Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 31388

 1                           Friday, 13 February 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Good morning.  Registrar, would you call the case,

 6     please.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom, this is case number IT-05-88-T, the

 9     Prosecutor versus Vujadin Popovic et al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  Good morning, everybody.  I notice that

11     for the record that all the accused are here, representation is exactly

12     as it was yesterday except the seating is different.

13             Good morning, Mr. Pandurevic.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Bourgon, I leave him in your hands.  Remember

16     that it's Friday, the 13th.

17                           WITNESS: VINKO PANDUREVIC [Resumed]

18                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

19             MR. BOURGON:  Good morning, Mr. President.  Good morning, Judges.

20     Good morning colleagues in the courtroom.

21                           Cross-examination by Mr. Bourgon: [Continued]

22        Q.   Good morning, sir.

23        A.   Good morning.

24        Q.   When we left off yesterday, sir, you were telling us that when

25     you had this conversation with Dragan Obrenovic at the forward command

Page 31389

 1     post on the 16th of July, he did not say anything about an alleged

 2     conversation he would have had with an elderly member of the

 3     4th Battalion on 15 July and nor that he possessed any information that

 4     Drago Nikolic was involved in the killing of prisoners at Orahovac.  That

 5     was at page 31386 to 31387.

 6             In your very last answer, you said the following, and I quote:

 7             "I would have expected him to tell me that, but since he did not

 8     do this and I don't know for what reason, perhaps he really did not know

 9     and he had nothing to do with it.  It was probably the reason why he

10     didn't mention it."

11             Now, if I can have in e-court 3D7D86, please.  I'd like to have

12     page 5 in English, so the document that will appear before you -- maybe I

13     can say that number over again.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  I was go to tell you to ask you to wait and be

15     patient a little bit.  Do you need the number again?  Yes, please.

16             MR. BOURGON:  3D7D86.  And that is the statement of facts which

17     which accompanied the guilty plea of Dragan Obrenovic.

18        Q.   Sir, I will refer to a segment of the statement of facts provided

19     by Dragan Obrenovic and I quote from paragraph 34.  And that's page 5 in

20     English:

21              "He mentioned the following:  Ristic told me that Milorad Trbic

22     had called him from Orahovac school where the prisoners were being kept

23     and asked for help.  Ristic then sent about eight men to Orahovac as

24     reinforcements to assist Trbic in guarding the prisoners."

25             JUDGE KWON:  Are we on the same page, Mr. Bourgon?

Page 31390

 1             MR. BOURGON:  Let me verify, Judge.

 2             I have paragraph 34, line 10.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  The thing is we don't have -- the text that we have

 4     is -- the numbers are not -- sorry, the paragraphs are not numbered.  So

 5     we have to go through each one of them to try and see, and we don't know

 6     where that starts with those words.

 7             MR. BOURGON:  It's on page 5 in English, according to the

 8     document that I have here which is the 3D7D86 page 5, and the paragraph

 9     begins with, "We went directly to the command of the 4th Battalion,"

10     beginning of that paragraph.

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  The end of that page, last paragraph of that page.

12     All right.

13             MR. BOURGON:  We have to go to page 6 for the part that I was

14     referring to.  I apologise for this.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  It is okay.  It is right in the middle in B/C/S,

16     it's right in the middle of the page.  It starts, "otisli smo direktno,"

17     but very soon we'll have to go to the next page in English.  Anyway.

18             MR. BOURGON:  In English we have to go to the next page.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, yes, exactly.  All right.  Go ahead.

20             MR. BOURGON:  It starts at the fourth line with:  "Ristic told

21     me."

22        Q.   So sir, I will read this segment over again.

23             "Ristic told me that Milorad Trbic had called him from Orahovac

24     school where the prisoners were being kept and asked for help.  Ristic

25     then sent about eight men to Orahovac as re-enforcements to assist Trbic

Page 31391

 1     in guarding the prisoners.  Ristic said he did not know at that stage

 2     about the killing of prisoners at Orahovac, but learnt about it when he

 3     visited the site early in the evening of the 14th July.  He said that he

 4     found his men guarding prisoners in the gymnasium of the school at

 5     Orahovac and that the execution of prisoners had already commenced in the

 6     nearby location.  He lined up his men and was about to take them away,

 7     when Drago Nikolic stopped him.  Drago Nikolic said that if the men

 8     stayed, they would all be issued with new uniforms by Captain Milosevic

 9     from rear services.  Lazar Ristic spoke of other soldiers there in

10     camouflage uniform from another location and he was not clear where they

11     were from."

12             I take it, sir, you are familiar with the statement of facts from

13     Dragan Obrenovic, and we also referred to that statement of facts

14     yesterday.  It's my understanding, however, that during your conversation

15     with Obrenovic at the forward command post, he did not tell you anything

16     about this alleged conversation with Lazar Ristic on 15 July at the

17     4th Battalion command; is that correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Now, you were in this courtroom when Lazar Ristic appeared as a

20     witness and denied having such a conversation at the 4th Battalion

21     command with Dragan Obrenovic, so I take it that when Lazar Ristic

22     testified, you weren't surprised by him denying ever having that

23     conversation.

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Now, if Obrenovic would have had such a conversation with

Page 31392

 1     Lazar Ristic, and if, at that time, he did have information that

 2     Drago Nikolic and Milorad Trbic were involved in the guarding of

 3     prisoners at Orahovac, would you have expected him at the time to tell

 4     you when you asked if anyone from the Zvornik Brigade was involved?

 5        A.   I expected him to tell me everything that he knew regarding these

 6     events including whether anyone from the Zvornik Brigade took part in

 7     those activities.

 8        Q.   One last question concerning your conversation with Obrenovic.

 9     Yesterday, when I asked you whether Obrenovic told you where

10     Drago Nikolic was when Obrenovic allegedly obtained information from him

11     on 13 July, your answer was, and I quote:

12             "... and I don't think he told me where Drago Nikolic was and

13     whether he called him or whether he had any personal contact with him."

14             If I can add ... one moment, please.

15             The question I put to you at that time, just to recall, was did

16     Obrenovic tell you where Drago Nikolic was when he conveyed this

17     information to him.

18             If I can have in e-court please 7D1154, page 3 in English and

19     page 4 in B/C/S.

20             Sir, this document that will appear before you is the

21     investigative note to file compiled by Eileen Gilleece, which was

22     discussed in detail during your examination-in-chief two days ago.  I

23     draw your attention to the last paragraph on this page which reads as

24     follows:

25             "Drago Nikolic was the chief of security for the Zvornik Brigade

Page 31393

 1     and the duty officer for the forward command post replaced by

 2     Major Galic."

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  I think we need to go --

 4             MR. BOURGON:  Again we have the wrong page?  I apologise.  I said

 5     page 3 in English, please and page 4 in B/C/S.  I apologise.  I will look

 6     again.  On the last page, page 3, last paragraph.  Here we are.  So you

 7     see the last -- in English it's the last paragraph and in the -- in your

 8     language, it's the fourth paragraph.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  Fourth paragraph.

10             MR. BOURGON:

11        Q.   The sentence I was referring to is:

12             "Drago Nikolic was the chief of security of the Zvornik Brigade

13     and the duty officer for the forward command post replaced by

14     Major Galic."

15             Sir, on the basis of the information or the -- your last answer,

16     about what Major Obrenovic told you during that conversation, I suggest

17     to you that this was not information that was communicated to you by

18     Obrenovic on 16 July, and that, in fact, this is something you learned

19     for the first time when you read the Butler report before having this

20     meeting with Eileen Gilleece.  Would you agree with that?

21        A.   As far as I can remember, I explained how the security organ was

22     mentioned at all and that Zivanovic got involved.  When he mentioned

23     certain names, I explained which posts they held.  I don't remember at

24     all mentioning the whereabouts of Drago, whether it was at the IKM or

25     not.

Page 31394

 1        Q.   And the specific information included in this paragraph where it

 2     says, "Replaced by Major Galic," this is not something you were familiar

 3     with at the time you met Eileen Gilleece; is that correct?

 4        A.   I read Mr. Butler's report.  Whether this was included in this

 5     report or not, but to me this was entirely irrelevant information,

 6     whether he was at the IKM and whether Mr. Galic had replaced him, so this

 7     made no impression on me.

 8        Q.   Thank you, I appreciate that's very useful, but I just need to

 9     clarify this to ensure that we are -- I just want to know that this

10     information which is included there is not something that you knew or

11     that you were ever informed of in July of 1995; is that correct?

12        A.   That's correct, you're right.  I already said that.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I just wanted to clarify.

14             I move to a different topic of my cross-examination, and I would

15     like to ask you a few questions concerning your military background.

16             If I can have in e-court please P372, page 1 in both languages.

17             Sir, you will recognise this document which was also shown to you

18     during your examination in chief and it has to do with your personal

19     information on -- or with respect to your military career.

20             Do you recognise this document?

21        A.   I used to see this document but it seems that somebody else had

22     filled in this form.  This is not my handwriting.

23        Q.   Can you quickly glance over the information that is included in

24     this document -- now my understanding it was shown to you during your

25     examination-in-chief but we'll -- I have just a few questions concerning

Page 31395

 1     this document.

 2             First, let's go to paragraph 10 where it says that you joined the

 3     JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army, on 30 July, 1982.  Now that's correct?

 4        A.   We finished the military academy in July, and we were given ranks

 5     of second-lieutenant.  I think it was mid-July, between the 18th and the

 6     20th, and this is the period that is calculated as the date of joining

 7     the army, only later on, I was given a specific post and a duty station

 8     in Ljubljana in Slovenia.

 9        Q.   So just to -- for the sake of clarity, first you go to military

10     academy and then you join the JNA; is that correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And it says that at paragraph 9, that you spent 4.6 years at the

13     military academy and that's the normal stay, it's a five-year course; is

14     that correct?

15        A.   No, I spent four years.  I don't know who wrote this 4.6, I

16     really don't know.

17        Q.   Now, during your examination-in-chief on 27 January, you

18     confirmed that you were promoted to lieutenant in July of 1983, to

19     captain in 1987, and to captain first class in 1991.  This was at

20     transcript page 30668, line 24 to page 30669, line 3 on 27 January; is

21     that correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Now, if we go back to this document, it also says at paragraph 11

24     that you distinguish yourself as a JNA officer in 1989 and 1991.  Would I

25     be right in saying that this means that you obtained outstanding

Page 31396

 1     evaluation reports on both occasions?

 2        A.   I don't remember exactly when my official appraisal took place,

 3     but generally it was done every four years; and I was familiar with every

 4     official appraisal because I had to sign it as taking a note of it.  And

 5     probably this outstanding appraisal was given to me by Battalion

 6     Commander Vahid Karavelic, who was later commander of the BH army 1st

 7     Corps in Sarajevo.

 8        Q.   Sir, is it at that time on 1 June 1992 that you officially

 9     switched from the JNA to the VRS as we see in paragraph 12 of this

10     document?

11        A.   I was formally on the register of the VJ, formerly the JNA.  My

12     wartime assignment was in the Army of Republika Srpska.  I don't remember

13     the exact date, but I do know that the orders about our transfer followed

14     only much later which is to say after we had actually been transferred.

15     That is why I really cannot remember the date.

16        Q.   I appreciate this.  Now if we look at paragraph 7, we say the

17     dates of your promotions to major, 7 January 1993; to lieutenant-colonel,

18     31 May 1994; and to colonel on 31 December 1995.  I'm not so much

19     interested in the dates on which you were promoted but more so in the

20     fact that it says that these promotions were extraordinary promotions.

21     What does that mean, sir?

22        A.   According to the law on the army, it specifies exactly how long

23     each officer should remain with a certain rank provided he is assigned to

24     an appropriate post and that he achieved an appropriate appraisal.  It

25     varies between three, four, and seven years.  Each promotion that is

Page 31397

 1     being effected before that time elapsed is considered as extraordinary

 2     promotion.

 3        Q.   So in common language, those are promotions which come faster

 4     than the normal required time for the next rank.

 5        A.   Yes, I agree.  That's correct.

 6        Q.   And only the very best officers get such promotions.

 7        A.   That's how things are supposed to be.

 8        Q.   And extraordinary promotions are also given to officers who

 9     receive outstanding evaluation reports; are you familiar with this?

10        A.   Not necessarily, only under the law he held the rank for a

11     shorter time than someone who had lower evaluation.  I remember a captain

12     who had an outstanding evaluation who was promoted after a shorter period

13     of time, but it doesn't guarantee that it will happen.

14        Q.   Now, I take it that you are familiar that on the basis of your

15     experience, that in the military, from the time that you are a junior

16     officer, if your superiors see the potential in you to reach the higher

17     ranks in the army, you become what is known as a streamer and then you

18     get a series of quick promotions.  Are you familiar with that normal way

19     of doing in the military?

20        A.   This was very specific in the JNA.  One didn't only need general

21     quality and capacity and training and good performance for someone to

22     achieve speedy promotions, there were other things that we, at that time,

23     called the ethnic key and also certain political appropriateness and

24     achievements in the sphere of politics.  It could have happened that for

25     a variety of reasons, certain officers, thanks to their good qualities,

Page 31398

 1     could have "represented" a professional threat to someone else and

 2     therefore didn't receive promotions.  However, war is an opportunity to

 3     test everyone's qualities, both human qualities and professional

 4     qualities including valour, bravery, et cetera.  That is why as the law

 5     says, in wartime, the president of the republic can promote an ordinary

 6     private to a general because these are extraordinary circumstances.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  That's very useful, and that fits into my next

 8     questions where all of your extraordinary promotions you obtained in the

 9     VRS, this happened during the war?

10        A.   Yes.

11        Q.   So it can be concluded that during the war, you were regarded by

12     your superiors as an outstanding officer?

13        A.   Up to my arrival in the Zvornik Brigade, my superiors probably

14     did not have a complete picture of my work and sufficient information

15     about my quality.  When I arrived in Zvornik, however, after only 10 or

16     15 days I was promoted to the rank of major for a single reason.  This

17     was a large brigade.  The previous commanders had been

18     lieutenant-colonels, and one of them had been a major and that milieu

19     needed a certain authority which the rank of major gave me, both among

20     the men and my peers.  This was an expression of the needs, the

21     requirements of the time, not something due to my special qualities

22     because I'd only been there for some 10 or 15 days.

23        Q.   Now, I was referring sir more to your -- what your superiors saw

24     in you throughout the war, and I will refer to one example and that is

25     when General Krstic testified during his trial, that was at page 6312,

Page 31399

 1     lines 7 to 10 on 20 October 2000, he said you were, and I quote:

 2              "The best brigade commander in the Drina Corps, one of the best

 3     commanders amongst his peers in the army as a whole, a professional

 4     soldier in every sense of the word."

