Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 30945

 1                           Monday, 2 February 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  So good morning.

 6             Madam Registrar, could you call the case please.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case number

 8     IT-05-88-T, the Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

10             All the accused are present.  The Prosecution is Mr. McCloskey.

11     Absent from the Defence teams are Mr. Lazarevic, Mr. Krgovic,

12     Mr. Ostojic.  That's it, I think.  All right.  Good morning to Mr. Haynes

13     and Mr. Pandurevic.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  We can start.  We'll dispose of two matters of

16     housekeeping very quickly.

17             On the 15th of January, the Borovcanin Defence team filed the

18     second motion for admission of 88 documents from the bar table.  On the

19     29th of January, the Prosecution filed a response not objecting to the

20     Defence motion.  For this reason, and also because the reasons submitted

21     in the motion themselves are acceptable, are good, the Trial Chamber

22     hereby grants the motion.

23             Now, on the 16th and on the 23rd of January, the Pandurevic

24     Defence team filed their third and fourth motions respectively seeking

25     leave to amend the Rule 65 ter list of exhibits.  On the 30th of January,

Page 30946

 1     the Prosecution filed the combined response not objecting to the motions.

 2     The Trial Chamber, for these reasons, grants the motions.

 3             Incidentally, on the 29th of January, but we only got it later,

 4     in my case I only got it today, the Pandurevic Defence team filed their

 5     fifth motion seeking leave to amend their Rule 65 ter list of exhibits.

 6     I don't know, Mr. McCloskey, if you have had an opportunity to look at

 7     it.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I don't think I have but I don't imagine there

 9     will be any objection.  But I will take a look at the break.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  All right.  Okay.  Thank you.

11             On your part, Mr. Haynes, if documents mentioned in the annex are

12     amongst those that you will be using today, please draw our attention.

13             MR. HAYNES:  Yes, I'll do my best.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  And we'll try and solve it there and

15     then as it arises.

16             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you very much.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

18             I think you can continue your direct, your examination-in-chief.

19             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you, and good morning to you.  Good morning

20     everybody else.

21                           WITNESS:  VINKO PANDUREVIC [Resumed]

22                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

23                           Examination by Mr. Haynes: [Continued]

24        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, on Friday afternoon when we finished off, you

25     were telling us about events in the morning of the 15th of July at the

Page 30947

 1     forward command post at Krivace, and you had just told us about some

 2     documents that General Krstic had handed to you and that you had read.

 3             So that we've got a picture of it, was there a discussion going

 4     on between you and General Krstic as you read the documents or did he

 5     just leave you with the documents to read?

 6        A.   After having read the documents or, rather, having had a look at

 7     them, I assessed the situation very briefly and I addressed General

 8     Krstic whether a request to grant me to return to the zone of

 9     responsibility of the brigade where I was going to deal with the problems

10     at hand.

11        Q.   And what was his response?

12        A.   It took him a while to think about it.  He was assessing the

13     situation on the front line around Zepa, and he knew that the withdrawal

14     of the tactical group and its pulling out of its direction of use would

15     pose a problem for him because he would have to replace those forces and

16     cover the area with some other men.  And in that sense he was not very

17     decisive.  He was not in a position to make that decision immediately and

18     send me to Zvornik right away.

19             However, being -- confronting him with my request and the

20     situation in the territory of Zvornik, his final decision was for me to

21     return to Zvornik together with my forces.

22        Q.   I don't believe you told us this on Friday, so let's clear this

23     up.  About what time in the morning was it that you went to the forward

24     command post?

25        A.   I believe that that was sometime around 9.00, maybe a few minutes

Page 30948

 1     before 9.00 in the morning.

 2        Q.   And how long were you there before General Krstic made his

 3     decision that you should return to Zvornik?

 4        A.   It's very hard for me to pinpoint the time.  I can't give you

 5     anything in terms of minutes or hours.  In any case, I spent as much time

 6     as I needed to look at the documents, carry out that conversation with

 7     General Krstic and after that, to also carry out certain conversations

 8     with the command of the Zvornik Brigade.  It may have lasted some 15, 20

 9     minutes, half an hour at the most altogether.

10        Q.   Well, thank you.  You've answered my next question, which is:

11     Did you speak to the command of the Zvornik Brigade that morning?

12        A.   Yes, of course.  The reports in the documents that I had a look

13     at were not enough for me to provide me with a complete insight into the

14     situation that the documents referred to, and that's why I contacted the

15     IKM of the corps and asked them to allow me to use their RU-1 radio relay

16     device and to establish a connection with the command of the Zvornik

17     Brigade.

18             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look please at P1171, A in the English

19     and B in the B/C/S.

20        Q.   This is an intercepted radio communication at 8.34 on the morning

21     of the 15th of July and I'm only concerned with the very small entry at

22     the bottom of the page in B/C/S, Mr. Pandurevic.  While you were at

23     Krivace, did you come to know that Semso Muminovic wanted to talk to you?

24        A.   I believe that this was conveyed to me at the IKM.  At this very

25     moment, I don't remember that; however, in view of the significance of

Page 30949

 1     that information, I would be of the opinion that Mr. Jevdjevic did convey

 2     that message on to me.

 3        Q.   It probably doesn't matter and you may not recall, but do you

 4     recall whether that was before, during or after your reading of the

 5     documents and your discussion with General Krstic?

 6        A.   This was probably after that because my first contact when I

 7     arrived at the IKM was my contact with General Krstic.

 8             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look at P1173, please.  That's, I

 9     think, A in the B/C -- D in the English and A in the B/C/S, I think.  No,

10     D in both.

11        Q.   Now, when you made contact with the command of the Zvornik

12     Brigade, who did you originally speak to?

13        A.   As far as I can remember, this could have been either Milosevic

14     or Jokic was my first point of contact; however, you could establish that

15     based on the analysis of these conversations and the information

16     contained herein.  It would be overly ambitious for me to try and

17     reconstruct the sequence of the conversations.  In any case, I spoke to

18     Milosevic, Mijatovic, and Jokic.

19        Q.   What was your particular interest in speaking to Mijatovic?

20        A.   I was particularly interested in the situation in the area of

21     responsibility of the brigade with regard to the documents that I had

22     already read before.  I knew that the most complex situation was to be

23     expected in the western part of the defence zone, which was the defence

24     sector of the 4th, 6th and the 7th Battalions, i.e., the positions

25     ranging from Petkovci to Memici in the west.

Page 30950

 1             Since Mr. Mijatovic at one point in time was the battalion

 2     commander in Baljkovica and he was best -- most familiar with the

 3     terrain, he was the one who could provide me with the most accurate

 4     information with this regard.

 5        Q.   And was he at the command Standard on the morning of the 15th

 6     when you called?

 7        A.   He must have been.  I'm sure he was.  I spoke to them.  They used

 8     the same telephone because his office and Milosevic's office are two

 9     adjacent offices to the office of the duty operations officer.

10        Q.   How did you leave things during the first conversation you had?

11        A.   As you can see in this conversation, I inquired about the 4th,

12     the 6th and the 7th Battalion.  Milosevic provided me with certain

13     information which was not completely consistent and he, himself, did not

14     have enough information to be able to portray the situation or assess it

15     in real time.  However, information that I obtained during those

16     conversations was more favourable than the information contained in the

17     documents that I had perused.

18        Q.   At the bottom of the intercept that we're looking at, it suggests

19     that you told Mijatovic to call the 4th, 6th and 7th Battalion and report

20     back to you; is that your recollection of how you left things?

21        A.   Yes.  I asked them to check the situation immediately.  I wanted

22     to have the situation in real time.  I wanted to know at the moment when

23     I was calling what the situation was on the front line.  That's why I

24     asked them to do that and I told them that I would call back, that I

25     would talk to them again.

Page 30951

 1             MR. HAYNES:  Can we now have in e-court, please, P1174, A in the

 2     English and B in the B/C/S.

 3        Q.   This intercepted conversation is timed at 9.10 on the morning of

 4     the 15th of July, so if the timing is accurate, about 15 minutes after

 5     the conversation we were just looking at.  Do you recall when you called

 6     back the second time speaking to Jokic?

 7        A.   Yes.  When I called back the second time, Jokic was probably the

 8     duty operations officer.  He replied.  However, I did not talk to him

 9     about the situation at all.  I knew him very well.  I knew that he was a

10     man who is faced by complicated situations and he is not able to convey

11     the real picture of the events.  That's why I wanted to be put through to

12     Mijatovic immediately.

13        Q.   And do the responses recorded as being made by Mijatovic in this

14     intercept accord with your recollection of the conversation you had the

15     second time you called the brigade?

16        A.   This was the information that Mijatovic had obtained after my

17     initial conversation with him.  In the meantime, he had spoken to the

18     units on the lines, and since this is not a very legible handwritten

19     version, but I remember that he said everything is okay on the lines, I

20     think, and that a chief, and I believe that he meant Obrenovic, said

21     there were long columns -- it's very hard for me to read everything that

22     it says here.  If you have a typewritten version, it would be better.  In

23     any case, this is the most recent information, an update that I received

24     at that time, at 0910.

25        Q.   Well, just to give you the opportunity, I don't think it will

Page 30952

 1     advance things very far, but the typewritten version is 1174 D, so if you

 2     would just like to have a quick look at that to assure yourself that

 3     nothing has been missed by you.  The document in e-court will need to be

 4     on page 2.

 5        A.   Yes, this is it.  The situation on the front line is good,

 6     stable.  Parts of the 28th Division, according to an estimate, some 4.000

 7     to 5.000 of them are encircled, and according to his information, Naser

 8     with a group has entered Krizevici.  And this would be all that it says

 9     in this intercept.

10        Q.   Now, you were present at Zepa pursuant to an order.  Did it

11     require an order for your unit to pull out of Zepa?

12        A.   Since I had participated in Stupcanica 95 operation, the

13     commander of that operation, General Krstic, had to issue a special order

14     for my unit to be pulled out and sent to Zvornik.  And as far as I can

15     remember, he did issue a written order for that to be carried out.

16             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look at 7D686, please.

17        Q.   We'll have a look at this in a little detail.  This is an order

18     dated the 15th of July.  If we go to the bottom, we can see the time at

19     which it was sent; it appears to be 10.41.  Do you agree with that?

20        A.   But I see at the end a handwritten note, "at 1000 hours" outside

21     of the original square.

22        Q.   And in the body of the order, it says:

23             "The Drina Corps Commander has decided to return part of the

24     forces of the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade and the Podrinje Special

25     Forces Detachment to their zones of responsibility where they are to take

Page 30953

 1     measures to remove and prevent the consequences of a possible attack on

 2     Zvornik and the link-up of Muslim units from Srebrenica and Tuzla."

 3             And then in the body of the order:

 4             "The 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, the Ministry of the Interior

 5     forces, and the attached units shall take all measures to block and, if

 6     possible, break up and capture Muslim forces until the arrival of parts

 7     of the Zvornik Infantry Brigade and the POSS."

 8             The first half of that order appears to relate to you.  Are those

 9     the orders you understood General Krstic to be giving you in relation to

10     the forces of the enemy that were in and around Zvornik at that time?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   The first paragraph under the heading "Order" appears to be

13     addressed to somebody else.  Who would that have been addressed to?

14        A.   It is "Return of the Elements of the 1st Zvornik Infantry

15     Brigade."  That's the title.  And this was also sent to the command of

16     the 1st Zvornik Brigade.

17        Q.   But I just was hoping to draw your comment on the fact that

18     although the orders are very similar, one appears to be addressed to you

19     and a separate one to Dragan Obrenovic, doesn't it?

20        A.   Yes, two separate tasks are contained in this order.  The first

21     one in the first part concerns the units that had been with me in Zepa

22     and the other one concerns those units of the Zvornik Brigade which were

23     in the zone of defence in Zvornik.

24        Q.   Okay.  Well, we'll leave that there.

25             Just to tidy up the whole process of your discussion with General

Page 30954

 1     Krstic, the documents you were shown and the order you were given, were

 2     you shown any documents that made any reference to prisoners of war?

