

 8     chiefs, can you please explain what other chiefs you were referring to.

 9        A.   Specifically, I was referring to the chiefs of branches.

10        Q.   Now, this training book, according to this booklet, can you

11     conclude who in the staff of the Main Staff would have replaced General

12     Milovanovic in his absence?

13        A.   One might conclude that under normal circumstances, the first one

14     to stand in would be General Miletic, but one also can conclude that if

15     the Chief of Staff goes away, he appoints someone else to stand in for

16     him.

17        Q.   When the Chief of Staff is temporarily absent, what were the

18     functions of the person who would stand for him -- stand in for him?

19        A.   The person standing in at the time are consistent with the period

20     of absence, which means that on his behalf he can only do the things that

21     are urgent at that moment and nothing beyond that.

22        Q.   When a person stands in for the Chief of Staff who is temporarily

23     absent and if in the period of that replacement the commander is also

24     absent, does the person who replaces the Chief of Staff also

25     automatically assume the functions of deputy commander?

Page 30019

 1        A.   Since the function of the deputy commander does not exist per se,

 2     he cannot discharge these duties.

 3        Q.   Now, in that case when there is no Chief of Staff and no

 4     commander, the person who stands in for the Chief of Staff, does that

 5     person also replace the commander?

 6        A.   No.  There is no way for this person to replace the commander.

 7        Q.   Could you please explain the difference between "standing in for"

 8     and "replacing" somebody?

 9        A.   Absolutely.  The difference is very clear.  Replacement is a

10     temporary action for a certain duration in a certain place and is

11     implemented only in emergency situations.  Rather, decisions can be made

12     and they are very limited in nature.  Certain things should be just

13     noted, some basic things should be resolved, and if there is an emergency

14     in combat operations he is devoid of any right of taking decisions.

15     Standing in is a status in the service when all the jurisdiction areas

16     are transferred to another person.  The difference between the person

17     standing in and the one who actually discharged his duties is virtually

18     non-existent, and the only thing that should be underlined is that it is

19     limited in time.

20        Q.   I would now like to show you Exhibit 5D753.  This is the Law

21     Pertaining to the Army from the 1st of June 1992, the law from Republika

22     Srpska.

23             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And what I need is page 15 in B/C/S

24     and 59 in English.

25        Q.   I think that there is a mistake in the interpretation -- in

Page 30020

 1     translation in English.  I'd like to read -- I'd like to ask you to read

 2     out loud Article 156.

 3        A.   "An officer who is temporarily unable to carry out his duties

 4     will be assigned and stand in on a temporary basis per establishment.  A

 5     standing person can carry out other duties in addition to his regular

 6     duties, and this assignment cannot last longer than six months or up to

 7     one year if so decided by a second superior officer."

 8        Q.   Could you please explain -- I think yesterday you touched upon

 9     it.  Could you please, though, explain what according to the law the

10     expression "temporarily prevented" means?

11        A.   To be temporarily prevented means that the officer assigned to a

12     post is unable to carry out his duties.

13        Q.   Now, what about this senior officer?  Is that person prevented

14     from exercising his duties when he's in the area of his unit but not at

15     the post of command?

16        A.   No way.  No officer, especially of that rank, can and discharge

17     duties from that post.  His work-place is the entire zone.  The Chief of

18     Staff, his work-place, is actually the whole of Republika Srpska.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I do not know about

20     the others, but I have a problem with the transcript.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  What's the problem?

22             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Okay, it's working now.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

24             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Now, in our case General Milovanovic, head of staff, was in at

Page 30021

 1     the period of time at the post of advanced command.  In that particular

 2     case, in such a case, if -- was General Milovanovic prevented from

 3     assuming or exercising his functions?

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

 5             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I don't have a problem with the question as a

 6     general proposition, but it calls for a factual conclusion.  "Whether

 7     he's within the zone of responsibility and prevented otherwise from

 8     exercising his functions?" is a factual question, which this witness is

 9     not qualified to answer.  If it's by virtue of his absent solely, then I

10     think he is, but if it relates to certain circumstances --

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.

12             MR. VANDERPUYE:  -- concerning the absence, that's a difference

13     question.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  I can see your point.  I can see your point.  I

15     think -- yes, okay.

16             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May I rephrase the question?

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, by all means, Ms. Fauveau, please.  Thank you,

18     both, for your pragmatism.

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Now, in the Army of Republika Srpska, the Chief of Staff -- can

21     the Chief of Staff exercise his functions of advanced command?

22        A.   I can give you an indirect answer.  First of all, the notion of a

23     forward command post involves several command posts:  the basic one, the

24     forward one, and the rear one, not to mention the reserve or any other.

25     Altogether, they constitute a command post, which means in whichever of

Page 30022

 1     these posts he is, he is at the command post and, therefore, exercising

 2     his duties relevant for that post.

 3        Q.   Now, I think you said -- we have a problem in the transcript on

 4     page 6, line 18 and 19.  You talked -- you were talking about several

 5     posts in the command structure.  The position which is the basic one, the

 6     post that is the forward one, and the logistics position, what about all

 7     of these positions?  What do they boil down to?

 8        A.   I might sometime over-do my precision talking.  There is a single

 9     command post which is composed of several elements.  One of the elements

10     of a command post is the basic command post.  Another element is the

11     forward command post; therefore, a command post is a system made of a

12     number of other systems and sub-systems.  So wherever you are, either in

13     one of the systems or sub-systems, you are within the system itself.

14        Q.   What are the consequences of representation?  How is

15     representation reflected on the status of the officer who stands in for

16     someone or replaces or represents that person?

17        A.   The consequences of representations are if a person is

18     represented by someone and the position is vacant, the person who had

19     been in this position previously cannot continue to do the duties, and

20     the one assigned as the representative will discharge full duties and,

21     therefore, enjoy all the rights and responsibilities to carry out his

22     duties in the best possible way; and of course, in compliance with his

23     performance he would be incentuised [as interpreted] to do his duty.

24        Q.   Now, does representation have a consequence on the officer who

25     stands in for somebody else?

Page 30023

 1        A.   When I said "reward" or "incentive," I meant pay, among other

 2     things.

 3        Q.   In paragraph 3 of Article 156 of the Law of the Army that you

 4     have before you, there is one decision that is mentioned.  Could you

 5     please say what decision is referred to in this paragraph?

 6        A.   In paragraph 3 of this article, two things are mentioned; that is

 7     to say, that the replacement can't last no longer than six months, upon a

 8     decision of one officer and another officer, and that both replacements

 9     have to be based on a decision.  Actually, an order is issued to that

10     effect, and it contains specific elements as to which post is to be

11     replaced, who is going to be the replacement, in what capacity, and what

12     the duration would be, but it cannot extend the period of six months.

13        Q.   Now, is it possible to be a representative according to the law

14     with all of the legal consequences without there being a written decision

15     about it?

16        A.   It's not possible.  A huge array of regulations govern this; one

17     is the law, the regulations on financial activities, the rules of

18     service, and without any of these rules, no valid decision can be taken.

19     And in that situation, no subordinate is -- can be forced to carry out

20     the order issued under such circumstances.

21        Q.   What about the decisions about representation?  Could they be

22     found in the personal dossier of an officer?  I mean, if you look if the

23     personal file of an officer, can you find a decision about representation

24     if there was such a decision?

25        A.   This is a crucial decision for the status and service of every

Page 30024

 1     officer, and it must be found.  There is no talking about whether it can

 2     or cannot be found because many other consequences stem from that

 3     decision.

 4        Q.   Can you please tell us if from a linguistic standpoint, both in

 5     the JNA, as in the Army of Republika Srpska, the difference between

 6     replacement and representation was always made?

 7        A.   Absolutely.  It's an essential and professional difference, and

 8     every soldier has this difference, distinction in his blood.

 9        Q.   I would now like to show you Exhibit P412.  I'd like to show you

10     two rules now.  The first one is P412.  This is a rule pertaining to the

11     corps of the army, the land army of the JNA.  And I would like to have

12     page 36 in B/C/S and 22 in English, please.  In the paragraph just before

13     58, you can read that the chief of the operational application is the

14     Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the B/C/S takes -- uses

15     the word "replacement" or "replaces."  Can you see this text?

16        A.   Yes.

17             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like the witness to be

18     shown P410.  P410 is The Rules Concerning the Responsibilities of the

19     Corps of the Land Army, Land Forces, in Peacetime.  This also is rules

20     from the former JNA.  Could you give us page 12 in B/C/S and 10 in

21     English, please.

22        Q.   Could you read the paragraph number 2, sub-paragraph of number

23     13, because there is a mistake in the English translation of this

24     sentence.  Can you read this sentence aloud, please?

