Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 30722

 1                           Wednesday, 28 January 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning.  Madam Registrar, could you call the

 6     case, please.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is the case

 8     number IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, ma'am.

10             Out of the accused, only the accused Beara is not present today.

11     I take it, Mr. Ostojic, that we will be receiving his waiver in due

12     course.

13             MR. OSTOJIC:  Good morning, Mr. President.  You will.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.

15             Prosecution, I think the position is exactly the same as

16     yesterday as regards your presentation, so let's start.

17             Mr. Haynes, good morning to you.

18             MR. HAYNES:  Good morning, Mr. President.

19                           WITNESS:  VINKO PANDUREVIC [Resumed]

20                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

21                           Examination by Mr. Haynes:  [Continued]

22        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, yesterday afternoon when we finished off, we were

23     discussing or we had just begun to discuss the brigade rules of the JNA

24     of 1984.  Before we get into a further discussion, as it were, as to

25     their legality, purpose, and application, I'd just like to cover a few,

Page 30723

 1     rather, more basic facts about them.

 2             Before you became commander of the Zvornik Brigade in December of

 3     1992, had you ever had the opportunity to study the brigade rules of the

 4     JNA of 1984?

 5        A.   Yes, I had such an opportunity, and I did start studying these

 6     rules, but I didn't study all the rules.

 7        Q.   And I don't want to lead you.  During which period of your

 8     military career and education was that?

 9        A.   That was during the 20-day period when I was in the Staff school,

10     Command Staff School.  I was previously aware of the fact that such rules

11     did exist, but I didn't have a copy of them.

12        Q.   Which leads me to my next question.  When you arrived at the

13     Zvornik Brigade in December of 1992 and the Command at Orahovac, was

14     there a copy of the brigade rules there?

15        A.   I can't say.  The Command was based in Orahovac.  As for the

16     library that used to be in the Territorial Defence Staff before, I don't

17     know whether there was such a library -- whether there was such a copy

18     there.  I saw some of the rules, but I can't really tell you which rules

19     I saw, or I saw certain sets of rules, and there were probably the

20     brigade rules among them.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And just to complete the point:  Other than you, was

22     there anybody else in the Command or Staff who at that time had any

23     familiarity with them at all?

24        A.   I think that the Chief of Staff was familiar with those rules.

25     As far as I can remember, it's on the basis of those rules that he

Page 30724

 1     compiled sort of a summary on the obligations of certain organs of the

 2     Staff and of the Staff, summary on the duties they should perform.  But I

 3     can't be certain whether he had a copy of those rules.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I just want to recap, as it were, towards the

 5     end of yesterday's session.  We just dealt briefly with the legal force

 6     of those rules, and we looked at the instruction at the head of them.

 7     What was your understanding of the legal force of the brigade rules in

 8     1984?

 9        A.   Well, given that I was previously a lot more familiar with the

10     battalion rules, because those are the rules that I used, and given that

11     they are quite similar to this other set of rules, I had a general

12     position and approach with regard to rules of that kind, and I can say

13     that those rules - and that's the case for other rules too - were issued

14     on the basis of instructions or directives on professional military

15     textbooks or literature.  So that's the kind of literature we're dealing

16     with.  It wasn't issued on the basis of law, and adhering to the

17     provisions of those rules or not adhering to them didn't result in any

18     legal action.  These rules also had certain ideological elements that

19     were the result of the idea of general People's Defence, and this is

20     based on the socialist self-management system.  These were rules that

21     governed doctrine or related to doctrine, which would change over time,

22     and these rules related to an army that no longer existed at the time.

23     However, these rules did provide instructions and aided one in training

24     officers and command staff in order to make it possible for them to

25     perform their duties.

Page 30725

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now, can we move straight to the heart of the matter,

 2     please, and have a look at Article 115.

 3             So can we have in e-court, please, for the benefit of

 4     Mr. Pandurevic P694, page 64 in the B/C/S and page 37 in the English.

 5             Something very interesting has appeared in e-court in the English

 6     channel.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  The document seems to be only in English.

 8             MR. HAYNES:  We're looking for P694.

 9             I just better check that.  That wasn't a document that should

10     have been kept secret or anything?  Okay.

11             I'll repeat that.  It's page 64 in the B/C/S.  You have 37 in the

12     English.

13        Q.   We can all see it, but:

14             "The brigade commander has the exclusive right to command all

15     brigade units and attached units.  He bears full responsibility for the

16     work of the brigade command and subordinate commands, for the state of

17     morale, for security and combat readiness, for training, and for the

18     proper performance of tasks.  The commander takes decisions, assigns

19     tasks to units, monitors their fulfillment, and demands their strict

20     execution regardless of difficulties that arise.  Through his personal

21     conduct, work and involvement in the implementation of policies, ethical

22     standing, courage, ability, fairness, cool-headedness, consistency, and

23     respect for personality and opinions of subordinates, the commander

24     vitally influences the entire condition of the brigade, especially the

25     morale of the units in command."

Page 30726

 1             Do you agree with that as a basic statement of principle?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   How does that paragraph help us to determine what happens if, for

 4     example, the brigade commander is absent for any reason?

 5        A.   Well, first, I should say that you'll find such items in all the

 6     rules that concern battalions, brigades, divisions, corps; and this item

 7     is based on the idea of command and control and primarily on the

 8     principle of singleness of control.  This principle, this idea, means

 9     that only one man can be in command of one unit, of a given unit.  This

10     can be the commander of a brigade, for example, in this case, who was

11     designated to be the commander.  Someone who represents the brigade

12     commander at any given point in time can also act under this item, or an

13     individual appointed or designated by the superior command.  So this idea

14     of singleness of command is included in this item.

15             The second item -- or, rather, the second paragraph means that

16     the commander has to be a member of the League of Communists.  If we

17     apply this to the VRS, then he would have to be a member of the leading

18     party or, rather, the party in power.  That wasn't the case in the VRS.

19     This rule -- rather, this item doesn't take into consideration certain

20     possibilities that are set forth in certain other rules, and that has to

21     do with the absence of the commander or the fact that he is prevented

22     from performing his duties.  If this item was applied in literal terms,

23     one could say that the brigade is dead and no one could command the

24     brigade, and that can never be the case.  The unit must never remain

25     without a commander or an officer.  This is a basic military rule.  So

Page 30727

 1     this item is applicable to each and every officer who, at a given point

 2     in time, has command over a given unit.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  In the English, the whole of the next article,

 4     Article 116, is on the screen.  I think it is in the B/C/S, as well, but

 5     let's go to that, please, Article 116:

 6             "The Staff is the main organ of the brigade command, and it

 7     functionally links and integrates the operations of all the command

 8     organs.

 9             "The Chief of Staff directs the work of the Staff.  He is also

10     the deputy commander of the brigade.  The Chief of Staff, in accordance

11     with the commander's decisions, has the right to assign tasks to

12     subordinates.

13             "The Staff consists of an operations and training organ, an

14     intelligence organ, a recruitment and personnel organ, organs for combat

15     arms, and the office."

16             Firstly, the statement there that the Chief of Staff, in

17     accordance with the commander's decisions, has the right to assign tasks

18     to subordinates.  What, practically, does that mean?

19        A.   The Chief of Staff is in a brigade if the establishment provides

20     for this.  There are certain brigades where there is no Chief of Staff.

21     In this case, we're talking about Chief of Staff.  In Article 116, when

22     it says that the Chief of Staff, in accordance with the commander's

23     decision, has the right to assign tasks to subordinates, well, in this

24     case "assigns tasks to subordinates" is put in a very subtle manner.

25     This means that he doesn't have the original right to command brigade

Page 30728

 1     units.

 2             What does this mean?  It means that there has to be at least one

 3     condition, and that is that the brigade commander is on site and in

 4     command of the brigade, and he took a decision, and then the Chief of

 5     Staff, in accordance with that decision, assigns tasks to units, and he

 6     is then de facto playing the role of Chief of Staff and not the role of

 7     deputy commander.

 8             Here, it isn't said that the deputy commander issues tasks as a

 9     commander.  It says the Chief of Staff, so his role is a twofold one.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I'd like to move on from there because we're

11     going to come to deal explicitly with the question of the absence of the

12     commander.

13             Was the situation where the brigade commander was absent from the

14     brigade regulated by military law within the JNA?

15        A.   Yes, it was regulated.

16        Q.   I don't want to give you a memory test, but do you recall the

17     name of the rules or regulations that regulated it?

18        A.   For every command level, from the level of brigades, regiments,

19     corps, and at higher levels, for each level there are special documents

20     that regulate the responsibilities of the commander, and these are the

21     rules on the responsibility of the command for regiments, brigades,

22     divisions, corps, and so on and so forth.  So this is a document that is

23     legally binding, and it means that the commander has to abide by the

24     provisions of the document.

25             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.  Can we have, please, into e-court 7D717,

Page 30729

 1     and we'll begin by looking at the first page of the document to underline

 2     the point that Mr. Pandurevic has just made, and I'm grateful for it

 3     being pointed out to me that there has been additional translation of

 4     this document, so I have to ask for the complete version to be put into

 5     e-court, please.  Thank you.  Just page 2 in the English; 3, maybe.  Yes,

 6     thank you.

 7        Q.   These are the rules on responsibility of the command in a brigade

 8     or regiment, and at the top there we see the, as it were, legal authority

 9     of these rules, and in English it reads:

10             "Pursuant to Article 7, item 8, on the Law of the Yugoslav

11     People's Army and the authorisation by the Supreme Commander of the

12     Armed Forces of the SFRY, I hereby issue rules on responsibility of the

13     commander of brigade and regiment."

14             You've probably already answered this, but what does that tell us

15     about the rules that we're looking at now?

16        A.   This means that the rules are based on the laws or, rather, the

17     Law on the Yugoslav People's Army, and on the title page you can say that

18     this is a confidential document and it has a registration number.

19        Q.   And just to repeat an exercise we carried out with the brigade

20     rules, were these rules on which you'd received any training or education

21     prior to becoming a brigade commander?

22        A.   Unfortunately, no.  I was familiar with certain general matters,

23     but I wasn't familiar with these rules then.

24        Q.   And, again, do you know whether a set of these rules was present

25     at the brigade command of the Zvornik Brigade during 1992 to 1995?

Page 30730

 1        A.   I certainly didn't have a copy.  As to whether there was such a

 2     copy somewhere, I couldn't say.

 3             MR. HAYNES:  Now can we have a look at page 5, probably in both

 4     of the documents.  We're looking for Article 10.  Thank you.

 5        Q.   "The commander is responsible for the overall situation of the

 6     brigade or regiment, for the correct and lawful work of the command

 7     organs, and for the successful and timely completion of all tasks within

 8     the remit of the command organs.

 9             "The commander has direct control over the brigade and regiment

10     units through the Chief of Staff, his assistants, and the organs for

11     combat arms."

12             Does that accord with your understanding of the brigade

13     commander's legal responsibility?

14        A.   Yes, certainly.  It does agree with my understanding of it.

15             MR. HAYNES:  And can we now move forward one page to page 6 in

16     both documents and have a look at Article 17.

17        Q.   "In the absence of the commander, the Chief of Staff or deputy

18     commander stand in for him with all the commander's rights and duties."

19             Is that your understanding of what the legal responsibility was

20     of the Chief of Staff or deputy commander in the absence of the

21     commander?

22        A.   Yes, precisely.

23        Q.   And perhaps you could explain to us how this provision interacts,

24     as it were, with the articles of the brigade rules we were just looking

25     at, Articles 115 and 116.

Page 30731

 1        A.   Well, Articles 115 and 116 from the brigade rules and Articles 10

 2     and 17 on the powers of the commands of the regiment are somewhat

 3     different.  In Article 115, a principle has been applied without any

 4     elaboration, and the power on the commander has been absolutised [as

 5     interpreted].  As a human being and in professional terms, in these

 6     articles what happens, the commander is defined as the one who commands

 7     the units of the brigade immediately and through the Staff and his

 8     assistants.  If we were to apply Article 115 from the brigade rules, we

 9     could understand that the commander needs only a typist and a courier,

10     nobody else in the Command.  However, this book of rules elaborates that

11     somewhat further in a more precise way.