 5             Do you agree with General Krstic's assessment which he said

 6     during his trial?

 7        A.   He had the right to evaluate my work because he was my superior.

 8     I agree with that assessment.

 9        Q.   Now one thing I'm curious about, however, is your military

10     education, in other words, whether and when you attended the career

11     courses which are usually a prerequisite before getting certain

12     promotions.  If I begin with the command and staff academy.  You said in

13     your testimony --

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, Mr. Bourgon, initially I forgot to put

15     on record that we are sitting pursuant to Rule 15 business.  Judge Stole

16     couldn't be with us this morning.  The other thing is before you proceed

17     with this line of questions, what are you seeking to prove?

18             MR. BOURGON:  It's coming very quickly, Mr. President.

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  I'm glad to hear that.  Thank you.

20             MR. BOURGON:

21        Q.   We were talking about, sir, the command and staff academy, and

22     you said in your testimony that you attended the first 20 days of the

23     command and staff academy but that you did not complete the course due to

24     wartime obligations.  That was at page 30673 on 27 January; is that

25     correct, sir?

Page 31400

 1        A.   Yes.  The course mentioned here was the regular schooling which

 2     lasted for two years at the time.  There were also courses for company

 3     commanders and battalion commanders.  The regular schooling in the JNA

 4     covered the military academy, the staff command, the command and staff

 5     academy and some similar schools, and also the school of national defence

 6     or the war school.  All these were forms of regular schooling.  In

 7     addition to this, in the course of one's service in the JNA, there was a

 8     special plan of training for officers which was implemented on a monthly

 9     basis.  Every officer was duty-bound to undertake continuous education in

10     the course of his service.

11        Q.   And, sir, my first question in this regard is:  Did you ever

12     complete the command and staff academy after the war at any time?

13        A.   In the course of the war, the generation which started its

14     schooling together with me in 1991 had its schooling interrupted because

15     of the war and continued again in 1993.  I was invited back to the

16     school, but the commander of the Main Staff did not approve my return to

17     the school which is why I did not complete it.

18             However, because I have a master of arts in sociology, I was

19     given a VES, which is my military specialty which has the -- carries the

20     same rank as the command and staff school.  After the war, I tried to

21     enroll again in that school, but again it was not approved.

22        Q.   My second question in this regard is those 20 days that you say

23     you attended the staff command academy, now, I take it that this was in

24     1991?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 31401

 1        Q.   And to which unit did you belong at the time?

 2        A.   I was assistant commander for moral guidance and political

 3     guidance, and also I deputised with the battalion commander.  That unit

 4     moved to Zenica, and from Zenica, I went to that school.

 5        Q.   And the unit you were with just because this was my precise

 6     question was the 1st Motorised Battalion of the 14th Volunteer Brigade in

 7     the Ljubljana Corps; is that correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And that was the unit commanded then by Vahid Karavelic, who you

10     mentioned earlier before?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   Now those 20 days that you spent at the staff command academy is

13     this information that should appear in your personal dossier at any

14     place?

15        A.   I think that in my file, there should be orders showing that I

16     was sent to school as well as the order that after the interruption of my

17     schooling I was assigned to temporary work in the Uzice Corps or the

18     37th Corps as it was called to the 19th Mountain Brigade, and that should

19     all be in my file.  I think there were two copies in the file and one was

20     always kept in the personnel department of the General Staff of the JNA

21     in Belgrade.

22        Q.   Have you seen this information yourself in your personal records?

23        A.   I saw the order sending me to school and the one sending me to

24     temporary work in the Uzice Corps.

25        Q.   And have you seen your personal record here in The Hague since

Page 31402

 1     you arrived some three years ago?

 2        A.   I saw parts of that record and yesterday, I saw the remainder

 3     from my photograph as a second-lieutenant onwards.

 4        Q.   Now, that's information that I've been looking for, and I could

 5     not locate, so I will seek the assistance of your counsel to provide this

 6     information.  We've been trying to get this from the Prosecution.  We

 7     don't know if it exists or not, but I have a series of questions that

 8     were following; but I will wait until I see the documents before I put my

 9     questions to the witness on this particular issue.

10             Sir, the staff and command academy, you will agree with me, is a

11     prerequisite for promotions to the group of senior officer or higher

12     officers as you said yesterday.

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And you mentioned a few moments ago one of the career courses

15     which officers must attend before getting promoted to senior positions in

16     the VRS would be the National Defence School; is that correct?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And this is the one-year course you mentioned during your

19     testimony, the course you attended in Belgrade in 1997, but as you told

20     us, you only graduated in January 1999 due to disciplinary proceedings

21     which were instituted against you; is that correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Now, even though you only graduated from the National Defence

24     School in January of 1999, you were nonetheless promoted to major-general

25     on 28 June 1997; is that correct?

Page 31403

 1        A.   Yes, I agree.  First, I completed the war and then the war

 2     school.

 3        Q.   Now, sir, you would agree with me that you really have to be a

 4     very good officer in order to be promoted to the rank of major-general

 5     before having attended or completed the career courses such as the

 6     National Defence School.

 7        A.   If someone has a wide choice to promote someone to that rank and

 8     appoint him to a certain duty, and if there is a lot of competition, then

 9     it's very difficult.  If the choice is very limited, then even someone

10     who doesn't fulfill all the conditions can be promoted.

11        Q.   Now, in terms of yourself being a very good officer during the

12     war, I'd like to refer to the testimony of Milenko Ljubicic, who

13     testified at page 11576 that you were an exceptionally strict commander,

14     that you knew the job that you were doing very, very well, and you were

15     an extremely good person; do you agree with this statement?

16        A.   I tried to do my job in the best way I could, whether it was all

17     good enough, well, probably it wasn't.  My strictness was based, first of

18     all, on strictness towards myself and then towards others.  I was not

19     stricter towards others than I was towards myself.

20        Q.   If I refer to the testimony of Miodrag Dragutinovic, that was at

21     pages 12639 and 12640, he testified that you had a lot of skill and

22     knowledge about the unit command, and you took very seriously the orders

23     you received from higher command.

24             Do you agree with this assessment from Miodrag Dragutinovic?

25        A.   Yes, I agree.  I'm afraid I might be reactivated after all these

Page 31404

 1     questions and answers.

 2        Q.   And finally, you became a general in the Army of Yugoslavia and

 3     that was on 20 March 2001; is that correct?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   Now, something you mentioned during your examination-in-chief

 6     that I'd like to look a bit into, and I'd like to know that during the

 7     war when you were a younger officer, I'd like to know, were you an

 8     ambitious man, Mr. Pandurevic?

 9        A.   I don't want to refer to Napoleon saying that a soldier who one

10     day doesn't want to become a general is a poor soldier.  If that's

11     ambition, well, I don't think I was more ambitious than you are, for

12     example, it's a privilege to be a lawyer in this court, appear as counsel

13     here.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Can we come to the point because to be honest, I

15     don't know what you think, but if you think that we are interested in all

16     this, go ahead by all means.  But I suggest to you to think different.

17             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Your advice is noted.

18        Q.   Sir, you testified two days ago that when the president of

19     Republika Srpska, Mrs. Plavsic selected you to become the assistant

20     commander for morale, religious and legal affairs for the general staff,

21     there were reports in the Belgrade media highlighting the fact that you

22     were too ambitious.  That was at transcript 31254.  You said that you did

23     not enjoy these reports.  What truth was there to these reports,

24     Mr. Pandurevic?

25        A.   Well, what I said, the authors wrote what they did.  They wanted

Page 31405

 1     to challenge the credibility of new appointees to the General Staff.

 2     They wanted to challenge the credibility of the same people they had

 3     praised in wartime when they had to risk their lives, but now when

 4     someone was appointed to a similar duty as his predecessors he was not

 5     good enough.  So this was all envy and competition.

 6        Q.   So you probably recall that when Nebojsa Jeremic testified in

 7     this trial, I asked him about, or I comment in a statement he provided to

 8     the office of the Prosecution to the effect that you acted like a god in

 9     the brigade.  That was at page 10444.  Why would Jeremic say, in your

10     opinion, that you acted like a god in the brigade?

11        A.   May God forgive me if I ever had such a thought.  I am a mere

12     mortal.  I am not a god.  How he came to that conclusion, I don't know.

13     To the best of my understanding, Mr. Bourgon, I may be wrong, you were a

14     soldier once and you know that the role of a commander is to invest his

15     best efforts in getting his unit to perform its task.  He may not always

16     be successful.  Sometimes one succeeds and sometimes one doesn't.  They

17     may have viewed me as a god because they are not religious people.  I

18     don't know why.

19        Q.   Sir, I heard, when preparing this case, comments from many of

20     your former soldiers that you were not only an ambitious man, but that

21     you were ready to sacrifice anything for your career including your men,

22     which is why even though you lost many soldiers that way, you were always

23     ready to fight outside of your own territory to show how good you are.

24     Is there any --

25             MR. HAYNES:  I'm going to object to that.

Page 31406

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes.

 2             MR. HAYNES:  Mr. Bourgon is giving evidence.  What he heard in

 3     the preparation of this case has got nothing to do with anything

 4     Mr. Pandurevic should comment upon.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Bourgon, do you wish to comment --

 6     Mr. McCloskey.

 7             MR. McCLOSKEY:  If this kind of thing is going to be thrown at

 8     any witness it should be specified where it's coming from and what it is

 9     because otherwise it really is absurd.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Has that convinced you to move to your next

11     question?

12             MR. BOURGON:  Not really, Mr. President.  I think in

13     cross-examination, if I have a foundation to ask a question and to ask

14     whether it is true, whether Mr. Pandurevic feels that he was willing to

15     sacrifice anything to his career, it is something that I'm entitled to

16     explore in cross-examination because it will have to do with his

17     decisions after that which I will challenge.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Are you in a position to quote -- give proper

21     indication of your source, Mr. Bourgon?

22             MR. BOURGON:  I've heard this from many former soldiers of the

23     Zvornik Brigade, which I have interviewed in preparing for this case and

24     he can tell us if there is any foundation to these comments that I've

25     heard.

Page 31407

 1             JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's proceed and we suggest, again, that you go to

 2     the facts which are relevant to the case rather than this background

 3     information.  If it continues like this, we are in agreement here that we

 4     will have to cut down on your 12 hours.

 5             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 6        Q.   Sir, I suggest to you that if there is one thing that you could

 7     not tolerate from anyone during the war, it would be anyone who would

 8     disseminate information which would tarnish your reputation; would you

 9     agree with that?

10        A.   Mr. Bourgon, I have to touch on your previous question.  I did my

11     very best to protect the lives of my men and to ensure that my soldiers

12     had what they needed.  These were reservists who did not understand the

13     logic of warfare and the ways in which soldiers were used.  They were

14     local patriots.  Had they carried out my orders and acted in ways

15     described by certain individuals in this courtroom, and had everything

16     been done the way they say it was, I would happily have had been a

17     commander for another ten years, but that's not how it was.  I could not

18     prevent the dissemination of disinformation.  There was a huge amount of

19     disinformation coming from various sources.  If every soldier did not see

20     me next to him at the front line, he said I went to Loznica in Serbia and

21     that I was sitting in a cafe.  I would have had to have been seen by

22     every soldier at every time everywhere because if they didn't see me in

23     the brigade, they would start spreading rumours about me.

24        Q.   Thank you, sir, I appreciate this answer, and we'll come back to

25     this later in my cross-examination but for now I would simply say that

Page 31408

 1     one of the reasons for which you testified the way you did concerning

 2     Drago Nikolic is that at some point during the war, he did make a report

 3     against you which you found out about; is that correct, sir?

 4        A.   I don't know what this is about.  If there is something like

 5     that, please jog my memory.

 6        Q.   I will.  But for now, I'd like to quickly turn to the issue of

 7     officer-like qualities, and as it was put to you by your counsel, you've

 8     been in the army all your life; and I'd like you to confirm whether you

 9     agree with me that trust and loyalty towards the chain of command is one

10     of the most important, if not the most important value in the military

11     profession.

12        A.   That's how it should be in every army, yes.

13        Q.   And it's very important for a general to be able to trust his

14     senior officers?

15        A.   Trust must exist.  Without trust, there can be no successful

16     work, but trust can be betrayed.  I never used any other methods to

17     obtain information important to me and my command, apart from the usual

18     procedures envisaged by the rules of command and control.

19        Q.   And it was very important for a brigade commander such as

20     yourself during the war to trust your Chief of Staff, your assistant

21     commanders, and your officers; is that correct?

22        A.   Yes.  I was responsible both to my superior and to my

23     subordinates and associates.  I was responsible to the local community.

24     I had responsibility towards myself and also to my enemies.

25        Q.   And one of the areas, sir, where trust can be demonstrated

Page 31409

 1     between officers is in written communications; would you agree with that?

 2        A.   I don't understand your question.

 3        Q.   Well, you will agree with me that a general must trust that what

 4     his brigade commanders will tell him in written communications such as a

 5     combat report, for example, is accurate; is that correct?

 6        A.   Well, it's logical that communication must go two ways, that

 7     there must be information coming from the top down and also from the

 8     bottom up.  The flow of information from the top down is usually faster

 9     than the other way around.  A subordinate always can either alter the

10     information to make it look better that he sends up or he can send up

11     accurate information.

12        Q.   And on this basis, sir, you will agree with me that when an

13     officer drafts and sends a combat report, for example, it is critical

14     that the information contained therein be as accurate as possible?

15        A.   Yes, he usually writes down the information he has available

16     because he, himself, gets information from the duty organs of subordinate

17     units.  When the information starts from the company up to battalion and

18     then up to corps level, it arrives at various nodes where certain

19     elements can be lost so that in the end, the information can appear quite

20     different by the time it reaches the top.  That's always a problem in the

21     army.

22        Q.   And I take it, sir, that you will agree with me that if a combat

23     report does not contain accurate information, whether it was on purpose

24     or simply because the officer sending the report does not have the right

25     information, this can have disastrous consequences for the army; is that

Page 31410

 1     correct?

 2        A.   It can have consequences, whether disastrous or not so important

 3     depends on a particular situation.  However, having information at one's

 4     disposal is essential in order to make the right assessment and reach the

 5     right decision.

 6        Q.   And you will also agree with me that if you found out that one of

 7     your officers deliberately sent you a combat report containing false

 8     information, you could no longer trust this officer thereafter; would you

 9     agree with that?

10        A.   I couldn't fully agree.  I would undertake measures to make him

11     write future reports as accurately as possible.  If I lose trust at any

12     point, I would have no choice other to dismiss this officer and give up

13     on him.  One has to work with people.