25        A.   I see Article 12 on the screen.

Page 30025

 1        Q.   Yes, just before this Article 12, the last sentence.

 2        A.   "In the absence of the Chief of Staff, the chief of operations

 3     and training shall stand in for him."

 4        Q.   In this specific case, does the word "represent" have the same

 5     meaning as what is meant by "represents" according to the law?

 6        A.   That word has the same meaning, but two distinctions are

 7     important here.  First, you showed me the rule of the ground forces, and

 8     then you showed me the rule on jurisdictions and competences of the

 9     ground forces rule.  These are very different documents.  The rule of the

10     ground forces is intended for commands in order to creatively apply the

11     provisions of that rule depending on the situation of their units, the

12     situation on the ground, et cetera.  It's not binding in any way.  It is

13     a guide-line, and we can understand very clearly that the rule of ground

14     forces contains a recommendation that in the absence of this and that, he

15     shall be replaced by so-and-so or so-and-so shall stand on him, which can

16     or may not happen.  Whereas, in this document, it is said very precisely,

17     in the absence of the Chief of Staff, the chief of operations and

18     training shall stand in for him, which means that this rule stipulates

19     that in the absence of the Chief of Staff, an order may be issued to the

20     effect that only the chief of operations and training may stand in for

21     him, no one else.  But, it has to happen pursuant to an order.  It

22     doesn't happen automatically.  An order has to be issued to stipulate

23     this stand-in.

24        Q.   These two rules which I've shown you are for the corps.  Could

25     they also be applied automatically to the Main Staff?

Page 30026

 1        A.   In addition to the fact that they differ in essence, one is a

 2     rule and the other is a rule book -- I don't know if this distinction can

 3     be translated properly.  This --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the last part

 5     of the answer?

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Madam Fauveau, did you hear the interpreters?  They

 7     would like the witness to repeat.  Yes.

 8             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Could you please repeat the last part of your answer concerning

10     precisely my question, which was, Do these rules or can these rules be

11     automatically applied to the Main Staff since they are rules which

12     concern the corps?

13        A.   Neither the rule of the ground forces nor the rule on competences

14     of the ground forces corps may be applied to the Main Staff of the VRS.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now go back to your report,

16     5D759, Exhibit 759 of your report.  In B/C/S, it will be page 19, and in

17     English, page 25.  What I am interested in is the last part -- sorry, a

18     bit lower, the bottom of the page.  It's the last paragraph, last

19     paragraph within paragraph 51.  It's the top of page 25 in English.

20        Q.   In this paragraph, you wrote that the fact that General Miletic

21     signed a great number of documents as representative does not reflect the

22     fact that he had the function of a representative.  Could you explain

23     your conclusion?

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

25             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  In the transcript,

Page 30027

 1     receiving the term "representative" repeatedly instead of "stand in," and

 2     I just want to make sure, A, that we're talking about the same thing

 3     since it's a relatively important concept.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.

 5             MR. VANDERPUYE:  And the second thing is that in the report

 6     itself, the English translation uses the term "stand in."

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  That, I was thinking about myself, this last

 8     part of that.

 9             Yes, Madam Fauveau, please.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] As far as I am concerned, I accept

11     "standing in for" in this context.

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  And incidentally, following the proceedings both

13     yesterday and particularly today, this is how it has been translated

14     almost all along, into English, in other words, because that was also

15     something that I wanted to draw your attention to since you are probably

16     following in French.  Yes, not always.  This is why most of the time, not

17     always.  So I suggest that if you are interested in this that you also

18     try and follow on your monitor because most of the time it has been

19     "standing in for," but sometimes it hasn't.  And also, the way it's been

20     translated in the document here has not always been...

21             But anyway, I am saying this, of course, each time there is a

22     variation it will not be taken by the Trial Chamber as prejudicial to the

23     position taken by you or by the Prosecution or by anyone else, for that

24     matter.  It's still open for your presentations in due course.  Thank

25     you.

Page 30028

 1             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. President,

 2     but it's as I tell you.  In this context, I accept "standing in for" as

 3     the proper expression.

 4             I would like to repeat my question.

 5        Q.   How did you reach this conclusion and the fact that General

 6     Miletic signed a certain number of documents as representative or

 7     standing in for the Chief of Staff?  Standing in for did not reflect the

 8     function of standing in.

 9        A.   First of all, by studying a large number of documents that had

10     been made available to me, all sorts of documents and enactments, and the

11     distinction is important; second, from talking with competent officers

12     with whom I had occasion to meet, officers of the VRS, I came to the

13     conclusion and established the fact that he signed certain documents such

14     as reports, information papers, et cetera, and not combat documents.  In

15     the following part of the report, I explained what combat documents mean.

16             We can see that by not a single one of these signatures did he

17     assume the role of Chief of Staff upon himself; rather, he was performing

18     a service role.  He signed these documents and he chose, I believe, an

19     unfortunate form of signature, but it was nevertheless appropriate

20     relative to these documents.

21        Q.   What were the competences and the powers of General Miletic when

22     he signed those documents as standing in for the Chief of Staff?

23        A.   A moment ago, I did not quite understand the discussion between

24     you and the other counsel, but it doesn't matter.  I proceed from the

25     factual situation.  General Miletic never stood in the for the Chief of

Page 30029

 1     Staff, and he signed documents you could say strictly in keeping with the

 2     rule of service.  But he did choose an unfortunate form of signature

 3     block.  For a while he signed papers correctly, which means that when the

 4     Chief of Staff was not present at the basic command post and a report

 5     needed to be signed so that it could go forward from the basic command

 6     post, because this report needed to be sent urgently rather than via the

 7     forward command post, he signed for the Chief of Staff.  That was correct

 8     and appropriate to the moment, to the document itself, and to the

 9     consequences arising from that.

10             Later, when I read that General Milovanovic made it clear that

11     did not like to be signed -- did not like anyone to sign on his behalf,

12     another way of signature was chosen.  General Miletic signed as a

13     stand-in, but again, this form was chosen depending on the moment and

14     appropriate to the document signed.  This way of stand-in was chosen.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

16     5D1017, 1017, documents from the Drina Corps of the 4th of July, 1995.

17     What I am interested in is paragraph 2 of this document where you can

18     read:  [In English] "Exceptionally, a unit commander may issue an order

19     authorising a number of officers of the command, either individually or

20     by function, and specify which documents they may sign and for a stamp to

21     be affixed to their signature."

22             [Interpretation] Here, we're talking of a document of the Drina

23     Corps which applies obviously to the unit corps, Drina Corps as such, but

24     I would like to know whether this sort of rule about the signature is

25     usual in the Army of the Republika Srpska.

Page 30030

 1        A.   Yes.  This paragraph 2 of this explanation developed in the Drina

 2     Corps can practically be viewed as taken over from the rule book on

 3     office procedures, and two things must be distinguished here:  may be

 4     authorised to signed, but not may be authorised to issue a document.

 5     There was a tacit understanding that General Manojlo authorised General

 6     Miletic to sign operative reports and reports on combat readiness.

 7        Q.   I believe you have already answered, but to be quite sure and

 8     clear, does the authorisation to sign a document entail in itself the

 9     powers of an officer who normally should have signed the document in

10     question?

11        A.   To be quite precise, no.  If you are authorised to sign

12     something, then you are only authorised to something.  If you are

13     authorised to issue a document, then you would be able to both issue a

14     document and sign it.  This way an authorisation is given only to sign.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I consult my

16     client just a while.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Sure.

18                           [Defence counsel and accused confer]

19             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  You may proceed.  Thank you.

21             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   On the basis of the document which you may have seen and

23     analysed, could you tell us whether General Miletic in 1995 at any time,

24     even when he was colonel, had the power belonging to the Chief of Staff?

25     Did he have these powers?

Page 30031

 1        A.   Not for a moment.  In all the time he performed the duties of the

 2     chief of operations and training, he never had authorisations to perform

 3     the role of the Chief of Staff.  Not a single one of the Chief of Staff's

 4     powers were transferred or assigned to General Miletic.

 5        Q.   When General Milovanovic was absent - and I am speaking of a very

 6     temporary absence - to whom were transmitted his functions?

 7        A.   At every moment, General Milovanovic kept all the competences of

 8     the Chief of Staff wherever he was on the territory of the Republika

 9     Srpska.  He could not assign to anyone else any of his powers or

10     competences.

11             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1279.

12     For the transcript, this is a conversation of the Croatian collection, an

13     intercept.  Could the text be blown up a bit in B/C/S, please?

14        Q.   In this conversation, this intercept, at the very beginning of

15     this conversation you can see that General Nicolai, Chief of Staff of

16     UNPROFOR, wanted to speak to General Milovanovic or with someone who had

17     the proper authority, and he eventually spoke to General Mladic.  Was

18     this usual in that it was indeed the superior officer who would take a

19     conversation or a call who was for his subordinate in the absence of the

20     subordinate officer?