12             In Article 116 of the brigade rules, the only thing that is said

13     is that the Chief of Staff is also the commander's deputy.  However,

14     Article 17 explains that, and it says that in his absence, the commander

15     may be replaced by the Chief of Staff or the deputy commander with all

16     the rights and responsibilities of the commander, which means that that

17     person acts on behalf of the commander and has to act pursuant to

18     Article 115 of the brigade rules.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Now, earlier on you did say that the legal rights and

20     duties of the commander and the Chief of Staff were regulated at every

21     level, and just to illustrate that point I wonder if you could have a

22     quick look, please, at P410.  We want to see Article 10.  It's page 8 in

23     the English and page 10 in the B/C/S, and this is to show the position at

24     corps level.

25             This is P410, the regulations on the responsibilities of the land

Page 30732

 1     army corps command in peacetime, and it reads:

 2             "Article 10.  The Chief of Staff shall replace the commander when

 3     the latter is absent and shall have all rights and duties.  If the

 4     commander and Chief of Staff are both absent at the same time, the

 5     commander shall be replaced by the officer assigned on the order of the

 6     commander."

 7             Was that the provision you had in mind when you told us earlier

 8     that these matters were regulated by law at every level of the army?

 9        A.   We can see that the provisions of this article as well as of the

10     previous articles are the same.  If we were to look at a division book of

11     rules, we would find a similar provision, i.e., if we were to look at the

12     book of rules on the division commands.

13             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.  And I apologise to the court manager for

14     this, but can we now go back to 7D717 and have a look at the second part

15     of Article 17 to see the position in relation to the brigade and regiment

16     if both the commander and the Chief of Staff are absent.

17             I think in the B/C/S, we'll need to go over one more page.  Yes,

18     I knew this was coming.  It reads in the English:

19             "If the commander and the Chief of Staff are absent, one of the

20     assistant commanders shall be ordered to stand in."

21        Q.   Can you glean that from the, as it were, bad scanning of the

22     document in B/C/S, Mr. Pandurevic?

23        A.   Yes, I can.

24        Q.   And does that describe the situation in law as you understood it

25     to be if both you and your Chief of Staff were absent from the brigade?

Page 30733

 1        A.   Yes.  This describes a situation when both a commander and a

 2     Chief of Staff are absent; it will be the corps commander who will

 3     regulate that matter and order which officer will perform the duties of

 4     the commander in such a case.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  You anticipated the next question.  I suppose it's

 6     not beyond the bounds of possibility that a set of circumstances would

 7     arise where the commander and the Chief of Staff were both absent and

 8     there was no time or no possibility for the corps commander to order one

 9     of the assistants to stand in.  What would happen then?

10        A.   It is very clear that life cannot be regulated in all of its

11     segments by rules and regulations and instructions.  Situations arise in

12     life when one has to react promptly and spontaneously.  If both the

13     commander and the Chief of Staff or his deputy are all absent for

14     whatever reason, at that moment the Command should be taken over by the

15     most senior officer who is in the Command, or, rather, the corps

16     commander should appoint somebody from the corps command, an officer,

17     that is, who would be in charge.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And I just want to come to a couple more provisions

19     to deal with that point.

20             Can we have a look, please, at P26, and we can move through this

21     document very briefly, Mr. Pandurevic, a document headed "The

22     organisational and establishment structure of the army Corps, the

23     Main Staff of the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,"

24     dated the 26th of May, 1992.

25             In brief, what did you understand this document to be?

Page 30734

 1        A.   We know that the Army of Republika Srpska was officially

 2     established pursuant to a decision of the Assembly of Republika Srpska on

 3     the 12th of May, 1992, and we can see that this order was drafted on the

 4     26th of May, 1992, and it was created as a result of the process of

 5     negotiations and counselling between the highest political and military

 6     leaderships in the Republika Srpska, and the topic was how to organise

 7     the Army of Republika Srpska.  It doesn't say anywhere here that one

 8     should start from the existing doctrine that had been in use by the

 9     Yugoslav People's Army or that the establishment books should be used

10     that had already existed.  It says here that one has to start from the

11     specific circumstances and that brigades should be established in keeping

12     with the abilities and conditions under which parts of the Territorial

13     Defence existed.

14             This is a creative approach to the organisation of the military

15     which was applied by the Main Staff and the Supreme Commander.  In one

16     place here, it says that the army should be enabled for offensives and to

17     protect Serbian territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina rather than to be

18     able and capable of taking territories that belong to others.  This is

19     about a new state being created and a new military being created in that

20     new state.

21             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.  And now, can we have a look at P147, and

22     we need page 10 in both the B/C/S and the English.

23        Q.   Now, I've not shown you the first page of this document, but

24     these are the provisional service regulations for the Army of Republika

25     Srpska, dated the 25th of August, 1992.  Just remind us:  What was your

Page 30735

 1     position within that army on the 25th of August, 1992?

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  For the record, the document is P417.

 3             MR. HAYNES:  Yes, I'm sorry.  I'm speaking too fast, I think,

 4     when I give numbers.  I will slow down.  I promise you.

 5        Q.   So where were you on the 25th of August, 1992, Mr. Pandurevic?

 6        A.   At that time, I was in Visegrad.  I was the commander of the

 7     Light Infantry Brigade of Visegrad.

 8        Q.   Were a copy of these rules delivered to you at that stage?

 9        A.   No.  These were temporary regulations that I did not see during

10     the war, but I was familiar with the rules of service of the armed forces

11     of the former Yugoslavia, which were very similar to these rules.  So in

12     practical terms, the new rules did not present anything new to me.

13        Q.   And do you know whether a copy of these rules were kept -- or

14     these provisional rules were kept at the Command of the Zvornik Brigade

15     during the time of your command?

16        A.   I'm not sure.

17        Q.   Okay.  Can we start by having a look at Article 17:

18             "Members of the army shall carry out the orders of their

19     superiors without demure in full, accurately and punctually.  If by

20     chance the order was not given in good time, the person is required to

21     take measures and act in accordance with the specific situation.

22             "Members of the army shall carry out the orders of the most

23     senior officer present when the superior officer is absent."

24             I'll complete it:

25             "The execution of each order shall first be reported to the

Page 30736

 1     superior officer or to the officer who has given the order."

 2             What does that mean?

 3        A.   Allow me to say, first of all, something in general terms about

 4     the relationships in the army.  This will make Article 17 clearer.

 5             The main relationship in the army is the relationship of command,

 6     and this command relationship is based on issuing orders and execution of

 7     the orders issued.  Here, the subtitle reads "Giving orders."  Giving

 8     orders is one of the fine functions of command and control.

 9             Every officer in the army who has his subordinates, either organs

10     or individuals or units, even, is entitled and is duty-bound to give

11     orders, i.e., to command.  Every officer thus, with regard to their

12     subordinates and their superiors, is placed in the command relationship,

13     and this Article 17 regulates precisely these issues.  If it had been

14     applied in practice fully, if it was fully applied, it would be much

15     easier to carry out command over the army, if the orders were carried out

16     without demure in full, accurately and punctually.  This is what this

17     strives for.

18             In any case, you can see that there is no situation in which an

19     officer would not be found to give orders, and if the situation is such,

20     then any such given order has to be carried out.

21        Q.   What about the obligations of a soldier under the VRS to carry

22     out the orders of the most senior officer present?

23        A.   According to these rules, he's duty-bound to execute the order.

24        Q.   Does a commanding officer always have to be a commander?

25        A.   No.  I tried to explain already.  It is not a common expression

Page 30737

 1     to say "a commanding officer."  A commanding officer does not have to be

 2     a commander.  There's also the chief of an administration, the chief of

 3     department.  They also have their subordinates to whom they issue orders,

 4     i.e., command them.  Also, an officer who is not a commander by function

 5     can be assigned temporarily to a task and perform the duties of a

 6     commander.  This is what my Chief of Staff did.  The corps command issued

 7     an order to go outside of the zone of responsibility of the corps and

 8     carry out the duties of a commander there.

 9        Q.   What would be the situation were an officer, for example, of the

10     rank of colonel to have given orders to soldiers in one of your units,

11     say, a battalion?

12        A.   In keeping with these rules, soldiers should act upon such an

13     order.

14             MR. HAYNES:  Now can we have a look at Article 16, "Joint Tasks."

15             "When several units are given a joint task, a commanding officer

16     shall be appointed in good time to direct the execution of the task.  If

17     this is not regulated beforehand, the role of superior officer shall be

18     assumed by the most senior officer, who shall direct the execution of the

19     task.  If a unit or an institution is suddenly left without a commanding

20     officer, command shall be assumed by his deputy or the highest-ranking

21     officer in that unit until a new officer is appointed."

22             I'm not too worried about the second paragraph.  I think we've

23     covered that.

24        Q.   Can you help us as to what your understanding of a joint task is?

25        A.   A joint task, in itself, implies that several units have to be

Page 30738

 1     involved in the execution of that task.  This means that there are

 2     several participants in the execution of a task.  You can have a company

 3     from one brigade, a battalion from another brigade, a group from another

 4     corps, and they can all appear in the same territory, executing the same

 5     task.  If it is not regulated, who will be in charge of all these units,

 6     who will be in command of all the individuals in the territory, then in

 7     keeping with Article 16, para 1, the role of the commander is assumed by

 8     the most senior officer among these people.

 9        Q.   What is the smallest army unit in the JNA?

10        A.   The smallest organisational unit in the JNA was a department.

11        Q.   How many soldiers did that comprise?

12        A.   Detachment.  That detachment comprised eight to ten soldiers, but

13     that changed.  There is a role called a soldier in the infantry

14     detachment.  From the lowest level, from the level of soldier and

15     detachment, the work is regulated.  I'm not sure whether the translation

16     "detachment" or maybe "squad" would be better to describe what I've just

17     described.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let's just imagine that you have a unit of

19     military policemen from one brigade, a unit of military policemen from

20     the corps, some battalion soldiers from another brigade, and a unit from

21     a Main Staff regiment, and that they are working on the same task.  Would

22     that, under these rules, qualify as a joint task?

23        A.   Yes.  In keeping with these rules, this may be considered a joint

24     task.  In order to establish who should be in charge and responsibility

25     in terms of the command of all the units which are present in the

Page 30739

 1     execution of such a task, it has to be established what the rank and the

 2     size of each of the units are, and, also, it should be established by the

 3     function and the rank of all the officers who are present there, and

 4     based on that, it may be established which of the officers is the most

 5     senior one and who should be in command of such a joint task.

 6        Q.   Yes.  I suppose, equally, one could have been appointed, couldn't

 7     he?

 8        A.   In any case, that would be better.  If the superior who sends

 9     various units to perform this joint task, and they come from all the

10     different areas, the most appropriate situation would be to appoint an

11     officer in advance who would be in command of all these force.

12             In the war in Bosnia and the Army of Republika Srpska, there were

13     very frequent situations when the so-called temporary compositions were

14     formed of various units from various areas.

15        Q.   I want just to leave, as it were, the rules alone and go back to

16     something we were discussing yesterday.

17             As a matter of practical reality, you knew the sort of soldiers

18     who comprised your battalions.  What do you think their reaction would

19     have been to the presence of an officer of the rank of colonel amongst

20     them apparently giving them orders?

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  At this point, I think the hypothetical needs, if

22     it's reflecting the reality, why don't we just go there because otherwise

23     it's so massively broad.  A colonel showing up at the Zvornik Brigade any

24     time between 1992 and 1995 could mean innumerable things, which don't

25     help us, but if we're going to the events we know of, just go there.

Page 30740

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes.

 2             MR. HAYNES:  I'll particularise.  I mean in July 1995.  That's

 3     enough, isn't it?  And you can cross-examine about it later.

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think if we're dealing with hypotheticals, we

 5     need to be specific to what we're talking about.  Again, a colonel

 6     showing up on July 3rd or July 2nd to help organise a unit to go to

 7     Srebrenica is a much different thing than Colonel Beara coming to the

 8     Zvornik Brigade under the context that we're all aware.

 9             MR. HAYNES:  I don't mind.

10        Q.   If a colonel from the Main Staff had turned up in a village near

11     to Zvornik and had ordered some of your battalion soldiers to guard a

12     school, Mr. Pandurevic, how do you think they'd have reacted to that

13     order?

14        A.   Well, without doing the guess-work, those people would have

15     carried out the order.  You have to be aware of how the military

16     functions.  The soldiers of the Zvornik Brigade didn't have the -- didn't

17     frequently have the opportunity to see a colonel in Zvornik, and all

18     those who served in the JNA also knew that they would mostly see junior

19     officers, captains, but they would rarely meet majors and higher-ranking

20     officers.  So that rank has a certain authority, but the person who has a

21     higher rank or position doesn't necessarily have more knowledge.  But

22     that is, in fact, how things should work.