14        Q.   And, sir, my question is quite straightforward:  Did you ever

15     tell General Krstic or any of your superior officers that

16     on 16 July 1995, you deliberately sent to them a combat report concerning

17     false information as you say you did?

18        A.   I didn't tell him that.  He could have concluded that himself

19     just like the visit by the team from the Main Staff and what was actually

20     and really going on.

21        Q.   So I take it then that General Krstic and the -- your senior

22     officers at the time never got back to you saying that you had filed a

23     false combat report on the 16th of July; is that correct?

24        A.   As far as I remember, there was no discussion about that report.

25     There were speedy developments.  The situation in the Krajina was

Page 31411

 1     chaotic, and there was no discussion about that.  However, speaking about

 2     true or false reports, I have to tell you about certain practice that was

 3     implemented both in the JNA and the VRS; and that is that an in addition

 4     to commander's reports about the same event, their assistants for

 5     security reports followed as a confirmation of whether this was true or

 6     not.

 7             When you mentioned my meeting with Mr. Semso in November 1993 in

 8     the presence of Mr. Drago Nikolic, I reported about this meeting, the

 9     corps command in my regular report whereas Drago, along his line of

10     communication and reporting, informed the security administration of the

11     main corps [as interpreted].  The corps command then asked me to send a

12     special report about what had actually transpired and to address it to

13     the Chief of the Main Staff of the corps [as interpreted].

14             I was really surprised at this request, and this is just one of

15     the examples.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. McCloskey.

17             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Sorry to interrupt, but we had some translation

18     issues that are just going to confuse the issue.  If you can see, we

19     interchanged Main Staff of the corps, main corps, things I think that can

20     be fixed simply enough, but I don't think they should sit in the record.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.  Mr. Bourgon if you want

22     to go through it now you can do so otherwise if you prefer you can do it

23     later with the staff.

24             MR. BOURGON:  I'll make one correction, Mr. President.

25        Q.   Just at page 24, line 6 where it says main corps, I take it

Page 31412

 1     Mr. Pandurevic, you meant Main Staff; is that correct?

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Do you have the English transcript in front of you,

 3     Mr. Pandurevic?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  He can answer the question.

 6             MR. BOURGON:

 7        Q.   So page 24, line 6, sir, where it says, "security administration

 8     of the main corps."  Is that what you said, or can you clarify what you

 9     said exactly?

10        A.   Security administration of the Main Staff.

11        Q.   And at the end on the last line where you said, "Address it to

12     the chief of the Main Staff of the corps," now that's not what you said,

13     I take it.

14        A.   I sent the report to the Chief of Staff of the Drina Corps

15     because probably Zivanovic was not that at the time, instead Colonel --

16     late Colonel Skocajic was there.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Now, I get to my point here because you said that I

18     mentioned Semso Muminovic, I don't recall I did, but I will check my

19     notes.  My question is the following, and we'll get back to this when we

20     get back to the events of the 16th of July, but I put to you that an

21     officer of your calibre enjoying the absolute trust of your corps

22     commander as we have seen, and aiming for the highest positions of the

23     army, would never deliberately include false information in a combat

24     report.  Would you agree with that?

25        A.   I don't agree with that, and I invite you to confirm that fact.

Page 31413

 1        Q.   And I simply put it to you that your combat report of 16 July

 2     with respect to the information contained therein with the situation as

 3     it evolved on the ground was an accurate report and did not contain false

 4     information.

 5        A.   I have to tell you that four or five times, the corps and the

 6     Main Staff asked for reports and that some people were sent out to check

 7     the situation.  The report was as I described it in my

 8     examination-in-chief, and I also believe that another protected witness

 9     spoke about this in a similar manner.

10        Q.   So you agree with me that your report represented accurately the

11     situation as it evolved in the field?

12        A.   The report reflected the situation as I believed would create the

13     least consequences as a result of my actions.

14        Q.   But that's not my question, sir.  I want to know whether the

15     situation on the ground on 16 July was as you reported it in your interim

16     combat report or whether you deliberately sent false information up the

17     chain of command?

18        A.   The information was partly untrue, particularly the one relating

19     to the loss of three trenches, that was not correct.  The front-line had

20     never been broken through at any point.  Also, if I can remember, that

21     everyone who passed through passed unarmed.  That is not true.  You can

22     see it in the video footage who passed through.

23        Q.   And I further suggest to you, sir, this will be my last question

24     on this topic, that your reason why you say what you said what you said

25     during your testimony is to convince us is that you let the 28th Division

Page 31414

 1     cross your lines with their weapons on 16 July, not for humanitarian

 2     reasons, but rather because you wanted to save your brigade as a good

 3     commander should do if this is possible without compromising the ultimate

 4     mission he is entrusted with; is that correct, sir?

 5        A.   Saving lives and one's soldiers and that of the enemy's as well

 6     are humanitarian reasons.  My task was to repel the breakthrough by the

 7     28th Division.  I wasn't able to do that, but I could have massacred the

 8     28th Division.  I could have pulled out my men from Baljkovica, let the

 9     28th Division concentrate in the area, allow elements of the 2nd Corps to

10     link up with them, and in the area of one square kilometre, cover 5.000

11     men with artillery fire and each shell would hit the target; and,

12     therefore, I would have fulfilled my task completely.  However, that's

13     not what I did.

14        Q.   Well, we'll come back to that when we cover the events of 16

15     July, but I now move to a different topic.  And I'd like to ask you a few

16     questions concerning some of the evidence which was heard in this trial.

17             Now, of course as a person accused in this case, you've been

18     sitting in the courtroom for the testimony of all witnesses who appear

19     before this Trial Chamber with the exception of one or two days; is that

20     correct?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   During your testimony, you mentioned that you also reviewed

23     documents which had been given to you to prepare for your defence.

24        A.   Of course.

25        Q.   And, in fact, you even mentioned, that was on page 30821, lines

Page 31415

 1     23 to 24 that you were shown all documents on the EDS system; do you

 2     recall saying this?

 3        A.   Not all documents were shown to me.  What I received in an

 4     electronic form from the EDS was what I reviewed, but I don't think it

 5     was a complete set.  I've -- I see that you are announcing some documents

 6     that I haven't seen before, and I believe it was impossible to go through

 7     all of them in the period of time that I had at my disposal.

 8        Q.   I don't think I am announcing such documents on my list, but if I

 9     do, I will speak to your counsel at the break.

10             Now, you are familiar with all of what the witnesses in this case

11     have said and also with the witnesses that were not called by the

12     Prosecution; is that correct?

13        A.   I heard all the testimony given here.  I don't remember, however,

14     all the details of each testimony, and I don't know what the witnesses

15     who haven't appeared here told to the OTP.  I don't know.

16        Q.   My question was actually poorly put to you.  I'm not talking

17     about witnesses who weren't called, but you read statements obtained by

18     the Office of the Prosecution from persons who did not testify in this

19     trial; is that correct?

20        A.   I received a number of statements, whether that's a full set, I

21     don't know.

22        Q.   And you are familiar with the documents both with have been

23     discussed in this courtroom and those which you received which were not

24     admitted in evidence; is that correct?

25        A.   This is so ambiguous, I don't know what documents you are

Page 31416

 1     referring to.  I reviewed a huge number of documents that were put on

 2     e-court and shown here including those who haven't.

 3        Q.   That's -- that was my question, so I take it that you understood

 4     it.  But all of this evidence, sir, whether coming from witnesses or from

 5     persons who were to be witnesses or documents, I take it that you have

 6     had an opportunity to discuss these documents with your defence team?

 7        A.   We discussed many things, primarily those that we thought to be

 8     of vital importance to our approach to this case, but of course we didn't

 9     discuss each and every document.

10        Q.   And I don't want to get into the details of any discussion,

11     that's not my purpose, but would I be right in saying that you, yourself,

12     have been active in the preparation of your defence?

13        A.   Yes, I was active.  I did a lot of work on my own.  That was

14     because I believed that I have to do everything in my capacity regardless

15     of the outcome of this trial.

16        Q.   And for example, you mentioned that you met with your expert

17     witness, Bosko Antic; and you said that you gave him some general

18     guidance before he set out on his mission; is that correct?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   And would I be right in saying that you actually drafted some

21     questions which were put to witnesses during this trial?

22        A.   I don't know which witness you are having in mind.

23        Q.   Did you draft questions in order to help your defence team put

24     your case forward before this Trial Chamber?

25        A.   For each witness, I assisted my defence team and their

Page 31417

 1     preparations by reviewing documents, by offering my own interpretations

 2     and professional expert explanations, by providing the facts that I knew.

 3             However, the drafting and the formulating of questions in the

 4     form that is permissible in this courtroom is something to be done by a

 5     professional defence team.

 6        Q.   And without getting into the details of any particular

 7     conversation you had with your defence team, is it correct to say that in

 8     general, your defence was and is being presented pursuant to your

 9     instructions?

10        A.   I suppose that's the point of cooperation in defence cases.

11     Whenever my defence team managed to persuade me something, I never

12     interfered any longer with these matters.

13        Q.   And what I'm curious about is that if and when some evidence was

14     heard that you disagreed with, I take it that you made a point of raising

15     these issues with your defence team?

16        A.   I could have disagreed with evidence, but I couldn't change

17     evidence.  I could have told them where we had interpretation of facts

18     and where we had actual facts because there is a huge difference between

19     a fact and an interpretation of facts as someone who took part in events

20     can speak about the facts.  Someone else can talk about interpretation of

21     facts based on the knowledge or rather second-hand knowledge.

22        Q.   And sir, did you hear any evidence, testimony, or see documents

23     admitted in this trial which you believed to be not true or not accurate?

24        A.   Many documents were admitted into evidence in this court.  For a

25     certain period of time, I tried to keep track of those documents but then

Page 31418

 1     I realised it was a futile effort, and I gave up.  Whether all these

 2     documents are true and correct, I honestly don't know.  But we discussed

 3     each and every document through cross-examination here, and I'm referring

 4     to the documents that we were interested in.

 5        Q.   And how about witness testimony, did you hear any witnesses in

 6     this courtroom where you went back to your room and you thought this

 7     evidence is not true?

 8        A.   If witness testimonies were contrary to what I know and I believe

 9     that was true, then I thought that this witness didn't speak the truth.

10        Q.   And what did you do when this was the case?  How did you react?

11        A.   Of course we would analyse these specific testimonies, we would

12     use documents, and by analysing the contents and the -- making

13     comparisons with other testimonies and other documents, we would arrive

14     at certain conclusions and attempt to arrive at the truth.

15             You are now asking me about some expert procedures that you are

16     more familiar with than I am.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

18             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Yes, Your Honour, I notice it's getting to the

19     break time.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.

21             MR. McCLOSKEY:  But I'm also, just for the record, some of these

22     questions are obviously taking the witness into the area of

23     attorney-client privilege and perhaps, and I know Mr. Haynes can defend

24     this principle better than I can, but perhaps they should have a chance

25     to discuss that whether or not they feel the need to object to it or not.

Page 31419

 1     I -- because for the record and for the future of this case, as we all

 2     know, no one gives up that right by taking the witness stand.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you, Mr. McCloskey.  You will not be

 4     surprised if I confess to you that this has been moving in all directions

 5     at the back of my mind all the time.  However, I did not notice

 6     Mr. Haynes stand up and object.

 7             MR. HAYNES:  I was watching the clock as well.  I thought we

 8     could get to 10.20 and I'd think about this.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  Let's take the break now then.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE AGIUS:  Twenty-five minute break from now.  Thank you.

12                           --- Recess taken at 10.22 a.m.

13                           --- On resuming at 10.48 a.m.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes, have you had -- and Mr. Bourgon, have

15     you had a chance to talk?

16             MR. HAYNES:  Yes, Mr. Bourgon says he has one more question on

17     this topic.

18             JUDGE AGIUS:  Then we can proceed, I suppose.

19             Mr. Bourgon, go ahead.

20             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21        Q.   Sir, I have one last question on this topic concerning your

22     review of your -- of the evidence in this case before your testimony, and

23     I'd simply like you to confirm that in preparing for your testimony

24     before this Chamber, you did not ignore any evidence which was contrary

25     to what you, today, say is the truth; is that correct?

Page 31420

 1        A.   Well, I don't think that I and my defence team in preparing for

 2     the testimony went through the evidence already admitted.  All I want to

 3     say is that I always had endless trust in professionalism and

 4     responsibility of members of my team, that they acknowledged my military

 5     profession, and I recognise their professional legal knowledge.  And in

 6     the course of preparing the defence case, I provided all the information

 7     that I had available relating to my engagement and the events that are

 8     subject of this case.

 9             I don't know if this same thing applies to other Defence teams,

10     we never gave it a thought actually.  During preparations, we worked

11     together and the lead counsel was in charge of the preparation in

12     general, and I was there to explain to him anything that from a military

13     point of view he couldn't understand.

14        Q.   Thank you.  That will be useful when we get to the events of

15     16 July.

16             At this time, what I would like to do is to ask you, now that I

17     have completed your examination-in-chief, and that you have heard all of

18     the evidence in this case which was presented both by the Prosecution and

19     by the -- your co-accused in this case, I would like to ask you if you

20     believe, at least from the military point of view, you bear any

21     responsibility for the crimes that were committed in the area of Zvornik

22     in July 1995?

23        A.   I expressed my opinion about the indictment almost three years

24     ago.

25        Q.   But that was before you heard all the evidence in this case.  Now

Page 31421

 1     that you've heard all the evidence, and I'm not seeking a legal

 2     conclusion from you, I'm seeking a conclusion as the brigade commander,

 3     the commander of the Zvornik Brigade in July 1995; and I'm asking you

 4     straightforward:  Do you believe you bear any responsibility from a

 5     military perspective for the events that took place there at the time?

 6        A.   No.

 7        Q.   And looking back at these events, do you believe today as a

 8     military commander that you could have done something to save the lives

 9     of those Muslim prisoners who were executed during this period?

10        A.   Unfortunately, those who were executed before I learned about

11     that, it was impossible.  Those who we captured remained alive as well as

12     those who were allowed to pass through.  Whoever -- whoever's life

13     depended on me, they survived.

14        Q.   Now, yesterday, you said that you were surprised when you learned

15     that Obrenovic pled guilty.  That was at page 31331, lines 7 to 8.  And

16     it's also my understanding that you said that you did not think that

17     Obrenovic was guilty on the basis of the information he communicated to

18     you in 1995, and that was at page 31333, line 24, to 31335, line 2.  Do

19     you maintain this view today?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   Now, my question is the following, I'd like to review some facts

22     and then put a similar question to you:  On the basis of your testimony,

23     you will agree with me that Obrenovic obtained information about

24     executions in Orahovac at the latest in the evening of 14 July during his

25     conversation with Jokic, who was the brigade operations duty officer.

