1 Wednesday, 28 June 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, could you kindly call

7 the case, please.

8 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I'd like

9 to welcome all and everyone. This is case IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor

10 versus Prlic et al.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Today we are going to be

12 resuming the cross-examination, but before giving the floor to

13 Mr. Karnavas, the Trial Chamber has rendered an oral decision today

14 pursuant to Pusic's request for extension of time to respond to the motion

15 filed by the Prosecutor relating to judicial notice in Martinovic/Tadic

16 case, has granted the request, and the accused Pusic has now until the 6th

17 of July to file his written submission.

18 Mr. Ibrisimovic, you have the floor.

19 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President. I

20 only wish to clarify some points. Yesterday, we told the legal officer

21 that this would be a joint submission. We had some technical problems

22 when filing it, so I just wanted to say that it is in fact a joint Defence

23 submission in this case.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So there will be a

25 joint submission by the 6th of July.

1 Mr. Karnavas, let's not waste any more time. It's -- you have the

2 floor.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning, Your

4 Honours. Before we begin, a congratulations to the French football team

5 for yesterday's win.

6 WITNESS: STJEPAN KLJUIC [Resumed]

7 [Witness answered through interpreter]

8 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas: [Continued]

9 Q. We didn't get to watch it, sir, because we're trying to be as

10 efficient as we can. So we have a lot of material to go through. If you

11 could be as direct as possible, we can get you home and never have to come

12 back again on this case.

13 Yesterday we left off discussing the Livno question, if you may

14 recall.

15 A. We didn't finish, no.

16 Q. I know. That's where we're going to pick up. That's where we

17 left off. Now, I had shown you a document, and I believe it was document

18 00117. We had it on the screen, we had both -- both questions there, side

19 by side. If we could pull it up on the screen, and if we could -- it

20 would be on the second page. Just -- again just to remind ourselves.

21 And I don't want to belabour the point, but just to recap from

22 yesterday: The one that was being proposed from the Croats in Livno as an

23 alternative had in it some specific language about a joint state of the

24 constitutive and sovereign Croat, Muslim, and Serbian people. Whereas the

25 one that was passed by the Assembly that ultimately the folks voted on,

1 and as you rightly noted, the Croats in a very large majority voted on,

2 only spoke about a state of equal citizens. We can agree on that; right?

3 A. And peoples.

4 Q. Yes. And peoples. All right. But that's -- we can agree in

5 principle that that's what the two questions were about; right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, you -- you told us yesterday that you were not a lawyer, so

8 at least on some occasions you were not able to give us a legal opinion on

9 certain matters, or a legal interpretation; is that correct?

10 A. I cannot give it to you officially, but I can assist you to

11 understand the difference between these two questions.

12 Q. I'm sure you can. My question now, sir, is, during that period of

13 time, did you consult with any legal scholars, constitutional experts?

14 You specifically, being the president of the party, did you consult anyone

15 to see what the differences were so at least you could weigh in on this

16 debate and convince your fellow colleagues that perhaps the question that

17 was being posed by the Assembly would not put the Croatian peoples in

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina in any dilemma? That calls for a yes or no answer.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. And I take it -- and who might those be, those experts? If

21 you want to name names.

22 A. Among others, the judges of the Constitutional Court, the

23 president of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24 Q. Okay. Now, if we could just stick with this document, and if we

25 could just go through the -- some of the debates or some of what some of

1 the folks said, all right? And we would have to go to page 4. I'm just

2 going to cover very quickly. And while we're finding our way through this

3 e-court system, let me preface this area of questioning by reminding us

4 what you told us yesterday, and that is that you did not participate in

5 Livno. You did not attend that meeting. Is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And if I understood you correctly, you also did not receive or

8 obtain or had any desire, in fact, to even look and see what the record of

9 that meeting was.

10 A. Neither did I have any desire nor did I have an opportunity to do

11 so.

12 Q. Okay. Well, you could have -- you could have picked up the phone

13 and requested a copy; right?

14 A. Yes, I could have.

15 Q. You could have asked them to fax a copy to you, couldn't you?

16 A. Well, yes, I could have, but you don't want to understand one

17 thing: This was after the adoption of the question by the Assembly of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this move --

19 Q. I'm going to cut you here, because you're not answering my

20 question. We agree -- we agree -- we agree that this is after the

21 adoption of the Assembly. What I want to know is did you make any effort

22 to obtain a copy of the record so at least you could satisfy in your own

23 mind what the conflict, what the debate was regarding the two questions?

24 And it's a yes or no: Did you make any efforts?

25 A. No, I didn't make any efforts because it would have been out of

1 place.

2 Q. Okay. And let me just finish on that one. No one prevented you

3 from making any efforts. Because you said it was out of place. There

4 weren't any constitutional provisions, state-wise or party-wise, or even

5 as a human being, there was nothing to prevent you from at least

6 entertaining your curiosity of what might have been discussed on that

7 occasion, given that you, the self-proclaimed dissident, the one that was

8 one of the founding fathers of this political party, okay, did you have

9 any curiosity to find out?

10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, Mr. Karnavas. Your rhetoric is

11 wonderful, but the witness has answered exactly this question exactly and

12 clearly, and I do not see why you always complain about lack of time and

13 then ask three times the same question, with due respect.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour. There was a little twist

15 in the answer, but, okay, I'll try to overlook that.

16 Q. Let's look at the debate. With respect to Miro Lasic -- you do

17 know who he is; right?

18 A. I know best.

19 Q. Right. In fact, he is the one that replaced you when you became

20 -- on the Presidency; right?

21 A. Illegally.

22 Q. Is that an answer? Yes? He replaced --

23 A. Yes, he came to that position, but illegally.

24 Q. Yes. And as I understand it, under oath in Kordic you said that

25 he got to that position because President Tudjman along with President

1 Izetbegovic came up with this plan to throw you out because Izetbegovic's

2 term, his second term was coming up and constitutionally he couldn't

3 remain in that position, and therefore since you were the next in line,

4 this was an easy way to get you out of the picture, introduce Mr. Lasic,

5 and that way Izetbegovic could have his third term, and so on and so

6 forth. That's what you testified under oath; right? That's what you

7 believe, and you believe that today as you stand here?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. All right. Now, Mr. Lasic, also, as I understand - and correct me

10 if I'm wrong, and we'll get to the documents - he was also the individual

11 that was placed in charge to lead the negotiations in Lisbon; right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. The one that you would requested through an intermediary to be put

14 on on that particular group that would go to Lisbon because you had in a

15 hospital, you were recuperating, and you had communicated a message

16 through a friend to Mr. Mesic that you be placed on that -- on that

17 particular -- that you be part of the delegation; correct?

18 A. Yes, yes.

19 Q. Okay. But instead -- but instead you were noted that Mr. Lasic

20 would be not only one of the delegates but also he would lead that

21 particular delegation during those negotiations; correct?

22 A. That was my goal, for Lasic and not Boban to lead the delegation.

23 Q. Okay. And it was Boban that went along with Lasic?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. All right.

1 A. And the third one was Iko Stanic.

2 Q. Iko Stanic; right. And just so we have it for the record, the

3 letter from Mr. Mesic -- we can pull it up, but I believe it was already

4 introduced yesterday as P 00124.

5 All right. Now, let's look at what Mr. Lasic said when the

6 question of Livno was being discussed. And this is on page 4. You might

7 be able to track it along. He says: "Minister of BiH government,

8 presented the view that the referendum question is unacceptable in the

9 part where it mentions cantonisation, which means a territorial

10 definition, and in this respect asked if anyone knew how many thousands of

11 Croats would be living in Serbian or Muslim cantons."

12 So, sir, here we have Mr. Lasic, at least, saying, Listen, this

13 word "cantonisation" should be coming out; right?

14 A. That's what it says in this document.

15 Q. Okay. And then it goes on -- I'm going to skip part of it, but it

16 ends with: "... Mr. Lasic, adding that the referendum was absolutely

17 necessary because the EU would guarantee the borders of BH, prevent a

18 break-up --" I underscore that myself -- "prevent a break-up which is what

19 some wanted." This is what Mr. Lasic said, the very same individual that

20 went to the delegation in Lisbon and also replaced you on the Presidency

21 of BiH; correct?

22 A. Correct, but you should know --

23 Q. Sir --

24 A. -- why. Please wait.

25 Q. -- we're just going to go --

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, please.

2 MR. KARNAVAS:

3 Q. Excuse me. We're just going to go through what the debate were,

4 what everyone debated at Livno regarding the different questions, and the

5 purpose of this exercise is to show that there wasn't one voice, that this

6 was a democratic process, that this was a debate, one that you might have

7 wanted to participate in, and one that you were not even interested in

8 knowing how the debate went. And the whole purpose goes to your

9 credibility, sir. That's why we're doing this.

10 MR. SCOTT: Object. Object. This is a speech, this isn't a

11 question.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm trying to assure the gentleman that there's a

13 reason for the questioning, Your Honour.

14 Q. So if we could go on to what Mr. -- the next individual stated. I

15 believe it's Zvonar, from Tuzla. He sought clarification on some "...

16 points in the referendum question, and pointed out that cantonisation

17 should not be pursued if there is not a sufficient practical foundation

18 for it." That's what it says; correct? Yes or no.

19 A. Everything that it says here simply goes to counter the interest

20 in the Livno question. You see that both Zvonar and Lasic are talking

21 against it, but you insist on the Livno question. The Croatian people at

22 the referendum gave their answer to the Livno question.

23 Q. We're going to get there. We're going to get there step-by-step.

24 We know what your point is, okay? Then we're going to talk about Saric

25 from Prijedor. He "... insisted that the second part be dropped from the

1 question, precisely the part that refers to cantonisation ..." But then

2 it goes on: "... whereas Iko Stanic, president of the HDZ in Bosanska

3 Posavina, stressed that his region was all for that kind of question."

4 Right?

5 A. Well, I'm reading it now just as you are. That's probably

6 correct.

7 Q. All right. I'm just showing you the democratic process that was

8 going on at the time, sir. Then Pero Markovic of Capljina supported the

9 question but stressed that if he had to take a position on it, he would

10 propose a plebiscite to the Croatian people and that the date of the

11 referendum be postponed. Another point of view; correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Then we have: "Mr. Bender from Neum, confirmed that the question

14 was politically well formulated and grounded, and said: 'If the

15 discussion of this question produced no answers, let us prepare a

16 plebiscite for the Croatian people.'" Yet another point of view; correct?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. All right. I'm going to skip some because we don't need to go

19 through all of them. We'll have time to read them. But if we go to the

20 next page: "Perica Juric replied: 'It is precisely the referendum that

21 will decide the position of the Croats in the independent state of BH, and

22 is also the most suitable manner of expression.'"

23 Again, here's another point of view, correct?

24 A. But I don't know what referendum. The official one that we held

25 or the one where they were proposing the Livno question?

1 Q. My point, sir, is, as we can see from this document, there were a

2 variety of opinions on how to formulate the question if one was an

3 alternative question or whether to go ahead with the question that was --

4 that had been adopted. So you had members in the party, some that were

5 for the question as it was, some who wanted it modified with the word

6 "cantonisation" in it, some not with it. Some asking for plebiscite,

7 others not. Correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. Now, if we go to page 6, so we can leave this document, we

10 see that on page 6 the presiding officer put both questions to a vote, and

11 it says here there were 4 votes in favour of the question adopted at the

12 BH Assembly on 25 January, 140 against, and 3 abstentions. Do you see

13 that, sir?

14 A. That's what it says in the minutes.

15 Q. And then there were 140 votes in favour of the question, 3

16 against, and 4 abstentions, and this is the question that was being

17 proposed during this meeting as an alternative; correct?

18 A. But it's not clear to you that post festum voting in a party body

19 has no influence on the referendum adopted by the Assembly of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 Q. Sir, that's not the point of this exercise. I guess the point of

22 the exercise is -- is to show that at this point in time, at least in

23 party politics, you are indifferent. Perhaps because of your wounded ego,

24 which we'll get to, of what happened up in Zagreb when you were personally

25 attacked by your colleagues for your failures, your incompetent positions,

1 your failure to -- to preside over certain meetings or your positions.

2 I'm not saying that they were right, but this is what happened, okay? But

3 at this point in time, you, in a sense, sir, have deactivated yourself

4 from party politics.

5 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Karnavas. Mr. Karnavas, I really would like

6 to ask you, like my fellow Judge, Judge Trechsel, that when you are using

7 something like where you said just before, and let me quote, "... that

8 perhaps because of your wounded ego ..." I really do not think that

9 expressions like "wounded ego" should be used when a witness is

10 interrogated. Thank you very much.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Q. Now --

13 A. Please --

14 Q. There's no question. There's no question, sir. There's no

15 question.

16 Now, if we could just go ahead. Now, we agree that the Assembly

17 -- the question that was adopted by the Assembly ultimately was the one

18 that was voted on. We agree on that; right?

19 A. No, not the one that was suggested by the Assembly. The Assembly

20 officially adopted that question with the participation of the Croatian

21 delegates.

22 Q. All right. You're right. I stand corrected in my phraseology.

23 Now, on -- on February 27, 1992, and I'm referring to document --

24 I guess it would be P 09616. If we could look at this a little bit. This

25 is an excerpt from the meetings -- excerpt from the minutes, okay, from

1 the Presidency of the HDZ. Again, you weren't there at the time, correct?

2 A. No.

3 Q. And I take it -- but at this point in time, just to make sure that

4 we understand each other, you still believed, at least in your mind, that

5 you were the president, although you had tendered your resignation. You

6 were sort of the resigning president; right? That was your understanding.

7 A. That's how it is according to the statute of the HDZ of

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9 Q. Okay. Well, I'm not talking about what the statute says. I'm

10 asking you what was in your mind. In your mind you still believed that

11 you were the resigning president of this particular political party;

12 correct?

13 A. According to the statute of the Croatian Democratic Union, that's

14 what I was.

15 Q. Okay. And so in that sense -- in that sense, getting back to the

16 earlier meeting in Livno and this one over here on the 27th, one would

17 suspect that you at least would have been participating in these

18 particular meetings; correct?

19 A. But they didn't invite me. They had excommunicated me so that

20 they could be the leaders.

21 Q. All right. And incidentally, because on this particular -- if we

22 look at the minutes, we don't have an acting president. You say they

23 didn't invite you. Are you saying that this meeting took place without

24 your knowledge? You didn't know anything about it?

25 A. Absolutely.

1 Q. Okay. At some point you did find out about it, though, did you

2 not?

3 A. I always find out from the newspapers what happened.

4 Q. Okay. Good. Now, if we can look at the second page, we see here

5 a decision that was taken by the Presidency. I'm going to read it, the

6 relevant part. It's rather short. And then we can discuss it just very,

7 very briefly. It says here: "The assurances of the European Union

8 expressed on previous occasions as well as during yesterday's talks at the

9 conference of the European Union --"

10 A. [In English] Excuse me. I haven't text.

11 Q. Okay. We'll wait for the text.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. All right. But it would appear you also understand my reading.

14 First page in B/C/S. All right. "The assurances of the European Union

15 expressed on previous occasions as well as during yesterday's talks at the

16 conference of the European Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina indicate that the

17 result of the forthcoming referendum will not prejudice the future

18 constitutional system of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Likewise, fundamental

19 principles ensuring the sovereignty of the Croatian people in

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina in their national regions as well as in the whole of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina contained in the decision of the Central Board of the

22 HDZ BH in Livno are not disputed." Okay. Now --

23 A. That's what it says here, yes.

24 Q. And then it says: "On the basis of the above, we call on the

25 members of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina and all

1 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to fulfil their duty and vote in the

2 referendum."

3 Now, if we could just park here a little bit and discuss it. When

4 it says here "during yesterday's talks at the conference," I suspect what

5 they're talking about are the talks in Lisbon, because if we look at the

6 other documents, your letter to Mesic and Mesic's letter to you, it would

7 appear that the Lisbon conference took place right before this -- this

8 particular meeting of the Presidency; correct?

9 A. It's possible, but Mesic never wrote to me. He wrote to the

10 general secretary, Ivan Markesic.

11 Q. Right. And that's 00124, for the record, P 00124. Now -- and

12 that was the very same meeting that Mr. Lasic was the delegation to,

13 right, that we talked about earlier?

14 A. Possibly, yes.

15 Q. Okay. So if we could piece it, the Assembly adopts a question.

16 Some Croats within the HDZ leadership feel that the vital national

17 interests of the Croatian people may not necessarily be protected through

18 this particular referendum question, hence they have the Livno meeting;

19 correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Then there is a delegation that goes to the European Union which,

22 as we all know, was the one that required this referendum to take place.

23 A delegation goes, led by one of the individuals who were at this meeting,

24 and two other participants. They come back with assurances from the

25 European Union that they have nothing to worry about, that the question as

1 adopted by the Assembly, okay, will not prejudice the constitutional

2 system of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, likewise, it -- it ensures the

3 fundamental principles of the sovereignty of the Croatian people. So they

4 have assurances that they need not worry; correct?

5 A. Those were their convictions.

6 Q. Okay. But those were the convictions that were -- those were the

7 assurances that they got from the European Union after having this meeting

8 where they had -- they sat around for a day or so, they discussed the

9 issues, they aired out their problems, and they were told by the European

10 Union, don't worry, be happy, go and vote; correct?

11 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, excuse me --

12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Scott.

13 MR. SCOTT: Again, this is overly characterised. Apparently all

14 we're talking about is what is reported on the face of Exhibit 9616.

15 Mr. Kljuic has said he has no other independent knowledge of that, so

16 everything else is Mr. Karnavas's characterisation. We don't know exactly

17 what was said. We don't know exactly what the assurances were. I do

18 agree the document says what it says. That's all we know.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll move on, Your Honour.

20 Q. And then after this, after this date, there was the voting;

21 correct? This -- this meeting that took place after the Lisbon

22 conference, that's dated the 27th of February. And if you recall, when

23 was the date on the referendum? Do you recall that? It was a two-day

24 period.

25 A. The 29th of February and the 1st of March, 1992.

1 Q. Okay. And in fact, we have evidence, do we not, that the Croatian

2 people went out and voted and voted significantly in favour of the

3 referendum; right?

4 A. Absolutely correct. But it wasn't the consequence of the message

5 from these people, because they said that they should go to the

6 referendum, they didn't say how people should vote. We said how people

7 should vote.

8 Q. Okay. Well, I mean, it is -- it is somewhat of a democracy, isn't

9 it? They are telling them to go and vote in the referendum, and as you

10 stated and we all know, the Croats under no circumstances wanted to remain

11 in anything that would have anything to do with the former Yugoslavia.

12 You're shaking your head. Is that yes?

13 A. But it was very important that they be told that it was for the

14 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15 Q. Okay. Now, I just want to show you one more document just to

16 complete this chapter of our cross, and that's 1D 00398. This from a text

17 on the International Conferences of the Former Yugoslavia official papers,

18 and I just want to share with you -- if we could look on page -- it would

19 be numbered page 24, but in the document I think it's the third or fourth

20 -- fourth page. It starts with B, statement of principles. And at the

21 bottom of the page it will be 1D 190034. If we could just look at -- you

22 can look at the editor's notes first.

23 For the record, the entire volume of both -- I believe it's two

24 volumes, that can be found in the library in this building.

25 If we look at the editor's note, it says: "The following

1 Statement of Principles was agreed upon by the leadership of the three

2 sides of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in March, 1992. However, it

3 was subsequently repudiated by the Bosnian Presidency."

4 If we go and we read just a little bit into it, it says 1 -- this

5 is: "A. Independence. 1. Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a state

6 composed of three constituent units, based on national principles and

7 taking into account economic, geographic and other criteria."

8 "Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue to have its existing

9 borders and neither the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina nor the

10 governments of the constituent units will encourage or support claims of

11 any part of its territory by neighbouring states.

12 "Sovereignty --" Let me read that word again: "Sovereignty

13 resides in the citizens of the Muslim, Serb, and Croat nations and other

14 nations and nationalities, who realise it through their civic

15 participation in the constituent units and the central organs of the

16 Republic."

17 This was 18 March, 1992. Were you aware of this Statement of

18 Principles, sir?

19 A. Where? Where?

20 Q. No, I'm asking were you aware? Were you aware of the Statement

21 of Principles of 18 March, 1992, for New Constitutional Arrangements for

22 Bosnia and Herzegovina? This was done under the auspices of the European

23 Union who at the time were trying to broker a peaceful divorce within the

24 former Yugoslavia.

25 A. If that's the Lisbon document, then I was aware of it, but I only

1 have the English text before me now, which I do understand, but I don't

2 know where that agreement was reached and between which parties.

3 Q. All right. But nonetheless, if we look at this document, it talks

4 about sovereignty residing in the nation -- in the citizens of the

5 Muslims. It talks about nations; correct? And at least in principle here

6 we have a Statement of Principles that more or less incorporates --

7 incorporates some of the concepts and ideas that were part of the Livno

8 question, that Livno debate, even though it wasn't specifically

9 incorporated into the referendum question that was adopted by the Assembly

10 and which people voted on, including the Croats, and which the HDZ

11 supported; correct?

12 A. Well, I have to tell you something. Up until now, you're somebody

13 who has paid greatest attention to the Livno issue in history. Nobody

14 ever gave that document as much importance. You are now keeping me here

15 with the English text -- just a moment, please -- with the English text,

16 you're not telling me where the document originated from, who wrote the

17 document and who signed it, and now you want my comments.

18 Q. Okay. Now --

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Counsel Karnavas. I have a

20 question. This declaration of principles or Statement of Principles of

21 the 18th of March, 1992, for New Constitutional Arrangements for Bosnia

22 and Herzegovina, who made that agreement, where, when?

23 MR. KARNAVAS: This was part --

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you ask the witness first

25 whether he was aware of this Statement of Principles, because if you're

1 asking him and he's just looking at it for the first time today, that's a

2 different matter. So you must ask him whether he was aware of it, whether

3 he knew about it. If not, we are facing problems.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, Your Honour. Okay. Let me go step-by-step.

5 Q. At this point in time, sir, you were a member of the Presidency?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. Now, number two, this document, although it's in English

8 but I understand that you read English as well as you understand English,

9 had you seen it before? And as I understand it, it was part of the

10 Cutileiro Plan.

11 A. I did not take part in the negotiations with Mr. Cutileiro.

12 Q. Okay. But I understand this document was generated in Sarajevo on

13 3/18/1992 -- 18th of -- March 18, 1992.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Could the technical booth kindly be asked to

15 adjust the sound in the courtroom. Thank you.

16 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, my colleague -- and I want to thank

17 her very, very much, Ms. Alaburic -- has provided me with the B/C/S copy

18 of it. So perhaps I can have the assistance of the usher, and perhaps we

19 can clear up this dilemma and the gentleman won't think that the

20 high-priced lawyer is trying to pull the wool over his eyes.

21 Q. If you could look at the book first. And I've been in quite a few

22 libraries and in people's offices, and I've often seen that particular

23 text. Even though I can't read it, I recognise it. Have you seen this

24 book before, or someone -- or a copy of it?

25 A. No, I haven't.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. This is a book by the son of President Tudjman.

3 Q. All right. Now, can you -- can you look at the page that was

4 shown to you. At least would you verify --

5 A. Yes, I can.

6 Q. Okay. And will you verify for the record whether that version --

7 and we will copy it for the record, Your Honour, at some point -- but

8 would you verify that that is -- what you're looking at is a translated

9 version of what I've shown you, the Statement of Principles of 18th of

10 March, 1992, signed or agreed upon in Sarajevo.

11 A. First of all, it says here that the text was compiled in Brussels.

12 Secondly, this is the topic of -- of discussion between three national

13 delegations, which I did not participate in, and this is a text that was

14 revoked afterwards because the three national delegations did not agree.

15 It was withdrawn.

16 Q. So are you saying that -- first of all, let me back up. My

17 question was: Does it purport to be a translated version of what I have

18 shown you? That's a yes or a no. There's no in between on this one.

19 A. Yes, it's the same text.

20 Q. Yes. Thank you. That was the same question I asked you about two

21 questions before. Now, having read this question -- having read the

22 document, okay, and what I'm saying to you, sir, is -- I'm just pointing

23 out that it does contain words such as "sovereignty," right? And

24 "nations" in paragraph -- under Independence, point 3? Does it not have

25 those words in there, sir? I'll read it for you: "Sovereignty resides

1 in --"

2 A. Yes, you don't have to read it to me. I can read it. That's what

3 it says, yes.

4 Q. Okay. If you could answer the question. Thank you. Now, now

5 that we agree what it says, are not these concepts the very same concepts

6 that were being debated, that were being debated in Livno? Yes or no.

7 A. They were mentioned, but they were never adopted, not the Livno

8 ones or the Cutileiro Plan ones.

9 Q. I understand that. But they were being discussed. The point that

10 I'm saying, sir, is these -- this is -- these were concepts that were

11 very --

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. -- there were very dear to the Croatian people; correct? The

14 Croat leadership within the HDZ; right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And this, sir, follows, does it not, it follows the Lisbon

17 meeting? I mean, if you look at it chronologically. Is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And as we noted -- as we noted, the minutes of the meeting of the

20 Presidency followed the Lisbon meeting and preceded the referendum.

21 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, just for accuracy's sake. The

22 minutes of -- the Statement of Principles that Mr. Karnavas has shown the

23 witness is dated in -- I believe on the 18th of March, 1992, about two and

24 a half weeks after the referendum, not before the referendum. Thank you.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Maybe --

1 Q. Let me -- let me rephrase the question. You have the minutes of

2 the meeting from the Presidency that preceded the referendum. That's when

3 they -- correct? It's not in the book, sir. The minutes of the meeting

4 of the Presidency --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- was before --

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. Right. And it was after the Lisbon meeting. And it was after the

9 Lisbon meeting.

10 A. But there are two proposals of the Cutileiro Plan. You have 38

11 and 41.

12 Q. I'll move on. I'll move on. Obviously the gentleman does not

13 wish to cooperate.

14 Now, we'll move on to the next topic. Yesterday, you told us

15 about your political platform, and when I say "your political platform,"

16 you kept saying that this was something that it was yours, you had drafted

17 it, and it was something that you could take full credit for; correct?

18 That was the impression that you wanted to give us, or was I mistaken?

19 A. I compiled a political platform at which I won the elections and

20 the HDZ convention. So that political platform of mine was accepted as an

21 HDZ programme.

22 Q. Now, as I understand it, the political platform is adopted by the

23 Main Board of the party; right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. So --

1 A. First the convention.

2 Q. Okay. First the convention, and -- but who is on the Main Board?

3 Is it a one-person board? Stjepan Kljuic, board of the HDZ, or are there

4 other members since they have to adopt this political platform? And I

5 suspect there is debate, and some add to it, some subtract part of

6 whatever the proposals are, and they come up with a platform that

7 represents the platform of the party. So who is on this Main Board? If

8 you recall. If you don't, I can get the statute. It's under Article 36,

9 and you can look at Article 35 as well of the statute that set up the HDZ.

10 A. First of all, you must know that that body changed.

11 Q. Sir, I'm not asking you whether the body changed. I'm asking you

12 who is on the Main Board. I'm asking for names, if you could just tell

13 us. How many people are on the Main Board?