21        A.   This is an example of excellent functioning of the chain of

22     command in the VRS.  As far as I know, there were strict regulations

23     governing contacts with the UNPROFOR in terms of who was allowed to

24     maintain that contact and how.  I see that one of the powers to maintain

25     contact with the UNPROFOR was transferred from General Milovanovic -- was

Page 30032

 1     transferred from Mladic to Milovanovic.  Since this power was transferred

 2     only to Milovanovic, only Mladic and Milovanovic had the competence and

 3     the authorisation, so only the two of them were authorised.

 4        Q.   I would like to come back on what you say in your report, Exhibit

 5     5D759, page 21 in B/C/S and page 26 of the English text.

 6             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could paragraph 59 be displayed.

 7        Q.   In this paragraph, you indicate that the command of the Republika

 8     Srpska was defined at three levels:  strategic, operational, and

 9     tactical.  What is the strategic level?

10        A.   From the viewpoint of the VRS, the strategic level is the Army of

11     Republika Srpska or at least the main body of the forces of the VRS.

12        Q.   Were certain military actions commanded at the strategic level?

13        A.   Strategic operations are commanded solely from the strategic

14     level, and in certain cases the strategic level command can also command

15     operative --

16        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... identifying or making the

17     plans of the operations at the strategic level?

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes --

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The command includes planning, as

20     well, which means --

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Vanderpuye.

22             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Sorry.  I didn't mean to interrupt the answers,

23     but the previous question and answer were not recorded in the

24     transcript --

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.

Page 30033

 1             MR. VANDERPUYE:  -- and I wonder if he could complete those

 2     answers.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, let's start with that first.  I am taking you

 4     back, General, to a previous question that Madam Fauveau asked you.  And

 5     the reason for doing so is that the transcript did not complete your --

 6     did not register the complete answer that you gave.  The questions was as

 7     follows:

 8             "Were certain military actions commanded at the strategic level?"

 9             And what we have in the transcript, which is incomplete, is as

10     follows:

11             "Strategic operations are commanded solely from the strategic

12     level, and in certain cases the strategic level command can also command

13     operative ..."

14             Can you continue from there, please?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It can also command operations or

16     operational actions, and that's it.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Turning to you, Madam Fauveau, I think you need to

18     repeat your next question because it is also incomplete.

19             And thank you, Mr. Vanderpuye.

20             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Who planned the operations at the strategic level?

22        A.   If I said that the strategic operations were commanded by the

23     Main Staff of the VRS and if we know that an integral part of commanding

24     is planning, then the answer is that the Main Staff of the VRS is in

25     charge of planning the main operations.

Page 30034

 1        Q.   What was the role of the Chief of Administration in Charge of

 2     Operational Affairs and Education for the planning of such actions?

 3        A.   In the process of planning these actions, this role doesn't alter

 4     at all.  Operation and training organ monitors the status of the units

 5     and, based on the commander's decision, drafts documents required for

 6     carrying out a specific action.

 7        Q.   What was the role of the chief of administration in charge of

 8     operations for the execution of strategic operations?

 9        A.   His institution or, rather, his organisational unit, that is an

10     operation centre where all the information are gathered -- is gathered,

11     they collect the information and distribute it to officers, they update

12     the states of individual units, and based on the decision of the

13     commander they pass on these decisions forward.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes Mr. Vanderpuye.

15             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Sorry, Mr. President.  At line 19, we have a

16     question which reflects the role of the chief of administration in charge

17     of operations for the execution of strategic operations.  In the previous

18     answer, the witness refers to carrying out a specific action, and it's

19     unclear whether or not the action he's referring to is a strategic

20     operation, tactical operation, or just an operation.  I wonder if we

21     could just clarify that so at least the record is clear with respect to

22     his role.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Let's see if the General has understood

24     what you said in the first place.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not quite clear on the

Page 30035

 1     gentleman's comment.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Precisely.  I asked you this question because I

 3     suspected that would have been your answer.  Shall I take it to my hands,

 4     Madam Fauveau, or you do it?  I think you need to refer him first to the

 5     previous answer so that he understands exactly what is the specific

 6     action more or less that it could have been referring to.  I mean, you do

 7     it.  You're perfectly capable of doing it.  I will --

 8             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank

 9     you, Mr. President.

10        Q.   In this part, when we were speaking of the planning and execution

11     of operations, at what level of the operations or military actions do you

12     refer -- did you refer?

13        A.   When we spoke about planning operations, we were talking about

14     the operations commanded by the Main Staff of the VRS; in other words,

15     strategic operations.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Is that --

17             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   And when you spoke -- I have to find the proper line.  When you

19     speak of the chief of the administration charged with operational

20     affairs, we are indeed speaking of the chief of the administration who is

21     in charge of operational and education of the Main Staff, aren't we?

22        A.   Yes.

23             MS. FAUVEAU:  [Interpretation] Does this clarify the questions of

24     my colleague?

25             MR. VANDERPUYE:  I think it's a matter I can address on

Page 30036

 1     cross-examination, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, all right.  Thank you.

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Could you tell us which command in the Army of Republika Srpska

 5     was -- is at the operational level?

 6        A.   There are several commanders at the operational levels.  These

 7     are corps commanders, commander of the airforce and anti-aircraft

 8     defence.

 9        Q.   Which are the tasks of the commands at the operational level?

10        A.   The commands of operational forces command their units, which

11     mean that they plan, organise, command, and control the operation of

12     their units.  They carry out operational actions to which other forces

13     can be attached outside the corps itself.

14        Q.   What was the task of the Administration in Charge of Operational

15     Affairs and Education in the planning of military actions at the

16     operational level?

17        A.   Military actions at the operational level ordered by the Main

18     Staff of the VRS, once the plans had been prepared at a certain level and

19     all the documents are in place, the order and the decision are sent over

20     to the Main Staff of the VRS, and each person analyses their respective

21     field of responsibility in order to see whether the planned action is

22     consistent with the task.  And if that is the case, then a proposal is

23     made to the commander of the Main Staff of the VRS to approve this

24     action.  So his role is that within his jurisdiction he reviews the plan

25     for the operation and either gives his approval or disapproval.

Page 30037

 1        Q.   You said that these actions were prepared at a certain level.  At

 2     what level were these actions prepared or the plans were prepared?  At

 3     what level were they prepared?

 4        A.   At the operational level.  It is corps commands that prepare

 5     these decisions and orders.

 6        Q.   Could you tell us which command in the Army of the Republika

 7     Srpska was situated at the tactical level?

 8        A.   They range practically from battalion to division, and the VRS

 9     had all these units.  The highest tactical unit was a division.

10        Q.   To clarify the transcript, in your answer -- in your preceding

11     answer, one may read, at line 16, that the commander of the staff of the

12     Republika Srpska approves the actions - and we are speaking about actions

13     taken at the operational level - and after that, I think you were

14     speaking of the chief of the Administration In Charge of Operations and

15     Education.  And according to the transcript, it seems that he was either

16     giving or not giving his approval or he may have disapproved.  So who

17     approved those decisions?  It is just to be absolutely sure.  Who

18     approved those decisions of the commander at the operational level?

19        A.   This decision was exclusively approved by the commander of the

20     Army of Republika Srpska, and the assistant chief for operations and

21     training does not issue any decisions.  His only role, and within his

22     purview, can give an opinion about the document that he received, for

23     example, whether the decision and the order are in accordance with the

24     decision of the Main Staff of the VRS.

25        Q.   We were speaking about the tactical level.  Was the

Page 30038

 1     Administration in Charge of Operational and Educational Matters of the

 2     Main Staff, did it have a role to play in the preparation of operations

 3     at the tactical level?

 4        A.   Operations are not carried out at the tactical level.  It's

 5     combat operations, and in this particular case, this administration has

 6     no jurisdiction over the units engaged in combat.

 7        Q.   Did it have a role to play in the planification of combat at the

 8     tactical level?

 9        A.   It has no jurisdiction on the tactical level.

10        Q.   Did the Administration in Charge of Operational Matters have a

11     role to play in the execution or performance?  I am speaking of the

12     administration at the level of the Main Staff, have a role to play in the

13     execution of operations at the operational level which was prepared by

14     the corps?

15        A.   All operations prepared by the corps based on the orders issued

16     by the Main Staff of the VRS, through the operations centre or, rather,

17     the Operations and Training Administration, which is part of it, received

18     reports distributed to competent officers based on which a report was

19     prepared for the competent command; or, based on these reports, the

20     commander of the VRS can issue a corrective decision, which is then

21     passed on further through the same channels.

