Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 31134

 1                           Tuesday, 22 July 2008

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The Accused Pusic not present]

 5                           [The witness entered court]

 6                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the

 8     case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning,

10     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-74-T,

11     the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

13     Today is Tuesday, the 22nd of July, 2008.  Good morning to the accused.

14     My best wishes for Mr. Pusic who's been absent for a few of days.  Good

15     morning to the Defence counsel, to all the OTP representatives, and of

16     course good morning to you, Witness, and good morning to all the people

17     helping us.

18             We are going to continue with the cross-examination.  You have

19     used so far one hour and 39 minutes, Mr. Scott.  You may proceed.

20             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good morning,

21     Your Honours, and to all those in and around the courtroom.  Just before

22     I begin, Your Honour, just for the record the Prosecution is filing this

23     morning a written objection to some Defence documents tendered through

24     the witness -- in connection with the witness Buntic, and we ran into a

25     bit of a computer glitch, but as soon as that's corrected it will be

Page 31135

 1     filed straight away this morning.

 2                           WITNESS:  MIOMIR ZUZUL [Resumed]

 3                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 4                           Cross-examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]

 5        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Zuzul.

 6        A.   [In English] Good morning.

 7        Q.   I'd like to just go back ever so briefly to just a couple of

 8     points from yesterday.  Again, just in terms of negotiations, would it be

 9     fair to say in your negotiations experience, would it be fair to say that

10     in a situation where people are -- parties may expect a cease-fire or a

11     peace agreement, if you will, to, if I can put it this way, break out at

12     any moment or to be approaching, each side at that moment wants to put as

13     much territory as possible under its boot, so to speak.  Is that correct?

14        A.   [Interpretation] Well, I think that one could put it that way,

15     generally speaking.

16        Q.   And so it wouldn't surprise you in any particular situation in

17     the Balkan conflict that all sides were engaged in that, would it?

18        A.   I wouldn't dare to make such a generalised statement in respect

19     of specific cases.  Generally speaking, that is correct but I wouldn't

20     dare confirm that for every specific case.

21        Q.   All right.  And you were asked some questions at one point about

22     military planning and you were shown some documents which seem to confirm

23     that there was indeed some advanced planning of certain military

24     operations.  Isn't it also correct, sir, that that's often the idea

25     behind planning military operation because you don't tell the other side

Page 31136

 1     what the plans are?

 2        A.   It is only logical and understandable that this should be the

 3     case.

 4        Q.   Now -- and then just touching on -- going back to the

 5     presidential transcript that we were in yesterday, I asked you about the

 6     decision to remove Mate Boban from the negotiations, from the peace

 7     negotiations, as of early -- at least early 1994, and I asked you about

 8     that and you said - looking at page 87 of the daily transcript from

 9     yesterday - and you said:  "But whether anyone made a formal decision

10     about that and who made it, I don't know."

11             But, sir, didn't you see it on the very page of the transcript

12     that I showed you that President Tudjman said in no uncertain terms:  I

13     made the decision, it was my decision, I decided.  Isn't that correct?

14             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour, I object.  Is he asking to verify

15     what's on the transcript or is he asking to verify what was on Tudjman's

16     mind and intentions?  There's a distinction there.

17             MR. SCOTT:  Not what was on Tudjman's mind, what Tudjman said.

18             MR. KARNAVAS:  Then the transcript speaks for itself.  That's the

19     best evidence.

20             MR. SCOTT:

21        Q.   And do you have some reason to doubt that, sir?

22        A.   Is that question addressed to me?  I'm sorry.

23        Q.   Yes, sir.  Didn't Tudjman say - and if we need to go to it again,

24     if you want to turn to Exhibit P 07856, which we'll be going back to in a

25     moment in any event, it was in the second binder, binder number 2.  The

Page 31137

 1     usher we'll need your assistance, please.

 2        A.   I remember what I said yesterday too, and you're right.

 3     President Tudjman uttered the sentence which found its way into the

 4     transcript.  However, what I said or added in my answer and what I wish

 5     to repeat today is that I don't know whether a formal body was supposed

 6     to verify or make that decision.

 7        Q.   Well --

 8        A.   However, as is generally known, the international community

 9     always asked President Tudjman to use his influence in the negotiations.

10     We can see this in the specific case.  The international community asked

11     President Tudjman to help and intercede in order to make sure that the

12     Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina were forthcoming and -- in these

13     negotiations.  Now, I don't know whether President Tudjman issued this

14     decision or not; this is something that I stressed.

15        Q.   Sir, what you just said now, isn't that another way of just

16     saying -- recognising that everyone involved, the international

17     community, knew of the direct connection between Tudjman and the

18     Herceg-Bosna leadership?  It was no secret, was it?  And it was for that

19     very reason that the international community approached Tudjman time

20     after time after time?

21        A.   Correct.

22        Q.   In fact -- I know you know and you've testified about some of

23     your dealings with Ambassador Galbraith, Ambassador Galbraith testified

24     that the direct connection and the control by Tudjman of the Herceg-Bosna

25     leadership, I think his exact words were was an open secret bearing on

Page 31138

 1     be -- verging on being no secret at all.  Would you agree with that?

 2        A.   That he had a direct connection with the representatives of

 3     Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina was no secret, open or otherwise.  When they

 4     came to -- into Zagreb for meetings, this was reported to the public at

 5     large.  When international negotiators came to Zagreb, it was always a

 6     public matter, no secret at all.

 7             Now, when it comes to control that you mentioned, that's a

 8     different matter.  It is true that President Tudjman had quite an

 9     influence over the Croat representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I don't

10     think that it was -- that he even had that sort of informal control at

11     all times.  I do recall when President Tudjman, or rather, the HDZ of

12     Croatia nominated -- or let me say supported a candidate from

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that candidate was not ultimately elected.  He

14     definitely had influence, but I wouldn't say that he always had control.

15        Q.   Going back to the transcript - and if you can find that, please,

16     now that you have the binder in front of you, binder number 2, 7856 - if

17     you'll go to page 8 of the transcript, please, just again confirming as

18     we began to discuss yesterday, your involvement in this particular

19     meeting.  On page 8 this statement is attributed to you.

20             "I might suggest, Mr. President, as Mr. Akmadzic and Mr. Zubak

21     received messages to transmit -- in fact, they're similar to what I said,

22     et cetera ..."

23             And then the conversation turns to Mr. Akmadzic and Mr. Akmadzic

24     says:  "I would just like to say a few words, as I assume, Mr. President,

25     that Mr. Granic and Mr. Zuzul have already informed you to some extent

Page 31139

 1     about certain matters."

 2             Was that the case, that prior to, in fact, this meeting you and

 3     Dr. Granic had already briefed President Tudjman on these matters?

 4        A.   I think that that's correct.

 5        Q.   There's a reference further down in the part that I just read to

 6     you about Mr. Akmadzic where he says:  "... we spoke with this delegation

 7     of the so-called Croatian council from Sarajevo."

 8             Can you briefly, please, tell us the Judges what this Croatian

 9     council from Sarajevo was?

10        A.   The Croatian council from Sarajevo was an attempt on the part of

11     a group of Croats living in Sarajevo, some of whom were politically

12     active before, others weren't, to get organized as a sort of parallel

13     representatives of Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It seems to me that

14     they never gained the support of the Croat population in

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Regardless of the fact that representatives of the

16     international community sometimes received them, they never had any

17     actual influence in the communication with the international community.

18     There may have existed a wish for them to be recognised to a greater

19     extent, but what was also evident was the fact that they in fact

20     represented mostly themselves rather than a population.

21        Q.   All right.  Well, Mr. Zuzul, I don't have time to argue about

22     that with you today, but was Mr. Komsic, a man named Ivo Komsic, part of

23     that group?

24        A.   To my knowledge, he was.  Members of that group changed, but I do

25     believe Mr. Komsic was a member.

Page 31140

 1        Q.   Now, if you'll turn to page 28, sir, I'm going to ask your

 2     assistance in the -- it might be difficult, but I would ask for you,

 3     please, despite whatever differences that the two of us may have, we need

 4     to move fairly quickly today.  My time is limited, and I'll try to be as

 5     concise as I can and I'll appreciate if you can assist us in doing the

 6     same.  If you'll go to paragraph -- page 28, please, I just want to

 7     indicate here this is another intervention by you.  Just to confirm what

 8     you said yesterday, if you look at the second paragraph under your name

 9     and you report to the group, first the conference -- the conference, and

10     I take it that is the reference to the International Conference on the

11     former Yugoslavia, ICFY; correct?

12        A.   Yes, yes, correct.

13        Q.   "The conference is at its death bed, it is presently frozen if

14     not dying ..."

15             So that process had really run its course, so to speak; correct?

16        A.   In my view, yes.

17        Q.   If you go to page 33, please, and this is still you speaking.

18     You say on the first paragraph on that page you say:  "Silajdzic told me,

19     very openly, that Komsic's proposal was not entirely Komsic's.  I mean,

20     that's completely clear, because besides this map, which you have in

21     front of you, these are completely developed documents, evidently done by

22     experts.  And Redman," he was the US Special Envoy, I believe, correct,

23     "has indicated that he is very familiar with their content."

24             Now, this is the same Mr. Komsic that you mentioned just a moment

25     ago; is that correct?

Page 31141

 1        A.   Yes, that's the same gentleman.

 2        Q.   And what did you know at the time and what did you mean when you

 3     said that Komsic's proposal was not entirely Komsic's?

 4        A.   As I said here, Silajdzic told me this and he was not only

 5     familiar with Komsic's proposal but Silajdzic said, it seems to me, that

 6     the proposal was agreed upon between Komsic and the Muslim side.  I also

 7     believe that they had already acquainted Ambassador Redman with the

 8     proposal.

 9        Q.   In fact, sir, isn't it correct that what Komsic put on the table,

10     so to speak, was what came to be the Washington Agreement?

11        A.   I don't exactly remember what it was that Mr. Komsic put on the

12     table, but I wouldn't say that this evolved into the Washington Agreement

13     because there still had to -- there was still a long way of negotiations

14     to pass before the agreement would be reached.

15        Q.   All right.  Well, again, I don't want to spend too much time on

16     it, but it may not -- Mr. Komsic's proposal may not have been the last

17     word, the final version, but isn't it fair to say that it was the concept

18     put on the table at that time that then after further negotiations

19     evolved into Washington?

20             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour, I'm going to object again.  The

21     witness indicated that he doesn't remember exactly what Komsic put on the

22     table.  Now he's trying to force an answer out of him.  He can put to the

23     witness what Komsic put on the table and then he can ask whether it's in

24     concert with the Washington Agreement.

25             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, I disagree, and Mr. Karnavas knows

Page 31142

 1     better.  It's not required for cross-examination that I do that.  I can

 2     put propositions to the witness, he wither knows or he doesn't know.

 3     Secondly, I can probe the witness.  I don't have to accept the first

 4     answer given as the last answer.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely.

 6             MR. SCOTT:

 7        Q.   Sir, just to clarify, you heard my question, whether or not it

 8     was subject to further negotiations and refinement.  I repeat to you

 9     again:  Wasn't what Komsic put on the table what evolved into and

10     ultimately became Washington?

11        A.   I cannot confirm that because I don't know what Mr. Komsic put on

12     the table at the time.  However, as I said, the process of the Washington

13     Agreement took a long time.  In my earlier evidence I spoke extensively

14     of the negotiations I had with Mr. Biscevic, with Ambassador Biscevic on

15     behalf of our side, and on the other side there were Mr. Silajdzic and

16     Mr. Komsic.  The proposals we discussed at the time originated from our

17     side, in fact, from my side.  If one closely follows the course of

18     events, that can in fact be taken as the start of the negotiations

19     leading to the Washington Agreement or the talks Mr. Granic had with

20     Mr. Silajdzic or the talks between Mr. Granic and myself with Ambassador

21     Redman --

22        Q.   All right, sir.  I want to go on, please --

23        A.   -- all of that preceded --

24             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Excuse me.  I'm very sorry to interrupt you, but

25     let me ask both of you, please slow down a bit for the sake of the

Page 31143

 1     interpreters.  I would appreciate it very much.  Thank you.

 2             MR. SCOTT:  My apologies, Your Honour.

 3        Q.   And I apologise to you again, Mr. Zuzul, I'm not trying to be

 4     discourteous, but again time is quite limited and sometimes -- I have to

 5     press forward with particular questions.  I wish we had more time,

 6     frankly.

 7             Let me ask you to go to page 59 of the transcript.  At the middle

 8     of that page, sir, President Tudjman comes back into the conversation and

 9     says this:  "Well, Gentlemen, what we have heard about this reversal, in

10     the sense that America would attempt to impose such a solution, is not

11     really anything new for us.  Because we have always known that the West

12     was interested - as was evident in the case of Germany - in punishing

13     Serbia, if possible, and forcing us to cooperate with the Muslims."

14             Now, two questions.  In the first line where President Tudjman

15     says:  "... we have heard about this reversal ..." what reversal is he

16     talking about?

17        A.   I find it quite difficult to interpret at this time what

18     President Tudjman referred to, the reversal.  Perhaps he meant the

19     departure from the Vance-Owen Plan which was topical at the time and

20     going on to the first step which would mean the rapprochement between the

21     Croats and the Muslims.

22        Q.   Can I ask you, please, to go next to Exhibit P 10535, which would

23     be in binder number 3, please.  Sir, this appears to be an interview --

24     or, sorry, an account of a speech that was given to -- by

25     President Tudjman around this time.  The article is dated the 28th of

Page 31144

 1     February, 1994, so it would have been a few days after the meeting

 2     transcript that we were looking at a few moments ago, a few days later.

 3     Now, if you can scan down the page until you see the heading:

 4     "Muslim-Croat union in Bosnia-Herzegovina ..." and it starts off with

 5     Mr. Tudjman saying:  "Today, for the first time, all the relevant

 6     international factors from Europe to the USA have reached the conclusion

 7     that the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it is, is impossible and have

 8     recommended to us and in their own way consider it necessary both because

 9     of us and because of the world for us to accept a solution according to

10     which the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina would stay in a union with

11     the Muslims ..."

12             Now, we continue on and I'll put a question to you in a moment.

13     Going over to the next page, top of the next page, there's a paragraph

14     that says:  "Therefore, they have recommended to us, insisted and

15     persisted, that we must reach an agreement with the Muslims."

16             Now, when one reads this entire article, including the parts that

17     I just quoted to you, in a consistent -- I put to you consistent with

18     President Tudjman's use of the word "reversal" in the presidential

19     transcript, this agreement, the Washington Agreement, represented a

20     fairly abrupt shift from what had happened previously and

21     President Tudjman viewed this largely as something that had been imposed

22     on Croatia by intense international pressure; is that correct?

23        A.   I should say that all the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

24     Croatia occurred in the context of the international community.  On

25     several occasions I stressed that President Tudjman always took as his

Page 31145

 1     goal the position of Croatia within the international community, that's

 2     number one; number two, the protection of the Croats in

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Keeping in mind and taking care of these two

 4     matters, the position of Croatia and the second matter where up to that

 5     point there was the variant whereby the status of Croats within

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina could be resolved either by making them one of the

 7     three republics in Bosnia-Herzegovina or by being recognised clearly in a

 8     different manner as one of the three constituent nations, that is,

 9     entities, in that sense the Washington Agreement was indeed a turning

10     point or reversal because the position of the Croat people was now going

11     to be resolved through a rapprochement with the Bosniak people and

12     through setting up a federal relationship with the Bosnian -- with the

13     Muslim side.

14        Q.   Sorry, sir, I'm waiting for the translation and that's why there

15     seems to be a lapse of silence.  Sir, if you go to the top of the third

16     page of the document, please, just to follow on this point,

17     President Tudjman is quoted as saying:  "This is yet another historic

18     turning point in the life of the Croatian people and in the drawing of

19     those everlasting lines, in the process of demarcation between the worlds

20     and civilizations in this area."

21             Do you agree with that statement?

22        A.   Well, I do agree that this is a statement that I heard on several

23     occasions from President Tudjman, though it was not only from him that I

24     heard it.

25        Q.   I would like to turn briefly to some maps that resulted from

Page 31146

 1     Washington.

 2             MR. SCOTT:  If I can have the usher's assistance, I'm looking

 3     first at P 10550, and I'm not really sure how those have been -- they

 4     should be in the binders, in the third binder, binder number 3 for the

 5     courtroom.

 6        Q.   Sir, these are -- there's a collection of maps here that we're

 7     going to look at for a few minutes.

 8             MR. SCOTT:  For the courtroom, for the Judges and for counsel,

 9     these are maps that have been prepared based on the so-called same base

10     map of the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the municipalities that the

11     Chamber and others have seen since the beginning of the trial.

12        Q.   Now, sir, Exhibit P 10550, if you can scan that for a moment, can

13     you confirm that this is a map resulting from the Washington Agreement?