Page 31422

 1     That was your testimony; is that correct?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And it's your testimony that you arrived at the Zvornik Brigade

 4     command at around mid-day on the 15th of July?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And it was your testimony that in the afternoon of 15 July, you

 7     were informed that prisoners were being held in schools in the Zvornik

 8     area including Petkovci and Pilica?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   And it's your testimony that Obrenovic kept this information

11     until he conveyed it to you on the 16th of July at around 6.00?

12        A.   In the afternoon, yes.

13        Q.   1800 hours, you're right.  And you know on the basis of all the

14     evidence that we've heard in this case, that during this time, a large

15     number of prisoners who were held in Pilica and Petkovci schools were

16     executed.  You're familiar with this evidence?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And on the basis of these facts, is it still your position that

19     from a military perspective, you bear no responsibility for these

20     executions which took place in those schools?

21        A.   If you believe that the fact that the place of execution and the

22     place where prisoners of war were kept, held captive was in the area of

23     Zvornik where the Zvornik Brigade was the -- makes the brigade

24     responsible for that, then I don't think you're right.  It was someone

25     else who did this business, organised everything and executed everything.

Page 31423

 1     Had it by any chance happened that they had taken these prisoners to

 2     another location, and that they had met the same fate, I never would have

 3     been here, nor would anyone ask any questions of the Zvornik Brigade

 4     about that.

 5        Q.   Let me make my question more precise.  Dragan Obrenovic was your

 6     subordinate, and for two days he had information about executions taking

 7     place in Orahovac, and you had both the means to find out this

 8     information and the duty to find out this information; and this

 9     information included the participation of elements of the Zvornik

10     Brigade.

11             Do you believe that you have no responsibility whatsoever for

12     those events?

13        A.   When Dragan Obrenovic conveyed this information to me and also

14     later, there was no information or report about the participation of

15     members of the Zvornik Brigade in the events.  If Obrenovic was

16     responsible and had any role in the events of the 14th and the morning of

17     the 15th, then the corps command who was his superior command at the time

18     should have requested him to provide this information or undertake

19     certain measures against him.  The command didn't do anything which is

20     one of the indicators based on which I believe that Obrenovic was not

21     responsible.

22        Q.   Now, on the basis of this answer, Mr. Pandurevic, what I'd like

23     to do at this time, and that's my purpose, is to try and understand your

24     point of view from the military perspective so I can better understand

25     how it is that you testified the way you did concerning Drago Nikolic.

Page 31424

 1             During your examination-in-chief, when you testified about the

 2     conversation you had with Obrenovic in your office concerning the

 3     executions on -- that was the conversation of 23 July -- you stated and I

 4     quote from page 31171, lines 11 to 12:

 5              "But according to the information that we had, we knew that the

 6     order had come from General Mladic."

 7             Do you recall testifying to that effect?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And later, on the same page or on page 31172, lines 7 to 9, you

10     said:

11             "However in light of the subsequent events, and the fact that no

12     measures were taken, I'm still convinced that the order did, indeed, come

13     from him."

14             Do you stand by this testimony?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   At page 31106, you also testified as follows.  And I quote:

17             "On the 18th of July, when you dictated this report" -- that was

18     the question, sorry.

19             "Q.  On the 18th of July when you dictated this report, did you

20     have any reason to believe, for example, that General Krstic knew

21     anything about the killing operation of the prisoners?"

22             The answer was:

23             "I did not have any kind of explicit information that would point

24     to the fact that General Krstic knew something about that.  However, I

25     was thinking logically since he had not reacted to my report sent on the

Page 31425

 1     15th, since in the course of the conversation that we conducted in the

 2     morning of the 17th, since never happened after my report on the 16th, I

 3     fully believe that he was in possession of certain information."

 4             Do you remember testifying to that effect?

 5        A.   Yes, I do.

 6        Q.   And at page 31112, you also testified that when talking about the

 7     sources of your information about crimes committed, and again I quote

 8     you, lines 19 to 23:

 9             "The main source of my information was Dragan Obrenovic, and on

10     the 18th in Baljkovica, Jokic confirmed to me the engagement of the

11     engineering machinery and one machine from the Birac Holding enterprise

12     and one machine from the stone quarry from Josanica."

13             Do you recall testifying to that effect?

14        A.   Yes, I do.

15        Q.   And you will also agree with me that in your

16     examination-in-chief, talking about reburials, you expressed the view and

17     I quote 31244, lines 13 to 18:

18              "I did not have any direct information about who was engaged in

19     this, who was in charge of it, but I was able to conclude that it was

20     being done by the security organs because no task had been issued to any

21     of the commands for them to pass the orders down the chain of command and

22     deal with this matter."

23             Do you recall testifying to that effect?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Now, I could continue with more examples from your

Page 31426

 1     examination-in-chief, but my question is the following:  Bearing in mind

 2     your testimony in this case, help me out in understanding if I am right

 3     in saying that according to you, the chain of command from the Main Staff

 4     to the corps, the security organs of the VRS, Mladic, Krstic, Jokic, were

 5     involved and are responsible to some degree for the crimes that are

 6     committed against prisoners of war in the Zvornik area in 1995, but that

 7     you, Mr. Pandurevic, have no responsibility whatsoever.  Is that what we

 8     are to understand from your ten days of testimony?

 9        A.   You will understand it in the way you can and want to understand

10     it.  I had no command responsibility or personal responsibility for those

11     events.

12        Q.   Let's try and explore a bit further into this.  I'm not saying

13     that I want to have an understanding, I'm saying this is my

14     understanding.  Am I right or am I wrong?

15        A.   I don't know.  That's for the Trial Chamber to decide,

16     Mr. Bourgon.

17        Q.   I'll move to a different topic of my cross-examination dealing

18     with forcible transfer.

19             If I can have in e-court, please, P5.

20             Sir, you will recognise this document -- sorry, it's not there

21     yet.  That's P5.  Sorry.

22             JUDGE AGIUS:  Be patient, Mr. Bourgon.

23             MR. BOURGON:  It's a long document.

24             JUDGE AGIUS:  We have the Tribunal logo at the moment.  Do you

25     want to go to any particular page?

Page 31427

 1             MR. BOURGON:  No, the first page will be fine for now,

 2     Mr. President.

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Fine.  If you look at your monitor, Mr. Bourgon,

 4     you will see that the English version that we have does not correspond

 5     with the -- okay, it does now.  Okay.  Go ahead.

 6             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7        Q.   Sir, you recognise this document which appears before you on the

 8     screen as being the directive for upcoming operations to the command of

 9     the 1st -- addressed to the command of the 1st -- sorry, it's the

10     directive for further operations number 7.  Do you recognise this

11     document?

12        A.   Yes.  Yes, I have seen it in this courtroom.

13        Q.   Now you see the date of this document is 8 March 1995?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   But if we go back one page at least on the English side, we see

16     the cover letter, which is page 1 in e-court on the English side.  So we

17     see from this page that this is a document that came from the Main Staff

18     of the Army of Republika Srpska and that it was addressed to the command

19     of the 1st Krajina Corps by Milovanovic, the Chief of Staff, on 17 March.

20             Do you recognise this cover letter, Mr. Pandurevic?

21        A.   I saw it here for the first time.

22        Q.   Well, that's exactly my point leading into my next question.

23     During your examination-in-chief, and that was on page 30821, lines 21 to

24     24, you said that you saw this document for the first time here in

25     The Hague; is that correct?

Page 31428

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   And you will agree with me that this is a strategic level

 3     document?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And you will also agree with me that if you did not see it until

 6     you arrive in The Hague, nobody else in the Zvornik Brigade did; is that

 7     correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And you would agree with me that you would not expect brigade

10     officers in general to be informed of strategic level documents issued by

11     the Supreme Command of the armed forces?

12        A.   I agree.

13        Q.   I'd like to move now to another document which is P203 in

14     e-court, please.

15             We have this document now on the screen, Mr. Pandurevic.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, Mr. Bourgon.  Just out of curiosity,

17     even though out of the back of my mind I seem to remember something, can

18     you -- okay.  I notice, although I do remember that there was an

19     explanation for this, that while the B/C/S version at the top right-hand

20     corner says copy number 6 P, in the English, it says copy number 9.  I

21     just want a confirmation, nothing else, that we're talking exactly of the

22     same document.

23             Later on the title does seem to indicate that we're talking about

24     operative order number 7.  Yes, Mr. McCloskey.

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Mr. President, we'll check on that.  I believe

Page 31429

 1     this will -- I believe it's been in evidence that this Directive 7 was

 2     sent around to the different brigades.  We may have translated one that

 3     came from a different brigade but we'll check on that.  It shouldn't

 4     change the substance.

 5             JUDGE AGIUS:  I seem to remember that this was brought up earlier

 6     on in the course of the trial but I just wanted to -- in case you need or

 7     you wish to make any submission regarding this.

 8             Yes, Mr. Haynes.

 9             MR. HAYNES:  It's also not on the list of documents that has been

10     disclosed, P203 but I have no objection at this stage.  I may have

11     something to say about that a little later.

12             MR. BOURGON:  I apologise to my colleague.  I thought -- we

13     thought this document was on our list, and I will take this at the break

14     but it's a document that is of -- very well known that was used in the

15     examination-in-chief.

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Right.  No, that I know.  But let's proceed then,

17     and I will reserve your respective rights.

18             MR. BOURGON:  And I thank you, Mr. President, for raising the

19     issue about the copy number 9 and number 6 in the B/C/S version, and I

20     will also follow-up on this with my colleagues from the Prosecution.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  And then there is one in handwriting.

22             MR. BOURGON:

23        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, you see that this is -- this document is called

24     "Order For Defence and Active Combat Operations, Operative No. 7."

25     You've seen this document during your examination-in-chief?

Page 31430

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   If I can move to page 6 in English and page 3 in B/C/S, please.

 3             Now, sir, if we look in item number 2, and I think this one

 4     appears in the middle of the page in your language and in English, I'm

 5     looking at the last sentence of the first paragraph where it says or the

 6     infamous sentence appears:

 7             "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations create an

 8     unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival

 9     or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

10             Sir, it was your testimony that this sentence was copy pasted

11     word for word from the strategic document that we looked at, the

12     directive for further operations 7, which you never saw during the war;

13     is that correct?

14        A.   Not only this sentence, but the task given to the Drina Corps.

15        Q.   Well I move now to the tasks and the order which was -- which is

16     issued by this document.  If I can go to page 8 in English and page 4 in

17     B/C/S.

18             Now, under item 4, under the heading, "I have decided," we see

19     that there is no reference whatsoever to that infamous phrase including

20     in item 2 about the survival of the inhabitants of Srebrenica; is that

21     correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And on the basis of your military experience, you can say that

24     what matters in an order of this type is the decision of the corps

25     commander which is expressed in this paragraph; is that correct?

Page 31431

 1        A.   From point 4 to the end of the order, all that is considered to

 2     be a decision in the military sense.  The first part is the idea behind

 3     it, and it's important for the subordinate command receiving this order

 4     in studying its task because it has to understand the goal and the idea

 5     of the superior commander who issued the order; so the part containing

 6     the idea behind the decision reached by General Zivanovic is to separate

 7     the two enclaves and prevent communication between them and nothing more

 8     than that as regards the enclaves themselves.

 9        Q.   And as far as you were concerned as the commander of the Zvornik

10     Brigade receiving this document, what is important for you is the

11     decision part from paragraphs 4 and onwards; is that correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   If I can move to page 9 in English and page 5 in B/C/S.  This

14     section, sir, under item 5, "The tasks of the units," we see at paragraph

15     5.1, that these are the tasks which were assigned to the Zvornik Brigade

16     by this order; is that correct?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And I'd like to cover two specific parts of paragraph 5.1, namely

19     the first part which starts after the colon with a little dash, and it

20     says that your task or that of the Zvornik Brigade was to:

21             "Prevent an enemy breakthrough along selected tactical axes,

22     taking control of dominant features, cutting the Zvornik-Kozluk road and

23     reaching the Drina River."

24             Was that the main task that you were assigned as commander of the

25     Zvornik Brigade?

Page 31432

 1        A.   This was the main task throughout the war.  So it didn't have to

 2     be written down specially, everybody knew about it, and it was only being

 3     reiterated here.

 4        Q.   In other words, concentrate on the forward defence line and

 5     prevent a breakthrough from the Muslim 2nd Corps; is that correct?

 6        A.   Yes, that was the main rationale for the existence of the

 7     Zvornik Brigade.

 8        Q.   And the last task in this paragraph 5.1, which is the third

 9     little dash which says:

10             "The brigade command shall form battalion-strength ready forces

11     for the intervention along threatened axes and carrying out offensive

12     operations in their area of responsibility and by the order of the Drina

13     Corps commander."

14             Can you explain to us what this means?

15        A.   This is practically reiterating a task we had been given

16     previously.  This battalion had been established, and that was the

17     Podrinje Detachment of special forces with reinforcements.

18        Q.   And the purpose of this task is to have forces ready to intervene

19     both in your area of responsibility and, of course, if the Drina Corps

20     commander needs some assistance; is that correct?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   But as you mentioned in your examination-in-chief, there is no

23     mention whatsoever in this paragraph 5.1 of either Srebrenica enclave or

24     Zepa enclave; is that correct?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 31433

 1        Q.   And in your examination-in-chief, you stated at 30829, lines 6 to

 2     16, the question was:

 3             "Q.  Now going back to, as it were, the infamous words which are

 4     set out under paragraph 2, the tasks of the Drina Corps, how did you or

 5     do you view the task of the Drina Corps under that heading in terms of

 6     achievability?"

 7             Your answer was:

 8             "When I received this order, I first read it and we call it the

 9     first reading, just to get the general idea.  During that first reading,

10     I noticed item 2, the task of the corps.  However, I did not dwell long

11     on it and during the next reading and analysing, I focused on item 4.  I

12     cannot tell you now exactly what I understood at the time.  The sentence

13     has been mentioned here, but definitely I gave it a lot of thought in

14     this trial."

15             So my understanding on the basis of this answer, Mr. Pandurevic,

16     is that when you read this order coming from the corps and that you acted

17     upon it in accordance with your duties as brigade commander, you focused

18     exclusively on the commander's decision-making and the tasks issued to

19     the Zvornik Brigade; is that correct?

20        A.   Yes, and the neighbouring brigades.  That was the

21     Sekovici Brigade.

22        Q.   And we've heard lots of evidence in this case, sir, about the

23     staffing process which follows once you receive such an order from the

24     corps; and you will agree with me that the staffing process, of course,

25     is directed by both you and your Chief of Staff inside the

Page 31434

 1     Zvornik Brigade command; is that correct?

 2        A.   The process was started by the commander and then continued by

 3     the Chief of Staff and the other staff organs.

