1 Monday, 26 March 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 [The Accused Pusic not present in court]
6 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
10 IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you Mr. Registrar.
12 Let me greet the Prosecution bench. Good afternoon, Mr. Witness.
13 You appeared before us several weeks ago. My greetings to the Defence
14 counsel, to the accused. There is still one who is not totally recovered.
15 I hope he will be with us very soon.
16 Let me give the floor to Mr. Registrar for some IC numbers.
17 THE REGISTRAR: OTP has submitted a lot of documents to be
18 tendered through Ferida Likic; the list shall be given IC number 508.
19 Thank you, Your Honours.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you. The --
21 we're going to he resume with the witness's cross-examination. With
22 regard to time allotted, at the time we had given 45 minutes for each of
23 the Defence teams for cross-examination purposes, all together 240
24 minutes. As to that -- as to the time used until now, 118 minutes, 47,
25 for 5D, 32 minutes for 1D, 21 for 2D, and 18 minutes for the 3D team.
1 Mr. Praljak, in other words. So you still have 122 minutes. Let me
2 remind you if you refer to incidents 8 and 14 of the report you'll have to
3 ask to move into private session since you would be dealing then with
4 protected witnesses.
5 This is all I had to say. I believe that it is now Mr. Praljak
6 who must continue with the cross-examination.
7 WITNESS: PATRICK VAN DER WEIJDEN [Resumed]
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honour.
10 Cross-examination by the Accused Praljak:
12 Q. Good afternoon, Witness. May I kindly ask you at the very
13 beginning since I'm going to deal with the technical aspect of your
14 expertise, trajectories, angles, speed, velocity of the bullet, entry and
15 exit wounds, I would appreciate it if your answers to it my technical
16 questions could be as short as possible. If the question is clearly
17 phrased, I would like your answer to be brief because I am under certain
18 time limitations, and we do have to cover quite a number of incidents.
19 Thank you very much in advance.
20 May I now kindly ask for 3D 00849. 3D 00849.
21 In your earlier testimony you said that you did not properly
22 inspect the house on Stotina from which there was a sniper shooting, in
23 your opinion because there were mines around, and I am therefore producing
24 a record on the removal of mines from the area around the building and
25 inside the building. It's 3D 00849. My question is, did you know that
1 that area was de-mined, according to all regulations, that it was handed
2 over, taken over as de-mined and that the de-mining enterprise was paid
3 for by the government of the Netherlands?
4 A. No, I was not.
5 Q. We still can't see the document -- oh, yes, it is here. I won't
6 go on about this. This document shows everything that is necessary to
7 prove that that area de-mined. The date is 9 September, 2004. But let us
8 move on.
9 You did not inquire in the proper place whether the -- this
10 location was de-mined or not, cleared for mines?
11 A. We inquired at the -- the field office in Sarajevo as to whether
12 the area -- there were dangerous areas still in the vicinity of Mostar.
13 Q. Thank you. I should now like to move to another incident,
14 documents 3D 00768. Again, 3D 00768. Give me just a second. Incident
15 number 9. It involves a boy of around 14 who was hit in Orucevica street,
16 Donja Mahala neighbourhood. You have drawn a sketch here and I would like
17 quickly to go through the technical aspects of this.
18 You say that the distance from Stotina was 470 metres; is that
20 A. That is the distance that I measured with the laser range finder,
22 Q. All right. Please, let us note the initial velocity of the
23 bullet. Do you agree that calibre 7.62 times 51 millimetre has the
24 initial velocity of 860 metres per second?
25 A. That depends on the rifle, but it would be just around the right
2 Q. Do you agree that calibre 70 -- sorry, 7.9 times 57 millimetres in
3 an M-76 sniper rifle has the initial velocity of the bullet of 730 metres
4 per second?
5 A. I wouldn't be able to know that out of my head right now at this
7 Q. All right. I read the information from the technical
8 specification attached, and that is verifiable.
9 My next question: The last time I showed you a table, an Eberhard
10 and Hinbert [phoen] table where the median velocity where running of a
11 14-year-old boy is 4 metres per second or thereabouts. Do you agree with
13 A. I think that would be a fair conclusion.
14 Q. Can we further agree that the time the bullet takes from leaving
15 the barrel, and according to the speeds I've read, crosses the distance of
16 470 metres in .6 to .7 [Realtime transcript read in error,"2.7"] seconds?
17 A. That would be about the right time, yes.
18 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we have a problem with
19 the record, line 15, page 4. The question was from .6 to .7 seconds,
20 whereas the record says .6 to 2.7. That needs to be corrected now.
21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Now, Witness, could you please answer, if the boy appears on the
23 corner and crosses 2 metres in .5 seconds until the spot where he was hit,
24 so he crosses 2 metres in half a second, and the bullet takes .6 or .7
25 seconds until that same spot from the moment that it was ejected from the
1 barrel, how can these two bodies meet at the same spot at two different
2 times? We have a technical problem there. And the problem is the boy,
3 of .6 or .7 seconds would not be in that spot even if we set aside the
4 time necessary to locate a target, to aim at a target, and pull the
6 A. It is indeed difficult to hit a target moving at that speed at
7 that distance, but it's -- with anticipation it is still possible. And if
8 I make a comparison to a shooting range where you have pop-up targets that
9 are operated radiographically or manually, they will get up, but if -- if
10 you've been on the shooter range for a longer time you would still be able
11 to -- you know the exact location where the target will appear, and if you
12 shoot the target it falls away, it will swing up again. If you start
13 shooting when the target is still down, the bullet will be there when the
14 target is coming up and hitting the target again. So it is possible with
15 anticipation, but it is difficult.
16 Q. Please, what does anticipation mean unless it is blind shooting?
17 According to my technical data, it means that somebody fired before having
18 seen the target. Is that correct?
19 A. In a way it is. Anticipation in this incident would be that the
20 shooter who might have been at the -- shooting location for a longer time
21 would have known -- would have seen people moving the same -- along the
22 same path time and time again, so he will know when someone looks around
23 the corner to see if it's clear and will then move. He will know that --
24 his target will move in that direction. So it's not a -- it's still a
25 very lucky shot to hit the target, but it's -- it's possible, and that's
1 what I mean with anticipation.
2 Q. Please, sir. We're talking about technical data here. The bullet
3 left the barrel and on the assumption that he had seen the boy, that the
4 shooters had seen the boy, the bullet would have reached that spot in .1
5 to .2 seconds?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Please tell me, how much time does a sniper need to locate a
8 target, to aim at it, and pull the trigger? How much time does that
9 require for a moving target?
10 A. Approximately one second.
11 Q. So 1 second and 6/10ths. So aiming at a non-existing target, the
12 shooter fired and the bullet and the boy met after the boy started
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Thank you. I would like to pull the next picture that deals with
16 the same problem. The same number, just the next sheet, please.
17 Please have a look. No, no, no. The next page, please. We've
18 seen this page. Next page, please. No, I mean my drawing, my drawing.
19 MR. KOVACIC: There was a misunderstanding. The previous one,
20 which was on ...
21 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
22 Q. While this is being put on the screen, do you remember that the
23 boy sustained an entry and exit wound in the left side of his stomach, the
24 exit side being on the back, again on the left side of the boy's body, but
25 it was absolutely parallel. The entry and exit wound was absolutely
1 parallel to the ground level, and the boy was hit on the left side of his
2 stomach, and the exit wound is on the right side of his back in the
3 abdominal area.
4 Can we turn the page that shows this. The same exhibit number,
5 next page. I will use up too much time this way.
6 While this is -- no, no, not this one. Can we please put this
7 sheet on the ELMO.
8 Look at this photograph, the photograph clearly shows that it's
9 the left side of the stomach, and the -- there is a wound on the right
10 side of the boy's back. In fact, he is a young man now who appeared in
11 this courtroom earlier.
12 Do you agree that the entry wound is on the left side of the
13 stomach and the exit wound is on the left side of his back?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Could we now see the drawing that I produced, the next page.
16 Could you please put it on the ELMO. No, no, the next one. Just turn
17 that page. No. Please take the sheet that I'm holding. We have seen it
18 before. I don't understand how it can't be produced again.
19 Please, Witness, look. Does this correctly depict the movement of
20 the boy from that corner forward? Is that correctly drawn?
21 A. That would be an assumption because he was moving from one corner
22 to the other, but he had to move around the fence that is in my drawing.
23 So he would be moving around it. So it wouldn't be a straight path but
24 just -- but -- it would be the direction that he was moving, yes?
25 Q. Okay. So it was not to -- completely straight line, but the
1 direction is shown directly, isn't it? It was at a right angle to the
2 trajectory of the bullet, if the bullet was coming from Stotina. Could we
3 agree that the bullet was coming from the right side as juxtaposed to the
4 movement of the boy?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Is it possible, and if it is possible, how, if the movement of the
7 boy was at a right angle to the trajectory of the bullet for the wound to
8 be on the left side of the stomach? According to the laws of physics and
9 geometry, is that possible?
10 A. If the boy was moving exactly without turning to that, then it
11 would be impossible, yes.
12 Q. Of course we can speculate that the boy may be stopped or turned,
13 but the boy was running, knowing that it was dangerous ground. He had
14 four metres to cover, and he did run those four metres. That's what he
15 testified. If that is correct, then it would be impossible for a bullet
16 coming from his right to inflict a wound on the left side of his stomach.
17 Can we agree on that?
18 A. It would be very unlikely.
19 Q. Could we now see 3D 00847. In particular, photograph 3D 23-0245.
20 3D 23-0245.
21 Witness, do you see on this photograph this boy, who is now a
22 young man, showing the exact spot of his exit wound? Can you see that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Is that the left side of his back?
25 A. It is.
1 Q. Thank you. In conclusion, can we agree that it is much more
2 likely, in fact it is the only likely possibility from all we know, that
3 the bullet came from the opposite direction and that only a bullet coming
4 from the opposite direction could have hit the boy, moving as he was, in
5 the left side of his stomach and exited on the same side through the back?
6 A. No, I am not of that opinion.
7 Q. You are not of the opinion that the boy was running towards the
9 A. No. If the direction that the bullet originated from was exactly
10 the opposite side, it would be at the wall -- the shooter would have to be
11 against the wall three metres away from the victim, which seems to me very
12 unlikely. If you -- if you look at the -- my sketch, the layout of the --
13 of the incident site --
14 Q. On your sketch we clearly see that the street towards which he
15 wanted to run is a very open space and that at the moment he was hit he
16 had already cleared the wall. You don't agree with my proposition, or
17 maybe you agree that the bullet could have come only from the direction in
18 which the boy was moving, straight forward into that street. Yes or no?
19 We'll move on.
20 A. [Microphone not activated].
21 Thank you very much. Can we now move on to incident number 2.
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, there is no answer recorded in the
23 transcript. I don't know whether there was any, but it should be recorded
24 in that case.
25 THE WITNESS: My answer was no.
1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. That was not recorded.
2 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Can we please have 3D 00765.
3 Q. This is incident number 2, which is at Gojka Vukovica Street. A
4 water tank truck was hit. Please have a look. At Gojka Vukovica Street
5 in front of two buildings, you drew the water tank truck as having been
6 parked in front of the second building, looking toward the north, and that
7 the bullet arrived from Stotina. Is that correct? Is this consistent
8 with your sketch?
9 A. That is correct.
10 Q. You calculated the coordinates at which this took place. My
11 question is as follows: According to you, the corner of the right-hand
12 building, the -- the building in its height, did it obstruct the view
13 towards Stotina? You did not take that corner of the street -- corner of
14 the building into account, but when you were visiting the site were you
15 able to see the place where the water tank truck was parked from Stotina?
16 A. No, I was not.
17 Q. Do you know that the witness testifying about this event drew the
18 water tank truck as having been marked more to the south, in front of the
19 first building, in fact?
20 A. The building that you mean -- described in your sketch with A? Is
21 that the first building?
22 Q. No. You drew the water tank truck in front of that building,
23 whereas the boy drew the water tank truck as having been parked in front
24 of the building I marked as B. Are you aware of the fact that you and the
25 witness had quite the opposite opinions as to where the water tank truck
1 was at the time?
2 A. No, I was not. I -- the information that I had and the exact spot
3 that was pointed out to me by the investigator on the scene was the
4 location that I drew in my sketch.
5 Q. Very well. Thank you. Could we please turn to the second sheet
6 of the same document, my sketch.
7 Here. Have a look. The place where the boy marked the water tank
8 as having been parked is drawn in red, and we see your sketch of the water
9 tank as well. The difference in altitude between the water tank truck cab
10 and the point Z at Stotina, are you aware of it? Do you know what the
11 difference in altitude is between the water tank and the house at Stotina
12 from which, to your knowledge, the water tank was fired at? Do you know
13 the difference? Did you calculate it?
14 A. I only calculated the elevation from my location, of the location
15 that I had for the water truck. So I didn't have the difference in
16 altitude for the location where the boy said his -- the water truck was.
17 Q. Sir, could you please give me specific answers. My question is
18 quite specific.
19 Do you know the difference in altitude from -- between the place
20 where the water tank was and Stotina? Do you or do you not?
21 A. No, I do not.
22 Q. Thank you. Could we please pull up document 3D 00756 on our
23 screens. 3D 00756.
24 I will show you a host of photographs I asked to be taken at the
25 time when we were having a recess in the proceedings. This photograph was
1 taken from the point where the boy said the water tank truck was parked,
2 in front of the first building, facing Stotina. Can you see -- can one
3 observe Stotina from this spot?
4 A. No, I don't see Stotina on this photo.
5 Q. Do you agree with me that if we move the water tank truck back,
6 the building will obstruct the view of Stotina, which cannot be seen as it
7 is anyway, even more? Therefore, if we move to the spot where you said
8 where the water tank was, will we not obstruct the possible view of
9 Stotina even more?
10 A. No. It will be -- if the truck would be moving away, the angle
11 would be towards -- Stotina will be smaller, and therefore it would be
12 more likely for the target to be visible.
13 Q. Your answer was entered in the transcript, although it goes
14 against the elementary rules of geometry.
15 Let's have 3D 2205 -- or, rather, 0657. That's the next
17 This photograph was taken from Stotina, from the forward left part
18 of it. Do you see the two buildings up front? No, this is 743. I would
19 like us to show 3D 22-0765, although we can stay with this one. 743, yes.
20 Look at this photograph. Do you see the two buildings in front of which
21 the water tank was parked as we see them? Can you in any way see a water
22 tank parked in front of the two buildings to our right as you are looking
23 at the spot now?
24 A. With respect, I don't see the area where the truck is supposed to
25 be. It's too -- is not enough detail to distinguish the buildings for me.
1 Q. You have cypress trees there, but I see you can't tell. Well, can
2 we have document 3D 00845. It will make the exercise somewhat easier. 3D
4 On that photograph you will see the building at Stotina -- or,
5 rather, the house that was constantly referred to as the place where the
6 sniper shooter was located. You see, I went my investigators out afield,
7 and I asked them to climb the ladder up to the window that could best be
8 used as the shooting position. Do you recognise the building?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. Could we have this document bearing the same number and photograph
11 number 0235. 0235. From the position where the gentleman standing on the
12 ladder was, the camera faced the opposite side, i.e., the place where the
13 water tank was located. Can you recognise on this photograph behind the
14 Cyprus trees those two white buildings in front of which in are view water
15 tank that was hit was located?