 3        A.   No, I wasn't.

 4        Q.   Did any part of the discussion you had with General Krstic

 5     concern prisoners of war?

 6        A.   No.  No, they didn't.

 7        Q.   And did you receive any order from General Krstic relating to

 8     prisoners of war?

 9        A.   No, I did not.

10        Q.   Did you at the time you were at Krivace have any knowledge of the

11     presence of prisoners of war in the Zvornik area?

12        A.   No, I didn't.  I didn't know that there were prisoners of war

13     anywhere.  I didn't know that at all.

14        Q.   Now, what did you do following General Krstic's order?

15        A.   Having received the order, I returned to the sector where my

16     units were and I issued tasks to my subordinated officers.  I ordered

17     them to pull out the units from fighting to form a column, to organise a

18     march and return to Zvornik.

19        Q.   Was the removal of your units from the line a straightforward

20     process?

21        A.   Since we were engaged in combat with the enemy, that was a very

22     sensitive procedure, and removal from this combat engagement had to be

23     carried out very carefully in order to avoid any losses.  And we also did

24     not want the enemy to conclude what our true intentions were.  That is

25     why the whole operation took a while.

Page 30955

 1        Q.   But once it had been achieved, what did you then do?

 2        A.   Once the units were removed from combat engagement with the enemy

 3     and when I had issued my tasks to the officers, I was the one to leave

 4     with my escorts, my signalsmen, and I went in the direction of Zvornik.

 5        Q.   About what time did you leave?

 6        A.   It was sometime around 10.00 or maybe half past 10.00, or even

 7     closer to 11.00, thereabouts.

 8        Q.   Did you stop en route to Zvornik or did you go directly there?

 9        A.   I don't remember whether I stopped anywhere.  I can't be sure of

10     that.

11        Q.   And about what time did you get to Zvornik?

12        A.   I arrived in Zvornik around noon, around 1200 hours.

13        Q.   Now, we'll just leave that to one side for a moment to have a

14     brief look at the situation in the brigade that morning.

15             MR. HAYNES:  Could we have a look, please, at P377, the duty

16     officer's notebook.

17             I know Ms. Stewart's kindly brought the original with her again

18     this morning, so if you can have a look at that, Mr. Pandurevic, you'll

19     need to find the ERN number 5756.  The rest of us can look at page 138 in

20     the e-court version.  5756.

21        Q.   It's the entry at the bottom of the page at 9.21.  Obrenovic

22     ordered an urgent request for reinforcements from the corps, reported.

23     What can we glean from that as to your deputy's understanding at 9.21 in

24     the morning?

25        A.   The duty operations officer recorded Obrenovic's order for an

Page 30956

 1     urgent reinforcement from the corps, and it says underneath that Badem

 2     sent reinforcements, and I believe that Badem at the time was the

 3     code-name for the Bratunac Brigade.

 4             This is a sequence to Obrenovic's request that he sent in the

 5     interim combat report, sent from Zvornik at 0110 hours, between 14 and 15

 6     July, as far as I can remember.  I remember having seen that report at

 7     Krivace.  He did not request for my return expressly, but he just

 8     requested for reinforcement to be sent.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. HAYNES:  Now we can have a look at P1176; that's A in the

11     English and B in the B/C/S.

12        Q.   This is a conversation intercepted and recorded as being at 9.39

13     on the morning of the 15th of July.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes, the B/C/S version is under seal.

15             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.  Then it should not be broadcast.

16        Q.   A conversation between Zlatar, which is what?

17        A.   This intercept is a conversation between the duty officer of

18     Palma and the one of Zlatar, that is, the Zvornik Brigade and the Drina

19     Corps respectively.

20        Q.   And here we see the duty officer at Zlatar saying:

21             "Z:  Put me through to the duty officer.

22             "P:  Right away, hello.

23             "Z:  This is the Zlatar duty officer."

24             And the duty officer at Zvornik:

25             "P:  Major Jokic, duty officer at Palma.

Page 30957

 1             "Z:  Jokic.

 2             "P:  Yes.

 3             "Z:  Your /deserters?/ are coming to you.

 4             "P:  Pardon?

 5             "Z:  Your ... they are coming.

 6             "P:  Who is coming?" says Major Jokic.

 7             "Z:  Your lot, fuck it.

 8             "P:  Our lot with the boss.

 9             "Z:  Come on, stop blabbering, bye.

10             "P:  Bye."

11             What does this intercepted conversation appear to record?

12        A.   The duty officer of Zlatar tried to inform the duty officer of

13     Palma in good time that the unit under my command was on its way back.

14     He intended to do that briefly and in code so that whoever was listening

15     in would not understand, but it turned out the other way.  So whoever was

16     listening was able to conclude what this was about.  In any case, he is

17     informing Jokic that the forces which had been at Zepa were on their way

18     back.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Well, I think we can leave that there.

20             Now, with whom did you travel from Zepa to Zvornik?

21        A.   Of course, the driver, escort and communications man.

22        Q.   And when you arrived at Zvornik, was there anyone on the gate to

23     the barracks?

24        A.   Yes, there was a policeman at the gate.  I don't know if it ever

25     happened that there was no policeman or soldier on duty at the gate

Page 30958

 1     controlling the entrance, people coming in and out.  And the policeman

 2     opened the gate so that the vehicle could go in.

 3        Q.   What did you do when you arrived?

 4        A.   On entering the barracks, my vehicle always parked in front of

 5     the entrance to the building.  And one member of the escort always went

 6     ahead of me, I would follow him, and another member of my escort would

 7     walk behind me.  I immediately went up to the first floor where my office

 8     was and also the office of the Chief of Staff.

 9        Q.   Did you notice any other cars in the carpark Standard when you

10     arrived?

11        A.   Yes, I did.  There were some parked cars, but I didn't know whose

12     they were at that point in time.

13        Q.   Who did it turn out they belonged to?

14        A.   I learned later on that these were cars belonging to Mr. Vasic

15     and Mr. Borovcanin.

16        Q.   Once you got inside the building, did you see anybody?

17        A.   In front of me was my escort, the soldier escorting me, and at

18     the steps in front of the office of the operations duty officer, he

19     stopped and I went on down the corridor towards my office.  He remained

20     where he was and went to another room.  There was nobody else in the

21     corridor at that point in time.

22        Q.   And which room did you go to first?

23        A.   Since my job was urgent, I went straight to the office of the

24     Chief of Staff.

25        Q.   And what did you do when you got to the office of the Chief of

Page 30959

 1     Staff?

 2        A.   When I entered the office of the Chief of Staff, at the head of

 3     the table was Dragan Obrenovic.  I remember Mr. Vasic, Borovcanin, Danilo

 4     Zoljic, and Miso Stupar.  Whether there was anyone else, I can't recall

 5     now.  Of all these people, with the exception of Borovcanin, I had seen

 6     them all before and I knew them.

 7        Q.   Were they standing up or sitting down?

 8        A.   Obrenovic was the only one who got up; the others remained

 9     sitting down.  I said to Obrenovic, "Can you inform me immediately about

10     the situation on the front?"

11        Q.   And what did he do?

12        A.   As there was a map hanging on the wall, he took a pointer and

13     explained to me what the situation was in the area of defence of the

14     brigade and what activities had taken place that morning.

15        Q.   Did he tell you what he knew about the size of the enemy force

16     you were dealing with?

17        A.   He gave me his assessment, that was his own assessment, and also

18     the information he had received from intelligence which had been

19     submitted to him by Captain Vukotic and our intercepts centre.  And he

20     told me that the forces of the 28th Division were in the area of Crni

21     Vrh, Planinac, and that there were maybe 5.000 to 6.000 men in total,

22     some armed and some unarmed.

23        Q.   And what information was there as to where the forces of the 28th

24     Division were headed?

25        A.   The information he gave me was that the 28th Division intended to

Page 30960

 1     continue moving across Crni Vrh and Planinac and to come out at Nezuk.

 2     He said that from the early morning there had been attacks by parts of

 3     the 2nd Corps from the front but that the front line had not moved at any

 4     point.  Our positions at the front end were stable.  There was

 5     information that Naser Oric, with a group, had entered the village of

 6     Krizevici but that was not correct.  That was only a ploy they used,

 7     trying to get us to believe that through the radio communications.

 8        Q.   Given the state of the information you had at that meeting, were

 9     you concerned for the security of the town of Zvornik itself?

10        A.   In view of the location of the 28th Division and the intentions

11     we had assessed they had, I was fully aware that there was no threat to

12     Zvornik, that the threat was over and that no one had the intention of

13     attacking Zvornik.

14        Q.   Why was that?

15        A.   The forces of the 28th Division had only one goal and that was to

16     reach the territory controlled by the 2nd Corps of the BH army, and their

17     combat-readiness was such that they were unable to carry out any

18     large-scale offensive activities.

19        Q.   Did the size of the force of the 28th Division worry you?

20        A.   At any rate the numbers did play a role, but there was a bigger

21     threat from the front line from the forces of the 2nd Corps.  I knew,

22     however, that in the column of the 28th Division -- rather, I assumed

23     there were both armed and unarmed able-bodied men and that this column

24     was marching -- rather, had been marching for some five days and that

25     they must be exhausted.

Page 30961

 1        Q.   What did you -- what were your orders?

 2        A.   The orders I received from General Krstic were that I should stop

 3     the column, block it, prevent it from going further and destroy it, or

 4     rather to prevent them from joining up with the forces of the 2nd Corps.

 5     This same order was issued to the Zvornik Brigade.  They were to do that

 6     until I returned.  So acting on those orders, I issued tasks to the

 7     persons present in the office of the Chief of Staff.

 8        Q.   Just before we come on to the orders you issued, you've said that

 9     your orders were to destroy the column.  What, in military terms, would

10     that entail?

11        A.   I think I said something about this the other day.  "To destroy"

12     means to carry out military activities which will destroy most of the

13     enemy unit so that they no longer represent a military threat.

14        Q.   What are the various ways in which that might be achieved?

15        A.   There's another term which is to neutralise.  "To neutralise"

16     means to render harmless in another way by disarming, imprisoning,

17     capturing or putting the unit in a passive situation where it can no

18     longer act.

19        Q.   So if the 28th Division had laid down its arms and surrendered,

20     that would have achieved destruction, would it, or neutralisation?

21        A.   The division would have been neutralised or, rather, the military

22     threat it represented would have been eliminated.

23        Q.   In that event - I know it's a hypothetical question - did you

24     have any idea what you might do with 5.000 to 6.000 prisoners?

25        A.   That would have been the first instance in all my military

Page 30962

 1     experience where there would be such a huge number of prisoners, and I

 2     would ask the corps for guidance as to what to do next.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  So let's move on to the tasks.  What tasks did you

 4     issue to the people present at that meeting on the 15th of July?

 5        A.   As Obrenovic had told me in detail, the positions of the forces

 6     of the Zvornik Brigade, both those at the front line and those that had

 7     organised ambushes and roadblocks, Borovcanin told me about the state and

 8     disposition of his units.  In compliance with the orders I had, I issued

 9     tasks that these units should be engaged in cutting off the forces of the

10     28th Division and defence from the forces of the 2nd Corps.

11        Q.   What was the overall plan of the tasks that you gave?

12        A.   The overall plan was to strengthen the forward defence line or,

13     rather, the positions of the 4th and 7th Battalions and prevent at any

14     cost a break-through by the forces from the front, and then by cutting

15     off the forces of the 28th Division, both from the flank and across, to

16     neutralise the forces of the 28th Division.

17        Q.   Were you by the time of that meeting expecting other forces to

18     join you?

19        A.   I knew that at any moment a tactical group should arrive, the one

20     that had been with me.  I knew that in the area of Crni Vrh there were

21     two companies previously engaged by Dragan Obrenovic.  I knew that the

22     Intervention Platoon of the 2nd Battalion was at Tisova Kosa, in that

23     area, that is.  And I knew that some other forces should arrive from

24     Bratunac and some had already arrived and that the MUP units under the

25     command of Ljubisa Borovcanin were ready to be used.

