Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 27547

 1                           Tuesday, 6 May 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 2.21 p.m.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Mr. Registrar, kindly call the

 6     case.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon to

 8     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-74-T,

 9     the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.

10             Thank you, Your Honours.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

12             Today is Tuesday, the 6th of May.  My greetings to the

13     Prosecution, the Defence counsel, the accused, and everyone helping us.

14             Today, we are going to continue with Mr. Prlic's opening

15     statement.  He has the floor.

16             THE ACCUSED PRLIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17             [Interpretation] In light of the allegations in the indictment

18     related to inter alia the functioning of the prisons, let me say that

19     apart from the district prison in Mostar, as indicated in the report

20     issued by the Department for Judiciary and General Administration,

21     page 57, and now I quote:

22             "So far district, military, and civilian prisons have been

23     established in Orasje, Busovaca and Gabela pursuant to appropriate

24     decisions.  The decree on district military courts in the territory of

25     HZ-HB during the time of imminent threat of war that was adopted on the

Page 27548

 1     17th of October, 1992, by the Presidency of the HZ-HB, marks the setting

 2     of the foundations -- legal foundations for the creation of district

 3     prisons in the territory of HZ-HB.

 4             In Chapter 6 of this decree, the enforcement of criminal

 5     sanctions, the provisions contained in Articles 30 through 35, it is

 6     stipulated, for instance in Article 31, and I quote:

 7             "Convicted persons shall be sent to serve their prison sentences

 8     by the district military courts to the nearest district prison or

 9     penitentiary and correctional facility."

10             Since the Gabela prison was -- or, rather, the report of the

11     Department for Judiciary and Administration describes how the Gabela

12     Prison was turned into a detention centre, and I quote:

13             "Because of the war operations and for reasons that had to do

14     with other purposes of these facilities, they were anything but

15     institutions where persons remanded in custody and convicts can be

16     placed."

17             Through arbitrary acts and decisions of bodies that were not

18     competent to make such decisions, they were turned into detention centre

19     without any agreement or monitoring of the superior authorities.  That

20     is, again, the same document that I quoted above, Prosecution

21     Exhibit P09551, the work report.

22             At the session of July 19th, 1993, the HVO HZ HB, that's

23     Exhibit P03560, put on the agenda the demand to relocate the persons

24     remanded in custody and isolated persons.  That is done at the

25     intervention of the Capljina HVO, and this is listed under miscellaneous,

Page 27549

 1     item 7, which means that this was not an item on the agenda that had been

 2     prepared in advance.  A group was set up, as indicated in the conclusion

 3     from this session, in order to improve the conditions of their

 4     accommodation and to resolve the situation, the newly-emerged situation.

 5     In other words, it was necessary to see what was going on.

 6             The first conclusion from this session of the HVO HZ HB, already

 7     presented to this Chamber, calls for consistent compliance with the

 8     Geneva Conventions, quoting obligations from the decree on the treatment

 9     of persons taken prisoner in combat or in armed conflict, which was

10     passed one year before by the HZ-HB Presidency.  The real willingness to

11     do so by the provisional body of the executive government is reflected in

12     this conclusion, which reads as follows:  I quote:

13             "Access shall be granted to the International Red Cross and other

14     international organisations in order to control the conditions for their

15     accommodation in the facilities where detained persons are located."

16             This position reflects the actual state of mind of the

17     provisional body of the executive government because this is an internal

18     document, the minutes from a meeting, not a propaganda-type document

19     meant for the public at large.

20             At that time, in the second half of July 1993, I wrote a public

21     letter to Mate Granic, the deputy prime minister of the Republic of

22     Croatia - that's document P 3673 - and also four days earlier, that's

23   document 1D 01870.  This letter had to do primarily with the implementation

24     of the Makarska Agreement.  In this letter, the provisional body of the

25     executive government for the first time makes it public and faces this

Page 27550

 1     problem, expressing its readiness to assist in resolving this problem

 2     that really did exist, although the provisional body of the executive

 3     government, as indicated by all the documents and all the minutes, did

 4     not have either de jure or de facto powers over those centres, and that

 5     goes also for the conduct of the people there.

 6             In this press release, an effort is made to establish some

 7     principles that were defined by the provisional organ or provisional body

 8     as the, I quote, "unconditional exchange on the all-for-all principle."

 9             As I've already pointed out, the HVO HZ-HB took the position

10     that, I quote:

11             "It should be possible to allow access to interested humanitarian

12     organisations to all the facilities where isolated persons who are placed

13     in isolation are housed," which shows that they were obviously willing to

14     resolve this problem as soon as possible and not to hide anything.

15             This press release clearly shows that a call for some actions is

16     made, and through the involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

17     Croatia and international organisations, there is this will to create

18     conditions to really solve this problem.  At the same time, these

19     conclusions show that the provisional body of executive government does

20     not manage or run those facilities, and there are no documents where it

21     is possible to find any indication that any decisions could be made,

22     least of all decisions that had to do with the detention issues.

23             We did not have the right to make such operational decisions, and

24     there are no such decisions in the documents at our disposal.  The only

25     thing that could be done was to call -- that's the document that I've

Page 27551

 1     already referenced, that P 03673, and I quote:

 2             "HVO HZ-HB calls on all the bodies to consistently comply with

 3     international conventions, both in their treatment of civilians and of

 4     prisoners of war."

 5             The tone of the press release and the call to set up yet another

 6     meeting with the representatives of the government in Sarajevo, in the

 7     context of the Makarska Agreement that had been signed some ten days

 8     earlier testifies to our efforts to take every measure at our disposal,

 9     the comprehensive measures that envisaged all forms of fighting, all

10     forms of crime that were already mentioned in the minutes from the

11     meeting of the 11th and the 18th of August.  That's documents P 04111 and

12     1D 01675, include the following, and I quote:

13             "The Defence and Interior Affairs Departments should see whether

14     it is necessary to establish a mixed unit that would contain personnel

15     from military and civilian police in the town of Mostar in order to

16     provide efficient protection to the citizens against various groups and

17     individuals.  And it is in particular necessary to link up and to place

18     under full control various groups that are outside of full command

19     control."

20             At the second meeting on the 18th of August, conclusions are made

21     related to the service of sentences for persons who have already been

22     convicted and whose convictions were final, and who could only be placed

23     in the prisons which were part of the judicial system.

24             In document P 4756, quotes were made from the meeting of the

25     collegium of the Defence Department before this Trial Chamber which

Page 27552

 1     clearly show that there is no system because it is quite obvious that

 2     nobody knows who was in charge of most of those centres, and

 3     this is the information that was at the disposal of the HVO HZ-HB because

 4     Bruno Stojic stressed that quite clearly on several occasions at our

 5     meetings.  The Defence Department was not in charge, but as documents

 6     indicate, regardless of this fact, it did take a number of measures to

 7     improve the situation.

 8             The positions taken at the working meeting of the government of

 9     the Croatian Republic on the 6th of September, that's document P 4841,

10     show the commitment to take measures, although it is quite clearly stated

11     in the minutes, and this was our position at the time, unanimous

12     position, that the provisional body of executive government is not

13     responsible for this situation in any way.

14             Defence witnesses will talk about the joint declaration by the

15     president of the Republic of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, and the president

16     of the BiH Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic, signed in Geneva on the 14th of

17     September, 1993.  That's Exhibit P 5051, appointing their special plenary

18     potentiaries for the implementation of those measures, the Foreign

19     Minister Mate Granic and Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic.  Together with

20     the working groups that had been established, they took a number of

21     measures to close down the detention centres and to improve the overall

22     humanitarian situation.

23             I spoke about the necessity of implementing those demands in a

24     lengthy TV programme aired on the 21st of September, 1993, calling on all

25     the bodies to prevent all the conduct that is contrary to Geneva

Page 27553

 1     Conventions.  That's document 1D 2230.

 2             At one of the meetings that I attended, and that was attended by

 3     both envoys, Granic and Silajdzic, I demanded that all the conditions on

 4     the declaration be met, that all the detention centres be dissolved,

 5     threatening, as recorded in the minutes, that I would otherwise be

 6     abandoning everything, my position in the government, and that I would be

 7     tendering my resignation from all the positions I was holding at the

 8     time.  The provisional organ of executive government, or the Government

 9     itself, had no power to do this on their own, and the document is 1D 01291.

10         Finally, as the Chamber knows, Mate Boban adopted the decision on the

11     10th of December, 1993, on the unilateral and unconditional dismantling

12     of all detention centres, which eventually led to their closure.

13             I'm trying to keep my presentation as short as possible, but I

14     hope the Chamber will allow me to say a couple of words on the

15     establishment of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.  It was

16     established in keeping with the constitutional agreement on the

17     establishment of the union of the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which

18     in itself was envisaged in the international peace package.

19           Throughout the latter half of 1993, there were continuing negotiations

20     about the borders of the republics within the union.  The establishment

21     of the Croatian Republic and the establishment of clearer relations for the

22     first time according to the principle of the division of power into the

23     legislative, executive and judicial branches, allowed me to function in a

24     much more professional manner.  It took us no more than a month or two to

25     get most of the system up and running, including the financial system.

Page 27554

 1             Another thing that I wish to point out is that the relations that

 2     were established within the insufficiently defined community, which

 3     is what it was prior to this, had not been successful in guaranteeing a

 4     more effective functioning in terms of the work of the municipalities and

 5     the coordination between municipalities, which was one reason why the

 6     breakdown of various responsibilities was never that clear.

 7             Early in 1994, we took charge of financing the entire military

 8     system, the police, and the health system.  Early in 1994, the first

 9     pensions were eventually paid to the citizens of Herceg-Bosna, not just

10     to all of its citizens under the control of the HVO.  I'm referring to

11     HVO-controlled territory, of course.  Rather, there were various forms of

12     compensation, a total of 130.000 from the budget that were paid to Croats

13     in other territories, as well, which is something that the Prosecutor

14     quotes, as well, bases on one of my discussions in the presidential

15     transcripts.  This is 27048.  That is the transcript reference for this

16     trial.  I am quoted as saying that each and every one of the Croats were

17     eventually paid.  This was said in a bit to illustrate the difficulty

18     that we were facing in sustaining our budget.

19             Now that I've made a reference to the presidential transcripts, I

20     want to add something about the 5th December meeting in Split where the

21     serious situation that we were facing was discussed.

22             I turned down a proposal by Mate Boban [Realtime translation read

23     in error, "Granic"] on how the government was to be put together, and I

24     added as follows:

25             "I mean, I can't be made to answer for this situation.  Why am I

Page 27555

 1     being called to account?  I am responsible as a member of the Government,

 2     but I'm not answering for anything in particular.  It is be the minister

 3     who should be answerable to the parliament."

 4             MR. KARNAVAS:  The transcript should say "Mate Boban," not "Mate

 5     Granic," if we were listening correctly.  It's line 21 on page 8.

 6             THE ACCUSED PRLIC:  Exactly, it was Mate Boban.

 7             [Interpretation] This is P 6454, and that's where you can find

 8     the relevant quote.

 9             After that, I was involved in proposing a setup for the new

10     government.  Although it was a mixed composition in terms of personnel,

11     it was capable of carrying out its work in an effective manner.

12             In order to illustrate the objectives of the HR-HB, in my opening

13     speech as the prime-minister of the HR-HB government, at the meeting of

14     the House of Representatives on 20th November 1993, when we were elected,

15     talking for the first time about the programme for 1994, I pointed out

16     the following.  I quote:

17             "The fundamental objective of the HR-HB government is to stop the

18     war and stop the ongoing clashes, as well as to create a republic for the

19     Croatian people in which all the other peoples of the BH, the Muslims and

20     the Serbs, and all ethnic minorities will enjoy all human and ethnic

21     rights, in keeping with European standards."

22             At the same time, we are under an obligation to make sure that

23     all Croats in all other areas throughout B and H will be able to enjoy

24     the same rights.

25             If I may make a suggestion to the Chamber, to look at my

Page 27556

 1     presentation before the House of Representatives, the presidents of

 2     the municipalities of Herceg-Bosna, and the deputies elected to the

 3     Council of Municipalities and Council of Citizens of the Assembly of Bosnia

 4     and Herzegovina, in May 1994.  This is something that was broadcast over the

 5     radio, and here I tried to provide an overall picture of the government's

 6     work, but also of the provisional organ of executive government prior to

 7     that.  If the Chamber looks at that, I think you will see the greater

 8     picture, the context of what was happening at the time, but it will also be

 9     better able to judge my motivation as well as that of others who were

10     involved in the work of other executive bodies of Herceg-Bosna.  The results

11     that we managed to achieve will also become clearer, and assessments of

12     some events might then be made that, to some extent, are part of this

13     trial.  The document number is 1D 2719.

14             Your Honours, I am now moving on to my second-to-last subject.

15     This is my interview with the OTP.  Although to some extent I've been

16     referring to elements of this interview - this is P 9078 - please allow

17     me to shed more light on some of these statements that I made.

18             My interview with the OTP took place in 2001, when the alliance

19     for a change was set up in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which then formed the

20     government, and then for the first time the HDZ was no longer represented

21     in any of the levels of power above county level.

22             Back in 2000, I had left the HDZ, which drew a lot of attention

23     from the media.  There were also a number of newspaper articles which had

24     been specially commissioned, of course, to expose and denounce me as a

25     person and to pin on me the responsibility for everything that had been

Page 27557

 1     going on during the war, including alleged war crimes.  That,

 2     however, was not sufficient, so elements of white collar and other kinds

 3     of crime were also fabricated, and this kept the newspapers busy for some

 4     time, or at least some of them.  Of course, I know or can guess who was

 5     behind this campaign to discredit me.

 6             In addition to all of this, I was labelled as a traitor of the

 7     Croatian people.  All these attacks were aimed at my person, despite my

 8     more or less natural sangfroid, I understood that this was part of the

 9     process that all new democracies had to face.

10             Despite all of this, as I say, this gave rise to a certain amount

11     of bitterness, which I then vented in my interview with the OTP.

12             It is true that the OTP served on me a series of questions that

13     they said they would be interested in.  There were a total of 24 subjects

14     included.  I drafted a special written analysis in relation to each and

15     every one of those areas, and I was prepared to answer all of the

16     questions.  However, I succeeded only to a limited extent.

17             I can offer you my views as to why that was the case.  First of

18     all, I'd received at a later date a tape-recording of the OTP's interview

19     with Mr. Kresimir Zubak who at the time was the vice president of the

20     provisional organ of executive government.  I was then given a chance

21     to cross-reference these and compare his interview to my own.  The

22     interview with Mr. Zubak unfolded over five days, and my interview only

23     took two days.  It was obvious to me that Mr. Zubak was given sufficient

24     time to address all the same issues that I spoke about, except

25     he was given more time so he could provide more precise and more

Page 27558

 1     detailed elucidations.

 2             The other thing that I noticed at the time was that the chemistry

 3     or the overall atmosphere in those two interviews were entirely

 4     different.  During my interview, especially if you listened to the actual

 5     tape-recording rather than to just read the transcript, there was a

 6     certain amount of tension that was in the air, and that was clearly

 7     noticeable.  I believe that there were several reasons behind this sort

 8     of atmosphere.  Above all, as you can tell by inspecting the English

 9     version, I had to make several corrections to the work of the

10     interpreter, who was using erroneous terminology in relation to a number

11     of truly crucial matters.  I wasn't able to catch all the mistakes and

12     all of the omissions, simply because I was trying to focus on the

13     questions and to answer them in the appropriate context.  That was the

14     reason that we asked the OTP to put together for us a transcript in Croatian.

15             For example, page 18, there is something missing in the

16     translation.  Yugoslav dinars were coming from Croatia following the

17     introduction of the Croatian currency.  The wording used by the

18     Prosecutor is missing the adjective "Yugoslav," which lends the entire

19     context a whole new meaning.

20             I believe the other reason to have been the following:  The OTP,

21     people come from an entirely different legal background.  I think, then

22     as now, it might have been difficult for them to understand the

23     differences between the two systems.  I did my best to explain our legal

24     system and my position within that system, the system that applied at the

25     time throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.  As you can see, this led to

Page 27559

 1     misunderstanding, and this sidetracked the entire interview.  I observed

 2     the negative reactions of my interviewers; for example, when I said I

 3     simply didn't have the power that my position seems to entitle me to.

 4             My impression at the time was that instead of having a

 5     conversation, instead of providing explanations, I was merely expected to

 6     provide yes-or-no answers to any of their questions.