16 A. I would just -- just one question, because you said just two
17 minutes ago that the photos were taken -- the first photo you shown was
18 from the left side of the building and this is from the right side of the
19 building. So this is -- these photos are taken from the right window on
20 the first floor.
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. Okay. I --
23 Q. This position is much more appropriate to achieve the hit, because
24 the more we move to the right the more the view is obstructed. And as we
25 move to the left we see the back side of the buildings. So I tried to
1 move to the right-hand side to see whether from the further-most
2 right-hand side window one could see the location or not.
3 Let's look at the photograph again. Do you recognise the
5 A. I recognise the cypress trees and the buildings behind it, yes.
6 Q. Mr. Prlic tells me that the transcript contains an error. The
7 more we move to the left-hand side within the building at Stotina the less
8 likely are we to see the buildings on the right. Do you agree with me?
9 A. Yes, I agree.
10 Q. Could we look at photograph 236 now. My investigators took the
11 necessary steps, which was they took a tele-photo lens and tried to take
12 photographs zooming in the spot where the water tank should have been. Do
13 you recognise now behind the cypress trees the two buildings we've been
14 referring to?
15 A. Yes, I do.
16 Q. Could we have photograph 238. 238. This is the photograph taken
17 with the use of the objective lens, and is it clear to you now, sir, that
18 if the water tank had been located in front of that building that was
19 further away it was quite unlikely for that spot to have been observable
20 from the Stotina building?
21 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Praljak please repeat the last part of
22 his question.
23 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
24 Q. The water tank at the location where you placed it, would you have
25 seen it from this spot?
1 A. From the location that I took the photograph, which was also on
2 the right-hand side in front of the window in a direct line from the
3 window to the incident site, which produced the photo that I provided in
4 the report, which shows for me that the target would have -- of the water
5 truck would have been visible in front of the second building.
6 So from your pictures I would say it would be very difficult to
7 see the target from that location, but from my pictures that I took, it
8 would be very visible.
9 Q. Sir, please take a look at your photograph at page 12 of the
10 Croatian version. Look at your photograph, and please explain to me what
11 your photograph shows. It doesn't show either of the two buildings, nor
12 does anyone know what the photograph shows, which section of the street.
13 Your photograph does not show either of the two buildings, and it is quite
14 unclear as to what in fact you took the photograph of. Would you agree
15 with me?
16 A. No, I don't.
17 Q. Tell me, please, what did you take the photograph of? Which
18 section of the street? If we can't see the section in front of the
19 buildings where the water tank was located, what do we in fact see here?
20 A. As you -- as you've shown me -- shown to me a while ago the
21 cypress you see in the -- on the left corner of my photograph, it's the
22 same cypress that's visible on the right side of photo 0238, but my photo
23 shows more of the street, and it tries to show the exact incident site.
24 So the trees you see that fill the left side of the street are the trees
25 in front of the two buildings.
1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Could we please be shown the picture the witness
2 has taken, because we do not have it on the screen.
3 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] In the witness's material,
4 that's at page 12 of his report, in the Croatian version, that is.
5 MR. MUNDIS: For the record - sorry, Your Honour - it's P 09808.
6 P 09808 in the report. It's page 12 on the hard copy or page 13 in
8 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, sir.
9 Q. Here is the photograph you took, sir. On this photograph, we
10 can't see the buildings in front of which, according to your knowledge or
11 the witness's knowledge, the water tank was located. Is that right?
12 A. That's -- that's true.
13 Q. How are we able to know what it is you wanted to show on this
14 photograph unless you also include in the photograph the place where the
15 water tank was parked? You obviously took the photograph of the front
16 part of the street where the water tank was not parked; is that right?
17 A. I took the photograph of the location from -- in front of the
18 house of Stotina toward the location where I -- where my information said
19 the water truck was located, which is shown by the arrow, case number 2.
20 Q. Very well. Can you please tell me where is the building on the
21 left-hand side which you drew in the earlier sketch? Where is it? In the
22 earlier sketch you drew the water tank in front of one building and there
23 is another one next to it, and here, quite arbitrarily, you showed the
24 spot where some other water tank was located but certainly not the one
25 from the earlier sketch; is that right?
1 A. No, that's not true. The buildings start to -- to appear in the
2 left-hand side just beyond the -- the cypress and more to the left. So
3 the buildings are not visible. What is visible is the garden that is
4 visible on -- that I've drawn into my sketch, which is marked by the trees
5 in the photograph. The reason why the buildings are not visible is
6 because I took the photo through a pair of binoculars, laser range
7 finders, which narrowed the field of view but give a very detailed picture
8 of the exact incident site.
9 Q. Sir, we disagree fully, because the buildings cannot be seen on
10 this photograph. They are to the far left. You can agree with me or not,
11 but I will tell you that the place that you drew on the sketch as the
12 place where the water tank was is certainly not depicted in this
13 photograph. Now, would you agree or disagree with me?
14 A. I disagree.
15 Q. Very well. Can we have 3D 00771. 3D 00771. This refers to two
16 incidents, namely incident number 8 and 14. These two incidents -- yes,
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You only deal with technical
19 details. There's no need for a private session otherwise.
20 Yes, Mr. Mundis?
21 MR. MUNDIS: I was just making the same point, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Mundis.
23 So, Mr. Praljak, please continue.
24 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will be
25 dealing with technical matters from the expertise alone. I simply want to
1 show the way in which the expertise was done.
2 Q. These two events or incidents took at Brace Brkica Street, could
3 we please see 3D 00771.
4 THE REGISTRAR: I'm sorry to interrupt, but this document hasn't
5 been released in e-court. If it could be released, then ...
6 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Give me a moment, please.
7 3D -- very well. Let's look at page 34.
8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] According to my information, 3D 771
9 is something that should be in e-court, but you can place it on the ELMO.
10 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] No, no. This is not it.
11 This is not it. I will give you my copy, please. Perhaps I made a
12 mistake. Who knows. Perhaps we can deal with 3D 771 later. I made a
13 mistake there.
14 Q. Sir, there were two incidents that took place there at the
15 sidewalk next to the intersection between Marsala Tita and Brace Brkica
16 Streets; is that right?
17 A. That's right.
18 Q. Do you agree with the way the incidents were marked, because one
19 took place in the vicinity of the other.
20 A. Yes, I agree.
21 Q. Very well. Can we please have 3D 00844 shown. And then
22 photograph 3D 23-0206. 0206. 3D 00844, photograph 0206.
23 Do you know that what we see in the foreground is Brace Brkica
24 Street, and the street running parallel to the brown building is Marsala
25 Tita Street?
1 A. Yes, I know.
2 Q. Can we please have the next photograph, 207. 207. Is this the
3 spot where the two incidents took place on the sidewalk right here?
4 A. Well, it didn't look exactly same location, but it was in the
5 vicinity of this location, yes.
6 Q. Can you tell us in what vicinity -- what was the vicinity of the
7 two incidents? Can you draw and mark on this map where the two incidents
8 took place? If you're not able to, we can move on. We've already dealt
9 with this. We don't have to go back to it. If you know, fine. If you
10 don't, fine again.
11 A. I would need a different photograph.
12 Q. Can we please have photograph 209 -- or, rather, sorry, 208, 208.
13 To your knowledge, was this photograph taken exactly from the spot
14 where the incident took place?
15 A. This would be the exact location of incident 14.
16 Q. Thank you. Could we now have photograph 211.
17 From this same spot a number of photographs were taken with an
18 objective lens toward the direction where the two men were hit at
19 different times. Is that the same photograph depicting the scene of the
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Could we have photograph 212, and could 213 be prepared. 212.
23 Sir, can you see Hotel Bristol here?
24 A. Yes, I can.
25 Q. Can you see -- we've already discussed under whose control Hotel
1 Bristol was, but do you see a single spot from which -- I mean, any spot
2 under the control of the Croatian Defence Council, from which it was
3 possible to shoot at a spot where two persons were hit? Do you see a
4 single building controlled by the HVO at the time of the conflict in
5 Mostar that provides the possibility for shooting at the spot where two
6 persons were hit? Yes or no? Or maybe you don't know.
7 A. I don't know, yes.
8 Q. All right. Photograph 213, even closer up. 213.
9 Have a look. Do you know that all the buildings we see here were
10 under the control of the BH army at the time of the conflicts in Mostar?
11 If you don't know, that's good enough.
12 A. I don't know. I didn't know.
13 Q. Can we now please have photograph 214. It's a whole series of
14 photographs that I had made from the Spanish Square and possible shooting
15 from the Spanish Square from the crowns of trees or maybe from a platform
16 or a ladder, or a platform provided by a truck. Do you recognise this
17 spot? We see a high school there and the Bulevar.
18 A. I recognise the Spanish Square, yes.
19 Q. Do you know that the left side of that photograph is an area held
20 by the BH army at the time of the conflicts? You see those devastated
21 buildings, that side.
22 A. I do know.
23 Q. Now the next photograph would be 215. They were taken
24 anti-clockwise. The next one is 215. So we are moving towards the
25 location of the incident, the possible incident, and this is a street
1 leading towards Marsal Tito bridge. Do you recognise it? Do you know it
2 was under BH army control?
3 A. No, I did not.
4 Q. 216, please. Do you recognise this area? It's the street leading
5 towards Marsal Tito bridge and further on to the area where the incidents
6 took place. Is it possible to see the location of the incident in any way
7 from here?
8 A. From that exact location, no, it's not possible.
9 Q. To speed up things a little we'll skip a number of photographs,
10 but they can stay on file. Let's move on to 221.
11 This photograph faces west. It's taken from the same spot as the
12 ones before. The area controlled by the HVO. Do you recognise that it is
13 the Spanish Square and that the camera is facing west?
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. Photograph 221, please, now -- sorry, 222. This photograph will
16 again show part of the high school, the camera facing west, and we see a
17 long alley of trees in Mostar from a place where you concluded there could
18 have been a platform providing a good view for shooting. Do you recognise
19 the area?
20 A. I recognise the area, but this is not the area that I indicated as
21 the origin of fire. The area that I indicated was in 3D 23-0220 and 0221.
22 Q. We'll get to that. Photograph 223, please. And could 224 be on
23 stand-by, please.
24 On photograph 223, since you mentioned in your testimony the
25 crowns of trees where the shooter could have been, I placed my man on top
1 of a ladder. Do you see the man on the ladder?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Next photograph, please. It was taken from the spot where the man
4 atop a ladder was. Photograph 224, facing east. Does the photograph show
5 abundantly clearly that this spot where the plain trees were does not
6 provide a view of the site of the incidents at all?
7 A. No, this location doesn't provide a -- a view of the incident
9 Q. Thank you. Photograph 225, please, which is only closer up, the
10 same thing. Is it even more clear here that from that spot it was
11 impossible to shoot towards the incident site?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Photograph 227, please. 227. I placed my man next on a very tall
14 ladder, and the location is now such that the Spanish Square is on the
15 right. Do you see the man on the ladder?
16 A. Yes, I do.
17 Q. From that spot a number of photographs were taken. 228, please,
18 then 229. A whole series of photographs, and they all face the incident
19 site. The purpose was to see if the incident site was visible even from a
20 platform, from an elevated position, even if we set aside the fact that
21 the war was going on at the time and there was the front line between the
22 two warring factions in the middle.
23 Is it possible to shoot at Brace Brkica Street from here?
24 A. From this location it's not possible.
25 Q. Next photograph, please, closer up, 230. Do you see that it's
1 simply impossible to see the incident site because the street is a
2 meandering one?
3 A. From the location that this photo was taken it is impossible to
4 see the location of the incident.
5 Q. Thank you. Photograph 232, please. The cameraman had the task to
6 establish whether it was possible to see the incident site from any spot
7 at all, the Spanish Square or anywhere else, so he kept moving further to
8 the right. Do you see the man?
9 A. I see the man on the ladder.
10 Q. The last photograph, 233. Do you see that even from this location
11 we do not have a view of the incident site?
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. Since we had certain witness statements, can you agree with what
14 I'm going to say now: There was not a single location under HVO control
15 that made it possible to shoot at the incident site in Brace Brkica
16 Street, 1814 [as interpreted]? Not a single spot provided a view of the
17 man at incident site number 8 or number 14?
18 A. I don't agree.
19 Q. So that the sniper would be in any spot located in a site under
20 HVO control? Why don't you agree? Where in that case, according to you,
21 was the sniper located?
22 A. As I've mentioned in the report, the photo that I took of the
23 incident site where the -- the red building, or the red-brown building, is
24 clearly visible with the markings 1904, that building is clearly visible
25 in my picture, and I haven't seen it -- I've only seen the top half
1 visible in some of the pictures provide by you.
2 I took the photograph from the platform in the direction of Brace
3 Brkica Street towards the incident site, and in my photograph it is
4 possible to get a view of the incident sites, especially if you're go on a
5 slightly higher level.
6 Q. Let's look at your photo on page 26 of the Croatian version of
7 your report. Look at it. I'm not saying from where you can see a certain
8 building. I'm asking you to show me the exact spot in which in your
9 opinion the sniper shooter was looking at the man located in the way we
10 have heard they were located in incident number 8 or 14. Look at your own
11 photograph. In my personal view, it shows absolutely nothing. It's on
12 page 26 of the report, the Croatian version. It's not the one, but again
13 that's the photograph you took.
14 Next photograph. Raise it a bit. Further up, please.
15 Now, tell me, what do we see on this photograph? Do we see the
16 spot where two men were hit?
17 A. As I've said before, it's -- it shows all the surroundings of the
18 exact incident site, but I wasn't able -- at that time I wasn't able to go
19 to a more elevated position. My photo was taken from above approximately
20 two metres of height. If I would be at a position two metres higher, I
21 would get a clear view of the incident site.
22 Q. I'm not asking you, sir, what you were able to do. I'm asking you
23 if we can see on this photograph the spot where people were hit. Can you
24 tell me from which exact location you photographed this?
25 I put it to you that you were not able to photograph this from
1 Spanish Square, number one; and number two, I put it to you that this
2 photograph does not show the spot where the people were hit.
3 A. This photograph is taken from exactly the same position that is
4 shown in the picture of page 39 of my copy, the other photo that's
5 included, some two pages. It's with both cases. That is 20 -- 25 and 39.
6 It's the same picture. That is the exact location from where I took the
7 picture towards the incidents sites. The man behind the -- the laser
8 range finder is the investigator on scene. And the concrete structure you
9 see behind this, the one that's also visible in the pictures you provided.
10 Q. But, sir, the building on the left, the left building that we see,
11 and the Judges will make the comparison, does not depict the left building
12 on the corner of Marsala Tita and Brace Brkica Street. This
13 secessionistic style of architecture or whatever it is doesn't have
14 anything to do with the corner of Brace Brkica Street that is relevant.