14 A. Well, sometimes there were nine, at others 16. Take a look at the

15 documents that you showed. Take the 16th of September, for example, and

16 then you'll see how many were in the Executive Board, how many in the Main

17 Board, and that went on until the convention. At the convention a new

18 leadership was elected, and you have a list of all the members of both the

19 Main Board and the Executive Board.

20 Q. But my point is it's the board and it's not you that adopts the

21 platform. So it's not your platform, it's the board's platform, and the

22 board represents the HDZ.

23 A. Absolutely.

24 Q. All right. Now, you led us to believe, and I might be wrong, but

25 there were two instances, one on page 38 of the -- your first day's

1 testimony, which I believe would have been on the 26th of June, and

2 yesterday on page 35 to 36 on a question posed by Judge Trechsel. As I

3 understood, your position is that the political platform did not change.

4 That was your understanding, or your belief, I should say. One that you

5 conveyed under oath to us.

6 A. The political platform that was adopted at the convention of the

7 23rd and 24th of March, 1991, could only have been changed at a new

8 convention, which was never held while I was in the HDZ.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. However, there were attempts made by some people to change policy

11 over the course of time, and ultimately they succeeded in doing that.

12 Q. All right. If we could look at document 00047. I don't -- I

13 believe we might have covered it yesterday, or some parts of it. The

14 Prosecutor did, at least. It's the Main Board of BH HDZ 6 August, 1991.

15 You were still the president of the HDZ, were you not, sir?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And I take it you were still active. You hadn't deactivated

18 yourself or you hadn't been deactivated; right? Still engaged?

19 A. Yes, yes, yes.

20 Q. Okay. Now, if we look at the very first page, we have all the

21 names of the participants, and you seem to be the very first, followed by

22 Mate Boban, and so on and so forth; correct? Do you see that? On the

23 very first page on the English version --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay. Now, if we could go -- I don't want to go through the

1 entire one, but the second page we have the agenda, and as in any meeting

2 I suspect there's an agenda; right? It's a pretty organised party, has

3 agendas; right?

4 A. Yes, yes.

5 Q. Okay. And if we could go to the part called -- page 3, under

6 "Resolutions." Under "Resolutions." And I'm going to -- we're going to

7 go through some parts of it. We'll spend some time. It says -- it starts

8 with: "Which represent the platform of the activities of the BH HDZ in

9 the newly arisen situation were drawn after all proposals and

10 discussions."

11 You see that, sir, do you not? It's right after --

12 A. I can't see the text either.

13 Q. Okay. All right. Perhaps we can assist you with a -- with a --

14 A. Okay.

15 Q. All right.

16 A. Yes, yes.

17 Q. And we need to have a B/C/S copy. Okay. I can provide you a

18 physical copy if that would help you. All right? Any --

19 A. Yes, fine, I have one.

20 Q. Super, super. All right. So the first part, it says, "which

21 represent --" "Resolutions which represent the platform --" the platform

22 -- "of the activities of BH HDZ in the newly arisen situation were drawn

23 after all the proposals and discussions."

24 You see that, sir, right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. And I take it -- let's go to page -- let's go to the next

2 page, and under point 3. For -- the same page for you.

3 Now, before we get to this, perhaps we might want to talk a little

4 bit about the background of what's going on in the field, what's going on

5 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is 6 August, 1991. At this point in time,

6 sir, would it be fair to say that not just the political landscape but

7 also the social landscape, the safety landscape in Bosnia-Herzegovina has

8 changed. And by that I mean there's war raging on around, there's panic,

9 there's concern, folks are worried about what is going to happen in BiH;

10 correct? It's not midnight yet, but it's getting close to it.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. Now, so let's get to point 3. Point 3 says, and I'm going

13 to go through this, I'm going to read it, I'll read it slowly: "All the

14 current problems in the field, including internal party conflicts,

15 conflicts between members of different parties or nations, mobilisation of

16 reserve forces, exchange of fire, desertion, movements of the so-called

17 JNA, Yugoslav People's Army, pressing charges against 'persons subject to

18 military conscription,' provocation by individuals, et cetera, should be

19 reported by the municipal boards of the BH HDZ to the secretariat of the

20 BH HDZ in order to take certain preventive political measures."

21 So what I was saying earlier about the landscape, how it had been

22 changed, this more or less talks about that. It gives us a clue of what's

23 going on; correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, if we go to the next one, number 4, it says: "The Main Board

1 --" "The Main Board of the BH HDZ states the fact that the Croatian

2 people are in a state of war, and that it has its -- and its territories

3 are subject to direct occupation by Serbia, which is helped by a part of

4 the JNA and other paramilitary Chetnik units." That's correct, is it not,

5 that statement?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And when we're talking about the Croatian people, we're talking

8 about the Croatians living in the Republic of Croatia; correct?

9 A. No. Also the Croatian people living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 Q. Thank you. Thank you. I thought I was mistaken.

11 All right, now, number 5: "We recommended --" "We recommend to

12 the BH government to take a decisive --" I'm going to read that once more

13 -- "a decisive and unambiguous position regarding sending recruits to the

14 so-called JNA."

15 So here, sir, they're asking the BH government, of which you were

16 a member of at the time, to take a decisive and unambiguous position;

17 correct?

18 A. You see, I was a member of the Presidency. That's a different

19 body. It's not the government. The government is an executive body.

20 Yes, well, we did receive recommendations from the HDZ, and of course the

21 Muslim Bosniak members of the government and Croats were against

22 mobilisation, but the Serbs were in favour of mobilisation. But in

23 August, anyway, we stopped people being sent, the citizens of

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina not Serbs being sent to the Yugoslav People's Army.

25 Q. Okay. Because just to make sure, the government, the executive,

1 doesn't sit on top of the Presidency, does it? It's the Presidency that's

2 above; right?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Okay. And we'll go on to the next one. We're still on point 5,

5 I'm going to skip a paragraph. It says: "The government of BH is

6 requested to stop the mobilisation of the reserve forces in BH." Correct?

7 Because up until that point in time --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. Then it goes on: "The government of BH is requested to

10 prevent the 14th Corps of the so-called JNA from coming to BH."

11 Rather ambitious proposal, but -- or recommendation, but

12 nonetheless it was being made; right?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Yeah, because, let's face it, at that point in time it was rather

15 unrealistic for the government or the Presidency to act on this; right?

16 A. We strove for that, but the fact that we didn't have the forces

17 for it, that's another matter. The army was above civilian authority.

18 Q. All right. Okay. Then -- and incidentally, by that point in time

19 - and we'll get to it in a little bit - but by that point in time the TOs

20 are more or less stripped of their weapons, are they not? The Territorial

21 Defences.

22 A. The weapons were seized earlier on. I assume you know that.

23 Q. Exactly. So by that point in time other than maybe the police,

24 there's not a whole lot that Bosnia-Herzegovina can do to prevent the JNA,

25 who, as I understand, was a rather formidable and well-organised and

1 well-staffed and well-resourced army; correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. All right. Now we'll skip one, and then it says: "The BH

4 government is requested to use legal means at its disposal and deploy the

5 forces of MUP, Ministry of Interior, to retake the occupied TV transmitter

6 on the Kozara Mountain."

7 So here we're talking about using basically the police, because

8 that's what we're talking about, MUP, Ministry of Interior, that's the

9 police force. Special police, maybe, because we know at some point they

10 were armed with some heavier weapons, but that's what's being requested;

11 correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Here they say -- the next one says: "If the BH government ignores

14 these resolutions, we shall demand that it be called to account, or

15 possibly to resign."

16 Now, I take it by this point in time folks are getting a little

17 fed up in the HDZ party leadership with the inaction or inability or

18 unwillingness of the Bosnian government to provide safety and security to

19 the good folks who are living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20 A. Well, you're not telling the truth. The government did everything

21 it could given the elements it had that took care of citizens, but you

22 must know what the civilian authorities could do faced with a military

23 occupation. So it's not true that the government didn't do this. The

24 fact that the government didn't have the strength to solve the problem,

25 that's an objective difficulty, but to say that the government didn't do

1 anything and that it was indifferent or indolent, that wouldn't be

2 correct.

3 Q. Okay. Let's work with this a little bit. Let's assume the

4 government did all it could do. It was precious little as far as the

5 folks that were out -- outside of Sarajevo. It was precious little for

6 them, at least, because they weren't sufficiently protected, or at least

7 that's how they felt; right?

8 A. All this is true.

9 Q. Yeah. Which would mean that at least if you can't count on the

10 government to protect you, you might as well do something to protect

11 yourself. Maybe not that the government doesn't want to do something, but

12 they cannot under the circumstances. Right?

13 A. Well, yes. You're right there.

14 Q. And in fact -- and in fact, for those of us who come from

15 different cultures and from different ways of -- you know, where the

16 government is structured a little bit differently, Tito had -- had already

17 solved this into his game plan, and that's why he had provided not just

18 for the JNA but he had also provided at the very local level, at the

19 municipal level, Territorial Defence systems, so that in the event -- in

20 the eventuality you get cut off from the government, then at the

21 municipality level you would have sufficient arms, and you would have a

22 plan in place so you could self-organise, both politically but also

23 militarily. And that was called the All People's Defence, was it not?

24 A. You've explained it really well.

25 Q. Thank you. Now, if we could go on to the next page, we're going

1 -- I'm going to focus just on point 10. It would be the same page for

2 you. For us it would be -- it's point 10. It says here: "In order to

3 relieve President Stjepan Kljuic from a part of his obligations, the Main

4 Board of BH HDZ authorises the General-Secretary Ivan Markesic, members of

5 the BH HDZ Presidency, vice-presidents of the BH HDZ, and the secretariat

6 of the BH HDZ to act independently in their sphere of work, but with full

7 political and other responsibility."

8 It says that, does it not, sir?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Now, if we could park a little bit here, and if we could discuss

11 this just a bit. By this point in time, you as a member of the Presidency

12 are preoccupied with a great deal -- with many affairs, state affairs;

13 correct?

14 A. One could say that, yes.

15 Q. Okay. Well, I'm saying it.

16 A. Excellent.

17 Q. All right. Now, being part of the Presidency and also being

18 president of a party in this very turbulent time meant that you -- you

19 were stretched in many different directions. Stretched for time,

20 stretched for your ability to focus on issues; right?

21 A. One could put it that way, but I am a very calm man.

22 Q. All right. Well -- all right. Now, aside from being calm, it

23 would appear that at least on point 10 what -- a decision is being made

24 that they want to free you up of some of the day-to-day activities, of

25 some of your obligations, and in your stead you have these other members

1 who will act independently in their sphere of work but with full political

2 and other responsibility. So that's a responsibility or -- you're

3 delegating authority at this point in time, or authority is being

4 delegated to these individuals, authority that would normally be under the

5 control of the -- of the president of the party; correct?

6 A. Yes, but I initiated that.

7 Q. Exactamundo. Exactly. That's what I'm saying. In other words,

8 you're telling these folks act independently in your sphere of work and

9 you will have full political responsibility. And I take it some of them

10 did exactly that, that exactly which you asked them to do.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Now, if we go on to 14 real quickly - page 5 for you - on 14 it

13 says here that -- there are several appointments of councils, and you're

14 put on the Security Council; correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Yes. And then we're going to talk about that in a second, but

17 then on the same point, it says: "The persons in charge must immediately

18 --" underscore immediately -- "submit the list of persons whom they

19 propose for council members at the -- to the secretariat of the -- of the

20 BH HDZ."

21 So you're asked to go ahead and staff immediately and carry on,

22 correct, in your particular councils?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. All right. Now, the security council, if you could tell us, what

25 is that exactly? What did that exactly entail? I think I maybe have a

1 notion of it, but maybe you could help us out here.

2 A. In view of the situation, the security council was the most

3 important one. You've seen there were others; legal, health, culture, and

4 others, but this was in view of the situation prevailing in Yugoslavia,

5 especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a council that was supposed to take care

6 of the security of the Croatian people, police and military activities,

7 reservists, JNA, and so on, and coordinate all this information.

8 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, if we go to 16, point 16, it says:

9 "It is considered that the war is gradually being transferred to

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that the HDZ leadership must be constantly alert."

11 And then at the end it talks about introducing a state of emergency, you

12 know. It talks in -- "In order to try to normalise the situation and

13 avoid causing panic in the field, it is considered that there is still no

14 need for BH HDZ to introduce state of emergency in the party," but

15 nonetheless it sounds like this is a clarion call, that the war is coming

16 our way. The winds are blowing southerly, right? And northerly, and

17 westerly; right? You agree with me?

18 A. Absolutely.

19 Q. Okay. And then it goes on: "If there is a direct danger of war

20 in the area, Municipal Board, after consultation with the leadership, will

21 introduce a state of emergency in the Municipal Board of the HDZ."

22 So in other words, HDZ is already putting in the measures in the

23 eventuality so that a state of emergency can be declared; correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, if we can just skip to 19. Page 6 for you. 19. We're

1 almost there. It says here: "The Croatian Democratic Union of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina confirms its known position that Bosnia-Herzegovina is

3 a sovereign and indivisible state and its proclaimed principle that BiH --

4 the BH is a state of Croatian people, together with other peoples, but it

5 will never allow the Croatian people to be treated as a national minority,

6 nor would it allow other peoples to determine the destiny of BH without

7 the influence of the Croats."

8 All right? It says that, does it not?

9 A. These are very significant theses.

10 Q. Absolutely, because this goes -- this goes to the heart, the core

11 of -- of the Croatian issue prior -- prior to the elections, prior to the

12 break-up of Yugoslavia, because is it not a fact, sir - and I think you as

13 a dissident would agree with me - that there were many Croats that did not

14 wish to be in the former Yugoslavia, and they wanted their own Croatian

15 nation. I'm told that the translation is somewhat --

16 A. Okay, okay.

17 Q. But you understood my English.

18 A. I understood you very well, but you mentioned elections. There

19 were no elections taking place at the time, and that the Croatian people

20 wanted to live in a state and that they wanted their own independent

21 state, well, that -- that was something they had hoped for for eight

22 centuries.

23 Q. Okay. And this was their moment in history.

24 A. But you must know that many wishes never come true in generations

25 and generations. But we Croats have had the fortune of having two

1 independent states; both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 Q. Okay. And within Bosnia-Herzegovina that's where the Croatian

3 nation was one of the constituent nations, correct? Within that

4 geographical space.

5 A. Yes. All over the territory of the state we were a constituent

6 people.

7 Q. And I stand corrected just for -- to make sure the record is

8 clear: When I spoke earlier of a Croatian nation, it's my habit because

9 in America we refer to that as a state, where here, given the context in

10 this particular region, when we're speaking about a nation we're speaking

11 about something different than a state. You would agree with me on that?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. All right. And the -- at least the Croatian people as a nation --

14 as a nation within Bosnia-Herzegovina had been guaranteed by the

15 constitution. You know, it was in the constitution, was it not?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. And it would appear, sir -- it would appear, sir, and maybe

18 I'm just a little bit off, but it would appear that perhaps if you look at

19 the date, this is 6 August, 1991, and then we look at the date of the

20 referendum, perhaps some folks within the party, within the HDZ leadership

21 thought that the question on the referendum may in part be in

22 contradiction or in collision with paragraph number 19 of this platform

23 resolution, hence why the whole debate.

24 A. No. By your leave, I'll assist you to understand the situation.

25 The referendum question was about the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1 It did not pre-judge the internal organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2 According to the constitution of 1974, Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of

3 three constituent peoples; the Croats, the Muslims, and the Serbs, as well

4 as all other citizens. This remained after the referendum. It remained

5 so. This entire process, the Cutileiro Plan, further discussions on

6 cantonisation, all these were simply discussions in which a consensus was

7 sought about the internal ordering of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8 Q. I think we agree on this. As you well know being in politics --

9 A. [In English] Finally.

10 Q. Okay. We'll get there. Slowly, slowly. But you would agree with

11 me that reasonable people can often, you know, disagree, and is it not --

12 would it not be fair to say that at least some of your colleagues, at

13 least because they didn't see the word "sovereignty" or "sovereign nation"

14 in that particular question when in fact it had been part of the party

15 platform, as is stated here on paragraph 19, that might have been a cause

16 of their concern, hence why they at least needed to get that second

17 opinion at Lisbon, and once they were assured, they went ahead. So that's

18 all I'm merely pointing out, is that some of your colleagues may have seen

19 some things a little bit differently than you and could have looked at

20 this paragraph and said, Why aren't those words, "sovereignty," "nation,"

21 why aren't they in the resolution? Is that possible?

22 A. Please, these colleagues --

23 Q. Just answer --

24 A. It's possible.

25 Q. All right. I know you didn't like some of your colleagues, but

1 that's okay.

2 A. No, no, no. On the contrary. They didn't like me. I liked them.

3 Q. Okay. All right. Okay. If we get to 22 -- I think we can skip

4 21, even though it's significant, but we can deal with it later. 22: "We

5 remain behind the policy of independence and indivisibility in BH but

6 should the war start in BH by an attack by Greater Serbia or any other

7 aggressor on the Croatian people in BH, a special plan will be applied."

8 My question, sir, is, when you say "special plan," when the folks

9 that were drafting this resolution of which, as I understand, you signed

10 as president, what did you have in mind when you said "special plan would

11 be applied"?

12 A. There were several variants. We spoke about this at length when

13 discussing the document of the 13th of June in Zagreb.

14 Q. Okay. And that was the plan that you spoke to us yesterday about?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. All right. And so there were different options on the table.

17 A. It all depended on how the situation developed on the ground. If

18 you lost the war, you didn't have a chance. If you won a bit, then you

19 did have a chance. Our aim was to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina. If we

20 could do that, we would have the greatest chance.

21 Q. Right. And if you could not preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina, what was

22 the plan for? What did the plan call for?

23 A. In that case, we would see what we could do. There was talk about

24 Croats and Bosniak Muslims linking up with the Republic of Croatia

25 together. There was a discussion of the Croats taking the area where they

1 lived as their own community. All these were hypotheses.

2 Q. Okay. And so when folks were sitting around talking, as they did,

3 you know, on that particular occasion, I think -- what was it, July 13th

4 was that? And then later on say --

5 A. The 13th of June in Zagreb. And this is already the 6th of

6 August --

7 Q. Right.

8 A. -- in Rama.

9 Q. And these discussions, I take it, went on for some time, because

10 as the war progressed, as the situation changed on the ground, people met,

11 had discussions; correct?

12 A. People were constantly discussing. Nobody slept at all. We were

13 all tense. You're coming from a stable environment, so you are unable to

14 understand the situation psychologically.

15 Q. I would -- I would totally agree with you on that one. And I take

16 it such discussions were held -- one example of such discussions, for

17 instance, would be on the 27th of December, 1991, in Zagreb, which you

18 attended. That was one of those sort of discussions where folks talked

19 about the various options; right?

20 A. Yes. But it's one thing when somebody discusses options and

21 another thing when somebody assigns only one option.

22 Q. I understand that. And I don't want to get ahead of myself, but

23 on that particular occasion, on the 27th of December, after speaking of --

24 after talking about the various options, discussing them, and as I

25 understand it, it was a rather heated -- a rather heated environment where

1 you felt personally attacked, and you voiced it, we can see it in the

2 transcript, the meeting concluded with some sort of a commission being put

3 together, you being part of that commission, the whole purpose of it to

4 begin and -- or actually to continue the discussions along with your

5 counterparts in BiH, in specific the Muslims and Izetbegovic, to see how

6 the situation could resolve in BiH?

7 A. President Tudjman had, even before this, asked that we negotiate

8 with the Serbs, and we did, but you have to know what the standpoints of

9 our partners were. The Serbs were exclusively in favour of remaining in

10 Yugoslavia at any cost. We were not. The Muslims, or the Bosniaks, were

11 not either. So the problem was how to proceed. That's why there would be

12 a referendum and things would take the course they did.

13 As for us within the HDZ, those people who were personally opposed

14 to me favoured a thesis which later proved to be self-defeating. I'm

15 referring to Kostroman, Kordic, Boban, and so on. On the other hand, as a

16 disciplined man, I asked that a convention be called, and after all this

17 struggle, for you to understand my position, you should know that when I

18 became the president of the HDZ in the former Yugoslavia, it was seen as

19 an Ustasha movement, and only because of my civic image was I able to

20 civilise this movement, which was a wonderful movement, but some Croat

21 officials from the last Communist government did not want to join us. I

22 wanted a convention to be held so I could hand over the party to them and

23 they could continue on their way.

24 Q. Okay. Thank you. But let me just conclude here because we're

25 about to have a break now. I can finish with this document.

1 If we skip to number 24, it says here: "In order to educate the

2 population for a successful system of defence and self-protection, the

3 secretariat is assigned the task of organising seminars in the field of

4 defence, communications, civil protection."

5 Again, we see, I believe, the HDZ wanting to take actions because

6 they understand that their safety is at risk; correct?

7 A. That's how I understand it. I read Churchill's memoirs to them

8 about civilian protection or civil defence, for them to prepare it because

9 it was necessary for survival.

10 Q. Right. And then on 27 you state -- it's stated: "We must be fair

11 and show goodwill in our relations with other people -- with other

12 parties, in order to -- in order not to provoke disorder and incidents."

13 Right? That was part of the party platform.

14 A. You have to recognise the European approach.

15 Q. Okay. And this was the platform as of -- of -- of 6 August, 1991;

16 right?

17 A. Yes. In the prevailing conditions.

18 Q. In the prevailing conditions. Okay.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, I know we're three minutes early,

20 but this concludes this chapter, and we're moving quite slowly but we're

21 getting there. I'll try to pick it up.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just before we take a break, I

23 have listened to you during this cross-examination, and for over 20

24 minutes you have put questions to the witness on document 47. As you

25 know, under Rule 90(F) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Trial

1 Chamber must monitor the cross-examination of witnesses so that the

2 cross-examination satisfies the Chamber and can unravel the truth and so

3 that we don't waste too much time.

4 I must say I had difficulty in understanding some of the questions

5 that were put to the witness sometimes, and that related to this document.

6 I don't know exactly what you want us to understand in light of these

7 general questions you have put to the witness. If you spend 20 minutes on

8 a document, you are wishing to convey a message to the Bench. As a

9 general rule, one finishes off with a question which wraps up all the

10 other questions that have been put prior to that so that the witness -- so

11 that one understands whether the witness agrees or not.

12 In the questions that were put today, I broke it down into four

13 areas: You addressed the issue of the referendum in paragraph 19 of this

14 document, the attacks launched by the Serbs, and therefore it was

15 important to set up a special plan. This was in paragraph 22. Then the

16 role played by the Croats, the role of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croats

17 inside Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a number of issues relating to

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. So there are a number of important issues

19 that are raised, and -- and that you have discussed.

20 I must say I'm a little bit perplexed. After 20 minutes, I'm not

21 quite sure what you were getting at. So that we don't lose any time, what

22 you do, generally speaking, after you've put your question, you sum up

23 with one question which is a way of wrapping it up. As I have said,

24 you've addressed at least four issues, and I find it difficult to find my

25 way around in all of this. Maybe the questions you will ask afterwards

1 will make things clearer, but I just wanted to make sure that I mentioned

2 this to you.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, Your Honour, Mr. President, there's always

4 room for improvement, first and foremost, and I will be the first one to

5 admit that we strive over here for improvement.

6 Secondly, I have an outline. I usually go from the general to the

7 specific. I will be filling in. Hopefully at the end of the day it will

8 all make sense. Maybe not with this witness but at some other point.

9 It's a step-by-step process. I understand the frustration that perhaps

10 I'm not being as clear as I could be. I will regroup, rethink, I will

11 take your remarks on board, but rest assured, Mr. President, I did not get

12 to watch that very good game yesterday where France was able to win and

13 move forward on the World Cup because I was diligently preparing.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. So it is now 10.30.

15 We shall have a 20-minute break and resume at ten minutes to 11.00.

16 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have an hour and a half until

19 12.30. Counsel Karnavas, I give you the floor again.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Your Honours.

21 Q. Mr. Kljuic, we're going to go on to the next -- the next topic.

22 And just so there's no dilemma about what it's about, it's about the

23 prediction of the conflict in BiH. So we're going to go through a series

24 of documents, and I'm going to step back on date. The last document we

25 dealt with was, I believe, was on August 6th, but I'm going to start with

1 a series of documents. But first, I want to see whether we can agree.

2 As early as April, 1991, and onwards, and it was becoming much --

3 it was becoming clearer and clearer every day that -- that BH, BiH,

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, was facing -- was going to face ultimately the JNA and

5 the Serbian aggression, if you want to call it that. Some call it the

6 Chetnik. I prefer not to use that because I think it's a pejorative term,

7 but in any event, as early as April, 1991, it became clear that something

8 was about to happen; right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. All right. Now, and just to make -- and this was a discussion, by

11 the way, that was going on within the party, within HDZ.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And I don't want to get ahead of myself into the other chapters,

14 but it's fair to say that with this new democratic process in place where

15 you have multi -- a multi-party system, it's one thing to say, okay, let's

16 have a new party. It's another thing to organise it, to staff it, and the

17 day-to-day operation. This was something of a new experience for many of

18 the folks that were engaged in politics at that period of time.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And we're going to talk about some of the challenges that you

21 faced, but suffice it to say there were many challenges, especially you

22 being at the top and, as I understand it, it's rather windy up there, and

23 sometimes the impossible is asked of you. Sometimes folks elsewhere,

24 especially out in the field, don't understand the challenges, don't

25 appreciate the hard work, don't realise how difficult it can be, that it's

1 simply not ordered and done.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And it would be fair to say that -- and again we'll talk about

4 this a little bit later, but it would be fair to say that at times you

5 were misunderstood by your colleagues, because where they saw no

6 particular result, they may have interpreted as inaction on your part when

7 in fact maybe you were incapable of motivating people or getting things

8 done, not for lack of trying but because of the circumstances; correct?

9 A. At that time there wasn't any of that yet. It's my triumph in

10 Mostar seven days before April. I won at the convention. You heard the

11 results when they were presented by Mr. Scott.

12 Q. Right. But there's a saying in America that one day in politics

13 you are the toast of the town - people are toasting you - and then the

14 very next day perhaps you may be toast, because politics can be a sort of

15 rough game, especially when people are getting to learn how to -- how to

16 exercise or how to play within the new rules of the game; right?

17 A. Yes. And it's very important how many times you rebound, get back

18 up there.

19 Q. I agree. Now, getting back to the topic that we're going to talk

20 -- that we will be discussing, which is predicting the conflict, I'm

21 going to go through a series of documents just very quickly. The first

22 one is dated 4 April, 1991, 00032, I believe. P 00032. Extract of

23 minutes. And while this is being placed on the monitor, I'll begin.

24 Here you are present along with others. And if we could go to

25 page 2 in the English -- page 3 in the English version, under -- page 2 in

1 the B/C/S. Under item 2 you will see that -- we will see from -- the

2 third paragraph we'll start. It says: "HDZ must remain totally mobile.

3 It is the only political power of the Croatian people which is capable of

4 confronting Greater Serbian policies." Do you see that, sir?