 7             Having heard Mr. Tomjanovic's arguments, and he was one of the

 8     persons who spoke to me at the time, who conducted an analysis that the

 9     Chamber is aware of, which shows that in actual fact I was never offered

10     a chance, during that interview, to offer not an alternative

11     interpretation but, rather, an authentic interpretation of the laws.  I

12     decided to draft a written answer to his own analysis.  I have been

13     preparing this reply for quite some time.

14             Since we opted for this opening statement or introduction only as

15     late as ten days ago, which by the way turned my entire provisional

16     release to spending endless hours before my PC, working on my

17     presentation, and I thank the Chamber for granting my provisional

18     release, I have simply not had sufficient time to draw up this reply.

19             However, as an addendum to my presentation, I will be submitting

20     to the Chamber the full and final version of my reply to Tomjanovic's

21     paper.  This I will do in a bit to furnish the Chamber with complete and

22     thorough information, thereby enabling the Chamber to make better

23     informed conclusions.

24             When I read the interview now, it is quite clear that the answers

25     in the interview are in some ways incomplete or not sufficiently clear.

Page 27560

 1     Some of them demand further clarification.  Besides, I have since

 2     received a lot of documents that I had not inspected before.  Therefore,

 3     some of my assessments would now be somewhat different.  Above all, I'm

 4     referring to the 27th of December, 1991, conversation.  This is P 89.

 5             I first set eyes on it when it was published in

 6     Professor Ribicic's book.  He testified as an expert witness before this

 7     Tribunal and also brought along the transcript itself.  I read the

 8     transcript for the first time.  It is full of hypothetical statements and

 9     assumptions.

10             In addition to this, I had not been able to inspect a number of

11     documents that now became available.  The conclusion that I reached was

12     more or less the same as that reached by Professor Ribicic.  I simply

13     disregarded the context in which the conversation took place.  The message

14     was clear: Pursue negotiations and try to avoid war, and this message was

15     put across by those who called on the Croatian people two months later to

16     vote for Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence at a referendum.

17             That is why I stated in the interview that there was another

18     political possibility that was being held in reserve, just in case.

19       There was a secondary political objective under consideration, to have part

20     of the territory join the Republic of Croatia, should Bosnia and Herzegovina

21     break up.  At first I was quite impressed by the transcript, but there is

22     something that I wish to say to the Chamber: you have the minutes of the

23     provisional organ of executive government and the government of the Croatian

24     Republic of Herceg-Bosna.  Those are over 100 sets of minutes, none of which

25     make a single reference to any division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor was

Page 27561

 1     there any such reference made in what was not included in the minutes, nor

 2  was it ever mentioned at those sessions.  We will call witnesses who will speak

 3    about that, and you do have minutes.  They have been admitted into evidence.

 4             Again at page 16, I say that I was not in a position to talk about

 5     the intentions of the people who had created Herceg-Bosna, because at that

 6     time I did not know them at all.  I took my positions after having read

 7     those documents for the first time, or almost a year after they were

 8     adopted, and I could get a full picture only after I was given access to

 9     the full set of documents of the HDZ dated 1991, which I mentioned yesterday.

10             In my interview, I tried to depict the relations as they really

11     existed, but I also tried to describe how those organs had been set up

12     de jure in a community that really had a structure that was sui generis.

13         At page 33 of the interview, especially if a person who does not have any

14     previous knowledge reads it, the explanation of my role looks insufficiently

15     articulated.  As I explained yesterday, the passing of the statutory decision

16     about the executive government and the character of my appointment, this

17     was signed by Mate Boban, as the president of the HVO.  It was very

18     clearly determined, as I was told at the beginning, "You have nothing to

19     do with the military and the police, you have nothing to do with the

20     passing of the Rules of Procedure."  This indicates what my position was

21     as the member of -- as a member of this collective body.  Those are facts.

22             Outside of the sessions, outside of the conclusions reached at

23     those sessions, I did not have any discretionary powers to take any

24     independent decisions about anything.  That was the position in all the

25     executive bodies in our system.  That is why I said, at page 36, that in

Page 27562

 1     essence I was not the president of the HVO.  I explained that yesterday,

 2     in part, by describing the evolution of this body from the spring to the

 3     summer of 1992, and in particular through the amendments of the relevant

 4     documents such as, for instance, the Decree on the Armed Forces from

 5     October 1992.  That is why I used the abbreviation "PIO."  This means the

 6     Provisional Executive Body, both in the interview and in my presentation

 7     here in court.

 8             To cut the long story short, there were three HVOs; the military,

 9     that was again the term used for the executive bodies in the

10     municipalities, and the same term again was used for the provisional

11     organ of executive government.  This all stems from history, from the past,

12     from the anti-fascist struggle.  That was when the boards for national

13     liberation were set up, and that was the term that was used for all the

14     bodies at all the levels.

15             I have already explained that the powers of the HVO HZ-HB were

16     reduced after the amendments were passed on the 14th of August, 1992,

17     which was the time when Mate Boban ceased to be the head of this body.

18     This explains my views at page 47 of the interview where I say that I

19     really did not have any function, because I could not make any decisions

20     either formally, or actually, without going to the collective organ.

21     My resentments [Realtime transcript read in error "reassessment"]

22     at the events that were going on around me at the time of the

23     interview were expressed, among other things, when I said that

24     I had been used by some people, at the time when I was needed to

25     help set up a functioning economic system.  This is what I said at

Page 27563

 1     page 49, and this is what I said in the letter that I wrote when I left

 2     the HDZ ranks, saying that I had never actually been with those people.

 3             MR. KARNAVAS:  One correction, because it's rather point at this

 4     point in time, Your Honours.

 5             Where it says "my resentment," and that would be, I believe, on

 6     line 20, page 18, it's "my bitterness."  Page 16, I'm sorry.  Page 16,

 7     not 20, it's "my bitterness," not "resentment."  Or not "reassessment,"

 8     but "my bitterness."

 9             THE ACCUSED PRLIC: [Interpretation]  Our views were different,

10     but that is business as usual in other parties.  But given the

11     circumstances and the fact that emotions ran high, this is a

12     characteristic of that time and of the people from our region.  Some people,

13     including myself, may have said some things we shouldn't have said.  Some

14     people were against me.  I mentioned some of them, because I believe that

15     they were against me.  That’s how it was, and there was nothing more to it.

16             The part of the interview at page 55 looks quite confusing,

17     partly because the consecutive interpretation failed to render everything

18     that was actually said.  This is where I say something that I've already

19     mentioned; that no information from the security services ever reached

20     me, which is quite obvious from the documents that have been admitted

21     into evidence in this case, because all those reports contained the list

22     of addressees.

23             The debates that we had at the sessions, they are mentioned in

24     the minutes, including the intervention by Bruno Stojic about the current

25     situation.

Page 27564

 1             Yesterday, I briefly spoke about the decisions on the internal

 2     organisation of the Defence Department, which quite clearly and

 3     explicitly stipulate that the military and the civilian segments should

 4     be separate.  The Defence Department, let me stress once again, primarily

 5     had a civilian function, and that is how it acted at the sessions of the

 6     provisional organ of executive government, which I say when I stress that

 7     the military part of the defence was separate and was operating

 8     independently from the provisional organ of the executive government.

 9             The provisional organ of executive government, in this case as in

10     other cases, merely appointed the assistance to the heads at the

11     recommendation of the head, himself.  This is a technical issue.  The

12     experience and the practice of the former Yugoslav system, including the

13     republics, was such that the executive councils never had anything to do with

14     the military and never had anything to do with the security services.  The

15     services and the military were responsible to the presidencies or the

16     presidents of the state or of the republics or the political parties and the

17     assemblies.  And Herceg-Bosna was no exception; nothing changed there.

18             When I spoke about what Bruno Stojic had said at those meetings,

19     I would like to say that those were not military reports.  I stress that

20     at page 94.  For the most part, they had to do with problems related to

21     the non-functioning of the system, particularly as it related to

22     mobilisation or funding.  We did not have any military information.

23     This had indeed not been envisaged anywhere.  The people in the military

24     were under no obligation to do that.  They had their commander-in-chief,

25     so that I did not have any right to make any complaints to the

Page 27565

 1     commander-in-chief in this regard, as indicated at page 96 of the

 2     interview.

 3             I did know Petkovic and Praljak, but I was under no obligation to

 4     provide any official information to them, and they, in turn, were under

 5     no obligation to provide any official information to me.  Our contacts

 6     were sporadic and quite accidental, except at two or three meetings that

 7     were attended by the members of the provisional executive body.

 8             As for Valentin Coric, I met with him even more seldom. 

 9     Of course, that was up until the establishment of the government of

10     the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna whose member he was.

11     As far as I can recall, we're talking about one or two meetings of the

12     coordination of the body for fighting crime, which was set up pursuant to

13     the action plan for the fight against crime that was put together as the

14     sessions of the 11th and the 18th of August, 1993.  I've already made

15     references to that.

16             In accordance with the topics for the discussion that I had

17     received from the Prosecution, I tried to present the basics of the

18     judiciary in this interview, and I was only partially successful in this

19     effort.  But the Trial Chamber has at its disposal all the relevant

20     decrees, you're all lawyers, and you can see the relationship between the

21     prosecutor's offices, prisons, courts, that are the same as in all other

22     countries with the civil law system.

23             At page 88 of the interview, there is some discussion about the

24     Gabela Prison.  Pursuant to -- this prison was set up pursuant to

25     Article 145, paragraph 2, of the Law on the Enforcement of Criminal and

Page 27566

 1     Misdemeanour Sanctions of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

 2     according to the reports of the judiciary department, it was part of the

 3     network that comprised four district, military and civilian prisons in

 4     Herceg-Bosna, prisons that were quite logically linked to the relevant

 5     courts, courts that had jurisdiction in those areas.

 6             But as I've already noted, the same reports state that in the

 7     second half of 1993, neither the courts nor the judiciary department had

 8     any access to some of the places that were used to detain prisoners.

 9     Moreover, some facilities that were set up as prisons were turned into

10     detention centres without any decisions having been passed by the

11     relevant higher organs.

12             Enough documents have already been admitted into evidence and are

13     at the disposal of Your Honours about how this facility functioned, who

14     the reports went to, and who -- whom it was responsible to.

15             I've already mentioned at page 87 that barracks were used to

16     house detainees.  They are mentioned even earlier in 1992 as facilities

17     where detainees were kept.  This was -- this is obvious from the

18     agreements that were signed in Geneva under the auspices of the ICRC,

19     where mention is made of the prison in Dretelj.  I was able to learn that

20     in that year, it was actually run by HOS, and the Capljina prison.

21             Finally, let me say that in several places in my interview, for

22     instance, at page 82, I spoke about the perpetrators of the crimes that

23     occur in every war.  I said that they were committed mostly by people

24     wearing uniforms, by soldiers, members of the military units, military

25     conscripts, and that these people should be punished, regardless of who

Page 27567

 1     they are.  And I'm absolutely sure that none of the accused here is

 2     opposed to that.  Quite the contrary.

 3             Let me make a brief summary at the end, Your Honours, in light of

 4     my alleged contribution to the alleged joint criminal enterprise,

 5     presented by the Prosecution in several subparagraphs, in paragraph 17(1).

 6     I will refer to the same subparagraphs using the same letters.  A, so this

 7     is in answer to the allegations contained in the indictment.  A: It has

 8     already been noted that the HVO HZ-HB was not the highest body in the defence

 9     system, that was the HVO as a military organisation, as the military.  My

10     role in the provisional organ of executive government did not cover any

11     military affairs, either de facto or de jure, as has already been shown.

12             Enough has been said about the decisions that were issued in

13     accordance with the Rules of Procedure.  Your Honours, there is not a

14     single decision passed in accordance with the Rules Of Procedure that

15     would be discriminatory and that would allow the alleged objectives of

16     the joint criminal enterprise to be implemented.

17             B.  The goals of the policies were established in the platforms

18     of the HDZ of BH and peace plans, in no uncertain terms.  None of those

19     documents contain any indications about the alleged goals of the joint

20     criminal enterprise.  At that time, I was not a member of the HDZ.

21             C.  My role in the provisional organ of executive government,

22     as a collective organ, has shown -- was shown to be such that any alleged

23     influence over the work of the departments, including the three

24     departments singled out by the Prosecutor, is patently unfounded.

25             D.  I stand behind all the -- or stand by all the decisions of

Page 27568

 1     the collective body that I signed.  None of those decisions could be

 2     taken to support the alleged goals of the joint criminal enterprise,

 3     including the ones that were singled out in particular by the

 4     Prosecution.  Let me address two of them now.

 5             The decree on the use of abandoned housing, P 3809, was meant to

 6     coordinate the work of various municipalities, because they had already

 7     passed such decisions.  It made it possible to allocate housing

 8     apartments on a temporary basis, up to one year, but any apartments that

 9     had been abandoned under duress could not be disposed of.  HVO HZB did

10     not allocate any apartments, any such apartments to anybody.

11             On the other hand, the Sarajevo government made it possible to

12     allocate apartments on a permanent basis, which was one of the greatest

13     problems in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.  As members

14     of the council of ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the support of the

15     International Community, we decided that everybody had the right to go

16     back to their own apartment, even though those apartments were actually

17     socially owned, which, for instance, is not the case in the Republic of

18     Croatia.  The Republic of Croatia never adopted such a decree.

19             The decree on border crossings at state borders simply applied a

20     previous federal regulation that had already been adopted by B and H,

21     defining the state border with the Republic of Croatia, whereas the

22     indictment claims that the aim was to have Herceg-Bosna annexed by the

23     Republic of Croatia.  This is P 1560.

24             Item E.  The decision we took was exactly the opposite from

25     trying to monitor all the municipalities.  We took a decision to have

Page 27569

 1     democratically-elected assemblies in each and every of the municipalities

 2     where it was possible.  The municipalities were fundamental agents of

 3     government, and their presidents were members of the legislative body,

 4     the Presidency, and later also of the House of Delegates of the HR-HB who

 5     appointed members of the HVO, and all the members, including me, answered

 6     to them and submitted reports to them.

 7             The Prosecutor refers to a decision taken by Mostar Municipality

 8     on refugees.  I had never previously heard of this before I was

 9     interviewed.

10             We have documents available to us, and we will be tendering those,

11     showing that the municipalities took dozens of decisions that were patently

12     contrary to some of the laws passed by the provisional organ of executive

13     government.  Appointments throughout municipalities were of a technical

14     nature precisely because the bodies in charge throughout the municipalities

15     made the relevant proposals.  The decisions, for the most part, were

16     signed by the president of the HZ-HB.  It was in no more than a handful

17     of cases that the decisions were signed by the HVO HZ-HB.

18             For example, as the Prosecutor points out, Ljubuski is a case in

19     hand.  The president of the HVO was Milan Simic, who was legitimately

20     elected mayor in the democratic elections that were held in 1990.

21             F.  The Prosecutor allegations that there was such a thing as

22     Croatisation [as interpreted], which is a term that occurs in none of the

23     world's dictionaries, Your Honours.  It is simply a word that does not

24     exist.  They back this by showing decrees in relation to the

25     establishment of the university and institutions of primary/secondary

Page 27570

 1     education, the Croatian dinar as a currency used for cash transactions,

 2     but also the use of the Croatian coat of arms on the territory of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina that was at the time at least half a century old.

 4             Defence evidence will demonstrate that these decrees were adopted

 5     because of the need to bring life back to normal in areas in which the

 6     republican bodies had ceased to function after the war had escalated, and

 7     these decrees never discriminated against anyone.

 8             G.  Contrary to the allegations made by the OTP about the measures --

 9     the financial measures that were adopted, and the system of payments that

10     was established with full recognition for the sovereignty of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina, this probably represented the single-most important

12     contribution to its economic recovery, bearing in mind the many people

13     from Bosnia-Herzegovina who lived abroad, who were continually

14     contributing to the joint defence of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and

15     were, in fact, contributing funds by sending funds to a single account

16     which the Chamber is aware of.  It still remains unknown, especially

17     after we've heard testimony about how much money had actually arrived

18     from Croatia during the war, whether Croatia, in fact, backed

19     Herceg-Bosna in its defence at all, all the more so bearing in mind the

20     vested interests of Croatia to help mount a defence in order to preserve

21     its own territory from the same aggressor.  Instances of assistance to

22     the Muslim people in government in Sarajevo by Croatia, they have been

23     documented throughout this trial and will continue to be documented, both

24     as it concerned putting up refugees, treatment in Croatian hospitals,

25     education, organising and delivering humanitarian aid, supplying weapons,

Page 27571

 1     and training entire units of the BH Army.