Page 30963

 1        Q.   Did anybody at the meeting suggest any other course of action,

 2     other than strengthening the lines and cutting off the forces of the 28th

 3     Division?

 4        A.   There were other suggestions.  I think that Mr. Borovcanin put

 5     forward a suggestion that the forces of the 28th Division should be

 6     allowed to pass through, that the area should be opened up immediately

 7     for their free passage.

 8             There were other comments as to how to engage the forces of the

 9     VRS in carrying out the assigned task, but as there was a need for urgent

10     action, I cut short the discussion.  I reiterated the tasks I had issued

11     and I said that everyone should now set out to implement those tasks.

12     And if somebody did not wish to be engaged in this, they didn't have to

13     be.

14        Q.   Why did you not feel able to entertain the suggestion that the

15     forces of the 28th Division should be let to pass through at that stage?

16        A.   I had quite a lot of wartime experience as regards the

17     information coming on the enemy coming in, and the information I trusted

18     most was the information I obtained personally and convinced myself on

19     the ground that it was true.  It would have been irresponsible if the

20     task I had been issued by General Krstic was changed by me in the office

21     without my having gone out on the ground and seen for myself what the

22     situation was.  At that point in time I didn't want to accept any other

23     suggestions.

24        Q.   How long did the meeting last with you there?

25        A.   The meeting didn't last long, at least not while I was there,

Page 30964

 1     only for as long as it took Obrenovic to explain the tactical situation,

 2     for us to have a brief discussion all together, for me to issue the

 3     tasks.  So all this might have taken some 20 minutes or so.  It's hard

 4     for me now to establish a time frame, but it wasn't long because I wanted

 5     to go to the forward command post as soon as possible.

 6        Q.   And what happened at the end of the meeting?

 7        A.   At the end of the meeting, I sent Obrenovic to the command of the

 8     4th Battalion in Baljkovica, Borovcanin went to take his units to the

 9     Parlog and Baljkovica area, and I went to the forward command post.

10        Q.   Now, before we leave the command of the Zvornik Brigade, a few

11     specific questions about the meeting and your arrival at the Standard

12     barracks.  Is there any truth in the suggestion that you saw Obrenovic on

13     his own in the corridor before you went into his room?

14        A.   No.

15        Q.   Is there any question of Obrenovic stepping outside the room once

16     you were all in the meeting together?

17        A.   No.  I entered the room and found them all inside.  No one went

18     out for the duration of the meeting.

19        Q.   And did anybody, Obrenovic or anybody else, mention during the

20     course of that meeting anything about prisoners of war?

21        A.   No, no one did.

22        Q.   Just before the next series of questions, I'd like you to have a

23     look at the notebook you have under your left arm again, please, and can

24     you look at 5757.  That's the ERN number of the page you need to see.

25     For the rest of us, it's page 139 in the e-court version.  And it's the

Page 30965

 1     entry right at the top of the page.

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And it reads in the English:

 4             "The Turks have cut off the road to Crni Vrh, the Chief of Staff

 5     reported, 6th Infantry Battalion.  IKM reports a column moving from

 6     Krizevici towards Motovska Kosa."

 7             Was the information about the cutting off of the road to Crni Vrh

 8     available to you before you set out from that meeting towards the IKM?

 9        A.   During his briefing on the overall situation on the ground,

10     Obrenovic also conveyed information on the situation on the roads and the

11     possibility of moving in certain directions, secure movement, and I knew

12     that the road across Crni Vrh, Orahovac, and Krizevici was not safe.

13        Q.   One of the routes to the forward command post would take you

14     through Orahovac, wouldn't it?  Did you go that way on the afternoon of

15     the 15th of July?

16        A.   That's the usual route one took to reach the 4th Battalion -

17     Zvornik, Orahovac, Krizevici, Parlog, Baljkovica.  But on that day I

18     didn't take that route.  I took the route Zvornik, Jardan, Cer,

19     Kitovnice -- Jardan, Cer, Kitovnice.  That was a safer and more secure

20     route.  The road was worse but it was safer.

21             MR. HAYNES:  Just to reinforce that point, can we have a look,

22     please, at P2232, page 12; and 2231, that's the original page 16, and

23     this is the book of tactical intercepts.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes, it's almost ten past 10.00.  We stop at

25     20 past.  Okay, I apologise to you.  Yes, it's the second time.

Page 30966

 1             MR. HAYNES:  I'll have to make these first sessions more

 2     interesting.  You're obviously running out of patience with me 10 minutes

 3     before the break.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  I raised it because you were going to start with a

 5     new thing, which I knew for sure you wouldn't finish in two minutes.

 6             MR. HAYNES:  No.  No.

 7        Q.   About two-thirds of the way down the page in the English, I don't

 8     know how easily you will identify it in the original script,

 9     Mr. Pandurevic, but there's an intercepted call between L-1 and Igman

10     about the sending of 40 -- forces of 40 men.  Can you see that?  I don't

11     know precisely where it is on the page in the -- thank you.  It's exactly

12     halfway down, right in the middle of the screen.  Can you see that?

13        A.   Yes, I can see that L-1 is reporting to Igman-1 about the 40 men

14     who should not be sent via Krizevici, and Krizevici is immediately about

15     Orahovac, but rather to send them across Jardan, Kitovnice, and I can't

16     read the last word.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18        A.   The last word is Delici.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Do you find them in English?  Could you take a look?

20     It's page 16 in -- what we have in front of us is page 16.  Is it the

21     correct one?

22             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you, Judge Kwon.  No, it's not.  It should be

23     page 12 in the English.  Thank you very much, because --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I see it now.

25             MR. HAYNES:  Yes, it's two-thirds of the way down.

Page 30967

 1        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, in the original, did you say you can see the word

 2     "Jardan" before the Kitovnice?

 3        A.   Yes, Jardan is a village that you have to go through first in

 4     order to reach Kitovnice.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I mean, even to my eye it's quite clear but it's

 6     recorded as "illegible" in the English translation but thank you for

 7     that.  Was that the advice you'd received as to which route to travel

 8     towards the IKM, which of course is at Delici, isn't it?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Can we deal with the forward command post.  I think a long time

11     ago now, the Trial Chamber and some of the lawyers in the case may have

12     visited it, but in July of 1995 what would you actually have found at the

13     forward command post at Delici in physical terms?

14        A.   In very general terms, a forward command post is a room on the

15     ground from which a commander with his command group oversees combat on

16     the ground and commands this.

17             During the war, the Zvornik command had three locations for IKMs.

18     One IKM, in July 1995 and even before that, was in the village of

19     Kitovnice, i.e., in the hamlet of Delici.  In some of the maps you will

20     see it referred to as Hajdukovici; however, this IKM in contrast, in

21     physical terms, was a small prefabricated building with maybe two or

22     three rooms which housed the communications centre, and next it was a

23     container which housed the security and the signalsmen, and north of the

24     object, some 300 metres away from it, was there was an observation point.

25     It was a facility made of wood and earth and it was connected with wire

Page 30968

 1     with the prefabricated building.  When I was in command at the IKM, I

 2     would always be at the observation point.

 3        Q.   And was that where you were throughout the 15th of July?

 4        A.   Yes.  As soon as I arrived in the Delici sector, I went to the

 5     observation post from which I had an opportunity to observe the entire

 6     area of combat.

 7        Q.   And from there would you have been aware of everybody who came

 8     and went to and from the main building of the forward command post?

 9        A.   I did not know and I couldn't see the comings to and goings from

10     the prefabricated building.  As I've told you, I was 300 metres further

11     away at the observation post, which was a dug-out building in the ground

12     with two openings from which you could indeed observe what was going on,

13     but it was also at the same time protected from artillery fire.

14        Q.   What time did you arrive at the forward command post on the 15th?

15        A.   1300 hours would be that time, but it was actually sometime after

16     1300 hours, to the best of my recollection.

17        Q.   And at that time how did the situation on the ground appear to be

18     to you?

19        A.   The situation on the ground appeared completely different than

20     described in my previous documents.  In the defence sectors of the 4th

21     and 6th Battalions, the situation was calm; there was no combat going on.

22     On the left flank in the Memici sector, I could hear sporadic fire coming

23     from there.  The forces of the 28th Division, which were encircled, did

24     not make any sound.  So I can say that during that period of time, at the

25     moment when I arrived at the IKM and the observation post, the situation

Page 30969

 1     was completely stable.

 2             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look, please, at the next page in the

 3     book you have in front of us, 5759, and for the rest of us, B/C/S and

 4     English, page 141 in P377, the duty officer's notebook.

 5        Q.   General Pandurevic, I want to direct your attention to the entry

 6     at 1330 hours, which, according to your evidence, is about the time you

 7     first arrived at the forward command post, which reads:

 8             "Lazo reported that everything is okay at his end.  The men from

 9     Bratunac have arrived and they are deployed at Parlog."

10             Who is Lazo and what is he reporting on?

11        A.   On this page, at 1330 hours, it says literally:

12             "Lazo reports that everything is okay at his end.  The men from

13     Bratunac arrived and have been deployed in Parlog."

14             This is information reported by the then Deputy Commander of the

15     4th Battalion, Lazar Ristic, who was in command of the 4th Battalion,

16     while his commander Pero Vidikovic was in training in Banja Luka.  This

17     man, Lazar, appeared before this Trial Chamber as a witness.

18             MR. HAYNES:  Can we go on another page, please, in the duty

19     officer's notebook; 5760 for you, Mr. Pandurevic, and for the rest of us,

20     page 142.

21        Q.   It's the big entry in the middle of the page, which reads:

22             "A large group of armed and unarmed Turks is blocked in the wider

23     area of Potocani.  One should expect that at any given time this group

24     shall attempt to break through in a stampede towards Nezuk.  They say

25     they can't do anything about it until the forces from the front do

Page 30970

 1     something.  One should expect an attack from the front early in the

 2     morning.  At 400 hours wake up all the troops with guns in their hands

 3     and boots on their feet."

 4             This is recorded in the duty officer's notebook during the

 5     afternoon of the 15th of July.  Who is this a message from?

 6        A.   I believe that this was entered in the late afternoon hours on

 7     the 15th.  Based on my observation of the situation on the ground and

 8     information received from our surveillance sector and the reports of the

 9     battalion commanders and commanders of the units which were immediately

10     involved in blocking the 28th Division, I received this type of

11     information.  I conveyed this information to the duty operations officer

12     for him to be able to report to all the other battalions in the entire

13     area of defence of the brigade.  I wanted us to be prepared for possible

14     combat engagement.

15        Q.   Where we see in the middle of that paragraph, "They say they

16     can't do anything anything about it until the forces from the front do

17     something ..." what sort of surveillance does that reveal that you had?

18        A.   Our radio surveillance station monitored the communication

19     between the forces of the 28th Division and elements of the corps, and

20     they became privy to the information that the 28th Division informed the

21     corps that they could not do anything and that their destiny was in the

22     hands of the 2nd Corps.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And did you, during the afternoon of the 15th of

24     July, prepare yourselves for an attack in the early morning of the 16th?

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection as to leading.  He's putting times in.

Page 30971

 1     We have not established any time for this and so I think it's appropriate

 2     that the witness be asked to give times.

 3             MR. HAYNES:  Times for what?

 4             MR. McCLOSKEY:  The reference we just have in the duty officer's

 5     notebook has no time.

 6             MR. HAYNES:  He said, "... late afternoon, the 15th of July."

 7     Check the transcript.

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Well, if we could get that from the witness

 9     clearly, then ...

10             MR. HAYNES:  Well, we've got it from the witness but ...

11        Q.   What time does this entry appear in the book, Mr. Pandurevic?

12        A.   In this diary on the previous page, we have the last recording at

13     1510.  The following page does not contain any indications of time;

14     however, given the contents of the message, i.e., the order which says

15     that all the soldiers should be awake at 4.00 in the morning and

16     prepared, this would mean that this was recorded late in the afternoon or

17     at dusk even, because after that the handwriting in the logbook appears

18     to have changed.

19        Q.   And what preparations were you initiating by passing this message

20     back?