23        Q.   Thank you.  I'm going to leave that topic and these regulations.

24             During the period that you were commander of the Zvornik Brigade,

25     were you required to carry out combat activities in areas outside the

Page 30741

 1     brigade's area of defence?

 2        A.   Well, at the very beginning, in December 1992 when I arrived in

 3     Zvornik, this wasn't something I was asked to do.  The brigade wasn't

 4     even capable of doing that.  In January, there was an urgent case to deal

 5     with.  It had to do with sending in a unit to assist the Bratunac

 6     Brigade.  They were defending the village of Kravica.  But later on in

 7     the course of the war, this is something which because frequently done.

 8        Q.   And were you the only officer from the Command of the Zvornik

 9     Brigade who was sent elsewhere with units by order of the corps or other

10     high command?

11        A.   I wasn't the only one.  I was sent out, as well, but my Chief of

12     Staff often went too.

13        Q.   And was that something that endured throughout the whole of the

14     war?

15        A.   Yes, at various periods of time, and for a certain period of time

16     we'd be outside our zone of defence.  That concerned myself and the Chief

17     of Staff.  But this isn't good practice, and it's rarely done in

18     organised armies.  You don't usually have a commander of the brigade

19     leaving the brigade and going off to carry out another task with other

20     units.

21             MR. HAYNES:  I want to have a look, please, at P3379.  Thank you.

22        Q.   And this is -- well, you can tell us.  What is this document

23     dated the 27th of September, 1994?

24        A.   This is a document I sent to the corps command, to the commander

25     personally, and in this document I requested an amendment to his order,

Page 30742

 1     the order according to which Dragan Obrenovic was to be appointed as the

 2     commander of a Drina Corps battalion which was to go to the zone of

 3     operations of the 2nd Krajina Corps.  And as an explanation, I referred

 4     to certain situations in which either Obrenovic or myself were absent.  I

 5     said we were rarely in the command of the brigade together, and that

 6     could cause serious problems for us when it came to commanding the

 7     Zvornik Brigade.

 8        Q.   What sort of problems did that cause?

 9        A.   Well, since the brigade had very few professional officers and

10     since the commander and Chief of Staff were the men who were most

11     frequently in the field and had a direct influence on the life and work

12     of the brigade, well, if one was absent, and that amounts to 50 per cent

13     of the staff, then we have a serious problem.  That's quite evident.

14        Q.   Perhaps it's worth pushing that.  What sort of serious problems

15     arise when one or other of you can't get out to the soldiers in the line?

16        A.   Then the battalion commanders and the company commanders are

17     those who have to do their best to carry out the tasks they received from

18     the Brigade Command, but it was very difficult for them to do this, given

19     their professional qualities.  If you wanted to single out 50 soldiers

20     from the brigade, from various battalions, in order to send them outside

21     the brigade's zone, well, then either the commander or the Chief of Staff

22     would personally have to go to the battalion concerned, and with the

23     assistance of the battalion commander they would have to separate or

24     single out such men.

25        Q.   Just before we leave this document, I want to look at the -- as

Page 30743

 1     it were the -- towards the bottom of it, where it says:

 2             "We also proposed detailed analysis of the corps commanding

 3     personnel so we can see who were the ones we can count on and get rid of

 4     extras."

 5             What did you mean by that?

 6        A.   Well, I've already said what you can see here.  Perhaps I

 7     wouldn't say that now, but at the time, as I was a young man,

 8     inexperienced, I said that.  I addressed the corps commander in quite

 9     strident terms.  I was forced to do so because there were officers, there

10     were lieutenant colonels and colonels in the corps command who were never

11     ready to lead a brigade or battalion outside the corps zone, or there

12     were officers from other brigades who rarely left their zones of defence.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Now, when you were absent from the Brigade Command,

14     who was in command?

15        A.   When I was absent, my deputy, Dragan Obrenovic, was in command of

16     the brigade.

17             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look at 7D462, please.

18        Q.   This is a document dated the 11th of April of 1993, the

19     appointment according to standard wartime formation, an order of the

20     Drina Corps.  You tell us what this is.

21        A.   This is an order on appointing someone to a certain position in

22     the army.  The commander of the Drina Corps, General Zivanovic, issued

23     this order in which Dragan Obrenovic was appointed as the Chief of Staff

24     and also as the deputy commander of the 1st Zvornik Light Infantry

25     Brigade.  It's a textbook example of such an order, and in this order he

Page 30744

 1     was assigned permanent duties, a permanent position, and these were

 2     duties that he was to perform throughout the course of the war.

 3        Q.   Whose deputy was he upon appointment in April 1993?

 4        A.   He was the deputy commander of the Zvornik Brigade.

 5        Q.   I only ask because we looked at a document yesterday that showed

 6     that you, in fact, were not formally appointed until October.  So

 7     according to the documents we've looked at, in April of 1993 the Zvornik

 8     Brigade had a deputy commander but no commander formally.  Is that the

 9     position?

10        A.   Yes.  One could say that he was officially Petkovic's deputy, but

11     it doesn't say that he's being assigned as the deputy, and then the name

12     isn't mentioned.  It just says that he is to be the deputy commander.

13        Q.   Now, on each of the occasions you were absent - let's keep it

14     simple - after April 1993, was it necessary to write a special order

15     every time?

16        A.   No, because this order on his appointment, giving the right or,

17     rather, the duty to act in this capacity when I was absent because

18     otherwise the term "deputy" wouldn't have any sense.  So when the

19     commander was absent, he would automatically be the deputy commander, and

20     he would assume command of the brigade.

21        Q.   When would such an order be written?

22        A.   This order on being a deputy is drafted on the basis of the law

23     in the army.  We saw that the other day.  It says that if an officer

24     cannot be -- cannot carry out his duties, someone will stand in for him.

25     It doesn't say why he's prevented from carrying out his duties.  It just

Page 30745

 1     says that he may be prevented from doing so.  So this is done

 2     automatically if the establishment doesn't provide for a deputy.  If the

 3     establishment does provide for a deputy, and that's the case here, then

 4     if it's necessary to replace or stand in for the commander for over a

 5     month, then one would have to deal with the status of the person who is

 6     standing in for the commander, and one would then have to draft an order

 7     on standing in for the commander so that this could be part of that

 8     person's personal file.  This would then make it possible for one to

 9     follow his career clearly and see what duties and responsibilities he had

10     to carry out.  There would also be certain financial consequences of such

11     a decision.

12        Q.   In relation to Dragan Obrenovic, in terms of his authority and

13     responsibility, did it make any difference on occasions when you were

14     absent if a special order for a more-than-month's absence was written or

15     not?

16        A.   In terms of his responsibilities and duties that arise from the

17     rules on the responsibilities of brigade commander, and we've seen those

18     rules, well, in terms of those responsibilities nothing would be

19     different.  He has the same duties and responsibilities as brigade

20     commander.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Now, approximately how many times between December

22     1992 and the end of the war were you absent from the Command of the

23     Zvornik Brigade?

24        A.   To the best of my recollection, it was on about ten occasions, no

25     more.

Page 30746

 1        Q.   And how many of those occasions exceeded a duration of one month?

 2        A.   I think that was the case on two occasions.

 3        Q.   And can you tell us when those two occasions occurred?

 4        A.   The first time was at the beginning of January 1995 up until the

 5     20th of March, 1995, and the second case was in August and September

 6     1995.

 7        Q.   Now, we saw from a document we were just looking at, at the end

 8     of December 1994, that you were complaining of health problems.  What was

 9     the reason for your absence between January and March of 1995?

10        A.   Well, in January 1995, I was feeling the consequences of my

11     wounding in August 1992, and it was necessary to operate on my spine, and

12     I went to the military hospital for the operation, and after that, I had

13     to recover.

14        Q.   I want to just briefly run through, as it were, the history of

15     that to see where you were and what was happening to you.

16             Can we start with 7D961, pages 3 and 4 in the English, page 3 in

17     the B/C/S.

18             This refers to your referral to a hospital.  Where's Meljine, if

19     I've pronounced it correctly, Mr. Pandurevic?

20        A.   Meljine is a military hospital which is in the vicinity of Herceg

21     Novi in Montenegro.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes, I don't want to interrupt you unduly,

23     but it's the break time that you had asked for.

24             MR. HAYNES:  Yes.  I was happy to go on a bit longer because we

25     started quite late today, and I can get through these four or five

Page 30747

 1     documents in very little time.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Go ahead.

 3             MR. HAYNES:  It would be logical.

 4        Q.   And that appears to suggest -- this document appears to suggest

 5     that you were there between the 13th and 16th of March?

 6        A.   I'm not sure whether that's the right document that shows what

 7     you are referring to.

 8        Q.   Well, let's come on to 7D962, please, and we want the first page

 9     in both English and B/C/S.

10        A.   I would suggest the following:  As there are a lot of documents

11     here, perhaps we could go through them during the break and put them in

12     chronological order because it will be difficult to proceed like this.

13             MR. HAYNES:  I can see you're in control of these proceedings,

14     Mr. Pandurevic.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  We've been over it, you and I, Mr. Haynes.  Let's

16     have the break.  It's perfectly understandable.  Let's do it the way he

17     prefers.

18             Let's have a 25-minute break, starting from now, which the time

19     now is 10.20, 10.21.

20                           --- Recess taken at 10.21 a.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes.

23             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you, Mr. President.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Perhaps you can check with your client whether he

25     has gone through the documents and arranged them in a presentable order.

Page 30748

 1             MR. HAYNES:  They were given to him during the break, and I have

 2     a note of the pages that should be called up in e-court so that we have a

 3     chronology.

 4             Can we start with page 5 of this document, both in the English

 5     and the B/C/S.

 6        Q.   And does that show your presence in a neurosurgical clinic

 7     between the 11th of January and the 6th of February, 1995?

 8        A.   Yes.  This is a discharge note showing that between 11 January

 9     and 6 February 1995, I was hospitalised.  But before that, I underwent a

10     course of physical -- physiotherapy.

11        Q.   Where did you undergo the physiotherapy, and where is this

12     hospital that we're looking at?

13        A.   This is a discharge note from the Military Medical Academy in

14     Belgrade.

15        Q.   Thanks.  Now can we go back to page 4 in the record.  Where is

16     Igalo?

17        A.   Igalo is also close to Herceg Novi in Montenegro.

18        Q.   And lastly, forward to page 7 in the documents.  I should just

19     say, that document shows you were in Igalo from the 7th of February to

20     the 1st of March, 1995; is that correct?

21        A.   Yes.  I was at the Institute for Physiotherapy.

22             MR. HAYNES:  And we should lastly have page 7 in e-court, please.

23        Q.   And that covers a period from the 2nd to the 11th of March and

24     relates to some facility in Visegrad.  What was that?

25        A.   Yes.  During that period of time, I continued physiotherapy in

Page 30749

 1     the 2nd Banja in Visegrad upon my return from Igalo.

 2        Q.   And when did you, in fact, return to work at the Zvornik Brigade?

 3        A.   I believe that I returned on the 19th of March, or maybe one day

 4     before or one day later; I'm not sure.

 5        Q.   And who was in command in your absence?

 6        A.   Dragan Obrenovic was in command.

 7        Q.   Now, are you aware whether any order was written to appoint him

 8     deputy commander during that period of absence from January to March?

 9        A.   As deputy commander, he assumed duties automatically when I left.

10     No order was issued, which was a case of injustice on his behalf, and

11     that was the same case with me a year later when I was appointed

12     commander of the Zvornik Brigade.  This means that he did not receive the

13     salary that he was supposed to receive, and in his personal file it

14     doesn't say, there is no document to that effect, that he was acting or

15     standing in for the commander, and this was an omission on the part of

16     the commander of the Drina Corps.

17             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.  Can we look now, please, at 5D 309, a

18     regular combat report from the 15th of March of 1995.

19        Q.   Firstly, can we just have a look at the date and confirm that

20     that's a regular combat report of the 15th of March of 1995 and then

21     briefly go to page 2 to confirm the signature on it as that of Dragan

22     Obrenovic.  Is that correct?

23        A.   Yes, it is correct.

24             MR. HAYNES:  Can we go back to the first page.

25        Q.   While we're doing that:  Does that confirm for you your

Page 30750

 1     recollection that you had not by then returned back working in the

 2     Brigade Command?

 3        A.   Yes.  I know that Dragan Obrenovic signed regular combat reports.

 4     He signed his name as Chief of Staff, and he was supposed to sign as

 5     deputy commander, but -- because that's what the order said.