 2             H.  The non-existence of a provisional executive body in military

 3     matters, this is something that has been inspected quite closely.

 4     Preparations for defence plans were, as I pointed out before, only about

 5     the civilian aspect of defence in schools, banks, kindergartens, and

 6     other such institutions.  This is illustrated by 1D 2722, 1D 2723,

 7     1D 2724, and 1D 2811.

 8             I.  As a member of the provisional executive body, I was in no

 9     position to appoint or, indeed, replace or dismiss anyone on my own. 

10     Mine was a single vote, and the same applied to everyone else.  Normally,

11     this vote, was used to back proposals that were made, proposals that had

12     already been endorsed by the one of the winning parties or a candidate's

13     municipality.

14             J.  The decision on military production was a decision that had

15     to do with the economy primarily - it was in relation to both ABiH and

16     HVO - while the decree of the Republic of B and H, the envisaged

17     production only for one of the components of the armed forces, the

18     BH Army.

19             K.  The cooperation with Croatia in its various aspects is

20     purportedly seen as a crime.  An example cited is the adoption of the

21     decision on the import of goods from Croatia.  I explained yesterday that

22     this was a reciprocal measure because goods from the BiH were handled the

23     same way when being imported to Croatia.  EU countries, NAFTA in North

24     America, and all the countries throughout the region enjoy free trade

25     with no restrictions.  In the present case, however, the Prosecutor seems

Page 27572

 1     to believe that a measure like that constituted a war crime.

 2             L.  The decision taken on the 15th of January, 1993, did not in

 3     any way affect the commencement of clashes.  It was adopted and withdrawn

 4     pursuant to orders and information supplied by the head of the Croatian

 5     negotiating team, the president of the HDZ and HZ HB, Mate Boban

 6     This was done in good faith and with a view to setting up a

 7     joint command.  Dozens of agreements had been signed to that effect.

 8     Another objective was to avoid clashes between the two parties, and now

 9     I'm giving you a definition of the entire conflict under consideration

10     here.  It is a conflict that can be considered an internal conflict

11     between two components of a single armed force on part of the free territory

12     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That's my definition, and I'm saying that as

13     the defence minister who prepared the first law on the armed forces

14     of the federation when these formations were formally merged.

15             The period that followed the 15th of January is the only period

16     in which the HVO HZ-HB emerged as one of the addressees when information

17     was submitted on the situation that was unfolding in Gornji Vakuf, where

18     clashes had already erupted prior to the 15th of January, as we have all

19     witnessed.

20             M.  In April 1993, again, there was no ultimatum whatsoever.

21     Both parties had already signed the Vance-Owen Plan by this time, and

22     we're talking about its implementation.  Defence evidence will show that

23     clashes in parts of the territory had nothing whatsoever to do with the

24     HVO HZ-HB meeting that was held on the 3rd of April, a meeting devoted in

25     its entirety to documents related to the Vance-Owen Plan and preparations

Page 27573

 1     for its exceptionally complex implementation, which in effect meant the

 2     dissolution of Herzeg-Bosna.

 3             N.  The provisional organ of executive government never opened nor

 4     exercised any control over any of the detention centres referenced in the

 5     indictment.  The HVO HZ-HB, in order to restore order, activated, based

 6     on republican regulations and the legislation of the Presidency of the

 7     HZ-HB, institutions of the judiciary, civilian and military, the

 8     prosecution offices, as well as courts, prisons, in which, under the law,

 9     prisoners could only be kept pursuant to a decision from an appropriate

10     court.

11             O.  There is no evidence at all showing that the HVO HZ-HB was in

12     any way involved in anything to do with forced labour performed by

13     detainees.

14             P.  The provisional executive body did not take a single

15     decision, and you have all the minutes, you have all the copies of

16     the Official Gazette, that discriminated against the Muslim population,

17     or anyone else, for that matter.

18             Q.  The Defence will lead evidence to get the Chamber a full

19     picture regarding the functioning of the Office for Refugees, which was

20     an institution with a humanitarian remit.  They offered all possible

21     assistance to persons whose lives were at risk, especially refugees,

22     regardless of their ethnicity, and it was certainly not involved in any

23     deportations.  There is nothing to corroborate the alleged activities by

24     the Commission for Population Migrations, something else that is

25     referenced by the Prosecutor in the Indictment.

Page 27574

 1             R.  It is malicious to suggest that this assistance in receiving

 2     over 100.000 Croat refugees, because of military action by the BH Army;

 3     for example, in Zenica, Travnik, Kakanj, Konic [phoen], Bugojno, Fojnica

 4     or Vares, was aimed at getting the Croats to leave the areas in which

 5     they were residing.  This was not the case, and this is in fact

 6     demonstrated by the fact that most of them left for Croatia, while very

 7     few actually remained under relatively difficult conditions in

 8     Herceg-Bosna, but certainly not in Mostar.

 9             S.  Reactions to attacks by the Muslim army against Croats, which

10     was something that led to tens of thousands of citizens being displaced,

11     cannot be considered as an attempt to spread fear, hatred, and

12     distrust.  Croats were, in fact, expelled from territories historically

13     inhabited by Croats, and this is something that the Prosecutor places

14     under quotation marks, because their ancestors had been living in those

15     areas for at least a thousand years previously.  Mostar was defined as

16     the capital of the province and then also the capital of the Croatian

17     Republic of Herceg-Bosna, as well as of the Herzegovinian Neretva County

18     in the Federation.  Proposals were even made for Mostar to become the

19     capital of the entire Federation, and the Muslim negotiators agreed with

20     this. 

21             The 30th of June declaration, of which I spoke yesterday, is a

22     mere declaration.  It is certainly not an order or a decision.

23             T.  All the humanitarian convoys that ever travelled through

24     HZ-HB territory reached their destination.  The protocol that

25     was defined in cooperation with international organisations helped to

Page 27575

 1     work out a procedure for this.  In addition to this, the Defence will be

 2     showing that no request by international organisations to furnish

 3     humanitarian aid was ever refused, regardless of its eventual

 4     destination.

 5             U.  As has already been pointed out, the provisional executive

 6     organ had no role to play in any of the military operations.  Contrary to

 7     allegations made by the OTP, it was a reconstruction of whatever had been

 8     destroyed, including the cultural and historic heritage of all of the

 9     ethnic groups, was one of its primary commitments.  I am quoting the

10     following documents:  1D 02703, 1D 02706.

11             V.  The body that I was a member of, as is suggested by the

12  Prosecution in its contradictory allegation, through the establishment of the

13  bodies of the internal affairs and judicial bodies created conditions for the

14  crimes to be prosecuted.  The Defence will show, through its document and

15  witnesses, that the fight against crime was a continuous effort and that the

16  HVO HZ-HB and the government of the HR-HB, later on, involved all the

17  competent institutions in those activities.  Operation Pauk, Spider, had as

18  its task the criminal prosecution of all the crimes that documents existed for,

19  in particular major ones, including war crimes.  After that, I participated in

20  building the judicial bodies of the BH Federation.  We entrusted those tasks

21  to them.  After the signing of the Dayton Agreement, as I said yesterday,

22  an agreement was signed on special conditions for the criminal prosecution

23  of the war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the so-called Rome rules of the

24  road, that stipulated that nobody could be indicted for war crimes without

25  the approval of the OTPW.  The evidence admitted so far and the testimony of

Page 27576

 1  witnesses indicated I was quite clear in my contacts with international

 2  representatives, urging them for their support and assistance in resolving

 3  the current situation related to the detention of a large number of military

 4  conscripts.  I had no reason not to tell the truth either then, or now.  What

 5  I said in public was meant to urge the dissolution of all the detention centres

 6  and the release of all prisoners.  All the documents without exception say

 7  that the provisional body of executive government demanded full compliance

 8  with international humanitarian law and unimpeded access to the ICRC.

 9             The last letter of the alphabet that I will use is X.  For the

10     first time, the Prosecution is partially right when it alleges that I

11     always said that individual crimes were committed by elements that were

12     outside of anyone's control, loose cannons, because I was not aware of

13     any decisions by any official bodies related to this.  This is what I

14     believe today.  They were not an organised activity mounted by the

15     institutions that had anything to do with the provisional organ of

16     executive government.  I condemned all kinds of criminal behaviour, and I

17     relayed the information about investigations that had been conducted, and

18     which, as we heard here, I had received, to the international mediators.

19             Your Honours, so much for my contribution to what I believe is

20  the non-existence -- nonexistent joint criminal enterprise.  Let me repeat

21  once again.  I sympathise with all the war victims.  These are people who

22  lived side by side with me in the same city, people with whom I lived all my

23  life, or with their families.  I can say that with the provisional body of

24  executive government and later on with the government, I did all I could,

25  and believe me, really everything I could under those circumstances,

Page 27577

 1  to assuage the consequences of the war and the destruction that was caused

 2  during the war and to punish those who committed crimes.  This is what I

 3  thought, this is what I did at the time, in the difficult circumstances, and

 4  this is what I still think now, now that I'm able to look at all the documents

 5  and all the information that I did not have at my disposal at the time.

 6             The developments have shown that we were unable to resolve the

 7     problems with the Muslim politicians, but we made every effort to ensure

 8     that the Croatian Bosnian Federation actually started functioning after

 9     that.  I initialed the Dayton Peace Agreement, and after that, for more

10     than five years, I represented Bosnia and Herzegovina as the foreign

11     minister.  I represented all its citizens.

12             If you look at my career, you will see that apart from just a few

13     years, I spent all my time in Sarajevo, where I always felt that I was

14     welcomed by all, and this is where I lived at the time when the

15     indictment was served.

16             Thank you very much for your attention.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Very well.

18             We are about to take a 20-minute break, and after the break we

19     will hear the first witness as scheduled so that we can start with the

20     examination-in-chief.

21             We will resume in 20 minutes; that is, at 4.00 sharp.  Thank you.

22                           --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 4.07 p.m.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  The hearing is resumed.

25             I believe Mr. Scott wanted to say something.

Page 27578

 1             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, Your Honour, thank you.

 2             Mr. President, Your Honours, good afternoon, and good afternoon

 3     to all those in and around the courtroom.

 4             Your Honour, I wanted to raise two important matters before we

 5     continue further.  Out of deference to Mr. Prlic, I did not want to

 6     either delay or interrupt his statement, but there were two matters

 7     I think should be addressed before we continue.

 8             First of all, Your Honours, the Prosecution would move for the

 9     unsealing and making public of Mr. Prlic's prior statement, which is

10     Exhibit P 09078, which this Trial Chamber, as you know, has previously

11     admitted into evidence.  While the litigation concerning the admission of

12     that statement was ongoing, the statement had been placed under seal.

13     However, it appears that notwithstanding the Chamber's decision admitting

14     that statement now, that the statement has remained under seal and not

15     available to the public or anyone else, for that matter.  And,

16     Your Honour, the Prosecution does not see any reason at this point why

17     that particular piece of evidence, unlike the other voluminous evidence

18     in this case today should be secret or under seal, especially --

19     especially in light of the fact that in the last two days, yesterday and

20     today, Mr. Prlic himself has, on numerous occasions, referred both to the

21     existence of the statement and the content of the statement, and in fact

22     has, well, tried to correct or change some of the statements that he made

23     in that statement.  I think it's only fair that that statement be a

24     matter of open evidence that anyone can review at this time.

25             So, Your Honour, the Prosecution moves that Exhibit P 09078, the

Page 27579

 1     previous statement -- written statement or testimony, a transcript,

 2     actually, of Mr. Prlic be unsealed and made a public exhibit, number 1.

 3             Number 2, Your Honour, the Prosecution must raise its concerns

 4     and objections to the practice so far, only at this early moment in the

 5     Defence cases, in connection with the information provided so far

 6     concerning Defence witnesses and statements; that is, their evidence.

 7     And before Mr. Karnavas gets too excited about that, let me assure him

 8     that I intend to make a measured statement and to acknowledge, in fact,

 9     some steps that Mr. Karnavas has taken.

10             But, Your Honours, since we are now starting the Defence cases,

11     and as everyone in the courtroom knows, we will be engaged in this

12     process now for some months.  It seems to the Prosecution entirely

13     appropriate to raise this at the outset so that we can hopefully, if you

14     will, get off on the right foot.  And of course we would expect this to

15     apply to all the Defence cases and not just the Prlic Defence, but the

16     six Defence teams.  Indeed, it may be that some of the other Defence

17     teams already intend or contemplate a different practice, and I cannot

18     speak to that except to say that, of course, we're starting with the

19     Prlic Defence case, so that is the case that I must direct at least my

20     immediate comments to.

21             Now, Your Honour, with respect, the Zuzul statement, and if the

22     Chamber has it, and I hope that the Chamber might -- at least one of the

23     Judges might have it at hand.  If the Chamber looks at the Zuzul witness

24     statement that was filed as part of the Rule 65 ter G Defence filings,

25     the Prosecution respectfully submits that the summary is deficient and is

Page 27580

 1     not what Rule 65 ter(G)(i)(b) requires.  What the Prosecution submits

 2     must be summarised is not simply the background information on the

 3     witness, that is, what positions he or she have held in the past, and

 4     must be more than simply even a listing of the topics or subjects on

 5     which the witness will testify.  What the Rule requires, in our

 6     submission, is an actual statement of the substantial -- not every word

 7     and of course not a verbatim statement, but a substantial and detailed

 8     summary of what the witness's actual evidence will be, not what he --

 9     where he was during the war, not what his positions were during the war,

10     but what his or her evidence will actually be.  And if I can remind the

11     Chamber -- excuse me.  If I can refer the Chamber to the Rule itself, and

12     I'm quoting now Rule 65 ter (G)(i)(b), it requires, "a summary of the

13     facts," and I underline the word "facts," "a summary of the facts on

14     which each witness will testify."

15             And I invite the Chamber again, if you will turn your attention,

16     please, to the summary for Mr. Zuzul, which is the first witness listed

17     in the Prlic 65 ter (G) witness list.  The first paragraph and the first

18     sentence of the second paragraph is entirely information -- which we

19     appreciate but is readily available from any number of sources, is

20     entirely information about various positions he has held.  He was deputy

21     foreign minister at one point.  He was at the United Nations at one

22     point, et cetera, et cetera.

23             Then the last full one-third of the summary is simply a statement

24     that says, in practical effect:

25             "Having sat through meetings that were recorded and referred to

Page 27581

 1     in the presidential transcripts, Mr. Zuzul's testimony will touch upon a

 2     significant portion of the alleged JCE."  "Will touch upon the JCE."

 3             And then the rest of the summary essentially is a paraphrase of

 4     paragraph 15 of the Prosecutor's indictment, which with all respect we

 5     don't necessarily need to be reminded of, but we appreciate it.  But,

 6     Your Honour, if you look is the summary in substance, not the number of

 7     lines, not the number of words on the page, but if Your Honours,

 8     President Antonetti, Judge Trechsel, Judge Prandler, if you will look at

 9     the actual words on the page and what's said here, there's almost no

10     information provided to the Prosecution --

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  And you forgot Judge Mindua.

12             MR. SCOTT:  My apologies, Judge.  My apologies to that, as well

13     as to you, Judge.  If you will look at the summary, and again, my

14     apologies.  You will find that -- you will find almost no information,

15     almost no information by which the Prosecution can reasonably prepare to

16     meet the evidence of this witness.  We'll talk about the JCE.  We'll talk

17     about the JCE.  That's about 99 per cent of what it says.

18             Now, beyond that, Your Honour, what compounds the problem in this

19     situation, what compounds the problem, unlike the Prosecution witnesses,

20     we've not received any statement of this witness, no statement of the

21     witness whatsoever, and I don't know if the Chamber has.  I assume the

22     Chamber hasn't, or if it was, I would assume the Prosecution would be

23     provided a copy of the same.

24             I see the Chamber shaking its head in a negative response, saying

25     they have not.  If that's the case, Your Honour, then both the Trial

Page 27582

 1     Chamber and the Prosecution are working at a substantial disadvantage in

 2     being able to prepare to receive this witness's testimony, and that

 3     simply puts everyone in the courtroom at a substantial disadvantage and

 4     was not the practice followed by the Prosecution.