15 Do you claim that what you photographed is the corner of Marsala
16 Tita street and Brace Brkica Street? Is that the corner?
17 A. The location where the arrow is pointing, that's an exact
18 location. The old building on the left-hand side it's the same building
19 as the old building in 3D 23-0211, the old building with the shed in front
20 and the roof of the -- angled roof of the shed is also visible in my
22 Q. All right. I will leave it to the Trial Chamber to analyse and
23 compare, but my assertion is that the building we see on the left here is
24 not the building on that corner.
25 I have one more matter for you.
1 Can you please place this on the ELMO. Meanwhile, can we have 3D
2 00771 ready, and we'll deal with this one very briefly.
3 With incident number 2, you calculated east as 17 degrees, 49
4 minutes, and 9.-something seconds, whereas incident 3 is 17 degrees, 98
5 minutes and .2 seconds.
6 I did some reckoning myself. Do you agree that 1 minute has 60
7 seconds in sphere geometry, and 1 degree is 60 minutes?
8 A. Yes, that's correct.
9 Q. Is it true that the equator is about 40.000 kilometres long, which
10 means a half of the equator is 20.000 kilometres? And when we divide it
11 into 180 degrees, which is the amount we have from Greenwich towards the
12 east, it turns out that 1 degree is approximately 100 kilometres. Do you
13 agree with that?
14 A. Yes, I do.
15 Q. And if 100 kilometres are divided into 60 minutes, then it's --
16 then 1 minute is approximately 1.7 kilometres.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Is it then correct that if an incident has 49 minutes and another
19 98 minutes - could we scroll down a bit? - that the difference is around
20 15 minutes, and 15 minutes multiplied by 1.7 kilometres is around 75 -- 85
21 kilometres, the difference between two incident sites? Is my arithmetics
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. I'm asking you, how could you have made such a major error if the
25 incidents were 85 kilometres away from one another? How can an expert
1 make such a major error in view of the distance from Greenwich?
2 A. It's a writing error.
3 Q. But the GPS system you used, do you know what the standard margin
4 of error it has in --
5 JUDGE PRANDLER: I'm sorry, very sorry. We haven't received the
6 answer from the witness previously, so be so kind to repeat it again to
7 the -- I mean, your answer to the previous question. Actually, it is by
8 Mr. Praljak. Thank you.
9 THE WITNESS: I understand. It was probably a writing error.
10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] For the record, Your Honour, page
11 26, line 23, you still have it on your screens, it says the distance --
12 the difference is 15 minutes, whereas in fact Mr. Praljak's question
13 referred to 5-0, 50 minutes' difference.
14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation]
15 Q. My next question, Witness, is this: Before measuring by GPS, did
16 you know what is the standard margin of error for your device?
17 A. The standard margin of error for my personal GPS is five metres.
18 Q. You think. Do you know or do you think?
19 A. I know.
20 Q. How long ahead of your measuring did you check the GPS device when
21 you calibrated it or standardised it?
22 A. Well, the GPS -- the GPS coordinates were provided me by the
23 Prosecutors. I didn't always use my GPS to measure the exact location.
24 Some were -- some were -- I took as GPS and some were pointed out to me by
25 the investigator on scene, according to the DVD.
1 Q. Thank you. Can we have 3D 00 --
2 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Excuse me, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to have a break.
4 The time has come for a break. It's 20 to 4.00. We will resume at 4.00.
5 --- Recess taken at 3.42 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 4.03 p.m.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Okay. We can start again. As
8 far as time is concern, I was told that there's -- Defence still has 42
9 minutes, but I've understood that 4D needed 10 minutes, and 6D, I don't
10 know. So, Mr. Praljak, you know exactly what you need to know now.
11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I'm
12 sorry that we're unable to go through all these incidents properly, but I
13 will go as far as I can.
14 Can we look at incident 1, 3D 00771?
15 Q. Here we have a man who was hit from the distance of 760 metres in
16 his leg according to this sketch. Sir, do you see the sketch?
17 A. Yes, I do.
18 Q. The spot where the man was hit in his leg in relation to the
19 direction of the bullet was at the alpha angle, which is roughly 45
20 degrees, wasn't it?
21 A. I wasn't able to conclude that from my information.
22 Q. Could we turn to the next page, please. We will see the
23 photograph where the witness told us -- and this is the photograph from
24 the same bundle. Look at the anatomy of a person from the back, as the
25 witness shows us how he was hit while he was standing next to the wall.
1 He was hit in the back above the knee. That was where the entry wound
2 was. And the exit wound was at the parallel -- or, rather, was at the
3 parallel height, and it exited just above the knee. Is that right, sir?
4 A. If that's the information supplied by the witness, I suppose it's
6 Q. Although you didn't answer my question. My question was did you
7 have any documentation as to the entry wound and exit wound?
8 A. The only documentation to me was the information on the DVD where
9 the victim shows his -- the location of his wounds.
10 Q. Very well. Can we turn to the next sheet. At what angle would
11 the entry/exit wound have been if we assume that the shot was fired from
12 Stotina? Do you know what the difference in altitude is between the spot
13 where the sniper shooter might have been active and the spot where the
14 victim was? What -- or where the person hit was. What's the difference
15 in altitude?
16 A. I don't know.
17 Q. Thank you. Let us now look at some photographs from 3D 00846.
18 Photograph 240.
19 Are you familiar with this reconstruction put forth by the person
20 who was hit? He said, "I stood thus, leaning against the wall when the
21 bullet hit me above the knee of my right leg."
22 Are you familiar with this?
23 A. These are stills from the DVD. I recognise them.
24 Q. Yes. How can you explain then that the entry/exit wound does not
25 correspond with the angle which should have been shot at had the shooter
1 been in fact at Stotina? How do you account for the fact that the
2 entry/exit wound is parallel, whereas Stotina is on much higher ground?
3 Can you answer briefly, please?
4 A. I wouldn't be able to confirm that.
5 Q. My next question: If the position of this man, which is quite
6 clear from the sketch, is that he faced the Neretva with his back and
7 Stotina stands at exactly 45 degrees' angle in relation to his position,
8 how could he have been shot from the back then and not at a 45-degree
9 angle, which would mean more to the side? How can you account for the
10 bullet trajectory and the positioning of the entry and exit wounds?
11 A. I came to the conclusion that Stotina was the most likely origin
12 of fire not only based on -- not -- solely based on the images from the
13 DVD, and for him the incident was also a long time ago, so I don't know if
14 it's exactly precisely the same position he was in. But looking at this
15 still from the DVD, if he had been positioned like this and the -- the
16 bullet of the entry and exit wound would have been of -- since they were
17 completely parallel, they shooter would have to be in the river, because
18 he's pointing with his thigh slightly upwards. So then -- yeah. So it's
19 very difficult to get an exact location from the shooter from only his
20 entry and exit wounds.
21 Q. Thank you. On the basis of the position of the body, would you
22 agree with me the bullet could have reached him from his back, which means
23 from possibly the river or the hillside beyond it? Is that right?
24 A. The direction physically where the bullet might have originated
25 from could include that direction, yes.
1 Q. Could we please have 3D 00769. 3D 00769. That's incident number
2 10, yet again involving Stotina. 3D 00769.
3 You drew the possible line of movement according to the witness's
4 testimony in the direction of the stair -- of the stairs. Is your sketch
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Again, Stotina is located at an angle higher than 45 degrees in
8 relation to the direction in which the person who was hit was moving. Is
9 that correct based on your sketch of the bullet trajectory?
10 A. This is the elevation you talk about?
11 Q. No, no. It's on the right side. If the aggrieved person is
12 moving from the Neretva, as you drew it, the direction in which Stotina
13 lies, again according to your sketch, is at some 45 degrees. That's what
14 I'm asking you. In relation to the person moving.
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Thank you. We have seen this, and I will show it to you on the
17 photograph, that the bullet hit him in the heel in the general area of
18 where the Achilles tendon is, and it exited just where the heel is. So
19 it -- the bullet entered the body at roughly 45 degrees compared to the
20 axis of the leg. It entered roughly the area where the Achilles tendon
21 is - you can see it on my sketch - at a 45-degree angle compared to the
22 axis of the human body. Is that right?
23 A. That is right.
24 Q. If the bullet entered the Achilles tendon and exited at the heel
25 parallelly, then it did not arrive from either the right or left side.
1 Can we conclude that the position in which the person was -- can we show
2 photograph 3D 00848, photograph number 251. 3D 00848, photograph 21 --
4 Do you agree that the person showed exactly the position in which
5 his body was when he was hit or right before he was hit? Do you see that?
6 Is that visible?
7 A. That is visible.
8 Q. Is he turned with his back to the Neretva River?
9 A. Yes, he is.
10 Q. Is his side turned towards Stotina, that we might possibly see in
11 the background laterally at an angle of 70 degrees? Is that right?
12 A. That's about right, yes.
13 Q. Thank you very much. Could we please have photograph 253 from the
14 same bundle.
15 Look at the entry wound, which is almost from the top, and it is
16 true that it -- the bullet did not arrive from the side but that the entry
17 wound was made from a very high degree and exited at the heel almost
19 A. I didn't draw the conclusion that this was the entry wound. I
20 don't know if it's in the medical reports. I wasn't able to locate it in
21 the medical reports. What I do know is that with the limbs especially in
22 the areas where there's -- there are bones, it's very difficult to discern
23 between the entry and exit wound.
24 Q. Are you aware of the fact that the witness confirmed for us here
25 explicitly that this was the entry wound and that the exit wound was at
1 the heel below?
2 A. But I believe this is also the witness that -- that testified that
3 he was hit by a 50-calibre round, which -- which would have taken his foot
4 off. So if the witness believes that was the entry and the exit wound,
5 then according to him it is.
6 Q. My last question concerning this: Is it in any way possible to
7 have a wound inflicted at an angle of 70 degrees vertically to the body if
8 Stotina is positioned to the right at some 40 to 50 metres high -- or
9 rather, at an elevation of some 40 to 50 metres? Is that theoretically
11 A. Under the conditions that you described it would be impossible.
12 Q. Thank you very much.
13 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] There is another explanation
14 of this, Your Honour, another sketch of mine which shows the possible
15 trajectory of the bullet and the movement of the person, but unfortunately
16 the time that I have left does not permit me to deal with it so we will
17 move on. We can remain in open session because I will be dealing with
18 technical matters only.
19 Can we now have incident number 13 where a boy was hit? Can we
20 have the first photograph placed, 3D 00843, photograph 202?
21 Q. Witness, are you aware of the fact that the place where this
22 incidence took place was accurately marked?
23 A. It is slightly different from the location that I marked on my
24 sketch, but it's the approximate location, yes.
25 Q. Do you see marked here two possible directions from which one
1 could possibly shoot at the place where the boy stood?
2 A. Yes, I do.
3 Q. Are you aware that according to a witness's statement the army of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina sometimes held their forward positions here, if ever
5 there was soldiers in here? But are you aware of this information?
6 A. No, I'm not.
7 Q. If you were a soldier and were confronted with an army close by,
8 would you come down the hill and open sniper fire? Would that not amount
9 to an exaggerated exposure beyond any logic?
10 A. It would be tactically [Realtime transcript read in
11 error"technically"] very unwise to expose yourself in the open on the
13 Q. Thank you very much.
14 A. Excuse me. It's not "technically," but "tactically." Line ...
15 Q. Of course, tactically.
16 Could we now have photograph 3D 204.
17 This photograph was taken from Stotina. Can you please flip it.
19 Look at the large building over there, and then to the left of
20 that high building you can see the building outside which this took place.
21 I don't know if you recognise this. To the left of this largest building
22 here is the building in front of which the incident took place.
23 Therefore, from the positions at Stotina where you said the sniper
24 shooter was located, is it possible to see the scene of the incident on
25 this photograph?
1 A. On this photograph it's impossible because the tan-coloured
2 building was built after the incident, which now blocks the view.
3 Q. There was another building that was built, and the roof of that
4 building is facing quite a different direction. Could we have photograph
5 205, please. It will provide a clearer view. 205.
6 Sir, do you recognise the building in front of which this took
7 place by the balconies that we can see to the left here? Can we agree
8 that this was indeed the building in front of which the boy was hit?
9 A. Yes, it is.
10 Q. The building we see in the foreground with the brown roof, do you
11 know that the building was there at the time of the incident? In other
12 words, this is not the building that was built afterwards. Are you aware
13 that this building was there at the time of the incident?
14 A. The investigator on scene pointed out to me that the brown
15 building was built after the incident, so that's my information.
16 Q. I believe you, but on the basis of the earlier photographs do you
17 understand that the building that I was referring now and the other
18 building were not one and the same building? Are you aware of this?
19 A. Could you clarify that, please?
20 Q. The building on the right side, its roof is -- is going to the
21 right, whereas the other building we saw on the other photograph had a
22 roof that was turned differently. Are you aware of the fact that the
23 building I was referring to earlier in that other photograph and this
24 brigade here are not and the same?
25 A. Could you show me a picture of the other building, please?
1 Q. Yes. Can we go back to photograph 3D 202. Look at the roof here.
2 There, 202. The roof-top we saw a moment ago is positioned perpendicular
3 to this building, whereas the building marked B here is parallel -- or,
4 rather, the ridge is parallel to the building. So my question is, are you
5 aware of the fact this building marked B here and the building I showed
6 awe moment ago are not one the same building?
7 A. Yes, I am aware of that.
8 Q. Very well. Thank you. And you're not aware of the fact that the
9 building we saw a moment ago at the other photograph existed get at the
10 time of the incident? Are you aware of this or not?
11 A. I'm not aware.
12 Q. I know that my time is up, but I have only one incident left, not
13 that I wouldn't want to go through all of them, but I don't have time.
14 Could we have 3D 00850, please. We are still talking about number 13, in
15 respect of which you established that the alleged position from which fire
16 was opened was the -- was Mount Hum that was 300 metres away.
17 At page 34 of the report it says that the possible position was
18 Mountain Hum which was 800 metres, correction, away from the spot. Is
19 this something you wrote?
20 A. This is something I wrote, yes.
21 Q. Could we please have the map enlarged. That's fine.
22 A circle was drawn on this map, and the centre of that circle is
23 the top of the Hum mount, and everything that is within that circle is up
24 to 2.000 metres away from Mount Hum. Can you locate where approximately
25 the house where the incident took place is? Can you tell roughly?
1 A. If I could have the map enlarged.
2 Q. Can it be enlarged, please?
3 Mount Hum. Do you see this parallel running through Mount Hum,
4 and then across the Neretva there is a bridge, and then it says Luka up
5 there. Do you see the word Luka?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. These buildings are in fact located in an area called Luka to the
8 left of the rectangle marked in black and then a bit up to the left. Do
9 you see that now, near that road there? It's -- you should actually start
10 from Mount Hum. Can you tell roughly where this would be?
11 A. The house would be going from the -- the intersection --
12 Q. Can you show it to us? Can you indicate?
13 A. How do I indicate on this map?
14 Q. Look at the bridge across the Neretva River. We've seen it on
15 many photographs. And then cross that bridge across the Neretva. There.