14     Does it look about right to you if you don't recall it in every detail?

15        A.   I remember the map and the details very well because in the -- I

16     took part throughout the duration of the Vienna negotiations.  I can't

17     really confirm every line of it, but I do believe that that's it.

18        Q.   And as a result of this process there were two areas which might

19     be considered Croat majority cantons marked in blue, light blue, on the

20     map, number 2 and number 8.  Do you see that?

21        A.   Yes, I do.

22        Q.   And two rather large mixed -- I'll call mixed cantons, Croat and

23     Muslim, which are marked in hash marks and numbered 6 and 7.  Do you see

24     those?

25        A.   Correct.

Page 31147

 1        Q.   And, sir, if you can recall again - and hopefully we can again do

 2     this without needing to pull out a number of other maps - but if you can

 3     recall -- sir, can you please confirm to the Judges that contrary -- in

 4     quite substantial contrast to the maps resulting from the Vance-Owen

 5     Peace Plan that were signed in March 1993, a large part of what had been

 6     in the so-called Croat provinces 8 and 10 are now instead in the mixed

 7     province of 6 and 7?

 8        A.   Correct.  I can even try to explain to you why I believe that

 9     this came to be.

10             MR. KARNAVAS:  Excuse me, sir.

11             Before that I would like to object on the grounds of relevance.

12     Are we prosecuting the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?  I mean, what is the

13     relevance of all of this?  I think it's an abuse of process to give the

14     Prosecution all this time and then go into areas that are totally not

15     relevant.  Where is it in part of the indictment?

16             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Karnavas.

17             MR. KARNAVAS:  Yes.

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  The Defence so far has put great accent on the

19     fact that the Croatian side accepted the VOPP and always put this to the

20     Chamber as something very legitimate, and --

21             MR. KARNAVAS:  It accepted the Washington as well, it accepted

22     the Washington Agreement.  It accepted the Cutileiro Agreement, it

23     accepted the Owen-Stoltenberg Agreement.  What is this particular line of

24     questioning?  What does it have to do with the indictment?

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I think Mr. Scott is the one to answer it.

Page 31148

 1             MR. KARNAVAS:  That's why I'm objecting on the grounds of

 2     relevance.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Let's listen to Mr. Scott.

 4             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, this topic, both the Washington and

 5     Dayton have been mentioned numerous times by the Defence including with

 6     this witness.  I think I counted the references to Dayton in this

 7     witness's testimony at least 15 references to Dayton in 1995 and at least

 8     eight references to the Washington Agreement.  So my cross-examination is

 9     no different than going into the topics that were raised on direct

10     examination.

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  I beg to differ.  There is a difference

12     referencing to the different negotiations that are going on versus

13     prosecuting Vance-Owen Peace Plan with respect -- with what happened at

14     the Washington.  I mean, listen to the line of questioning, Your Honours,

15     and I beg you to look at the transcript -- at the indictment and point to

16     me where is it and how is this line of questioning relevant?  Now, I

17     don't mind if he wants to spend all that time, but I do think that it is

18     an abuse of process to give the Prosecution that much amount of time

19     simply to harass witnesses.  Your Honours, this is pure harassment.  It

20     has nothing to do with the case.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The objection is overruled.

22             Mr. Scott, you may proceed.  The Chamber deems that the questions

23     in relation to the Washington Agreement can be relevant in the context.

24             MR. SCOTT:

25        Q.   And, sir, if I can next ask you to go in a similar fashion to

Page 31149

 1     P 10552, which is a map resulting from the Dayton Agreement.  Can you --

 2        A.   Yes, Mr. Prosecutor, certainly but I do wish to mention that I

 3     didn't manage to answer your previous question --

 4        Q.   Well, I've lost --

 5        A.   -- because there was an interruption.  If you wish me to answer

 6     it.

 7        Q.   I do appreciate that, sir.  I've lost it on the screen, to be

 8     perfectly honest.  If we can go back --

 9             MR. KHAN:  If it helps, Your Honour, page 14, line 2.

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Page 13 --

11             MR. SCOTT:

12        Q.   Yes, sir, here's my question to you, please, and perhaps you

13     recall it, you seem to recall it and I do appreciate your bringing it to

14     my attention.  It says:  "Hopefully -- but if you can recall, sir, can

15     you please confirm to the Judges that contrary, in quite substantial

16     contrast to the maps resulting from the Vance-Owen Plan that were signed

17     in March 1993, a large part of what had been in the so-called Croat

18     provinces 8 and 10 are now instead in the mixed province of 6 and 7?"

19             And actually your answer was:  "Correct."  But if you'd like

20     something more, sir, briefly, then please do so.

21        A.   Thank you very much.  The Croatian side, as is well-known,

22     accepted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.  However, evidently it could not be

23     negotiated fully.  Inter alia, the demarcation within zones 6 and 7 could

24     not be negotiated.  I often spoke, for example, about the issue of Neum

25     which was very important to the Muslim side, and according to the

Page 31150

 1     Vance-Owen Plan and every previous plan it was part of a unit belonging

 2     to the Croatian people.

 3             The model of the Vance-Owen Plan was the following.  There are

 4     three entities, both ethnic and territorial.  The model of the Washington

 5     plan was that Croats enter a federation with the Muslims, and in such a

 6     situation the demarcation in the various units in zones 6 and 7 is no

 7     longer so important because it was agreed that the Croats and Muslims

 8     would hold power together in these areas and that they would not divide

 9     the territories according to the ethnic principle.  That is why there is

10     this deviation from the Owen-Stoltenberg or the Vance-Owen Plan, which

11     the Croatian side accepted, out of the same desire that it had when it

12     accepted the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and that was to find a solution in

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina that would lead to peace.

14        Q.   Thank you.  We're going to have to move forward.  If I can ask

15     you to look, please, next briefly at P 10552.  And can you just confirm

16     to us, please, that based again on your general knowledge and familiarity

17     with these items, that this is a map which shows the cantons resulting

18     from the Dayton peace process?

19        A.   I think that's correct, yes, I think that's the map.

20        Q.   And in terms of anything that might be considered Croat majority

21     provinces or cantons, would those correspond with what on this map has

22     been marked as 8 and 10?

23        A.   With respect to 8 and 10, as a rule, yes.  As far as Croatia's

24     concerned there's a big difference in the part marked 2 here, the

25     Bosnian Posavina area.  Now the territory marked as Croatian is

Page 31151

 1     considerably smaller.

 2        Q.   And in contrast -- in contrast to that, the total area covered by

 3     8 and 10 in the Dayton map is quite a bit -- significantly larger than

 4     the area covered by area 8 or canton 8 in the Washington map; correct?

 5     Simply looking at 8 and 10 combined together; correct?

 6        A.   Well, it's hard to compare like this.  It's probably somewhat

 7     bigger, but I can tell you why.  In Dayton, in the middle of the

 8     negotiations, the principle of percentage of territory was introduced.

 9     This was accepted, so the solution of Dayton was sought by establishing

10     the percentage of the territory which would be, so to speak, allocated to

11     or controlled by a particular side.

12        Q.   Let me ask you while we have the map in front of us - and now

13     we'd like to go back to 10550, the Washington map, if you can just flip

14     back for a moment, please.  You said during your direct examination

15     testimony that at one point or on two occasions you said Izetbegovic had

16     offered western Herzegovina to Tudjman.  Now, at that time how did you

17     define or what did you consider western Herzegovina?  What territory was

18     being offered, according to your testimony, to Tudjman?

19        A.   I think that I said quite precisely in the course of my testimony

20     that when I was present there was no mention on what territory this was

21     about.  That was the situation where I was a witness.  In another

22     situation which Minister Granic told me about but where I was not

23     present, Granic told me that then Mr. Izetbegovic mentioned the territory

24     with greater precision.  In neither case, to the best of my knowledge, or

25     rather, I'm sure about the first case and according to what Granic said

Page 31152

 1     to me in the second also, Tudjman did not take up that conversation, he

 2     didn't accept it, so there was no further talk of defining the territory.

 3        Q.   Do you have any reason to agree or disagree that western

 4     Herzegovina for these purposes may have been something similar to what is

 5     marked on the Washington map as area number 8?

 6             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me -- Your Honour, there's answers --

 7     statements being said "no" verbally in the courtroom from the other side

 8     of the courtroom.  I've heard it now twice.  Someone has said "no" twice,

 9     I heard it twice.  That should not be happening.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Although I am no expert in

11     establishing maps and territories, I'm sufficiently familiar with the

12     area for me to say that this is not a map of western Herzegovina because

13     it does not include areas such as Citluk, such as Capljina, such as Neum.

14     Generally speaking, Herzegovina is a geographic and historical entity

15     which has existed for centuries.  It's divided not necessarily by a

16     border, but it's divided into western and eastern Herzegovina primarily

17     by the proportion of the population.  In western Herzegovina there were

18     predominantly Croats, Catholics; and in eastern Herzegovina, Orthodox,

19     that is, Serbs.

20        Q.   Thank you for that.  If I can ask you to go next very briefly to

21     Exhibit P 10481, which should be in the binder number 3, 10481.  You find

22     that, sir, and if I can ask you and direct the courtroom's attention to

23     page 10, starting on page 10 of that document.  -- or actually, page 9,

24     excuse me.

25             Sir, I just wanted to cover this very briefly because you did

Page 31153

 1     mention on your direct examination that you had, in fact, been involved

 2     with preparing, I believe, this document at page 27721 of your direct

 3     examination testimony you said:  "I was present" -- excuse me.

 4             "Sometime in mid-June President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic

 5     issued a joint statement.  I was with President Tudjman when we prepared

 6     the statement."

 7             So can you just confirm to us that pages 9 and 10 of Exhibit

 8     P 10481 is the document that you helped prepare at that time?

 9        A.   I think that's the document.

10        Q.   I'd like to turn next, please, to the topic of

11     President Tudjman's views or positions and connections with Croatia and

12     Croatian territory.  You've told us several times that President Tudjman

13     often talked about these matters as an historian, but I'd like to show

14     you in a few moments some statements of people that were dealing with him

15     not as an historian, I put to you, but in an operational capacity, if you

16     will, or in connection with negotiations.

17             Before I do that, you said during your direct examination that

18     one of President Tudjman's motivations or the basis on which he acted

19     throughout this period was in the interest of the Croats living in

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina, that even -- in fact, at one point you said that

21     there was even an obligation under the Croatian constitution to protect

22     the Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Is that correct?

23        A.   Yes, that is correct.

24        Q.   Now, would you agree with me, sir, however, that doesn't

25     mean - at least in general circumstances - that Croatia would have the

Page 31154

 1     right to invade Bosnia-Herzegovina to "protect the Croats" there?

 2        A.   In my opinion, it absolutely does not mean that, nor am I aware

 3     that anyone in Croatia ever even considered such an option or thought of

 4     it.

 5        Q.   Well, sir, let me put to you -- I appreciate that answer but in

 6     terms of President Tudjman's stated position as you've described it, a

 7     problem with that position, sir, is:  Wasn't that exactly

 8     Slobodan Milosevic's position in connection with the Serbs, that all the

 9     Serbs should be gathered together in one state?  And in fact I think

10     that's exactly how you described Greater Serbia when I asked you that

11     yesterday.

12        A.   Correct, that's how I described Greater Serbia and that was

13     Slobodan Milosevic's standpoint.  However, I never heard

14     President Tudjman express such a standpoint, that all Croats should live

15     in one state, nor did I hear it from any Croatian official ever.  I think

16     it would have been treated as absurd had it been uttered.

17        Q.   Well, sir, I'm just reacting to your testimony when you said

18     repeatedly during direct testimony that Tudjman -- one of Tudjman's

19     principal motivations throughout this period was to act on behalf of --

20     and in fact that he was under a constitutional obligation to protect the

21     Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Doesn't that lead -- that logic lead you

22     to the same position as the position taken by Milosevic?

23        A.   No, not at all.  Those are two drastically different lines of

24     thinking.  In many constitutions of democratic countries around the

25     world, there is an obligation to care for the diaspora of that nation or

Page 31155

 1     the minority of that nation living in another state.  For example, the

 2     case of Hungary and Slovakia, the case of Romania and Hungary.  There are

 3     many states that regulate in this way the fact that it's impossible to

 4     organize the world politically in such a way that ethnically pure nations

 5     can exist.  Europe has abandoned the idea of ethnically pure states long

 6     ago.  Due to the development of circumstances, a group of Serbian

 7     ideologues and Slobodan Milosevic believed that such a model could be

 8     restored.  However, looking after members of one's nation living in

 9     another state cannot in logical or political terms be equated with a

10     desire to take part of the territories of that other state.

11        Q.   Let me ask you, sir, to look at -- go to, please, Exhibit 8630,

12     P 08630, it should be in binder number 2.  And while you're looking for

13     that let me say to you for the record -- I said a moment ago that I would

14     show you some statements from persons who were dealing directly with

15     President Tudjman during this time-period, and one of those persons was

16     Warren Zimmermann, a US ambassador to that region who had extensive

17     dealings with President Tudjman, and I think the Chamber has seen

18     references to his book before.  I'd like to ask you about several

19     passages, please.  If I can ask you to turn in the preface -- if you can

20     see the numbers at the top of the page, the page -- the preface at Roman

21     numeral IX, the preface at the top of the page of Roman numeral IX, let

22     me just read to you, sir, just bear with me, let me read a couple of

23     passages and I'll ask you a couple of questions about him.

24             About halfway down that page it says:  "Franjo Tudjman, elected

25     president of Croatia in 1990, also played a leading role in the

Page 31156

 1     destruction of Yugoslavia.  A fanatic Croatian nationalist, Tudjman hated

 2     Yugoslavia and its multi-ethnic values.  He wanted a Croatian state for

 3     Croatians, and he was unwilling to guarantee equal rights to the 12 per

 4     cent of Croatia's citizens who were Serbs.  Tudjman's arrogance in

 5     declaring independence without adequate provisions for minority rights

 6     gave Milosevic and the Yugoslav Army a pretext for their war of

 7     aggression in Croatia in 1991.  And Tudjman's greed in seeking to annex

 8     Croatian areas of Bosnia prolonged the war and increased the casualties

 9     in that ill-starred republic."

10             And if you will then turn to page 75 and then I'll stop and ask

11     you about these.  Top of page 75 Ambassador Zimmermann says:  "Unlike

12     Milosevic, who was driven by a power, Tudjman betrayed an obsession with

13     Croatian nationalism.  His devotion to Croatia was of the most

14     narrow-minded sort and he never showed much understanding of or interest

15     in democratic values. "

16             Now, these words have been written by someone who had extensive

17     dealings with President Tudjman at that time.  What is your comment about

18     that?

19        A.   I can make several comments about this.  Firstly, at that time I

20     was not active in politics or diplomacy, but I don't believe that

21     President Tudjman, as you said, frequently met Ambassador Zimmermann.

22     They did meet, but not that often.  Of course that doesn't mean that

23     Ambassador Zimmermann could not know him very well.  On the two pages you

24     quoted there are two different points made.  What it says on page 75

25     about the assessment of Tudjman's personality, we can discuss that until

Page 31157

 1     kingdom come, and I don't want to deny that Ambassador Zimmermann or

 2     anyone else has the right to hold a certain opinion about someone.

 3     Everyone has that right.  However, in the first quotation you read

 4     Ambassador Zimmermann puts forward his own view of the break-up of

 5     Yugoslavia.  A time of serious international analysis, including the

 6     analysis presented by Ambassador Zimmermann at the time has shown that

 7     this interpretation is totally incorrect.  In my personal opinion,

 8     moreover, in this book which was written at a later date

 9     Ambassador Zimmermann is attempting to justify what is now well known.

10        Q.   All right.  Well, let me take you --

11        A.   The catastrophic --

12        Q.   I'm going to give you a chance to continue.  I'm going to give

13     you a chance to continue.  When you're talking about this is

14     Mr. Zimmermann's impressions, let me take you to another part of the book

15     which I put to you he's not stating his impressions, but he at least

16     purports, he at least purports to give an account of a particular meeting

17     with President Tudjman, if you'll go to page 181, page 181, please.  And,

18     sir, if you will bear with me and if the Chamber will bear with me on

19     this passage, he describes a meeting in March -- excuse me, in

20     January 1992, on the 14th of January, and Zimmermann says:  "Tudjman, as

21     usual, was more bluff in his approach to Bosnia.  Among his closest

22     advisers was his defence minister Gojko Susak, a Darth Vader-like

23     individual with black eyebrows and a permanent scowl, whose Canadian

24     fortune had gone into supporting Tudjman's party and, it was believed,

25     buying arms for Croatia.  Susak was originally from Herzegovina, and his

Page 31158

 1     foremost objective was to wrest the Croatian part of Herzegovina from

 2     Bosnia and join it to Croatia.  Susak and his ilk relentlessly pressed

 3     this agenda on Tudjman, but the Croatian leader didn't need a lot of

 4     encouragement."