22        Q.   I understand that this is the general position, but yesterday you

23     said that there wasn't an operational centre for the Army of the

24     Republika Srpska.  Does this fact change the situation somewhat in the

25     Main Staff?

Page 30039

 1        A.   All the reports are gathered in the same place, and that is at

 2     the communications centre.  I said that a kind of makeshift solution was

 3     made for a communications centre to be functional.

 4        Q.   Did all the operations prepared by the corps at the operational

 5     level have the source or their basis in an order given by the Main Staff?

 6        A.   I am afraid we might not understand each other.  Various --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat the answer

 8     slowly.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  General, one moment.  The interpreters are having

10     problems.  If you could start your answer again, please, and go slowly.

11     Thank you.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  All operations

13     planned and organised by the Main Staff of the VRS were followed and

14     monitored through back-feed information.  All other activities and

15     actions carried out other -- by other units from operational forces were

16     not followed through because there were no direct orders for them to be

17     carried out.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   How can one distinguish between an operation and other activity,

20     a combat activity?

21        A.   I said last time that whether something is to be defined as an

22     operation or not is up to the forces engaged in it, depending on the

23     task, the objective to be achieved, and the level of command that had

24     issued the decision.  Therefore, for the activities, which are based on

25     the decisions made by the Main Staff of the VRS and which involved the

Page 30040

 1     engagement of one or more operational and enforce unit, and for which it

 2     is -- says very precisely that their decisions should need approval,

 3     these are the operations that are run by the Main Staff of the VRS.  All

 4     other combat activities are natural activities pursued by corps commands.

 5        Q.   I would like to ask a few questions concerning the operational

 6     control and in your report 5D759, page 24 in B/C/S and page 29 in the

 7     English text.

 8             We have seen that there were three levels of command:

 9     strategical, operational, and tactical.  Here, it's about operational

10     control.  Is this operational control linked to the operational level of

11     the command, or is it universal?

12        A.   The operational control mentioned on page 24 of my expert report,

13     due to some previous or later misunderstandings, a definition was given

14     here based and relied on the US forces and NATO.  However, it cannot

15     apply to the VRS.  This form of operational control, as we see it here,

16     in the Army of Yugoslavia or in the VRS or any other army that derived

17     for the former Yugoslavia did not exist.

18        Q.   You said that in the Republika Srpska the strategic level was

19     situated at the level of the Army of the Republika Srpska.  Who took the

20     decisions?  Who made decisions at that level, at the strategical level?

21        A.   The commander of the Army of Republika Srpska.

22        Q.   And what was the role of the supreme commander?

23        A.   The role of the Commander-in-Chief or the Supreme Command is

24     defined in the decision on establishing the Supreme Command, and his role

25     derives from the first census, which means to ensure the coordination of

Page 30041

 1     all potentials of the VRS with a view to solving specific problems.  That

 2     means that supreme commander, in such a manner, took over upon himself

 3     to -- by engaging all other resources of the state ensure coordination

 4     and successful solution for the problems by the VRS.  This is how it was

 5     regulated.

 6             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D755.

 7     This is about a decision concerning the establishment of the Supreme

 8     Command, and, indeed, one may see here that the Supreme Command was

 9     established with an objective to coordinate and to improve the efficiency

10     of the command system of the Republika Srpska's army.  And in Article 2,

11     one can see who are the members of the Supreme Command, and among these

12     members there is no member of the Republika Srpska who was mentioned.

13        Q.   Is this usual, that no member of the army, and in particular the

14     commander of the army, should not be a member of the Supreme Command; is

15     it usual?

16        A.   If you read Article 1 carefully, which says that "The Supreme

17     Command of the Army of Republika Srpska is hereby established for the

18     purpose of coordinating and improving the efficiency of the system of the

19     Army of Republika Srpska," which means that conditions are being created

20     for it to be more efficient and that the Supreme Command is made up of a

21     large number of key figures, then one can say that Article 1 and Article

22     2 are in accordance and in harmony and that no one from the army is

23     required to be there.

24             Sometimes, this coordination, however, had to be pursued based on

25     the situation in the army, and for that purpose in Article 3 it is

Page 30042

 1     stipulated that if and when necessary, members of the military can be

 2     included and involved in the work.

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. President, perhaps this would

 4     be a suitable moment.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  We'll have a 25-minute break.  Thank you.  How do

 6     you feel you're going time-wise?

 7             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] For the moment, I think I'm within

 8     the 16 hours in question.  I don't think I will go any further.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  I don't think I will go beyond.  Correction of

10     the interpreter.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.56 a.m.

13             JUDGE AGIUS:  So for the record, we didn't resume after the break

14     as we should have because there was a technical -- a major technical

15     problem, which has only been resolved now.  The understanding is that we

16     will go right through until 1.45, a quarter to 2 without a break.  Thank

17     you.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   We were talking about the Supreme Command before the break.

20     Could the Supreme Command make decisions pertaining to military

21     operations?

22        A.   Formally speaking, it could.  It seems that sometimes it did

23     exercise this power or possibility, although it shouldn't have.

24        Q.   Could the Supreme Command elaborate on its own without the Main

25     Staff participating?  Could it elaborate military documents?

Page 30043

 1        A.   The answer would be almost the same as to the previous question.

 2     By virtue of the very fact that the Supreme Command had the right to

 3     command the army, there was no law requiring the Supreme Command to

 4     involve the army in the development of military documents.  Basically, in

 5     such cases the army should have been involved, always.  You can see on

 6     the basis of some documents made by the Supreme Command that it developed

 7     certain documents without the involvement of a competent qualified

 8     military person.

 9        Q.   In your report, Exhibit 5D759, on page 26 in the B/C/S version

10     and 32 in the English version, and here referring to paragraph 71, you

11     have indicated the various characteristics or features for command.  The

12     first principle is singleness of command, and the second one is

13     subordination.  Then you go on to explain what the singleness or

14     uniqueness of command is.  Can you please explain how this principle

15     operated in light of the existence of the Supreme Command?

16        A.   Organisationally speaking, they were set up rather well.  The

17     Supreme Command was supposed to pass on its decision to the Main Staff of

18     the army of Republika Srpska, and the commander of the VRS was supposed

19     to forward -- to pass the decision on to units and commanders down the

20     chain.  So organisationally speaking, it functions in the best possible

21     way.  However, in my report in a later chapter, I explained that it can

22     be skipped.  But then again, there are mechanisms that recover the

23     principle of singleness of command, but we will come to that later.

24        Q.   I would like now to show you Exhibit 5D1219, 1219.  Now, this is

25     a document from the president of the republic dated 9th of March, 1995,

Page 30044

 1     which is directly addressed to the Sarajevo Corps.  How is it -- I mean,

 2     the fact that this document exists and that it is sent directly from the

 3     president of the republic to the corps, how is it that it has an

 4     influence on the respect of the principle of uniqueness of command?

 5        A.   Since I am a military analyst and a military expert, I want to

 6     avoid getting into politics, but I will try to describe some very

 7     important features of this procedure.  It's obvious that the president of

 8     the republic, the supreme commander, had received information that he

 9     knew originated from the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, that he was anxious to

10     urgently get some details, and then for that purpose he sent a telegram

11     to the corps commander without delay.

12             If the corps commander had directly answered the president of the

13     republic, the supreme commander, he would have broken the principle of

14     single command.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Just a moment, please.  Can we show

16     page 2 of this document.  I would precisely like to show you the answer

17     from the Sarajevo Corps.

18             Now, what we have on the screen is the answer from the Sarajevo

19     Corps to the Main Staff of the Republika Srpska.  I would like to

20     apologise, but I think that it's easier to speak as we have this answer

21     before our eyes.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Do we have an English of translation of this?

23             THE REGISTRAR:  The document in English has only one page.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  That is the first page that we saw earlier?  Okay.

25             Let's proceed, and we can't do anything about it.

Page 30045

 1             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Well, maybe we can have the

 2     translation in English on the ELMO, if that's all right.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  If the document exists, we can do that.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Could you please continue your answer, how come that the

 6     commander of the Sarajevo Corps answered or sent his reply to the Main

 7     Staff of the army?

 8        A.   I've said based on the prior telegram sent by the supreme

 9     commander to the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, that if he had

10     answered directly without putting in the know his direct superior, then

11     the principle of single command in the VRS would have been breached;

12     however, the commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps acted in an

13     extremely professional way.  He sent this document to his direct

14     superior, the commander of the Main Staff of the VRS.  He acquainted him

15     with the situation and suggested a solution, and this is a perfect

16     example of how the principle of single command is restored even though

17     one step had been initially skipped.

18        Q.   Now, in paragraph 2 of this reply, we can see that this is a

19     situation in which General Tolimir was in the Sarajevo Corps, and

20     according from what we read this had an influence on the facts which were

21     reported to the Main Staff and which were about the Sarajevo Corps.  Can

22     you please explain how the presence of deputy [as interpreted] commander

23     of the Main Staff in a subordinated unit had an impact or an influence on

24     the way the reports were presented?

