1 Tuesday, 5 June 2007
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.32 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon to
8 everyone. This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et
9 al. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much,
11 Mr. Registrar.
12 I would like to greet everyone here in this courtroom, Mr. Scott,
13 the Defence counsel, the accused, and everyone else in the courtroom. We
14 are starting late. I don't know for what reason. I was told that the
15 Popovic Trial Chamber was late in finishing. I saw on my screen that
16 Mr. Karnavas was in another case. So I don't exactly know what this delay
17 is about.
18 In any case, we are 20 minutes late, and we'll try to make up for
19 it but I will first like to ask the registrar to give us some IC numbers.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you again, Your Honour.
21 OTP has submitted a list of documents which should be tendered
22 through a Mr. Rudy Gerritsen. This list will become Exhibit IC 591 under
23 seal. In addition, several parties have submitted lists of documents to
24 be tendered through Witness BH. The list submitted by OTP shall be given
25 Exhibit number IC 592 under seal. The list submitted by 3D shall be
1 given Exhibit number IC 593 while the list submitted by 4D shall be given
2 Exhibit number IC 594 under seal. That's everything, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. We are now
4 going to move into private session for a few minutes, Mr. Registrar.
5 [Private session]
5 [Open session]
6 THE REGISTRAR: We are back in open session, Your Honours.
7 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I had asked for closed session but only
8 out of great caution, Your Honour. There is -- there is a motion
9 current -- perhaps it's safer --
10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] We're in open session.
11 MR. STEWART: I understood that Your Honour. I understand that.
12 I was just wondering whether in the circumstance I could safely proceed
13 but I think not actually, Your Honour. I -- may we go back into private
15 [Private session]
11 Pages 19456-19458 redacted. Private session
4 [Open session]
5 MR. SCOTT: The reason we selected four and a half hours is for a
6 reason and we think that that's a reasonable estimate of time that will be
8 MR. KARNAVAS: I do wish to raise a concern here, Your Honour.
9 Here we are right before the witness testifies and we find out for the
10 very first time that the Trial Chamber, on its own, has decided to make
11 cuts and changes to the allocation of the time. The Prosecution obviously
12 indicated it needed for its case four and a half hours. You cut their
13 time and then you cut the Defence's time without recognising the amount of
14 time that the Defence needs and I must -- I must say that again this is
15 not the proper way to proceed. I've said it in the past; I'll say it
16 again. This is not a way to ensure that the accused are getting a fair
17 trial. And so -- and I certainly don't want the Prosecution at the end of
18 their three hours to then try to introduce documents later on because they
19 didn't have enough time to put it in. Of course, that's something that
20 they feel compelled to do but it puts the Defence at a disadvantage and
21 we're getting closer and closer to violating the Statute. We're getting
22 to the point where there's no need for us to appear in Court if that's the
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll see.
25 [The witness entered court]
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, can you please stand.
2 Can you please give me your first name, last name, and date of birth?
3 THE WITNESS: I'm Bo Pellnas, born on the 22nd of October, 1939.
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is your current occupation?
5 THE WITNESS: I'm a retired brigadier general from the Swedish
6 armed forces.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, have you ever testified
8 before a Tribunal on the events that took place in the former Yugoslavia
9 or is this the first time you've testified?
10 THE WITNESS: This is the first time.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm now going to ask you to read
12 the solemn declaration shown to you by the usher.
13 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
14 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, General. You may sit
17 It's the first time you've testified here, so let me give you a
18 few words of explanation about this week of hearing where we will hear
19 your testimony. In the first stage you will answer questions put to you
20 by the Prosecutor. I'm sure you've met him before the hearing. The
21 Prosecutor will also show you a number of documents that you've probably
22 been shown earlier during the meeting you had with the Prosecution.
23 Afterwards, the Defence counsel, who are sitting on your left, or
24 as the case may be the accused themselves, may be able to put questions to
25 you as part of the procedure we call the cross-examination.
1 The four Judges sitting before you may, according to the Rules of
2 Procedure and Evidence, may ask you questions at any time, but for
3 practical purposes and so as not to obstruct the examination conducted by
4 each of the parties, we find it better to put questions at the end. For
5 extraordinary reasons, for example, because you're dealing with a
6 particular document, we may decide to ask questions to deal with that
7 particular document so as not to have to go back to it at the end. But
8 usually we prefer to wait until the end to put questions to you.
9 If you do not understand one of the questions put to you, do not
10 hesitate to ask the person asking the question to repeat it. Please try
11 to be extremely accurate when answering the questions. This is an oral
12 proceedings, and what is important is what you will tell us and what will
13 be confirmed and corroborated by documents that will be submitted to you.
14 That's why you have a screen in front of you where what's being said by
15 everyone here in this courtroom is transcribed. We have breaks every 90
16 minutes for technical reasons and also to give the witness the opportunity
17 to rest, but if in the meantime you feel that you need to rest, do not
18 hesitate to notify us and ask for a break. The Trial Chamber is ready to
19 answer any questions you might have during the hearing.
20 These are a few words of explanation about the way we are going to
21 proceed today and on Wednesday and Thursday during this week that is
22 entirely dedicated to you.
23 Mr. Scott, without further ado and without wasting any more time
24 because time is precious, please proceed.
25 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours, and good
1 afternoon to everyone else in the courtroom.
2 WITNESS: BO PELLNAS
3 Examination by Mr. Scott:
4 Q. General Pellnas, good afternoon. General, our time under any
5 scenario would be rather limited so I would like to go through some of
6 your background fairly quickly. If you can just confirm a few facts for
7 us, please. As you've just indicated, you are a retired senior officer
8 from the Swedish armed forces; is that correct?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. You are an infantry or were an infantry officer by training. You
11 began your military service in 1958. You were commissioned in 1961. You
12 became a colonel in 1984 and brigadier general in 1990; is that correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. During your time in the Swedish armed forces you were also a
15 regimental or brigade commander. At a time you were in charge of what was
16 called training and economy during the period from 1990 into 1992.
17 Perhaps you could just briefly explain what that position involved.
18 A. I was charged with the planning of the training of our conscripts
19 and our units, and also to oversee the economy for this training as well
20 as the housing for the training units.
21 Q. When you say to oversee the economy, might we understand that to
22 be involved with administering the budget with these functions?
23 A. Yep. Yes. At the time about 8 million Swedish crowns.
24 Q. And that was yours -- its correct that was your last assignment in
25 Swedish armed forces?
1 A. Yes, before leaving for the former Yugoslavia.
2 Q. During this same time period, at various parts of the time that
3 I've just very quickly covered, is it correct, sir, that you were a United
4 Nations battalion commander in Cyprus --
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. -- during the period 1983, 1984?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Were you in charge of military observers in Kabul, Afghanistan
9 during 1988, 1989?
10 A. Correct.
11 Q. Is it correct that from approximately the 8th of November, 1992
12 until the 15th of November, 1993, you were the chief military observer for
13 the United Nations Protection Force, or UNPROFOR, in the former
15 A. Correct.
16 Q. And of course it is that particular function which we will focus
17 on in particular today. Your office in that function, your regular office
18 was located in Zagreb?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. In November 1993, you went to Geneva where you worked as military
21 advisor to Thorvald Stoltenberg at the International Conference on the
22 Former Yugoslavia; is that correct?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. And you stayed in that position until approximately January 1995?
25 A. Yes. I think it was the 15th.
1 Q. All right. And one other item before finishing with the
2 background. After being the chief military observer for the former
3 Yugoslavia, you -- on the 14th of September, 1994, you went to Belgrade
4 where you took charge of the border mission in Serbia-Montenegro at the
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina border; is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And is it correct based on what you told us a moment ago when you
8 returned to the Swedish army, essentially, you completed these duties and
9 most recently at that time your duty with Ambassador Stoltenberg, you
10 returned to the Swedish army and retired from the armed forces and retired
11 on the 15th of January, 1995?
12 A. On the 1st of February.
13 Q. 1st of February. Yes. Thank you very much.
14 Just by way of additional background sir, it may come up in the
15 course of your testimony, you wrote a book about your experience in the
16 former Yugoslavia called, if I understand correctly, "Never ending"?
17 A. "Without end?"
18 Q. Is it correct that that book was primarily written in the summer
19 of 1994 and published in February 1995?
20 A. Yes. It was written during vacation in France.
21 Q. Let me then go directly to your position as chief UN military
22 observer. Can you tell the Judges and the Judges have heard a bit about
23 some of these different functions and have had witnesses who were
24 themselves, at least one if not more, but I know at least one who was a UN
25 military observer, in fact, but can you tell them a bit more about where
1 the UN military observers failed you, what function they performed as part
2 of the overall international involvement in the former Yugoslavia. For
3 instance, how did they compare or relate to UNPROFOR?
4 A. I think we had about 270, or something like that, observers when I
5 started and they work in teams and the idea is to put them together from
6 different nations and I think the idea behind that is to certify that they
7 will be reporting objectively and not playing any national agendas and we
8 had over 570 observers when I left UNPROFOR.
9 Q. And these observers, is it correct, were stationed throughout the
10 former Yugoslavia?
11 A. Yes. We had about, when I started, 60 observers in Sarajevo, and
12 there were observers in Tuzla, in the Mostar region, in Dubrovnik, also I
13 think in Bihac and of course in what was at the time known as Krajina, in
15 Q. Very well. Could I ask that the witness be provided the binder of
16 exhibits that will be used with the witness, please.
17 Sir, what's just been placed in front of you is a binder full of
18 exhibits which should all be tabbed in numerical order. So in the course
19 of your testimony, I will be referring you to exhibits by number, and
20 hopefully you will be able to find them there without too much trouble.
21 Can I ask you please to go first of all to Exhibit 487. For the
22 record, P 00487. They're not in the order in which we will necessarily
23 use them, but they should be in numerical order.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, we don't have that
25 exhibit, 487.
1 MR. SCOTT: Okay.
2 THE WITNESS: I have a 485.
3 MR. SCOTT: Maybe I've written down the number incorrectly.
4 Excuse me, Your Honour. I apologise for that. Let me see if I can ...
5 Q. All right. I apologise. There's been some error in that regard.
6 Maybe we can come back to it in the course of your testimony.
7 MR. KARNAVAS: We'll need to share with the Bench our copy. I
8 don't believe it's marked.
9 MR. SCOTT: If it's in e-court, perhaps we could proceed in
10 e-court, Your Honour. It would be easier to do it now than to obviously
11 come back to it at some other time in the future especially with the time
12 being limited. I apologise for whatever happened, but if I could have the
13 assistance of the ushers to go to Exhibit P 00487 in e-court.
14 Q. And, General, what will happen in this instance, I think it will
15 come up on your computer screen, but apparently we don't have a hard copy.
16 Sir, if you could just -- and with the assistance of the registry
17 or usher if necessary, if you could just look at that document. I had
18 shown you that previous -- previously.
19 This is a document that's titled "Concept for the deployment of
20 UNMO in Bosnia-Herzegovina command." And is this document, and if you
21 need to -- if you need to go through more parts of the document I'll ask
22 that the usher assist us in doing so, but is this a document that sets out
23 essentially what you understood the structure of the UN military observers
24 was during the time that you were the chief of that organisation, roughly
25 speaking? It may not be exactly in detail, but primarily.
1 A. Yep.
2 Q. If I can ask the usher to assist us by going to item number 9 on
3 the second page. And I'll abbreviate my questions in light of the fact
4 that we don't have a hard copy.
5 In item number 9, if you have that, you see that it indicates the
6 nature of the task of UNMOs being, "A, patrolling in the area of
7 responsibility; B, liaison with concerned parties; C, negotiations with
8 authorities as required; D, inevitable/ad hoc humanitarian tasks." Do you
9 find that to be an accurate statement of the various tasks or missions of
10 the UNMOs during this time?
11 A. Yes. If it is understood that reporting is imbedded in all of
12 these tasks, yes.
13 Q. And I'm not sure that we need to look -- turn to the page but down
14 below on the screen that we're looking at now you can see in fact that at
15 that particular time there are approximately 19 observers allocated to
16 Mostar in section 10. Do you see that?
17 A. Yep.
18 Q. And as part of this document and again I don't think we
19 necessarily have to go to it but there is an organisational chart which
20 shows in fact one of the locations being Mostar.
21 Could you briefly tell us what the reporting in fact -- you just
22 mentioned the element or component of reporting. What was the
23 arrangements or the structure or process for reporting from the UNMOs in
24 the field to others that were in -- either to you or others who were along
25 the chain of reporting or command?
1 A. Well, their first reporting line was the operational line to the
2 battalion commander which they -- in which whose area they were operating,
3 and to the -- and for him to the headquarter. But they also through their
4 line of -- I should say observer line of order reported directly to me in
6 Q. So there was essentially a dual system of reporting?
7 A. Yeah. It was actually quite deliberate the dual system.
8 Q. And was there any particular terminology for what you called
9 the -- the basic daily report that would be received from the field?
10 A. It was called situation reports which came every morning, and I
11 actually had three situation reports, one first put up by my headquarters
12 and all the reports coming in from the observers. Secondly, there was the
13 UNPROFOR sitrep, and I think also most of the time we had sitreps from the
14 ECMM monitors.
15 Q. Let me -- let me just briefly ask you about some of your travels
16 and missions in the former Yugoslavia, again just by way of additional
17 background. Is it correct, sir, that in the course of your duties in the
18 former Yugoslavia you travelled to such places as Zvornik, Tuzla,
19 Kiseljak, Fojnica?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. You travelled in the Tuzla, Vares, Sarajevo area?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You travelled, I take it, in the Mostar, Metkovic area?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Also Dubrovnik, Gorazde, Srebrenica --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- Banja Luka?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Medjugorje?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. I would like to ask you about some of the senior officials or
7 personalities that you interacted with during this time. You were
8 stationed in -- or headquartered, if you will, in Zagreb. Did you ever
9 have occasion to deal directly with the president of Croatia at that time,
10 Franjo Tudjman?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. And can you tell the Judges approximately, and we'll just dealing
13 with an approximation here, how many times that you had dealings or
14 meetings with President Tudjman?
15 A. I would guess about four times directly. Three or four times.
16 Q. These primarily occurred - I can just look at my notes as well -
17 all during 1993, perhaps?
18 A. Yes. Yes. One was dealing with the Maslenica bridge problem. I
19 was also taking part in a meeting at Brioni together with Ambassador
20 Vollebaek and Gert Ahrends, and I was on another later meeting together
21 with General Eide and Tudjman.
22 Q. Let me ask you similar questions concerning the Croatian minister
23 of defence Gojko Susak. Did you ever have occasion to meet with or have
24 dealings with Mr. Susak?
25 A. Yes. When I took the office I had a number of meetings with him.
1 We were at that time working with the Prevlaka peninsula and that problem,
2 and I had rather good access to him in the beginning. After my period in
3 Mostar in April 1993, he stopped seeing me.
4 Q. Do you know why he stopped seeing you in April 1993?
5 A. I think there might have been two reasons. I was too low ranking,
6 actually, for him to associate with and, secondly, I think he found me a
7 bit troublesome.
8 Q. Troublesome in what way, sir?
9 A. That's a good question. I don't know why he found me troublesome,
10 actually. He should not have done that.
11 MR. KARNAVAS: Might I just point out for the record that the
12 gentleman is mere speculating.
13 THE WITNESS: No, he stopped receiving me.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, stop seeing him is one thing but speculating
15 as to why he stopped seeing him unless he can verify the reasons is still
16 speculation and we're dealing with facts, not speculation or fancy.
17 MR. SCOTT:
18 Q. During the times that you were at a meeting with Mr. Susak, can
19 you characterise, can you tell the Chamber your observations of Mr. Susak
20 in terms of his leadership, the way he participated in meetings, any
21 observations that you can share with the Judges about --
22 A. Yeah. He was a very sharp personality. He was very determined.
23 And the deals we made he kept them. So you could trust his word actually.
24 Q. Did you --
25 A. And I think he had a great influence on the Croatian politics.
1 Q. Did that influence, to your knowledge or observation, extend
2 beyond the borders of Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina as well?
4 A. It was generally said and generally known at the time that he had
5 good contacts in the Herceg-Bosna region.
6 Q. Did you ever directly observe or participate in meetings where
7 Mr. Susak was present along with perhaps various leaders, either military
8 or political leaders from as you've just described it Herceg-Bosna?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Having put -- having put Mr. Susak on the table, if you will, and
11 having asked you about your meetings or involvements with President
12 Tudjman, can you share with the Chamber any observations about the
13 interactions of President Tudjman or Mr. Susak in the course of any
14 meetings that you observed where they dealt with each other?