21        A.   Up to that time, all the forces of the Zvornik Brigade which were

22     engaged in the general area of Baljkovica were in their positions.  The

23     forces of the 6th, 4th and the 7th Battalions had been reinforced and

24     brought up to strength.  The Borinski [phoen] Special Detachment had

25     already been deployed partly in Tisova Kosa and partly closer to the

Page 30972

 1     command of the 4th Battalion.  In the same sector there was also the

 2     Intervention Platoon from the 2nd Battalion.  The tank company or,

 3     rather, two-thirds of it were deployed in the area of Sapari [phoen],

 4     prepared for engagement against the 7th Battalion, and part of the

 5     company was on the Krizevici-Parlog-Baljkovica axis.  Two companies under

 6     the command of Milan Maric and Zoran Jovanovic respectively were deployed

 7     in the territory of Crni Vrh.

 8             The company from the Bratunac Brigade, behind the command post of

 9     the 4th Battalion, MUP units were deployed on the Baljkovica-Parlog axis,

10     and as far as I can remember the police from the East Bosnia Corps were

11     deployed at the contact line between the 4th and the 6th Battalions.

12     Also, the mixed artillery division was prepared for use.

13             This means that all the forces of the Zvornik Brigade were in

14     full combat-readiness.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  We need to stop here.

16             MR. HAYNES:  One last question.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  We need to stop here.

18             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  So we'll continue in 25 minutes' time.

20                           --- Recess taken at 10.25 a.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  For the record, I just want to announce that we

23     have received the filing from the Defence team for General Miletic

24     announcing that he will not be with us tomorrow and that he will be

25     waiving his right to be present.  Let's proceed.

Page 30973

 1             Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 2             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I have no objections to the Pandurevic documents.

 3     I've informed Mr. Haynes.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  So the motion of the 29th of January to which --

 5     the Pandurevic motion of the 29th of January to which I referred to

 6     earlier is hereby being granted.  Thank you.  Let's proceed.

 7             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   Can we just have a look, please, again at the duty officer's

 9     notebook.  It's a page before the large passage you were just looking at,

10     so it's 5759 for you, Mr. Pandurevic; page 141 for us.  It's the entry at

11     1512 which reads:

12             "Premier reported that the enemy is getting closer to our lines.

13     All units informed."

14             We've heard a lot of evidence about it in this case, but just

15     remind us what is Premier and what does this entry in the duty officer's

16     notebook reflect?

17        A.   When I joined the Zvornik Brigade, I encountered this name,

18     "Premier."  This was the code-name for the radio surveillance centre of

19     the Zvornik Brigade and it kept that code-name throughout the war.  That

20     radio surveillance centre intercepted successfully the enemy's radio

21     communication throughout the war.  This is one of the notes reflecting

22     their activities in monitoring the communication of the 2nd Corps and

23     provided timely information about the activities of the enemy.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And just to complete what you've been telling us

25     about your observations of the situation on the ground on the afternoon

Page 30974

 1     of the 15th of July, what did you expect the enemy to do?

 2        A.   I expected that the forces of the 2nd Corps would launch an

 3     offensive in order to take over the front line of the Zvornik Brigade and

 4     link up with the forces of the 28th Division.  On the other hand, given

 5     the fact that the commander of the Muslim side, Semso Muminovic, had

 6     requested to talk to me and had left a frequency that could be used for

 7     that conversation, this was an additional argument for me to think that

 8     he had something to offer and that the situation could be resolved even

 9     without fighting.

10        Q.   When did you first meet Semso Muminovic?

11        A.   I believe that this was sometime in late 1993.  That's when our

12     first personal encounter took place.

13             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look, please, at 7D454.

14        Q.   This is a document dated the 11th of November, 1993, and

15     entitled, "Negotiations Between the Zvornik Infantry Brigade Commander

16     Major Vinko Pandurevic and the 106th Muslim Brigade Commander Semso

17     Muminovic," and it reads:

18             "At the initiative of the enemy, our commander, Major Vinko

19     Pandurevic, met with the commander of the 106th Muslim Brigade, Semso

20     Muminovic, at 1200 hours on the 8th of November, 1993, in the area

21     between Pecina and Kovacevici.  Apart from the commander, the following

22     officers from our side attended the meeting:  The Chief for Intelligence

23     and Security Affairs, Second Lieutenant Dragan Nikolic; and Lieutenant

24     Vitomir Tomic of the National Security.  The talks focused on a prisoner

25     exchange and establishing a cease-fire and a truce between the two

Page 30975

 1     brigades.  The talks were constructive and showed mutual respect.  It was

 2     agreed that the cease-fire and truce between the brigades would enter

 3     into effect at 1200 hours on the 10th of November of 1993."

 4             This is a document, if we go to the third page in English, the

 5     last page in both documents, please, this is one of those documents that

 6     is produced by your assistant commander for moral guidance, religious and

 7     legal affairs; is that correct?

 8             But, in fact, we can see that this event made its way into a

 9     regular combat report, if we now look at 7D945, the regular combat report

10     for the 8th of November, 1993.  Under the second paragraph of this

11     document, does this refer to precisely the same meeting between you and

12     Semso Muminovic?

13        A.   Yes, it refers to the same event, the same meeting.  This is a

14     regular combat report where the corps command is being briefed as part of

15     the regular report, and what we saw previously was information drawn up

16     by the assistant for morale, religious and legal matters, Mr. Simic.  In

17     addition to this event, it encompasses a number of other pieces of

18     information and is used for internal purposes within the Zvornik Brigade.

19        Q.   What circumstances gave rise to the meeting between you on the

20     8th of November, 1993?

21        A.   I don't recall all the details.  I know where the meeting was

22     held.  This was between the confrontation lines on no-man's land, so to

23     speak, and the topic was the one mentioned in the information.

24             In view of the fact that the front line stretched between the

25     Muslim forces of the Zvornik Brigade, which were right next to villages

Page 30976

 1     and farm land which had to be plowed and sown and harvested, the aim of

 2     both sides was to enable farm work to be carried out, depending on the

 3     season, of course.

 4        Q.   And what was the result of the meeting in November 1993?

 5        A.   The result was that we carried out an exchange.  I think that a

 6     soldier was exchanged on that day or the next day, I'm not sure.  We

 7     established a hotline and had mutual contacts, and in spite of the fact

 8     that in our regular combat report we included this information, I later

 9     received from the corps command a request addressed personally to me that

10     I should send detailed information about this because the Main Staff was

11     asking what kind of meeting this had been and why it had been held.

12        Q.   After this, did you use the hotline?

13        A.   We did have occasional contact by radio, depending on the needs

14     that I have just mentioned.

15        Q.   And what, generally, did you talk about when you spoke over the

16     radio?

17        A.   We spoke about respecting our previous agreements, although there

18     was always a certain amount of suspicion that the other side might take

19     advantage of the agreement to carry out a covert offensive activity.

20     However, the experience was that the agreements were in fact complied

21     with.

22        Q.   Now, going back to the 15th of July of 1995, you've told us a

23     little bit about the intercepted communication we saw earlier in the

24     morning involving Milenko Jevdjevic and the name Semso Muminovic.  Did

25     you become aware that he wanted to contact you when you got to the

Page 30977

 1     forward command post of the Zvornik Brigade?

 2        A.   At the forward command post, Mica Petkovic gave me this same

 3     information.  He was a desk officer in the intelligence organ.  He said

 4     that Semso had asked to speak to me and had left a frequency on which we

 5     could communicate through the radio equipment, the KT Motorola that has

 6     been talked about so much here, something resembling a mobile phone.

 7        Q.   And did you call him or did he call you?

 8        A.   In the afternoon of the 15th, I called him.  I contacted him.

 9        Q.   What inspired you to do that?

10        A.   I wanted to hear why he had been looking for me.  I assumed he

11     thought I was the most suitable person for him to talk to in connection

12     with his requests.

13        Q.   What did you imagine he wanted to talk to you about?

14        A.   In any case, I thought that he wanted to talk about the column of

15     the 28th Division.

16        Q.   When did you first call him?

17        A.   I can't tell you the exact time, but it was after the

18     consolidation of the deployment of the units that I have just described.

19     The situation was completely quiet at the time.  It was in the afternoon.

20     It was certainly after 1500 hours.

21        Q.   What did he say when you called him?

22        A.   He said that he had been trying to contact me before, that he

23     wanted to talk to Obrenovic but that Obrenovic did not want to accept his

24     offer, and he asked me to let the whole column of the 28th Division pass

25     through in the area of Nezuk.

Page 30978

 1        Q.   And during that first conversation, how did you respond to that?

 2        A.   I said that we could discuss that, that to the best of my

 3     knowledge, there were many civilians and unarmed men in the column and

 4     that I was willing to let that sort of people go to the free territory

 5     right away, but that those who were armed had to give themselves up.

 6        Q.   And what did he say?

 7        A.   He said that he was not interested in civilians, that he was

 8     interested in the armed part of the column of the 28th Division and that

 9     he would not accept my offer.

10        Q.   When you said that the armed men had to give themselves up, did

11     you mean they had to surrender as prisoners of war?

12        A.   In my original offer, yes, that was what I meant.  However, when

13     he said that he was not interested in civilians, I thought that he wanted

14     to place the fate of the civilians on my shoulders and that he was

15     fighting or struggling to preserve exclusively the 28th Division, and

16     this prompted me to call him again.

17        Q.   How long after the first call?

18        A.   Not long after, I called him again and suggested to him that he

19     should designate a place for the civilians to gather so that they could

20     pass through, because he was in communication with the column; that those

21     who were armed should lay down their weapons and that then they, too,

22     could leave, but that they could not pass through carrying weapons.

23        Q.   And what was his response to that?

24        A.   He continued insisting on his position and that was the end of

25     our conversation at that point.

Page 30979

 1        Q.   So it's probably obvious but just articulate it for us, will you?

 2     What was the change in your position during the second conversation?

 3        A.   I considered the order I had been issued by the corps command.  I

 4     also considered the meeting I had had in the command, in the office of

 5     the Chief of Staff.  I considered the request of the commander of the

 6     opposite side and I thought I could carry out my task by neutralising the

 7     28th Division by allowing it to pass on to the free territory without

 8     carrying any weapons with them, by making them lay down their arms.

 9        Q.   Now, I want you to listen to something for us, please.  This is

10     the tape recording of a conversation, the surrogate sheet for which -- on

11     which we'll all be able to read the words and the translation is 7D656.

12     It's already an exhibit in the case.  It was tendered through PW168.  So

13     would you just listen to this with us for a minute, Mr. Pandurevic.

14                           [Audio-clip played]

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Is there a transcript available of this

16     conversation?

17             MR. HAYNES:  Yes.  It's 7D656 and it's on your screen now.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.

19             MR. HAYNES:  I don't know whether you'd like to hear the piece

20     again so that you can follow.  We'll do that.  That's probably better.

21     It's actually quite easy to follow.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  I think it will be better, yes.

23             MR. HAYNES:  Yes.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

25             MR. HAYNES:  It appears that the image on e-court stops the --

Page 30980

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, exactly.  Let me just consult with my

 2     colleagues that it's okay that we can proceed.

 3             MR. HAYNES:  We could give you a hard copy.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  It's okay.  We can see it on the monitor.  Can we

 5     proceed?  We can proceed.  We don't need to hear it again.

 6             MR. HAYNES:  Thanks very much.

 7        Q.   Who is speaking on the intercepted conversation we've just heard?

 8        A.   Semso Muminovic and I.

 9        Q.   And on what date was the conversation taking place that we've

10     just listened to?

11        A.   The 15th of July, 1995.

12        Q.   In total on the 15th of July - we'll come to the 16th in due

13     course - but in total on the 15th of July, how many times did you speak

14     to Semso Muminovic on the radio?

15        A.   It's hard for me to remember now which conversation was when, but

16     I think it was five or six, although I've seen Semso's statement to the

17     effect that it was much more.  But this is what I remember.  This is my

18     recollection.

19        Q.   And given the position you appear to have adopted in this

20     conversation, can you help us as to which conversation we're listening to

21     here - the first, the second, the third, the fourth, or fifth, or sixth?

