1 Tuesday, 15 January 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.14 p.m.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, kindly call the case,
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Jadranko Prlic et al.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Today is Tuesday,
10 the 15th of January, 2008. I would like to greet the representatives of
11 the Prosecution, Defence counsel, as well as the accused. We must resume
12 yesterday's hearing and bring in the witness into the courtroom. In the
13 meantime, I have an oral decision to hand down. I would like the
14 registrar to move into private session for a few moments, please.
15 [Private session]
11 Pages 26232-26235 redacted. Private session
17 [Open session]
18 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I'd like to inform
20 the parties that the registrar has just raised a technical issue which I
21 am discovering, but this requires additional information. It seems that
22 if one of you discusses a topic in private session we have to stop for 30
23 minutes to enable the technician to do what's required. So I'm very
24 surprised by what I've just been told but this is what the registrar has
25 just told me. So if you'd like to move into private session, please think
1 twice about it, because we would then have to have a 30-minute break.
2 Mr. Prlic, I believe you would like to have the floor.
3 THE ACCUSED PRLIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much. I need
4 to say what I have to say in open session, and I would indeed prefer the
5 whole trial to be held in open session, and this is the essence of my
6 brief request: The Trial Chamber decided yesterday to punish or sanction
7 my Defence counsel, preventing him from actively defending me in the
8 courtroom for a certain period of time and it was done in open session.
9 Bearing in mind that both interventions of may lawyer that led to this
10 response on the part of the Trial Chamber were actually done in private
11 session, both in the cross-examination -- in the course of the
12 cross-examination and in his address to the Trial Chamber. This was all
13 done in closed session. So I believe that it would be a good idea and I
14 believe that the Trial Chamber will support me on this in order to make
15 this trial transparent. So I think it would be a good idea to make it
16 possible for those two interventions on the part of my lawyer to be
17 accessible to public. In light of the fact that this witness testified in
18 closed session, perhaps some elements might be redacted, some words might
19 be redacted, if such words might lead to the identification of the witness
20 who testified in this courtroom over the past two weeks.
21 So it is my request to make public the two interventions of my
22 lawyer that led to this decision of the Trial Chamber.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have been seized of your
24 applications, and we'll deliberate on the matter you've just raised.
25 We shall now bring in the witness into the courtroom.
1 I'll give the floor to the registrar in the meantime so that we
2 can have some IC numbers.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Prosecution response to exhibits
4 tendered by Prlic Defence for Witness BF will become Exhibit IC 773.
5 Prosecution response to exhibits tendered by Stojic Defence for Witness BF
6 will become Exhibit IC 774. Prosecution response to exhibits tendered by
7 Praljak Defence for Witness BF will become Exhibit IC 775, and Prosecution
8 response to exhibits tendered by Petkovic Defence for Witness BF will
9 become Exhibit IC 776.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]
11 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] We're not receiving any
12 interpretation, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As far as the timing is
14 concerned, let me repeat.
15 [The witness entered court]
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The lead counsel had 40 minutes
17 yesterday. You therefore have 26 minutes left unless the other Defence
18 counsel have given you some of their time, which I don't know.
19 WITNESS: CEDRIC THORNBERRY [Resumed]
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.
21 Did you hear?
22 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.
23 Good afternoon, Witness, and good afternoon to everyone in and around the
24 courtroom. The Prlic Defence has no further questions for this witness
25 and we cede our time to Mr. Stojic's Defence.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you very much.
2 Good afternoon, sir. We are going to resume your
3 cross-examination. Prlic's Defence counsel has just told us that they
4 have no further questions for you. Their time has been given to the
5 Defence counsel of Mr. Stojic.
6 I shall now give the floor to the counsel who would like to take
7 the floor.
8 Ms. Nozica.
9 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours good
10 afternoon to everyone in the courtroom.
11 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:
12 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir. As far as I can see the
13 Trial Chamber has just been given the exhibits that I intend to use, and I
14 could please ask the usher to give the exhibits that I intend to use to
15 the witness and to the Prosecution.
16 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as you have just heard,
17 I have been given the time that remained to the Prlic Defence for my
18 cross-examination, but I don't think that I will be using up all of this
19 time. I think that I will be able to complete the cross-examination in
20 the time that I was allotted originally, but I will try to do that as
21 slowly as possible so that we can avoid any interventions to correct the
23 Q. Mr. Thornberry, before you left Mostar on the 1st of September,
24 1993, you arranged the evacuation of the wounded from the hospital in East
25 Mostar and the hospital in Nova Bila.
1 A. True.
2 Q. The meeting where all the details were supposed to be arranged was
3 held in Medjugorje on the 1st of September, 1993, and you attended that
4 meeting. Am I right?
5 A. I don't have it immediately in my memory. Perhaps I might just
6 say that when the political decisions had been taken to create a system of
7 removal with their consent of the various persons who had been injured or
8 sick, once that had been taken, fundamentally it was left up to other
9 colleagues, perhaps more junior, and I myself was not very much involved.
10 In immediate answer to your question, however, I hope that you --
11 that you feel that this is an appropriate way to approach it, I think
12 it's -- I cannot remember whether I was present at that meeting or not.
13 There was a host of meetings because there were problems -- problems all
14 the way with that system of removal of people.
15 Q. But if I understand you correctly, you've just told us, in
16 addition to the answer to my question, that this was part of a process,
17 indicating that it lasted over a period of several days and that in the
18 end the -- there was this evacuation. Could you agree with me on that?
19 A. There was a partial evacuation. The evacuation, as I recall it,
20 and it wasn't fully sent through to me, they didn't -- they didn't tell me
21 all the detail of it, the -- yes, the -- the -- the issue came -- was sent
22 to -- was kicked upstairs, as they say, and we had to deal with the
23 political aspects, and those tended to hang around maybe for at least six
24 weeks. They were being recorded and sent to -- usually to Stoltenberg
25 in -- in -- sorry. They were sent to Stoltenberg in Zagreb or wherever he
1 was at that time. He wasn't at that meeting either. We left it, as I
2 said, mostly to our subordinates.
3 Q. Mr. Thornberry, I would like to focus on this evacuation that was
4 arranged, the one that you managed to agree on, and let me now show you a
5 document that might refresh your memory about some details.
6 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Would the usher please assist the
7 witness with the first document in my binder. That's document P 4857.
8 Just so that the witness familiarise himself with the methods that we use
9 here. The first document I want him to look at is P 4857. That's the
10 first green sticker on my binder. I think that we have the translation in
11 the original here.
12 Q. Mr. Thornberry, this is a report from the first meeting held on
13 the 1st of September, 1993. It is signed by the chief of the inspection
14 service in the HVO, Mr. Ivo Sandrk, a man who apparently attended this
15 meeting, and I would now like us to go very briefly through some of the
16 details. You can see here that he's talking about the 1st of September
17 1993, listing the names of the people who were present there.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Nozica, in the document I
19 can see the name of a witness who has been granted protective measures, so
20 please avoid mentioning the name of that witness so that we are not faced
21 with the technical problem I mentioned earlier on. Thank you.
22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Very well. Yes. Thank you. Thank
23 you. Yes, I've seen that too.
24 Q. Anyway, can you look at the middle of the page or, rather, your
25 name is mentioned here, too, saying that you were present at the meeting.
1 Could you take a look at that? Can you see that portion? I'll give you
2 some time to find it.
3 Do you remember that on the 1st of September you did indeed attend
4 that meeting and that in fact after that meeting you left straight away?
5 So that's the last day according to your reports.
6 A. That's -- that's the day that I remember, yes.
7 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, we said it was an ongoing process and
8 we see on page 2 and the other date, the 2nd of September, which means
9 that the meetings continued at 1000 hours on the 2nd of September and at
10 this meeting the technical details were agreed upon with respect to the
11 evacuation, the conditions that each party was to meet, and it was agreed
12 that they should ensure the resources necessary to carry out the
13 evacuation, the final destination where the wounded are to be evacuated
15 Mr. Thornberry, do you remember that this is how the process
16 continued? Can you remember this detail, that each party was supposed to
17 secure the necessary means of evacuation?
18 A. When you mean -- when you say the means of evacuation, I take it
19 you are not referring to whether it is by land or by air or -- how is that
20 intended, please, that question, that issue?
21 Q. From the document further on we can see that it was necessary to
22 ensure helicopters for this, but I'm just asking you whether you remember
23 that part of the negotiations incorporated the preparations that I read
24 out, that is to say the term I used, "to ensure resources for the
1 If you can't remember that, we can move on. It's not a
2 particularly important detail, but I just want to check out and see which
3 information you had about how the evacuation ensued after you had left
4 Mostar and Medjugorje.
5 A. I -- I don't at all want to convey a contrary feeling, but I would
6 have to say that it would be very unlikely for this kind of detail to be
7 brought to me other than for a formal signature, and I cannot remember
8 going behind that at this stage.
9 Q. I do apologise. Now all my questions linked to this document --
10 well, if you feel that some information from this document wasn't
11 essential as far as you were concerned, essential that you know about
12 them, but I should like to continue along those lines.
13 And now, on the 3rd of September, and you'll find that on page 3,
14 the -- was the third day of the negotiations, and the meeting started in
15 Medjugorje once again at 1000 hours, and from this paragraph and this
16 section related to the third day and the 3rd of September, it says that
17 the Muslim side did not have the helicopters ready for the evacuation, so
18 that the entire operation, well, was not brought into question but was
19 delayed for those reasons. It had to be postponed.