 5             Slowing down for the interpreters.  My apology.

 6             "In a long meeting with me on January 14, 1992, just a few weeks

 7     after his German protectors had bullied the European Community into

 8     supporting Bosnia's independence, Tudjman spent over an hour trying to

 9     convince me that Bosnia should be split up between Croatia and Serbia.

10     It was the most astonishing single discussion of my years in Yugoslavia.

11             "Tudjman began with a 15-minute monologue.  He had just met with

12     a delegation of Croats from Bosnia who told him they felt threatened by

13     Izetbegovic's policies."

14             Now, I would cut through some of this but then I would probably

15     be accused of editorialising so I'll just keep reading.

16             "Tudjman's description of those policies were breath-taking.  The

17     Muslims, he said, want to establish an Islamic fundamentalist state.

18     They plan to do this by flooding Bosnia with 500.000 Turks.  Izetbegovic

19     has also launched a demographic threat.  He has a secret policy to reward

20     regard large families so that in a few years the Muslims will be in a

21     majority in Bosnia (at the time they were 44 per cent).  The influence of

22     an Islamic Bosnia will then spread through the Sandzak and Kosovo, et

23     cetera ..."

24             If I might be allowed, skipping down to the next paragraph.

25             "Tudjman admitted that he had discussed these fantasies with

Page 31159

 1     Milosevic, the Yugoslav Army leadership and the Bosnian Serbs, and 'they

 2     agree that the only solution is to divide up Bosnia between Serbia and

 3     Croatia.'  Magnanimously, Tudjman said he didn't insist on a 50/50

 4     division ..." et cetera.

 5             Skipping to the next paragraph:  "Listening to Tudjman I realized

 6     I had to abandon diplomatic niceties.  With considerable emotion I

 7     reminded him, recalling the Iran hostage crisis, that the United States

 8     had a lot more experience with Islamic fundamentalism than he did.  In

 9     our view Izetbegovic was neither a radical fundamentalist nor a threat to

10     anybody.  The United States would strongly oppose the break-up of Bosnia.

11     'Nobody who wants to do this can count on any assistance from us.  The

12     threat in Bosnia comes from the Serbs and the JNA not from the Muslims.

13     There will be war in Bosnia if you try to divide it.  Don't you think the

14     Muslims will react?  What you propose ignores the rights of a large share

15     of Bosnia's population.'"

16             Now, this is described, sir, as a factual account, put forward as

17     a factual account of a conversation and meeting with Tudjman and not

18     Zimmermann's own musings after the fact.  Now, do you have any basis to

19     disagree that that's the conversation that Mr. Zimmermann had with

20     Mr. Tudjman on that day?

21        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I think that both you and I and Their Honours

22     certainly know full well the difference between a factual description and

23     a description in a book.  Had we before us the minutes of that meeting,

24     and I'm sure that Mr. Zimmermann as a professional diplomat had minutes,

25     then we could talk about a factual representation.  These are the

Page 31160

 1     impressions of a person writing a book after a lapse of time.  I can

 2     point to some obvious mistakes quite easily.  I think you said in English

 3     that Tudjman's monologue lasted about 15 minutes.  In the interpretation

 4     I heard an hour.  Was it correct that you said 15 minutes?

 5        Q.   I believe that the book says 15 minutes, sir, in that particular

 6     aspect -- the monologue portion.

 7        A.   Well, you see, even the faster of speakers with the clearest of

 8     lines of thought wouldn't be capable of saying as much as Mr. Zimmermann

 9     says President Tudjman in 15 minutes.  You have to take into account that

10     there was interpretation as well and then you see that in that space of

11     time President Tudjman could not have possibly explained all that.

12             How subjective is Mr. Zimmermann in respect of, for instance,

13     Mr. Susak?  He speaks of some fortune that Mr. Susak allegedly had in

14     Canada.  I must admit that this is something I had never heard either

15     from Mr. Susak or from anyone from Croatia or Canada for that matter.

16     Therefore, he expressed his very, very subjective impressions.  The

17     difference between me and the accounts of the books here is that I'm

18     speaking here under an oath, and the authors wrote books for various

19     motives.  As for the author of this book, I had the honour of speaking to

20     Mr. Zimmermann and I believe that a motive in his writing the book was to

21     justify the erroneous assessments which he initially made at the start of

22     the break-up of Yugoslavia.

23        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... I apologise to the

24     interpreters.  I know it makes it difficult but I simply don't have

25     time --

Page 31161

 1             MR. KARNAVAS:  This is the second time the Prosecutor interrupted

 2     this gentleman as he was going into this area.

 3             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, it is and I will continue to do that because of

 4     the time.

 5             MR. KARNAVAS:  Now, Your Honour, then I suggest that he ask more

 6     narrower questions.  He can't ask a wide-range question and then cut the

 7     witness off when he's about to answer the question completely.  I think

 8     it's unfair to the witness and it's unfair to you, Your Honours.

 9             MR. SCOTT:  Based on what the witness has said, Your Honour, I

10     would like him to take him to another account by another person that

11     might be differently situated than Mr. Zimmermann, and that is

12     Mate Granic, the foreign -- minister of foreign affairs.

13             MR. KARNAVAS:  I believe the gentleman is entitled to express the

14     motives of Mr. Zimmermann.  If you look at Zimmerman's book --

15             MR. SCOTT:  He did that.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  No, he did not.

17             MR. SCOTT:  I did not cut him off.

18             MR. KARNAVAS:  I don't wish to debate the point, Your Honours.

19     The point is that the gentleman was not through with his answer and he

20     should be given an opportunity to fully address that matter.

21             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, I can remember many, many occasions

22     during the Prosecution case when Mr. Karnavas cut off Prosecution

23     witnesses.  I regret that my time is limited.  If the Chamber would like

24     to expand my time, then I will certainly, in turn, be more generous with

25     the witness.  But I think he has answered the question and I need to move

Page 31162

 1     forward.

 2             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may speak about

 3     this discussion.  At page 23, line 1, after a very long question my

 4     learned friend, Mr. Prosecutor, ends the question with the following

 5     question:  [In English] Now these words have been written by someone who

 6     had extensive dealings with President Tudjman at the time.  What is your

 7     comment about this?  What is your comment about this.  Then the witness

 8     starts -- then the witness was -- as soon as the witness mentioned that

 9     it seemed that Mr. Zimmermann also issued another book after this one, he

10     was cut off.  And then there is -- this is the second round which my dear

11     colleague Karnavas was talking about.  So the question was:  What is your

12     comment?  Unless the witness said:  This is my comment, he's still

13     responding.  Thank you, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, in relation to what

15     Mr. Kovacic has said, a minor detail.  It looks as though Mr. Zimmermann

16     published a second book after this one.  Have you read this second book

17     by him?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I spoke of the same book.  I

19     read the book, admittedly a long time ago, and I discussed this

20     particular book with Mr. Zimmermann and I expressed my great disagreement

21     with his interpretation of the events.  We had this conversation over a

22     lunch in Washington.  He had his opinions on the matter, but I wish to

23     stress that these are solely the opinions held by Mr. Zimmermann and not

24     of the state that he represented.  What's more, time showed that or

25     proved his opinions wrong.  Recently CIA reports were published dating

Page 31163

 1     from that period, which showed that the CIA had completely erroneous

 2     assessments as to what was going to happen and how the break-up of

 3     Yugoslavia -- or completely different assessments of how the break-up of

 4     Yugoslavia was going to unfold.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for this information.

 6             Please proceed, Mr. Scott.

 7             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   I think we can probably all agree that that probably wasn't the

 9     first or the last time that the CIA got something wrong, but be that as

10     it may if we could go, please, to Exhibit P 10402.  This is a -- this

11     comes from a book written by Mate Granic, the foreign minister of Croatia

12     during this period and a person who you described at least in part as

13     your immediate superior and a person from whom in addition to

14     President Tudjman directly you took instruction from.  There's much in

15     the book that we could cover, again, if we had more time, but I'd like to

16     direct your particular attention, please, to page 71 -- excuse me, my

17     apologies, it should be in binder number 3, P 10402.  On page 71

18     Mr. Granic says -- and he's referring in the context, I represent to you,

19     to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if you look at the previous

20     passages and pages.

21             "As the minister of foreign affairs, I often spoke about the

22     situation there," a reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina, "with Tudjman.

23     Bosnia and Herzegovina was his favourite topic.  He always talked about

24     it at the strategic level while he left to Susak all practical issues

25     including military aid, the financing of Croats or political relations

Page 31164

 1     with the BH, HDZ.  Despite the enormous confidence he had in Susak, I

 2     knew that Tudjman occasionally received information from other sources.

 3     He was in direct contact with Darinko Bago and often spoke with Zdravko

 4     Sancevic, Croatian ambassador in Sarajevo and Ciro Grubisic, the general

 5     consul in Mostar who had been appointed at the insistence of Susak.

 6     Tudjman's obsession was to recreate the Croatian Banovina which had been

 7     established in 1939 based on the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement according to

 8     which Herzegovina and parts of Central Bosnia and Bosnian Posavina were

 9     joined to Croatia.  The president often told me that Banovina was the

10     best solution."

11             Now, are you suggesting that this is another account that was

12     only simply Dr. Granic's impressions and he had his own agenda here or do

13     you have any reason to disagree that this is an accurate accounting by

14     Mate Granic of his dealings with President Tudjman?

15        A.   Again, I want to stress first of all that I speak here under an

16     oath, whereas Mr. Granic wrote his book while he was participating in

17     political campaigns.  My statements aim at the truth and of course the

18     motives he had for writing this book are probably the motives shared by

19     all politicians when writing their books.  It's true that Mr. Granic had

20     very frequent contact with President Tudjman.  It is most certainly true

21     that oftentimes they discussed Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It is not true that

22     Mr. Granic did not have any political tasks or influence vis-a-vis

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina; quite the contrary, he very often did have tasks as

24     the foreign minister.  What's more, the ambassadors reported primarily to

25     him, regardless of their contacts with President Tudjman.

Page 31165

 1             I had never heard from President Tudjman or I had never heard

 2     President Tudjman say that in territorial terms Croatia should have the

 3     borders of the former Croatian Banovina.  I tried to show the full extent

 4     of the absurdity of that idea on the map we looked at yesterday.  I

 5     cannot claim or state anything about what Mr. Granic might have heard

 6     from anyone including the president.  However, to my mind, or rather, he

 7     did not speak to me either as an ambassador or as a friend.  I still

 8     remain a friend of Mr. Granic's despite the fact that we do not belong to

 9     the same political parties.

10        Q.   In terms of the Banovina, you said this several times you said it

11     yesterday, I put to you that what was being discussed here was not to

12     reshape Croatia in its entirety in the form of the Banovina but to take

13     the existing territory of Croatia, the existing territory and borders and

14     add to it those additional parts which were part of the Banovina.  Now,

15     that's logically what was being discussed or put forward, isn't it?  It

16     was Croatia plus the Banovina, wasn't it?

17        A.   That's how you put it.  My answer to that is that this is an

18     absurdity.  Who could be so naive as to try and restore a solution

19     from -- dating back from history and think that this would involve only

20     gain and not loss?  Tudjman was not so naive as to think that he would be

21     able to take the territories which belonged to Banovina while not being

22     aware of the fact that he might lose those parts of the territory that

23     weren't even included in the Banovina ones.  Besides, the memories the

24     Croats had -- have of Banovina mostly tend to go in the direction of

25     Serbia.  Nowhere was it stated that Tudjman wanted to take those

Page 31166

 1     territories that are part of Serbia and which used to be once Banovina.

 2             I can tell you that based on my experience which was extensive I

 3     never ever believed that anyone in Croatia would consider to expand the

 4     borders of Croatia in order to fit in territorial terms the borders of

 5     the Croatian Banovina.  When Tudjman - and allow me to finish - mentioned

 6     the borders of the Croatian Banovina he was referring to the resolution

 7     of the national issue between Croats and Serbs.  He spoke of specific

 8     solutions in terms of organization, and it is true that he went back to

 9     that frequently.  However, interpreting this in territorial terms is

10     something that I'm fully convinced - and I'm speaking under an oath - is

11     not correct.

12        Q.   Well, sir, let me put it to you, you can tell the Judges that

13     Mr. Tudjman never said those things to you.  You can say that it would

14     surprise you to hear those things, that wouldn't fit in your experience.

15     But I put it to you, sir, do you have any basis for saying, were you in

16     the room, were you in all the meetings between Tudjman and Granic, do you

17     have any basis to say that Granic is lying in his book when he says that

18     this is his deal -- these are based on his dealings with Tudjman?  Maybe

19     you didn't hear it, but are you saying that Mr. Granic just made up these

20     statements?

21        A.   I think that the Prosecution could have called Mr. Granic and

22     asked him to repeat or not repeat the assertions he made in his book

23     under an oath here.  What I tried to say earlier on --

24        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... are you calling Mr. Granic a

25     liar in making the statements that he makes in his book?

Page 31167

 1        A.   I think that you are using generalisation that I would never use.

 2     I wouldn't say that Mr. Granic is a liar.  However, what I'm trying to

 3     say for the third time now is that if President Tudjman ever told him

 4     something along those lines - and I don't know what it was that they

 5     discussed - then the only logical and normal thing would be that he

 6     should to me as an ambassador and he as a superior and he to me as a

 7     friend and I'm still his friend, that he should tell me so because that

 8     was important for our work.  I'm convinced that neither I nor Mr. Granic

 9     would take part in such business, in the business of taking away

10     territory from another state.  I'm asserting here that Mr. Granic had

11     never told me that he had had a serious conversation let alone some sort

12     of instructions from President Tudjman about the territories --

13        Q.   Well, sir --

14        A.   -- [indiscernible] another state.

15        Q.   -- let's then go, please, to another participant in these events

16     whom we've heard about frequently in this courtroom, not least of which

17     from the Defence side, Lord Owen.  If you'll please turn to P 08632 --

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we move on to that

19     document, Witness, let's remain with this document we have in front of

20     us.  The Prosecutor put questions on the part of the text, but there's

21     another part in it that seems relevant.  Let me sum it up as follows.

22     Tudjman is alleged to have said to Mr. Granic that in his view the

23     Banovina was the better solution.  Granic in his book wrote, and as you

24     view it, in a political context to say this.  The idea of dividing Bosnia

25     and Herzegovina into three republics in Granic's view was to say at least

Page 31168

 1     in Lord Owen's mind, but also this seems important to me.  Tudjman

 2     believed that the English and the French wanted to divide Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina but that the division was indeed not possible or only

 4     possible if the USA agreed to it.  And from what Mr. Granic seems to say,

 5     that seems to be the conclusion in this page.  He would only have been

 6     convinced about this at the beginning of the Washington negotiations.

 7     You were in the very heart of all these negotiations.  In Tudjman's mind,

 8     was his mind somehow maybe influenced by the game played by the British

 9     and the French who were not opposed to a division of Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina, but that this would only have been possible with the

11     Americans' agreement.  And apparently Tudjman only realized this when the

12     Washington negotiations started and he did not realize that before.

13             What do you think, because this is what Mr. Granic wrote.  You

14     were a friend and you may still be a friend of Mr. Granic's.  Maybe you

15     discussed the issue with him.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I discussed the Washington

17     negotiations particularly extensively with Mr. Granic, and I believe that

18     both of us presented to President Tudjman quite adequately both the

19     position of the international position of Croatia and the fact that the

20     Washington Agreement may lead to a solution acceptable to both the Croats

21     in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international community.  It is true that

22     sometimes President Tudjman was under the impression that some

23     representatives of the international community, and perhaps particularly

24     the British, were in favour of a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Perhaps

25     the fact that contributed to this most, when we're speaking of an

Page 31169

 1     atmosphere surrounding the negotiations, was the meeting between

 2     Muslim -- or the agreement between Muslims and Serbs that was brokered by

 3     Lord Owen and this agreement allowed the Serb entity to, should they

 4     decide so, leave Bosnia-Herzegovina two years later or separate from

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I spoke about this at the start of my testimony.

 6             I personally believe that President Tudjman would have accepted a

 7     division of Bosnia-Herzegovina if such a division had been made by the

 8     international community if such a division had -- did not endanger the

 9     interests of the Republic of Croatia and if such a division ensured the

10     protection of the rights of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  However, I

11     believe that President Tudjman was aware of the fact that these

12     conditions could not be met, and that is why I maintain that he looked

13     for a solution of the issue of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina within the

14     borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15             I particularly assert this in respect of the period between 1992

16     and the Dayton Accords when I was actively working on this and had

17     frequent discussions about it with President Tudjman.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             Mr. Scott, before the break, you had a last document you wanted

20     to submit to the witness.

21             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you very much for that.  If

22     we could just finish this one document then we could come back to another

23     topic after the break.