17 A. That would be the location of the building.
18 Q. Very well. Thank you. Tell me, please, if the distance from the
19 top of the Mount Hum to that red dot is 2.000 metres, how far is the top
20 of Mount Hum to -- or, rather, if the previous distance to the circle was
21 2.000, how far would you say is Mount Hum to the dot you drew? Is it
22 1.400 to 1.500 metres?
23 A. I think there has been a mistake, because one square on a
24 geographical map is usually depicted -- this is 1:50.000 scale, which
25 means that every square is 1 kilometres, and the diameter of the complete
1 circle is 2 kilometres. So the distance from Mount Hum to the location
2 would be 6 to 800 metres on this map.
3 This location on the map is 1 kilometre, this distance.
4 Q. I cannot bring any rulers here, but -- right. Right. There is an
5 error. Correct. It's 1 kilometre. This is a mistake.
6 So the diameter is 2 kilometres, and half of it is 1 kilometre,
7 but let us leave it at that.
8 What is the distance from the top of Hum hill to the point you
9 marked, 800 -- right. It's written correctly. My apologies. My
10 apologies. It's a mistake that I made.
11 Just one last thing, please. Is it true that from the top of Hum
12 hill, since there is first a mild slope, then a sharper slope, the
13 position where the boy was hit is completely invisible. From Hum hill you
14 cannot see the incident site and vice versa. Do you know that?
15 A. That is correct.
16 Q. Thank you very much. Thank you for all these answers. I'm sorry
17 that I have no more time to go through the other incidents so as to see if
18 they make sense geometrically and otherwise, but two days was too short a
19 time for you to arrive at absolutely accurate and precise data. Do you
20 agree with me?
21 A. No, I don't.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. 4D now.
24 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I just have
25 one technical matter to raise in connection with what Mr. -- General
1 Praljak said. This map is 1:50.000 in scale, and the distance is 4
2 centimetres on the map. So that should be 2 kilometres. It is a good map
3 indeed, because in principle between two measurements, from 96 to 98,
4 there are 2 kilometres. This distance is equal to the distance from Hum
5 hill. I claim that there are 4 centimetres here and that makes 2
6 kilometres on this map. I just want my objection on record and then we
7 can leave it to experts.
8 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Yes. The fact remains it is
9 2 kilometres. So the distance from the top of Hum hill to the location of
10 the house is 1.500 to 1.600 metres. Thank you.
11 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Stewart:
13 Q. Mr. van der Weijden, if you have precise information about an
14 entry and exit wound and you also have precise information about where the
15 victim was standing and at what angle at the point of impact, it's
16 correct, is it, that you can within really quite a fine tolerance, you can
17 state with precision the direction from which the shot must have come?
18 A. If the precise position and placement of the body is known, then
19 it is possible to get a reasonably accurate direction of fire, yes.
20 Q. You need those elements --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. That I've described. You need entry and exit wound or at least
23 entry wound precision, position and angle of body --
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. -- and then you can get --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- with pretty good precision?
3 A. Exact position of the body at the time of the entry wound.
4 Q. And the other way round. If you start with a fixed, definite
5 location or direction, let's say direction from which the shot has come,
6 and you also have precise information about, let us say, the entry and the
7 exit wound, you can also work out, with a high degree of precision, the
8 angle at which the victim's body must have been standing at the point of
10 A. That would have been possible, yes.
11 Q. In the first situation, then, where we're working from the
12 victim's body position and the wounds, but we're work being from the
13 victim's body position, let's take as examples incidence 1 and incidence
14 10, and you've shown --
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You've shown enormous familiarity with those incidents. Your know
17 exactly the once I'm talking about. 1 near the bridge and 10 from the
18 river, fetching water at the river. So they're both down by the river.
19 And we can agree, can't we that a feature of each of those cases is that
20 until we get to such questions as to the precise position of the victim's
21 body there is actually a wide range of possibilities, isn't there, as far
22 as location of the gunman is concerned?
23 A. Well, actually it's not that wide a range of possibilities. There
24 are things in -- yeah, to be taken in consideration technically. While
25 technically it would be possible for a wider range of possibilities, if I
1 would have to -- if I would have to take a shot at a target and I would
2 have to stand out -- completely out in the open, that -- technically it
3 would be possible for me to stand in that position and shoot at the target
4 and hit the target, but technically it would be very unwise. So it's --
5 Q. I want to be quite precise. I'm not talking at the moment about
6 preferred locations and where a professional sniper might locate himself
7 and all the other factors which you bring into play here and there to
8 explain why such-and-such a location is more probable. In each of those
9 cases there is, in fact -- physically there is a quite wide arc, isn't
11 A. Yes, there is.
12 Q. So that it follows that -- it follows just mathematically or
13 arithmetically, doesn't it, if the victim's body is turned through an
14 angle of 15 degrees that alters the direction of the shot by the
15 corresponding 15 degrees?
16 A. Yes, it does.
17 Q. Working the other way round quite a lot of people working in this
18 matter as informants did, if we start from a fixed idea of where the shot
19 came from and you have the other elements of the information, you've got
20 the entry and the exit wound, then - I think you confirmed this a few
21 minutes ago - you can then work out the angle at which the victim's body
22 must have been placed to suffer that wound from that specific location?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And in a significant number of cases where there is a very clear
25 entry and exit wound, or perhaps even a very clear entry wound, it doesn't
1 actually require, with all respect to your expertise, Mr. van der Weijden,
2 it doesn't require a degree of expertise to work that out, does it?
3 A. For the technical part, no. As long as we have knowledge of
4 geometry it could be worked out, yes.
5 Q. It's pretty straightforward?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. If I've been shot it doesn't matter particularly for the record
8 where to make the point, if I've been shot here in my back and I know or
9 if I have a got a fixed idea where I was shot from, it's not at all
10 difficult for me to turn my body to the position in which I must have been
11 to be shot there from that position; correct?
12 A. Well, that is where I don't completely agree. There is some --
13 something called -- well, there are -- the memory of people is not always
14 what the physical conditions exactly are at the time of some things
15 happening. In the military there's the fog of war. As people -- they
16 know they're hit but are not completely able to exactly be in the same
17 position at exact time of when they're hit. So it's -- I -- I agree that
18 on a lot of the case, a lot of the incidents the victims when they show
19 their self, where they show where they're hit on the DVD, for me it
20 doesn't necessarily mean -- if I've -- especially in the case of my -- of
21 the hill, where the victim is hit in the hill, in case number 10, for an
22 incident happening 10 years ago it would be very difficult for me to -- if
23 only for one moment I have my heel turned to the right or to the left, it
24 can alter the complete situation. So it's -- it's very -- yeah. For me
25 the biggest difficulty was is the -- the memory of the victims, is it
1 correct as to where the exact location or at the exact position their body
2 was in at the time.
3 Q. Now, the complete list of incidents, it's numbers 1 to 14 but with
4 two -- two numbers taken out, numbers 5 and 12. So we've got 12 incidents
5 here and they're on different dates, the earliest being 13th of May, 1993,
6 and the latest being the 2nd of March, 1994. Just one, possibly two
7 dates -- I think there was just one date where there were two incidents on
8 the same date.
9 It's right, is it, that you have yourself no knowledge of what was
10 happening -- apart from what you've been told about the specific
11 incidents, you have no knowledge of what was happening on any of those
12 dates in terms of what military combat there was, what attacks, what
13 activity there was in the area? You had not been briefed on that and you
14 do not know any of that, do you?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Mr. Ibrisimovic, any questions?
19 MR. IBRISIMOVIC: [Interpretation] [Previous translation
20 continues] ... questions, Mr. President. We have time to other Defence
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Does Prosecution
23 have any redirect?
24 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President, I have just one question
25 but I would like to simply put on the record the fact that during the
1 cross-examination of General Praljak the fact that the Prosecution didn't
2 object to a number of questions does -- should not in any way be taken to
3 imply that in any way we agree with any of his characterisations of any of
4 the evidence given to date.
5 Re-examination by Mr. Mundis:
6 Q. Lieutenant van der Weijden, I just have one question, if you
7 will. It follows from a number of questions put to you during the course
8 of cross-examination, and the question is this, sir: What action should a
9 shooter take in the event that he or she is unable to distinguish between
10 the civilian or combatant status of the intended target?
11 A. For the rules of engagement that I've been provided with in my
12 operations, it has always been to withhold fire until positive
13 identification of enemy personnel.
14 Q. Thank you, sir.
15 MR. MUNDIS: We have no further questions.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you very much
17 on behalf of myself and my colleagues for coming here to give testimony.
18 Your testimony was in two steps, and unfortunately we were not able to do
19 anything else.
20 My best wishes for you to continue your mission. I will now ask
21 the usher to please escort you out of the courtroom and to bring the new
22 witness in the courtroom.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, our next witness,
24 could you tell us who our next witness is?
25 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. The next witness is
1 Lieutenant Colonel Hakan Birger.
2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Before this witness leaves, I think
3 it eluded us all, the initialing of the map where there was a discussion
4 about 2.000 metres. Maybe it would be good to have an IC number for it
5 because there will be later references to whether it was 1 or 2
7 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] And what was on the ELMO for
8 some reason was not entered into evidence.
9 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] No. The others are not a problem.
10 The others are all in e-court.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The registrar is telling me that
12 the image must absolutely be marked. So, please, Witness, could you sit
13 down. We will call up the photograph again on the screen. Thank you.
14 Could you please mark on the screen today's date, March 26, 2007,
15 and sign your name.
16 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, would it be possible for me to zoom out
17 on the map to look at the map data?
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.
19 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] We can show the witness the
20 original so he can look at the distance.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You will be given the original
23 THE WITNESS: I have to correct myself. I said 2 centimetres is 1
24 kilometre. It is 4 centimetres is 2 kilometres, but it is still one
25 square is 1 kilometre so it doesn't change the diameter.
1 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] At the bottom of the map
2 take a simple pencil and see, according to the scale, what the distance is
3 from 0 to 2 kilometres.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll give an IC number for the
5 map on screen. Registrar, please.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the map on the screen will become
7 Exhibit IC --
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute Just a minute,
9 registrar, please.
10 THE WITNESS: I see my mistake. Sorry.
11 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] The witness did not mark the
12 spot where the incident happened. I would like him to do that.
13 THE WITNESS: [Marks]
14 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Could you please mark it
15 with a number 1.
16 THE WITNESS: [Marks]
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 Mr. Registrar, could you please give number for this map that we
19 have now on the screen.
20 THE REGISTRAR: This will become IC 509.
21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: For the record it might be useful to state that
22 in a map 1:50.000, which we have before us, 2 centimetres are equal to 1
23 kilometre in the terrain. In a map 1:100.000, it is 1 centimetre which
24 corresponds to 1 kilometre. I do not think that this is something which
25 is not really a matter of common knowledge.
1 JUDGE MINDUA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, please. The date is
2 May 25 or May 26? I think the date is wrong.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, this were May 26th today.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Or March 26th today, says the interpreter.
5 March 26th, interpreter's correction.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, please, you put March
7 25, and we're at March 26th today.
8 THE WITNESS: Sorry. I'm also very sorry I have to correct myself
9 again on the distance on the map because I was too quick with my
10 conclusion. The reason for it is I usually work with military maps that
11 have 1-kilometre squares, but these have indeed 2-kilometre squares,
12 because it's usually with 88, 89, 90, and here it's only the even numbers
13 that are mentioned.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. The map on the screen now
15 dated March 26th, 2007, is number IC 509.
16 Mr. Kovacic, do you want an IC number also for the map itself?
17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] It would be a good idea for
18 technical reasons. This is good enough for us, especially after the
19 witness has made the correction in his statement about the distance.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [Previous translation
21 continues] ... necessary.
22 Witness, now, after this correction, thank you. And could the
23 usher please escort you out of the courtroom.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis, you now have the
1 floor for the next witness.
2 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President. The next witness is
3 lieutenant colonel Hakan Birger. And perhaps if I could suggest that once
4 he's brought in and placed under oath perhaps if we could then take the
5 break before I begin the direct examination I believe I could then
6 structure it in such a way that I could finish the direct examination
7 before we finish for the evening.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Time, regarding time, the
9 Prosecution had planned on an hour and 30 minutes. We decided that the
10 Defence would be allocated two hours, and it's up to the accused to split
11 the time among themselves.
12 Maybe to prevent any problem we could have the break right now?
13 We'll have a 20-minute break right now and then we will resume after the
14 break. I think this is a batter way to proceed.
15 --- Recess taken at 5.00 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 5.20 p.m.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I can see that the
19 witness is in the courtroom. Please, Mr. Registrar, have the witness be
20 taken out of the room, just for a matter of seconds.
21 Please leave the room, sir. Sir, you're going to leave the
22 courtroom just for a few seconds. I have to make an announcement without
23 you being in the courtroom.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. With regard to the length,
1 we decided that the Defence would have two hours. I said that you had to
2 agree among yourselves. If there's no agreement, we will think that
3 General Petkovic should have 30 minutes, General Praljak 30 minutes, and
4 as to the other counsel, they will each have 15 minutes. This is how
5 we're going to spread the time.
6 Secondly, I'm saying this to you without the witness being in the
7 courtroom because last time Mr. Karnavas, who is not with us today, said
8 that when the witness knew in advance how much time he had to answer
9 questions this could have an impact on his testimony. So from now on we
10 shall no longer say how long the time will be when the witness is in the
11 courtroom, because we don't want him or her to how much time is left for
12 questions and to answer them.
13 So this is what I wanted to say. This is the reason why I asked
14 the witness to go out the courtroom.
15 Yes, Ms. Alaburic.
16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, for giving
17 me this opportunity. I would like to make a verbal request to enable the
18 Defence to have a longer time for examining this witness for the same
19 reason. The Prosecution intends to spend 90 minutes on direct examination
20 exclusively on evidence that they intend to introduce through this
21 witness. Apart from that, there will be statements introduced totaling 30
22 pages of text. Mere reading of these statements would require around 90
23 minutes without interpretation, and for answers to be elicited in direct
24 examination, the Prosecution would need approximately four to five hours
25 for the same content and testimony, so that in viva voce, the Prosecution
1 would need five to six hours for this evidence.
2 I would therefore kindly ask for the Defence to have the whole day
3 tomorrow for cross-examination, which is around four and a half hours, and
4 we will distribute this time between us.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I do not have the 65 ter list in
6 front of me, but I was under the impression that initially there was one
7 hour and a half for the Prosecution on that list. So the Defence was
8 aware of the time allotted. I know that the Prosecutor intended to have a
9 65 ter -- or, rather, to have a 92 ter witness, but then you decided to
10 remain viva voce. So this is what is happening.
11 I'm just leafing through the documents as you were speaking, and
12 their a number of documents we have already seen and that we're bound to
13 see again. However, there is the 2980 document, which is of several
14 pages, but as a matter of fact, we are interested in the 23rd of October,
15 and that's not 30 pages long.
16 So personally, this is what I wanted to convey to you.
17 But, Mr. Mundis, you are on your feet.
18 MR. MUNDIS: Excuse me. Thank you, Mr. President. Good
19 afternoon, Your Honours. Let me -- I'll accept full responsibility for
20 perhaps what has resulted in some confusion.