20 So can you remember anything about that, because it was, after
21 all, a significant operation both for your mission and for the sick people
22 and for the evacuation of persons from Nova Bila and East Mostar and so
23 on. So did you receive information to that effect, that they did come
24 across these difficulties, the difficulties that I've just described to
25 you briefly?
1 A. I think they came across not only those difficulties but a number
2 of others which were more political than technical. But as I tried to
3 suggest a little earlier, in principle this kind of paper doesn't come to
4 me. Except, of course, as you have -- as madam has indicated, except as
5 regards as the -- the kinds of question which crossed boundaries, as it
6 were, in -- in a supervision of this kind of process.
7 It was an extremely difficult process, because the parties had
8 been fighting each other for a long time and they hadn't got used to the
9 idea that maybe they could do things some other way.
10 Q. Mr. Thornberry, you have helped me a great deal with that answer
11 of yours when you said that it wasn't just these technical details that
12 were a problem but that there were a series of problems, and you mentioned
13 political goodwill. So that's why I'm showing you this document, which
14 I'm sure didn't reach you because it's an HVO document. So I'm not
15 actually asking you about the document but about the information contained
16 therein, and I just wanted to indicate that political and military aspect
17 of this whole operation and the operation of transporting the -- the
18 wounded later on. And I'd like to indicate just one more detail to see if
19 you were informed about that.
20 If we carry on through this document and look at the 3rd of
21 September once again, it says that the Muslim side did finally secure
22 helicopters. And I'm going to read a sentence out to you slowly, and it
23 says: "And the evacuation was to have begun on the 3rd of September at
24 1500 hours from the plateau or open area by the former bus station." And
25 then the following information is provided: It says at 1400 hours -- at
1 1430 hours rather, there was a mortar attack by the MOS forces on part of
2 the town under HVO control. On that occasion 18 civilians were wounded of
3 which five were children -- five civilians were killed, two of them
4 children. Among the wounded civilians there were eight Muslims."
5 Now, you see when the departure of 1500 hours was decided upon,
6 then the HVO, and this is what it says in the document, "... cautioned
7 UNPROFOR representatives," and told them that "... incidents could be
8 expected on the MOS side, MOS forces side, in order to show that the HVO
9 was trying to obstruct the agreement."
10 Now, any of these details here which would come under military and
11 political details but important to see whether your agreement was
12 obstructed, have you ever seen this information before?
13 A. I really have an extremely vague memory of something coming up and
14 having to be dealt with on an emergency basis, but I'm sorry to say my
15 memory does not run -- at this stage does not run further than that. I
16 wish it did, but I can't do that, I'm sorry.
17 Q. From this document, just to finish my questions on that, so that
18 part of the evacuation that was agreed was completed on the 6th of
19 September, 1993; is that right? Now, from this entire document it would
20 follow and emerge that the representatives on the Muslim side changed
21 every time. Different people attended the negotiations every time. So
22 what I'm going to ask you is this: In your statement, Mr. Thornberry, you
23 said that -- you said this in court and also in the written statement you
24 gave to the Prosecutor, that you encountered a very serious and difficult
25 situation and difficult conditions in East Mostar.
1 Now, Mr. Thornberry, at that time, and linked to these
2 negotiations and we've just shown one document about them or later on
3 linked to negotiations which took place later as you said almost six weeks
4 later, did you gain the impression that the BH army, as concerns the
5 wounded, was using the wounded in order to further its military and
6 political goals, to achieve them? Did you gain that impression?
7 A. If I did, I don't remember its specifics. And if I did, it's very
8 likely that not only the BH army but others were using the wounded at that
10 When I say using it, I don't mean in some Machiavellian way but,
11 rather, in a manner which will -- which would -- which would enable them
12 to fall back on some expedient if they found that the situation was
13 becoming unacceptable for them because of their political -- the political
14 commitment which they might have made. In other words, the -- the BH army
15 was really doing what I think most people do after a very major conflict
16 and they have something pressed on them of a humanitarian nature, they --
17 they tend to be cautious in how they accept it.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Nozica, before you continue
19 your questions, as regards the technical issue I mentioned a moment ago,
20 here is the situation: Everything that is being said is live. As you
21 know, usually we have a 30-minute delay in the broadcast. For an unknown
22 reason, everything we're saying today is broadcast live, which means that
23 if somebody mentions the name of a protected witness or a confidential
24 event, there will be no possibility for us to redact the transcript,
25 because as said, everything is broadcast live. Our technicians are trying
1 to solve the problem, but for the time being it hasn't been. So please be
2 very careful.
3 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, for that
4 warning. I'll do my best. And I think in the questions that I have
5 prepared, there is not a single document which could be of the nature
6 which you have just described.
7 Q. Now, Witness, your answer was that all the sides tried to use the
8 wounded. Now, the Trial Chamber here must gain the right impression, must
9 gain an insight as to what the real conditions were when it came to the
10 HVO and children and civilians. So a precise picture is what is needed.
11 And which of those conditions either of the parties was able to wield
12 influence on.
13 Now, I'd like us to continue this topic for us to see whether the
14 BH army accepted the solutions offered up by the international agencies
15 and organisations or --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we continue, we have a
17 document, a document that's been shown to you by the Defence. As of the
18 3rd of September, obviously there has been discussions between the HVO and
19 the BH army on the issue of the evacuation of the wounded. All of this,
20 of course, was done with the international community having been informed.
21 And suddenly - that's what the document shows, at least - the Muslim side
22 attacks. An attack is carried out, and at 2.30 p.m. to be more specific.
23 Attack with mortar.
24 According to that document, 18 civilians were wounded. Among them
25 five were children. Five civilians were killed, and among those five
1 killed there were also two children. So two children were killed, and
2 five were wounded.
3 One could believe that since the BH army is attacking the HVO, all
4 the victims are Croats. In fact, that's not what the document says,
5 because among the victims there are also eight Muslim civilians. So it is
6 quite surprising negotiations are going on, and then suddenly in the
7 middle of those negotiations one of the parties decides to launch an
9 You were there at the time. Do you have yourself have an
10 explanation to give?
11 THE WITNESS: No, I am afraid not, Mr. President. I don't have an
12 explanation. Much that happened in the country at that time was
13 without -- objectively without explanation. It seemed to be an attack
14 upon the foundations of the agreement.
15 But if I might just add this: From personal experience in regard
16 to, for example, the situation in Sarajevo, when I negotiated there with
17 the Serbs, the answers had been given by the Serbs to my questions were
18 punctuated, I think is the word, by mortar shells which fell 20 metres
19 away. And that was a mortar which was in fact Mr. Karadzic and General
20 Mladic who were actually conducting that negotiation.
21 So all I can say is, yes, I concede that -- that the circumstances
22 were rather bizarre, and worse than that, obviously, horrible, but I'm
23 afraid I can't put myself in the place of the parties.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, you say that circumstances
25 were bizarre. The question that comes to mind and to the Judge's mind in
1 particular is the following: Were there individuals that behind the back
2 of the official negotiators were playing an entirely different score?
3 Were they not trying to sabotage the agreement being negotiated, or maybe
4 they were pursuing other more mysterious goals? Did you have the feeling
5 at any stage that there could be external individuals other than the
6 negotiators themselves who would come there to sabotage the work that was
7 being done?
8 That's what -- I'm asking you because yesterday I was very
9 impressed by the video that was shown to us, the video in which you met
10 HVO officials, and I thought I recognised at some stage General Petkovic.
11 And when one sees this video, one feels the climate, this almost fraternal
12 climate, this atmosphere that comes out of such meetings between
13 international representatives and HVO. The atmosphere is very friendly,
14 as we saw yesterday in the video. So this question comes to mind: There
15 are negotiations. Everybody is taking part in such negotiations, and then
16 those attacks take place and they come and disrupt the proceedings.
17 THE WITNESS: Sir, I have worked in peacekeeping for nearly 20
18 years, and in maybe half a dozen examples, and I do not know the answer to
19 your question.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
21 Ms. Nozica, please proceed.
22 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
23 Q. Mr. Thornberry, we're going to continue discussing the medical
25 Now, I started my question a moment ago, so I'll repeat it now.
1 From the documents that I wish to present to you, what I want to see is
2 whether the BH army, if it was, and you say it was, and I have no reason
3 to doubt that, if it was in such a difficult situation with respect to the
4 wounded, then did it use everything possible to help its people and its
5 own wounded?
6 Now, do you remember whether after this evacuation that we're
7 discussing, that is the evacuation of the 1st of September, the HVO made
8 suggestions and proposals to the BH army about the evacuation of the
9 wounded, especially women and children, from the hospital in East Mostar
10 to the war hospital in West Mostar? Do you remember what the response was
11 from the BH army when that request was made? And we're talking about the
12 proposals and offers after this evacuation of the 1st -- from the 1st to
13 the 6th of September, 1993.
14 A. I think that I -- I think that I do not have any memory of this
15 aspect of a very complicated negotiation and delivery of personnel,
16 wounded personnel.
17 Q. Very well. Now let's take a look at another document in my
18 binder. It is, in fact, the last green document. P 05428. With the
19 green sticker. The last document. You've found it, I see.
20 A. Well --
21 Q. Now, if you look at the English version.
22 A. Okay.
23 Q. You will see that this is a report sent by the UN military
24 observers to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The date is the 27th of September, 1993.