15 A. I never met Susak together with President Tudjman at the same
17 Q. All right. Did you ever have any dealings with General Bobetko,
18 the head or chief officer of the Croatian army?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Approximately how many occasions?
21 A. On two or three occasions. One major when we discussed the
22 Prevlaka peninsula, late December 1992. Then there were more social
24 Q. And what -- what was your experience in dealing with General
1 A. I found him very determined nationalist, of course, and besides
2 that I don't have very much judgement to make about him. I met him so few
4 Q. During the -- during the occasions you did meet with him, were
5 these in the context of negotiations?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And how did you find him as a negotiator?
8 A. We didn't cover much ground. There was an agreement about the
9 peninsula, Prevlaka, signed by the Serbs. Zivota Panic, I think, signed
10 it in Geneva. The Croats never signed it, and they left the agreement.
11 And I tried to push him back into it, and I wasn't very successful in
13 Q. Let me direct your attention, moving forward, to the period of
14 February, March of 1993. Did you become involved in any meetings at the
15 Sarajevo airport around that time?
16 A. Yes. I think I went there with Wahlgren, if I remember correctly,
17 the general Swedish force commander and had a meeting personally with
18 Ratko Mladic about bringing observers into Gorazde, if that is the
19 occasion you refer to.
20 Q. During the same period of meetings at the Sarajevo airport, did
21 you understand that General -- I'll try to follow your pronunciation,
22 Wahlgren, was he also involved in other meetings around that time with
23 various military leaders?
24 A. Yes, there was a cease-fire negotiating taking part at the same
25 occasion with General Petkovic, Mladic, and Halilovic, I believe it was.
1 And there was a document signed of some sort.
2 Q. Directing then -- moving on to April of 1993, did you become
3 involved at that time in various efforts, peace-making efforts that led to
4 your going to Mostar around the 18th of April?
5 A. Yeah. I don't know so much about the background. There must have
6 been something with the Vance Owen team working, but I was called up to
7 Wahlgren one day and there was Ejup Ganic, the vice-president of Bosnia,
8 and he asks Wahlgren to provide him with a high-ranking officer to go to
9 Mostar to help to establish peaceful conditions, and he claimed that there
10 was an agreement between himself and Mate -- yeah, Boban, Mate Boban. And
11 Wahlgren pointed me to go, to follow him up to Mostar.
12 Q. Let me just stop sir, and ask you because you've mentioned this
13 name a couple of times. It may be a name that people in the courtroom are
14 less familiar with than some of the others. General Wahlgren, what was
15 his position at this time?
16 A. He was force commander. And this was before there was a Special
17 Representative of Secretary-General. So he had the full responsibility
18 for the mission.
19 Q. When you say the entire mission, are you talking about all of
21 A. All of UNPROFOR, yes.
22 Q. All right. So General Wahlgren, as I understand it, called you
23 into a meeting with Mr. Ganic about trying -- he wanted someone to go to
24 Mostar to meet with Mr. Boban and others?
25 A. Yep.
1 Q. And what happened after that?
2 A. I went to see Boban at the -- to make sure that they really had
3 this agreement, and at that meeting he claimed that he also wanted -- they
4 had agreed to create peaceful conditions in Mostar. And then I went back
5 and had a meeting with Ejup Ganic, and we later left for Mostar. We flew
6 to Split, I believe.
7 Q. Before we get to that, let me go back and go a bit slower over a
8 couple of items. You've just mentioned a meeting with General Wahlgren
9 and Mr. Ganic as one. That was in Zagreb?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And did you meet with Mr. Boban in Zagreb later that same day?
12 A. Yes, at the Intercont [sic] Hotel.
13 Q. And then when you met with Mr. Ganic, you say, if I understood
14 you, you met with Mr. Ganic again. Was that again later that same day?
15 A. Yes. We met him I think at the Hotel Yugoslavia.
16 Q. And if you travelled to, in fact, then from Zagreb to Split to
17 Medjugorje, that was on the 18th of April, 1993. Can we then understand
18 that these other three meetings all took place on the 17th of --
19 A. I believe so, yes.
20 Q. Now, going to your meeting with Mr. Boban, can you tell us,
21 please, how -- how did that meeting -- how was it arranged? Where did you
22 meet him and what conversation did you have?
23 A. I met him down in the lobby of the Intercontinental Hotel, and he
24 explored some ideas he had about the future of Herceg-Bosna or Bosnia, but
25 I didn't at the moment understand it so clearly. I understood it better
1 when I met him in the Mostar region.
2 Q. Can you recall the positions or the things that Mr. Boban told you
3 when you met him at the Intercontinental Hotel?
4 A. He indicated, as I remember it, that there should be a division of
5 command between the Croats and the Muslims, and he was willing, he said,
6 to hand over the command of the Croatian forces north of Kiseljak-Vares
7 line to the Muslim forces, but he then demanded that all Muslim forces
8 should be put under Croatian command south of that line.
9 Q. Just so the record is clear, when you say a line, did he indicate
10 a line -- did he draw a line for you or give any --
11 A. Not on this occasion but later on he did.
12 Q. And this was a line roughly between Kiseljak and Vares?
13 A. Yeah, roughly. Including, I think, the two enclaves south of the
15 Q. Did you have any reaction at that time on this first occasion
16 whether that -- that proposed division would have been acceptable to the
17 BiH government or the Muslim party, if you will, at that time?
18 A. No, not at all. And I don't think I fully understood what he told
19 me at that first occasion.
20 Q. And why do you say that this would not have been acceptable, as
21 you, say not at all?
22 A. No, I meant I did -- I did not have any conversation with the BH
24 Q. At that time.
25 A. No.
1 Q. Thank you. You say that you travelled then to Mostar on the 18th
2 or to the -- well, ultimately perhaps Mostar, but to Medjugorje. Did you
3 go -- did you enter into a meeting that was already in progress when you
4 arrived there?
5 A. Yes. To my -- I was astonished. The meeting had already started
6 and it was led by the ECMM ambassador, Thebault, and so we -- they had to
7 start it once again over again when we entered into the localities, which
8 I believe was the hospital in Mostar.
9 Q. And just so the record is clear, when you travelled from Zagreb
10 that day and arrived in the meeting, Mr. Ganic was also travelling with
12 A. Yes. We flew to Split and the Spanish Battalion took us to
14 Q. All right. Can you tell us briefly please, when you arrived at
15 the meeting, other than the fact that it had already started, can you tell
16 us who you saw at that meeting? And for now I'll just say at any part of
17 that meeting, whether they were there at the beginning or any time during
18 the course of the meeting, but who did you see participating in any part
19 of that meeting?
20 A. Mr. Jadranko Prlic was there. General Petkovic was there. The
21 Muslim General Pasalic was there. I had believed until recently that the
22 minister of defence, Stojic, was there, but obviously he arrived while I
23 was out talking to General Petkovic. So he was not present probably when
24 the meeting started.
25 Q. And anyone else that you can remember?
1 A. Well, of course Thebault, the ambassador, and Ganic, myself, my
2 adjutant, and probably General Lasic. I don't remember quite certain, but
3 I think he was there.
4 Q. And this Lasic was, just so -- for the record, that was Miljenko
5 Lasic who was an HVO commander in the Mostar area; is that correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Now, let me go back a little bit through the names that you've
8 just mentioned. The first name you mentioned, if I'm not mistaken, is
9 Jadranko Prlic was there. What did you know about Mr. Prlic at that time,
10 about his position, anything that you knew at that time or observed or
11 learned on that day about him?
12 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, if we could just have non-compound
13 questions. The question becomes much more compound as Mr. Scott asks it.
14 So what did he know beforehand would be one question. What did he learn
15 that day, what did he learn thereafter. I would prefer having it that
16 way. That way it would assist us in having a clear record and also for
17 cross-examination purposes.
18 MR. SCOTT: Let me just restate the question, Your Honour.
19 Q. What did you know about Mr. Prlic when you arrived at the meeting
20 that day?
21 A. I know that he was uphelding the function of so-called Prime
22 Minister of Herceg-Bosna, and the president was Mate Boban. I might have
23 had lunch with him in Mostar before this date but I can't really recollect
25 Q. Can you tell us whether you had any meetings or dealings with
1 Mr. Prlic after this meeting on the 18th of April, 1993?
2 A. I only ran into him in Medjugorje in 1994 at the hotel Ana Marija.
3 He sat together with some individuals.
4 Q. And perhaps we're getting a bit ahead of ourselves, but what
5 position or title did Mr. Prlic hold if you recall the second time you met
6 him in 1994?
7 A. I can't really tell. I anticipated -- I pass on that one.
8 Q. We'll come back to that in any event. You've also mentioned that
9 Mr. Petkovic, General Petkovic was one of the persons in attendance. Is
10 that the first time you had met General Petkovic or had you had any
11 dealings with him before?
12 A. No, this was the first time I saw him.
13 Q. Can you tell us what happened in terms of after Ambassador
14 Thebault had completed any remarks that he had, what happened at the
16 A. Petkovic took the floor and said that he was not willing to talk
17 to anybody below the rank of Halilovic, the Muslim commander in chief.
18 And I didn't want to talk to anybody in this meeting. And I got the
19 impression that he was under heavy stress. So I asked if we could go
20 aside and talk between ourselves, and so we did.
21 Q. And can you tell us about the conversation you had with General
22 Petkovic on that occasion?
23 A. Well, he maintained that he was -- that Pasalic was far too low
24 rank to deal with Petkovic directly, and he demanded that Halilovic should
25 come to Mostar.
1 Q. How did you respond to that?
2 A. I responded saying that we should not allow formalities and
3 protocol to stop us from start working immediately in Mostar, and we
4 should create some sort of organisation for that. And he agreed later on
5 to that, Lasic and Pasalic could start talking to each other.
6 Q. Did you make any efforts or did you tell him that any efforts
7 would be made to have General Halilovic arrive in the Mostar region to
8 attend --
9 A. Yeah. I -- I promised that we would do everything to bring
10 Halilovic to -- to Mostar. At the time when I gave this promise I didn't
11 know if I could deliver, but I called Wahlgren to make sure that he was
12 pushed to -- to Mostar.
13 Q. Did the two of you then, General Petkovic and yourself, General,
14 did you then -- the two of you rejoin the larger meeting?
15 A. Yes, we did.
16 Q. Can you tell the Judges, after that, after the two of you rejoined
17 the meeting, did Mr. Petkovic play any further role in the meeting?
18 A. No. It was sort of rather violently interrupted by Mr. Stojic.
19 Q. And what happened?
20 A. Well, obviously he claimed that the Muslims had committed some
21 attacks in the area, but it ended with him threatening to kill --
22 promising that Ejup Ganic would never leave Mostar alive. And then he
23 banged the door and left, and Jadranko Prlic excused him.
24 Q. Do you recall how Mr. Stojic was dressed at the time that he --
25 A. As I remember --
1 Q. -- made these statements?
2 A. As I remember, he was in full uniform and armed.
3 Q. How was he armed if you recall?
4 A. Sidearm.
5 Q. Did he say anything else directed at Mr. Ganic personally, make
6 any statements or --
7 A. No, it was just this threat that he would not be able to leave
8 Mostar alive.
9 Q. And can we understand that that essentially brought the meeting to
10 an end?
11 A. Yes, it did. Nothing more was said. So we got Ejup Ganic into a
12 Spanish armoured carrier and took him to Medjugorje.
13 Q. Did you return after that time to the Spanish Battalion
14 headquarters at Medjugorje?
15 A. Yeah. We got word that General Morillon and Halilovic were on
16 their way to Medjugorje, so we went up there.
17 Q. And, in fact, did you speak with General Wahlgren later that
18 evening, again trying to ensure that Mr. Halilovic would be -- General
19 Halilovic would be arriving in Mostar?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can I ask you now to look, and I hope we'll have better luck than
22 before, if you find Exhibit 1965, P 01965.
23 Sir, this is a report from ECMM dated the 19th of April, 1993.
24 And if I can direct your attention to the bottom of the first page, item
25 number 1 indicates, I believe, "CCO Pol advisor" but you can correct me if
1 I'm wrong, but I take to mean political advisor. And chief of UNMO,
2 Brigade-General Pellnas have accompanied vice-president Ejup Ganic from
3 Zagreb to Mostar for initiation of peace negotiations between Bosnian and
4 Bosnian Muslims. And then over to the next page. At the first meeting in
5 Mostar, attended by the above-mentioned persons and then down through
6 there indicating other persons that were attending.
7 Is this, sir -- appear to you to be a report concerning the
8 meeting that you've just told the Judges about in the last few minutes?
9 A. Yep. And I would guess that the ECMM presentation or members is
10 probably more correct since they were organising the meeting.
11 Q. Did you know -- this memo's written by someone or at least over
12 the name or from Ole Brix Andersen. Did you know Mr. Brix Andersen?
13 A. Yeah, I must have, but I don't remember him.
14 Q. Going back to page number 2, about not quite halfway down the page
15 you will I'll see a paragraph that begins chief of UNMO informed the
16 meeting that the international community and the UN has had all their
17 goodwill used up by the is Serbs and is not prepared to started all over
18 again with the Croats and the Muslims. He demanded that both sides
19 immediately stop fighting before further negotiations take place. Is that
20 at least a fair summary of part of the presentation you made at the time?
21 A. I suppose so.
22 Q. If I can ask you then to go over to the top of the third page.
23 And does item number 4 make reference to the intervention, we'll call it,
24 by Mr. Stojic? Do you see that?
25 A. I see it.
1 Q. Number 4.
2 A. I see it.
3 Q. There are several references throughout the document to something
4 called the joint operations commission or the establishment of a joint
5 commission. Can you tell the Judges what that meant to you or what you
6 and the other international representatives had in mind in terms of a
7 joint commission?
8 A. Well, the idea was that we would sit together, the UN and the two
9 parties, but also create teams who were also joined by the two parties and
10 a member of the UN or ECMM to go out to the spots where we had problems
11 for the moment. I suppose the name inclined that we had hoped that
12 together we would be able to formulate or even issue directives it.
13 Q. On -- and at paragraph number 5, just briefly it makes reference
14 to setting up or a meeting being anticipated for the following day the
15 19th of April, at 1000 hours, do you see that?
16 A. Yeah.
17 Q. And we'll come to that in a moment, perhaps, but is that basically
18 what happened the following day? That there was a meeting.
19 A. Yep, yep, yep.
20 Q. Can I ask you next, please, to look at Exhibit P 01980.
21 A. Where do I find that?
22 Q. Hopefully you'll -- 1980.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And just quickly can I ask you to go to page -- it would be I
25 think the fourth page of the document, to paragraph number 12. And can
1 you just tell us is that again a -- an account or report of the meeting
2 that you attended on the 18th of April, 1993?
3 A. Yep.
4 Q. Let me then take you on, General, to the following day, the 19th
5 of April. Did you make arrangements to travel -- you stayed at the
6 Medjugorje base, I take it.
7 A. Yep.
8 Q. And you made arrangements to travel into Mostar on the 19th?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Who did you travel with on that day, if you recall?
11 A. Together with my adjutant and driver. And there might have been
12 ECMM people coming along as well.
13 Q. Did you have other UNMOs from that -- from the Mostar region who
14 were with you on that day?
15 A. Probably Major Ronksley and Grant Finlayson. I can't remember
16 exactly, but they were most certainly with me.
17 Q. Paul Ronksley and Grant Finlayson?
18 A. Finlayson, yes.
19 Q. Was that the first time you had met Mr. Finlayson in person?
20 A. I believe so, yes.
21 Q. Did you come to learn that morning that General Petkovic wanted to
22 meet you?
23 A. I'll pass on that one. I don't remember.
24 Q. Tell it us what else that you did then as you moved into Mostar on
25 the 19th of April. What do you recall -- first of all, just setting the
1 screen a bit. What do you recall about the -- what was happening in
2 Mostar at that time? What condition did you find it in? What was
3 happening there?
4 A. We got the definite feeling that the situation was extremely
5 tense, and there were no -- almost no people out in the streets. And why
6 we stayed on one place, ladies came down with tea and asked us in French
7 to "souvez" Mostar, save Mostar. So we felt a bit awkward standing there
8 with no resources. And then we went to this meeting.
9 Q. Let me ask you, if I could, to go to Exhibit P 02054. 2054.
10 A. Yep.
11 Q. Can you tell the Judges, please, what that document is?
12 A. It is my report to the force commander summing up my experience in
13 Mostar during the 18th to 23rd of April, I think it was.
14 Q. And you wrote that report on the 23rd of April, 1993?
15 A. I believe so, yes.
16 Q. Did you write that report when you were still in Mostar or when
17 you arrived back in Zagreb? If you recall.