24        Q.   Sir, you just in your last answer in the last few minutes made

25     subtle references to Lord Owen, and it's to Lord Owen's book that I would

Page 31170

 1     like to go next, please, P 08632, which is in binder number 2, 8632,

 2     please.  This is an excerpt from Balkan Odyssey by David Owen and I would

 3     like you to go, please, to page 36.  There are two parts to this, it's in

 4     one paragraph, but there's two parts that I will read to you but there's

 5     two aspects that I'd like to address.  On page 36 it says, starting about

 6     a quarter of the way down the page perhaps:  "Because the 1939

 7     Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement had given the Croatian nation control over

 8     substantial parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina many Croats, not least

 9     Franjo Tudjman, never in their hearts accepted the 1945 boundary between

10     Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina."

11             It mentions -- "similarly, the Serb-inhabited areas ..." and he

12     goes on and talks about that.

13             Skipping down a few lines, everyone has it in front of them.  It

14     goes on to say:  "This resistance was particularly strongly felt after

15     1945 for the inhabitants," which had been referred to in part by the

16     Krajina, "the inhabitants had been subjected to genocide by the Croat

17     Ustashas during the Second World War.  Very few commentators in 1995

18     understood or acknowledged that when the Croatian government attacked the

19     Krajina they were not 'retaking' or 'reoccupying' this land, for the

20     Serbs had inhabited it for more than three centuries.  At most, the

21     Croats were reclaiming territory."

22             Now, as for the first part of that passage, is it not clear to

23     you, sir, that here again another international, senior international

24     representative, it was very clear to him that Tudjman very much had in

25     mind this view, this implementation of the 1939 agreement or are you

Page 31171

 1     saying that Mr. Owen, apparently like Mr. Zimmermann and like Mr. Granic,

 2     had just made this up?

 3        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, neither in the case of Mr. Zimmermann nor in the

 4     case of Mr. Granic did I say that they invented it all.  I merely said

 5     that those were their very subjective interpretations.  One needs not

 6     be -- need not be a psychologist or a lawyer to know how different

 7     subjective interpretations can be.  The passage that you've just read out

 8     shows the full complexity of the issue of the Banovina.  If you ask me,

 9     now that I'm looking at this passage, it can be used for exactly the

10     opposite argument, that's to say that Tudjman would never even attempt to

11     implement the idea of the Banovina because the precise issue that you

12     quoted would be raised, that the Serbs would ask for their territory to

13     be defined within Croatia and that's the last thing that Tudjman would

14     accept.  As the vast majority of Croats, I am also convinced that Tudjman

15     believed that the AVNOJ borders of Croatia were the best solution for the

16     Republic of Croatia and that when we're discussing borders it is

17     unjustifiable to rule out the evident fact, which is that the borders of

18     the Banovina leave out vast parts of the Croatian territory.

19        Q.   All right.  And just again, as I said, to finish up on this

20     passage before we take the break, the second part of it, can you confirm,

21     sir, that in fact the area called the Krajina, this was an area of

22     Croatia that had been occupied by the Serbs for, as Mr. Owen says, more

23     than three centuries; is that correct?

24        A.   Yes, that's correct.  They reached those areas fleeing the

25     Turkish occupation.  That was an area that had been inhabited by Croats

Page 31172

 1     for -- by that time for some 12 or 13 centuries.

 2        Q.   And isn't it true, sir, that in fact what you've pointed out

 3     several times about this, that it was a contradiction that a number of

 4     people, both domestic politicians in Croatia and international

 5     representatives, it was a contradiction pointed out to Tudjman on a

 6     number of occasions that he could not support Herceg-Bosna on the one

 7     hand and deny the claims of the Serbs in Croatia on the other; correct?

 8        A.   No, Mr. Prosecutor.  The international community also accepted

 9     the fact that there was a difference in terms of the position of the

10     Serbs in Croatia and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  All the documents

11     of the international community and all the results of all the

12     negotiations speak of the Croatian people as one of the three constituent

13     nations in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  All the communications

14     between the Republic of Croatia and the international community about the

15     Serb population in the Republic of Croatia had the intention of providing

16     that population with the highest possible level of rights.  I believe

17     that drawing a parallel there is quite wrong.  So with the intention of

18     providing the population with the highest possible level of rights as a

19     minority.

20             May I just say this, I will agree with you on one point.  Had

21     Tudjman really intended to include a part of the territory of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina into the territory of the Republic of Croatia, then

23     there would certainly have been many of those who would have claimed that

24     the same right is enjoyed by Milosevic and his ideologues to include the

25     territory inhabited by Serbs in Croatia into the Republic of Serbia.  I

Page 31173

 1     do agree that there are many individuals who would have had this line of

 2     thinking, and I believe that this is one of the reasons, among others,

 3     why President Tudjman never even contemplated the inclusion of parts of

 4     the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Republic of Croatia.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to have a 20-minute

 6     break now.

 7                           --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

 8                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

10     Mr. Scott, you still have two hours and three minutes.

11             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I appreciate that, and

12     I'm -- I need to ask -- I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask the Chamber

13     that despite my continued editing down I'm going to ask the Chamber if I

14     could possibly have another hour of time.  I think we were -- safely

15     we'll finish this witness I think tomorrow, but I would ask for the

16     Chamber's indulgence.  The Defence has had a total of seven -- a bit

17     over, I believe, seven hours with the witness altogether, and I would ask

18     to have some additional time.  I need to know that now rather than later

19     so I know how much I have to alter my plan, please.

20             MR. KARNAVAS:  I would object on the grounds that time that was

21     given was not used properly.  We've gone into areas that were not

22     necessarily relevant, and I think had the time been managed I would be

23     much more gracious in agreeing to more time.  But I'm afraid that given

24     what I've seen, that more time would only be wasted.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I also wish to have

Page 31174

 1     it put on the record that General Petkovic's Defence objects to the fact

 2     that the cross-examination of General Petkovic's Defence is being added

 3     to the time that the Defence of Dr. Jadranko Prlic had, and that is --

 4     the witness is his witness.  So I feel it is unjustified to add together

 5     the times of two Defence teams.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber will deliberate on

 7     this matter later.  Please proceed for the time being.

 8             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Just to respond ever so

 9     briefly.  I'll of course put myself completely in the Chamber's hands if

10     the Chamber thinks that I've used my time unwisely.  I think the matters

11     that we've covered have been all of them been quite relevant and directly

12     pertinent to the case.

13             As to Ms. Alaburic's comments, I mean I have to respond to all

14     the questions put by the Defence to this witness including those put by

15     co-accused.  I don't know why it would be the case that that time

16     shouldn't somehow be considered.  Other than that, other than that,

17     Your Honour, as I say --

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a moment.  We will confer

19     now.

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.  The Bench's microphone,

21     please.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, having pondered the

24     matter and listened to your request, having taken into account the

25     objections raised, the Chamber decides to give you an additional 30

Page 31175

 1     minutes.  This should allow you to finish today.

 2             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'm gracious for whatever

 3     additional time the Chamber can allow me.  Thank you for that.

 4        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, just one point that hopefully we can take fairly

 5     quickly.  We've talked in the last two days about the parts of Croatia

 6     that were occupied, approximately one-third of the country that was

 7     occupied by the Serbs in the latter part of 1991, including those parts

 8     that then came to be claimed as para-states or autonomous zones, such as

 9     the RSK, the Republika Srpska Krajina.  Let me just ask you as a senior

10     member of the Croatian government, at any time that those parts of the

11     territory of Croatia were occupied or claimed by the Serbs, did you ever

12     consider that they were not -- that they did not continue to be part of

13     the sovereign territory of Croatia?

14        A.   To the best of my knowledge, never at any time or in any

15     situation was it the position of the overall Croatian leadership and

16     President Tudjman; rather, the position was to attempt through

17     negotiations to gain control of the entire territory of Croatia as

18     fortunately happened in Eastern Slavonia.  If this was not possible, then

19     the Croatian government and the Croatian people were prepared to restore

20     the territory through military operations.

21        Q.   Thank you for that, sir.  That wasn't exactly my question.  My

22     question was a bit -- I think, a little simpler than that.  At any time

23     during 1991 until the time that those territories were ultimately

24     restored some years later to the territory of Croatia, did the Croatian

25     government ever consider those territories to cease being territory --

Page 31176

 1     the sovereign territory of Croatia?  Did you ever consider:  That's not

 2     Croatia anymore?

 3        A.   No, never.

 4        Q.   And is it correct, sir, that that was the case despite the fact

 5     that, for instance, in the RSK the RSK had set up its own government, had

 6     its own currency, had its own military force, but, nonetheless, you

 7     consider that to be -- continued to be throughout that time-period the

 8     sovereign territory of Croatia; correct?

 9        A.   Correct.

10        Q.   Now, going to the so-called Friendship Agreement from July 1992.

11     As I understand your testimony, sir, on the involvement of the Croatian

12     army on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that as it was put to

13     you your position was that the presence and involvement of the Croatian

14     army in Bosnia-Herzegovina during at least 1992 was, I'll say, okay, was

15     not a problem, because the Croatian army there was there by agreement to

16     fight together with the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the

17     Serbs?  Does that accurately state or summarize your position?

18        A.   Well, my position was then, as now, that the fact that parts of

19     the Croatian army in early 1992 were there was indispensable to prevent

20     the Serbs from achieving their goals, that is, to defend southern Croatia

21     and also to defend part of Bosnia-Herzegovina --

22        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... sorry, but my time, as you've

23     heard, is very limited.  It may have been necessary for them to be there

24     but that didn't give them the right to be there, on the sovereign

25     territory of another nation's state.  So put aside whether they needed to

Page 31177

 1     be there.  You've said that they -- I don't think there's any dispute, if

 2     I understand your testimony correctly, that they were there in 1992, and

 3     as I understand your justification for that is that it was there by

 4     agreement with the Bosnian government in a fight together against the

 5     Serbs.  That's your justification for the Croatian army being on the

 6     territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that correct?

 7        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, in your previous question, which I'm re-reading,

 8     you asked me to summarize my position; and in my response that's what I

 9     started to do but you interrupted me in the middle of my response.  If

10     you're asking me about my position, I had to say what I said as the first

11     part of my sentence.  As the second part of my sentence I would add --

12        Q.   If you're going to do this I'm going to interrupt you again, sir.

13     My time is limited.  My question is not whether you considered it or

14     others considered it indispensable for Croatia to be in that territory;

15     that does not give them the right to be there.  Now, on what legal basis

16     or agreement or consent do you purport that it was okay for the Croatian

17     army to be operating on the sovereign territory of the UN Member State of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

19        A.   Well, you see, Mr. Prosecutor, you are putting questions in such

20     a way that it's impossible to give you answers as simple as you wish.  In

21     your question you say that this was the sovereign territory of a

22     UN Member State, and we are talking about a period when Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina was not yet a member of the United Nations.  So we cannot put

24     it all in the same context --

25        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... forward, sir, from May 1992

Page 31178

 1     forward when Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted to the United Nations as a

 2     Member State and its independence was recognised, from that date forward,

 3     let's talk about that.

 4        A.   You put your question about early 1992.  --

 5        Q.   I've changed it, sir, I've changed it.  From May 1992 forward,

 6     please answer my question.

 7        A.   Even before and certainly from May 1992 onwards, Croatian

 8     diplomacy had intensive communications and took steps to reach an

 9     agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina in order for us to achieve our common

10     goals and several agreements were signed to that effect.

11        Q.   And one of those agreements, is it correct, then came to be the

12     so-called Friendship Agreement of 21 July 1992; is that correct?

13        A.   Yes, that's completely correct.

14        Q.   Now, in that regard, if I can ask you, please, to turn to a

15     Defence exhibit but it's in Prosecution binder 3, 1D 02295.  Sir, you

16     were shown this exhibit during examination by the Defence.  This was a

17     letter from Mr. Abdic to Croatia dated the 6th of August, 1992, asking

18     Croatia's consent to establish an ABiH Main Staff logistical centre or

19     centres in Croatia.  Do you see that or do you recall that?

20        A.   I don't see it in my binder, but I'll try and look at it on the

21     screen.

22        Q.   Thank you, sir.  If we missed it, my apology.  If you can look on

23     the screen, please, and my apologies to the Judges and counsel if it's

24     not in the binder, Defence Exhibit 1D 02295.  I'm sure it's my error and

25     I take responsibility for it.

Page 31179

 1             But, sir, if you look at that document it was shown to you and

 2     discussed during your examination, and in fact at page 27736 you said:

 3     "I think that Mr. Abdic was referring to the agreement that we had just

 4     looked at and discussed," which I will tell you in the transcript was the

 5     21 July agreement.  And then you went on to say:  "... because this

 6     letter is only a logical part of the implementation of this agreement."

 7             So would you agree with me that, sir, that this was it was fully

 8     appropriate for Mr. Abdic or the Bosnian government to send such a

 9     communication in carrying out the Friendship Agreement asking for further

10     specific approvals from the Croatian government in order for the Bosnian

11     government to carry out activities on the sovereign territory of Croatia?

12        A.   Yes, I think, yes.

13        Q.   And just to expand on that a bit, if we can take that as an

14     example.  Would you agree with me, sir, that the fact that Izetbegovic

15     and Tudjman had signed the 21 July 1992 agreement did not mean that

16     either state was free to move and roam at will and conduct activities on

17     the territory of the other without further -- without further agreements

18     and consent; correct?

19        A.   Well, it's hard to answer such a general question, respond to

20     such a general statement.  I think we --

21        Q.   Well, let me explain to you, sir.  Let me explain it to you, sir,

22     let me put it in a law enforcement context if you've ever come up in this

23     situation.  Countries have agreements to cooperate in law enforcement

24     together.  And there may be one between, say, the United States and the

25     United Kingdom.  The fact that that agreement exists doesn't mean that

Page 31180

 1     law enforcement agents of the United States can freely enter the

 2     United Kingdom and roam at will and carry out law enforcement activities

 3     on that territory.  You have to give notice to the local authorities,

 4     we're coming here, we appreciate your cooperation, maybe there's a

 5     liaison officer who will be working with us, and that's the way these

 6     things normally work, correct, and that would have been the same here and

 7     that's why Mr. Abdic sought further approval to carry out activities in

 8     Croatia and that's what you would expect, isn't it?

 9        A.   Generally speaking, yes.

10        Q.   Now, moving forward, sir, because again our time is quite

11     limited, you don't -- I take it it is not your position or is it that

12     once the war broke out between the Croat and Muslim forces in

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina, it's not your position, is it, that that

14     Friendship Agreement was then the basis for the presence or involvement

15     of the Croatian army on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the

16     purpose of fighting against the Muslims; correct?

17        A.   In your question there are several statements, but I thought and

18     still think that the Friendship Agreement between Croatia and

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina was based on the idea of putting a stop to the

20     conflict between the Croats and the Muslims; that's correct.

21        Q.   Sir, again, we don't have time to go through all the

22     documentation on this point and we can't, as the Chamber I'm sure

23     appreciates, we can't put our full case to every witness.  But taking --

24     assuming for the purposes of these questions that the Croatian army was

25     present in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, 1993, 1994 on the side of the HVO,

Page 31181

 1     fighting against the Muslims, the Friendship Agreement would not have

 2     been a legal basis excusing their involvement on the territory of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina, would it?

 4        A.   The parts of the Croatian army which were on the territory of

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 - and you said that was the period we were

 6     discussing - were fighting primarily the Serb forces, the Serb -- or

 7     rather, the Yugoslav Army together with the Muslim forces there --

 8        Q.   Sir, let me take you to 1993, please.  You know and I'm sure you

 9     know that after a skirmish, an open armed conflict between Croats and

10     Muslims in Prozor in October 1992, a further round of serious fighting in

11     January 1993 in Gornji Vakuf and Central Bosnia, and then the major

12     conflict breaking out in mid-April 1993 that continued until at least the

13     end of 1993, there was a major war going on between the Muslim side, the

14     ABiH, and the HVO.  And I put it to you, and for purposes of this

15     argument, that during that time from January 1993 until February at least

16     of 1994, the Croatian army was present in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the side

17     of the HVO.  Now, if that's the case, are you telling the Chamber that

18     the Friendship Agreement signed in July 1992 made that okay?  It was okay

19     to fight against that lawful government because of a Friendship Agreement

20     entered into previously under different conditions?

21        A.   In your question you include a lot of statements I do not feel

22     confident in commenting on because I'm not aware of most of the events

23     you mention.  What I do know and what I repeat is that the agreement

24     signed in July 1992 referred to the situation as it was then, but I also

25     know that throughout 1993 there was communication and diplomatic efforts

Page 31182

 1     were made to find a solution for the relations between

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the

 3     Republic of Croatia.  I have spoken about that extensively and I can say

 4     a lot about that because I'm quite familiar with that.

 5             As for what happened on the ground, I do know that there were

 6     conflicts, of course.  I apologise.  I knew, of course, there were

 7     conflicts, but my knowledge was not nearly so precise for me to be able

 8     to testify with the same precision about the events on the ground as I

 9     have about the diplomatic efforts.