25 It is a daily report for that particular day. And would you turn to page
1 5 of the English version and look at paragraph 4 on page 5. It's a long
2 report, but I'm interested in paragraph 4 on page 5, which is page 6 of
3 the Croatian text. And there on page 5, if you've found it, you will see
4 paragraph 4, and there it talks about the continuation of the endeavours
5 to help the wounded from the hospital, and it says: "Meetings. East
6 Mostar had routine meeting with 4th Corps." It says: "Higher military
7 observer met with General Pasalic." It is General Pasalic, in fact,
8 because in brackets it says "Commander of the 4th Corps of the BH army."
9 "... discussed his recent refusal to negotiate with the HVO while they
10 continue shelling civilian targets. Discussions went on to the wish for
11 peace. Of course the obvious conflict between the two points was
13 Now, the next portion is very important. "The HVO -- medical
14 evacuation for women and children to the west hospital has been offered by
15 the HVO. However, it would appear that the Bosnian-Herzegovinian side is
16 unlikely to take advantage of this due to the political advantage that
17 such an arrangement or evacuation would give the HVO."
18 Can you remember discussions of this kind and refusal on the part
19 of the BH army with respect to the evacuation of civilians? Perhaps it
20 would be a good idea to take a look at another document first, sir, which
21 you may have seen yourself. The document is 2D 455. And that might be
22 the proposal by the HVO. It's the second document in my binder.
23 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Could the usher help us out. The
24 document number is 2D 455.
25 Q. This is a document --
1 A. Thank you.
2 Q. -- which -- it's an HVO signed by the assistant chief of medical
3 health care department, Mr. Ivan Bagaric. It is dated the 16th of
4 September 1993, and I'd just like to mention that a moment ago we read a
5 report dated the 27th of September. Now, in this document sent both to
6 UNPROFOR and the Spanish Battalion, Mr. Bagaric is issuing a request to
7 help the Muslim side -- to offer the Muslim side the accommodation and
8 hospitalisation of civilians, especially women and children in the Mostar
9 war hospital as well as other HVO hospitals.
10 Mr. Bagaric also says that the sick and wounded -- Muslim sick and
11 wounded would be guaranteed the same treatment as our civilians, and he
12 says, "We propose that the control of our work could be done by the
13 International Red Cross, the European or, rather, EC monitors and
14 UNPROFOR." And he goes on it to say that: "We are doing this for only one
15 reason. It is the humanitarian reason. Therefore, we kindly ask you not
16 to make any political connotations to this matter."
17 So this is quite obviously related to the offer conveyed through
18 the UN monitors to the east side and Mr. Pasalic.
19 Can you remember anything linked to this type of situation?
20 A. There was a -- there were steps towards a cease-fire and agreement
21 about that, to achieve that, from as early as late -- late July. From
22 that time on, the basic concern of the parties -- I want to qualify this
23 in just a moment. Basic concern of the parties was to advance their
24 position in respect of a potential settlement, especially in regard to
25 land, territory.
1 The qualification I want to make is that of course that isn't a
2 consistent pattern. It didn't happen all the time. And beyond that, I'm
3 sorry, I cannot go. There were very complicated cross-curtains --
4 cross-currents there, and I am not really able to decipher them for you.
5 I wish I could, but I can't.
6 Q. Mr. Thornberry, do you have information according to which the HVO
7 offered the BH army medicines previously, prior to that, and that part of
8 that the BH army accepted, that it also offered to transport the wounded
9 to the war hospital in West Mostar and further on to Croatia, and that was
10 partially done? And do you know that the HVO, even before these events,
11 offered the BH army the joint use of one of the hospitals in West Mostar
12 in which all the wounded would be put up together and who would be treated
13 by the same doctors, both Muslims and Croats, and which would be secured
14 by UNPROFOR?
15 Now, Mr. Thornberry, I don't want to make it difficult for you in
16 anyway. You say you don't remember many of the details, but try and tell
17 me the things that you do remember. And I'm asking you this for the
18 simple reason to see who actually cared for the wounded and civilians and
19 to what extent, but I am focusing now -- or, rather, I know that you had
20 far greater problems to deal with with respect to taking in humanitarian
21 aid, to bringing a stop to the hostilities and so on and so forth, but I
22 am always very sensitive when it comes to the wounded, especially women,
23 children, and anyone who was sick. So what I'm asking you now is do you
24 know that the HVO made every effort even before this to resolve this
25 question in the best possible way, or in a better way than it had been
1 resolved and then the conditions were at the hospital in East Mostar?
2 A. It would certainly not have been possible for them to have been
3 worse. But that much said, I -- I'm really in a quandary about this,
4 because I know, and I'm sure you can tell me, madam, something of what was
5 going on behind the scenes. Not merely on the humanitarian but also on
6 the political side.
7 I've tried to suggest that, as I'm sure, madam, you are well
8 aware, not everything seemed to be so actually was. This is the
9 difficulty which -- one of the difficulties that I faced at the moment. I
10 wish I didn't.
11 Q. Yes. Yes. Thank you for your answer. I -- let me just make this
12 clear to you. I thought that this document spoke for itself, the UN
13 military observer's document, which indicates that assistance to evacuate
14 the wounded was offered and the BH army rejected the offer saying that the
15 HVO would thus gain political points, so I am rather confused not just
16 you. But I'm using documents that you should have been or could have been
17 familiar with, and you have great experience, so that's the reason why I
18 am asking you all these questions.
19 Let me just indicate for the transcript because I am afraid, I
20 think that I am right, the that document speaking about the HVO offer to
21 provide accommodation for the Muslim civilians and the BH army personnel
22 and the Croat civilians and the HVO personnel in a Mostar hospital, a
23 joint hospital, it's described in P 02923. I think this document is under
24 seal. It is in my binder, but I don't want to show it to the witness
25 because the witness itself -- well, in light of his answers.
1 Finally, sir, on this topic, from all those documents that were
2 shown to you, don't they show that the BH army was not ready -- or,
3 rather, did not want for political or military reasons to accept even
4 those solutions that were offered to it to alleviate the suffering of the
5 wounded and the sick in the hospital in East Mostar in the period that is
6 indicated in those documents? Could you please just tell me what is your
7 impression, even if this is the first time that you see or hear of these
8 official documents.
9 A. I am sorry, what is the question therefore?
10 Q. The question is based on your experience or the documents that
11 you've just seen, does it not follow, irrefutably, that the BH army
12 refused to accept the solutions that were placed at its disposal to help
13 the wounded in the East Mostar hospital? And according to Mr. Pasalic's
14 statement, it is quite apparent that it did not do so. It chose not to do
15 so for military or political reasons.
16 A. There's a further reason, which is everybody was getting paranoid,
17 and it was very difficult for those of us who were trying to act at least
18 as some kind of brokers to persuade both sides that -- to -- to persuade
19 them that we were, in fact, in good faith. But when the United Nations
20 also is challenged and it's good faith is challenged, the situation
21 becomes a bit more difficult still. And I'm sorry, madam, I would like to
22 be able to answer your question more succinctly. I wish it were the case
23 that there are black and white hatted cowboys, but there are not. We
24 don't have clear indications here.
25 I don't want to confuse the matter further, so I'd better not
2 Q. Yes. You're giving me true political answers, and I fully
3 understand -- understand them, but you did answer my question. There is
4 another reason, if I understand you correctly. Therefore, you do agree
5 that the reasons that I was talking about were also in play: The
6 deliberate decision not to accept what was offered for political or
7 military reasons.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Fine. Thank you very much. In the end let me just ask you to
10 look at yet another document. This one is the document that you yourself
11 drafted, and it will be easy for you to do so, but Judge Antonetti asked
12 you yesterday about some high-ranking persons that you met in the course
13 of your mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Can you recall whether you met
14 at any time with Mr. Ejup Ganic? Do you remember who he was, and can you
15 very briefly share your impressions of that man with us?
16 A. I did meet Ejup Ganic. I met him several times. I did not meet
17 him in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I met him in -- I met him in -- in -- let me
18 think. I think it was actually in -- in the city. I think it was --
19 sorry, the word is gone for one silly moment.
20 He was one of the people whom I consulted when I negotiated the
21 air and -- airfield.
22 Q. That's correct, yes.
23 A. And -- and Ganic was the person on the Croat side whom it was my
24 responsibility to interview and, if possible, to get on board for an
25 agreement to share the airfield.
1 I would -- I would not want to -- to make an evaluation of
2 Mr. Ganic. He was a very shrewd political operator who sometimes provoked
3 positive reactions and sometimes did not. I found him moderately
4 difficult to do business with.
5 Q. Thank you. Sir, but let me just check. I think that on page 26,
6 line 20, you said that Mr. Ganic was a representative of the Croat side.
7 Is that what you meant or did you make a mistake?
8 A. I'm not sure whom he represented, in fact. There were times when
9 it was very difficult to follow his activities. He -- he tended to focus
10 in -- essentially in the -- in regard to events in the airfield matters,
11 in the headquarters, these kinds of matters, rather than a field
13 Q. Sir, I think that your own report will serve to remind you whose
14 side -- which side he represented.
15 Let us look at the fourth document in my binder. The number is
16 P 4395.
17 A. I'm sorry, may I go back to Ganic? I'd forgotten that I hadn't
18 given the answer to you on that one.