21 As I indicated in a letter that was submitted to the Defence and a
22 copy of which was provided to the Trial Chamber's legal officers this
23 morning, we indicated that due to time pressure and concerns about
24 completing the schedule for this week that we were considering or were
25 likely to employ the 92 ter procedure with respect to the next witness.
1 Given the fact that we seem to have now completed the first witness and
2 there are no longer those time pressures - I did indicate this to at least
3 one of the Defence teams earlier - we are prepared to go ahead with a viva
4 voce examination of this witness.
5 I will also state that although a number of documents were
6 initially listed as against this witness and are in the bundles that have
7 been provided at least to the Trial Chamber, I expect to only be using
8 approximately 10 of those documents with this witness because the
9 remaining documents have either been already covered or the witness didn't
10 have sufficient knowledge or information concerning those documents. So I
11 am at this point prepared to go forward taking this witness as a viva voce
12 witness and showing him approximately 10 documents. And as I indicated
13 prior to the break, I do believe that we will complete the direct
14 examination by close of business today or perhaps have a little bit of
15 time remaining for tomorrow but not any significant amounts of time
16 remaining for tomorrow.
17 So I would propose going forward as a viva voce witness and using
18 approximately 10 documents with the witness, and I certainly believe I can
19 do that within approximately 90 minutes, barring any unforeseen
21 I believe that the witness's two prior statements could be among
22 the bundle that was provided to the Trial Chamber, but again I will take
23 him as a viva voce witness under the current plan because of the fact that
24 we completed Lieutenant van der Weijden testimony in a timely manner.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.
1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I can only express my
2 satisfaction at having this witness heard viva voce. That will reduce our
3 needs for time, but not much, for the very simple reason that this witness
4 will utter a sentence and a document will be shown to him for which I will
5 need at least one hour to show the real state of affairs. So that if my
6 estimate was four hours for cross-examination, that can now be reduced to
7 three hours.
8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may point out one
9 matter that is perhaps technical in one aspect. Regardless of whether
10 there was a 92 witness or viva voce witness, if the Prosecution succeeds
11 in finishing with the witness in 90 minutes or so, then the Defence would
12 have all day tomorrow, approximately, because the witness after is not
13 scheduled until the day after tomorrow. We are at risk of facing an
14 absurd situation where we would leave tomorrow two -- or two and a half
15 hours earlier, before the end of the day, without having examined the
16 witness properly.
17 At this stage of the Prosecution case, I may say that the
18 Prosecution's planning is almost perfect. We had no idle time almost.
19 But there were some witnesses who were introduced at a late stage, like
20 Mr. van der Weijden, and the time was too short for us to properly prepare
21 for cross-examination.
22 This witness comes with two statements, as my colleague said, the
23 statements having been taken at different times and for purposes of
24 different cases as is the custom of the Prosecution. There are statements
25 from 1995, which in terms of content and lines of questioning was destined
1 to serve the indictment concerning a conflict between Croats and Muslims,
2 and another statement from 2000, or maybe 2001, that was designed to
3 support another case. I believe it was Hadzihasanovic. So now, if we are
4 going forward with 92 ter, then both statements should be taken into
5 account. If it's a viva voce witness, then we will have to cross-examine
6 on the second statement let alone the other documents.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Mundis said that it will be
8 a viva voce witness. Is that so, Mr. Mundis?
9 MR. MUNDIS: Well, unless we spend considerably more time arguing
10 about how little time there is available, I am prepared to go forward on a
11 viva voce basis and show this witness 10 documents. I expect that it will
12 take no more than 90 minutes to do that.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, we're going to start, as
14 we indicated. Tomorrow we'll have four hours. If indeed you need extra
15 time, speaking about General Petkovic, he will have the extra time. Let
16 us bring in the witness.
17 MR. MUNDIS: Perhaps while the usher is doing that, Mr. President,
18 there were a number of issues, or at least one issue in particular that
19 was remaining from our hearing late last week that the Defence teams
20 wanted the accused present for in order to discuss that issue. I might
21 suggest that if there were some time towards the end of this week that
22 might be an appropriate time to discuss that, because the next three weeks
23 or the entire calendar in April appears to be relatively tight, and if the
24 Chamber wants to come back to that issue and if there is some time towards
25 the end of this week, that might be the best time to deal with that issue.
1 [The witness entered court]
2 WITNESS: HAKAN BIRGER
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. Could you
4 please state your surname, first name, and date of birth.
5 THE WITNESS: My name is Hakan Birger, and I'm born in 1955, 26th
6 of August.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is your current occupation?
8 THE WITNESS: I'm an officer in the Swedish army.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Which rank?
10 THE WITNESS: Lieutenant Colonel.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, have you had an
12 opportunity to testify in this Tribunal and, if so, in which case?
13 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry?
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Have you had -- I shall repeat.
15 Have you had an opportunity to testify in this Tribunal and, if so, could
16 you tell us in which case you testified?
17 THE WITNESS: No, it's no problem for me. I don't understand the
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is a rather simple question.
20 I asked you whether you have been a witness in this Tribunal. So say yes
21 or no.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes. I've been here before, yes.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, since you said yes, maybe
24 you could tell me in which case you were a witness, in case you know.
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, I witness here in case about -- it was officers
1 and generals from the 3rd Corps and the, say, the Muslims' brigade from
2 the Bosnian army.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you have testified once
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. You testified in the
7 Hadzihasanovic, Kubura case. I shall ask you to read out now the solemn
8 declaration you have in your hands.
9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
10 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir. Please sit
13 Since you've been a witness before, you know the proceedings
14 before this Tribunal. First questions will be put to you by the
15 Prosecution. They believe they should complete their examination-in-chief
16 today, and tomorrow you will have to answer questions put to you by the
17 Defence counsel representing the accused or by the accused themselves.
18 You have four Judges in fronts of you. They, too, can ask questions of
19 you. We can ask questions at any time, but we have now decided to wait
20 until questions have been put by both parties to ask questions ourselves,
21 unless it is absolutely necessary, in which case we will put questions to
22 you because we should not necessarily wait until all parties have put
23 their questions.
24 Please try to respond very clearly. You are a military man. I'm
25 sure you'll do that. And if you do not understand a question asked of
1 you, do not hesitate to say so and ask the person putting the question to
2 reformulate it, as you have just done with me.
3 So this is generally speaking how the proceedings will unfold.
4 Mr. Mundis, you have the floor.
5 MR. MUNDIS: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Examination by Mr. Mundis:
7 Q. Good afternoon, Lieutenant-Colonel Birger. Could you hear me,
9 A. Yes, I hear you.
10 Q. Sorry. Let's start, sir, if you will, telling the Trial Chamber a
11 little bit about what you were doing in terms of your military career in
12 early 1993. What post were you serving in, in early 1993?
13 A. In early 1993, I was a battalion commander in the Swedish army,
14 and I was also working as a teacher in academy for officers' training and
15 so on.
16 Q. Did there come a time, sir, when you received orders to report to
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
18 A. I was there voluntary and all officers and soldiers were there
19 voluntary, so it -- it was what it was.
20 Q. And when did you volunteer to go to Bosnia and Herzegovina?
21 A. I think it was in the beginning of May 1993, and we start training
22 and we recruit the soldiers in June, and we start training in the
23 beginning -- first three weeks in July 1993.
24 Q. And what was the position that you held during this deployment to
1 A. I was company commander for one of the mechanised company, 8
2 mechanised company.
3 Q. And within what military organisation were you deployed to Bosnia
4 and Herzegovina?
5 A. It was a mechanised battalion, and we have three mechanised
6 companies in this battalion, and also one supply and staff company, and it
7 was also a Danish tank company in the battalion.
8 Q. And, sir, what was the name of this battalion that you were
9 serving in as a company commander?
10 A. Yes. We had one battalion in Macedonia before, so it was NordBat
12 Q. Now, Lieutenant Colonel Birger, can you tell the Trial Chamber
13 when you first entered Bosnia and Herzegovina and for what purpose?
14 A. I think it was the 13 of May -- middle of September. It was down
15 where we were recognised with the battalion commander, the company
16 commander and some staff members. We were -- used the Swedish air force
17 to Italy and next day we was flying to Sarajevo and was down there a week,
18 and after that we were flying back to Denmark. In Denmark our unit was
19 for training, the last training before going to Bosnia.
20 Q. And Lieutenant Colonel Birger, when did your company deploy to
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
22 A. It was me and my platoon leader. We was totally 10 in my company.
23 We came down into Bosnia the last day in September 1993 to Tuzla, and the
24 next day, the 1st of October, we used our cars and get down to Vares
25 [Realtime transcript read in error "various"] area and there we was living
1 together with engineering company from the Canadian Battalion. And the
2 1st Platoon of my alpha platoon arrived to Bosnia down to this area the 20
3 of October.
4 Q. Okay. And when did the other platoons --
5 A. I think it was the 22nd or something like this, the -- they
6 arrived -- I don't remember exactly but they arrived -- I have the three
7 mechanised platoons in October, 1 and 3.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please.
9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. I just wanted to point
10 out a mistake in the transcript, page 57, line 25. It says "various
11 area." I think the witness actually said Vares area, which seems
12 important to me.
13 MR. MUNDIS:
14 Q. That's correct.
15 A. That's correct, yes.
16 Q. To the Vares area?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Can you tell us again, sir, when the remaining platoons of the 8th
19 company or 8th Mechanised Company of NordBat arrived?
20 A. We arrived as they starting in the 20 -- 20 of October the first
21 platoon arrived and when they arrived some days later, and I think in this
22 time, I mean in the last day of October, have Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie
23 platoon in my area. That's 3 mechanised infantry platoons. And later we
24 also have my anti-tank missile platoon, but they arrived in November some
25 days without vehicles, and they came in -- in February.
1 Q. Now, sir, can you tell the Trial Chamber please a little bit about
2 the composition of each of your platoons to include the type of vehicles
3 and equipment that they had during this deployment?
4 A. It was Swedish -- Swedish old APCs. It was from 60s, beginning of
5 60s, and it was tracked APCs with 20 millimetres automatic cannon. We
6 have Carl Gustaf anti-tank weapon. We have machine guns, and we have
7 carbines, so to say, yeah, weapon, hand weapon hand. We also have -- we
8 was equipped for war, so to say, in Swedish organisation.
9 Q. And approximately how many men were in each of the platoons?
10 A. A little bit more than 30 and totally in the company we was 150,
11 and I have also directly in October one so to say unit from a medical
12 platoon. So I have also nurse and doctors in my company the whole time.
13 Q. And before I forget to ask you this, sir, how long was the 8th
14 mechanised company deployed with NordBat in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
15 A. It was long time. They change person in -- we changed. We had
16 the same name, same name of battalion, the same name of company, so we
17 start rotate -- we rotated personnel in last March and beginning of April
18 1994. So more or less six months.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down. Thank you.
20 THE WITNESS: Okay.
21 MR. MUNDIS:
22 Q. We've been asked by the interpreters to slow down. Can you please
23 tell us Lieutenant Colonel Birger about your reporting chain of command
24 going upwards?
25 A. Our battalion staff was in factory just outside Tuzla and where we
1 have a battalion staff and the staff and supply company and the battalion
2 commander. So I reporting to this place and the battalion reporting to
3 the BH command in Kiseljak.
4 Q. Now, what was the name of the NordBat commander, the battalion
5 commander, in Tuzla during your deployment?
6 A. It was Colonel Ulf Henricsson.
7 Q. And can you explain, sir, to avoid any confusion, what was BH
8 command in Kiseljak?
9 A. BH command what -- when we arrived it was UN command for the UN
10 commands in Bosnia, and when it was also in Zagreb it was headquarter for
11 UNPROFOR in whole Yugoslavia.
12 Q. So BH command was part of UNPROFOR?
13 A. Yes. It was a part and they command the UN battalions in
15 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Birger, during the time your company was
16 deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who was the BH commander, the commander of
17 BH command?
18 A. When I arrive it was General Briquemont from Belgium, and after
19 some months, I don't really exactly know, we changed commander to Sir
20 Michael Rose from United Kingdom.
21 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber, sir, where you located your
22 headquarters upon arriving in Vares?
23 A. We look for place so we could -- we know the winter could be very
24 hard in this area so we look for place where we could raise tent inside
25 buildings, and we find that place outside Vares more or less north of
1 Vares in -- in a factory. And this factory, it was also sawmill, and it
2 was also factory for furnitures. And the last place, the place for
3 furnitures factory, so it was good for us so we have agreement with the --
4 they were, what you can say, local government in Vares how we should pay
5 and so on. So we rent this place for the Vares company -- Vares
6 government, so to say.
7 Q. Was your location known to the local people as the sawmill?
8 A. Yes, it was close to the sawmill.
9 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber about any buildings that were
10 adjacent to the sawmill or outside the sawmill at this location?
11 A. Yes. The -- the commander for the forces in this area what they
12 call Bobovac Brigade, this headquarter was very close. I think it's also
13 only 200 metres from the gate to the sawmill, and it was, what I could
14 understand, a hotel, maybe a sports hotel or something like this.
15 Q. Now, you mentioned the Bobovac Brigade. Can you tell us which
16 military force the Bobovac Brigade belonged to?
17 A. It's belonged to who you ask. If we ask the commander of the 2nd
18 Corps up in Tuzla they said it was a part of a 2nd Corps. But if I asked
19 the commander of the Bobovac Brigade, he said it was more or less an
20 independent unit in the area.
21 Q. And, sir, when you say the 2nd Corps, which army or armed force
22 are you referring to?
23 A. BH army.
24 Q. Were you familiar with a military force known as the HVO?
25 A. Familiar -- I don't understand exactly.
1 Q. Did you know about an armed force known as the HVO?
2 A. No, I don't.
3 Q. Can you tell us, sir, about the situation from a military point of
4 view at the time of your arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1993?
5 A. Yes. What I could understand, the Swedish government was want to
6 have a more or less battalion up in Tuzla area, so to -- to have the
7 company down in Vares area, it was more or less something down to Swedish
8 government want, but when we came down where we were under command of UN
9 command, so they want to have one company in Vares area, and what we
10 understand it was, it could be war or fighting in this area and it was a
11 problem. There was also a lot of refugees. When I came there first day I
12 arrived to Vares when we was down in September, first I observed there was
13 a lot of refugees inside the town, thousands of them, and I understand
14 that most of them came from Kakanj area.
15 Q. And what about the actual situation from a military point of view?
16 Was there active combat in your area?
17 A. We find out in October that it was no problem in north and east.
18 What's mean, it was a brigade in Olovo was a part of 2nd Corps. When we
19 talked to this brigade commander and ask him about Bobovac Brigade, they
20 said it's no -- they was more or less friends. We will have a meeting to
21 solve small problem every week, and I have observed and we understand that
22 in west it was fighting, more or less small fighting against 3rd Corps,
23 the Bosnian 3rd Corps, Bosnian army 3rd Corps. And when I ask him he said
24 yes he understand it was fighting. And we went because I think he also
25 said, they really crazy, the 3rd Corps. So I understand they were
1 fighting. It was also fighting a little south-west of Vares, and some day
2 we have arrived it was some policemen and some policemen who are be --
3 some policemen was killed and some was wounded, and my medical look -- the
4 day after we visit the -- this policemen, and they was in what you can
5 call a field hospital, and it was in the 2nd Corps area west of --
6 north-west of Olovo. So I think it was more friendly with the 2nd Corps
7 because the 2nd Corps said it was a part of 2nd Corps, but not on the 3rd
8 Corps. That was fighting.
9 Q. And just so that the record is clear, sir, who was fighting
10 against the 3rd Corps?