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

Page 30046

 1             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Sorry to interrupt again, Your Honour.  We have

 2     a reference to General Tolimir, I think, as a deputy commander of the

 3     Main Staff, and I think that's a mistranslation.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  Ms. Fauveau.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely, Your Honour.  I

 6     talked about the assistant to the commander.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's apologies.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document -- first of all,

 9     General Tolimir acted as deputy co-commander in touring the corps.  You

10     can see that this inspection had been planned in advance and it was

11     performed professionally.  During this tour, this inspection tour,

12     certain problems and deficiencies had been noted as pointed out by some

13     of the officers of the corps.  They believed since they had informed

14     General Tolimir that General Tolimir would pass on that information to

15     the commander of the VRS as would have been natural and that the

16     commander of the VRS would inform the supreme commander.  In this belief,

17     they anticipated this sharing of information and created this document,

18     which created a bit of a problem.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

20             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Your Honour, at line 19 I think we have the same

21     reference again.  I don't know if that's what the witness is saying.  If

22     that's the case, it's fine.  But I see it says:

23             "General Tolimir acted as deputy commander in touring the

24     corps..."

25             And I just wonder if we could just clarify that or --

Page 30047

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  I think we can.

 2             MR. VANDERPUYE:  -- for the record at least.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Madam, if you could clarify it with the

 4     witness yourself, please.

 5             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Can you explain tell us what the function of General Tolimir was

 7     in 1995, please.

 8        A.   General Tolimir was assistant commander of the VRS for

 9     intelligence and security.  He was never deputy commander nor could he

10     have been deputy commander.

11        Q.   Now, in the system of command in the army of Republika Srpska,

12     did the Ministry of Defence have a role?

13        A.   Not in the system of command.  The Ministry of Defence was part

14     of the government and had a totally different purpose and different

15     objectives.

16             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May the witness now be shown

17     5D1330, please.

18        Q.   Now, as you can see, this is a document that is sent by the Main

19     Staff of the armed forces of Republika Srpska to the president of the

20     republic.  And in the first paragraph, you can see that the minister of

21     defence has issued some orders relating to command and control in the

22     army.  Can you please tell us something about this document?

23        A.   I have seen this document before.  The thing is, the minister of

24     defence issued an order regulating powers in settling or determining

25     relationships within the service obstructing the function in the service.

Page 30048

 1     By analysing in detail the provisions of this order and the situation at

 2     the time in the VRS and by analysing in detail the Law on the Army of

 3     Republika Srpska, it seems me that this order was inadequate.  It stood

 4     in the way of redressing the situation in the service, and the reaction

 5     of the commander was, therefore, justified.

 6        Q.   Earlier, we were talking of the principles for command, and in

 7     your report -- well, I don't think that it's really necessary for us to

 8     come back to that.  You have indicated that the second principle is that

 9     of subordination.  Was this principle of subordination respected in the

10     Army of Republika Srpska?

11        A.   For the most part, yes.

12        Q.   Did this system exist in the former JNA?

13        A.   Yes, because successful command and successful performance of

14     assignments and missions is based on that principle.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can you now be shown 5D1363.

16     Meanwhile, I just want to say that this is a document from the army of

17     Bosnia and Herzegovina dated the 2nd of June, 1995, which is sent to the

18     command of the 28th Division and the Zepa Brigade.

19        Q.   As we look at the first paragraph of this document, what can you

20     say about the application of the principle of subordination in the Army

21     of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

22        A.   I had occasion to look at a very extensive collection of

23     documents of the BH Army, and I could note the following:  They sought to

24     observe the principle of subordination to the maximum possible, although

25     in certain situations it was breached.

Page 30049

 1        Q.   And do you have an explanation why in paragraph 2 the 28th

 2     Division and the Zepa Brigade were to directly refer to the Main Staff of

 3     the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina for questions relating to the supply

 4     of weapons?

 5        A.   I can explain that, and this explanation must be put into

 6     context.  If we know that it was the president Alija Izetbegovic who very

 7     often contacted the local authorities directly, and if we know that it

 8     was commanders of brigades who contacted them directly, we see that this

 9     was a direct connection without going through the superior command.  The

10     superior command of the 28th Division was the 2nd Corps, and for the

11     285th Brigade it was the 28th Division.  And this was set up in that way

12     in order to resolve the questions of replenishment and resupply even

13     outside the limits of the system.

14             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would now like to show you

15     Exhibit 5D1204.  This is an order from the Main Staff dated 5th of

16     September, 1993, and I'd like to show you page 4 of the B/C/S version,

17     which is page 7 in the English version.

18             Can we have the very bottom of the page in English because that's

19     what I need, paragraph 11 at the bottom of the page.

20        Q.   Could you please have a look at this paragraph 11 and tell us why

21     such an order was made necessary in 1993 and particularly the factor that

22     the influence of parties, political parties, was forbidden?

23        A.   Now, this is a very complex order.  It deals with a large number

24     of areas.  The order emphasizes or points out a problem, suggests a way

25     to resolve it, and it emphasizes also certain prohibitions.  In this

Page 30050

 1     specific case, we see a very professional attitude, a very professional

 2     position that the army should remain outside the influence of political

 3     parties and depoliticised.

 4        Q.   Could you define in the military terminology what a decision is?

 5        A.   In the most simplest terms, according to a military definition, a

 6     decision is a determination how to perform a certain assignment or a

 7     mission.

 8        Q.   What is the difference between a decision and an order?

 9        A.   An order is an element of command, and command is the skill to

10     implement these decisions.  So this decision is a determination setting a

11     goal, whereas an order is an element of command describing how to reach

12     that goal.

13             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now come back to your

14     report, so Exhibit 5D759 on page 39 in B/C/S, 48 in English.

15        Q.   Now, in this paragraph, could you please show the bottom part,

16     paragraph 107.  In paragraph 107, you mention three methods by which the

17     work is done:  the full method, the abridged method, and the

18     decision-making without consultations.

19             First of all, can you please say what level of command applied or

20     enforced the full method?

21        A.   All methods of work relate to the tactical command and upwards,

22     from the regiment and brigade up to the Main Staff of the VRS.

23             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now see the following page

24     of the report.

25        Q.   And I would like to ask you to briefly write or describe the full

Page 30051

 1     method of working.

 2        A.   Here, we see the process of work of the command, and one of its

 3     characteristics is that it has many points of contact with other

 4     commands, so the procedure doesn't differ very much.  The differences are

 5     more linguistic than anything else.  Here, we see the complete method of

 6     work.  We see it consists of 13 steps.  It has to be followed strictly,

 7     and these 13 steps ensure that all the organs of the command from

 8     beginning to end are involved in decision-making.  And each, according to

 9     its competences, propose the best possible solutions.  This method of

10     work is always applied when the time allows, and every command strives to

11     ensure there is sufficient time to go through the entire process and to

12     allow enough time to subordinate commands to also apply this method of

13     work.  This method of work is also applied in issuing documents of the

14     highest order, such as orders to operative units.

15             The abridged method is used when there is limited time, and you

16     can see according to this schematic that the abridged method contains

17     four steps less.  Practically, all organs of the command are also

18     involved in the process of decision-making, but the decision-making

19     process itself is abbreviated.

20             And the third method is the urgent method, when there is no time,

21     and it's practically decision-making on the move when decisions are made

22     very quickly and passed on very quickly to subordinate units.

23             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can the witness now be shown

24     Exhibit P699.  This is the handbook for the work of command and staffs,

25     and I would like to have page 60 in B/C/S.  I'm sorry about this delay.

Page 30052

 1     I am looking for the number of page in the English version.  Thank you.

 2        Q.   Can you please have a look at number 2 -- or, rather, the two

 3     last paragraphs before sub-paragraph (b), before paragraph 104 and just

 4     before sub-paragraph (b).  This is the paragraph that starts by "Team

 5     members..." and I would like to ask you to please read those two

 6     paragraphs because the English version has translated two words in B/C/S

 7     by the same word in English.  So if you can read it now, maybe we can

 8     avoid this mistake.

 9        A.   "Team members and other command organs with their assistant will

10     formulate segments of the command relating to their respective area and

11     shall submit them to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations.

12             "The Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations shall formulate the

13     final version of the organ" -- "of the order and will take care that it

14     is technically processed and forwarded to the subordinate."

15             I would just like to add that for technical reasons only, the

16     term "training" has been omitted, but that happens often.

17        Q.   Apparently, we still have the translation of two words that have

18     a different meaning in B/C/S.