22        A.   I think this is the third conversation.

23        Q.   What authority did you have to enter into these conversations

24     with Semso Muminovic?

25        A.   The authority -- well, I did not have specific authority from the

Page 30981

 1     superior command.  Based on my own conscience, I assessed that it was a

 2     good idea for me to carry out this kind of conversation.

 3        Q.   At the time -- well, I'll take a step back from that.  Over what

 4     period of time on the 15th of July did you have these conversations?

 5        A.   Well, you can't have this sort of conversation very often because

 6     the terrain is not flat and the communications equipment did not have a

 7     long range.  So it wasn't easy to establish contact.  This was after 1500

 8     hours and before dark fell, so it was in the course of the day.

 9        Q.   Were any of the conversations after dark fell?

10        A.   Not on the 15th -- sorry, no, no, no.

11        Q.   And during the time that you were engaged in these conversations,

12     how did it appear to you the military situation was?  Sorry, that's a

13     very inelegant question.  While you were talking to him, how did you view

14     the military situation?

15        A.   I engaged in negotiations only after I had stabilized the

16     situation and deployed all the forces that would be needed if it came to

17     a fight.

18        Q.   So why in those circumstances were you prepared, on the 15th of

19     July, to make an offer to allow the whole of the 28th Division to walk

20     free to Nezuk?

21        A.   The reasons were very rational.  I would have been able to carry

22     out the task in this way while saving many lives, or I could carry out

23     the task using fire-power.  I opted for this version, this possibility,

24     and I knew that Semso knew well that the greater the pressure of his

25     forces from the front line, the more fierce would be my firing on the

Page 30982

 1     blocked forces of the 28th Division, and that this was what led him to

 2     ask for a conversation with me.

 3        Q.   Were agreements for cease-fire and the safe passage of enemy

 4     soldiers tactics you'd ever deployed in the past?

 5        A.   Yes.  As is well-known here, I had done similar things before.  I

 6     considered the use of force and weapons to be something that should be

 7     done only in the direst necessity.  It was only a last resort.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Now, throughout the afternoon of the 15th of July,

 9     who was present with you at the forward command post or observation post?

10        A.   To the best of my recollection, when I arrived at the forward

11     command post, I found the signalsmen there; two or three, I don't know

12     how many.  I think Mica Petkovic was there, whom I have mentioned from

13     the intelligence organ.  The Chief of Communications, Captain Milisav

14     Petrovic, arrived together with me.  After a while, the President of the

15     Municipal Council of the Serbian Democratic Party, Brano Grujic, paid a

16     brief visit subsequently, and in the afternoon Ljubo Bojanovic arrived.

17     There may have been someone else, but I don't recall that now.

18        Q.   I just want to leave that there for a minute because I want you

19     to clear up something that appears ambiguous in the transcript.

20             When you said earlier that you would have been able to carry out

21     your task in this way while saving many lives, "... or I could carry out

22     the task using fire-power.  I opted for this version..." what were you

23     saying you did?

24        A.   Well, the version of negotiations and agreements.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Now, can we just have a look, please, at a page in

Page 30983

 1     the duty officer's notebook.  For us on e-court it's page 92, and the

 2     page you want to look at, Mr. Pandurevic, ends 710.  And if you would

 3     just look at the very top entry, it's just the name at 1400 hours, "Brano

 4     Grujic."  Is that the man you're referring to as having been present at

 5     the forward command post on the 15th of July?

 6        A.   Yes, that's the man.  He used to be the president of the

 7     municipality, but in 1995 he was only the president of the party.  He was

 8     a man I was not on good terms with from the moment of my arrival in

 9     Zvornik.

10        Q.   Did any of the people present at the forward command post on the

11     afternoon of the 15th of July tell you anything about prisoners in

12     schools in the Zvornik area?

13        A.   Only Brano Grujic did.

14        Q.   And at what time was he at the forward command post and for how

15     long?

16        A.   It's really hard for me to tell you the precise time of his

17     arrival.  I knew it was after my arrival, maybe an hour or an hour and a

18     half later.  He didn't stay long.  He simply arrived and asked me how

19     come there were prisoners in some schools on the territory of Zvornik

20     municipality.  I think he mentioned the school in Petkovci and the one in

21     Pilica.

22        Q.   What information did you get from what he told you or asked you?

23        A.   He said that his party activists in the local communes had

24     conveyed this information to him and that there was concern in the local

25     community where these people were situated.  I said I did not have any

Page 30984

 1     specific information about this and that I would check to see what it was

 2     all about.  He continued asking me questions about the situation on the

 3     ground, because his native village was Baljkovica, and then he left.

 4        Q.   Did you check?

 5        A.   The persons who were then at the forward command post were

 6     persons who were unable to provide me with any information.  When Ljubo

 7     Bojanovic arrived, and he was from the brigade command, in the operations

 8     organs sometimes and sometimes in the organ for morale, I asked him to

 9     give me more detailed information concerning what Mr. Grujic had told me.

10        Q.   And what did Ljubo Bojanovic tell you?

11        A.   Ljubo Bojanovic told me that he knew that some buses with

12     prisoners had passed by the command and that they had gone in the

13     direction of Bijeljina.  But whether they stopped in some schools in the

14     Zvornik area or not, he didn't know, so he said.  And he said he didn't

15     know that the command of the Zvornik Brigade had received any task

16     concerning prisoners of war.

17        Q.   Was he the only other person that you spoke to?

18        A.   On that day, yes.

19        Q.   Now, I appreciate it's difficult, I'm sure we all do, but

20     approximately what time did you speak to Ljubo Bojanovic?

21        A.   I don't mind answering any question; however, it is rather

22     difficult to pinpoint times, as you say.  But I believe that the

23     conversation with Ljubo Bojanovic took place maybe an hour before I

24     drafted the interim combat report for that day.

25        Q.   What about your deputy Obrenovic?  Didn't you check with him on

Page 30985

 1     the 15th?

 2        A.   At the time Obrenovic was in Baljkovica at the command of the 4th

 3     Battalion, so I did not discuss that matter with him on that day.

 4        Q.   Now, in general terms, what circumstances would lead you to send

 5     an interim combat report to corps command?

 6        A.   Since General Krstic had sent me to Zvornik in the first place,

 7     there would be one important reason which was the aggravation of the

 8     tactical and combat situation.  That's why I believed that it was my duty

 9     to draft an interim combat report and report to the corps command about

10     the combat situation in the zone of defence of the Zvornik Brigade.  Any

11     other officer would have done the same.

12        Q.   Before you sent your report on the 15th of July, what was your

13     understanding as to the state of the corps' information as to the size

14     and motives of the column of the 28th Division?

15        A.   It was my impression that the corps command did not have all the

16     necessary information about the size and the intentions of the 28th

17     Division.  Obrenovic had hinted to the fact at the meeting on the 15th,

18     because his previous report that he had sent to the corps command, at

19     least according to what he believed, had not been taken seriously.  And I

20     believed that once I received complete information about the 28th

21     Division, that I should put all that information in an interim combat

22     report.

23        Q.   Now, how was the interim combat report of the 15th of July made?

24        A.   I personally dictated to Mr. Bojanovic at the observation point,

25     so I dictated the report to Mr. Bojanovic.

Page 30986

 1        Q.   And what did he do?

 2        A.   I was dictating and he was writing in his own hand.

 3        Q.   And did he read it back to you or did you read over what he had

 4     written?

 5        A.   He did not read it back; I did not read it.  I just initialled

 6     the report and it was sent to Zvornik at the communications centre there,

 7     where it would be encrypted and sent to the corps command.

 8        Q.   And how was it sent to Zvornik?

 9        A.   A courier driver took it there by car.  In any case, it could not

10     have been encrypted and sent in an encrypted form from the IKM.

11        Q.   Give us some idea of the mood you were in at the time you

12     dictated that report to Ljubo Bojanovic?

13        A.   I was tired.  I had been on the ground for 12 days, did not get

14     enough sleep.  I worked hard.  Second of all, all the proposals that I

15     had sent to the corps command and the command of the Main Staff with

16     regard to the measures that should be taken in respect of the 28th

17     Division had been rejected, and for that reason I was disappointed, even

18     angry.  However, I did draft the report and I did it based on the

19     situation and the information that I was privy to at the time.

20             MR. HAYNES:  Then let's look at it.  P329, please.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please could I be provided with a

22     hard copy?

23             MR. HAYNES:  Of course.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

25             MR. HAYNES:

Page 30987

 1        Q.   The first paragraph reads:

 2             "Since the fall of Srebrenica, in the territory of the 1st

 3     Zvornik Infantry Brigade area of responsibility, in the wider area of

 4     Pandurice, Planici, Crni Vrh, Kamenica, and Glodjansko Brdo, there are

 5     about 3.000 armed and unarmed enemy soldiers.  Brigade forces are sealing

 6     off and searching the aforementioned region.  A few hundred enemy

 7     soldiers have so far been liquidated."

 8             Where did you get the information which you set out in paragraph

 9     1 of that report?

10        A.   I received this information mostly from Dragan Obrenovic at a

11     meeting in his office.  Some of the information I received from my

12     subordinate commanders on the ground.

13        Q.   As to the number of enemy soldiers in the area, did Obrenovic

14     tell you there were 3.000 or a different figure?

15        A.   The figure he gave me was a bit higher and I subsequently reduced

16     it somewhat.

17        Q.   Why did you do that?

18        A.   Well, if you follow the part of this report to its end, the

19     previous paragraphs follow a certain logic and tally with how the report

20     ends.  I knew what my final intentions were in terms of the

21     accomplishment of the mission given to me by General Krstic.  The

22     information that several hundreds of enemy soldiers had been killed by

23     then was rather arbitrary.

24        Q.   Well, you've pre-empted the question.  What does the word

25     "liquidated" mean in this report?

Page 30988

 1        A.   It's a classical military term which is used in order to show

 2     losses in fighting.

 3        Q.   And did you have any information that a few hundred enemy

 4     soldiers had been killed in fighting during the 15th of July?

 5        A.   I knew that they did suffer losses, but it was unlikely that

 6     there were a few hundred killed.

 7        Q.   Can we go to the second paragraph:

 8             "Throughout the 15th of July, BH army forces of the Tuzla 2nd

 9     Corps launched fierce attacks on the brigade defence area in order to

10     link up with the forces which had been cut off.  The attack on the

11     defence area of the 4th, 6th and 7th Battalions along the Petkovci-Memici

12     stretch was launched at 4.30 with simultaneous actions by the besieged

13     forces."

14             Where did this information come from?

15        A.   This information was obtained from Dragan Obrenovic and battalion

16     commanders.  At the time, at 4.30 in the morning, the blocked forces were

17     in Snagovo and Crni Vrh.  That's where most of their activities were

18     taking place.  They did not move anywhere forward from there.

19        Q.   The reference in that paragraph to fierce attacks on the brigade

20     defence area, was that an accurate reflection of the situation on the

21     ground on the 15th of July?

22        A.   As far as artillery is concerned, yes, but as far as infantry

23     assaults are concerned, the answer would be no.  There were some

24     attempts, but they failed.

25        Q.   The artillery attack that's reported as starting at 4.30 in the

Page 30989

 1     morning, when, to your knowledge, did that finish?

 2        A.   The artillery attacks were sporadic.  They did not go on all the

 3     time.  The fire would mount at moments, then there were periods of lull,

 4     and then fire would be renewed.  It was altogether somewhat fiercer than

 5     during any other periods of time but nothing out of the ordinary.

 6             MR. HAYNES:  I just want to briefly look at the other report

 7     filed that day.  That's P328.  The original of this is very hard to read.

 8        Q.   Can you read it, Mr. Pandurevic?  I'll hand you a hard copy.

 9        A.   If it's blown up a little, I might be able to.

10        Q.   I'll hand you a hard copy.  It's easier.

11        A.   Thank you.

12        Q.   This is the regular combat report of the 15th of July and this

13     was sent at 11 minutes past 7.00 in the evening, about a quarter of an

14     hour before the interim combat report, and under paragraph 1, it reads:

15             "On the 15th of July, 1995, at around 4.40 in the morning, the

16     enemy launched a heavy artillery attack on the defence lines of the 4th,

17     6th and 7th Battalions.  The attack ended at about 5.30 but the enemy

18     continued firing artillery and infantry weapons at short intervals?"