 6             In point 2 of this report, we see that the operations officer

 7     states the Chief of Staff, who also represents the commander of the

 8     brigade, visited the IKM.  That's what the duty operations officer put in

 9     this report.

10        Q.   And in the Serbian original, what's the word used for

11     "represents"?

12        A.   It says "stand in for."

13        Q.   Now, it follows from what you said earlier that if there were ten

14     occasions when you were away from the brigade and two which were more

15     than a month, there were about eight occasions when you were away for

16     less than a month; is that correct?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And, again, I don't want to ask you to perform a memory test, but

19     doing your best, when was the first time you were away from the brigade

20     after you'd assumed command for a short period of time?

21        A.   As far as I can remember, it was sometime in the second part of

22     February 1993.  I asked from the corps command to grant me a leave

23     lasting seven days.  I sent my request to the corps command to that

24     effect, and I also remember some other cases when I was absent for less

25     than a month.

Page 30751

 1        Q.   Well, we've heard a volume of evidence in this case that in May

 2     and June of 1993, you took part in two combat operations, both called

 3     "Sword" or "Match."  How long were away from the brigade on each of those

 4     occasions, and what function did you fulfill in those operations?

 5        A.   Towards the end of May 1993 and the beginning of June, I

 6     participated in Sword 1 in the territory of Gornja Podrinje in the

 7     triangle, Visegrad, Rogatica, Cajnice.  I was the commander of a

 8     temporary unit, of an ad hoc unit from the Zvornik Brigade, which also

 9     comprised of some other units hailing from that area where the combat

10     operations were taking place, parts of the 2nd Romanija and parts of the

11     Rogatica Brigades.  I commanded the forces that were deployed on the left

12     bank of the Drina River.  Also, in mid-June of the same year, I

13     participated in Sword 2, which took place from the direction of Cajnice

14     towards Gorazde, and I was the commander of a combat group under the

15     command of Colonel Masal.

16        Q.   And the duration of those operations in the time you were away

17     from the Brigade Command in Zvornik?

18        A.   At the time, I was the commander of the Zvornik Brigade, and

19     while I was in command of these units, it was the deputy commander,

20     Dragan Obrenovic, who was in command of the Zvornik Brigade.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I was just trying to establish how long you were away

22     for on each occasion.

23        A.   As far as I can remember, Sword 1 started on the 25th or the 27th

24     of May and lasted up until the 5th or 6th of June.  Sword 2 was planned

25     to continue immediately thereafter.  However, the units from the Zvornik

Page 30752

 1     Brigade were returned to Zvornik, and only a few days later an order

 2     arrived for them to return to the area of Cajnice, and there I stayed for

 3     some five or six days, as far as I can remember, in the area of Cajnice,

 4     participating in the Sword 2 operation.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Just to be clear for the record, and not because I

 7     have any doubts, we're talking of 1993, aren't we?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

 9             MR. HAYNES:  And we'll come back to that a little while later.

10             But I want you now to have a look at 7D1011 [Realtime transcript

11     read in error, "7D0111"] relating to another period that you were away

12     for a short period of time, a document dated the 14th of February, 1944

13     [sic].

14        Q.   I'm sure none of us want to know what private affairs you needed

15     to leave for, but it's a request to have six days leave beginning the

16     following day.  Do you recall sending that request?

17        A.   Yes, I recall sending in that request.  A few months into working

18     without any breaks, both in Visegrad and Rudo and in Zvornik, I requested

19     a leave to visit my daughter in Belgrade.

20        Q.   Do you recall what, in fact, the response of the corps command

21     was to that request, and your comment that:  "The Chief of Staff or a

22     person assigned by you shall stand in for me during my absence"?

23        A.   The request did not receive a positive answer immediately.  It

24     was granted only a few days later.  Major Petkovic, who was the brigade

25     commander before me, was in Zvornik, and I knew that General Zivanovic

Page 30753

 1     wanted him to assume the duties of the commander again.  In order to be

 2     granted the leave, I wanted to make sure that it was granted, I put the

 3     sentence that I will be replaced by the Chief of Staff or a person

 4     assigned by the corps commander, and if I remember it well, the corps

 5     commander appointed Major Petkovic to stand in for me during my absence.

 6             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look at 7D1012, please, a collection

 7     of combat reports from the period the 17th to the 21st of February of

 8     1994, and if we can have a look at page 2, please, then page 3, then

 9     page 4.  Just have a quick flip through them.  The contents of the

10     document are not important.

11        Q.   I'd just like your comment, Mr. Pandurevic, on the way

12     Major Petkovic signs himself in these documents.

13        A.   Here on the screen, I have the English version of a report signed

14     by Petkovic, and in the B/C/S I can see an interim report also signed by

15     Petkovic, and he signed himself as commander, not as standing in for

16     somebody but as the commander.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Excuse me, but for exactitude, could we say

18     "type-signed," because we see that these aren't actually signed, and I

19     don't think anyone's doing that on purpose, but just so it's clear for

20     the record.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you for that, Mr. McCloskey.

22             Mr. Haynes.

23             MR. HAYNES:  Yes.  I can't actually recall whether it's all of

24     them.  I'll just take a moment to see that.

25        Q.   Now, during the period the 17th to the 21st of February, had you

Page 30754

 1     been formally relieved of the command of the Zvornik Brigade?

 2        A.   No, not formally.  I was still formally the brigade commander.

 3     And here you can see the block signature of Major Petkovic, as it were,

 4     and this is a standard procedure used for regular combat reports, just as

 5     is the case with those which show either Dragan Obrenovic's name or my

 6     name.

 7        Q.   Now, I've noticed, of course, that Mr. McCloskey's last

 8     interruption, in fact, came before you'd answered my question, and I want

 9     you to please consider the block signatures we see on all of these

10     reports in the name of Major Petkovic.  What's your comment on the fact

11     that they are type-signed as commander by him?

12        A.   This is one of the copies of a regular combat report.  Regular or

13     interim combat reports are usually drafted by the duty operations

14     officer.  The procedure in the Zvornik Brigade was as follows:  The

15     operations officer would draft a report in handwriting.  Then he would

16     hand it over to the Staff office, and then it would be typed on a

17     computer.  The report would then be signed by the authorised person at a

18     given moment, and then the signed report would be sent to the

19     Communications Centre where it would be encrypted and sent by teleprinter

20     to the designated addressee; hence, on the report you can see the name of

21     the signatory and a block signature but not the actual signature in that

22     person's own handwriting.

23        Q.   What is the significance of the fact that he has type-signed this

24     document "Commander"?

25        A.   Probably, he put his signature on the handwritten document, i.e.,

Page 30755

 1     on the document typed on the typewriter, and thereafter he could not put

 2     it on the encrypted version.  The person who wrote the document wrote

 3     "Commander" by inertia because Major Petkovic had been the commander

 4     previously, and this was just an automatic action for people to put the

 5     word "Commander," although they should have put "Standing in for the

 6     commander."  However, I'm sure that that phrase, "standing in for," was

 7     something that the officers of the Zvornik Brigade were not that familiar

 8     with.

 9        Q.   But what does it tell us about the way in which all Zvornik

10     Brigade reports are type-signed?

11        A.   If I understand your question well, there are reports which are

12     typed, but not signed, either in the original version, hence in the

13     version as we see it on the screen.  No single report that was encrypted

14     and handed over in that form can bear a signature, especially not at the

15     receiver, because my signature cannot be encrypted and transferred to

16     Vlasenica in that way.  The only thing that can be communicated in this

17     way are my name, my rank, my function; not my signature, as such.

18        Q.   I'll approach this from a different direction.

19             Can we have a look at 7D944 in English [sic].  These are not

20     translated into English, but the point is the same as in the last

21     document.  We only want to look at the signatures or type-signatures.

22     Can we go to page 2, please.

23             This relates to the period we were just talking about, when you

24     were in hospital at the beginning of 1995.  We see that Dragan Obrenovic

25     has type-signed this document "Chief of Staff."  How should it have been

Page 30756

 1     type-signed?

 2        A.   It should have been "Deputy Commander, Major Dragan Obrenovic."

 3        Q.   And if we, just for the sake of argument, go forward, I don't

 4     know, five pages.  Let's go to page 6 and have a look at the report

 5     there, and we only want to see the signature.  And, again, how is that

 6     signed, and how should it have been signed?

 7        A.   It's signed in the same way as the previous document.  It should

 8     have been signed as "Deputy Commander."

 9        Q.   And how should the reports sent by Major Petkovic have been

10     type-signed?

11        A.   Well, since the corps commander designated him to stand in for

12     the commander, that he didn't have a position in the Zvornik Brigade, he

13     had to sign as deputy commander because in establishment terms, he was

14     not the deputy; he was not in that position.

15        Q.   Did you say "deputy" or something else?  "He should have signed

16     as deputy"; is that what you said?

17        A.   No, as standing in for.

18        Q.   Thanks.  Now, I just want to finish this particular area of your

19     examination by seeing what your reactions to a couple of propositions

20     are.

21             A year ago, you might remember hearing the evidence of

22     Mr. Richard Butler, and I'm going to read this slowly, and I hope it's

23     adequately translated to you, that this is what he said:

24             "The brigade commander is -- by law and regulation, he has the

25     exclusive right of command.  Individuals from outside that formation,

Page 30757

 1     even if they are higher-ranking individuals, do not have the authority to

 2     interfere with that particular commander's right to command his own

 3     brigades."

 4             Do you agree with his assessment of the situation in the Army of

 5     Republika Srpska?

 6        A.   This position expressed by Mr. Butler is mainly based on

 7     Article 115 of the rules on brigades.  I can agree with what he said to

 8     the extent that the brigade commander, who performs his duties on the

 9     basis of the law and orders from his superior commander, well, his duties

10     can't be interfered with by another officer when the commander is, in

11     fact, in command and has control over his brigade.  However, there can be

12     a high-ranking officer sent to the Brigade Command with a certain task in

13     order to carry out certain duties that will be carried out bypassing the

14     brigade commander.  He can't take over the command of the entire brigade,

15     but he can carry out certain duties; that is correct.

16        Q.   He was then asked by Mr. McCloskey:

17             "So what military process or procedure would have to take place

18     before a brigade commander no longer had command responsibility under

19     these regulations?"

20             And he answered:

21             "He'd have to formally be relieved or relinquish command to the

22     superior next in line that's authorised to either relieve him or accept

23     his relief of command."

24             Do you have any comment to make about that?

25        A.   Yes.  A while ago, we spoke about the law on the army and the

Page 30758

 1     provisions that had to do with standing in.  It says that an officer who

 2     can't perform his duties shall be assigned an officer to stand in for

 3     him.  This individual doesn't have to be formally relieved of his duties

 4     because so long as someone is serving in the army, this person has to

 5     have certain duties.  If I, as the commander of the Zvornik Brigade, was

 6     prevented from performing my duties of command of the Zvornik Brigade

 7     because I was in command of some other unit outside the brigade's zone, I

 8     was in such a case not formally relieved of my duties.  However, I was

 9     not in command of the Zvornik Brigade at that point in time.  My deputy,

10     pursuant to the establishment rules, did that.  This means that there can

11     only be one person in command of a given unit at a given point of time,

12     and that is what the term "unity of command" actually means.  I cannot be

13     in command of two units at the same time.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And just one last point on this.  What about the

15     deputy commander when the commander is away?  Does the commander have

16     command responsibility for his deputy commander?

17        A.   When the brigade commander is prevented from performing his

18     duties and his deputy takes over those duties, he performs the duties of

19     brigade commander pursuant to the law and rules on brigades, and on the

20     basis of an order issued by the corps command, he is directly responsible

21     to the corps command and doesn't take any decisions in the spirit of the

22     command.  He takes his own decisions on the basis of orders issued by the

23     corps command.  In that sense, he is directly subordinated to the corps

24     command and not to the brigade commander who's prevented from performing

25     his duties for certain reasons.

Page 30759

 1        Q.   Thank you.  We're finished now with that topic, but I want to

 2     move on to another area of, as it were, the question of the organisation

 3     of the brigade.

 4             What sort of brigade was the Zvornik Brigade?

 5        A.   It's not easy to describe the Zvornik Brigade by using the rules

 6     on brigades.  Yesterday, we saw a report here from a Main Staff team.