19             Well, first of all, I would like to ask you to tell us what is

20     the difference between the formulation in the first paragraph, "to

21     formulate," and "to put in form," which is what's in the second

22     paragraph.

23        A.   At a meeting, a civilian meeting, I provided an explanation that

24     sealed to be helpful to them, and I am going to do it again.  The

25     Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training provides a whole as

Page 30053

 1     if he were using Lego cubes, but he doesn't provide the content of the

 2     cubes.  The Chief of Staff will provide the whole from these elements,

 3     whereas the elements themselves and the content will be decided by the

 4     competent officers from respective commands.

 5        Q.   Now, concretely when one looks at these two paragraphs, what is

 6     the tasks of the members of the team and that of the other organs of the

 7     command structure?

 8        A.   The task of team members and other organs of the command is by

 9     abiding by the commander's proposals to prepare decisions from their

10     respective areas, and once they have drafted these decisions, they should

11     pass them on to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training.

12        Q.   What, then, is the task of the person, the officer, in charge of

13     operations and training?

14        A.   Once he receives all these elements, he puts them in the order as

15     defined by this rule in order to arrive at a whole document, and then he

16     hands over the document to the Chief of Staff.

17        Q.   I think you have already talked about this, but, you know, to be

18     even more clear, can you please be very clear, what is the influence of

19     the officer in charge of operational affairs and training on the content

20     of a document, for instance, a directive or an order?

21        A.   No influence.  He has no influence on the content, but on the

22     form the influence was strong.

23        Q.   And what do you have in mind when you talk about the form?  Can

24     you explain what it means in an order or in a directive?

25        A.   Speaking of a whole of a document implies that this directive or

Page 30054

 1     an order contains all the required elements, that they are put in the

 2     proper order and that these elements are in a sequence that will be

 3     efficient for the subordinate command.  This sequence is prescribed,

 4     among other things, by this Manual for the Work of Commands and Staffs.

 5        Q.   Now, in this hand-book, in the paragraph you have read, this

 6     paragraph mentions the orders.  What other military documents were also

 7     issued according to this process?

 8        A.   This procedure allows a whole array of procedures to be

 9     implemented.  A directive can be drafted by applying this procedure by

10     the Main Staff of the VRS, and on the basis of this directive the corps

11     command can draft operational orders.  And then based on the operational

12     orders, brigade commands or regiment commands can -- which are tactical

13     commands can draw up their own orders, and this is how we go down the

14     whole chain of command.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now see page 24 in B/C/S of

16     this same exhibit, this same hand-book, page 22 of the English version.

17        Q.   Can you please tell us, and I think it's in paragraph 33 of this

18     handbook, what are the elements which determine the choice of method of

19     work to be used?

20        A.   You can see here a detailed explanation of what I mentioned

21     several times.  The selection of a particular method of work is done at

22     the -- based on the level of command, on the qualification of command,

23     the structure and the quality of officers, and many other elements.

24     However, one of the crucial parameters is the time-frame or the available

25     time.  The division of labour here is slightly more flexible in this

Page 30055

 1     document because this document is intended, also, for regiments, and

 2     regiments are on a much lower tactical level than the Main Staff;

 3     therefore, they require more details than the Main Staff of the VRS would

 4     require.

 5        Q.   Can you please tell us what the difference is between a directive

 6     and an order?

 7        A.   The difference between a directive and an order is primarily at

 8     the level where they are issued.  There are two level of issuance for a

 9     directive, and I have provided a charter of that in my expertise.  One

10     level is the state level when you have a directive issued by the

11     commander-in-chief, and the second level is strategic level when a

12     strategic amount issues a directive.  In terms of its content, a

13     directive is not intended strictly to contain all the elements.  It is

14     something to give a steering or a direction, and it set up objectives to

15     be achieved by the subordinate command.  It is binding at the same time,

16     but it is also a direction.

17             An order, on the other hand, is an executive document which

18     contains strictly defined decision, time, participants, and very often a

19     decision can be divided into stages.  In that manner, it narrows the

20     space for the subordinate in terms of the institution; that is to say, it

21     restricts his space for his imagination by putting him into a precise

22     time-frame and space-frame.

23        Q.   Now, in your report you have analysed the Directive number 7, for

24     the report -- this is Exhibit P5, but I don't need it right now.  I would

25     only like to ask you about this directive.  On the basis of this

Page 30056

 1     directive and of documents which you have consulted, were you able to

 2     draw conclusions about the method which was used when those directives

 3     were elaborated?

 4        A.   The fact that a few numbers that were directives made it

 5     necessary for one to draw a highly likely conclusion.  Therefore, my

 6     conclusion was that, for instance, a directive is never drafted by

 7     applying an abridged method because this is a long-term document without

 8     any time limits.  It provides direction and steering, and I don't know

 9     and I don't believe that there is any directive done by either an

10     abridged method or without consultations in history ever.

11             Secondly, the source of this directive and the idea underlying it

12     dates back to the analysis of combat readiness in 1994.  The fact that

13     the draft of this document was most probably completed on the 7th or

14     8th -- or 8th March, and the fact that was that it was most probably

15     approved on the 16th and the 17th of March indicates that the only

16     possible way that was applied in preparing this directive was the full

17     method.

18        Q.   Just before I move to the work on Directive number 7, I would

19     like to show Exhibit 5D999.

20             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] This is Directive Number 9.

21        Q.   You said that you did not know the situation of the case in which

22     a directive was put together on the abridged method of work, on the basis

23     of that method.  Now, the officer who worked on this directive told us

24     here in court that this specific directive was devised on the basis of

25     the abridged method.  Can you say something about this, please?

Page 30057

 1        A.   As far as I can see, this directive was prepared at the forward

 2     command post where at the time there were a sufficient number of officers

 3     for a valid decision to be taken required for such a directive.  Whether

 4     all these officers were the first- or second-ranking people in their

 5     respective areas, I don't know, but I wouldn't agree that this was done

 6     by applying an abridged method or that it was done without consultation.

 7     One might conclude that at the forward command post there were enough

 8     competent officers from the command staff and some organs that they

 9     needed for taking this decision.

10             Probably, what they didn't consider to be relevant, this

11     directive seems to be shorter than the other ones.  As far as I can

12     remember, it is said that some of the elements will be taken over from

13     the previous directive, and I see that as a proof that actually a full

14     method of work was applied rather than the abridged method.

15        Q.   And about the officer in charge of operations who was not

16     involved in the drawing up of this directive, but in theory, what is the

17     role of the officer in charge of operational affairs and training in --

18     when an abridged method is used?  Does he have a different role from his

19     role if the full method is to be applied?

20        A.   No, his task is always the same.  His task is to prepare the

21     directive pursuant to the commander's decision.

22             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now come back to your

23     report.  This is Exhibit 5D759, on page 41 in B/C/S and 51 in English.

24        Q.   In paragraph 109 -- well, you have already mentioned the analysis

25     of the combat readiness of 1994.  In this paragraph, you have indicated

Page 30058

 1     that the supreme commander ordered the preparation of the directive

 2     during the analysis of combat readiness.  How did you reach this

 3     conclusion?

 4        A.   I reached this conclusion in two steps.  The first step was when

 5     I analysed how the analysis of combat readiness was organised and

 6     implemented and what the corps commands had come up as suggestions and

 7     what measures were taken by the staff command and what were the decision

 8     of the state of the VRS, and the VRS one could have concluded that the

 9     idea for Directive 7 was based on this analysis of combat readiness.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now see 5D767 -- sorry, 967.

11     This is the diary for the meeting about combat readiness for 1994 that

12     was held on 29th and 30th of January, 1995.  And I'd like to show page 2

13     in B/C/S and page 3 in English.

14        Q.   In this document, one sees that the president of the republic was

15     to make a presentation at 1550 [as interpreted] a.m. about the political

16     and military objectives for the future as well as the strategy about the

17     conduct of the war and peace negotiations.  Was this presentation to have

18     a connection with directive -- the future Directive number 7?

19        A.   Absolutely.  This is a classic form of reporting about the combat

20     readiness.  If you would look at all the former JNA armies, you would

21     basically find everything identical.  Only the names would be different.

22     This is a classical approach that you have the commander-in-chief present

23     there and that he is formulating the future policies of negotiations and

24     prosecutions of war.  And later on, we see the input of his associates

25     and other people who were present at this briefing.

Page 30059

 1             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Just before we continue, one

 2     correction of the transcript.  On page 17, line 4, this is 1750 p.m.

 3             Can we now move to page 4 in English, and in B/C/S we are still

 4     on page number 2, at the very bottom of that page.

 5        Q.   At 2100, one sees that the main commander, the staff commander,

 6     were to talk about the position -- the tasks of the Army of Republika

 7     Srpska during the truce and the most important tasks in 1995.  So there

 8     was to be a discussion about that.