19             Did you write that report or was that written by somebody else?

20        A.   This report was drafted by the duty operations officer.  It is

21     obvious that we had the same or at least similar information.

22        Q.   Which of those two reports more accurately reflects the situation

23     on the ground on the 15th of July?

24        A.   The regular combat reports mention the names of the fallen

25     soldiers; however, more detail about anything else that was happening on

Page 30990

 1     the ground is provided by the interim combat report.  The intention of

 2     the interim combat report was certainly not to repeat the facts mentioned

 3     in the regular combat report, that's for sure.

 4        Q.   Very well.

 5             MR. HAYNES:  Let's go to the third paragraph.  If we can have

 6     P329 put back on the screen, please.

 7        Q.   "Enemy attacks were vigorously supported by all calibres of

 8     artillery and tanks.  Attacks of varying intensity followed one another

 9     from the direction of Nezuk and Kalesija on Memici.  The attack on Memici

10     is still in progress.  All targets deep inside the territory and the

11     suburbs and town of Zvornik have been under artillery fire.  All attacks

12     have been repulsed successfully so far.  So far, according to information

13     received, we have four dead and a dozen or so wounded.  With all

14     available forces, we have sealed off the wider area of Crni Vrh and

15     Planici and partially the area of Kamenica.  All brigade forces are fully

16     engaged and we have no reserves."

17             Where did the information in that paragraph come from?

18        A.   The information in that paragraph, particularly the part that

19     refers to the past time, is something that I received on the ground, and

20     the information about the current situation is something that I

21     personally witnessed.  When this report was drafted, there was no

22     artillery fire opened on the IKM sector or the city of Zvornik opened.

23     All the artillery fire had been opened earlier in the morning.

24        Q.   How accurately did that paragraph reflect the military situation

25     at about 7.00 in the evening, when you were dictating the report to --

Page 30991

 1     sorry, I shouldn't say that.  How accurately did that paragraph in the

 2     report reflect the military situation when you were dictating the report

 3     to Ljubo Bojanovic?

 4        A.   I suppose that information that I received about the events that

 5     had happened before I arrived is correct and that this passage reflects

 6     that situation.  I also believe that what I had noted about the blockade

 7     of the Crni Vrh, Planici and Kamenica, it was also correct.

 8        Q.   Let's go to paragraph 4.

 9             "An additional burden for us is the large number of prisoners

10     distributed throughout schools in the brigade area, as well as

11     obligations of security and restoration of the terrain."

12             Were you aware of any order or instruction not to mention

13     prisoners in any oral or written communication at that time?

14        A.   Up to the moment when Mr. Grujic conveyed the information to me

15     about the existence of POWs, I did not have any information about them or

16     the fact that there was a ban on reporting their existence.

17        Q.   So did you think there was anything wrong in writing this report

18     and explicitly referring to the prisoners you'd heard about?

19        A.   I believed that this should be conveyed to the corps command.  At

20     that moment I did not have any reliable information as to where they had

21     come from, why they were there, and I fully believed that the corps

22     command would react upon the receipt of my report.

23        Q.   Why the corps command?

24        A.   Because that was my superior command who were the recipients of

25     my reports in the first place.

Page 30992

 1        Q.   What did you mean when you said the prisoners were a burden to

 2     the brigade?

 3        A.   The whole report mentions certain facts and information of

 4     different significance.  The term "additional burden" does not mean the

 5     same as if we had been given a task or were under some obligation towards

 6     the prisoners; however, this just shows that those people were there and

 7     might present a burden in different ways.  For example, there could be

 8     reactions of the families of the fighters who resided close to the

 9     locations where POWs were located.

10        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, did you intend the references to what in Serbian

11     is "asanacija" and what has been translated as "security of the terrain"

12     to refer to guarding and burying prisoners in the Zvornik area?

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection, leading.  "What did you intend that to

14     mean?"

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, can you rephrase it, please.

16             MR. HAYNES:  I don't think that's a leading question.  He is

17     entitled to answer the case that's put against him absolutely.  That's

18     the Prosecution case.  He is entitled to answer that as steadfastly as he

19     is entitled to enter a not-guilty plea.

20             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I absolutely agree, but he first needs to set the

21     foundation by letting the witness say what he intends.  That's the

22     important thing.

23             MR. HAYNES:  Well, I've got nothing further to say.  I'd like you

24     to rule on this.

25             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, exactly.

Page 30993

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Our conclusion is that we consider the question as

 3     put as leading, to be a leading one, and we therefore suggest that you

 4     rephrase it and possibly agree to the way suggested by Mr. McCloskey.  Of

 5     course, you will be able to follow it through once you have rephrased the

 6     question.

 7             MR. HAYNES:

 8        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, when you wrote this report, what did you believe

 9     to be the state of health of the prisoners that Brano Grujic had referred

10     to?

11        A.   I didn't know anything about the state of the prisoners.  I just

12     stated in the report that they were present and that was all, nothing

13     else.

14        Q.   Did you know whether anybody had been executed?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   Did you know whether anybody had been buried?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Did you know about any plan to execute or bury prisoners?

19        A.   No, I didn't.

20        Q.   In this paragraph, when you referred to "obligations of security

21     and restoration of the terrain," as we have it in English, what were you

22     referring to?

23        A.   When I was dictating this report, I knew what I was referring to,

24     I knew what I meant to say.  I used the appropriate words to convey that.

25     "Obligations of security," that is the wrong translation.  These words

Page 30994

 1     mean support.  "Asanacija" is a military term and it's well known what it

 2     means and what it refers to, and that's the way I used it.

 3        Q.   Let's deal with "asanacija" first.  As a military term, what

 4     responsibilities did you regard that as placing upon the brigade at the

 5     time you wrote the report?

 6        A.   Military commanders have the duty to carry out "asanacija" of the

 7     battle-field or of the terrain on which combat is carried out.  That's

 8     what I meant.  "Asanacija" involves a number of activities and stages.

 9     One of the first activities or stages in "asanacija" is finding and

10     taking care of the wounded and sending them to appropriate facilities,

11     then finding the corpses of those who had been killed.  After combat,

12     complete "asanacija" has to be carried out, which means inspecting the

13     terrain and removing any remains that would be a threat to the lives of

14     people or that might cause epidemics on the ground.

15        Q.   What work did you anticipate would need to be done by brigade

16     resources in the event of a fully contested battle involving your forces,

17     the forces of the 2nd Corps and the forces of the 28th Division?

18        A.   The fighting was already going on.  There was combat starting

19     early in the morning of the 15th, as we have already said.  There was

20     sporadic fighting on the left flank in the course of the day.  Those

21     three men in the medical corps had already been killed, in the medical

22     vehicle, so that was already something that involved the first stage of

23     "asanacija".  If you have a single wounded man, you need at least two or

24     three soldiers who are fit to take him to the field hospital and

25     therefore you have fewer men to be used in fighting, so this is certainly

Page 30995

 1     a burden.

 2             MR. HAYNES:  I wonder if we could just have a quick look at

 3     another document while we're considering this one, and it's 7D480,

 4     please.  We're going to need page 6 in the English -- I'm sorry, page 6

 5     in the B/C/S, page 5 in the English.  This is "The Federal Secretariat

 6     for National Defence Instructions on Hygiene and Sanitation Measures in

 7     Battle-fields of 1991."

 8        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, can you see the whole of point 2 there, which is

 9     what I wanted to refer you to?

10        A.   Yes.  Yes, now I can see all of it.

11        Q.   It reads that:

12             "Hygienic and sanitation measures in battle-fields include the

13     following:  Finding the wounded who are accidentally left behind,

14     gathering them, giving them first aid and evacuating them to medical

15     institutions; finding, gathering and helping wounded or diseased animals

16     and animals that were accidentally left behind; finding, gathering and

17     burying or burning those who have been killed or have died of natural

18     causes and establishing the necessary records; finding, gathering and

19     removing animal carcasses ..." and so on and so forth.

20             Does that conform with your understanding of what hygienic and

21     sanitation measures on a battle-field were required of you?

22        A.   Certainly.  At the military academy, we had a special subject,

23     rear support, and "asanacija" of the battle-ground was dealt with in that

24     subject.  So this is all familiar to me.

25             MR. HAYNES:  Can we go back to P329, please, and can we go to the

Page 30996

 1     second page in the B/C/S only.

 2        Q.   Now, I don't know if a pen can be made available to you, General

 3     Pandurevic.  I wonder if you could just mark for us, please, the last

 4     four words of the second paragraph on that page.

 5        A.   [Marks]

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I want you to give us a word in Serbian now,

 7     please.  If you were referring to your security organ or security

 8     service, what word would you use?

 9        A.   I would use the word security -- "bezbednosno" or "obezbedjenje,"

10     security support.

11        Q.   Well, what word would you use to say "security organ"?

12        A.   "Organ bezbednosti."

13        Q.   Chief of security?

14        A.   "Nacelnik bezbednosti."

15        Q.   Would you read the last four words of that paragraph, please.

16     And I don't want them translated.

17        A.   "Obaveze obezbedjenja i asanacije terena."

18             MR. HAYNES:  I want another document put onto the screen, please.

19     Can we have P6 --

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  We need to save this one, please.

21             MR. HAYNES:  Yes, certainly.

22        Q.   Would you --

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  Sign and put the date, please.

24             MR. HAYNES:

25        Q.   -- initial that.

Page 30997

 1        A.   [Marks]

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  And it's time for the break --

 3             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE AGIUS:  -- any time you wish.

 5             MR. HAYNES:  It would be a good time now, actually.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.  Let's make sure that the witness

 7     signs ...

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My signature is already there, but

 9     I can put another one on it.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Thank you.  We'll have a 25-minute break.

11                           --- Recess taken at 12.12 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

13             MR. HAYNES:  I wonder if we could just illustrate this point

14     graphically by placing into e-court, please, P407.

15        Q.   These are the rules of service of the security organs, and in

16     Serbian, "security organs" appears as "organa bezbednosti"; is that

17     correct?

18        A.   Yes, "organa bezbednosti," that's right.

19        Q.   Now, the words which you circled for us on P329 include the word

20     "obezbedjenja."  I wonder if, so that we've got it clear on the screen,

21     you would just spell that word for us, because you wrote it in Cyrillic

22     or, rather, Ljubo Bojanovic wrote it in Cyrillic.  So would you spell

23     that word in Latin letters.

24        A.   Yes.  O-b-e-z-b-e-d, with a diacritic or alternatively "dj,"

25     e-n-j-a.

Page 30998

 1        Q.   And so that we're clear, can you see that word on the document we

 2     have on the screen now, the rules of service of security organs?

 3        A.   No.  No, we can't see that word on this document.

 4             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have now, please, into e-court P694, the

 5     brigade rules, chapter 5.3; the B/C/S page 105, the English page 65.

 6        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, do we see on that document the word

 7     "obezbedjenja" that you put in your report as the heading to chapter 3?

 8        A.   Yes.  I see here under number 3, "bezbednosti" or "obezbedjenje,"

 9     but that's something different from "obezbedjenje" of the terrain.

10        Q.   Do we also see the word there used for security in terms of the

11     security organs, "organa bezbednosti"?  So we've got both of the words

12     we've been talking about juxtaposed on this document; is that right?

13        A.   I'm not sure I understand your question.

14        Q.   We'll move on.

15             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look, please, at the same document,

16     page 56 in the English, page 92 in the B/C/S.  And this is P694, just for

17     the correction of the transcript at line 6.

18        Q.   Again, simple question, Mr. Pandurevic:  At the heading of

19     chapter 5, do we see again the word "obezbedjenja" that you wrote in that

20     report?

21        A.   Yes.  Yes, that's right.

22        Q.   And what, just so that we're clear, are "borbenih dejstava"?

23        A.   "Borbenih dejstava" is an overall term covering all kinds of

24     combat activities in fighting.