19 Mr. Ganic was one of my interlocutors in the main city, and I
20 dealt with him in regard to major questions of policy. He was very close
21 to Mr. Izetbegovic. In fact, he was really the major figure with
22 Mr. Izetbegovic until late July of 1993. Around about late July.
23 Q. Then, Mr. Thornberry, we can agree that he did not represent the
24 Croat side but, as you just indicated, the Muslim or the Bosniak side.
25 A. Sorry about that.
1 Q. [In English] Okay. [Interpretation] The usher is right next to
2 you to assist you. I asked for document P 04395?
3 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Could I please ask the usher to
4 assist the witness in finding the English version and so that he can
5 identify this document.
6 Q. This, sir, is a document that you yourself forwarded. This is
7 your report. The date is the 22nd of August, 1993. Could we please look
8 at page 3 in the English version. That would correspond to page 3 in the
9 Croatian version too. The sentence that's right below -- please go ahead.
10 You wanted to say something.
11 A. Well, I was -- I was just wanting to be quite sure that we were
12 talking about the same document. This document, is it letter from Viktor
13 Andreev to -- to me. But I thought that it was -- it's on the 21st of
14 August. Maybe there's some confusion about the number.
15 Q. Yes, you may be right, in fact, but could you please look at the
16 document in English. You could see that on the first page it says "From
17 Thornberry," and then on page 2 it says: "From -- from -- from Andreev."
18 Yes. But if you look at the document, I'm sure that you will be able to
19 recall it probably. This is entitled the summary of political issues or
20 political situation, and if you can perhaps just tell us who did this
21 summary or overview of the political situation.
22 The passage that pertains to my question, that's on page 3 where
23 it says the area under the control of the BH Presidency. It says here:
24 "While the BH delegation was in Geneva, Sarajevo has been left in the
25 hands of hardline vice-president Ganic. All the time he has been
1 increasingly aligning himself with the military commanders who talk of
2 fighting on even if there is a settlement in Geneva, in order to achieve
3 the goal of uniting BH."
4 So the impressions that you shared with us about him, do they
5 correspond with those presented in the report that you presented about
6 Mr. Andreev and that you then forwarded to other addressees? Does that
7 reflect your impressions, at least in this period of time?
8 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, Mr. President.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Stringer.
10 MR. STRINGER: As I follow the questioning, I'm remembering my
11 direct examination yesterday and how it was limited by the scope of the
12 Trial Chamber's ruling on which basis this witness was asked to come
13 testify originally as a 92 bis witness as to matters for which we'd
14 indicated other witnesses had testified. The Trial Chamber again indicated
15 others had testified in corroboration of the relevant issues but that it
16 wanted to hear this witness on these issues.
17 There are clearly a good many reports that came to this witness or
18 which this witness sent on to others which were available to the
19 Prosecution which were not led in direct because we tried to limit
20 ourselves to the scope laid down by the Trial Chamber, and I don't think
21 that counsel now is -- is doing the same.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Let me remind Defence
23 counsel that initially we had been seized of a 92 bis motion, and the
24 witness statement could have been admitted because a number of testimonies
25 had already been heard on that point. To entitle Defence to put question
1 on Mostar and on another very specific points, we decided that Defence
2 counsel could examine -- cross-examine this witness on very particular
3 points, but now with the questions you're putting, you are addressing
4 other issues.
5 Either you have no questions to put concerning Mostar and in order
6 to use your -- up your time you are addressing issues we have already
7 seen. This is why Mr. Stringer is standing up and objecting.
8 What do you have to say to that, Ms. Nozica?
9 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I believe, and I may
10 have misinterpreted this, that the last question -- only the last question
11 that pertains to Mr. Ganic, is indeed related to the issue of Mostar to a
12 great extent. And let me remind Your Honours that this has to do with the
13 witness who testified before this one here in court. So this is why I
14 believe that this is a significant issue. And let me just say that I
15 decided to ask this question precisely on the basis of the part of the
16 statement made by this witness where he indicated the names of the persons
17 that he met, and that is why I asked him whether he knew anything about
18 the person that he received reports about.
19 If, Your Honours, you believe that this is not relevant, the
20 witness has already in part answered my question, and I don't have any
21 other questions in this regard. In fact, I have no further questions for
22 this witness, and this concludes my cross-examination.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you,
24 Ms. Nozica. So your cross-examination has come to an end.
25 It might be better to have our 20-minute break now, and then we
1 will resume our hearing and hear the cross-examination of another Defence
3 We are now having a 20-minute break.
4 --- Recess taken at 3.34 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 3.58 p.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed. I'd
7 like to give the floor to the next Defence counsel. Ms. Alaburic.
8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good
9 afternoon, Witness, and everybody in the courtroom. Just one note. We've
10 switched with the General Praljak's Defence just so that we're all clear
11 that General Praljak's Defence will be cross-examining this witness too.
12 Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:
13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Thornberry, my name is Vesna Alaburic. I'm
14 an attorney from Zagreb, and in this trial I'm representing General
15 Milivoj Petkovic.
16 I would like to ask you to clarify some details from your
17 statement, and we will also be using some documents to see to what
18 extent -- please go ahead.
19 A. Sir, I wasn't sure whether we had finished the lady's comments on
20 Mr. Ganic. Did you want me to complete what I was saying about Mr. Ganic?
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Would you like to add something
22 to your answer? Please do so if you wish to do so.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes. I do know Mr. Ganic. I've known him for a
24 number of years, and he is vice-president and has a very wide range of
25 contacts, shall we say, and -- and is a very consummate politician, I
1 would say.
2 That's all, sir. Thank you.
3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Mr. Thornberry, in your statement, in paragraph 54 -- or, rather,
5 56, I apologise, you said that you visited East Mostar, and then you went
6 on to visit West Mostar, and then you said, let me quote -- could you
7 please listen to what I'm saying. I don't think that it will be necessary
8 for you to look at it, but if you want, please do so. This is a document
9 in the Prosecutor binder, and the number is P 10041.
10 The sentence that I'm interested in reads as follows: "We then
11 went to see the HVO in Mostar where they continued the attacks on the UN."
12 A. I'm sorry, I'm really at a loss. I cannot figure out which
13 paragraph the witness [sic] --
14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It's in this binder, the Prosecution binder
15 [Microphone not activated]
16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Paragraph 56.
18 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I've got the paragraph now. Thank
19 you very much.
20 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. So in paragraph 56 -- let me assist you. It is in the bottom half
22 of the paragraph.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You found it. Okay. So the sentence that I would like you to you
25 to clarify reads as follows. I understand you to be saying that the HVO
1 continued with its attacks on the UN. Did I understand your statement
3 A. Well, I still can't be sure that the paragraph that I am looking
4 at is the one from which the witness [sic] is quoting. I have a paragraph
5 that begins 56: "In mid-August I passed through Split and was approached
6 by my own staff," et cetera. Would that be the same paragraph from which
7 the witness [sic] is commenting?
8 Q. Yes. Yes. That's the paragraph I'm talking about. Now, could
9 you please look at the middle of this paragraph.
10 A. Yes, I've got it.
11 Q. I think it's line 8, so you say: "We then went to see the HVO in
12 Mostar where they continued the attacks on the UN."
13 Could you please tell us first whether this is what you actually
14 meant to say, that the HVO continued with its attacks on the UN? Are we
15 talking about the HVO attacks?
16 A. I'm sorry, I simply cannot find this sentence here.
17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I'm sorry, there is -- in the translation there
18 is a little difference. The sentence does not say that they continued to
19 attack but that they proceeded to attack, and it is not necessarily the
20 same meaning. It may be something quite different, and it may be also a
21 verbal attack. I do not know, but maybe it is easy now to -- it's really
22 line 8 from the top.
23 THE WITNESS: Yes. Mr. President, thank you. I've got it now. I
24 understand that there are slight differences between the translation and
25 the original.
1 I have this sentence, madam.
2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. So my question was: What HVO attacks on the UN are we talking
4 about here? Can you explain that?
5 A. " ... they proceeded to attack the UN," are the words that I
6 understand, and that of course refers to verbal harassment or haranguing,
7 and it might say Mostar where they proceeded verbally to attack the United
8 Nations. That would be a possibility.
9 Q. Fine. Let's us assume that these were really verbal attacks, if
10 we assume that. Could you please explain to us who it was in the HVO that
11 verbally attacked the United Nations?
12 A. No. I'm afraid I could not. I have no memory of this -- of this
13 particular section of this particular paragraph. I'm sorry. I wish it
14 were different.
15 Q. Fine. We will now skip two sentences, and let us look at the
16 sentence that is -- that starts in the fourth line from the bottom in the
17 same paragraph. I will read it in English so that we may avoid
18 differences in translation. [In English] "Although the HVO officials we
19 met with did not say this directly, the gist of their response was that
20 they would kill us if we attempted to enter East Mostar."
21 [Interpretation] Mr. Thornberry, could you tell us whether this
22 means that the HVO would kill those who entered East Mostar, or is the
23 meaning of it different?
24 A. I think we -- as I seem to remember, we discussed this sentence
25 yesterday, and I was at pains to emphasise that it was a -- a rather gross
1 oversimplification of perhaps a rather complicated idea.
2 Q. Mr. Thornberry, could you please tell us whether this sentence
3 actually means that the HVO would kill those who went to East Mostar or
4 the BH army, regardless of whether this was an exaggeration or not?