5 A. Yes, yes.

6 Q. Okay. So -- by that we mean -- when we're talking about Greater

7 Serbian policies, we're also talking about the war that is being waged or

8 that is about to be waged by the Greater Serbian policies; right? Or as a

9 result of these particular policies; correct?

10 A. Yes. It refers to the aggression against Croatia.

11 Q. Now, the next -- very next line, it says: "There is a possibility

12 that the conflict may spread from Croatia to the territories of BH."

13 So as early as 4 April, 1991, the alarm bell is being sounded off,

14 that there is a possibility.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And the next point is: "That the people -- Croatian people remain

17 peaceful and dignified but it is also necessary to know how to physically

18 protect the people if the need arises. This is expected from us, and it

19 is our duty to do so."

20 So again, HDZ, taking it upon itself to be the political power of

21 the Croatian people, is very mindful of its responsibility and the

22 necessity of the Croatian people to at least self-organise themselves. At

23 least, that's how I interpret it. Would that be correct, sir?

24 A. Yes. That was our duty given the situation and the electoral

25 results.

1 Q. Right. And then the very next one, it's -- it says: "The

2 standpoint of HDZ towards the army is clear. The army must defend the

3 external borders and must not become involved in inter-ethnic relations."

4 Now, when we're talking about the army, which army are we talking

5 about?

6 A. The official army, the Yugoslav People's Army. It was called that

7 way but already at the time it was in fact absolutely Serb.

8 Q. Right. And for all intents and purposes, if we step back, in the

9 former Yugoslavia, the JNA was for the entire country, which was made up

10 of several republics and some autonomous regions, and now the JNA for all

11 intents and purposes has become the Serbian army and the Republic of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina does not have an army other than the Territorial

13 Defences which, as you noted, at some point are stripped of all of its

14 weapon stockpiles; correct?

15 A. Yes. The only army on our soil was the Yugoslav army.

16 Q. Right. Now, if we go to the -- the second to last paragraph on

17 page 3 in the English version, it talks about the need for 24-hour

18 presence at the offices of the HDZ Municipal Boards. It's still on the

19 second page. It says: "This is going to be a very long and difficult

20 month in the terms of the political situation and Municipal Boards are

21 asked to remain mobile and to ensure 24-hour presence ..."

22 And this by and large is because of the situation that is

23 unfolding; correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And we, as we sit here today in this courtroom, can only imagine

1 -- can only imagine the situation, how it was back then, but for you and

2 your colleagues and the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly those

3 who were on the fringes of where the fighting was going on, for them it

4 was a very surreal situation, one which they had not experienced before

5 but one that certainly was very troublesome, to say the least.

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. All right. Now, I don't believe there's anything other --

8 anything else in this -- let me go on. There's one more in item 3, just

9 very briefly. It says here on item 3 -- it's one, two, three -- the

10 fourth paragraph. I'll read it. It's on page 4 of the English version,

11 page 3 for you. It says: "In some municipalities, because of the

12 build-up of internal party problems, it is necessary to carry out

13 preparations for extraordinary HDZ assemblies in order that higher quality

14 personnel are elected to the leadership of the party."

15 In my conversation earlier with you where I said that there was --

16 there are some difficulties at this particular time because everybody's

17 learning how to work within a democratic process, the party is rather new,

18 the circumstances are incredibly difficult, expounding the situation, and

19 here is a situation where you say they need to exercise more care in

20 finding and ordering higher-quality personnel; correct?

21 A. What you're saying now is only part of the problem. The other

22 part of the problem was that for the elections many serious-minded people,

23 well educated, did not wish to accept the HDZ. But later on, with the

24 development of events and the introduction of the -- or, rather, the

25 advent of the danger from a Serb aggression, they came to understand they

1 must stand by their people. And then we took in many more serious minded,

2 educated and so on citizens.

3 Q. But that took a while. That took some time.

4 A. Yes. And we gave them an official status. That's why we set up

5 these extraordinary assemblies in the municipalities.

6 Q. Right. And then on a very -- just the very last page, on page 5

7 for us, right -- slightly above your signature line, you'll see your name.

8 It says: "Stjepan Kljuic will always -- will always invite one of the

9 vice-presidents to be present at inner party negotiations."

10 It's page 3 for you, sir.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: It's -- and I'll read the English version and then,

12 as I understand it, Your Honour, it's been -- perhaps the gentleman can

13 read it in B/C/S and it can be translated, because as I understand it,

14 it's -- there's a mistake, and I apologise for self-correcting it.

15 Q. Sir, if you could read that for the record, because -- so we can

16 have an accurate translation.

17 A. I always had at inter-party negotiations to take one of the

18 deputy presidents and a member who would be an expert on the subjects

19 under discussion.

20 Q. Yes, but if you could read it, just for the record, what it says.

21 Because the English version is slightly -- there might be a mistake in the

22 English version, just so we could have a correct translation. If you can

23 just read it where it says: "Stjepan Kljuic ..."

24 A. "At the inter-party negotiations, Stjepan Kljuic always called

25 somebody some vice-president."

1 Q. That's it. Okay.

2 A. One of the vice-presidents.

3 Q. Very well. Now, these inter-party -- just to make sure that we

4 understand, these inter-party negotiations, what are you speaking about?

5 A. In the period when we won the elections and when the new

6 government was established, we had to replace the entire state apparatus,

7 and the easiest thing to do was in parliament, because the situation was

8 clear there, as it was indeed in the Presidency, and when we came to set

9 up a government, too, where all the nations were represent. However, you

10 must understand that that was still -- it was still a communist country

11 that we were living in and where everything was state owned.

12 Perhaps because the former Prime Minister, Markovic, there might

13 have been 3 to 5 per cent of private ownership in the business world, but

14 as these companies and enterprises were very important politically,

15 economically, and socially speaking, they had to be taken over, and those

16 places had to be filled. On the other hand, what we needed to do was to

17 replace, in the federal representative offices in Belgrade and in the

18 sphere of diplomacy, the old cadres, and that was a slow, painstaking

19 process especially because of the system of voting that was in place.

20 Some people had terms of office from the previous elections for the

21 Federal Assembly, for instance. And generally speaking, the process was a

22 slow one and an unwieldy one, and there was resistance in having the new

23 powers that be take over all these functions. That's why we set up these

24 commissions, we invited people to attend sessions we organised. We even

25 invited people who didn't have to be necessarily a member of the party.

1 Q. All right. And just -- so as I understand it, depending on the

2 availability of positions that had to be replaced or filled, the parties,

3 among themselves, would make proposals as to -- they would work out the

4 numbers to make sure that their -- that every ethnic -- every nation had

5 its number of people at every level; correct? You're shaking your head.

6 Does that mean yes?

7 A. No. Only in the top echelons of the state did you have parity,

8 whereas in the other parts it was proportionate representation. And we

9 had some formulas, 5, 4, 3, 4, 2, et cetera, these ratios, 4, 3, 2, 3, 2,

10 1, et cetera.

11 Q. And the party itself, for instance the HDZ in this instance, it

12 would try to locate and designate the appropriate Croats to fill those --

13 those seats that were available to the Croat nation, the Croat people;

14 right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And we'll get to it in a little bit, but that was a long,

17 painstaking process, trying to find, identify the right people, making

18 sure that they had a background clearance, they weren't Communist oriented

19 or had been part of the last Communist system, had the qualifications.

20 No? Okay.

21 A. Yes, that's right, but you know, you couldn't find somebody who

22 hadn't been a Communist. And we had a principle of reconciliation, so we

23 just didn't take the extremist Communists who had done evil to the Croat

24 people and other people within the police force, for example. But if a

25 professor of economics had been a Communist before, that was tolerated.

1 Q. All right. As long as he wasn't an extremist. And as I

2 understand, that took up a lot of your time, your personal time, this

3 process.

4 A. Yes, it did, but we had a cadres commission of the HDZ.

5 Q. All right.

6 A. And if you would like me to explain this to you, I can do so

7 briefly. We tried --

8 Q. We're going to get to it. I just wanted to touch on that. And

9 we're going to get to it, though, because as I understand, that was one of

10 the major issues within the party, one of the criticisms that was lodged

11 against you or the leadership, that they weren't acting fast enough to

12 fill in these positions, and there was a sense of frustration. I'm not

13 saying that those accusations were necessarily true or not, but

14 nonetheless they existed there; right?

15 A. Yes, that was true, but it was very difficult to find the right

16 people.

17 Q. Right. Right.

18 A. Suitable people.

19 Q. I agree. I totally sympathise with you. Now, if we can get to

20 00034, the next document, excerpt of minutes dated 16 April, 1991. If we

21 look at item 2, going back to our -- our chapter of predicting the

22 conflict, on item 2.1, it states: "Due to further --" page 2 for you but

23 it's under item 2.1: "Due to the further deterioration of the political

24 situation in the homeland, round-the-clock duty must be continued in the

25 municipal boards and BH HDZ secretariat to ensure timely dissemination of

1 information."

2 So here once again the alarm is being rung for 24-hour vigilance.

3 Is that correct?

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Murphy.

5 MR. MURPHY: [Interpretation] I think we have a technical problem,

6 Mr. President.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's going to take a few moments

8 to put right, I'm told.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: And we'll stick with that document, incidentally,

10 just so -- while this -- okay. We'll go to item 3. I don't know if the

11 -- okay. Relax, everyone. It's under control.

12 Q. If I may inquire, sir, do you have it on your screen? Good.

13 A. [In English] I have now.

14 Q. All right. If we could go to page 4. And under item 3, just very

15 quickly, it says: "The members of the Presidency were informed of the

16 political and security situation in the homeland." And then it says:

17 "The situation is judged to be extremely serious, and HDZ members are

18 called on to be sensible and do nothing on their own initiative in a

19 political context without specific instructions from the HDZ headquarters.

20 Any rash or tactless move could have unforeseeable political

21 consequences."

22 Now, here it appears that you're trying to warn the members to be

23 very careful because the situation is extremely precarious; correct? Not

24 just politically but also militarily.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And then you go on to say: "At the moment, the worst hot-spots in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina are in the Bosnian Krajina and Eastern Herzegovina. We

3 condemn any attempts to change the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

4 So here the HDZ is condemning any changes to the borders of Bosnia

5 and Herzegovina; correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And -- and then you go on to say: "We must do everything to calm

8 the Croatian population in the areas at risk and to ensure their peace and

9 safety." Right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. It would appear, would it not, sir, that as -- at this period of

12 time it's becoming eminently clear that the Croats are going to

13 self-manage, if I can use that term, self-manage in making sure that they

14 have the necessary wherewithal to protect themselves. One, to be vigilant

15 and, two, to perhaps arm themselves -- organise themselves and arm

16 themselves for the eventuality of an outbreak of war; right?

17 A. Yes. The problem was how to protect all the Croats, not just a

18 part of them.

19 Q. Exactly, because you had areas where -- that were predominantly

20 Croat, other areas where the Croats were fewer in numbers, in a minority.

21 And of course Bosnia-Herzegovina, depending on the area, too, that you had

22 particular hot-spots; right? And so that was one of the problems. And

23 the only existing formula, if I could put that, or the only thing that was

24 at least familiar to the folks back then was this Territorial Defence

25 concept where, at the municipal level, the municipalities would sort of

1 ensure that they had the arms to protect the municipality itself, not

2 outside the municipality; right?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. Then, of course, that poses a problem. That poses a problem,

5 because, you see, if a municipality is only looking after itself and maybe

6 the neighbouring municipality also might be at risk, maybe down the road

7 but not necessarily at risk at that particular point in time, may not

8 necessarily come to the aid of its neighbour because, again, each

9 municipality is looking after its own well-being, hence the reason or

10 hence why the municipalities may need to pull themselves together, to pull

11 themselves together so as they have -- collectively they may be able to

12 assist each other in time of need.

13 A. You put forward two theses here. One is a hypothesis that there

14 were weapons, and you're talking about the other one when the weapons had

15 already been confiscated.

16 As you were able to see from the previous documents, we insisted

17 that the party municipal bodies link up for easier subordination.

18 Q. All right. Let's forget about the weapons, whether they had them

19 or not. The concept that I'm proposing is based on the model that was --

20 that was known to the folks. One, each municipality would take care of

21 itself, based on the concept of Territorial Defence; correct?

22 A. That's a concept that could not apply, because if everyone had

23 been armed, one municipality could not go to another. It was only when

24 there were weapons that those who received weapons from the JNA could go

25 against the other municipality.

1 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... but just work with me. We're

2 going to go step-by-step. Under the territorial concept -- Territorial

3 Defence concept, the municipalities were to look after themselves, not

4 after other municipalities; correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And so if one municipality came under attack, they could not

7 necessarily rely on other municipalities coming to their aid under the

8 concept as it existed back then; correct?

9 A. That's not certain.

10 Q. All right. Okay.

11 A. Not certain, no.

12 Q. Needless to say, the Croats at least realised that their safety

13 lied in numbers and lied in the collective grouping of municipalities in

14 order to self-protect themselves.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And out of that concept -- out of that concept we have the HVO,

17 which was in essence nothing more than a bunch of Territorial Defences,

18 municipalities organising themselves, pooling their resources together so

19 that they, collectively, would be able to protect not just their own

20 municipality but protect others?

21 MR. SCOTT: I'm going to object at this point, Your Honour. For

22 one thing, the evidence is pretty clear that Mr. Kljuic was not involved

23 at the time that the HVO was formed in April of 1992. He was no longer in

24 the party or involved in those efforts at all. If counsel can establish

25 some personal knowledge of this witness to talk about the HVO, we could

1 possibly do that. But again, beyond that, my second basis of objection is

2 again the characterisation by Mr. Karnavas for facts that are not in

3 evidence.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, if I may respond. The gentleman was a

5 product of the former Yugoslavia. He -- he was a member of the Crisis

6 Staff. As you told us, everybody was forming Crisis Staffs, including

7 HDZ. He obviously -- everybody was taught about civil protection,

8 including the Territorial Defence. It was thought in the high schools, if

9 I'm not mistaken. Everybody was mobilised. I mean, this country was

10 highly, highly prepared in the eventuality of a war, because the JNA was

11 not an army for offensive purposes but merely for defensive purposes. And

12 the whole concept of the All People's Defence was that, along with the

13 JNA, you would have -- at the municipal level you would have the

14 Territorial Defence working side by side.

15 Q. And if I'm mistaken, sir, perhaps you can correct me on all of

16 that.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. In order to enable the

18 Judges to understand this question properly, Witness, did you do your

19 military service in the JNA?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I did. I was a reserve

21 captain. I went through officers' school in Bileca.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you went to the

23 officers' school in Bihac [as interpreted] and you were a reserve captain.

24 So if we were to understand the term "Territorial Defence" --

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I graduated with the rank of

1 2nd lieutenant, and then every year I went for further training and I

2 arrived at lieutenant colonel.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Captain, interpreter's correction.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You were a lieutenant, so

5 defence is something which means something, doesn't it?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You listened to the question

8 that was put to you by Mr. Karnavas. Mr. Karnavas was putting forward a

9 theory. He was saying that, given the fact that there was no army, that

10 there was a Territorial Defence, that the municipalities had to unite in

11 order to counter a potential attack, this idea which was put forward by

12 Mr. Karnavas, in other words the creation of the HVO, is a theory which

13 you agree with or disagree with?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. Please. When the aggression

15 against Bosnia-Herzegovina was at its fiercest, the people organised in

16 whichever way they could. We had three components. One was the HVO. The

17 second was another smaller Croatian association, the HOS, the Croatian

18 defence forces, and the third was the Territorial Defence. We in the

19 Presidency were happy for anyone to stand in defence of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but there was not a single command. So we tried to

21 create a framework for all these three components, and we adopted a

22 decision that they should all be part of the armed forces of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this way, all this was legalised. However,

24 problems later occurred between the HOS and the HVO. As for the

25 Territorial Defence, it was to grow into the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Just one point I

2 would like to clarify. You just talked about the HOS. What does the HOS

3 stand for?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is an old Croatian political

5 party, and in the Republic of Croatia where the aggression began before it

6 did in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this party created a volunteer organisation to

7 defend the state. Its name was the Croatian Liberation Forces; HOS.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

9 Mr. Karnavas, you have the floor again.

10 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

11 Q. Just one -- just to go back a little bit. As I understand it,

12 after serving -- after one served his military service, they were in

13 essence in the reserve up until the age of 60 or 65 under the old system;

14 is that correct?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. And in fact -- and in fact, the municipalities had a

17 well-established Territorial Defence office, and in the eventuality of a

18 mobilisation, either for military purposes or for natural disasters,

19 everybody knew, the women and the men, knew exactly what they needed to

20 do. Enterprises knew how they would need to contribute. Is that correct?

21 In other words, it was very well structured.

22 A. Absolutely.

23 Q. Okay. Now, if we could go to the next document, and that would be

24 P -- D -- no, P 00041. Just very briefly. We're going through this

25 rather quickly. Again, item 1 on this document. This is excerpts from

1 the minutes of the HDZ BH Presidency. The date is 10 July, 1991. So now

2 we've moved on a couple of months down the road.

3 On the agenda, item 1. It's at the bottom the page in English.

4 It says: "The situation in the entire homeland was estimated as extremely

5 dramatic and that due to aggressive Greater Serbia policy, a widespread

6 armed conflict may be expected at any time."

7 So here we see that the situation seems to have gotten worse.

8 More predictions of war. Correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And if we were to go to the end of the -- end of this document, we

11 would see that it was signed by you. You were one of the signatories. So

12 in essence you were part of this particular meeting where again the issue

13 of a widespread conflict looming in the air was being discussed.

14 If we could go on to the next document, and that would be P 00042,

15 generated on 21 July, 1991. This is a Croatian Democratic Union of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina Travnik region meeting at Busovaca. We can see from

17 the top paragraph that you were present. No, I'm sorry. It says on the

18 basis of the conclusion, I apologise, and based on the decision of HDZ BiH

19 president Stjepan Kljuic, there's a meeting here. And if we could go to

20 the conclusions. In English it would be on page 2. And it would be page

21 2 for you as well.

22 Under paragraph 2 -- well, paragraph 1, it says: "Croatia is in a

23 state of war." By that we're talking about the Republic of Croatia;

24 correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Then we -- then in number 2, it says, and this is rather

2 interesting: "A silent occupation is being carried out in the territory

3 of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the same invader."

4 A. Excellent.

5 Q. Right. And so at this point in time -- at this point in time, 21

6 July, 1991, the silent occupier is none other than the JNA, and they're on

7 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as we discussed yesterday, they're

8 using Bosnia-Herzegovina as a launching pad to attack the Republic of

9 Croatia. Right?

10 A. The Yugoslav People's Army was still the regular armed force,

11 because Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of Yugoslavia. So was Croatia.

12 Q. Well, that's what -- and -- and -- it would be fair to say that

13 it's a rather confusing period of time. I mean, the very same army that's

14 -- the very same army that's supposed to be protecting you is now

15 launching attacks against a neighbour; correct?

16 A. The Presidency of Yugoslavia, which was supposed to stop that

17 army, was unable to do so. And you will see that it says the Presidency

18 of Bosnia and Herzegovina couldn't stop the army. Well, it couldn't. You

19 can't use the hands of a civilian to stop a tank. The JNA was conquering

20 particular territories within Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you will

21 later see that this was all in accordance with the Ram plan.

22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I intervene to correct a probable error? You

23 have said, Mr. Kljuic, the Presidency of Yugoslavia was unable to stop the

24 attack, and you would probably -- you wanted to say the Presidency of

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. At that time, the Presidency of

2 Yugoslavia was in existence. Jovic, Drnovsek, Mesic, Tupurkovski,

3 Bogicevic, and others were in it. We had the same level -- the same

4 system at state level and republican level.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: I was hoping --

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So why, according to you, did

7 the Presidency of Yugoslavia not want to stop the JNA in its tracks?

8 Because usually an army is dependent upon the government of the country.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In every democratic country the army

10 obeys the civilian government. However, in Yugoslavia you had people

11 advocating Milosevic's policies and democrats fighting against them. But

12 Kadijevic and Adzic, they were the minister of defence who didn't obey the

13 Prime Minister, and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces did not

14 respect the intervention of the Presidency. This means that the army was

15 out of the control of the civilian government.

16 MR. KARNAVAS: If I may.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for having clarified

18 this, Witness.

19 MR. KARNAVAS:

20 Q. Mr. Kljuic --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Karnavas, please.

22 MR. KARNAVAS:

23 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I was expecting you to correct me when I said that

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina was used as a launching pad to attack a neighbour, a

25 neighbouring state, in other words, because obviously Croatia at that time

1 was still a republic within Yugoslavia. Just -- correct? I mean, this is

2 what's happening.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. [In English] Yes, yes.

6 Q. It's not until later when you have -- it declared its

7 independence, then we can speak about the JNA using Bosnia to attack

8 another country, but in this particular period it is used --

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a republic, the land is used there as a launching

10 pad to attack another republic within -- within Yugoslavia. And that was

11 -- that was part of the problem at the time.

12 A. [Interpretation] No. The republic of -- not the Republic of

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was not the official policy of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Simply a part of the territory which was occupied by

15 the JNA on the Bosnian-Herzegovinian side was being used as a launching

16 pad to fire on Croatia. But the same was happening within the Republic of

17 Croatia. The JNA and the Chetniks had conquered certain areas so that

18 from Mirkovac they were firing on Osijek. And when they told me, "Why

19 don't you stop them using Nova Gradiska in Bosnia as a launching pad to

20 shoot on Croatia?" And I said to them, "Well, why don't you stop them

21 doing that from Mirkovci?"

22 You have to understand that the legal authorities at the time,

23 both in the Republic of Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina were unable to stop the JNA. In Croatia at that time, there

25 was already a police and an army, but we didn't have that in Bosnia.

1 Q. Okay. Now, just -- I guess we should just stick with this a

2 little bit to make sure that we're clear.

3 By -- in this period in history it's clear that Yugoslavia is

4 breaking up, one way or another.

5 A. It was quite clear, but it hadn't happened yet.

6 Q. It hadn't happened yet. And now you have the army, the JNA, and

7 as we said, it was there for self-protection, not for offensive purposes,

8 it was there to protect against invaders. Now the very same army that is

9 there to protect is being used to attack certain republics within --

10 within Yugoslavia; correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. All right. And we could say that this is a civil war going on.

13 That's one way of putting it. But because of the make-up of Bosnia -- of

14 Yugoslavia, we know --

15 A. No, no, no.

16 Q. Hold on. Let me finish my question, please. When I pose a

17 question, then you can answer it.

18 You have within Yugoslavia various republics, some of which --

19 some of which aspire to have -- to be independent; correct?

20 A. First of all, it was not a civil war.

21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... no, please, sir. If you

22 could answer my question.

23 Were there not several republics within Yugoslavia that aspired to

24 be independent from Yugoslavia? Yes or no.

25 A. Withdraw your question about the civil war and I will answer you.

1 Q. All right. I withdraw that question. This is the question that's

2 being posed to you.

3 A. Excellent. Excellent.

4 Q. All right.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. All right. So now that we are in agreement. Now, one of those

7 republics at some point in time was going to have to make a decision, that

8 is Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether it was going to stay within the former

9 Yugoslavia or the Yugoslavia as it existed back then, or whether it would

10 take a path, as Slovenia did and as Croatia was doing, and become

11 independent. Obviously they were going to have to make a choice at some

12 point - they, it - Bosnia-Herzegovina; right?

13 A. Yes. Yes.

14 Q. And while this you have this -- this play going on between JNA in

15 Slovenia, JNA in Croatia, Bosnian territory is being used by the JNA in

16 attacking another republic; right?

17 A. There was a game in Slovenia, but in Croatia there was aggression.

18 But, yes, that's how it was.

19 Q. All right. And I guess that's why we had that conversation

20 yesterday, because I wanted to make clear, and I thought we had reached an

21 understanding at the end of the day but maybe we hadn't, that some Croats

22 in Bosnia-Herzegovina felt an unease with Izetbegovic after he made the

23 proclamation, "This is not our war," because, after all, they were on the

24 front line and the JNA was using Bosnian territory to attack Croatians,

25 and so that was part of the mix of the atmosphere at the time, part of the

1 confusion.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. All right. Now that we got that cleared, going back to

4 this particular document, document P 0042. We talked about the silent

5 occupation. That was on point 2. If we could go to point -- if we could

6 go to point 4. Here it says that President Kljuic is ordered to call an

7 urgent session.

8 I'm told I need to go above one line, to paragraph 3, so let's do

9 that first.

10 "The Croatian Democratic Union has declared a state of emergency

11 and is demanding the HDZ BiH Presidency to take a stand on this and

12 initiate adequate measures."

13 I guess that's what I was talking about a little bit earlier. The

14 BiH Presidency to take a stand. Right now it's on the fence. They're

15 waiting to see who is going to win. Is it going to be Serbia with the JNA

16 or is it going to be Croatia? And they want a clear message from the

17 Presidency, as a collective body of which Izetbegovic was the president,

18 they want a clear stand: Where does BiH stand in this situation given

19 that there's a silent occupation? Isn't that a fact, sir?

20 A. Please, you're wrong on two counts. You keep mixing up the

21 Presidency of the HDZ and the Presidency of the Republic of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the HDZ, we adopted a conclusion that we should

23 take a stand and take certain measures. These measures were

24 subordination, sending information about movements of the JNA, and - why

25 not say it? - collecting weapons --

1 Q. All right.

2 A. -- while the activity of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

3 was on another level.

4 Q. All right. All right. Let's move on to -- to -- if you go to --

5 we'll skip -- we'll fast forward to item 12, which may be on the next

6 page, page 3 for you. It says here: "The BH government has done nothing

7 about resolving the new situation in a satisfactory manner."

8 When we're talking about BH government, we know who they're

9 talking about, do we not? Those are the folks in Sarajevo. I understand

10 you made the distinction you're not part of the government, you're part of

11 Presidency which sits on top of the government, but it's pretty clear, is

12 it not, that there is dissatisfaction with what is happening at the state

13 level. And I'm not suggesting that they could have done something, but

14 I'm just -- I just want to be clear on this matter.

15 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. Far be it from me to try to

16 help Mr. Karnavas be more efficient, but I just wonder, haven't we talked

17 about these things about five or six times now in the last several hours,

18 and what's the point of asking about what the government didn't do when

19 Mr. Karnavas has said repeatedly he admits they had no ability to do

20 anything. So why do we keep doing it over and over and over again?

21 MR. KARNAVAS: And I can explain that, Your Honour. I can explain

22 that.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: We have document after document after document, and

25 that's what I'm doing; I'm showing progressively, they're asking do

1 something, do something, do something. Now we have a silent occupation

2 mentioned for the first time. We're talking about a state of emergency.

3 And if we're going to look at the events in context, one of -- when it

4 goes to the joint criminal enterprise, the Prosecution would have us

5 believe that the self-protection of the Croatian people is a joint

6 criminal enterprise. That's why. And so now we're hearing it and we're

7 going to see it progressively that the government is impotent, is unable

8 to do anything. Not only that -- not only that, but he admits to the

9 president of the Presidency sending mixed messages. And one of the

10 messages is, "If you're Croat, don't expect any help from us." That's

11 what the message is. And that's -- that goes to the joint criminal

12 enterprise at least in part. So why the Croatian felt it necessary to

13 organise themselves at the grassroot level, why the HVO was organised.