 4        Q.   And would you agree with me that during the complete staffing

 5     process which followed receiving this order, that which took place within

 6     the Zvornik Brigade command, you never discussed, indicated in any way,

 7     nor made any request to your Chief of Staff, your assistant commanders,

 8     and your staff officers in relation to actions targeted at the civilian

 9     population of Srebrenica and Zepa?

10        A.   That was absolutely not to be considered.

11        Q.   So if I put myself today or -- no, not today, but then in the

12     shoes of any of these officers, whether your Chief of Staff, your

13     assistant commanders, or your staff officers in the command, would you

14     agree with me that I could not infer from your orders and instructions as

15     brigade commander that the Zvornik Brigade had anything to do or any

16     actions to do in the sense of targeting the civilian population of

17     Srebrenica and Zepa?

18        A.   Your conclusion is correct.  The order I issued based on this

19     order starts with point 1 where I put forward information on the enemy in

20     front of the brigade zone.  Point 2 would be the brigade's tasks, the one

21     contained in this order issued by the corps commander.  Point 3 would be

22     the task of the neighbouring brigade, the Sekovici Brigade; and point 4

23     would be my idea behind the decision for the engagement of the brigade in

24     the spirit of the assigned task and nowhere would Srebrenica or Zepa be

25     mentioned in all this.

Page 31435

 1        Q.   And one last question on this topic, and you covered this at

 2     length during your examination-in-chief.  It is your testimony that the

 3     Zvornik Brigade, to your knowledge, was never involved in any way in the

 4     forcible transfer of the civilian population from Potocari to Kladanj in

 5     Muslim-held territory?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   And the same applies for the civilian population of Zepa; is that

 8     correct?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   I'd like to move to a different part of my cross-examination and

11     in this part I would like to go back to your testimony in relation to the

12     period from 12 to 15 July 1995, that is before you left the area of Zepa

13     to return to Zvornik.  The first issue I would like to address is the

14     command relationship between Major Obrenovic and yourself during this

15     period.

16             Based on your testimony, it is my understanding that according to

17     you, from the moment you left Zvornik with Tactical Group 1,

18     Major Obrenovic was acting in his capacity as deputy commander of the

19     brigade; is that correct?

20        A.   Yes.  Yes.  He was the acting brigade commander.

21        Q.   And you had no responsibility, according to your testimony,

22     whatsoever, for anything that happened until you resumed your functions

23     as commander; is that your position?

24        A.   Yes.  I was prevented from carrying out the duties of the

25     commander of the Zvornik Brigade in that period because I was carrying

Page 31436

 1     out another task, and in that period, there was no command relationship,

 2     no superior-subordinate relationship between Dragan Obrenovic and me.

 3        Q.   Now, we'll move to the -- your arrival in the Zvornik Brigade

 4     command on 15 July a little later, but my question is when exactly do you

 5     resume in your functions as commander?  What's the exact defining moment

 6     when Major Obrenovic no longer was the acting brigade commander and that

 7     you resume your functions?

 8        A.   When he completed the briefing in his office, I think that I then

 9     said, Now I'm taking over the command.

10        Q.   So what you are basically saying is once you are -- once you have

11     been informed or you got the briefing as to the situation in which the

12     brigade is, then it's for you to decide whether you resume command or

13     not; is that your position?

14        A.   Yes.  General Krstic was the one who sent me back and I had to

15     assume command.

16        Q.   What if someone would say that the moment General Krstic gave you

17     the order to go back, you were now the brigade commander.  What would you

18     say to such an allegation?

19        A.   That allegation would be illogical and untrue.

20        Q.   Help us in understanding why.

21        A.   Because actually it produced no effect on the spot and by that, I

22     mean in the brigade zone.  Because I was still not there, I was still not

23     able to command.

24        Q.   And when you spoke on the phone that morning with Jokic,

25     Milosevic, and Mijatovic, were they speaking to the commander of the

Page 31437

 1     brigade or were they speaking to someone who was yet to resume his

 2     functions as commander?

 3        A.   As far as I can remember, I think that they tried to contact

 4     Obrenovic, but I think they failed to do so because he was in the field;

 5     and, therefore, they spoke to me.

 6        Q.   Maybe my question is not precise enough.  Those calls were

 7     initiated by you; is that correct?

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And when you speak to these three individuals as we've seen from

10     the intercepts, are you speaking as the person who has resumed his

11     command over the Zvornik Brigade or are you still not yet commander of

12     the Zvornik Brigade?

13        A.   I was commander formally speaking, but I didn't resume my duties

14     as commander of the brigade yet.  Let me give you another example.  When

15     I set off from Visegrad to assume duties of the Zvornik Brigade command,

16     I didn't become the brigade commander automatically in Visegrad.  It

17     happened only when I arrived in Zvornik, received all the information

18     necessary, and sat at the command -- brigade commander's desk.

19        Q.   Now, I agree with what you're saying about the moving from the

20     Visegrad Brigade to the Zvornik Brigade but you will agree with me that

21     beforehand you had no relationship whatsoever with the Zvornik Brigade;

22     is that correct?

23        A.   I wasn't.

24        Q.   Now, in the instance that we're talking about, you were, before

25     leaving with Tactical Group 1 and during your deployment with

Page 31438

 1     Tactical Group 1 formally still the commander of the Zvornik Brigade?

 2        A.   Formally speaking, yes.

 3        Q.   And when you spoke on the phone that morning to those three

 4     individuals I've mentioned, could you issue them orders, for example?

 5        A.   I could have issued orders but I didn't do so because I was not

 6     in command of the brigade.  That would amount to dual command, not single

 7     authority because Dragan Obrenovic had already issued them tasks, and

 8     they were in the process of carrying out and that would only create

 9     confusion.

10        Q.   So that was an understanding, or is it your understanding that

11     both you and those three individuals understood that on that moment

12     within you spoke to them, and you were asking for information about the

13     4th and the 7th Battalion, that you were not speaking to them as the

14     brigade commander?

15        A.   No, I received this information in order to discuss with Krstic

16     the request for my being sent back.

17        Q.   Now, if I understand you correctly, based on what you're saying

18     now is that once you left with Tactical Group 1, you no longer cared what

19     happened at the Zvornik Brigade because there was an officer there,

20     Obrenovic, who was qualified to talk over and you did not need to worry

21     about what was going on there; is that your position?

22        A.   I didn't have to be concerned, and I couldn't make any decisions

23     and I couldn't influence the operation of the brigade.

24        Q.   But as you've mentioned, formally you were still the brigade

25     commander because Obrenovic did not get a formal appointment; is that

Page 31439

 1     correct?

 2        A.   An individual who is prevented from carrying out their duties is

 3     given a standee because according to establishment of president of the

 4     Chief of Staff is at the same time the deputy commander, and the rule on

 5     the regiment command says that in absence of the commander, the Chief of

 6     Staff stand in for the commander with all his respective duties and

 7     responsibilities.

 8             Therefore, Obrenovic was in command of the brigade.  The

 9     individual who is absent is formally registered as being in this post,

10     but there could be a variety of reasons for this individual not to be

11     able to carry out his duty.

12        Q.   I think we are very close to each other on this, but my question

13     is simply once you -- still being the formal commander of the brigade, do

14     you forget about that brigade or you still have military responsibilities

15     towards that brigade?

16        A.   I didn't have command responsibility, but I cannot disregard the

17     brigade, and my command post cannot be outside the brigade zone because

18     the communications lines that I use in commanding are within my zone and

19     have certain range.  My forward command post cannot be in Zepa while I

20     command the brigade in Zvornik, for example.  Even if I had such a large

21     connection that wouldn't have given me the right to command.

22        Q.   So then, sir, I take it that you will agree with me that during

23     this period, we're talking specifically 12 to 15 July, but I could extend

24     that period, that even though from a legal point of view you may not bear

25     any responsibilities for crimes committed in your absence, now that's a

Page 31440

 1     legal question and is not something I wish to address at this time,

 2     you'll agree with me that from a military perspective you were still

 3     formally the commander and you still had a duty of care for your brigade.

 4     Do you agree with that?

 5        A.   Look, I didn't have the duty to care because I was prevented from

 6     carrying out my duties.  What I thought was just my choice, and I could

 7     have thought anything.

 8        Q.   And I suggest to you, sir, that when you obtained information of

 9     the threat posed by the column and the 28th Division moving towards the

10     area of Zvornik that was sufficient reason for you to be informed -- not

11     to be informed, sorry, it was sufficient information for you to take some

12     actions to at least find out what was happening in Zvornik at the time.

13        A.   This information served only for me to send a request to

14     General Krstic to eliminate the reasons for my being prevented from

15     commanding the Zvornik Brigade.  At 9.00 on the 15th, I was commanding

16     the TG at the IKM at Krivace which was in combat engagement with the

17     enemy.  That was my basic task.

18        Q.   Sir, I will be straightforward with my case here.  I'm putting to

19     you here that during this period when you were away, that you did remain

20     in contact with Major Obrenovic contrary to your testimony in this case,

21     and I'd like to cover that aspect step by step.

22             Firstly you mentioned during your examination-in-chief and that

23     was at 30741 lines 15 to 20:

24             "That it is not right for the commander of a brigade to be called

25     upon to participate in combat activities outside of the area of

Page 31441

 1     operations of his own brigade."

 2             You added:  "This does not or should not happen in organised

 3     armies."

 4             Do you still agree with that?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Nonetheless, when you received the order for Krivaja 95 and that

 7     is asking for Tactical Group 1 to be put together and to take part in

 8     combat activities near Srebrenica, you did not hesitate in assigning

 9     yourself as commander of Tactical Group 1, which means I suggest to you

10     that you accepted to deprive the Zvornik Brigade of its commander for the

11     time that you would be away in Srebrenica?

12        A.   This is contrary to the laws of physics, Mr. Bourgon.  I didn't

13     assign myself.  It was an order from Krstic.

14        Q.   Well I suggest to you, and we can go to the order if you want,

15     but that this order never said that you were to take command of this

16     Tactical Group 1, or that you were to create Tactical Group 1; do you

17     agree with that?

18        A.   I agree.

19        Q.   So it was your choice to take command of this tactical group?

20        A.   It wasn't my choice, because this tactical group was twice as

21     strong than the forces given by the 1st Romanija or the 1st Birac

22     brigades.  Each one of them gave a company, it was not reasonable for a

23     brigade commander to command a company.

24             The Zvornik Brigade provided a reinforced light infantry

25     battalion, it is quite understandable in view of the task received for me

Page 31442

 1     to assume command of this unit because it was made up of three different

 2     units.

 3        Q.   So it's your testimony that it was understandable that you,

 4     nonetheless, decided to do so; but that was not part of the order, was

 5     it?

 6        A.   That was an oral order from General Krstic for me to command

 7     these forces from the Zvornik Brigade.

 8        Q.   Well, we've seen the order --

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  One moment, Mr. Bourgon, let me intervene here.

10             Had you, Mr. Pandurevic, instead of taking -- assuming the

11     command of this tactical group appointed, say, Obrenovic, to take command

12     of it, what would have been the consequences, if any?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would have stayed

14     at the brigade command and commanded the Zvornik Brigade.  Only this part

15     of the tactical group would not be under my command but under Obrenovic's

16     command or rather General Krstic's command.  Because Obrenovic didn't

17     have any responsibility towards TG-1 which was under my command.

18             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

19        Q.   So Mr. Pandurevic, all I'm saying is that you could have

20     appointed, instead of yourself, for example, Legenda or Bojanovic or

21     Strbac to take command of that group; is that correct?

22        A.   I can agree about Legenda as the person capable of commanding,

23     but the other two names are an unfortunate choice.  They couldn't have

24     done this duty.  I could have appointed anyone but what would that mean?

25     That would be really irresponsible.  I wouldn't carry out the task of the

Page 31443

 1     core.  I had an oral order from the corps commander to command these

 2     forces personally.

 3        Q.   Now just for the record would you agree with me that this is the

 4     first time that this oral order from General Krstic is ever mentioned

 5     this trial?  Do you agree with me on this?

 6        A.   I think I mentioned Krstic's order before.  Whether I specified

 7     that it was an oral one, I don't think it makes any difference.

 8        Q.   It was simply an oversight on your part.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   I'd like -- when you created Tactical Group 1 and you took

11     command of the group, I take it you were aware that once you were away

12     with this Tactical Group, the brigade would be short or deprived of very

13     important resources to hold the line facing the 2nd Corps of the Muslim

14     army; is that correct?

15        A.   These resources would not be lacking because in the period, the

16     number of soldiers on defence line increased in this period.  They were

17     called off from their leave, and they were deployed in positions.  The

18     Podrinje Detachment of special forces never held any positions on defence

19     line.  The Zvornik Brigade had sufficient strength to defend from any

20     possible attack by the 2nd Corps.  The estimate of the Drina Corps

21     commander was such that they needed those forces and given the Muslim

22     operation offensive around Sarajevo, we knew that their intervention

23     forces from the 2nd Corps had been sent to the Sarajevo area.

24             MR. BOURGON:  Now, I don't --

25             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Excuse me, if I could just make just one

Page 31444

 1     question.  Was there a reference to General Krstic as the commander of

 2     the corps at this point?  Is that a translation issue or not?

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Bourgon.

 4             Which part of the transcript are you referring to?

 5             MR. BOURGON:  One example, Mr. President, is at page 55, lines

 6     19 and line 14 also.

 7             JUDGE AGIUS:  But that's --

 8             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It was the General's answer that I was

 9     questioning, whether or not the translation was correct.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes.  Mr. Pandurevic, can you help us.

11             MR. McCLOSKEY:  It's 55, line 14.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I understand

13     Mr. McCloskey's interventions.  General Krstic was, at the time, still

14     the Chief of Staff and the deputy commander of the corps, but he was in

15     command of Krivaja 95 operation and a limited number of the forces from

16     the Drina Corps were involved in that operation.

17             General Ivanovic [as interpreted] was totally side tracked at the

18     time but he certainly had a approval from Zivanovic for me to go there

19     and command my forces taking part in Krivaja 95.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you for that clarification, Mr. Pandurevic.

21             You can proceed, Mr. Bourgon.

22             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23             I'd like to have in e-court, please, P318.  I believe this one is

24     on our list.

25        Q.   Sir, is it your position that when you left with

Page 31445

 1     Tactical Group 1, pursuant to the orders that you had received, according

 2     to your testimony, that this had no impact or no effect on the

 3     Zvornik Brigade or what was left of the Zvornik Brigade?

 4        A.   It's all related as a cause and consequence.  I'm not viewing

 5     things in isolation.  I'm viewing them as a whole.