10        Q.   Well, let's talk about another historical example and see -- if

11     we take it out of this particular context it will be easier to come to an

12     understanding.  You may recall at the beginning -- at the early part of

13     World War II Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union entered into a

14     non-aggression pact in August 1939.  Approximately 22 months later in

15     June 1941 Hitler went back on the non-aggression pact and, in fact,

16     invaded the Soviet Union.  Now, I take it is it your position that it was

17     okay for Hitler to invade the Soviet Union based on the fact that 22

18     months earlier they had entered into a non-aggression pact --

19             MR. KOVACIC:  I object, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Scott, I think that's a bit far-fetched,

21     really.

22             MR. SCOTT:  Really?

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Yes.  I think so.

24             MR. SCOTT:  I don't see it myself but --

25             MR. KHAN:  Your Honour, it doesn't really matter.  With the

Page 31183

 1     greatest of respect this has been going on for quite a while.  There has

 2     been a ruling by the Trial Chamber.  The thoughts of counsel are really

 3     not relevant.  I think we can just simply move on and accept the finding

 4     of the Trial Chamber.

 5             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour, but I didn't interject any

 6     thoughts.  I put the question to the witness, and while I understand that

 7     Judge Trechsel may disagree with me, I wasn't expressing any thoughts

 8     other than putting questions and positions to the witness.

 9             But having said that, I'll be happy to move on.

10        Q.   Can you tell us, sir, as a specific example, then, moving forward

11     from World War II, the example that we use concerning Mr. Abdic.  Can you

12     think of any examples at the time when in 1993 during the conflict

13     between the Croat forces and the Muslim forces in 19 -- excuse me, in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina, that there was ever a time when the Croatian

15     government asked for consents or permissions for its armed forces to

16     operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the forces of the Government of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Can you give me an example of anything where there

18     was a letter to Mr. -- dear President Izetbegovic, pursuant to the

19     Friendship Agreement of 21 July 1992, we hereby seek permission for our

20     armed forces to enter into your country and wage war on your forces.  Can

21     you point me to any letter like that?

22        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, you are saying things that are totally absurd and

23     yet you are expecting logical responses from me.  I think these are

24     absurd statements.  I think it's offensive that you want to suggest that

25     I would draw a parallel between World War II and the agreement between

Page 31184

 1     the Nazis and so on and the agreements I achieved in a sincere effort to

 2     achieve peace.  Each of us has the right to his own dignity and I find

 3     this offensive.

 4        Q.   So you're not going to answer my -- you refuse to answer my

 5     question then.  Do you know of any such agreements or communications to

 6     that effect --

 7        A.   No, no, Mr. Prosecutor --

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9        A.   -- no.  I'm not refusing to answer questions, but I do refuse to

10     have you offend me directly or indirectly.  I will answer every question

11     I know the answer to; that is why I came here quite consciously and of my

12     own free will.

13        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... do you know of any

14     communications between the Croatian government and the Government of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina to the effect that I put to you a few moments ago?

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour, it's been asked and it's been

17     answered.

18             MR. SCOTT:  No, it has not been answered.  We've had a speech --

19             MR. KARNAVAS:  It says:  "No" --

20             MR. SCOTT:  -- but we haven't had an answer.

21             MR. KARNAVAS:  -- "no, Mr. Prosecutor."  "So you refuse to answer

22     my question."  He's got his answer to his question.

23             MR. SCOTT:  No.  He says, I'm refusing [sic].

24             MR. KARNAVAS:  The question was absurd and he got an answer to

25     it.

Page 31185

 1             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour, I disagree with

 2     Mr. Karnavas's position.  If the witness clarifies that his answer was

 3     no, he doesn't know of any communications then I accept that.  But if his

 4     answer is no, I'm refusing to answer -- not answering your questions and

 5     then on -- and goes on to make a speech then I don't know the answer to

 6     his question.

 7        Q.   Sir, is it your answer that you do not know, the answer is no,

 8     you do not know of any communications between the Croatian government and

 9     the Bosnian government authorising the operations of armed forces of the

10     Republic of Croatia on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina to engage in

11     war against the forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina?  You either do know of

12     such communications, you don't -- as Mr. Karnavas likes to say, you

13     either know, you don't know, or you don't remember.

14        A.   Of such communications that are contained in this extreme example

15     that I termed an absurdity, I am not aware and I don't believe that there

16     were any such communications.  That there had been communications all the

17     time between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the

18     Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is something I am

19     certainly aware of.

20        Q.   Can you tell the Judges, please, what you know about citizens of

21     the Republic of Croatia being forced to fight in Bosnia-Herzegovina

22     against the ABiH involuntarily?

23        A.   I truly do not know enough about this matter in order to be able

24     to comment upon it.

25        Q.   Do you recall it being reported in the Croatian press around that

Page 31186

 1     time that the families of various Croatian soldiers were protesting their

 2     sons being sent to fight in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that criminal charges

 3     were brought against some of these young men who would not go and fight

 4     in Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Do you recall that?

 5        A.   I do seem to recall something about that being written about but

 6     at my work-place in Geneva I did not receive such information.

 7        Q.   Well, let me just ask you to quickly look at a couple of things

 8     to see if it might jog your memory.  If you could please look at P 10547,

 9     it should be in binder 3, P 10547.

10             While you're looking for that, sir, I'll just say for the record

11     that this is a report from the United Nations Centre for Human Rights

12     based in Zagreb dated 3 January 1994, reporting the drafting of men in

13     Croatia, in this particular instance of Bosnian origin, to be sent to

14     fight in the country of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15             Point number 4.  "The persons who appealed to the objection of

16     consciousness were beaten in the barracks.

17             "All the drafted were told they would be sent to fight in BiH."

18             It makes reference -- also at the top it says:  "We received

19     information from the Committee for Human Rights that Croatian citizens

20     born in BH were mobilised on 15 and 16 December 1993."

21             Now, with that in mind if I can ask you, please, it should be

22     close in the same binder, turn to P 10555.  I suggest to you that this is

23     the referenced report from the Committee for Human Rights, being the

24     Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, a letter by Mr. Cicak.  Did

25     you know of Mr. Cicak and his involvement in these issues at that time or

Page 31187

 1     have you heard of his involvement in these matters?

 2        A.   I do.  I know Mr. Cicak personally.  I didn't know, I don't

 3     remember, his involvement in the matter at the time --

 4        Q.   Is Mr. Cicak still involved with the Helsinki Committee in

 5     Zagreb?

 6        A.   As a matter of fact, I'm not certain.  I don't think so.

 7     Mr. Cicak is a public figure who was involved in various public

 8     activities either through his membership of various political parties,

 9     through his membership of various non-governmental organizations.  I

10     believe that he is a journalist and I don't know where else he works.  I

11     am not aware of this report.  This is the first time I see it.

12        Q.   Can I ask you, please, to look at Exhibit P 10548 in the same

13     binder, 3, 10548.

14        A.   I see that.

15        Q.   Which is an article written in the Christian Science Monitor on

16     the 6th of January 1994 titled:  "Croatian conscripts tell of Bosnian

17     duty."

18             Now, do any of that -- excuse me.  Do any of those documents

19     refresh your memory further over the fact that in late 1993 at least,

20     perhaps other times, and in early 1994, men in Croatia were being

21     conscripted and sent to fight in Bosnia-Herzegovina against their will?

22        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, I do see these articles.  They cannot and do not

23     need to refresh my memory because I never had knowledge of such events

24     described here.  I cannot assert whether these events happened or not.

25     If they did, then I can only say that this was a grave error.  I

Page 31188

 1     didn't -- I wasn't aware of it at the time and I cannot tell you whether

 2     this is correct or not.

 3        Q.   All right.  Thank you, sir.  If I could ask you to next turn to

 4     P 10545, which again is in binder 3, 10545.  This is an article from the

 5     New York Times dated the 24th of November, 2003, and you're referenced in

 6     the -- about halfway down the page you'll see some -- a statement

 7     attributed to you.

 8             "Miomir Zuzul, the former ambassador to the United States who is

 9     likely to be named foreign minister, said, 'Croatia will be led by a

10     moderate centre-right government over the next four years.'"

11             Next paragraph:  "The victory for the Croatian Democratic Union

12     follows an overhaul of its image, and a purge of the extremists, some of

13     whom were implicated in war crimes committed during the 1991 to 1995

14     Balkan wars."

15             As someone who was, as you've told us, was very involved in these

16     events at the time and held very senior positions in the government back

17     during that time-period, can you tell us who some of the extremists were

18     that were purged from the party?

19        A.   Well, the Croatian Democratic Union, as is well-known to those

20     who follow the political events in Croatia, redefined itself in a way in

21     2000 and defined itself clearly as a centre-right political party quite

22     open and prepared to cooperate with the world.

23        Q.   My question was more direct, sir.  Can you tell the Judges while

24     we have you here and the benefit of your knowledge, can you name some of

25     the extremists who were purged from the party as a result of this

Page 31189

 1     overhaul.  I'm talking about if you can give us names, please.

 2        A.   Well, you see, quite a few of them left the party.  I would not

 3     dare to name any names because I did not take part in the process and to

 4     thus categorize these people as extremists.  All those who did not wish

 5     to accept the new policy of the HDZ as it was defined by the president of

 6     the party, Mr. Ivo Sanader, left the party, either lost the intra-party

 7     elections or were thrown out of the party.  Quite a few of them left the

 8     party that way.  Now, were all of them extremists, well, I certainly

 9     would not say that one --

10        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... give us one names at least.

11        A.   I do not see that my testimony should serve to define the

12     positions of anyone, of any politician.  Those who did not wish or feel

13     that they were a part of that party anymore left the HDZ.

14        Q.   You may or may not want to answer, I think you should, but that's

15     my question to you.

16             THE ACCUSED PRLIC:  May I say something?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think I can answer such a

18     question because I was not in a -- I am not in a position to know what

19     the political views of a particular person were.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Prlic.

21             THE ACCUSED PRLIC:  A question was made but this is not quoting

22     what Mr. Zuzul told in his interview.  And this is for the third time he

23     was asked about something he didn't say.

24             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, I never said that he said it, but I did

25     put it to him and as a senior government official and a member of this

Page 31190

 1     party that if that's true.  If he says that that didn't happen, that this

 2     is not a true statement, that extremists were not purged from the party

 3     after -- between the war and the elections in 2003, then he can say that.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, Witness, we have a

 5     text in front of us, and apparently you granted an interview to the

 6     New York Times.  And you know that as well as I do when somebody says

 7     something the press will quote the words uttered by the interviewee, and

 8     here apparently some words are put into -- between inverted commas.  I

 9     see, and it may be what Mr. Prlic was referring to, the purge of

10     extremists and those involved in war crimes, those words are not

11     presented as quotations.  So this might lead to think that now it is the

12     journalist drawing this conclusion based possibly on an off-the-record

13     discussion you had with him or her but it's not being quoted between

14     inverted commas.

15             So what is it?  Are these conclusions drawn by the journalist or

16     does he report an off-the-record conversation you might have had with

17     him?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  As one

19     can glean from the text, this was not a conversation only with me but

20     with several personalities from the Croatian political life and some of

21     them are mentioned here.  It is the journalist's statement that is

22     reported here and not mine.  Now, why did I not want to make such a

23     statement directly?  Because the change occurring in my political party,

24     in the HDZ, occurred at the time while I was not in Croatia but in the

25     United States of America.  I welcomed the change and I publicly commended

Page 31191

 1     the work of Ivo Sanader.  The fact that he won the election for the

 2     president of the HDZ against Mr. Pasalic is something that evidently

 3     shows that change did occur in that party.  I welcomed the change and I

 4     still do.  The HDZ was being reformed.

 5             Now, it is very difficult for me to answer the question as to who

 6     the extremists were because in such a way I would be attributing

 7     political views to an individual who perhaps did not hold those views,

 8     especially so when these extremists are placed in the context of war

 9     crimes.  I really do not know who committed war crimes in the territory

10     of Croatia or in any other territory of the former Yugoslavia, but as

11     Mr. Prosecutor knows full well the government I was a member of was

12     prepared in all the ways to cooperate with the Tribunal and with all the

13     international organizations in order to ascertain the truth, that is, who

14     it was who committed crimes and who did not.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [Previous translation

16     continues]...

17             MR. SCOTT:

18        Q.   All right.  Well, we'll come back to that topic in a few moments.

19     Let me turn back to your -- the positions you held and your previous

20     training.  Based on what you've told us, sir, and based on a review of

21     your CV that I've seen various places that's available, prior to 1991 --

22     prior to April of 1992, is it correct to say that -- had you had -- well,

23     let me just ask you.  Had you had any military training or experience

24     prior to April or March 1992?

25        A.   Prior to March or April 1992?

Page 31192

 1        Q.   Prior to --

 2        A.   -- I as a -- in fact, the majority of Croats, as the majority of

 3     the citizens of the then-Yugoslavia, I served my military service in the

 4     Yugoslav People's Army in 1982 for some ten months.  I had the training

 5     that was compulsory for all the adult men at the time.  I wouldn't say

 6     that I had had any special military training.

 7        Q.   And --

 8        A.   Yes.

 9        Q.   And just in terms of reviewing your advanced degrees at least,

10     you received a masters in social psychology in 1983 and a Ph.D. in

11     psychology in 1987; is that correct?

12        A.   Correct.

13        Q.   And at the time -- at the time that you were appointed or at

14     least -- excuse me, let me -- at the time that the war broke out and

15     fighting in 1991 and I believe you said you spent some time -- part time

16     working in the Croatian army, at that time you were a professor of

17     psychology at the University of Zagreb; is that correct?

18        A.   Correct.  Sometime in early September 1991, I, together with a

19     group of colleagues from the university, reported to the Croatian army as

20     a volunteer.  Prior to that I was a professor at the Croatian faculty in

21     Zagreb.

22        Q.   Just to be clear, when you say reported to the Croatian army to

23     volunteer, were you offering your services in a civilian capacity or did

24     you become a member of the Croatian army at that time?

25        A.   I became a member of the Croatian army; however, since we were

Page 31193

 1     all university professors we offered our professional knowledge, and that

 2     knowledge was not in the art of war but in the various fields that we

 3     were involved in in our day-time job.

 4        Q.   Did you continue working at the same time at the university?

 5        A.   I don't know when it was that I formally left.  In Croatia there

 6     is a law which to some extent differs to the law in other countries, that

 7     was still in the former Yugoslavia.  If you leave your post at a

 8     university, for instance, because you have a certain duty to perform,

 9     then your job status with the university remains valid.  So for all those

10     years over which I was engaged on other duties, based on the labour law

11     in Croatia my formal employment and my work booklet lay with the

12     University of Zagreb.  And I was even allowed to, to the extent I had

13     time -- the spare time to do that, to even teach at the university.  Some

14     of my colleagues did that.

15        Q.   You said earlier in your testimony at page 27609 that this group

16     of you that you've just described again in the last few moments set up a

17     "department that dealt with psychological and informational aspects of

18     the war."

19             Is that something that either was or became known as the IPD

20     administration?

21        A.   Yes, I believe that that's precisely it.

22        Q.   And IPD stands for what, information propaganda?

23        A.   No.  Initially, IPD meant the information and psychological

24     activity.

25        Q.   And did that department or entity ever further evolve into some

Page 31194

 1     sort of intelligence service?

 2        A.   I don't think that the department ever evolved into an

 3     intelligence service.  The department did evolve, but unless I'm

 4     mistaken, an intelligence service was already in existence before the

 5     department was set up and developed over time.  I'm not sure how -- what

 6     the communication between the two was.  I know that an intelligence

 7     service existed at the time when I was performing this other duty.

 8        Q.   Well, at the risk of taking a bit of time, can you tell us

 9     exactly the nature of the work at the time of this psychological and

10     information department?  What were you actually doing?  What services

11     were being provided to the armed forces in that capacity?

12        A.   When I arrived there and when we set it in motion, it was the

13     early days of the department.  As a psychology professor I was engaged in

14     a large research project titled:  Children in war.  Through the project

15     we tried to assist children, victims of war, by giving them psychological

16     counselling, and a large number of experts were involved in that

17     activity.  Through my work there I realized that adults were in fact

18     faced with many difficulties, persons who were refugees or who hailed

19     from war-torn areas.  I, together with some other psychologists, tried to

20     develop some preventative measures aimed at countering the development of

21     the post-traumatic disorder, the PTSD.  The focus of our work was to

22     counter psychological problems, and we looked at how the US army dealt

23     with that during World War II --

24        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... significant amount of time to

25     give your answer to that, but let me move on, please.  During your

Page 31195

 1     involvement with the Croatian armed forces, during that period in the

 2     early 1990s, did you raise -- did you ever rise to any particular rank or

 3     were you given any particular rank during that time-period?