14 And then we're going to see so on and so forth later on why it's

15 necessary, even at the administrative level, to organise. Hence, no joint

16 criminal enterprise; self-protection, self-preservation,

17 self-determination. That's what this is all about.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Scott has just

19 remarked, Mr. Karnavas, on the fact that you asked the same questions

20 yesterday and you're asking the same questions today. We understand fully

21 that the question is part and parcel of what you wish to demonstrate, but

22 please try to avoid asking the question several times over.

23 Mr. Scott, you are still on your feet. What would you like to

24 say?

25 MR. SCOTT: Just very briefly, Your Honour. I just note most of

1 the documents -- almost -- virtually all of the documents that

2 Mr. Karnavas has used in his cross-examination are documents that have

3 been admitted as part of the Prosecution case. You have all those

4 documents. We put those documents in. The Judges can read all these

5 points. None ever this was kept from the Chamber. It's all in the

6 documents the Prosecution put into the record, and again I just don't know

7 that we have to say the same things five or six or seven times.

8 As to -- as to the question that, Did at some point Bosnian Croats

9 take efforts to organise themselves? Yes, they did. I don't think

10 there's any dispute about that whatsoever.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, there's --

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Karnavas, please

13 proceed.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: I will do so, Your Honour. I will do so, and I

15 will endeavour to be non-repetitive.

16 Q. Okay. Getting back to the same document, sir, I'm going to move

17 -- I'm going to skip some parts since we lost a little bit of time and go

18 to item 6. You will see at some point -- I don't want to read the whole

19 thing, but at some point it says: "The relations with the other

20 parties ..." And then afterwards, it says, "A clear stand if the SDA

21 decides to remain within the Rump Yugoslavia or, rather, Serboslavia;

22 about the statement made by the president of BiH Presidency, Alija

23 Izetbegovic, that he requires the representatives of BiH to attend a

24 conference of Islamic countries, even without previous consent of the

25 Presidency; and other topics ..."

1 Now, from item 6, I didn't read the whole thing, but obviously

2 they want a clear position, are they not? This is what is being asked.

3 A. You see, some people at that time were impatient. They would set

4 an ultimatum. Either for us or against us, they would say. But I wasn't

5 like that. And it was very important to hold Izetbegovic and the SDA

6 from going over to the SDS -- going over to the SDS and JNA side.

7 Now, as far as the departure of the delegation to Jeddah for the

8 Islamic conference there, that was the desire for Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a

9 state populated by Muslims, to become an observer in that international

10 organisation, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to that present day is an observer,

11 although I don't see any great benefits to be reaped from that. But

12 anyway, at the time they probably wanted to ask for assistance for the

13 defence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which they did indeed receive later on, but

14 I prayed to God they never received that aid and assistance.

15 Q. Right. But I guess, getting back to the point, and I understand

16 that folks might have been impatient out in the field, out in the areas

17 where they were close to the front line rather than being in Sarajevo,

18 which ultimately later on comes under siege, but here they're asking for

19 the SDA, which is the Muslim party, to make a decision. They want a clear

20 -- they want a clear answer. Where does Izetbegovic stand in his party,

21 because as you noted, the Serbs, they're looking for a partner, and they

22 want to know, is Izetbegovic with us or is he with them, them being the

23 ones that are doing the attacking. And I think that's a legitimate

24 question, don't you? One that needed to be answered at that time; right?

25 A. Of course. That was the key question.

1 Q. Okay. And --

2 A. We couldn't put an ultimatum to anybody, but it was a very good

3 thing that Izetbegovic didn't join the SDS, didn't go to that side.

4 Q. I understand. And I've never met the man, but he was an associate

5 of yours, and some say, as you rightly pointed out here in the Balkans,

6 some of us have -- say one thing in the morning and do something else --

7 or decide to do something else in the afternoon. Izetbegovic was a man

8 that was very ambivalent at times, and it was very hard to get a clear,

9 stable, unmovable answer from him.

10 MR. SCOTT: Is that a speech or a question?

11 MR. KARNAVAS: That's a question based on his experience of having

12 worked with the man who is no longer here to be sitting in the dock.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, of course I cooperated, and

14 that's how it emerged that Mr. Izetbegovic did not cross over to the Serb

15 side. We were partners, not colleagues.

16 Q. I didn't ask you whether you were --

17 A. I don't want you to bring me into a situation where you would

18 refer to me as being a colleague with Karadzic. We were partners. So not

19 colleagues; partners.

20 Q. Izetbegovic, was he not known of not having taken a very firm and

21 clear stance, one which troubled the Croats at the time, which is why

22 they're asking for the SDA, of which he was the president of - and he was

23 also the president of the Presidency - to take a clear stance? Isn't that

24 a fact? If you can answer my --

25 A. This is how it was: The fact is that Izetbegovic did not cross

1 over to the Serb side and that the Bosniak Muslims did not cross over to

2 the Serb side.

3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

4 A. That's a fact. And that a large number of them defended Croatia.

5 Q. Excuse me, sir. What part of the question did you not understand,

6 you being a very intelligent human being. I'm asking you about

7 Izetbegovic as a politician, because these are troubled times and people

8 in the field, people that you were supposed to be responsible for were

9 asking for a clear message. Is it not a fact, sir, that during that

10 period of time Izetbegovic, being the politician that he was, never gave a

11 clear and concise answer in that period of time as to where he, the SDA,

12 the Muslim nation, stood? And this is in light of the comments that he

13 made, "This is not our war," after a Croatian village gets massacred. Is

14 it not a fact that he never gave a clear answer and now they're asking him

15 to. Yes or no.

16 A. You can't judge by the speech, the speeches made by Izetbegovic.

17 You have to judge him on the basis of his conduct and behaviour.

18 Q. If you could answer my question. Why would the Croats be asking

19 for a clear stance of the SDA if they had one? Is it not a fact that

20 Izetbegovic was not giving a clear answer because he wanted to have it

21 both ways. And he was negotiating with the Croats, he's negotiating with

22 the Serbs, he's sitting on the fence. He's waiting to see where the winds

23 blow, who wins, and then he's going to make his decision. I'm not saying

24 it's good or bad, but that's the way it was; isn't that a fact?

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas, if you ask the witness to say what

1 the intention of Mr. Izetbegovic was, is that not inviting him to

2 speculate? I remember having heard such objections from the Defence side

3 addressed to the Prosecutor.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, normally, under some circumstances

5 that would be an excellent objection. Under these circumstances, I would

6 say in light that the gentleman worked closely with the -- and we can look

7 at circumstantial evidence, that -- hence the lengthy question, because

8 I'm giving him enough there, facts one can judge. But my -- I'm asking a

9 very simple question. Did he give a clear stance to the Croats? Yes or

10 no. Where does he stand?

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Well, there's a question

12 that you were asked, and you were asked to answer yes or no, give a yes or

13 no answer. That is to say whether Mr. Izetbegovic had a clear-cut

14 position with respect to that issue and problem. So you can say he didn't

15 have a position, his position was very clear, I don't know, or whatever.

16 So that's what we want to hear, without speculation, of course. Because

17 you were working in the Presidency. So we would like to know what you

18 thought about the situation which was described in the document, in

19 paragraph 6, in fact. And that document wasn't signed by you, it was

20 signed by Dario Kordic, but since at the time you were the president of

21 the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you must have had a point of view. So what

22 was your point of view? Did you have one or not? And when we hear that

23 answer, the Defence can continue.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please. If a regional organisation

25 of one particular party sets an ultimatum to the president of the other

1 party, then the president of that party is not duty-bound to respond to

2 the question at all. And it is my life-long trouble and problem to see

3 that Izetbegovic didn't cross over to the Serb side, because he wasn't

4 clear on that issue.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm going to interrupt here. You were asked a very

6 specific question. Now, if the gentleman doesn't wish to answer the

7 question maybe he can just tell us that he doesn't wish to answer the

8 question.

9 A. No, I will answer the question, but just explain to me what duties

10 Izetbegovic had towards Kordic to answer the question he was asked in that

11 way. Just explain that to me. How? Reading it in the papers?

12 Q. Sir, let me go back. Did Izetbegovic -- forget about Kordic. I'm

13 asking you. Did Izetbegovic at that point in time take a firm stance,

14 give a clear stance on what the SDA, that represented the Muslim nation,

15 planned, keeping in mind -- keeping in mind that he's the president of the

16 Presidency and he does - I dare disagree with you - but he does have an

17 obligation to respond to the folks, the people, the citizens that live

18 within Bosnia-Herzegovina, given his position. So did he have a clear --

19 did he have a clear stance? Yes or no.

20 A. I don't know what his stance was, but he acted in a satisfactory

21 manner at that stage. And as far as I was concerned as president of the

22 HDZ, that was very important, that he didn't join Karadzic.

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. I'll move on, Mr. President, and I

24 apologise for wasting time on this question.

25 Q. If we go to number 11, Kordic, along with the others that

1 attended, say: "The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina with their vague and

2 generalised declarations did not contribute to resolving the political

3 situation created in BiH and Yugoslavia."

4 Would you agree or disagree with that? That would be a yes or no.

5 A. At those meetings an agreement was never reached. Not because of

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina but because all the participants disagreed.

7 Q. Sir, I'm asking about -- the statement here is that, "The

8 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina --" of which you were a member -- "with

9 their vague and generalised declarations -" empty words, in other words -

10 'did not contribute to resolving the political situation created in BiH."

11 Do you agree or disagree with that?

12 A. I disagree with that.

13 Q. How about number 12? Do you disagree with: "The BiH government

14 has done nothing about resolving the new situation in a satisfactory

15 manner." Agree or disagree?

16 A. Please, when you say --

17 Q. Do you agree or disagree with that, sir? Because we have to move

18 on. You can either agree or --

19 A. I don't know why -- listen here. I have my position, you have

20 your position. Perhaps you're in a hurry; I'm not in a hurry. I'll come

21 back for another five days, if need be, but I don't want to give hasty

22 answers nor do I want to say something that was not my stand. There is a

23 gradation here, and that means in our language that probably the

24 government did what it could but not what it should have done perhaps, or

25 what we wanted it to do perhaps. The fact remains that it did not do

1 better and could not have done better than it could have done. I'm not

2 defending the government, but that's the situation, what the situation was

3 like. You must be aware of the fact that this is written by a man in a

4 small place and now you're discussing global issues.

5 Q. Okay. As opposed to a big man in a big place, such as yourself in

6 Sarajevo. But that --

7 A. No, no, no.

8 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

9 A. No, no. Oh, come on. No. But you have to be aware of the fact

10 and know that in a chaotic situation of that kind the person with more

11 information knows more. So it's easy to put the question in the form of

12 an ultimatum when you have no obligation of receiving an answer.

13 Q. All right. If we did -- if we go to 14, it says: "The Ministry

14 of National Defence is impassively watching the mobilisation of the

15 reservists in BiH being carried out without its consent." Agree or

16 disagree with that? This is the Ministry of National Defence. This would

17 be at the Yugoslav level.

18 A. First of all, the ministry didn't have any weapons and the

19 reservists, under force of arms, were mobilised. Croats and Muslim

20 Bosniaks fled whereas the Serbs went voluntarily, of their own free will.

21 They couldn't wait to join up.

22 Q. All right. Number 16: "The BiH economy is in a state of total

23 collapse and social unrest of large proportions is in sight. The present

24 authorities are powerless in their attempts to consolidate -- to -- to

25 consolidate the situation."

1 Would you agree or disagree that at that point in time in BiH the

2 economy was virtually in a state of total collapse? Yes or no.

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. Okay. And -- and I would take it that that would cause some

5 concerns of the folks out -- you know, the little folks out in the various

6 areas, regions.

7 A. Well, they first of all did what they could to save their lives

8 and then their property. Heads first, property second.

9 Q. All right. And one would expect that there's a -- if the economy

10 is in a state of total collapse, that municipalities might have to fend

11 for themselves, and might have to sort of organise and perhaps even join

12 with other municipalities to sort of try to see how they could best

13 weather out the storm?

14 A. Certainly.

15 Q. And then it says on 17: "On the basis of all these conclusions we

16 urge the Croatian population in the Travnik region and Herzegovina

17 municipalities to join the Croatian -- the Croatian Regional Union of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina." So I assume, based on your previous answer, you

19 would agree that this is a good conclusion.

20 A. I don't have a position on that, but it's a good thing for them to

21 associate.

22 Q. Okay. And at some point we see that they're also calling for a

23 Croatian National Council to be formed because others have already formed

24 their national councils. Is that true?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. By the way, I just want to make sure that, you know, you

2 talked about Izetbegovic and -- and -- I mean, politicians do what they

3 have to do in very difficult times. They're entitled to be ambivalent,

4 and they're entitled to hold several conflicting positions at the same

5 time.

6 Is it a fact or not that at the time -- at that period of time

7 Izetbegovic was also being courted -- being courted by the Serbs, just as

8 the Croats at some point were?

9 A. Very intensively so.

10 Q. All right. And hence your earlier answer, which I agree with,

11 hence why it was very important on your part, on your part, to make sure

12 that he didn't cross over to the other side. Right?

13 A. Absolutely.

14 Q. And so --

15 A. And I succeeded in that.

16 Q. All right. We'll give you credit for it. And so while this young

17 upstart politician in a rural area is sort of impatient and pushing you,

18 you on the other hand, being in the eye of the storm, having perhaps more

19 information, you're trying do everything you can, perhaps not as quickly

20 or to the satisfaction of others, and that, as I understand it, was part

21 of also the misunderstanding within the party. They thought you weren't

22 moving fast enough and thought you were at least politically in bed with

23 Izetbegovic. You had become his puppet. Isn't that a fact? That's what

24 they thought. I'm not suggesting that it was true.

25 A. Well, they can think what they like, but that's not true. It was

1 only thanks to me and some other people that Izetbegovic didn't cross over

2 to the other side, and that's a very important point, because the

3 aggression against the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have

4 started a year earlier.

5 Q. Right. And I take it you -- you being in Sarajevo and having

6 access to information also knew that -- I guess it was around August 2,

7 1991, of the agreement with the Serbs between Filipovic and Zulfikarpasic.

8 That's one of those names I just can't pronounce. Zulfikarpasic. Right?

9 A. It's even more difficult for you to understand the situation.

10 First, they didn't reach an agreement with the Muslims because the main

11 Muslim party, the SDA, in parliament, in the parliament of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, had 86 deputies. When Milosevic and Cosic, through

13 the cultural circles, did not succeed in attracting the Muslims, Milosevic

14 opened variant B, went to plan B and called upon the other Muslim party,

15 the Muslim Bosniak organisation, which had only two deputies, two

16 representatives in parliament out of 240 seats. This attempt to make a

17 historical agreement with Zulfikarpasic was an attempt finally to

18 liquidate the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because had the agreement been

19 reached, and it provided for the fact that between the JNA forces,

20 the Serb population, and the Muslims, there would not be a military

21 conflict but that all outstanding issues would be resolved through

22 agreement, given a situation of that kind, it would mean that only the

23 Croats would be the destructors and destroyers of Yugoslavia. They would

24 be the secessionists, and along with Belgrade propaganda, which always

25 characterised us as Ustashas and a genocidal nation.

1 I know how I contributed to toppling that historical agreement. I

2 don't want to go into that now, but it was a major political success, the

3 fact that the Muslim people did not accept Zulfikarpasic but remained

4 loyal to the SDA party, the Party of Democratic Action.

5 Q. Right. Now, this was not such a secretive event that nobody knew

6 about it. In other words, word was getting out that the Serbs were

7 courting the Muslims and the Muslims were trying to cut deals with the

8 Serbs; correct?

9 A. Well, lots of things were recounted, but luckily for me, an

10 agreement was not reached.

11 Q. I understand, but just hear me out again. At that time -- at that

12 time, while this was happening, this information was also known to others.

13 It wasn't just known to you. The point that I'm trying to make is when

14 folks out in the region are hearing that this is the sort of thing that's

15 happening, that Izetbegovic and his -- and his colleagues are being

16 courted, and perhaps even proposing to enter into agreements, those are

17 the sort of news -- that's the sort of news that one hears and becomes

18 alarmed. Not knowing, of course, that, thank God, you were on the scene

19 to make sure that it didn't happen. But nonetheless the folks in the

20 region are becoming increasingly alarmed at that sort of news, hence even

21 more of a reason for folks in the regional level to organise themselves

22 for the eventuality of a war.

23 A. Well, that's quite normal, but don't bring me into a situation

24 where I challenge the right to self-organisation, arming, and so on.

25 That's something that I advocated. I'm not disputing that.

1 Q. You advocated that. That was one of the things that you had

2 advocated.

3 A. Well, of course. What ought I to have done? To leave the people

4 unarmed? It's quite another matter that I as a politician didn't have

5 access to the resources, money or weapons, but other people did.

6 Q. All right. Okay. And incidentally -- okay. Just to make sure

7 that it's very clear, that agreement, the historic agreement between

8 Filipovic and Zulfikarpasic, that was also recounted in the press at the

9 time so that God and mankind would have known about it, not just you.

10 A. Well, they learnt a little later, learnt about it in general

11 terms, but the details were accessible to just a narrow circle of people.

12 But the image of the talks and negotiations was negative for the citizens

13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14 Q. And perhaps a question that might be -- that might be in

15 everyone's mind, when you said that if they had made the agreement, war

16 against the Croats would have started a year before. Could you tell us --

17 explain that a little bit to us. What do you mean by that? The

18 significance of it.

19 A. Well, it's very simple: Had the Muslims accepted cooperation with

20 the Serbs -- and on that level a number of meetings were held at different

21 levels. For example, on one occasion Dobrica Cosic, a leading Serb man of

22 letters, writer, on behalf of the Serbian national elite invited Muslim

23 intellectuals to come to Belgrade. Then on another occasion Milosevic

24 invited Izetbegovic secretly and offered him the post of president of the

25 Yugoslav Assembly. Not to speak of Karadzic, Krajisnik, Koljevic, who

1 permanently asked for opposite numbers among the Muslims. And when that

2 didn't succeed, they went through Zulfikarpasic. But that doesn't succeed

3 either. Had it succeeded, then the Yugoslav People's Army, which had

4 weapons, which had a command staff, would have mobilised 300.000 Muslims

5 and with the necessary propaganda would have sent them into Croatian

6 territory, and you can assume what would have happened then.

7 Q. Okay. If we can move on really quickly because we have a few

8 moments before the break. I just want to cover the rest of this. If we

9 could move to the next document, 00047. This is dated 6th of August,

10 1991. Main Board of the BH HDZ. Just very quickly.

11 If we could look at number 4. On your page it would be page 3.

12 This is item 4. It says here: "The Main Board of BH HDZ states the fact

13 that the Croatian people are in a state of war and that it and its

14 territories are subjected to direct occupation by Serbia, which is helped

15 by a part of the JNA and other paramilitary Chetnik units."

16 Again, one more alarming sign.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. If you go to paragraph 5: "The government of BiH is requested to

19 prevent the 14th Corps of the so-called JNA from coming to BH,

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina." Of course, wishful thinking at the time, given that

21 the government of BH is unable to do anything, but nonetheless it's there;

22 right?

23 A. Not that it was unable. They didn't ask us. There was already a

24 military dictatorship at the time on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 Q. Right. Then it goes on to say further down, the very last one on

1 page 5, I don't know what -- it should be still page 3 of yours: "If the

2 BH government ignores these resolutions, we shall demand that it be called

3 to account or possibly to resign."

4 Threatening, fighting words I see coming out of the board, Main

5 Board of the HDZ, which, incidentally, bears your signature at the end.

6 So you, too, now, like the young upstart from the woods, is also calling

7 for the BH government to account for itself and to resign if it fails or

8 ignores these particular resolutions, albeit you know in your

9 heart-of-hearts at that particular time they're really incapable of

10 complying with many of these resolutions because of the circumstances on

11 the ground.

12 A. This is your description of those people, not mine. That's one

13 thing. Another thing: Of course we exerted pressure on the government,

14 and even made threats that they should resign, but we would never have

15 allowed them to resign, because that's what the Serbs wanted, and even

16 greater chaos would ensue.

17 Q. So as a politician, being the politician that you were, and

18 politics is a life of compromises, you put your signature on a document

19 knowing very well that a resolution such as this one in actuality is

20 meaningless, but nonetheless you go along with the crowd, if not leading

21 them.

22 A. I was leading them.

23 Q. Okay. Exactly. Then if we could just go to 16 -- paragraph

24 number 16. It's on your page -- it's on page 5 on your page, the B/C/S.

25 It says here: "It is considered that the war is gradually being

1 transferred to Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that the HDZ leadership must be

2 constantly alert. In order to try to normalise the situation and avoid

3 causing panic in the field, it is considered that there is still no need

4 for the BH HDZ to introduce state of emergency in the party."

5 That was your sentiment at the time. But then you go on to say:

6 "If there is a direct -- if there is a direct danger of war in an area,

7 the Municipal Board, after consultation with the leadership, will

8 introduce a state of emergency."

9 And this, of course, is 6 August, 1991. So we've moved from

10 April, and we've found ourselves in August.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. All right. Now, if we could go to the next document, and that

13 would be P 00052, dated 26 August, 1991. It comes from the BH HDZ

14 Presidency, excerpts of the minutes. We can see on page 1 that you

15 attended the meeting. And we can look at the agenda later on. But if we

16 could just go through the -- if we could go to the conclusions,

17 conclusions reached. On number 10. I think we'll just do this one. The

18 rest, as the Prosecutor indicated, we can read on our own and draw our

19 respective conclusions.

20 "The BH HDZ Presidency requested that the BH government and its

21 organ urgently convene a meeting of the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina

22 which must take a position on the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina in light of

23 recent events and on the stationing of fascist military units in

24 Bosnia-Herzegovina which has become a staging ground for the aggression

25 against the Republic of Croatia."

1 Sounds to me, Mr. Kljuic, that you're now sounding a little bit

2 like Mr. Kordic. You, too, leading this meeting, are also saying that

3 something has to be done. You're asking the BH government and its organs

4 to urgently convene a meeting, and you're asking for a position on the

5 status of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So I take it by August 26, 1991, you're

6 saying the very same thing that we talked about back at a meeting that was

7 chaired by Mr. Kordic; correct? A few months earlier.

8 A. Please don't compare us. It's inappropriate. Not because I'm

9 trying to make out I'm an important person, but we are not on an equal

10 footing. As you can see I and the leadership of the HDZ of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina was seeking a legal route. We were seeking an Assembly

12 session, and we wanted to get the Serb delegates, or at least a majority

13 vote, to condemn the fact that the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina was

14 being used as a launching pad for firing on Croatia.

15 Q. Right. If we look at number 7, it says here: "President Stjepan

16 Kljuic should attend the next meeting of the Travnik BH HDZ regional

17 organisation in order to resolve all misunderstandings that have arisen to

18 date."

19 Now, the misunderstandings that they're talking about, could they

20 be that at this point in time they don't know where you, the president of

21 the HDZ, stands on this position because they perceive, rightly or

22 wrongly, they perceive you not to be pushing Izetbegovic, not to be

23 pushing the SDA, not to be pushing the BH government in taking a clear

24 stance in light of all what is happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina? It's near

25 midnight and nothing is happening. Might that be the misunderstandings

1 that they're talking about?

2 A. No. Please. Every party has its misunderstandings. Take any

3 leader. I'll be modest and I won't draw comparisons with other parties,

4 but there are always people who disagree among themselves. Of course it

5 was my wish to smooth this out and regulate it. In any case, we were

6 trying to work through the institutions of the state of Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina to improve a situation that was not good.

8 Q. And if we go back to 10, it says: "The BH Assembly must also take

9 a position on the silent and perfidious occupation of the BH aggressor."

10 So they're not asking not just the government but the Assembly.

11 Incidentally, where does the Assembly sit in comparison with the

12 government? The government is the executive. Is the Assembly below or

13 above? And perhaps you could also tell us where the Presidency sits.

14 A. The Assembly is above, but you have to know how an Assembly

15 session is called. There is a collegium of the Assembly composed of

16 representatives of all the parties, and to call an Assembly session you

17 need 40 deputies to sign unless it's a regular session, which is called by

18 the Assembly leadership.

19 We tasked our deputies with initiating an Assembly session, and

20 then we would take the floor and ask the Assembly to take a stand on the

21 aggression against the Republic of Croatia, the arrival of the army, and

22 the abuse of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23 Q. Just to finish with this document, because we have to go to lunch.

24 Perhaps you could give us a short answer. May I ask why you as a member

25 of the Presidency didn't also -- and you were attending - in fact chairing

1 - this meeting, why didn't you ask the Presidency of which you were a

2 member to also take a position? I mean, perhaps it wasn't -- it wasn't

3 easy to order the government to take a position. It wasn't easy to order

4 the Assembly to take a position or convene, let alone take a position, but

5 why not just ask the Presidency, since you were already on the Presidency?

6 Why not ask the very same body and put it in here? Any particular reason,

7 or that escaped you at the time?

8 A. The Presidency asked more than once the Presidency of Yugoslavia

9 to put the army under the control of the civilian bodies, because we in

10 the Presidency were not competent. We wanted to, but we didn't have the

11 power to give orders to the army. The Presidency constantly did this but

12 without any result.

13 Q. But my question was this: Why didn't you also, you know, put

14 yourself into it? You know, a little self-criticism. It was kind -- I

15 know the bygone days of communism and socialism where self-criticism was

16 somewhat in mode, but at this point in time why not say, "You know what?

17 We should ask also from the Presidency to take a clear stance." Since you

18 were on the Presidency. And then you could say, "Well, the HDZ has

19 requested, where do we stand, guys? Where do we stand as a Presidency so

20 at least we can communicate this to the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina

21 because we're trying to make sure that we don't split apart, that we don't

22 have these ethnic, you know, differences?"

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Kindly answer this question,

24 please. It was a question I was going to put to you myself yesterday.

25 Could you answer this question, please.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We often raised this issue and

2 submitted it to the higher instance in Belgrade. As for self-criticism,

3 don't ask me to do that. That was a Communist virtue. Unfortunately, I

4 was not a member of the League of Communists. They would not accept me.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, the question wasn't answered. We

7 could break for lunch and --

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So we shall have a

9 break for an hour and a half and resume close to 2.00.

10 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

11 --- On resuming at 2.01 p.m.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We are now resuming

13 our hearing. Just one point I'd like to clarify. Before we -- we broke

14 up, I said I wanted to ask the same question as the Defence team had. I'm

15 only talking about content. I'm not talking about form. That said, I

16 give the floor back to Mr. Karnavas. We have another hour and a half

17 before we have our next break.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President. And the Defence always

19 welcomes questions from the -- from the Bench for clarification, and we

20 hope that we are assisting the Bench with our questions.

21 Q. Okay. Mr. Kljuic, if we could go back so I can close this

22 chapter, I just have two -- two minor documents to show you. One is dated

23 on the 26th of August, 1991. It's P 00051. If you can just look at it.

24 We're still on -- unfortunately, on the second chapter -- the third

25 chapter, predicting the conflict. This one, we see this is a statement

1 that is being issued, a public statement, is it not? Condemning the use

2 of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a staging ground. Right?