18 A. I believe I wrote it immediately after having come back to my
20 Q. If I can ask you to go to the -- well, again just for the record
21 if we go to the second page of the document itself, to the top it
22 says "From," and it says "CMO." And does that stand for chief military
24 A. Chief military observer.
25 Q. And is that your signature next to that, sir?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. You give essentially a daily account. Let me ask you to go to the
3 third page and to the 19th of April, 1993. If I can direct your attention
4 back to the second paragraph or -- excuse me, to the second paragraph of
5 that section, the 19th of April. Your report says: "On may way to Mostar
6 I was informed that General Petkovic wanted to see me and I therefore went
7 directly to the ministry of defence. "He stated that he demanded
8 to see Halilovic before any work could start in the Mostar area. He
9 underlined the seriousness in the situation in Vitez, Travnik, and sell
10 notes a." I'm just reading. "he demanded that the focus point should be
11 Central Bosnia, not Mostar."
12 Now, do you recall a meeting with General Petkovic around the 19th
13 of April where these things were said?
14 A. Well, the protocol is correct. There's no doubt about it, or the
15 report is correct.
16 Q. At this time, if we read through that particular section, you were
17 still making efforts and hoping to have Mr. -- Or excuse me, General
18 Halilovic arrive later that day?
19 A. Yep.
20 Q. And toward the end of that -- or at the end of that section before
21 a break in the page it says "He presented General Lasic and his
22 representative." Is that correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And is that what happened at that time when you next had a meeting
25 about the so-called joint commission, it was General Lasic who attended?
1 A. I think so.
2 Q. And did you in fact go to a meeting, what might be called an
3 organisational meeting of the joint commission?
4 A. Yes we did.
5 Q. Tell us just briefly what happened at that meeting. Who attend
6 and what happened.
7 A. It was Brigadier General Pasalic who came over from his
8 headquarters with a number of his bodyguards, and -- but I was -- it
9 wasn't very long until I was called away.
10 Q. And to where were you called?
11 A. I was called to see Stojic, minister of defence.
12 Q. Do you recall how you received this information, this request?
13 A. No, I don't remember. Probably somebody in the Croatian team got
14 the phone call.
15 Q. And did you then leave this meeting and go to attend a meeting
16 with Mr. Stojic?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And where did you meet Mr. Stojic.
19 A. At the defence -- Ministry of Defence.
20 Q. In Mostar?
21 A. In Mostar, yes.
22 Q. And can you tell us about the meeting you had with Mr. Stojic at
23 that time? What did he say to you?
24 A. Well, firstly he apologised for his behaviour at the meeting with
25 Ejup Ganic, saying that he had not been able to control himself because
1 Ejup Ganic was such a scoundrel and guilty of so many atrocities.
2 Secondly, he said that they were not willing to talk to anybody
3 below the rank of Halilovic. And he also told me that we should not
4 concentrate on Mostar but, rather, go to other places which were more
6 Q. Was that consistent with the same information, request that you
7 had received from General Petkovic?
8 A. I think this was the first occasion when they really pressed the
9 question of the other areas.
10 Q. Did you have any particular reason why they wanted to focus on
11 areas other than Mostar?
12 A. I believe they might have been -- the a places they mentioned
13 could be places they were not so well-off militarily at the moment. But
14 that is guess I from my point.
15 Q. Did Mr. Stojic say anything to you about the negotiations that
16 were then under way with the Muslims about the joint operations commission
17 or any of the other actions or activities that were taking place --
18 A. He explained to me that there was little use of negotiating with
19 the Muslims at all because you couldn't trust them anyway. So these were
20 the three messages he sent to me. Start in more important places. You
21 didn't do anything before Halilovic is here, and it would, anyway, be
22 quite useless.
23 Q. Now, going -- going on from that meeting with Mr. Stojic, did you
24 then have any further meetings or did you return to any meetings with Mr.
25 Pasalic and Lasic later that same day?
1 A. They -- there was a refusal to work with us before Halilovic came
2 in. So we couldn't get any work done, and I -- I then demanded to see
3 Mate Boban, but he could not be found, as they said.
4 Q. Do you recall who told you he could not -- well, who did you
5 express your concerns to?
6 A. Well, probably -- probably Pasalic. Could have been Zelenika, but
7 I'm not sure of that. The leader of a Croat delegation, anyway.
8 Q. So at that time, you considered the leaders -- is it correct that
9 the leaders of the Croat delegation at various times would be either
10 Mr. Lasic or Mr. Zelenika?
11 A. Yeah. I never really got at why they changed, showed up.
12 Q. All right. Did in fact General Morillon and Mr. -- or General
13 Halilovic arrive later that same day?
14 A. Yes, they did. I got message from Cedric Thornberry, I think,
15 that Halilovic was on his way.
16 Q. And who was Mr. Thornberry?
17 A. He was the political head. He was the chief political officer of
18 UNPROFOR at the time.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, we're going to take a
20 break. So it's a quarter to 4.00. We are breaking for 20 minutes, and we
21 shall resume at five past 4.00.
22 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 4.07 p.m.
24 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Q. General, if we could then come back to this time when, I believe,
1 we left off about the time when General Morillon and Mr. Halilovic
2 arrived. Can you just describe for a moment how it was that they arrived,
3 what the situation was, and what happened after that in the sequence of
5 A. As I remember, General Petkovic had come up to the Spanish
6 headquarter and was waiting with us before they arrived, and it was a big
7 entourage around Morillon with journalists, actually, coming down to
8 Medjugorje. But Halilovic was with him, and we immediate -- we starting a
9 meeting there to discuss with the two parties. And the atmosphere was
10 nice and we made concrete results.
11 Q. Did -- in the course of that meeting that you just described, did
12 General Morillon give you the floor at some point, and did you make any
13 presentation or proposal?
14 A. Yeah. I had a proposal that we should immediately separate the
15 two armies from each other. We should create a joint commission, and we
16 should send teams to the trouble spots.
17 Q. And just so the record is clear, we're now still talking on the --
18 this is the 19th of April; is that correct?
19 A. I believe so, yes.
20 Q. Was there a further meeting after this back in Mostar?
21 A. After that we all went down to Mostar, to the Minister of Defence,
22 and Halilovic and Petkovic both made statements about they're willing to
23 create a peaceful situation, and they gave orders to their subordinates to
24 cooperate and to become members of the joint commission and the teams
25 we're going to send out.
1 Q. General, just so the record is clear, when you say that there was
2 a meeting at the Ministry of Defence in Mostar, this was the Ministry of
3 Defence of, as you understood it --
4 A. Of Herceg-Bosna.
5 Q. All right. You indicated just a moment ago that at that time both
6 General Petkovic and General Halilovic expressed support for the plan.
7 Did you feel encouraged as a result of this meeting? Did you think that
8 this was actually going to result in substantial change in the local
9 environment at that time?
10 A. I think my Scandinavian novice had been crushed before that, so I
11 wasn't too optimistic really.
12 Q. Sorry, for the record Scandinavian what --
13 A. Novice. I was naive when I came down to this area.
14 Q. And you said it had been crushed before that, so you weren't
16 A. I wasn't too optimistic really. I was very tired because this was
17 late night, and I felt -- I didn't like what I saw, actually. There was a
18 lot of media things around, which was probably nothing.
19 Q. Going then to the next day, the 20th of April, did Mr. Morillon
20 and Mr. Ganic and Mr. Thebault leave Mostar on the morning of the 20th of
21 April for Central Bosnia?
22 A. Yes, they did, but I had ask Wahlgren that I wanted to be left
23 back in Mostar, because I thought that all the promises given should be
24 followed up upon a bit. So I stayed.
25 Q. And later that day was there, in fact, a further meeting of either
1 what was by then or at least in a formative stage what was supposed to be
2 the joint commission?
3 A. Yes. I believe it was at that time Zelenika, who showed up, and
5 Q. And did you talk further about how the joint operations would go
6 forward at that point?
7 A. Yeah. First we discussed how to separate forces in Mostar and how
8 to get soldiers back to -- to the barracks.
9 Q. Can you tell the Judges whether the concept of a joint police
10 force or joint police patrols played any part in this?
11 A. Yes. This was the first time, I think, in the history of Mostar
12 that a joint police force was discussed after the conflict started, and
13 they agreed on that; and, actually, it was created, and I think it lived
14 for 24 hours or something like that.
15 Q. I think in one of your accounts, sir, you said you were actually
16 surprised or amazed that the two of them actually -- the two commanders,
17 Zelenika and Pasalic, actually agreed to that; is that correct?
18 A. Yes. I was a bit surprised, but it was a rather good atmosphere,
19 and I suppose they knew each other from a long time back.
20 Q. How so?
21 A. I suppose they both had been officers of the Yugoslav National
22 Army. So they had probably met, and we made some progress. I asked them
23 to mark on the maps all the spots they thought we had to handle, and there
24 was a great agreeance about these spots. Only one different; I don't
25 remember which one.
1 Q. Can you tell the Judges what some of the locations were the two of
2 them agreed were the problems areas that needed to be --
3 A. It was Jablanica, Konjic, and some other village, probably what I
4 have written there, Pasolice [phoen], which is probably Sovice [phoen],
5 and, of course, Mostar.
6 Q. All right.
7 A. So we created three teams out of the three other places, and I
8 decided to stay back in Mostar and handle Mostar myself.
9 Q. The three teams or these teams that were created to go to these
10 various locations, how were they being composed, or how were they
12 A. Major Ronksley was head of one team, and he had with him then a
13 Croatia and a Muslim officer; Grant Finlayson headed the other one; and
14 the third was headed by an ECMM. I think he was a Brit, and I don't
15 remember his name.
16 Q. All right. Did you speak with General Wahlgren -- excuse me,
17 Wahlgren, around this time, about using any element of UNPROFOR, the
18 Spanish Battalion?
19 A. Yep. I seeked his consent to be able to bring in as much as
20 possible of the Spanish Battalion, and I told him that I had talked to
21 Morillon about it, and he had agreed. So Wahlgren said, "Go on."
22 Q. Did that seem -- based on your peacekeeping experience in places
23 such as Cyprus and Afghanistan, did that seem to you like a reasonable way
25 A. Yes. It was a very conventional, peacekeeping method to interpose
1 between the parties to stop them from firing at each other.
2 Q. Did you then make arrangements, in fact -- and let me just say,
3 we'll come back to the joint patrols in a few minutes. But before we do
4 that, did you make efforts then to actually obtain some unit or component
5 from SpaBat and --
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. -- deploy them in Mostar?
8 A. Yes. Unfortunately, I was only provided with one platoon, and so
9 I was -- I was transformed to a company commander that day. I had to take
10 action myself.
11 Q. And just so the record, when we're talking about a platoon in this
12 context, this was a platoon, what might be called a --
13 A. Four or five APCs with six or seven soldiers inside.
14 Q. All right. And these four or five APCs were then -- armoured
15 personnel carriers were put under your -- put at your disposal?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. What did you do with them?
18 A. We agreed they should be interposed along Bulevar Revolution, I
19 think the name is. So we took it up position, and we were actually fired
20 at on one occasion.
21 Q. And this location, the Bulevar, was this a street that ran through
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And how did you go about actually placing the various APCs then?
25 A. We placed them on positions where they should be able to see each
1 other, but also where we thought there were important buildings. So there
2 would be possibilities to support each other with firearms as they could
3 see each other, which also diminished the length of the area where we
5 Q. All right. Sometime after you had deployed the APCs, did you
6 attend a further meeting or have a further communications with the two
7 delegations, the Croat delegation, if you will, and the Muslim or ABiH
8 delegation, about the joint police effort?
9 A. Yeah. I was given the location where the joint police force
10 should be located, and I was also having a promise that I go and see them,
11 so I went there during the evening.
12 Q. What did you find when you arrived?
13 A. I found a number of young soldiers, Croat, in the outer room and
14 Muslims in the inner, and there was what I would call a political officer
15 running around there. I met him later on as well. And they were not too
16 eager to do anything, and they had not received any orders to do anything,
17 and I think both parties thought it was too dangerous to go out in the
19 Q. Let me just ask you about the two groups. You said there was one
20 group, the Croats, in one room, and the Muslims in another room.
21 A. Yep.
22 Q. Did these men appear to you be policemen --
23 A. No.
24 Q. -- as we would think of as policemen?
25 A. No. They were soldiers.
1 Q. And what was your reaction to what you saw?
2 A. Well, of course, I thought it was nice that they had been able to
3 get them into the same house, so that was progress; but, otherwise, on
4 that, it was rather disappointing. So I went back to the HVO territorial
5 command headquarters and asked a fellow called Maric to call the two
6 commanders, Lasic and -- or Zelenika and Pasalic.
7 Q. And did Mr. Pasalic and Mr. Zelenika then respond to --
8 A. Yeah.
9 Q. -- to that location?
10 A. Yeah. They arrived, and I was also a bit agitated because I
11 believe that they had been shot at. We heard -- we heard the noise and
12 gunshot. I really don't know how close it was, but it was enough to make
13 me agitated, so I was a bit rough when we met.
14 Q. Where in the course of -- when in the course of events that you
15 described in the last few minutes did you believe you had been shot at?
16 A. When we went back from the police headquarters.
17 Q. And you said that Mr. Pasalic and Mr. Zelenika did, in fact,
18 arrive at the location?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And you said you were pretty unhappy. What did you tell them, and
21 what happened after that?
22 A. I believe I threatened to go public with media the next day if
23 they didn't take action.
24 Q. And --
25 A. It was one of the few cards I had to play.
1 Q. Why did you think that would make any difference?
2 A. I'm is not sure it would have made any difference, but it was the
3 negotiating card I had.
4 Q. And did you get any response from the two officers?
5 A. Yes. They went on telephone to, obviously, tell people to stop
6 shooting at us, but it was in Serbo-Croatian, so I don't know really what
7 was said.
8 Q. And -- well, let me ask you. Were you or any of your people shot
9 at any time later that evening?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Did another Spanish Battalion contingent arrive sometime during
12 the evening?
13 A. Yeah. We got a platoon with carriers with 30-millimetre guns that
14 came up from Split, and we took them directly into the field.
15 Q. And this was, again, a unit of approximately five or six armoured
16 personnel carriers?
17 A. Yes, yes, yes. It was a rather young captain in command of this,
18 so I put his driver in my car and took him away, and patrolled Mostar
19 during the whole night actually.
20 Q. So this was in addition to those who were -- which had taken up
21 stationary positions --
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. -- on the Bulevar?
24 A. Yes. We tried to look impressive with those 30-millimetre guns.
25 Q. And was there any conflict or fighting, if you know, in the course
1 of that night?
2 A. No. On the contrary, it was a rather nice morning the next day.
3 We were extremely tired; but when we got out, people started coming out.
4 So I think the message got around.
5 Q. Now, before going on to the 21st of April - I said a moment ago I
6 would come back to these joint patrols that you sent out under Major
7 Ronksley and Grant Finlayson and the other British officer - what reports
8 did you receive back from the three teams around this time?
9 A. Very bad reports.
10 Q. How so?
11 A. There was absolutely no delegation of authorities to the officers
12 following the teams.
13 Q. The delegation of authority to which officers?
14 A. To the Croat and the Muslim officers. I think from neither of the
15 sides. They had no instructions, as far as I can see, to help us.
16 Q. And why was that? It may be obvious; but so that there's no
17 doubt, why was that important?
18 A. It was obvious they had no interest in creating peaceful situation
19 on the spots. On one spot, maybe one side; on another spot, maybe the
20 other. But we got no cooperation. On the other hand, it was very
21 difficult to get through the check-points, and I think it was Major
22 Ronksley at Jablanica who was brought into a meeting where the team was
23 more or less used as a propaganda thing.
24 Q. Do you know how they were used --
25 A. No.
1 Q. -- in that way?
2 A. They just told me that way. And I don't know if this was this day
3 or late next day, but Grant Finlayson came back and said that he had run
4 into a platoon dressed in black with swastikas on their arms and actually
5 making the Nazi salute. So he was a bit agitated about this.
6 Q. Had this been in an area somewhere north of Jablanica?
7 A. I believe so. He was on his way to this village, but I don't
8 think he ever reached it.