 4        A.   Yes.  I received a rank while I was in the Croatian army, the

 5     rank of a brigadier

 6        Q.   Can you give us any particular assistance as to, if you know, how

 7     that particular rank might fit into the rank hierarchy of a Western army

 8     in terms of -- where I -- in the United States, for example, a brigadier

 9     is typically referred to as a brigadier-general.  Is that the same in

10     Croatia or does it mean something different?

11        A.   In Croatia the rank of brigadier is somewhat lower than the

12     brigadier-general but a bit higher than a colonel.  The logic behind

13     these ranks was the one that the US army developed during World War II

14     when they included a number of professors, university professors,

15     particularly psychologists in the army and the ranks coincided with their

16     expertise, with their expert knowledge, rather than their military

17     performance.  And we followed the very same logic in developing these

18     ranks in the Croatian army.

19        Q.   Now, moving forward to your positions as assistant minister of

20     foreign affairs and then a few months later deputy minister of foreign

21     affairs, based on your CV and what you've told us in your testimony,

22     prior to that time you had no experience, you had no education or

23     training or experience in diplomacy or foreign affairs; is that correct?

24        A.   Correct.

25        Q.   Around this same time-period can you tell us, and that is in,

Page 31196

 1     let's say 1992, during the time you became -- took up your post in the

 2     foreign affairs, what role or position did President Tudjman's son,

 3     Miroslav Tudjman, have in the Croatian government?

 4        A.   I think that Mr. Miroslav Tudjman who was in that same group of

 5     university professors who volunteered to become members of the Croatian

 6     army and who participated in the setting up of the IPD department with

 7     me, I think that he stayed behind as a member of the army when I left it.

 8     If you're referring to the positions he held later on, I think that this

 9     happened a bit later after I had left the army that he transferred to the

10     intelligence service of Croatia.

11        Q.   At what point did he become the head of one of the national

12     intelligence services of Croatia?

13        A.   Unless I'm mistaken, it was at the very end of 1992.  I'm not

14     positive about it, but I believe it was the end of 1992.

15        Q.   And which particular intelligence service was this, because there

16     may be several in the Croatian government at that time?

17        A.   For a brief time I was appointed advisor for national security to

18     President Tudjman, and there our task was through organizational

19     cooperation to propose cooperation with other friendly states, that is --

20     or rather, in cooperation with other friendly states to make a proposal

21     for the organization of intelligence services in Croatia.  I didn't work

22     on this long, but I did start working on this with Mr. Miro Tudjman

23     and --

24        Q.   Excuse me, Mr. Zuzul, sorry to interrupt you.  Perhaps you

25     misunderstood or my question's mistranslated or I'm sure -- I'll take

Page 31197

 1     responsibility for any confusion.  My question to you, you referred to

 2     Miroslav Tudjman taking up a position as head of an intelligence service

 3     at the end of 1992.  My question was if you could simply identify that

 4     particular intelligence service.  There is something -- there was after

 5     that time, it may have been at the time, there was an agency called the

 6     Croatian Information Service, HIS; there was the Security Information

 7     Service which I believe was part of the Ministry of Defence, SIS, perhaps

 8     there were others.  So which of the intelligence services was

 9     Miroslav Tudjman the head of by the end of 1992?

10        A.   Yes, that's precisely what I was trying to say.  To the best of

11     my recollection, he became the head of the HIS, H-I-S, which was a newly

12     established service based on what I was just trying to say, if my memory

13     serves me well and I think it does.

14        Q.   And then you referred to, I was going to ask you that next, you

15     referred to an appointment as national security advisor to

16     President Tudjman sometime during the period 1992/1993; is that correct?

17        A.   That was sometime in the autumn of 1992.  I don't recall the

18     precise date, but, yes, that's correct.

19        Q.   And again, sir, prior to your appointment as assistant minister

20     of defence -- excuse me, minister of foreign affairs in March 1992, had

21     you had any training or involvement or previous experience other than

22     your ten months of service in the JNA in 1992, anything that might be

23     called national security?

24             JUDGE PRANDLER:  A translation problem that the very last

25     sentence of yours, Mr. Scott, it says, anything that might be called

Page 31198

 1     national service, and you said security.

 2             MR. SCOTT:  If it was my mistake, Your Honour, I apologise --

 3             JUDGE PRANDLER:  No, you said security and in the transcript it

 4     is service, so it should be replaced.  Thank you.

 5             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Judge Prandler.

 6        Q.   Sir, could you answer my question.  Did you have any prior

 7     training, experience, background in anything called national security?

 8        A.   No, neither did the vast majority of Croats.  I had no

 9     experience, to be quite frank.  My service in the JNA is not something I

10     would term experience in national security.

11        Q.   Well, sir, I have to put to you that based on this review that

12     we've conducted in the last few minutes, and I don't mean to offend you

13     particularly but I do have to put to you this point, and that is based on

14     what you've told us I see no, absolutely no previous experience,

15     training, or qualification for these extremely senior positions in

16     government that you found yourself in in 1992 and 1993.  And is it fair

17     to say, sir, that your principal qualification for those positions were

18     being a close friend of Gojko Susak and a close friend of

19     Miroslav Tudjman, the president's son?

20        A.   Well, of course you have the right to any opinion you choose to

21     adopt, but this is completely incorrect.  At that time I was one of the

22     youngest professors at Zagreb University.  I was the youngest vice-dean

23     of a faculty at the university.  I was already a professor in the USA.

24     In Croatian conditions, all these are major results.  I dealt with

25     aggressive behaviour --

Page 31199

 1        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... anything to do with military

 2     service or national security or diplomacy or foreign policy, it had

 3     absolutely nothing to do with those fields, sir.

 4        A.   But when you put such a personal question to me, you should allow

 5     me to complete my answer.

 6        Q.   Go ahead.

 7        A.   When you look at the structure of the Croatian government, the

 8     other persons in the government, when I was deputy minister my immediate

 9     superior was Professor Dr. Zdenko Skrabalo, a professor of medicine who

10     had even less experience than I did.  He was succeeded by

11     Dr. Mate Granic, a professor of medicine.  When you look at who the

12     Croatian ambassadors were, none of them, almost none of them had any

13     previous experience in diplomacy.  Why?  Well, the reason is the

14     following.  Apart from a very small number of those who did have

15     experience, no persons who had such experience chose to join the Croatian

16     option, and this includes both -- both civil servants and the army.  I

17     became assistant minister of foreign affairs, and my task was to select

18     staff members, and as a psychologist I had dealt with such issues.

19        Q.   Sir --

20        A.   At that time there were 35 people in the Croatian diplomatic

21     service, only half of them --

22        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... some minutes to go further

23     with your question -- your answer, excuse me.  Sir, isn't -- again,

24     wasn't your primary qualification that you were President Tudjman's man,

25     you were deeply loyal to President Tudjman, both at the time in 1992,

Page 31200

 1     1993, 1994, and thereafter.  You were the president's man, weren't you?

 2        A.   I do not take that as an insult because had I not been loyal to

 3     those I worked with, I would not have done that job.  I had many critical

 4     comments to make about President Tudjman, but I did accept him as the

 5     president of my country and as the man I worked with.  Had I thought this

 6     was something opposed to my principles, I would have left the job.

 7     However, I find it completely unacceptable because I have held many

 8     positions in the international community.  And certainly it was not my

 9     friendship with Miro Tudjman or anyone else or my loyalty to

10     President Tudjman that got me there.  That loyalty was understood as my

11     doing my job honestly under difficult conditions and you can check that

12     with your colleagues.

13        Q.   Let me ask you -- I apologise to the interpreters.

14             Let me ask you, please, to turn to Exhibit P 10401 in binder 3,

15     P 10401, binder 3.  Do you have it?  Sir, this appears to be an interview

16     that you gave or at least purports to be an interview that you gave on

17     the 10th of December, 1992, titled at least in part or referenced here

18     as:  "Interview with Miomir Zuzul, deputy foreign minister of the

19     Republic of Croatia."

20             Now, if I can direct your attention to the middle of the second

21     page, under -- there's a heading on the middle of that page that says:

22     "I would refuse the position of prime minister ..."

23             In the paragraph that follows, let me refer to that place and

24     then put a question or two to you.

25             "There are at least three reasons why people believe that

Page 31201

 1     Miomir Zuzul until recently 'only' professor and head of the department

 2     of developmental and child psychology in the school of philosophy at

 3     Zagreb University but today deputy foreign minister of the Republic of

 4     Croatia and the president's national security adviser, is one of the most

 5     powerful and promising people in Croatian politics.  He is from Imok, and

 6     they say that that lobby is fairly strong.  It is said that Miomir Zuzul

 7     is 'Susak's man' and the power of the defence minister is well-known.

 8     Aside from that, he is a personal friend of the president's son.  A third

 9     reason has to do with his job.  People believe that the very fact that

10     someone is involved in the organization of the intelligence service, in

11     this case within the foreign affairs sector, is already sufficient reason

12     for personal political power."

13             Now, do you recall that, I assume, you gave an interview back in

14     1992, I think probably if most people give an interview and it comes out

15     in the press, I guess we're all proud enough or what have you that we

16     want to read the interview.  Do you remember those words being written

17     about you in December of 1992?

18        A.   Well, now it is coming back to me when I see this interview, but

19     as we can see these are words written by a journalist.  Had you wanted to

20     read the next sentence, which we can all read now, in the next sentence

21     it says that even then I denied what the journalist was saying, the fact

22     that this journalist wrote that.  Had it been correct, I would really

23     have become prime minister within a few months or the minister of foreign

24     affairs because both those posts were filled with new people a few months

25     later.  I became an ambassador of the Republic of Croatia.  I'm not

Page 31202

 1     complaining about that.  It was an honour and I was proud of it, but it

 2     shows that what the journalist thought at that point in time was not --

 3     did not reflect reality in fact.

 4        Q.   Sir, I refer you further down the page where the -- statements

 5     are attributed to you directly, questions are -- excuse me, questions are

 6     put to you by the interviewer and then you'll see in brackets (Zuzul) and

 7     then it starts out:  "Taken individually ..."

 8             I'm just giving you that as a landmark.  If you go to the next

 9     paragraph which is still attributed to you speaking, it says this:

10     "Susak?  I'm a friend of his, I hope, but I have not known him long

11     either.  Watching him through the war and through politics I recognise

12     that this is a man worthy of esteem.  I belong to no one, not even to

13     Susak, but I acknowledge that we are working along the same political

14     line, that is, we have a similar political option which in the final

15     analysis is not Susak's but the president's.  In that sense, both Susak

16     and I are the president's men but he is the closer and stronger one."

17             Is that the statement that you gave to the interviewer in

18     December 1992?

19        A.   Correct, that's the statement I gave then and I would not change

20     it now.

21        Q.   Staying on the topic of intelligence services or coming back to

22     that again, which has been mentioned several times in the last few

23     minutes.  Did you ever have any dealings or have dealings with a man

24     involved in intelligence named Markica Rebic?

25        A.   Yes, I knew Mr. Rebic well.  He comes from the same town I come

Page 31203

 1     from.  For a while we both worked together in the secondary school in

 2     Imotski.  However, when he became involved in intelligence we had very

 3     little contact and our personal contact, private contact, ceased as early

 4     as the early [as interpreted] 1990s.

 5        Q.   And --

 6        A.   [In English] As the mid-1990s, I said.  There is mistake in

 7     translation.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  When you say "mid-1990s," sir, can you help us a bit

 9     more with that.  Mid-1990s could be, I suppose, anything from 1993 to

10     1998.  Can you help us?

11        A.   [Interpretation] When I became the ambassador to Geneva,

12     Mr. Rebic, to the best of my recollection, was not yet involved in

13     intelligence work.  When he did join the intelligence service, I was

14     already a diplomat.  And in the nature of our work we didn't have a lot

15     of contact.  Privately, our contacts grew less because I gained the

16     impression that there was a certain circle of people within the then-HDZ

17     and within the institutions which did not gladly accept me.  When you

18     have such an impression about someone you have known for years, whether

19     your impression is correct or not, your relations cool and that's what

20     happened between me and Mr. Rebic.

21        Q.   Back a few months ago in October of 2007 when a verdict was

22     issued by this institution in the so-called Vukovar case, you're reported

23     by the Croatian news service HINA as saying that -- you were very

24     critical of the verdict.  You say you hoped it was a mistake and you said

25     that the ICTY verdict "has scandalised the whole civilised world."

Page 31204

 1             Is that correct?

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:  Can we get the -- where this comes from.  I

 3     mean --

 4             MR. SCOTT:  A HINA report on the 1st of October, 2007.

 5             MR. KARNAVAS:  Which document is it on?

 6             MR. SCOTT:  It's not an exhibit, Mr. Karnavas.

 7             MR. KARNAVAS:  Well, if it is not an exhibit I would object.

 8             MR. SCOTT:  I don't have to put an exhibit to the witness,

 9     Mr. Karnavas, and you know that.  That is my basis for asking the

10     question, you do not have to put every document to the witness.

11             MR. KARNAVAS:  I beg to differ.  I think it's professional

12     courtesy to at least give counsel the opportunity to see if whether

13     you're quoting the document correctly.  I will take it that you're

14     bona fides, but I don't think that you should presume that I should have

15     to.  Thank you.

16             MR. SCOTT:

17        Q.   Sir, do you recall making that statement?

18             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I think it would be -- show

19     courtesy to show the witness that article.

20             MR. SCOTT:

21        Q.   Sir, are you denying that you made such a statement --

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just one moment.

23             Mr. Praljak.

24             THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, now that this

25     is being discussed there was several documents previously which were in

Page 31205

 1     English only.  Mr. Prlic responded but we were unable to participate to

 2     understand.  So could we, the accused, be provided with the documents in

 3     a language we understand?  There were several documents in English only.

 4     Thank you.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, this report by HINA,

 6     you don't have it, do you?

 7             MR. SCOTT:  Not in the courtroom, sir, and I strongly in the most

 8     uncertain terms -- most certain terms, excuse me, I disagree with

 9     counsel.  We do our investigation, we read a lot of documentation.  I

10     prepare questions.  I do not have to show every document on which I base

11     a question to the witness.  The witness can tell us very easily, if he

12     says he never gave such an interview or made such a statement, he can

13     tell us that.

14        Q.   Sir, is it -- are you telling us that you don't recall --

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The witness may answer.

16             THE WITNESS:  Are you -- [Interpretation] Mr. Prosecutor, I don't

17     know why you are putting in my mouth what I want to say or don't want to

18     say.  I want to answer every question, and if I don't know the answer I

19     will say I don't know.  There's no need for you to answer in my stead.  I

20     did make a statement, and like most people in Croatia I do think it was a

21     bad decision.  I don't know whether the statement was made in the precise

22     words you quoted because I don't see it before me, but in investigating

23     me and my life you must have seen that I'm a person who held certain

24     principles throughout, who from 1993 to this day have supported the work

25     of this Tribunal, not only as a Croat but also as a member of the

Page 31206

 1     international community.  And I think I have done quite a lot and that's

 2     how I came to be here.  So when I thought that a decision had been made

 3     which was not just, in view of what had happened, I said so.

 4             MR. SCOTT:

 5        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone.

 7             MR. SCOTT:

 8        Q.   I didn't put any words in your mouth.  I was asking a question, I

 9     may have had some arguments with counsel, but I never put words in your

10     mouth except to ask you if you were critical of that judgement.  Now, you

11     said you were and I didn't say there was anything wrong with that.  Of

12     course you're entitled to your opinion, but I simply wanted to just

13     establish that by way of background.  Further on that, sir, and based on

14     what you just told us about your attitude toward the Tribunal, can we

15     agree, sir, that this Tribunal can only do its work and judgements can

16     only be issued, good or bad, based upon the evidence and information that

17     is gathered and put before this Tribunal, much of which must come from

18     the states of the former Yugoslavia.  Correct?

19        A.   Yes, completely correct.

20        Q.   Now, you were instrumental, were you not, in the hiring of a

21     Washington DC attorney named David Rivkin to represent the Republic of

22     Croatia in the 1990s before this Tribunal; correct?

23        A.   Not the way you formulated it.  When I was appointed to the post

24     of ambassador in Washington, Mr. Rivkin was already working for the

25     Croatian Embassy and the Republic of Croatia.  I met him, I was

Page 31207

 1     introduced to him as somebody who had already been recruited by

 2     Minister Granic, if I'm not wrong, and this had happened at least half a

 3     year before I arrived.  I was introduced to Mr. Rivkin, I had good

 4     cooperation with him.  I thought then, as I do now, that he did a good

 5     job for the Republic of Croatia, but my communication with him was almost

 6     exclusively concerning his work as a lobbyist for the Republic of Croatia

 7     in Washington and not concerning his representing Croatia before the

 8     Tribunal.  This was never organized through the Embassy of the Republic

 9     of Croatia in Washington.

10             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may very

11     briefly, it's evident that my learned friend is going somewhere with

12     this.  In any case, the last two questions, especially the last one

13     concerning Mr. Rivkin, is difficult to evaluate as to relevance.  What

14     can the witness's possible contact with an American attorney-at-law while

15     he was an ambassador in Washington, all of which occurred after all the

16     events in the indictment, all of this has to be shown to be relevant,

17     otherwise it's a pure waste of time.  So the relevance has to be

18     established.  We sense where this might be going and then it's

19     irrelevant.  So please let this be established first.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, if you asked that

21     question you probably had a goal.  I must admit that I'm a little lost.