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. And then in the last paragraph it states: "In expectation of war,

5 we might -- In expectation of war which might soon spread to

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina ..." and then it goes on urging, once again, the JNA to

7 think of the historical, that they will be held accountable. But more or

8 less, again, the expectation that war is about to spread to

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 Finally, if we could pull up P 00060, dated 8 October -- 8

11 October, 1991. And I would -- that would be on page 2 of your -- your

12 document, sir. If we could look at paragraph number 5, under

13 "Conclusions." And again, see as we started in April, now we're in

14 October, and here on page -- on paragraph number 5, "The decision of the

15 Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina about the neutrality of Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina is -- is endorsed, but --" it comes with a big "but." "...

17 but with a condition that Bosnia and Herzegovina may not and will not be a

18 military training ground for continued aggression."

19 Just touching on that, we did speak about it yesterday. For all

20 intents and purposes, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a military training

21 ground or launching pad, I would say, by this point, since we've been

22 talking about the events since April. Correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. At least here by this point, October -- October 8, 1991, we

25 finally -- at least we could conclude that some sort of a -- a public

1 statement, some sort of a decision, some sort of an announcement was made

2 by the Presidency of Bosnia, of which you were a member of about the

3 neutrality of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So finally there is that which was

4 asked by Kordic and then eventually by you. Finally we have something

5 here tangible, albeit not much more than just rhetoric.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. Thank you. If we can move on to the next area, and -- let

8 me have a moment here. Sticking with the topic, basically, or somewhat

9 connected to what we were speaking about, loss of weapons. That's what

10 we're going to call this particular chapter. I just want to bring to your

11 attention P 00058. If we could just discuss this for a second. It's a

12 document dated 18 September, 1991, HDZ, Croatian Democratic Union of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if we could look at that. We'll look at point 1

14 here. The Security Council is now called the Crisis Staff. It takes on a

15 different name. This was the same Security Council that we spoke about

16 earlier which you were the chairman of, as I believe, or you were

17 appointed to; correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. If we look at paragraph 3 under -- under point 1, it says: "The

20 Crisis Staff shall start working immediately and shall be in charge of the

21 entire system of the defence of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina

22 to ensure the acquisition of weapons."

23 You see that? It's the third paragraph --

24 A. I don't see it.

25 Q. Okay. It's the third -- it's the third --

1 A. I don't see point 1 at all.

2 Q. Okay. Well -- it's the -- hold on. Hold on. I'm going to direct

3 you. Relax. No need to get excited. Page 1. You told us you were a

4 calm man. Page 1.

5 A. I only told you that it's not on my screen. I didn't say anything

6 else.

7 Q. Is it on your screen now, sir? If not, I have a hard copy for

8 you.

9 A. Yes, it's there.

10 Q. All right. Okay. Now, if we look at point 1, I just read that

11 out, where the Security Council is now the Crisis Staff.

12 Now, if you look at the third paragraph under point 1, it says

13 here: "The Crisis Staff shall start working immediately and shall be in

14 charge of the entire system of the defence of the Croatian people in

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina and ensure the acquisition of weapons."

16 Do you see that, sir?

17 A. Yes, yes.

18 Q. And if we were to go all the way to the end of the -- of the

19 document, of course, we would see that you have signed this as president

20 of the HDZ.

21 Now, I take it, sir, given that you were a member of the Security

22 Council which then became the Crisis Staff, you immediately embarked on an

23 enterprise to acquire weapons in order to protect the Croatian people, at

24 least at the local level. Did you do that, sir?

25 A. I was the president of that Crisis Staff, and it was not possible

1 for me on my own, or anyone on their own, to protect the Croatian people.

2 As for obtaining weapons, I said yesterday that we were in contact with

3 the Republic of Croatia, and in view of the position of certain regions

4 where this was possible, we tasked two members, two vice-presidents; Mate

5 Boban and Iko Stanic. One of them was assigned to Western Herzegovina and

6 the other one to Posavina to carry out the technical part of the job.

7 Q. Okay. The technical part of the job, that is making sure that --

8 that -- that weapons are acquired for the protection of the Croatian

9 peoples. We're speaking now September 1891 [sic] -- 18 September, 1991;

10 right? So this was tasked to them by the Crisis Staff of the HDZ.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And if we recall, earlier today we went through one of the

13 documents where -- it's on the record, where it indicated that the HDZ

14 undertook the obligation or saw itself as the one in charge of the

15 protection of the rights of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

16 correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, if we were to continue on to the next page, it would be page

19 2 on my document, and I believe it might be page 2 on yours as well, it

20 says here, and I'll read at the top of the page, first paragraph on page 2

21 in English: "In case of an armed conflict on a territory with a

22 predominantly Croatian population, the Crisis Staff shall take over all

23 government functions in the municipalities, and the work of the BH HDZ

24 shall be suspended until the threat of war is over; i.e., until it is

25 deemed to be over by the Crisis Staff."

1 A. Yes. But here it is expressly said, "in case of." So it's not an

2 order that comes into force on the same day but which will be issued later

3 if it becomes justified. In case this happens.

4 Q. I agree with you. That's -- you know, I just want to make sure

5 that this was something, a document generated by the HDZ Security Council

6 with you heading it, chairing it, and where you task others, including

7 Boban, and here you foresee the possibility that -- that should a conflict

8 come into place where Croats are the predominant nation, the Crisis Staff

9 takes over all governmental functions in the municipality. And I take it

10 what you mean by that is administrative functions; right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. This is not something unusual, by the way, this sort of -- of a

13 precautionary measure. This was something that was ingrained going back

14 again to the Territorial Defence, because as I understand it, and of

15 course I didn't grow up with it for 50 years where the people were trained

16 and drilled on it, but as I understand it, in the eventuality, for

17 instance, a municipality was overrun by the enemy, it would reconstitute

18 itself someplace else and from there it would -- it would operate. Not

19 just militarily but administratively. In other words, it would -- it

20 would move out of danger, and wherever it could, take care of the --

21 A. There were such instances, but what was basic was defence on the

22 ground. It's little satisfaction if somebody drives you off your own

23 ground and you set up an administrative representative office far from

24 your home.

25 Q. I understand that. But I --

1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I -- may I ask for a clarification? When one

2 speaks of Crisis Staff here, is it the central Crisis Staff of which you

3 have spoken first page of this document, or is it a municipal Crisis

4 Staff?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This was the central party

6 Crisis Staff. But for you to understand the context, at that time the

7 state had its own Crisis Staff, the Presidency did, the government did,

8 all the parties did, every municipality did. So we did too.

9 MR. KARNAVAS:

10 Q. Including the municipalities. The municipalities had --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

12 MR. KARNAVAS:

13 Q. The municipalities had Crisis Staffs. Isn't that correct? So

14 even at the local level.

15 A. Of course. Every municipality that could had a Crisis Staff.

16 Q. Right. And so -- and then within the HDZ, just to make sure I

17 understand it, and I might be wrong, but along with this Crisis Staff, and

18 this ties in with the questions from Judge Trechsel, aside from this

19 Crisis Staff at the central HDZ, if we want to call it that, there were --

20 you would have municipal Crisis Staffs within the HDZ. So -- and they

21 would all be linked up. And I believe we saw some documents earlier to

22 that effect.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. I think -- let me -- if I could go to number 4, just very

25 quickly. It says: "It is the duty of the person representing the BH HDZ

1 in government bodies to continue performing the task conscientiously,

2 bearing in mind primarily the interest of the Croatian people."

3 A. Please, it's very important for you to understand this. The

4 setting up of our Crisis Staffs was not incompatible with the

5 participation of our officials in the state apparatus. We continued

6 working in the state administration, but we were focusing on the interests

7 of our people.

8 Q. Well, first of all I want to thank you very much for that

9 clarification. That was the point that I was trying to establish.

10 Obviously I missed it. I'm glad you picked it up and I hope we all

11 understood that, that establishing the Crisis Staff under those

12 circumstances was not only necessary but it was legitimate and proper and,

13 most importantly, it was something that had been ingrained in the

14 philosophy of the All People's Defence, which was the military doctrine

15 that existed in Yugoslavia with the JNA on the one hand, the territorial

16 on the other, protecting the motherland against invasions; right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. All right. Now, getting back to number 4. And incidentally, this

19 is very important for all of us to understand, because we didn't live

20 through that area -- that -- that period. To show that it is not an

21 anomaly, in other words. It is not something that one side or the other

22 side did. Everybody was responsible. And since we have three nations in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, every nation then took it upon themselves to ensure

24 that they were protected even though they occupied a geographical space

25 called Bosnia-Herzegovina. Am I correct on that?

1 A. Yes. The Crisis Staff had a different task, to help organise

2 people in case of an emergency or whatever.

3 Q. Yeah. And it was not just militarily, for military purposes. It

4 was for natural disasters and other events; correct?

5 A. And personal tragedies, personal disasters too.

6 Q. Right. And while I'm on the topic, in the spring of 1991, we see,

7 just as the Croats were trying to organise themselves and to arm

8 themselves, we see the Muslims doing the same thing with the establishment

9 of the Patriotic League; correct?

10 A. Yes. Now, whether it was the Patriotic League or not that is

11 questionable, but that they organised themselves, that is true, yes.

12 Q. Okay. And -- well -- and only if you know, sir, only if you

13 know: It's my understanding that the Patriotic League, in fact, got a

14 start on the Croats. In fact, they had begun to organise themselves, and

15 they had established themselves before -- before the Croats. Am I correct

16 on that or could I be off? What do you think?

17 A. Nobody can know that, because they were illegal moves so that,

18 apart from the Patriotic League, the Bosniak Muslims still had some berets

19 of some kind. I can't say exactly. Nobody can.

20 Q. When you say berries, you mean they were tucked away for a rainy

21 day? Is that what we're talking about? Oh, berets, I'm sorry. I got it

22 wrong. I apologise.

23 So going back to paragraph number 4, it says here: "Stjepan

24 Kljuic shall contact the leadership of the SDA without delay and ask them

25 to state their policy, but the Crisis Staff shall develop an action plan

1 with or without the SDA and take specific steps with this direction."

2 This is now September, 1991 - 18 September - and so you're now

3 asked again, it seems -- this is through the Security Council of the HDZ,

4 of which you were chairing, so in other words you as the chairman of the

5 Security Council were tasking yourself or had been tasked by your

6 colleagues to contact the leadership of the SDA presumably because you

7 resided in -- in Sarajevo, as did the leadership of the SDA, and find out

8 what their policy was and were they going to be with the Croats or against

9 the Croats. Am I right on that?

10 A. Well, I have to say that it was a very difficult time and that we

11 wanted at all events that the Bosniak Muslims be with us, because in that

12 way all the defence tasks would have been easier to accomplish. However,

13 even if we were to agree upon that in principle, in the field it was

14 different to implement it. On the other hand, there were municipalities

15 where people, without asking us in Sarajevo, achieved agreements of that

16 kind. So we wanted to make a front with the Muslims, a defence front, and

17 that is why we keep saying what their position and stance was.

18 However, since we're dealing with preparations, you have to take

19 all the options into account, and then we made a programme for if the

20 Muslims were with us, but we had to have a second variant if we were left

21 on our own.

22 Q. And I guess from that I can conclude that, since you're being

23 asked to inquire and since you are also making alternative plans, a second

24 variant, at that particular point in time in history, that is 18

25 September, 1991, in spite of all the other attempts, you still don't know

1 where the SDA stands, even though presumably you would be having

2 day-to-day contact with Mr. Izetbegovic.

3 A. Well, in principle we did know, because for as long as they

4 supported the actions that we did, they were with us, regardless of

5 whether they had gone public with it or not.

6 Q. All right. But of course as we -- as we talked about earlier, in

7 a not so public way they were also having contacts with -- with the enemy,

8 the perceived enemy, and there was always that lurking danger that they

9 would be cutting a deal behind the Croatian back, hence the reason why

10 again it looks like as late as 18 September, 1991, clarification is

11 requested with you directly making contact to make sure to find out what

12 exactly are their plans; who are they with. Correct?

13 A. Please, the state of Yugoslavia was still in existence. The State

14 of Bosnia-Herzegovina was still in existence. Parliamentary meetings are

15 held. Presidency meetings are held. Government meetings are held. The

16 Muslims did not agree to a historical agreement. Now, the fact that a

17 peripheral Muslim party attempted to reach an agreement or contract with

18 Milosevic was not effective. On the other hand, if you see from point 7

19 here -- as you can see from point 7, we're preparing stocks, military

20 locations, and doing everything hypothetically, although not even in that

21 year of 1991, during the first -- nor the first three months of the

22 following year were there any conflicts that would be exclusively directed

23 against the Croats.

24 Q. The SDA wasn't a peripheral party. It was the party for the

25 Muslims; right? I mean, it's not some fringe that they have, you know --

1 A. The MBO was a peripheral party. MBO. That was peripheral.

2 And --

3 Q. Sir --

4 A. -- it discussed the issues with Milosevic.

5 Q. Sir, what I'm trying to say is here you're being asked -- the SDA,

6 without delay, to ask them to state their policy. They're asking you, the

7 SDA. Izetbegovic, was he not the president of the SDA at that point in

8 time, as well as the president of the Presidency? So it would appear that

9 you're being tasked as chairman of the Security Council, which was --

10 became the Crisis Staff as of that moment, to make inquiries, to find out.

11 So we're not talking about --

12 A. Well, I did make inquiries. I made inquiries every day.

13 Q. Okay. All right. And incidentally, I was just reminded.

14 Recently it was indicated that -- on television I believe it was

15 Mr. Filipovic who went on television and said that Izetbegovic had sent

16 him to meet with Milosevic to cut a deal. Were you aware of that,

17 Mr. Filipovic's acknowledgement of that on television? You being in

18 Sarajevo, and I assume he's in your neck of the woods.

19 A. I personally didn't hear about that, but it might be true and

20 here's why: Izetbegovic did not accept direct talks with Milosevic, but

21 probably he knew that Zulfikarpasic was going, as was Filipovic, and we

22 knew this when this was published. I can only assume that Izetbegovic

23 thought in the following way: If the Muslim nation agreed to that option,

24 he would too. That was his line of thinking. However, this was not by

25 chance. But we were not still either. And anyway, the Muslim nation did

1 not agree to the historical agreement. So that ultimately when

2 Izetbegovic saw that his people did not lend their support to that, he

3 distanced himself from it.

4 And let me also mention as far as those negotiations are

5 concerned, this: You must remember that there was the state of

6 Yugoslavia, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that meetings were being

7 held every day, of parliament, of the government, of various commissions,

8 and that all of us were located in two buildings in Sarajevo. We ran into

9 each other every day. We talked to each other every day.

10 Q. All right. But Milosevic wasn't in Sarajevo. He was in Belgrade.

11 Okay.

12 A. Well, I described that case to you. The two men that I mentioned

13 left, they returned, they didn't get the SDA's support.

14 Q. Yes. And another take of that story would be, or Izetbegovic's

15 position, is a term that was used during the Watergate period in the

16 United States with respect to President Nixon, it gave him what they

17 called "plausible deniability." I'm not having any contact with the

18 Serbs. I'm not having any contact with Mr. Milosevic. Now, if somebody

19 else is, I don't know. Maybe. It also gives him that plausible

20 deniability, sending his agents while at the same time saying I'm not

21 meeting with him. We could look at it that way, could we not, as well?

22 I'm not suggesting that that was the case, but there's two ways of looking

23 at this. The coin has two faces, doesn't it?

24 MR. SCOTT: Objection, Your Honour. I'm just going to have to

25 say, Your Honour, we continue to have speeches that are just speeches, and

1 there's a difference -- I know on cross-examination you can ask leading

2 questions. I'm fully familiar with that. There's a difference between a

3 leading question and a speech followed by nothing more than even a yes or

4 sometimes there's almost no response at all and it's the next speech. I'm

5 going to object this afternoon to that. I'm just going to say right now

6 that I'm going to object to it all afternoon, if necessary, and also

7 speculation by this witness about this theory of deniability.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll move on, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, avoid speeches and

10 get to the heart of the matter, please.

11 MR. KARNAVAS:

12 Q. Let me just ask you one final question on this. Do you know

13 whether those agents or representatives of Mr. Izetbegovic went there with

14 Izetbegovic's knowledge and acquiescence and instructions or were they

15 sort of self-managing on their own? It calls for a yes or no. If you

16 don't know, that's fine.

17 A. Unfortunately, only Izetbegovic can know that, and he has died.

18 Q. And he never disclosed anything to you?

19 A. I'm not receiving the interpretation.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Well, he disclosed that nothing had come of it.

22 Q. Which would presume that he knew they were going to meet with

23 Izetbegovic, that they were there with his acquiescence.

24 A. Well, maybe they did have that agreement, acquiescence. Why not

25 go to Belgrade? But when everything was put on the table, what Milosevic

1 offered, the Muslims did not accept that.

2 Q. And I guess what I'm trying to also establish is others, perhaps,

3 within the Croatian Community and within the Croatian leadership, may not

4 have been able to understand the nuances of this game as you would have.

5 They might have perceived, perhaps, that Izetbegovic and the SDA,

6 representing the Muslim nation, perhaps are not to be trusted and that's

7 why we need some clear guidance as to where they stand.

8 MR. SCOTT: So again, Your Honour, is that a question?

9 MR. KARNAVAS: It is a question.

10 MR. SCOTT: I don't see a question mark.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: There is an inflection, Your Honour.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, you must know that

13 everyone sought to save his own skin. Secondly, everybody talked to

14 everybody else. But the result is the vital point, and up to that time

15 Izetbegovic did not cross over to the Serb side. And with further

16 developments, we were to see when he would do that. You'll learn of that

17 in due course.

18 MR. KARNAVAS:

19 Q. Okay. Thank you. Before we leave this document, if we could go

20 all the way to page 5 just so we can understand the structure. I want you

21 to look at it and tell me whether this is correct. On the last page it

22 has a diagram. It says diagram, and then it says "Structure of regional

23 Crisis Staff," where it says commander, assistant, liaison officer,

24 information officer, security officer, logistics, quartermaster, medical

25 corps, Municipal Crisis Staff -- and I'm sorry --

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment, Mr. Karnavas. I

2 wanted to step in because I've just seen that in the document there was a

3 schematic, but we haven't got it.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: [Previous translation continues] ... Your Honour.

5 I don't have the schematic.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If you want to use it, perhaps

7 we could place it on the ELMO.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, we -- the schematic is actually just a

9 list. We can put it on the ELMO, but it's the -- it would be on page 5 of

10 the document. If you don't --

11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: We have no page 5.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: Pardon?

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: We have no page 5.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: I totally apologise. If we could put it on the

15 ELMO. We have an extra copy. It's P 00058.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's fine now. We can see it

17 on our screens. Thank you.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.

19 Q. So this was the -- the structure of the regional Crisis Staff that

20 was decided by the HDZ.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. And we can see, answering His Honour's question, Municipal

23 Crisis Staff, same structure as regional, so we know this was a template

24 to be used at a municipal level as well; correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. All right. And if we could move on to -- to another document, and

2 this is 1D 00 --

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment. Before we move

4 over -- on to the next document, I have the following questions: Can we

5 go back to page 1 of this document now, please. Mr. Registrar, can we

6 have page one back. The B/C/S document.

7 And paragraph 1 contains a list of the members of the Crisis

8 Staff. It begins with your own name, Witness, then there's Mate Boban, et

9 cetera. And I can see in last place there's Bruno Stojic. Can you tell

10 me, please, what he was doing there in that Crisis Staff. What position

11 was he within the Crisis Staff?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He was a member of the Crisis Staff,

13 and that was on the grounds of his working in the police. As you can see,

14 we have the Defence Minister here, Jerko Doko, as a government member, and

15 all the officials like Branko Kvesic, who is the second assistant in the

16 police force. Thanks to the ministries they worked in -- or, rather, they

17 were members of the Crisis Staff according to the ministries they worked

18 in.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The members of that Crisis Staff

20 of the HDZ, were they there because they belonged to your political party,

21 or were they also there by virtue of their function, post?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you can see that in line 1 we

23 have the president and vice-president. Then we have members of the

24 government, the ministries -- ministers and deputy ministers - Bozo

25 Skravan is the deputy minister for telecommunications - and then you have

1 people from the ground, probably presidents of regions. They were Zeljko

2 Raguz for Stolac, Dario Kordic from Busovaca, Ivo Lozancic from Zepce, and

3 Mijo Tokic from Tomislavgrad. And some of the members, on the basis of

4 something else, were from other places. Such as Mate Boban. He was from

5 Grude. And Jerko Doko was from Mostar. Filip Evic was from Samac. So

6 you had the president, the vice-president, the minister, deputy ministers,

7 and representatives of the individual regions represented there.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And what about Mr. Stojic? He

9 was there because he had a post in the police force?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. He and Branko Kvesic were our

11 cadres within the police.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Right. Second question that has

13 nothing to do with Mr. Stojic is this: With respect to the procurement of

14 weapons, the Crisis Staff decided to procure weapons. Now, in order to do

15 that, you need money, money to procure weapons. So how did you do that?

16 Did you have a budget? How was this financed? Or did you expect to get

17 weapons by donations or things like that? Could you tell us how you were

18 able to equip men with weapons?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this was very simple, you see.

20 From the pre-election campaign in 1990, many people gave money donations

21 to the Croatian Democratic Community, most of this money coming from expat

22 Croats working from Australia, America, and so on. Most contributions

23 came from our workers in Germany, for instance. And they were most

24 numerous from Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, all the money accrued went to

25 Zagreb, to the treasury there that was in Gunduliceva Street, and they

1 took all our money. Then we had to ask them for weapons in return. So it

2 was very rarely that any of us from Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance,

3 individually procured weapons by purchasing them from individuals or

4 anything like that, because you must know that at the time there was a

5 fair amount of trade in weapons going on. Serb officers stole from the

6 JNA and sold weapons to the Muslims and Croats, for example. So there was

7 a dynamic trade.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, I'm sure we'll come to

9 that, but I saw Counsel Nozica on her feet.

10 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Yes. I

11 wanted to clarify something, but I'll do that when my turn comes. Thank

12 you anyway, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Thank you. Mr. Karnavas,

14 please proceed.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

16 Q. Now, I want to go to another document, that was 1D 00524, and so

17 we're going to be stepping back a few months. The previous document was

18 18 September, 1991, and we're going to go to a document dated 24 and 26 of

19 June, 1991, which might also assist the Trial Chamber, particularly in

20 light of the questions that were raised.

21 This document, do you have it on the screen, sir? Oh, sorry. We

22 have an extra one for -- in English. If we could just put the English one

23 on the -- on the ELMO.

24 First let me just ask some questions about what the document is.

25 From the title of the page, it says Presidency of the Socialist Republic

1 of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would it be correct to say that as of June 24th

2 and 26th, 1991, Bosnia was referred to or was officially known as the

3 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now -- and it's -- the title says "Minutes of the meeting of the

6 18th session of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina, held 24 and 26 of June 1991."

8 Sir, during that period you were a member of the Presidency. Do

9 you by any chance -- can you confirm that indeed this session took place

10 as it's stated on what purports to be an official document, albeit an

11 unofficial translation for the Trial Chamber and for the rest of us.

12 A. Yes, it was held.

13 Q. Okay. And does the document look familiar to you?

14 A. Well, it looks familiar but there's nothing there to jog my memory

15 15 years on.

16 Q. Okay. If we could look at the next page, under minutes of the

17 meeting. Perhaps if we go down memory lane it might help you a little

18 bit. We're not going through all of the minutes, just the relevant

19 minutes.

20 It says here that the session had been presided by president of

21 the Presidency of Alija Izetbegovic of the -- you know, the SRBiH, Alija

22 Izetbegovic. He indeed was the president of the Presidency, was he not?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So we see your name there, Stjepan Kljuic, along with Biljana

25 Plavsic and the others. So at this time we can also probably conclude

1 that the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina are still participating in the -- in

2 the government, in -- in the affairs of the Republic of --

3 A. Yes, yes, yes.

4 Q. Okay. All right. And of course we see other names. And then we

5 get to the agenda. But let's skip over the agenda and look at item 3.

6 And for the record, that would be -- you'll see a number on the page,

7 00931718. I'll read it in English and hopefully you will find it. It

8 says here: "The Presidency has analysed the information of the Republic

9 headquarter of Territorial Defence of BiH on the current situation of arms

10 and the ammunition in public companies, the Opinion of the Council of

11 General National Defence on this matter and the measures which are

12 prescribed by the Government of SRBiH for keeping of weapons left in the

13 companies."

14 It goes on to say: "It was determined that there are no safety

15 and technical conditions for keeping of weapons in the firms and that it

16 is necessary that it would be transferred to a safer place."

17 Next paragraph: "It was stated that the actual political-safety

18 situation was inconvenient for the redrawing -- for redrawing the weapons

19 for keeping them in the JNA facilities, where the weapons of Territorial

20 Defence were kept -" past tense - "but even further consequences would

21 have non-principal decision by which all the companies would not have the

22 same position."

23 Finally, it states: "The Presidency has concluded that the drawn

24 weapons, before transferring to the JNA warehouse, would be first offered

25 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of SRBiH for its needs in accordance

1 to adopted formative organisation."

2 Now, first of all I want to make sure that more or less that is

3 what is stated in the official version or the B/C/S version.

4 A. Everything is correct except that you read incorrectly something

5 in the second passage. At least, that was the translation I received,

6 that the situation was favourable for the withdrawing of weapons, whereas

7 it says that it was unfavourable for the withdrawal of weapons to the JNA.

8 Q. Okay. With that clarification, let's talk about this a little

9 bit. This is June, 1991. We've gone through the document dated 18

10 September, 1991, where the HDZ Security Council, to be known as the Crisis

11 Staff, is now urging the Crisis Staff, or the Security Council, to go out

12 and acquire weapons. Here in this particular document a few months

13 earlier, the government -- or the Presidency - the Presidency - has made a

14 determination that whatever weapons are with public companies to be, in

15 essence - in essence - given to the JNA, but before that, first -- just

16 hold on and listen to the question before you shake your head -- first

17 MUP, the Ministry of Interior is to see the weapons to see what if any of

18 those weapons they want before they're being turned over. Is that the

19 essence -- and we'll discuss this in detail, but is that the essence of

20 the decision that was taken at the 18th session of the Presidency?

21 A. Please.

22 Q. We're going to go step-by-step, sir. Just trust me.

23 A. You're starting from the wrong premises and you're incorrectly

24 quoting the text. Please read the second paragraph again and then we can

25 agree.

1 Q. Okay. All right. I'll -- if I go down to the third paragraph,

2 which relates to my question, it says: "The Presidency has concluded that

3 the drawn weapons, before transferring to them -- before transferring to

4 the JNA warehouse, would be first offered to the Ministry of Internal

5 Affairs of SRBiH for its needs in accordance to adopted formative

6 organisation."

7 Now, let's work with this for a second. Or let's go backwards.

8 By this point -- by this point, the Territorial Defences have -- the

9 weapons in the Territorial Defences have been siphoned off by the JNA.