 6             If I left the brigade zone of defence and the deputy commander

 7     stayed back to command the brigade which was confirmed several times in

 8     various documents, the Zvornik Brigade was not hampered by that.  It

 9     remained with enough manpower and capable of carrying out the task given

10     to them.

11             At that point, nobody thought that some day, the 28th Division

12     would find itself in the defence zone of the Zvornik Brigade.

13        Q.   So leaving aside for now the fact that the 28th Division did

14     appear in Zvornik, it's your position that the brigade was perfectly able

15     to cope with its duties and tasks while you were away with Tactical Group

16     1; is that your testimony?

17        A.   Yes, with the tasks that it had been given.

18        Q.   Now, if you look at the document, which is on the screen before

19     you, do you recognise this as being your order highlighting or stating

20     the composition of Tactical Group 1; is that correct?

21        A.   I recognise this, and everything that is written here is correct.

22        Q.   So if we move to page 2 of this document, we have -- so at

23     paragraph 2.2, sir, we see that the first battle group was composed of

24     the Podrinje Detachment and we see at the letters E for Echo as part of

25     this battle group, you included the 82-millimetre Mortar Platoon.  Was

Page 31446

 1     that a unit formally attached to the Podrinje Detachment or did that come

 2     from the Zvornik Brigade?

 3        A.   No, it was part of the Podrinje Detachment.

 4        Q.   And at letters G for Golf, the Zolja Intervention Platoon from

 5     the 4th Battalion, this intervention platoon was composed of the best

 6     fighters from the 4th Battalion; is that correct?

 7        A.   Yes, because the detachment was incomplete, and it was almost 100

 8     men short than usual because part of their forces were in the Sarajevo

 9     Romanija Corps.

10        Q.   And if I look at the composition of the second battle group at

11     paragraphs 2.3, we see that all of these resources are resources that

12     were taken away from the Zvornik Brigade when you left for Tactical Group

13     1; is that correct?

14        A.   Yes, and we see the two companies have been formed within this

15     combat group made up of three platoons each; each platoon had about 20

16     soldiers, each company had -- which is twice the smaller number than the

17     usual, and these were men from the Zvornik Brigade.  Had they not joined

18     the tactical group, they would have been on leave.  They wouldn't be on

19     the positions of the Zvornik Brigade.  Maybe not these particular men but

20     some others, definitely.

21        Q.   If I look at paragraphs 2.4 where is it says, "The Armoured

22     Mechanised Company," those four T-55 tanks, they were no longer with the

23     Zvornik Brigade when you left, you took them with you.

24        A.   That is correct.  They were part of the detachment per

25     establishment, but I reshuffled the detachment and other battalions and

Page 31447

 1     units and I set up a special support unit of this tank company, however,

 2     some other tanks, T-34, for example, remained in the zone brigade which

 3     were fortified firing positions and were excellent for defence.

 4        Q.   If we move to the next page on the English side and also next

 5     page on the B/C/S side, and I refer you to also in paragraph 2.4, you see

 6     here the resources that you took with you, the 4 armoured personnel

 7     carriers, that's paragraph Bravo; the Praga with crew, that's paragraph

 8     Charlie; and the hand-held anti-aircraft rocket, the Strela 2m at

 9     paragraph Bravo.  And we also see that at 2.5, there is a platoon of 122

10     millimetres.  Were all of these resources that were --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Previous page on B/C/S.

12             MR. BOURGON:  In the previous page -- these were all resources

13     that were taken away from the Zvornik Brigade.

14        A.   Everything that is listed here has been taken away from the

15     Zvornik Brigade.  We do not have to go item by item.  These armoured

16     transporters and the Praga were always going with the Podrinje Detachment

17     if it was operating outside the brigade zone with the exception of 122

18     howitzers which were taken from the mixed artillery battalion.

19        Q.   Well then leaving that list aside would you agree with me, sir,

20     that when you left with Tactical Group 1, you took the best fighters of

21     the brigade with you leaving behind people with little or no combat

22     experience to hold the line; do you agree with that?

23        A.   They had equal combat experience as the soldiers in TG-2.

24        Q.   I'm not talking about Tactical Group 2, I'm talking about those

25     left in Zvornik to hold the line.  The people left in Zvornik, I suggest

Page 31448

 1     to you, were people with little or no combat experience; is that correct?

 2        A.   No, that's not correct, Mr. Bourgon.  I've been saying the same

 3     thing but as regards experience, the experience of the soldiers who

 4     remained to defend the brigade zone is the same as the experience of the

 5     men in Combat Group 2 who left with me.  They were all mobilised at the

 6     same time, and they had spent the same amount of time waging war.

 7        Q.   Now, based on the information that you had at the time, I take it

 8     that when you left with Tactical Group 1, and you referred to that

 9     earlier, you did not expect the Zvornik Brigade to face any major

10     situation or to be involved in any type of heavy fighting when you were

11     away; is that correct?

12        A.   Correct.  If someone had listened to me at the meeting in

13     Bratunac on the 11th, they would not have had to face that situation.

14        Q.   But you trusted when you went away with Tactical Group 1 that

15     Obrenovic could fulfill the duties of deputy commander because he had

16     done so in the past; is that correct?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   But it could not be expected, at least at the time, that a column

19     of many thousands of Muslims would soon be crossing the area of

20     operations of the Zvornik Brigade trying to breach your line of defence

21     and reach Tuzla?

22        A.   It could not be expected to happen that way.  I did entertain

23     some assumptions, but it was only on the 12th that we learned of the

24     specific intentions of the 28th Division.

25        Q.   What I am interested in, sir, is that what you did, once you

Page 31449

 1     realised that the 28th Division was heading for Zvornik, there was a

 2     possibility at the time, would you agree with me, that the 28th Division

 3     would even capture Zvornik; is that correct?

 4        A.   No, no, there was no possibility of that.

 5        Q.   Did the column and the 28th Division represent a major threat for

 6     Zvornik and the Zvornik Brigade or what was left of it at the time?

 7        A.   From the 12th of July onwards, the Army of Republika Srpska had

 8     specific information about the axis of movement and the intentions of the

 9     28th Division.  That column had only one goal and that was to reach the

10     territory of the 2nd Corps by the shortest route or the route they knew

11     best, in the fastest way, and with the least obstruction.  They had

12     previously reconnoitred those axes for that column to aside to attack

13     Zvornik would have been crazy and those commanders in the units of the

14     28th Division never even thought of that.

15        Q.   Now, sir, you had fought a part of the 28th Division just a few

16     hours before that.  Would you agree with me that you were aware of the

17     determination and the fire power which could be mustered by the

18     28th Division if it reached the territory of Zvornik?

19        A.   Obrenovic himself knew on the 12th, he had information about the

20     movements of the 28th Division.  On the 13th and 14th, his information

21     was complete.

22        Q.   But my question is what did you have as information at the time

23     concerning the threat posed by the 28th Division to Zvornik, and what did

24     you do about it?

25        A.   Nobody sent me any information, nor did I, after leaving Vijogor

Page 31450

 1     going towards Zepa, inquire about it.  My last contact at Vijogor with

 2     Krstic and Mladic was when I learned from them that there was sufficient

 3     and adequate forces to stop any further movement of the 28th Division,

 4     and I didn't worry about it anymore.

 5        Q.   We'll cover your encounter with Krstic and Mladic, but before you

 6     had this encounter were you worried at any time concerning the threat

 7     posed by the 28th Division to the Zvornik Brigade?

 8        A.   I put forward my thoughts and my suggestions at the meeting of

 9     the 11th.  They were rejected.  They were not accepted.  After that, I

10     could think whatever I wanted, but I could no longer influence the

11     situation.

12        Q.   And did you find the need at any point in time to contact

13     Major Obrenovic to inform him of the threat and at least find out what he

14     was doing or what he was planning to defend against this threat?

15        A.   I didn't contact him at all.  He was on the radio network with

16     the corps command.  The corps and Dragan Obrenovic had much more

17     information about the 28th Division than I did; in fact, I had no

18     information at all.

19        Q.   So what you're saying today that Major Obrenovic was on the radio

20     network with the corps and that he had all the information, the same

21     information that General Krstic possessed at the time; is that your

22     testimony?

23        A.   I don't know whether he had the same information as Krstic, but

24     we saw here from a number of documents what activities Obrenovic

25     undertook with respect to the 28th Division.

Page 31451

 1        Q.   Sir, how big was the 28th Division?  What was your knowledge of

 2     the size of the 28th Division at the time?

 3             MR. McCLOSKEY:  Could we get a specific date?  It's sort of

 4     disappearing rather quickly.

 5             MR. BOURGON:

 6        Q.   Between the 12 and the 15 of July when you realised that there is

 7     a column including the 28th Division moving towards Zvornik, what was

 8     your understanding of the size of that force moving towards Zvornik?

 9        A.   I had information about the approximate numbers of the

10     28th Division which was in Srebrenica on the 11th.  When the VRS entered

11     Srebrenica and the 28th Division pulled out in the direction the Jaglici,

12     we had assessments to the effect that part of the division would try to

13     break through towards Zepa, one part towards Kladanj, and one part

14     towards Tuzla through the Zvornik area; but we did not know the numbers

15     of the forces who would be trying to break through in each of those axes.

16        Q.   What was your information that you possessed at the time

17     concerning the total numbers in the 28th Division?

18        A.   At what time?

19        Q.   Exactly at that period.  What was the total number of the

20     28th Division by the time you lounged or you set out with Tactical Group

21     1?

22        A.   We had information that there were about 6.000 members of the

23     28th Division in the Srebrenica area holding positions at the approaches

24     to Srebrenica.  When that number started pulling out, they were divided

25     in different directions, but how many of them were in each of those

Page 31452

 1     directions, I didn't know.

 2        Q.   And I don't think you answered my --

 3             JUDGE AGIUS:  Any time it's convenient for you, Mr. Bourgon,

 4     we'll have the break.

 5             MR. BOURGON:  I think that's a convenient time, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  25 minutes.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.

 9             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Bourgon, and please leave about five,

10     maximum 10 minutes towards the end because I understand Mr. Haynes would

11     like to raise an issue.

12             Yes, Mr. Haynes.

13             MR. HAYNES:  I think five will do.

14             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, okay, then five minutes.

15             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16        Q.   Sir, just before the break, I wanted to go back to a question,

17     which I felt you did not answer, and the question was that I suggest to

18     you that you were fully aware of the determination of the members of the

19     28th Division and their will to fight and to reach Tuzla by all means.

20     Would you agree with that?

21        A.   I wasn't fully aware of that because I did not have a clear

22     picture of their evil intentions --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Or rather of all their intentions,

24     interpreter's correction.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I knew that they wanted to reach

Page 31453

 1     the area of the 2nd Corps going through several -- taking several routes

 2     not in a single column.

 3             MR. BOURGON:

 4        Q.   But my question relates to the fact that you had been fighting

 5     them for some days by that time.  Were they good fighters or were they

 6     determined fighters?

 7        A.   They were very persistent along my axis of attack because they

 8     were fortified, they had well-dug trenches and shelters, parapets.  And I

 9     think they had more reason to fight then than later on when they lost

10     those positions.

11        Q.   I take it that you are familiar with the weapons which the

12     28th Division had in its possession?

13        A.   I'm familiar with the weapons they used along my axis of attack.

14        Q.   But were you aware that the 28th Division was a well-armed

15     division?

16        A.   I think it was well-armed with a light-automatic, and

17     semi-automatic weapons, a certain number of mortars of 82 millimetres,

18     anti-aircraft machine-guns of 12.7 millimetres, a 20-millimetre gun, and

19     I found a B-176-millimetre gun as well and some hand-held launchers and

20     other anti-armour equipment.

21        Q.   Let me share with you, sir, some of the figures that were given

22     in the Krstic trial by General Hadzihasanovic, who was the Chief of Staff

23     of the ABiH as you know.  He gave some figures in his testimony about the

24     weapons in the possession of the 28th Division and that was on

25     5 April 2001, page 9517.  These figures include according to him, 1.947

Page 31454

 1     automatic rifles; 13 sniper rifles; 27 submachine-guns; 15 machine-guns;

 2     12, 60-millimetre mortars; five 82-millimetre mortars; nine hand-grenade

 3     launchers; four recoilless guns, 82-millimetre; 68-hand held rocket

 4     launchers, zolja type; one light rocket launcher of Fagot type, the

 5     9K11F, which you are familiar with; and four anti-aircraft guns of 20

 6     millimetres.

 7             Is that the arsenal that you were familiar with that could be in

 8     the possession of the 28th Division?

 9        A.   These are more or less the weapons I enumerated by kind and

10     purpose.  The information given here is precise, whether it's correct or

11     not, I'm not sure but after withdrawal of the 28th Division during the

12     breakthrough, only the automatic weapons and the light machine-guns could

13     be used.

14             The other weapons could not be carried apart from the hand-held

15     launchers which are carried on the shoulder.

16        Q.   I take it you will agree with me that coming from an officer from

17     the Muslim army, that this is most likely a very conservative estimate as

18     to all the weapons which were in the possession of the 28th Division?

19             JUDGE AGIUS:  Can you answer that question, Mr. Pandurevic?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I can only say the

21     following:  That the Muslim command or rather the Army of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed, after the demilitarisation, that they had no

23     weapons and here, we see the figure of 2.000.  I have no reason to doubt

24     the figures provided here.

25             MR. BOURGON:

Page 31455

 1        Q.   And you are also aware, sir, on the basis of your experience that

 2     many people from the 28th Division were also using personal rifles such

 3     as hunting rifles, for example?

 4        A.   I've read that in various statements, and I heard some people

 5     testify to that here.  There were quite a few hunters in that area.

 6        Q.   Now, it's your testimony that -- just to come back on one quick

 7     point concerning the fact that the Zvornik Brigade was not shorthanded at

 8     the time, would you agree with me that this column moving towards the

 9     Zvornik territory was a major threat for the Zvornik area?

10        A.   If we bear in mind the principles for the tactical use of units

11     breaking through from encirclement is a specific kind of combat activity.

12     It is always undertaken in order to break through in the direction of the

13     nearest forces belonging to the same side and these were first in Zepa

14     then in Kladanj and only then in Nezuk.

15             The column, however, decided to take the longest route and to

16     march as a single column.  This was a military target and a military

17     threat, but how far it was fit for combat after 6 or 7 days' march,

18     that's another question.

19        Q.   And the fact that the column would appear in the Zvornik

20     territory, therefore, taking the Zvornik Brigade in kind of a sandwich

21     between the 2nd Corps and the column, this was an unprecedented situation

22     for the Zvornik Brigade; is that correct?