9 Q. Did you and the other -- the UNMOs that were working with you,
10 such as Mr. Ronksley and Mr. Finlayson, make any decisions about whether
11 it was worthwhile at that time to continue with these --
12 A. Yeah. I made immediately the decision: Unless we got
13 cooperation, we should not -- we should pull back from these teams and not
15 Q. You mentioned a moment ago a report from Mr. Finlayson about a
16 unit, some soldiers in black uniforms. During your time in Mostar in
17 April 1993, did you see any units dressed in black uniforms?
18 A. Yeah. We -- there was a special -- I would guess it was a special
19 unit all dressed in black. Very well trained young men with handcuffs on
20 their hips, and under the command of the major in a leather jacket,
21 speaking, in what I remember, an American accent, and this was definitely
22 something special. I tried to find out what it was, and I asked an HVO
23 elderly officer. He was embarrassed, but he didn't want to tell me who
24 they were.
25 Q. And do you recall the location where you saw this unit in black
2 A. Yeah, it was at Hotel Ero.
3 Q. Now, let me go forward then to the 21st of April, and were there a
4 meeting between the parties on that day or at least an attempt to have a
5 meeting? Maybe you can tell us whether the meetings took place or not.
6 A. Yes, it did, I think.
7 Q. Did either Mr. Lasic or Mr. Zelenika attend at least the first
8 meeting on that day?
9 A. It was Zelenika, I think. No. No, he didn't. It was this
10 policeman - it's in the report - Filipovic, who appeared instead.
11 Q. Did you have any understanding how it was that Mr. Filipovic came
12 on the scene, if you will, in the place of Mr. Lasic and Mr. Zelenika?
13 A. No. It was a bit astonishing that they did not show up, and I
14 came later to the conclusion that they might have had more important
15 things to do.
16 Q. Did you receive any information to that effect?
17 A. I heard reports later from people with the UNPROFOR, but they had
18 probably been out preparing for an operation in the field.
19 Q. And who I did you understand this Filipovic was? What position or
20 function did he hold in that area?
21 A. He was the chief of police, I understood. If it was in Mostar or
22 the whole of Herceg-Bosna, I'm not sure.
23 Q. Was he wearing a police uniform?
24 A. Yes, he did.
25 Q. What did you observe about his attitude or behaviour toward moving
1 this effort forward? Mr. Filipovic, I'm talking about.
2 A. It was not too bad during the first part of the day. I asked them
3 to materialise all their promises to move back their units and so on, and
4 to make sure that the joint police was started to work. I then went for a
5 lunch, and when I -- we started again, I think, at 1800 hours, and then
6 the atmosphere had changed completely.
7 Q. All right. How so?
8 A. Well, they -- on the surface, it was good because they produced
9 documents, written documents with orders that the units should withdraw.
10 But the process to -- of the withdrawal showed to be impossible, because
11 Filipovic said that they could not withdraw their units to the barracks
12 until the Muslims had evacuated Hotel Mostar, which was an intolerable
13 situation to have the Muslim soldiers.
14 Q. And -- sorry.
15 A. So I asked -- yeah. So I asked Pasalic why he had not pulled out,
16 and he said it was impossible because of Croat snipers around Hotel Mostar
17 to pull out. Then I asked the Croats to control their snipers, and Maric
18 said they could not possibly control their snipers --
19 Q. And --
20 A. -- which at the time appeared a bit untrue to me, because most
21 people you saw had mobile phones or other means of communication.
22 Q. What had been your experience up until that point in time in terms
23 of the -- the chain of command or authority of the HVO officers that you
24 had seen at that time?
25 A. I think like in most places in Bosnia the army obeyed orders.
1 They were -- they were controllable. I simply didn't believe the
2 statement that they could not control their snipers.
3 Q. After Mr. Maric had said that he couldn't control the snipers and,
4 therefore, since the snipers could not be controlled, the ABiH unit could
5 not be taken out of Hotel Mostar --
6 A. Yeah.
7 Q. -- what did you do?
8 A. I was in a moment 22, so I had to do something or give it all.
9 Q. Sorry, what's moment 22?
10 A. Catch 22.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. So I had to do something or give it up. So I decided to try to do
13 something, and I asked Pasalic, "If I take in a Spanish APC platoon, I'll
14 take your soldiers out." And after some hesitation, he said yes.
15 Q. And I think we will not use the time that we have to go through
16 every aspect of removing the soldiers from -- the Muslim soldiers from the
17 Hotel Mostar; but in the course of the next several hours, on the night of
18 the 20th -- or I believe we're at the 21st --
19 A. 21st, yeah.
20 Q. -- 21st, did you, in fact, extract the ABiH soldiers from the
21 Mostar Hotel?
22 A. Yes, with some difficulties, because it showed up that the platoon
23 I had was the one only with the guns. So there was no place -- I had only
24 one APC and Pasalic said there were 35 people. That would have taken
25 three hours. But when we started, a lot of more Muslim soldiers came
1 running in from the surrounding buildings, so there may have been 65 or a
2 hundred of them. But eventually I got a hotel that we could do the job.
3 The only interesting thing is actually that first load of Muslim soldiers
4 were taken into East Mostar.
5 Q. All right.
6 A. The second load, he refused me to go across the bridge and
7 demanded that we should unload on the western side. That came to be the
8 case. The rest of the soldiers from Hotel Mostar unloaded on the western
10 Q. Do you recall where -- what location on the west side of the river
11 were they were unloaded?
12 A. No. No. But rather close to the Bailey bridge, I believe.
13 Q. Now, let me go back to --
14 A. But I'm not sure about that. I'm not sure about that.
15 Q. Okay. Let me go back to a couple of points you mentioned, and
16 take it just a bit slower. You indicated at the time the vehicles that
17 were sent to you or were available to you at that moment, these were
18 essentially gun vehicles?
19 A. Yep.
20 Q. They didn't have much carrying capacity in terms of passengers?
21 A. No. They were full with the crew already, so there was none in
23 Q. So this limited your ability to evacuate soldiers because you
24 didn't have much carrying capacity --
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. -- in other words.
2 A. I had a Red Cross-marked APC.
3 Q. That's what I'm going to ask you, sir. Before I do that, though,
4 when you left -- when you had had this meeting and you were still at the
5 meeting with Maric, and you were talking about the snipers and what we
6 were talking about a few moments ago, was it was announced at that time --
7 was there anyone else -- well, was there any other HVO officer at the
8 meeting at that time other than Mr. Maric?
9 A. I think so -- no, no. Filipovic and Maric.
10 Q. Filipovic, the police chief?
11 A. Police chief, yeah.
12 Q. And is it correct that Mr. Maric and Mr. Filipovic knew that you
13 and Mr. Pasalic were going to the Mostar Hotel for the purpose of
14 extracting the ABiH soldiers?
15 A. Yeah, certainly.
16 Q. Now, let's just cover this couple of points that happened in the
17 course of these events. You did, in fact, wind up using an ambulance -- a
18 vehicle marked as ambulance to remove these soldiers; is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Why?
21 A. It was the only vehicle available. We were not at war. I had the
22 agreements of the two parties to carry out the evacuation.
23 Q. Mr. Pasalic, General Pasalic, was moving around with you during
24 this time in an effort to get the soldiers, for instance, out of the
1 A. Yep.
2 Q. Did you at some time in the course of those events put a UN helmet
3 on Mr. Pasalic?
4 A. I put a helmet with a blue clothing on it. If that is a blue
5 helmet, yes.
6 Q. It was coloured blue?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Why did you do that?
9 A. Because I wanted to keep him alive until we had evacuated
11 Q. And to the best your knowledge, as a result of that operation,
12 were all of the ABiH soldiers taken out of the Mostar Hotel on the night
13 of the 21st of April?
14 A. Yes, I believe so.
15 Q. Now, let me ask you, sir: Before we finish on this topic, can you
16 tell the Judges were the -- were all of the ABiH soldiers that you
17 encountered coming out of the hotel were they happy about leaving this
19 A. They were extremely unhappy, and we had this what I would call a
20 political fella, who we met in the police headquarters, running around and
21 screaming and telling them not to leave, and we more or less put them into
22 bunches of seven and kicked them down the stairs and into the APC. And
23 I -- I think we were a bit stupid, because we could easily have been shot.
24 Q. And when you say "we kicked them," does that --?
25 A. My driver and myself, yes?
1 Q. And what was General Pasalic doing?
2 A. He was rather passive. He was not trying to help us very much.
3 Q. But was he giving orders to the soldiers?
4 A. Not really. Not really.
5 Q. And after you had taken the last soldier out, after you had made
6 the last trip, did you go back with General Pasalic to his headquarters?
7 A. I went with him to his headquarters.
8 Q. And where was his headquarters located at that time, do you
10 A. I know -- there was a name on this building, but I don't remember
11 it, but it was on the western side anyway.
12 Q. Was that the Vranica building?
13 A. I believe so, yes.
14 Q. And did you in the course of this it evening, the same evening
15 now, we're still on the night, essentially, the night of the 21st, 22nd of
16 April, after going back to the headquarters with Mr. Pasalic, did you meet
17 later that same night with, again, Mr. Filipovic and Mr. Maric?
18 A. Yes, we did.
19 Q. Where did you meet them?
20 A. At the same place as we had -- where we had been before. It was
21 quite -- quite light -- quite late. I guess around midnight sometimes.
22 Q. Did you report to them or had they otherwise become aware by this
23 time that the ABiH soldiers had been extracted from the Mostar Hotel?
24 A. Well, I told Filipovic and Maric that I had carried out my taking
25 away the hinder for them, to go on with bringing their soldiers back to
1 the barracks. And now I -- since I have taken away this obstacle, I
2 really anticipated that they would now do their part of the job.
3 Q. What was the reaction or response that you received from
4 Mr. Filipovic and Mr. Maric when you reported this information?
5 A. A thorough lack of enthusiasm.
6 Q. And how did understand that? How was that communicated to you?
7 A. It wasn't communicated more or less. They were sullen and sour.
8 They were not enthusiastic at all. If I had been expected any sort of
9 praise for what I had done the other night, I was incorrect. So I just
10 anticipated that what I had done was not in their interest.
11 Q. How would it not be in their interest?
12 A. It seems to me that the obvious conclusion is that they were not
13 too eager to make a peaceful situation in Mostar.
14 Q. Let's go on to the 22nd of April, 1993. Did you make efforts to
15 meet with Mate Boban that day?
16 A. Yes, I did.
17 Q. And do you recall to whom you made the effort or made -- try to
18 make the arrangements --
19 A. I believe, it must have been through General Petkovic.
20 Q. And through those efforts, were you in fact able to arrange a
21 meeting with Mate Boban at that Spanish Battalion headquarters in
23 A. Yeah. He came up with his two BMWs and his bodyguards.
24 Q. Where did the two of you meet?
25 A. In the mess, the officers' mess or the canteen, of the Spanish
2 Q. And what did Mr. Boban and you talk about on the 22nd of April?
3 A. Well, I complained bitterly about the lack of cooperation from the
4 Croat side, and I told him about this platoon with swastikas and so on.
5 And he first told me that it was probably the Muslims have provoked, and
6 then I smiled a little and he said that it might have been some
7 individuals who were who were out of control.
8 Q. When you say "it was probably the Muslims who provoked," what do
9 you mean?
10 A. He said that it was probably a Muslim unit wearing swastikas to
11 provoke us.
12 Q. And did you take that answer, his position seriously?
13 A. No. He noticed that I smiled, so he changed and said that maybe
14 there were some individuals which he could not control.
15 Q. Did you indicate that you were going to report your experiences
16 and the problems you had with the HVO to the UN in New York?
17 A. Yeah. I made that in rather plain language. The situation got a
18 bit heated for a while.
19 Q. Now, you mentioned earlier this afternoon, when you first met with
20 Mr. Boban in Zagreb at the Intercontinental Hotel, you said that he had
21 made some points to you about a line that he drew approximately between
22 Kiseljak and Vares.
23 A. He elaborated on this at this meeting, and it was the idea that
24 they should sort of divide the burden of fighting the Serbs. That he
25 should put his 15.000 soldiers north of the line under Muslim command, and
1 south of the line the Croatian army would be in -- or the HVO would be in
2 full control. So, in practice, what he suggested was a division of
4 Q. Can I ask you to look again at the exhibit --
5 MR. KARNAVAS: Before we move on, can we get an explanation on
6 that? How does subordinating troops divides Bosnia? I know we can cover
7 that on cross-examination, but it would be interesting to get the
8 gentleman's opinion. How does one lead to the other?
9 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'll leave it to cross-examination.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. General, I noticed your
11 comment as well. I didn't say anything. But since Mr. Karnavas is on his
12 feet about this, I'll take advantage of it. And can you tell me in what
13 way the deployment of the ABiH and the HVO would have led to a division of
14 Bosnia, if I understand you correctly?
15 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, at this time, the power in Bosnia was
16 completely related to the presence of military power, and I have no doubt
17 in my mind that had the Croats been given all military powers south of
18 Kiseljak, Vares, they would have established what was already Herceg-Bosna
19 with the President and the Prime Minister. That is the only logic
20 explanation of what would happen if we had had this share of or division
21 of power.
22 MR. SCOTT:
23 Q. I was about to ask you, sir --
24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Sorry. Once the ice is broken, it's always
1 MR. SCOTT: Yes.
2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I ask another question in relation to this?
3 You told us that Mate Boban said his 15.000 soldiers north of the
4 line, he would abandon to an ABiH command.
5 THE WITNESS: Yep.
6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Did he say or do you know or did you know how
7 many Muslim soldiers there were south of the line?
8 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't know, really.
9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
10 THE WITNESS: May I just add one thing? It is a known fact, and I
11 saw it myself, that in the Tuzla region of responsibility, the Croat units
12 were already rather well entwined with the Muslim forces up there.
13 MR. SCOTT:
14 Q. On the very points that have been raised is what I was attempting
15 to direct you to, was that if you could go back to your Exhibit P 02054,
16 your report of the 23rd of April.
17 A. Yep.
18 Q. If I can ask you to go to page 7 of that report, halfway down the
19 page to the section titled "Meeting with President Mate Boban 1993-4-22."
20 A. Yep.
21 Q. Do you have that?
22 A. Yep.
23 Q. Now, if you look -- scan down that page, sir, and continuing over
24 to the top half of the following page, is that a record of the meeting
25 that you made on the 23rd of April of a meeting that took place just the
1 day before?
2 A. Yep.
3 Q. If I can ask you on page 7, toward the last paragraph beginning on
4 that page, it says: "He then came back to the subject he already lectured
5 me upon in Zagreb; namely, the construction of a command system for the
6 military forces. The idea being that Croat forces in Northern Bosnia
7 should be under Muslim control and Muslim forces inside the Vance-Owen
8 Plan areas 8 and 10 should be under Croatia command."
9 Is that consistent with the account that you've just given us in
10 the last few minutes?
11 A. Yep.
12 Q. Further -- in further response perhaps the President's question to
13 the Muslim's question, if you go on to the next page, 8, and the second
14 line -- excuse me, second line starting on that page: "I answered that
15 the Muslims obviously fear that his forces in Northern Bosnia could be
16 withdrawn and that the joint command could be closed down."
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, if I may, just for -- in order to be
18 complete and objective about this, perhaps we could read, at the top of
19 the page, the very first four lines before we go to what his answer might
20 have been, because there we see that what Mate Boban is asking the
21 gentleman is to assist and to -- to assist with Lord Owen in implementing
22 the plans that were already under discussion.
23 Now, of course, we're going to bring this out on
24 cross-examination, but it would appear at least that the gentleman, it
25 seems to me, was ignorant at the time of what the Vance-Owen Peace Plan
1 was all about and what was happening. So if we could read that, because
2 then we glean what exactly Mate Boban had in mind and what his intentions
4 MR. SCOTT: Well, number one, Your Honour, there is absolutely no
5 basis to suggest that the ignorance of this man about the Vance-Owen
6 Plan. That's a completely gratuitous remark by Mr. Karnavas. Number two,
7 I assume that everyone in the courtroom could read a couple of lines
8 above, and everyone had the entire document in front of them. Of course,
9 we could read the entire document from page 1 to page -- to the end, if we
10 needed to. But I assume that everyone can read the full context it of the
11 statements, and, of course, Mr. Karnavas can pursue it further in
12 cross-examination, if he wishes.
13 Q. You raised with him and you then said: "I briefed him on my
14 experiences in the Mostar area. He was informed that the joint commission
15 with its three teams in the Mostar area not had," probably should be had
16 not, "been able to achieve its goals. This was caused by the
17 unwillingness of the Croat forces to cooperate."
18 Did you feel that when you left your meeting with Mr. Boban that
19 you had pretty much stated your grievances to him?
20 A. Yes, I believe so.
21 Q. Can I ask you to go to page 9, last paragraph above the heading
22 that says "Some suggestions."