10 There are no more weapons to speak of.

11 A. There are.

12 Q. I beg your pardon?

13 A. There are. I'm trying to assist you, but you won't listen to me.

14 Please.

15 Q. Okay. We're talking about weapons that are being kept in -- not

16 weapons being kept in the Territorial Defence warehouses, wherever they

17 may be. We're talking about weapons that are being kept in public

18 companies; correct? That's what this document is referring to.

19 A. Excellent.

20 Q. All right. Now, they don't want the JNA to get a hold of whatever

21 little is left in Bosnia-Herzegovina, hence -- hence --

22 A. We, we; the members of the Presidency.

23 Q. Yes, yes, yes. You, the president -- you, the Presidency, don't

24 want the JNA to get what little is left, and so you come up with this

25 idea. First, you declare that the weapons aren't safe where they're kept,

1 that is, in the -- in the companies.

2 A. Because the JNA want to take them.

3 Q. Exactly. So it's not that there's -- that they're not safe there

4 or that technical conditions for keeping the weapons -- you know, is not a

5 safe place. That's just an excuse, and that's why you pass this decision

6 to say, okay, let's give the weapons to MUP, because that's what's going

7 to happen. It's really never going to go to the JNA warehouse. First it

8 has to stop at MUP. This way, Bosnia and Herzegovina can begin to at

9 least establish a -- a police force with -- with the little weapons it has

10 left.

11 A. Not only for that reason, but also because it was only the police

12 at that time that was allowed to have weapons. The police was under the

13 leadership of the civilian government.

14 Q. All right. Okay. So that's what I wanted to cover, that in June

15 the government itself, not having any of the choice, is going to turn over

16 the weapons that are stored in the companies and give them to -- to --

17 A. Not our government.

18 Q. Well --

19 A. Not our government. It was the Communist government that did this

20 before we came to power. I spoke about this yesterday. Both Croatia and

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina --

22 Q. Mr. Kljuic. Mr. Kljuic, let's not play games. We're talking

23 about the Presidency. It says here "the government of SRBiH." Okay? I

24 don't care who put them there to begin with. The point I'm trying to

25 drive home to this Tribunal is by this point there is no -- there is no

1 army in BiH; correct? There is no Bosnia and Herzegovina army; right?

2 A. But you have to find another witness to confirm what you are

3 saying.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I must tell you that the key issue is the following: Before the

6 democratic elections in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Communist

7 governments handed over the weapons of the Territorial Defence to the JNA

8 with the exception of individual companies. Unlike what Croatia and

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina had done, Slovenia did not do this and, therefore, it

10 had weapons to defend itself. So when you say the government, you can't

11 say our government. We were faced with empty weapons depots because the

12 Communists were afraid that if they lost the elections, the ownership of

13 the weapons would change.

14 Q. Exactly.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. We are able to follow what

16 you are saying, but you talk about the meeting you held at the Presidency.

17 Are we to understand that the weapons were handed over to the JNA, that in

18 the firms there are still a number of weapons that have been left, and the

19 number you quoted only related to those weapons which were still to be

20 found in -- in those public firms?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honours.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation].

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. Sorry to interrupt, but I was

25 just going back to the transcript. Perhaps I missed it, but what kind of

1 weapons and companies are we talking about? I've heard no explanation.

2 Are we talking about the director's personal firearm or -- what kinds of

3 guns and what volume are we talking about here?

4 MR. KARNAVAS: It's an excellent question. It's an excellent

5 question and one must wonder why hasn't the Prosecutor asked the question.

6 I will ask it for them because they ought to know by now, it's their case.

7 What kind of weapons --

8 MR. SCOTT: It's your cross-examination, Mr. Karnavas.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: It's your case, sir. You indicted these folks.

10 Q. So, sir, what kind of weapons were left?

11 A. As a rule, the Territorial Defence had light weapons, short and

12 long barrels. To a lesser extent there were bazookas, mortars, but those

13 were smaller weapons intended for guerrilla warfare. There were no tanks,

14 cannons, or things like that.

15 Q. And one last -- one last question: Why were the weapons kept

16 there? I mean, there were warehouses, but why were they -- these --

17 certain weapons were kept in these companies.

18 A. That was based on the Doctrine of Territorial Defence.

19 Q. I know. I just wanted to get the answer from you so we -- so we

20 all know, because under the Doctrine of Territorial Defence, everything

21 was commandeered in case of a war. Everybody was mobilised. All the

22 industries were mobilised. That was part of the essence of the Doctrine

23 of the All People's Defence. Isn't that a fact, sir?

24 A. But every able-bodied person had weapons in the company they

25 worked in.

1 Q. Okay. Thank you. Okay. With that, we're going to move to

2 another chapter. We've covered to some extent some points in this. I'm

3 going to call this staffing policy problems in staffing. And let me

4 preface my questions by saying earlier we talked about how difficult it

5 was to staff certain positions in light of the transition with the new --

6 with the elections. There was a need to make certain appointments in

7 various places based on proportional basis. Remember we had that

8 conversation?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Now, for the record, I don't want to go through all the documents.

11 I have several of them, but to save some time, and just for the record, in

12 P 00027, which was introduced, we will find matters to that effect.

13 P 0034 -- P 00034. P 00036. Let's look at that for a second. If we

14 could pull that one up. This is on 29 May, 1991. The previous documents

15 were from January 29 and 16 of April, 1991.

16 Do you have the document in front of you, sir?

17 A. Yes. But I don't see it.

18 Q. You do not see it or you see it?

19 A. I see the title of the document. I don't see the text.

20 Q. Okay. Well, slowly we'll get it to you. All right. Now, if we

21 could look at -- we're going to focus our attention on page 2, item 2,

22 paragraph 1. In the B/C/S version it would be page 2, item 2, paragraph

23 1. They coincide. So with the usher's assistance ...

24 Here we're going to talk a little bit about the problems. Item 2,

25 it says here: "The deputies in the BiH Assembly who were elected by the

1 HDZ are obliged to attend the scheduled sessions of the Assembly and the

2 HDZ Deputies' Club."

3 Let me stop there for a second. Isn't it a fact, sir, that at

4 that point in time it was rather difficult for you as party -- as

5 president of the party, because a lot of the delegates, a lot of deputies

6 were not attending sessions or leaving sessions, and that had been a

7 constant theme within some of the meetings, of how to get folks to do

8 their job?

9 A. They had the president of their Deputies' Club who was in charge

10 of seeing whether they were coming, whether they were sticking to the

11 agenda, and so on. But in spite of this, people didn't turn up.

12 Q. Right. And if you -- we don't need to go through the entire item

13 2, but just if you skip to the paragraph 3, it says that some deputies are

14 irresponsible. And it goes on and on. What I'm trying to point out is it

15 was a very difficult time. Some folks that were elected to positions did

16 not take them seriously.

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Now, if we look at item 4, item 4 in -- I believe it's -- it would

19 be page -- page 3, I believe, or page 4 in the B/C/S. But let's look at

20 item 4, paragraph 4. That would be page 4, sir.

21 A. Yes, I see it. Point 4.

22 Q. And in the English version it would be on page 4, and if I can

23 read it: "The Municipal Boards and the city board of the BH HDZ shall

24 submit a written report on the progress made in assuming power in the

25 municipalities and the problems that arise. The boards should also submit

1 a report on their staffing requirements so that a redistribution of

2 personnel can be made at the republican level."

3 And then further down, if you skip one paragraph, it says: "The

4 competent authorities shall speed up the appointment of executive

5 personnel at the republican level, bearing in mind the territorial

6 representation of personnel."

7 So here we are, 29 May, 1991, and it appears that, based on these

8 minutes, that appointments are slow to come, perhaps because you're having

9 a hard time finding qualified people or people who are willing to

10 participate in HDZ politics, as you indicated earlier.

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. All right. Now, I want to go -- let's go to another document, and

13 that would be 00041, 10 July, 1991, a few months later. If we could have

14 that. And I'm going to focus your attention on page 3, item 2(c). In the

15 B/C/S, it would be page 3, and I'll read it and see if you can follow

16 along: "Some deputies representing the HDZ do not attend BH Assembly

17 sessions, attend them irregularly, or leave the Assembly early. In the

18 future, such behaviour shall not be tolerated, especially since lately the

19 Assembly has been debating crucial decisions."

20 And if we go up a little bit, we'll see that you're mentioned as

21 head of the Security Council within the HDZ. So that was the situation as

22 it was back then, was it not?

23 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honours. I apologise for

24 interrupting, but I just have to wonder, are these -- are these the

25 questions that should really justify possibly bringing this man back on

1 another -- having him come back to The Hague on another occasion? Are

2 these really the most important questions to put to this witness? And I

3 wonder, what about the other Defence counsel? What is the allocation of

4 their time --

5 MR. KARNAVAS: May I respond as to the relevancy, Your Honour?

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Karnavas. What is the

7 purpose of the questions you're asking now? You now said you would talk

8 about appointments. What are you trying to demonstrate?

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, Your Honour. The relevance of the questioning

10 is as follows: The gentleman had testified on direct examination that he

11 was more or less forced out of the party. There are a lot of

12 documentation here showing that there was discontent within the leadership

13 with Mr. Kljuic, rightly or wrongly, that in one area at least, with the

14 appointments, they were too slow to come and that the party wasn't

15 organised properly and things weren't working.

16 So part -- the Prosecution, at least as I understood it, was

17 advocating that within this joint criminal enterprise there were those who

18 were working against this particular gentleman, and I -- what I am putting

19 is that there was just some dissatisfaction, and as in any political

20 party, sometimes there are misunderstandings, but in this instance there

21 were some reasons why those within the political leadership felt that

22 Mr. Kljuic wasn't responding enough. Now, he's given us reasons how

23 difficult it was, and I think we have to take him at his -- at his word.

24 But the point is there's no joint criminal enterprise to force him out in

25 order to conduct some nefarious affairs later on. That's the point that

1 I'm trying to make.

2 Now, if the Prosecutor wants to concede that point, then I'll move

3 on.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I think we've got the point.

5 Ask him the question, and tell him that he had to leave the party, and you

6 have some evidence to prove this, that he left the party because he didn't

7 manage things well and things were running late. And in that case, he

8 will respond and say either it's true or it isn't. And we save time.

9 What we need is to -- we need to understand the relevance here and

10 understand in which way it is useful to you and in which way it

11 contradicts the arguments put forward by the Prosecution.

12 I think things are quite clear now, aren't they, Mr. Scott?

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, Your Honour --

14 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'm just waiting for the translation.

15 Sorry, I'm just waiting for the translation.

16 Very briefly, Your Honour. First of all, to respond to

17 Mr. Karnavas about the relevancy of this, I think -- I don't think that

18 the transcript of the 27th of December, 1991, meeting had anything to do

19 with whether some people were attending sessions or not in

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The disagreement between this man and others in the

21 party was quite clear and it had a lot more to do with other things

22 besides whether people showed up for certain meetings or not.

23 Secondly, Your Honour, again I think -- if that's -- if that's

24 Mr. Karnavas's -- as you said, Mr. President, and I fully agree with you,

25 if that's Mr. Karnavas's case, he should put that case directly to the

1 witness. "Sir, isn't it true that the real reason you were removed from

2 office was administrative incompetence," what have you, but put the

3 question directly to the witness instead of spending the next three hours

4 talking about it.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours -- Your Honours -- if I --

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That is the question that should

7 be asked. Like that, we all save time.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I dare say -- I dare say that is not

9 how to conduct cross-examination. It may be for --

10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: In your country.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Even in this country, sir. Even in this country.

12 Because there are a lot of documents here and the situation is extremely

13 complex. There's not just one issue. There were lots of issues why there

14 was dissatisfaction. Now, if the Court wishes me to move on, very well,

15 I'll move on, I'll state for the record the documents I wanted to go

16 through. These are documents of the Prosecution case. I'm entitled to

17 lay the groundwork. Otherwise, everybody will miss the point, and I think

18 there's been some benefit by having this gentleman go into a great deal of

19 the details because the situation is rather complex. And so it's not easy

20 to always ask the direct question. Sometimes you have to lay a

21 foundation.

22 So -- but I can just state for the record, based on all the

23 documents that were available to us from the Prosecution with respect to

24 dissatisfaction within the party or with the slowness in making

25 appointments, I will read for the record the documents that I was going to

1 go through and then I will close this chapter and move on to another. All

2 right?

3 So, first document, as I indicated, would be P 00027. Second

4 document is P 00034. Next document, P 00036. We just covered that.

5 P 00041, P 00045, P 00082, P 00116, P 09616. These are the documents.

6 And might I also add that because the Prosecutor is introducing so

7 many documents and since the Tribunal here under these particular rules

8 allow all these documents to come in without laying a foundation, it is

9 necessary at times for me to question a witness with respect to documents.

10 I'm fully mindful of the rules we have here, and the Rules of Evidence.

11 So I'm labouring under extreme, difficult conditions. Maybe not as

12 difficult as Mr. Kljuic had, but nonetheless they're difficult.

13 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I have to respond to that.

14 It's Mr. Karnavas -- every time there's a criticism or a question about

15 Mr. Karnavas, of course it always -- the blame is always shifted to the

16 Prosecution.

17 MR. KARNAVAS: Absolutely.

18 MR. SCOTT: "The reason I can't conduct a more effective

19 cross-examination, that I repeat the same question seven or eight, nine

20 times, is because there's so many documents in the Prosecution case."

21 Your Honour, we moved through these documents quite efficiently. I

22 believe the record will show that, and again that is not my fault for

23 Mr. Karnavas's cross-examination. And I object, and on behalf of the

24 entire Prosecution team, Your Honour, I resent that every time

25 Mr. Karnavas has a problem in the courtroom, of course it's always blamed

1 on the Prosecution. We have a standing objection to that. Thank you.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, I'm not going to -- I will move on, Your

3 Honour.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well -- Mr. Karnavas, you have

5 mentioned a number of documents. You have given us some examples

6 contained in some of these documents, so I think you could now ask the

7 vital question. So put the question to the witness.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: And there's the little problem. I will do so, Your

9 Honour, but that's why I have to show them the documents. But

10 nonetheless, I will -- I will go ahead.

11 Q. I read, sir --

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You can introduce another

13 document which will be a clear example of the point you would wish to

14 make. Last time you weren't here, your colleague, when it came to talking

15 about renaming of documents -- renaming of street names that were no

16 longer Croatian street names, I think 10 or so examples were given. We're

17 just trying to save time. So you have a document and you can say with

18 this document we can illustrate what happened. But I think that is

19 enough. Suffice to just use one document. I understand that you may need

20 four to five days if you proceed this way.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm just trying to be thorough, Your Honour, and I

22 take -- I take the -- the advice of the Court.

23 Q. If I could -- if we could look at one document, 11 -- P 00116.

24 And while we're looking at this -- for this document, sir, you've been

25 following the discussion.

1 A. Absolutely.

2 Q. Okay. And would it be fair to say that one of the criticisms that

3 had been lodged against you, among many other - and I'm not saying that

4 they're justified - but as you said some folks were impatient, some were

5 operating with less knowledge, some didn't quite appreciate the

6 difficulties you had, but was it not one of the frustrations or one of the

7 complaints that you were moving too slow on the appointment process?

8 A. Before I answer you, I wish to say that it's not true what you

9 said a little while ago, that I was expelled from the HDZ. I resigned on

10 the 2nd of February, 1992, and that's the truth. There are documents to

11 prove that.

12 As for criticism of myself and whether I was slow or not, you have

13 to know what the context was. A change in the state system, people who

14 hadn't been checked, and the opposition that you're standing by now would

15 show the results later on, when I left.

16 Q. All right. I apologise -- I apologise if the impression was that

17 you were expelled. I'm not suggesting that, the Prosecution is suggesting

18 that. And so if we could look at page 5 in the English version.

19 A. You said that I was expelled, excluded.

20 Q. Okay. Sir, we're going to get to your resignation. Okay? We

21 will get there.

22 We talked about -- by the way, we did talk about earlier how, at

23 least on a different matter, you believed, as you testified under oath in

24 Kordic, that you had been expelled or you had lost your position or

25 dismissed, call it whatever you will, from the Presidency, and this was as

1 a result of President Tudjman cutting a deal with President Izetbegovic,

2 because this would allow Izetbegovic to unconstitutionally remain in power

3 as president of the Presidency beyond the two-year limitation; correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, when it came -- now, getting back to the issue. If you look

6 at page 5, at the bottom -- in English it's page 5. It's titled

7 "Re-examination of Staff Appointments." I don't know if it corresponds

8 with your document, sir, the page number, but at the top of the page it

9 would be 00533966. That might assist the -- the usher. And it says

10 here: "The competent bodies of HDZ BH are to immediately collect written

11 approvals from the HDZ municipal boards responsible for all staff on a

12 local level appointed to represent the HDZ of BiH. Those who do not

13 receive the approval must immediately have dismissal procedures initiated

14 against them while the appointment of new staff should proceed according

15 to the regulated procedure. A candidate who is not a member of the HDZ

16 cannot be appointed to a post in the bodies of the republic. All the HDZ

17 municipal boards of BH and the HDZ Presidency of BH are requested to take

18 up the portfolios which had been assigned to them in the distribution of

19 portfolios."

20 Now, that was the policy back then, was it not? HDZ, the

21 political party, was the one that was entrusted in filling those

22 positions.

23 A. Apart from the composition of the government, the ministers,

24 something that had to be decided straight away, any subsequent appointment

25 was at the proposal of the cadres commission. Now, the fact that some

1 people didn't like the fact that we had put in people who weren't active

2 members of the party but were experts was natural. However, I was not

3 able to appoint somebody to a particular post, or the cadres commission

4 people to a particular post if they didn't have any experience or

5 qualifications for the job. And from this we can clearly see that what

6 they wanted was that every person first be a party member, then he must be

7 put forward by a municipal organisation, and once he's verified by the

8 municipal organisation, he gains the necessary credibility.

9 First of all, we didn't have time to do all that. Secondly, we --

10 people didn't want to take up posts. What use would it be to put someone

11 forward if the person didn't want to occupy a state function? So that

12 there were many personal family-tie combinations and so on I have to say

13 that I couldn't pay attention, take all this into account at the time, all

14 the more so as I wasn't personally responsible, it was always the

15 commission that was responsible.

16 Q. Because you were the head of the party, a lot of the criticism was

17 coming back to you, whether you deserved it or not; correct?

18 A. Well, yes, all right.

19 Q. All right.

20 A. But from these manuscripts you can see which group of people were

21 against me and how their voice grew louder.

22 Q. Okay. Now, within the same document, on a slightly different

23 issue but still voices of discontent, if we look on page 4 - and for the

24 B/C/S version it would be on page 00533965 - it says here: "The

25 assessment of the work and the role of the party. The attitude of the

1 Croatian representatives in BiH Assembly, especially when the issue of

2 referendum was being decided is a direct result of the absence of a clear

3 political stance, which is an unacceptable political improvisation of the

4 leadership of HDZ of BiH. Before having reached such an essential

5 decision, consultation with the competent bodies of the party should have

6 been conducted, which was not done at any level. The work of the party is

7 otherwise assessed to be poor, disorganised, motivated by private issues

8 and political -- and politically irresponsible, which will not be

9 permitted in future."

10 Now, to some extent, sir, it would appear that there's a little

11 criticism being lodged against you in this. Rightly or wrongly. I'm not

12 suggesting that it's correct. I'm just saying that at least from the

13 document, on its face, that there were -- there was blame -- you were

14 being blamed for a variety of reasons.

15 A. Sir, very rarely do you have an international document that can

16 stand the test of 15 years' time, and you're asking for a digest from the

17 minutes of a party that had just been established to be absolutely correct

18 and exact and something that one could rely on.

19 Now, you see here when people say that the deputies were wrong in

20 voting for the referendum question as set by the republican commission,

21 don't wish to understand that in our programme declaration the first

22 principle was a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina and the equality of Croats

23 within it. So those two principles are -- were contained in that

24 question.

25 Now, I assume that the person speaking here said that they should

1 be convened and then told don't vote now, we're going to prepare the Livno

2 issue.

3 Q. Let me stop you here, because I think --

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, may I add for a point of the witness.

5 Are you saying, Witness, that this criticism is not serious, was

6 not even seriously brought forward but was masking other aversion against

7 you? Is that what you're putting forward?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The criticism was serious. It

9 wasn't a trick. Those people really wanted that. However, the criticisms

10 were not because of my work but because I, as a political figure, with

11 absolute legitimacy, got in their way. And we were to solve that two or

12 three days later.

13 MR. KARNAVAS:

14 Q. All right. Now, I think you touched upon a problem that I wanted

15 to cover within this global aspect, which was how difficult it was

16 starting -- starting with this new -- new system, elections, formation of

17 parties, and would it be fair to say that many folks had unrealistic

18 expectations?

19 A. I would put it this way: They had -- they had unrealistic

20 assessments, not expectations.

21 Q. Okay. Assessments. And some of these unrealistic assessments

22 came back to haunt you personally because you were criticised.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. All right. I believe we covered that point. If I could

25 just move on to another chapter, and this has to do with -- I'm trying to

1 clarify a point that was raised yesterday -- oh, I apologise, and I'll try

2 to move faster too.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's time to take a break. It's

4 half past 3.00. So in theory, we should reconvene in 20 minutes and go on

5 working until 5.30. Will you all have finished by 5.30, or do you think

6 we're going to have to have the witness back, Mr. Karnavas? How much more

7 time do you need, Mr. Karnavas?

8 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm trying to move fast, as fast as I can. I will

9 look at -- I will look over at the break to see what I can do, and I do

10 want to clarify one thing at the point. I think it's an unfair

11 characterisation, Judge Trechsel, to say that I'm cross-examining as if I

12 was in the United States. Trust me, I'm not. I've modified completely my

13 approach. I'm trying to adjust. It's a little bit difficult, but I take

14 your point to heart. I will try to be as precise as possible, and I thank

15 you for the criticism.

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I apologise if you felt offended. This was

17 certainly not my intention.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You must know that they're not

20 criticisms on the part of the Judges, they're just observations in order

21 to try and make our work more efficacious on all sides. So no criticisms,

22 just observations to give you food for thought.

23 So the problem is as follows: We're going to work this evening

24 until 5.30. Is the Defence -- will the Defence be finished by 5.30 and so

25 that we can let the witness go, or are we going to have to recall the

1 witness? Because if the Prosecution has redirect, then we won't have

2 time.

3 Mr. Scott, do you intend to ask additional questions?

4 MR. SCOTT: Let me answer your question this way, Your Honour, in

5 terms of where we are: I frankly had intended, at the beginning of the

6 last session, to raise this question and decided not to interrupt and hope

7 that maybe perhaps Mr. Karnavas would be concluding early in the last

8 session, so I decided not to interrupt. I suppose it's almost a fait

9 accompli now, perhaps, that the witness will have to come back. I must

10 say I don't think there has been a wise use of the cross-examination time

11 so far --

12 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm going to object to those comments, Your Honour.

13 MR. SCOTT: I think other counsel, Defence counsel should, of

14 course, have an opportunity, a reasonable opportunity to put questions to

15 the witness, but now we find ourselves at a time where the Prosecution --

16 and I'll certainly be governed by the Registry's time, but according to

17 our estimates, we used approximately five hours and 36 minutes. The

18 Defence so far has had right at five hours, and except for a few minutes

19 by Mr. Ibrisimovic, that has all been taken by Mr. Karnavas, and I just

20 say I just say that I think it's a bit of a shame that the witness will

21 have to come back when I think that the time today could have been used

22 more wisely.

23 Secondly, to answer your question, Your Honour, if we could finish

24 today in order to accommodate the witness, I would be happy not to ask any

25 questions on redirect. Of course, if the witness does come back, then

1 likely there will be some redirect examination.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, this is a court of justice. Now, if

3 these gentlemen are going to get a fair trial, they are entitled to their

4 share. Now, the Prosecutor ought to be ashamed of himself of presenting

5 the case the way he's presenting it. He's dumping documents and now he's

6 saying that I should just forego my client's rights because of some time

7 schedule that he has.

8 Madam Del Ponte came here and said she doesn't want to cut. Why

9 should I give up my client's rights to accommodate the Prosecutor? No

10 way. I'm entitled to ask these questions. This is a very complicated

11 issue. This witness was at the forefront of the events. He's a critical

12 witness, and I think every issue that we're covering is relevant. My

13 colleagues fully agree with me. They have their own space, and they're

14 entitled to as much time as they need, and as I'm told, they're going to

15 need, collectively, about three or four hours. And I think -- I

16 forewarned everyone in advance that I needed about six hours. Now, I will

17 try to do my best. That's the best I could do. But I will not accept any

18 criticism from Mr. Scott especially, especially when I see how he's

19 presenting his case.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. During the break

21 you're going to see each other, and if we finish by 5.30, well and good.

22 If not, we're going to continue at a subsequent date. And I'd like to ask

23 the registrar to give me a breakdown of the time used. So we'll do those

24 sums.

25 Judge Prandler would like to say something.

1 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you, Mr. President. I would simply like to

2 say that again there should be avoiding any expression which is in a way

3 offending anybody; offending either the witness, either the Defence, or

4 the Prosecution. And we heard now a few minutes ago that the Prosecution

5 should be ashamed of himself or itself. I really feel that these kind of

6 expressions are to be avoided. Thank you very much.

7 THE ACCUSED PRLIC: May I say something?

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Prlic.

9 THE ACCUSED PRLIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that my

10 Defence counsel has the right to defend me, and please allow my Defence

11 counsel to do his work. The witness said that none of us took part, but

12 because of the character of the indictment, we have to address all these

13 matters. So we are the party in jeopardy, those of us sitting here.

14 Thank you.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. It's 20 to 4.00.

16 We're taking a break and we're going to reconvene at approximately 4.00.

17 --- Recess taken at 3.37 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 4.02 p.m.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. I'd

20 like to make an observation with respect to time. We've been doing the

21 calculations. Mr. Scott has used five hours and 40 minutes, and today the

22 Defence used five hours, 20 minutes so far. So pursuant to our decision

23 that the time should be equally shared unless it was the personal

24 responsibility of the people, that the same time should be accorded to

25 both the Prosecution and the Defence. So that's the framework.

1 Mr. Karnavas, please continue. Could you tell us whether you have

2 discussed the matter with your other colleagues and what the outcome is.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: Briefly, we've consulted with each other, and

4 here's where it stands: I'm going to continue with my cross-examination.

5 It will probably -- not probably, it will, indeed, take the rest of the

6 time. I'm hoping to finish by that point in time. And I understand that

7 the Stojic team has approximately an hour and a half. I know General

8 Praljak would like to -- has some questions of about half an hour,

9 slightly more, perhaps slightly less. I know the Petkovic team has

10 approximately an hour to an hour and a half, and I understand the Coric

11 team has approximately 30 minutes to 45 minutes.

12 That's where we stand, Your Honour, and again I want to remind the

13 Court that this deals with joint criminal enterprise.

14 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. You forgot -- yes, go

16 ahead, Counsel.

17 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just

18 wanted to say that we would need one and a half hours, not 30 to 40

19 minutes, as was stated.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: I stand corrected. So there we are. There we are,

21 Your Honour.

22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I don't think our colleague managed

23 to collect all the relevant information. We had to adjust our time.