 9             Now, was the future Directive number 7 to be somehow connected to

10     this part of the briefing and of the analysis?

11        A.   Not necessarily.  The conclusions and tasks relating to the units

12     of the VRS have most to do with it, but in this specific case I think

13     that these tasks were assigned on the 5th of February, 1995.

14             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we now move to page 3 in B/C/S.

15     In English, we'll still be on page 4, at the bottom of page 4.  So you

16     can see that at 2200 there was a closing speech by the commander, and

17     amongst other things he was to talk about the conclusions and short-term

18     tasks and most important tasks for the Army of Republika Srpska in 1995.

19        Q.   What is normally the role or the objective for this part of the

20     analysis?

21        A.   Practically, this is the final act of the analysis in which the

22     commander of the VRS presents or, rather, accepts the evaluation of

23     combat readiness according to all relevant elements; and on the basis of

24     that, he imparts what he believes to be important and how he assesses

25     combat readiness.  This was preceded by the assessments by corps

Page 30060

 1     commanders that they should have provided them in time and on the basis

 2     of this and as well on the conclusions that very often are added on the

 3     spot during the meeting become part of this final act of the analysis of

 4     combat readiness.

 5        Q.   And right after that at 2230, one can see that proposals and

 6     conclusions and tasks for the Army of Republika Srpska in 1995 were to be

 7     formulated.  And according to this document, one can see that the head of

 8     Administration in Charge of Operational Affairs and Training of the Main

 9     Staff as well as the chief of the organs in charge of operations and

10     training of the units were entrusted with that formulation.

11             Can you please tell us what the role of these organs were in the

12     formulation of the proposals that are mentioned in this part?

13        A.   Since the analysis of combat readiness implies that background

14     material has been received in time and evaluations had been provided

15     previously by subordinate commanders, practically all the organs

16     cooperate and write together and gather all the oral information

17     collected previously.  Based on that, they write their conclusions and

18     proposals of tasks and present it -- present it here in a shortened form

19     -- [microphone not activated]

20        Q.   Did the organs in charge of operational matters who did this work

21     were also in charge of formulating the contents of the proposals?

22        A.   It was the speakers who presented the content of proposals.  They

23     were in charge of formulating and sorting these proposals, and the

24     speakers were commanders, assistant commanders.  There is a whole group

25     determined there.

Page 30061

 1             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 5

 2     in English, and for B/C/S it's still page 3.  We can see at the bottom of

 3     the page the name of Colonel Miletic, just at the bottom of the page.

 4        Q.   Did Colonel Miletic determine the content of specific

 5     interventions indicated in this document?

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

 7             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Again, Mr. President, I don't know if we're

 8     talking about something on a theoretical level or we're talking about

 9     something that's peculiar to the facts of this case, and I would suggest

10     that if that's the nature of the question that it's inappropriate to put

11     to the expert unless there is some foundation for it.  Otherwise, if it's

12     just talking about the signature on the document as a matter of form

13     rather than a matter of factual substance, then I think the question

14     would otherwise be appropriate.  But I just wanted to clarify that and

15     make sure that it ...

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Ms. Fauveau, do you wish to comment?

17             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Of course I am speaking about the

18     rules concerning the usual methods of work.  I don't know about this

19     specific situation how General Miletic did it and had to do and how he

20     could do it.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

22             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Mr. President, the question was directed to the

23     specific -- the content of the specific interventions indicated in the

24     document, and unless this witness has some direct knowledge of the

25     circumstances concerning the contents of this document, the question

Page 30062

 1     would be inappropriate and would call for speculation.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  She is going to reformulate --

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I will reformulate.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  Go ahead, because I think basically after having

 5     heard him the second time, I think he is right.

 6             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   How is this sort of document normally elaborated?

 8        A.   Analysis of combat readiness is a normal action, normal procedure

 9     defined by structure, and in terms of structure it would not be different

10     than any other army.  It has its own elements of combat readiness; there

11     is a stipulated way of making proposals, of drawing conclusions, and

12     settling the matter.  Every point in the analysis of combat readiness is

13     prescribed in advance, a skeleton already exists, and everybody just

14     makes specific proposals in their area.

15             Let's take as an example problems of financing -- planning,

16     development, and financing of the VRS in 1994.  It would be the chief for

17     planning and development who would fill in this box, make this proposal.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness now be shown

19     5D1206.  This is an order from the Main Staff, 23 January 1995.

20             Just before I ask my question, could the witness be shown the

21     last page of the document.  We can see here that this document bears the

22     name of the commander, General Mladic.  I would like now to come back to

23     page 11 of this document.  Page 1, maybe.

24        Q.   The plan of the analysis for the combat readiness which we saw a

25     while ago and which bore the name of General Miletic, was it or should it

Page 30063

 1     have been linked in any way to this order of General Mladic?  Should it

 2     have been connected?

 3        A.   We must decipher the methodology of maintaining the analysis of

 4     combat readiness.  There are several more elements here.  The analysis of

 5     combat readiness for a certain year is usually part of the annual plan as

 6     well.  As we can see, the order of the commander of the VRS invokes that

 7     plan.  This analysis is made according to a certain skeleton and

 8     methodolgy.  The commander defines the obligations of all the executive

 9     components.  When the commanders of subordinate units submit their own

10     results, a draft plan of implementation is created.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             THE INTERPRETER:  We haven't heard the President.

13             JUDGE AGIUS:  [Microphone not activated] Sorry, I had the

14     microphone switched off.  Go ahead, I think we have got everything now.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Once this draft plan of

16     the analysis of combat readiness is made - that's the plan we reviewed

17     previously - the draft is submitted to the commander who agrees on it,

18     gets the approval with the supreme commander because no plan must be

19     contrary to the decisions of the supreme commander.  Then, it is returned

20     for final technical processing, and it awaits all the participants on the

21     table when they come for a final analysis.

22             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown page 3

23     in B/C/S of this decision.  In English, it would be page 5.  We have seen

24     that the chief of the organ in charge of education and administration had

25     a role in the preparation of this meeting for analysis of the combat

Page 30064

 1     readiness of the Army of Republika Srpska.

 2        Q.   Did other organs of the command -- did they take part in the

 3     preparation of this analysis?

 4        A.   If we know what the analysis of combat readiness consists of, if

 5     we know that it comprises all the elements, all the same elements that

 6     the command consists of, then we know that not only were they involved

 7     other organs of the command, they actually proposed their own elements;

 8     thus, Mr. Djukic of the logistics was the proponent for the security of

 9     General Tolimir, and the chief of operations and training was the

10     proponent of passages dealing with operations and training.

11        Q.   Could you please have a look at number 8, which is on the last

12     page, page 6 of the English text.  According to this number 8, after --

13     at the end of the meeting, the commanders of units were to transmit to

14     the chief of administration in charge of operational questions and

15     instruction, education, the analysis prepared for combat preparedness

16     made in 1994.  Which unit is mentioned here?  Which units are we speaking

17     here?

18        A.   These are unit commanders directly subordinated to the commander

19     of the Army of Republika Srpska.  It relates to the ground forces, the

20     ground corps, the airforce, regiments, and brigade, the school centre,

21     Rajko Balic, and other units.  I'm not sure because I don't see the

22     mobilization trail.  But those are the units that are directly

23     subordinated.

24             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown now

25     5D1207.  This is an order from the Main Staff dated 25 January 1995 which

Page 30065

 1     bears the name of General Tolimir.

 2        Q.   Could you please look at number 2 of this order --

 3             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] -- page 2 for the English version.

 4        Q.   In this paragraph, the tasks of the assistant of the commander

 5     for logistics was determined -- the tasks were determined.  How does the

 6     assistant of the commander for security, since this order has the name of

 7     General Tolimir, could determine the tasks of the assistant commander for

 8     logistics?  How is it possible?

 9        A.   We know that the analysis of combat readiness is an activity

10     where all commanders on the operative and tactical levels attend.  Even

11     heads of state often attend.  That fact in itself indicates that it is a

12     very risky moment, something that could be lethal to the unit.  In these

13     analyses, measures of security are much more stringent than in a regular

14     situation.  This is the task of the chief of security.  He insisted here

15     on stricter methods of security and proposed guard duty, which is not

16     strictly within his competence, but everybody understood that it was

17     necessary, and nobody minded that he overstepped his authority a little.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

19             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  We have a reference

20     in the transcript, I think it's at line 22, where the expert mentions the

21     chief of security.  In the context of this order that's signed by General

22     Tolimir --

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  I don't know --

24             MR. VANDERPUYE:  -- I just want to clarify that we are talking

25     about assistant commander for intelligence and security as distinguished

Page 30066

 1     from chief of security within the structure of the Main Staff, just so

 2     that the record is --

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Also for the record, because he keeps

 4     saying -- I mean, there is something which makes it obvious to me that

 5     the page and lines that I have are not tallying with yours, for sure, but

 6     in any case that will be checked later.  What I have here is page 24,

 7     line 4.