23 You say -- your report says: "I fear, however, that the question
24 how to give them a decent influence over the Joint Command will be
25 extremely difficult to achieve through negotiations with the Croats. I
1 believe Mr. Boban is dedicated to creating a region in Southern Bosnia
2 where Croats are completely in control. That does not probably mean an
3 ethnically clean area, but surely an area where Muslims are politically
4 and military fully controlled. Process seems already to have started, and
5 will most probably and unfortunately include further fighting and in
6 places atrocities and ethnic cleansing."
7 As a result of the report -- this report was written, you said,
8 when you returned to Zagreb on the 23rd?
9 A. Yep.
10 Q. And let me just ask you: Before we move off to other periods of
11 time following your -- this particular mission, can you tell the Chamber
12 then what was your net assessment as you left Mostar on the 22nd or 23rd
13 as to the conditions there, what was happening?
14 A. I think the lines you just read there capture my feelings. The
15 report reflects also, I think, a bit of, should I say, sadness that we
16 couldn't achieve more, and I left in a very strong feeling that we had a
17 conflict coming. And I told verbally to Wahlgren that I believe we had
18 about a fortnight, three weeks, before it would be a full-scale war, and,
19 unfortunately, I was correct on that point.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: For the purpose of context, Your Honours, I don't
21 mean to interrupt, but if you could look at the previous two paragraphs.
22 I think that adds context to -- to the portion that the Prosecution read.
23 I think it's important that we see things in context as the gentleman
24 recalled them at the time.
25 MR. SCOTT:
1 Q. Before we go on, as of the time you left Mostar, had you seen any
2 indications that the joint police force was -- was working or had any
3 chance of working at that time in your assessment?
4 A. I don't even know if -- if it still existed when I left Mostar. I
5 doubt that.
6 Q. Do you recall that right around the time that you left Mostar that
7 there was some legislation passed that you've mentioned in one of your
8 accounts about the status of refugees in Mostar?
9 A. Yes. I think about the same day as we left, there was a decision
10 taken not to allow refugee Muslims to stay in Mostar.
11 Q. Let me then direct your attention forward to a meeting in Zagreb
12 on the 30th of April, 1993. Did you have a meeting with various parties
13 on that day?
14 A. Yes. Owen and Vance were in Zagreb, and I was summoned up by
15 Brigadier Wilson, who asked me to come and present some sort of solution
16 for creating a joint military force between the Croats and the Muslims.
17 Q. Who was General Wilson?
18 A. He was my predecessor, as chief military observer, and had left
19 for work as military advisor with the ICFY, International Conference.
20 Q. And do you remember who attended this meeting in Zagreb on the
21 30th of April for the HVO or Bosnian Croats side?
22 A. Yeah. General Petkovic was there.
23 Q. Did you present any proposals during this meeting about a possible
24 organised joint operation or Joint Command?
25 A. Yes, I did. I suggested a Joint Command and under it a joint
1 territorial army and two small units or two units of national army or
2 national guards, and it was deliberately put in a way what you could
3 interpret it in many ways. You could have a big territorial joint army,
4 and a very small National Guard. So you could have a rather small
5 national territorial unit and rather big national armies.
6 Q. Did -- sorry.
7 A. It was constructed to get an acceptance on the idea of a Joint
8 Command and a joint territorial thing, because if you could have them join
9 forces over the territory, it could probably stop them from killing each
10 other, maybe.
11 Q. And do you recall, sir - you said General Petkovic was at this
12 meeting - what his response or position was or participation in that
14 A. I believe, he said on one occasion that he saw there is little
15 possibilities to form a joint -- a Joint Command together with the
16 Muslims. But my main impression was that he was absent-minded and not
17 very interested in what was going on that day.
18 Q. Based on what? What did you see or observe that caused you to
19 think that?
20 A. He was not very active in the conversation. I got the distinct
21 feeling that he was not very interested.
22 Q. And as you said a few moments ago, in fact, the fighting then did
23 break out in Mostar just, as you said, about a fortnight later, on the 9th
24 of May; is that correct?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Do you recall receiving reports from UNMOs and UNPROFOR, in fact,
2 on the 9th and 10th of May, describing what was happening in Mostar at
3 that time?
4 A. Yes. I ordered the Mostar team to report directly to me about the
5 events in Mostar those days.
6 Q. Let me ask you to look at Exhibit, in your binder, P 02276.
7 A. Yep.
8 Q. This is an UNPROFOR report dated the 10th of May, 1993, titled or
9 subject "Mostar situation." And going to the body of the report on the
10 second page, does that give a -- essentially a chronology of events from
11 approximately 5.00 that morning until midnight on the 9th?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. A number of these entries, for example, the entry at 1530, and
14 about halfway down as one example, it says: "UNMO reports ten buses
15 carrying men, women, and children; left football stadium; and heading
16 towards Citluk. Stadium is now empty of civilians."
17 When you say "UNMO reports," is that indicative of the fact that
18 the UNMOs in the Mostar region were sending these reports to you and
19 UNPROFOR around this time?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can I ask you to go next to Exhibit 2269. Sir, this appears to be
22 an UNPROFOR report dated the -- again, the 10th of May, 1993. And if we
23 go to the second page, up in the upper-left corner, I think -- can you see
24 2HQ UNPROFOR Zagreb?
25 A. I'm on the wrong paper. 22?
1 Q. 69. 2269.
2 A. Yeah. I don't have that paper. Maybe here it is it. Here it is.
3 Q. All right. If you can turn to the second page, there's a cover --
4 essentially a cover page, but there's a bunch of stamps on it?
5 A. Yep.
6 Q. And the second page, it says, towards the upper right -- excuse me
7 upper left corn, it says, "Headquarters, UNPROFOR Zagreb." Do you see
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. In one of the boxes below that, again, listing number -- listing
11 various units or organisations, do you see "HQ UNMO"?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And if I can ask you to turn to the next page of the document,
14 which is numbered page 2 in the upper right corner, in item C, Southern BH
15 command, item 1 Mostar, again, does this reflect information that you
16 began to receive on the 10th of May, 1993, as what was happening in
18 A. Yes, it is.
19 Q. Toward the end of the paragraph, that numbered paragraph 1, it
20 says, "HVO check-points have been set up to deny movement in to and out of
21 the city. The SpaBat company has withdrawn from the city and is keeping
22 it under surveillance."
23 Did you come to know around this time that UNPROFOR and the
24 international organisations were being denied access into Mostar around
25 this time?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Let me next ask you to turn please to Exhibit P 10008. That would
3 be toward the back, I imagine. It's a big number. P 0 -- three 0s. I'm
4 sorry, P 10008. I think, sir, it will be pretty much -- it will be toward
5 the back of the bundle.
6 A. Okay. Sorry. Yes. Okay. Say again, please.
7 Q. 10008.
8 A. Okay. Yeah, got it.
9 Q. Thank you. Sir, this appears to be a memorandum or a
10 communication dated the 10th of May, 1993, from Wahlgren, UNPROFOR Zagreb,
11 to Annan, UN, New York. I take it Annan is Kofi Annan?
12 A. Yeah.
13 Q. And this makes reference to a meeting with Radic, the Chief of
14 Staff for the President's office, and Susak on the 10th of May, 1993. And
15 Mr. -- or General Wahlgren reports in the second sentence of that
16 paragraph number 1: "I was accompanied by DCM Pellnas and Abdul Aziz."
17 Is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And can you just confirm to the Judges that you did, in fact,
20 attend the meeting with Mr. Radic and Mr. Susak?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And when it says Mr. Radic was the Chief of Staff, President's
23 office, he was the Chief of Staff to which president?
24 A. President Tudjman.
25 Q. And you said -- or Wahlgren says: "I was accompanied by DCM." Do
1 you recall who DCM was? Well, first of all, what that stands for, if you
3 A. All these abbreviations. Deputy chief of mission. I don't know
5 Q. And do you recall who it was that also was with you that day,
6 besides General Wahlgren and Mr. Abdul Aziz, if you recall? If you
7 don't --
8 A. Should have been -- no, I don't remember. It should have been
9 Cedric Thornberry, but I don't remember.
10 Q. All right. Toward the end of that paragraph, on page 1, the first
11 section on page 1, you, again, indicate: "UNPROFOR was being prevented by
12 the HVO from having access into the city, making it difficult to assess
13 the situation there."
14 Was that on the 10th of May, 1993, and did that continue
15 throughout, really, the balance of 1993, the summer and fall of 1993, to
16 be one of the major international concerns?
17 A. I don't remember when we were first let back into the town. It
18 took quite a long time, I believe, before UN could enter.
19 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, Mr. Scott. I am a bit puzzled because
20 I thought this was the document from Mr. Wahlgren, but you refer to it and
21 you say, "you state that" to the witness.
22 MR. SCOTT: If I did, I misspoke, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Okay. I thought there was something that I had
24 misunderstood. Line 10 on page 65.
25 MR. SCOTT: At any rate, Your Honour, if I did, I misspoke.
1 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Okay. Good.
2 MR. SCOTT:
3 Q. The report, sir -- the document indicates what I had read to you
4 and this is general -- just so the record is clear and so there is no
5 confusion, this is General Whalgren's report; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. I apologise if I misspoke. In the -- about the middle of that
8 paragraph, it said, "I stated," "I stated," I'm quoting, Your Honour, "I
9 stated that ECMM were reporting that Croatian army forces were moving
10 towards Mostar." Do you recall what other information either you or
11 UNPROFOR or General Wahlgren had on that -- at that time about the
12 involvement or movements of the Croatian army?
13 A. No, I don't recall. One has to go back to documents and reports
14 to be sure. I -- I don't have it in my head any longer.
15 Q. Going to page number 2, item 2, section 2, Radic referred to
16 Tudjman's message to President Izetbegovic and Boban, a copy of which is
17 attached. And while we're at this point, if I could then just ask you
18 keep your finger, if you can, at this exhibit, but would you also look at
19 P 02265.
20 A. 2265?
21 Q. Yes, please. And this appears to indeed be a letter from
22 President Tudjman dated that day, the 10th of May, 1993, to Izetbegovic
23 and Mr. Boban. And do you recall whether it was Mr. Radic or Mr. Susak,
24 one of those gentlemen in the meeting, that presented to -- to the --
25 let's just say, the UN delegation, General Wahlgren, yourself, the others,
1 a copy of President Tudjman's letter?
2 A. No, I don't remember.
3 Q. If you go back to the memorandum of the meeting with Radic and
4 Susak, again, toward the end of paragraph numbered 2, on the second page,
5 it says: "Susak suggested that UNPROFOR should contact Boban directly and
6 express the Croatian government's readiness to exert some influence on him
7 to cooperate. He said that he personally would guarantee access of the
8 people being taken out of the city."
9 Did -- do you recall whether Mr. Susak explained how it was that
10 he would personally guarantee --
11 A. No.
12 Q. -- access to the people in Mostar?
13 A. No.
14 Q. If I could next ask you to go to Exhibit 2254.
15 A. 22?
16 Q. Yes, correct. 2254.
17 A. Yep.
18 Q. This is a note by the president of the Security Council, again,
19 dated the 10th of May, 1993. Let me direct your attention in particular
20 to the second page, top of the second page. It says: "The Security
21 Council calls upon the Republic of Croatia in accordance with the
22 commitments under the Zagreb agreement of 25 April 1993, which is
23 (S/25659), to exert all its influence on the Bosnian Croat leadership and
24 paramilitary units with a view to ceasing immediately their attacks,
25 particularly in the area -- areas of Mostar, Jablanica, and Dreznica."
1 Do you recall at that time what the relationship was between the
2 Croatian government and the Bosnian Croat leadership?
3 A. I don't think there were any problems between the two parties at
4 that time. As I said earlier, it was generally known that everybody
5 thought in UNPROFOR that Susak had a special amount of influence in the
6 Herceg-Bosna region. But how the political lines were going and who was
7 commanding what, I don't, really.
8 Q. Do you know whether General Wahlgren and the others that were part
9 of the UN delegation that met with Susak and Radic on this very same day,
10 the 10th of May, 1993, did they have this Resolution in hand or -- excuse
11 me, note by the president of the Security Council in hand at the time they
12 met with Susak?
13 A. They might at least have had the text, I guess, which they could
14 have had on beforehand.
15 Q. All right. General, I want to move forward then to the summer --
16 we're leaving the 9th and 10th of May for a moment, and if we can move
17 into 1993. I would just like to show you some of the reports that you
18 were receiving during that time period. Could I ask you, first of all, to
19 go to Exhibit P 03094; in other words, 3094.
20 A. You say 03?
21 Q. Maybe they haven't been -- okay. 3094. If you have that, you'll
22 be there.
23 A. Yes. 3094. I got it.
24 Q. General Pellnas, this is a letter from the acting senior military
25 observer from BiH south, Medjugorje, on the 1st of July, 1993, addressed
1 to Lasic; and in the second paragraph, it starts: "I also find it rather
2 curious." Mr. Rosenroll indicates that they are still -- they're not
3 having any access in to Mostar as of, again, the 1st of July, 1993. I
4 think you said a few moments ago, there was a lack of absence into Mostar
5 for a substantial period of time; is that correct?
6 A. Yes. A lack of presence.
7 Q. How did that affect the ability -- I mean, again, for the record,
8 so you -- how did that affect the ability of the UNMOs to do their job?
9 A. Well, we could not report what was going on inside Mostar, for
10 sure, and that was the effect of it. Not exact what you could notice from
11 a distance then.
12 Q. Let me ask you to next go to Exhibit - and I'll try not to confuse
13 you - just 3148.
14 This appears to be a report from UNMO -- an UNMO report dated the
15 3rd of July, 1993. And, again, if I can just direct your attention
16 quickly to section -- it's under "General situation" in item B: "BH
17 south: Mostar access still denied ..." Is that correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Let me ask you to go to the fourth page of the -- that exhibit, to
20 the bottom of that page under -- under heading D, "Meetings." And BH
21 south reports contacted "HVO LO," I submit is liaison officer.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. " ... regards restriction of movement, and in particular the
24 inability -- inability of MXA to return to Jablanica. LO stated he had
25 passed our concerns on to higher authority and would forward their reply
1 when it was forthcoming."
2 Do you recall any further information about who that BH south was
3 dealing with at the time as the liaison officer, and what more senior
4 authorities were involved in this?
5 A. No.
6 Q. If I can ask you to look at Exhibit 3376.
7 A. Yep.
8 Q. And this appears to be an UNMO report dated the 10th of July,
9 1993, and on the second page under, again, section B --
10 A. Hang on.
11 Q. Yes. Sorry. "BH south."
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you see that again: "Mostar: Access again denied"?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. All right. Let me just look at a few of these, and I will
16 probably discard a few for the time being.
17 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, in the interest of time, I will skip over
18 some of these, but with the understanding that we will submit them by
19 motion or otherwise.
20 Q. If I can ask you to go, sir, to the next -- next to 4464.
21 A. Yep.
22 Q. Did you have an UNMO in the area around -- in August of 19 --
23 1993, excuse me, named, if you recall - and he realise you may not recall
24 all these names - but Dan Ashitey?
25 A. No. There were over 500 coming and going, so I don't remember
1 many names, unless I really bumped into them and talked it them.
2 Q. If I can ask you to go to the second page of this report, toward
3 the bottom of the second page, it says: "Discussion, General
4 Petkovic/Captain Collingwood. In negotiations with UNMO requirements, the
5 following points were required by UNMOs from the HVO." The first one
6 mentions a police escort.
7 Then going on to the next page, number 2, "Access/ability for
8 UNMOs to cross front line north of Buna." And, again, this is dated, I
9 should say, to put this in context, this is the 25th of August, 1993.
10 3, "Access to Mostar by any route (HVO controlled) at all times."
11 And then we can see points 4 and point 5. And then in the next paragraph,
12 we get the responses to the various five points. And if I can ask you to
13 look in particular about four lines down in that section, it says, "Item
14 3," which is, "Access to Mostar by any route." "Item 3 was acknowledged
15 although it was questioned and not well-received."
16 Did you receive any other information from the UNMOs under your
17 command around this time, what the nature of the continuing objection was
18 to granting access to the UNMOs was?
19 A. I don't recollect that.
20 Q. Further into that paragraph, "When asked how long UNMOs expected
21 to remain in Mostar, I replied," again I'm quoting, I being presumably
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. "That it was our intention to remain until the cease-fire
25 completely breaks down. To this, General Petkovic replied that we should
1 not ask for HVO help to get out, if the cease-fire breaks."
2 And do you know if, in fact, the UNMOs got any greater access to
3 Mostar, in fact, around this time, late August 1993?
4 A. I don't remember. To see that, one has to check with reports
5 coming in later, I think, to see what happened actually.