5 A. Well, it was a gross exaggeration. Well, I don't -- I may say I
6 don't have memory of this sentence, but -- of this paragraph, but earlier
7 in the paragraph it refers to HVO personnel, and it seems to be the case
8 that that sentence or that paragraph is continuing over the next two or
9 three lines so that what the sentence appears to say is that -- that the
10 Bosnian Croats threatened us, and if this -- if we attempted to enter East
12 I emphasised yesterday just for our memory's sake that I said that
13 this was a serious overstatement and that the sentence was an
14 exaggeration, an exaggeration from the standpoint of -- of attributing
15 actions and threats without there being any justification for such
16 behaviour. That's what I was trying to say.
17 Q. Fine. Let us move on, and I believe that we will be able to
18 clarify the relationship of the HVO towards UNPROFOR and the convoy
19 heading for East Mostar later.
20 Mr. Thornberry, you told us that East Mostar was for a time under
21 siege; is that correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. In the document that was shown to you by the Prosecutor yesterday,
24 you don't have to go looking for it, and let me just state for the record
25 that this is document P 03858, this is a press release by Shannon Boyd,
1 the date is the 21st of August, 1993, and in this document it says -- Mr.
2 Thornberry, please just listen to me carefully. It will be sufficient for
3 you to understand my question. You don't have to do anything else.
4 And it says in this document Commander Budakovic said that the
5 Presidency would agree with the cease-fire but that they have to maintain
6 the corridor towards Jablanica. Budakovic who is mentioned here is a
7 commander of the BH army. The Presidency that is mentioned here is the
8 Muslim civilian government in East Mostar. And my question to you is as
9 follows: Were you aware of the existence the corridor linking Mostar and
11 A. Yes. But if you proceed to ask me what does it -- what -- what
12 was carried along that corridor I might have some difficulty, because I
13 remember being told, and this was something which had to be incorporated
14 from any agreement. The agreement, if it was to have an adequate support
15 on all sides, it would have to take that particular corridor into account.
16 Q. Yes. We'll come to the corridor and discuss it in greater detail
17 on the basis of some documents in due course, but I'd just like now to ask
18 you to clarify part of this statement that I quoted, and from the
19 statement it would emerge that the command of the BH army in Mostar in
20 fact conditioned the cease-fire and humanitarian aid to Mostar with a
21 military element, that is to say by maintaining the corridor towards
22 Jablanica. Those were his conditions.
23 Now, my question to is this: Were you aware of, did you know that
24 the BH army commanders primarily wanted to achieve some military goals
25 even at the expense [Realtime transcript read in error "extent"] of a
1 humanitarian catastrophe in East Mostar?
2 A. I'm sorry to say, madam, that that was the impression which all of
3 the gentlemen left with us.
4 Q. I'd now like to ask you, and may I have the usher's assistance,
5 please, in helping the witness out, to take a look at document 4D - in my
6 set of documents - 4D 770. It's a document --
7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I draw attention to a line in line 37.2 in
8 the transcript. It is said "even at the extent of a humanitarian
9 catastrophe," I think was the word, "in East Mostar." But I think it's not
10 "at the extent" but "at the expense" that you were asking, wasn't it?
11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter notes that she said "expense."
12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. The interpreters have put it right.
13 I'm sorry.
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, counsel, please. Microphone please,
16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes. That was my question, that
17 certain military goals were reached at the expense of the humanitarian
18 situation in Mostar. So I thank Judge Trechsel for that.
19 Q. Now, Mr. Thornberry, look at the next document, please, which I
20 would like you to comment, and I'd like us to take a look at the third
21 paragraph from the bottom. At the end of that document, the third
22 paragraph from the bottom where Sulejman Budakovic, writing to his
23 superior, Rasim Delic, says, and I quote: "It would also be good if a
24 helicopter could be found to bring us the approved mortar shells (648
25 pieces from Krupa) to Glogova which is halfway between Jablanica and
1 Mostar (on the road that our convoy carrying materiel and technical
2 equipment is travelling)."
3 Now, this sentence, Mr. Thornberry, indicates to us that the BH
4 army had this route between Jablanica and Mostar for convoys carrying
5 materiel and technical equipment, MTS. Now, tell us, were you aware of
6 the fact that that particular corridor running from Jablanica to Mostar is
7 one that the BH army used to bring in weapons and other materiel and
8 technical equipment?
9 A. No, I did not.
10 Q. Mr. Thornberry, how would you comment on the following situation
11 on the assumption that it is correct: There's a corridor. It is the
12 Jablanica-Mostar corridor, and the BH army uses that corridor to bring in
13 tonnes, or perhaps that's an exaggeration, hundreds of kilogrammes of
14 materiel and technical equipment, and at the same time that same corridor
15 is not being used to bring in food and other necessities for the life of
16 the population in East Mostar. Now, what would be your comments to that
17 situation on the assumption that it is a correct rendition of the
19 A. Hmm, they would be adverse comments, and beyond that I could not
20 go unless I had a lot more information available to me. This was a very
21 hot route, as counsel will be aware, and it was going to have to be tidied
22 up before it became in any effective way a corridor for bringing in
23 humanitarian elements.
24 Q. Do you mean to say by that that there was no impediment to
25 bringing in hundreds of thousands of materiel and technical equipment,
1 military equipment, but that that same corridor would not be suitable for
2 bringing in food? Is that what you wanted to say?
3 A. No. I wanted to say what I did say, actually.
4 Q. Very well. I must admit that I didn't understand you fully, but
5 let's move on.
6 Now, look at that same document, please --
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. By Sulejman Budakovic and the date is the 25th, 26th of August,
9 1993. Can you tell us where you were at that time on that day?
10 A. Please, I'm just looking for that date. 25, 26 August. I would
11 need to research a little bit in order to identify that. It looks to me
12 as if it was a date -- it was certainly a date within which the
13 discussions and consultations and arguments were taking place about the
14 use of that corridor, amongst others, the use of that corridor for
15 bringing in foodstuffs and -- and medicaments.
16 Q. Can we agree, Mr. Thornberry, that at that time you were in
18 A. Oh, dear. No, I'm sorry. I would like to agree it, subject to
19 our discussion, but I don't know where my information on that is currently
20 at this time. I would have to -- I would have to take a little bit of
21 time to look within the archives or within the papers available now today
22 before I could actually go ahead and agree -- and agree on that matter.
23 I'm sorry that it's so difficult for me to answer your questions,
24 but a number of these questions go into areas which it's very difficult
25 for me to recall.
1 Q. Very well, Witness. That is the time that you mention in your
2 statement as the time when the convoy entered East Mostar, and we know
3 from your statement that that is indeed the time that you were there.
4 However, it's not essential that you remember that at the present time.
5 We can establish that on the basis of the documents.
6 I'd like to draw your attention to one more fact now, something
7 that you mention -- well, an assertion you made in actual fact, not a
8 fact. There was mention about the difficult situation for civilians in
9 East Mostar. I'm sure you will remember that?
10 A. Yes. Yes.
11 Q. I'd like to show you now part of the testimony of a witness, it
12 was a protected witness, so I'm not going to mention the name, but for the
13 record and for anybody who wishes to check it out it was Witness BB, and
14 I'm going to quote the testimony. It was on the record, on page 25335.
15 And I'm going quote --
16 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, if we're going to quote from
17 closed-session testimony, I think we should be in private session to do
18 that, because that testimony is currently confidential under a protective
19 order of the Trial Chamber.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Indeed. Mrs. Alaburic, should
21 wish to quote Witness BB, I'd like to remind you that this testimony is
22 confidential. So we should go into closed session.
23 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise for not
24 thinking of that myself, and I thank Mr. Stringer for stepping in. So may
25 we move into closed -- or, rather, private session?
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's move to closed session.
2 [Private session]
2 [Open session]
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we are back in open session.
4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Thornberry, my question to you is this: Did you know that
6 there were inhabitants in East Mostar who wished to leave East Mostar but
7 the Muslim authorities in East Mostar didn't let them? Were you aware of
8 that fact?
9 A. Well, yes. Much of the population wanted to leave East Mostar.
10 Q. Can we then make the following conclusion: That the BH army used
11 the civilians in East Mostar for achieving its military goals?
12 A. I think you would have to get better information than I can give
13 on that subject. It's very difficult for me to have an open discussion in
14 the circumstances.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. This question is an
16 important question. You have just answered by saying that most of the
17 people in East Mostar wanted to leave East Mostar. That is what you said,
18 but the question put to you by Ms. Alaburic was a broader question. She
19 was asking you whether the Muslim authorities were preventing these people
20 from leaving East Mostar. So were you made aware of this? What do you
21 have to say about it? What can you tell us about this?
22 THE WITNESS: First of all, if I may say so, I -- in the -- I
23 think in the third line, I think that I intended to say much of the
24 population in East Mostar rather than the phrase which I think -- I think
25 you said the most. I don't think I ventured as far as "most," but I'm
1 quite willing to be -- for the matter to be clarified.
2 Now, I have to say that I believe that it's quite likely that --
3 that much of the population would have liked to leave -- to leave East
4 Mostar because conditions there were becoming so really dreadful. Yes, I
5 think that's the answer I want to give.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Very well. But -- that's
7 your answer, but you haven't answered the question. They wanted to leave.