 7     They went into the field, and they assessed the level of combat readiness

 8     of the Zvornik Brigade.  It was said that it would be possible to form a

 9     tactical group consisting of three brigades.  The Zvornik Brigade was

10     also called the Light Infantry Brigade.  That was part of its title, but

11     light infantry brigades can have no more than 2.000 men, whereas the

12     Zvornik Brigade at various points in time had about 6.000 men.  In terms

13     of its equipment, in terms of the number of battalions it had, and in

14     terms of certain other elements, it could have been an infantry brigade

15     or even a motorised brigade because given its strength and the equipment

16     it had, this was made possible.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, Mr. Haynes, to interrupt you.  Can I draw

18     your attention to the previous question and answer.  Your question was:

19             "When the commander is away, does the commander have command

20     responsibility for his deputy commander?"

21             And Mr. Pandurevic answered to the effect that:

22             "He," the deputy commander, "is directly subordinate to the corps

23     command and not to the brigade commander who is prevented from performing

24     his duties for certain reasons."

25             Whether that is fully responsive to your question.  While the

Page 30760

 1     deputy commander is directly subordinated to the corps commander, and it

 2     may be a separate matter whether the commander who is away can command --

 3     can exercise his command function over his deputy commander or not.

 4             If you could clarify, please.

 5             MR. HAYNES:  Yes, I can.

 6        Q.   When you were engaged with Tactical Group 1 in Operation

 7     Krivaja 95, who was in command of Dragan Obrenovic?

 8        A.   The corps commander, General Zivanovic, was in command of Dragan

 9     Obrenovic.

10             MR. HAYNES:  Is that clear enough?

11             JUDGE KWON:  So, Mr. Pandurevic, you were not allowed to

12     interfere with the command of General Zivanovic?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours.

14     General Zivanovic was the corps commander.  He was superior to all the

15     brigade [Realtime transcript read in error, "corps"] commanders in the

16     Drina Corps, so I couldn't influence his decisions.  I received his

17     orders, which I carried out.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I'll leave it there.

19             MR. HAYNES:

20        Q.   You were just talking about the, as it were, the size and

21     organisation of the Zvornik Brigade.

22             Can we have a quick look, please, at P -- wait a minute.  7D324,

23     please?

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  For the record, before he answers -- you put the

25     question at line 17 -- line 18 of the previous page:

Page 30761

 1             "... so I couldn't influence his decisions."

 2             I clearly recollect the witness saying:  I received his orders

 3     and I carried them out.

 4             And that's for the purpose of correcting the transcript.

 5             MR. HAYNES:

 6        Q.   This is a Drina Corps command order on appointment, dated the

 7     20th of September, 1995, sent to the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, and it

 8     says:

 9             "We cannot enter the orders for appointment that you send for

10     battalions in excess of four infantry battalions anywhere in our files.

11     Thus according to the establishment, you should have four infantry

12     battalions, whereas you have seven.  Perhaps it's high time you did

13     something to form your brigade according to the existing establishment.

14     The number of men in the present seven infantry battalions, when combined

15     and divided by five, would give battalions numbering 750 men each, which

16     would be acceptable ..."

17             And then it carries on.

18             What was the purpose of this document that you received from the

19     Drina Corps in September 1995?

20        A.   Well, there were documents similar to this one before, throughout

21     the wartime period.  We were unable to organise the Zvornik Brigade and

22     structure it so that it corresponded to what it was supposed to be

23     according to the establishment structure.  This was literally impossible.

24     I had to have so many battalions, or I would have had to divide the

25     brigade into two parts.  Given the mobilisation plan for the

Page 30762

 1     Drina Corps -- well, in the mobilisation plan, it stated that there was a

 2     1st Zvornik Brigade and a 2nd Zvornik Brigade.  The second one was never

 3     established, so there's an individual from the Drina Corps command here

 4     who was responsible for organisational and mobilisation matters, and he

 5     insisted that I should restructure the Zvornik Brigade so that it

 6     corresponded to what it was supposed to be pursuant to the establishment

 7     structure.  I couldn't do this because this was a circle that couldn't be

 8     squared.

 9        Q.   Now, I want to have a look now at the scheme of the

10     ideally-organised brigade, as proposed by the brigade rules.

11             So can we have P694, scheme 1, which is at B/C/S page 15, in

12     English, page 4.

13             Can I correct that?  We've committed that usual sin of having a

14     page of this translated, and it's not translated in P694.  So can we have

15     7D359, please, which is a translated version of it.  539.

16        A.   Could we enlarge the Serbian version of this document, please.

17        Q.   I'll give you a hard copy.  This is the structure of an infantry

18     brigade according to figure 1 of the brigade rules of the JNA of 1984.

19     Were the units of the Zvornik Brigade organised according to a scheme

20     precisely similar to this?

21        A.   In principle, one could say that it was similar.  But in terms of

22     size and the number of its units, it wasn't identical to this scheme

23     here.

24        Q.   Were there functional relationships within that scheme between

25     the organs that we see within the figure there?

Page 30763

 1        A.   Yes, there were functional relationships in this scheme, the

 2     relationships -- command relationships, on the whole.  You can see that

 3     all these units in the lower part of the scheme are under the commander.

 4     The other units have relationships through the Staff or through the

 5     deputy commander, and through the deputy commander they are linked to the

 6     commander.  This is similar to Article 10 on the responsibilities of the

 7     brigade commander, where it says that the commander has direct command or

 8     exercises direct command and also indirect command through his assistants

 9     or deputies.

10        Q.   And how in practical terms did that mean that, for example, the

11     Engineering Unit of the Zvornik Brigade was run?

12        A.   Since the Zvornik Brigade didn't have a combat arms at the level

13     of battalions, it didn't have an engineering battalion, it didn't have a

14     mechanised battalion, it didn't have an ABHO battalion, and so on and so

15     forth, then these units that were equivalent to companies were linked to

16     the Staff, to the Chief of Staff, or to some of the deputy [as

17     interpreted] commanders.  So with reference to the Engineering Company,

18     the chief of engineering, apart from the duties he had with regard to

19     that company, the duties he had to monitor the company, train them, well,

20     in addition to those duties he was authorised by me to issue direct tasks

21     to those units, to assign direct tasks to those units.  I almost never

22     directly assigned a task to the commander of the Engineering Unit.

23        Q.   Can you deal with the same question, please, in relation to the

24     Signals Unit?

25        A.   The Signals Unit, and for a while the Reconnaissance Platoon that

Page 30764

 1     we had, were units that were attached to the Staff.  The Signals Unit was

 2     directly linked to the signalling chief.  He was in charge of the unit,

 3     and the Chief of Staff was in command of it through him as well.  I

 4     received information on that unit through the Chief of Staff.

 5        Q.   And the Military Police Unit?

 6        A.   The Military Police Company, as you can see in the scheme, was

 7     linked to the security organ, but in my order on the reorganisation of

 8     the brigade, I said that the Police Company should be attached to the

 9     Staff.  It was linked to the chief of security, too, and he, together

10     with the Chief of Staff, would usually issue orders to this unit.  Both

11     of them reported to me or provided me with information on the situation

12     in this unit.

13        Q.   Since you've referred to it, let's look, please, at 7D806, the

14     reorganisation order of the 21st of March, 1994.

15             And, again, Mr. Pandurevic, because this is a document with a few

16     pages in it, it might be quicker for you to have a hard copy so that we

17     can -- you can read it ahead of us.

18             Is this the reforming order that you were talking about?

19        A.   Yes, it is.

20        Q.   And to summarise it, what was it you sought to achieve by this

21     order in March 1994?

22        A.   I was trying to achieve something similar to what the corps

23     commander warned me about in the order of September 1995.  I was told

24     that I should reduce the brigade to the lowest possible number of

25     organisational units because the command brigade, given its size,

Page 30765

 1     couldn't serve all the units that were linked to the brigade and given

 2     its professional level.  So I tried to reduce the number of battalions

 3     and the number of direct links to myself because in such a case, the

 4     communication channels and command channels are obstructed to a certain

 5     extent.  So I ordered -- I issued an order to have the brigade reformed

 6     in the following way:  There was to be a commander with units attached to

 7     the Staff.  These are units that are directly attached or linked to the

 8     Staff or to some of the deputy commanders.  You have the Reconnaissance

 9     Platoon, the Signals Company, the Military Police Company and the

10     Engineers Company, so these are the units that were not under my direct

11     command.  I was in command of them through the intermediary of the Chief

12     of Staff and my assistants.

13        Q.   In practical terms, if your Chief of Staff or your chief of

14     security wanted to employee some military policemen, would you

15     necessarily be consulted about that?

16        A.   Since all of these headquarters support units or units attached

17     to the Staff have clearly-defined tasks and duties, and these tasks

18     usually were a repetitive kind, they are carried out to the same extent

19     and same manner every day, so in such a situation it's not necessary to

20     consult me.  The individuals who had been authorised by myself had the

21     possibility of directly putting those units to certain use.

22             In the case of the police and in the case of counter-intelligence

23     work and the need in the course of such work to involve the police or to

24     use some kind of equipment, well, in such a case I would not have been

25     informed of the matter.  But if it was necessary to use the Police

Page 30766

 1     Company to carry out a particular task or if it was necessary to use a

 2     platoon from that company, I or someone standing in for me would have

 3     been asked to authorise such a task.

 4        Q.   When you mentioned equipment, were you talking about equipment

 5     within a military police unit or equipment in some other unit?

 6        A.   I was talking about the equipment of military police.  I don't

 7     mean major technical means, but mostly the things that the crime

 8     prevention police had or what was necessary for counter-intelligence work

 9     on the part of the police.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And the Engineering Unit?

11        A.   The Engineering Unit had daily tasks which were always the same,

12     and this was to lay minefields [Realtime transcript read in error, "my

13     fields"], servicing minefields, constructing and maintaining roads,

14     bridges, felling trees, and similar tasks.  Every battalion would use the

15     operations duty officer to express the need to engage somebody from the

16     Engineering Unit, and if it was for some ordinary tasks, then the chief

17     of engineers, together with the commander of the Engineering Unit, would

18     go and carry out such tasks.

19        Q.   Would that be with or without seeking your authority or notifying

20     you or seeking your approval?

21        A.   The chief of engineers and the Chief of Staff had my blanket

22     approval to use those units in such a way.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, just allied to that, we know the various organs

24     of the brigade had, as it were, corresponding organs within superior

25     command units; is that correct?

Page 30767

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And I'd like to go to something that you've already referred to,

 3     which is P699, at point 7.  That's page 15 in the B/C/S and page 14 in

 4     the English.

 5             It may be necessary for us to just glance at Article 6,

 6     "Functional relationships," as well, but principally I'm going to direct

 7     your attention to the second paragraph of Article 7, which says:

 8             "Staff relationships between command organs and staff at a higher

 9     and lower organisational level are in fact functional relationships

10     governed by the principle of obligatory action in accordance with the

11     requests of the staff organ of the superior command for the purpose of

12     implementing the decision made by the superior commander."

13             In practical terms, how did the organs of the brigade function

14     together with their corresponding organs at a higher organisational

15     level?

16        A.   This is about staff relationships, as it were.  This is what

17     every modern army is familiar with.  The first to introduce the staff

18     relationships were the ones that had most success in combat.  This means

19     that within a command or a staff, assessments were made, proposals were

20     drafted, and decisions taken.  In considering problems and situations,

21     the person who was in charge of decision-taking, which is the commander

22     or the Chief of Staff, were able to take an appropriate decision.  Those

23     who made proposals to the person who takes decision have an obligation

24     towards that person.

25             At every level of organisation, at the level of the brigade there

Page 30768

 1     is a staff.  At the division level, there is also a staff.  At the corps

 2     level, there is also a staff, and they are identical, basically.  They

 3     may differ in the number of people that they employ, but in

 4     organisational terms they are almost identical.

 5             Between these organisational parts of the Staff, the lower --

 6     between the lower command and the organisational parts of the Staff of

 7     the higher command, they are the so-called functional relationships which

 8     are formed on the basis of the identical scope of work, so that the

 9     assistant commander for logistics of a higher command, pursuant to his

10     commander's decision, has the right to communicate with the organ for

11     logistics of the lower command, or some other organ of a higher command,

12     artillery or communications, has a functional relationship with the organ

13     of the corresponding branch of a lower command.  However, this functional

14     relationship becomes binding for the staff organs of a lower command,

15     which means that the organ for logistics of a lower command is duty-bound

16     to carry out the requests of the organ for logistics of a higher command

17     with a view to implementing the decisions of the commander of the higher

18     command.  So these relationships have not to go through the commander of

19     the lower command or the lower-ranking unit.