 5             The Chamber will know that with the Prosecution witnesses, there

 6     was at least always at least one detailed multi-page statement, sometimes

 7     multiple statements, sometimes verbatim transcripts of prior testimony,

 8     by which the evidence could be reviewed and a cross-examiner could

 9     prepare his cross-examination accordingly.  I might add that these are

10     not easy witnesses.  This is not a criminal case where a witness comes in

11     and says, "I think I saw the suspect run out of the door.  I think the

12     suspect was wearing a blue coat."  In cross-examination, that witness can

13     be prepared, perhaps, perhaps reasonably easily.  We're talking now about

14     cross-examination on a whole host of issues.  The only information we

15     have is evidence touching on the JCE, evidence touching on the JCE.

16             Now we've been provided one, two, three, four, five, six, seven

17     binders of documents with no prior statement and no sufficient summary to

18     prepare -- to prepare to meet this evidence, and, Your Honour, that's

19     simply not efficient.

20             Now, I said I wanted to be fair to Mr. Karnavas, because I did

21     raise this with him, and he was kind enough, and I do thank him,

22     yesterday to provide a proofing note, presumably after meeting with

23     Mr. Zuzul over the weekend or at some time, of about a page and a half of

24     a letter, about a page and a half of a letter, which I think the Chamber

25     may have also received.

Page 27583

 1             Now, again, let me be measured.  I appreciate and I thank

 2     Mr. Karnavas for having provided that letter, but it is, in itself, an

 3     anomaly and actually illustrates the Prosecution's point.  A proofing

 4     note is prepared to supplement and to correct, if necessary, a prior

 5     statement, so that the person -- the opposing party, the people preparing

 6     to meet that evidence, are duly advised, are duly advised of any

 7     additions or corrections to the statement, but it is an anomaly, one that

 8     we appreciate but nonetheless an anomaly, to get a proofing note that

 9     corrects or supplements something that doesn't exist.  We have no

10     statement.  We have no statement, and all we know is we have seven

11     binders of documents concerning the evidence of a witness which will

12     touch upon the JCE.

13             Now, Your Honour, that's, among other things -- it also

14     represents a matter of fundamental fairness to the process and in

15     relation to the Prosecution witnesses.  There cannot, Your Honours, there

16     cannot be a rule or a practice that says that Prosecution witnesses are

17     subject to greater scrutiny and greater testing of their evidence than

18     Defence witnesses.  With a Prosecution witness, we must have a prior

19     statement.  With a Prosecution witness, we can test any inconsistencies

20     with prior statements.  But with the Defence witness, well, we'll give

21     the Defence witness a pass.  We'll make it the Defence witness, we don't

22     have to do that.  The Defence witness is not subject to the same scrutiny

23     or to have his or her evidence tested to the same degree as a Prosecution

24     witness.  That is a double standard that the Trial Chamber should not

25     accept.

Page 27584

 1             It is further, Your Honours, a matter of efficiency, and while

 2     that word is sometimes given a bad rap, if you will, efficiency is

 3     absolutely required if this trial process can move forward at any sort of

 4     a pace that the Trial Chamber, I know and we all know, wishes it to

 5     proceed.  But in order to allow opposing counsel or opposing parties to

 6     prepare, there must be adequate information provided.

 7             The Chamber knows, according to the Chamber's requirements and

 8     guidelines, that the cross-examining party has to provide copies of

 9     cross-examination exhibits.  They have to be prepared in advance, and, by

10     necessity, even far before the direct examination is finished because you

11     can't make 15 copies of voluminous documents in five minutes.  So when

12     the direct examination finishes, we can't just automatically produce all

13     the documents for cross-examination in 15 copies that have been organised

14     and with no previous information having been received about the witness.

15             So, Your Honour, not only is it an issue -- Your Honours, it is

16     not only an issue of fairness.  It is also one of efficiency, which

17     touches on fairness, because then what the Prosecution is required to do,

18     and with respect, what the Prosecution has been required to do concerning

19     Mr. Zuzul is make some sort of guess, "Well, it's going to touch upon the

20     JCE," and therefore we have to be over-broad, over-inclusive in the

21     material that we prepare, in the amount of documents that we select, that

22     our trial support staff and others then have to prepare, because we don't

23     know what the actual evidence of the witness who is coming is going to

24     be.

25             Your Honour, in our respectful submission, these raise serious

Page 27585

 1     issues.  This is not a technical matter.  This raises serious issues as

 2     to the fundamental fairness of the process, and not only disadvantages

 3     the Prosecution, but, frankly, it disadvantages the Judges as well.

 4             So, Your Honour, we would ask the Chamber to address this matter

 5     and that full and fair -- at least full and fair summaries be provided.

 6     And in addition, if at all possible, statements for the witness can be

 7     provided.

 8             Thank you.

 9             MR. KARNAVAS:  If I may be heard --

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Before hearing you, and of course we will hear

11     you with great interest, but I would like to ask Mr. Scott whether he has

12     some proposal or motion regarding the hearing of this witness today,

13     tomorrow, and so forth.

14             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, Your Honour, I do.  I think that in this

15     particular instance, hoping that we can adopt a different procedure in

16     the future, but we can't today, we can't now with a fact, if you will,

17     with respect, our proposal would be that assuming that we can complete

18     the -- assuming that the direct examination of this witness and any

19     further of the other Defence questioning that we've discussed by the

20     other Defence teams, assuming that all that questioning can be completed

21     by Thursday, that now having received for the first time to know what the

22     evidence is that the Prosecution is required to meet, we think that if

23     that is the case, and since and only, and only because Monday is a

24     holiday and only because our team is willing to work through the weekend,

25     that if we -- if the evidence -- other evidence is completed by Thursday,

Page 27586

 1     we would be prepared to begin cross-examination on Tuesday.

 2             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you for this clarification.

 3             Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas.

 4             MR. KARNAVAS:  That's okay, Your Honour.

 5             Let me address that last point because I think it's false for the

 6     Prosecution to stand here and say, with a straight face, that this is the

 7     first time they know of the evidence, and I think it would be false for

 8     the Judges to look me in the eye and say that is the case, as well,

 9     because as of March 31st, you, Your Honours, as well as the Prosecutor,

10     were provided, as well as my colleagues, with the number of documents

11     that this witness, along with the other witnesses, would talk about.  So

12     he had ample time to look through.  He's had years to read those

13     documents.  Many of the documents are "P" documents.  "P" stands for

14     what?  "Prosecution."  "D" documents stand for "Defence," some of which

15     are already entered into evidence, others of which are connected to the

16     "P" Prosecution documents.  Therefore, I find it rather ironic - in fact

17     it's supremely ironic - for of all people, Mr. Scott, who knows this case

18     better than anybody, working seven, eight years on it, to sit here and

19     say that now, for the first time, he's dumbfounded and now he's going to

20     have to need time to prepare to challenge the JCE of which Mr. Zuzul will

21     touch upon.  That's number 1.

22             Number 2, the Rules do not require for me to take statements.

23     That is very, very clear.  We only need to provide summaries.

24             Third, may I point out, may I point out that on March 31st, we

25     provided the summaries as we were required.  As of March 31st, Your

Page 27587

 1     Honours as well as the Prosecutor had those summaries.  As of March 31st,

 2     the Prosecutor could have -- could have raised that issue, as opposed to

 3     today.  And I won't go into any reasons why today he chose to spend 20

 4     minutes addressing this issue, but he could have raised it.  We even had

 5     a hearing, and I believe that was on the 21st.  It wasn't raised back

 6     then.  So clearly, if Mr. Scott had a problem with the summaries, I think

 7     acting due diligently, especially when he indicated that he is overly

 8     concerned about -- I believe the word "efficiency" was used, then he

 9     should have brought it well in advance when we could have addressed it on

10     the 21st.  And, of course, had I been ordered to provide additional

11     information, I probably would have been able to do so under the

12     circumstances.

13             Now, the Rules do not say that I have to do a statement or that I

14     have to go through each and every document and pointing out exactly what

15     part of the document I'm going to refer to.  For instance, we have

16     presidential transcripts.  In those presidential transcripts, many of

17     which we have seen here, some of them have Mr. Zuzul in.  Now, you don't

18     have to be a 25-year veteran, a career prosecutor, to figure out that

19     you're going to be focusing, among other things, on what Mr. Zuzul said,

20     or at least knowing based on the little tidbit I gave him, because he's

21     claiming that I've been, you know, rather stingy with my parceling of my

22     information to him, that probably I would be asking Mr. Zuzul, since he

23     was present during those discussions, to give us some insight, and I

24     believe I might have even used that word once or twice, maybe even in my

25     proofing notes, that he would give insight.

Page 27588

 1             So I don't see where the problem lies.  If you look at other

 2     documents.  For instance, we have the Friendship And Cooperation

 3     Agreement.  How often have we seen that document?  How many witnesses

 4     were paraded by the Prosecution?  So is there something in that document

 5     that I can possibly yank out that isn't there on the four corners of the

 6     page?  Of course not.  But if you look at my summary, you'll see that

 7     Mr. Zuzul was an active participant, you know, almost shadowing in some

 8     ways Mr. Tudjman on events, and so he has some insight.  You know, the

 9     JCE talks about the carving up of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That's going to be

10     one of the issues, okay?  Maybe he'll talk about the confederation issue

11     because that's touched upon.

12             So if you glean through the documents, Your Honours, it's -- you

13     don't have to be a veteran.  In fact, with no disrespect to Stevie

14     Wonder, even he could see exactly where I'm going if he had these

15     documents.  It's that plain and simple.

16             Now, that said, Mr. Scott contacted me.  We have been rather busy

17     primarily because of the last-minute circumstances.  I understand that he

18     had some concerns.  I tried to address them as best as I could.  I made a

19     phone call.  I spoke with the case manager, and as he well knows and as I

20     well know, that sometimes, you know, it's a lot more difficult to get --

21     even once the witness is here, to sit down and actually get all the

22     information in an appropriate time to get it to the other party.

23             I finished the proofing notes - although Mr. Scott doesn't like

24     the fact that I characterized them as proofing notes, but in fact that's

25     what they were - Sunday night at approximately 12.00 or 1.00, and one of

Page 27589

 1     my staff, who actually was still working Sunday night.  Unfortunately, we

 2     weren't able to e-mail it until the morning probably because we were

 3     still trying to deal with other technical issues.

 4             I take Mr. Scott to heart.  I will sit down with him.  I will ask

 5     him concretely what more information would he have liked to have seen.  I

 6     don't agree with what he's saying, that he cannot cross-examine until

 7     next week, and frankly I would oppose to that.  I would oppose to it

 8     vehemently, and I'll tell you why.  First, I think we're going to be

 9     through with the questioning way before Thursday, but even if it only

10     takes us to Thursday, I would ask that we not handle it next week.  Why?

11     Because all the other witnesses are preprogramed.

12             I had his colleague -- Mr. Stringer asked me, "Are we still on

13     for the next witness?"  And I said, "Yes."  So if now we have to use up

14     Tuesday with Mr. Zuzul, it throws everything off because everybody is

15     preprogramed.

16             I would suggest, and I want to be fair to Mr. Scott -- God knows

17     I would love for him to feel at the end of the case that we on the

18     Defence side have been fair to the Prosecution.  I would suggest that we

19     pick a further date down the road, and I would suggest -- we have two

20     particular weeks in mind; one -- because I anticipated Mr. Scott standing

21     up and making a big fuss.  He's predictable in some ways, as I am too.

22             We have two weeks in particular.  One is the Friday of 18 July.

23     Now, I haven't mentioned this with Mr. Zuzul, but that week we happen to

24     be going five days, and that would not upset the axis, as it were.  You

25     know, the other one would be the following Monday, which is Monday, the

Page 27590

 1     21st of July, because we're due to sit all day that day.

 2             So I would say that if, and that's a big qualifier, if we run out

 3     of time or if the Prosecution needs additional time, then we can choose

 4     those two days, and I don't think that they can cry foul because, one,

 5     they have more time to prepare.  Two, they have -- you know, it's well in

 6     advance, they're not going to be prejudiced in any way.  And, three, and

 7     more importantly, this has happened to us at least on two or three prior

 8     occasions.  So -- but I would not agree with his assessment that -- or

 9     his urging the Trial Chamber to adopt a rule that is not in the Rules,

10     that has been heavily discussed, having sat on the Rules committee

11     myself, you know, that the Defence is not obligated to provide a

12     statement.  They're entitled to provide summaries, and of course if the

13     summaries are incomplete, we can provide more, more information.  If

14     that's his problem, we can go through the witnesses.  I'm willing to sit

15     down.

16             This is the first that I've heard that it was so complicated that

17     they're unable to do their cross-examination, but again I want to

18     emphasise that they've had the documents.  In fact, all the binders that

19     they've had, we've streamlined it.  We've added one or two, of which we

20     gave notice, but, by and large, all the other documents that they've had,

21     with the exception that some have already been trimmed out because we're

22     trying to be as efficient as possible.  And I must say that it is not

23     sometimes until you -- the witness comes to The Hague and you proof them,

24     because some of these witnesses are extremely busy.  I don't have the

25     same power of subpoena or the same august presence, as it were, as the

Page 27591

 1     Prosecution.  When he shows up at the presidential palace, you know, they

 2     know he's from the Office of the Prosecution.  When I go, I'm like

 3     Oliver Twist with a cup in hand, knocking, saying, "Please, would you let

 4     me in," you know.  So it's not easy for me to get all these witnesses to

 5     actually sit down with me in the field for a detailed analysis, you know,

 6     but we will do our level best.

 7             Finally, let me address the first issue.  Of course, we would

 8     agree with the Prosecution that the statement should have been made

 9     public.  After all, the reason that we kept it -- I had moved that it not

10     be public on the grounds that it was still being litigated.  And once we

11     had a final conclusion on that, there is no other reason, and I don't see

12     any confidential information in there so obviously we want a public

13     trial.  We've stressed it from the very beginning.  We have nothing to

14     hide, and so we concur and we join the Prosecution in that motion.

15             See, here is a good example of great cooperation between the

16     Defence and the Prosecution.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Thank you very much,

18     Mr. Karnavas.

19             As regard the unsealing of the statement, the Chamber will rule

20     over that issue.  Apparently, there will be no difficulty.

21             As far as the second issue is concerned, you've mentioned

22     Oliver Twist.  Somebody else mentioned Stevie Wonder.  I could also talk

23     about the Judges, the Judges who were also the drafters of the Rules.  Of

24     course, it did not escape the Judges' attention, because over the several

25     weeks that we dedicated to several issues, we realised indeed that there

Page 27592

 1     was no statement for Defence witnesses.  We took a look at the Rules, and

 2     the Prosecution has the obligation to provide statements.  This

 3     obligation is not a Defence's obligation.  So you're both right to raise

 4     that issue.

 5             But after 15 years of existence of that Tribunal, I believe it

 6     belonged -- it was up to the various Prosecution teams to raise that

 7     issue from the very beginning and not some 15 years later.

 8             There is a commission being set up at the moment, a commission

 9     which will see how we can speed up the various trials, and I'm sure that

10     this will be part of the agenda of that commission.

11             I read the various summaries, and in particular the summary of

12     that witness statement, and I did realise that there were a lot of things

13     missing.  Therefore, I tried to study that summary in order to determine

14     the possible duration of the -- duration of the time to be allotted to

15     the Defence for that particular witness.  But with a summary such as this

16     one, it is not enough for me to make such a determination.

17             And Mr. Scott is right in stating his position and in saying

18     that, "It is not on the basis of such a summary that I can work on an

19     equitable basis within this trial."  He's right, too, but unfortunately

20     you are not responsible of this state of facts.  It is the Judges whom at

21     the very beginning did not realise that such a problem was going to

22     appear.  And I said it before and I can repeat it again.  If everything

23     had been controlled prior to now, we wouldn't have to have that kind of

24     discussion.  Unfortunately, this is too late now.  Of course, the Chamber

25     will make a determination because we've been asked to do so by Mr. Scott,

Page 27593

 1     and we'll see how we can work this out in the future.  But as regards the

 2     current witness, it's too late.

 3             Now, Mr. Scott complained about documents.  I've had a look at

 4     the five binders while you were talking, and what did I see?  There are

 5     four binders containing "P" documents, documents coming from the

 6     Prosecution, so the Prosecution of course is very well aware of these

 7     documents.  It would be quite impossible to think that he isn't.

 8             Now, as regards binder number 1, which is the 1D binder, I had a

 9     quick look at those documents.  I don't need hours to do so.  And what

10     did I see?  There's a whole bunch of documents which relate to two books

11     which are well known by the Prosecution.  It would be unbelievable that

12     the Prosecution didn't know anything about those books.  There are

13     several documents relating to the Security Council.  There again, it

14     would be quite hard to believe that the Prosecution doesn't know anything

15     about those documents.  And there are also some various documents, and

16     there again we don't need hours to understand the content of the

17     documents.