8 Why couldn't they leave? Why not?
9 THE WITNESS: Well, I think it's in the nature of a siege, sir,
10 that it is -- that the population cannot move individually and -- and upon
11 their own personal decisions. And I think that's the situation -- that
12 was the situation at that time, namely that some people -- some people
13 from East Mostar wanted to leave and were not able to leave in part
14 because of prevention by the -- by the -- I'm sorry, I've lost my place in
15 the -- by the -- by the -- by the authorities of the -- of East Mostar,
16 and there were, to my knowledge in any event, a number of different groups
17 within East Mostar who did not agree with everything or even perhaps in
18 some cases with anything which the notional government of East Mostar
19 wanted to impose. It would be very surprising to me if -- if there were
20 not, in fact, splinter groups, groups which are based on different ethnic
22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Mr. Thornberry, I'd like to move on to another topic now, the
24 media campaign, and I'd like to remind you that in paragraph 59 of your
25 statement - you needn't look for it - you said that the tactics of taking
1 TV crews with you in this case proved to be very successful.
2 Now, I'd like to show you a document, once again compiled by
3 Sulejman Budakovic, about the media campaign, so let's take a look at it
4 together. It is 4D 00722.
5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] May we have the usher's help,
6 please, in assisting the witness.
7 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. In this document Sulejman Budakovic refers to a meeting with you,
10 you needn't worry about the spelling of your name. Now, in certain parts
11 of the former Yugoslavia names were phonetically transcribed as they were
12 pronounced, but I'm interested in the last portion where Sulejman
13 Budakovic says that "Except for media presentation of Mr. Cedric
14 Thornberry and a donation of 300 kilogrammes of medicines, nothing
15 specific was done to help the hungry citizens of Mostar and the
16 surrounding areas.
17 Now, the media campaigns is what we're discussing, and I would
18 like to ask you the following, Mr. Thornberry: Did you have any
19 experience in organising media campaigns, and did you know how in media
20 terms, a problem should be presented for the public to become aware of the
21 problem to the greatest possible extent, to raise public awareness of a
23 A. Well, I've had several experiences in that field, most notably in
24 Namibia at around the same time as this. In Namibia to a very large
25 degree the success of the campaign was based upon a high level of coverage
1 of electronic and ordinary coverage.
2 We had tried to organise a campaign in --
3 Q. Witness, I do apologise for interrupting you. However, I'd like
4 us to discuss the campaign in greater detail device for East Mostar, not
5 focusing on Namibia. I apologise for that, but tell me whether the
6 purpose of this media campaign, the one we're discussing now, the East
7 Mostar campaign, to have the world public see the difficult situation in
8 East Mostar, to portray the difficult situation in East Mostar, was that
9 the purpose of the campaign?
10 A. I would recollect that the purpose of the campaign was to shake
11 some of the media and indeed even some of the public authorities elsewhere
12 in the world. My desire -- our intent was to -- to make that campaign
13 more effective perhaps by bringing home to the Western world's and other
14 groups, I may say, not only the Western world, but was to try to bring
15 home to other peoples in the world the -- the dreadful conditions in that
16 country. So, yes, the answer is the main purpose of that campaign was to
17 bring home, to shake from their complacency a large number of people who
18 normally one would have expected would be operating in -- not only in a
19 public relations but in a practical way to help relieve the population of
20 this city.
21 Q. Very well. Now tell us, please, the following: Can you -- would
22 you agree with me that a media campaign can be effective if in a simple
23 and well-devised way indicates the problem? So it has to be striking.
24 A. It depends who's going to be struck. I mean, you could have a
25 target audience.
1 Q. In this case specific as you've said, and as we've seen on the
2 basis of a number of documents, the targeted audience was the population
3 of the Western countries, which was supposed to exert influence on the
4 government of its country, to take more energetic measures in resolving
5 the problem in Mostar. Can we agree that that was the object of the
7 A. You put it much more succinctly than I did. Thank you.
8 Q. So can we agree then that if we wish to achieve that goal in our
9 media campaign that the message we send out to the public must be simple,
10 easily understood, and convincing?
11 A. That helps too, yes.
12 Q. Tell us, please, if in a media campaign you wish to indicate the
13 difficult situation of the Muslim population in East Mostar, for instance,
14 would you in that case indicate the fact that the Muslim authorities do
15 not wish to use the possibility of bringing in food to that part of Mostar
16 or that the Muslim authorities do not wish to reduce the number of
17 inhabitants in East Mostar and thereby make the situation easier for the
18 rest of the population, or would you keep quiet in that media campaign
19 about circumstances like that?
20 A. Madam, I would follow the cogent advice which you had just given
21 us. I agree with it. It is a very good idea to have simple and striking
22 images to bring home.
23 We think that the various media groups which came there with us
24 were actually doing that. They were -- that was their -- that was their
25 task. Many of them were highly professional and practical-minded media
1 people, and basically I think the best thing we could do was to stand
2 aside and -- and let them get on with the job.
3 Q. Very well. Thank you for that answer. Now, can we just clarify
4 something else while we're on this subject? Can we agree, you and I, that
5 some political conclusions based on -- or an attempt to establish the
6 facts on the basis of what was contained in a media campaign, that there's
7 great probability that those conclusions will not be correct, or, rather,
8 that they will be incomplete, that most probably they would be
10 A. I think that's a constant problem in running a media campaign,
11 that not only may it hit to the wrong -- hit the wrong targets and hit
12 them with weapons or -- I mean with darts, with means, it's -- it's
13 important to -- as we've already agreed, it's important to have a
14 thoroughly professional and well-targeted campaign.
15 I'm sorry, I'm perhaps losing you in translation at the moment,
16 but I'm a little puzzled. I'm trying to find a way of communicating.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, the media campaign, as
18 I can see in paragraph 59, that you did address this issue, and you
19 confirmed, because you told Defence counsel that you felt it was useful to
20 have the media play a part by inviting them to come when you toured the
21 country. So, for instance, when you went and visited the hospital in East
22 Mostar, we've seen the video footage, and C -- CNN media crew came along
23 with you, and we can see, for instance, a child suffering on a hospital
24 bed. Of course this will have a huge impact, but you were neutral, and
25 this was a part you were playing because you were a UN civil servant.
1 Why didn't you ask CNN to come to the hospital in West Mostar so
2 that they could also show a small child in that hospital also who was
3 being treated there? So how did you take your decisions? Why did you
4 decide to have the media come along with you in one place and not another
5 against the backdrop of your objectivity, which should be the golden rule
6 when you have such a mission to carry out?
7 THE WITNESS: When objectivity, however, turns into passivity, we
8 have a problem, and one of the reasons why we found ourselves in the
9 invidious position of trying to -- to preclude some of the barbarity which
10 was still being practised, I think that we were based to some extent --
11 our actions were based to some extent by information which was already
12 coming to us when we went into East Mostar.
13 The situation, sir, which I might very briefly mention was one in
14 which the -- the campaign which has been referred to, was a rather blunt
15 instrument. It -- it -- it hit rather bluntly, but it's very difficult,
16 sir, or we found it very difficult some years ago to -- to impact upon a
17 very broad population. That was what we attempted to do. I think we were
18 actually remarkably successful, and not all UN campaigns, information
19 campaigns, have been so successful. But I am absolutely available, sir,
20 should you be more precise about the aspects of the campaign which --
21 which you feel were lacking.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] When you decided to ask a
23 television crew to come along with you, was this a personal initiative, or
24 were you obeying orders from the top inside the UN?
25 THE WITNESS: I'm afraid that -- I'm afraid that at that time,
1 sir, we were the top. Nobody else was much interested in what was
2 happening in Mostar. That's the blunt truth, I'm afraid. And, sir, I
3 would like just to defend the impartiality of the United Nations. It
4 doesn't mean neutrality. Not to my understanding, in any event.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for your answer.
6 We have a question.
7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Still insisting a little bit on this aspect. It
8 does appear that -- that your campaign was a unilateral campaign which in
9 a way took sides and put the blame on one of -- of two parties. Was that
10 not so?
11 THE WITNESS: I -- I wouldn't -- I wouldn't -- first of all, it's
12 a long time ago, and my memory is no better than that of someone of my
13 age, but I don't think that our approach to this was unilateral. We
14 operated locally through the local authorities, whoever they might have
15 been, and we've had a discussion on that subject. But also, we sought --
16 while we were there in Mostar on the first of our visits, we tried to
17 gather as much information as we could. We had public information people
18 with us, and I don't think that our -- our campaign was as sophisticated
19 as it might have been in the sense of targeting an area which was, if I
20 may say, was very well-explored by counsel.
21 So I don't -- I don't really see how we could get a more precisely
22 focused campaign on that first voyage, on that first trip. Later perhaps
23 it might have been said we should have done this or we should have done
24 that, but in the meantime people were being fed. Children were being
25 cared for in hospitals. It is -- it was very easy for outsiders, and some
1 of them did, not many but some of them did, some people were critical of
2 us. They said, "Well, you should have gone through the established
3 channels." The established channels had existed since time began and
4 there was still the edge of famine in that city.
5 I don't myself see the -- I'm the first person to concede that we
6 may have got something wrong, but I don't think we got something wrong,
7 and certainly the media didn't think so. I hope.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic.
9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Mr. Thornberry, since I believe that I know a thing or two about
11 the media, I would say -- I would agree with you that this was a good
12 media campaign, and I'm not trying to challenge it either from the point
13 of view of the legitimacy of the objective or anything. What I'm
14 interested in is a legal issue, and because you're lawyer, I believe that
15 we will be able to come to an agreement.