23        A.   This was the first instance where the Zvornik Brigade was facing

24     conflict both from the front and from the rear to this extent.  There had

25     been previous attempts to break out from the Konjevic Polje and Cerska

Page 31456

 1     area via Crni Vrh, but these were units of up to about 500 fighters, so

 2     the Zvornik Brigade had not faced this kind of situation before.

 3        Q.   Now, knowing that this threat was on the way towards the Zvornik

 4     Brigade, it is not testimony that not once did you call or try to call

 5     Major Obrenovic to warn him and to discuss with him the situation?

 6        A.   No, I did not have any contact with Mr. Obrenovic at that time,

 7     nor did I tell him of the threat emanating from the 28th Division.

 8        Q.   And you agree that it was possible for you to contact the

 9     Zvornik Brigade by using any civilian phone in the area where you were;

10     is that correct?

11        A.   Yes, I did have the technical capability to do that.

12        Q.   And in your testimony, you mentioned two occasions on which you

13     called back the brigade, on the 5th of July to get additional tank

14     ammunition, that was on page 30892; and then on 7 July, when you called

15     the duty officer because you remembered some teaching materials that had

16     to be photo copied and delivered to the students of the school.  That was

17     at 30919.

18             So you maintain your testimony that those are the only two

19     instances where you called back the Zvornik Brigade when you were away

20     with Tactical Group 1.

21        A.   Yes, to the best of my recollection, those were the two

22     instances.

23        Q.   And sir, these, as you know, you will confirm that those are the

24     only two instances which are recorded in the brigade duty officers'

25     notebook.  You didn't see any other instances in the brigade duty

Page 31457

 1     officers' notebook?

 2        A.   No, no other instances were recorded.

 3        Q.   And you will agree with me that if you had called or if you did

 4     call Dragan Obrenovic in his office, this would not be written in the

 5     duty officers' notebook; in fact, we've seen many intercepts of

 6     conversations involving members of the Zvornik Brigade command which were

 7     not written in the duty officers' notebook.  Do you agree with that?

 8        A.   Probably there were such conversations, but it was my practice

 9     whenever I called the Zvornik Brigade outside the brigade area of

10     defence, I always called the operations duty officer because I knew he

11     would always be there.  I would never know whether the Chief of Staff was

12     in his office or not.  So when I called from the IKM at Krivace, I called

13     the operations duty officer, not Dragan Obrenovic on the 14th and the

14     15th.

15        Q.   What about, sir, the three cables that you told Eileen Gilleece

16     that you received from the Chief of Staff Obrenovic during this period;

17     did you receive any such cables during this period?

18        A.   I didn't say I received three telegrams from Chief Obrenovic but

19     rather that three documents arrived, and one of them was the interim

20     combat report sent by Dragan Obrenovic, not to me but to the corps

21     command; but a copy arrived at the forward command post where Mr. Krstic

22     was.  The other documents concerned the radio reconnaissance platoon of

23     the Drina Corps, and I think there was one document coming from Colonel

24     Jocic.  There may have been other documents as well, but I don't recall

25     that now.

Page 31458

 1        Q.   So what you are saying now is that there was nothing important

 2     enough for you to call back your brigade even though you were, as you

 3     testified, worried about the column heading towards Zvornik?

 4        A.   On the 14th, in the morning, I was given the task of launching an

 5     attack in the -- on the axis of Podzeplje-Brloska Planina and towards

 6     Zepa.  That was a task issued to me by General Krstic.  I was totally

 7     focused on that task.  I wasn't worrying about the situation in the

 8     Zvornik Brigade because Dragan Obrenovic and the corps command were in

 9     charge of that.

10        Q.   Now, sir, if I look at the same situation from the point of view

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18                           [Private session]

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 31459

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15                           [Open session]

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  We are in open session.

17             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you.

18        Q.   Sir, on 10 February you testified about the period when you

19     commanded the Drina Corps Brigade in the Krajina, and you stated and I

20     quote from page 31203, lines 16 to 20:

21             "I did call in several times in order to report if there were any

22     losses, what the situation was among the men, so that the families of the

23     fighters would have the information because they were concerned and there

24     were rumours circulating about all the different events in the Krajina."

25             So on the basis of this, your testimony, I suggest to you that it

Page 31460

 1     is not true that you were not in contact for the same purpose as a

 2     minimum with the Zvornik Brigade or with your Chief of Staff when you

 3     were away with Tactical Group 1.

 4        A.   I assert quite the opposite.  These were two quite different

 5     situations.  I think when I was referring to the material for the

 6     university, I said that we were working and that we were well.  This

 7     material from the Krajina confirms that I was taking care of my men, and

 8     I was informing their families on whether there were any casualties, any

 9     men wounded, or killed, but this did not have any command purpose.

10        Q.   And when you were away with Tactical Group 1, you also had some

11     casualties but did not feel the need to call back and report on the

12     situation of your men; is that correct?

13        A.   That's not correct.  Look at the report of the 10th, the daily

14     combat report, and you will see that the names of the soldiers killed in

15     Srebrenica are listed there.

16        Q.   And how was this information -- how did that information make its

17     way into the combat report of the 10th?

18        A.   Because the person who was in charge of this in the command of

19     the tactical group sent this information through the corps forward

20     command post because this information on losses is very important.  If

21     it's not timely and precise, various rumours start spreading.

22        Q.   And did you send any reports through the forward command post of

23     the corps while you were away with Tactical Group 1?

24        A.   No, I reported to General Krstic on losses, on those killed and

25     wounded in the course of the fighting.

Page 31461

 1        Q.   Sir, coming back on the command relationship, you testified on

 2     28 January, that was page 30760, that during the period you were away,

 3     the commander of Obrenovic was the corps commander.  So in other words,

 4     Obrenovic was receiving his orders from the corps command; is that

 5     correct?

 6        A.   I didn't say that he was the corps commander, but that he was

 7     directly subordinated to the corps commander, and he received orders from

 8     him and reported to him and send reports to him.

 9        Q.   Maybe you misunderstood or maybe it's not clear in the

10     transcript, what I've mentioned is while you were away, the commander of

11     Obrenovic was the corps commander.  You said that; that's correct?

12        A.   Yes, that's correct.

13        Q.   So orders being issued to the Zvornik Brigade or to Obrenovic

14     were issued by the corps commander?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Now, you would agree with me that during this period, nothing

17     prevented either Major Obrenovic from contacting you to obtain advice or

18     to inform you of the impossible situation he was placed in as deputy

19     commander.

20        A.   No, he stood in for the commander, and his post or establishment

21     was deputy.  On the 14th, when he was in the most serious situation, he

22     sent an interim report to the corps command requesting reinforcement.  He

23     didn't send this request to me nor did he ask me to come back.  He had

24     enough military training to know that.

25        Q.   I'm not saying that he sent that report to you.  What I'm saying

Page 31462

 1     is that there is nothing preventing him from calling his formal commander

 2     from the situation he was in and to seek your advice as his formal

 3     commander, would you agree with that?

 4        A.   He was prevented by procedures and the military job because he

 5     knew that corps commander knew much more and had more information about

 6     what was going on in the corps zone than me who was engaged only on one

 7     axis within the zone and that I had limited information.

 8        Q.   So being placed in the most difficult of situations by two

 9     different -- for two different reasons, that is being informed of

10     prisoners arriving in the zone of responsibility and being informed and

11     not facing the column in his zone of responsibility, what you are saying

12     is that you did not expect Major Obrenovic to call you at any time to

13     inform you of this situation?

14        A.   I did not expect him to do that.

15        Q.   I'd like to move to a different issue, and you said yesterday

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25        A.   How could I have suggested to him to seek my opinion in this

Page 31463

 1     situation if I didn't know what the situation he was in.

 2             Secondly, the information that he had did not refer or had

 3     nothing to do with the Zvornik Brigade.  It wasn't the Zvornik Brigade

 4     who was tasked with receiving and accommodating the prisoners.  All they

 5     had was information that they were arriving, not to the barracks but

 6     rather that they would be placed in some non-military facilities.

 7             If I had been in the shoes of Major Obrenovic, I would have

 8     probably reasoned in the same way.

 9        Q.   But if he had information that these prisoners were to be

10     transported to the Zvornik area to be killed, then as you said yesterday,

11     the least he could have done was to call the corps command and clarify

12     the issue with them and undertake steps for such things not to occur; do

13     you agree?

14        A.   That's what I said, yes.

15             MR. BOURGON:  Mr. President, it is brought to my attention that

16     we need some redaction at page 75, line 3.

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  It's already been taken care of, Mr. Bourgon.

18     Please, go ahead.

19             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you.  Thank you, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  And let's try to be a little more careful.

21             MR. BOURGON:

22        Q.   Sir, I suggest to you that when, and you've heard this evidence

23     and we have the intercept to that effect that Major Obrenovic did speak,

24     the night of 13 July with General Zivanovic, do you recall this

25     intercept?

Page 31464

 1        A.   I do.

 2        Q.   Now during this conversation, he did not report to

 3     Major Obrenovic -- to General Zivanovic any information concerning the

 4     prisoners; do you recall that?

 5        A.   Yes, I don't know if this conversation with General Zivanovic

 6     took place before he obtained that information or after.  I'm not sure.

 7        Q.   According to his statement of facts, this conversation took place

 8     after he obtained the information, but my question is the following:  The

 9     fact that when he spoke to General Zivanovic, this was an open line or an

10     un-secure line is not an excuse, you will agree with me, for not

11     discussing the matter with his corps commander because there were other

12     means that he could do that?

13        A.   I agree that this could have been done in a different way.

14        Q.   Now, my final question on this topic is the following:  During

15     your examination-in-chief, you said, and I quote:

16             "If he," meaning Obrenovic, "had consulted you about whether he

17     should give an order to have prisoners killed, what would you have said?"

18     That was the question.

19             The answer:  "I would never have given him such an order."

20             "Q.  Well, this is really important.  I'm going to try that

21     again.  If he had asked you about whether he should give such an order,

22     what would you have said?"

23             Your answer was:  "I would have told him not to issue such an

24     order at all."

25             Do you recall saying this on 30 January?

Page 31465

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   It is my understanding, sir, that based on your answer, that if

 3     Obrenovic, one, would have had information about an order to kill

 4     prisoners of war on 13 July; and two, had he contacted you as I suggest

 5     to you he did on 13 July to inform you about such an order, you would

 6     have done everything in your power to stop those killings from taking

 7     place immediately upon being informed.

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Mr. Haynes.

 9             MR. HAYNES:  There are several questions in there and I think --

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  It is a compound question.

11             MR. HAYNES:  And I think if the explicit suggestion is going to

12     be made to General Pandurevic that he contacted Major Obrenovic on the

13     13th of July, it should be put in precise terms when, by what means, and

14     what his information is as to that.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Bourgon.

16             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I note the --

17             JUDGE AGIUS:  It is definitely a compound question which was

18     raised by Mr. Haynes, and I think it's a very valid one too.

19             MR. BOURGON:  I will rephrase the question.

20             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.

21             MR. BOURGON:

22        Q.   Mr. Pandurevic, if Obrenovic contacted you on the night -- had

23     contacted you on the night of 13 July, and if he had information about an

24     order to kill prisoners of war, you would have done everything in your

25     power to stop the killings from taking place immediately upon being

Page 31466

 1     informed.

 2             JUDGE AGIUS:  Yes, Mr. Haynes.

 3             MR. HAYNES:  Again, I don't think that's actually any better.  Is

 4     the suggestion going to be made that he did contact Obrenovic on the 13th

 5     or not?

 6             JUDGE AGIUS:  Well, I think at this stage, Mr. Pandurevic has

 7     heard the question twice.  I agree with you that the second question

 8     doesn't address the point raised by you directly or specifically, but I

 9     think it can be dealt with by Mr. Pandurevic now on his own.  Thank you.

10             Yes, Mr. Pandurevic.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

12             This is a conditional question.  First of all, there was no such

13     conversation, and I had no such information.  If I had received this kind

14     of information, among other things, I would have instructed Obrenovic to

15     contact the corps command, and I would have told him that under no

16     circumstances should he issue such illegal orders.

17             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you.  That's very useful.  That's the

18     information I was looking at, and that question was favourable to you so

19     I'm not understand the objections of my colleague.  But I move to a

20     different topic.

21        Q.   During your testimony, you mentioned the fact that when you were

22     sent back to Zvornik on the 15th of July in the morning, you possessed no

23     information whatsoever concerning the fact that there were prisoners of

24     war being taken in large numbers.  Do you confirm this testimony?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 31467

 1        Q.   Now, the next part of my cross-examination, I suggest, sir, that

 2     this is not true and that by the time you went back to Zvornik, you were

 3     informed of a large number of prisoners that had been taken by the

 4     Drina Corps and other units.  And for this I will go through a number of

 5     steps.

 6             First of all, you can confirm that you did meet with

 7     Generals Krstic and Mladic on a number of occasions during the period

 8     from 12 to 15 July.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   To try and make it as short as possible, on the 12th of July, you

11     stated that you met in the morning in the sector of the Bojina repeater,

12     that you were met there by Colonel Vicic, Colonel Andric, and

13     General Krstic among others; do you recall testifying to that effect?

14        A.   I remember.

15        Q.   And that at 1800 hours, the same day on the 12th July, you met

16     again with Krstic in the area of Vijogor; is that correct?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And at that time, General Krstic wanted to know whether there was

19     any information that had been collected about elements of the

20     28th Division that were lagging behind?

21        A.   Yes, he wanted to know whether we had come across elements of the

22     28th Division.

23        Q.   And that's when for the first time you expressed your concerns to

24     General Krstic about the column heading towards Zvornik.  That was at

25     page 30901, 30902; do you recall this?

Page 31468

 1        A.   As far as I can remember, I only repeated my suggestion made at

 2     the meeting of the 11th vis-a-vis the 28th Division.  I wanted to hear

 3     from General Krstic if he had any additional information about the

 4     intentions of the 28th Division.

 5        Q.   And in the morning of 13 July in the sector of the Bojina

 6     repeater, you were visited there by Krstic and Mladic; is that correct?

 7        A.   That's not correct.  Not in the Bojina repeater sector but rather

 8     in Vijogor, and that was on the 13th.

 9        Q.   I refer to page 30905, but I will check that and move on just not

10     to hold things up.

11             On the 14th of July at 1000 hours while you were at the forward

12     command post, you received the order Stupcanica and you reported to

13     Krstic; is that correct?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   And finally, to again just based on your testimony on 15 July, a

16     few minutes before 900 hours in the morning, you had a meeting with

17     Krstic at the forward command post; is that correct?

18        A.   Yes, that's where we met.

19        Q.   So is it your testimony that on every one of these occasions,

20     neither General Krstic nor General Mladic or any other officers at the

21     forward command post of the corps informed you that a large number of

22     prisoners had been captured and that they were or had been transferred to

23     the Zvornik area?