22     I can't see precisely what you're aiming at, but please proceed.

23             MR. KARNAVAS:  Is the objection overruled, Your Honour, because

24     there's a question on relevance.  Is Mr. Rivkin here now being tried for

25     errors and omissions --

Page 31208

 1             MR. SCOTT:  That's not the standard of relevance.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I said that the Prosecutor must

 3     have a goal, an aim, so I asked him to proceed in order to see what his

 4     aim is.

 5             MR. KARNAVAS:  Very well.  I misunderstood you, Mr. President.  I

 6     agree with you.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed, Mr. Scott.

 8             MR. SCOTT:

 9        Q.   Can I ask you, sir, to turn to Exhibit P 10544, which will be

10     found in the binder 3.  You have that, sir.  This is an article in the

11     Washington Post dated the 1st of July, 2000.  I would like to refer you

12     to the -- well, let's start at the top.  It says:  "Top Croatian

13     ministers looked to a Washington attorney for advice in recent years as

14     they weighed demands from the International War Crimes Tribunal for

15     information about alleged atrocities committed by Croatian troops in the

16     1991 to 1995 Bosnian war" --

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, Mr. Kovacic wants to

18     intervene.

19             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I think that it has been

20     established before this Tribunal that the accused have the right to see

21     exhibits in a language they understand.  This is not the first document

22     in this binder which we do not have in Croatian.  I propose that for this

23     reason the use of this document be prevented, and of any document in

24     future which is not translated into Croatian, as was every document that

25     the Defence could not use if it had not been translated.

Page 31209

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, the accused must

 2     have the document in their own language; however, sometimes documents are

 3     shown in B/C/S, we don't have any translation available.  The document is

 4     then placed on the ELMO, we read out the relevant paragraph, and then it

 5     is up to the interpreters to translate the document for everybody's

 6     benefit.

 7             MR. SCOTT:  [Microphone not activated]

 8             MR. KARNAVAS:  Your Honour, I don't mean to -- just one last

 9     intervention on this, on the grounds of relevancy.  As far as I'm aware,

10     there have been no accusations or charges against Mr. Rivkin with the bar

11     association concerning any illegal activity or unprofessional activity

12     that he conducted, that's number one, on behalf of Croatia or in his

13     private practice.

14             Number two, as you may know, an attorney of the United States who

15     represents a foreign government has to -- has to get clearance in that,

16     in those affairs.  So it's very well-known by the United States

17     Government that Mr. Rivkin was representing another country because they

18     have to be registered as such if they're going to be doing any lobbying

19     work.  I really fail to see on what grounds we're going into Mr. Rivkin's

20     activities.  If he gave bad advice to a client, shame on him, they should

21     take him before the DC bar association.  But what does this have to do

22     with Mr. Zuzul, what does it have to do with the case, what does it have

23     to do with the indictment?  I would beg -- demand from Mr. Scott his

24     basis as opposed to showing the document.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, in order to save

Page 31210

 1     time you asked for the additional time, you were granted additional time.

 2     What did you want to establish by mentioning Mr. Rivkin?  As far as I'm

 3     concerned, it's the first time that I hear about this gentleman.

 4             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, in order to do that we would have to

 5     excuse the witness and go into private session.  I do not have to lay out

 6     the rationale and goals of my cross-examination in front of the very

 7     witness who's being examined.  So if you would like to do that, if you

 8     would like to excuse the witness and go private session, I would be happy

 9     to address it.

10             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, by your leave, I would

11     like to draw your attention to the following.  The Prosecution advanced

12     the suggestion that they just advanced; however, the Prosecution in

13     another case before this Tribunal had a position that was quite the

14     opposite to this one and in that case when the Judges asked the Defence

15     to lay the foundation for their question the Prosecution opposed the

16     request that the witness leave the courtroom.  So I'm quite surprised

17     that the Prosecution should now be asking that the witness be requested

18     to leave the courtroom, so there must be a hidden agenda there; I'm sure

19     of that.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic, which case did you

21     have in mind?

22             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] That was in the Kordic/Cerkez case,

23     and by happenstance we were the counsel in that case, and I must say that

24     the Presiding Judge in that case was in the habit of asking us whenever

25     such a line of questioning was embarked upon, and of course the

Page 31211

 1     Presiding Judge, or rather, the Prosecutor could not know where this was

 2     heading, and of course the Presiding Judge would then ask us where we

 3     were going with our questions and we had to respond and we -- it was

 4     oftentime asked that the witnesses leave the courtroom.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, what are you getting

 6     at?  What is your purpose in the interest of time?

 7             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, I disagree with counsel.  I don't

 8     pretend, I'm not going to stand up and pretend to know the particular

 9     circumstances on that prior occasion, if that happened or not.  It may

10     have been for perfectly good reasons, I don't know.  But I stand by the

11     position that I'm cross-examining this witness, I want to put questions

12     to this witness, and I do not have to lay out my plan of questioning in

13     front of the witness before I put my questions to him.  So I would be

14     happy to talk to the Chamber, I would be very happy to talk to the

15     Chamber, but not in the presence of the witness.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I shall confer with my fellow

17     Judges to see whether the witness is to leave the courtroom or not.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             MR. KHAN:  Your Honours, could I just say before you deliver your

20     ruling, as a matter of principle, I think it must be said that my learned

21     friend Mr. Scott's proposition is quite correct.  I don't see any problem

22     at all with excusing the witness.  It can't be right that a witness be

23     forewarned as to a line of cross-examination.  Of course that's another

24     matter for the Court to know relevance.  So I would commend my learned

25     friend's proposition as being quite sensible.

Page 31212

 1             MR. KARNAVAS:  [Microphone not activated]

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, this is what we're going

 3     to do.

 4             Witness, anyway, we were about to have a break.  You're going to

 5     be excused out of the courtroom.  Then we'll have a break, and as soon as

 6     you've left the courtroom Mr. Scott is going to tell us about his

 7     purpose.

 8             So please follow the usher witness and you can start your

 9     20-minute break -- well, it will be a little longer for you.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, very quickly before

12     the break.

13             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, just in -- again, I would ask to please

14     go into private session because I think members of Mr. Zuzul's family

15     are --

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, yes, you're right.

17     Let's move into private session.

18                           [Private session]

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 31213











11 Page 31213 redacted. Private session.















Page 31214

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22                           [Open session]

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in public session.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

25             Please proceed, Mr. Scott.

Page 31215

 1             MR. SCOTT:

 2        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, I think at one point we left off and I had directed

 3     your attention to -- yes, I'm sure I did, P 10544, and I do acknowledge

 4     to counsel, apparently we're not able to get translation of this

 5     particular in time.  If we can have the English version brought up in

 6     e-court, I will ask for the interpreters' assistance.  In fairness,

 7     Mr. Zuzul, I understand that you're quite fluent -- if I may say so,

 8     excellent speaker and I'm sure read excellent English.

 9             This article starts off -- we read the part before and then it

10     goes on second paragraph to say:  "Croatia's foreign minister privately

11     urged the government to comply in full.  But attorney David B. Rivkin

12     Jr., at the time a partner in the law form Hunton & Williams, said at one

13     point that cooperating would be the 'worst option' and urged the

14     ministers instead to pursue diversionary legal tactics, according to

15     records of government deliberations made available here."

16             I'm pausing for the benefit of the interpreters.

17             "Rivkin, whose view won the day, said his view [sic] was to

18     present an aggressive defence of wartime actions by the Croatian

19     government, then headed by President Franjo Tudjman, and help the

20     government fend off the demands."

21             Then it goes on in the next paragraph just to further finish on

22     this particular aspect.

23             "The new government has declared it wants to cooperate with the

24     Tribunal, denounced Rivkin's legal strategies ..."

25             Now, just to pause there for a minute, sir, this is indeed,

Page 31216

 1     however, the same David Rivkin that, then, you further involved with the

 2     Croatian government in terms of, I think you said, lobbying work in

 3     Washington DC; is that correct?

 4        A.   No, Mr. Prosecutor, I did not involve him.  He had already been

 5     recruited to lobby in 1995, whereas I was appointed ambassador in 1996.

 6     As I said, I cooperated with him and I have to be sincere and say that I

 7     cooperated with him well but on work in Washington.

 8        Q.   Yes, I understand that.  My understanding is that at least as

 9     part of the work being performed by Mr. Rivkin he was hired in 1996 at

10     your suggestion and with the approval of Franjo Tudjman; is that right?

11        A.   I don't know what part of his work you are referring to.  He was

12     recruited to work for the Croatian state in 1995.

13        Q.   Sir, if I can direct your attention to Exhibit P 10542, which is

14     again in the last binder, binder 3, P 10542.  This is an article in a

15     publication called Newsday, Washington bureau, dated the 25th of July,

16     1997, in which you are one of the persons featured, being quoted and

17     referred to in the text of the article.  Toward the bottom half of the

18     page there is this paragraph just to set the context here.  It says:

19     "The Pentagon official" being referenced, "said Croatia 'should do more

20     to bring ethnic Croat indictees before the Hague Tribunal.'  The official

21     said that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman can 'make things happen' if

22     he seriously wants them to."

23             Then it goes back and makes a statement apparently attributed to

24     you:  "The Croatian envoy also said his government will resist subpoenas

25     handed down by the Tribunal for internal documents connecting Tudjman and

Page 31217

 1     his aides with the war waged in Bosnia by Bosnian Croats."

 2             Now, do you recall taking the position, and in fact announcing to

 3     this reporter that the Croatian government would resist turning over

 4     documents to the Tribunal in connection with Tudjman's involvement in the

 5     war in Bosnia?

 6        A.   I don't recall and I cannot confirm whether or not I said this or

 7     how I said it.  It is correct, however, that the official policy of the

 8     Croatian government at the time was not to hand over documents as I

 9     understand it concerning events in Croatia, not events in

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I was merely implementing the official policy.

11        Q.   I see.  In fact, on that official policy if I can direct your

12     attention to Exhibit P 10556, also in the third binder -- oh, I'm sorry.

13     Are the interpreters -- excuse me, sorry.

14             There is an interpretation of this document.  Sorry, Ms. Winner

15     is trying to help me out and doing a good job of it.

16             Sir, if you will look now at this exhibit, P 10556, this is a

17     report from Markica Rebic dated the 4th of June, 1998, to the president

18     of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman.  And for current purposes

19     I would like to direct your attention, please, first of all, to page 28

20     of this report in the English version so that the courtroom can have the

21     fuller understanding of what this document is about.

22             On page 28, sir, in paragraph number 4 provides us with this

23     information:  "In 1996, the HIS," and this was the intelligence agency

24     that you identified earlier today as the one that became headed by

25     Miroslav Tudjman at the end of 1992, "the HIS was assigned as the main

Page 31218

 1     protagonist responsible for carrying out Operation The Hague on the level

 2     of the Croatian government.  This service corresponded to the HIS, that

 3     is, the SIS in the department -- department of defence, I believe, OZRH,

 4     Republic of Croatia, in all important aspects of authority."

 5             Going on to paragraph -- excuse me, on page 20 -- going back to

 6     page 20, please, with that connection involved -- in mind.  At the top of

 7     page 20 this is reported to Franjo Tudjman by the intelligence service.

 8             "On the basis of ICTY documents, which this Service has acquired

 9     through intelligence methods and from reliable sources which have so far

10     proved to be correct, we propose that the ultimate objective of the

11     ICTY Prosecution is to link all indictments against Croats (Republic of

12     Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) attributing responsibility to the top

13     leadership, and the most prominent members of the RH leadership,

14     including the President of the Republic of Croatia."

15             Below that the Chamber may see that the reports about certain

16     testimony given at the Tribunal.  On page 34, top of page 34 numbered 4:

17     "The defence strategy shall rest on the crucial position of

18     non-involvement of the Republic of Croatia in the Muslim-Croat war in

19     Central Bosnia (the legal question of 'an international armed

20     conflict') ..."

21             And then as to Operation Storm, Oluja, the separate issue of the

22     ICTY's alleged lack of jurisdiction, and that's what is become known as

23     the Gotovina case.

24             Now, in that particular regard in connection with documents, sir,

25     and in connection with what you said implementing official policy to

Page 31219

 1     resist turning over documents, in that context if I can next direct your

 2     attention, please, to page 23 of the same report, top of page 23:  "When

 3     HVO archives became a serious problem in the course of preparation of

 4     General Blaskic's defence, with respect to the substance of the subpoena

 5     and ICTY's requests involving HVO officials, this Service, in cooperation

 6     with the HIS, took action and measures to protect the HVO archives."

 7             Now, sir, you said a few moments ago that you understood that you

 8     were implementing official policy in resisting the production of

 9     documents.  Did you understand that policy to be consistent with what is

10     stated in this document -- this report that I just put in front of you,

11     is that the policy that you were implementing?

12        A.   I have never seen this document before and I was not aware of its

13     contents or the policy it refers to.  It's quite difficult to me to draw

14     conclusions from this particular viewpoint.  There's a lot here I would

15     not agree with, but I never received instructions couched in the terms

16     presented here.  It's correct that the policy which I knew of as an

17     ambassador and which I tried to justify as best I could was that at that

18     time the government considered that the Tribunal was -- did not have

19     jurisdiction concerning the events of -- following Operation Storm and

20     during Operation Storm.  Whether there was a justified position or not,

21     I -- that was the position.  I tried to expound to my collocutors and

22     some agreed with it and some did not.  I am not sure, as regards other

23     matters, that the position was what is represented in this document.  I

24     know that my instructions were always that we would, in fact, cooperate

25     fully with the Tribunal as regards Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And from the

Page 31220

 1     outset Croatia supported the work of the Tribunal, not -- we did not only

 2     pay lip service to that some of us but we actually supported the

 3     Tribunal.

 4        Q.   If we can go back, please, to P 10544, the Washington Post

 5     article, and there again if we put it on the e-court on this document

 6     we'll need the assistance of the interpreters, please.

 7             In the second page of that article toward the bottom of the page

 8     there is a paragraph that starts -- yes, it's on the screen now.

 9             "Based on what Rivkin says were false assurances by officials in

10     the Tudjman government, he said that Hunton & Williams erroneously

11     claimed in legal filings that it had fully complied with Tribunal demands

12     for all documents related to the Ahmici atrocity."

13             And I'll note that that has nothing to do with Operation Storm.

14             "Shortly after taking office, however, the new government

15     revealed that it had uncovered several intelligence agency files that not

16     only named some of the Croatian militia members responsible for the

17     slayings, but also revealed that Tudjman's government provided false

18     identities and paid for homes where the men could hide from Tribunal

19     arrest warrants in a scenic village on the Adriatic coast."

20             Now, sir, did it ever come to your attention that at around the

21     time that you were saying it was the official policy not to produce

22     documents, that in fact subsequent to that these additional documents

23     became known and ultimately were turned over to the Tribunal?

24        A.   Excuse me, I didn't quite understand your question.  The official

25     policy that all the documents were handed over -- may I read this in

Page 31221

 1     English?  Sorry.

 2        Q.   Of course.

 3        A.   At that time with respect to quite a lot of the things you are

 4     mentioning now, I was not aware of them and I don't know what is and what

 5     is not correct.  If you as the Prosecutor of this institution or if this

 6     institution says that not all the documents which was subsequently handed

 7     over were handed over, then I believe you because I believe this

 8     institution far more than I believe Jeffrey Smith the journalist who

 9     wrote this article and whom I know personally.

10             As regards your previous question, who were the extremists among

11     the Croats, one name I can give you is Jeffrey Smith.  I know of some

12     other articles he wrote where he wrote all sorts of things starting from

13     certain political positions.  Having said that, I am not saying that what

14     you say is not true.  I do not know about it.

15        Q.   Sir, I note that when it comes to talking about Mr. Jeffrey

16     Smith, a person -- non-Croat person not in Zagreb, you're suddenly quite

17     capable and willing to identify him as one of the extremists that you

18     wouldn't tell us about before.  What is it about Mr. Smith that makes you

19     willing to identify him but not any of the others?

20        A.   Mr. Smith is an American, if he's the person I'm thinking of, and

21     I assume he is, an American of Croatian origin, close to a circle of

22     Croats who hold relatively extreme political positions with whom, neither

23     as an ambassador nor later on as a minister or politician, I never had

24     close relations with them because they thought Croatian policy should be

25     different from what it was.  Of course they had the right to their

Page 31222

 1     opinion, and he expressed this opinion, if it's the same Jeffrey Smith,

 2     in several articles in which inter alia, if I remember correctly, he

 3     fiercely attacked the government I was part of for cooperating with the

 4     Tribunal in another case, using different arguments but starting from the

 5     starting point of a group which exists among Croats in America and I

 6     believe elsewhere.  That's why I wanted to mention him.  I'm not even

 7     saying it's the same Jeffrey Smith, but I assume it is.