16 If we are trying to determine facts relevant to a criminal -- to
17 the criminal proceedings as lawyers, then we will not be relying on the
18 products of a media campaign. Can we agree on that in principle?
19 A. No, not necessarily, madam, because you may have a campaign which
20 would develop its own momentum and in that form, in other words a
21 strengthened form, become more effective. I think you perhaps, madam,
22 would accept that there can be. This is a -- a campaign which -- which
23 rolls forward, you hope, not backwards. But -- yeah, sorry, stop, full
25 Q. Well, we could discuss this topic, which is one of the most
1 interesting topics in law as far as I'm concerned, for a long time, but we
2 have to deal with other topics.
3 In paragraph 69 of your paragraph you're talking --
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm told that you've had your 40
5 minutes. How much time have other Defence counsel given you?
6 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I -- I have been ceded the time
7 that was allotted to Mr. Pusic's Defence.
8 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, Mr. President. Just while we're having
9 this brief intervention, I have some news about the next witness that I'd
10 like to share with the Trial Chamber and counsel at some time before we
11 break today, which might affect our scheduling for tomorrow.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you can let us
13 know when we finish. We shall finish with this witness at half past 5.00
14 because he needs to have a rest. So you will let us know after that. All
15 right? So let's proceed.
16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Thornberry, in paragraph 69 we have this very brief sentence.
18 I'm going to read it. You don't have to look for it. You talk about the
19 shelling, and you say: "[In English] It was my impression that the
20 civilians themselves were just as much a target of attack as the
22 [Interpretation] I would like to know what facts is this
23 impression of yours based.
24 A. Information made to us locally by the local authorities, by what
25 we had learned from our military information people before, during, and
1 after our visit to Mostar. I'm sure you know what I mean by that. And I
2 think those are the two main sources, but some governments also provided
3 us with information which has -- which turned out to be extremely
4 accurate, in my opinion, and which was based on the principle of
5 self-defence. Article 51.
6 Q. When you say the local government, do you mean the Muslim local
8 A. Well, was there another one which was functioning in that area? I
9 only ask because I'm not aware of it.
10 Q. Well, you may have gotten this information from the Croatian
11 government or authorities in West Mostar. That's why I wanted to clarify
12 this point.
13 Mr. Thornberry, could you please tell me, did you know how many BH
14 army units were deployed in East Mostar area and how many troops did the
15 BH army have in that part of Mostar?
16 A. I'm afraid I could not answer the question. I didn't have the
17 data now, and I didn't have it then, I'm afraid.
18 Q. Could you please tell us, did the local authorities, Muslim or
19 otherwise, give you the information that the BH army often set up
20 artillery weapons close to the hospital that you visited or close to
21 mosques or some other buildings where relatively large quantities of
22 civilians would gather? Did you ever get this kind of information?
23 A. We acquired quite a lot of such information, yes. Maybe you would
24 like to elaborate on your -- on your question, madam.
25 Q. No, no. I'm quite happy with your answer, because in UNPROFOR
1 documents we did find a number of warnings to the effect that the BH army
2 was setting up its artillery weapons close to such locations. And in this
3 regard, I would like to ask you the following: We heard an analysis in
4 this courtroom provided to us by a Prosecution expert about the shelling
5 of Mostar, and among his findings - I'm quoting from memory now - was that
6 about 75 per cent -- or, rather, three-quarters of the casualties in East
7 Mostar were men of military age.
8 Were you aware of this information or information of this sort or
9 to that effect?
10 A. I certainly heard from officials and professionals in that area, I
11 mean by that doctors and consultants, specialists, surgeons, what their
12 findings were. I'm sure I could -- if it was necessary, I'm sure I could
13 find that information, or nearly sure.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, you moved around East
15 Mostar, so this is an important question. As far as you're concerned, did
16 you see with your own eyes armed soldiers of the ABiH in East Mostar?
17 With your own eyes, I mean, not what X, Y, Z would have told you. Did you
18 personally with your own eyes see any?
19 THE WITNESS: I believe so, sir. I have to say that because I
20 cannot be at this distance so sure as to be able to say with absolute
21 precision, to answer that question with absolute precision.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It means that you think you
23 remember having seen soldiers.
24 THE WITNESS: Yes. That is exactly the case.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let me go back to the hospital.
1 We heard witnesses here, and they talked about that hospital that you
2 know, and they said that next to the hospital there were ABiH mortar
3 shells and that they were hitting HVO positions. You see how the whole
4 thing was going on? There were mortars next to the hospital, and those
5 mortars are used to shoot. The HVO, which is the target of the shells, is
6 reacting. Do you think that's quite an extraordinary situation? Is this
7 a realistic description of what happened?
8 THE WITNESS: Is -- is it an accurate description of what
9 happened? I'm sorry, I didn't -- I missed a part of your question, sir.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I -- I want to know if the
11 situation as described by some witnesses, and given what you were in a
12 position to witness, is the situation possible? Was it possible for the
13 ABiH, from the hospital in East Mostar, to target the HVO knowing that the
14 HVO will shoot back and that this would cause damage either to the
15 hospital, either among the people who would be killed next to the
16 hospital, and of course knowing that the media will portray the situation?
17 THE WITNESS: I'm not quite sure I know how to answer this
18 question. In every peacekeeping operation that I have had participation,
19 including those of the Middle East, allegations have centred on such
20 allegations as these. Similarly with the use of troops as storm-troopers
22 I don't remember having seen these events. In part, at least, my
23 answer would be based upon some of the reliable sources that I can
24 identify, I think I can identify, and those sources which included also
25 the Spanish authorities were available to me. I don't know whether they
1 were accurate. I do know that they're likely to be much more accurate
2 than we are now today sitting here. But it's very hard, sir, to --
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you didn't see anything. You
4 didn't see mortars.
5 THE WITNESS: Oh, I did. Oh, I did.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You did see mortars next to the
8 THE WITNESS: No, I didn't say that. I didn't say that I had seen
9 them close to the hospital. I did say that I had seen mortars in the --
10 in that part of the city, in eastern -- on the eastern side of the city.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
12 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Mr. Thornberry, I would like us to move on to a different topic
14 now. It has to do with paragraph 55 of your statement where you say that
15 it was considered to be undoubted that the Bosnian Croats were trying to
16 cut off a part -- to carve off a part of Bosnia for themselves. I would
17 like to ask you a couple of questions about that.
18 Were you aware of the fact that the Vance-Owen Peace Plan from
19 January 1993 envisaged that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be set up as a state
20 comprising ten provinces and that three of the ten provinces were supposed
21 to be so-called Croat provinces? So were you aware of that plan?
22 A. Well, of course they were not only based on -- on the idea of ten
23 provinces, but they were also based upon the agreement of the parties.
24 What wasn't particularly agreed was when the parties simply started
25 hitting each other on the head with clubs. That wasn't part of
1 Vance-Owen. That was a trial of strength, and that was what from about
2 the end of July onwards, really until Dayton, really what we saw. And I
3 think in a way it's -- I -- I wouldn't want to emphasise this too -- too
4 strongly, I don't think so, but you didn't have to dig very far to find
5 exactly what was going on politically, and those politics were tending to
6 impact upon the local authorities.
7 Q. What I'm interested in at this time is whether you were aware that
8 the representatives of Bosnian Croats, as early as in January 1993,
9 accepted the plan that was put on the table.
10 A. Yeah. Accepted until next time it became necessary to find some
11 other alternative.
12 Q. At the end of our conversation today we will find out what led to
13 the search for other alternatives, but you can take my word for it now
14 that the representatives of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina signed all
15 the elements of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan from January 1993. Let us now
16 assume that this is indeed so.
17 Can we then conclude that in January 1993 it was not doubtful at
18 all that Croats saw their future within the state of Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina as a state in which Croats would have their own entity, a
20 composite state?
21 A. But, madam, would you agree that at most -- during most parts of
22 1993 the weakest militarily body was in fact that corresponding to the
23 HVO? I ask this because I think it is almost -- perhaps almost
24 universally held that the Croats and the Croatian authorities were in a --
25 in a worse condition militarily, in terms of strength, and that those
1 circumstances, and it -- and it could be said that much of the Croatian
2 concern was to safeguard what they hoped had been agreed, what had been
3 established during the various bilateral and multi-lateral talks which
4 were going on at that time, which were going on frequently at that time.
5 I understand that -- thank you.
6 Q. Yes. I would agree with you, and perhaps we could reformulate
7 this conclusion. Please listen to me and tell me whether we can agree
8 that the representatives of Croats from Bosnia and Herzegovina, as early
9 as in January 1993, wanted to find a peaceful solution to the problems and
10 that they were happy with what the Vance-Owen Peace Plan envisaged for
12 A. Yes. I would agree with that, especially as I knew -- I knew that
13 talks were taking place between Muslim and HVO authorities on a fairly
14 frequent basis and had been doing so since -- since about January,
15 February of that time. This inevitably -- must inevitably have an impact
16 upon the strategy and the overall game plan of one of the sides in a -- in
17 a terribly wrought situation as we have been describing.
18 Q. Mr. Thornberry, I prepared two documents for you, but because we
19 don't have enough time let me just refer Their Honours to them, to those
20 documents, and then I will ask you some questions about it.