18             So Mr. Scott is saying, "I cannot use those documents to make

19     sure that I can explain my case."  I don't agree with him, because I

20     don't think the documents provided by the Defence are unsurmountable.

21     We'll see if we can make a determination and see if from now on we're

22     going to request the Defence teams to provide statements.  It's never

23     been done before.  It would be quite a revolution in the Tribunal, but

24     sometimes revolutions are useful to take things forward.

25             If we were to determine that from now on, before a Defence

Page 27594

 1     witness is heard, we need a statement, a complete, comprehensive

 2     statement such as the kind of statements that we request for Prosecution

 3     witnesses.

 4             Mr. Scott, you're on your feet.  Would you like to add anything?

 5             MR. KHAN:  Perhaps --

 6             MR. SCOTT:  I could respond to Mr. Karnavas first, perhaps, and

 7     the Chamber's observations, if the counsel might allow me.

 8             MR. KHAN:  Your Honour, as a matter of efficiency that my learned

 9     friend alluded to, it just may be more expeditious to respond to the

10     Defence response in toto.  He did predicate his remarks as having general

11     application to all Defence teams.  So I think it would be more efficient

12     that I be heard, and then of course he should be given proper time to

13     respond.

14             MR. SCOTT:  I'm happy to defer to Mr. Khan, Your Honour.  That's

15     fine.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Mr. Khan.

17             MR. KHAN:  Your Honour, there are three distinction applications

18     put forward by my learned friend.  In relation to P 9078, there's no

19     objection at all to the exhibit being made public.  Indeed, the Defence

20     starting point is that as much of this trial as possible should be in

21     open session and there should be a very -- Your Honours should be slow in

22     keeping any exhibit confidential unless good cause is shown.

23             In relation to the sufficiency, this was the third point of my

24     learned friend -- in relation to the sufficiency of 65 ter (G)

25     statements, Your Honour, that's a matter between my learned friend

Page 27595

 1     Mr. Karnavas and the Trial Chamber, and I don't wish to speak to that.

 2     However, I will say that my learned friend Mr. Scott has proposed a

 3     definition as to what amounts to a proofing statement.  Of course, my

 4     learned friend knows very well that the Rules are completely silent as to

 5     proofing.  There is no public -- as far as I'm aware, no public

 6     prosecution guidelines as the probity and proper conduct of what are

 7     often called these proofing sessions.  They are behind closed doors,

 8     there are no transcripts, they're not video-recorded, and they are

 9     matters that have had concerns for the Defence in many cases in the past.

10     And, of course, it is a practice that has been frowned upon and

11     prohibited, indeed, by the International Criminal Court.

12             The main submission that has relevance to my -- to the Defence

13     for Bruno Stojic is focused on the Prosecution's submission as to the

14     entitlement to a Defence witness statement and the ostensible prejudice

15     caused to the Prosecution by not having such a statement.

16             My learned friend Mr. Scott is of course a very experienced

17     lawyer with much experience not just in this jurisdiction but in the

18     United States.  And of course he knows full well that in the United

19     States not only would he, as a prosecutor, not have access to the name of

20     a Defence witness, he would not have a summary at all or any exhibits at

21     all, and that is something that American prosecutors deal with very

22     familiarly and without any difficulty in many cases indeed.

23             Your Honour has said that, of course, the Tribunal is more than

24     14 years old.  It can hardly be said, in the Defence's respectful

25     submission, that the quality of justice of this International Criminal

Page 27596

 1     Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia can be fairly said to have been

 2     deficient because of a rule which has not obligated the Defence

 3     previously to give witness statements.

 4             The burden of proof is on the Prosecution.  They have framed the

 5     indictment.  They have chosen the breadth of the charges.  And an

 6     accused, of course, can sit on his hands and say nothing and say, "Prove

 7     your case."  The issues of disclosure flow from that basic reality.  The

 8     Prosecution bring this case.  They must have confidence to prove the case

 9     beyond reasonable doubt.

10             Now, I was gratified -- I was gratified that my learned friend

11     has conceded this is not an easy case.  I am gratified, because when one

12     sits back and remembers the 98 bis submissions that had been made by some

13     of my colleagues here, one can be forgiven for getting the impression

14     from my learned friend's very eloquent and sensible submissions, as he

15     would say, that this is an open-and-shut cases.

16             Your Honours, of course, the Defence for each of the accused will

17     no doubt seek to reveal some of the complexity of this case in their

18     respective defences.

19             Your Honour, the Rule requirement for witness statements was

20     enacted only in March of this year, and it's very clear that the

21     obligation to provide witness statements is only if they exist.  It's

22     very clear.  There's been no practice in this Tribunal that the Defence

23     have to give witness statements.  Your Honour, it flows not just -- this

24     is an important point, in my respectful submission, and I would urge

25     Your Honours to have, as you will do, proper sensitivity to the

Page 27597

 1     difficulties in defending these cases.  It flows not just from the

 2     presumption of innocence.  It is resource led.

 3             The Prosecution have very experienced investigators.  They have

 4     them from Scotland Yard.  They have them from the United States, from --

 5     proper trained investigators.  The Defence in international courts,

 6     whether it's here, Rwanda, or Sierra Leone, do not have the funds to

 7     obtain and recruit, in many situations, trained investigators.  Very

 8     often they are junior individuals or accountants or people that are

 9     working as investigators.

10             A statement is a product -- I'm grateful.  A statement is a

11     product of a relationship between a witness and an investigator, and if

12     one is forced because of circumstance to have perhaps not a

13     professionally-trained investigator who takes a statement and then hands

14     it over to a prosecution if a statement is taken, of course it would be

15     fantastic for my learned friend, because they would say, "Well, this is

16     ambiguous, this is a contradiction."  That may not flow -- it may not, it

17     may, but it may not necessarily flow from any deficiency in the witness's

18     recollection of events.  It may be a product of the lack of a trained

19     investigator.  That is an additional factor I would ask Your Honours to

20     have -- to consider when looking at the Rules.

21             Your Honour, of course the Defence are obligated to follow the

22     Rules, whether we like it or not, and if statements are available, if

23     statements have been taken, of course the new Rule 67 obliges us to

24     disclose it.  But, Your Honours, it would be completely unfair to ask a

25     Defence team, for a trial that's been going on for more than a year and a

Page 27598

 1     half, to go back and take statements when there's no requirement in the

 2     Rules, there's no obligation in the Rules or in the Code of Professional

 3     Conduct, for the Defence to take witness statements.

 4             The Defence do not reveal their work product, and of course any

 5     attempt now to require the Defence, you know, to produce notes that are

 6     not statements runs contrary to fair notice and the clear terms of the

 7     Rules that Your Honours will, of course, have to apply when considering

 8     my learned friend's application.

 9             Your Honour, that's all I have to say on the matter.  I hope it's

10     been delivered -- at least it's intended to be delivered with a spirit of

11     cooperation, but they are matters that are of concern to the Defence as

12     we go ahead.

13             I'm grateful.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]

15             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't want to take

16     up a lot of time, but just for the record I would like to state quite

17     clearly that I fully support the arguments presented by Bruno Stojic's

18     Defence.  And I would just like to underline once again that we prepared

19     our Defence cases in line with the current Rules and current

20     jurisprudence before this Tribunal, and according to those Rules we don't

21     have to have a statement for the viva voce witnesses.  We have to have

22     the notes of the investigators and notes of the Defence counsel that

23     would be sufficient for us to draft the summary, but enough to satisfy

24     the requirements in 65 ter (G).  But we don't have to have a statement.

25             Of course, the situation is different when we have 92 ter and

Page 27599

 1     92 bis witnesses, but when we're talking about viva voce witnesses, we

 2     don't have to provide statements, and nobody has ever had to provide

 3     statements for such witnesses.

 4             I just wanted to stress that I support --

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Mr. Stewart for Mr. Petkovic.

 6             MR. STEWART:  Just to say, Your Honours, that the Petkovic

 7     Defence also supports and endorses what Mr. Khan has said.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Thank you, Mr. Stewart.  For

 9     Mr. Coric.

10             MS. TOMASEGOVIC-TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Mr. Coric's

11     Defence endorses what the previous Defence counsel have said.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Very well.  I see you hiding

13     behind a pillar, sir.

14             MR. SAHOTA:  Yes, I am.  Mr. President, just some very short

15     remarks.  I would like also to echo and endorse the submissions by all my

16     learned friends on the Defence benches this afternoon.  I would like to

17     add this.

18             Mr. President, if it is the case that the Trial Chamber is about

19     to deliberate on the application of Rule 67(a), then may I suggest that a

20     direction be made for all interested parties, all the Defence teams, and

21     indeed the Prosecution, to file written submissions within a deadline

22     that can be set at your discretion.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Thank you.

24             Mr. Scott, now you've heard all the interventions from all the

25     Defence teams.

Page 27600

 1             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you very much.

 2             Just to respond very briefly, and I must say, again, I try to be

 3     very careful with my comments or my statements of concern, not to

 4     indicate any bad faith or make any allegations against counsel, but

 5     simply to raise what we believe is a substantive issue.  So, again,

 6     I think counsel can refrain from, you know, talking about what the

 7     Prosecution counsel could or couldn't do or should or shouldn't have

 8     done.

 9             I must note that when Mr. Karnavas, and the Chamber perhaps will

10     recall the fact -- the circumstances of this situation, I must note that

11     when Mr. Karnavas says that someone from the Prosecution shows up at the

12     presidential palace, they take note.  Well, unfortunately not.  The

13     Chamber may recall that we were unable to produce one particular witness

14     having to do with the presidential palace, despite our good efforts

15     trying to do so.  So the Prosecution, sadly, is not all-powerful by any

16     means.  Not even close, quite frankly.

17             Further, Your Honour, and to respond to what Mr. Karnavas had

18     indicated, and I didn't really necessary get into the details of this,

19     but again since Mr. Karnavas raised the points, he indicated that I had

20     raised this matter belatedly.

21             I sent a letter to Mr. Karnavas last Thursday, I have a copy of

22     it here, in which I raise this issue, and I suggested that -- I

23     respectfully asked Mr. Karnavas if he could possibly provide us a revised

24     and substantially supplemented summary by Friday afternoon so that the

25     Prosecution, working on the weekend, could at least go into the weekend

Page 27601

 1     with that sufficient information.  So it wasn't -- I'm not raising it for

 2     the first time today.  I raised it in a letter to Mr. Karnavas last

 3     Thursday, in the hopes that we would have something by Friday afternoon.

 4     But -- well, I know everyone's busy.  I'm not attributing any bad faith.

 5     But the fact of the matter is we were not able to obtain any additional

 6     information.

 7             I also called Mr. Karnavas's office on Sunday afternoon to see if

 8     anything else might be available, but I was not able to reach -- I was

 9     not able to reach Mr. Karnavas at that time.

10             So those are -- those are -- and specifically approximately 3.00,

11     or 2.30 or 3.00, Mr. Karnavas.

12             Now, Your Honour, I again invite the Chamber to look at the

13     actual summary, look at the actual summary that is on the 65 ter (G)

14     list, compare it to what Rule 65 ter (G)(i)(b) requires, and,

15     Your Honours, I submit -- and Mr. Karnavas says that I've been working on

16     this case for years and I couldn't possibly be dumbfounded, but I

17     actually am regularly dumbfounded by many things.  But the fact that I've

18     been working on this case for some years, and I hope I know it reasonably

19     well, not perfectly, be that as it may, Your Honours, I am not

20     required -- with all respect, I am not required, even with whatever

21     knowledge I have, to make a best guess as to what the witness's evidence

22     is going to be.  We don't have to operate on that basis.  The words of

23     the Rule are clear.  What must be provided are a statement of the facts

24     on which the witness will testify.  Now, that's not Ken Scott's words,

25     that's what the Rule says, "the facts on which the witness will testify."

Page 27602

 1             Now, further, Your Honour, putting aside whatever the practices

 2     have been in the past about witness statements, and I won't say anything

 3     more about that now - it might come up again perhaps in the future - I

 4     won't say anything more about that now, but to say that because a

 5     document has a "P" number, just because a document has a "P" number, that

 6     I should then be able to guess as to its use or application with every

 7     particular witness, is absurd, is absurd, and the Rules do not require me

 8     to do that.  Whatever the Rules may or may not be about statements,

 9     Rule 65 ter (G)(i)(b) is not a new Rule.  It's been on the books for a

10     long time, and it is very clear, what it requires.  And while the Defence

11     may tell you all day long that you cannot perhaps require them to prepare

12     witness statements, I leave that in the Chamber's further consideration.

13             What the Rule clearly does provide and what this Chamber can

14     require, absolutely, is a fair and sufficient summary that the

15     Rule requires, a detailed summary, whatever you want to call it.  It may

16     not be a signed statement, but it's a detailed and sufficient -- I

17     emphasise the word, sufficient statement of what the evidence of the

18     witness is going to be, and the Chamber can order that, has absolute

19     prerogative and power under the Rules to order that.

20             Finally, Your Honours, of course in terms of the 15 years of the

21     Tribunal, one can only say and one can only hope it's never too late to

22     be fair.

23             Thank you.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  You're indeed right.  Yes,

25     it's always possible to rectify something that's wrong.

Page 27603

 1             Now, regarding this witness, here's my concern:  We've got five

 2     hours scheduled by the Defence.  I've had a look at the documents.  It

 3     doesn't seem to be too much.  The other Defence teams will have

 4     50 per cent of this time, i.e., two hours and a half.  I'm sure that some

 5     Defence teams will be willing to ask questions to such witness, to the

 6     said witness.  If we add to this the time needed by the Prosecution for

 7     the cross-examination, five hours maybe, and if we add on top of this the

 8     questions that the Judges will want to ask, we won't finish by Thursday.

 9             A first option would be to continue next week on Tuesday, but of

10     course there will be a problem with the witness scheduled on Tuesday, as

11     indicated by Mr. Karnavas.  The other option, therefore, would be to

12     conclude the examination-in-chief this week, maybe the Judges could also

13     ask questions on the basis of the examination-in-chief, and then we could

14     postpone the cross-examination to, for instance, Friday, July the 18th,

15     as proposed by Mr. Karnavas a moment ago.

16             Mr. Scott, what's your preference?  Since you will be the one

17     doing the cross-examination, what's your choice?

18             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19             I understand, first of all, the problems with scheduling

20     witnesses, no one understands that better than the Prosecution, which has

21     done the last two years doing exactly that, so we understand the

22     difficulties.

23             My first preference, having said that, would be to finish the

24     witness next week so that all of us can have the witness behind us and

25     have the evidence of the witness in full.  That would be my first

Page 27604

 1     preference.  But having said that, if indeed it raises great difficulties

 2     for Mr. Karnavas, then we can seek other alternatives.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Mr. Karnavas, the witness

 4     scheduled for next week, you've proposed four hours for that witness.  We

 5     were supposed to hear him on the 13th, the 14th and the 15th of May.  Do

 6     you absolutely want to start on Tuesday with that witness?

 7             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, let me begin by saying that from now until

 8     July, until the break, we have our witnesses locked in to certain weeks.

 9     Some of these witnesses are terribly busy and they have commitments, some

10     around the globe, so getting them to commit has been very difficult.

11     That's why -- now, following -- next week's witness, at one point,

12     because this issue came up - we talked about it this morning, what

13     if - it's impossible for me to do the next witness in two days, that is,

14     for direct and cross, given -- given the topic which has to do with

15     refugees in Croatia, and then the following week, of course, that witness

16     ties into the previous witness, you know, and then of course we round it

17     off, so I'm afraid that we cannot do so.

18             Now, I understand the Prosecutor would like to just get it over

19     with because, after all, they'll be more prepared or more fresh and

20     they'll have to re-prepare again.  On the other hand, I just heard an

21     earful, in fact an hour's full of earful, of complaints that they don't

22     have enough time.  Now, I'm giving them and you're giving them,

23     Mr. President, until July 18th, and I understand it may be somewhat

24     inconvenient, but I did hear that Mr. Scott is not opposed to that.  I

25     haven't talked with the witness, but I think this may be a sufficient

Page 27605

 1     time for him to arrange his schedule, too, because as I understand it, he

 2     has commitments the following week, and when you see his background you

 3     will understand that for me to get a hold of him even for a half an hour

 4     in Zagreb, where I went several times, it was very difficult.  So we're

 5     dealing with these sorts of individuals who are very, very busy, very

 6     talented, and in much demand by a lot of folks.  And, frankly, to ask

 7     someone to come here to devote a week of their time for someone that they

 8     casually know or have worked with, is -- that, in and of itself,

 9     demonstrates the Herculean effort that I'm having to make, plus the

10     commitment the witness has to getting -- to seeing that justice is done

11     in this courtroom.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Well, we shall rule straight

13     away to know what we are supposed to do.