24        A.   That is correct.  They didn't inform me about that.

25        Q.   But you will agree, nonetheless, that during this period, both

Page 31469

 1     General Mladic and General Krstic would have been fully aware that a

 2     large number of prisoners had been captured along the road between

 3     Bratunac and Konjevic Polje?

 4        A.   At the time, I didn't have this information.  During my

 5     examination-in-chief, I also said when was the first time that I assumed

 6     that it was possible for General Krstic to know about the prisoners of

 7     war in the area of Zvornik.

 8        Q.   Now, for example, according to the adjudicated facts accepted by

 9     this Trial Chamber, I refer to fact number 271 and facts 278; 271 reads

10     as follows:

11             "Late in the afternoon of 13 July, General Mladic visited the

12     meadow and told the men that they would not be hurt but would be

13     exchanged as prisoners of war and that their families had been

14     transported safely to Tuzla."

15             Fact number 278:  "General Mladic visited that field in the

16     afternoon of 13 July as well."

17             So you would agree that General Mladic would have been well aware

18     of the prisoners at least as of 13 July.

19        A.   If this is an adjudicated fact and as it is -- there is nothing

20     for me to agree or not agree.  I see that it happened in the afternoon,

21     and I know that he met with me at Vijogor on the morning of the 14th [as

22     interpreted].  Whether he knew about these men at the time, I'm not aware

23     of that.

24        Q.   Now if we look at the position from General Krstic's point of

25     view, one of the findings of the Trial Chamber in his trial was the

Page 31470

 1     following:

 2             "The Drina Corps command knew that thousands of Bosnian Muslim

 3     prisoners had been captured along the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road on

 4     13 July 1995."

 5             Now, in that case, the Trial Chamber referred to a number of

 6     documents which are also in evidence, so I'd like to look at two of these

 7     documents starting with 7DP1032 if I can have this document in e-court,

 8     please.  I'll say the number again 7DP1032.

 9             So this document, Mr. Pandurevic, you will agree with me that it

10     was from the command of the Drina Corps.  It was on the 13th of July, and

11     it was addressed to the forward command post of the Drina Corps as well

12     as to all subordinated units and that it was dealing with preventing the

13     passage of Muslim groups to Tuzla and Kladanj.  I'm just reading from the

14     document.

15        A.   Yes, yes, I can see.

16        Q.   Now, I refer to the second paragraph -- sorry, the first

17     paragraph where at the end, it reads that, the last sentence:

18             "There are hard-core criminals and felons among them who will go

19     to any lengths to evade capture and reach the territory under Muslim

20     control."

21             Does that correspond with your understanding at the time of the

22     determination of the members of the 28th Division trying to reach Tuzla?

23        A.   I first saw this order here in this trial, this preamble contains

24     the statements as you read them out, but I knew what actions had been

25     taken by members of the 28th Division in fighting the Zvornik Brigade,

Page 31471

 1     and this knowledge that I have, have nothing to do with this document.

 2        Q.   Now, I'm not talking about your knowledge of the document, I'm

 3     saying if the contents of the documents corresponds to your knowledge at

 4     the time about the members of the division, their determination to reach

 5     territory under Muslim control.  Does that correspond or what is there

 6     does not correspond?  That's what I'm asking.

 7        A.   I agree that members of the 28th Division had very serious

 8     intentions to break through towards the 2nd Corps at any costs, but I

 9     also know that they didn't have the strength to see that through.

10        Q.   We'll cover whether they had the strength or not during my next

11     part of my cross-examination but if I look at the next paragraph,

12     Mr. Pandurevic, where it says:

13             "During the night of the 12 and 13 July, part of these forces

14     managed to escape and cross the Bratunac-Konjevic Polje-Milici-Vlasenica

15     road and that they were observed heading towards Crni Vrh and Cerska."

16             Would you agree with me on this basis what is written there that

17     the command of the Drina Corps was very well aware as of the 12th of

18     July, at least when this document was written, that the 28th Division had

19     passed a critical point and was heading towards the area of the

20     Zvornik Brigade?

21        A.   It says that this happened during the night between the 12th and

22     the 13th.  I don't know when this particular information was actually

23     received, but one can see that they were cutting the road in two

24     different sectors, one is Bratunac-Konjevic Polje, and this axis could

25     lead towards Kamenica and Zvornik; and the other sector, Milici-Vlasenica

Page 31472

 1     and that is south-west, some 20 means which means that it can go towards

 2     Cerska and Kladanj; therefore, not all of them were headed towards

 3     Zvornik.

 4        Q.   That's what it says, in part, if you look in the first paragraph

 5     where it says:

 6             "I hereby order, you see that the brigade commands in their area

 7     of responsibility are to employ all available, able-bodied men to

 8     discover, block, disarm, and capture any Muslim armed groups and prevent

 9     their crossing into Muslim territory."

10             So there's no doubt about the intentions of the corps commander

11     at that time, is there?

12        A.   Yes, that's right.

13        Q.   If you move to the next page, so we have paragraph 7 of this

14     order and the next page in English too.

15             We see at paragraph 7 that:

16             "The order includes to transmit information on captured and

17     cut-off groups through secure means of communication."

18             Would you agree on the basis of this document that you would

19     expect that if any subordinate units of the Drina Corps did capture

20     prisoners, that the information would have been passed on to the

21     Drina Corps?

22        A.   What it says here is that the information should be relayed

23     through safe communication channels.

24        Q.   So would you expect the brigades to follow-up on this order and

25     if they do capture members of the 28th Division, that they would report

Page 31473

 1     this to the Drina Corps?

 2        A.   Yes, but as far as we could see here, the Zvornik Brigade did not

 3     capture anyone until the 18th apart from some individuals on the 14th, if

 4     I remember correctly.

 5        Q.   Now, I'm not referring to Zvornik Brigade at all.  I'm talking

 6     subordinate units of the Drina Corps in general that they did -- that

 7     they would inform on the basis of this document, the corps command of any

 8     prisoners captured.  Do you agree with that?

 9        A.   Yes, they were supposed to report and this secrecy indicates that

10     it was necessary to keep our intention secret and not divulged to the

11     enemy including the deployment of our forces in order to make it easier

12     for us to block them.

13        Q.   If I can have the next page of this document on the English side,

14     please.  You see at the bottom, sir, that the -- this document is dated

15     the 13th of July and that it was signed at 1600 hours or 4.00 in the

16     afternoon.  I'm not sure if that's clear enough --

17        A.   Yes, I can see it in the English version, but I can't see it in

18     the original.

19             MR. BOURGON:  If I can have in e-court please document 4D81, 81.

20        Q.   Sir, this document in front of you is a regular combat report.

21     It was used with a number of witnesses in this case.  I'd just like you

22     to confirm, first of all, that it comes from the Drina Corps command and

23     that it is addressed to the Main Staff.

24        A.   Yes, this is the daily combat report, the regular one, of the

25     command of the Drina Corps dated the 13th of July, 1995.

Page 31474

 1        Q.   And we see at the third paragraph under where it says, 1, "The

 2     enemy," the third paragraph, where it says that:

 3             "The enemy from the former Srebrenica enclave are in total

 4     disarray and have been surrendering to the VRS in great numbers."

 5        A.   Yes, I see that.

 6        Q.   Lower down just above paragraph 4, paragraph 4 reads "unusual

 7     incidents.

 8             It says here:  "In Konjevic Polje and also in Nova Kasaba,

 9     reception of Muslim civilians and soldiers who surrendered is being

10     carried out, taken in an organised fashion."

11             I don't think the next sentence has anything to do with that.

12     Would you agree, sir, that on the basis of the information contained in

13     this document that by the 13th of July, the Drina Corps command was fully

14     aware that large numbers of prisoners were being made from that column

15     heading towards Zvornik?

16        A.   Yes.  Based on this report, I agree with that.  This report also

17     confirms that there was no concern as regards the security of Zvornik and

18     the Zvornik Brigade's area.

19        Q.   I'd like to move to the next page of this document in B/C/S, as

20     well as page 3 in English.  The information you just mentioned about no

21     concerns for Zvornik, where did you see this, sir?

22        A.   Well, in the first part of the report, you said it said they were

23     surrendering en masse and that 200 or 300 had managed to cross the road

24     and get into the area of Udrc.  Udrc is a mountain which was on the route

25     towards Crni Vrh, which would mean to the corps command even had it

Page 31475

 1     wanted to couldn't have told me that the Zvornik Brigade was under

 2     threat.  They knew only what was contained in this report; however, it

 3     transpired later that this information was incorrect.

 4        Q.   Now if we look at paragraph 8 which is where I want to draw your

 5     attention, and the page 2 in B/C/S, sorry, where it says, paragraph 8:

 6     "Conclusions, projections, and decision for further action."

 7             "With regard to the situation created after the vigorous attack

 8     on the Srebrenica enclave and the successful pull-out of some of the

 9     extreme forces into the general sector" and that's what you were

10     referring to a few moments ago, "and their intention of conducting

11     further operations towards the Muslim-controlled territory ..."

12             So would you agree with me that this report makes it clear that

13     they know that at least part of those forces are heading towards

14     Velja Glava, Krizevici and Baljkovica and that they have the intent to

15     connect up with the forces which would operate from the Kladanj

16     direction; is that correct?

17        A.   This is an assessment.  This is possible.  The axes you mentioned

18     are correct.  In view of this conclusion, however, it's not clear to me

19     why the Drina Corps failed to take proper steps later on to respond to

20     this possible threat.

21        Q.   And you see from this page also, at least on the English side, if

22     I can have the next page in B/C/S that this combat report was by

23     General Krstic and that the time was 1945 which is in the night of -- in

24     the evening of 13 July.

25        A.   Yes.

Page 31476

 1        Q.   Now, my question is the following:  Given that General Krstic is

 2     aware that prisoners are being captured in great numbers along the road

 3     between Bratunac and Konjevic Polje, as early as the evening of 13 July

 4     1995, and bearing in mind your own testimony that he did not reply or did

 5     not take any actions in response to your interim combat report of

 6     15 July, that General Krstic had the information concerning not only the

 7     taking of prisoners but where they had been sent.  Do you agree with

 8     that?

 9        A.   From this report of the 13th, which is before us, we see it

10     doesn't say where those people were transferred and where they would be

11     transferred to.  It only says they were surrendering.  I don't know

12     whether Krstic knew where those people would go on the 13th.

13        Q.   I'm not saying he knew on the 13th, but it was your testimony

14     that because he did not take action concerning your interim combat report

15     of the 15th, that he was well aware of where the prisoners had been

16     taken.

17             Now, the only thing I'd like to find out from you before we end

18     is that when you were returned to Zvornik on 15 July in the morning, I

19     suggest to you that General Krstic would have informed you that there

20     were prisoners, if he knew as you say, that there were prisoners that had

21     been sent into your area and that before you left Zepa area, you knew

22     about the prisoner problem before you arrived in Zvornik; is that

23     correct, sir?

24        A.   No, that's not correct, Mr. Bourgon.  My assessment, which I

25     explained in my testimony based on the interim combat report of the 15th

Page 31477

 1     which followed on the evening was correct.  Had General Krstic known

 2     something about it in Richard Butler's report we see an intercept on the

 3     morning around 10.00 where one of the participants was Krstic and

 4     prisoners are mentioned, so Krstic did know; but I did not have this

 5     information.

 6        Q.   Then I will leave it on one last question, Mr. Pandurevic.  You

 7     testified in your examination-in-chief that General Krstic was aware of

 8     the situation involving the transfer of prisoners to Zvornik.  Is it your

 9     testimony that he hid this information from you when he sent you back to

10     defend the line and prevent the 28th Division from linking up the

11     2nd Corps?

12             MR. HAYNES:  Can we have a page and line reference for the

13     assertion that General Pandurevic testified that General Krstic knew

14     about the taking of prisoners?

15             MR. BOURGON:  I --

16             JUDGE AGIUS:  Should we leave it for Monday.

17             MR. BOURGON:  I can put a line, Mr. President, but I'd like to

18     have an answer to this question because this is something that I covered

19     at the beginning of my cross-examination, and this is something that

20     General said, and I refer to the page reference where he said exactly --

21     and I can quote from page 31106 for the benefit of my colleague where he

22     says at the end:

23             "However, I was thinking logically since he had not reacted to my

24     report sent on the 15th, since in the course of the conversation that we

25     conducted on the morning of the 17th, since never happened after my

Page 31478

 1     report on the 16th, I fully believed that he was in possession of certain

 2     information."

 3             That's one of the references I referred -- I use in my

 4     cross-examination.

 5             MR. HAYNES:  Is that it?

 6             MR. BOURGON:  And my colleague can use more during his re-direct

 7     if he wants, but I can come back with more on Monday morning.  I'd like

 8     to have an answer though, Mr. President.

 9             MR. HAYNES:  Not to that question.

10             JUDGE AGIUS:  We'll come to that on Monday.

11             MR. BOURGON:  Thank you, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE AGIUS:  We will finish here for today, and we come to that

13     on Monday.

14             Mr. Haynes.

15             MR. HAYNES:  I do this really at other people's invitation, but I

16     would like to invite you to consider time-tabling.  I've been collating

17     the various estimates of my colleagues for the amount of time they will

18     require for cross-examination of Mr. Pandurevic.  You may or may not know

19     that it's my conclusion that his evidence will take this month,

20     basically.

21             JUDGE AGIUS:  The way I have worked it out, Mr. Haynes, on the

22     basis of 50 hours, is that this will take us probably at most until the

23     4th of March.

24             MR. HAYNES:  Yes, I think my estimate is a little more

25     optimistic, I think I got it to pretty much the end of February.

Page 31479

 1             You might recall that I mentioned that I would appreciate, and I

 2     think everybody else would appreciate the opportunity of taking stock at

 3     the end of his evidence to see what shape the rest of my case would take;

 4     and I wondered whether at this point in the proceedings you'd actually

 5     reached any firm conclusions about that, and that's all I really wanted

 6     to open for discussion now.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE AGIUS:  Okay.  Mr. Haynes, we have not yet come to a

 9     conclusion particularly it seems because when you mentioned this matter

10     in the beginning of your direct, you had indicated that you would require

11     something like a week.  So perhaps you will think about it and tell us on

12     Monday whether you still maintain that you will require a week, and then

13     we'll be in a position to tell you what our intentions are.

14             MR. HAYNES:  Yes, thank you.  I'll come back to you on Monday.

15             JUDGE AGIUS:  Thank you.  We stand adjourned until Monday morning

16     at 9.00.

17                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.

18                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 16th day of

19                           February, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.