25             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look now, please, at P699, and we want

Page 30999

 1     page 93 in the English and page 100 in the B/C/S.

 2        Q.   Again, in the heading of chapter 5, do we see the word you used

 3     in the report, P329, again "obezbedjenja"?

 4        A.   Yes, we do.

 5        Q.   And we know now what the last two words you understand to be, so

 6     we can move on from there.

 7             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look at the same document, please,

 8     page 116 in the English, page 125 in the B/C/S.

 9        Q.   And again, at the heading of chapter 10, in that document, do we

10     see the word you used in your report, P329, "obezbedjenja"?

11        A.   Yes, we see the same word here, "obezbedjenja."

12        Q.   Now, at the time of writing the interim combat report of the 15th

13     of July, were you aware of any measures that had been taken to cope with

14     the problem of "obezbedjenja terena" within the brigade?

15        A.   In part some measures had been taken, but most of the measures

16     still had to be taken as concerns the roads and the rear of the forces of

17     the Zvornik Brigade.  This activity followed later on the 15th and in the

18     morning of the 16th.

19        Q.   It probably wasn't a very good question, but what men were going

20     to be used to deal with that?

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection; vague.  Deal with what?  We haven't

22     established what this is.

23             JUDGE AGIUS:  I think Mr. McCloskey is right, Mr. Haynes.

24             MR. HAYNES:  Very well.

25        Q.   What's the R Battalion?

Page 31000

 1        A.   I do apologise.  Let me just say this word, "obezbedjenja" of the

 2     terrain, is a combat activity carried out by units.  The R Battalion is

 3     the reserve battalion which was mobilised when required by combat

 4     conditions, was supposed to carry out the tasks of "obezbedjenja" of the

 5     terrain, the general area.

 6             MR. HAYNES:  Let's have a look, please, at a few documents,

 7     therefore.  Can we start with P377, the duty officer's notebook.  You

 8     will need to look at page 756, and the rest of us at page 138.

 9        Q.   I'm interested in the entry about Mr. Galic.  Who was he?

10        A.   Galic was the assistant of the Chief of Staff for organisation,

11     mobilisation, and personnel in the command of the Zvornik Brigade.

12        Q.   And when it says, "Galic to mobilise all able-bodied men," as

13     simply as you can, what would that have involved him doing?

14        A.   He was supposed to send a request through the corps command to

15     the department of the Ministry of Defence to mobilise the R Battalion,

16     and above Galic's name we see the name of Jagodic and the telephone

17     number.  That's the person who was doing that job in the Ministry of

18     Defence.

19             MR. HAYNES:  Okay.  Let's go to the Ministry of Defence, shall

20     we?  7D775, please.

21        Q.   This is a document signed by Stevan Ivanovic.  Who was he?

22        A.   Stevan Ivanovic was the chief of the department of the Ministry

23     of Defence in Zvornik.

24        Q.   And it's dated the 15th of July, it's from the Republika Srpska

25     Ministry of Defence Zvornik Secretariat, and it says:

Page 31001

 1             "For the purposes of guarding the territory in the zone of

 2     responsibility from infiltrated sabotage groups and broken-up Muslim

 3     groups from Srebrenica, immediately mobilise on all conscripts fit for

 4     military service from the area of the Zvornik municipality department who

 5     have not been assigned to RJ's war units."

 6             And if we go to the first line there, what do the third and

 7     fourth words say in Serbian, Mr. Pandurevic?

 8        A.   The words used were "obezbedjenja teritorije."

 9        Q.   What is the difference between "teritorije" and "terena"?

10        A.   They are synonyms; they mean the same.

11             MR. HAYNES:  Now can we go to 7D109.

12        Q.   I'm sorry, could you just help us as to what that document is?

13        A.   It is a document issued by the Ministry of Defence and it shows

14     the procedure followed when carrying out mobilisation of conscripts in

15     this case.  It shows that the instruction issued by the Ministry of

16     Defence was complied with in the process of mobilisation, and the

17     secretariat in Zvornik is called upon at the request of the Drina Corps.

18     So the command of the Zvornik Brigade could not do this directly; it had

19     to go through the corps command.  And this shows that the procedure was

20     complied with.

21             MR. HAYNES:  Yes.  Can we now look at 7D109 so we can follow the

22     process through.

23        Q.   Another document from Stevan Ivanovic in which he orders:

24             "In order to secure the territory in the corps' zone of

25     responsibility, immediately complete mobilisation of all conscripts fit

Page 31002

 1     for military duty from the territory ..." et cetera.  And the phrase in

 2     the top line of that order is what?

 3        A.   "Obezbedjenja."

 4             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have 1D698, please, a Drina Corps order of

 5     the 5th of July.

 6             JUDGE PROST:  Mr. Haynes, just to be clear in the transcripts, I

 7     think twice we're getting a reference to 1D709, and that might cause us

 8     problems later, at 11 and 12 on page 55, and then again at line 4 on page

 9     56.

10             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you very much, Judge Prost.  The document I

11     called into e-court is 7D709, and I do not have 1D709 on my list of

12     documents for examination of this witness.  I do have 1D698, though.

13        Q.   1D698, what is this document, Mr. Pandurevic?

14        A.   This document was issued by the corps command.  In it the corps

15     addresses the Ministry of Defence with the request for urgent

16     mobilisation of conscripts with a view to securing the territory in the

17     zone of responsibility of the corps.

18        Q.   And do we see that word "obezbedjenja" appearing there as well?

19        A.   Yes, in the first line.

20             MR. HAYNES:  Now, to complete the picture, can we have a look,

21     please, at 3D125.  The English translation is only partial because it's a

22     list of names, so it doesn't really matter.  But there is one correction

23     that needs to be made to the English translation.

24        Q.   What's this document, Mr. Pandurevic?

25        A.   This was issued by the Zvornik section of the Ministry of

Page 31003

 1     Defence.

 2        Q.   And what does it record?

 3        A.   The Zvornik section of the Ministry of Defence informs the

 4     Zvornik Brigade, i.e., military post 7149 Zvornik, which conscripts had

 5     been called on 15th July and who was supposed to be mobilised.  This was

 6     for the Zvornik Brigade in order to be able to collate their lists with

 7     this one and see whether all the conscripts who had been mobilised

 8     reported to the brigade.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And you've probably already confirmed this, but on

10     the English version it suggests that the date of mobilisation was the

11     17th of July.  What's the date of mobilisation on the original?

12        A.   Yes.  The report was drafted on the 17th and the conscripts were

13     called on the 15th of July.

14        Q.   How many of them were called?  You might need to go to the last

15     page of the document to see that.

16        A.   The last digits are 254 [as interpreted], as far as I can see,

17     but I believe that the last digit is not correct.  That was the number

18     called, but it doesn't have to mean that everybody responded.

19        Q.   Well, we'll come on to that.

20             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a look, please, at P377, page 768 for

21     you, and for the rest of us, 150.

22        Q.   About a third to half the way down the page, can you see a

23     reference to the R Battalion?

24        A.   Yes, R Battalion is mentioned.  It says that 195 were mobilised

25     and are ready in Standard at 1740 hours.

Page 31004

 1        Q.   It might seem obvious, Mr. Pandurevic, but you have to give the

 2     evidence, not me.  What does that tell us when we compare it to a list of

 3     245 men who were mobilised by order by the Ministry of Defence?

 4        A.   They called 245; however, only 195 responded and reported at the

 5     barracks.

 6        Q.   And just remind us, what were those men mobilised to do?

 7        A.   "Obezbedjenja terena," or territory.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey.

 9             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Can we get a definition of that?

10             MR. HAYNES:  Oh, we're coming on to it.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  From the booth?

12             MR. HAYNES:  Why?

13             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Haynes.

14             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I know the booth is trying to be cooperative and

15     I think that's good, but I think I have a right to know what that means

16     in English.

17                           [Trial Chamber confers]

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  We have been -- yes, Mr. McCloskey.

19             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Just as I sit here, I recall that sometimes it's

20     very difficult for the booth to tell what something means because of the

21     context it's in.  If that's the situation here, we can just leave it and

22     we'll try to sort it out ourselves, as opposed to them guessing or going

23     along with the context they're not clear about.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  That's not how I have understood things to be

25     developing, but Mr. Haynes, perhaps, can clarify.

Page 31005

 1             MR. HAYNES:  What I was going to move on to do next was ask

 2     Mr. Pandurevic to specify what tasks these men were to be put to, which

 3     will give us a better understanding of what the phrase meant in the

 4     document, according to him.  We have already the word, I think,

 5     "obezbedjenja" translated in four different ways in the documents we have

 6     before us.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Stop.  We can proceed, because that more or less --

 8     not more or less.  It actually tallies with how we were viewing your

 9     approach.

10             MR. HAYNES:  Yes.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  So let's proceed, and then if you are not happy,

12     Mr. McCloskey, you will make submissions to us.

13             MR. McCLOSKEY:  That's no problem.  I don't need to put the booth

14     in that spot.  We'll sort it out.

15             MR. AGIUS:  Okay.

16             MR. HAYNES:

17        Q.   Now, given the situation on the ground on the 15th of July, what

18     did you need to mobilise these 200 men, give or take a handful, to

19     actually do?

20        A.   In order for us to understand the situation better, I'll try and

21     provide a short explanation of the situation on the ground on the 15th.

22             We know that most of the column of the 28th Division crossed the

23     Crni Vrh-Zvornik road.  We also know that elements of the 28th Division

24     remained in the territories of Snagovo and Kamenica as well.  We also

25     knew at the time that the Zvornik-Crni Vrh road was not safe.  In order

Page 31006

 1     to provide security or support for our forces which were blocking the

 2     better part of the 28th Division, we had to mobilise additional forces to

 3     secure the terrain.

 4             That's why we mobilised this R Battalion.  As for their task of

 5     providing security, or "obezbedjenja," for the terrain, it was carried

 6     out by way of setting up ambushes, blockades, carrying out patrols, and

 7     setting up observation points.  These were all types of combat actions

 8     which are comprised in the overall task of providing security or securing

 9     the terrain.

10             MR. HAYNES:  Let's have a look at how in fact they were used.

11     Can we have a look at P377, please.

12        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, you will need to turn to page 772; the rest of

13     us, to page 154.  And we see at the top of that page:

14             "R Battalion to join men from Bratunac to be given one combat set

15     of ammunition and take up the Crni Vrh-Planici line.  It should leave at

16     7.00 a.m.  The line was taken up at 8.00 a.m.  The commander to call

17     Petrovic regarding communications.  Distribute 1.800."

18             Tell us a little bit about what that means.

19        A.   This was a task given to R Battalion once the R Battalion was

20     mobilised and brought up to strength.  This shows that they were sent to

21     Crni Vrh where they were to join the Bratunac men who had already been on

22     the -- securing the terrain detail.

23             Pursuant to my report or based on my interim combat report

24     drafted on the 15th, General Krstic also sent some of the Vlasenica

25     military brigade elements to carry out the same task.

Page 31007

 1             MR. HAYNES:  Can we now just follow that through by looking at

 2     page 775 in the original book, or page 157 for the rest of us.

 3             Here we see it says at the bottom of the page:

 4             "The R Battalion took up positions between quarry in Grbavci and

 5     Crni Vrh, 163 conscripts and 80 conscripts from Bratunac.  The platoon

 6     deployed on the Devanje-Kruska [phoen] line returned from that position."

 7             There were 195 at Standard earlier that day.  Do you know what

 8     the other 32 were doing?

 9        A.   Those who were supposed to report to Standard, I believe that

10     that number is correct.  However, I believe that some of those men were

11     also demobilised, because brigade commanders would know some people and

12     would demobilise them, and I believe that the rest remained in the

13     barracks, in the rear.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             MR. HAYNES:  Can we go back to P329 now.  You will need to see

16     page 2.  Indeed, everybody who speaks your language will need to see page

17     2.

18        Q.   When, in paragraph 4 of that report, you referred to

19     "obezbedjenja terena," what obligation of the brigade were you reporting

20     to corps command?