6 Q. Very well. Let me just show you the next exhibit, 4785, primarily
7 because I want to ask you about a topic that's only come up once or twice,
8 and if you can shed any light on it. This is another UNMO report dated
9 the 3rd of September, 1993, from BiH south, paragraph under "Operations,"
10 paragraph B, "Patrols, MX5," which I think the Chamber knows is the
11 UNMO -- the designation or the call-sign for the UNMO team in Mostar?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. It talks about apparently 7 to 8.000 refugees in Blagaj.
14 Let me ask you though, specifically, to go to the next page, item
15 F and item G.
16 Did you understand, during this time, that one of things that both
17 UNPROFOR and UNMOs were attempting to monitor, in addition to other
18 things, was aircraft, the movement of aircraft in the airspace of
20 A. No. I don't think that the air observers on the ground took a
21 special interest in aircraft; but I suppose if they saw them, they would
22 report on them.
23 Q. For example, under section F, it gives the report. The report's
24 coming from an ABiH brigade in Blagaj, but it's reporting the use of
25 aircraft by HVO to drop some sort of clusters, it says, of 120-millimetre
1 mortar bombs. Do you know whether there was, apart from international
2 flights, whether there was a no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina during this
4 A. I would have to go back to papers to see what no-fly zones
5 indicated at that time. So I pass on at that question.
6 Q. All right. Item G, "Other," references air drops. "Aircraft
7 still dropping pallets too far into the east into Serb territory. BiH
8 forces report no aid reaching areas north and south of Mostar. These
9 areas require aid as much as main Mostar." And it's suggesting some
10 various map coordinates are listed there for the purposes of the air
12 What do you recall about the international community's efforts to
13 air drop relief supplies into the Mostar area around this time?
14 A. I remember that there were air drops; and, obviously, reading
15 this, they were as uncontrolled as all this -- or inaccurate, I would say.
16 Q. Can I ask you to go next to 5085, an UNMO report dated the 15th of
17 September, 1993. And if I can ask you to go to the -- physically turn to
18 the fourth page of the document. And, again, in the --
19 A. Which I don't have. I have page 3 and 5.
20 Q. All right. If you go to what's marked as page 5, and item G,
21 "Other," and the only part of the document I'll take the time to ask you
22 about at this point is the paragraph that says: "BH informed the UNMOs
23 that cease-fire agreement has been reached between BH and Croatia.
24 Apparent --" excuse me, "agreement to take effect 18 September.
25 Apparently, 79th cease-fire recorded and success unlikely. It was
1 confirmed that agreement was with Croatia and not BH Croats."
2 And let me just ask you, sir, if we can get your general -- your
3 reaction here to -- does that sound to you about right, that by September
4 of 1993 there had been something like 79 cease-fires?
5 A. If not more.
6 Q. What was your, not only your personal, but the other
7 internationals that you were also working with, how did you feel about the
8 situation when the cease-fire was announced during these times?
9 A. Well, after a while, in these conditions, you -- you don't take
10 much notice of paperworks or oral statements. You wait to see what
11 happens. So you don't get, I would say, optimistic or pessimistic about
12 the announcement that a cease-fire has been signed. You wait and see what
13 happens before you make any valuation of it.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, do you have a
16 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Croatia isn't
17 mentioned anywhere in the Croatian translation, but the Croatian Defence
18 Council. Now, an agreement was never written between the -- between
19 Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was always the BH army and the
20 Croatian Defence Council, if it was an agreement and in the Croatian text.
21 So it just says "Croatia," so can we clear that point up, please.
22 MR. SCOTT:
23 Q. Well, only the -- sir, if you still have that item in front of
24 you, item G, "the 79th cease-fire," does the UNMO report state: "It was
25 confirmed that agreement was with Croatia and not BH Croats"?
1 A. Yeah. I have no comment on it regarding what was just said. It
2 may well be incorrect in this paper. It could be.
3 Q. Can I ask you to go to Exhibit 5127.
4 A. Yep.
5 Q. Under BH south, again, "Mostar. Unstable. Thirteen impacts fired
6 directly at team Mostar east accommodation from 20-millimetre
7 anti-aircraft by HVO this morning. Verbal and written protests lodged.
8 Firing stopped when team Mostar West went to Mostar OZ," operational zone,
9 "to complain."
10 Can you tell the Judges what sorts of reporting were you receiving
11 from UNMOs in the Mostar region about their personal situations during
12 this time, the summer and fall of 1993, in terms of sniping or shelling?
13 A. I was at the time very skeptic about having the observers inside
14 the town at all because it was rather dangerous. So it is always a
15 decision to make, whether it makes -- whether the risk is worth taking.
16 And as it turned out, we decided to stay, but I was not completely in
17 control of this. The BH command also had a great say in where to locate
18 the observers, even move than I had.
19 Q. And just so the record is clear, because some of these
20 abbreviations might become confusing. When you say "BH command," you're
21 talking about UNPROFOR command?
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. Exhibit 5234. UNMO report from the 20th September 1993. Item
24 number 1, "General situation. Medjugorje calm. Mostar, unrelenting
25 bombardment of East Mostar since 0600 hours today. Hundreds of artillery,
1 tank, and mortar rounds. UNMOs on the east bank have had to bureau deep
2 into their bunker." It says, "HVO explains bombardment as punishment for
3 BiH attack on Hum hill.
4 Did you recall -- I mean, other than this one, do recall other
5 reports from your UNMO teams, from the Mostar region, that some of this
6 shelling will take place as some sort of punishment or payback for
7 something that had happened in the area?
8 A. There was a constant rather heavy shelling going on, and I don't
9 remember that it was related to punishment or anything like that.
10 Q. And I think, finally, on this one, and perhaps the final one
11 before the break - I think we're coming up on about the time for the
12 break - 5519. And this is an UNMO report from the -- covering the period
13 the 29th of September to 30th of September. And I just want to ask you,
14 specifically, on the last -- no, I'm sorry, not the -- the next to last
16 On that page, on item number 6, again, aircraft sightings, and it
17 makes reference to the times coincided with airdrop times. What was the
18 point of -- what was the point of your UNMO officers reporting this
19 information about aircraft sightings? Why was that part of their report,
20 I guess, is the point?
21 A. Well, I think they would report anything they would think was of
22 any significance.
23 Q. Under SMO assessment, SMO is senior military observer?
24 A. Yep.
25 Q. In item 8: "The situation remains calm. However, although we
1 cannot say there is a build-up, there is a lot of movement and activity
2 around the AOR."
3 A. Area of responsibility, yes.
4 Q. "Denial of access over the past two days supports speculation the
5 HV are operating in the region north of Neum." Do you recall any
6 particular reports or information you were receiving around the end of
7 September, 1993, about HV operations in that area?
8 A. No, I don't especially recall. When you read one report now, you
9 may see paragraphs which you think are remarkable, but it was a steady
10 flow of reports on all corners of the former Yugoslavia, and we might have
11 well at this time been pretty heavy occupied with problems in Mostar for
12 the moment.
13 Q. Let me just ask you this, because hopefully we'll come back to
14 this topic before we finish your testimony. Is that something the UNMOs
15 were looking at or trying to be aware of on a regular basis?
16 A. No, no.
17 Q. No?
18 A. I don't think so.
19 Q. Why not?
20 A. Well, first of all, it seldom happened that they had to report an
21 aircraft passing and so on; and, secondly, I think they normally were not,
22 I should say, focused on these sort of things. We had this no fly
23 organisation with special teams placed at the airports and checking what
24 was going up and down. We had observers at the Zagreb airport, for
1 Q. Let me ask you about the -- my final question, perhaps, before the
2 break is the second topic that I raised under this: What about the topic
3 or subject of HV movements, the Croatian army movements or involvement, is
4 that something that the UNMOs were attentive to or reporting?
5 A. Absolutely. They would report immediately if there were HV
6 movement inside Bosnia.
7 Q. And why was that something deemed important or reportable?
8 A. Well, that would have been an intrusion by Croatia into another
9 acknowledged country.
10 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, I suggest that might be the time for
11 the next break.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have a 20-minute break.
13 --- Recess taken at 5.36 p.m.
14 --- On resuming at 5.56 p.m.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're back in session.
16 MR. SCOTT:
17 Q. General Pellnas, I'd like to move now to the end of 1993, to
18 approximately December. First of all, let me just ask you how you became
19 involved, and we might work backwards just a little bit, so you can tell
20 us the context, as you recall it, for the request for you to become
21 involved in a particular effort.
22 In December 1993, were you asked by Lord Owen to become involved
23 in negotiations, again, in Mostar concerning something called the -- that
24 was being proposed as the European Union Administration of the City of
1 A. Yes. He sent me out there to -- there was an agreement between
2 the parties in Bosnia. He sent me out to "delineate," as he said, the
3 area that would be administrated by the EU, and that was all the guidance
4 he gave me.
5 Q. All right. Let's start when you said -- so there's no
6 misunderstanding, when you said there was an agreement between the parties
7 in Bosnia, there was agreement as to how the EU --
8 A. That's EU should administer this area.
9 Q. So in concept?
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. Were you sent then into Mostar again to -- in an effort to do
13 A. Yeah. It was very strange mission because as you know the
14 fighting was still going on in Mostar and I was sent there to make the
15 parties agree on how to delineate the area for the EU.
16 Q. And do you know -- do you have any recollection of approximately
17 when this concept of an EU administration of Mostar kind of as a UN -- or
18 EU, excuse me, protectorate, when that concept first began to be
20 A. No, I don't know.
21 Q. Had there been any discussion around this time about who might
22 serve as the EU administrator of Mostar?
23 A. The I think the first rumours had come up when I started that it
24 was Mr. Koschnick from Bremen who was the German candidate for the job.
25 Q. Let me ask you to look to Exhibit 5757. First of all, let me ask
1 you if we can just again set the context a bit more. As of the time that
2 you got involved several months later, when you arrived in Mostar in
3 January 1994, what was the position of the Croat side that you first
4 encountered when you arrived in Mostar in January? What was their
5 position as to the delineation or administration of Mostar?
6 A. It was headed by a lawyer by the name Tomic, and when we started
7 to discuss the delineation of Mostar, he produced the idea that the EU
8 would administer -- should administer East Mostar and nothing more.
9 Q. And was that consistent with what you understood the EU concept or
10 mandate to be?
11 A. No, the EU should -- the idea was to maintain a multi-cultural
12 Mostar with the entire city under the administration.
13 Q. Now if we go then back to 5757, this appears to be a letter from
14 Mate Boban dated the 8th of October, 1993. And if you look at the last
15 page, it's being addressed to particularly Owen and Stoltenberg, but also
16 European Community foreign affairs ministers. Do you see that?
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. Now, the -- the letter goes on for some pages talking about why
19 Mostar is a Croat city, and if anyone wants to argue with me about that,
20 everyone can read the letter, and the Judges can read the letter. But if
21 you can find -- if you go to page number 3, to the middle of the page --
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. The second paragraph beginning on that page which says, "In all
24 types," and at the end of that paragraph Mr. Boban says, the conclusion of
25 the last preceding sentence: "The Croats only have Mostar. Therefore,
1 the Western European Union request is absurd." And is that reflective of
2 the position or posture that you encountered when you arrived in Mostar in
3 January 1994?
4 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, sir, before answering that question. I
5 object to the form of the question. How can this gentleman possibly
6 comment with respect to what Mate Boban is saying in this letter about the
7 absurdity of what the Western governments think versus what Mr. Tomic, I
8 believe, the lawyer, was advocating. Perhaps if there was more testimony,
9 it might assist but I think it's best to take the testimony from the
10 witness as far as what he heard, what he learned in great detail, as
11 opposed to pointing to a letter and saying, does this comport with Tomic's
12 position, because I think Mr. Boban is speaking about something in a much
13 broader context.
14 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, I think my question was a proper
15 one and the witness was there on the ground in -- in January and February,
16 and I think he can say -- he can say for himself whether this sort of --
17 this sort of feeling, this sort of position as depicted in this letter are
18 similar to the positions that he encountered himself during those
19 negotiations. It's a very simple question.
20 Q. Is that correct, sir?
21 MR. KARNAVAS: Can we get a ruling, Your Honour? Can we get a
22 ruling first?
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Scott, I'm trying to
24 understand what you're getting at and what you would like the witness to
25 express. There is a sentence on page 3, and so you would like the
1 witness -- you would like to ask the witness whether what is said here in
2 the sentence is indeed what he saw, what he learnt while on the ground.
3 Is that the idea?
4 MR. SCOTT: Well, not just that particular sentence, Your Honour.
5 If we want to spend the next 15 minutes reading the entire letter from the
6 beginning to end we can do that. It seemed to me that's not necessary
7 when everyone in the courtroom has the letter.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Scott, the problem is
9 that he doesn't know the letter himself. I mean, he did not know the
10 letter then.
11 MR. SCOTT: That was not the question. The question was whether
12 what is depicted in this letter, which he can read as well as -- or better
13 than many of us, is that the same -- essentially, the same or similar
14 posture that he encountered when he arrived on the ground in January,
15 February, 1994. And he can clearly say, "Yes, this is basically what I --
16 the same posture or attitude that I encountered at the time."
17 MR. KARNAVAS: Again Mr. President, Mr. Boban is speaking about
18 other matters in a much broader sense. The gentleman was there at a
19 meeting. He met with Mr. Tomic, and I believe that later on he met with
20 Mr. Buntic, and then I believe there was also another meeting with Mr. --
21 THE WITNESS: Tomic.
22 MR. KARNAVAS: And Buntic was there, although Buntic didn't say
23 anything. Perhaps it would be better to get the information from the
24 gentleman. He was there. What did he observe, what did he hear, what was
25 learned? Then if the Prosecution feels the need to go back because they
1 want to, somehow, get the gentleman to say, "Yes, this letter comports
2 with what I heard," perhaps there would be sufficient foundation, but at
3 this point in time the gentleman is being asked to divine into what Mr.
4 Boban was thinking at the time when he wrote the letter -- well, that's
5 how I understand it.
6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas, with due respect, I understand this
7 differently. We read what Mr. Boban wrote, and the witness has spoken to
8 several people in Mostar about Mostar and the future of Mostar, and the
9 question is whether these other people told him the same thing, whether
10 the essence of what all the others told them corresponds to what is
11 written in the letter. I think that's a legitimate question.
12 MR. KARNAVAS: If indeed it is a legitimate question, then I
13 would, with all respect, suggest that perhaps we hear from the witness --
14 from the witness all the meetings with respect to this particular issue,
15 because he needs to get in Mr. Buntic, who agrees, and then Mr. Tomic
16 again, who apparently goes back. So I think, perhaps, if we hear it all
17 it might be better in order to understand, but I leave it -- I'll leave it
18 up to the Court.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, please then, Mr. Scott,
20 can you please ask your question.
21 MR. SCOTT:
22 Q. General Pellnas, you've heard the question I put to you several
23 times now. If it will help make it -- if it will help give you some
24 further context and orientation on the letter, because I know the use of
25 the police in Mostar was something that you were interested in all -- for
1 a long time, including back in April 1993, so let me, before I put a
2 further question to you, go back to the first paragraph of Mr. Boban's
3 letter and it says:
4 "Following the Western European Union 5 October 1993 statement
5 about the initiation of planning for a possible police deployment as
6 support forces of the reputed European Community planned protectorate of
7 Mostar, allow me to stipulate the position of the Croat party in relation
8 to this issue."
9 Again, when you look at this letter and the claims to Mostar and
10 everything that's in here, the demographics, everything that everyone in
11 the courtroom has in front of them and can read, is this similar to the
12 attitude and positions that you encountered, voiced by the Bosnian Croat
13 representatives in your negotiations in January, February 1994?
14 A. As far as comes to what Tomic said during negotiations, I think he
15 fairly well reflected these opinions about Mostar.
16 Q. And do you know who made Mr. Tomic the head of the Bosnian Croat
17 delegation for these purposes?
18 A. No. I anticipated that it should have been Mate Boban, but I
19 don't know.
20 Q. Did you learn before leaving Zagreb to go once again to Mostar for
21 the purposes of these negotiations who would be leading the Croat team,
22 the Bosnian Croat team or delegation, if you will?
23 A. Yes. I learnt that a certain Mr. Tomic will lead the Croat
24 delegation. We had no information at the time who was going to lead the
25 Muslim delegation.
1 Q. And when you heard about Mr. Tomic being involved in this
2 capacity, did you have some information or basis for being concerned about
3 your future dealings with Mr. Tomic and how productive that might be?
4 A. Well, I got information, and I don't remember from whom, that he
5 was a hard-liner and absolutely dedicated to Mate Boban. So I got a bit
6 worried about the prospects.