24 General Praljak's Defence will need about an hour at the minimum, as

25 things now stand.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And 15 minutes for General

2 Praljak within that hour?

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] No. As things now stand, General

4 Praljak will use up a whole hour.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Him? Very well. That means

6 that the witness will have to come back another day.

7 So we're going to finish the sitting today with Mr. Karnavas. We

8 have until 5.30. And then, sir, you will have to come back at a future

9 date which is convenient to you, and the cross-examination will last

10 another morning or afternoon, because usually a sitting is four hours and

11 45 minutes, a day's sitting. So that means one more day of sitting, an

12 additional day, and that will get through it.

13 Mr. Karnavas, I give you the floor.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. I believe Mr. Murphy wanted to say

15 something. I saw him stand up.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Murphy.

17 MR. MURPHY: I just wanted to make a modest contribution, Your

18 Honour, to diminishing the --

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Your contribution is never

20 modest, Mr. Murphy. It is always highly important.

21 MR. MURPHY: Thank you, Your Honour. A modest contribution to the

22 -- the scope of the indictment, perhaps, by correcting the record at page

23 91, line 2, which talks about weapons being acquired for the protection of

24 the Croatian people from September 1891 to 1991. I think if we narrow

25 that down to 1991, Your Honour, it may save a great deal of time. I ask

1 for the record to be corrected.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, fine. Thank you. I took

3 note of that, yes.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. If we could now move on to another chapter, and this would be

7 clarifying the -- some issues with respect to the two different versions

8 of the decision that was shown to you yesterday, the decision on the

9 establishment of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. So first, to

10 recap, yesterday you were shown a document, I believe it was 1D -- well,

11 1D 00048 -- 1D 00488. I don't know. The Prosecution's document might

12 have been -- I don't know what the number is, but that's the document that

13 we have. This was the original, the initial decision, if you see it. Do

14 you see it, sir?

15 A. I can't see a thing.

16 Q. All you need to see is the first part of it. I have -- I have a

17 copy for you, a hard copy. One for the ELMO, one for you. This was the

18 document that was shown to you yesterday, sir, was it not?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. That stated that on 18 November, 1991, there was a decision

21 passed. Now, if you will recall, there was another document with the same

22 title, different date, and this was Prosecution Exhibit 00078, and that's

23 the one that shows that the 18 -- that the decision of 18 November, 1991,

24 had been amended.

25 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. To assist the Court - excuse

1 me - the document on the screen now is the same as document P 00081.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

3 Q. And it was yesterday you were asked to look at it, and I believe

4 yesterday we were able to determine that some changes had been made;

5 correct?

6 A. All I can see in front of me is the decision of the 18th. 18th of

7 November, of course.

8 Q. Okay. If we could pull up the 00078 for the gentleman. And you

9 will see from the preamble where it says: "The decision to establishing

10 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was adopted by the elected

11 representatives of the Croatian people at the session held on 18 November,

12 1991. The said decision was amended at the session of the Presidency of

13 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna on 3 July, 1992, and the final

14 draft reads as follows."

15 Do you see that one, sir? It's at the very, very top of the page.

16 If it's not there, sir, we can provide you with a hard copy.

17 A. Yes, I can see it on the screen now.

18 Q. Yes. And yesterday we had this discussion, and -- you had a

19 discussion with respect to this particular document, a discussion

20 generated by the Prosecution wherein you said that you took exception to

21 this particular decision because it appeared that they had taken on

22 executive powers; correct?

23 A. In the party.

24 Q. If you look on -- if you look at Article 7. If you compare

25 Article 7 of the first document with Article 7 in the amended version, I

1 believe, based on viewing Article 7 and then Article 8, I believe you had

2 some reservations with respect to this particular decision. Am I correct?

3 A. Well, the first decision was taken while it was still peacetime.

4 The second, of the 3rd of July, 1992, was made during the aggression

5 against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

6 Q. All right. Now you say peacetime, but we went through all these

7 documents. That was the essence of this entire exercise, even though the

8 aggression hadn't formally started, it was clear that war was about to

9 start or Bosnia-Herzegovina was about to be attacked; correct?

10 A. That was what was assumed.

11 Q. Right. And now you rightly noted that several months later, 3

12 July, 1992, war has broken out and the situation on the ground has changed

13 markedly; correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now, with that in mind, perhaps we can go through the chronology

16 of the major events that took place during that gap, and that might assist

17 the Trial Chamber, and the Prosecution and anybody else who might be

18 listening, to know what exactly took place during those months and perhaps

19 why it was necessary to amend that decision, okay? So --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- I'm going to go through a series of dates and events, and if

22 you could just say "yes" or "no," or "I don't know," I would most

23 appreciate it, but this is the chronology that I put on. We'll move

24 rather quickly.

25 18 November, 1991, that's the first document, but also that is the

1 date where Vukovar is in the hands of the Serbs; right? Rather memorable

2 date, 18 November.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. 23 December, 1991, Germany recognises Republic of Croatia.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. 30 December, 1991, 700.000 refugees and displaced persons find

7 themselves in Croatia.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. 9 January, 1992, the Republika Srpska, the RS, is established

10 within BiH.

11 A. Yes, but it wasn't legitimate.

12 Q. I agree with you there. Probably, but nonetheless it was

13 established; right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you. 15 January, 1992, the EU recognises the Republic of

16 Croatia.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. 9 January, 1992, this is -- there's a meeting of the Central Board

19 of HDZ Livno, and that had to do with a question that we talked about.

20 Remember we had that lengthy discussion? We'll move on because we covered

21 that already.

22 On 28 February --

23 MR. SCOTT: Mr. Karnavas, sorry. The 9th of February, if I can

24 just correct that.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay. Thank you. I stand corrected.

1 Q. 9th of February, 1992, there was the meeting in Livno, and we had

2 this whole discussion. And since this is on the record, we need not cover

3 it.

4 On the 28th of February and March 1, 1992, we have the referendum

5 about the independence of the SRBiH; correct? Those are the dates when

6 people went out and voted.

7 A. The 29th.

8 Q. The 29th. Thank you very much. It was a late night last night,

9 trying to get this together.

10 March 25, 1992, Neum is shelled by the JNA.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And Neum, for those of us who haven't been there, is right on the

13 coast. It's one of the few -- that little bitty coast that's been

14 allocated or that belongs to BiH of the entire Adriatic coast. It's about

15 10 kilometres long.

16 A. Yes, 23.

17 Q. Okay. 29 -- 29 March, 1992, people, Croats -- Croats and Muslims,

18 several thousand, from South Herzegovina are escaping to West Herzegovina.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. 30 March, 1992, people from North Bosnia are escaping to the

21 Republic of Croatia.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. 2nd of April, 1992, Bijeljina, which is a town, as you well know,

24 in -- in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is under siege by Serb forces.

25 A. Well, crimes happened over there on that day as well.

1 Q. Right. In fact, there's some footage. I believe it was Arkan

2 that goes there and commits all those crimes. In fact, it was videotaped.

3 But it was at this particular time, as I recall, that Alija Izetbegovic,

4 the president of the SDA, who is also the president of the Presidency,

5 states, "I think that we cannot say that we have a war in SRBiH. Clashes

6 will stop as soon as BiH is recognised on 7 of April, 1992."

7 Do you recall him saying that? Yes or no.

8 A. Possibly he said that.

9 Q. All right. And again, if indeed he had said that, little comfort

10 was he giving to his own people, his own nation, let alone the Croats, if

11 he's saying when Bijeljina is under siege, Arkan is going there, the

12 notorious Arkan, and he's saying, "Well, we cannot say that we have a war

13 in SRBiH."

14 Moving along. 3rd of April, 1992, one day later, massacre in

15 Bijeljina -- in Bijeljina mosque, Tuzla and Brcko under siege by Serb

16 forces, Serbs take over Banja Luka.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Now, for those of us who don't know exactly where these places

19 are, Brcko in particular, that's -- we're talking about the Posavina

20 corridor, isn't it? It's right on there.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And that place is going to play a very significant role, because

23 if we were to look on the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it is today

24 with the two entities, we'll see why Brcko is so important that at Dayton

25 it was not resolved and had to go to international arbitration and was

1 resolved three years later through an international arbitration award;

2 correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Because if, for instance, Brcko -- Brcko, that corridor, would cut

5 the RS in half. That's why Brcko was so important; right?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In Tuzla, Tuzla, which is -- has -- is historic in many ways for

8 being a very multi-ethnic and tolerant city, and in fact during the war it

9 stayed that way, more or less.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. April 4, 1992, general mobilisation is pronounced in the RS -- the

12 SRBiH. Although we don't know by whom, general mobilisation was

13 pronounced, if you will. 4 April, 1992.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. 5 April, 1992, Serbs started armed force conflict in Sarajevo.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. 6 April, 1992, the EU recognises BiH.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Same day in Sarajevo, extraordinary situation is pronounced.

20 Extraordinary situation is pronounced.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. In Mostar and Siroki Brijeg, shelling from North Camp by the GNA

23 -- the JNA. Same day.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. All right. The next day, 7 April, 1992, Republic of Croatia

1 recognises BiH.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Serb members, on that same day, leave the Presidency of BiH.

4 A. Just a moment, please. They had previously suspended or frozen

5 their status. This was a trick. If they walked out of the Presidency, we

6 would have the right, based on the constitution, to find replacements for

7 them. It was quite clear, because after the elections there was a list,

8 but by suspending their membership they were attempting to block the work

9 of the Presidency. However, on the 7th, they all went over to Pale and

10 then the crisis of the composition of the Presidency arose, which was

11 solved in the subsequent period.

12 Q. All right. Thank you. On that same day, 7 April, 1992,

13 Medjugorje and Citluk are shelled by the JNA.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And this is sort of the first reaction by Izetbegovic against the

16 JNA. It was on that day, 7 April, 1992, finally, Mr. Izetbegovic reacted

17 as president of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. On the next day -- on next day, 8 April, 1992, the HVO -- the HVO

20 is established as the supreme defence body; right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. April 9 -- April 9, next day, decision on pronouncement of

23 imminent war, imminent threat of war. And by doing so -- and by doing so,

24 the Presidency has Assembly powers. That's what happens when the

25 Presidency pronounced the imminent threat of war on 9 April, 1992;

1 correct?

2 A. Yes, because the work of the Assembly was paralysed. It was no

3 longer possible to work in the Assembly.

4 Q. Exactly. And I'm trying to show what happened during these

5 events. And so we can see now the Assembly is paralysed, and so the

6 Presidency takes on its powers.

7 Now, 11 April, 1992, Mostar comes under heavy shelling, does it

8 not?

9 A. Yes. Every day, yes.

10 Q. We're going to get there slowly, slowly, step-by-step.

11 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas. Mr. President, before it

12 leaves the screen, I just wonder if the witness could assist us. On page

13 139 at line 3, Mr. Karnavas asks the question, "And this is sort of the

14 first reaction by Izetbegovic," et cetera, but I don't see any description

15 there of what this first reaction supposedly was. Maybe I missed it, but

16 perhaps the witness could give us a full answer as to what this reaction

17 supposedly was.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Gladly.

19 Q. Do you recall what --

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.

21 MR. KARNAVAS:

22 Q. -- his reaction was?

23 A. You're asking me?

24 Q. I'm asking you. You're the witness.

25 A. Well, let me tell you, this is a whole sea of events. This is not

1 a quiz. You have to tell me what the statement was and I'll tell you

2 whether I recognise it or not.

3 Q. All right.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: We'll move on, Your Honour, and we'll establish

5 that point through other witnesses.

6 Q. On 14 April, 1992 --

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, if you know how

8 Mr. Izetbegovic reacted, you can ask him how he reacted and then the

9 witness can respond and say yes, I corroborate this, or I don't. If you

10 know. If you don't know, move on to something else.

11 MR. KARNAVAS:

12 Q. The reaction, as I understand, is a public condemnation against

13 JNA.

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Now, we talked about the 11th, the shelling of Mostar. On the

16 14th of April, there's fighting in the city of Mostar.

17 A. Correct, but I have to tell you you're listing one event after

18 another, and these events occurred in a condensed period of time. I was a

19 witness to all this, and I received information, but today, after so much

20 time has elapsed, I cannot tell you whether something happened on the 14th

21 or the 11th. I can tell you, generally speaking, that the whole territory

22 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially Sarajevo and the neighbourhoods

23 inhabited by Croats and Bosniaks, were attacked.

24 Q. Okay. All right. Is Sarajevo under siege from 5 April, 1992?

25 A. Sarajevo was under siege even before that.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Even during peacetime. The JNA officially held training

3 exercises, and during that period it encircled Sarajevo.

4 Q. All right. But once it becomes even more under siege, as of on or

5 about 5 April, 1992, would it be fair to say that Sarajevo in essence is

6 cut off from the rest of the country because it's under siege?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And the state -- the state institutions, such as they were at the

9 time, were handicapped, unable, perhaps, to carry out many of their

10 functions with respect to the rest of the country.

11 A. Of course they couldn't carry out all their tasks. Everything was

12 done to carry out what was possible. There were some secret routes one

13 could use to get out of Sarajevo. We still had telephones and fax

14 machines.

15 Q. All right. Were there any problems with the central bank and the

16 currency at the time?

17 A. That problem had arisen much earlier, when the Republic of Croatia

18 and, before that, Slovenia stopped using the Yugoslav dinar. We also took

19 steps to print our own currency, but unfortunately, it remained in London.

20 Q. I see.

21 A. So that all the Yugoslav dinars from Croatia and Slovenia poured

22 into Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its value was nothing. And then in Sarajevo

23 we printed some sort of vouchers, and from that time onwards practically

24 the only real currency in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the West German mark.

25 And in memory of this, our currency today is called the mark, only it's

1 called the convertible mark because it can be exchanged for other

2 currencies in any bank in Bosnia and Herzegovina without any difficulties.

3 Q. So for all intents and purposes, once the central bank stops

4 operating, the currency that you've printed is left in London in some

5 printing house, all you have are these sort of vouchers, as you've said,

6 as somewhat of and official currency, or something to trade with, but

7 certainly nothing that you can take outside and trade for -- for marks or

8 dollars, guilders, or what have you.

9 A. No. We had nothing. But you have to know that in Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina, a lot of people had worked abroad, and for many years the

11 dinar had not been convertible; there were a lot of German marks around.

12 Q. That I understand. I just want to make sure that the Trial

13 Chamber understood that in this period of time there is no official

14 currency, nothing that's functioning in the -- in the State of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not that anyone's fault, other than the war and the

16 circumstances that were placed upon Bosnia-Herzegovina by the former

17 Yugoslavia, primarily from events occurring from Belgrade.

18 A. Correct.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just one example. If you told

20 us that at the time you were in Sarajevo when you went out to buy some

21 bread, what did you pay for your bread with? Was it a Belgrade dinar or a

22 voucher or German marks? When you went out to buy something, what kind of

23 currency did you use?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I had both vouchers and marks, but

25 most people had vouchers, but after the aggression started, bread was

1 distributed free of charge.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] These vouchers, did they

3 resemble banknotes? Was there a nominal value to these vouchers or not?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. They resembled theatre tickets

5 or tickets for sports events. They had various nominal values, but we had

6 to abolish them very soon because people falsified them. They forged

7 them. They printed them out on their computers.

8 MR. KARNAVAS:

9 Q. And who issued these -- these vouchers? Was this the state? Was

10 this done through the state bank, the central bank?

11 A. The state.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I think, actually, it was the central bank, but it was actually

14 the state that was responsible for them.

15 Q. Okay. Now, I've heard, and I'm not prepared to -- to go forward

16 on this today, but I've heard that certain municipalities also printed

17 their own money, or had their own way of bartering -- their own bartering

18 system with similar vouchers. I could be wrong, but is there any truth to

19 that? If you know.

20 A. No, you're right. You're right.

21 Q. I thought so. And would you care -- I mean, just from memory, if

22 you can tell us some of those places that were printing their own vouchers

23 or sort of currency, whatever you want to call it?

24 A. I don't know, but I do know it was the practice. I was in

25 Sarajevo. I didn't leave Sarajevo for a long time, but I know that the

1 problem was solved in the same way as in Sarajevo. People printed some

2 sort of vouchers or papers on the basis of which one could get a litre of

3 oil or a kilo of sugar or a loaf of bread or powdered milk or whatever.

4 Q. Okay. Thank you.

5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Just an additional question. Were salaries paid

6 in vouchers, of state employees and others?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but very few people received

8 salaries. At that time, as a member of the Presidency, I earned one

9 German mark a month.

10 MR. KARNAVAS:

11 Q. Okay. Now, moving along on our chronology. And incidentally, if

12 you don't remember, say you don't remember, or you think it's correct,

13 just say you think. It's behooves the Defence to prove up all of these

14 dates, which we intend to do throughout the course of this trial.

15 So on the 16th of April, 1992, Mostar is bombarded from the North

16 Camp. Do you recall that? And from another --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Yes. Okay. On 18th of April, 1992, Sarajevo is heavily attacked.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. On April 21, 1992, Alija Izetbegovic is calling the inhabitants of

21 Sarajevo to defend Sarajevo.

22 A. Yes. I called on them on the 4th of April.

23 Q. Okay. And as I understand it -- one second, with your indulgence.

24 Let me move on here.

25 On -- on the 26th of April, 1992, do you recall whether Mate Boban

1 issued a letter concerning Mr. Izetbegovic's response?

2 A. I'm not aware of that, but I know they communicated with each

3 other because two days later they went to a conference in Lisbon.

4 Q. Okay. Perhaps we could pull up 1D 00525. And I have hard copies

5 in the event you can't see it on the screen because, as I understand, it's

6 a poor copy, and we may need --

7 If we could take the other document from the -- sir, if we could

8 take the document off the ELMO as well. And this is for the ELMO. This

9 is in English.

10 And if you could just give it a quick read. I'm primarily

11 interested in the third paragraph, third and fourth paragraph. And here

12 we have -- For the record, paragraph 3 says: "Still convinced that the

13 principles of the negotiations under the patronage of the European

14 Community are the only possible way for establishing -- for the

15 establishing of the Government of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina that

16 the war still can be stopped, it is necessary to apply at once some of the

17 agreed principles of the future constitutional arrangements of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina."

19 Do you see that, sir?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And that perhaps -- since this is dated April 26, it would appear

22 that he's referring to the earlier document that we saw earlier, back in

23 March, the one that was in the text that was shown to you that we talked

24 about.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And I'll get the number for the record on that. And for the

2 record, that was 1D 00398, what we were referring to earlier as the -- the

3 Statement of Principles of 18 March, 1992.

4 Then it goes on to say: "Therefore, we suggest, that instead of

5 disintegrated and illegal authorities, immediately a Ministry Council of

6 Bosnia and Herzegovina should be mandated, consisting of nine members (a

7 party of the three people) as the European Community has proposed, being

8 the only authority of temporary governing Bosnia and Herzegovina."

9 So here's Boban making this proposal as president of the Croatian

10 Community of Herceg-Bosna to Mr. Cutileiro, Izetbegovic -- and he's

11 copying Izetbegovic and Karadzic. Were you aware of this, sir, of this

12 initiative?

13 A. No, but I knew about the meeting they had two days later.

14 Q. All right. But at least from here we -- it would suggest -- the

15 text would suggest that Mate Boban, as president of the Croatian Community

16 of Herceg-Bosna, is reaching out, and he's making a proposal, and it seems

17 that the proposal is suggesting a formula that would prevent war and

18 ensure that all three peoples and their rights be guaranteed and assured.

19 Would you not agree with me?

20 MR. SCOTT: Objection, Your Honour. The witness has already said

21 he knows nothing about this document whatsoever, so this is pure

22 speculation.

23 MR. KARNAVAS: I'm asking the gentleman to comment based on the

24 text and based on his knowledge of the events. I think that he can --

25 he's perfectly capable, particularly keeping in mind that we discussed the

1 text of -- of 18 -- of 18 March, 1992. So the gentleman was in the

2 Presidency at the time. If he's unable to answer, then he can certainly

3 tell us that he's unable. I'll accept that and move on.

4 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, I submit that this is just again

5 asking -- this is asking the witness to agree with one more of

6 Mr. Karnavas's speeches. The witness has already said he doesn't have any

7 knowledge about this effort by Mr. Boban at all.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I'm asking the witness to interpret

9 the text. Now, if the Court wishes for me to move on, I'll move on. It's

10 not a speech; it's a question.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So, Witness, please answer the

12 question. The Defence is showing you a text in which Mr. Boban is

13 suggesting to Mr. Cutileiro, Mr. Izetbegovic, and Karadzic, in other

14 words, a constitution based on equal representation, and the issue of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina was addressed.

16 As you were a member of the Presidency, were you aware of the

17 content of this proposal? Yes or no. And an underlying question to this

18 one: What was your feeling about such a proposal?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I didn't have this

20 text. Secondly, it wasn't possible to stop the war. It had been planned

21 much earlier. If one had wanted to stop the war and have a peaceful

22 discussion about the constitutional reorganisation of Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina, there wouldn't have been any shooting. And then in this

24 proposal, it has been forgotten that Bosnia-Herzegovina is an independent

25 state, and by proposing the establishment of a nine-member council,

1 probably the assumption is that this would derogate the government and

2 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina as legally elected and brought into

3 crisis after the departure of the Serbs, even though a number of Serbs did

4 remain, especially in the government.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Q. Nonetheless, I think what we can see is at least an initiative on

7 the part of Mr. Boban in trying to find a solution, albeit rather

8 creative, perhaps not realistic, but he is trying to make an effort of

9 thinking outside the box under a most difficult situation when, as you've

10 indicated, Sarajevo is not really functioning much and the state

11 institutions, many of them are not functioning as well.

12 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Your Honour, we're back to making a speech

13 again. There is just nothing more than Mr. Karnavas making an

14 arrangement.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, the gentleman has already answered

16 these question. The concept is called looping, and I'm happy to give the

17 gentleman a lesson afterwards, but that's what I'm doing. I'm looping his

18 previous answers into my question. These are established facts. They

19 come from the witness himself. They're not Karnavas making speeches.

20 He's indicated that most of the institutions were not functioning. We

21 talked about the currency, we talked about Sarajevo being under siege.

22 What part of the question is a fact that is not in evidence?

23 MR. SCOTT: Most all of it, Your Honour. I don't know what

24 looping is. "Looping" is new term to me, Your Honour, but all it is is

25 Mr. Karnavas following an answer and then restating it in a way that suits

1 his argument. If the witness has answered the question, he's answered the

2 question. It isn't up to Mr. Karnavas to recharacterise the witness's

3 answer.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll move on, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Karnavas, please move

6 on to something else.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll move on.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You asked the witness what he

9 felt about this proposal. He responded by saying that because it was

10 wartime, it wasn't realistic and none of this could work. So this is the

11 feeling we have. So please don't belabour the point. There might be more

12 interesting questions you would like to ask.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.

14 Q. On the 27th of April, 1992, BiH Presidency rendered a decision

15 that the JNA should leave Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on that same day the

16 JNA is shelling -- or still shelling Mostar; is that correct?

17 A. That's correct. We as an independent state asked that a foreign

18 army leave Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19 Q. And when was this independent state declared an independent state?

20 Just if you could remind us again. Was it on that date?

21 A. The independent state? No. That was before. You know that on

22 the 5th of April, President Tudjman recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 74

23 countries of the world recognised it over the following few days. The

24 European Community recognised it on the 6th of April.

25 Q. Precisely. And my question is: What took the Presidency 19 days

1 to finally say, "Hey, we've got a foreign occupying force here. Why don't

2 you leave?" What was the purpose of allowing them 19 or 20 days to

3 continue to wreak havoc and raise hell in Bosnia-Herzegovina? If you have

4 the answer, give it to us. If not, we'll move on.

5 A. I have to tell you something. You're looking at papers, and they

6 don't provide you with a good picture of events. We couldn't walk around

7 the town because of the JNA. One had to carry out some preparations,

8 mobilise at least some services, especially the police, as far as it was

9 possible, to ensure the work of the state bodies. Besides, we spoke to

10 the representatives of the European Union who had arrived in Sarajevo and

11 asked that the European Union, in recognising us, protect

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and eliminate the JNA from our country.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 A. Where none of this was successful, we then went public and sent a

15 demand to Belgrade that they should withdraw an army which was a foreign

16 army on our territory. But they didn't leave, and Belgrade had no

17 intention of withdrawing it, and nobody in Europe cared about how we were

18 managing to survive.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're not quite answering the

20 question. It seems like the European Union recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina

21 on the 6th of April. Why did you need to wait several days before warning

22 the JNA that it needed to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina? Why wait for

23 so long? Is it because you trusted the European Union to settle the issue

24 or, as you indicated, you were involved with other things like

25 mobilisation of the police force and military equipment? Does that

1 explain why you had to wait for such a long time? On the 27th of April,

2 you called upon the JNA so that it withdraws from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can

3 you answer this question?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I can't answer it. I

5 can't tell you the reason.

6 MR. KARNAVAS:

7 Q. Okay. Thank you. But I do appreciate the fact that you told us

8 and you shared with us the difficulties in understanding the events by

9 simply looking at paper. We need live testimony such as the one that

10 we're getting here to convey the images of what was happening at the time.

11 Now, please tell us whether on the 28th of April, 1992, the BiH

12 Presidency pronounced Serbia as an aggressor.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. And on the 29th, negotiations in Lisbon were taking place?

15 A. I know that, but I wasn't there.

16 Q. Right. On the 30th of April, 1992, Mostar is still under the

17 shelling of -- still under the shelling; correct?

18 A. Not just Mostar.

19 Q. Okay. All right. And then the republic Territorial Defence

20 headquarters orders its units, whatever they are, to stand against the

21 JNA. Do you recall that?

22 A. Of course.

23 Q. And then we're going to get to this date of the 2nd to 3rd of May,

24 1992, was a day when Alija Izetbegovic was some say arrested, others say

25 he was kidnapped, others say that he was held, detained, whatever it may

1 be. Do you recall that particular day? Especially since you, as I

2 understand it, were one of the protagonists in that event.

3 A. Certainly he was arrested.

4 Q. All right. Now, if I -- if I could get the technical booth to

5 assist us, we're going to look at a video. I suspect that it has a

6 number. It does not have a number. But this was -- if we could look at

7 it. And while it's getting -- we're getting ready, I must apologise for

8 not having the text translated. We will get it translated. But if we

9 could look at it first and then at some critical point we'll ask the

10 witness to assist us with what is happening. And it's very short but

11 rather interesting.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] How long does the video last?

13 MR. KARNAVAS: As I understand it, less than -- less than a

14 minute. It's ...

15 The video itself, Your Honour, is when Izetbegovic was being

16 detained. Apparently he was able to communicate and have live

17 communications, and so that's what this is about. And as I understand it,

18 and the gentleman can confirm, that he was in -- he was communicating with

19 Mr. Izetbegovic as he was being held captive.

20 Q. Is that correct?

21 A. Only when the Serbs allowed him to communicate.

22 Q. Right. But he was on the phone and you were speaking to him;

23 correct?

24 A. Yes, yes, yes.

25 Q. Okay. And I think here it is. If we could slowly -- if we could

1 look at this. This is President Izetbegovic; correct?