11 A. Bobovac Brigade.
12 Q. Can you please tell the Trial Chamber what was the geographic
13 extent of your company's AOR or area of responsibility?
14 A. Yes. It was -- it was very big. We -- we -- from the south we
15 have to the confrontation line or to the border to the BH army and up to
16 Kladanj. It's a place north of Olovo. And up in the area of Ribnica and
17 down to Kopjari and down to south of -- south-west of Vares. So it was
18 very big area for one company.
19 Q. Other than the Bobovac Brigade and the 2nd and 3rd Corps of the
20 army of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what other military forces, if
21 any, were in or near your AOR?
22 A. Sometimes I don't really not understand what the type of unit was
23 from the south. They tell us it was the 6th Corps and it was the 1st
24 Corps, but in November and the rest of my time there it was the 1st Corps
25 in south, and it was more or less they call it Sarajevo corps, they call
2 Q. And again, which army was that?
3 A. BH army. Sorry.
4 Q. To your knowledge, sir, were there any Bosnian Serb army or VRS
5 forces in or around your AOR?
6 A. Yes, in Olovo there was more or less heavy fighting, and some days
7 in the winter we could -- some were about 2.000 impacts in Olovo and it
8 was fighting with the BSA army and the BH army. So it was also Serbs just
9 east of Dastansko. Dastansko is a village east of Vares.
10 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Birger, during your first, say, month of being
11 deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, did you have any interaction with the
12 leadership of the Bobovac Brigade?
13 A. In the first weeks we have a good cooperation with the Bobovac
14 Brigade. We was interest to know where -- the first thing for us, the
15 important thing for us was to have freedom of movement, because if we
16 don't have freedom of movement, we couldn't do anything. So that was very
17 important for us. And that was no problem with the Bobovac Brigade. We
18 have freedom of movement, and we was the first two weeks, maybe three, we
19 was out more or less every day to -- to recognise in the different roads
20 and different areas for observe -- where we could have observation posts,
21 where are we could check points later, where we could even recognise
22 positions for the Danish tank, because one of my missions was also to
23 protect this area. I mean, the Tuzla finger up. So if not, the Serbs
24 were cutting this area.
25 Q. With whom did you have discussions in the Bobovac Brigade
1 concerning freedom of movement?
2 A. We had a meeting with -- with commander, and -- but the officers
3 who was more or less showing us the maps who some days also following us
4 out in the terrain what we call the operational officer.
5 Q. And, sir, do you recall the names of the commanding officer and
6 the operations officer?
7 A. I think it was Emil Harah, or something like this, was the
8 commander, and Kresimir Bosic, something like this, was the operational
10 Q. Do you recall, sir, the names of any other Bobovac Brigade
11 officers that you had regular contact with?
12 A. No. I remember they call one was security officer, and he could
13 speak a little bit English, but I'm not really exactly remember the name.
14 Q. Did you similarly have any contacts or discussions with anyone
15 from the BH army 2nd or 3rd Corps?
16 A. Yes, of course. We have the same discussion with the brigade
17 commander in Olovo, and also want to have freedom of movement, and we was
18 there and more or less every time when we was there was impact close to
19 our vehicles from the Serbian side.
20 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Birger, did there come a time in October 1993
21 when the situation in your AOR became much more hostile or intense, in
22 terms of the parties to the conflict?
23 A. Yes. I -- it was very important for me to -- soon I have my first
24 soldiers down there to take them up in Kopjari area, and I had two reasons
25 for that. First was to observe what's going on in the area, and the
1 second was to observe down into village, Mijakovic and Dragovic, because
2 it was more clear Muslims village inside this area, and I -- I want to
3 observe so nothing happening with these people, and they have no food
4 where it was -- they have a little bit bad situation in these two village.
5 Q. Do you recall, sir, the approximate date that you went to this
6 area, Kopjari?
7 A. Yes, I was there one of these first weeks in -- when I arrived we
8 was up, and recognised also visit these two village, and immediately when
9 I have down my Alpha platoon in this 20 of October, I at the afternoon
10 take them up to this area, and -- and they have a position just south of
11 Kopjari up on the hill.
12 Q. And what was the purpose of this position just south of Kopjari up
13 on the hill?
14 A. They was there to observe and report what was going on in the area
15 and also to observe the -- down in the two village so nothing should
16 happening with Muslims inhabitants in these two village. And I remember
17 it was dark when I leave this place this evening, the 20 of October, and I
18 talk to one might have officers when we walk to the car, and I said I
19 think it's going on very quickly, because we also have observed the same
20 day. It was a lot of BH soldiers down in Dragovic and Mijakovic and there
21 were no soldiers there some weeks before.
22 Q. And I believe, sir, just for the record you mentioned Dragovici
23 and Mijakovici; is that correct?
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. Did the situation in the area around Kopjari and Dragovici,
1 Mijakovici change in the next day or two?
2 A. Yeah. The next day think it was early in the morning before I
3 wake up I had waked up my staff soldiers and they was under fire, my
4 soldier were was under fire in Kopjari, and the BH army had start an
5 attack and they attacked at first from west a little bit north of Kopjari
6 but the main, the big attack, so to say, came from this two village. And
7 it was also fog in this morning, so -- they use this, so they came very
8 close to the Kopjari and after some hours the village was taken by the BH
10 Q. How long did your Alpha platoon maintain an observation post on
11 the hill near Kopjari?
12 A. They was there until about -- until I send -- I don't know how
13 long time they been in there, but in November sometimes we take them away,
14 but these belong to the -- all the lines have changed in this moment one
15 month later.
16 Q. But in the October November period you still maintained an
17 observation post?
18 A. Yes, that's correct.
19 Q. Let me turn now, sir, to the morning of 23 October 1993. Can you
20 tell the Trial Chamber what you remember happening on the morning of 23
21 October 1993?
22 A. This morning I was up in the meeting or I went -- I get up to --
23 to the Bobovac Brigade because we also have a meeting one day before about
24 the situation in Kopjari area and so on, so we have a new meeting this
25 morning, and when I came up there, there was no commanders. So nobody
1 want to talk to me, and -- sorry, I -- sorry. It was later. I meet the
2 commanders and they say it was in fight and they was in the war and been
3 attacked from the south and that was correct because we have observed
4 detonations and so on from the south. And the village of Mir, I think it
5 was a village inside the Bobovac Brigade area, was attacked by the BH
6 army. And they also informed me that therefore they have attacked a
7 village with name Stupni Do, and they do that because there was shooting
8 against the supply lines. The supply line was through this village down
9 to Mir. I don't know before what this should be some Muslim village or
10 something like this, so I don't really this moment understand. I think it
11 was solely from BH army who had taken this village. So in the fighting
12 was not -- nothing for us. We was not there to stop the war. We was there
13 to protect the civilians.
14 Q. And, sir, when you say it was a soldier from the BH army who had
15 taken this village, which village are you referring to?
16 A. My mean, BH army was attacking Mir and what I understand was also
17 some soldiers inside Stupni Do shooting to the Bobovac Brigade supply
18 lines. That was what they tell me in this morning. So therefore the
19 Bobovac Brigade has start attack the Stupni Do.
20 Q. Okay. And when you say, sir, that was what they tell me in the
21 morning, who was the "they"?
22 A. It was the leader of the operational officer of the Bobovac
23 Brigade. Brigade commander wasn't there.
24 Q. And again the name of the operation officer?
25 A. I think it was Kresimir Bozic or something like this.
1 Q. Do you recall, sir, approximately what time on the 23rd of
2 October, 1993, Kresimir Bozic told you this?
3 A. I don't really negotiation but I think it was maybe 8.00 or
4 something like this. We have a normal routines in the camp, so maybe I --
5 or maybe between 7.30, 8.00, leave my camp and get up. It take only
6 minutes. It was very close.
7 Q. Do you recall, sir, approximately how long you remained at the
8 Bobovac Brigade headquarters on the morning of the 23rd of October --
9 A. I was maybe there only 20, 30 minutes because the commander wasn't
10 there and they said they was in fighting in this area, and they have a lot
11 to do and so on. So I leaved, and when I came back to my camp I have a
12 reporting about some minutes after I have arrived that my soldiers who was
13 going up to Kopjari was stopped by a check-point inside Vares, and this
14 check-points have been opened before because we have agreement with
15 Bobovac Brigade for freedom of movement. So --
16 Q. Approximately what time was this?
17 A. It was maybe 9.00. It was just -- it was before lunchtime, I
18 remember. And I get down there and talk to this -- you can call them
19 policemen or what they was, and ask them why we don't -- was allowed to
20 pass the check-point and they said it was for our safety, UNPROFOR safety
21 because there was attack in Vares. I said that is my problem. That is
22 not your problem. But they have order to stop UN units. So I ordered my
23 soldiers to stay there and you are here until they let you go up to
24 Kopjari or I give you another order. And that immediately I went back to
25 Bobovac Brigade and talk to why we don't have freedom of movement.
1 Q. And when you returned to the Bobovac Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel
2 Birger, who did you speak with?
3 A. I speak to what we call the security officer or they called him --
4 we call him like this. Not the operation officer. And he could little
5 English and we was not in the normal room, so to say. Normally we have
6 meetings in -- you can call it an operational room with maps and so on.
7 Now it was -- it was inside, the right side of the building. Now we were
8 putting into the left, into a restaurant. And where we were sitting, and
9 I want to talk to the commanders, but they said -- he only said, "No, no.
10 We have no commanders. It's bad day for us today," and so on. And after
11 some -- between coffee we have lunch there, and one hour get, two hours,
12 and after some hours he said, "Maybe now we have people here from
13 Kiseljak." And I asked what it was, two people, but I don't really
14 understand what he mean about people from Kiseljak, but in afternoon I
15 could observe it, arrive people. I don't know how many, but they arrived
16 directly from a door past the restaurant and get inside to operational
17 room, and it was people I never seen before.
18 Q. Did you at any point in time on that morning speak to the people
19 who came, who passed by this door?
20 A. Sorry, I don't --
21 Q. Did you at any point in time on that day speak to any of the
22 people who passed by that door?
23 A. Not -- not this morning. Not on the day.
24 Q. And how long did you remain at the Bobovac Brigade at this point
25 in time on 23 October 1993?
1 A. I was there just -- I think it was going to the end of afternoon,
2 it's going to be dark, so I understand that nobody want to talk to me. No
3 commanders was there, they said, so -- but I understand some commanders
4 were coming from Kiseljak area but nobody want to talk to me. So I
5 couldn't be there. So I leaved and get back to my company.
6 Q. And approximately how long were you there on that day, the 23rd of
8 A. I think it was about totally five to six hours. I don't really
9 remember, but I was there just before lunch, or lunchtime, and get back
10 just before it was starting to be dark outside.
11 Q. And before I neglect to ask you this, sir, you mentioned that --
12 that the security officer spoke a little bit of English.
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how you generally communicated with
15 the leadership of the Bobovac Brigade?
16 A. Normally we have interpreters. We have interpreters in our unit,
17 and then later we also have a so-called local interpreters from Tuzla area
18 and other areas. But in this moment we just have arrived to Bosnia, so we
19 only have interpreters from Sweden.
20 Q. And can you tell us what the situation was like when you returned
21 to your headquarters at the sawmill on the 23rd of October in the late
22 afternoon, early evening?
23 A. Yes, I can, but I have to add one more. When I remember when I
24 was sitting in this restaurant I also could see they came with wounded
25 soldiers, and what he informed me, this security officer, he came from
1 fighting area just around Stupni Do. He was black dress, black in the
3 When I arrived to my company, I -- I haven't been there so long
4 time because I have my equipment off my body because I -- we have a movie
5 of this -- from a video movie, because just after I arrived my battalion
6 commander arrived from south. So he informed me about the situation he
7 had observed from south, and the Bosnian army check-point in the south had
8 been -- there have within some impact with mortar, and he -- when he
9 passed by there was a die cow and a die old man lying beside the road.
10 And he also observed up in the mountain, so to say, he came from south up
11 to Vares. On the right side he could observe up in mountain it was red
12 and smoke. So he could -- he understand that something was burning, very
13 big area was burning. So when he came to my camp he said to me, "Do you
14 know you have a village probably in your area who is burning?" "Yes, I
15 know, and I think the name of this is Stupni Do."
16 Q. Do you recall lieutenant Colonel Birger approximately what time
17 Colonel Henricsson arrived at the sawmill headquarters?
18 A. No, I don't know which time it was. It was dark outside. It was
19 raining and I don't know. And -- but we start talking. We have to do
20 something. And he have already talk -- if I remember right, talked to the
21 BH army in south, and now he want to -- to inform me what -- we must do
22 something. And we discuss that very much, look at the map, and we have a
23 long discussion in mandatory terms what we have to do. And we decided
24 to -- to try to stop fighting from the both side, and after that get into
25 Stupni Do for look what's happening, especially with the civilians.
1 Q. Having had this discussion with the NordBat commander, sir, what
2 steps did you take?
3 A. Yes. We -- we understand that we have to do something to get
4 inside, so before that we also have to -- to have stop fighting. So we
5 went down to the BH army, small headquarters or something. I think it was
6 in Pajtov Han or something like this, south of Vares, and my commander was
7 talking to these others, I don't talk to them. But he have some type of
8 agreement that if we could get inside Stupni Do they should stop fighting
9 for hours or something like this. So it was no problem. After that we
10 went north, passed into the Bobovac Brigade area up to the Bobovac Brigade
11 and have a meeting there with the leadership but it was little bit
12 strange. It was not -- we don't meet normally brigade commander. It was
13 new man from Kiseljak, and -- and he had a moustache, and he said his name
14 was Ivica Rajic. And the operational officer we have meet before was also
15 there, and we start negotiations with him but it was not so easy, because
16 -- in the beginning it was no problem. We could get out to Stupni Do.
17 We could do everything. And when he understand we have to do it this
18 night, he said no. So we was discussing and the whole time he build up
19 his steps, instead to find a solution little bit down. So it was
20 impossibility to have agreement with him. So we leaved. And I remember
21 he was walking out and he said, "If you get out Stupni Do tonight I'm
22 going to stop you. I'm going to fight." And we said, "Okay, we
23 understand what you are saying but we are going to get into Stupni Do."
24 Q. And approximately what time was this discussion or what time did
25 you leave on the 23rd of October 1993?
1 A. It's been very late. I think it was just before midnight.
2 Q. And where did you and Colonel Henricsson go at that time.
3 A. We went back to my camp and we discuss again, and immediately when
4 we leave Bobovac Brigade, I give order with radio to my soldiers to be
5 ready to -- with trucks and vehicles, armed vehicles to go out to Stupni
6 Do. So when we come back they were more or less ready to go, but we
7 discussed in the car and we discuss about risks for us. We have never
8 been in this area. It was dark. It was fog outside. It was -- so to say
9 it was not good weather for us. It was not good situation where we could
10 use our weapons. It was more good weather for, say, light armed soldiers.