7 Q. What did you do based on those concerns?
8 A. I went to see Mr. Sarinic in Zagreb.
9 Q. Who was Mr. Sarinic?
10 A. He was chief of Croatian security with Tudjman.
11 Q. And what did you say to Mr. Sarinic?
12 A. I raised my fear that I would run into problems, and he then
13 assured me that I would have no problem and Tomic would be very reasonable
14 and he was not in the pocket of Mate Boban.
15 Q. Did you learn anything around this time as to what Mr. Boban's
16 status or position was in the Herceg-Bosna or HVO government?
17 A. Up till the moment when the federation became a political reality,
18 I think he had a very strong position, but after that he -- he was an
19 obstacle to the future more than a possibility.
20 Q. Do you know what position or role he was given after he was
21 removed as president of Herceg-Bosna?
22 A. He was the -- he was -- became the president of the Croatian
23 petrol company INA.
24 Q. Where was that company, that petroleum oil company, based?
25 A. It was based in Zagreb, so he had his there, and he stayed most of
1 the time at the Intercont.
2 Q. The Intercontinental Hotel?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And so you'd received these assurance that is Mr. Tomic would not
5 be a problem and then when did you -- what do you recall arriving in
6 Mostar then?
7 A. I don't remember the date now. It may be in the paper somewhere.
8 It's -- I went up to the Spanish Battalion, and they were not too happy to
9 see me because they haven't heard about it. So we called
10 General Briquemont who was the commander-in-chief in Bosnia and he was
11 also very irritated because he had not been informed, and he ordered the
12 Spanish Battalion to house me and -- but to give me no further assistance.
13 Q. Let me just stop so the record is clear before we go too much
14 further. I notice that in the transcript the reporter has made a note at
15 line 20 that INA, I-N-A, and I think there won't be any dispute with the
16 name, that is the name of the oil company that Mr. -- or General Pellnas
17 was referring to, I-N-A?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Is that correct, sir?
20 A. That should be capital letters, I think.
21 Q. So once you arrived in Mostar or Medjugorje and were -- found
22 yourself a place to stay, did you see Grant Finlayson again?
23 A. Yes. I thought that the atmosphere in the Spanish Battalion
24 headquarter was not likely to produce a cup of coffee, so I called my
25 observers and asked them to take me out. So they gave me transport and
1 took care of me.
2 Q. And --
3 A. And I had to, because we had no information about the Muslim
4 delegation. There was none. So I had to decide to go into Mostar and try
5 to find it.
6 Q. And when you arrived in Mostar, I believe you said -- or
7 Medjugorje, and correct me, please, you stayed in a hotel during this
8 time, I think?
9 A. I stayed in the hotel Ana Marija in Medjugorje.
10 Q. Okay. Thank you. And did you check into the hotel sometime that
12 A. Yes, I did during the evening.
13 Q. And did you encounter anyone that you had met before in the hotel?
14 A. Yeah. Jadranko Prlic was there with an entourage of, I think,
15 three -- maybe two or three people in leather jackets, and with all the
16 normal insignias what goes with leather jackets in this area.
17 Q. Meaning?
18 A. Meaning gold rings and other things.
19 Q. And did you have a conversation or exchange words with Mr. Prlic
20 at this time?
21 A. He came up and said hello, and quite ironically asked if I was
22 going there -- if I had come to create peace.
23 Q. Had you seen -- in your time in the former Yugoslavia, had you
24 encountered other, as you said, men that were dressed in this way?
25 A. Yeah.
1 Q. Where?
2 A. On many places, not least Montenegro.
3 Q. Doing what?
4 A. In -- they were most of the time in -- in the business, that is,
6 MR. KARNAVAS: Perhaps -- perhaps the gentleman should -- should
7 be asked to quote from his book, because he's referring to Montenegrin
8 politicians who are smugglers. So that's the context of the book, and I
9 think it goes into the state of mind of the individual as to what he
10 thinks of the people in the region.
11 MR. SCOTT: Well --
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I think that's an excellent question for
13 cross-examination, Mr. Karnavas.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, if he's -- if the gentleman -- if the
15 Prosecution is going to go into it -- if the Prosecution is going to go
16 into some of it, he should go into it completely, but the reason they
17 don't is because they know that we have limited time for
18 cross-examination, and that's my dilemma. You see, if I had enough
19 adequate time for cross-examination, then I would -- which would be two or
20 three days for this gentleman, then obviously I can go into those at my
21 leisure. But I think if they're going to touch into it, have him exactly
22 describe and he should tell us, what does he mean by Montenegrin
23 politicians as being smugglers of the type that Mr. Prlic looked like or
24 his "entourage" looked like.
25 MR. MURPHY: In addition to that perhaps Mr. Scott can refresh all
1 our recollections as which paragraphs of the indictment deal with the
2 wearing of leather jackets and why we're taking up time with this. It's
3 just another example of trying to assassinate characters.
4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I didn't make up the witness's evidence.
5 The witness encounters Mr. Prlic in his hotel, and he exchanges a couple
6 of -- a few words with him and he simply says this is how I found them. I
7 think that's simply reporting direct eyewitness observation. And that's
8 all it is, and if Mr. Karnavas wants to go into it more on
9 cross-examination then he's certainly welcome to do so if he thinks it
10 will assist him to go into it further.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, what I fail to understand,
12 Mr. Scott, is about the leather jacket question. I mean, in what way is
13 this important or relevant?
14 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, the Chamber -- you'll have to --
15 ultimately have to decide that based on the totality of the evidence in
16 the case and that's all I can say, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, can you please proceed
19 MR. SCOTT:
20 Q. Did you then go back into Mostar either later that day from the
21 hotel or the following day to begin these actual negotiations?
22 A. I went into Mostar the following day as I remember, and the
23 observers brought me in.
24 Q. When you say the observers, you mean Mr. Finlayson and the others?
25 A. Yes. Yes. But also a team that was already in Mostar met us
1 because they had an armoured car.
2 Q. I just want to spend a few minutes on your actual travel into
3 Mostar on this occasion. Can you tell the Judges a bit about the route
4 that you followed, what you had to do to actually gain access into the
5 city of Mostar, into the centre of Mostar?
6 A. As I remember, there was only one bridge left where you can come
7 over to the eastern side, and we used that one which I think is south --
8 or was south of Mostar. And then coming up to an area as I remember could
9 have been a railway area. There were some containers, and we had to pass
10 fro and to a couple of times before we got into a road that led us into
11 the centre of East Mostar.
12 Q. And once you then began into East Mostar -- travelling into
13 East Mostar, what happened?
14 A. I was shocked by what I saw because I hadn't been there since the
15 events in April 1993, and there was no way what I would recollect or
16 recognise anything in East Mostar to what I seen before. It was only the
17 mosque or the remnants of the mosque that were made an orientation point.
18 Q. Do I understand, sir, that the conditions in Mostar and the
19 physical condition of the city was substantially worse than what it was
20 when you were there in April 1993?
21 A. Yeah. I would say that it was considerably worse than in
23 Q. Now, when you moved into -- when you travelled into the city, and
24 before we -- getting to the point where you make this particular
25 observations now, can you tell the Judges whether your vehicle -- your
1 vehicle or the UNMO vehicles that you were travelling with at the time
2 were shot at at the way -- as you entered into Mostar?
3 A. Not when we went into Mostar, but when we left Mostar.
4 Q. All right. When you arrived --
5 A. A young British --
6 Q. Sorry go ahead?
7 A. -- a young British officer, who drove them, he had -- he had some
8 ideas where snipers were located up on the hillside. So he was a bit
9 worried about the situation.
10 Q. All right. Well, did you say -- then we will come back to that in
11 a few moments.
12 Now, you said you indicated a few moments ago - excuse me - that
13 you were going into Mostar in part to arrange -- to meet with the Muslims
14 about organising a delegation; is that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. On that date, did you meet with someone named Klaric?
17 A. I met with him in his office. He -- to the best of my knowledge,
18 he was the mayor of East -- so-called mayor of East Mostar.
19 Q. And did Mr. Klaric have a deputy by the name of Alija --
20 A. Alikadic.
21 Q. -- Alikadic. Sorry for my pronunciation. But that's the man that
22 you knew?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. After meeting, first, with his deputy, did you have a meeting with
25 Mr. Klaric himself?
1 A. Yes, yes.
2 Q. And can you tell us a bit about that meeting, the impression that
3 Mr. Klaric made on you, and what he said to you in terms of negotiations?
4 A. He made a very good impression on me because he was very
5 controlled. He was probably dressed and washed and shaven, which nobody
6 else around him was. So he made quite a distinction from his surrounding.
7 So I was impressed by that. He was also very cool. When shells landed
8 rather near, he didn't blink. He was very, very controlled.
9 Q. I was about to ask you, in fact, was there shelling going on of
10 Mostar around this time?
11 A. Yeah. Around every fifth minute, a few rounds landed. I thought
12 it was 12-centimetre mortar shells.
13 Q. And did that continue around throughout the time that you were
14 meeting with will Klaric?
15 A. Yes, it did. He started by accusing us that the UN, European
16 Union, were letting them down and not protecting them. So he was quite
17 aggressive in the beginning, but later on he promised to -- to put
18 together a team and send it up to Medjugorje later on.
19 Q. And then when you left the meeting with Mr. Klaric, where did you
20 go? What route did you take?
21 A. We went the same way back; and then in this, what I recall as a
22 railway area, we were shot at from the hillside. And we had, on the
23 second, I think, three impacts in the car; and on the last round, we had a
24 number of impacts, one hitting the window where Grant Finlayson sat. But
25 it was small calibre rounds, 7.62, so it made no harm.
1 Q. And do you recall did the meetings then between the two
2 delegations, that is, the Bosnian Croat delegation and the Bosnian Muslim
3 delegation, begin sometime after that? I don't know exactly what the
4 passage of time was, if you remember.
5 A. I think it was maybe a week or something before we could get the
6 parties together.
7 Q. Can you tell us how this first meeting went, and can you confirm,
8 in fact, was it this Mr. Tomic who appeared representing the Croat side?
9 A. Yep. And as I said, his only concept was -- with the European
10 Union was to administrate East Mostar, and that was not quite the idea we
11 had about it. And so I went out and telephoned Sarinic in Zagreb and told
12 him that I thought I was using up my young life for nothing and -- in
14 Q. And you were able to get -- this was the same Mr. Sarinic that you
15 had talked to in December?
16 A. Yes. He was the security advisor to Mr. Tudjman.
17 Q. And did you have an understanding of what happened next?
18 A. Well, Tomic was suddenly called to the telephone, and when he came
19 back he was furious and said I was negotiating behind his back, and it
20 appeared that it was Mr. Susak who had called him. What he has told him,
21 I don't know, but he was furious.
22 Q. How did you learn or what information did you come to have that it
23 was Susak who had recalled Mr. Tomic?
24 A. I'm not sure who told me. Could have been the telephone people
25 with the Spanish Battalion or more probably Tomic himself, because he was
1 just furious. But I remember it clearly because it was a bit odd. I
2 called Sarinic, and it is Susak that calls back.
3 Q. And even after that intervention, did anything come of the
4 meeting? Was any progress made in that particular meeting?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Can I ask you to look at Exhibit 7584? And this is an ECMM report
7 of the 14th of January, 1994. If I can ask you to look to the paragraph
8 titled on the first page"A, Political Situation."
9 A. Yeah. I think it is correct, the interpretation. I mean, I was
10 sent out with almost no mandate at all and no guidance and under the
11 circumstances where the parties were still fighting. So I suppose you
12 could say that Lord Owen used me as a sort of guinea pig to see what
14 Q. And down further in that paragraph, number 1, do you see the
15 reference, in fact, to the meetings under "the chairmanship of General
17 A. Yes, that's what I meant was rather correct. It was rather
19 Q. But that is a reference to the meetings that you were beginning to
20 engage in around this time?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Did you have any meeting with this General Lasic, the same Lasic
23 that you had met with in April of 1993?
24 A. Yes. I had him in rather good memory, actually, so I invited him
25 for dinner Medjugorje, also with the idea that I would try to create a
1 better atmosphere for negotiating, and asked him to stop shelling Mostar
2 while we were negotiating.
3 Q. And what response did you get from him?
4 A. Well, we had some wine, so he was in good mood and promised, but
5 the next morning he called back and said that it wasn't possible.
6 Q. What was your assessment of him saying the next morning that what
7 he committed to the night before was not possible?
8 A. I think he had probably be come under pressure or he just
9 regretted what he had promised.
10 Q. And what was your response to that?
11 A. I told him that I would haunt him down to hell, if he didn't stay
12 by his word. That was probably the correct words. And it appeared later
13 on that he actually did, or it might have been a coincidence, but the
14 number of shells during the time significantly diminished.
15 Q. Can you give us a bit more of an idea of that specific idea?
16 How --
17 A. Just a few rounds hit Mostar during the time.
18 Q. During those three days?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And compared to?
21 A. Three hundred a day maybe. So I like to think that he kept his
23 Q. Now, going forward in the course of negotiations, and I'm trying
24 to -- some of these things you've already touched upon, so I'm trying to
25 not to repeat them too much again. But when you say later that there were
1 other meetings where you, then, ultimately made some proposal as to what
2 the map should look like.
3 A. Yep. Since nobody came up with it, I had to draw map myself and
4 present it to them.
5 Q. And what did that map -- I mean, very broadly, just in concept,
6 how did you propose that the city would be --
7 A. The first map was Mostar in itself and as little as possible
8 outside the city, because I didn't want the EU administration to have
9 borders to the Serbs, which would have created another problem.
10 Q. And how was that -- excuse me.
11 A. And, as I remember, the airport was not included in the first
13 Q. And how did the two sides receive your proposal?
14 A. Tomic put it in his briefcase without any comments, just saying
15 that he would give it to his superiors who they might have been. And the
16 Muslims said, well, maybe, yes, perhaps could be acceptable.
17 Q. Did there come a time when these negotiations moved to a meeting
18 in Geneva?
19 A. Yep.
20 Q. Do you recall approximately when that was?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Okay.
23 A. Must have been -- could have been February, or something like
25 Q. And who attended, in terms of the senior, if you will,
1 representatives of the two parties?
2 A. I was to form a small group in which this Mr. Buntic mentioned
3 here before turned up as the negotiator for the Croats about the
4 delineation of Mostar.
5 Q. Were --
6 A. And he agreed to my proposal.
7 Q. And did Mr. -- Excuse me, were Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Tudjman also
9 A. Yeah. They -- they were there, yes. But this -- I did not deal
10 with them. I was on this level dealing just with the concrete question of
11 delineation of Mostar.
12 Q. And had you met this Mr. Buntic before?
13 A. No, I'd never seen him before. And then I called in the Muslim
14 delegation and said, "We have an agreement."
15 Q. And what --
16 A. And they said, "No. We don't have an agreement because we need
17 the airport."
18 Q. And I -- leading again to a stalemate. Is that --
19 A. Yeah. So it was -- it appeared that at this time the Muslims had
20 no interest of receiving a quick solution.
21 Q. And do you have any -- can you provide the Judges any insight or
22 information as to why that was the case?
23 A. Yeah. It is, of course, also an evaluation of a situation, but I
24 believe that they had military success in the enclaves further north, and
25 they were in no hurry to settle the Mostar business at that time.
1 Q. In February --
2 A. Yeah.
3 Q. -- 1994?
4 A. Yeah.
5 Q. Can I ask you please to look at Exhibit 7965?
6 A. Yep.
7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I just come back to this last answer.
8 General, is that your appreciation of the situation? So it's a
9 bit of a speculation?
10 THE WITNESS: Yes.
11 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Is that correct?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, like all political judgements.
13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.
14 MR. SCOTT:
15 Q. In 7965, this is an ECMM report for the period covering the 19th
16 of February to the 25th of February, 1994; and I think if you look down
17 into the text it, you'll see your name, and do you agree that this is a
18 report largely upon the status of the negotiations concerning the EU
20 A. Which page do I appear?
21 Q. 7965. I think in the first paragraph. First page, first
22 paragraph, number 1.
23 A. Oh, yes. Yes.
24 Q. "This hot issue has been dealt with by the Mostar administration
25 working group chaired by General Pellnas." Do you see that?
1 A. Yep. Yeah. One may perhaps smell a bit of organisational envy
2 here, but I don't know. On the whole it is correct. It was not very
3 relevant for the time being.
4 Q. In the next paragraph, the next bulleted the paragraph, it starts:
5 "CRHB representatives consider that such an administration should be
6 restricted to the town and the airport should not be included in it. None
7 commonplace of all CRHB politicians is the capitality of Mostar." And is
8 that consistent with the positions you, indeed, encountered in your
10 A. Yep.
11 Q. If you go to the top of the next page, please. I asked you
12 earlier about what Mr. Boban's status was, and the man named Pogarcic
13 apparently says or had given the information that he was on an extended
14 vacation in Croatia. Nobody knows when he will return.