2 [Videotape played]

3 MR. KARNAVAS:

4 Q. Okay. From the smile on your face --

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It would have been a good idea

6 if the interpreters could have translated this. I -- usually they do. I

7 don't know what happened.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: I understand, Mr. President, and it's one of those

9 things that you come up against. You come up against deadlines, and this

10 came to us late in the hour. I apologise, but perhaps we can get --

11 through my questioning we'll find out what happened, and we'll have it

12 translated and we can show it again.

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. The question I would like to ask, and

14 it's a question, a technical question, could we not have it run again and

15 our interpreters, while it runs, interpret the text? Is that not

16 possible? I think it would be better than if the witness were to

17 translate.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: I agree. Your Honour, I agree. We could have the

19 -- I have no problems with that. I've never -- because there's lots of

20 talking going on, and I don't want to tax our good translators, but

21 certainly, why not? Play it again and perhaps they can cue in and tell us

22 whether they're able to do that. I'm not saying that they're not, so --

23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters can do their best. However, if

24 we don't have a transcript, we usually don't translate videos without a

25 B/C/S transcript, because it's very fast and the voices overlap.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can the interpreters translate

2 the video and listen to what's being said?

3 MR. KARNAVAS: They -- I think at some point, but I know how

4 difficult it is when they're speaking at this pace and you have

5 interlapping. We will provide -- the most critical aspect, perhaps, of

6 the tape that could be, and perhaps they could assist us with, is if we

7 play it back and they play the section where Mr. Kljuic, at the end, is

8 having a conversation with Mr. Izetbegovic, at which point Mr. Izetbegovic

9 asks Mr. Kljuic to hand the phone over to Mr. Ganic. But we're going to

10 cover this. If I could ask some questions first and it might -- and then

11 we can perhaps go back to the video. If that may assist the Trial

12 Chamber. And again I apologise, but this came to us literally, you know,

13 overnight.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Perhaps if you put the question

15 to the witness how -- you could talk about the way in which he was

16 arrested. We know nothing about this.

17 MR. KARNAVAS:

18 Q. All right. Now, Mr. Kljuic, I know it's been some time, but I

19 take it, hearing yourself, seeing the events, brought back flashes of

20 memory. On that particular day, as I indicated, Alija Izetbegovic was

21 arrested or detained by the JNA. Could you tell us a little bit, but very

22 briefly because we don't have that much time, but briefly, where was

23 Mr. Izetbegovic at the time when he was detained?

24 A. He was coming back from Lisbon, from the tripartite conference

25 there. When he arrived at Sarajevo airport, instead of going to the

1 Presidency, the Yugoslav People's Army arrested him. In the meantime, as

2 there was a lot of shooting during those days and the defenders responded

3 in like manner to the Yugoslav army, there was a situation in which the

4 military command of the Sarajevo Corps, led by General Kukanjac, remained

5 in an encirclement, under siege. However, his assistant and adjutant,

6 General Djurdjevac, brought Izetbegovic to Lukavica - it's a large

7 barracks outside town - and while this was going on, everybody was

8 shooting. Most -- the worst thing was that the paramilitaries started

9 firing, and they were firing at the Yugoslav People's Army in order to

10 retaliate towards the citizens of Sarajevo. And now everybody stopped

11 shooting. And while this was being confirmed on the Serb side, a shell

12 fell in front of our windows and demolished the room we were in. However,

13 Izetbegovic and us and Kukanjac, who was in the encirclement, asked that

14 there be a cease-fire.

15 There's an important fragment missing here where I told

16 Izetbegovic that he mustn't sign anything because he had been taken into

17 custody. However, he says at the end that Ganic was replacing him.

18 Now, for you to understand that paradox, I have to tell you that

19 during the Communist regime a series of changes had taken place in the

20 Presidency. At its head there was a Serb, a Croat, a Muslim. That was

21 the order within the Presidency. The last Communist president was a Serb.

22 Now we had Izetbegovic, who used as much time as possible accorded to him

23 by the constitution, under the constitution, and the next person was to

24 have been me.

25 Today in the Presidency we have the same order, but instead of

1 seven members there are three. And today the practice is that if there is

2 no presiding officer, the next person to be president and the next person

3 in line replaces him. However, Izetbegovic said that Ganic would be

4 replacing him, and I have to say that he did me a great service there

5 because he was very fervent in replacing him, very enthusiastic, and

6 negotiated, whereas in the meantime many crimes had been committed.

7 Let me tell you something at this point. I'm a serious man, and

8 I'm answering your questions and have been doing so for three days now.

9 So please let me tell you something that I consider to be crucial.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, please go ahead.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. So he gave Ganic the

12 authority to negotiate with UNPROFOR officers, because the programme was

13 for Izetbegovic to be exchanged for Kukanjac --

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Was Galic [as interpreted] a

15 Croat, a Muslim, a Serb? What was he?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. He's a Yugoslav. He was a

17 Yugoslav. And in seven-member Presidency, he represented others, the

18 other peoples. However, the command had to be pulled out, with all the

19 soldiers and all the equipment, from Bistrik, which is a district of

20 Sarajevo. And the representatives of UNPROFOR were there. Negotiations

21 were held. I stayed in my room all the time, in my office, and then

22 finally there was a truce, a cease-fire that was proclaimed for just a

23 short while, 15 minutes. The firing stopped for 15 minutes, because we

24 were in the centre of town and there was shooting coming from all sides,

25 and Sarajevo is a city in a valley. So you don't have to see the shell

1 but you can hear the echo and reverberation of a shell. And then it was

2 envisaged that Izetbegovic from Lukavica, that is to say from the airport,

3 which is called Lukavica, sets out for the command where Kukanjac was

4 encircled so that they should go to the centre point in town, the

5 Skenderija bridge, for Izetbegovic to turn right into the Presidency

6 building and Kukanjac, with his entourage, officers, families, and so on,

7 should go on further towards Lukavica which was the forward staff of the

8 JNA. And at that point there was a lot of shooting. There were many

9 casualties. Unfortunately, I wasn't there myself to be able to tell you

10 exactly what happened, but politically speaking, after this solution - and

11 this is something that the Croats held against him - because he told

12 Ganic, "You replace me." That was more propaganda. The Croats weren't as

13 sensitive where I was concerned, but that was the first sort of treachery

14 of a multinational Bosnia-Herzegovina, where it had been betrayed. In the

15 coming period, my position -- I would -- I -- I didn't hold it against

16 Izetbegovic. I swallowed my pride, because what should I do, fight with

17 the Muslims, argue with them? I didn't want to do so, because at that

18 time the Muslim people were friendly towards us. But Izetbegovic was that

19 kind of man. He didn't have trust or confidence in anyone, and the fact

20 that it was contrary to the law at a time when there was shooting on all

21 sides and when you did your best to save your skin, who cared whether it

22 was Stjepan Kljuic according to protocol or somebody else. So I didn't

23 take this in any tragic sense, although I never forgot what actually

24 happened.

25 MR. KARNAVAS:

1 Q. Thank you. Now Ganic was a Muslim. He declared himself a

2 Yugoslav.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. But -- while you might not have taken offence -- hold on, sir.

5 Let me pose the question. Okay. I'm let you -- you spoke for ten minutes

6 on that one.

7 Now, while Ganic -- while you didn't mind Izetbegovic passing you

8 over, the Croatian people, of which you were representing at the

9 Presidency level, saw that as a betrayal because you were passed on.

10 Isn't that a fact? And perceptions in this part of the world, the

11 Balkans, as you called it, matter; right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And by your earlier answer, Izetbegovic showed his true colours

14 because he did not follow the constitution. He did not follow the laws.

15 He bypassed you and went for his fellow Muslim because he didn't trust a

16 Croat, and that's how it was perceived by the Croats, wasn't it? And

17 that's why you were being criticised as well by all members in your own

18 party; right?

19 A. You must understand the situation. Who could have commanded all

20 that?

21 Q. Answer the question. Whether he was more competent than you,

22 that's a different issue. I'm talking about perceptions. You were voted

23 by the Croatian people to represent them at the Presidency, sir. And this

24 was televised. This was live. And Izetbegovic showed every Croat in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina that you didn't matter and that he reached out and went

1 for someone else. Isn't that a fact?

2 MR. SCOTT: We're back to argument and speeches, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, yes.

4 MR. SCOTT: We are back to arguments and speeches. The witness

5 has given his answer, it's not the answer Mr. Karnavas wants, Mr. Karnavas

6 just wants to argue with the witness, and I object.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: He hasn't answered the question, Your Honour.

8 That's the issue.

9 Q. Because this came up, did it not, sir, within party politics, that

10 you had been bypassed visibly, for the whole world to see, at a most

11 critical point of time when -- at a most critical point of time when

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina was being attacked.

13 A. Excellent. But I cannot have a fight with Izetbegovic over that

14 because of my pride.

15 Q. I -- I understand you, sir. As long as we made the point for the

16 record, and I think we have, we can move on.

17 Now, on that particular day --

18 MR. SCOTT: Well, sorry, Your Honour, no. We object to that.

19 What Mr. Karnavas says is not evidence. He says he's made the point.

20 There is no point to be made by Mr. Karnavas's question. A question gives

21 no information to the Court whatsoever. It is a question, it is not

22 evidence. And unless the witness is given a chance, if he needs to, to

23 make a full answer to that, then there is no evidence and there is no

24 point to be made. Mr. Karnavas's question is not evidence.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll break it down Your Honour. I'll go

1 step-by-step.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a moment, Mr. Karnavas.

3 Stop there for a moment.

4 The Judges are going to interpret what both sides have said.

5 Place your trust in the Bench. Now, the question that the witness has

6 been asked, in this situation where Mr. Izetbegovic was taken into custody

7 by the Serbs and normally you should have replaced him, not Mr. Ganic,

8 now, the question that the Defence is asking you - and this corresponds to

9 the defence's strategy - since you were not designated, now, with respect

10 to your Croat compatriots, did you not appear to be somebody who had been

11 slighted by Mr. Izetbegovic and could your fellow Croats doubt you in any

12 way because of that?

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They could not doubt me because I

15 was in Sarajevo throughout. That's the first point. Secondly, that was

16 an improper gesture on Izetbegovic's part, a sleight of hand, but that

17 didn't mean that I had to enter into a fight with Izetbegovic. I just

18 took note of that in my own head. But the general situation was such that

19 sometimes you have to pass over something and tolerate something. I

20 didn't see this as an attack on my pride or any particular slight, and it

21 never entered my head that I could clash with the Muslims because of that.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak.

24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Mr. Kljuic, let's forget your feelings for the moment, what you felt at

1 the time. Did the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, legally elected, was

2 it functioning? Did it function pursuant to the rules, regulations, and

3 principles? Yes or no.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Up until that point, yes, it did,

5 but once they threw me out, it wouldn't have functioned.

6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you. Now, in any

7 country, democratic country, constitutionally based, can we consider this

8 kind of gesture where the president of the Presidency violates the rules

9 and is replaced and gives authorisation as if the state were his property,

10 gives authority to somebody else by skipping you over, is that considered

11 a -- an attack, a state coup?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, not a state coup, but it was

13 improper.

14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Now in democratic states, is

15 this considered to be a coup d'etat, regardless of what you may think?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. A coup d'etat is when the army

17 replaces democratically elected governments.

18 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Mr. Kljuic, a state coup can

19 be effected through an army, but it can also be a violation of the

20 constitution. Was the constitution essentially violated here, the

21 constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there was a violation of the

23 constitution and of standard practice as well, and customs.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you'll make up --

2 we'll make up for the time used by Mr. Praljak when he intervened.

3 MR. KARNAVAS: [Previous translation continues] ... we can always

4 use intervention from a general to get to the heart of the matter, Your

5 Honour.

6 Q. And just to touch up on the last question, that constitutional

7 violation was also viewed by everyone. It wasn't something that was kept

8 secret. This was played on national television. Right? Okay. Thank

9 you.

10 A. Well, yes, it was, but in the constitution it doesn't say -- it

11 isn't written. This isn't written strictly speaking. That was practice

12 and that was protocol, but much more important than that was the general

13 impression it left on me, for example, when he promoted Ganic.

14 Q. And the general impression that it left on you with respect to

15 those who had voted you in is that the Croats are not being represented or

16 are being bypassed by Izetbegovic. That's the essence of the questioning

17 here. That on national television the Croats saw that Izetbegovic doesn't

18 really care about the constitution, and in time of crisis he's not going

19 to reach out to the next person because he's a Croat but, rather, he'll

20 reach out to a Muslim.

21 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I'm going to object again. I

22 said I would object all afternoon and --

23 MR. KARNAVAS: He can object all he wants, Your Honour.

24 MR. SCOTT: Well, I will. These are just arguments.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you. Mr. Karnavas,

1 ask your question so that the witness can answer, without making speeches

2 yourself. Everybody understood the legal problem and constitutional

3 issues, so ask him. Or I'll ask him.

4 You have been following the debate, Witness. Now, from the

5 aspects of the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was there a legal

6 obligation on the part of Mr. Izetbegovic to nominate you in his place

7 rather than Mr. Ganic? Was this a written rule or a custom?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It was customary and protocol

9 to do so. Take the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, and

10 then you'll see that, unfortunately, that is not the case. However, much

11 more than that act was a political message that was promoted here. So

12 don't ask us to enter into a clash with the Muslims at a point in time

13 when the Serb units were bombing all the territory populated by other

14 people including the Croats.

15 MR. KARNAVAS:

16 Q. Is the procedure, sir -- is this in the rules of procedure as to

17 who's next in line?

18 A. Which? What?

19 Q. Well, after Izetbegovic -- after -- hold on. After Izetbegovic,

20 were you not next in line and was that not in the rules of procedure as to

21 who would be next in line?

22 A. I told you that that was the established practice during Communist

23 times, and it was continued and is implemented today, too, but it --

24 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

25 A. -- doesn't say anywhere specifically -- what rules of procedure?

1 Q. Very well.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: I'll move on, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Kovacic.

4 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] May I just be of assistance and use

5 the real word. I don't think the witness understands. The rules of

6 procedure, known as "poslovnik."

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but the rules of proceedure or

8 "poslovnik" is not a constitutional category. All right. If you say

9 that that is how it was, I was the one who was slighted, nobody else.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Karnavas.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

12 Q. Now, on the 4th -- we'll go back. On the 3rd of May and the 4th

13 of May, Siroki Brijeg was shelled. Do you recall that event?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. On the 6th of May, 2.000 -- 200 -- 230.000 refugees from BiH are

16 in Croatia, or go to Croatia. I believe are in Croatia at that point in

17 time. 230.000; is that about right?

18 A. There's no need for you to mention figures. As armed actions were

19 undertaken, people left certain regions, and the only place that they fled

20 to was to Croatia.

21 Q. On the 10th of May, Mostar was heavily damaged and cut off from

22 the rest of the world, more or less; right? Do you recall that?

23 A. Well, those are -- that is the information that we received every

24 day.

25 Q. And we had testimony here in this court as well that on the 13th

1 of May, 1992, habitants from the east side of Mostar were escaping to the

2 west side of Mostar under some rather treacherous conditions. Does at

3 that ring a bell, sir?

4 A. Well, they were attacked by the JNA. They're Serbo-Chetnik

5 volunteers and therefore they had to flee to the west where the majority

6 population was Croatian and you had the units of the Croatian Defence

7 Council.

8 Q. Right. The one that they had armed themselves and prepared

9 themselves for war because they saw what was about to happen. We

10 discussed this earlier today.

11 Now on the 17th [Realtime transcript read in error "3rd"] of May

12 it is recorded that 28.000 shells hit Mostar. Does that sound about right

13 to you?

14 A. Well, it sounds -- it means a lot to me, yes. It sounds about

15 right.

16 Q. Sounds about right. All right. On the 19th of May, HDZ and --

17 A. A lot.

18 Q. H -- When you say "a lot," are you disputing the figure or is

19 this something --

20 A. No, I'm not disputing figures. I lived in a city where there were

21 shells every day, lots of them, and if I were to tell you that on the 14th

22 of May in Sarajevo, for example, there were so many shells that --

23 Q. We can move on, point made.

24 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour, just a correction. My

25 understanding is that the date was not the 3rd of May but it was the 17th

1 of May, I'm told. There may have been a transcript error.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: 17th of May. 17th of May.

3 Q. Now, on 19 May, 1992, it's my understanding that HDZ and SDA of

4 Mostar signed an agreement about joint fighting against the Serbs on BiH

5 territory. And the Muslims in Mostar issued calls for all their fighters

6 to join the HVO. Were you aware of that, sir? Does that sound about

7 right?

8 A. Possibly. I'm not quite sure whether that local agreement applied

9 to the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but certainly it had pretensions of

10 being for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 Q. And I believe we heard some testimony, but we'll hear some more,

12 that on the 23rd of May, 1992, Mostar was more or less in flames. The

13 right castle of the old bridge was damaged by shells and the city hall was

14 as well. Does that sound about right?

15 A. Probably.

16 Q. All right.

17 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, while Mr. Karnavas has stopped, I just

18 want to note for the record I'm a little disturbed about the nature of

19 this questioning and answering. I don't know if Mr. Karnavas takes it

20 that these things have been established just because the witness says

21 something sounds about right, or probably. I'm just concerned this way of

22 presentation is as if these facts are conclusively established, and for

23 the record, I note my concern about this way of establishing facts.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, the court deals with objections, not

25 concerns, but if he has a concern, earlier I noted that during the course

1 of the proceedings we will be proving up these dates and that we're not

2 going to rely simply on the gentleman's memory, but this is merely to show

3 the gap of the events that happened from the first time to now, and so I

4 take the concern to heart and I'm sure I'm not telling the Prosecutor

5 something that he doesn't know or should know.

6 Q. Now, on the 14th of June, 1992, HVO liberated the east side of

7 Mostar.

8 A. Please let me just tell you this. You have a piece of paper in

9 front of you -- Just wait. Let me tell you. I'm not your slave here. I

10 lived through all that. I'm a victim of all that. I experienced it all,

11 and what I want to say is this: There was shelling every day. You have

12 before you a piece of paper and you say 3, 5, 4, 7. There was shelling

13 every day. I don't have a document in front of me, I don't have an

14 aide-memoire or anything like that, I assume that what you're saying is

15 correct, but we're not on a footing of equality and you're asking me

16 now --

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, sir, but the question was

18 not about the shelling of Sarajevo. You were in Sarajevo but not in

19 Mostar, and the Defence is asking you now whether on the 23rd of May

20 Mostar was in flames. So you either saw it on television or not. So say

21 yes or no. You were not there.

22 And then they said the 19th of June the HVO liberated Mostar. Do

23 you know this? Yes or no. If you do, say yes, if not, no, I don't know.

24 So you're not being asked about Sarajevo. For the moment, for the time

25 being, the questions refer to Mostar.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as the shelling of Mostar is

2 concerned, it was daily shelling. As for the liberation of Mostar, that

3 was one of the happiest, joyous moments that we experienced, all citizens

4 in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 MR. KARNAVAS:

6 Q. Thank you. Thank you for that. Now, we'll go to the 20th of

7 June, 1992. That's when we have the decision on pronouncement of state of

8 war. That would have been at the state level, no? So you would have been

9 a part of it, or aware of it?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. So -- so it takes at least the -- the state to react

12 several months and finally declare a pronouncement of state war after we

13 -- we've heard that Mostar has been in flame, you know, and heavily

14 damaged. Other parts of the country are -- have been shelled, like Siroki

15 Brijeg. The president has been detained and ransomed. You bypassed in

16 the meantime, and so on and so forth. So finally on the 20th of June, the

17 government, or the -- I should say the state, the Presidency, finally

18 pronounces a state of war. Right?

19 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, motion to strike. I make a motion to

20 strike the statement -- the speech by Mr. Karnavas from the record. We

21 don't seem to be making any other communication. He just continues doing

22 it, and I ask that the question be stricken from the record and then

23 Mr. Karnavas put a correct question to the witness.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, is the Prosecution doubting the events

25 that we just covered? I mean, he's been in the case for several years.

1 These are all facts, they're going to be proved in this court.

2 MR. SCOTT: It's a question of proper procedure, Your Honour.

3 It's a question of proper procedure. Pure and simple. This is not the

4 way that you put questions to a witness.

5 MR. KARNAVAS: I have one last question, Mr. President.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you gave us a

7 series of dates and then raised questions and asked the witness about

8 everything that had taken place over the space of several months. Now,

9 you should now come to a question which is a conclusion. So what is the

10 concluding question that you're going to ask the witness? A question with

11 a conclusion. We're going to listen and record what we're told. Perhaps

12 your dates have some logic, perhaps they don't. So ask your final

13 question and we'll see what happens, what the answer is.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. -- I was attempting to do that. I

15 did it inartfully.

16 Q. You indicated to us that Bosnia-Herzegovina was declared and

17 acknowledged to be independent as of April, April 6th, 1992. You stated

18 that and that's a fact, is it not, sir?

19 A. And you omitted to say that on the 22nd it became a member of the

20 United Nations, the 22nd of May, which was to change defence strategy.

21 Q. Be that as it may. And here we are in June 20th, 1992, when a

22 decision is pronounced on the state of war; correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And between those two periods we covered all of these events which

25 you acknowledged to either knowing -- personally knowing or knowing of;

1 the various shellings of Mostar, Siroki Brijeg, and other parts of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And then it's not -- and then on 3 July, 1992, that brings us to

5 the revision of the decision.

6 Now, one last question. At this point in time, in light of the

7 events, in light, as you have testified here today, that Sarajevo was

8 under siege, that the state institutions, some of them, were not

9 functioning, at least not to the extent that they should, some were not

10 providing the services that they could, Sarajevo was cut off from the rest

11 of the country and the rest of the country was cut off from Sarajevo. In

12 light of all these circumstances, is it your belief that the state could

13 still provide the necessary assurances to the people in the country and

14 the services that it needed to provide, or was it necessary for folks

15 outside of Sarajevo to self-manage themselves as they had been taught

16 under this 50-year policy, this military Doctrine of All People's Defence?

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So the question has

18 been properly formulated. Will you answer the question now, which is

19 obviously important in view of all the questions leading up to this one

20 final question.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The official powers and authority in

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina could not ensure the protection of all citizens.

23 However, when we became members of the United Nations, the United Nations

24 Charter was great encouragement for us, because it says there that if a

25 Member State is attacked, then the international community is duty-bound

1 to defend that State.

2 The second point is this: We were not able to declare a state of

3 war earlier until we had gathered up our defence potentials, because had

4 we declared a state of war, let's say in April, then we gave the Yugoslav

5 People's Army and the Chetnik volunteer units the right to shoot at us

6 legally, because for as long as we did not declare a state of war,

7 everything was irregular, and we didn't have the power to stand up to

8 them, because you must realise that throughout the month of May there was

9 the fight to pull out people from the barracks in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I

10 happened to take part in those negotiations. The Serbs and the JNA always

11 asked the Serb soldiers to be able to leave the barracks with dignity. We

12 let them leave, but we took their weapons away.

13 I don't want to tell you and go into detail what they did to those

14 weapons to make them -- to put them out of order, but we -- that's what we

15 did. We didn't have the necessary defence potential to be able to stand

16 up to the other side, and that is why we procrastinated with this

17 declaration of war.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine, but you don't quite answer

19 the question, because the question was a very specific question. Was this

20 situation to lead to their own -- to the protection of some people who

21 were to find the way in which to protect themselves? Public services were

22 not working. Sarajevo was under siege. The Serbs were everywhere, and

23 there was shelling. Does this not mean that the Croats had to take

24 certain steps?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, not only the Croats but all

1 citizens who were able to organise themselves, and it was quite normal to

2 expect that.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you answer the question by

4 saying all citizens had to get organised.

5 THE WITNESS: [Previous translation continues] ... been a good

6 thing had everybody organised themselves, but you must differentiate

7 between citizens firing at us and citizens defending themselves. Those

8 who were firing were well organised.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, we are reaching

10 the end.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, we have, and I don't want to keep the -- the

12 translators any longer. I need about another hour, hour and 15 minutes

13 with the gentleman. I have four chapters. I suspect that we can deal

14 with this when we see the gentleman again. They are critical, but they're

15 not -- they shouldn't take too long. And I will try to, in the meantime,

16 be -- to streamline my questioning, but as you could see, it takes a while

17 to get to the point, but I think we've covered the major difficult issues,

18 and I'll try to readjust my questioning so that perhaps Mr. Scott will not

19 have the concerns that he had today, and I'll take on board his

20 observations.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I think if you

22 streamline your questions you should also discuss this with the other

23 Defence counsel, because perhaps some issues were to -- were going to be

24 raised by some other Defence counsel. There's no point in repeating the

25 same questions. So if they intended putting the question, you better

1 check that out with them.

2 So we have to now finish the hearing. Witness, you will have to

3 be called back. During the month of August and September, are there days

4 where you cannot come to the Tribunal or are you available at any time?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can't give you an answer to

6 that now. When I go back home I shall have to consult my diary and see

7 what commitments I have. You know that the pre-election campaign is

8 coming up. I'm an advisor, an assistant, I'm not an active participant,

9 but I will take part in it. And then, of course, there is the holidays.

10 My wife is a physician. She -- her job is not as flexible. She has to

11 take her annual holiday at a given period of time, but I'm sure we will be

12 able to find a date that is suitable to all of us, and you could perhaps

13 propose two or three dates and I will do my best to come.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott is on his feet. He

15 certainly had a number of dates to suggest. What kind of dates were you

16 going to suggest?

17 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. The calendar is full,

18 actually, as it now stands, for August, for reasons -- I won't go into all

19 the names in open session - it may or not be a problem - but the first

20 available time would be the week of the 4th of -- the week of the 4th of

21 September, Your Honour. That would be the first date, and then I suppose

22 it could be the following week as well. The 4th -- the week of the 4th,

23 the week of the 11th. Obviously the Prosecution needs to know as soon as

24 possible as well so we can schedule other witnesses around that.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: And Mr. President, I would ask that we have a full

1 day. So if we could have, like, four sessions, just to be on the safe

2 side. So -- it's a long trip. So we can -- it doesn't matter if it's

3 three hours or five hours, I understand it's the same inconvenience.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, we would have to start on

5 a Monday. In an ideal situation, I think if we start on a Monday -- I

6 think the 4th is a Monday, and I think the 11th is a Monday. Are you

7 unable to come on the 4th of September or the 11th of September?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I -- I can't on the 4th, not at all.

9 As for the 11th, I will see, or I'll propose a different date; the 18th,

10 perhaps, or the 25th, and I will let your office know in Sarajevo.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, the problem is we have to

12 work out our schedule beforehand. This is rather difficult sometimes, so

13 we have to -- if you tell us that you can come on the 4th, fine. If you

14 tell us on the 11th, fine. But you have just said that you cannot come on

15 the 4th. So let's assume you can come on the 11th.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know. I would suggest

17 after the 1st of October, if possible, because then I will be free.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All right. The office in

19 Sarajevo will tell you when to come back. I would like to thank you. I

20 wish you a safe journey home.

21 And we shall all reconvene next week on Monday at a quarter past

22 2.00. I'd like to thank you all.

23 [The witness stands down]

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.43 p.m.,

25 to be reconvened on Monday, the 3rd day

1 of July, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.

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