11 So later we decided to wait until it was darkness the next day.
12 Q. And do you recall, sir, approximately how many men from your
13 company were available on that evening of the 23rd of October, 1993?
14 A. I don't remember. It was more or less maximum one platoon or when
15 we have also some truck, and -- but it was not so much. Maybe five, six
17 Q. Where were the rest of the members of your company at that point
18 in time?
19 A. We have -- I have soldiers out in -- in -- in Kopjari. I think it
20 was one -- one part of one platoon. I have a lot of soldiers still in the
21 Pancevo base in Belgrade. So it was more or less three platoons,
22 mechanised platoons, inside. Maybe it was only two. I don't really
23 remember. Maybe the second one have arrived the 22nd. So it could be
25 Q. And again, sir, just to avoid confusion later, when you made
1 reference to a lot of soldiers still in the Pancevo base in Belgrade, what
2 were they doing there?
3 A. They was preparing a way to get inside Bosnia, and it was again
4 the whole time with the Bosnian Serbs. We have -- it was not so easy to
5 take inside these soldiers. They stop us the whole time. It was in
6 November, I think, they stop all APCs. So the rest came from Croatia in
8 Q. Okay. I take it, sir, your vehicles were shipped by rail to
9 Belgrade; is that correct?
10 A. Yes, that's correct, from Denmark.
11 Q. Can you tell us, Lieutenant Colonel Birger, what steps you took
12 beginning the next morning --
13 A. The 24th.
14 Q. -- to try to get to Stupni Do?
15 A. We used the road down in Vares and in the south part of -- little
16 bit south of the centre where is the bridge over the road and -- and when
17 you take the road up to -- to Stupni Do, and you also have to pass under
18 the railway. And this tunnel was closed so to say. There were anti-tank
19 mines and it was soldier there with anti-tank weapons. So when we came
20 there they stop us and said we was not allowed to pass. And we -- I
21 remember I talked to them and tried to find a negotiation, because it was
22 more or less no problem for us to use violence and go up, because I
23 immediately could see we could passed over the railway, so to say, left of
24 this tunnel, but we don't do that because we don't want to stop fighting.
25 It was not Bafobe [phoen] was there. So I tried to negotiate and it was
1 impossibility. They said, "No, you are not allowed to pass." I tried to
2 talk to their commander, Bobovac Brigade. Nobody was there to talk to me.
3 I send a part of my 2nd platoon up in another way. I know it was one road
4 I think more or less from north down to Stupni Do to find this road, and
5 he -- he reported later -- a bit later in the day he was stopped also in
6 the check-point. And after I understand they was very, very close to
7 Stupni Do. We have -- leave the vehicles. Get out. Some -- maybe they
8 could observe down in the village.
9 Q. How long did you remain down with your platoon that was by the --
10 the railroad tunnel?
11 A. They was there the whole day. We tried to get out and there was
12 also some young -- we could call them -- they was equipped like soldiers,
13 but they was young and they was more or less -- I don't understand what it
14 was for type of soldiers, but they belong -- there was Croats, and they
15 came down there just after we have arrived and said, "This is not your
16 country. Leave here," and they unload the workmen and so on. And my
17 military police protect me and also been ready to open fire, and after
18 some minutes we leaved and I talked to the policemen there and they said
19 you must be careful about this soldier, because they are dangerous, and he
20 also think -- he explained they came from Kakanj area and their family
21 members have been killed and so on. And he also said, "I'm sorry to say,
22 but I think you also have some type of these people in your country, but
23 you have them in prison," or -- and I remember I tell him that, "You are a
24 policeman. Take them. Arrest them and take them to prison." But he
25 sard, "No, that's impossible, they kill me."
1 Q. I believe, sir, there might be an error in the transcript on line
2 11 of this page. It indicates they unload the workmen and so on and my
3 military police protected me. What did these -- this soldier or soldiers
4 do when they approached you?
5 A. They have Kalashnikov in their hands and they do something like
6 this to -- ready to shoot and walking to -- forward me. And therefore my
7 policemen get in front of me to protect me.
8 Q. And how was this situation diffused?
9 A. Yes. They -- after some minutes they leaved, and -- and I also
10 leaved, get up back to the Bobovac Brigade headquarter, try to -- to find
11 the commanders, to talk to them, to find a solution, but nobody commander
12 was there. I don't remember how long time, how many times I was there,
13 but I -- I remember I also have sent a patrol with a corps, only one
14 officer and a driver with a car up at the road to Kopjari because over
15 this road when you came, as I said, you could look down in Vares. You
16 also could look over Vares. So we maybe could observe what's going on in
17 Stupni Do.
18 So I travel up to this officer to talk to him about the situation,
19 and when I was there, there came a lady, maybe was 40, 45 years old, and
20 she could speak a little bit German. So she inform us about the situation
21 down in Vares, and she said it was more than 200 Muslims, young boys and
22 men, inside the school just beside the mayor house.
23 Q. Had you heard of this before?
24 A. No. It was new information for me, so I went back to Vares and
25 get into the police station and I was very tough when I come inside there.
1 I said, "I know and you know what's going on in this school. I want to
2 have a list of all the prisoners and I want to have it now." And they
3 immediately gave me a list and I could see that the left of every name it
4 was a number, and I follow quickly down, and I have only a chance to look
5 some seconds because they understand, I think, it was not so good for them
6 to let me look at that. So just before they take it away from me again I
7 have summarying down and could see it was about 233 numbers of prisoner.
8 Q. Do you recall approximately what time on the 24th of October,
9 1993, you were at the police station?
10 A. It was at the afternoon, but not exactly the time, I don't
12 Q. And how long did you remain in the police station on that
14 A. I -- I know what I -- they give me coffee and so, and I said to
15 them, "But now I want to have --" I would get inside this it and they
16 said, "No, you are not allowed." I said if I'm not allowed I want to talk
17 to one commander who can give me the -- he say that I'm allowed to get
18 inside. But he said, "No, no, no, you couldn't talk to a commander." So
19 I been angry and take my helmet and smash it in the table, and said, "No,
20 I want to talk to your commander." And he immediately take the telephone
21 and talk to somebody, but he's outside here and I could hear he was very,
22 very angry, and he said, "You couldn't talk to him. He don't want to talk
23 to you, and you're not allowed to get inside this school."
24 So when I came out one of my soldiers informed me what it was,
25 somebody who want to talk to you. So I went back. It was dark now
1 outside and I went back my -- one of my APCs on the square and talk to --
2 and just to -- I think it was two members of the Bobovac Brigade. It was
3 two HVO soldiers. And they -- they asked me, "Do you know what's going on
4 in this school?" And I said, "Yes, I think so. I know that there are
5 Muslim men and boy inside there." And he said, "If you are the UN
6 commander here in Vares, you have to do something, because I am from this
7 town and I don't want going bad for them," and then he walked away in the
9 Q. Do you know who this person was?
10 A. No, I have never meet him before.
11 Q. Now, can you tell us, Lieutenant Colonel Birger, approximately how
12 far this school was from the police station?
13 A. Oh, it's a small square, and you have the mayor house and -- in
14 the square, and you have the school and if you look here you have the
15 mayor house and back in you have the small police station. It was also a
16 very little police station.
17 Q. Where did you go after having this encounter with this gentleman?
18 A. I --
19 Q. At your APC?
20 A. I don't really remember. Maybe I also once more tried to talk to
21 the Bobovac Brigade, but I have no meeting just then, but I ordered in
22 this minute that if we're not allowed won't get inside, we want to have
23 APC outside. So I ordered that one APC from the 1st Platoon to stay down
24 in the tunnel just close to the HVO check-point to try to get through up
25 to Stupni Do. I had a Red Cross APC outside the school because I don't
1 want to provocate. So therefore I had a Red Cross APC out there, and they
2 have only -- mission for one was only observe, do nothing, only observe.
3 I also have -- have some information earlier this day that it was
4 Muslim people down in the village of Dastansko and there was also one
5 musky [phoen]. So earlier this day have ordered had platoon who have been
6 tried to find a way north of Stupni Do. It was the 2nd Bravo platoon. So
7 two of these vehicles was down in Dastanko, and they stay there this
8 evening to protect civilians, protect musky and so on, and observe, of
9 course, what's going on in Dastansko.
10 I also have one APC outside Dastansko up on the hill but I don't
11 remember the name or the place but it was good place to observe the area.
12 And of course I have one -- I have soldiers still up in Kopjari.
13 So when I have all of that and give all of that and everybody was
14 out, I have a new meeting this time at the evening. I don't really know
15 the -- exactly time but it was at the evening. We were in Bobovac
16 Brigade. It was not -- Ivica Rajic was not there. It was -- the
17 battalion commander was not there, but I talk to the operational officer,
18 and I understand more or less maybe he now was the, to say, the new
19 brigade -- the new commander.
20 Q. And again for the record, sir, can you giver us the name?
21 A. The operational officer Kresimir Bozic, something like this.
22 Q. And it's your understanding that he became the brigade commander
23 at -- at about this time?
24 A. Yes, he was the commander that I understand. And we -- I have --
25 I tried to get into the school. I wanted to visit this prison. He said
1 no. And the message to me from him was that you have to take all your
2 soldiers inside the camp, and if you don't do that we're going to destroy
3 them. And we are also going to -- shooting at your camp. The camp was
4 not already a camp. It was still a factory. We have moved one day
5 before, all of us in the 34 -- 33 [sic] of October. We do nothing to
6 protect ourself. So it was still a factory with my units inside.
7 Q. Okay. Now, Lieutenant Colonel Birger, when you mentioned that you
8 moved, and I think that was the -- can you give us the date that you
10 A. I think we move the 23rd of -- of -- of October.
11 Q. Okay. Can you tell it the Trial Chamber where you moved from --
12 A. From the sawmill --
13 Q. -- or to?
14 A. It was the same factory area but I moved 100, 200 metres from the
15 sawmill down to the furniture factory.
16 Q. Okay. But this was all within 1 fenced area?
17 A. It was inside one fence, yes.
18 Q. But part of it was known as the sawmill and part of it was known
19 as the furniture factory?
20 A. Yes, and we built a new fence between the two.
21 Q. And could you recall whether anything else happened on the evening
22 of the 24th of October, 1993, after you got back to the sawmill?
23 A. Yeah. I get back and -- and I get -- we have erect a tent outside
24 so to call it staff tent with communications and I was inside there and
25 talked to my soldiers who was there, some of my officers, and summary what
1 happening the day and checked out what's going on, give order for -- I
2 mean, you couldn't have same soldier outside the whole night so same APCs
3 inside my camp and they have order to some time tonight get out and send
4 back cadavers. So it was about -- I think it was about 10.00 or something
5 like this at the evening. I went into the factory and take my sleeping
6 bag and get ready to sleep, and I have -- I remember I was just to --
7 going down I have my shoes off. One soldier come inside and said, "Major,
8 major, must came out. They have said we are going to shooting against the
9 Red Cross APC down in Vares if they don't move." And I said, "Don't move
10 them. They should stay there. I don't think they are going to shoot. So
11 let them -- don't move. Stay on the place."
12 And he leaved and in that's moment I talked to myself, so to say,
13 and understand that it's not time for me to go to bed. So I start take my
14 shoe and get ready to get out again, and before I was ready for bed the
15 same soldier come running inside again and said, "You must came. They
16 start shooting in Vares," and in this moment I also could hear it was
17 shooting. And when I come out I could see it was shooting against my
18 positions. I could see flash from weapons. I could also see bullets over
19 the building. And it was -- the situation was not so good in the tent.
20 We was in very high position on the hill and we have nothing to protect
21 us. So my soldier was lying down and talking in radio and it was a lot of
22 talking in radio there. And what's happening was that they threw hand
23 grenades to the Red Cross APC. In the same moment it was two Red Cross
24 APCs. One was going down there to change 10.00. So at this moment it was
25 two Red Cross APCs. And those two APCs was hit with a lot of bullets and
1 two hand grenades. So the wheels -- some of the wheels was destroyed on
2 this vehicle.
3 Q. Okay. Let me just ask you this clarification, sir, these, what
4 you've called Red Cross APCs, who owned these vehicles?
5 A. It's a part of my company for wounded soldiers, let's say. They
6 have no arms outside the APC.
7 Q. Were these vehicles of the International Committee of the Red
9 A. No. It was a number of the UN forces UNPROFOR.
10 Q. And what colour were the vehicles?
11 A. White -- red cross, back side and white near the front.
12 Q. Can you tell us what you remember after having been awoken and
13 going outside and seeing this shooting?
14 A. The first thing that I do is that in this same time they also have
15 change APC down in the tunnel so it was the APC who was coming back. It
16 was the -- the platoon leader for Alpha platoon. So I gave him radio
17 order to went back and assist these two APCs down in -- in Vares. And
18 also one wheeled APC following after. So it was two APC. One tracked and
19 one with wheel. And they moved down and meet these two Red Cross APC, and
20 we sent them back to the camp and moved down with -- with this in the
21 first vehicle was the tracked APC. And when we came down just before the
22 square it was a lot of shooting against this APC. So they stop, shoot
23 some warning shoot. We were automatic cannon in there. I gave order that
24 if they are shooting against you, I have inform the commander of Bobovac
25 Brigade, so to say, the new commander early at the evening that if you are
1 shooting against us we are going to shooting back, no warning shoot. And
2 what was I gave order? No warning, shoot. If shooting at both you, shoot
4 Q. Can you tell us, sir, by the late night of the 24th of October,
5 1993, had any members of the 8th Mechanised Company been successful in
6 entering Stupni Do?
7 A. No. Nobody had come inside. As I say, before we was outside in
8 this position, I have tell about before, 10.00, and when they start
9 shooting what I have described, we back some 1, maybe 200 metres, stop
10 there, and after that we were staying there the whole night with this
11 tracked APC and one wheeled APC.
12 Q. And do you recall, Lieutenant Colonel Birger, approximately what
13 time you went to bed on the night of the 24th of October into the 25th of
14 October, 1993?
15 A. I was not going to bed because we have red alert the whole night
16 of my camp. I have -- I have not so much soldier inside my camp, so all
17 was out digging, and we also have some type of mines, not to -- so to say
18 to kill, only for warning. And we was ready the whole night to -- to
19 fight, because we was afraid. Like I said, we was afraid, because if
20 they -- if they shoot at the Red Cross APCs, if they shoot at my APCs down
21 in Vares, we also could do the second thing. He had warning me to -- with
22 snipers shooting down in the camp because it was a valley and we was -- it
23 was very close to -- to the hill, so to say. So my soldier was out the
24 whole night. Nobody was sleeping. I -- I get to sleep early in the
25 morning inside one Red Cross APC. So I have some hours to sleep, but I
1 wake up about 6.00 or 5.30 like this when we have one more platoon from
2 the 10 Corps also there, another company up in Tuzla.