14                           [Trial Chamber confers]

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Very well.

16             The Judges discussed the issue, and we decide that the witness

17     will be examined in chief, with possible questions by the Judges.  As to

18     further cross-examination by the Prosecution, it will take place on the

19     18th of July.  On account of his various commitments, the witness can

20     schedule to appear on the 18th of July so that everybody will be happy.

21             Good.  Let's have the witness brought in.

22             Mr. Karnavas, you were asking for a break, because in basketball

23     that's sort of break time, half-time.

24             MR. KARNAVAS:  Mr. President, we've had an hour.  Hopefully, this

25     won't happen again, but I think it would be better to just take a break

Page 27606

 1     now and then we can go through the rest.  And, frankly, I've been a

 2     little frazzled by all of this commotion, and I came here already -- and

 3     I already had nerves, but now I'm really nervous, so I could use the

 4     break.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Let's have a 20-minute break,

 6     and we shall resume at 5.20 until 7.00.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 5.04 p.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 5.24 p.m.

 9                           [The witness entered court]

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Sir, would you mind standing

11     up.

12             THE WITNESS:  I apologise.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  You're about to make a solemn

14     declaration, but before you do so, can you please state your name,

15     surname, and date of birth.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Momir Zuzul, born on the 19th of

17     June, 1955.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Could you tell me whether you

19     have a current occupation?  And if so, which is that occupation?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I teach at a university, but now

21     I'm a consultant and adviser for international relations and

22     international affairs.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Have you had an opportunity to

24     testify before a court on the events that took place in the former

25     Yugoslavia or are you about to testify for the first time?

Page 27607

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have not testified yet.  This is

 2     the first time that I'm testifying.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Can you please read out the

 4     solemn declaration.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 6     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 7                           WITNESS:  MOMIR ZUZUL

 8                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Thank you, sir.  Please be

10     seated.

11             Sir, you will have to answer questions asked by Mr. Prlic's

12     counsel.  You met with him in the last 48 hours.  This is an examination

13     that is going to take a long time, at least five hours, after which the

14     other Defence counsel, as part of a cross-examination, will ask questions

15     of you, and the Judges, the four Judges you have in front of you, can

16     also ask questions.  Normally speaking, the Prosecutor, who's seated to

17     your right, was supposed to cross-examine you, but for procedural reasons

18     it was decided that the cross-examination would take place later.  It

19     could take place on Friday, the 18th of July.  You will therefore have to

20     come back and take -- make arrangements for the cross-examination to take

21     place on the 18th of July.  This is what I wanted to convey to you.  As

22     an academic, but also as a former diplomat, you are accurate and I ask

23     you to be accurate and brief in your answers.  If you fail to understand

24     the meaning of a question, do not hesitate.  Ask the one putting the

25     question to you to rephrase it.

Page 27608

 1             Normally speaking, we have breaks every 90 minutes, but since we

 2     had a break already, we're going to carry on until 7.00 tonight, and we

 3     shall resume tomorrow at 2.15 in the afternoon.  If at any point in time,

 4     for a reason, whatever it is, you need to have a break, just raise your

 5     hand and ask us to make a break.  Of course, we are at your disposal for

 6     any questions you might have.

 7             So this is it in just a few words.  This is how the testimony is

 8     going to take place.

 9             Now, Mr. Karnavas, you have the floor.  You may proceed.  And we

10     are now counting your time.

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Thank you, Your

12     Honours.

13                            Examination by Mr. Karnavas:

14        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Zuzul, and my deepest apologies for having

15     you wait in that room while we took care of some technical matters here.

16             Let me begin by asking you a little bit about your background.

17     We'll start with your education, and then if you could briefly tell us

18     about your professional experiences.

19        A.   Most of my education I did in Zagreb.  I studied and graduated in

20     psychology at the Zagreb University.  That's where I got my MA and my

21     PhD, again in psychology.  I spent some time at the Harvard University.

22     After completing my studies, I worked as a psychologist for a while.  And

23     since 1979, I've worked at the Zagreb University, first as the assistant

24     lecturer and finally as a full professor.  I held various posts at the

25     university.  I was the deputy dean for psychology of the Department of

Page 27609

 1     Psychology, and just before the war in the former Yugoslavia broke out, I

 2     was the deputy dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in Zagreb and also head

 3     of the chair for children's and developmental psychology.

 4             I participated in the work of various international

 5     organisations, psychologists' associations.  I was also a member of the

 6     presidency of several international organisations that dealt with

 7     psychology or with mental health.

 8             From this period of my professional career, I perhaps could say

 9     that I was particularly interested in studying aggressive behaviour.  I

10     published several papers and books that dealt with this area.

11             In the early 1990s, I was not involved in politics in Croatia or,

12     indeed, in the former Yugoslavia, but when the war broke out, when

13     Croatia came under attack, I joined the defence effort.  I spent several

14     months in the Croatian Army ranks.  For a while, I served in the Croatian

15     Army, and in parallel I worked at the university.

16             There were several of us university teachers in the Croatian

17     Army, and we set up a department that dealt with psychological and

18     informational aspects of the war.  This was because of our professional

19     background.  Most of us taught psychology or information science.

20             Although at the beginning I was not a member of any political

21     party, that's at the beginning of the 1990s, I however did join the

22     Croatian Democratic Union in November 1991.  That was one day after

23     Vukovar fell.  That's when I joined.  It was not my intention to fulfill

24     any political ambitions, because I didn't have any at that time.  It was

25     a personal act, a symbolical act, an expression of my faith that Croatia

Page 27610

 1     would be able to defend itself against the aggression.

 2             While I was in the Croatian Army, I was able to talk several

 3     times with President Tudjman.  I had met him while I still taught, and at

 4     that time, that was only once or twice, we discussed the reform of

 5     university education.  At one point, however, he did suggest that I

 6     should take up a post in the government, that I should become the deputy

 7     defence minister.  I didn't want to take that post because I thought that

 8     it would be just an episode in my life.  I fully intended to go back to

 9     the university.

10             Soon afterwards, President Tudjman offered me a position in the

11     Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The post he offered was the following:  I

12     was supposed to put in place the Croatian diplomacy.  I was to use my

13     knowledge and my experience as a psychologist.

14        Q.   Let me stop you here.  What year and what month, date, are we

15     talking about?

16        A.   We're talking about March 1992.

17        Q.   Okay, all right.

18        A.   I accepted this proposal by President Tudjman, and in mid-March

19     or in the second half of March 1992, I was appointed the assistant

20     minister of foreign affairs.  As I said, my specific task was to select

21     the future Croatian diplomats.

22             When I joined the foreign ministry, I think that it had about 35

23     employees in total.  Although at that time I thought that I would be

24     working there mostly as a psychologist, quite soon I was given an

25     opportunity to work on something that I found of -- to be of great

Page 27611

 1     interest at that time, something that I'm still very much interested in,

 2     and that's peace negotiations, so that as early as in the beginning of

 3     April 1992, I took part in peace negotiations, and I think that sometime

 4     in early July I became the deputy foreign minister because of my

 5     activities.  And then, if I'm not mistaken, it was in September of the

 6     same year I became the adviser for national security to the president of

 7     the republic.  But my primary area of responsibility was peace

 8     negotiations or peace talks.

 9             After the international conference for the former Yugoslavia was

10     established in Geneva, I was appointed the ambassador of the Republic of

11     Croatia to the United Nations in Geneva.  Again, the idea was that I

12     would participate in the work of the conference and in the talks.  And in

13     that capacity, I participated in most of the talks that took place in

14     Geneva at that time.  I also performed all the other duties that pertain

15     to the post of the permanent representative of the Republic of Croatia.

16     Since I was the first one to hold that post, there were quite a few of

17     those duties, I think that I signed more international treaties on behalf

18     of Croatia than any other diplomat.

19             Sometime in early 1994, if I'm not mistaken, when the so-called

20     contact group for peace talks was set up, they were dealing mostly with

21     Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also with the rest of the former Yugoslavia.

22     I was appointed the special envoy of the president of the republic, and

23     it was my remit to liaise with the contact group and to get involved in

24     negotiations.

25        Q.   If I can just stop you there.  The contact group, if you could

Page 27612

 1     just help us out here and just briefly tell us a little bit about that.

 2     We're going to go back and touch on some of these other things, but just

 3     before we go any further.

 4        A.   I'm convinced that the work of the contact group would be a topic

 5     that would crop up regularly during this trial.

 6             It was my impression that the contact group was set up at a time

 7     when the conference for the former Yugoslavia, as it had been conceived -

 8     it was headed by a representative of the European Union and a

 9     representative of the UN Secretary-General - no longer yielded

10     satisfactory results.

11             At that point in time, a group of countries - I think that the

12     United States gave the initiative - set up a pragmatic group of countries

13     called "the contact group."  It included representatives from the United

14     States of America, Germany, France, Great Britain, and Russia.  Although

15     that group was not based in any of the multilateral international

16     organisations, it was obvious that it wielded the power that would --

17     that was vested in it by the countries represented in the contact group,

18     and it was through the efforts of the contact group that first the

19     Washington Agreement was signed, and so were the basic principles of the

20     Dayton Agreement.  I think that even the Dayton Agreement was signed

21     through their efforts.

22             As all of us who follow foreign policy can see, there were

23     several other cases when contact groups were set up to deal with other

24     hot spots all over the world.

25        Q.   Now, just to interrupt here.  You mention Washington and Dayton.

Page 27613

 1     Did you participate in those two events, the establishment or the

 2     negotiation of the Washington Agreement and of the Dayton Accords?

 3        A.   Yes, I participated in both those events.

 4             As far as the Washington Agreement is concerned, I was there

 5     right at the beginning, at the first round of talks about the possibility

 6     of reaching an agreement between Bosniaks and Croats.  I took part in the

 7     pre talks, if I can call them that, preliminary talks in Geneva, partly

 8     in Paris, too, and I also participated in the negotiations, the actual

 9     negotiations that took place in Vienna in the US embassy on two

10     occasions.

11        Q.   What about Dayton?

12        A.   I think that I can say that I participated in all the stages of

13     the preparations for the Dayton Agreement.  I worked closely with

14     Ambassador Holbrooke and all the other people who were preparing the

15     agreement, and in a way I was in charge of organising our delegation, and

16     I was part of the delegation throughout the talks in Dayton.  I attended

17     the talks.  I came there one day before everyone else, and I left Dayton

18     with everybody else after the agreement was initialled.

19        Q.   All right.  Now, let me just fast forward, and then we're going

20     to double back.

21             And as I understand it, it was sometime after this period that

22     you served as ambassador to the United States, and also you've been the

23     minister of foreign affairs for the Republic of Croatia; is that correct?

24        A.   That's correct.

25        Q.   Now, and we can cover that a little bit more later on, but

Page 27614

 1     sticking with this as a segue into what I call your association with

 2     Tudjman:  In light of the fact that you were with -- you negotiated in

 3     Washington, you participated in Dayton, organised the delegation and was

 4     there, could you briefly tell us, by this point in time, at least, how

 5     much time had you spent with President Tudjman either in group settings

 6     or one on one?  What was your relationship so at least the Trial Chamber

 7     can make an assessment as to your knowledge of President Tudjman, his

 8     thoughts, his attitudes, because I think that may be important as a

 9     staging ground before we launch into these other areas.

10        A.   Although it's difficult to assess that in absolute terms, I think

11     that I did spend quite a lot of time with President Tudjman; not as much

12     as the people who worked with him in his office or in various ministries

13     because I spent most of my time abroad.  I was not in Croatia.  But I can

14     say that I had a direct relationship with him, in other words.  So

15     despite the fact that I was in the foreign ministry, I mostly received

16     instructions for my work directly from President Tudjman; not always, but

17     for the most part.

18             I also had an opportunity to present my views to him quite often,

19     and it was my impression that, as a rule, he would always hear me out,

20     and it seemed to me that he valued my opinion, especially when it came to

21     international relations.

22        Q.   Okay.  Now, just to make sure that -- because I'm told that

23     perhaps there might be an oversight in the record, on page 67, line 16.

24     I believe you said despite the fact that you were deputy foreign

25     minister; in other words, you weren't the foreign minister, you were

Page 27615

 1     deputy, you had this close relationship -- close association with

 2     President Tudjman; is that correct?

 3        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 4        Q.   Now, with that in mind, what I propose to do is first cover some

 5     general areas, and then we're going to go through a series of documents.

 6     But I think it might be interesting for the Trial Chamber to go right

 7     into these issues right from the get go.

 8             The Prosecutor and the Prosecution has alleged that President

 9     Tudjman had certain attitudes towards Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Those

10     attitudes stem from the fact of part of this Banovina Hrvatska?

11        A.   [In English] I apologise.  There is a mistake in -- even in the

12     English, there is a mistake in the text, that it is written here.

13        Q.   Don't worry.  If I'm speaking, they're going to correct it.

14        A.   [In English] Okay.

15        Q.   Okay, in line 10, but I'm glad you're catching it.

16             So my first question, first and foremost, do you feel confident

17     that you spent enough time with President Tudjman and that you knew him

18     well enough to know of his attitudes about Bosnia-Herzegovina,

19     specifically as they related to the Prosecution's allegation that

20     Tudjman, Susak and others were -- had embarked on a joint criminal

21     enterprise to carve up Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to at least take part

22     of the Banovina back and make it part of Croatia.  Can you -- help us out

23     here?

24        A.   President Tudjman was a complex person, as a historian, as a

25     statesman, as a person who left his mark on one part of history of a

Page 27616

 1     whole region, and to -- it is not really easy to outline his opinion --

 2     opinions in just a few sentences, but I think that I had enough

 3     opportunity to discuss things with him and that we worked together for a

 4     sufficiently long period of time to be able to say, with certainty and

 5     conviction, things that you asked me about.

 6        Q.   All right.  Well, let me just cut to the chase.  Let me just ask

 7     you straightforward.

 8             Did you ever hear or did you ever know or did you ever see any

 9     document, for that matter, where President Tudjman was advocating for the

10     re-establishment of the Banovina Hrvatska?  Especially I ask you that

11     question because the Prosecution has brought witnesses here in this

12     courtroom showing that the Banovina is in the Constitution, in the

13     preamble.  We're going to get to that, but so have you ever come across

14     any document, had you ever heard -- overhear a conversation or partake in

15     any conversation with President Tudjman --

16             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry, Mr. Karnavas.  Is this a

17     non-directive question?

18             MR. KARNAVAS:  Yes.

19             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I find it very, very directive, actually.

20             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, I'm asking --

21             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  You say everything.  He just has to say "yes" or

22     "no".

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  No because then the -- I'm going to get him to

24     explain, but if there's a way that you would prefer me to ask the

25     question, because I certainly know the question goes with the answer.

Page 27617

 1        Q.   Firstly, let me ask you this:  I'll break it down.  Did you know

 2     President Tudjman's attitudes about BiH?  And if so, what were those

 3     attitudes, clear and cut, knowing the Prosecution's theory?

 4             MR. KARNAVAS:  Because you got to know that, Your Honours.  He's

 5     got to know what the Prosecution's theory is.

 6        Q.   Would you please tell us?

 7        A.   Well, on the basis of my overall work and all of those things

 8     that I know, I could say with full certainty that President Tudjman

 9     supported Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state, that he wanted to

10     have a special relationship with it for several reasons.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters note, could His Honour

12     Judge Trechsel please switch off his microphone.

13             MR. KARNAVAS:

14        Q.   Now, special reasons, if you could tell us, what were those

15     reasons because I want it from your mouth, not from my mouth.  I want it

16     for the record.  I want the Judges to know exactly what you knew, what

17     you heard, what you saw, what you experienced, what you felt.

18        A.   Well, I think that the first reason -- the first reason was

19     because President Tudjman, both as a historian and as a statesman, knew

20     that unless the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina were resolved, there

21     could be no lasting peace in the region.

22             The second reason was because President Tudjman, both because of

23     his personal traits but also because it was his obligation under the

24     Constitution, had the interests of all the Croats all over the world at

25     heart, in particular Croats who lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina because

Page 27618

 1     it was quite clear right from the beginning of the war that the Croats

 2     who had lived there for centuries were under threat.