20        Q.   Can you give us an example of that relationship in operation?

21        A.   This would be the corps command.  The corps command has a staff,

22     just like the brigade has a staff, and that staff of the corps command,

23     as the operations command, is almost identical to the brigade staff,

24     especially when we're talking about infantry and motorised brigades.  The

25     organs of the Staff or the Command of the Drina Corps could communicate

Page 30769

 1     directly and deal with certain tasks with the corresponding organs of the

 2     Staff or the Command of the Zvornik Brigade.

 3        Q.   A concrete example?

 4        A.   Perhaps we could use the example of logistics.  We did not have

 5     reliable and constant sources of supply.  We always made do as we could,

 6     so the logistics organs of the Zvornik Brigade were often in

 7     communication with the logistics organs of the Drina Corps and even of

 8     the Main Staff, and they dealt with the issues and problems at hand, and

 9     those communications or those lines of communication did not go through

10     me.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I want to just turn very briefly to one

12     particular organ within the brigade, and that's the security organ.

13             We've looked at the scheme.  The chief of security of the brigade

14     was your direct subordinate; is that right?

15        A.   Yes, certainly, that's correct.

16             MR. HAYNES:  I want to have a look now, please, at 7D717 again,

17     Article 11.  It's page 5 in both documents, and this is the authority of

18     the commander in the brigade regiment again:

19             "The commander heads the work of the command organs and the

20     officers of the subordinate units, guides the training and education of

21     the entire contingent, the execution of daily tasks, and the maintenance

22     of continuous and full combat readiness.

23             "He takes appropriate measures to continuously maintain and

24     strengthen combat readiness and ensures the brigade or regiment is ready

25     to carry out combat tasks."

Page 30770

 1             Let's go directly to point 5:

 2             "He is in charge of the security service and personnel affairs

 3     within the remit granted to him under special regulations."

 4             What are the special regulations referred to, and what are --

 5     what was the extent of your remit to be in charge of the security

 6     services under this law?

 7        A.   What is of significance for an organisation or a system such as

 8     the army is that the internal documents which regulate its functioning

 9     and work should be harmonised instead of contradicting each other, but

10     this is not always easy to achieve.

11             In the Communist system, this all originated from the unique

12     concept which was All People's Defence and social self-protection, which

13     was led by the League of Communists, so that some service within the

14     system had the so-called privileged position.

15             Here, in bullet point 5 of the rules on the powers of the

16     brigade, it says that a commander is in charge of the security service

17     and personnel affairs within the remit granted to him under special

18     regulations.  This implies the regulations which regulate the work of the

19     organs of security on some issues pertaining to the scope of personnel

20     affairs.

21        Q.   Thank you.  But what were the limits of the extent to which you

22     were in charge of the security organ or security services?

23        A.   This was regulated by the rules of the security service and the

24     instruction on the management of the security services which was issued

25     by the Main Staff.

Page 30771

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we might as well -- we'll turn to that in a

 2     little while.  But those rules, like many we've looked at before, are

 3     rules of the JNA.  Was the role and function of the security service

 4     under the Army of Republika Srpska precisely similar to the role it had

 5     under the JNA?

 6        A.   In view of the fact that the security service in the Army of

 7     Republika Srpska relied mostly on the rules of the security service that

 8     were used by the JNA, i.e., the armed forces of the SFRY, they mostly

 9     dealt with the same tasks, but they also had some additional aggravating

10     conditions and obligations, and I mean primarily the war situation, the

11     presence of a number of international organisations of a different nature

12     which could always be engaged in some intelligence work.  There were also

13     some problems which appeared due to frequent communication via secret

14     channels between various persons on both sides of the front-line, and

15     that's why I'm saying that their scope of work was very complex.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we will look at P2741 now, the instruction

17     you've referred to, and let's start with something that's nothing to do

18     with the detail of the document.

19             Did you have something to do personally with the reasons for the

20     issue of this instruction?

21        A.   No.  I did not draft it myself, no.

22        Q.   That wasn't the question.  Why was this instruction issued in the

23     first place?

24        A.   Why it was issued, you should ask the author.  He knows the best.

25     In my view, it was issued as an additional explanation for the

Page 30772

 1     application of the rules of the security service in the Army of Republika

 2     Srpska and as a result of the malfunctioning of the organs and their

 3     relationship with all the other organs at all levels, as you can see

 4     here.

 5             As far as I'm aware of the organisational and establishment

 6     structure of the Intelligence and Security Sector of the Main Staff, I

 7     believe that in the book of establishment, I believe that it's called

 8     "The Intelligence and Security Sector," whereas here an instruction is

 9     issued for the management and control of the intelligence -- security and

10     intelligence organs, which means that the security organs were given the

11     most prominent place here.

12             And one more thing I would like to say:  The sector in the

13     Main Staff, the security and intelligence sector, was very specific with

14     regard to the organisation of the two similar services in the JNA.  The

15     security -- the Intelligence Administration in the JNA was within the

16     General Staff, and it was subordinated to the chief of the General Staff,

17     which means that it was a completely separate service, and its rules were

18     issued by the Federal Secretary for National Defence, whereas the

19     security service was part of the Ministry of Defence, and the chief of

20     the Security Administration was the assistant minister of defence, and

21     its rules are the rules for the work of the security services were issued

22     by the Presidency of the SFRY.  In the Army of Republika Srpska, these

23     two services were merged into one sector and were subordinated directly

24     to the commander of the Main Staff.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 30773

 1             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could I ask the general to slow down a little

 2     bit.  The reporter is having a very difficult time.

 3             MR. HAYNES:  That's a very sensible observation.

 4             General, you really are speaking far too fast now, and the danger

 5     is we're losing a lot in translation.

 6        Q.   Can we go to the first paragraph of this instruction, and,

 7     firstly, can we establish, is this a document that you received in this

 8     form, or was it communicated to you, as it were, differently?

 9        A.   First of all, I would like to apologise for going too fast.  I'll

10     try to abide by your instruction.

11             This instruction on the management and command of the security

12     and intelligence organs was drafted in the Main Staff, and I'm sure that

13     it certainly arrived at the desk in the Drina Corps.  I know that I

14     received an instruction with this content.  I don't know whether I first

15     received the instruction from the Main Staff or from the Drina Corps.

16     However, the contents of -- were identical, save in a very little

17     segment, so that means that I was familiar with the contents, but I don't

18     know whether this came first from the Main Staff or the Drina Corps.  I

19     can't be sure of that.

20        Q.   Well, I'm -- just to clear that up, let's have a look, please, if

21     we can, at 7D890.  This is a document from the Command of the Drina Corps

22     sent on the 26th of November of 1994.  If we go to the last page of this

23     document, we can see that it's signed by somebody called Mile Tomic.

24     Who's he?

25        A.   I believe that at the time, Mile Tomic was the chief of security

Page 30774

 1     in the Drina Corps, and as far as I can tell by the signature in pencil,

 2     this is not "Tomic," but "Petrovic," which means that somebody else

 3     signed on his behalf.

 4        Q.   And if we go back now to the first page of this document, we can

 5     see in the English version there is a different introduction to the

 6     document.  In particular, there's a second paragraph which says:

 7             "Any explanations needed will be given by the chiefs of the

 8     security and intelligence departments of the corps commands, who will

 9     also clarify any matters concerning application of the instructions."

10             When you said that there was something slightly different about

11     what you received from the Corps command, is that what you had in mind?

12        A.   This is what I had in mind:  The organ of security of the

13     Drina Corps provided this remark and said that any explanations needed

14     will be given by the security organ of the Drina Corps as regards the

15     application of this instruction.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes, whenever it's convenient.

17             MR. HAYNES:  That is perfectly convenient.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

19             So we'll have a 25 -minute break, starting from now.  Thank you.

20                           --- Recess taken at 12.09 p.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 12.43 p.m.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Haynes.  Apologies for the delay, but we

23     had a problem.

24             MR. HAYNES:  There's really no need to apologise at all.

25             Before we resume the topic we were dealing with before the break,

Page 30775

 1     there are a number of transcription or translation errors - I think

 2     they're transcription rather than translation - which have been drawn to

 3     my attention, and I thought it would be better to deal with them now

 4     rather than rushing to deal with them at the end of the day.

 5             The first is at page 13, line 17, and it's already had some

 6     modification because it's the answer to Judge Kwon's question, and it

 7     appears that in the transcription of Mr. Pandurevic's answer, he said

 8     that General Zivanovic was superior to all the corps commanders, and the

 9     universal view of everybody behind me is that he said he was superior to

10     all the brigade commanders.  It's perhaps best that I deal with it by way

11     of a further question.

12        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, when you answered Judge Kwon's question about

13     your ability to interfere with decisions of General Zivanovic, did you

14     say that General Zivanovic was superior to all the corps commanders or

15     something else?

16        A.   I said that General Zivanovic was the commander of the

17     Drina Corps and he was superior to the brigade commanders who were within

18     the Drina Corps.

19             MR. HAYNES:  [Realtime transcript read in error, "MR. THAYER"]

20     Thank you.  And the second which was drawn to my attention, I think, by

21     Ms. Fauveau, is at page 16, line 16, and again, I'll see if it can be

22     cleared up with a question rather than just an assertion by me.  Yes.

23     It's the phrase "... Chief of Staff, or to some of the deputy commanders

24     ..."  and I think the belief is that in answering a question about how

25     the Engineering Unit of the Zvornik Brigade was run, the general said the

Page 30776

 1     Chief of Staff and some of the assistant commanders, because of course

 2     there was only one deputy commander, but there were several assistant

 3     commanders.

 4        Q.   Did you at any stage today, General, refer to a number of deputy

 5     commanders within the Zvornik Brigade or, in answering that question, did

 6     you refer to the assistant commanders?

 7        A.   This question isn't really in the right context, but I didn't

 8     talk about deputy commanders.  He had assistants and one deputy.  The

 9     commander had assistants and one deputy.

10             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.  And two minor errors.  At page 5,

11     there's a reference to an exhibit as P0111 [sic].  It should be P1011

12     [sic].

13             And lastly at page 19, line 12, the Engineering Unit,

14     Mr. Pandurevic often had tasks to lay minefields, didn't they, not to lay

15     your fields?

16        Q.   Did the Engineering Unit lay minefields?

17        A.   Minefields, not my own fields.  I didn't have any fields.

18        Q.   Okay.  Well, let's move on.

19             Before the break, you were just looking with us at a document

20     which you received from corps command --

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, one further, since we are in the mood of

22     correcting the transcript, Mr. Haynes and Mr. McCloskey.  Page 29, line

23     3, it's not Mr. Thayer but Mr. Haynes.

24             MR. HAYNES:  I'm not sure who should be flattered.

25        Q.   You were in the process of looking at this again, at an

Page 30777

 1     instruction you received from corps command.  So that we're clear, is it

 2     your recollection that in late 1994 you received two such documents as

 3     commander of the Zvornik Brigade or only one of these two?

 4        A.   As far as I can remember, I already said that I was certain about

 5     the contents of the documents.  I became familiar with it in November.  I

 6     remember that there was snow on the ground.  As for which document was

 7     the first one to arrive in the Zvornik Brigade, I'm not sure, but I'm

 8     familiar with both documents.  The Drina Corps document isn't from the

 9     corps command but from the Department for Intelligence and Security.

10     It's been signed by Colonel Tomic.

11        Q.   Well, I'm not going to take a long period of time on this topic

12     with you, Mr. Pandurevic.  If we look at paragraph 1 of the report, it

13     decrees the way in which the security and intelligence organs will spend

14     their time, and the simple question I have for you as to this is:  How

15     was it determined, and who by, what particular task fell under which

16     heading?

17        A.   Well, I'm not sure that I fully understand the question because

18     the letters are very small in paragraph 1.  Perhaps one could zoom in.

19     It will be easier for me then.

20        Q.   In fairness, it's probably better to go back to P2741 because

21     it's a much clearer document altogether, and it doesn't involve us going

22     over the page quite so much.  So if we can go back to P2741, which apart

23     from the little passage we've looked at is identical.  It would make it

24     easier for everybody, I think.

25        A.   May I?

Page 30778

 1        Q.   Yes, of course.

 2        A.   If we have a look at item 1 of the instructions, it has to do

 3     with the field of work of the security and intelligence organs of the

 4     VRS.  It's a little confused, or it's quite confused and contradictory.

 5     Under one organ, you have two completely different services, the security

 6     organ and the intelligence organ, two different organs, and not a single

 7     rule for the intelligence organ states how much work relates to a given

 8     field.  There are two rules that have been confounded in one paragraph.

 9     This should have said only instructions for leading the security organs

10     because the instructions mostly concerned the security organ.