21 Witness, you don't have to look for this document. I will not be
22 asking you about any details. That's 4D 325. This is the
23 Izetbegovic-Krajisnik agreement signed on the 16th of September, 1993, in
24 particular paragraph 5 envisaging that the referendum should be called on
25 whether the Muslim or the Serbian state should remain within the union of
1 the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 At the same time -- or, rather, two days earlier, and this is
3 document P 0 -- P 50 -- P 051. Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic signed
4 a document which was almost identical in its contents, but paragraph 5 was
5 quite different. There is no mention of the secession of any part of the
6 territory of the Croatian part of the territory. This document is P 5051.
7 Mr. Thornberry, could you please listen to my question. Sir, you
8 don't have to look at those documents. The Judges will check and see for
9 themselves whether what I'm saying is correct.
10 If Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina in mid --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: If Muslims and
12 Serbs --
13 MS. ALABURIC:
14 Q. -- in mid-September 1993 are talking about the possibility that a
15 referendum might be called for the Serbian republic to remain within this
16 state and Croats and Muslims do not mention that in their agreement, which
17 is otherwise almost completely identical, can we agree then that Croats
18 and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina felt that both the Croat and the Muslim
19 entities should remain within Bosnia and Herzegovina, that they had no
20 doubts in their minds as to that?
21 A. Well, I really feel that this issue is -- takes place way up high
22 beyond my pay grade. These were the essence of what a lot of the
23 negotiations that were taking place centred upon, and I think you know
24 that as well as I do.
25 Q. Very well. I hope that Their Honours and my conclusion will be
1 found to be the only logical one.
2 Now, can we move on to a document that I'd like you to look at in
3 my set of documents. It is P 7548.
4 A. P 75 -- P 7548.
5 Q. P 7548. Yes. And I'd like us to focus on paragraph 7. In
6 paragraph 7 of this document -- or, rather, let's define what the document
7 is to begin with. What is the document? Are you familiar with it? Have
8 you ever seen it before?
9 A. It says the "Secretary-General only." That's the next to the
10 highest level of confidentiality which the United Nations uses for its
11 communications. So it --
12 Q. Yes, and the document is being sent by Thorvald Stoltenberg. It
13 says from Thorvald Stoltenberg on the first page of the document.
14 A. Yes, special representative of the Secretary-General.
15 Q. That's right. Now, in point 7 we have a summary of the positions
16 of the three warring parties or conflicting parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You raised a question in my
18 mind. You say that the Secretary-General is next to the highest level of
19 confidentiality. What's the highest level then?
20 THE WITNESS: Most immediate. Most immediate plus in turn ask
21 Mr. Akashi. So it has "most immediate" and Secretary-General only, and
22 that is definitely above my pay grade.
23 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me. I apologise for the interruption,
24 Mr. President. I'm just looking at this document on my list and it
25 appears to be one that we've marked as under seal. I don't -- I can't say
1 a hundred per cent on that, but could I ask maybe to be cautious, or --
2 out of -- to have caution just to treat it as such until I can get that
4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have nothing against
5 that. There weren't any markings on the document, so I didn't check,
6 didn't feel that was necessary, but, yes, we can move into private
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's then move into
9 private session just to be sure.
10 [Private session]
11 Pages 26291-26292 redacted. Private session
14 [Open session]
15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.
16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Now, the document that I mentioned is the transcript -- or,
18 rather, tape recording from the 235th session the Presidency of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina held on the 14th of January, 1994. The tape recording
20 and transcript is an interesting example of a political action which boils
21 down to the following: How not to accept an agreement which is being
22 proposed by the international community but how to leave the impression
23 that you are willing to cooperate on an international level.
24 Unfortunately, Mr. Thornberry, we're not going to have enough time
25 to deal with the very interesting portions of this transcript, but with
1 regard to this 33 per cent of territory that the Serbs agree should be
2 given over to the Muslims, what Alija Izetbegovic has to say about that,
3 and you will be able to find the translation of that portion on pages 19
4 and 20.
5 A. 19 and 20.
6 Q. 19 and 20. Otherwise, the pages are numbered -- well, may we have
7 the usher's assistance, please. The document is 4D 930, and the part that
8 I'd like to refer to is to be found on pages 19 and 20. It is the
9 statement by Alija Izetbegovic.
10 A. Page --
11 Q. Yes, pages 19 and 20. Alija Izetbegovic is speaking.
12 Witness, you might hear a different interpretation to the written
13 text, but that is because different translators and interpreters are
14 working. I think it is an important portion. It's not -- I don't usually
15 read the document, but I think that it will be important for me to do so.
16 Alija Izetbegovic says as followings and I quote: "Let us
17 understand, all these talks we had including the republics and the 33 per
18 cent, et cetera, none of that has been determined, because Klaus warned
19 me," and I think it was Klaus Kinkel that he was referring to, "they" -- I
20 apologise. I won't think any more. I've been put right. "Klaus warned me
21 when I talked about some things he said, you know, Mr. Izetbegovic, the
22 rule about politics. Until we agree on everything, we agree on nothing.
23 So so far we have not agreed on anything. These are all just
24 pre-conditions for some agreement.
25 "Of course we can, if it suits us, go back to the beginning. We
1 only have to ask ourselves if we have a better solution. But as soon as
2 we see that we're better off, then turn everything back to the beginning."
3 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, Mr. President. Before there's a
4 question, I just want to raise an objection again to taking the witness to
5 this document which I don't think any of us have ever seen before.
6 It's -- it purports to be from January 1994, which is after this witness's
7 time in Mostar certainly, which was again the reason, primary reason for
8 his being asked to come testify. I've said it before. I'm going say it
9 again. There are lots of interesting things that I could have led from
10 this witness on my direct which I didn't because of the limitations, and I
11 think that this is unfair at this point to go as far down this road.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There are two issues here,
13 Ms. Alaburic. Limitations on the cross-examination do not entitle you to
14 address this issue, all the more that as Mr. Stringer has said, this is a
15 document that's dated January 1994, and the witness was no longer
16 operating in that area in Mostar. So needless to spend any time on that.
17 Just ask your question briefly, because we need to have a break now. So
18 put the question you wanted to highlight.
19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I be allowed to
20 respond to Mr. Stringer. My question follows on from part of the
21 witness's statement contained in paragraph 55 to the effect that it was
22 the Croats that tried to cut off part of Bosnia for themselves. That's
23 why I ask about the Vance-Owen Plan. That's where my question about the
24 Krajisnik-Izetbegovic agreement or Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreements comes
25 from, and that is why I'm working up slowing to this transcript.
1 It is true that the transcript is from 1994 but Alija Izetbegovic
2 speaks of his own policy from the beginning of the conflict in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina and so therefore what he says there has to do with
4 January 1993 as well as well as the whole of 1993. So it does refer to
5 the relevant time, the time relevant in the indictment. I consider this
6 to be an extremely important transcript. I've had it for a long time but
7 not used it yet.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Judges will read the minutes
9 right through.
10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, might I be allowed to
11 summarise? In continuation Alija Izetbegovic goes on to say that the army
12 of Republika Srpska was too strong for the BH army --
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No, Mrs. Alaburic, no. Please
14 put your question. You -- there's a document that states such-and-such
15 and then you put your question.
16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours -- yes, that's
17 precisely what I want to say, what it says in the document, because if I
18 go on to ask my question without laying the foundations, then the
19 objection is raised that I have not laid the foundations for my question.
20 So that is why I wish to say what it says --
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We need to adjourn now. You
22 have had approximately 70 minutes, 40 minutes which was your own time, the
23 Pusic Defence gave you the rest. So theoretically you have ten minutes
24 left for tomorrow. So please do your calculations again.
25 Sir, we shall meet again tomorrow at 2.15 p.m., because the
1 hearing will be in the afternoon tomorrow. So may I ask you to follow the
2 usher, because Mr. Stringer needs to take the floor on another matter.
3 [The witness stands down]
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer, do you wish to be
5 heard in closed session or in open session?
6 MR. STRINGER: Public is fine. Public is okay, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer, you have the
9 MR. STRINGER: Just for scheduling tomorrow. While the
10 proceedings have been taking place this afternoon, I've been informed that
11 everything that needed to happen in respect of the next witness has
12 already happened. He is ready to testify, and he can testify tomorrow if
13 the schedule allows, and that he has informed our people now that he is
14 not seeking any protective measures so that he can testify in open
15 session. So that's the news for the next witness.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you for this
17 piece of information.
18 Theoretically tomorrow Ms. Alaburic still has ten minutes left for
19 her cross-examination. Then we will hear Mr. Praljak's Defence, who I
20 believe will use his 40 minutes, and I think Coric's Defence had given
21 their time to somebody else. I don't know if Coric's Defence wishes to
22 take the floor tomorrow.
23 Do you wish to take the floor tomorrow or not?
24 MR. PLAVEC: The Defence of Mr. Coric cedes its time to the
25 Petkovic Defence and Mr. Praljak if they need it.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So if we do not lose
2 any time, we will be able to finish with this witness tomorrow and then
3 hear the next witness after that. You have already indicated that this is
4 a 92 ter witness and that you will lead the witness for a short time and
5 the Defence teams will have one hour and 40 minutes approximately. This
6 is what I seem to remember. So we shall meet again tomorrow at a quarter
7 past 2.00.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.38 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 16th day of
10 January, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.