15 By this time, the latter part of February 1994, did you have any
16 more information as to what Mr. Boban's status was?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Can I ask you to go to Exhibit 7904?
19 A. Yep.
20 Q. And can you look at that and tell us what that is, because it's
21 addressed to you.
22 A. Yep. I remember it.
23 Q. And just for the record, tell the Judges what this is.
24 A. It is a letter from Klaric, in short, saying that they will not --
25 due do what is happening in East Mostar, they have decided to cancel their
1 representation in the further negotiating. They will not attend.
2 Q. And just so that it's clear, you understand this to be the same
3 Mr. Klaric that you had met with a few days earlier?
4 A. I suppose so, yes.
5 Q. Can I ask you to look next at Exhibit 8019.
6 A. Yep.
7 Q. This appears to be the report of a delegation that went to Mostar
8 in March of 1994. It's dated on the top of the first page Geneva, 25
9 March 1994. On the bottom somebody named Elmar Dinter.
10 A. Yep.
11 Q. I don't know if you can shed any light on who Mr. Dinter --
12 A. Dinter was the liaison officer from the CMM at the ICFY in Geneva.
13 Q. And in the persons, this is addressed to ICFY, and your name seems
14 to be listed in the second line?
15 A. It's a whole -- it's the whole ICFY headquarters.
16 Q. And then on the second page, this appears to indicate that around
17 this time there had been a -- a French delegation -- a kind of joint
18 French-Spanish delegation to Mostar; is that correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And it gives a report of the mission. The third -- excuse me, the
21 fourth overall page of document, if you start with the first page, and the
22 fourth physical page starts. It says, "Trip report on the European Union
23 administration of Mostar." And it appears, do you agree, that the letter
24 gives them a synopsis of meetings with various people in Mostar?
25 A. I had no information at the time about this trip and about this
1 combined friend. I don't want comment on it, I think.
2 Q. Well, let me just ask you about the content of the document. For
3 example, on page 3, when it says, "Mr. Klaric expressed a few principles
4 on the European administration of Mostar." He says, "Mostar must be an
5 open city. Mostar cannot be a part of the territory of the CRHB. Mostar
6 cannot be the capital of CRHB. All refugees must return to their homes."
7 Is that consistent what you understood Mr. Klaric's position to be during
8 the times you talked to him?
9 A. Yes, it is. But as a matter of fact, I did not talk so much with
10 Klaric, except for the first meeting. It was his deputy that made the
12 Q. And that was Mr. --
13 A. Alikadic.
14 Q. -- Alikadic. And did he, Mr. Alikadic, express --
15 A. He had the same ideas, yes.
16 Q. And do you recall as a result of your meetings around this time
17 you continued -- you came back from Geneva. We've talked about that
18 before we went to the exhibits, and this is where this Mr. Buntic appeared
19 for the first time. Did you have another meeting back in the
20 Mostar-Medjugorje area after Geneva?
21 A. I had this meeting where only the Croatian delegation showed up
22 and the Muslims stayed out.
23 Q. And did Mr. Buntic appear at that meeting?
24 A. Yes, he did, and I was promised that it should be led by
25 Mr. Buntic, but the fact is that he did not say a word during this
2 Q. Who -- who led the Croat delegation?
3 A. It was Mr. Tomic. And as a fact he went back on everything they
4 had accepted in -- in Geneva.
5 Q. At the end of that meeting, sir, can you just told us was there --
6 had there -- was there any resolution in sight or had there ultimately
7 been any progress on the agreement between the two parties?
8 A. No. We were back at square one. Both parties had abandoned what
9 they had agreed on. I had agreement from both parties but never at the
10 same time. And what -- it was my impression that Mr. Buntic obviously was
11 more closely connected to Zagreb, and Tomic was not, actually. He might
12 have had other interests. I saw him at the time as the spokesman for
13 Mate Boban. But that is also a guesswork from my point.
14 Q. Now, around this time then after the end of February -- or around
15 the end of February, actually, 1994, did you understand that the
16 Washington Agreement came into effect and the federation, the Muslim-Croat
17 federation, was established --
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. -- at least on paper?
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. And were there negotiations then in Brussels concerning, again,
22 still the topic of the EU administration of Mostar?
23 A. Yes. It was led by the Greek ambassador, because Greece had the
24 chairmanship of European Union at the time.
25 Q. And was an --
1 A. But Michael Steiner from Germany played a very important role.
2 Q. And was an EU administration ultimately put in place in Mostar?
3 A. Yeah.
4 Q. In 1994?
5 A. Yes, finally we got to the agreement about it.
6 Q. And do you know approximately -- can you tell the Judges
7 approximately how long that administration lasted?
8 A. Now I don't know how long it lasted. For quite a while, actually.
9 Long time.
10 Q. And was this Mr. Koschnick in fact appointed the administrator
11 from Bremen?
12 A. Yes, but we went in there with his should I say, Chief of Staff or
13 deputy, on a beforehand mission at what time we met Mr. Zubak.
14 Q. And let me just ask you before coming to that: Is this -- were
15 you, once again, after the Washington Agreement and after Mr. Koschnick
16 was essentially named the administrator sent back once again into Mostar
17 to try to lay further groundwork?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Did you accompany --
20 A. After Geneva, I didn't deal with Mostar except from the fact that
21 I followed Ambassador Metsher into Mostar.
22 Q. Well, that was my question to you. Was there a time when you went
23 with ambassador, the German ambassador, Metsher, into Mostar?
24 A. Yes.
25 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, is this period within the indictment?
1 If not, if not; meanwhile it might be interesting and I would like to
2 discuss this matter over a beer with the gentleman, perhaps this is not
3 the best forum to have discussions on matters that are outside the scope
4 of the indictment and the period of the indictment.
5 MR. SCOTT: It's not, Your Honour, because the period of the
6 indictment, it goes to at least April of 1994, and I thought the Chamber
7 would, frankly, want to know a little bit about not the end of the story
8 but at least the end of this chapter of the story about the administration
9 of Mostar, after all the things that the Chamber's heard about from 1991
10 forward. I have about -- several -- three or four questions left on the
11 topic at all. And it is -- but in any event, the bottom line is it's
12 within the period of the indictment, correct.
13 MR. KARNAVAS: As long as it's within the period, and if he wishes
14 to go outside the period, as long as we're able to go into the period so I
15 can discuss Mr. Prlic's involvement at Dayton and thereafter, I don't have
16 a problem with that.
17 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, I've already said it several times,
18 this is within the period of the indictment we're talking -- that we're
19 now -- so I think it is more than reasonable to at least finish this part
20 of the story.
21 Q. Sir, you said you went with the German ambassador Metsher. Was
22 this part of an EU advance party?
23 A. Yes, it was.
24 Q. And how did this trip into Mostar compare to the trips into Mostar
25 that you made before?
1 A. Well, the agreement made -- the fighting had stopped so there was
2 no hostilities in Mostar at the time, nothing really.
3 Q. Do you know during the time that you continued to be involved
4 either in February, during the January-February period - and, sorry, in
5 the interests of time -- because of time I skipped over it - or again in
6 this later period were you still pushing the idea of a joint police --
7 some sort of a policing agreement for Mostar.
8 A. No. This idea had been taken over by the European Union. It was
9 a great discussing matter in Brussels, but I was not involved in that
10 matter. I just intervened in the negotiation by telling Michael Steiner
11 that they had to have very strong wordings in any document dealing with a
12 joint police force.
13 Q. And why did you give that counsel?
14 A. I had my background and my misgivings about the possibility to
15 create a joint police force. I thought it would be a very superficial
16 organisation and the communities would continue to work business as usual
17 below that surface. But I was not involved in the direct negotiation
18 about the police force.
19 Q. And when you accompanied Mr. -- Ambassador Metsher back into
20 Mostar at this time, was that the last time that you were in Mostar during
21 the conflict?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, if I can change to a different topic and the last topic of
24 direct examination. I asked you earlier in reference to one of the
25 reports that I showed you whether the UN military observers were regularly
1 interested in the possible involvement of the Croatian army in
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And did you understand that as the chief UNMO, if you will, to be
5 something that was part of your mandate and the UNMOs' mandate, among
6 other things, to monitor?
7 A. Yes, of course.
8 Q. Can I ask you to go to Exhibit 785.
9 A. Sorry. Yeah.
10 Q. This appears to be a report from the senior military observer of
11 BH south dated the 20th of November, 1992. "Subject: Special report on
12 presence of CA troops in Herzegovina." Do you see that?
13 A. Yeah.
14 Q. And just so the record is clear, at the time what did you
15 understand the abbreviation "CA" to be?
16 A. Croatian army, I guess.
17 Q. And there is a reference in the second numbered paragraph to
18 information that was being received about the presence of a number of
19 numbered Croatian army units. If you see that paragraph. The 1st, 4th
20 145th, 116th, 162nd, parts of the 2nd and 3rd Brigade with a total of
21 10.000 to 12.000 troops. Do you see that?
22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, for clarification
23 purposes, in the continuation of the sentence it say that the mentioned
24 units were put up in the region of Konavle, and Konavle is in the Republic
25 of Croatia. It's an area in the Republic of Croatia. That's what I
1 wanted to explain. Thank you.
2 MR. SCOTT:
3 Q. And in reference to paragraph numbered 1, General Pellnas, do you
4 recall any information that was received in connection with
5 General Petkovic around this time of the involvement of the Croatian army
6 in the Stolac area?
7 A. No, I don't remember.
8 Q. In item number 3 on the third page, it says,"Assessment:
9 Brigadier Petkovic's statement prove the independent presence of Croatian
10 army fully under their own command." And then making reference to a
11 Colonel Grubac, "detailed information."
12 Do you recall what other steps that the UN military observers,
13 around this time, the end of November 1992 took to -- seeking to verify
14 this information?
15 A. No, I don't -- I don't think they were out seeking information.
16 They patrolled on what they saw. They reported. I don't think they
17 were -- but this is also an assessment. I don't know. I don't think they
18 were especially running around looking for HV units. But when they
19 come -- came across them, they probably reported.
20 I have one comment on this paper which --
21 Q. Yes, go ahead.
22 A. -- perhaps should be made. I believe this Colonel Grubac is a
23 Serb officer. So one should be a bit careful about what is reported here.
24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise once
25 again, but just another clarification. I think it will be easier for us
1 to clear it up straight away. This document relates to the actions of the
2 Croatian army for the liberation of the southern parts of Croatia, and
3 that is why the document refers to the Serb army or Serb officers and the
4 Croatian army is also mentioned. Thank you.
5 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, again that's counsel testifying,
6 and they can put evidence on that if they wish. And the fact that it's a
7 Serb -- this is a Serb source of information is said right on the face of
8 paragraph number 1. "During my meetings with Serb authorities," which --
9 I mean I think everyone can read that, if it's not clear.
10 Q. Sir, when you said a few moments ago though, or earlier today,
11 this afternoon, that the presence of Croatian army units in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina was something that was important and something UNMOs
13 were interested in, I mean, that concerned -- had continued back even
14 before your time. That was something the UN was always interested in;
16 A. Certainly.
17 Q. Can I ask you, please, to look at Exhibit 205. This is Security
18 Council Resolution 752, dated the 15th of May, 1992. And if I can direct
19 your attention to paragraphs number 3 and 4 on the second page.
20 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, the gentleman was not in theatre at
21 the time, so he's being asked to comment about something at a period of
22 time when he was not working as an UNMO. If I understand him correctly,
23 it was from November 1992 to November 1993.
24 MR. SCOTT: The testimony of the witness, Your Honour, was that
25 this was something -- this was an issue that the UN military observers
1 was -- were continuously interested in. There is a reason they were
2 interested in it, because of UN Security Council Resolutions, and this
3 simply provides the further foundation for what the witness said, that
4 this was part of the responsibility of the UN military observers to
6 MR. KARNAVAS: The question is did military observers exist at the
7 time, and was this observed by military observers at the time. In other
8 words, did this information that the Security Council put in, in the
9 resolution, did that come from military observers? If it did not, if it
10 did not, then I suggest that this is not the right gentleman to be asking
11 these sorts of questions. So I think some background information might be
12 necessary, assuming the gentleman can answer the question. He was the
13 chief military observer. Perhaps he could tell us as of what period of
14 time, when exactly did the military observers, the UN military observers
15 arrive in theatre. And if they arrived after this particular date then,
16 obviously, this gentleman is not competent to answer any questions
17 regarding this resolution, and I suggest that the Prosecution bring over
18 whoever it was that drafted this, who provided this information to the UN
19 and as a result that information got into the resolution itself.
20 MR. SCOTT:
21 Q. Sir, as a UN military observer, I take it you worked -- a UN
22 military observer worked for the UN?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And the Security Council is part - I think we can all agree - it
25 is part of the United Nations?
1 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, the question, again, I'm asking for
2 clarification. First, we need to establish as of when. The fact that --
3 this is a UN tribunal. Does that mean that because a UN tribunal,
4 everything that the UN does is correct? Come on. This is the whole point
5 of having this exercise.
6 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I -- if I can respond, Your Honour.
7 It's --
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Scott, you want to
9 respond. Mr. Scott.
10 MR. SCOTT: Well, Your Honour, I'm not sure why Mr. Karnavas is so
11 exercised about this. These are officially UN records that anyone can
12 access. I don't think there's anything, doubt -- they have been
13 fabricated in some way. This man worked -- he was the chief UN military
14 observer during this time period from November of 1992 to November of
15 1993. He's already confirmed to us several times that part of his mandate
16 was to monitor these things, and this is simply part of the UN official
17 basis for him being involved in these issues.
18 MR. KARNAVAS: Here is the problem that I'm having with this. The
19 document can come in through somebody else. But now the gentleman is
20 asking to vouch, to vouch for the authenticity, the reliability, the
21 credibility, or the truthfulness of what's contained in the documents
22 themselves. That's what is, in essence, he's being called upon. And I
23 think the gentleman wasn't there. UN military observers weren't there at
24 the time.
25 So if the document -- if the Prosecution wishes to get the
1 document in through some other witness, they can do so. But to have this
2 gentleman somehow vouch for what's in the document itself, and it appears
3 that is what is happening.
4 I think the Prosecution made its point, and that is that one of
5 the things is at that period of time, while he was there, they were
6 looking for Croatian army involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think that
7 point was made.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, you were the chief of
9 the United Nations Military Observers; and when you took up your position,
10 were you aware of that there had been resolutions passed by the UN
11 Security Council?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We have here in
14 front us a resolution that dates back to earlier than your arrival in
15 theatre. Were you aware of this resolution dated 15th of May, 1992?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Very well. In this
18 resolution that you were made aware of, at paragraphs 3 and 4,
19 interference from outside is mentioned by units of the JNA and elements of
20 the Croatian army, and the UN Security Council demands that this stops
22 What we see at paragraph 3 and 4, does that reflect the situation
23 you became familiar with when you took up your position?
24 THE WITNESS: This was one of the reasons, of course, why United
25 Nations observers should and must report every observation that the Serb
1 army or the Croatian army appeared inside Bosnia. There were also many
2 other things like that.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have just stated something
4 that could be extremely relevant. You said that the United Nations
5 Military Observers had to observe what was going on, including the
6 presence of the Serb army or the Croatian army. Were you given specific
7 directions or instructions in that respect, or did you yourself and the
8 people working with you improvise in that respect, or was this part and
9 parcel of your mandate?
10 THE WITNESS: I think it was part and parcel of our mandate, but I
11 can't recall that I had specific written instructions. We could all read
12 the Security Council resolutions and see how they affected our work.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine.
14 Mr. Scott, then, could you please resume. This was only a
15 technical problem in order to have the question put without raising
16 objections that are a waste of time. But, unfortunately, I think we're
17 going to have to adjourn, but you can finish this topic first.
18 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I won't be able to finish. I think I
19 will need tomorrow, and I think I'm still just barely at three hours. I
20 think I would need, approximately, a half an hour or so in the morning to
21 finish. And I would remind the Chamber that it's the only witness we have
22 this week, so I can't imagine why we are going to be short on time.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. We'll discuss this among
24 each other, among the other Judges when we meet tomorrow morning. This
25 additional half hour, of course, we also have to provide the Defence with
1 additional time, of course.
2 It's five after 7.00. We will now adjourn and will meet tomorrow,
3 but remember the hearing is tomorrow in the morning at 9.00.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 6th day
6 of June, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.