3 Q. Now, Lieutenant Colonel Birger, do you know which force or forces
4 was firing upon the 8th company?
5 A. Yeah. It was inside Vares, and it was HVO soldiers. We
6 recognised one jeep we had seen before, and it was one jeep staying there,
7 and we also used smoke grenades with phosphor when we draw back and some
8 of this phosphor was also hitting this jeep. So next day we could also
9 see that -- the phosphor, and it was part of the Bobovac Brigade.
10 Q. What about the force or forces that was firing upon your camp in
11 the sawmill do you know?
12 A. No we couldn't see it was dark but if my opinion it was the same
13 forces that shutting down in Vares.
14 Q. Now, let me break these into two subject areas, one being Stupni
15 Do and one being the school in Vares. Let's talk first, sir, about Stupni
16 Do. What steps did you take on the morning of the 25th of October, 1993,
17 to gain access to the village of Stupni Do?
18 A. Yes. We still was -- it was very important for us to came inside
19 Stupni Do, both Stupni Do and the school. So we try again to -- to -- to
20 talk to the Bobovac Brigade to get inside the school, but it was never a
21 thought about that this day.
22 Q. Into the --
23 A. We couldn't come inside this day.
24 Q. Into the school.
25 A. Stupni Do.
1 Q. Stupni Do, okay. So when was the first time tower recollection,
2 sir, that members of the 8th company mechanised company of NordBat were
3 able to get into Stupni Do?
4 A. If I may remember right, I think it was the 26th of -- of October.
5 And we do it in the same way what we have to do the morning of 24th. We
6 do it from two -- two roads. My third platoon, with battalion commander
7 Henricsson on, taken, so to say, the north part, and they was also the
8 first unit who came into Stupni Do. In the same moment when they arrived
9 into Stupni Do, a platoon - it was not from my company, it was from -- I
10 think it was Alpha platoon from the 10 Coy [Realtime transcript read in
11 error "corps"] in Tuzla - I ordered them to passed what we tried to do two
12 days before, over the railway, and they do that, and nobody was shooting
13 against them. So they came in from this road, this direction.
14 Q. Okay. Now, line 2 of page 86 makes reference to the 10 corps. I
15 believe you said Coy, C-o-y, which is an abbreviation.
16 A. 10 Coy.
17 Q. Coy being an abbreviation for?
18 A. It was a company in our battalion.
19 Q. And why did part of the 10th company come down to Vares?
20 A. Because I don't have all my soldiers inside my company. Part of
21 them was still outside, and I need more soldiers. This big problem who
22 was growing up day for day in my area.
23 Q. And how did you get these reinforcements from the 10th company.
24 A. They arrived with tracked APCs, tracked APCs one with wheel
25 down -- at night-time from Tuzla area, and some day later it was one more
1 platoon from this company.
2 Q. Now, sir, just to be very, very clear for the record, did you
3 personally ever go to the village of Stupni Do in late October?
4 A. No.
5 Q. What information did you receive concerning what NordBat soldiers
6 observed there?
7 A. I have immediately the information from my battalion commander
8 that there have been a massacre in Stupni Do. All houses are destroy,
9 still burning here. We could see bodies and so on, so we understand
10 something very, very bad happening in Stupni Do.
11 Q. Do you recall the names of any of the specific people in NordBat
12 who went into Stupni Do on the 26th of October, 1993?
13 A. Yeah. As I said, it was the 3rd platoon, the platoon leader was
14 lieutenant Nilson, and together it was also my commander, my platoon
15 leader for 4th platoon. His soldier wasn't there so he was, so to say, an
16 extra officer with this platoon. It was captain Nilson and, of course, my
17 battalion commander, Colonel Henricsson. It was the first officers who
18 came into Stupni Do, and ti -- together it was 30 soldiers also, and they
19 spread them out immediately to look, to observe what's going -- what's
20 happening inside this village. So very quickly I -- we understand that it
21 is -- what's happening there.
22 Q. Do you recall, Lieutenant Colonel Birger, whether any medical
23 officers from NordBat entered Stupni Do in October 1993?
24 A. Yes. Later we send in our battalion doctor, so to say, medical
25 staff doctor but it was not this same day. It was later. And the day
1 after we have entered it was some people from Kiseljak where it was
2 military police there to investigate what's happening, and it was also the
3 Chief of Staff of BH command, Brigadier Ramsay, was there, and it was also
4 a lot of media there.
5 Q. And who were these people from Kiseljak?
6 A. It was military police, and the -- and the mission for them was to
7 investigate what's going on, and they have written report about what's
8 happening there.
9 Q. And what military force were these military police from?
10 A. It was from UNPROFOR.
11 Q. Now, Lieutenant Colonel Birger, let's turn to the school, the
12 situation --
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, Mr. Mundis. You do not plan this, I
14 think, but you constantly address our witness as Lieutenant Colonel. He
15 has told us that he's a Colonel now, if I understood you correctly, and I
16 do not think there is any reason to downgrade you again.
17 THE WITNESS: I'm not -- I was Major when I was down in Bosnia.
18 I'm now Lieutenant Colonel. My commander in Bosnia was Colonel.
19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry. Then there is a mistake in the
20 transcript, because when the president asked you for your grade it is
21 stated that you said Colonel. I apologise, Mr. Mundis.
22 MR. MUNDIS: No problem.
23 Q. Now, sir, let me turn then to the school in Vares beginning again
24 from the 26th of October 1993, where we left off. What steps -- or the
25 25th, I'm sorry, the 25th of October. What steps did you take to gain
1 access to the school where the detainees were being kept?
2 A. I remember when this platoon arrived at the morning of the 25, I
3 give them order to get down in Vares, so to say, open the road again, take
4 control over the city, and they do that. Then maybe 10.00 or something
5 like this they are reporting that they get down in Vares and they --
6 nobody was shooting against them. It was more or less very quiet. There
7 is no problem to use the road down. And they send one or two APCs down to
8 the check-point in south and back again. And after that we -- I have this
9 platoon outside the school where we have this prisoner what's mean at the
10 square, and I also arrived with one APC, and we try to use force to get
11 into the school, but it was a lot of HVO soldiers there, and -- and I take
12 a decision it was not to say the right time to use force because we wasn't
13 there to start fighting, and -- and it was also little bit bad position
14 for us. So we wait and put one APC outside the school and leave the area.
15 And the 26th, Sunday, we get into Stupni Do. If I remember right,
16 we also was allowed to visit the prison or in the school, and the officer
17 was Major Daniel Ekberg.
18 Q. And Lieutenant Colonel Birger did you visit any of the people in
19 the school?
20 A. Yes but it was some days later.
21 Q. Can you tell us what report you received from Major Ekberg
22 following his entry in the school on the 26th of October?
23 A. He described the situation as it was. They were sitting in
24 athletic hall around and they was all of them was more or less beaten up,
25 smashed in the head, in the face, and they was very afraid, and he talked
1 to them and tell them that now, the word now what's going on inside this
2 school, and we do everything to stop what's going on here and try to help
3 you to get out from the school.
4 Q. Do you recall, sir, what he reported to you about the conditions
5 in the school and the conditions of the people who were kept in the
7 A. Yes. We understand that it was maybe policemen who was there, but
8 we also understand that the people who beat them up was not the policemen,
9 it was young boys who came out, get in and smash them and beaten them up
10 and leave again. And we also have observed that the day before, that is
11 to say traffic in and out of different persons, young boys.
12 So the situation was very bad, and we was afraid they also killed
13 people there, but we don't know in this -- this time we don't know if
14 somebody have been killed.
15 Q. Do you recall whether you received any reports about the number of
16 people who were being kept in the school?
17 A. Yeah. We -- we -- I have -- as I said before, it was 233, 233
18 people there, and we -- maybe we couldn't say it was so many now there,
19 but it was more than hundreds of people. It was a lot of people inside.
20 Exactly I don't remember if we know how many inside the school.
21 Q. Now, Lieutenant Colonel Birger, do you recall the date that you
22 personally went into the school?
23 A. Yeah. It was some days later, and I don't really remember exactly
24 the day, but I remember this day all forces from HVO have leaved Vares,
25 leaved the city. We have information that 27 of the prisoner was moved,
1 and -- and -- and -- no, I'm sorry. I'm going to -- to -- one or two days
3 When I was there in the beginning, I -- the first time I was in
4 the school it -- they have moved the prisoners so -- to another school.
5 We call it that the south school, and it was south of the city, south part
6 of the city, close to the Catholic church. And I remember also that I was
7 in a mass meeting with commander of Bobovac Brigade. That mean
8 operational officer. And he allow -- he get permission us because we was
9 allowed to get inside the school but only to visit very, short time look
10 and talk to the prisoners, and then we get out again. I don't really
11 remember which day but I think it was somewhere last day in October.
12 Q. Can you -- can you just -- sorry to interrupt, sir. Can you tell
13 us what you saw on that first occasion when you went there?
14 A. Yeah. We could see the same what we have seen before. They have
15 been beaten up. In the face you could see. Blue eyes, and scars and so
16 on. Blood. They turn off the light so we have to use our hand lights.
17 And up, I want to get upstairs. First they said no, but we discussed with
18 them and we walked up. It was me and one military policeman from my
19 battalion. And we could observe in one room it was blood on the floor.
20 There was also blood in the corridor like you have drawn like a pencil,
21 but if you draw a dead animal, for example, if you draw that with blood
22 you could see some on the floor. It was the same in the stair. So we
23 understand that they have killed bodies. Somebody -- or they have been
24 beaten them up and take them through the corridor out.
25 I also observed that it was -- we -- we ask them. We know, we
1 have information about it 7 -- 27 prisoners is very, very bad. "Where
2 they have these prisoners?" They said, "No, no, they are here." But we
3 could -- we understand that it wasn't like this. So downstairs I could
4 see a door of iron, and I said I want to get inside there and take my lamp
5 and look there, but they stopped me and said, "No, no, there is nothing."
6 And I stopped because I think it was right because there was a lot of bad
7 things lying down there, they haven't used this door for a long time.
8 And some days later we have information about that this 7 -- 27
9 prisoners was down in an old police station down in the south part of
10 Vares. So we -- we observed in the area and tried to find out which house
11 it was, and -- and -- and one day I think it was -- it was this day what
12 the HVO -- the Bobovac Brigade had leaved Vares, and I think it was the
13 3rd, maybe, of November. It was the beginning of November. They leaved,
14 but they -- this morning they also burned their headquarter, Bobovac
15 Brigade, and the town -- city was empty of people. Nobody was outside.
16 There was no soldier there. We could hear some single shooting.
17 We won't down to this place called Vares-Majdan, maybe what's the
18 name, and we find this prisoner. They was outside the house. So we take
19 them with us and get up to the south school, and just before I came up
20 there my soldier had opened the school and prisoners was walking outside
21 together with family members. There was also some international media
22 there, and I ordered my soldiers to put up UN flag on the building and we
23 protect the building.
24 Q. And can you tell us -- you've mentioned this, events about the 3rd
25 of November, roughly, 1993. Can you tell us what else was happening in
1 the town of Vares?
2 A. Yes. Yes it was -- it was one house outside Vares was burning.
3 The Bobovac Brigade headquarter, the hotel, was burning. It was a little
4 fire also in the hospital in Vares. That was all. It was -- not much was
5 destroyed. It was -- it was only empty. No soldier there, no people was
7 Q. What caused these various fires that were burning?
8 A. I think -- I know that one of the families outside had tell me
9 before that, if I leave, I putting fire on my house. So I think it was
10 doing like this. Maybe in the hospital it was a normal accident to
11 have -- it was firing there. I don't know.
12 Q. What about the Bobovac Brigade?
13 A. Bobovac Brigade the evening before I was there because I have been
14 at a meeting up with the deputy commander of the 2nd BH corps in -- I
15 think it was north of Bobovac Brigade's area. And I have also message in
16 a letter to the -- to the leadership of Bobovac Brigade that came here
17 tomorrow as friends or be a part of 2nd Corps. No negotiations. And --
18 but when I came down to the Bobovac Brigade this evening, it was dark. It
19 was hundred of civilians outside, refugees, so to say, and when I came
20 inside this building it was no commanders there. It was only what I
21 called before, the security officer. He was a little drunk. The
22 people -- soldiers inside there was drinking, and they was burning papers.
23 And next morning it was the whole building on fire.
24 Q. And just to complete this story, sir, what was the next event of
25 any great significance in the town of Vares after the 3rd of November,
2 A. It was the morning, next morning, very early. The next morning we
3 have information it was forces from the BH army coming from south, and it
4 was some -- also this morning it was some international media team who was
5 leaving my camp, and they came back after some hours or something like
6 this and tell me that they have been looting by -- they take the food and
7 so on. It was soldiers from the BH army, and they was shooting and
8 destroying when we came into the city. So I take one platoon and one --
9 APCs for my -- as my commanding APCs and get down. And just when we came
10 in front of the square where the mayor house is, what I described before
11 where we also have the first school and the police station, I stopped
12 there, take out my -- my three APCs like a shield, get out and get in
13 front of the soldiers. They came in two lines more or less like in good
14 infantry in this kind of fighting, and there was cross shooting up into
15 the windows and so on and I tried to stop them because there was no
16 necessary to shooting. There were no soldiers there, they only destroy
17 the houses.
18 Q. Let me interrupt you there, sir. How many people were left in
19 Vares at this point in time when the ABiH forces entered from the south?
20 A. I -- what I can understand it was thousands of Croats who have
21 leaved. And many of them was down in Dastansko but I also think many have
22 leaved the Serbia area down to Kiseljak.
23 Q. Now, let me just in the couple of minutes left for this evening
24 ask you about recording of what happened with respect to your unit. Did
25 you keep a personal diary or was there a unit diary that was kept?
1 A. Yeah. Every day we was writing down everything in papers. We
2 signed everything. We send out a patrol, it was signed down. If I gave
3 an order, it was written down. Everything what we do, everything what we
4 observed, everything what's happening was written down in a paper. And
5 in -- when we was down there, my operational officer start written a diary
6 of the company, and he had start already when we was in Denmark, and he
7 finish it when we came home to Sweden.
8 Q. And what was done with that diary when it was completed in
9 Sweden --
10 A. He show me that and I also find somebody -- something I think was
11 not really correct, so I correct so that you have written this and this.
12 And it was not exactly written exactly what's happening. It was more a
13 less a summary for every day.
14 Q. Was this an official document?
15 A. No. It's only for the soldiers and officers in the company as a
16 memory of the time in Bosnia.
17 Q. And what happened to the official logbooks of the unit?
18 A. What I can understand they sent to -- we have them in -- in
19 Sweden. We take them every month for something like this, but I don't
20 really exactly where they are.
21 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, I note the time. I would require
22 approximately 15 minutes tomorrow morning simply to go through about 10
23 documents with the witness and then that would complete the
24 examination-in-chief, but I don't believe we could even start that
25 efficiently at this point in time.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Well, it's time to stop.
2 It's almost 7.00 p.m. As you know, we're sitting in the morning this
3 week, so we will resume tomorrow at 9.00 a.m. Thank you.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.58 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 27th day of March,
6 2007, at 9.00 a.m.