 3             The third reason, a very important reason, was that from the

 4     beginning of the aggression against the Republic of Croatia, some of

 5     those attacks were launched from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

 6     and Tudjman, not only because he was a general - this was something that

 7     was clear to any layperson - knew that Croatia could not defend itself if

 8     this fact was not taken into account, the fact that attacks were launched

 9     from the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10        Q.   Let me stop you right there before you go on.

11             If you could please describe to the Trial Chamber, what efforts

12     did the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina do to stop those attacks being

13     launched into Croatia, concretely?  How many troops did they send; what

14     sort of weapons did they use; what did they do exactly to repel these

15     activities?

16        A.   My impression from that time, and this has been confirmed after

17     I've read some documents relating to this period, was that the leadership

18     of Bosnia and Herzegovina did nothing.  Quite the opposite was true.  In

19     the critical moments, in the first months of the aggression against

20     Croatia, the then-president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Izetbegovic,

21     said that it was not their war.

22        Q.   All right.  Let me stop you right here because we have a map, and

23     because you said that Croatia was under attack, and disregarding some of

24     those arrows that are there, but if you could tell us -- at least because

25     of your experience, you told us that you had served in the army; early on

Page 27619

 1     you had joined.  Could you tell us a little bit about where the attacks

 2     came from and how it impacted on Croatia because I think it might be

 3     good -- just might be good for the Trial Chamber to know about where and

 4     how Croatia was being attacked from Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to

 5     fully understand and comprehend the context in which Croatia was then

 6     having this relationship which you speak of and will be speaking about

 7     with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 8        A.   Although I did spend some time in the military, I do not consider

 9     myself a military expert, but you don't really need a lot of military

10     expertise for what I'm about to tell you.

11             Whoever drew in those axes of attacks on Croatia was correct.

12     This is how those attacks were executed, and I have nothing to add or to

13     take away.  This is really how the aggression against Croatia progressed,

14     and when you look at the map, you will see that a fewer -- fewer attacks

15     were actually launched from the territory of Serbia.  Their objective was

16     mostly Vukovar, at the beginning of the war, also to Osijek.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Witness, I'm sorry for

18     intervening.  I'm saying "witness."  I could say "minister" or

19     "professor" or "ambassador."

20             On several occasions, you spoke about the aggression against

21     Croatia.  For the Judges to be fully informed, could you specify the

22     dates?  When was there an aggression?  Could you tell us what the legal

23     situation was for Croatia with respect to international law?  What was

24     its relationship with the former Yugoslavia?  Could you be more specific

25     in your answers so that the Judges can reorientate themselves, knowing,

Page 27620

 1     of course, that this was a very complex situation?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I will try to do

 3     that, but I have to apologise in advance if I fail to provide accurate

 4     dates.  I will be focusing more on situations.

 5             After the Croatian people took part in a referendum and opted for

 6     Croatia's independence by an overwhelming majority, at the time when it

 7     became clear that it would be unrealistic to expect that it could

 8     continue being part of the former Yugoslavia, and this despite the fact

 9     that President Tudjman, together with the Slovenian representative,

10     President Kucan, did table a proposal under which Yugoslavia could

11     continue to exist as a confederation of sovereign states.  And when this

12     proposal was rejected, the Yugoslav Army tried to prevent Slovenia from

13     leaving Yugoslavia.  If I'm not mistaken, that was in June 1991, but I

14     have to apologise once again if I fail to provide accurate dates.

15             The Yugoslav Army failed to stop Slovenia from leaving.  The war,

16     or the attack, if you will, did not go on for too long.

17             There were two parallel developments in Croatia at the time in

18     progress.  Some of the Serbs living in Croatia fell under the influence

19     of Greater Serbian ideas derived from Belgrade.  These Serbs, to all

20     practical intents, occupied or seized part of Croatia's territory, having

21     previously expelled all non-Serbs from those areas, particularly in the

22     area surrounding the town of Knin.

23             It was hand in hand with these developments that the JNA, on the

24     other hand, started talking about their intention to prevent the breakup

25     of Yugoslavia.  They underlined this by launching an attack against

Page 27621

 1     Croatia.

 2        Q.   Let me interrupt here just to clear the record.  On page 73, line

 3     15, it should be -- the gentleman indicated "non-Serbs," and that's what

 4     the translator had indicated.  He had said that they expelled non-Serbs,

 5     not the Serbs, because the Serbs obviously wouldn't be expelling

 6     themselves.

 7        A.   On the 8th of October, 1991, Croatia's Parliament passed a

 8     decision to sever all relations to Yugoslavia or by now the former

 9     Yugoslavia.  The Yugoslav Army at the time was busy occupying Croatia's

10     east.  They held the town of Vukovar under siege for several weeks,

11     practically flattening it in the process.  They committed crimes of a

12     massive magnitude against the civilian population, thereby perpetrating

13     the first act of ethnic cleansing known to the modern world.  In other

14     words, they expelled virtually all of the non-Serbs who used to reside in

15     that area.

16             By way of an answer to Your Honour's question, I'd be hard put to

17     say who was the first to use the actual term "aggression ."  However,

18     keeping in mind the framework that I have just outlined, I do believe

19     that "aggression" is an appropriate term to describe what the Yugoslav

20     Army was busy doing at the time.

21        Q.   Now, let me -- let me focus you, since we're on this issue of

22     aggression, we all know about -- and in fact they've prosecuted a couple

23     of cases here in this particular building, cases dealing with Dubrovnik.

24     First, could you tell us what happened in that area, where is it located

25     exactly in Croatia, and if you know anything in particular about those

Page 27622

 1     events?

 2        A.   I do believe I know a great deal about what was happening in and

 3     around Dubrovnik at the time.

 4             Dubrovnik was attacked sometime early in October 1991.  A large

 5     minority of the attacks came from Montenegro's territory, while most of

 6     the attacks were being launched from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 7        Q.   Who was launching the attacks?

 8        A.   If I may just complete what I was saying.  Some of the attacks

 9     were coming from the sea.  Seaborne attacks were being carried out by the

10     JNA navy.  Attacks from other areas were being carried out by the JNA,

11     and as was suggested at the time, it was aided in this by certain Serb

12     and Montenegrin volunteers who were involved in this.  There is no doubt

13     that the attacks were planned and organised as well as carried out by the

14     JNA.  I believe this is also in evidence in one of the judgements passed

15     by this Tribunal.

16             May I just ask you to focus on the outline of --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters note, we can't hear the witness

18     properly because he's speaking too far away from the microphone.

19             MR. KARNAVAS:  We may need to move the microphones a little bit

20     so you can be heard, and we need a pointer --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Karnavas, please.

22             MR. KARNAVAS:  If we have a pointer, it might be useful.

23             I guess the record should reflect that the witness is pointing to

24     a map that has been used in the past in this courtroom by the Praljak

25     Defence team, which we appreciate them lending us the map for this

Page 27623

 1     purpose, and I believe it's under 3D 03171.

 2        Q.   Okay.  Now, you were pointing to that one area in the southern

 3     part of Croatia, and I believe what you are pointing at is what is known

 4     as Neum; is that correct?

 5        A.   That's right.  Croatia's coastline is not entirely homogenous.

 6     It is intersected at one point by Bosnia-Herzegovina territory.  The

 7     relevant section surrounds the town of Neum.  The reason I'm bringing

 8     this up is because based on everything I know about the negotiations, I

 9     do believe there will be further need to discuss Neum at a later stage in

10     this trial.

11             Then there is the southern-most section of Croatia's territory, a

12     place known as Prevlaka, and that is where Croatia borders on Montenegro.

13     May I say with a certain degree of satisfaction that today this

14     represents the border between two friendly states.

15             Nevertheless, at the time this was a starting point for an

16     aggression against Croatia's territory, and this was being done hand in

17     hand with attacks coming from Bosnia and Herzegovina's territory.  This

18     part of Bosnia-Herzegovina or East Herzegovina, if you like, is mostly

19     populated by Serbs.

20        Q.   You're pointing to the southern part --

21        A.   Around the town of Trebinje.  I'm talking about East Herzegovina,

22     mostly populated by Serbs.  There were, however, a number of Croat

23     villages in the area.  I'm saying there were.  I'm saying that because at

24     a very early stage, I believe in the autumn of 1991, the villages were in

25     fact taken by the JNA.  Crimes against civilians were committed, and the

Page 27624

 1     civilians living in the area were, as a result, expelled.

 2             Bosnia and Herzegovina's leadership failed to react in any shape

 3     or form.  They did not denounce this as an act or aggression, nor did

 4     they in fact pay any particular attention to this in any other way.

 5             When the Serb forces eventually took this entire area in Eastern

 6     Herzegovina, their task became relatively simple, the objective being to

 7     take this narrow strip of land adjacent to the Croatian coastline,

 8     thereby surrounding or encircling the city of Dubrovnik.

 9             The Croatian forces, they were pitifully weak.  I think we were

10     looking at a total of maybe around ten Croatian soldiers who managed to

11     hold on to Sroj, a hill behind Dubrovnik, as their last stronghold.

12             However, in addition to their desire to seize this territory,

13     which to a large extent they were successful in doing - if I may be

14     permitted to comment here as a human being and as a professional

15     psychologist - they also had another desire which I found difficult to

16     understand but patently obvious, that other desire being to simply

17     destroy Dubrovnik.

18             Dubrovnik was no sort of military target.  There were no Croatian

19     armed forces in Dubrovnik itself, despite which the town was directly

20     targeted and damage was caused to the city's ancient walls.  The degree

21     of destruction was unprecedented in the city's long history.

22             Dubrovnik was not eventually taken by the attacking forces.

23     Nevertheless, the ring around Dubrovnik was tightening over a couple of

24     months.  Throughout those months, the only way to access Dubrovnik was by

25     sea, and this applied to food supplies, medical supplies, or anything

Page 27625

 1     else, the situation being what it was.

 2             And I think I'm now returning to the initial question.  Anyone in

 3     their right state of mind could only draw the following conclusion:  The

 4     only way to defend Dubrovnik was by defending the part of the coast that

 5     actually belonged to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  There simply was no other

 6     way to defend Dubrovnik or, indeed, to stop the aggression from spreading

 7     and more territory from being seized.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Let me stop you here for a second because you began by

 9     pointing to Neum, and, again, just to make sure that we fully appreciate

10     this because you also indicated that supplies -- the only way supplies

11     could get to -- in order for supplies to get to Dubrovnik, it had to go

12     through the sea, could you please tell us what significance Neum played?

13        A.   In a military sense, the significance of Neum at the time was

14     tantamount to the significance of the entire remaining portion of the

15     hinterland that I'm pointing out [indicates].  Regardless of this, in a

16     political and purely metaphorical sense, Neum became one of the key

17     issues being discussed by Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18        Q.   And why?

19        A.   As a result of this particular experience, the experience of how

20     vulnerable this particular section of Croatia was, simply because it was,

21     in purely geographic terms, isolated from the rest of Croatia and

22     therefore impossible to defend, in the eyes of all Croats and President

23     Tudjman, Neum became a strategic hotspot.  On the other hand, Neum also

24     constitutes Bosnia's and Herzegovina's only access to Adriatic Sea, which

25     made it a hot political issue for them as well.

Page 27626

 1             I think it is no exaggeration to say that hours and hours were

 2     spent in friendly negotiations between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina

 3     about Neum.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Now, can you tell me a little bit about those

 5     negotiations?  What were those negotiations about?

 6        A.   At various points in time, depending on solutions envisaged by

 7     the International Community for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the talks

 8     developed in different ways.  Invariably, however, whether the discussion

 9     was about the division into three different republics or that envisaged

10     in the Vance-Stoltenberg Plan, Neum always ended up belonging to the part

11     of territory falling under Croatia's control, so to speak, in terms of

12     this internal organisation being proposed for Bosnia-Herzegovina, simply

13     because it happens to be in an area that is largely populated by Croats,

14     and this applies to the town of Neum itself as well.

15             However, each of the Muslim Bosniak governments were at pains to

16     point out the significance that Neum held for them because it was their

17     only point of access to the Adriatic Sea, regardless of the fact that

18     this failed to effect the international status of Bosnia and Herzegovina

19     as a landlocked country, because this kind of access does not allow them

20     to access the Adriatic Sea, since Neum is simply unable -- it doesn't up

21     to the capacity to be used as a commercial port, or at least this is what

22     I have invariably been told by experts of all sorts of different

23     affiliations.  Regardless of this, all of these successive governments in

24     Sarajevo were adamant about this.  All sorts of solutions were being

25     proposed.

Page 27627

 1             Neum was often placed in the same context as the port of Ploce,

 2     which is the kind of port that can indeed be put to good use as a

 3     commercial port.  While the former Yugoslavia was still around, Bosnia

 4     and Herzegovina tended to use Ploce as a commercial port.

 5             There were several rounds of negotiations that I attended where

 6     discussion focused on the possibility to allow Bosnia-Herzegovina access

 7     to Ploce and at the same time to allow Croatia unimpeded transit through

 8     the Neum area belonging to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Some of the options

 9     and proposals were more imaginative and some less.  Some proposed a

10     tunnel.  Some proposed a major road crossing the area, based on the

11     German model, you might say.  In symbolic and political terms, this is

12     still an issue for the Republic of Croatia, and this is demonstrated by

13     the fact that as we speak, Croatia is busy building a bridge connecting

14     the mainland with the Peljesac Peninsula in a bit to find a way around

15     this political issue.

16        Q.   Was the issue of swapping land, say swapping Neum with Croatian

17     coastal land, ever discussed?  And if so, in what context?

18        A.   Yes, that, too, was one of the points being negotiated.  This

19     wasn't something that was widely publicized, I believe.  However, at one

20     point in time, for at least two months, negotiations went on between

21     Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina about a possible swap, and what this

22     involved was Neum, on the one hand, and the area around Prevleka and

23     Molunat on the other.  I can't remember specifically who informed me

24     about this, who brought it up.  It might have been Lord Owen or perhaps

25     someone else from the international conference.  I made sure to inform

Page 27628

 1     President Tudjman about these ideas that were being tossed about.

 2             And then it was in Geneva, unless I'm mistaken, and this is

 3     something that is based on statements that I saw from Mr. Sarinic and

 4     also in Zagreb, that this possibility was eventually discussed.  In other

 5     words, we are looking at a stretch of the coast that is about 12

 6     kilometres long in Neum's case, and the idea was awarding Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina an equivalent stretch in the Prevlaka and Molunat area.

 8             I believe -- not only do I believe.  In fact, I actually heard

 9     President Tudjman discuss this.  His reasoning was primarily to link

10     these different parts of Croatia in a purely territorial sense.  I think

11     both he and the international negotiators, regardless of the fact that

12     any statesman would find it difficult or impossible to accept such a

13     swap.

14             As I was saying, I think there were additional reasons for him.

15     He wanted to find a way around having a border with Montenegro.  Back

16     then, Montenegro could in no way be considered a friendly country.  "Back

17     then," as I say.  The borders shared with Bosnia and Herzegovina is

18     simply a given that is something that Croatia is doomed to, so whether it

19     was slightly longer or slightly shorter is not something that would have

20     changed anything essential about the nature of this problem.

21             This was further aggravated by the sad fact that the Croatian

22     population, because the area is populated essentially in its entirety by

23     Croats, had already been expelled and their houses had been destroyed

24     almost in their entirety.

25             I don't know that solution would have succeeded or not, but

Page 27629

 1     another problem cropped up when representatives of the Serb entity in

 2     Bosnia and Herzegovina, too, started making demands about an access to

 3     the Adriatic Sea.  It was at this point that the conference started

 4     discussing issues about this and making plans about potentially having

 5     two commercial ports, Prevlaka and Molunat, one purportedly to be used by

 6     the Bosniaks, because they were the party that were adamant about it, and

 7     the other by the Serbs, because they too were adamant about this.

 8             However, sometime later, and it wasn't a particularly exceptional

 9     circumstance that this peace plan changed as did a number of others, the

10     idea was dropped and to my knowledge never discussed at later stages.

11             If I may just add this, in no uncertain terms, but I think that

12     is what your question implied, to some degree.  This is the only

13     situation that I'm aware of, the only situation that I witnessed, but

14     President Tudjman agreed to discuss possible swaps or anything at all

15     that might have affected the extent of Croatia's territory.

16             Likewise, I can say that several approaches were made by both

17     Serbia and Yugoslavia but also by international players, the gist being

18     that a possible territorial swap would resolve the war in Croatia.