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Objection.  That is not what he says in the

22     document.  I don't mind a reading of the document, but that's counsel's

23     interpretation.  I could read it in B/C/S and that's not what it would

24     say, literally.  So I think he can just say what he means by that last

25     sentence, but please don't misquote it like that.

Page 31008

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Haynes.

 2             MR. HAYNES:  I don't think it requires a contribution, Your

 3     Honour.  I'm sure the witness can answer the question however I phrased

 4     it.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Pandurevic, you followed the exchange of

 6     comments and you can go straight to the point, please, particularly

 7     explaining to us what you mean by "obezbedjenja terena" and "asanacija".

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe that this

 9     document is one that has been quoted most and interpreted most of all

10     that I've ever written, and I believe that it has been misinterpreted and

11     things have been taken out of the context quite a lot.

12             What I'm saying is that this report is one whole, and that in the

13     first part of this report, on the first page thereof, I speak about every

14     single problem that the brigade encountered at the time and which arose

15     from the combat situation.  And at the end I state in this document that

16     all the brigade forces were fully engaged, that I had no more reserve

17     forces at my disposal.  And I also say that there is an additional burden

18     as a special problem and also I add this obligation of "obezbedjenja" and

19     "asanacija" and I -- what I mean is combat activities undertaken by the

20     units of the Bratunac Brigade and the R Battalion.

21             In other words, this obligation of "obezbedjenja" and "asanacija"

22     were -- are current obligations and also obligations which continued

23     throughout the next few following days.

24             MR. HAYNES:

25        Q.   Were you referring in that report to guarding and burying

Page 31009

 1     prisoners of war?

 2        A.   This passage may be interpreted from the linguistic point of view

 3     but it would take other kinds of experts to do that.  I can only

 4     interpret it from the aspect of the essence of the matter that is

 5     contained here.  This has nothing to do with guarding prisoners or

 6     burying their bodies.  It cannot even be suggested by the words that were

 7     used in this document.

 8             MR. HAYNES:  Can we move on to paragraph 5 now, please.

 9        Q.   This command cannot take care of these problems any longer, as it

10     has neither the material nor the resources.  If no one takes on this

11     responsibility, I will be forced to let them go:

12             "I made an offer to the commander of the other side to separate

13     out the civilians and have the other surrender, but he refused asking

14     that they should all be released together.

15             The situation is still complicated but under control."

16             What did you mean in that section referring to "these problems"

17     and "this responsibility"?

18        A.   Since General Krstic ordered me to go back to Zvornik and gave me

19     concrete tasks, and that concrete task was to prevent a break through of

20     the 28th Division and its linking up with the forces of the 2nd Corps, I

21     explained my problem to him.  I told him about the situation, about the

22     forces that I had available to me in the brigade, and in this paragraph

23     here, I indicated that I would let them go because that's the decision

24     that I had reached after my conversations with Mr. Semso Muminovic.  And

25     when I say that I would let them go is confirmed in the next sentence

Page 31010

 1     which reads, "I offer the commander on the opposite side that the

 2     civilians should be separated and that the rest would surrender," which

 3     was turned down, and we were asked to let everybody go.  I am talking

 4     about the column of the 28th Division and of them being let go.

 5             Later on, this was confirmed by the events on the ground.

 6        Q.   What do you mean by that?

 7        A.   What I'm saying is that on the 16th, the column was let go, they

 8     were get through.

 9        Q.   At the time of writing this report, did you have any idea how

10     many prisoners were in the schools in the Zvornik area?

11        A.   No, I did not have a figure in mind.  I didn't know that number.

12        Q.   How many schools were being used?

13        A.   I said that I remember Grujic having mentioned school in Petkovci

14     and Pilica.  I didn't know anything about which schools existed in the

15     territory of the municipality, whether POWs were housed in all of the

16     schools or not, I didn't know that at the moment.

17        Q.   What was your purpose in writing this report in these terms to

18     corps command on the evening of the 15th of July?

19        A.   My purpose was to inform the corps command and let them gain a

20     complete insight into the situation in the territory of Zvornik or rather

21     in the zone of responsibility and defence of the Zvornik Brigade,

22     especially bearing in mind the task which brought me back from the

23     territory of Zepa.

24        Q.   Why did you threaten in that document to let the column of the

25     28th Division go?

Page 31011

 1        A.   As I've already told you, the tone of my entire report was set so

 2     as to enable me to say at the end that I would be forced to let the

 3     column go especially after the conversation that I had had with

 4     Semso Muminovic.  All who had Motorolas at the time could listen to our

 5     conversations, and in some way, I wanted to use the report indirectly to

 6     let the corps command know what my final decision would be when it came

 7     to the column of the 28th Division.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Just one more thing on that day.  Given what you'd

 9     been told earlier by Brano Grujic, why did you not try and find out as

10     much as possible about the prisoners he told you about?

11        A.   Well, as I'm talking about these events, and as I'm reading the

12     documents and especially this report, I'm trying to place myself in the

13     past.  I'm trying to go back in time and put myself in the role that I

14     played at the time because that's the only way one can understand the

15     events; and I would ask the same question if I'd been anybody else but

16     the commander at the time.

17             First of all, General Krstic had sent me back with a clear task.

18     He did not give me any alternative information or information of any

19     other kind.  All he gave me was a combat task.

20             Second of all, the information that I was provided about the

21     prisoners, I did try to check that information with Ljubo Bojanovic who

22     was in a position to know something more if the command of the Zvornik

23     Brigade had been issued with such a task.

24             Since I did not receive any additional information, any

25     information pointing to the fact that the command of the Zvornik Brigade

Page 31012

 1     was supposed to deal with POWs, and I also did not receive any

 2     information to the effect that those people were treated in any way that

 3     was against the law; and I also sent a report to the corps in which I

 4     mentioned POWs, and I expected that if the corps did not know anything

 5     about this, they would ask for some additional information or they would

 6     order me as to what to do.  However, I never received any feedback from

 7     the corps with this regard.

 8        Q.   Where did you spend the night on the 15th and 16th of July?

 9        A.   At the forward command post in the prefabricated building there.

10        Q.   And did you remain there throughout the day of the 16th?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And what was the focus of your attention throughout the night of

13     the 15th and 16th?

14        A.   In this period of the information I had, I drew up the task that

15     we read out here addressed to all the battalions, in readiness to have

16     them all go at 4.00 a.m. in -- with weapons in their hands and boots on

17     their feet ready to meet an enemy attack.  I was awake at that time at

18     the observation post.

19        Q.   And did that attack materialise?

20        A.   In the early morning hours, there was an attack by the 2nd Corps.

21     It was focused on the positions of the 4th and 7th Battalions and partly

22     the positions of the 6th.  And they had artillery support.

23             MR. HAYNES:  I'm going to leave that there until tomorrow and as

24     it were look at some parallel events now.

25             Can we have a look at P377.  You will need to look at page 761

Page 31013

 1     and we'll have to look at page 143.  Thank you.

 2        Q.   Now, firstly can you help us by perhaps looking back in the book

 3     to ascertain what time on what date the entries at the top of that page

 4     would have been made, approximately?

 5        A.   The sentence that begins with the word, "Early in the morning to

 6     report to Major Golic," is that what you are referring to,

 7     Lieutenant-Colonel Popovic would report to him?

 8        Q.   Yes, I'm asking you whether you can place a time on that entry.

 9        A.   As it says in the morning, probably on the following day, and

10     that's the 15th in the afternoon or evening, as it says in this notebook.

11        Q.   Who is Major Golic?

12        A.   I knew a certain Major Pavle Golic who worked in the intelligence

13     organ of the Drina Corps.

14        Q.   Now, can we go forward two pages please to page 763 in the

15     original which you have and pages 145 in the document we have.

16             And here, the entry I'm interested in, we can place a time on,

17     8.45.  Again, here we see Golic asked Popovic to call them and said that

18     he can forget what he asked for and what he wrote about.  He knows what

19     he's supposed to do according to agreed procedure, "Boss from panorama,

20     message conveyed to Popovic at 9.10."

21             Who is the boss from Panorama?

22        A.   Panorama was the code-name for the Main Staff and when it's used

23     next to 01, that refers to the commander of the Main Staff.  Just as I

24     was Palma 01.

25        Q.   If we go to the entry at the bottom of the page, there's a

Page 31014

 1     reference to Panorama 155, does that mean anything to you?

 2        A.   When you say code-name or when you use a code-name, whether it's

 3     Palma, Panorama, or Zlatar, and a three-digit number next to it, you are

 4     referring to an extension.  So this is an extension in the Main Staff

 5     from that number that the code refers to.  I don't know whose it is.

 6        Q.   Can we go over the page, please, to page 764 in the original book

 7     and page 146 in the e-court document.

 8             At 11.15 there is an entry relating to a report from Zlatar.

 9     You've already told us what Zlatar was, but can you remind us?

10        A.   Somebody from the command of the Drina Corps is telling the duty

11     officer of the Zvornik Brigade conveying the message that screening of

12     the wounded has to be carried out and it says here in brackets that this

13     was conveyed to Beara.

14        Q.   Did you know he was at the command of the Zvornik Brigade on the

15     morning of the 16th of July?

16        A.   No.  No, I was not aware of that.

17             MR. HAYNES:  Can we go forward to page 766 in the original,

18     please, and page 148 in the e-court version of this book.

19        Q.   1400 hours, "Popovic requested a bus with a full tank and 500

20     litres of D2.  Zlatar duty officer and Golic informed."

21             Did you know anything about this?

22        A.   No, I didn't know anything about it.

23        Q.   Did you approve anybody being given a bus or any fuel on the 16th

24     of July?

25        A.   No, no, I did not.

Page 31015

 1        Q.   And at 2.00 in the afternoon of the 16th of July, did you know

 2     that anybody called Popovic was at the command of the Zvornik Brigade?

 3        A.   No, I wasn't aware of that, no.

 4        Q.   We'll come on to it in a bit more detail.  What were you doing at

 5     2.00 in the afternoon on the 16th of July and where were you?

 6        A.   At 2.00 p.m. on the 16th of July, I was close to the corridor we

 7     had opened up and overseeing the passage of the column of the

 8     28th Division.

 9             MR. HAYNES:  Can we just have a quick look please at P1189 A in

10     the English and C in the B/C/S.  It's under seal in the Serbian but not

11     in the English.

12        Q.   Do you know who Basevic is?

13        A.   I know Major Tomislav Basevic who was the chief of the technical

14     service in the rear of the Drina Corps.

15        Q.   When a duty officer says over the radio, "Somebody is in the

16     field."  What does that mean?

17        A.   I don't have the original before me.  Could it please be shown to

18     me?

19             MR. HAYNES:  Certainly, it's a two-page document, and it's

20     probably easier for you to look at the hard copy.  We may all appreciate

21     going to page 2 for a little while.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Would you please repeat your

23     question now?

24             MR. HAYNES:

25        Q.   Yes.  If a duty officer says that a certain person is in the

Page 31016

 1     field, what does that tell us about their location?

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  I think we have a misconnect here.  We're getting

 4     a hypothetical question and the witness thinks he's referring

 5     specifically to the document and if -- I think we should do one or the

 6     other but not both.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Haynes.

 8             MR. HAYNES:  To say that I'm astonished to receiving the

 9     objection from that quarter, that would be putting it mildly, but I will

10     correct the problem.

11        Q.   At the bottom of the page in English, the Palma duty officer is

12     recorded as saying, "Well I don't know.  He just called me from the field

13     and told me to pass you the message over there."

14             That person is said to be the Palma duty officer.  If a duty

15     officer says that somebody has called from the field, what does that tend

16     to mean about their whereabouts?

17        A.   It means that the person who called the duty officer of Palma was

18     somewhere out on the ground, not at the command from where they can use

19     communications to achieve contact.

20             MR. HAYNES:  Thank you.  We'll leave it there for the day.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. Haynes.  We will continue tomorrow

22     in the afternoon at 2.15, correct?  Thank you.

23             Yes, Mr. Zivanovic.  All right.  Okay.  Thank you.  So we stand

24     adjourned to tomorrow.  Thank you.

25                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

Page 31017

 1                           1.45, to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 3rd day of

 2                           February, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.