 8             Otherwise, do you agree with -- not do you agree.  Actually, I

 9     think it's a valid point.  If you could pursue it with the witness,

10     please.  Thank you.

11             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I entirely agree on the function of

12     General Tolimir.  I entirely agree with my colleague from the

13     Prosecution.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Let's proceed then.

15             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Why did the meetings concerning readiness for combat, why were

17     they organised?

18        A.   I said more than once, they were held in order to make a good

19     decision, and in order to successfully command, one must be

20     well-acquainted with the status and condition of your units, and you will

21     best be able to assess the situation of your units if you get the reports

22     on combat readiness.  This is like an X-ray, and the analysis of the

23     combat readiness was that X-ray for the commander of the VRS, and with it

24     he knew what to do next.  You will see that this is correct when you see

25     the document when he defined further tasks, after this analysis, and

Page 30067

 1     decided that combat readiness should be raised to a higher level.

 2        Q.   Could you tell us during which period these meetings were

 3     normally organised, these meetings concerning readiness for combat?  What

 4     was their frequency?

 5        A.   For the strategic and operative level, the analysis of combat

 6     readiness is done once a year, normally at the end of the year for the

 7     year past; and for lower levels, it's done more frequently.

 8             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D966.

 9     This is an order from the Drina Corps dated 17 January 1995 concerning

10     the analysis of the combat readiness of the Drina Corps.  Could you look

11     at number 5 in this order on page 2.  In this paragraph number 5, you can

12     read first of all:

13             "[In English] All organs and sectors of the corps command will

14     prepare for the annual analysis according to their functions and present

15     for the purposes a joint analysis the necessary summaries and charts in

16     order to obtain a better picture of the situation in the corps in 1994.

17             "The corps command operations and training will be in charge of

18     preparing the analysis, and all questions should be addressed to them."

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Could you explain, what was the role of the

20     organ in charge of operational and education for the preparation of

21     analysis, according to this order?

22        A.   The role of the operations and training organ in command of the

23     Drina Corps, and here in paragraph 5, is defined exactly as I explained

24     the role of that organ and the level of the Main Staff of the Army of

25     Republika Srpska.  I don't want to -- in fact, I will tell you about the

Page 30068

 1     specific task that the commander issued, that everybody, according to

 2     their function, prepare a report and schematic that is necessary to

 3     evaluate the situation; and then, together with the Assistant Chief of

 4     Staff for Operations and Training, he would define it and put it together

 5     into a whole where he would determine the sequence, the terminology, the

 6     time and place, et cetera.

 7             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we go back to page 1 of this

 8     order.  At number 2, you can see the elements of combat readiness.  I

 9     think there is a translation mistake concerning the third element, which

10     is the education, which has not been accurately translated into English.

11        Q.   So could you read out to us in B/C/S the components for combat

12     readiness.

13        A.   [No interpretation]

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment.  I've not received the --

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first element is control and

16     command.  The first element of combat readiness is control and command;

17     the second element is moral guidance, religious, and legal affairs; the

18     third element of combat readiness is combat training and education; the

19     fourth element is mobilisation, or mobilisational, organisational,

20     financial, and personnel support and affairs; the next one is logistical

21     support; after that, intelligence and security support; and the last

22     element is administrative and office management.

23             We can conclude that this fourth element is mobilisational,

24     organisational, establishment, and staffing or personnel affairs.

25             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown 5D1394.

Page 30069

 1     This is an analysis of combat readiness for the Drina Corps in 1994.

 2     5D1394.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   This document bears the date of 28th January, 1995.  According to

 6     what we've seen in the Main Staff documents and according to your

 7     experience, do the elements of this analysis, do they have to be

 8     presented during the analysis of the combat readiness of the Army of the

 9     Republika Srpska which was supposed to take place on the 29th and the

10     30th of January?

11        A.   It is always precisely established by a methodolgy that

12     subordinate corps should submit their written analysis before the

13     analysis taken at the level of the Main Staff.  Each organ reviews this

14     analysis within their respective purview, and the commander should also

15     present their own analysis.  In this context, this should have preceded

16     the analysis carried out at the Main Staff of the VRS, and all the

17     officers in charge should be able to review this analysis.

18             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Could page 20 in B/C/S be shown,

19     please, and page 22 for the English text.

20        Q.   So one sees at the bottom of the page what are the main

21     assignments in 1995.

22             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] And if we could show the very

23     bottom, please, just a little further down.

24        Q.   According to assignment number 4, the corps command is to find a

25     way to completely close off the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves.  Who

Page 30070

 1     ascertained that assignment for the Drina Corps in January 1995?

 2        A.   This task was signed to the Drina Corps in 1993, and it was a

 3     continuous task, but it practically was never completed until the

 4     separation of the enclave in July.

 5        Q.   And you know, just to elaborate a little bit on what you just

 6     said --

 7             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown Exhibit

 8     5D988.  This is the monthly plan for the Drina Corps for November 1994.

 9     Under item 3, one sees that the complete close-off of the Srebrenica

10     enclave was one of the main assignment for the Drina Corps in November

11     1994.

12        Q.   Is this in line with what you said before?

13        A.   Absolutely.  It appears in various forms.  I am only surprised

14     how this could have been one of the main tasks for months and years

15     without it being completely finalised.  They are speaking here of closing

16     off the Srebrenica enclave, which automatically involves the separation

17     of the enclave.  This task is formulated in different ways, but the

18     basics and the fundamental and essential meaning was there, but it was

19     never completed and achieved.

20             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] May we now come back to Exhibit

21     5D1394, i.e., the analysis for combat readiness of the Drina Corps.  I

22     would like to have page 21 in B/C/S, 23 in English, please.

23        Q.   In the very last part of this document, the Drina Corps suggests

24     that the supreme commander be given to -- in the Main Staff find a

25     solution for the elimination of enclaves.  Now, is such a proposal

Page 30071

 1     normal -- such a proposition of a subordinate unit a regular or a normal

 2     one?

 3        A.   This proposal is an unusual one and out of the context.  If

 4     someone gives you an order to make a separation this year and then two

 5     years later you come up with a proposal for elimination, this is out of a

 6     military context.

 7        Q.   And do you see a link between this proposition and Directive

 8     number 7?

 9        A.   I don't see any connection between the Directive 7/1 because this

10     one that refers to the enclaves is very precise and clear.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.

12             MR. VANDERPUYE:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I don't know if it

13     was a translation error, but the question was put specifically with

14     respect to Directive number 7 and the answer responds Directive 7/1.  I

15     wonder if we could clarify that, please.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  I suppose that the witness must have heard the

17     question that it was related to Directive number 7.  What I want to know

18     is whether in his reply, in his answer, he referred to Directive number 7

19     or to Directive number 7/1.

20             And you are the one who can tell us that, General.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Both Directive number 7 and number

22     7/1 were precise and accurate.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Vanderpuye.  It doesn't answer your

24     question.

25             MR. VANDERPUYE:  It's not responsive to the question that was put

Page 30072

 1     by my colleague, actually.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  I am going to leave it in your hands,

 3     Ms. Fauveau, because I wouldn't like to interfere here.

 4             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Can we limit ourselves to Directive

 5     7.  So I would like to ask the question again.

 6        Q.   What about the proposition of the Drina Corps?  Could it have an

 7     influence or a link with Directive number 7?

 8        A.   This proposal from the Drina Corps - actually, it's item number 1

 9     - has no bearing on Directive number 7.

10             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to show you now

11     Exhibit 5D1208.  This is an order from the Main Staff from 16th of

12     February, 1995, and I -- with the name of General Milovanovic.

13        Q.   Can you please have a look at this order and tell us whether this

14     order is one way or another connected to the analysis about combat

15     readiness which was performed at the end of January?

16        A.   Judging by the content, this has nothing to do with the analysis

17     of combat readiness conducted in that period.  This is a daily order of a

18     completely different type where information about the enemy is required.

19        Q.   Could this order have had a link with the preparation of

20     Directive number 7?

21        A.   According to the contents, it is possible because they are

22     looking to see what the balance of forces is, which would serve as a

23     basis for proposing further activities.

24             MS. FAUVEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  Can we leave it

25     at that for today because I need to show an exhibit.

Page 30073

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  That's why I intervened, in fact.

 2             General, we are going to stop here.  We will resume again

 3     tomorrow morning, same advisory as yesterday.  Please do not contact or

 4     discuss this with anyone until you finish your testimony.  We stand

 5     adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9.00.

 6                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 14th day of

 8                           January, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.