19     Nevertheless, and I must say this again, this was the only situation

20     where President Tudjman actually agreed to discuss anything like this.

21        Q.   Okay.  Before we leave --

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  Witness, a follow-up question,

23     please, because you were not very precise.

24             This basic question of access to the sea which is claimed by

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina, but as you said, also by the Serbian entity, what was

Page 27630

 1     the final position of President Tudjman?  Was he in favour of, against

 2     it, or based on all the data would he have accepted a swap?  What was his

 3     basic position in respect of this demand, which might be quite a

 4     fundamental one for any state?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand, Your Honour, and

 6     I think that this is the way that President Tudjman understood it, in

 7     fact.  He agreed to discuss it.  The talks were not brought to completion

 8     because the idea -- the whole idea at that time was not heading towards

 9     its implementation.

10             It was my impression, and I have to stress that this was an

11     impression, that had it been possible to achieve a stable and

12     long-lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time, that President

13     Tudjman would have accepted that solution in the face of any possible

14     political repercussions.

15             MR. KARNAVAS:  Thank you, Mr. President.

16        Q.   Now, before we leave that region, you told us that the

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina government did nothing to stop the JNA, did not

18     assist, did literally nothing.  Could you tell us how much assistance,

19     that is, military assistance, combat assistance, did the UN provide - the

20     United Nations, that is - through its Security Council or whatever.  What

21     kind of troops it provided to defend the territorial integrity of Croatia

22     in that southern part, and in particular, in protecting Dubrovnik which

23     has been characterized as the jewel of the Adriatic?

24        A.   Unfortunately, and I really do mean that, unfortunately, and this

25     is something that I can really say with full responsibility, there was no

Page 27631

 1     assistance whatsoever.

 2        Q.   All right.  And before we leave this issue of aggression, because

 3     we have the map, if you could tell us, and try to keep it within a time

 4     frame, as well, when this aggression occurred against Croatia, how much,

 5     if any, of the Croatian soil was occupied and by whom?  And when I mean

 6     "occupied," by foreign forces or foreign aggressors.

 7        A.   At least one-third of the Croatia territory was occupied, and it

 8     remained occupied, for all intents and purposes, until 1995.

 9        Q.   From what date, though?  Tell us about what's starting -- and you

10     don't have to give us an exact, but approximately, so at least we have an

11     idea, because I'm going to ask you about this issue, where all this stuff

12     happened, because I'm going to be asking about this kind of

13     [Indiscernible] issue where all this stuff happened, and there's going to

14     be all sorts of discussions because the Prosecution's theory is that

15     during this period while Croatia is occupied at the same -- by the JNA,

16     at the same time, you know, they're negotiating for other parts in

17     neighbouring countries, so could you tell us?

18        A.   Well, Eastern Slavonia, after the fall of Vukovar, that was in

19     October 1991, remained occupied until 1998 when it was brought back under

20     the Croatian authority in the process of peaceful reintegration.

21        Q.   We need to make a record.  Of course, you're pointing at 3D

22     03171.  That's the map.  And you pointed at a part of Croatia.  Could you

23     tell us exactly where you're pointing?  Where is this area that you're

24     saying was occupied?

25        A.   Well, that would be this area here [indicates].  Of course, I

Page 27632

 1     can't now draw it in very accurately, but that would be the part that

 2     we're talking about.

 3             MR. KARNAVAS:  It might be easier if we just put a map on the

 4     ELMO and you can sort of pencil in or -- you should be able to do that.

 5        Q.   Now -- and while we're getting that ready, but I see -- if I look

 6     at the map, I see that there's some arrows of other areas that -- if you

 7     could listen to my question before you get that.

 8        A.   Mm-hmm.

 9        Q.   And when I see the big map, I see other arrows pointing

10     presumably at attacks from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia, so could you --

11     could we first get -- cover that area, because what I'm interested in is

12     if there was a particular logic -- if there was a particular logic in

13     what the JNA was trying to do, that is, strategic logic, and why they

14     were targeting certain areas in Croatia that might be of some

15     significance.

16        A.   I think although other areas were under occupation, I think that

17     in this context we should look at three areas.

18             (In English) I wouldn't dare to draw because I am not so precise

19     in this, but I think that I am quite precise in what I would try to

20     explain.

21        Q.   Okay, but you need to say, like, "east," "west," so that way we

22     have a record.

23        A.   [In English] Certainly.

24             [Interpretation] So a part of Eastern Croatia was occupied by the

25     Yugoslav People's Army, primarily.  A part of Croatia around Knin, in

Page 27633

 1     this area [indicates], was occupied primarily by the Serbs, who used to

 2     live -- or, rather, who lived in that area, but they received military

 3     support from the Yugoslav Army, and in ideological terms, they relied on

 4     Belgrade, and the guiding principle was a Greater Serbia.  This part

 5     remained occupied until the military and police operation launched by

 6     Croatia in the summer of 1995.

 7             The occupied territory shrunk at one point because at one point

 8     it went all the way down to the sea.  That was in late 1991 and early

 9     1992.  Croatia was virtually cut in two.  In order to travel from Zagreb

10     to Split, you had to go from Zagreb to Rijeka, and then you had to take a

11     boat because it was impossible to travel by land.  It lasted a couple of

12     months, but the occupation of this area that was called the Serbian

13     Krajina or the Republic of Serbian Krajina, continued until August 1998

14     [as interpreted] --

15             THE INTERPRETER:  1995, interpreter's correction.

16        A.   -- based on information that Croatia had at its disposal in

17     autumn of 1991, and this information was obtained from various sources,

18     including sources in the Yugoslav People's Army because some of the

19     officers had defected and joined the Croatian side, it was Serbia's plan

20     to occupy Croatia so that the border would run from Virovitica to

21     Karlobag.  The point was to create the so-called "Greater Serbia."  There

22     is a series of documents about that, and I think that it's quite

23     interesting and indicative to note here that some were published before

24     aggression started, before Yugoslavia broke down.

25             This plan fell through, in military terms, for a number of

Page 27634

 1     reasons.  I don't want to say that I am a military expert.  By no means,

 2     I'm not, but I was close enough to those events to say that there were

 3     three key military reasons why this plan fell through.

 4             First of all, the Yugoslav People's Army took more time than had

 5     been planned to capture the town of Vukovar, and this made it possible

 6     for the Croatian forces to mount their defence.

 7             Second, somewhere here [indicates] there is Sunja.  It's

 8     here [indicates].  If I'm not mistaken, it was a major railway junction,

 9     and had the Serbian forces taken it, or, rather, had the Yugoslav Army,

10     had it taken it, it would have been able to hold this key railway line.

11     The Croatian forces managed to defend the town, and the commander of the

12     defence of the town of Sunija was Mr. Slobodan Praljak.  This is a

13     historic fact.  I actually met him there, or, rather, I had known him

14     before, but this is where we met on one occasion.

15             The third key reason is the fact that they failed to take this

16     area around Sibenik and they couldn't cut Croatia in two.  Had they

17     managed to do that, Croatia would have been really cut in two and

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina would have fallen later, and this crazy, insane idea

19     of a Greater Serbia, it would be possible to actually implement it.

20             But despite the fact that anyone with any common sense would see

21     this idea for what it was, an insane idea, it is obvious that they really

22     tried to implement this idea.  And when they failed to implement this

23     idea, they opted for some alternative strategic options.  One of those

24     options was to take the whole of the territory all the way down to the

25     Neretva River.  I think that there is enough evidence in support of this

Page 27635

 1     option.

 2             When they decided against this initial idea to take this whole

 3     area, even those who considered themselves to be more reasonable -

 4     although we cannot really use this term - in the Serbian leadership were

 5     considering the idea of giving up on holding the area around Knin and

 6     this area here [indicates], and in return they wanted Croatia to cede

 7     parts of Eastern Slavonia.  I heard those proposals on several occasions

 8     from third parties, and twice I actually was there when those proposals

 9     were mooted.

10        Q.   If I can interrupt you here for a second.  Just to go back to the

11     Sunja situation because that was one of the three reasons, and as I

12     understand it, it's rather -- the example of that is rather indicative,

13     and you mentioned that it was General Praljak that was involved.  Do you

14     feel knowledgeable enough to inform us exactly what it was -- or how that

15     was defended and how that played a key role as one of the three main

16     reasons why the JNA failed in their project?

17        A.   Well, quite a few years have passed, and I will try to recollect.

18             We, as members of the Croatian Army, came to visit Sunja, and we

19     were able to see on what lines the defence was organised.  The defence

20     was mounted by a small number of troops, if you compared the defence with

21     the attacking force, but the defence command and General Praljak -- well,

22     he was not the general at that time.  He commanded the defence -- had

23     this idea that he implemented.  He had trenches dug all around the town,

24     making it possible for his soldiers to move quickly from one position to

25     another.  This is not something that I heard.  This is something that I

Page 27636

 1     actually saw.  There was heating installed in some of the trenches.  This

 2     made it possible for the soldiers to man those positions for much longer

 3     than classic military doctrine prescribed.

 4             At that time, Mr. Praljak expounded his defence philosophy.  He

 5     said that, in fact, his defence philosophy was the exact opposite of the

 6     JNA doctrine, and obviously it functioned in this town because Croatia

 7     managed to defend this town.

 8        Q.   All right.  Okay, thank you.  Now, we only have ten minutes left,

 9     so I want to touch just briefly on two other issues in the general sense

10     because tomorrow we will go through documents to tie all this together,

11     this and other matters.  But have -- you are acquainted -- I could put it

12     in another fashion.  Are you acquainted with the Friendship and

13     Cooperation Agreement?  And if the answer is, "Yes," how so, very, very

14     briefly, and what it is, again very briefly?

15        A.   Yes, I think that I am quite well acquainted with it because I

16     was personally involved in drafting the agreement.  I was directly

17     involved in drafting the agreement, and I also worked on the preparations

18     for this agreement for months before the agreement was actually drafted

19     or signed.

20        Q.   Who is the agreement with?  And if you could give us a time, and

21     perhaps it might assist if you could tell us, was this before or after

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence?

23        A.   The agreement itself was in July 1992, so it was after, but

24     President Tudjman had instructed me, in a way, as early as the beginning

25     of April 1992.  He explained to me why it was necessary to aim for such

Page 27637

 1     an agreement and asked me to start working on the agreement.  It took

 2     several months to draft it.  During this period, Bosnia-Herzegovina

 3     achieved international recognition, and there were several meetings that

 4     preceded the actual signing of the agreement.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Now, we're going to get into that agreement when we get to

 6     the Prosecution document -- 339 is their document.  They're familiar with

 7     it.  We'll be discussing that and going into it in more detail, but, you

 8     know, reflecting back, did that agreement, that Friendship and

 9     Cooperation Agreement, had anything, in your opinion, had anything to do

10     with the events that were ongoing at the time, specifically the events

11     that you spoke of for the last hour or so, that is, the aggression and

12     the occupation of Croatia --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Counsel is kindly asked to speak closer to the

14     microphone.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it was directly linked to this

16     fact.  President Tudjman was fully aware of the fact that without the

17     possibility to defend Croatia from the territory of Bosnia and

18     Herzegovina, it would be impossible to actually defend it.  I remember

19     that quite clearly because that was the first time that I travelled with

20     him to participate in negotiations.  That was on the 1st of April, 1992,

21     so already at that time, months before the agreement was signed, he was

22     explaining to me in the car that it was necessary to achieve an agreement

23     with Mr. Izetbegovic, regardless of the fact that it's not always easy.

24     I remember that he said that.  He said it has to be done because Croatia

25     would not be able to defend itself otherwise, in this area here, but also

Page 27638

 1     in other areas potentially.  So that was one reason.

 2             The second reason for this agreement, right from the beginning of

 3     my working together with President Tudjman, this is something that I

 4     always heard him say, and I think that it was also right from the

 5     beginning of working together with the International Community, President

 6     Tudjman always strove to find a solution where the Croatian people in

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina would be protected, and of course this agreement had

 8     this dimension too.

 9        Q.   Okay.  Now, just for the record purposes, you were pointing at

10     the map, which is 3D 03171.  I believe you were pointing at the southern

11     part of Croatia.  Am I correct in stating that that's -- when you said

12     that -- earlier, when you said that Tudjman wanted to make sure that

13     Croatia was able to protect that area, is that the area we're speaking of

14     primarily?

15        A.   Yes, primarily, because as you can see here on this map, in other

16     areas, too, it was easier to defend the Croatian territory if you didn't

17     have the Serbian forces manning positions on this side.  But in military

18     theory and in practice, as it turned out, it was possible to do that from

19     the Croatian side, too.  The only way to liberate Dubrovnik, according to

20     the doctrine, would be if Croatia had a strong navy and a strong air

21     force, and Croatia had neither.  And the only way to access Dubrovnik by

22     land would involve the forces going to the territory of another state,

23     and otherwise it would have been impossible because even a small force

24     would be able to hold Dubrovnik against an attack.

25        Q.   Okay.  The last general area, and we're going to speak about this

Page 27639

 1     quite a bit, but we have five minutes, is the issue of confederation, and

 2     I would appreciate it if you would tell us, first of all, have you ever

 3     heard of that term, in what context was it used, what was it meant?  And

 4     specifically we're speaking about if President Tudjman ever used that

 5     term because we have some documents.  It's come up.  It's cropped up

 6     quite a bit in certain documents, but could you tell us, what was your

 7     understanding, if any, of this particular term?

 8        A.   As a statement and -- as a statement and as the presidents of the

 9     republic, President Tudjman based his work on three principles:  The

10     principle of creation, survival, and recognition of Croatia within its

11     existing borders.  I think that was the first basic principle.  The

12     second principle was to protect the Croatian people -- the Croatian

13     ethnic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina but within the territory of

14     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  And the third principle was to stop the war.

15             I think it is possible to prove that at every point, these were

16     the three guiding principles.  The confederation cropped up on several

17     occasions, and after all, after the Washington Agreement and the Dayton

18     Agreement, confederation was spoken about as a future fait accompli.  But

19     I was in a position to work on this model of confederation at earlier

20     stages.

21             I think that President Tudjman liked the confederation model

22     because it made it possible to implement all three principles:  The

23     Croatian territory would not be under any threat; Croats within the

24     borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina would enjoy an adequate status; and it was

25     possible to stop the war with this option.

Page 27640

 1             In the late summer of 1993, in late August and early September,

 2     President Tudjman instructed me to embark on talks with the

 3     representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina about the political

 4     reproachment and also the cessation of any hostilities between Muslims,

 5     Bosniaks, and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Following those

 6     instructions, I talked with Haris Silajdzic, and we agreed on a meeting

 7     where we were to discuss various ideas that might result in this.  I set

 8     up a meeting with him with quite a specific date in September of 1993 in

 9     Geneva, and then Mr. Silajdzic told me that he would be accompanied at

10     this meeting by Mr. Komsic.

11             I told President Tudjman about that, and he asked me what would

12     Mr. Komsic's capacity be.  I didn't know that, but President Tudjman

13     said, "Fine, accept the meeting."  And then having thought about it a bit

14     later, he called me and said that I would be accompanied by Ambassador

15     Biscevic at that meeting.  At that time, Ambassador Biscevic I believe

16     was the Croatian ambassador to Turkey.  I knew him well.  I had worked

17     with him in the foreign ministry.  Mr. Biscevic travelled to Geneva.  The

18     four of us met in the president's hotel in Geneva, and based on our

19     talks, we drafted an agreement, a written agreement between Tudjman and

20     Izetbegovic, and I think it was signed on the 15th of September, 1993,

21     but I may be wrong on that.  I'm just giving you this date off the top of

22     my head.

23             And if I can now go back to confederation --

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation]  No, we have to stop.  It's

25     7.00 p.m.  It's fascinating listening to you, but we have the clock, and

Page 27641

 1     we have to stop.

 2             Witness, just a few reminders.  You are under oath, so you are a

 3     witness of justice.  In other words, you're not allowed to have any

 4     contacts with Defence, with Mr. Prlic's Defence, or with the other

 5     accused or Defence teams, or the Prosecution, or of course with the

 6     Judges.

 7             We shall reconvene tomorrow at 2.15 for the end of the

 8     examination-in-chief.  I think you've used about an hour, Mr. Karnavas,

 9     but we'll know that more exactly from the Registrar.  So we'll have three

10     and a half to four hours tomorrow to complete the examination-in-chief.

11             Good evening to all of you.

12                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.04 p.m.,

13                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 7th day

14                           of May, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.