11        Q.   Can we look at the paragraph numbered 1, please, rather than the

12     first paragraph in the document, which determines that 80 per cent of the

13     total engagement of the field of work of security and intelligence organs

14     should be taken up with intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks.  Was

15     that any change to the position as it had been before the issue of the

16     instruction?

17        A.   As far as I can remember, in the early rules two-thirds of the

18     work of the organ of security was counter-intelligence.  Perhaps I'm

19     mistaken, but here it explicitly says that it concerned 80 per cent of

20     their total workload, which means that 20 per cent of their work related

21     to security issues, to military police issues, and command staff issues.

22        Q.   Coming out of the question I started with:  Whether on a

23     day-to-day basis those -- any given work was determined to be

24     intelligence and counter-intelligence or some other form of work, was

25     that determined by you?

Page 30779

 1        A.   I knew what the difference was between counter-intelligence and

 2     other matters that the security organ dealt with.  I wasn't familiar with

 3     the working methods in the field of counter-intelligence, I wasn't

 4     familiar with the contents of that work, and I didn't know when my

 5     assistant for security was involved in counter-intelligence.  What I

 6     requested from the corps command, but I never succeeded in obtaining

 7     this, was to have the corps commander inform me that my assistant for

 8     security would be engaged in particular tasks on the basis of the chief

 9     of security of the corps, and I wasn't to be interested in the contents

10     of the work.  But I didn't manage to obtain this from the corps

11     commander, so I don't know what sort of counter-intelligence work was

12     involved.

13        Q.   Do you recall when you made that request from corps command?

14        A.   It took up quite a lot of time because as the brigade commander,

15     I was responsible for the overall level of combat readiness, and that

16     means I was responsible for the situation in the field of command and

17     control; I was responsible for the brigade's training, for their morale;

18     I was responsible for security and for logistics.  So I had to be quite

19     free to use the relevant mechanisms to carry out this work.  However, I

20     couldn't have full insight into security tasks, so the problems that

21     appeared between the commander of the Zvornik Brigade and the assistant

22     for security -- I won't say between myself and Drago Nikolic on purpose

23     because it wasn't a matter of a personal relationship.  I would have

24     acted in the same way if anyone else had been in Drago Nikolic's place.

25     However, I understood that I couldn't be persistent in efforts that I was

Page 30780

 1     making.

 2        Q.   Did you or, indeed, could you ask him what work he was engaged in

 3     on a day-to-day basis?

 4        A.   I have to say that Drago Nikolic is a disciplined officer.  He

 5     conducted himself in a civilised manner and in accordance with the rules.

 6     His relationship to the commander was correct.  He attended the Command

 7     meetings and briefings, and I didn't ask him about the nature of his

 8     counter-intelligence tasks.  If he told me he was involved in such a

 9     task, I had to believe him, take him at his word.  That is -- was not

10     something I could check.

11        Q.   Thank you.  We'll just briefly go through a couple of other

12     aspects of the instruction and how you understood it.

13             I should just clarify this:  Did you ever seek from the chiefs of

14     security of the corps any explanation or clarification or interpretation

15     of the provisions of this instruction?

16             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Just to clarify that, the "chiefs" somehow got

17     pluralised.

18             MR. HAYNES:  It got pluralised because I misspoke.

19        Q.   Did you ever seek clarification of the instruction in line with

20     the copy of it we've seen from the corps?

21        A.   I never asked this gentleman, Colonel Tomic, to clarify the

22     instructions.  I think he dwelled very -- or he remained in that position

23     very briefly.  I could have only made such a request from the corps

24     commander, and he, through his assistant for security, would be provided

25     with the relevant interpretation.  I only had information on when this --

Page 30781

 1     I only had information according to which the person who drafted the

 2     instructions had the commander of the Zvornik Brigade and the commander

 3     of the Rogatica Brigade from the Drina Corps in mind, as well as

 4     commanders who were preventing the security organs from working

 5     efficiently, And the situation remained such as it was.  I didn't try to

 6     penetrate further into the matter.

 7        Q.   Very well.  Just quickly going to paragraph 2, it reads:

 8             "The security and intelligence organs are directly commanded by

 9     the commander of the unit or institution of which they form part, but

10     with regard to professional activities they are controlled centrally by

11     the security and intelligence organs of the superior command."

12             In practical terms, what did that mean?

13        A.   Well, the security and intelligence organs, or, rather, that

14     sector in the Main Staff, was completely subordinate to the commander of

15     the Main Staff, and everything had been totally centralised.  Both

16     services had been centralised within the framework of one section, and

17     the commander of the Main Staff, through General Tolimir, his assistant,

18     could successfully control the work of these services, these organs, and

19     assigned tasks to them at lower levels in infantry brigades.  These

20     functions were distinct.  The assistant for intelligence was in the

21     Staff, and he was subordinate to the Chief of Staff, so the first

22     sentence, that the security and intelligence organs are directly

23     commanded by the commander, is true only with regard to the security

24     organs, not with regard to the intelligence organs in the brigade.

25             I have already said that Drago Nikolic, as the assistant for

Page 30782

 1     security, was my subordinate.  That's correct.  But to what extent?  If

 2     80 per cent of his work was counter-intelligence work and the commander

 3     didn't have to have any knowledge of this work, I accepted that, and I

 4     was only -- I only had -- my assistant for security was only under me to

 5     a certain extent.  I had 20 per cent control over him, and that's how I

 6     acted.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  The paragraph that's caused us a degree of debate

 8     during the course of this case, the second paragraph, paragraph 2:

 9             "Furthermore, all members of these organs and services are

10     authorised by law to act and work on tasks from their field of work

11     analogous to the authority of members of the Republika Srpska Ministry of

12     the Interior State Security Department."

13             What does that mean?

14        A.   I wasn't very familiar with the field of work of the MUP, of the

15     State Security, but on the basis of my experience from the JNA, I knew

16     that the security organs had such tasks, but not the intelligence organs.

17     The intelligence organs were in the Command or in the Staff, and they

18     can't have any authorisation from -- the authorisation of state security

19     organs or these responsibilities.

20        Q.   So far as you were aware, did that involve any additional powers,

21     or was it really merely a confirmation of their powers and authorities

22     that had existed before?

23        A.   I know that according to the rules on security organ, it says

24     that they have the responsibilities of the state organs, but what comes

25     under that field, what these responsibilities involved exactly, I

Page 30783

 1     couldn't say precisely.

 2        Q.   Very well.  Can we look at page 4, which will involve us going

 3     to -- sorry, paragraph 4, page 2, and it's really just the second half of

 4     that paragraph:

 5             "All telegrams and mail of the members of the security and

 6     intelligence organ shall be delivered exclusively to them personally, and

 7     no other organs of the Command, including the commander, have the right

 8     to inspect their contents."

 9             Had that been the case before?

10        A.   Probably.  I didn't receive such mail.  The method was probably

11     the same earlier on too.  However, as far as the reports are concerned,

12     given my responsibilities as brigade commander, I requested that in

13     regular combat reports, under the security situation, one should say what

14     the security organ had to do, and in such regular combat reports you can

15     see that these items aren't very extensive.  The operations officer would

16     draft these items.  So I wanted all command organs to place everything

17     that they had with regard to corps in regular combat reports that I would

18     sign.  I would then be responsible for the contents of such reports.

19     I think that this led to a conclusion between the security organ and

20     myself -- this led to a clash between the security organ and myself.

21        Q.   And can we then go to the third page and have a look at

22     paragraph 7:

23             "The monitoring of the professionalism, legality, and correctness

24     of the work of the security and intelligence organ shall be carried out

25     exclusively by the first superior organs for security and intelligence

Page 30784

 1     affairs, except in that part of their engagement relating to command and

 2     staff affairs."

 3             What would be a command and staff task?

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I apologise for the interruption, but the

 5     previous answer doesn't make sense in English, so if we're going to

 6     correct these things, perhaps we should do it now.  Something led to a

 7     conclusion between "myself and security"?

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  The witness said

 9     something led to a clash, not a conclusion.

10             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.  That's how it appears in

11     the transcript, anyway, I think.

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, it's a correction without the removal of the

13     previous wrong statement, so let's continue, and thank you, Mr. McCloskey

14     and Mr. Haynes.

15             MR. HAYNES:

16        Q.   What is a command and staff task or a command and staff affair?

17        A.   Well, as in the case of all organs of the Staff and Command, the

18     assistant for security or, rather, the chief of the security section has

19     to be involved in the work of the Command or Staff when taking decisions,

20     and he, in a professional sense, has to draft an order that will be

21     signed by the commander, and that involves -- that concerns the contents

22     of Staff and Command duties.  Military police work and tasks could also

23     come under this title.  The classical -- or textbook examples of security

24     tasks also come under this field.  But these Command and Staff tasks

25     involve using the security staff, the Security Sector.

Page 30785

 1        Q.   And the paragraph as a whole, what does it mean, the monitoring

 2     of the professionalism, et cetera, shall be carried out exclusively by

 3     the first superior organs for security and intelligence affairs?

 4        A.   Well, it means that this concerns the field of work that

 5     consists -- that represents 80 per cent of the security organ's work.  It

 6     has to do with the control of their professionalism, their legality, and

 7     with their work.  The security organ from the superior command has to

 8     assess this work, and as a result, when a professional assessment is made

 9     for the security organ, there is a field that concerns whether the

10     assessment is agreed with.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Well, let's leave that behind us now, and we've

12     really finished with that section of your examination which involved you,

13     your deputy commander, the subordination of your units, their

14     relationship with superior command, and the security organ, and we're

15     going to go back to, as it were, the historical narrative that we'd

16     stopped when we got to the point where you arrived at Zvornik, but we're

17     actually going to go back a little further than that, please, and start

18     by having a look at P29, Directive 4.

19             When was the first time that you ever saw Directive 4?

20        A.   The first time I saw it was in the Detention Unit, when I

21     received it as part of the DS material.

22             MR. HAYNES:  And if we can move on very quickly from there and

23     look at P3029, the Drina Corps order of the 24th of November of 1992.

24        Q.   You've already told us that you became the commander of the

25     Zvornik Brigade on the 18th of November [sic] of 1992.  This document was

Page 30786

 1     delivered personally to the commander of the Zvornik Brigade.  Did you

 2     receive it?

 3        A.   I apologise.  In the transcript, it says "November," whereas it

 4     should be December that I became the commander of the Zvornik Brigade.

 5        Q.   You're quite right.  I don't know whether I said the wrong thing

 6     or whether somebody else made a mistake, but this document, dated the

 7     24th of November, was it delivered to you?

 8        A.   No, this document was not delivered to me.

 9        Q.   And when you arrived at the Command of the Zvornik Brigade, did

10     anybody draw it to your attention?

11        A.   I believe that this document was filed at the Zvornik Brigade,

12     but nobody actually drew my attention to it.

13        Q.   Now, I want you to -- I want to take you back in your narrative

14     to your period in Visegrad, which you told us was between June and

15     December of 1992.  Can you tell us a little bit about the general

16     situation on the ground in the Drina Valley at that time?

17        A.   I will gladly do that.  However, I can't be brief in explaining

18     that, and I apologise in advance.

19             I did have an occasion to gain an insight into the tactical and

20     operative position of the units of the Army of Republika Srpska almost

21     across the entire valley of the Drina, and I was also aware of the

22     position of the Serbian population and the Serbian settlements in the

23     area.  When I say "the valley of the Drina River," I mean the area of

24     Upper Drina Valid which includes the municipalities of Cajnice, Gorazde,

25     Rudo, Visegrad, and Rogatica.  I also mean the Central Drina Valley, the

Page 30787

 1     area from Skelani to Bratunac, as well as the Lower Drina Valley, the

 2     area from Zvornik to Bijeljina.  The situation in that area, particularly

 3     in the upper and central Podrinje, in the first and second half of 1992

 4     was very difficult and not in favour of the Serbian forces.  The Serbian

 5     population, in the areas of the municipality of Gorazde, had been

 6     expelled from the left bank of the Drina River, and partly they managed

 7     to keep the settlements on the right bank of the Drina in the direction

 8     of Cajnice.  Visegrad was completely cut off and completely encircled

 9     without any means of communication towards the Romanija Plateau and

10     Sarajevo.

11             In Central Podrinje, the Serbian settlements had mostly been

12     destroyed and reduced to the territory of the town of Bratunac and partly

13     the village of Skelani.  Likewise, in the area of Zvornik, the danger

14     came from the Muslim forces deployed across Konjevic Polje, Cerska, and

15     Kamenica.  The only communication between the Sarajevo-Romanija Plateau

16     and the Drina River went across Han Pijesak, Vlasenica, and then via

17     Sekovici, which was a detour, and then Crni Vrh and Zvornik.  In that

18     area which I have just described, there were approximately 80.000 and

19     90.000 inhabitants whose position was not enviable.  They were either to

20     defend themselves in the area or cross the Drina River and resettle in

21     Serbia.  In short, that would be the description of the tactical

22     situation in the area at the time.