 8        Q.   If we can go forward to another aspect of the report from

 9     Mr. Rebic that was actually then touched on in part of the

10     Washington Post article that I just referred to and that is the

11     protection -- the giving of false identities and protection of men or

12     hiding on the Adriatic coast.  If I can refer you back again to page 23

13     of Exhibit P 10556.  Under the paragraph about the HVO archives is this

14     paragraph, and we do have a translation of this.

15             "This service established through counter-intelligence methods

16     the existence of seven other secret indictments against Croats in

17     Central Bosnia.  On several occasions, it forwarded timely

18     information" --

19             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Excuse me, Mr. Scott, I wonder which page?

20             MR. SCOTT:  Page 23.  I apologise, Judge Prandler.  Page 23.

21        Q.   "On several occasions it forwarded timely information on the

22     intention of SFOR members to arrest the individuals charged in secret

23     indictments, and to that end measures were taken to hide and protect

24     them.  We are providing direct protection to four individuals from

25     Central Bosnia who are subject to secret indictments; the HVO SIS is

Page 31223

 1     protecting one individual, while the remaining two persons were informed

 2     on time of their possible arrest."

 3             Now, do you recall having any information at the time, sir, that

 4     one of the persons being protected at this time, in 1996, was

 5     Ivica Rajic?

 6        A.   No, I didn't have any information about that.

 7        Q.   Could I direct your attention, please, to Exhibit P 10539 in the

 8     third binder, P 10539.  Sir, this is a letter, again from you, in fact,

 9     to the Washington Post, published a letter to the editor, on 11 November

10     1996 which you were apparently responding to certain -- an article

11     written concerning Mr. Ivica Rajic.  We'll put that on the ELMO, please,

12     we made need the assistance of the interpreters, please.

13             You refer to in the second paragraph:  "In his article, Mr. Dobbs

14     wrote that Ivica Rajic, who is wanted by the United Nations War Crimes

15     Tribunal was 'reportedly seen in a state-owned hotel' in Split.  This

16     report apparently drawn from a report appearing in the Croatian weekly

17     Globus, is incorrect."

18             At the end of the paragraph:  "Contrary to the media assertions,

19     the current movement or residence of Rajic remain unknown to Croatian

20     authorities."

21             And I note the date of this -- your letter to the Washington Post

22     being 11 November 1996.  Do you remember sending that letter to the

23     Washington Post, sir?

24        A.   Well, now that I see the letter, yes, I sent the letter.

25        Q.   What kind of inquiries did you make of the Croatian government

Page 31224

 1     prior to sending your letter to determine whether, in fact, your

 2     government knew where Mr. Rajic was or not?

 3        A.   Mr. Prosecutor, as you are well aware I was a Croatian ambassador

 4     at the time.  Any ambassador may seek instructions and this is what they

 5     often do, but no ambassador may conduct an inquiry into finding out

 6     whether the information he received from the government or not.

 7     Evidently, the Croatian government did -- was not able to know what was

 8     correct here or not.  I received information from the Croatian

 9     government, on the basis of which I drafted the letter.

10             Was I supposed to mistrust the information I received from the

11     Croatian government?  Was it true?  I don't know.  As I may have said, I

12     hold the author of this article, Mr. Michael Dobbs in high esteem, he's a

13     very good journalist and I can even say he's a very good friend.  I wrote

14     a response on the basis of the information I received from my very own

15     government.  I don't think any other ambassador would have done something

16     different.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may be allowed

18     one intervention that might help clear up the matter, I personally know a

19     great deal about this issue.  I would like to clarify one point.  This

20     particular paragraph says:  "The current movement or residence of Rajic

21     remain unknown."  And at the time the letter was drafted --

22             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Will you take an oath?  It seems to me that you

23     are testifying now, Ms. Alaburic?

24             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] No, no, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  You're testifying without an oath?

Page 31225

 1             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I appeal to you to

 2     hear me out.  You will see that I'm not making a statement of any sort;

 3     I'm merely drawing your attention to what is different in this paragraph

 4     and what the Prosecutor has to tie up with.  This article was published

 5     in the Globus weekly at some point in time, it also says that a

 6     photograph was published of a man who was supposed to be Rajic but was

 7     not.  It was a hotel staff.  And then there follows this sentence:  "...

 8     the current movement ... of Mr. Rajic ..." is such and such.  The time at

 9     which this statement was given to the editorial office does not coincide

10     with the publishing of the Globus article, so that both the Globus

11     article and this particular letter could have been true.  I'm merely

12     trying to point out that these refer to two different time-periods.

13     Thank you very much.

14             MR. SCOTT:

15        Q.   Sir, if you will next direct your attention, please, to Exhibit

16     P 10546, P 10546, in binder 3.  In a nutshell, sir, this is a letter from

17     the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Defence, dated the 17th of June,

18     1996, in which Ivica Rajic's employment with the minister of defence is

19     extended.  If you look under "Decision" at the first paragraph above

20     "Statement of reasons."

21             "The service is being extended for a duration of six months to

22     carry out the same job duties starting on 30 December 1994 ..."

23     continuing on.  This is dated the 17th of June, 1996, if my calculations

24     are correct, six months would have extended to at least the 17th of

25     December, 1996.  So, sir, were you aware that when you reported that the

Page 31226

 1     Croatian government did not know of Mr. Rajic's whereabouts or movements,

 2     that at that very time he was employed and paid by the Croatian Ministry

 3     of Defence?

 4        A.   Of course I wasn't aware of that and I don't know how I could

 5     have been aware of that as an ambassador.  I only knew what my government

 6     informed me of.  Whether somebody inside the system was aware of that I

 7     don't know and I cannot testify to that.  But most certainly, had I known

 8     that this was not correct, I would not have written a letter such as this

 9     one because the crucial sentence in the entire letter is at the end.

10        Q.   Sir, I next want to turn to the topic of Mr. Ivo Komsic again,

11     whose name has come up several times in your testimony.  You had a number

12     of contacts with Mr. Komsic in the negotiations, the peace negotiations,

13     in the latter part of 1993, early part of 1994; is that correct?

14        A.   I had a number of contacts with -- with others I even had more

15     contacts so I can't define the significance of that, but most definitely

16     I contacted Mr. Komsic and he contacted me.

17        Q.   I believe in your testimony on direct examination in reference to

18     the joint -- the document that was put before you at the time was a joint

19     declaration by Tudjman and Izetbegovic on the 14th of September, 1993,

20     and that was Exhibit 1D, if I'm not mistaken, 1D 01535, we're not -- just

21     for the purposes of the record.  I'm not going to open it.  But the

22     persons who signed that document on the -- the persons who signed that

23     document, among others, included Mr. Komsic and I believe -- and yourself

24     on 14th of September, 1993.  And I believe you testified at page 27788

25     that the persons who signed that document were among those persons having

Page 31227

 1     the greatest political influence or impact in Bosnia-Herzegovina around

 2     that time.

 3             Do you remember giving that testimony?

 4        A.   Well, I don't know what it was that I exactly said.  I did say

 5     that the document was signed the way you described it.  Perhaps I may

 6     have referred to the greatest political influence, but I certainly did

 7     not have Mr. Komsic in mind.  I did say, and I can repeat it, that

 8     Mr. Komsic helped bring the agreement about.  I said before, and I

 9     believe I repeated it today, that at the meeting preceding this one there

10     was Ambassador Biscevic and I on the one side, Mr. Silajdzic and

11     Mr. Komsic on the other side.  I also said in my earlier evidence that

12     President Tudjman had certain reservations vis-a-vis the possibility of

13     Mr. Komsic representing the other side.  After a lengthy conversation

14     with him, and if I can put it that way, my comments that this was the

15     express wish of the Muslim side and if this was the way in which we would

16     reach an agreement, it would be a good idea to agree to Mr. Komsic.

17     President Tudjman responded to that by saying, Very well, but then

18     Mr. Biscevic will be accompanying you.

19        Q.   Sir, I think if you will remember back to a transcript that we

20     were looking at earlier, presidential transcript on record that we were

21     looking at earlier today and I believe at the end of the day yesterday,

22     it was a record for the 13th of February, 1994, and in that transcript

23     you made -- you and others made reference to the involvement of

24     Mr. Komsic in the negotiations in Geneva at that time.  Do you remember

25     that?

Page 31228

 1        A.   Do you mean the transcript from the meeting of the Presidency of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 3        Q.   Yes -- no, no, the Presidency of Croatia.  The one that you

 4     reported about and you gave -- made certain statements that the ICFY was

 5     on its deathbed and you're reporting about the Washington developments

 6     and it was a transcript of that meeting.  I don't think in the interests

 7     of time we need to pull out the transcript.  Do you recall that?

 8        A.   Mm-hmm.

 9        Q.   Yes?  All right.  And --

10        A.   I do remember that.

11        Q.   And you mentioned in that record I believe, if I'm not mistaken,

12     around that same time you had involvements with Mr. Komsic that in fact

13     you reported, I think that's when there were discussions about whether it

14     was completely Mr. Komsic's proposal or not and then conversations with

15     Mr. Redman.  Do you remember that?

16        A.   Yes, I remember.  I think that I said that Mr. Silajdzic had told

17     me that it was not only Komsic's proposal.  I think that that's the way I

18     put it.

19        Q.   Absolutely right.  Absolutely correct.

20             Now, if I can ask you to go to Exhibit P 10403.  I'm afraid, sir,

21     that I have to put one last book in front of you today, and to the best

22     of my knowledge, Your Honours, I'll tell you this is my last exhibit.

23             Mr. Komsic -- this Mr. Komsic wrote a book and actually it's been

24     listed and used in this case by both the Defence and Prosecution, various

25     excerpts, called:  "Surviving a country" by Komsic.  And there's a

Page 31229

 1     chapter or portion of his book, if you haven't had a chance to read, I

 2     guess I have to break the news to you which is titled:  "Zuzul's

 3     blackmail."

 4             And you have Exhibit P 10403, Mr. Komsic is giving an account and

 5     in this chapter it starts, in fact on 11th of February, 1994, so two or

 6     three days prior to the presidential transcript meeting that we looked at

 7     earlier today.  He talks about being in Geneva and he talks about

 8     Mr. Silajdzic, which seems to be consistent.

 9             "Silajdzic insisted that there were no borders between the

10     Muslims and the Croats, the borders were an invention leading to war and

11     that everything was the consequence of Tudjman's obsession with getting

12     the former Banovina.  Zuzul reacted and there was a heavy exchange of

13     words.  (Granic left yesterday and took our plan to Zagreb).  It was not

14     possible to have a proper dialogue after that."

15             Now, if I can direct your attention, please, to the last page of

16     this excerpt, on page 3, the top of the page, please.

17             "The conference increased the tension between the two

18     delegations, the HNV and Herceg-Bosna, both in Geneva."

19             Now, can we agree, sir, that the HNV is a reference to the

20     Croatian National Council, a body that had been formed in Sarajevo and

21     was another organization of Bosnian Croats that you spoke about earlier

22     today; is that right?

23        A.   Correct.

24        Q.   Mr. Komsic says that:  "Zuzul invited me for a talk about this.

25     It was a very unpleasant and difficult conversation.  He first tried to

Page 31230

 1     tell me his personal views trying to give me some advice.  When this did

 2     not help and I stated the arguments that completely justified everything

 3     that we had done and proposed, he told me the 'government' position.  He

 4     was clear and unambiguous, and in addition to mentioning high treason, he

 5     threatened me.  He warned me that 'they' had my family, who were in

 6     Sisak, under control.  I told him that I was not impressed by these

 7     threats because they had tried to kill me before, my property was

 8     confiscated and divided, an arrest warrant was issued for my son and they

 9     were threatening me publicly and arrogantly on Croatian Television.  I

10     reminded him of the appearance of Ignjac Kostroman on Croatian Radio

11     Television."

12             Do you recall, sir, having this conversation with Mr. Komsic

13     around the 11th of February, 1994?

14        A.   The conversation, as is described here, is the sort of

15     conversation I've never had with anyone, including Mr. Komsic.  I can't

16     remember and I can't make any claims about meeting up with him or not on

17     that day.  I must say that I am scandalised by this.  For instance, he

18     said that he left our premises in the United Nations building excited and

19     encouraged.  I never had an office in the United Nations building, so to

20     say the least, he is lying about the venue of the meeting.

21             Allow me, Mr. Prosecutor, to put a logical question.  Two days

22     after what happened an official record was made.  Was there anything in

23     what was recorded as me having said that even remotely resembles what is

24     written by Mr. Komsic here?  You have gone over the better part of my

25     career as a diplomat and not only as a diplomat.  Did you ever come

Page 31231

 1     across a situation where I threatened anyone, mentioned anyone's family,

 2     or anything of the sort?  Yesterday we had occasion to see the way

 3     Mr. Komsic addressed at the --

 4        Q.   [Previous translation continues]... I'm not sure that you would

 5     have necessarily reported that in the meeting in Zagreb, but perhaps you

 6     would have.  But be that as it may, sir, let me direct your attention to

 7     the next paragraph.

 8             "In the end, I told him that they did not have the right to

 9     decide about our lives, our property, and our history, and we would not

10     become a national minority in order for a handful of Herzegovinians to

11     have their own state.  I left their offices in the UN building, both

12     excited and encouraged.  I finally realized that they were powerless.

13     Out of control, Zuzul said at one point, 'You got rid of Boban, but you

14     won't get rid of Tudjman.'"

15             Do you remember making that statement?

16        A.   Of course I did not make it.  A moment ago in my answer I told

17     you that Mr. Komsic was even lying about the venue of the meeting.  What

18     were these offices of ours in the UN building that he was coming out of?

19     We never had anything of the sort.  He was lying about the venue and

20     about everything else.  Whoever knows me would find it inconceivable --

21     well, after all, I'm 185 centimetres tall and I have as many kilogrammes

22     as I have, and Mr. Komsic is a rather short, tiny person.  Would I

23     threaten him?  Nowhere in any of the texts will you find me advocating

24     any sort of an option that he suddenly seems to be claiming that I

25     espoused.  These are just fabrications in the service of I do not know

Page 31232

 1     whom, but they are not the truth.  I have never said anything bad about

 2     Mr. Komsic and I was always a minority in behaving thus, and that's why

 3     all the more so am I surprised in seeing that he is putting these words

 4     into my mouth that do not tally with my personality, with my political

 5     views, and this event as described herein never occurred.

 6             The same Mr. Komsic, as we had occasion to see in the transcript

 7     from the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which I was unaware of until

 8     yesterday, makes it his business to invent derogatory terms for his

 9     compatriots, Croats, at the Assembly.  So that's the sort of man he was,

10     and I was not aware of that until yesterday.  Not even now that I know

11     this would I threaten him politically and even less so physically.

12     Your Honours, would I ever include in a threat somebody's family?  The

13     family, to my mind, is something sacred, it comes before everything else,

14     and I am really shocked that anybody should wish to impute something of

15     the sort to me.

16        Q.   Mr. Zuzul, I want to thank you for coming to The Hague and giving

17     your testimony and that concludes my examination.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

19             Mr. Karnavas, will we have re-direct tomorrow?  Maybe you don't

20     have re-direct.

21             MR. KARNAVAS:  This cross calls for no re-direct, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's good news.  Nobody had

23     expected that.

24             Witness, on behalf of my fellow Judges I would like to thank you

25     for having come and testified here.  It was lengthy but necessary because

Page 31233

 1     both the Defence and the Prosecution needed to put questions to you.  I

 2     wish you and the family members accompanying you a safe trip back home.

 3             Could Mr. Usher escort the witness back out of the courtroom.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]...

 5     and Your Honours.

 6                           [The witness withdrew]

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, you sent us the

 8     schedule for after court recess.  I think a witness is scheduled.  I

 9     don't believe he's been granted protective measures.

10             MR. KARNAVAS:  The next witness, no, Your Honour, and I should

11     note, I should note, that after that witness we're still trying to make

12     arrangements to bring the -- Mr. Perkovic back to follow-up.  We're

13     waiting to hear back.  As soon as we hear back, we hope within the next

14     day or so, certainly before Friday, we will communicate that news.  We

15     do -- Mr. Scott did approach me yesterday and I did give my assurances

16     that as soon as we know we will let everybody know so they could prepare

17     accordingly.  So in any event, we might have an updated calendar for all

18     of you.  That's it.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

20             As you well know, we shall re-convene after court recess.  We

21     have a few minutes left, but I take this opportunity to wish everyone a

22     good rest.  We have spent some three intense months, so I encourage you

23     all to take a good rest.  We shall re-convene on Monday, August the 25th,

24     at quarter past 2.00.  That's all.  I need to leave, because in less than

25     25 minutes I'll be back in this courtroom.

Page 31234

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 25th day of

 3                           August, 2008, at 2.15 p.m.