23        Q.   Thank you very much.  And just to try and reflect that position a

24     little bit, we're going to take a look at three or four documents.

25             Can we have 7D968 placed into e-court, please.  This is a

Page 30788

 1     document from the 23rd of June of 1992, and, again, this is a document of

 2     some length, so it might be easier if the accused had a hard copy to flip

 3     through.

 4             We'll give him a hard copy, yes.  968.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  When this is done, now and later, if any one of you

 6     would like to have a look at the document that is being given to the

 7     witness, please tell me so, tell us so.

 8             While we are waiting, Mr. Ostojic, we received the waiver of your

 9     client relative to today's sitting, but I don't recall having seen one

10     covering yesterday's absence for the last session or so.  So I would like

11     confirmation from you that he actually told you that he was waiving his

12     right.

13             MR. OSTOJIC:  He did indeed, Mr. President, and we'll look into

14     that and get you one.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right, thank you.

16             MR. HAYNES:

17        Q.   The document from the 23rd of June of 1992 describes the

18     situation in a number of villages and the activity of the enemy.  Is that

19     one that was familiar to you at that time?

20        A.   This document is a detailed description of the situation that I

21     attempted to describe, and it mentions some very concrete settlements and

22     areas, and it points to the necessity of preserving certain towns and

23     settlements inhabited by a majority-Serb population, and also, a

24     reference is made to an easier communication that has to be established

25     between Zvornik and the Sarajevo-Romanija area.

Page 30789

 1             MR. HAYNES:  And another Main Staff order, 7D965, please.

 2        Q.   Again, not in great detail, just remind yourself of the document.

 3     It's a Main Staff order of the 29th of October.  Is it a document that

 4     you saw contemporaneously, either in -- that is, in October of 1992?

 5        A.   I did not see the document in October 1992.  However, I can see

 6     that it was drafted four months after the previous document and that it

 7     deals with the -- with similar problems which had not been resolved,

 8     although the previous document set out some tasks.  This document

 9     continues to show that the situation is still very hard in the area and

10     that the entire population needs to be mobilised in the areas of

11     Visegrad, Rogatica, Rudo, Cajnice, Foca, and so on and so forth with an

12     intention to defend the entire area.

13        Q.   And then are you aware of any attempts to realise any of the

14     objectives under the order?

15        A.   Well, from June to December, the combat achievements of the Army

16     of Republika Srpska in the area were very modest or even none.  The

17     successes were mostly expressed in documents and reports, and they did

18     not reflect the situation as it was on the ground, unfortunately.

19             MR. HAYNES:  Okay.  Just one last document, which is a Muslim

20     document, 7D985.

21        Q.   Does this appear to relate to the geographical area and the

22     problems you've been talking about?

23        A.   This is an article from the journal of the 2nd Corps of the Army

24     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was written on the occasion of the

25     jubilee of the brigade in Hajrudin, a message from Tercuk [phoen] and

Page 30790

 1     206th Vitez Brigade of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it mostly

 2     concerns the territory of Zvornik.  This text speaks about the successes

 3     of the aforementioned units and the losses suffered by the Chetnik

 4     forces, both in manpower and equipment.  The rough estimate that is

 5     mentioned here is 5.000 Chetniks, 50 tanks that were either destroyed or

 6     damaged, and so on and so forth.  In my view, this is an exaggeration to

 7     a certain extent.

 8        Q.   Of course.  But during the period we're talking about, the second

 9     half of 1992, did you have opportunity yourself to see the effect of

10     Muslim offensives on the ground in the Drina Valley?

11        A.   I could see the effects mostly in the territory of Gorazde,

12     partly in the northern parts of Visegrad Municipality.  However, I read

13     military reports, and from the media I was aware of the hardship of the

14     Serbian civilians and soldiers in the territories of the municipalities

15     of Srebrenica and Bratunac.

16        Q.   Did you ever see burnt villages?

17        A.   Unfortunately, I did see burned villages, quite a lot of them,

18     during the war.

19        Q.   In that period, the period we're talking about, do you know how

20     many Serbian villages were burnt to the ground?

21        A.   I did not see all of those villages, but I know that in the

22     Command of the Drina Corps, General Zivanovic had a map of all the

23     Serbian villages that were either destroyed or burnt in the territories

24     of the municipalities of Bratunac and Srebrenica.  That's where his

25     native village was, and he was very familiar with the region, and I

Page 30791

 1     suppose that he had his own personal and emotional reasons to deal with

 2     the situation there.

 3        Q.   Well, we have General Zivanovic's map.  Its surrogate sheet is

 4     7D940, and for those of us who don't read Cyrillic, that will show us

 5     that the title of the map is "Burned Serbian Villages and Churches from

 6     May 1992 to January 1993."  We could sit here and count them,

 7     Mr. Pandurevic, but we already have, and there are 146 villages on that

 8     map marked as being destroyed.  Does that sound about right to you?

 9        A.   The map behind my back is the map that I saw in the Command of

10     the Drina Corps.  I can see some pieces of paper with ordinal numbers,

11     the names of the villages and the times when they were destroyed.  The

12     last number is 146.  I would say that this is the total number of

13     villages and hamlets that were destroyed in that area.

14        Q.   You say "that area."  It's not the greatest map in the world.

15     What is the area we're talking about there?

16        A.   This is the area covered by the municipalities of Srebrenica and

17     Bratunac.

18        Q.   Now, we're going to come on, probably tomorrow morning, to some

19     of the combat activities you took part in in 1993.  You've told us you

20     didn't know about Directive 4 until you got here to The Hague.  When you

21     took part in those combat activities in early 1993, were you aware of any

22     strategic plan that you were taking part in?

23        A.   When I first came to Zvornik and took over the command of the

24     Zvornik Brigade, the only picture that I had before me was the very

25     difficult tactical position and lack of organisation in the Zvornik

Page 30792

 1     Brigade, and my main task was to improve its organisation and to make the

 2     brigade as efficient as possible and include it in combat.  I did not

 3     have before me the order of the Drina Corps or Directive number 4.

 4     However, as a soldier, I was aware that even without an order or without

 5     a command, life itself imposed tasks on me and ordered me to do

 6     something.

 7             In that sense, at the beginning of January, I launched certain

 8     combat activities - very limited, however - just to show some activity,

 9     just to show everybody that the Zvornik Brigade was still alive.

10        Q.   What was the necessity of those activities you began with the

11     Zvornik Brigade?

12        A.   On the map that you showed me yesterday, and we couldn't use it,

13     you could see the position of the Zvornik brigade as it was at the time.

14     We had a battalion in Drinjaca, south of Zvornik, 12 kilometres south of

15     Zvornik.  It was completely encircled at the time.  We also had Muslim

16     forces at -- within the shooting range from the city.  Children and women

17     from Zvornik had already moved out to Serbia.  The combat readiness of

18     the brigade was very low.  The territory of Crni Vrh was not taken, and

19     there was a constant communication line between the BiH Army forces in

20     Zenica and Srebrenica, and the road leading from Zvornik towards Crni Vrh

21     and Sekovici was very often blocked, and traffic was interrupted by the

22     activities of the Muslim forces.

23        Q.   In January of 1993, did you first take part in combat activities

24     pursuant to a Drina Corps order; namely, Operation Proboj?

25        A.   This name, Operation Proboj, would have to mean a lot

Page 30793

 1     symbolically.  It would be the whole corps or at least two or three

 2     brigades that would have to be engaged in that operation.  It would last

 3     over four to six days, in two stages.  However, what we did at that time,

 4     under the name of Proboj or "Breakthrough," which was painstaking

 5     maneuvering of forces left and right with minimum movements in depth, and

 6     the first actions in January were actions at the entrance to Kravica when

 7     we tried to stop the breakthrough of the Muslim forces to the Drina

 8     River, and after that actions started in the general area of Kamenica.

 9        Q.   At the tactical level, what did it seem to you was the purpose of

10     the action, the operation?

11        A.   The main task was to repel the Muslim forces from the town of

12     Zvornik, to prevent the forces to communicate between the 2nd Corps and

13     the 28th Division, which was then 8th Operations Group, and later on, if

14     possible, the aim was to push all those forces even further away from the

15     town.

16        Q.   And what was the apparent intention of your enemy?

17        A.   The intention of the enemy was to link up the forces of the

18     2nd Corps on the north and north-west sides of Zvornik with the forces in

19     Kamenica, Cerska, and Konjevic Polje.  In the second stage, they would

20     have taken the area on the banks of the Drina River and would -- they

21     would have eliminated any form of the Serbian life in the eastern part of

22     that area.

23        Q.   Your orders under Operation Proboj, did they seem to you to be

24     justifiable military orders?

25        A.   Those orders, from the military point of view, were absolutely

Page 30794

 1     justified and logical.  I issued those orders and I received those orders

 2     both orally and in a written form, and from time to time I even had a

 3     personal communication with the corps commander and the Chief of Staff

 4     with this regard.

 5        Q.   We'll move on to Kamenica.  We've had a look at this document

 6     before.  It's 7D1006, the regular combat report for the 1st of February,

 7     1993.

 8             Thank you, it's on the screen.  Just remind yourself of what this

 9     report says.

10             At the time you wrote the report on the 1st of February, 1993,

11     what was the military situation, what were you engaged in, and what point

12     had you reached?

13        A.   As far as I can remember, during this period the tactical

14     situation of the Zvornik Brigade was much more favourable than it was in

15     December 1992.  We had managed to take the area of Kamenica, and on the

16     1st of February or somewhat later we took Glodjansko Brdo.  In November,

17     our forces had been defeated there and we had suffered great losses

18     there.  We were also planning on continuing combat operations in the

19     direction of Konjevic Polje.

20             Judging from this report, as we look at it, I -- you can see that

21     I sent an imprisoned enemy soldier to the Muslim forces -- Muslim

22     villages where we expected conflict and offered protection to the

23     civilian population, which was in compliance with the application of the

24     International Laws of War, which was in force in the armed forces of

25     Republika Srpska.

Page 30795

 1        Q.   Let's address that head-on.  During the Bosnian conflict, what

 2     generally caused population movement, Mr. Pandurevic?

 3        A.   The armies which were engaged in the civil war in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the one side, the Army of Republika Srpska, and

 5     the other side, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in some parts also

 6     the Croatian Defence Council; basically, we are talking about armed

 7     populations, civilians that called themselves armies.  This was a

 8     conflict between people who had lived together and knew each other very

 9     well there because they had been neighbours, and in that conflict, if the

10     one side prevailed over the other side, their respective villages and

11     territories would become completely deserted, and they would be taken by

12     the prevailing force.

13             At that time, we could not speak of any trust.  Nobody waited for

14     the enemy side to come to the village.  Even to this day, we have Annex 7

15     of the Dayton Accord which has never been fully implemented, and it talks

16     about the return of the refugees.

17        Q.   Just one more question, and answer it as quickly as you can.

18             Why did you take this step of opening a corridor and apparently

19     ceasing fire in the circumstances you'd reached by the 1st of February,

20     1993?

21        A.   The provisions of the International Rules of War say that the

22     commanders of the warring parties in a certain area may establish the

23     so-called safety areas where civilians could be sheltered because

24     civilians could not be objects of military actions.  At that time, I

25     could not get in touch with the Muslim commander in order to agree on

Page 30796

 1     that.  However, I did have a choice to send my prisoner of war there.

 2             On the other hand, the International Law of War and the

 3     regulations that I was aware of say that the commander can ban the

 4     civilians from leaving the encircled area.  I did not opt for that.  I

 5     justified a fire opened on enemy lines by what we call the military

 6     necessity.

 7             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.  I think we'll leave that there.  I would

 8     just like to check that answer.

 9        Q.   Did you say you justified fire on the enemy lines there?

10        A.   Any action was justified by military necessity.

11             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.  Well, we'll leave it there for today.

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Haynes.  Thank you, Mr. Pandurevic.

13             MR. HAYNES:  Nobody is very happy with that.  Is that

14     translation --

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  We'll clarify it tomorrow because there is another

16     sitting -- another court sitting this afternoon.

17             We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.  Thank you.

18                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

19                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 29th day of

20                           January, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.